Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Angela Eagle Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 18th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. The Conservative party has tabled the new clause to ensure that proceedings of the lower-tier immigration tribunal will be heard in public. We have seen absurd outcomes in some of the cases heard in the upper tribunal in recent months, and we feel it is important to make sure that the system is transparent and that the public have full access to the tribunal records at both levels.

Examples of recent cases reported by the Telegraph include that of an Albanian criminal who avoided deportation after claiming that his son had an aversion to foreign chicken nuggets, and that of a Pakistani paedophile who was jailed for child sex offences but escaped removal from the UK as it would be unduly harsh on his own children. More recently, it was reported that a Pakistani man was convicted of sexually assaulting a woman but was allowed to stay in Britain after he claimed he was gay. An Albanian criminal also avoided deportation after a judge ruled that long-distance Zoom calls would be too harsh on his stepson.

The absurdity is further emphasised by the case heard recently in which a Ghanaian woman won the right to remain in Britain as the wife of an EU national, even though neither she nor her husband was present at the wedding held in Ghana. The lower-tier tribunal stated that the marriage was not legal, but that was overturned in the upper tribunal, which ruled that the proxy marriage was recognised in law and that registration at the same time as the marriage ceremony was not mandatory.

The continued abuse of our legal system, and the use of human rights as a defence, has gone on for too long. In another case, a tribunal ruled that a convicted Ghanaian pastor who was deported from Britain for using fake documents should be free to return to the country. Despite being jailed for using illegal documentation, the individual in question appealed under article 8 of the European convention on human rights, leading a judge to revoke the deportation order, claiming that it was an “unjustifiable interference” in his human rights.

The number of decisions may be used as an argument against the new clause, but these decisions are important. The first-tier tribunal’s asylum appeal backlog increased from 34,234 outstanding cases at the end of September 2024 to 41,987 by the end of December. That contrasts with 58,000 in the first quarter of this year. That is significantly more than the upper tribunal, but it underlines the importance of us knowing what has happened in these cases. Public trust is pivotal, as it—

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Dame Angela Eagle)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Dr Murrison—I suspect that you will be bookending our proceedings, if we make reasonable progress today. Does the shadow Minister acknowledge that increases in appeal backlogs are a result of the legacy process that his Government undertook, because people whose claims were not granted in that process have appealed and added to the backlog?

[Matt Vickers]

We know that significantly more people are arriving in the country. In fact, since the election, the number arriving illegally is up 29%, as is the number of people staying in hotels. The Government are actually removing fewer people than arrive by small boat now. The more people arrive, the more the backlogs will become an issue. Transparency in these tribunals is essential.

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[Matt Vickers]

We were doing lots of things. I am sure we will come on to some of the progress that was being made, including the Albania agreement, which has taken thousands and thousands of people back to Albania and reduced the number of people coming. That deterrent stopped people setting off in the first place. It was real progress.

The Bill—this is the reason why we are sitting here today—is the opportunity to shape what comes next, what impact that will have on the number of people coming across the channel and what impact that will have on public confidence in our courts system. That is what we are here for. It is why we have bothered sitting here for so many hours—to ensure that the legislation that goes forward tomorrow is fit for purpose.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Not that many!

[Matt Vickers]

Well, we will see how much longer we get to sit. Time will tell, but I will move on.

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[Margaret Mullane (Dagenham and Rainham) (Lab)]

It is an honour to serve on your Committee, Dr Murrison. I do not see how turning border security into public discourse on a case-by-case basis is beneficial to the process, either for those administering or presiding over the hearings, or for those subject to the tribunal process. I accept that there is an argument for greater transparency, but given the circumstances of people’s arrival at our borders—they are fleeing trauma, in a vulnerable state—I feel it is inappropriate to parade the lives of asylum seekers in the public domain.

I have every faith that the Bill will create a robust system that is effective and accountable. The new clause would add nothing to its overall strength. The hon. Member for Stockton West says that trust has been lost in the asylum system. I think it will take this Bill and this Government to bring that trust back.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I have to compliment the hon. Member for Stockton West on his tie, since he raised it, and the hon. Member for Weald of Kent seems to have good taste in the colour of her jackets. I promise that that is the last fashion statement that I will make in our proceedings today.

On new clause 24, we agree that accountability and transparency are absolutely vital for building trust and credibility in the immigration system. Under rule 27 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014—note the date—the presumption already is that hearings at the first-tier tribunal must be public unless the first-tier tribunal gives a direction that it or part of it is to be held in private. Indeed, the majority of hearings at the first-tier tribunal are public. However, there are sometimes appropriate reasons for a hearing not to be public. For example, hearings may be held in private to preserve confidentiality in respect of sensitive medical details or to protect the privacy of a victim of a serious crime—for example, of a sexual nature. It may also be done to protect a party or witness from duress.

That is precisely why the Tribunal Procedure Committee has broad discretion to determine what practice and procedure in the first-tier tribunal will best support the overall interests of justice, and why the judiciary has a range of case management powers under the tribunal procedure rules to decide how individual cases should proceed. Those tribunal powers were published and written when the party of the hon. Member for Stockton West was in government, in 2014. It is expected that judges will have a wide discretion in dealing with these sensitive issues.

On making rulings of the first-tier tribunal available to the public, currently judgments of the immigration and asylum chamber of the first-tier tribunal are not routinely published. The decision about whether to publish a judgment is a judicial one. However, members of the public and the media can apply to the tribunal for a copy of the judgment in a specific case. I know that the Lord Chancellor will continue discussions with the judiciary about how we can bolster accountability and transparency to build public confidence, but I cannot help feeling that perhaps certain people who might work for a certain newspaper are getting to the end of their search engines for absurd cases that they can publish, and want a whole new database to search. If they want to bring these issues out into the open at the first-tier tribunal, perhaps they should send some reporters to listen to the case or apply on an individual basis for the judgment to be published. Perhaps that might assuage their ongoing interest in these issues.

[Matt Vickers]

I thank the Minister for her opinion, but we stand by this new clause. We want greater transparency, and we think this is an opportunity to do just that and allow the public to see what is and is not going on, so we will press it to a Division.

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[Matt Vickers]

That is a safe assessment of my scientific qualifications.

We are not saying that this is the only thing that agencies and experts on the frontline, who deal with these cases day in and day out, will be able to use; it is something that they can use. If we have ended up with adults in classrooms alongside children, that is wrong. We need to give the agencies every tool in the armoury to make the situation work. This is one thing that they can use—with their knowledge and with every other assessment they would make—and it is the right thing to do.

We have talked about kicking this down the road. I think we have a commitment that the Government will do something on this issue some day, or some time. But here is an opportunity to keep the power in the legislation for agencies to use here and now, rather than in six months or a year. I am sure that the Minister will give me a timeframe on whether the Government will come back with such a power.

The SNP’s new clause 43 is almost the polar opposite of our new clause. It states:

“A person who claims to be a child must not be treated as an adult by the Home Office for the purpose of immigration control.”

We know that there are adults coming to this country who claim to be children. Believing them without question would make it harder to control our borders and create significant safeguarding concerns. Why does the SNP think it should be made harder for the Government to determine the true age of those entering this country illegally? How does this best serve the interests of the British people? Given the SNP’s blind adoration for the European Union, we must question why they are happy for the United Kingdom, of which Scotland is a key part, to be the only European nation that does not use medical tests to determine the age of those coming to the country.

Why does this matter? The issue has not decreased in significance. The number of asylum age disputes remains high, particularly in the latest available figures. Of those about whom a dispute was raised and resolved, more than half were found to be over the age of 18. The fact that a record number of asylum seekers pretend to be children should be the wake-up call that we need to ensure that we have the checks in place to verify age and stop those who seek to deceive from entering the UK. As the available figures show, this tactic is becoming commonplace, and action must be taken to stop this abhorrent abuse.

If the figures were not evidence of the need to support new clause 26, perhaps the facts of the cases will be. A 22-year-old Afghan who had murdered two people in Serbia claimed asylum in the UK by pretending to be a 14-year-old orphan, when in fact he was 18. There is the utterly horrific case of the Parsons Green terrorist, Ahmed Hassan, who posed as a 16-year-old before setting off a bomb on a tube train in west London, injuring 23 people. Although the Iraqi’s real age remains unknown, the judge who jailed him for 34 years in 2018 said he was satisfied that the bomber was between 18 and 21. The clock is ticking. The crisis is not slowing; it is surging.

In quarter 2 of 2024 alone, 2,088 age disputes landed on the desk of the Home Office. That is 2,088 claims where someone said, “Trust me, I’m a child.” By the end, 757 were unmasked as adults, and the deception rate was a staggering 52%. That is not a blip, but a blazing red flag. That is more than 750 grown men, and potentially dozens more uncaught, slipping through a system that Labour has crippled by repealing the scientific age checks in the Illegal Migration Act, leaving us guessing in the dark while the numbers climb.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I will deal with some of the broader points in my response, but we do age assessments. We do not simply accept—just as his Government did not—asylum seekers’ claims about their age as if they were the truth. I would not like the shadow Minister to give the Committee the impression that that is happening—that we are accepting claimed ages without any kind of check. I will go into much more detail in my response to the debate about precisely what we do, but he must not give the impression that we are not checking; we are.

[Matt Vickers]

I hope the Minister agrees that we should be doing more, rather than less. We need to give agencies all the opportunities and powers to do so, with or without the consent of people who aim to deceive. That is the right thing to do.

If we rewind to 2022, 490 disputes in quarter 1 ballooned to 1,782 by quarter 4. Now we are at 2,088 and counting. This is not a fading headache; it is an escalating emergency. It is a conveyor belt of fraud clogging our borders and spilling into our schools. Failure to conduct these vital checks would mean that we are not just blind, but complicit in handing traffickers a playbook that says, “Send adults, call them kids and watch us flounder.” The public sees it and parents feel it, and every day we delay, the risk festers. We need science, not sentiment, and we need it now.

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[Katie Lam]

It was a privilege to hear about Thomas Roberts’s life. The hon. Member for Bournemouth East did himself great credit in telling us about him so movingly. Thomas’s mother, Dolores, whose pain is impossible for us to imagine, has also done his memory great credit by finding a way in her grief to talk about her son to her Member of Parliament and to the Minister.

Securing the border is a genuinely difficult job, and the Opposition are genuine in our desire to support the Government in doing that. We really believe that the new clause would help the Government to expand their ability to do that job. We deeply hope that they will consider it. I also thank the hon. Member for Clwyd East for her generous words.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I start by endorsing what my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East said about Dolores, Thomas Roberts’s mum, whom I met last night. She has gone through a searingly awful life experience. It is difficult even to think about that, let alone to offer any comfort. Unfortunately, I do not think that her experience would have changed much had scientific age assessment been in place, although the person in question had been assessed by his local authority as a child and was therefore in a separate environment from that which he would have been in had he not been assessed.

I am determined to see whether we can connect up our information about people coming from Europe, following Brexit and the disintegration of our access to Eurodac and various other pieces of information collected in Europe on asylum seekers and those arriving illegally—not all of them are asylum seekers. Reconnecting, if possible, to those databases would give us more comfort than we have at the moment. However, I emphasise that when people come to this country, we do check them against all our biometric records and the terrorism lists and watch lists that we have. It may be possible for us to do more in future.

We have had a debate about new clause 26 from the Opposition and new clause 43 from the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire on behalf of the Scottish National party. That has again demonstrated the wide range of opinion that there is at both ends of the argument whenever we consider such issues. I will deal with both arguments in my response, and I hope to find a middle way.

First, repealing section 58 of the Illegal Migration Act, which the Bill seeks to do, does not stop our capacity to do age assessments. Listening to some of the contributions from members of the official Opposition, one would have thought that repealing section 58 will take off the table—completely and utterly—all age assessment. That is simply not true. The age assessments in section 58 were about the duty to remove somebody to Rwanda; they were not connected to anything else. As I understand it, the issue with that legislation was that the then Government’s intention was not to remove children to Rwanda, so it became more important to have a way of assessing whether somebody was a child. The Safety of Rwanda Act and the IMA—the previous Government’s approach to this issue—would have created even bigger incentives for people to claim that that they were children, because they would have avoided being sent to Rwanda, not that anyone ever actually ended up there. The previous Government’s approach of deportation permanently to Rwanda actually created even more incentives for people to lie about their age.

The fact is that there are people who are genuine asylum seekers who are children, people who are not genuine asylum seekers who are adults who claim to be children, and children who sometimes claim that they are adults. When that happens, one has to look at modern slavery issues and coercive control. There are safeguarding issues on both sides of the age assessment argument. Children pretend to be adults for reasons that we can imagine, but we will not go into those, because they are not very pleasant. There are also incentives created by the way in which the Children Act 1989 deals with unaccompanied asylum-seeking children. As a Kent MP, the hon. Member for Weald of Kent knows exactly what happens with the Kent intake unit and the pressure that her own local authority has been put under. However, she also knows about the Government support that her local authority has been given to disperse unaccompanied asylum-seeking children around the rest of the country so that some of the burden can be shared.

We are dealing with people who arrive without papers. Some of them wish to lie about their age, and some have been told to lie because the people-smuggling gangs perceive it as a way for people to access more resources than they could if they were seen as adults. As the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire pointed out, the system can get it wrong on both sides. People who are children have been judged to be adults and put in inappropriate places, and people who are adults have been judged to be children and put in appropriate places. There is no guaranteed scientific way of making a judgment. We can make judgments about people who are much older, but we are dealing with that uncertain four to five-year range on either side, which is the difference between 18 and 24 or 17 and 23; you will know about that, Dr Murrison, from your work as a medical doctor.

On new clause 26, I want to reassure Opposition Members that there is already provision in law for the use of age assessment, and our repealing of section 58 of the Illegal Migration Act does not remove that provision. That is because the Immigration (Age Assessments) Regulations 2024, which followed scientific advice from the Age Estimation Science Advisory Committee in the Home Office, specify for the purposes of section 52 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 the scientific methods currently recommended for age assessment. We have retained those bits of legislation; neither the 2024 regulations nor section 52 of the Nationality and Borders Act have been repealed by the Bill, so the capacity to use scientific age assessments remains on the statute book.

The hon. Member for Stockton West did not seem to know which age assessment methods we were talking about. The 2024 regulations specify the power to use X-rays and MRIs, and that it is possible to take a negative view of the credibility of a person who refuses to consent, where there are no reasonable grounds for refusing that consent.

With those measures on the statute book, the Government continue to explore methods to improve the robustness of age assessment processes by increasing the reliability of the scientific methods being used. At the moment, we do not have enough certainty about the gap that exists in the current assessments, which are still being assessed. The hon. Member for Stockton West and the Conservative party put these things on to the statute book but then did not operationalise them. At the moment, we are doing as much work as we can to see how reliable they are, with a view to operationalising them. But as I wrote in a response to shadow Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Croydon South, when he wrote to me about this issue, we are in the middle of that process. I hope that we will soon be in a situation to make announcements one way or the other, and those announcements will be made in the usual way.

[Matt Vickers]

New clause 26 does not specify the method to be used; it commits the Government to coming back within six months with a statutory instrument. How long does the Minister think it will be before the Government are in a position to do that? Is it six months’ worth of people coming here without our having the ability to assess them without their consent using these methods? Is it a year? Is it 18 months? How long does she think it will be before we are in a position to make these decisions?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

We are making a scientific assessment of how accurate and effective the methods are that could be used to make age assessments, and I hope to have some results from that work soon. What I do not want is to have a clause in primary legislation telling me that I have to do that by a set time.

I am trying to reassure the hon. Gentleman that despite the repeal of section 58 of the Illegal Migration Act, which this Bill brings about, the capacity to do age assessments and apply them scientifically is still on the statute book. We are looking closely into how we can operationalise these methods if we feel they will give us a more trustworthy result, but we will not do that if we do not. We are in the middle of getting to the stage where we can make that judgment.

I will also address new clause 43, which says that we should not use age assessments at all, other than in exceptional circumstances. Given what the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire said when he moved it, I think it accepts that we should continue with Merton assessments, which are the other way of dealing with age assessments currently. Those usually involve two social workers and various other experts interviewing the person concerned to try to get a handle on their real age.

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[Matt Vickers]

I welcome the fact that the Government will come back with scientific age assessments that also do not require consent. But if six months is too long, at what point would the Minister expect to be concerned? If we have not been applying these assessments and we have ended up with the wrong people in the wrong classrooms for years, at what point should we be concerned? If six months is too soon, is it 18 months?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The hon. Gentleman is being a bit mischievous. We are in the middle of an assessment of whether scientific age assessments work and at what level of capacity and detail we can trust them. I expect reports fairly soon, and once I have them I can make a decision on how we go ahead with them. I will let Parliament know in the usual way when that has happened, but it is not useful or effective to have the hon. Gentleman’s new clause setting a deadline for that in the Bill. I hope he will accept that in the helpful way in which I intend it. We are not in disagreement on principles, but if we are going to use scientific age assessment, we need to ensure that it is as effective and useful as possible, so that it can be taken seriously and play an effective part in the battle that all of us want to be involved in: ensuring that children do not end up in adult settings and adults do not end up in children’s settings.

[Matt Vickers]

People who arrive here deceptively claiming to be children cannot be allowed to succeed. We should make use of the best scientific age assessment methods available to us, with or without consent. Those will not be used in isolation, but alongside all the other possible assessment methods available to us. We can debate the science all day. The new clause would require the Secretary of State to define those methods within six months through a statutory instrument, using expert advice to do so. One deceptive adult migrant in a classroom or care setting alongside children or vulnerable youngsters is one too many. Giving our agencies the ability to use the best scientific methods available to them to assess age without consent can further their ability to protect children. I would therefore like to press new clause 26 to a Division.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Angela Eagle Excerpts

Tuesday 18th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

Liberal Democrat new clause 27 seeks to repeal provisions in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 passed by the previous Conservative Government. By attempting to repeal section 29 of the Act, the Liberal Democrats are seeking to prevent the Government from removing people, including criminals, to a safe third country.

Rewind back to 2022 when 45,000 people crammed into small boats, flimsy rafts teetering on the channel’s unforgiving waves—a swarm, spurred by the hope of slipping through our borders, hammering coastal towns and stretching security to its limits.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Dame Angela Eagle)]

Did the hon. Gentleman really mean “swarm” in that context? That is quite emotive language.

[Matt Vickers]

Well, hot air is required in this room this afternoon, and I intend to provide it.

We fought back with the Nationality and Borders Act third-country removals, which helped the Government to deter crossings by 36% in 2023 from 45,000 to under 29,000—not by chance, but by design, sending a message to traffickers and migrants alike that Britain is no soft touch or guaranteed prize. Now, the Liberal Democrats barge in with new clause 27, desperate to repeal section 29 to shred that deterrent and plunge us back into chaos, flinging the channel wide open not just to the weary but to every chancer or criminal. That is not tweaking policy; it is torching a firewall, inviting all those to Dover’s cliffs and Deal’s shores and erasing every inch of progress that we have clawed from the crisis. The Lib Dems owe us hard answers. How many boats—50,000 or 60,000?

The Albania deal delivered a masterstroke of border control. That pragmatic triumph has turned a torrent of illegal crossings into a trickle through sheer diplomatic grit. Back in 2022, Albanians dominated the small boats surge. A 12,000-strong, relentless wave of young men were lured by traffickers with promises of easy UK entry for £3,000, clogging Dover’s processing centres and fuelling tabloid headlines of chaos. Then came our 2023 pact with Tirana—a no-nonsense agreement that flipped the script with fast-track returns, joint police operations and a clear signal: Albania is safe and you are going back.

By 2024, the results were staggering. Weekly flights were whisking deportees home, with each jet a nail in the coffin of the smuggling networks that once thrived on our porous borders. That was not luck or loud threats but cold, hard execution, bolstered by UK-funded cameras on the Albania-Kosovo frontier and Albanian officers embedded in Dover.

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[Matt Vickers]

His writing seems to be going quite well at the moment. I do not know that I have the cash for him.

What I have described is not asylum. We cannot pretend that the EU’s 27 nations and its vast tapestry of safe, stable and prosperous lands—we can take our pick of France, Italy, Spain, Sweden and so on, each a bastion of peace and plenty—somehow warrant the same desperate lifeline that we reserve for those fleeing real and genuine chaos. This is the same organisation that the Liberal Democrats supposedly want to build closer ties with. They also want the UK to grant asylum to people who come to this country having already been in a country where they have claimed and been granted asylum. Why are the Liberal Democrats encouraging people to cross the channel when they already have asylum or can claim asylum in a safe third country?

Just like the Labour Government, the Liberal Democrats want to remove sections of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 that allow local and public authorities to conduct an age assessment on an age-disputed person. As we discussed before when the SNP did not wish those who claim to be a child to be treated as an adult, every European country apart from ours uses scientific age assessment techniques such as an X-ray of the wrist. As we have said, there are also other methods. More than 50% of those claiming to be children were found to be adults after an age assessment in the quarter before the election. Without a scientific age assessment method, it is very hard to determine age. Given the horror stories in this area, why do Liberal Democrats want to put the people of this country at risk, and blindly allow unverified people into the UK?

Let us now talk about a nightmare unfolding right under our noses: one that the Liberal Democrats seem hellbent on making worse. In the first quarter of 2021 alone, 560 adults—grown men with stubble, receding hairlines and years behind them—had the gall to pose as kids, slipping through the cracks until scientific age checks, such as wrist X-rays and dental scans that every sensible European nation uses, caught them red handed and stopped them cold.

The Lib Dems’ new clause 27 would axe those checks and rip out the one tool keeping us from dumping people who are 25 years old or even older into classrooms alongside children. That is not some abstract risk. It has happened and it is real; it means men in their 20s sitting at desks meant for teens, all because we have let sentiment trump science. That would not protect children, but endanger them—a reckless gamble that would turn schools into hunting grounds and parents into nervous wrecks, all so the Lib Dems can pat themselves on the back for being compassionate. If they get their way, every classroom will have a question mark. How many 25-year-olds will slip through before the damage is done?

What do the Liberal Democrats believe should happen if the authorities believe a migrant who is claiming to be under 18 is actually an adult? Do they believe that such people should be placed in schools with schoolchildren? Again, it seems as though the Liberal Democrats want to strip the Government of any power to control who comes to the country. That would see net migration drastically increase.

The issue cuts deeper than policy, however; it is about what people expect, and the Liberal Democrats’ new clause pulls hard against that grain. Voters have signalled what they want loud and clear, with 68%—nearly seven in 10—backing tougher border controls in surveys: a call echoing from Dover to Folkestone, where residents live with the reality of arrivals day by day. That is not a passing opinion; it is a steady demand—rooted in years of debate, from the 2016 Brexit vote to the 2019 landslide—for a system that prioritises their say.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I do not know what the hon. Gentleman had for lunch, but perhaps we should find out and get some of it ourselves. We can then all compete with the poet laureate and the virtuoso performance that we have just heard.

I am going to talk about the new clause, however, which is in respect of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. The hon. Member for Mid Dunbartonshire is proposing that numerous sections of the 2022 Act be repealed under the Bill.

I should start by making it clear that we are determined to restore order to the asylum system, so that it operates swiftly, firmly and fairly, and ensures that the rules are properly enforced. That is a financial necessity to deal with the backlogs that we have inherited—the permit backlog in particular, but also others, especially in the appeals space—so that the costs do not continue to mount up at the expense of the taxpayer. Getting the system moving again is an important part of what we have been doing.

Following the election, the Home Secretary acted rapidly to change the law to remove the retrospective application of the Illegal Migration Act 2023, which allowed decision makers to decide asylum claims from individuals who arrived in the UK from 7 March 2023. Previously, there was a ban on that, because of the duty to remove, which was never going to be sensibly put into effect.

I am not going to speak to every section of the Nationality and Borders Act, but the hon. Member for Mid Dunbartonshire wants us to repeal very large chunks of the Act under the new clause. I will mention only a few, and I hope that she will forgive me for not talking about every section.

The introduction of the national age assessment board, for example, in March 2023, relies on a piece of the Nationality and Borders Act that the hon. Lady wishes to repeal. In the interim, since that Act has come into being, we have introduced the national age assessment board and made it available across the country. It continues to offer significant improvement to our processes for assessing age, including creating greater consistency in age assessment practices, which can be very inconsistent in the practical delivery of Merton-compliant assessments in different local authorities—some are more experienced and some better at it than others. The national age assessment board creates a standard and a bar below which it is hard to go. It sets important standards in age assessment, improves quality and ensures that ages are recorded correctly for immigration purposes.

The Nationality and Borders Act also placed protections and support under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings on a legislative footing for the first time in the UK. That includes the right to a recovery period in the national referral mechanism, during which potential victims of modern slavery and trafficking are eligible for support and are protected from removal from the UK. The Act provides the means to disqualify individuals—I suspect that this may be the bit that the hon. Member for Mid Dunbartonshire objects to—from protections or support on the grounds of public order or bad faith. However, that is in line with article 13 of the convention; that part of the Nationality and Borders Act put the convention into UK law. I am surprised she is suggesting that we should remove it.

The Act also sets out the circumstances in which confirmed victims of slavery and trafficking may be granted temporary permission to stay in the UK. The Government will be launching a public consultation, before summer recess, on how we can improve the process of identifying victims of modern slavery. We will provide details on that consultation in due course.

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[The Chair]

Before I call the Minister, I will just point out that Erskine May urges us not to be critical of judges in UK superior courts. I am sure hon. and right hon. Members will wish to be circumspect in their remarks.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I am not sure how much of the debate we could have heard, Dr Murrison, had you made that observation at the beginning of it.

I do not think this Government wish to join Belarus and Russia among those who are not signed up to the European Court of Human Rights. The Government are fully committed to the protection of human rights. When we talk about human rights, that means all people who are human: everybody, applied universally.

As the Prime Minister has made clear, the United Kingdom is unequivocally committed to the European convention on human rights. The Human Rights Act is an important part of our constitutional arrangements and fundamental to human rights protections in the UK. To start taking those away on a bit-by-bit basis, particularly beginning with people who are very unpopular and have done difficult or bad things, could be the start of a very slippery slope if we are not careful. That is why I am proud that our Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill has printed on its front cover that it is compatible with convention rights. This Government will always do things that are compatible with convention rights.

The paradox of some of what has been said in the debate we have just had is that it politicises decisions. That is a very different approach to judicial issues from the one we have seen for very many years, where, in effect, a lot of the powers on particular issues that used to sit with the Home Secretary have been taken by judges who are publicly accountable for their decisions. I do not think that this Government would want to see that reversed. The paradox of new clause 33 is that all those who potentially had a human rights claim, whatever their circumstances, could go straight to the Strasbourg court, which would clog up that court. As the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire pointed out, that is not taking back control, it is abrogating it, and would flood the Strasbourg court with decisions that could have sensibly been taken here.

That is not to say that any one of us would not be frustrated by particular individual decisions, but I caution against using decisions that have been only partially covered or talked about on the front pages of The Daily Telegraph, which often takes decisions in cases out of context. We have talked a lot about chicken nuggets, and I would just put on the record that that case is being appealed, and judicial activities on that case have not yet finished.

With that commitment to human rights and European convention rights, I hope that Opposition Members will think about some of the potential consequences of what they are suggesting in chopping up human rights and wanting to put us in the same company as Belarus and Russia; about the way convention rights were developed; and about the benefits that adhering to human rights frameworks has given us as a democracy over the years.

[Matt Vickers]

I am sure that the Minister must disagree with some of the examples that we have seen, and agree that they undermine public trust in the judiciary, legal institutions and the frameworks we have. What is the solution? Must we grin and bear the appalling outcomes of those cases or is there a solution? How does she propose to stop such things happening?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I would respectfully say that the hon. Gentleman’s party had many, many years to think of a solution, and most of the cases that Opposition Members have raised today had their genesis in the years that they were in power. Close to the very end, as they became more and more frustrated, they started coming up with more and more outlandish approaches.

Obviously, one wants the entire judicial process to be used, as speedily as possible, and if the Home Office wishes to appeal a particular case, it will do so. We keep a constant eye on the issues and we think about reforms that we could make. Obviously the hon. Gentleman will be the first to hear if we decide to make changes, but we do not wish to abrogate from the Human Rights Act, the ECHR and the human rights framework. That is where we and other Opposition parties differ from him and his party. That is why I do not accept new clause 33 and I hope that the Committee will vote against it if it is pressed to a vote.

[Katie Lam]

I hope it was clear in my remarks, but for the avoidance of doubt or ambiguity I want to say that the Opposition do not criticise our judges. Indeed, as my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West said, they are doing the best they can with the rules and precedents under which they operate. That is why the new clause seeks to change those rules—

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[Matt Vickers]

Currently a prison sentence of one year is required before a foreign national who is a convicted criminal can be deported. Even then, removal can be frustrated by asylum and human rights claims. New clause 34 would prevent a foreign national who is convicted of any offence from remaining in the UK, as well as anyone who has been charged with or convicted of an immigration offence under section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971, and would disapply the Human Rights Act from those cases. We believe that the protection of British citizens is paramount and should be the overriding priority for Government. If a foreign national has been convicted of any offence, they should lose their right to remain in the UK.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

On that point we agree, so why was his Government so tardy at actually deporting foreign national offenders when they were in office?

[Matt Vickers]

We have just had a lengthy discussion about the Human Rights Act and the impact it has on deportations. However, if she agrees so wholeheartedly on the principle, I am sure she might consider backing our amendment.

There are a number of countries where the UK has a significant number of foreign national offenders currently serving in British prisons. However, we deport only a small number of those foreign national offenders each quarter. Our new clause 42 would require the Secretary of State to use a visa penalty provision if a country is not co-operating in the removal of any of its nationals or citizens from the UK, or in relation to the verification of their identity or status. We have done this by amending the Nationality and Borders Act, so that the ability to impose visa sanctions is not discretionary but mandatory. We know that there are countries that are hard to secure returns to. We believe strongly that that should not be without consequences for those countries.

New clause 34 shifts the lens to where it belongs—on the victims left in the wake of foreign offenders, not the perpetrators gaming the system. In 2024, theft offences alone averaged just 8.1 months—a shopkeeper’s livelihood dented, a pensioner’s purse snatched, or a family’s peace of mind and sense of security destroyed. Public order crimes averaged just 9.6 months, with more huge consequences for the wellbeing of victims who are left with a fear of entering public spaces or unable to go about their ordinary lives. Yet the one year deportation bar enables those culprits to linger, post-sentence, free to reoffend while victims wait for justice that never comes.

This clause says, “Enough.” Any conviction, for shoplifting or worse, triggers removal—no Human Rights Act excuses—because every day a foreign offender is allowed to stay is another day a British victim’s trust in the system erodes. Why are the Government okay with that shadow hanging over our streets? New clause 42 would force nations to play ball uphill. We see too many countries dither and delay in refusing to take back offenders. Mandatory visa sanctions flip that script. No co-operation, no UK visas for their elite. Watch fast how passports materialise when there are real consequences. Why is Labour soft-pedalling when we could wield this stick, clear the backlog and reduce pressure on prison places?

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[Katie Lam]

In that case, I am happy to reassure him that I wrote every word.

The short answer to the question about Albania is yes. We think that would be completely appropriate. Why would Albania refuse to accept one of its own citizens that should, by our rules and our laws, be returned to that country? If it refuses to do so, we would absolutely consider that to an appropriate trigger for that response.

To continue what I was saying, new clause 40 amends section 70 of the Nationality and Borders Act, and it expands the Act to cover both nationals as well as citizens. We consider that it should be a basic and fundamental principle that we should be able to remove from this country those who break our rules. That is harder than it might sound, particularly when individuals are determined to lose their documents and obfuscate their identity and origin in every way they can. What we propose here will align other countries’ incentives with our own. It will create substantial pressure on other nations to co-operate with us to secure our border, and we strongly hope that the Government will consider adding it to the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

New clauses 34 and 42 reprise some of our debate on the last group of new clauses, but they also introduce the idea of the visa penalty that, as the hon. Member for Weald of Kent has just explained, is encompassed in new clause 42. New clause 34 seeks to extend automatic deportation to any foreign national convicted of an offence in the UK, or charged with an immigration offence, without consideration of their human rights. We dealt with some of that in the last debate. It would remove protections for under-18s and victims of human trafficking, and it seeks to extend the automatic deportation provisions to certain Commonwealth and Irish citizens who are currently afforded exemption from deportation.

I do not believe these new clauses would be workable. They are unrealistic and would undermine our international obligations. We already have the power to deport any foreign national on the grounds that doing so would be conducive to the public good, regardless of whether they have had to serve the 12-month prison sentence that the UK Borders Act 2007 requires. If they are subject to a 12-month prison sentence, it is a duty to deport them.

The hon. Member for Weald of Kent was a special adviser in the Home Office, so she knows about these things, and the hon. Member for Stockton West is a spokesperson in the shadow Home Office team. The Conservatives talk a lot about deportation, but they did not do a lot about it when they had the power to do so.

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[Katie Lam]

New clause 36 would give access to asylum accommodation centres to our immigration enforcement officers. Members of the public may be surprised to learn that this power does not already exist. It seems to me common sense that when a person has come here illegally and is being housed by the state, immigration enforcement—an arm of that state—should be able to enter that accommodation to carry out their work.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West rightly set out, these accommodation centres exist because the volume of those coming here illegally is such that it is not possible to hold everyone in immigration detention. There are therefore substantial numbers of people on immigration bail, and a reasonable number of those are held in accommodation centres. Immigration decisions are made elsewhere, but this is the criterion set out in current legislation. In our view, this is a quirk of the current system, and not how one would design it if starting from a blank page. These sorts of accommodation centres did not exist when our rules were written, and we think that this corrects that quirk.

I echo the question asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West: does the Minister think that this would be of operational benefit to immigration enforcement officers? If so, will she include it, and if not, why not?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

New clause 36 seeks to provide a right of access upon request for Home Office teams working within immigration enforcement to asylum accommodation centres in order to visit those centres and residents at any time.

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[Matt Vickers]

I think the public will be stunned to hear that immigration enforcement officers have challenges in accessing asylum accommodation centres, as outlined by Tony Smith, the former director general of UK Border Force. We will therefore seek to press the new clause to a vote.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The new clause talks about accommodation centres, which do not exist. What does the hon. Gentleman mean by accommodation centres?

[Martin Vickers]

We have had provision for accommodation centres. We have had accommodation centres.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

But they do not exist.

[Martin Vickers]

I know there are 8,500 more in hotels now, but this was a measure that was put in place to reduce that hotel dependency, to stop us increasing the number of people in those hotels by 29%.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I want to put something on the record before we vote. There is a specific meaning in law for the phrase “accommodation centres” under the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Since that law was passed, no Government have actually stood up accommodation centres under that specific meaning. Therefore, the shadow Minister in his new clause 36 is asking for powers to enter something that does not exist.

[Pete Wishart]

While the Minister is on her feet, could she perhaps ask the Opposition spokesperson whether he actually means hotels?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that. I was trying to help the shadow Minister, because I thought he might be trying to talk about accommodation generally. If that is the case, we already have the powers we need to enter when and where we wish. This power is much broader, and we would not like to see it put into effect, which is why I hope the Committee will vote against the new clause.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

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[Katie Lam]

We have spoken many times today, and over the course of this Bill Committee’s proceedings, about the fundamental principles of fairness upon which we believe that our immigration system should be built. We have also spoken extensively about the generosity of the British state, and how much it costs to support those who, according to our rules, cannot support themselves. But that generosity, while admirable in what it says about our approach to our fellow man, costs the British taxpayer dearly. As my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West set out, it costs many billions of pounds a year. It also causes additional pressure on infrastructure and public services, which is not covered by what we suggest here.

We consider that new clause 37, which would introduce the asylum support repayment scheme, is a totally fair way of proposing that people who come to this country are responsible for contributing for the services that they receive. That includes the accommodation that they live in. We do not see any reason why that should be viewed as a negative change, and we really hope that the Government include it in their Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

New clause 37 would give the Secretary of State regulation-making powers to set out arrangements for asylum seekers to receive loans towards their maintenance and accommodation—but, as we have discussed in this Committee during scrutiny of the Bill, the costs of accommodating and supporting asylum seekers has grown significantly. The reason for that increase is that the Government inherited an asylum system under exceptional strain, with tens of thousands of cases previously at a complete standstill—the perma-backlog, which we have referred to on many occasions during our proceedings in the past few weeks—claims not being processed, and a record number of people having arrived on small boats in the first half of the year.

While immediate action was taken to restart asylum processing, we cannot resolve the situation overnight. It nevertheless remains our commitment to reduce the cost of asylum accommodation, including by ending the use of asylum hotels. The size of the existing backlog, particularly in appeals, means that we are forced to use hotels in the meantime. That is not a permanent solution, but it is a necessary and temporary step to ensure that the system does not buckle under exceptional strain.

Increasing the speed at which asylum claims can be processed and dealt with is the best way of dealing with this issue of cost, in my view. I think on all sides we want to see the costs come down. We want to see a properly functioning immigration system that delivers fair, timely decisions and manages public funds. Hotel costs have actually dropped from over £9 million a day to under £6 million a day. Overall the Department is planning to deliver £200 million of additional in-year savings in 2024-25, and £700 million of savings against 2024-25 levels during the following financial year, on asylum costs. These measures, taken together, would represent a saving of over £4 billion across 2024-25 and 2025-26 when compared with the previous trajectory of spending.

The Home Office has a legal obligation, as set out in the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, to support asylum seekers—including any dependants—who would otherwise be destitute: “destitute” is the word that people need to remember there. Asylum seekers can apply for accommodation, subsistence, or both accommodation and subsistence support when they are destitute. Once official refugee status has been given, the individual is able to work in the UK.

Although asylum seekers generally do not have the right to work in the UK while they are waiting on a decision about their asylum claim, there are some instances in which they can apply for permission to work. They are eligible to do so if they have waited over 12 months for an initial decision on their asylum claim, or for a response to a further submission for asylum, and they are not considered responsible for the delay in decision making.

In that context, the new clause proposed by the hon. Member for Stockton West is an interesting one. I would welcome clarification on how such a loan scheme would operate alongside or instead of the current system, and the details of any assessment of the practical or economic benefit of such a scheme. Further scoping would be necessary in order to establish whether it is a feasible option. As such, its inclusion in this Bill is premature.

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[Katie Lam]

I welcome the Minister’s response. Might she please commit today to a date by which the Home Office at least aims for all migrant hotels to be closed, as per her party’s manifesto commitments? I also welcome what she had to say about bringing down costs. She is right to say that the best way to minimise the Home Office’s bill for asylum accommodation is to process applications as quickly as possible. Where asylum applications are approved, though, most of those costs transfer to the welfare system, so I would be interested to hear her response on who in Government is currently responsible for tracking and understanding that cost.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

We inherited a system that was very siloed, where work was not really cross-departmental at all. One example that occurs to me is that the system dealing with all the legacy applications, which the previous Government embarked on dealing with at first-tier tribunal in 2023 and then boasted about having achieved. However, that was only the initial decision in the system; if it was granted, I suppose people felt lucky, but those who were not granted appealed the decision. While the Home Office, under the previous Government, congratulated itself publicly on dealing with that legacy system, many people were actually still in the system.

One important thing we have done since coming into government has been to begin working cross-departmentally to develop metrics on how to deal with an end-to-end system. We are not there yet, and we understand that costs can sometimes be transferred to other areas; that is why I am working closely with the Local Government Association, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and the MOJ to try to get the system working more effectively end to end.

I cannot give the hon. Member for Weald of Kent a date on when hotels will close, but I can say that we are doing our best. Given the huge cost and the fact that the contracts for providing them that we inherited from the Conservative party are so expensive, it will certainly be in the interests of saving a lot of money to close them as soon as we can, and we certainly aim to do so.

[Katie Lam]

Again, rightly and reasonably, the Minister talks about lowering costs, but might she say a few words about fairness and the principle that this new clause seeks to speak to: should those who have lived in that accommodation, who have benefited from that provision by the state, ultimately pay it back, if they can afford to?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The hon. Lady will have noticed that I have not dismissed the idea completely, but I do not think the idea is anywhere near a position where one could talk about how it might be practicable, and certainly it is not at a stage where one could consider putting it into primary legislation.

[Matt Vickers]

State support is not a right and, if a person is able later to contribute by paying some of it back, we believe it is right for them to do so. We wish to press the new clause to a Division.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

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[Katie Lam]

Throughout our long history, Britain has been an unusually compassionate place. From time to time, people have come to this country to seek sanctuary from tyranny and authoritarianism elsewhere in the world. My county of Kent became home to many of the Huguenots who fled religious persecution in France in the 16th century. Indeed, Canterbury cathedral still hosts a French-language service every Sunday, in honour of those who came to this country in search of tolerance and religious freedom.

My grandmother came to Britain in 1937 at the age of 13, as a refugee from Germany. Her grandfather was a state senator and a fierce critic of the Nazis. When Hitler came to power, the whole family were stripped of their citizenship and several were arrested. After years imprisoned and various daring prison escapes, the family first made it over the border to Czechoslovakia, where they set up a resistance radio station broadcasting back into Germany. One night, that was raided by the SS and one of the operators was shot dead. They then fled to England and to freedom.

We should be proud of our history. There are so many Brits like me who would not be here and would never have been born without the past generosity of this great country. But as I said earlier, we must also be realistic about the very many ways in which our system can be exploited by the cynical and the sinister. There are, of course, people who come to these shores legitimately seeking asylum, but we must also be honest about the fact that not everyone who comes to this country and applies for asylum has a legitimate case for doing so. We can see that evidenced in the fact that not all claims are approved.

Too often, asylum is used as an immigration route for those who otherwise would not be able to come here. Our compassion is therefore exploited by those who are in no real danger at all, a sad truth made clear by the fact that many would-be asylum seekers regularly return home without issue. The bar to claiming asylum should rightly be high. People should be in serious danger in their home country to qualify. Government Members are right to say that the new clause might cause difficult and, in some instances, heartrending situations, but that in and of itself does not make it the wrong thing to do.

Last December, as I mentioned earlier when discussing our human rights legislation, a Turkish heroin dealer was allowed to stay in the UK after first seeking asylum here in 1988. Despite claiming that he would be persecuted in his home country, the man had returned to Turkey at least eight times since arriving in Britain. On one of those trips, he even got married to a woman with whom he had been having an affair, despite already being married with children in the UK. Nevertheless, he escaped deportation, as it was ruled that deporting him would interfere with his right to a family life. That kind of scenario is clearly wrong and contributes to the persistent feeling that so many ordinary British people have that our asylum system is broken and unfair.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

New clause 41 would require the revocation of protection status or leave, or discontinuation of asylum claims, where an applicant returns to their country of origin. The Government are in absolute agreement on the principle behind the new clause. Although we are committed to providing protection to those who genuinely need it for as long as it is needed, in accordance with our obligations under the refugee convention and the European convention on human rights, such protection status must be granted only when it is required. As such, I want to reassure Opposition Members that, under our existing policy, where an individual returns to their country of origin, we consider whether they have re-availed themselves of the protection of that country. Where that is the case, we seek to revoke their protection status under the appropriate provision set out in the immigration rules.

We are also clear that asylum claims may be discontinued and withdrawn where the applicant fails to comply with the asylum process, which includes leaving the UK before a decision is made on their claim. I hope Opposition Members are therefore assured that the immigration rules enable protection status to be revoked already and applications to be discontinued where an applicant has returned to their country of origin. As such, new clause 41 is not required.

[Matt Vickers]

We wish to press the new clause to a Division.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

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[Katie Lam]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

This is a probing amendment tabled by the Father of the House, my right hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh), to tease out what he feels are important issues to discuss in the context of the Bill. I would like to make it very clear that the Opposition are neither supporting nor opposing this new clause. Ideally, my hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire would have spoken to this new clause, but she has Parliament-related business elsewhere today, so I am standing in.

The background to the new clause is that various international treaties impose, or have been interpreted as imposing, an obligation on states not to send people back to a country where they would face harm. This is known as non-refoulement. However, not all non-refoulement obligations are the same, and there are important differences. The new clause seeks to tease out the differences between the ECHR on the one hand, and the refugee convention and torture convention on the other. One key difference is whether there are any exceptions to the principle of non-refoulement, which is to say: are there any circumstances in which someone can be sent back to a country where they would face a real risk of relevant harm?

Under the refugee convention, the obligation not to refoul is not absolute; it is subject broadly to two exceptions. The first of those is the article 1F exclusion from protection of the refugee convention. That exclusion applies to those who have committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, serious non-political crimes abroad and acts contrary to the purposes of the United Nations. The second exception is provided for in article 33(2), which concerns those who pose serious risk to the security of the host country and those who have been convicted of particularly serious crimes, and therefore pose a danger to the community of the host country.

As the UNHCR said in respect of article 1F exclusions, the rationale is that certain acts are so grave as to render their perpetrators undeserving of international protection as refugees. The Court of Justice of the European Union has said that its purpose is to maintain the credibility of the protection system, and as Professors Hathaway and Foster have noted, the realpolitik reason was that the drafters of the refugee convention were persuaded that if states parties were expected to admit serious criminals as refugees, they would simply not be willing to be bound by the convention.

The same is presumably true of the article 33(2) exceptions. It would be surprising if states would have been willing to sign up to a duty not to refoul if there were not that exception for those who were a threat to their countries. In 1987, the UN convention against torture came into force. It now has 173 states parties. Article 3 of the torture convention provided for an absolute non-refoulement rule in cases of torture.

Although the convention also dealt with cruel, inhumane and degrading treatments, states were careful to limit the absolute non-refoulement rule to torture. The result is that even if an individual falls in the scope of article 1F or article 33(2) of the refugee convention but would face a real danger of torture, they cannot be removed. It was felt by states that torture was such an absolute evil that the credibility of the international protection system would be undermined by preventing the removal of such individuals if they faced torture.

While the refugee convention and the torture convention both explicitly addressed non-refoulement, the ECHR did not. It prohibits states from engaging in torture or cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment, but it says nothing about refoulement. That is not surprising, as the ECHR was drafted at the same time as the refugee convention, and arguably it was felt that those issues were best addressed by the refugee convention. None the less, in the late 1980s, the Strasbourg court interpreted article 3 as prohibiting refoulement. It did so not just for torture, but for all forms of treatment contrary to article 3, and it held that the rule was absolute. As the court put it:

“The conduct of the person concerned, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be taken into account.”

The consequence is that the protection afforded by article 3 is broader than that provided for in articles 32 and 33 of the 1951 United Nations convention relating to the status of refugees. That interpretation by the Strasbourg court completely negated the careful balance struck by the international community with the refugee convention and torture convention.

The new clause posits that that interpretation threatens the legitimacy of international human rights law and that the conclusion by Strasbourg is the means by which that happens. The KM case provides a good illustration. KM was a police officer in the Democratic Republic of Congo. He entered the UK illegally in 2012 and applied for asylum. His application was refused by the Home Secretary on the grounds that he had been involved in torture. The upper tribunal upheld that finding and held that he should be excluded from protection under article 1F of the refugee convention. However, because of article 3 of the ECHR, as interpreted by the Strasbourg court, he could not be removed.

There are many more cases of serious criminals and terrorists—people who are a threat to those who live in the UK—who could be deported under article 33(2) of the refugee convention but cannot due to article 3 of the ECHR. In Saadi v. Italy, two Strasbourg judges wrote that they would not be surprised if some citizens of Europe

“find it difficult to understand that the Court by emphasising the absolute nature of Article 3 seems to afford more protection to the non-national applicant who has been found guilty of terrorist-related crimes than to the protection of the community as a whole from terrorist violence.”

Indeed, the Father of the House, were he here, would say that he suspects that the vast majority of Britons and Europeans would be baffled by that conclusion. That is also precisely the reason why the drafters of the refugee convention saw fit to include exceptions for criminals and terrorists: they knew that with rights come responsibilities, and that those who act in this way completely violate the social contract and cannot properly claim its protection. The interpretation that Strasbourg has given has, in the view of the Father of the House—at least, he would like us to debate this—weakened the legitimacy of the international humanitarian protection system.

The new clause, tabled by the Father of the House, seeks to find a solution to the problem—one that he says will restore common sense. The first step of the new clause would put a duty on the Secretary of State through careful litigation before our courts to identify cases of individuals who could be deported under the refugee convention and torture convention but would be blocked under the ECHR. He sees cases such as KM, which I discussed, as exemplars of that. The new clause would disapply the duty on the Secretary of State to comply with the Human Rights Act in such cases. That is to ensure that the Secretary of State can proceed to deport such people, and if they want to challenge their deportation, their recourse will be to bring a case to Strasbourg.

I know that the Father of the House would be comfortable with putting a duty on Ministers to still deport such individuals even the face of a Strasbourg judgment or rule 39, but he knows that the firm commitment that the Government have to international law mean that they will refuse to do so—although he also said that we should ask why they would privilege the ECHR over the refugee convention. Instead, the new clause would allow the Government to comply with Strasbourg, while requiring them to argue with Strasbourg that it is wrong to interpret article 3 in a way that negates the provisions of articles 1F and 33(2) of the refugee convention.

Were Strasbourg to apply the principle of lex specialis properly, it should conclude that it cannot be unlawful for states to rely on articles 1F and 33(2) of the refugee convention in order to deport criminals. The Father of the House would be interested to hear from the Minister whether the Government would be interested in running such an argument before the Strasbourg court. Even were we to lose in such efforts to be reasonable, he feels that the new clause would allow the Government still to decide to comply with the flawed jurisprudence from the Strasbourg court; however, it would require that, were they to do so, they must be transparent with the British public and publish a report telling us who the criminals are whom we could have deported under the refugee convention, had the Strasbourg court’s flawed interpretation of the ECHR not prevented us from so doing.

I will not press the new clause to a vote, and I repeat that I did not table it, but I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I compliment the Father of the House on his ingenious approach to the slightly different signals, as the hon. Lady set out, that the international conventions, with their judge-made law, have left us with over the years. The new clause would create a duty to remove people who are not protected by the refugee convention, irrespective of our obligations under the Human Rights Act and the European convention on human rights as it has developed. The hon. Lady set out that issue extremely well.

We will always seek to deport or remove foreign nationals who pose a threat to the UK or whose behaviour is such that they are not entitled to international protection. Where the UK’s obligations under the European convention on human rights prevent us from doing that, we will consider granting restricted leave, sending a clear message that the person is not welcome in the UK and will be removed as soon as possible. As the hon. Lady will remember, we amended the Bill to allow us to closely monitor people who pose a threat to the public but cannot be deported because of our obligations under domestic and international law. She will remember that that involves such things as curfews, and inclusion and exclusion zones.

The Government are clear: Britain will unequivocally remain a member of the ECHR, and work with international partners to uphold human rights and international law. Leaving would undermine protections for UK citizens and isolate Britain from its closest allies. The new clause would provide a mechanism to disregard a ruling of a court or tribunal that removal from the UK will breach a migrant’s human rights. That would place the UK in direct conflict with the European Court of Human Rights. The law does not permit us to operate with one foot in and one foot out; we are either in, as signatories to the ECHR, or we join Russia and Belarus as countries that do not accept its jurisdiction.

The law does not permit us to operate in that way; nor can it be said that the ECHR takes precedence over the refugee convention. They are distinct treaties of international law that deal with different issues. The new clause would therefore create a situation that would be wholly unworkable. I know that the Father of the House will look at this in due course. He has had a good go. We do not think that the proposal is workable. I therefore hope that it will not be pressed to a vote.

[Katie Lam]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the Chair do report the Bill, as amended, to the House.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is at this occasion, traditionally, that those who have shouldered the burdens under your expert guidance of the Committee, Dr Murrison, thank all the officials—both the House officials and my own—for their sterling work.

I thank all members of the Committee for their contributions, all of which have come from positions of principle and concern. We have had some robust debates during our time in Committee; we have even had a bit of fashion commentary. I think we will all be pleased to get out of Committee today, because the room is getting colder as the week goes on—goodness knows where we would be if we had to come back on Thursday to finish our deliberations. I hope that members of the Committee have enjoyed scrutinising the Bill and having these debates as much as I have.

Bill, as amended, accordingly to be reported.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Seventh sitting)

Angela Eagle Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 11th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Would everyone please ensure that all electronic devices are turned off or switched to silent mode? We now continue line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The grouping and selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room, as well as on the parliamentary website. I remind Members about the rules on the declaration of interests, as set out in the code of conduct.

Clause 37

Repeal of the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Dame Angela Eagle)]

It is a pleasure once more to be in this delightful room doing line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill.

The clause repeals in full the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024. The Act, which requires that decision makers treat Rwanda as a safe third country for the purposes of removing individuals there, and disapplies sections of the Human Rights Act 1998, was passed by the previous Government in an attempt to facilitate removals to Rwanda under the migration and economic development partnership. Despite that, the Act has served no practical purpose since it became law: no decisions were made that were affected by its provisions, and, as we have stated repeatedly, only four individuals were ever relocated voluntarily. No enforced removals to Rwanda ever took place under the partnership.

The Government have been clear from the outset that we will not proceed with the partnership. There is no evidence that it was successful in deterring small boat arrivals, nor has it delivered value for money for the British taxpayer. On the contrary, nearly 84,000 people arrived on small boats between 14 April 2022, which was the date the partnership was announced by the former Government, and 5 July 2024, which was the day after this Government were elected.

The Government have been clear that we will not make further payments to Rwanda, saving £100 million in upcoming annual economic transformation and integration fund payments, and a further £120 million that the UK would otherwise have been liable to pay once 300 individuals had been relocated to Rwanda. That is without even considering the additional staffing and operational costs, which would have been substantial. We will also exit the UK-Rwanda treaty as part of ending the partnership. It is therefore appropriate for the Government to repeal the Safety of Rwanda Act so that the legislation, which relies on the provisions of the treaty, will no longer be on the statute book. That is what clause 37 achieves.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

Clause 37 repeals the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024. In doing so, the Government are removing the only deterrent, and indeed the only place where we can send people who have arrived from a safe third country. It is well established that it is extremely difficult to return people to some countries. In addition, the lack of documentation can frustrate the process of removal to someone’s home country. That is why a third country deterrent is needed: if people cannot be removed to their home country, they can and will be removed to a third country.

The logical consequence of repealing the Safety of Rwanda Act is that a greater number of migrants will arrive from countries that are harder to return them to. Without some form of agreement to send the migrants to a safe country, they will continue to come and to stay. Section 80AA of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 contains a list of safe countries, but the list is limited to countries that contribute very few illegal migrants, save for Albania. The last Conservative Government cut the number of Albanian illegal migrants coming to the UK by small boat crossings by over 90%, showing that our returns agreement with Albania worked. As the former director general of Border Force said:

“If we cannot send them back, we could send them to another safe country—ergo, Rwanda—where they could be resettled safely without adding to the continuing flow of arrivals by small boat from France.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 41, Q43.]

Channel boat crossings are up 28% since the election, with more than 1,300 people crossing in the week commencing 1 March 2025. This Labour Government have smashed farmers, small business owners and pensioners, but it seems that the people-smuggling gangs are the only ones who are safe. The only thing that will stop the gangs is a strong deterrent that means that people do not board small boats because they know that they will be deported if they reach the UK, and they will not be allowed to stay.

The additional offences and powers in this Bill are welcome as far as they go, but, with the scrapping of the Conservatives’ deterrent—that if someone has no right to be in this country, they will not be able to stay—this Bill is just window dressing. It will not, and cannot, stop people crossing the channel in small boats. The Government know that, because their own impact assessment shows that only a handful of people each year would be imprisoned because of the new offences created by this Bill.

Since the announcement that our deterrent would be scrapped, there are almost 8,500 more people in asylum hotels. That is the Government’s failure.

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[Matt Vickers]

In terms of the political arguments, what people out there want to see is the number of people arriving illegally in this country going down. They are not seeing that; it is up 28%. They want to see the number of hotels in communities across the country going down. It is not, although it was. The number of people arriving was also going down, but it is now up 28%, and there are 8,500 more people in hotels. That is the reality of the situation.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way; he is being very generous. Of course, that is what Committee debates are meant to be about; it is easier to have a bit more to and fro in Committee than it often is on the Floor of the House, when we have two and a half minutes and we have had to rewrite our speech and discard most of what we were going to say.

Will the hon. Gentleman admit that the way in which the Illegal Migration Act interacted with the Safety of Rwanda Act meant that nobody could be processed at all; they were just stuck, and there was a build-up in hotels of small boat arrivals and other asylum claimants who could not be processed? That meant that there was a big backlog, and we have had to restart decision making. That inevitably means that there will be a slowdown in sending back people who have arrived by small boat until we can get on top of the backlog that the Conservative Government created.

[Matt Vickers]

The principle at stake is that if someone arrives in this country illegally, they will be removed. We were not processing people who had arrived illegally and were meant to be removed, but we were returning more of them before the election than we are now. However, I will get through my comments, and there will be plenty of time then for debate—we have a full morning ahead of us.

Does the Minister think that allowing 96% of illegal migrants who arrive by small boat to stay in the UK is a deterrent? At the moment, people know that if they come here on a small boat, they are 96% likely to be allowed to stay. That is a strong pull factor. The only way to remove that pull factor is to reinstate a strong deterrent. People need to know that if they arrive here on a small boat, they will not be able to stay. Can the Minister explain how she will increase the number of removals without a third country to which migrants can be sent? If it is not Rwanda, where will they go? Will it be Redcar? Will it be Romford? Will it be Richmond? Where will these people who cannot be removed to a safe country go?

As Alp Mehmet said,

“repealing the Rwanda Act will encourage illegal immigration… 240,000 people were declared to have entered”

the EU “illegally last year” and will likely end up coming to the UK. The Government have confirmed with this Bill and the repeal of the Safety of Rwanda Act that there is no deterrence, because once people arrive here, the likelihood is that they will be able to stay. Mehmet also echoed the comments from the National Crime Agency, saying,

“the only deterrent is to restrict arrivals, and to contain and remove quickly. That will send the right message.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 39-40, Q43.]

As he pointed out, there is not “anything in the Bill” that would suggest that people will be removed quickly. Why has a removals agreement not been included in the Bill? The EU is now looking at offshore processing and deportation centres. There is also a growing consensus in the EU that the 1951 refugee convention is not fit for purpose. What assessment has the Minister made of the impact of these changes on the UK? Why have the Government scrapped the Rwanda plan, leaving the UK as an outlier? We wish to oppose the repeal of the Act by way of a Division.

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[Dame Angela Eagle]

Does my hon. Friend realise that the detention estate was used by the Conservative party to empty some prison places and try to relieve pressure there? I think it highly unlikely that there would be even 400 spaces.

[Tom Hayes]

I thank my hon. Friend for that important reminder that when the Labour Government took office after our historic win, we inherited an awful mess in our prison system, which was described by independent experts and organisations as near to collapse—so near that there were just a few hundred spaces left at a time when the country was rioting.

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[Dame Angela Eagle]

Elegant.

[Tom Hayes]

I thought I would to and find a moment of humour in the dispiriting debate on this topic.

The Conservatives may progress to blaming successful legal and judicial challenges to the policy. The Rwanda policy was, as my hon. Friend the Member for Dover and Deal said, unlawful and deemed to be so by the courts. If they do, His Majesty’s Opposition should confirm whether they respect the independence of our judiciary in adjudicating such challenges on the one hand, and respect the international human rights laws, under which challenges were made and were successful, on the other. That is important, because one of the hallmarks of the new Government is to be lawful and to respect our judiciary. We need to embrace that change. The Opposition could also reflect on the probability of further legal challenges being undertaken because of the human rights concerns about Rwanda, which my hon. Friend highlighted so effectively.

Last, the Conservatives may want to blame political challenges for undermining the credibility of their Rwanda asylum policy. In a democracy, it is of course right that Members of Parliament raise concerns on behalf of their constituents—indeed, that is what we have been doing—but the Conservatives overcame those political constraints by passing the Safety of Rwanda Act to address judicial concerns, and they signed a legally binding agreement with Rwanda. So the idea that the deterrent was not able to function because of legal or political challenges is actually farcical, because the previous Government held the cards in their hands.

I have heard it said that the Conservatives could have followed the Australian asylum policy, which has been described as a successful model—perhaps it even inspired the Rwanda asylum policy—but there is good reason to believe that UK could not have achieved the deterrent effects of the Australian offshore asylum processing model. Indeed, Professor Brian Bill, chair of the Migration Advisory Committee, said in oral evidence that it was inappropriate to draw comparisons between the Rwanda scheme and the Australian policies.

Were we to be generous and accept the view of the hon. Member for Weald of Kent that the Australian policy stood out in the world as being successful, there would be challenges to assessing the efficacy of that policy. As the Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford, an expert and independent institution, has said, there is no compelling evidence to suggest that the Australian offshoring policy was the reason for a drop in numbers of people going to Australia. Put bluntly, if migrants were paying attention to the last Government’s policy, they had no reason to believe that they would be barred from staying in the UK.

That takes me to my third and final definition of what would make an effective deterrent. Yes, the state must be understood to be highly resolved to deter, detain and remove, and capable of doing so, but it takes two to tango. Britain can only be understood if asylum seekers are able to understand, which in turn depends on several key factors. It means migrants being able to do at least three things: to pay close attention to the last Government’s actions—I struggled to do that, so I cannot see how asylum seekers would—to stay fully informed about the many twists and turns in the Safety of Rwanda Act asylum policy, which again I struggled to stay abreast of, and to behave as rational actors who weigh up the costs and benefits of action.

We have heard in testimony and oral evidence that migrants are typically unaware of Government policy and actions, because they are too busy being asylum seekers and migrants. Moreover, it can be said that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the chaotic and difficult circumstances that they are forced to inhabit prevent them from being the rational actors that they would otherwise be, calmly and objectively assessing the trade-offs between the perceived costs of illegal entry, the probability of those being incurred, and whether those are outweighed by the potential benefits of migration.

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[Chris Murray]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Stuart, especially after we have had such an interesting debate with some very thoughtful contributions. I will respond to some of the issues that have been raised.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East mentioned that I keep quoting Peter Walsh, and I am going to again, because the point he made in the evidence sessions was one of the most critical points on immigration policy in Britain overall. He said that demand for Channel crossings is “fairly inelastic”. The demand will not wax and wane hugely in response to Government policy, which tells us that deterrence will have only limited use. That is the conceptual flaw at the heart of the Rwanda plan. It put all the country’s cards and money on a deterrence-only approach. Deterrence has to be real and believable, which the scheme clearly was not.

I listen closely to what the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire says about the role of deterrence in migration policy. The exchanges we are having are helping to clarify the thinking. It is clear from the Bill that deterrence can only ever be a component. We must focus on the supply—the ability for people to cross the Channel—and not just the demand. That requires the measures in the Bill, but also diplomatic work and upstream work.

The repeal of the Rwanda legislation was inevitable and written in the stars from the very beginning of that hare-brained scheme. Before it passed, the European Council on Foreign Relations said that the scheme was doomed to failure and a “floundering disaster”, because it was unlikely to deter illicit migration, it would damage the UK’s standing in international law, it would endanger refugee lives and it would come at huge financial cost. Every single one of those predictions came to pass, so it is no surprise that we are having to deal with this today. I would also say that it presaged the Conservatives going down in an historic election defeat, so it was clearly a failure politically for them as well.

On the point about removal to third countries, before we left the European Union, the UK had the capacity to remove people to safe countries in the EU that they had travelled through. The Conservatives manifestly failed to avail the country of that power we had, and then failed with the Rwanda system. Clearly, the Conservative track record on third countries is very poor. There is a component in the immigration system for people going to third countries when they have no right to stay here, which is something we need to look at further ahead.

The hon. Member for Stockton West made reference to the Albania relationship and returns increasing to Albania, as if that somehow proves that the Rwanda scheme would have worked if we had just let it take its course, but it is a completely spurious parallel. The returns to Albania happened before the communiqué was signed with Albania, so the two are not related—perhaps he was arguing that the prior readmission agreement was the variable that led to the increase, but it came after the spike, so it cannot be held responsible. The Albania agreement was not just about illegal immigrants; it also included a huge number of foreign national offenders—a different group of people entirely. It was also about people from Albania returning to Albania, not third-country nationals. The idea that the Albania scheme is somehow an alibi for Rwanda can be completely rejected.

That is not actually the point, however, because the Rwanda scheme would never have worked at the scale required, even if it had been able to work at all. The Minister was correct when she talked in her initial remarks about the interaction between the Illegal Migration Act and the Safety of Rwanda Act. That meant that nobody was getting processed, so the country ended up with a perma-backlog of asylum seekers with nowhere to go; they could not return to the country they came from through a voluntary returns agreement or be recognised as refugees. The Rwanda scheme would never have worked at a meaningful scale, and it would never have been able to deal with the backlog. We were on track to having to take over half the hotels in the country to accommodate asylum seekers.

We can have a debate about how best to manage an asylum system—voluntary returns, swift processing, meaningful decisions and removals are clearly components of that—but we can surely say in debating this clause that the Rwanda Act was not the solution. Some £240 million of our constituents’ money was wasted on the scheme, which the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire was quite correct to call “crackpot”. Passing legislation to assert that reality is not what it is will never be an effective way to govern anything, never mind the asylum system, so I am pleased that the Act will finally be off the statute book.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

We have had an interesting debate about taking the Safety of Rwanda Act off the statute book, as clause 37 does. I am distressed that the Conservative party continues to assert without evidence—in fact, contrary to most evidence—that that Act and the Illegal Migration Act were about to work. Apparently, those Acts were on the cusp of being a great success when the evil new Government came along and cancelled them.

I speculate that many Conservative Members are secretly pleased that they can assert that, because it gets them out of an embarrassing, expensive farrago; the Safety of Rwanda Act will go down in this country’s history as one of the most catastrophic pieces of legislation that Parliament has ever dealt with. As my hon. Friend the Member for Dagenham and Rainham rightly pointed out, it was not ordinary or normal for Conservative ex-Prime Minister John Major to pronounce the Act to be “un-Conservative”. The Act is many things, unconservative being one of them.

Government Members, and the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire, assert that the Act was not a deterrent. This is the current discourse: we are saying that it was not a deterrent and that we can prove it, and the Conservative party, which was responsible for the Act, is left asserting that it was a deterrent, despite there being absolutely no evidence for that despite all the years since the policy was announced and all the years the Act was on the statute book.

That reminds me of discussions I used to have as a student—a very long time ago—about whether communism in its pure sense had actually ever existed. It was obviously a failure, but when one came across the ideologues, they simply asserted that the communism that had been tried to date just was not pure enough, and it was therefore still likely to succeed if ever it was tried properly. Does that sound similar to the discussions we are having about this iteration of fantasy asylum policy as gimmick? I think it does.

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[Matt Vickers]

I have asked this question a few times and never quite got to the bottom of it. We were sending people to Rwanda who could not be returned to their home country because it was not safe. Where will those people go now, if not Rwanda? Does the Minister fear that, as the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire said, the Government might end up coming back to this issue in a few years when they realise that things are continuing to go the wrong way?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

First things first: the hon. Gentleman was not going to send to Rwanda only those whom we could not return to their own country; in theory, he was going to deport to Rwanda absolutely everybody who arrived to claim asylum after March 2023—that was what we were told. In reality, those people all ended up in hotels, unable to be processed and growing in number, while the Conservative party indulged in its expensive gimmicks and fantasies of how the world should be.

As many Committee members have pointed out, the day job was not being done while that parallel universe policy was being developed. It took all the attention away from running what is a complex enough system as it is. Many resources were diverted to try to create that new reality, resulting in the neglect of the system, and huge backlogs were built into the system because of how the Illegal Migration Act interacted with the Safety of Rwanda Act. That made it impossible to run the current system or to move to a new system that was remotely workable, thereby landing this country with a huge, dysfunctional series of backlogs, and a system that we have had to literally start up again from scratch to try to get working coherently.

[Pete Wishart]

The Minister may have been coming on to the second part of the question asked by the hon. Member for Stockton West, but will she be brave enough to tell the Committee that this Labour Government will never consider sending asylum seekers and refugees to a third country?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The Home Secretary has said that she does not rule out third country processing; that is not the same as the Rwanda scheme, which was deportation to a third country permanently. I think the hon. Gentleman is talking about third country returns, such as reviving the Dublin system. When the previous Government negotiated the EU withdrawal agreement, they perhaps should have included something about returns to Europe. Had they done so, perhaps we would be in a different situation, but those would also have been third country returns. He asked a wide-ranging question, and I have been as honest as I can in answering it at this point.

We could spend all day, and probably many more days, talking about the failure encompassed in the interaction of the Safety of Rwanda Act and the Illegal Migration Act. Our job today, though, is to tidy it up. Clause 37 will take the Safety of Rwanda Act off the statute book and put it in the dustbin of history, where it belongs.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 2—Repeal of the Illegal Migration Act 2023—

“The Illegal Migration Act 2023 is repealed.”

This new clause would repeal the Illegal Migration Act in full. In combination with Amendment 8 to leave out clause 38, it would replace the selective repeal in the Bill with a full repeal.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

As always, the Lib Dems are keeping us on our toes. I hope there is a benign reason why they are not in attendance today—perhaps my horrible cold made its way over to them and they are not well.

Clause 38 repeals the vast majority—not all—of the Illegal Migration Act 2023. We decided not to take a blanket approach to repealing it all, and we will have that debate when the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire speaks to new clause 2. He has given us the choice whether to repeal the Illegal Migration Act as a whole. Our view, which I will explain in response to his speech, is that there are a few useful clauses in the Act that we have decided to keep on the statute book.

In general, we all know that the Illegal Migration Act was a flawed piece of legislation that made it impossible for us to process and run asylum claims. It was on the statute book in the context of the Safety of Rwanda Act, which assumed that anyone who arrived after March 2023 would not be allowed to become part of an asylum claim in this country. It contained the so-called duty to remove, which placed a statutory duty on the Home Secretary to remove everyone who came to this country after that time. It was flawed in many ways, but it made it impossible for us to run asylum claims in this country lawfully. Therefore, it is important that the vast majority of this flawed legislation should be removed from the statute book, and that is what clause 38 does.

I will set out in detail why we have decided to keep six clauses of the Act. I will try to explain to the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire and the rest of the Committee our thinking behind each case, but I will do so when the new clause has been spoken to.

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[Pete Wishart]

I must say to the hon. Member for Stockton West that he really does not want to know my views on British citizenship, because they are likely to blow his head—but we will leave that one at that.

It is disappointing to note the absence of our Liberal colleagues. Back in the day—the good old days, Mr Stuart —when we had an effective, efficient, diligent and conscientious third party, there would always be someone present to ensure that the views of the third party were represented. I am sure that the Liberal Democrats have good excuses, but I hope they start to take a bit of interest in this important Bill, because it has been disappointing thus far.

I say to the Minister, “‘Useful clauses?’ Come on!” We are talking about sections 29, 12, 59, 60 and 62, some of the nastiest and most pernicious parts and aspects of the Illegal Migration Act. I cannot believe that this Government want to continue that horrible and heinous Tory set of proposals and clauses in this Bill. This was their great opportunity to wipe the slate clean of the previous Government’s hopeless and useless crackpot Rwanda scheme and their heinous and horrible Illegal Migration Act.

I will give the Minister a few quotes from some of her colleagues, some of which I wish I had come up with myself. The now Prime Minister said at the time that the Illegal Migration Bill would drive “a coach and horses” through protections for women trafficked to the UK as victims of modern slavery. The now Home Secretary said that that IMA does the “total opposite” of providing support for those who have been trafficked, and that it was nothing other than “a traffickers’ charter”. There are other prize quotes from the Home Secretary and various Ministers within the Home Office—absolutely and totally correct, right and true—about the horrible Illegal Migration Act. Now we have a Labour Government inconceivably standing by large swathes of an Act that they so rightly and widely rubbished and wanted rid of only a short while ago.

It would be different if the Government were maintaining some benign, useful or helpful parts of that Tory Act, but they are maintaining some real, pernicious nasties. Provisions that were damaging, dangerous and contrary to human rights under the Tories are just as damaging, dangerous and contrary to human rights under this new Labour Government. I remind the Minister what the then Home Secretary said on that Bill when introducing it:

“I am unable to make a statement that, in my view, the provisions of the Illegal Migration Bill are compatible with the Convention rights, but the Government nevertheless wishes the House to proceed with the Bill.”

The previous Government could not care less about our obligations under international law or about human rights, and they were quite happy to set them aside. Now we have a Home Secretary who stands by certain provisions of that Act, with all its difficulties concerning its relationship with convention rights.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The hon. Gentleman will have noted on the front of the Bill that we are debating the statement from the Home Secretary on the European convention on human rights:

“In my view the provisions of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill are compatible with the Convention rights.”

[Pete Wishart]

I am glad that the Home Secretary stated that, as she always does when it comes to our relationship with, and compatibility with, human rights. I want to raise a couple of issues and ask a couple of questions about just how very loosely this Bill is connected with the Government’s obligations and about some of our real concerns on human rights. I will come to that in the course of what I hope will be a short contribution.

It is completely incomprehensible that the Government have chosen to repeal only some aspects of the IMA rather than the whole Act, particularly since so many members of this Government have been so vocally opposed to the IMA in the past. Can we please just have a look at some of the stuff that they want to retain? The one that concerns me most, and the one that concerns the range of organisations, groups and charities associated with refugees and asylum seekers, is the retention of section 29.

Let us remind the Committee what section 29 does. It extends the public order disqualification originally introduced by section 63 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 and mandates that victims of trafficking and modern slavery who have criminal convictions or are considered a threat to public order be disqualified from support and protection. To me, that provision is deeply concerning, as it means that victims of trafficking, many of whom have been coerced into committing crimes as part of their exploitation, could face detention, deportation or removal rather than the support and recovery that they need.

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[Tom Hayes]

It is an honour to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh, who, in an outstanding speech, set out the major challenges with the Illegal Migration Act, part of which will be repealed.

I want to knock on the head four things that were said by the hon. Member for Stockton West. The first was in reference to section 23 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023. That provision, which the Opposition have talked about, was never implemented by the last Government, so in effect he is opposing a repeal of something that his last Government never started. That feels to me like the worst kind of politics. Between the Royal Assent given to that legislation and the Dissolution of Parliament, 315 days passed, yet no effort was made to implement that provision.

Secondly, sections 9 and 10 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 were, as we have heard, unworkable. They allow people to arrive, claim asylum in the UK, get support, and be put up in a hotel, which as my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh described, will often be in the some of the most dire conditions that somebody can go through after fleeing some of the worst experiences that people can have, be it trauma, famine, disease or poverty—the list goes on. Applications were not processed, so people were not able to leave their hotel. The consequence of that is not just an expensive asylum backlog, but people living with serious psychological scarring for a significant amount of time.

That brings me to my third point. I will talk more about this when we reach new clause 26, which relates to scientific age assessments, but I really do not know how the Conservative party can talk about the welfare and protection of children when we heard oral testimony from the Children’s Commissioner about children who were subject to, and vulnerable to, organ harvesting, rape, sexual assault and disappearance from hotels and into wider society, where, as my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh said, they are likely to continue to be abused, exploited and victimised. I will make those points when we reach that debate.

Lastly, on the point about France, I wish the Conservative party would stop throwing stones at one of nearest neighbours and most important strategic allies, particularly when we are in such a volatile international climate. It is really important that we properly scrutinise legislation, but do not indulge in the petty politics that defined the last Conservative Government, disrupted so many of our international relations, and actually made us less secure.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

This has been a small but perfectly formed debate on clause 38, which repeals all but six sections of the Illegal Migration Act. As Government Members have pointed out, despite the amount of time that has lapsed since the Act got on the statute book, the vast majority of its provisions have never been commenced. In fact, we had to commence one tiny bit of it so that we could restart asylum processing; that is probably the most it ever had any effect.

Let us be clear: the Illegal Migration Act meant that thousands of asylum claims were put on hold, because of the duty to remove, increasing the backlog, putting incredible pressure on the asylum accommodation system and creating what has been called the “perma-backlog”. We all know what that was, and how big it was when we came into Government. The Act has largely not been commenced, nor will it be under this Government. We need to sort out the chaos created by the unworkable and contradictory provisions in the Act. Despite the bravado of the hon. Member for Stockton West in his earlier contribution, I suspect that most Conservative Ministers knew that the Act was unworkable, because it was not commenced when they had the ministerial capacity and power to do so for all the time between when it was put on the statute book and when we formed a new Government a year later.

The system had been left in chaos but, were the Government to accept new clause 2 and simply repeal the entire Act, it would lead to a missed opportunity to improve our immigration system. I will go through some of that with the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire. Clause 38 will repeal section 2 of the 2023 Act, which provides for the duty to remove. The Government are committed to ending the migration and economic partnership with Rwanda, so section 2 will be repealed to deliver that by repealing the duty to remove and associated provisions.

On sections 22 to 28 of the Illegal Migration Act, we are not retaining the vast majority of modern slavery provisions in the Act because they are connected to the duty to remove irregular migrants. These sections were never commenced and provided that where a duty to remove was applied for an individual, that individual should be disqualified from the national referral mechanism unless certain limited exemptions applied. We are removing sections 30 to 37 relating to permanent bans on entry, settlement and citizenship, which, while held up as a success by others, were unenforced and unworkable. Sections 57 and 58 of the Act are also repealed. They relate to age assessments, but both sections are unworkable and irrelevant without the duty to remove.

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[Matt Vickers]

Is there any reason we cannot introduce provisions in this area as part of the Bill, and when can we expect to see them?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Work is going on in the Department to assess the accuracy of the various methods of age assessment, which ministerial predecessors from the hon. Gentleman’s party commenced, but which has not yet been finished. As soon as we have more idea about how reliable scientific age assessment can be, how expensive it is and all those things, I will either come to Parliament or make a statement about how we intend to proceed. The hon. Gentleman must not assume that because these sections have been repealed we are not interested in scientific age assessments and their potential per se. They were simply unworkable because they were attached to the duty to remove, which was such a feature of the Illegal Migration Act.

The six measures that the Government intend to retain, including where provisions are in force, have been identified as having operational utility and benefit. These powers are all ones that the Government see as important tools to allow for the proper operation of the immigration system and to achieve wider priorities alongside the powerful measures set out in the Bill.

The hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire talked about section 29 of the Illegal Migration Act. The public order disqualification under the Nationality and Borders Act is currently in operation. It enables decisions to disqualify certain individuals from support and protections afforded by the national referral mechanisms on grounds of public order and bad faith. Public order grounds include serious criminality and threats to national security. Such decisions are made on a case-by-case basis, considering the individual’s vulnerabilities. That is the sole modern slavery measure in the Illegal Migration Act that is being retained. It would, if commenced, amend the public order disqualification to allow more foreign national offenders to be considered for disqualification from modern slavery protections on public order grounds. Disqualification will continue to be assessed on an individual basis.

[Pete Wishart]

I am glad that the Minister got to that last sentence, because it is quite clear from section 29 that victims of modern slavery only have to be considered a threat to public order. It is quite likely that many victims of modern slavery will get caught up in this; in fact, they already have. Is the Minister happy that those who were probably coerced into criminal activity will now almost be blanket-banned from any opportunity to go through the asylum process in the United Kingdom?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

There will not be a blanket ban. Individuals who have been subject to public order disqualification will have been disqualified for things such as multiple drug offences, possessing a firearm and ammunition, multiple counts of sexual assault and assault by beating, grooming and engaging in sexual communication with a child. Those are the kind of things that currently lead to public order disqualifications. Nothing in the retention of section 29 will mean that individual circumstances on a case-by-case basis cannot be taken into account. It is important to understand that that will still happen. If it were commenced—it has not yet been—section 29 would introduce a duty to apply the public order disqualification, unless there are compelling circumstances that the disqualification should not apply. That still ensures case-by-case consideration.

The citizenship ban is removed from the Bill because it was unworkable and unenforced; that is, again, attached to the duties to remove. We have updated the good character guidance to prevent people from gaining citizenship if they arrived illegally by dangerous journeys. The idea is to emphasise that citizenship is not a right, but a privilege. We will continue to make those decisions on a case-by-case basis.

The other sections that we have retained are thought to be useful. The six measures in section 12 emphasise the right of the Secretary of State to determine what constitutes a reasonable time period to detain a person for the specific statutory purpose of effecting removal from the UK. Section 52 allows flexibility in our judiciary by making first-tier tribunal judges eligible to sit in the upper-tier tribunal. I cannot imagine anyone in the Committee would worry about that.

Section 59, if commenced, would extend the inadmissibility provisions to asylum and human rights claims from nationals in a list of generally safe states. Section 60 requires an annual cap to be set on the number of individuals admitted to the UK by safe and legal routes. Section 62 adds failing to provide information, such as a passcode to an electronic device, to the behaviours that could be considered damaging to the credibility of an asylum and human rights claim. All those issues are thought to provide utility, but outside the context of the duty to remove.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Eighth sitting)

Angela Eagle Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 11th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I congratulate everyone on their very prompt arrival.

Clause 39

Sections 37 and 38: consequential amendments

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Dame Angela Eagle)]

It is a great pleasure to see you, the fourth Chair of our Committee, Dame Siobhain. I welcome you to the Chair. It is a pleasure to serve with you directing us.

The clause is a simple consequential one: it removes references to and amendments made by the Illegal Migration Act 2023 and the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024 when they no longer serve a purpose. During the passage of those two pieces of legislation it was necessary to amend existing Acts of Parliament, to cross-reference them and to enable enactment of the provisions within them. Few, if any, of those provisions were ever properly commenced or enacted but, since this Government intend to repeal the Safety of Rwanda Act and large parts of the Illegal Migration Act, which we spent most of this morning discussing, those references no longer serve any practical purpose. They should therefore be removed from the four existing Acts of Parliament.

[Katie Lam (Weald of Kent) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair this afternoon, Dame Siobhain, as it was yesterday afternoon. It is good to see you two days in a row.

The clause, as the Minister said, makes consequential amendments necessary as a result of the two clauses that we discussed this morning: clause 37, which repeals the Safety of Rwanda Act 2024, and clause 38, which repeals provisions of the Illegal Migration Act 2023. As we do not support either of those repeals, we do not support these revisions or agree that the clause should stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

We have had our debates about the contents of those Acts. The clause concerns truly miscellaneous aspects, although I understand the logic of the hon. Lady’s argument. I certainly hope that we will press on and agree clause 39.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider schedule 1.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The clause introduces schedule 1, which will allow the governance arrangements for the Immigration Services Commissioner and deputy commissioner to be made more flexible. That will bring them in line with other public appointments by allowing for interim or shorter appointment lengths.

Schedule 1 sets out that the commissioner and deputy commissioner are to hold office for a term not exceeding five years. That allows the appointments to be for less than five years; currently, there is a fixed five-year term. Schedule 1 will make it discretionary to appoint a deputy commissioner, allowing for the governance arrangements to remain flexible to meet the demands of the organisation. It will enable the Home Secretary to appoint a senior, experienced member of staff to act in the commissioner’s place in certain circumstances. It is to be used, for example, to ensure that cover is in place during a public appointment process where there is a vacancy in the commissioner and deputy commissioner posts. It does not replace the provision to appoint a deputy commissioner and will ensure continued regulatory oversight of immigration advisers, which is the point of this organisation.

The schedule will mean that the work of the Immigration Services Commissioner will continue and will operate more flexibly to ensure that good immigration advice is readily available. That is critical to the effective running of a coherent, efficient and fair immigration system.

[Katie Lam]

As the Minister has outlined, clause 40 inserts schedule 1 into the Bill. That provides that the Immigration Services Commissioner is not to hold office for a term exceeding five years. The current regime is based on there being a commissioner and deputy, so schedule 1 sets out that the commissioner may appoint a deputy. There is also a provision to enable a member of the commissioner’s staff to act in the commissioner’s place in certain circumstances, such as the roles of commissioner and deputy both being vacant. That effectively allows for the appointment of an interim commissioner.

As was said in evidence to the Committee, these amendments do not seem to us to have operational consequence. We will not oppose them.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 40 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 1 agreed to.

Clause 41

Detention and exercise of functions pending deportation

--- Later in debate ---

[Pete Wishart]

Clause 41 introduces a significant expansion of detention powers, allowing individuals to be detained from the moment a deportation is considered rather than waiting for a formal order. However, my main concern with the clause is that it is to apply retrospectively, meaning it would legally validate past detentions that were previously unlawful. As would be expected, the provision has sparked serious concerns among legal experts, human rights organisations and advocacy groups, raising critical questions about the rule of law, human rights and judicial oversight.

We had the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association with us as part of an evidence session. They have expressed great concern with this provision, saying:

“We are concerned with the dangerous precedent which would be set if unlawful deprivation of liberty were to be treated as lawful—such retrospectivity undermines the rule of law and remains wholly unjustified in the materials accompanying the Bill.”

I have looked at this issue and there does not seem to be any sufficient justification for this exceptional measure. The ILPA warns us that it could rewrite history, denying justice to individuals who could have sought remedies for unlawful detention.

Amnesty International, which again gave very good evidence to the Committee, has also voiced strong objections. It has highlighted how detention powers have expanded significantly while judicial oversight has weakened, leading to risks of serious injustice.

Bail for Immigration Detainees has stressed that clause 41 risks

“further criminalising migrants and refugees”.

It urges instead for a system that upholds human rights and dignity.

Combined with the Illegal Migration Act, the clause could lead to longer, more expensive and potentially unlawful detentions in breach of article 5 of the European convention on human rights. The Government’s own impact assessment acknowledges that clause 41 effectively makes lawful past detentions that were not compliant with due process at the time, yet the European convention on human rights memorandum does not properly address whether that retrospective validation aligns with the fundamental legal safeguards of article 5. I would particularly like the Minister to address those concerns.

Clause 41 therefore undermines accountability, weakens judicial scrutiny and risks setting a dangerous precedent through which the Government can retroactively legitimise actions that would otherwise have been unlawful. Given the weight of these concerns, there is a strong case for leaving out the retrospective provisions from clause 41, and that is what my amendment 7 seeks to do. Upholding the rule of law means ensuring that detention powers are subject to proper legal safeguards and that individuals are not denied their fundamental rights through legislative backtracking.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The purpose of clause 41 is to clarify the existing powers of detention pending deportation set out in schedule 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971. The clause ensures that the Secretary of State can detain individuals once they have been notified that deportation is being considered. It also aligns the power to detain with the power to take biometrics and to search for nationality documents. That is because the taking of biometric information and any other searches will ordinarily take place at the point that somebody is detained. The effect of clause 41 is to make clear that a person subject to deportation may be detained at any stage of the deportation process. It strengthens an existing power; it does not create a new power. It clarifies a power that has always existed and been used for this purpose.

Another effect of the clause is to confirm that the Secretary of State may take biometrics and search for those documents. Since clause 41 clarifies existing powers, the detention provisions it contains are regarded as always having had effect. It is extremely important for Members to understand what the clarification of the powers of detention means. If a person is subject to deportation on the basis that the deportation is conducive to the public good, they may be detained at any stage of the deportation process. It is extremely important that the Home Office should be able to detain those it is seeking to deport on that basis. Some of these foreign national offenders pose a high risk of harm to the public. Therefore, inability to detain them could have a direct impact on public safety.

The clause makes it clear that it is lawful to detain a person once they are notified that the Home Office is considering whether to make a deportation order against them, but that is not a new detention power; it has been misunderstood in some of the commentary from outside of this place. The clause clarifies an existing power to ensure there is no ambiguity about when someone subject to a conducive deportation can be detained. The accurate identification of such people is very important.

The clause also makes consequential amendments to existing powers to search detained persons—potential deportees—for documents that prove their identity or nationality, and to take their biometrics upon their being detained. Clause 41 sets out the power to detain pending deportation, as the Home Office has always understood it to operate. It is therefore right that the provision applies retrospectively. That deals with amendment 7, which is in the name of the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire and seeks to remove the retrospective element of the clause.

Clause 41 clarifies the existing statutory powers of detention. There are important public safety reasons why these powers need to be put beyond doubt. Clause 41 clarifies the powers as the Home Office has always understood them to operate. There will be no operational impact that we can assess, or increased use of the power, and no effect on people in relation to whom this power has been exercised. It is entirely right that these provisions should apply retrospectively in these circumstances.

[Pete Wishart]

I hear the Minister’s justification for the powers and why she feels they are necessary, but I do not hear any compelling reason for why they have to be introduced retrospectively. What on earth is that supposed to help with? She knows the range of concerns raised by a number of legal organisations. I wish she would address their concerns about the consequences of the clause.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The clause seeks to put beyond any doubt that the Home Office has the power to detain, in conducive deportation cases, at the earliest point. It has been doing that for many years. The clarification in the clause applies retrospectively to ensure that those who have been detained in the past have not been detained unlawfully. We do not believe they have, but this puts it beyond doubt. To clarify, this is not an extension of deportation powers; it is putting beyond doubt in the Bill the understanding of how and when these powers can be used—at the earliest opportunity, if it is a conducive deportation. The powers, including to detain at the earliest opportunity, have always existed.

If the amendment moved by the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire were agreed to, it would cast doubt on many of the arrests and detentions ahead of deportations that have happened in the past, which I do not think the hon. Gentleman would want to do. To reassure the hon. Gentleman one final time, this is not an extension of deportation powers; it is a clarification of the way that they have always been understood to work. The clause puts beyond legal doubt that if somebody is being detained pending deportation, they can be detained lawfully at the earliest opportunity. That understanding has always been the case, but the clause puts it beyond any legal doubt.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 41 confirms that the Home Office may detain someone subject to deportation from the point at which the Home Office serves the notification that deportation is being considered, when that deportation is conducive to the public good. We support this provision to allow for detention before a deportation order is signed, but that only applies if the Secretary of State has notified the person in writing. Can I seek reassurance from the Minister that the requirement for a written notice will not build any delay into the process? We also support the provision in clause 42 to allow the Home Office to capture biometrics at the new, earlier point of detention.

--- Later in debate ---

[Katie Lam]

May I ask for a response from the Minister to my question?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I am happy to give the hon. Lady the assurance that she sought. If somebody is going to be detained, it will always be done with written notice, and that should not delay anything—it has not in the past.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

You are getting a lot of practice with locking and unlocking the doors and having Divisions, Dame Siobhain—it is quite exciting this afternoon.

Clause 42 modernises our powers to capture biometric information, so that we have greater flexibility over who can take that information. It will enable a wider range of appropriately trained people to take biometric information, strengthening processing resilience following instances of small boat crossings or unexpected arrivals. In a situation where it is essential to capture biometrics at the earliest opportunity and through streamlined processes, we will be able to utilise our resources more effectively. For example, the measure will enable contractors working at a short-term holding facility to capture biometrics in the same way as other contractors based in detention centres currently do. The clause also includes a power to make secondary legislation where there is a need for others to be able to capture biometric information. That is a future proofing of the legislation.

These are sensible and necessary measures to ensure that we can identify people quickly and establish whether they pose a threat to public safety if they have arrived in an irregular or illegal way.

[Katie Lam]

We are essentially supportive of clause 42, which among other things allows a person employed by a contractor in a short-term holding facility to be an authorised person to take fingerprints. The clause also includes a regulation-making power to allow other types of people to be authorised for this purpose.

May I ask the Minister how the regulation-making power is intended to be used? Are there currently other categories of people whom the Secretary of State or others in the Department would like to authorise to take fingerprints, or is this essentially a future-proofing measure, as the Minister mentioned?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

This is essentially future proofing. If another category or range of people became available, we may future proof this power and use the regulation-making power to ensure that they are taking biometrics lawfully.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 42 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 43

Articles for use in serious crime

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider clause 44 stand part.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clauses 43 and 44 cover the creation of two new offences concerning articles for use in serious crime. Law enforcement agencies are increasingly encountering individuals in possession of, or supplying, articles suspected to be intended for serious crime. However, proving intent or knowledge for a prosecution is often difficult, as the connection to a specific crime may not be immediately clear and facilitators frequently go undetected.

To address that challenge, clause 43 introduces two new criminal offences. The first criminalises the possession of specified articles; the second targets the importation, manufacture, adaptation, supply or offer to supply of those articles where there is a reasonable suspicion that they will be used in a serious offence. The specified articles include templates for 3D-printed firearms components, pill presses and vehicle concealments. Those concealments are particularly concerning in relation to smuggling operations, as they are often used to hide individuals for irregular immigration purposes.

The accused will need to prove that they did not intend for the article to be used in a serious offence, or that they could not have reasonably suspected it—given the few, if any, legitimate uses for the articles I have just mentioned. Those offences will be triable either way, with a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment, a fine or both.

Clause 43 defines “serious offences” broadly, to include drug trafficking, firearms offences and assisting unlawful migration, as outlined in schedule 1 to the Serious Crime Act 2007. The clause strengthens the ability of law enforcement agencies to target those facilitating serious crime. It does that by closing legal gaps and addressing emerging criminal tools.

Clause 44 defines the specific articles to be included in the new criminal offences in clause 43. As I said, the articles are templates of 3D-printed firearms or their components, pill presses and encapsulators, and vehicle concealments. Law enforcement agencies have been clear that those articles are being increasingly used by organised crime gangs, and they will continue to be used unless we take action now. 3D-printed firearms templates are increasingly being used by organised criminals, and they are at present not illegal to possess. Pill presses are being used to manufacture illicit drugs, particularly benzodiazepines. Similarly, vehicle concealments have become a significant concern for law enforcement agencies, and they are used as aids in people smuggling and irregular migration.

Clause 44 also provides the Secretary of State with the power to amend the list of specified articles, allowing the law to adapt to emerging threats. Any changes will be subject to the affirmative procedure. The Home Office will continue to work closely with law enforcement agencies and other partners to monitor and update that list, ensuring that it remains relevant as criminal tactics evolve. By capturing those articles, the aim is to disrupt the enablers and facilitators who profit from supplying tools for organised crime.

[Katie Lam]

The clauses seem broadly reasonable, but we have a few questions on which I would appreciate some clarification from the Minister. Clause 43 creates two new offences: the possession of articles for use in serious immigration crime, and the importation, manufacture, and supply or offer to supply of articles for use in serious immigration crime. Could the Minister explain whether she feels that UK Border Force currently has the right capabilities to identify and intercept the harmful materials captured by the clause?

Clause 43 reverses the evidential burden of proof, in that a person charged with offences under it can successfully prove their defence if they provide enough evidence in court to raise a question about the issue, and the prosecution cannot prove the opposite beyond reasonable doubt. Could the Minister please explain why the decision has been taken to do that? The maximum penalty for the offences created under the clause is imprisonment for five years, a fine or both. Could the Minister please explain how and why those penalties were decided on?

Clause 44 defines “relevant article” for the purposes of the offences created in clause 43. Could the Minister please explain whether clauses 43 and 44 provide any operational benefit in terms of tackling smugglers operating abroad, and if so, how?

--- Later in debate ---

We know that law enforcement is calling out for these powers. In oral testimony, we heard comprehensively from operationally and frontline-focused senior leaders that they want to be able to do more to get ahead of these threats. One of the great things about the Bill is that it has been drafted by people who have listened to the experts, and it will give them the resources they need. As a consequence, we will be able to secure our border and make sure that people are safe on our streets.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The hon. Member for Weald of Kent may be familiar with the provisions in clauses 43 and 44, because they were in a Bill introduced by her predecessor, the right hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), who is now the shadow Home Secretary. That Bill was interrupted by the general election. Oddly, I chaired that Bill Committee in the last Parliament and listened to him make a speech about this issue. I therefore hope that there will be no real objection to the powers we need to take in clauses 43 and 44 to make it easier to disrupt and prevent harm from serious organised crime, some of the tools used in it and the facilitators who enable it. Such people might not have been at the scene of the crime, but they have enabled a lot of harm by supplying or importing the goods that I mentioned.

There are two sets of offences, which are designed to target different types of activity. The hon. Member for Weald of Kent asked about the evidential burden. These articles do not have ordinary, normal uses that I would consider legitimate. Printing 3D guns, or having pill presses in order to produce drugs for street sale, does not seem to be as legitimate as, say, purchasing a boat engine or indeed a boat. Given that there are no real, legitimate uses for such items, we think that placing the evidential burden on the defence to explain why on earth the person charged with possessing them has them is wholly reasonable.

Clauses 43 and 44 are intended to disrupt serious organised crime efforts to penetrate our border with paraphernalia for producing drugs or guns, or any of the things that go along with serious organised crime activity in this country, and thereby to keep people safe. I hope that the Committee will support them.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 43 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 44 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 45

Confiscation of assets

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 45 amends the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to include offences related to the possession and supply of articles intended for serious crime, as outlined in clause 43. It will enable law enforcement agencies to seize the assets of individuals convicted under clause 43.

Specifically, the clause adds:

“Offences relating to things for use in serious crime”

to the criminal lifestyle schedules for England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. A defendant convicted of an offence listed in those schedules will automatically be deemed to have led a criminal lifestyle and to have benefited from criminal conduct over a period of time. That means that assets obtained or spent in the six years prior to conviction are presumed to be derived from criminal conduct and are subject to confiscation unless the defendant can prove otherwise. However, the court is not required to make that assumption if it would result in injustice or is shown to be incorrect.

Confiscation orders are calculated based on the defendant’s monetary gains from crime—known as the benefit—and the assets they have available to them when the order is made. Orders are made to reflect the amount gained from crime and can be increased if the defendant’s finances improve. Non-payment of orders can lead to the defendant returning to prison.

By including these offences in the Proceeds of Crime Act, we can target financially criminals who profit from facilitating crime, disrupting both the crime and the financial gains that support it.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 45 allows the relevant articles listed under clause 44 to be confiscated under the Proceeds of Crime Act. We support this measure.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 45 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 46

Electronic monitoring requirements

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The purpose of clause 46 is to remove any ambiguity about the court’s power to impose electronic monitoring as a condition of a serious crime prevention order or interim serious crime prevention order.

As currently drafted, the clause applies in England and Wales for any serious crime prevention order or interim serious crime prevention order, and in Scotland and Northern Ireland in terrorism-related cases only. However, since the Bill’s introduction, further legal complexities have come to light regarding the devolved Governments’ powers to impose an electronic monitoring condition. Pending agreement from the Scottish Cabinet Secretary, an amendment will be tabled to remove that express provision for Scotland. Northern Ireland’s position is still to be determined. I point that devolution complication out to Committee members and will keep them informed as those discussions develop.

Electronic monitoring serves as a deterrent, but it also improves the detection of any breaches. If the subject violates the conditions, it enables quicker intervention by law enforcement agencies. The clause outlines specific requirements for both the courts and the individual, including the obligation for the subject to consent to the installation and maintenance of monitoring equipment and to avoid tampering with it.

Additional safeguards are included. For instance, electronic monitoring can be imposed only for up to 12 months at a time, with the possibility of extension. A further safeguard requires the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice on handling monitoring data, ensuring consistency and clarity for law enforcement.

This clause on electronic monitoring for those subject to serious crime prevention orders will enhance the effectiveness of such orders and interim SCPOs, supporting efforts to disrupt serious and organised crime, reduce harm and protect the public. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 46 allows the courts to impose an electronic monitoring requirement as part of a serious crime prevention order. The clause is helpful for investigating suspects who are already in the UK, and we broadly support it. Will the Minister confirm that the requirement for electronic monitoring will apply to those who are on immigration bail? What value does the Minister feel serious crime prevention orders might have as a deterrent for those operating abroad?

Clause 46 specifies that there will be a code of practice to outline the expectations, safeguards and broad responsibilities for the data gathered, retention and sharing of information on these orders. When will that code of practice be issued, and can the Minister please outline what the Government expect to be included?

[Mr Will Forster (Woking) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Siobhain. I would like the Minister to define electronic monitoring for us, if she can. I do not believe that there is such a definition in the Bill or in other Acts of Parliament. As a result, I worry that there is confusion, so I would welcome her thoughts.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

We are talking about electronic monitoring in the context of serious crime prevention orders; we are not talking about monitoring simply in connection to being an asylum seeker or migrant. I would not want Opposition Members to worry or mix up those two things.

This part of the Bill is about dealing with serious and organised criminality, some of which will involve people smuggling, and some of which will involve drugs, firearms or other serious organised crime. This is electronic tagging in the context of the granting of serious and organised crime orders, or interim serious and organised crime orders, which are designed to disrupt and prevent the activities of serious organised crime groups, not just general asylum seekers or migrants. Obviously, there may be some connection between the two, but it is not direct in this area.

Those orders and their conditions, such as electronic monitoring, therefore will not apply to migrants generally. Law enforcement agencies use serious crime prevention orders to manage individuals who have been convicted of, or are suspected of, serious criminality, where the order will protect the public by preventing, restricting or disrupting the person’s involvement in serious crime.

Serious crime prevention orders can be imposed on offenders for a range of offences relating to people smuggling. The specific conditions of the order will be a matter for the judge in the High Court who makes it, and for the law enforcement body that makes the application. This is very focused, and it is all about the context of the individual who has been served with such an order. For that to happen, there has to be evidence of their involvement in serious and organised crime.

Clearly, tagging is about being able to check where people are, while electronic monitoring can also apply to other activity. It will apply in a particular context to a particular person for disruption reasons, so there is not one definition of electronic tagging. I hope that helps the hon. Member for Woking to understand the monitoring that we are talking about. On that basis, I hope members of the Committee will agree to clause 46.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 46 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 47

Interim serious crime prevention orders

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss schedule 2.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 47 introduces interim serious crime prevention orders as part of the wider regime of serious crime prevention orders established under the Serious Crime Act 2007. Interim serious crime prevention orders are designed to protect the public while a full serious crime prevention order application is considered. The Court can impose an interim serious crime prevention order within hours, imposing a range of conditions and restrictions to disrupt further criminal behaviour. For example, anyone suspected of being involved in people trafficking or other serious crime could face bans on travel, using the internet and mobile phone use.

--- Later in debate ---

[Katie Lam]

Clause 47 introduces a new provision for interim serious crime prevention orders. These allow the High Court to impose immediate restrictions, pending the determination of a full serious crime prevention order application. The Court can do that if it considers that it is just to do so. Can the Minister explain a little more by what process the Court will decide whether it is just? Is the criterion that it is necessary for public protection?

Proposed new section 5F of the Serious Crime Act makes provision for without notice applications. That is where the application for an interim serious crime prevention order, or the variation of an interim serious crime prevention order, is made without notice being given to the person against whom the order is made, in circumstances where notice of that application is likely to prejudice the outcome. Subsection (2) of proposed new section 5F makes provision for the Court to allow the relevant person to make representations about the order as soon as is reasonably practicable. Can the Minister explain whether that will always happen after the order is granted?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The High Court will be empowered to impose an interim serious crime prevention order if it considers it just to do so. In other words, it is not an evidential test, because the Court does not apply a standard of proof. Rather, it invites the Court to impose an order before it has heard and tested all the evidence in instances that require fast-paced action to prevent and disrupt serious and organised crime. It is therefore an exercise of judgment or evaluation. There is a precedent for this approach in interim sexual risk orders and interim slavery and trafficking risk orders, which are currently a feature of the system and work reasonably well.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 47 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 2 agreed to.

Clause 48

Applicants for making of orders and interim orders

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Currently, the High Court can make a serious crime prevention order only upon application from the Crown Prosecution Service, the Serious Fraud Office and the police in terrorism-related cases. However, High Court serious crime prevention orders have not been fully utilised; between 2011 and 2021, only two applications were made, and only one resulted in a successful order. Clause 48 extends the list of agencies that can apply directly to the High Court for a serious crime prevention order, or an interim serious crime order, to the National Crime Agency, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the police in all cases, including the British Transport Police and the Ministry of Defence Police. The clause also specifies who within each agency is authorised to apply for these orders.

This extension will simplify and expedite the application processes for serious crime prevention orders, making it easier for agencies that are directly involved in tackling serious crime to make an application where appropriate. It gets rid of a gateway process that has proven to be so tight that it has not allowed very many of these orders to go forward at all. Those agencies are often best placed to apply for a serious crime prevention order as they already have an in-depth knowledge of the case.

The clause also requires the CPS to be consulted by the applicant authority, as it will continue to have responsibility for ensuring that the order is not used as a substitute for prosecution. That is a very important part of ensuring that these orders work appropriately. In practice, this clause will make serious crime prevention orders more readily available to the agencies that are most likely to use them, to ensure that this powerful tool is used to best effect to protect the public by preventing and disrupting serious and organised crime.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 48 details who can apply to make orders and interim orders, and it replaces and extends the previous list in section 8 of the Serious Crime Act 2007. Can the Minister please explain how long an application for an interim serious crime prevention order might take when made to either the High Court or the Crown court?

[Tom Hayes]

I want to reflect on where we have got up to. We have moved through the clauses at quite a pace, and that is very pleasing to see. The Bill responds to the requests of operationally and frontline-focused people in law enforcement and border security, and it is an attempt to give them the tools and powers that they need. I particularly wanted to mention that in the context of interim serious crime prevention orders, which we have spoken about in clauses 47 and 48.

That cuts such a sharp contrast with what has happened over recent years. In 2022, one Home Secretary introduced the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. At the time, the Government said that that would deter people from crossing in small boats, but it did not. In 2023, another Home Secretary brought in the Illegal Migration Act 2023. At the time, the Government said that that would turn people away from crossing the channel in small boats, but it did not. In 2024, another Home Secretary brought in the Safety of Rwanda Act, which happily we have just repealed today. At the time, the Government talked about the prospect of sending people to Rwanda, and they said that alone would be sufficient to deter people from crossing the channel in small boats. It is no wonder that that failed, too.

I wanted to set out how in 2022, 2023 and 2024 we had three separate Acts, which all aimed to do something and failed to do so. They have not delivered what operationally focused people have requested. We really need to look at how, just eight months into this new Government, we are turning the page on our asylum system and giving enforcement powers to the people who need them. We are also tidying up the statute book and ensuring greater co-ordination across the key agencies that can secure our border. I commend clause 48 to the Committee, as I do the series of clauses before it and the Bill overall.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The idea behind the creation of interim serious crime prevention orders is to ensure that they can be brought into use ahead of a longer lasting serious crime prevention order. The widening of the range of organisations that can apply for them is designed to empower organisations such as the National Crime Agency, HMRC and the MOD police to apply, because they are much closer to the evidence that could enable the disruption of a particular serious organised crime group.

The hon. Member for Weald of Kent asked how long it would take to get such an order, and that would vary from case to case. It depends on the evidence. As I pointed out in relation to the previous clause, this is about the High Court reviewing the papers. It is not about a trial or a pre-trial; it is just about issuing an order that will prevent something that might cause damage from happening. We think that the changes made by the clauses that we have just debated, up to and including clause 48, make it more likely that serious and organised crime orders will be used and will be effective.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 48 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 49

Notification requirements

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 49 amends the Serious Crime Act 2007 to introduce a standardised list of notification requirements for individuals and bodies corporate that are subject to serious crime prevention orders. This is a process of standardisation. Currently, notification requirements are added at the court’s discretion on a case-by-case basis. The clause will standardise those requirements for all serious crime prevention orders, improving the consistency and monitoring of the orders across police forces.

We have worked closely with law enforcement partners to identify appropriate requirements. The standard list will include monitoring legitimate income, checking addresses or communication methods for signs that criminal activities are being re-established, and monitoring foreign travel to assess potential indications of a return to crime. The courts can then impose additional requirements and conditions as part of the serious crime prevention order.

For bodies corporate, a designated individual must be named to liaise with the police and provide the notifiable information—including personal details, employment, financial data and contact information—which is essential for law enforcement to ensure compliance and assess risk to public safety.

The clause includes a delegated power to add to the list of notification requirements, ensuring flexibility to meet operational needs as technology evolves. The statutory instrument will be subject to the draft affirmative procedure. Individuals who are subject to a serious crime prevention order must provide the notifiable information within three days of the order coming into force. Failure to provide information, or providing false information, will be a criminal offence punishable by a fine or up to five years’ imprisonment. The standardisation of notifications will improve consistency in managing serious criminals and improve law enforcement agencies’ ability to assess risk and therefore more effectively protect the public.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 49 sets out a prescribed set of notification requirements, so that a person who is subject to a serious crime prevention order is required to provide the police or the applicant authorities with certain information. We support the clause, although can the Minister explain why three days has been given as the deadline to respond with the notifiable information requested?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Three days seems a reasonable amount of time to allow the individual or body corporate concerned to gather the information, but also to ensure that the authorities get it in a timely way, so as to prevent any potential harm that might come from delay.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 49 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 50

Orders by Crown Court on acquittal or when allowing an appeal

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Currently, the High Court has the authority to impose a serious crime prevention order without a conviction, provided that the Court is satisfied that the person has been involved in serious crime and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the order will protect the public by preventing, restricting or disrupting their involvement in serious crime.

Clause 50 amends the Serious Crime Act 2007 to grant the Crown court the power to impose a serious crime prevention order on individuals who have been acquitted of an offence, or in circumstances where the appeal has been allowed, if the same two-limb test is met. There may be cases where a person is acquitted but a serious crime prevention order is still needed. This can happen if the threshold for a criminal conviction is not met but there is still enough evidence to show that the person is involved in serious crime, and that the order would protect the public.

The Crown court would have just heard the evidence of the case and would be in the best position to assess whether an order is necessary to protect the public. Again, this approach is not new; similar provisions are found in other laws, such as domestic abuse protection orders under the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, and restraining orders under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, where orders can still be issued even after an individual has been acquitted. The effect of this clause is to streamline the process, enabling serious crime prevention orders to be applied more regularly and effectively in appropriate cases.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 50 allows the Crown court the power to impose a serious crime prevention order on acquittal or when allowing an appeal. Subsection (2) provides that in order to impose a serious crime prevention order in these circumstances, the court has to be satisfied both that the person has been involved in serious crime and that the court has reasonable grounds to believe that the order would protect the public by preventing, restricting or disrupting involvement by that person in serious crime in England or Wales. Why do both tests need to be satisfied for a serious crime prevention order to be imposed? Where these cases involve acquittal, as the Minister outlined, it might be hard to satisfy the first test. It seems to us that the second test of protecting the public is sufficient grounds to impose a serious crime prevention order.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is a two-limb test. Obviously, the evidential test for criminal proceedings is beyond reasonable doubt. There is a lower evidential test in other court instances, and it may very well be that someone who did not pass the “beyond reasonable doubt” test in a criminal trial would still be considered by the court to be involved in criminal activity, and therefore they would pass the first limb of the test. They would pass the second limb as they would still be likely to be involved in criminal activity in the future. We think that the two-limb test is an appropriate response to protect civil liberties, while protecting the public from the behaviour of those who are involved in serious and organised crime. We think that that balance is about right.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 50 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Martin McCluskey.)

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Fifth sitting)

Angela Eagle Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 6th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Jo White (Bassetlaw) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. I want to reinforce the points made by my hon. Friends the Members for Dagenham and Rainham and for Clwyd East regarding amendment 17, tabled by the hon. Member for Stockton West. I firmly believe that the amendment actually serves to dilute the legislation.

The hon. Member does not consider the fact that many people are coerced into boats in the belief that they will be safe, because there will be lifejackets provided. However, many times those lifejackets do not meet EU or British standards, or children’s lifejackets are provided for every person on the boat—or, when people get on the boat, there are not enough lifejackets. The gangs who are using that to coerce people on to the boats should be prosecuted for that simple act.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Dame Angela Eagle)]

It has been a while since the sitting began, and it is easy to overlook that I have not been up on my feet so far. We have had an interesting debate. The amendments before us range from, at one end, the Opposition, whose amendments seek to criminalise everyone who gets in a small boat and presumably cart them directly to prison, through to the other end of the argument, represented with his usual passion by the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire, who feels that, if someone is an asylum seeker, they should be exempt from being judged at all on the behaviour that happens on the boat.

I will deal with some of those points in turn, but I also want to compliment my colleagues who have made their own comments and some very important points in this debate. It is important, as my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh said, that we are clear-eyed about what is happening in the channel. We can be romantic about it in many ways, as the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire often appear to be, or we can regard all those who come over as criminals and a threat, but the truth is somewhere in between.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East made a moving speech about the realities of what can happen in these circumstances; it is easy to forget, when we are sat in a nice warm Committee Room—although it is not always warm, facing as it does on to the river. Imagine ending up in the water in the channel, Mr Stuart; you can last only so long. You could easily have a heart attack in that cold water and not be resuscitated. Clearly, if you are a child, or vulnerable in any other way, then that is likely to happen—and it will happen to you first.

My hon. Friends the Members for Bassetlaw, for Clwyd East and for Dover and Deal made important points about the realities too. I will come on to what the Government are trying to do with this offence and why it is in the Bill, but I will deal with the amendments first. I hope I will be able to answer some of the questions that have been asked during this important debate—[Interruption.] I also hope that my voice is going to last out.

Amendment 15 focuses on the length of the sentence attached to clause 18 and seeks to increase the sentence from six to 14 years where an irregular entrant arrival has caused or created a risk of serious personal injury or death to others during a sea crossing to the UK. Clause 18 introduces a new criminal offence that is to be inserted into section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971. The current sentence for the offence of arriving in breach of a deportation order under section 24(A1) of the Immigration Act is five years.

Because clause 18 will be inserted into section 24 of the Act, the intention of the clause is to ensure that, given the egregious and serious natures of the acts committed under the new offence, the maximum sentencing is increased, albeit remaining in line with the existing sentencing framework in section 24 of the Act. The issues about the length of sentence are all about keeping sentencing in that section of the Immigration Act coherent. Grabbing extra, lengthier sentences out of the air to insert them into the Act can create inconsistency and mess up the structures of sentencing involved in the Act, making it less coherent than it should be. The sentence of five years was reached after discussions with partners about all the sentences and offences in this particular area, and it rightly reflects that coherence.

An increased sentence of six years is considered to be appropriate for the endangerment offence. It furthers the deterrence aim of the policy, but is not so severe as to deter prosecutors from bringing a prosecution in the first instance. That is another area in which the rhetoric of even longer sentences deters prosecutors from bringing charges at all. We have seen that with the facilitation offences, where the introduction of a life sentence has led to fewer prosecutions being pursued; prosecutors think that for a sentence of that length, more obvious evidence has to be accrued, so they charge fewer people. An increased sentence can sometimes have a perverse effect on the system. We think that the sentence in the Bill is in keeping with the Immigration Act and is about right.

[Mr Will Forster (Woking) (LD)]

I am pleased that the Minister talked about the length of the sentence, which we have not talked about very much in the debate so far. Fourteen years is the maximum sentence for placing explosives with intent to cause bodily injury, and for such other offences as causing death by dangerous driving. To me, 14 years is more applicable in those cases. Does she agree? I do not understand the rationale for 14 years.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Yes, and it is not for me to get into the head of the hon. Member for Stockton West. Perhaps he will talk to us about why he picked that particular number. I agree with the hon. Member for—is it Worthing? [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Woking—I knew it began with a W, and my own constituency begins with a W, so we are there or thereabouts in the dictionary.

Similarly, amendment 16 seeks to increase the sentence from five years to 14 years where an irregular migrant or arrival has caused or created a risk of serious personal injury or death to others during a sea crossing to the UK and is entering without the requisite leave to enter, entry clearance or electronic travel authorisation. As with the approach taken to those who arrive in breach of a deportation order, and as discussed in relation to amendment 15, clause 18 will provide an increased sentence compared with the offences under section 24(B1), (D1) and (E1) of the Immigration Act.

--- Later in debate ---

[Pete Wishart]

I am sorry to see that the Minister is still bravely struggling with a cold—the Committee has noticed. A variety of offences are available to the courts to make sure that anybody who endangers people at sea can be prosecuted. There is illegal arrival, there is facilitating the illegal entry of others, and there is what Ibrahima Bah was convicted of—gross negligence manslaughter. These offences are all currently available to the prosecutorial authorities. I do not know why the Minister feels she needs this new offence. It can only be because she has a particular target in mind against whom she wants to apply these rules. Can she confirm that?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I will try to give the hon. Gentleman some insight. I was going to come on to this when addressing the clause itself, but it is in the Bill because we have perceived a change in behaviour in some areas.

There has been an increase in physical aggression towards other people, including migrants and third parties. There is a lot more violence on the beaches against French police. There is intimidating and controlling behaviour on the boats. People are preventing others from disembarking or calling for help when the boat gets into difficulty. There are physical acts that result in harm being caused to another person either while boarding a boat or while on a boat. People are being pushed off boats, including in shallow French territorial waters. The pilots sometimes decide to continue on to the UK even when there have been fatalities or serious harm on the boat. We are now seeing a range of behaviours that clause 18 will allow us to address.

I will address amendment 5, but the view of the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire is that no asylum seeker should be charged with this new criminal offence, which would render clause 18 unworkable and pointless, as 95% of people who come across on small boats claim asylum. How one behaved on the boat across will be in the purview of clause 18, whether it is dangling children over the side or forcing women and children to sit in the middle—often the middle of the boats come free and collapse, so the women and children are the first to die. Where women and children are forced to sit in the middle, they sometimes arrive in the UK with horrific burns because of the combination of fuel and seawater, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East said.

I simply do not agree with the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire that, just because someone will claim asylum when they get to the UK, none of their behaviour on the way over should have any bearing on what happens when they get here. Clause 18, which creates a new criminal offence under section 24 of the Immigration Act, will not criminalise everyone who makes these crossings. It would be pointless and completely unworkable if we sought to do that, as the Opposition amendments do. It is about addressing, discouraging and deterring the acts that cause or create a risk of serious injury or death to others, which we are now seeing from individuals travelling to the UK by small boats.

There have to be consequences for anyone who further jeopardises the safety and lives of others during these dangerous crossings. There are those who insist on continuing their journey when assistance is at hand, who refuse assistance, and often, when there have been fatalities, try to prevent others from being rescued. Clause 18 addresses specific acts that create or cause a risk of serious injury or death to others during a journey. We heard in oral evidence how these journeys are being made more dangerous by such acts, and clause 18 is a response to the increasing propensity of this kind of behaviour.

There have been shocking and tragic cases of women and children being forced and intimidated into life-threatening positions during journeys that are already dangerous enough, which is exactly the type of offending that clause 18 aims to target. The approach cannot simply be to say that whatever happens on the boat, stays on the boat. The new offence is another tool designed to curb the endangerment of life. It sits alongside other activity against gangs that intentionally place people in danger by selling these crossings as a viable route to the UK. This Government take fatalities and injuries at sea extremely seriously, and we are going further than ever to try to bring an end to them.

[Pete Wishart]

I thank the Minister for her full response to the amendments before the Committee. I totally agree with her on amendment 17, and I hope the Committee rejects it. It is a ridiculous and unworkable proposition that everybody who comes to our shores should be criminalised almost immediately upon arrival.

A couple of things have been said in this debate that I want to challenge and take head on, including the idea that everything is black and white, that people are either the exploited or the exploiters. Everybody accepts that there is a grey area. I think every member of this Committee believes that those who behave in a reprehensible, appalling and awful way, whether on the small boats or in getting people on to the small boats, should rightly face the full force of the law.

The Minister is right to highlight all those examples of the dangerous behaviour that happens during some of these journeys. None of us would want people to get away with that behaviour, but the Bill does not refer to such activity, and there is nothing in the guidance or the explanatory notes. Nothing in the Bill specifies this type of behaviour. As the Bill progresses, the Minister will have to make sure it mentions such behaviour.

The other challenge with the type of activity the Minister describes is how to get the evidence. This activity is happening in the most chaotic circumstances, on small boats coming across the channel. We know these things are reported, and we know that people are arrested and face the full force of the law, but the Minister still has to convince the Committee that a new offence is needed, and that certain categories of migrant will not be caught up.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Bool]

I did not hear from the Minister a response on the Law Society’s concern about parents and guardians being criminalised, and I wonder whether I could hear some thoughts on that.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

In general, it is not expected that parents will be criminalised, but there is not a total ban on that. It will depend on what has happened and what the circumstances were. That will be looked at on a case-by-case basis. It is difficult to be more explicit about that, given that the nature of the offence represents a stricter law that is meant to deter people from making small boat crossings. It is a signal to smugglers and passengers that fatalities and injuries at sea are taken extremely seriously, so there may well be consequences for particular unacceptable behaviour of the sort that I have talked about. I would not want there to be an absolute exclusion, but I would not expect a large cohort of people to fall within the purview of the new offences.

[Matt Vickers]

I thank Members for their considered contributions. Effective international partnerships can be useful, but I would not want to deny anyone the right to scrutinise a partner on Twitter, particularly one to whom we pay so much money. The previous Government were right to toughen up on sentences for the worst offences. They were right to restrict prisoner release during the pandemic. That put pressure on the prison system, and that that is why the previous Government were also right to undertake the biggest prison building programme since the Victorian era. I realise that the Labour party did not agree, but it was right that the previous Government used the Nationality and Borders Act to increase the penalty for people smugglers to a life sentence.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Sixth sitting)

Angela Eagle Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 6th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider clauses 20 and 26 stand part.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Dame Angela Eagle)]

It is a pleasure to welcome you back to the Chair, Mr Stuart, for what will be a marathon session. Clause 19 provides definitions for the key expressions used in relation to the electronic devices measure. These definitions mean that the measure will focus the powers only on irregular entrants who are in possession of an electronic device that authorised officers have reasonable groups to suspect contains information relating to facilitation offences under the Immigration Act 1971.

Furthermore, clause 19 defines “authorised officer” as:

“an immigration officer, or…a constable of a police force maintained by a local policing body”.

The aim of the powers is to gain access to information held on such devices on the organised crime groups who help facilitate or plan migrants’ dangerous journey and, as a result, to save lives from being lost. The clause is integral in defining the key expressions relating to how the powers can be used.

Clause 20 enables immigration officers within the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and police constables in England and Wales only to search an irregular entrant if they have reasonable grounds to suspect that they are in possession of an electronic device that contains information linked to a facilitation offence. That power enables the search of a person, property, premises, vehicle or container. That is to ensure that, in any circumstances in which it is necessary to obtain a device, the authorised officer can use the powers to conduct a search. The clause contains safeguards to ensure the powers are used appropriately. Clause 20 provides clarity over how searches must be conducted in accordance with these powers.

Finally, clause 26 defines any additional expressions referenced throughout clauses 19 to 23. That will ensure that it is clear to users of the powers what key expressions mean. It is important to be transparent about what is meant and to ensure that the public and authorised officers fully understand these expressions.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

We support clauses 19 to 26, but only in so far as they endorse powers that we think already exist to seize, extract and retain data from mobile devices. Clause 19 provides definitions of key terms in sections 20 and 21 relating to the provisions of those clauses to allow authorised officers to search for, seize and retain relevant articles. The definition of a “relevant article” is

“any thing which appears to an authorised officer to be a thing on which information that relates, or may relate, to the commission of an offence under section 25 or 25A of the Immigration Act 1971 is, or may be, stored in electronic form.”

Will the Minister provide some concrete examples of what the Government think such information might consist of?

Clause 20 gives relevant officers—either an immigration officer or a police constable—powers to search a relevant person, which is someone who has entered the UK without leave or in breach of a deportation order. Will the Minister explain why subsection (2) does not allow for any more than one search after the person in question has arrived in the UK? The clause gives officers the power to search for “relevant articles”, which are described in clause 19 as

“any thing which appears to an authorised officer to be a thing on which information that relates, or may relate, to the commission (whether in the past or future) of an offence under section 25 or 25A of the Immigration Act 1971”.

That is quite a narrow definition, as it covers just electronic devices. Will the Minister reassure the Committee that the necessary powers to search for non-electronic items exist elsewhere? In practice, we suspect the power will be used to gather information and evidence to identify smugglers for prosecution. We fully support that, but most mobile devices are destroyed during or prior to travelling across the channel. Will the Minister therefore explain whether she expects any of the evidence gathered using the powers in these clauses to be used to support decision making on immigration enforcement?

If the devices are seized, as the former director general of Border Force pointed out in his evidence, they may contain useful information about nationality, identity, age and travel history, and may provide valuable evidence when assessing asylum claims. Will the Minister explain how effective the new powers will be in supporting evidence gathering to remove those with no right to be here? Will information gathered using these powers be available to asylum screening teams? Will that evidence be used in decision making for immigration appeals? These clauses do not have extraterritorial reach, so can the Minister explain to what extent the Government envisage these additional powers will make a meaningful difference to smashing the gangs, when many of the perpetrators are located outside the UK?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The proposed powers will enable immigration officers and the police to search for, seize, retain and extract information from electronic devices, but only based on two criteria. The first is reasonable grounds to suspect that the person has a relevant electronic device and that it contains information that relates, or may relate, to the commission, whether in the past or future, of an offence under sections 25 or 25A of the Immigration Act 1971—the facilitation offence.

The second criterion is that the person must be an irregular arrival or entrant. Currently, the Illegal Migration Act 2023, which is on the statute book until we get this Bill made into an Act, allows for blanket seizure, and searching for all purposes, of all phones. We are repealing that very wide power and replacing it with this one, which is much more targeted than the IMA one.

The hon. Member for Stockton West hinted that we should use this clause to widen the powers, or allow all the information on the phone to be used for all purposes. That is not what we are suggesting. In fact, part of the reason why the Illegal Migration Act powers of seizure was never operationalised is that building the sheer capacity to take everyone’s phones off them and download the contents and analyse what was on all of them defeated the powers that be, and the technical ability to do so has not yet been developed.

It seems to us, from talking to organisations in the police, and the National Crime Agency, who follow these things very closely, that the best and most targeted way to get at some of this information is to have these criteria. There must be reasonable grounds to suspect, and that is not a blanket thing. These are intelligence-led powers, which will lead us potentially to certain individuals, so that we can take a device off them and analyse what is on it.

Experience suggests that what is on such devices can be very revealing. I will not list things here, because I do not want to produce a list of things that people should not leave on their phones that is essentially public, but we all use our telephones and other devices in ways that we all know about, and we probably would be very sobered if we realised how much Apple knows about us, for example, just by looking at its own records. A lot can be gleaned, but there must be reasonable suspicion that the individuals whose devices are taken are involved in facilitation—not just coming over, under section 24, but under section 25, which is facilitation, the more serious offence.

The hon. Member for Stockton West said he thought those powers already existed. In the Illegal Migration Act, yes, but they are completely uncommenced and not put into effect, and are far too blanket to be useful. There is a current power to seize, but that power does not enable immigration officials or police constables to search and seize devices in many circumstances at all. First, a person must be under arrest before that can be done, and we think that, as part of our intelligence-led, counter-terrorism-style powers to defeat organised immigration crime, being able to search a bit ahead, and certainly ahead of an arrest, is a useful power, so that is what these clauses provide for.

The hon. Member for Stockton West asked whether information found on phones could be used for asylum casework. No, we do not think that is appropriate. This focused power allows us to search for information and evidence about organised immigration criminality, not about any other aspect of the person’s existence. There are clauses that we will come to later, however, that would enable us to operationalise the information we have, particularly if other crimes come to light as a result of a search.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 19 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 20 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 21

Powers to seize and retain relevant articles

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 21 provides immigration officers in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and police constables in England and Wales, with the power to seize and retain electronic devices. Clause 21 provides a clear and detailed approach for authorised officers to ensure that the powers are correctly, efficiently and effectively used.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 21 gives authorised officers the power to seize any electronic device that has been found in a search under clause 20, or is not found on a search but appears to the officer to be, or to have been, in the possession of a relevant person. How would officers determine whether an article appears to be or to have been in the possession of a relevant person? What is the evidence threshold for that?

My question for the Minister about clause 21 is similar to my one about clause 20. Will the powers be used to gather evidence that can be used in immigration decision making and appeals? The Opposition support the powers in this clause, in so far as they go.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I am glad that the hon. Gentleman supports the powers, but I emphasise to him again that clause 21 is very much in the context of the clauses that we have just agreed. It is a more limited—not a blanket—power. It exists within the parameters that I set out in the previous debate.

I emphasise again that none of the information seized in this context could be used in an asylum case; it is for the purposes of dealing with organised immigration crime. It is not for wider purposes, unless other criminality is found, in which case it becomes available and can be passed on. That will be dealt with in some clauses that are coming up. But these provisions are limited to collecting evidence and intelligence on organised immigration crime from people who have just entered the country illegally.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 22

Duty to pass on items seized under section 21

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 22 will provide immigration officers using the powers with the duty to pass on electronic devices to other agencies, such as the police. The clause will be used if an electronic device seized contains information about a non-immigration offence—this is the case that I was hinting at earlier. Clause 22 provides the process to be used in these types of cases. We cannot seize an electronic device without that process in place, because we may discover information relating to a criminal offence, such as a counter-terrorism offence or an offence related to indecent and/or obscene material of a child—those kinds of offence. If we discover evidence of such activities on a phone, we must act, and to act we have to have the processes in place to enable items to be forwarded to police or any other agency that needs to take possession of the device for its investigation into the other criminality.

The clause provides for a robust step-by-step process to ensure that immigration officers know what actions to take to forward the device or if the agency to which we wish to forward the device refuses to accept it for an investigation.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 22 gives authorised officers the duty to pass on seized items that have been found in a search under clause 21 where there is a reasonable belief that the article or information stored on it has been obtained in consequence of, or is evidence in relation to, an offence other than the relevant immigration offence. The immigration officer is under a duty to notify someone who has the functions to investigate the relevant offence. What might be the reasons why a person notified under the clause might not accept the article, and what would be an acceptable reason? If a relevant person refuses to accept the article, what are the next steps? We support the powers in the clause so far as they go.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is a bit difficult to talk about specific circumstances in a generalised way. As the hon. Gentleman will perceive, there may be some material on a phone that police or immigration officers are worried breaks the criminal law—I talked about counter-terrorism and child sexual exploitation as potential examples. That information may be passed on and the relevant authorities might decide that it was not at a criminal level—that would be the kind of occasion that the hon. Gentleman was asking me about.

However, one would assume that, with the appropriate training, it would be fairly obvious whether something would be a worry for the purposes of counter-terrorism or child sexual abuse, and police forces could understand whether they have an obligation to try to prevent criminal activity of a category other than that for which the phone was originally seized. Once we begin to seize phones for narrow purposes, we have to make certain that passing on that information is lawful, and that is the purpose of the clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 22 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 23

Powers to access, copy and use information stored on relevant articles

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 22—Access to mobile phone location data—

“(1) The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 86 (Part 3: interpretation), after subsection (2A)(b), insert—

‘(c) illegal immigration.’

(3) The Immigration Act 2016 is amended as follows.

(4) In paragraph 4 of Schedule 10, (electronic monitoring condition), after subsection (2)(d) insert—

‘(e) involve the tracking of P using P’s mobile phone location data.’”

This new clause would allow law enforcement to access mobile phone location data of people who enter the UK illegally.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I will wait until the hon. Member for Stockton West has spoken to his new clause before I respond to anything he says about it; I will briefly outline what clause 23 does and if the hon. Gentleman wants a reply, I will come back at the end.

Clause 23 will ensure that authorised officers can assess, examine, copy and use information stored on a relevant article. It will enable authorised officers to copy the information from electronic devices so that the device can be returned to the owner as soon as possible. The clause is vital to enable authorised officers to obtain the information needed in relation to facilitation offences under sections 25 and 25A of the Immigration Act 1971, to use for purposes relating to the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of such an offence. It is very much targeted at organised immigration crime and the facilitation of illegal entry to this country.

Clause 23 will help the Government to tackle organised crime groups, protect migrants from exploitation and prevent lives from being lost on dangerous journeys across the channel. Obtaining that information will further focus our approach to tackling organised crime groups, identifying as early as possible the trends in the activities of gangs, including their modus operandi, and providing the Government with improved information to prevent future fatalities.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 23 gives authorised officers the power to access, copy and use information stored on relevant articles that have been retained under powers detailed in clause 21, and authorises the use of any information retained under this clause relating to the prevention, detection and investigation, or prosecution of such an offence. We support the powers in the clause. However, it is important to bolster the utility of the powers in clauses 20, 21 and 23. It is for that reason that we have tabled new clause 22, picking up on the suggestion made by the former director general of Border Force in his written evidence to the Committee.

We have tabled the new clause because currently Border Force and immigration enforcement officers are not able to use mobile devices to track illegal migrants on bail. Although powers exist for electronic tagging, there are difficulties with using these powers and so they are not frequently used. At present, mobile devices can be used only for tracking people for serious offences. Under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, an illegal entry into the UK does not count as a serious offence for these purposes.

Mobile devices are often used by migrants on bail to report by phone rather than in person, which minimises their risk of arrest and detention on reporting. Without access to location data about illegal migrants, they are able to stay at addresses not listed on their bail forms. If immigration officers were able to make use of location data from mobile devices, they would be better able to secure compliance with bail conditions and thus reduce the risk of absconding.

New clause 22 would allow law enforcement to access the mobile phone location data of people who enter the UK illegally. It would do so by adding illegal immigration to the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 as a serious offence that allows location data to be used. We would also amend the Immigration Act 2016 to allow a person’s mobile phone location data to be used as part of electronic monitoring for immigration enforcement.

Of course, migrants can change phones, but they are more likely to make use of them than electronic tags. In our view, the new clause would add a useful new power to immigration enforcement teams. I am very keen to hear the Minister’s view.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

New clause 22 proposes an amendment to section 86(2A) of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. However, I do not think that this proposal is either necessary or appropriate.

The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 provides law enforcement and other relevant public authorities with the ability to acquire communications data covertly, where it is necessary and proportionate to do so. Members of the Committee should particularly focus on the seriousness of the powers conferred in the 2016 Act, including the ability to covertly acquire communications data where it is necessary and proportionate to do so.

With new clause 22, the question arises as to whether it is appropriate to add immigration issues to that area of the law, and whether, with an immigration issue, it would be necessary and proportionate to start acquiring covertly communications in an immigration setting. It is important to consider whether that would unbalance the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 and cause some issues that would probably weaken it.

The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 is intentionally neutral on the specific types of crime for which the powers within it can be deployed. Instead, it sets a threshold for serious crime, to enable access to more intrusive powers. The threshold for the acquisition of communications data—the who, when, how and where of communication, but not the content—is set out in section 86(2A) of the Investigatory Powers Act. Events data, which includes details of where and when a specific communication took place, is available only for crimes that meet the serious crime threshold. The threshold at section 86(2A)(a) of that Act is a crime for which a sentence of at least 12 months’ imprisonment can be handed down.

The proposed new clause does not define illegal immigration, but many of the immigration offences in section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971, as recently amended by the Nationality and Borders Act, will already meet the serious crime threshold. There is no real reason to put immigration crime in there; it is already implicitly included. If we start to add particular instances, that will unbalance the way that the Investigatory Powers Act works. That is a technical point, but it is about keeping our statute book coherent, rather than adding things in for effect. Essentially, since offences under section 24 of the 1971 Act are indictable, the serious crime threshold would already be met, so events data can already be acquired as part of the investigation. We do not need to go through the rigmarole in the new clause to emphasise what is already possible.

Where offences do not meet the serious crime threshold, it would not be proportionate to extend the use of events data to those crimes. The right to private and family life is set out in article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998, and it is important to uphold our obligations to the European convention on human rights. I know that is not always the most popular thing among Opposition Members, but as someone who voted for it in 1998, I am still quite proud of it. Defending our human rights and ensuring that such things are proper, proportionate and lawful is an important part of trying to pursue and deal with difficult cases with certain standards of behaviour.

Although article 8 is a qualified right, we must ensure that interference remains necessary and proportionate to the level of criminality. By introducing specific crime types that do not meet the sentencing threshold, we risk eroding the safeguards in the regime. By taking away the rights of people who may seem marginalised at the moment, I submit that we are putting at risk our own rights, and human rights in general. That is not something that I would want the Government to do.

New clause 22 would also unnecessarily amend schedule 10 of the Immigration Act 2016. Where a person is subject to electronic monitoring as a condition of their immigration bail, the Home Office can access their location details via the GPS tag or non-fitted device. There is no need to access mobile phone location data, because there are already powers to monitor the whereabouts of individuals at risk of absconding. I hope that, having had that debate, the hon. Member for Stockton West will realise that those things are already covered in the way that we currently do things. I hope that he will not press the new clause to a vote, but obviously we will not know until we get on to voting on it—some time in the future.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 23 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 24

Amendment of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider clause 25 stand part.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clauses 24 and 25 deal with amendments to the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, extending those powers to other authorised officers and to key definitions in the clauses. Clause 24 includes amendments to the 2001 Act to extend powers of seizure where a device may contain legally privileged material, excluded material and special material. The 2001 Act also contains essential safeguards for the handling of such material. Extending its powers will ensure that the seizure of any device will not be prevented by claiming that it holds legally privileged, excluded or special material, which is often an excuse that is raised when such matters come up.

Furthermore, clause 24 will ensure that this data is protected, but that operationally, the information needed can still be taken for the purpose of these powers, and that seized electronic devices are returned as soon as reasonably possible.

Clause 25 provides the Secretary of State with the ability to extend the powers to other authorised officers, via secondary legislation, if they are required to support the disruption of organised immigration crime. The Government will ensure that any decisions on extending the powers to other authorised officers will be fully considered before action is taken.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 24 amends the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 so that provisions relating to the protection of legally privileged material and excluded and special material apply when mobile devices are seized under clauses 20 to 23. Can the Minister explain how often the Government envisage that those provisions would need to be invoked?

Clause 25 allows the Secretary of State to make regulations to extend the powers given to authorised officers in clauses 20 to 23, to be available to other people, including people designated by the Secretary of State. Why might these powers need to be extended to different categories of people? Who does the Minister have in mind? Why are those not included on the face of the Bill? Why was it judged appropriate that these powers are subject to the negative procedure?

Clause 26 defines key terms used in the preceding clauses, and we have no problem with those definitions.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Will Forster (Woking) (LD)]

Clauses 19 to 23 contain very wide powers. Often, police constables have those powers only when they are authorised and monitored by their superiors, but the powers in the Bill almost allow civil servants and immigration officers to use them without oversight. Clause 25, first, allows Ministers to extend those powers to privately employed staff, and secondly, does so without requiring Ministers to give directions for the exercise of those powers. That sits very poorly with me. I am quite concerned about that. I can understand why we need some broad powers, and I was happy to let the others go through on the nod, but clause 25 seems to go further still. Could the Minister try to reassure me—or us? Particularly, would the Government agree to issue directions for the use of those powers, either today or before MPs vote fully, on Report? I think some colleagues out there will say that the private sector should not have these powers, but if they are clearly identified and statutory guidance is issued, I would feel a lot more reassured.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The first thing to say is that the powers under the Criminal Justice and Police Act are already used by law enforcement and apply in many statutes. Therefore, all of these powers will be used to ensure compatibility with ECHR protections, GDPR protections and data protection generally. We have a very high level of expectation when it comes to data protection in these instances.

Both hon. Gentlemen—the hon. Members for Stockton West and for Woking—have asked about the extension to further authorised people, which is potentially available as part of the clause. It is not unusual—the hon. Member for Woking has made this point—for the Government to hire and use contractors, on either a short-term or a long-term basis, depending on demand or business needs. One example that comes to mind in this context would be for a forensic data specialist to do analytics of the information that had been downloaded. [Interruption.] I am very sorry if that is me. Hopefully it is not.

Some of this is about ensuring flexibility in the statute, within the protections that I have just talked about—the GDPR, data protection legislation and ECHR requirements —to be able to deal with the information in all circumstances without having to come back to primary legislation. Clearly, those people would be working under the same data protection expectations and requirements as any directly employed person working for the Home Office.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider the following:

Clauses 28 and 29 stand part.

New clause 23—Exemptions from the UK GDPR: illegal migration and foreign criminals—

(1) The Data Protection Act 2018 is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (2)(b) of section 15 (Exemptions etc), at end insert “, and makes provision about the exemption from all GDPR provisions of persons who entered the United Kingdom illegally and foreign criminals;”

(3) In paragraph (2) of Schedule 2, after sub-paragraph (1) insert—

“(1A) GDPR provisions do not apply if the data subject entered the United Kingdom illegally or is a foreign criminal.

(1B) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1A)—

(a) a person “entered the United Kingdom illegally” if they entered the United Kingdom—

(i) without leave to enter, or

(ii) with leave to enter that was obtained by means which included deception by any person; and

(b) “foreign criminal” is defined in accordance with section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007.”

This new clause would disapply data protection laws from data on people who have entered the UK illegally or are Foreign National Offenders.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Again, I will reserve my comments on the new clause until after I have heard what Members on the Opposition Front Bench have to say about it.

The group entails clauses 27 to 29, which cover the arrangements for HMRC to supply information that it holds in connection with its customs functions. The group also covers new clause 23, which I will try and separate out so that I can try to answer the questions from the hon. Member for Stockton West, once he has put them.

Government Departments like the Home Office and law enforcement partners rely on information sharing for a range of purposes, including law enforcement and border security-related purposes. Key datasets are held by His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, many of which are held in connection with HMRC’s customs functions. Existing statutory provisions to share this information are complex, fragmented and restrictive in ways that prevent the Government from taking full advantage of technology such as modern big data analytic tools.

Clause 27 will create a new power for HMRC to supply information that it holds in connection with its customs functions to a range of recipients, including UK Ministers, Government Departments, police, and certain international partners. HMRC will be able to supply information for use for the purposes of any of the functions of the recipient.

The sharing of entire datasets and the use of customs information for more than just customs purposes will enable the Home Office and other partners to analyse the information to identify suspicious activity that would not be apparent if each dataset were considered in isolation. This will support key Government objectives, such as disrupting and dismantling organised crime groups, preventing the unlawful movement of people and goods into the country, prosecuting offenders and protecting vulnerable people, as well as the Government’s safer streets mission.

Clause 28 regulates how the information supplied under clause 27 may be used and disclosed by its recipients. The aim is to ensure that the information is fully safeguarded while also enabling Government Departments to use information received for any of their functions. That will ensure that maximum benefit can be derived from the information received.

Information shared under clause 27 is subject to a general rule: the person who receives it must only use it for the purposes for which it was supplied. They may not further disclose it to anyone without HMRC’s consent. However, there are a number of exceptions to this general rule that will enable certain recipients to use and disclose information more flexibly. UK Ministers, Government Departments and the police will be able to reuse customs information for any of their functions and further share it between themselves for specified border security and law enforcement-related purposes. Additionally, there will be extra onward disclosure permissions for the Home Secretary so that she may disclose the information to any person for use for certain immigration and customs-related purposes.

Clause 29 regulates how the information supplied onwards in accordance with clause 28 may be used and disclosed by its recipients. The aim is to ensure that the information is fully safeguarded. The clause focuses on making clear the restrictions surrounding the reuse and onward disclosure of information supplied under clause 28. Any person supplying information in reliance on clause 28 or 29 must notify the recipients of these restrictions, as they apply to the reuse and onward disclosure of the information. In recognition of the particular importance of protecting HMRC information, which can include a great deal of personal information, clause 29 extends the existing criminal offence of wrongful disclosure under section 19 of the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 to apply to any person who discloses information in contravention of these restrictions.

The intent of clause 29 is a continuation of the safeguards laid out in clause 28, while ensuring that none of the restrictions go against the spirit of the overall information-sharing provision. Clause 29 protects information from being shared beyond the provision’s intent. I will not deal with new clause 23, tabled by the hon. Member for Stockton West until he has spoken to it.

[Katie Lam (Weald of Kent) (Con)]

rose—

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Ah, the hon. Lady will speak to it.

[Katie Lam]

We welcome the powers in these clauses to share HMRC data. Border Force is responsible for clearing both people and goods at the UK border. There is international precedent for moving towards joint targeting centres for people and goods. From a law enforcement perspective and from ours, the more customs information that can be shared with UK and other Government agencies, the better. HMRC has a range of customs functions, including the collection and management of customs duty, monitoring and controlling the movement of goods, and control of cash entering or leaving the UK. HMRC is bound by a statutory framework of confidentiality and needs a lawful basis to disclose information.

Clause 27 will allow HMRC to share customs information in support of defending the security of the UK borders. The clause allows UK Ministers, Government Departments and the police to reuse customs information for any of their functions, as the Minister laid out. The clause also allows data to be shared with international organisations that have functions relating to the movement of goods or cash across international borders, or if an international arrangement makes provision for co-operation between that organisation and HRMC. We welcome the powers in clause 27. I would like to ask the Minister how often she expects these data-sharing powers to be used for law enforcement and her assessment of what practical effects the powers will have on making it easier to disrupt organised crime networks.

Clause 28, which we support, specifies the circumstances in which UK Government Departments, Ministers and the police can further share customs data. We also support clause 29 on the safeguards included in this clause. We have tabled new clause 23 to disapply data protection laws from data on those who have entered the UK illegally or are foreign national offenders. The purpose of the new clause is exactly the same as the purpose of clauses 27 to 29, which is to minimise barriers to data sharing between agencies for immigration and law enforcement purposes. We table it in the spirit of the support I have already mentioned for the Government’s aims regarding data access.

If someone has entered the UK illegally or is a foreign national offender, law enforcement for their removal is vital and GDPR legislation should not stand in the way of being able to gather and establish any necessary evidence for use in immigration appeals or law enforcement. We wish to remove the barriers to data sharing in these cases, and we know the Government want that too. We hope that they will find the suggested new clause useful.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I thank the hon. Lady for speaking to new clause 23. As she said, it seeks to disapply the protections afforded by the UK GDPR regulations to people who have entered illegally or who are foreign criminals. I think that would massively complicate data protection legislation, given that we would always have to keep an eye on who is a foreign national criminal or an immigration offender, over time as well as in the moment. That could make it harder to apply some of the data-sharing rules.

We believe that with the protections in clauses 27 to 29, we can get and share the information that we need to share, to its greatest effect, while protecting people from unlawful disclosure, without complicating things further by trying to check whether somebody is a foreign national offender or has entered the country illegally.

We have a strong history of maintaining high data protection standards. The legislation permits the use of personal data for legitimate purposes, such as immigration control, while giving the public the reassurance that such use will be subject to proportionate safeguards. Our approach will be to rely on the proportionate safeguards, rather than to disapply the entirety of data protection laws to certain groups of people who happen to be in our society at the moment. The proportionality test, with the focus on organised immigration crime, is important.

[Becky Gittins (Clwyd East) (Lab)]

Does the Minister agree that the lesson learned from the previous Government, with the blanket application of some seizure powers under the Illegal Migration Act being so complicated that they were not actually enforced properly—as we learned from one of our witnesses—is a cautionary tale illustrating why new clause 23 should be rejected?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is certainly a good idea to create legislation that can actually be commenced. Otherwise, we are just all having a fun time in Committee— I can see everyone agreeing with me—and not affecting the statute book, making it easier to do what must be done or enabling the law to help with that rather than having a gigantic problem. As a Minister, I am certainly in favour of enacting laws that we can commence, and I hope that we will be able to commence large parts of the Bill as soon as it has made its proper progress through both Houses.

The UK has a long history of maintaining high data protection standards. Complicating them by trying to disapply them for certain individuals who are in our society whether we want them to be or not implies that we would have to keep very up-to-date, regular records of every single person in the country to check their status. That sounds like ongoing identity checks across the whole population, and that is easier said than done. It is not Government policy, and I did not think it was Opposition policy either. Although the new clause is well meaning, it is a complication rather than an assistance.

Where the exercise of data subject rights, such as the right to seek access to personal data, could undermine the tasks, appropriate exemptions can be applied on a case-by-case basis. Disapplying data protection rules in a blanket fashion for certain groups is unnecessary and could disadvantage some of the most vulnerable people in society, such as victims of trafficking. On that basis, I hope that the hon. Member for Weald of Kent will not press new clause 23, with the reassurance that we think that these clauses give us the power to use big data and big data analytics in a way that is in keeping with data protection laws, the GDPR and the ECHR.

[Katie Lam]

I take the Minister’s points about practicality, but in situations where new clause 23 created additional complexity, the Home Office would retain the option to adhere to the GDPR if it wished to; it would just not be forced to do so. We really think that the provision would be a useful addition and we hope the Government will consider it further. However, we do not intend to press it.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 27 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 28 and 29 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 30

Supply of trailer registration information

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 31 stand part.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clauses 30 and 31 concern the sharing of trailer registration information. Clause 30 creates a clear discretionary power for the Transport Secretary and, in practice, the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency to share some or all of the trailer registration information they hold with the Home Office, for specified purposes related to border security and law enforcement; the National Crime Agency and HMRC, for use in connection with their statutory functions; policing bodies, for purposes of policing law enforcement and safeguarding national security; and specified persons in the Crown dependencies and Gibraltar for purposes equivalent to their UK counterparts.

The measure is designed in recognition of the limited timeframes that law enforcement bodies have to review information and take decisions when risk-assessing thousands of lorry movements into the UK each day to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute crime, and to conduct checks at the roadside. Border Force intends to use this information, alongside customs information and other information it holds, to develop a richer picture of vehicle movements and enable timely interventions. For the police, the National Crime Agency, HMRC and recipients in the Crown dependencies and Gibraltar, the value of the information will be realised via the law enforcement data service, which will provide it on demand at the point of need.

[Tom Hayes (Bournemouth East) (Lab)]

I am sure that if we cast our minds back to 2019, we will all remember the awful case where 39 Vietnamese migrants died in the back of a trailer in Essex. Reading reports of what people found when they opened the lorry, and hearing about people dying in excruciatingly painful ways, makes us all realise that everything we are doing is about trying to stop harm to vulnerable people and save lives. Does my hon. Friend agree that this group of clauses will make it easier for data held by DVLA on UK-registered trailers to be shared with our law enforcement and police, and that as a consequence we might be able to avoid more misery and loss of life in such excruciating circumstances?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I certainly agree with my hon. Friend. That is at the higher end of the harms that one would hope could be prevented by more timely access to this kind of information. These clauses will ensure that those charged with securing the border and beyond can use the information in line with the range of threat types enabled by cross-border lorry movements such as the one my hon. Friend just mentioned, to ensure that the law enforcement community engaged in tackling organised immigration crime, and wider serious and organised crime, are able to tackle it at pace.

Clause 31 complements clause 30 by setting out how information received by the Home Office and the police may be disclosed onwards, with whom and for what purposes. Robust inter-agency and international co-operation is crucial to smashing the criminal gangs. Border Force routinely works with the National Crime Agency and the police for the purposes of criminal investigations connected with the smuggling of people and illicit goods, and with HMRC for customs purposes.

The police, in turn, need to be able to alert law enforcement partners to identify specific trailers of interest. Border Force and the police also need to be able to alert European law enforcement partners to intercept trailers where there might be a threat to life and in support of cross-border co-operation against illicit goods. This clause, subject to safeguards contained in clause 32, enables just such an outcome to be achieved.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 30 provides a power for the Secretary of State for Transport to supply trailer registration information to the Secretary of State for the Home Department for immigration purposes, law enforcement purposes, human welfare purposes, purposes connected with functions under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, protecting national security, and responding to an emergency. The information can also be shared with the National Crime Agency and HMRC.

We support the powers in the clause. As with the previous group of clauses, this is about being able to bring together the information held by different arms of the state to defend the border, and we wholeheartedly agree with that. I must confess that this is going to be a fairly friendly section of the afternoon, for which I can only apologise to all involved.

Clause 31 provides powers for the onward sharing of information in clause 30. It is important that that information can be shared with those exercising public functions, including those outside the United Kingdom. We also support the new powers in the clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 30 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 31 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 32

Sections 27 to 31: general provision about disclosure

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider clause 33 stand part.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

This group includes clauses 32 and 33, which provide for safeguards with respect to the customers and trailer registration information-sharing provisions, which we have just agreed will stand part of the Bill, as well as providing clarity about the meanings of terms within those clauses.

Clause 32 makes general provision about the disclosure of information with respect to clauses 27 to 31. That is information held by HMRC in connection with its customs functions, as set out in clauses 27 to 29, and the DVLA’s trailer registration information in clauses 30 to 31. The clause does two things. First, it clarifies that clauses 27 to 31 do not limit how information may be disclosed outside of the scope of this legislation. It does not tie the hands of a named party to disclosing information subject only to the regime established here if another information gateway exists. Secondly, it clarifies that nothing in clauses 27 to 31 authorises disclosure where it would contravene UK data protection or investigatory powers legislation. In deciding on that, the clauses are to be taken into account. Clause 32 neither treads upon other legal regimes to disclose information outside of the scope of this legislation nor permits anything that would fall foul of existing statutory safeguards—a perfect, balanced approach.

Clause 33 makes provision for the interpretation of clauses 27 to 31—the terms used, their scope and limits. First, it defines the meanings of certain terms through direct definition and in reference to other legislation. Secondly, it seeks to capture all UK police forces and bodies that might be the end users of the information, referring to a “UK authorised person” and a “UK authorising officer” for the purposes of clause 30, and defining what it means in this clause.

The use of the terms “UK authorising officer” and

“the person under whose direction and control the constable…is”

avoids reliance on references to chief constable, commissioner and chief officer, because those terms have prescribed legal meanings that exclude the commanders of the very important ports police and the even more important Mersey Tunnels police, which rely on other ranks to command. That ensures that the definitions apply to everybody, whatever the force. The ports forces and the Mersey Tunnels police are an extremely important part of defending the border, for obvious reasons.

For “UK authorised person”, the term constable, which includes special constable, is used. The clause also refers to

“other person who is under the direction and control of a person who has the direction and control of a body of constables”.

Such is the poetry of legislative diction, but lawyers know exactly what that means. Instead of police civilian staff, or similar terms with prescribed meanings, we have that rather long and convoluted explanation, which includes everybody. That is because not all forces employ police staff subject to employment contracts. Some also use police volunteers. The MOD police uses civil servants in such roles, while the Police Service of Northern Ireland has powers to use civil servants separately from employed police staff. Use of “other person” accommodates all these cases, so it is all-encompassing, and I hope we have not missed anybody out.

Thirdly—this applies only to the trailer data—we have worked with the Crown dependencies and Gibraltar to identify persons undertaking statutory functions equivalent to their UK border security and law enforcement counterparts. We have defined them as a non-UK authorised person and specified them in a table along with the authorising officers.

Finally, the clause establishes a regulation-making power for the Secretary of State to define the meaning of specified purposes related to policing to ensure that the data requirements are met today and can be updated from time to time as operational requirements evolve. Such an extension would be subject to consultation with policing bodies across the UK, Scottish Ministers and the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland, and it would require the affirmative resolution of both Houses. With those reassurances, I hope members of the Committee will be happy to support clauses 32 and 33.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 32 makes general provision about the powers of disclosure in clauses 30 and 31. Subsection (2), as the Minister laid out, clarifies that nothing in clauses 27 to 31 authorises disclosure where it would otherwise contravene data protection or investigatory powers legislation. How much difficulty does the Minister envisage these provisions causing for the sharing of information? I seek reassurance—she has offered some already—that the safeguard will not frustrate legitimate data-sharing activities. Clause 33 defines key terms included in clauses 27 to 31, and we have no problems with it.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I reassure the hon. Lady that we do not envisage the definitions causing any practical problems with data sharing and the powers defined in clauses 27 to 31.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 32 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 33 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 34

Provision of biometric information by evacuees etc

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider clause 35 stand part.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 34 is critical to the Government’s ability to manage crises and support evacuations effectively. Where the UK Government are considering or have facilitated an individual’s departure from a country in crisis, it is essential to lock in identity and conduct necessary biometric checks at the earliest opportunity, for obvious reasons. Clause 34 ensures that there is a clear legal framework for collecting biometric information outside the UK in these exceptional circumstances. The clause includes important safeguards, particularly for children, to ensure that biometric data is collected responsibly. The provision reflects the UK’s commitment to maintaining both security and efficiency in high-risk international evacuation situations.

--- Later in debate ---

[Katie Lam]

Clause 34 provides a power for an authorised person to take biometric information when the Government are in the process of facilitating their exit from a state or territory. The purpose of the power is to ensure that only those who qualify under particular evacuation schemes are able to come to the UK. The power to take biometric information should help to verify identity and conduct screening checks, as individuals in these circumstances are often undocumented. We fully support the provision.

We would be interested to hear more about whether the Government intend to take further action on biometrics, which could be brought about through the Bill. Countries such as Dubai and Singapore are investing in biometric entry and exit systems, as is the EU. The UK does not routinely capture biometrics at the border, although with the new UK electronic travel authorisation, we will collect digital photographs of all non-visa nationals, with the option of retaining fingerprint scans.

We are aware that there are logistical and financial challenges to enabling Border Force to collect biometrics routinely from all passengers on arrival and departure, but there are also substantial benefits, including helping to match illegal migrants and asylum seekers leaving the country, thereby giving a clearer picture of those who are overstaying through more accurate migration figures. We would be interested in hearing how the Government are thinking about biometrics more broadly in the context of their not extending the power to capture biometrics more widely in the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Working out the potential for electronic borders and a more sophisticated approach to the hundreds of millions of journeys that cross our borders every year is an important part of the day job of my hon. Friend the Member for Feltham and Heston. This is a more limited clause, but we are certainly investigating the potential, costs and benefits of a much more digitalised border. We are not about to introduce that through this Bill, but there will be more to be said when that work has been done in due course.

We understand the potential for making border crossings much more convenient for everybody while having more robust information about who has crossed borders, and when and where they were crossed. Some of this is about goods, trailers and a range of other things crossing borders, and ensuring that we have information on when people smugglers and clandestines cross borders, too.

[Tom Hayes]

I note that clause 34(3) sets out the requirement for an authorised person only to take biometric information from a child under the age of 16

“in the presence of a person aged 18 or over who is—

(a) the child’s parent or guardian, or

(b) a person who for the time being takes responsibility for the child.”

Does the Minister agree that we ought not to disapply the requirement for consent on such tests for children who are under the age of 16?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is important that we uphold standards and have those requirements, which is why the clauses we are debating do that. These clauses deal with the need, in an emergency situation, to evacuate people who are British citizens and/or people who live in families that include British citizens. It is about being able to get them to safety but, at the same time, to collect biometric information so that we can check who they are. It is much more effective for us to do that at the earliest opportunity rather than getting them to the UK or on UK territory and having to do it then. That is why the clauses will put us in a much better situation from the point of view of identity and security checks, if there is an emergency evacuation of British nationals from a particular place in the future, which we hope will not happen.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 34 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 35 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 36

Provision of biometric information at ports in Scotland

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 36 will enable the biometrics of persons detained in Scotland under schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000 and schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 to be taken at ports, thereby bringing the position in Scotland into line with that in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

Those schedules allow an examining officer—a constable, or a designated immigration or customs officer—to stop, question, search and detain a person at a port, or at the border area in Northern Ireland, for the purposes of determining whether the person appears to be a person who is, or has been, engaged in terrorism or hostile activity. An examining officer may stop and question a person whether or not there are grounds for suspecting that the person is, or has been, engaged in terrorism or hostile activity. Those are important powers that allow counter-terrorism police officers to detect, disrupt and deter terrorism and hostile activity at the border.

The powers for taking biometrics in Scotland are contained in paragraph 20 of schedule 8 to the 2000 Act and paragraph 42 to schedule 3 of the 2019 Act. Clause 36 amends those paragraphs, removing the unnecessary restriction unique to Scotland that requires that those detained under those powers are taken to a police station to have their biometrics taken. The clause will allow biometrics to be taken much more easily and quickly in situ, rather than the person having to be transported to a police station.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 36, as the Minister has laid out, extends biometrics powers to ports in Scotland. As we understand it, immigration enforcement already has the power to take biometrics from people arrested in the UK, including at ports, if they are suspected of having entered or remained in the UK illegally. How does the Minister think that the clause will add to existing operational powers?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is a lacuna in Scotland rather than a problem elsewhere. It is simply that, in Scotland, biometrics cannot be taken except in a police station. In his 2020 report on the operation of the Terrorism Acts 2000 and 2006, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation recommended that we address the issue. We saw the Bill as an opportunity to deal with what is obviously an unintended kink, so we are ironing it out.

[Katie Lam]

That is very helpful, but I just want to check that I fully understand what the Minister is saying. The power already exists, but it is about locational flexibility—is that right?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

At the moment, under Scottish law, biometrics—in this instance—must be taken in a police station. Everywhere else, they can be taken in situ. We are just bringing the situation in Scotland into line. It is a minor change, but it will have an important practical effect.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 36 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further considered be now adjourned.—(Martin McCluskey.)

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Third sitting)

Angela Eagle Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 4th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. The subject of this Bill is incredibly important to this country and its future. I hope that, during the next two weeks, the Committee will give us a constructive opportunity for the consideration and strengthening of the Bill.

Let me briefly outline our first amendment. Clause 1 creates the Border Security Commander as a statutory office holder, and requires that the Secretary of State must designate a civil servant as the Border Security Commander. As Tony Smith, former director general of the UK Border Force, said in evidence to the Committee:

“I am not sure he will actually be able to command anything. He is probably going to be more of a co-ordinator.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 40, Q43.]

That is why we tabled amendment 10, which would remove the requirement for the Border Security Commander to be a civil servant.

The status of the Border Security Commander—as well as the commander’s functions and priorities, which I will come to in discussions on later amendments—is crucial if the role is to be in any way meaningful. As the Minister is aware, there are organisations that do not require civil servants to run them. Such a structure ensures their independence and reduces the internal day-to-day political struggles that can easily be imposed on them. Allowing recruitment from outside the civil service may also provide a wider talent pool and prevent the role from being relegated to that of yet another senior civil servant in the Department. We heard evidence about the wide array of roles in the Home Office already. The amendment would highlight the clear distinction between existing positions and the importance of securing our borders.

I would be grateful for the Minister’s answers to the following questions. Why have the Government decided that the Border Security Commander must be a civil servant? What is the operational benefit of that decision? Why would the Border Security Commander not benefit from greater independence? What level of seniority will the Border Security Commander have? In evidence to the Committee, Tony Smith assumed that the post would likely be a director general. Is he correct? If so, why have the Government made that decision? Fundamentally, if Mr Smith is correct and the Border Security Commander cannot actually command anything—we will discuss that in detail when we come to later amendments—what is the point of the position?

Clause 2 sets out that the Border Security Commander must

“hold and vacate office in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Commander’s designation,”

and that the

“terms and conditions of a designation as Commander are to be determined by the Secretary of State.”

That is all the information we get. Will the Minister explain what the terms and conditions of a designation as commander will be? Let us compare the situation of the Border Security Commander, who is allegedly responsible for the security of our border, with that of the Metropolitan Police Commissioner. The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 sets out that the commissioner has to be suitably qualified; will the Minister explain why no such requirement appears to exist in the legislation for the Border Security Commander? What would count as suitable qualifications for someone to take up the post of commander?

If the Secretary of State determines that a person’s designation as commander should be terminated, the Secretary of State must give the commander a written explanation of the reasons, give them an opportunity to make written representations and consider those before making a final decision. That seems sensible and in line with other positions, such as the Met Commissioner, that ought to be vaguely comparable in terms of responsibility.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Dame Angela Eagle)]

It is a pleasure to serve with you chairing our proceedings, Dr Murrison, and I look forward to many hours of that—as I am sure you do.

I will set out what clauses 1 and 2 do and hopefully persuade the Committee that amendment 10 is not required. The clauses set out the role of the Border Security Commander and detail the terms and conditions under which they hold the office. The purpose of the Opposition’s amendment 10 is to remove the requirement that the Border Security Commander be a civil servant. The hon. Member for Stockton West—I will learn all Members’ constituencies by the time we get to the end—seemed to say that he thought there was operational benefit in complete independence. I suppose that is one way of looking at it, but there is also benefit in co-ordination and in being attached to a central strategic point. The Government believe that that attachment, rather than total independence for the sake of it, is more likely to be effective.

Amendment 10 implies that the Border Security Commander should not be a civil servant. The role of the commander is a civil service role and the Border Security Command is a directorate within the Home Office. In a future recruitment exercise, existing civil servants could be appointed or the role could be advertised externally. Under the arrangements in clause 1 there is no limit one way or the other on where the Border Security Commander might come from—they could be internal or external. I hope that is some reassurance.

The mechanism of appointment is a civil service recruitment campaign to ensure that the best candidate is selected on merit. Given that the role sits within the Home Office and leads the functions of a directorate in the Department, it is logical that the role would be a civil service role. The idea is to cohere, not to fragment the work that is done. I see it very much as ensuring that all the cogs across Government connect with one another, so that when we turn the wheel we get something out at the end, rather than having a load of cogs that do not connect, which would not lead to a more effective outcome.

Clause 1 sets out that the Secretary of State must designate a civil servant as the commander and will make the necessary arrangements to ensure that resources are available to support them in exercising their functions. The Bill will place the Border Security Commander on a statutory footing, which will future-proof and solidify the role and ensure a clear direction and leadership for the UK’s border security system. Placing the Border Security Commander under this new legal framework is a clear signal of our determination to tackle organised immigration crime by going after the criminals who put lives at risk and undermine our border security.

Clause 2 details the commander’s terms and conditions and how they will hold, maintain and vacate the office. This clarity is necessary to ensure continuity in the role, and it underlines the Government’s commitment to making the Border Security Commander an enduring office.

[Katie Lam (Weald of Kent) (Con)]

We on the Opposition Benches struggle to understand why the law must set out that the Border Security Commander must be a civil servant. The Minister said that amendment 10 implies the commander should not be a civil servant, but all it seeks to do is remove the requirement that they should be. If the Home Secretary and, presumably, the Home Office permanent secretary believe that the role is best filled by a civil servant, perhaps for the reasons of co-ordination that the Minister set out, so be it—they can still be appointed as a civil servant—but the legislation will mandate that they have to be, and we struggle to understand why that requirement is necessary.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I made it clear in my response to the hon. Member for Stockton West that the recruitment could be done externally. Were somebody to be appointed who was not a civil servant when they applied, they would then come into the Home Office on civil service terms, bringing with them whatever experience they had and that the recruitment process had determined would be suitable for the role. I am not sure there is much between us, unless the hon. Lady is implying that, by the act of becoming a civil servant, the commander would somehow be less effective. I do not believe that is the case, especially as the idea is to ensure that the Border Security Commander can convene the entire system across Government Departments. Having a base in the Home Office, albeit designated as a civil servant, will make that more effective rather than less effective. To be clear, if the legislation gets on the statute book, any future office holder would not have to come from the civil service. I hope that reassures the hon. Lady.

[Katie Lam]

I thank the Minister for that response, which is reassuring, but it does not quite address the concern. These issues are very difficult, and I presume the Minister accepts that it is possible that it might be better, either in due course or in relatively short order, for the commander to be operationally independent. If that is the Home Secretary’s judgment as time goes on, the Government will have to come back to Parliament to change the law. Would it not be better for them to give themselves the flexibility?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The hon. Lady implies that total independence from the machinery of government would somehow assist in the job that we wish the Border Security Commander to do. I do not agree with her in that analysis. The job of the Border Security Commander is to convene and cohere and to strategically focus, across Government Departments, with a focus on checking that our border security is as effective as it can be. I do not think that total independence is going to add to effectiveness in that context. In fact, we believe that having the commander operating out of the Home Office at a director general level, but appointed by the Prime Minister with a special place in primary legislation, is a more effective way to ensure that the commander’s basic role has the biggest-percentage likelihood of being effective.

[Mike Tapp (Dover and Deal) (Lab)]

The Minister has been clear that we can of course recruit from outside the civil service, and that being within the civil service equips the person with the powers, the tools and, of course, the access to be effective in the role.

I am slightly concerned that the hon. Member for Stockton West tabled the amendment off the back of oral evidence from Tony Smith, who—with full respect—retired from his role 13 years ago. The director general of the National Crime Agency gave evidence on the same day as Tony Smith, and he said:

“For me, I have worked really closely with Martin Hewitt already, and it works well. It allows me to focus on the operational leadership of tackling the organised crime threat and Martin to have the convening power and to work across Whitehall on a range of issues. It provides clarity, and we have more than enough to get on with in the NCA in tackling…organised crime”.

Jim Pearce, the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead on organised immigration crime, then said:

“I sit on Martin’s board, so strategically I am heavily involved, and members of my team sit within the operational delivery groups. Speaking from a personal point of view, his strategic plans over the next few years make absolute sense in terms of what he is seeking to achieve for the Border Security Command.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 38, Q42.]

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for—is it Dover?

[Mike Tapp]

Yes, Dover and Deal.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I was just checking that I had my hon. Friend’s entire constituency name. They have all changed, Dr Murrison, which can be a bit disorientating because I am used to the old names.

My hon. Friend is exactly right. He demonstrates, through the evidence we heard—particularly from the NCA, the Crown Prosecution Service and the police chiefs last Thursday—that there is and was a strategic gap. Everybody is doing fantastic work in the NCA, the police, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the security services, but nobody had taken a focused look at how border security could be delivered most effectively. From the meetings I have had since Martin Hewitt took up his post, it seems there is almost relief that somebody is convening a board that can look at analytics on where the threats are, how they are developing and how we can best deal with them, and do the legwork to come up with a strategy focused on border security. That is the whole point of creating the command.

[Chris Murray (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. I would like to make a couple of points about the amendment.

As the Minister set out, clause 1 does not mean that someone who is not a civil servant cannot apply for the role. We have to be careful not to have an old-fashioned view of how the civil service operates. External candidates are increasingly common nowadays as outside specialisms are required by the Government, even for roles that are not particularly senior.

Even if an external candidate applies, they will get the support of the civil service. The role compares to Home Office roles such as the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration and the commissioner on modern slavery, who are separate from the Home Office apparatus and often report—especially at the Home Affairs Committee—that they do not get the support and structural backing they need. Clause 1 would obviate that. The commander will also be subject to the civil service code, which is important given the high levels of public expectation for the role.

The one difference between this and other directors general, and other senior figures in the Home Office, is that the role is set out in primary legislation. We will thereby create a distinction for the role by passing the Bill. The shadow Minister suggested that we should discuss the suitable qualifications for the role, but the role is very operational so we should be wary of setting out in legislation or in this debate the exact specifications of every task.

Finally, we must be careful of the pendulum swinging in one direction with one Government and then, with a change of Government, straight back in the other direction, meaning we repeat the mistakes of the past. When the coalition Government came into office in 2010, Home Secretary Theresa May—now Baroness May—restructured the UK Border Agency, as it was under the Labour Administration. She commented at the time that the UKBA had been structured in such a way as to be so independent that it would

“keep its work at an arm’s length from Ministers—that was wrong. It created a closed, secretive and defensive culture. So I can tell the House that the new entities will not have agency status and will sit in the Home Office, reporting to Ministers.”—[Official Report, 26 March 2013; Vol. 560, c. 1500.]

Although we are trying to correct what has clearly gone wrong over the previous 14 years of Conservative government of Border Force, it is important that we do not overcorrect and go back to the situation we were in before, which Baroness May pointed out did not work then.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

My hon. Friend makes some very good points, particularly about over-correction between Governments but also about the fact that independence is an obvious thing to have for particular posts—in inspection, for example, but not necessarily operational ones—and the need to cohere a system, to ensure that all the good work being done across different Departments can be focused strategically on one aim. That is what the clauses seek to do.

[Tom Hayes (Bournemouth East) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to speak under your chairpersonship, Dr Murrison. I want to take on a principled point that I have heard levelled by the hon. Member for Stockton West and other Conservative Members today and on Second Reading, which is that the Border Security Commander cannot command. It is really important to address that point.

From 2018 to 2023, we saw the number of small boat arrivals increase from 299 to 29,500. That is a hundredfold increase. As I understand it, some of the explanation given by the Conservatives is that the matter became very complicated, and we were seeing an increase in organised crime activity. To their credit, that was reinforced by the director general of the National Crime Agency, Rob Jones, who said

“The problem that I focus on is the organised crime element, which needs concurrent effort in a number of areas, designed to undermine the business model that supports organised immigration crime. That means tackling illicit finance; the materials that are used in smuggling attempts and the supply chain that supports them; the high-value targets based overseas who are involved in supplying materials and moving migrants”.––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 29, Q28.]

Those were just some of the things he highlighted.

If we acknowledge that the present Government face a more complicated situation, we should agree that it will involve a suite of tools. As Rob Jones said,

“There is not one thing that you can do to tackle these problems”. ––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 29, Q28.]

Sarah Dineley, the deputy chief Crown prosecutor, concurred with her colleagues and said:

“I do not believe that there is one single measure that would impact so significantly that it would reduce migrant crossings to zero.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 30, Q28.]

Jim Pearce, the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for organised immigration crime, highlighted the same point.

If the situation is so complex and there is a need for the suite of tools that are being strengthened by this Bill, surely there is a need for greater co-ordination. Greater co-ordination will surely help to fix some of the strategic challenges that our immigration system and asylum system have faced in recent years. To co-ordinate is to command, and it is crucial we accept that point. If we do not, we will not be able to tackle the backlog we face, we will not be able to implement the measures in the Bill and we will not be able to secure our borders.

Amendments have been tabled in relation to aspects of the Border Security Commander role, but I am not entirely certain whether the Conservative party supports the role of Border Security Commander at all. On Second Reading, we heard colleagues asking what Martin Hewitt is doing with his time. I would welcome the hon. Member for Stockton West explaining whether the Conservative party does in fact support the role of Border Security Commander and Border Security Command. We heard clearly from those who gave oral testimony, who are operationally focused, experienced and expert in their field, about the necessity of such a command. Indeed, Enver Solomon, the chief executive of the Refugee Council, summed it up well when he said that

“the Border Security Command is an understandable response.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 5, Q1.]

[Matt Vickers]

We will discuss when we come to the next group of amendments the aims and objectives of this role, and the fact that if we are going to have a Border Security Commander, they should have a very meaningful role that can make a real difference. I would like to press on clause 2 of the Bill, which talks about

“The terms and conditions of a designation as Commander are to be determined by the Secretary of State.”

I would be grateful if the Minister could explain to the Committee what those terms and conditions of designation might be? As I mentioned, the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 sets out how the Met commissioner must be suitably qualified. What sort of qualifications could we expect to see in a commander and what will those terms and conditions be?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I do not want to read out the job description, which was put out there ahead of Martin Hewitt being appointed last year. It is there for all to see, it is a public document. The role is very much about being able to operationally cohere the system and to make certain by the operation of the Border Security Commander’s board, upon which sit many of the other parts of Government that need to have regard to the strategy, that we decide how to take forward and deal with threats to our border security. It is not really rocket science, and I do not think that there would be much to be gained from putting the details of all of that into primary legislation.

It is important that as the threats to our border security evolve, which they certainly will do over time, that we do not find ourselves with a very rigid set of requirements in primary legislation, which is hard to change. The idea is to have convening powers to give flexibility to the commander to ensure that he can bring together all of the forces across Government that are charged with security in this area and ensure that the focus on organised immigration, crime and border security is always at the forefront of the work that they do.

[Katie Lam]

I am a little confused by some of the contributions from Labour Members. They seem to be advocating for the commander to be a civil servant, and that is fine, but that is not actually what we are discussing. The question here is whether there could be any benefit in having some flexibility for the Home Secretary to do something different, and we do not feel that that point has been answered.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Could the hon. Lady go into more detail about what she means with respect to that? I have given her an assurance that the Border Security Commander could come from outside of the civil service and be appointed from outside of the civil service, but would then take up a civil service role of convening within Government and with the support of Government. That means that we do not have to set up an entirely new independent structure and fund it separately, which would be more likely to disintegrate rather than integrate the strategic approach to this multifaceted problem. I am beginning to wonder what the hon Lady has got against civil servants?

[Katie Lam]

Nothing whatever. There are lots of parts of the Home Office where the principle is accepted, that sometimes, particularly for difficult things and things that the Department has struggled to achieve, independence can be valuable. It sounds like the Minister is saying that she does not feel that that is the case. We must accept that, but we do not have to agree with it.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is true that independence has a very valuable part to play, particularly in holding Government structures to account. For example, the independent inspectors of our detention or prison estates who are allowed to go in and publish without fear or favour regarding what they find there. That is obviously a very important role where independence matters. But in this context, the Border Security Commander is cohering the effect and the work across Government that is trying to keep our borders properly protected. That is operational. It ties into the diplomatic and political as well, although obviously Ministers have an important part to play in that too.

The hon. Lady has nothing to worry about when it comes to the Border Security Commander sitting in a civil service context given that nothing in this Bill means that anyone who was not a civil servant when they applied to the post of Border Security Commander would be excluded from consideration. Being in the civil service to begin with is not a requirement.

[Matt Vickers]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3

Functions of the Commander

--- Later in debate ---

[Pete Wishart]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Murrison. It is a good 10 years since I have had the pleasure and privilege of being on a Public Bill Committee—or Standing Committee, as we used to call them back in the day—and I hope that it will be as much fun as I remember. Ten years ago, I was the home affairs spokesperson, and I saw a number of Bills quite like this one: good old-fashioned “stop them coming and boot them out” Bills. There has been a succession of them over the years from various Governments. The Minister knows that I hold her in great respect and affection, and I wish her particularly well with the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I hold the hon. Gentleman in similar affection. We are pretty long in the tooth—we are the two people who are the most long in the tooth on this Bill Committee—and I look forward to listening to his arguments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

I have not come across Chief Commissioner Miekelson before, but I will endeavour to catch up on Netflix or iPlayer.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

We are all going to be doing that.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 3 sets out the functions of the Border Security Commander. The shadow Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), correctly pointed out on Second Reading that the new Border Security Commander

“cannot actually command anything. There are no powers at all in the Bill, merely functions. They include, in clause 3, publishing a strategic priority document and, in clause 4, a duty to prepare an annual report…the Border Security Commander has no clear powers, merely an ability to publish documents and reports.”—[Official Report, 10 February 2025; Vol. 762, c. 69.]

According to the legislation, the functions of the commander

“must have regard to the objectives of…maximising the effectiveness of the activities of partner authorities relating to threats to border security, for the purpose of minimising such threats, and…maximising the coordination of those activities for that purpose.”

That sounds suspiciously like a co-ordinator, rather than a commander. That is exactly what the legislation states: the commander does not appear to be empowered by the Bill to command anyone.

Subsection (5) defines a partner authority as a

“public authority with functions in relation to threats to border security (whether exercisable in the United Kingdom or elsewhere)”,

but—in subsection (6)—

“not…the Security Service…the Secret Intelligence Service”

or “GCHQ”.

Will the Minister confirm what is meant by partner authorities? Does she have a list of likely organisations that the Border Security Commander should be able to direct co-operation with? How far does she think that the Border Security Commander will be able to have an impact on public authorities abroad? For example, what role might French law enforcement be expected to play in having regard to the commander’s strategic priority document?

The Opposition have tabled amendment 13, which would enable the Home Secretary to direct other agencies to support the Border Security Commander’s objectives and strategic priorities, specifically Border Force, Immigration Enforcement, police and crime commissioners and the National Crime Agency. Ideally, we would like the Border Security Commander to have a meaningful role and the ability to direct other agencies. As the Government seem unwilling to do that, however, we thought it might be possible for the Home Secretary to give the Border Security Commander a little support.

If the Minister does not want to accept amendment 13, I would like to understand why not. Why do the Government seem willing to allow the commander only to co-ordinate, rather than to command? Why could the Home Secretary not add some additional impetus?

The clause requires the Border Security Commander to issue a strategic priority document that sets out the principal threats to border security when the document is issued, and the strategic priorities to which partner authorities should have regard in exercising their functions in relation to any of the threats to the border identified by the commander. We have tabled amendment 12 to ensure that the strategic priority document supports the Home Office’s UK border strategy. We are attempting to ensure that the Border Security Commander is aligned with the rest of the Home Office’s work to secure the border. I am interested to understand why the Minister is not willing to accept that amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I think Chief Miekelson will be on all our lists now. I spend the small amount of time I have in life to twiddle my thumbs looking for new detective dramas, and it seems I have overlooked one. I have been too into Scandi noir, when I should have been into Scottish noir. I will talk to the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire after the sitting to see whether he can give me a little more detail, so that I can follow up for my own enjoyment.

This group contains various provisions relating to the Border Security Commander, including amendments 11 to 13 and new clause 21 from the official Opposition, and new clause 7, which the hon. Member for Mid Dunbartonshire spoke to. It also contains amendment 1, with which the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire opened our proceedings on this group. In our earlier exchange, he and I reflected on how long in the tooth we both are. So experienced is he that he anticipated what my answer to his amendment would be, and his comments show that he has a coherent and experienced view of the way in which human rights law works. If we had to list in every single bit of primary legislation the treaties we had solemnly entered into, and the international agreements that we had, in many cases, helped to formulate and that we had then put into effect in our own law, we would have an even messier statute book than we have at the moment.

Amendment 1 seeks to ensure that the commander has full regard to the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings while carrying out all his functions. Both pieces of international agreement and law were freely entered into by predecessor Governments, and we take them extremely seriously as a law-abiding Government who believe in the rule of law. The Border Security Commander will be a public authority within the meaning of section 6 of the Human Rights Act, and must act compatibly with the Act. That is absolutely the case. It is not explicitly written into the Bill, as the hon. Gentleman’s amendment would require, but that does not mean that all the requirements in the two agreements that amendment 1 mentions will not be adhered to.

[Pete Wishart]

Before I put my question to the Minister, I will just say to the Committee that “The Chief” is available on iPlayer, if they want to enjoy the eight episodes that will come their way.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Not in the room though.

[Pete Wishart]

Perhaps not—I am sure you would have a few words to say about that, Dr Murrison.

I did anticipate the Minister’s response, but I do not think there is anything wrong with ensuring that our commitments to international operations and to the whole force of human rights across the world—things we agree on—are in the Bill. We saw with the previous Government how easily international obligations and the international rule of law can be set aside and torn up. We are asking for these things to be in the Bill to give us security and a guarantee that the border commander will pay attention to them. If the commander is not compelled to do that by statute, there will be no obligation whatsoever.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The hon. Gentleman can be assured that everything the commander does must be compatible with our obligations under the Human Rights Act and the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings. Those things are implicit with every public office holder in the UK, in all the contexts in which they work. The fact that those things are implicit, and not explicitly in the Bill, does not undermine the commitment of any Government who want to act within the rule of law. One of the first things our current Prime Minister said when he walked through the door at Downing Street was that we would be a Government who respected the rule of law and the Human Rights Act.

[Chris Murray]

The most comparable piece of legislation on this topic in a devolved context is the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Scotland) Act 2015. That Act does not require a clause that specifies the obligation to respect international law. Those things are implicit in legislation passed by the Scottish Government, even on this topic.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

My hon. Friend is exactly right. Under section 6 of the Human Rights Act, all office holders implicitly have to follow the rules of the European convention on human rights. One issue, if we decide to move away from the current approach and start to include an explicit provision in particular Bills—as the amendment in the name of the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire would—is that it might look like the implicit duty to adhere to these agreements does not apply if it is not stated explicitly. That would actually lead to a lessening of protections, if judges looking at what Parliament was legislating for decided that we must take account of section 6 of the Human Rights Act only if we put that in a Bill. We would end up in a worse situation.

I ask the hon. Member to accept that the structure in the Bill is the one we have used so far. I understand why he is sceptical, after the behaviour of the last Government, but I hope he accepts, given the Prime Minister’s pronouncements right from the beginning of this Government taking office, that we are not planning on undermining the Human Rights Act or its provisions.

[Pete Wishart]

I do not like having to correct the hon. Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh, who is usually very diligent on these matters, but the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Scotland) Act 2015 is fully compliant with human rights legislation. That fact is included in the Act, as it is in practically every Act passed by the Scottish Parliament.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I am not massively familiar with the Scottish statute book.

[Chris Murray]

On that point, the 2015 Act does refer to the Council of Europe protections and its definitions are taken from there. But there is not a clause that says that due regard has to be given—

[Chris Murray]

But in an implicit way, just as this Bill is. There is nothing on the face of the Act, in the way the hon. Member is proposing for this Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I feel I ought to intervene and separate the combatants. I reassure the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire—especially given the pronouncements from some in the previous Government—that this Government are absolutely committed to the provisions of the Human Rights Act and the convention on action against trafficking in human beings. I hope he accepts that and will withdraw his amendment.

Amendment 12 seeks to ensure that the strategic priority document produced by the Border Security Commander is supportive of the Home Office’s UK border strategy. Border security is a fundamental part of the strategic approach to the wider border, and the strategic priorities for border security will help to drive the wider UK approach. They are part of the approach—they are not a threat or a counter to it. The strategic priority document will be consulted on at the board—which the Committee will discuss when we reach clause 6—which has representatives from across the border security system, to ensure alignment with wider strategic approaches to the border. The whole point of the Bill is to cohere and convene and to ensure that there is co-operation across complex systems; it is not to disintegrate systems. Therefore, it would be fairly astonishing if the border security strategy was somehow completely at odds with what the Border Security Commander and the wider system were planning.

Amendment 13 seeks to give the Border Security Commander the power to direct the specified law enforcement bodies and personnel in the delivery of his objectives and strategic priorities. The power to direct—what the hon. Member for Stockton West called “empowerment”—is not required. During last week’s oral evidence, we heard from representatives of the National Crime Agency and the National Police Chiefs’ Council that they welcome and value the collaboration to date with the Border Security Commander. The arrangements as provided for in the Bill will reflect and respect the operational requirements of the various board members. They are a balancing act between convening, collaborating and co-operating, and a way of ensuring that those who have some independence written into what they have to do in other areas feel not that they are being made “subject to” but that they are “collaborating with”. The most effective commanding is exactly that: it is done with co-operation; it is not done with dictatorial powers or attempts to undermine the independence of other organisations.

Under clause 5, partner authorities already have a duty to co-operate with the commander, in so far as it is reasonably practicable for them to do so. Under clause 3, partner authorities must have regard to the strategic priorities on which the board will be consulted and which will be endorsed by the Secretary of State, as set out in clause 4(b). Amendment 11 would remove the requirement for the Border Security Commander to obtain the consent of the Secretary of State to issue a strategic priority document.

My hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh has already pointed out that an obsession with complete independence can actually fragment a system and make it harder for us to achieve outcomes by working together. He rightly mentioned that, where there is operational independence and we are trying to make a system work in co-operation, that can sometimes lead to cultures of secrecy and non-co-operation, rather than co-operation that focuses on objectives.

In the Bill, we wish to foster co-operation that focuses on very defined objectives and strategies. The Government believe that that is the best balance. Allowing the Border Security Commander to publish documents behind the back of the Home Secretary, for whatever reason he or she may think fit, is not exactly fostering a co-operative working environment or an environment that is likely to be successful. We believe that the way in which these things are expressed in the existing clauses is more likely to foster agreement.

As already discussed, the strategic priority document provided for in clause 3(2) will set out the principal threats to border security when the document is issued, as well as the strategic priorities to which partner authorities should have regard in exercising their functions in relation to any of the identified threats. The role of the Border Security Commander is to support the Government of the day, and it is therefore only right that Ministers and the Secretary of State endorse the strategic direction and collective response of this public authority in relation to border security.

The hon. Member for Stockton West seemed to want to give the Border Security Commander powers to do things and to remove the requirement for ministerial consent for whatever they wanted to do. That seems to set up the Border Security Commander in a more powerful position than Ministers, which seems an odd thing for a Member of Parliament and a shadow Minister to wish to do. We think that the right way of ensuring accountability for the way these things are done is to have ministerial involvement, rather than set up operational structures that are so independent of Ministers that people want to do things behind Ministers’ backs.

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[Susan Murray]

The Minister makes good points about the practicalities. It is good to hear that she recognises that the Liberal Democrats are simply trying to ensure that we have international influence and cross-border activities.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I can certainly assure the hon. Lady that I recognise the import of what she is trying to do with the new clause. Often, such proposals are hooks to hang a debate on, so that there can be a little more information about the Government’s intent. I can assure her that having close operational and diplomatic liaison across all the different structures we have to work with to deal with cross-border immigration crime is absolutely at the centre of what the Border Security Commander will want to do. When we come to it, I hope she will not press her new clause to a vote.

[Matt Vickers]

The contrast is interesting. The Opposition want to see a Border Security Commander independently empowered to make meaningful changes to secure the border, rather than another civil servant muted by political oversight. There is a big contrast in perspective in terms of whether a Home Secretary should be signing off on anything anyone in this huge role—which will make a difference to our borders—will be able to say. Secondly, I would like to understand why the Government do not think it worth the Border Security Commander having the objective of reducing or even ending small boat crossings.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is quite revealing that the hon. Gentleman seems to think that the natural order of things is for Ministers to be at loggerheads with civil servants and the people who are operationally charged with delivering on objectives. That may say more about Opposition Members than about the way we are seeking to achieve operational effectiveness and objectives in what we are doing.

Finally, new clause 21 focuses on the Border Security Commander’s functions in relation to tackling small boat crossings to the UK. This is an all-encompassing new clause, which goes far beyond the commander’s functions as set out in the Bill. The new clause seems to want the commander to be all things to all people.

The immediate priority is organised immigration crime-enabled small boat crossings. The Border Security Commander will, and necessarily must, evolve over time to provide the systems leadership across all threats as they emerge. Such crossings did not really emerge until 2018, but they have become embedded and more of a threat over time. Had we been discussing something like this in 2017, small boat crossings would not have featured at all. It is therefore important that our legislation allows the Border Security Commander to change approach or focus as new threats emerge. Threats evolve and change over time. Our approach accounts for that by stipulating in legislation that the Border Security Commander has particular objectives that might be important now but less important in the future. The new clause seems to me to present an overly difficult and inflexible way of moving forward.

[Katie Lam]

Presumably, it would always remain an objective to bring an end to illegal migration, as far as is practical?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Yes.

I was going to talk about what new clause 21 suggests we should do. For example, the subsection on asylum processing seems to say that the Border Security Commander should somehow take over the duty to ensure that those who arrive illegally are processed within six months—something that the Conservatives did not achieve at all during their time in Government. I am not certain why the Border Security Commander should be empowered to take over the entirety of the asylum system.

Next, the new clause states that the commander should also be in charge of immigration enforcement, and that they should do removals as well as asylum processing and defending the border. The authors of the new clause seem to think that the Border Security Commander should be not only independent, but virtually all-seeing, all-singing and all-dancing, and that they should do absolutely everything with which the entire immigration and asylum system is currently charged. That is overreach, to say the least.

The new clause also suggests that the commander should remove people to a safe third place within six months for processing. In all their years in office, the Conservatives never managed to achieve any of those things. To put them into a new clause for a Government that has been in office for seven months—a Government who were left with the most appalling mess, with an asylum system that had crashed and had massive backlogs, and with a structure in the Illegal Migration Act that made it illegal for us to process any new arrivals who claimed asylum after March 2023—and to complain that we have not sent small boat arrivals home fast enough takes the biscuit.

[Sarah Bool]

I think the intention behind the new clauses, as has been identified, is to give the Border Security Commander more teeth to help him to do what he is supposed to do. Although I appreciate that behind the drafting of the Bill is a recognition that the commander might need to be reactive in future, the new clauses aim to reduce the number of illegal migrants; that is what we are all trying to tackle. When the Border Security Commander can only do things such as

“ maximising the effectiveness of the activities of partner authorities”,

“maximising the coordination” and issuing reports, it does not give us confidence that the commander has the necessary power or that we will see the results that the Government are trying to achieve.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is fairly astonishing to have a new clause that puts the Border Security Commander in charge of the entire asylum and deportation systems and asks him, in legislation, to achieve processing times that the Conservative party never achieved when they were in Government. It falls into the trap of empowering the Border Security Commander to such an extent that he seems to have to take over most of the Home Office. That is not really what we intend to do with this Bill. New clause 21 would result in a fairly astonishing increase in not only the power, but the reach of the Border Security Commander. That would be massively disruptive and would probably lead to an outcome similar to the collapse of the asylum system, of which we have had to clean up the mess.

[Mike Tapp]

I think the new clause is more of a political point than a constructive addition to the Bill. I am new to Parliament, but I think Bill Committees can be really useful. This new clause is far from useful, however, and there is nothing constructive in it. It is unrealistic and feels like political point-scoring.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Not for the first time today, I agree with my hon. Friend. When the time comes, we will be voting against this new clause.

[Katie Lam]

The Minister perhaps slightly mischaracterises new clause 21. It states that the Border Security Commander should “have regard to”, not manage, the wider aims of the Home Office in securing the border. Why would the Minister not want the Border Security Commander to have regard to that?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

New clause 21(1)(c) talks about:

“making arrangements with a safe third country for the removal of a person who enters the United Kingdom without leave, or with leave that was obtained by deception”

and new clause 21(1)(b) mentions:

“ensuring that a decision is taken on a claim by a person under subsection (1)(a) within six months of the person’s arrival in the United Kingdom”.

If that is not asking the Border Security Commander to take over the workings of the asylum system, I am not sure I understand what the new clause is trying to do.

[Katie Lam]

The new clause clearly does not do that. The two points that the Minister just mentioned are part of a broader sentence that states that the Border Security Commander

“must have regard to the objectives”

in subsection (1). The new clause does not state that the Border Security Commander should do those things themselves.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

But how on earth could asking the Border Security Commander to have regard to those things lead him or her to deal with border security? The new clause would take away the focus in the current Home Office arrangements on immigration enforcement and the asylum system. The new clause says that the Border Security Commander must have regard to all the processes in areas of the Department they have nothing to do with. It would upend working relationships. It would make it impossible and incoherent to deliver any kind of—

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[Dame Angela Eagle]

I think, Dr Murrison, you would probably not be very pleased with me if I started to talk about existential challenges at the heart of Conservative thinking, much as I would like to do so. I hope that I have given some reasons why new clause 21 should not stand part of the Bill.

[Pete Wishart]

I thank the Minister for her full response to some of my concerns about compliance with international obligations. Something that she did not respond to, and that I am really keen to secure her views on, is the FDA v. the Cabinet Office High Court case during the Rwanda litigation, which the Government obviously won. It seemed to suggest that any civil servant would not be bound by international obligations. Where does that leave the Border Security Commander?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The Prime Minister made it clear right at the beginning of his time in office that the Government will be bound by the international obligations that we have signed up to. I hope that gives the hon. Gentleman—[Interruption.] Well, he is a sceptical man, as I would expect, but I have said what I have said about that. Is he suggesting that we should change the law as a result of the High Court?

[Pete Wishart]

My concern is that the judgment in that court case significantly changed our approach to international obligations and the rule of law. All I am interested in knowing is whether the Minister has any concerns, given such a significant and dramatic shift in the way successive Governments have approached these issues. Will that have any bearing on the operation of the Border Security Command?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

As I said earlier, the Border Security Commander and the Border Security Command will work within the confines of international obligations and human rights law.

[Mike Tapp]

I apologise for my lack of timely bobbing earlier, Dr Murrison. I draw attention to the Home Secretary’s statement at the very top of the Bill:

“In my view the provisions of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill are compatible with the Convention rights.”

That adds to what the Minister has said: that those in public office have an obligation to abide by the law. If they were not to do so, there would of course be legal challenge.

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[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider clause 9 stand part.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clauses 3 and 9, taken together, outline the functions of the Border Security Commander and the directions given to the commander by the Secretary of State. Clause 3 ensures that the commander has the ability to bring partners together to provide an authoritative source of information on priority and emerging threats to border security. Through the strategic priority-setting process, the commander, working collaboratively with partners and with consent from the Secretary of State, will have the authority to issue strategic priorities on border security, to which partners must have regard. That creates a new mechanism to ensure that there is a whole of Government understanding and a collective response to border security threats.

The provisions of clause 3 recognise the varied responsibilities of partners, and deliberately ensure that the duty does not prevent partner authorities from exercising their existing constituted mandates or from setting their own wider priorities. The UK intelligence community are exempted from definition as partner authorities, in order to ensure that they can carry out their functions without constitutional conflict. However, UKIC will continue to work closely with the Border Security Command on border security matters, and arrangements are being developed, and will be agreed by the Home Secretary and Foreign Secretary, to ensure that that takes place. Such arrangements are required by clause 5.

Clause 9 builds on that by ensuring that the Secretary of State can hold the Border Security Commander to account for the delivery of improved border security outcomes. As an elected official, the Secretary of State is accountable to the Cabinet and to Parliament, and can assure that the actions of the commander are being carried out in the interests of the British public.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4

Duty to prepare annual reports

[Pete Wishart]

I beg to move amendment 2, in clause 4, page 3, line 37, at end insert—

“(c) set out how the Commander has fulfilled the Commander’s duties under section 3(1A) of this Act to have full regard to the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings.”

This amendment is linked to and consequential upon Amendment 1, and would require the Commander to include in the annual report information about how they have paid due regard to the Human Rights Act and the European Convention on Action against Trafficking.

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[Dame Angela Eagle]

Amendment 2, tabled by the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire, would require the Border Security Commander to clearly outline how they have paid due regard to the Human Rights Act and the European convention on action against trafficking by including that information in the annual report that is laid before Parliament. As discussed when we debated amendment 1, the Border Security Commander will be a public authority within the meaning of section 6 of the Human Rights Act, and must act in compatibility with the human rights legislation. The commander will be aware of the risks in relation to trafficking and modern slavery through their work, and will continue to comply with the obligations, as part of the Government, under the European convention on action against trafficking in human beings. Therefore, it is unnecessary to detail explicitly that that should be in the report. That does not mean that it will not be, as the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire recognised when he withdrew amendment 1. He has made his point powerfully.

Amendment 14 would create a requirement for the Border Security Commander to include in the annual report a range of statistics relating to the new offences created by the Bill, and wider relevant statistics in relation to irregular entrants who have arrived via a sea crossing, and to deportations. The amendment proposes that the annual report must state how the commander has carried out the functions of their office in the financial year, and set out the commander’s views on the performance of the border security system, with particular reference to the strategic priorities that have been set.

The clause envisages that the report will be laid before Parliament and published. That will provide public and parliamentary accountability for the work of the Border Security Commander across all threats, although the strategic priorities may change over time as the threats against which the commander will need to report evolve.

Amendment 14 in the name of the hon. Member for Stockton West is quite prescriptive about what should be in the report, and includes a range of statistics. In the UK, we have quarterly publication of immigration statistics, which are organised by the Home Office and under the code of practice of the independent UK Statistics Authority. Statistics are regularly made available about what is going on in this area. The hon. Gentleman wants such statistics to be published, under statute, in the annual report that the commander puts before Parliament but, with all due respect, I think it is important that the commander is able to write his report himself without primary legislation directing him what to put in it, especially given that those statistics are regularly made available and are well looked at and reported upon. What the hon. Gentleman is suggesting is cumbersome and would not assist in ensuring that we have parliamentary and public accountability for the commander’s performance.

The hon. Gentleman also quoted from the assessments of the number of prison places that would be created by the new crimes that we will talk about when we debate subsequent clauses. I am not sure what he does not understand about serious crime prevention orders or interim serious crime prevention orders. The idea of some of the new powers—the counter terror-style powers, which we will talk about in due course—is that they will prevent crossings and crimes from happening in the first place. They will allow the police and the National Crime Agency to intervene much earlier and to stop crime happening. In those circumstances, there may be a lesser sentence rather than a prison sentence, but lives would be saved and exploitation would be prevented. That is the nature of counter terror-style powers.

I hope that the hon. Gentleman will accept that the annual report will allow public and parliamentary accountability for the work of Border Security Command and that he will not press his amendment, as it would create too inflexible an annual report for the commander, with too much outside interference through primary legislation.

[Pete Wishart]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 14, in page 3, line 37, at end insert—

“(c) state the number of persons who have, since the later of the passing of this Act or the last annual report, been—

(i) charged with offences under sections 13, 14, 18, and 43 of this Act; or

(ii) convicted of offences under sections 13, 14, 18, and 43 of this Act;

(iii) identified as entering the United Kingdom via sea crossing without leave to remain;

(iv) detained pending deportation or a decision on deportation;

(v) deported to a country of which the person is a national or citizen; or

(vi) deported to a country or territory to which there is reason to believe that the person will be admitted.”.—(Matt Vickers.)

This amendment would place a duty on the Border Security Commander to include, in their annual report, figures on immigration crime, sea crossings, detentions and deportations.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 5 places a duty on partner authorities to co-operate with the commander in the carrying out of their functions. The commander is tasked with maximising the effectiveness of our collective response to border security threats, which requires a whole of Government response and will be enabled by the clause. It is recognised that partner authorities have wide-ranging functions that extend well beyond tackling border security threats. The duty set out in the clause extends only so far as is appropriate and compatible with partner authorities’ other functions. That ensures that partners across the system are working in lockstep to enhance border security, while continuing to enable the vital work undertaken by partners beyond border security matters.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 5 provides that a partner authority has duties, so far as is “appropriate and reasonably practicable,” to co-operate with the commander in carrying out the commander’s functions. It would be helpful if the Minister explained what the Government mean by

“so far as appropriate and reasonably practicable”

and under what circumstances it might be justified for a partner authority not to co-operate. Does it mean, as per subsection (2), that the partner authority would co-operate only so far as the co-operation was compatible with the exercise of its other functions, or are there other circumstances where partner authorities might not have to co-operate?

Again, the clause exposes how powerless the Border Security Commander is. The commander cannot actually command any of these partner authorities to do anything at all. Subsection (3) requires those who are co-operating with the commander in the exercise of their functions to put in place arrangements governing co-operation between the commander and that person. Does the Minister have—

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Fourth sitting)

Angela Eagle Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 4th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship on your first outing, Mr Stuart. Clause 5(3) requires those who are co-operating with the commander in the exercise of their functions to put in place arrangements governing co-operation between the commander and that person. Does the Minister have a view about what those agreements will look like and what sort of obligations will fall on both parties?

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Dame Angela Eagle)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. It will be the first occasion of many, I am sure. I hope you enjoy chairing Bill Committees as much as I enjoyed doing so in the previous Parliament.

Clause 5 places a duty on partner authorities to co-operate with the commander in the carrying out of their functions. The commander is tasked with maximising the effectiveness of our collective response to border security threats. That requires a whole-of-Government response, which will be enabled by this clause. It is recognised that partner authorities have wide-ranging functions that extend well beyond tackling border security threats. The duty set out in the clause extends only so far as it is appropriate and compatible with partner authorities’ other functions. That ensures that partner authorities across the system work in lockstep to enhance border security while continuing to enable the vital work undertaken by partners in other contexts, beyond border security matters.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6

The Board

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 6 places a duty on the Border Security Commander to establish and maintain a board to assist with the exercise of their functions. That unique forum enables senior representatives from across the border security system to convene to shape our collective response to organised immigration crime and other border security threats. The commander will consult the board when developing strategic priorities for border security, which makes the board a crucial forum in shaping the whole-of-Government response to these threats.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 6 states:

“The Commander must establish and maintain a board to assist the Commander in the exercise of the Commander’s functions.”

It is all quite open-ended: the chair will be the commander, and the board will be made up of one or more representatives from each relevant partner authority. Will the Minister explain on what basis the commander might decide to have representatives from partner authorities? Why do all partner authorities not need to be represented?

Subsection (6) states:

“The Commander must hold meetings of the Board at such intervals as the Commander thinks appropriate.”

Does the Minister have any views about how regular the meetings should be? What sort of matters does she envisage the board will deal with?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The Bill is a framework within which the Border Security Commander operates, but it is not prescriptive because the people who drafted the Bill could not see what the priorities will be in the future. It is a framework that enables the Border Security Commander to respond to what is going on at the time, without limiting him.

There has been a common theme throughout the speeches from the Opposition. They seem to feel that somehow the commander does not have sufficient empowerment to command the border security system, that he is not independent enough, and that he somehow cannot get things done, but the functions outlined in these clauses are not the sole capabilities of the commander’s role as empowered by the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister.

The Border Security Command is not an operational entity, but a strategic leader for border security. Representatives on the board would be Departments such as the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, the Department for Transport, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and the Cabinet Office, as well as operational partners such as the National Crime Agency, the UK intelligence community and security services, Border Force, Immigration Enforcement and policing. Those kinds of people will be convened for a strategic purpose. It makes sense, if we think about it, that the commander can bring these people together as and when he or she sees a need for them to meet, depending on what is on the agenda and what is going on.

The commander is already using the role and its associated capabilities to deploy key functions to lead on border security across Government, including deploying additional resources across partners, such as the additional £150 million for border security that has been announced by the Government, and developing border security legislation to be used by operational partners, such as the powers in this Bill. In last week’s evidence sessions, we heard from operational partners such as the police, the NCA and the Crown Prosecution Service on how useful they felt the powers in the Bill would be in their everyday operational capacity. The operational commander can also lead on international engagement diplomatically, and has accompanied both the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary on journeys to Italy, Germany and Iraq to ensure that we have meetings at the highest levels with people in other jurisdictions, to try to get more co-operation going to deal with the cross-border issues of border security.

The Bill provides a new significant wide-ranging power to lead the border security system strategically, which is being done for the first time. All partner authorities, defined as those public bodies with functions in relation to border security, must, as a legal duty, have regard to the strategic direction set by the commander. However, this works best if there is not a battle between different bits of the Government—if there is co-operation and co-ordination—and that is what these structures are designed to try to achieve. The Bill will, for the first time, provide a clear and long-term vision for border security, bringing together and providing leadership to all parts of the system that work to maintain the integrity of our border and immigration systems both domestically and internationally.

I hope that that has provided a little more explanation for the Opposition on the thinking and approach behind some of the powers set out in the clauses we are considering, and most specifically in clause 6.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7

Delegation by the Commander

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 7 ensures that the functions of the Border Security Commander can be delegated to an authorised civil servant when required. Flexibility in the exercise of these functions will support the most efficient and effective delivery of the Government’s actions to tackle border security threats.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 7 makes provision about the delegation of the commander’s functions. Subsection (1) provides that

“The functions conferred on the Commander by this Chapter may be exercised by any civil servant authorised by the Commander for that purpose.”

This is further evidence, were any needed, that the post of commander might not be a serious one. We have already seen that the Bill does not specify any minimum qualifications or experience for the commander, and we have seen why: they are not really in charge of anything.

There are serious questions to answer on the delegation of functions. What sort of functions does the Minister envisage the commander potentially delegating under this clause? Can any specific functions be named? The Bill does not specify any level of seniority for those the commander might delegate functions to. Is there any grade within the Home Office that the Minister thinks it would not be appropriate for the commander to delegate to? What oversight will there be of any delegation process?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I set out in some detail in my reply on the previous clause some of the things that the commander is involved with, including some of the meetings he is involved in convening and the purpose of those strategic meetings. During the evidence we heard last week from operational partners, both the NCA and the police chiefs set out some of the benefits they felt there would be.

[Margaret Mullane (Dagenham and Rainham) (Lab)]

Does the Minister agree that we seem to be having repetition in our discussions about the commander and his abilities within his role? The role is respected, and that came up in the evidence we heard. Does she feel that there is repetition of this point, with the Opposition picking up on it at every moment?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The Opposition have asked which bits of the commander’s functions may be delegated and to what level. In theory, it can be any of them. We are trying to ensure that there are no issues in primary legislation that would mean something is prevented from being delegated that would have been effective.

I do not think that the hon. Member for Stockton West would expect me to go into great detail about what might happen with delegation in the future, but I can give an example. If there was to be a high-level visit to Iraq to conclude a memorandum of understanding on returns and activity against organised immigration crime, and the commander was detained elsewhere, it would be possible to delegate that function to somebody who would then go in his place.

We are trying to get to the stage in legislation where we create the commander and give flexibility as to how the job can be put into effect in scenarios that may crop up, without being too prescriptive. I hope that the hon. Member for Stockton West will accept that example of the sort of thing that may crop up.

[Chris Murray (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)]

It is quite interesting to hear the points that the Minister is making, considering the conversation we had this morning about the commander being functionally a civil servant. Although I was never officially a civil servant in the proper sense, from my experience it is really important that senior leaders within the civil service are able to avail themselves of delegation capacities as needed.

It can be done for many reasons. It could be a bandwidth issue, where someone has multiple priorities and needs to delegate to someone else because they are not able to be in two places at once—and looking at the responsibilities of the commander as set out in the legislation, there are a lot. It could also be a resourcing issue or because of a conflict of interest. That brings me to the point I was making about this being a civil service role; there need to be proper conflict of interest considerations. That is what we are taking account of here.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

My hon. Friend is right that circumstances often crop up that require this kind of provision. All clause 7 does is allow it, so I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 8

Designation of an Interim Border Security Commander

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 8 ensures that the functions of the Border Security Commander can continue to be exercised in the event that the post of commander is vacant for a period, or if the commander is incapacitated or temporarily unavailable. This ensures that the work to enhance our border security and undermine the people smuggling gangs threatening our borders continues in the event that the post either falls vacant or is effectively vacant for a period.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 8 is clearly there in the event of the commander being incapacitated or ill and unable to do the job for a while. It is not unusual that people have life experiences that mean they have to take time off work. In that kind of instance, an interim commander could be appointed, pending the return of the role holder, who may be receiving medical treatment or may be incapacitated in some way. There may also be a gap between the resignation or retirement of a commander and reappointment, although one would hope that planning ahead would mean that that would be minimised. The clause addresses the practical issue of having an interim in case there were an issue with appointment.

The interim commander would, obviously, be expected to have the skills to do the job to the full extent. No time limit has been put into primary legislation because if there were a hard timeline it would make it harder in practical terms to get a replacement. It is very much a horses for courses thing, allowing there to be an interim in the case of incapacity, retirement or replacement while the replacement is advertised for and appointed in the usual manner.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 9 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 10

Exclusion of application to the armed forces

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider clauses 11 and 12 stand part.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 10 states that the duties in this chapter of the Bill do not apply to the armed forces, clause 11 makes amendments to the Data Protection Act 2018, and clause 12 provides definitions of the terms used. The work of the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence makes a significant contribution to the security of the United Kingdom. The Border Security Commander will work across Government, including with the Ministry of Defence, to enhance our border security. Clause 10 recognises the unique work of the armed forces. While the Border Security Commander will work closely with the armed forces, including through the military aid to the civil authorities process, it is correct that the important duty of our armed forces remains independent from the functions outlined in this chapter. That is achieved by clause 10.

Clause 11 amends the Data Protection Act 2018 to ensure that the Border Security Commander may process data for law enforcement purposes. That information is vital to build a shared understanding of the nature of border security threats and inform the priority setting process. Clause 12 provides definitions for the terms used in chapter 1 of the Bill for the reader’s understanding and to ensure clarity on definitions during the implementation and operation of the legislation.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 10 makes it clear that this chapter does not apply to the naval, military or air forces of the Crown. Clause 11 is an amendment to the Data Protection Act 2018 to allow the Border Security Commander to be added to the list of competent authorities in relation to the processing of personal data carried out for a law enforcement purpose. Given how toothless the Border Security Commander appears to be, will the Minister explain why this measure needs to be added to schedule 7 of the Data Protection Act, as well as what law enforcement purposes the commander will have and for what purpose they will be processing personal data?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The hon. Member asked why the Border Security Commander should be processing data collected from electronic devices. He will know that later in the Bill, there are some new powers that involve collecting, in an intelligence-led way, data from suspected organised immigration criminals. The point is to ensure that data is collected in a lawful manner, and that is why clause 11 allows the Border Security Commander to process data for law enforcement purposes. Some of that is about the counter terrorism-style powers, which we will discuss in relation to later clauses—I do not want to have that debate here—but it is really an enabling power to put beyond doubt the legality of the collection of such material.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 11 and 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 13

Supplying articles for use in immigration crime

[Pete Wishart (Perth and Kinross-shire) (SNP)]

I beg to move amendment 3, in clause 13, page 7, line 12, at end insert—

‘(1A) For the purposes of subsection (1), P cannot commit an offence if P is an asylum seeker.’

This amendment would specify that the offence created by clause 13 (“Supplying articles for use in immigration crime”) cannot apply to asylum seekers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Pete Wishart]

That is a helpful and useful intervention, and the hon. Lady is right that the CPS did say that. I listened again very carefully to what was said, because concerns about these provisions have been raised repeatedly. I am sure that the CPS is serious about that, but I challenge the hon. Lady to look at the provisions and tell me how such a scenario could not be caught. The Bill is badly drafted because it provides the conditions to allow such a perception to develop. I know the Government do not want to arrest people who are looking at weather maps. I am certain that is not their intention at all, but when we examine the Bill we can see that it will allow that very thing to happen.

The Minister refers to the provision in section 25 of the Illegal Immigration Act 1972 or 1973—

[Dame Angela Eagle]

1971.

[Pete Wishart]

1971—there we go. Section 25 of that Act offers the protection of allowing for a reasonable explanation of why people are caught up in such activity. That is useful when it comes to this Bill, but why do we have to rely on something like that? We are creating a new Bill, which does something specific and unhelpful for some of the poorest and most wretched people who exist on our globe. We have a responsibility for those people under our international obligations and conventions, and this new legislation does nothing to assist them.

The collection of data from people’s phones is facilitated by the Bill, which creates new broad powers to enable the search and seizure of electronic devices. I will come back to the main point I made on Second Reading. We did not get much time to elaborate on this, but I think it is pertinent to the clauses that we are debating, and the Committee must consider it properly.

The gangs have a monopoly and an exclusive right to the irregular migration market. There is no other way for asylum seekers to get to the UK. It just is not possible. There are safe routes available for a small number of countries, but for the vast majority of potential asylum seekers in war-torn regions, areas and countries around the world, the only way to claim asylum in the United Kingdom is to put themselves at the mercy of the gangs, and to go on a small boat to get across the channel.

Business is booming. I do not know if anyone saw the shots today from the camps in France—I think it was on Sky News. What a hell on earth they are! What a disgrace that is for us, who are part of the problem. We cannot get the situation resolved, and we are keeping some of the poorest people in such circumstances. Shame on us, and shame on everyone in the international community who allows such conditions to develop and thrive. Business is booming for the illegal gangs.

I will tell you something else, Mr Stuart. It will only get better for the gangs when the Government cut the international aid budget. What do they think will happen? Do they think that conditions in those areas will get better? Of course they will not. That will lead to so many more people making the journey to the UK, and it will be down to the Government.

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[Dame Angela Eagle]

We have had an interesting debate, and Members have come at this complex problem from different angles. The hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire would give everyone who gets on the boats the benefit of the doubt, the hon. Member for Weald of Kent was somewhere towards the opposite end of that spectrum, and we had everything in between.

The important thing that we need to get right in this Bill is that we must give those who are trying to prevent dangerous boat crossings all the tools they tell us they need to help them deal with the criminal gangs that have been allowed to take hold across the channel and who are currently perpetrating this evil trade. We all agree that we want to stop that.

I am starting by talking about what we agree on, and I will then explain how the clauses will assist. We all agree that the right way to go about this is to ensure that the decisions about who is allowed to come into our country are taken by the authorities in the country, rather than by sophisticated, internationally organised criminal gangs with supply chains that go across many jurisdictions, and which make millions out of their illegal trade.

I want to give the Committee a couple of examples to put some flesh on the bones of what we are trying to do with the clauses in this group. Although people may think they are wide-ranging, their purpose is not to criminalise every asylum seeker, or even the vast majority of asylum seekers. Our approach will be intelligence-led. The National Crime Agency and others who police our borders have told us that these powers will assist them in doing the things they most want to do. The NCA gave evidence last week in which it said that its strategy is to prevent, which is to deter participation in organised immigration crime; to pursue, which is to disrupt the way that organised criminals work; to protect, which is to detect and act before the damage has been done—not wait until there are deaths in the channel, but stop small boats being launched in the first place—and to prepare, which is to manage and deal with the issues.

I am going to read into the record a couple of examples, to give Members an insight into what we are trying to achieve. These powers are short of those in section 25 of the Immigration Act 1971, because they relate to preparatory acts, which is what these clauses deal with. These are two case studies from the National Crime Agency. The first relates to the offence of handling articles. In November 2024, a man called Amanj Hasan Zada, who organised cross-channel small boat crossings from his home in Lancashire, was jailed for 17 years after being found guilty of people smuggling charges following an investigation by the National Crime Agency. Investigators were able to link him to three separate crossings made from France to the UK in November and December 2023, and he was convicted under section 25. Each crossing involved Kurdish migrants who had travelled through eastern Europe into Germany, Belgium and then France.

It is possible that the reasonable suspicion element meant that investigators would have met the requirements to arrest and charge him earlier, ahead of the section 25 powers becoming an option, if the new offences had been on the statute book when this was going on. This man was also moving between the UK and Iraq regularly, meaning that these powers would have assisted investigators. He was overseas, but he had access to some of these articles when he was in the UK, so he would have been in the scope of the offence, and we would have been able to interdict and arrest him earlier and prevent those crossings from happening. Part of the idea of the new offences is that they are intelligence-led, but they relate to preparatory acts. They are attempting to disrupt before the more serious section 25 offence happens, and therefore they will prevent some of the damage done if that is allowed to happen because the authorities do not have enough evidence to arrest on the more serious offence.

Let me tell the Committee about another case study. An investigation into an Albanian organised crime gang using small boats to facilitate illegal immigration to the UK led to the arrest of an individual who was identifying rigid-hulled inflatable boats for sale on behalf of that gang. The gang subsequently bought and used the identified boats for organised immigration crime purposes. The individual was never directly involved in the movement of migrants or the purchase of those boats; he simply sourced them. The NCA provided evidence that they were on the periphery of the organised criminal gang and were researching for the gang to support their criminality. Despite that evidence, he was never directly involved in the actual facilitation, so the case could not go through to charging.

The preparatory acts offence would have enabled prosecution in that case, as the individual took part in the research and planning of acts to facilitate organised immigration crime, despite not being directly involved in the facilitation and illegal entry of migrants. Both the type of information and the circumstances the information was collected under would be captured by the new offence, and the evidence that the NCA had would have been sufficient for a sentence of up to five years.

We are talking about doing prevention work, to disrupt, to interdict and to stop some of this stuff happening before it has reached its full maturity and people’s lives have been put at risk in the channel. It is a different approach. To sit, watch and wait until something has happened and people have perhaps died is one way of doing it, but the entire approach of the counter-terrorism style powers, of which the powers in this clause are an example, is what the NCA and other people have asked us to assist them with. They see the pattern in their information gathering: how these things are organised, what the patterns are, who is involved and how they do their business. They have demonstrated to me and others that these kinds of powers would be really useful in a preventive way and may very well save lives. I hope that giving those two examples will mean that we have more of a handle on the kind of things that the clauses are trying to do.

The hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire was worried that the powers will criminalise all asylum seekers. That is not the intention. The intention of these powers is to be completely intelligence-led and focused on perpetrators, whether they are on the periphery or directly involved. More than 95% of people whom we know of who arrive illegally on small boats claim asylum. The hon. Member’s amendments, which would take all people who claim asylum out of consideration of these offences, would be an obvious way of avoiding the offences being brought to bear and could be used by any of the people who are involved in organised immigration crime to avoid the powers being used against them. Therefore, while I am sure it was not his intention at all, the effect of the amendments is to wreck the approach to prevention and disruption that these powers represent in the Bill.

I want to be clear—it is important that I put this on the record, so I will say it again—that it is not the intention to target asylum seekers with these new offences. The offences do not penalise individuals for entering illegally any more than they are penalised already, but they criminalise the conduct of activities connected to facilitation and illegal entry offences through the supply or handling of articles. In practice, the focus will be intelligence-led and targeted at those who law enforcement believe to be working in connection with organised criminal networks. Believe you me, Mr Stuart, those networks exist in the UK and they come across on small boats themselves. They also travel between the UK and some of the countries of origin they are working with. We know that that is exactly what happens because we can track and follow some of them. It is therefore important that we can bring these powers to bear. We know there are individuals who have claimed asylum in the UK and operated criminal activity from within the UK as part of a wider criminal gang with networks overseas in order to facilitate smuggling into the UK—I have just given the Committee an example. That is a phenomenon we are aware of today and we cannot exclude anyone with an asylum claim from the scope of these new offences, as the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire would want us to, regardless of the circumstances.

Excluding asylum seekers fuels abuse and exploitation of the asylum system, as well as the intentional frustration of our criminal justice system, with those involved in the supply and handling of articles able to claim asylum on arrival or arrest and therefore evade prosecution. I am sure that that was not the hon. Member’s intention, but I hope he will also take at least some comfort from what I have said about this power not being applied to everybody, but instead being very focused and intelligence-led. We cannot provide blanket exemptions. I hope given the explanation, he will therefore withdraw the amendments.

Turning more broadly to what the clauses will achieve in practice, clause 13 creates a new offence of supplying or offering to supply an article where the individual knows or suspects that the article is to be used in relation to an offence under section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971, which covers illegal entry, or section 25, which covers the facilitation of unlawful immigration.

Criminal smuggling gangs are using wide international and transnational networks to supply items for their criminal ventures. The new offence is intended to allow law enforcement to target those who act in a way that removes themselves from the direct act of people smuggling, so as to allow them to be caught under existing legislation. It will allow for earlier intervention, as in the example I have just used, potentially before boats have even been launched and lives risked. That is the prevention side.

--- Later in debate ---

[Pete Wishart]

I wish I could say that I was reassured by the Minister’s response. There were things she said that encouraged me and that I think she was genuine and sincere about. She, and everybody who has contributed today and who we have heard from over the past couple of weeks, is right that we do not want to arrest asylum seekers. That is the last thing we want to do, and I accept that that is the case in practically everything that anybody has said. However, more asylum seekers will be arrested because of these clauses. More will be facing justice, whatever way it applies, right across the United Kingdom because of these new offences.

What we have forgotten is that it is already illegal to enter the UK irregularly. In 2020, 6,477 people were arrested because they arrived in the UK irregularly. With clauses 13 and 14 we are not addressing the illegality of issues such as people coming to the United Kingdom; we are finding new ways of ensuring that those people will be subject to court proceedings—to being on the wrong side of UK law—and that is the thing that concerns us most.

Many people have referred to agencies that gave us support today. I listened to the NCA’s evidence, and some of it was very interesting and compelling. I accept that it wants to target the gang members and those involved in this violent trade, and that is what we should be helping it to do. Obviously, asylum seekers will get caught up in all that, but let us enable the NCA to focus exclusively on trying to apprehend the gang members and secure justice rather than trying to find new ways to criminalise people coming to the UK,.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Will the hon. Gentleman not take my word that the offences will be intelligence-led? They are not targeting all asylum seekers, but they certainly would target someone coming over on a boat who may claim asylum, who has been involved in an organised immigration gang, and who has been organising the supplies for it.

[Pete Wishart]

I obviously accept the Minister’s word when it comes to all this, but we need to look at what is in the Bill. There are measures that we do not like and that we do not think will help to achieve the major objective, which is to disrupt the gangs’ business model and ensure that they are brought to justice. That just does not happen with these new clauses. The measure to which amendment 3 refers does not offend me in the same way that the subject of amendment 4 does. I will withdraw the amendment, but I reserve the right to push the next amendment to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 13 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Amendment 4 negatived.

Clauses 14 and 15 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16

Collecting information for use in immigration crime

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The provisions in clause 16 create an additional tool to act earlier to disrupt criminal gangs smuggling people into the UK. The new offence targets specified preparatory activities associated with people smuggling. These activities relate to the collection, recording and possession, viewing or accessing of information that is likely to be useful to a person organising or preparing for a journey of more than one person into the UK, where their entry or arrival constitutes an offence under section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971. These specified activities must also be conducted in circumstances giving rise to reasonable suspicion that the information being collected, recorded, possessed, viewed or accessed will be used in organising or preparing for such a journey.

This clause is levelled strongly against people-smuggling gangs and their associates. It includes a defence for someone of undertaking these specified activities for their own journey only. Also included as a defence is a non-exhaustive list of reasonable excuses, where one express excuse is conducting these activities to carry out or to prepare to carry out the rescue of a person from danger or serious harm. The maximum sentence for this offence is five years’ imprisonment.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 16, as the Minister has just set out, creates a new offence of collecting information for use in immigration crime. A person commits such an offence if a person:

“collects or makes a record of information of a kind likely to be useful to a person organising or preparing for a relevant journey or part of such a journey…possesses a document or record containing information of that kind, or…views, or otherwise accesses, by means of the internet a document or record containing information of that kind.”

This is an extremely wide set of information that is being criminalised. We understand the desire to keep these offences broad in order to capture as many offenders as possible, and we support that aim. However, if the definition is too wide, there is a risk that it becomes meaningless and therefore self-defeating. So, it is important to understand how the Minister believes law enforcement will assess whether the information is of a kind likely to be useful to a person organising or preparing for a relevant journey. Could she please explain how this test will be met in practice? It would also be helpful, for similar reasons, to know when the CPS will publish its guidance on what might meet the threshold for an offence to be committed under this clause. Finally, it is again a defence for an organisation that aims to assist asylum seekers if it does not charge for its services. So, we have the same questions and concerns about this defence as we did in relation to the preceding clauses.

[Mike Tapp]

I will quickly talk about this clause, because it is one of my favourite clauses in the Bill. Having worked in a counter-terror role in the past, I know that one of the most effective ways of preventing terror attacks on the streets of the United Kingdom is by identifying hostile reconnaissance, whether it is physical or online. That is why I am so happy to see this clause in the Bill, because it gives our authorities the opportunity to get to these vile criminals before they take to the seas.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I take my hon. Friend’s point. This clause is very much about being able to capture preparatory work for any effort to evade our immigration laws and bring people over in small boats, illegally putting their lives at risk and potentially costing lives in return for money.

This clause is about a wide range of potential research, but there are also explicit safeguards within it that are sufficient to protect individual migrants and refugees, or families of refugees, trying to help family members to flee danger or serious harm. The defence that a person is conducting these activities exclusively in preparation for their own journey protects individuals from falling foul of this law. The clause is explicitly focused on and aimed at the work done by gang-affiliated facilitators of immigration offences.

The express reasonable excuse of

“carrying out, or preparing for the carrying out of, a rescue of a person from danger or serious harm”

may—depending on the circumstances—protect the families of refugees wanting to help their loved ones flee. There is also an express reasonable excuse for a person

“acting on behalf of an organisation which…aims to assist asylum-seekers, and…does not charge for its services.”

The list of reasonable excuses in the Bill is not exhaustive, so it is very much a question of looking at the information that has been gathered and making a judgment, knowing that the idea of this offence is to focus specifically on organised immigration criminality, not the individuals who may be asylum seekers or may be being trafficked.

--- Later in debate ---

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clause 17 provides for the offences set out in clauses 13 and 14—the supply and handling of articles for immigration crime—and clause 16—the collecting of information for immigration crime—to apply to activities committed both inside and outside the UK, regardless of the nationality of the person by whom they are done. The activities criminalised by these offences are often carried out overseas, as well as in the UK, by perpetrators of various nationalities to facilitate people smuggling to the UK. This clause will strengthen the offences, enhancing the ability to disrupt those involved in this trade, indiscriminate of their nationality and the location of their crime.

Clause 17 also makes provisions for, where an offence under clauses 13, 14 or 16 is committed outside the UK, proceedings to be taken in the UK. For application in Scotland, this clause provides that those proceedings are to be made in accordance with the relevant processes and bodies of the devolved Administration. Finally, this clause provides that section 3 of the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act 1878, which requires consent from the Secretary of State for certain prosecutions of non-UK nationals on territorial waters, does not apply. In doing so, the impacts of these offences are not narrowed and law enforcement is able to pursue perpetrators of these offences when committed on territorial waters.

[Katie Lam]

Clause 17 sets out that the offences of supplying articles for use in immigration crime, handling articles for use in immigration crime and collecting information for use in immigration—so the clauses that we have just discussed—apply to things done both inside and outside the United Kingdom, regardless of the nationality of the person by whom they are done. In essence, clause 17 makes these three new offences extraterritorial. Subsection (2) provides that where the offence is taken outside the United Kingdom, proceedings may be taken in the United Kingdom.

When we heard evidence from Sarah Dineley, the head of international at the Crown Prosecution Service and the national CPS lead, she said that this provision and subsection (7) of clause 18, which extends the offence of endangering lives at sea to acts committed outside the UK, create challenges. She said,

“we can obtain intelligence and evidence from our overseas counterparts at both judicial and law enforcement level…the Crown Prosecution Service has a network of liaison prosecutors based across the world…we can issue what are called international letters of request. They require the recipient country to execute the action, or to provide the information that we have asked for.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 31-33, Q30.]

However, she also said that, for these new offences to work, there has to be “dual criminality”; that is to say,

“there has to be the equivalent offence in the country that we are making the request to, and there are some gaps across Europe in establishing dual criminality for all the immigration offences that we currently have on our books.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 33, Q33.]

Can the Minister reassure the Committee that offences equivalent to those in clauses 13, 14 and 16 exist internationally in relevant partner countries so that we can be assured that the extraterritorial scope of the offences will be effective in tackling organised immigration crime? Can she name those offences or share a list? We fully support the aims of the Government but are keen to establish the efficacy of these measures in disrupting the vile work of people-smuggling gangs.

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[Dame Angela Eagle]

I thank the hon. Lady for her observations. In practice, the clause allows for prosecution where an offence was committed overseas. It may well rely on evidence sharing from an international partner. She is right to talk about the network of CPS prosecutors across other jurisdictions.

In the time that I have been in the Home Office, we have been strengthening those ties and growing them further. We have done a lot of work via arrangements such as the agreement we came to with the Italians; the German agreement; the work we have done with the Calais group; the information we are sharing in and around the Balkan countries about the routes that go through those countries; the work that the Home Secretary and the Border Security Commander have done in not only Italy, but Iraq, the Kurdish region and Tunisia and some of the other countries that tend to be countries of transit. We are focusing more and more on how we can co-operate operationally.

Some of that work involves cross-country and cross-jurisdiction work to hit particular organised immigration crime across the piece on a set day. There have been some very good examples of cross-jurisdictional days of action. The muscles in this area are strengthening and being worked more. This clause is an added power that will make it easier for us to continue that work.

[Tom Hayes]

I draw attention to what Sarah Dineley, the head of international at the Crown Prosecution Service, said in her testimony:

“I will start with how we rebuild relations with key allies.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 38, Q41.]

That implies that relations with key allies have been strained and need rebuilding. She then said:

“I have talked about our network of liaison prosecutors.”––[Official Report, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 38, Q41.]

She then talked about how there is regular engagement and said that engagement events with overseas prosecutors have increased in recent months. Does the Minister agree that one of the reasons we have had an asylum backlog in recent years, and our asylum system has been described as a disaster, a meltdown and worse in oral testimony, is that we strained our relations with key allies?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Yes. When things are cross-jurisdictional and cross-country, one has to be able to co-operate with other jurisdictions with some respect for their particular prosecutorial approach in order to be able to share information and work together operationally and diplomatically to deal with the significant challenges that organised immigration crime presents. The Government certainly want to renew and strengthen their approach in that area, and have made a good start.

People should not underestimate how often people who break this law and would fall foul of this increase in jurisdiction come to visit the UK. It is possible that we could pick them up and charge them here and, in some instances, follow them and wait for them when they arrive. The extension of jurisdiction, which is the essence of clause 17, will provide us once more with what we hope will be an extremely effective new tool that will help us to disrupt and begin to dismantle some of the organised immigration criminal gangs.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Martin McCluskey.)

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Second sitting)

Angela Eagle Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers]

Q What concerns, if any, do you have about the Bill as drafted?

Jim Pearce: From a policing point of view, there would be insurance around safeguarding. For the electronic devices, for example, I understand the benefits that would come from the counter-terrorism-style powers to be able to seize electronic devices. I am confident that that is managed through the measures in place around reasonable suspicion and having to get the advice from a senior officer. It is about operationalising that, putting it into practice, and making sure that our staff understand through education and training. Any change in legislation requires training, finance and input. Those are the types of things that I would be thinking about.

Rob Jones: I agree. It is about the professional development and the guidance for officers who are using new tactics and new tools against this threat, and making sure that we are ready to go with very clear guidance on how officers should look to engage the new offences in the Bill.

Sarah Dineley: Clause 17 and one of the subsections of clause 18 create extraterritorial jurisdiction for the offences, and it would be remiss of me not to highlight some of the challenges that that will bring. We have a system of judicial co-operation, something called mutual legal assistance, whereby we can obtain intelligence and evidence from our overseas counterparts at both judicial and law enforcement level. We work very hard on building those relationships to collaborate.

To that end, the Crown Prosecution Service has a network of liaison prosecutors based across the world. Specifically, we have liaison prosecutors based in the major organised immigration crime countries—Spain, Italy, Turkey, Germany, Netherlands and Belgium—and two in France, one of whom is actually a dedicated organised immigration crime liaison prosecutor. We use them to foster and build those relationships so that we have that reciprocal exchange of information where required. That is not to say that is without its challenges. I flag that as something that we will continue to work on, but it has challenges.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Dame Angela Eagle)]

Q Starting with Rob Jones, what do the witnesses think the Bill does for them operationally?

Rob Jones: It gives us the opportunity to make the most of the intelligence dividend that we have invested in tackling the threat. We have a good understanding of the people behind small boats crossings in particular, the supply of materials, the facilitation from near-Europe and further afield, but we want momentum and greater agility so that when we are aware that a crossing is being prepared—when materials are moving—we can act pre-emptively and proactively.

As I said earlier, we do not want to be investigating after thousands of people have arrived, and trying to put together very complex investigations that may involve months of covert surveillance and eavesdropping—a whole range of covert tactics—to get us over the line for a charging decision for a section 25 offence. The new offences give us the opportunity to act when we see that jigsaw puzzle coming together, to go to the CPS when we reach a tipping point and to go earlier than we can now. That means that we can pull more people through that system, deliver justice more quickly and be more disruptive in tackling the threat. That is a big step forward. That is lacking in the current toolbox to operationalise the intelligence we have.

Sarah Dineley: The endangerment offence potentially fills a gap between the current section 24 and 25 provisions. Each boat has a pilot—someone steering it across the channel—who, by the very nature and condition of those boats, the overcrowding, the lack of lifesaving equipment, and so on, puts everyone in that boat in danger of losing their life. We welcome that clause and will draft guidance on how it can be interpreted in terms of practical application.

Jim Pearce: Police officers mainly deal with the inland clandestine events as opposed to the small boats. From my point of view, it would be, correctly, common practice to use schedule 2(17) of the Immigration Act 1971 to detain migrants and then pass them into the immigration system. On searches after that, yes, there are powers in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 after that provision under section 32, but that is mainly to safeguard; it is not to seize evidence.

On Rob’s point about early intervention and intelligence gathering, the only way you gather intelligence is through what people tell you and what electronic devices give up. The Bill gives police officers the ability to gather intelligence through defined and clear powers in legislation, so that they are not misusing a PACE power, an operational procedure or anything else. That would be the biggest change for policing.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q We often hear that organised immigration crime is very lucrative, well established and transnational, and that there is therefore no point in doing a lot about it. What is your answer to that?

Rob Jones: You could say that about all serious organised crime. Where do you go from there? I do not agree with that view. It is definitely transnational and complicated, but it is a relatively new serious organised crime threat, and it is not too late to stop it. In 2018, there were a few hundred people coming on small boats. There were 36,000 last year. We need to unravel the conditions that have allowed that to happen, and this legislation will help with that. I do not take the view that you cannot stop it.

There will always be people attempting organised immigration crime, but this element of it—small boats—is relatively new. There are very specific things that organised crime groups involved in it need to do. They need access to very specific materials—otherwise they cannot move the numbers that they attempt to move—and they need to be able to operate using materials that are lawfully obtained, albeit for criminal purposes. This attacks that business model because we can pursue the dual-use materials with more vigour and have more impact. It is challenging, and it is a different challenge from drugs and other threats, but it is there to be dealt with. It is a very public manifestation of the OIC threat that has always been there. This part of it relies on a very specific business model that we can attack.

Sarah Dineley: The follow-on point from that, and one that you raised, is that people are making a lot of money out of this, so the illicit finance piece is really important. These new clauses actually give us more on which to hang illicit finance investigations. There is a lot of work going on in the illicit finance sphere; in particular, and most recent, the illicit finance taskforce between the UK and Italy, was set up specifically to look at the profits being made by the people who are preying on other people’s misery.

Jim Pearce: It has been said already but I want to reinforce the point about organised crime gangs being involved in polycriminality. Organised immigration crime is one part, but so are modern slavery, serious acquisitive crime and drug running. That is felt in local communities across the whole country. In my own force area of Devon and Cornwall, you would think that modern slavery and organised immigration crime do not exist, but we have a number of investigations and intelligence leads being developed; they are being looked at by both our regional crime units and members of Rob’s team. This exists everywhere across the country. As I say, if you are prepared to effectively smuggle people into the country, or at least to facilitate that, you are prepared to get involved in very serious things indeed.

[Mr Will Forster (Woking) (LD)]

Q I want to look at clauses 13 to 17 and what the Crown Prosecution Service thinks of them, so this question is more directed at you, Sarah. Considering their application both inside and outside the UK, what do you think the chances of successful prosecution are? How likely do you think the CPS is to take this up? We heard earlier today that some are concerned about how wide the powers in clauses 13 to 16 could be. We were told this morning that, if I was in Calais and someone asked me, “What’s the weather like today?”, technically I would have committed a crime under these clauses. What is your view of that?

Sarah Dineley: I will deal with the second point first, as it is probably the easiest and it flows into the first. In relation to clauses 13 to 16, with any new legislation, the Crown Prosecution Service always publishes guidance on how it is to be interpreted. Certainly, the example that you gave about asking what the weather is like in Dover when you are stood in Calais would not fall within the guidance as meeting the evidential test. Of course, it is not just about an evidential test being met, but a public interest test as well. Our guidance always deals with that specific question of whether it is in the public interest, so that prosecutors can do that balancing exercise and ask, “Are there factors that weigh in favour of prosecution? Are there factors that tend away from prosecution?” They want to come to a decision that is compliant with our code for Crown prosecutors, so it is a mixture of guidance and application of the code that hopefully gets us to the right conclusion.

Going back to your first point, I mentioned that we have mutual legal assistance and that we can issue what are called international letters of request. They require the recipient country to execute the action, or to provide the information that we have asked for. One of the problems is that there has to be something called dual criminality—there has to be the equivalent offence in the country that we are making the request to, and there are some gaps across Europe in establishing dual criminality for all the immigration offences that we currently have on our books. However, we are confident that there are reciprocal laws in the major OIC countries in Europe to allow us to make those requests for information under mutual legal assistance. We are aided by the network of prosecutors based abroad, which I mentioned. We also have Eurojust and the joint investigation teams run out of Eurojust. We are well versed in working internationally and with the measures that we can deploy to make sure that we build a strong evidential case.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

Q Are there any lessons from abroad that we are failing to learn at this point?

Tony Smith: One thing I have raised is the possibility of a biometric entry/exit system, which we do not have in this country. I chair a lot of conferences around the world, on border developments, border security and border technologies. Your face will become your passport sooner or later—sooner in some countries than here. If we had the powers and authority, we could capture a digital biometric image of everybody entering and exiting the country, and we could require the carriers to do likewise—we do not have physical embarkation controls.

This is happening in America. It is happening in Dubai. It is happening in Singapore. We are going to Curaçao, which now has a walk-through border. All it does is capture your face. It matches you to the API data that you already have, uploads it into the cloud and recognises you straightaway, so you have a more seamless border. It will give proper figures on who is in this country and who is not. Your net migration figures will be a lot more accurate than they are currently, provided that we have the powers to capture and retain everybody’s facial image. That means UK passports, Irish passports, electronic travel authorisations and visas, and permanent residents. I think that is achievable, and I would love to see it happening in this country.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q Migration Watch’s website says that you are worried about population projections and a

“significant fall in the percentage of the indigenous (white British) population.”

Can you explain what your worry is, and could you define “indigenous white population”?

Alp Mehmet: First, I am a first-generation migrant. I came here as an eight-year-old. I have been here since the mid-’50s. The immigrant ethnic minority element of the population in those days was something like 4%. In the 1951 census, it was 3.9%, and it is now 25%. That has substantially happened over the last 30 years.

What worries me, if that is the right word, is the fact that people are being added to the population, and migration is the only driver of population increase at the moment. I know you have David Coleman coming up next. He will tell you a great deal more about the likely evolution of the population’s demographic mix. That is my concern. Having arrived here as a migrant, and accepted and joined this country and made it my own, I see it now changing very rapidly into something that the majority of people in this country do not want to happen.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

You still have not told us what indigenous means, but thank you very much.

[Mr Forster]

Q Karl, you talked about how the Bill does not have very much deterrence in it. What is your view on safe, legal routes? If we had safe, legal routes, would that not deter people from unsafe, illegal routes?

Tony, you talked about your perfect solution to borders. You did not mention the costs. Do you have an idea of the set-up and running costs?

Karl Williams: The short answer is that we do have safe and legal routes. The new Home Office immigration data, which was published this morning, pointed out that last year 79,000 people arrived through safe and legal routes. Since 2020, about 550,000, maybe slightly more, have arrived by safe and legal routes: Ukraine, Hong Kong, the Afghan resettlement schemes, and people arriving through UN programmes and from Syria, yet that does not stop the crossings.

The fundamental problem is that there will always be more demand to come to this country than we would probably be willing to allow for through safe and legal routes. One stat is that, a couple of years ago, Gallup did a very wide-ranging poll of attitudes on migration and found that, globally, about 900 million adults would migrate, given the opportunity—30 million of those people put Britain as their first choice. There is always going to be a longer queue to get in than we have capacity for at any given time. That is my view.

Tony Smith: I do not have a detailed financial breakdown for you, but I can say that the direction of travel in the UK and around the world is to take away officers from the border and to automate a lot of the processes. We are doing that here already: we move, I think, more people through e-gates than any other country does. This is an automated border that will reduce the number of officers required to do frontline, routine tasks, which they really do not want to do, and enable them to target the people they want to focus on. If you were to do that detailed analysis, you would probably find that it will be cost-neutral in the end.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

Q Are there any lessons from abroad that we are failing to learn?

David Coleman: The lesson that everyone cites is the example of Australia, which, depending on which Government are in power, has a policy of diverting people right across the other side of the Pacific to an island where they were notionally safe, but where they were not able to enjoy being in Australia. That is supported or not supported depending on which Government is in power, which is one of the problems with migration policy. Generally speaking, whether the doors are tight shut, half open or fully open depends very much on the swings and balances of electoral change and is rather unpredictable. That is inevitable.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q Professor Coleman, are you a member of the Galton Institute?

David Coleman: Yes and no. The Galton Institute does not exist any more; it has changed its name to the Adelphi Genetics Forum.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

But it is a eugenics organisation?

David Coleman: No, it is not. It is devoted to genetics research and has conferences every year on genetics research. It promotes research into that and has a small grant fund that people can apply for. It is a very pukka organisation.

If you have any doubts about it, I suggest that you look at its publications and its website. You will find something by me on that that is only slightly connected to genetics: “New Light on Old Britons”—it is about palaeontology and human evolution. That is one of the things that the organisation was interested in. You are quite right that it started off as the Eugenics Society, and before that it was the Eugenics Education Society. That was in the days when progressives of every kind clustered around to support eugenic ideas because they were thought to be improving and beneficial to society. Society has changed its mind—

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q Eugenics was discredited because of the rise of Nazi Germany and the Holocaust, was it not?

David Coleman: It got a terribly bad name for that reason—exactly so. That is why, over the last century, opinion has moved against using that word and using those notions. But I respectfully point out that it has nothing to do with asylum seeking.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q Do you believe in universal human rights—that all human beings are equal and deserving of universal human rights?

David Coleman: I suppose, as a rather bad Christian, I am bound to believe that, but the problem with human rights definitions is that they tend to be infinitely extendible. All kinds of entitlements that started off being universally accepted by almost everyone of good will tend to get expanded beyond reason.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q You mentioned that trying to deal with the problems of illegal or irregular immigration can mean being, in some ways, “nasty to the smugglers”, which the Bill is, but also nasty to asylum seekers. Do you want to talk about what you mean by that?

David Coleman: I mean making the prospect of life in the country of intended asylum less attractive than otherwise might be the case. That is what the Rwanda policy was. I suppose I was speaking slightly tongue in cheek in calling it “nasty”, but it certainly is not the same thing as being welcoming, is it? The idea of the Rwanda Bill was to secure the safety from persecution and risk of death for asylum seekers, which is the aim of asylum, without admitting them to Britain and all the benefits of being in a rich country.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q But the reality was that tens of thousands of people had arrived and could not be processed, because of the Illegal Migration Act and its flaws. They were just living in hotels forever, as they were not able to be processed and not able to be sent anywhere else. How is that a solution to the issues that we are trying to deal with?

David Coleman: I am not here to defend the Rwanda policy, although I think that, in principle, it had some merit. That is a problem that would arise whether there was a Rwanda policy or an Illegal Migration Act or not, because of the sheer pressure of asylum seeking from all corners of the world. That has been the case in the past for a long time and will continue to be the case. We now have asylum claims up to 99,000 in the last year, so it is not just to do with the Illegal Migration Act; it is a worldwide process.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q Of course, asylum claims are up because they were not being processed, but now they are. That is dealing with the backlog that was caused by the problems with the Illegal Migration Act.

David Coleman: I do not know how important the Illegal Migration Act was in increasing the number of the backlog, to be perfectly honest. In the past, it has been the same height without the Illegal Migration Act. About 15 or 20 years ago, it was also 90,000 per year, and that was way before any of the past legislation was enacted.

[Pete Wishart]

Q I was actually very excited when I found out that there was a professor of demography coming to this panel; I have a particular interest in population demography. Using your vast knowledge of the subject, could you explain what the population and demographic trends will be for practically every European nation towards the middle part of the century and the end of the century? How will these nations cope with population stagnation, population decline and the assorted problems with a smaller working-age workforce supporting an older generation, with a falling birth rate around the world? What will they do to deal with that?

David Coleman: This is a formidable tutorial group to try to give such an answer to. If I could say with any kind of confidence what was going to happen by the middle of the century, I would deserve a Nobel prize.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q Professor Bell, do you think that in a democracy it ought to be the elected Members and the Government who decide who can come to our country, rather than criminals and people smugglers?

Professor Brian Bell: Yes.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q Therefore, do you share my view that, when we see the establishment along our borders of serious organised immigration criminals who are profiting greatly from their illicit activities and putting people’s lives at risk, we should try to do all we can to put a stop to it?

Professor Brian Bell: Absolutely, but that is sort of true of all crimes: if someone is committing a crime, you want to stop them doing it. I think the difficulty is in the question: if you stop one criminal doing it, what happens? Is there a substitution effect where you just get the next organised crime organisation taking action? The risk is that you may well succeed, but the overall macro effect of that may be not as positive as you might hope.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q But of course that is not a reason for not doing it, is it?

Professor Brian Bell: Absolutely not.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q Could you therefore comment on whether the new powers in the Bill will have an effect on our ability as a society with law and order to crack down on some of that abuse?

Professor Brian Bell: It is likely to have some positive effect. In some sense, it cannot have a negative effect, so it must have some positive effect. The difficulty is that, as almost everyone would accept, it is impossible to judge ex ante what the size of that effect will be, but that sort of tells you that you should try it and see how it works.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q We are taking evidence to see whether people think these things will be effective. I am not asking you to produce a crystal ball and tell us in advance, but I am trying to get a handle on whether you think this is an effort worth making. It seems to me that you are saying that it is.

Professor Brian Bell: It is an effort worth making, but I would caution that in other areas of police and crime activity, the impact of being tougher with sanctions and new offences does not necessarily lead to very substantial changes in crime rates. The overall crime rate in the UK is almost certainly driven more by incentives and economic outcomes in the long run than it is by particular offences and statutes that are passed.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q Is it desirable to use counter-terrorism-style powers to disrupt so that we can prevent some of these crossings from happening rather than waiting until after people have died in the channel and then trying to pick up the pieces?

Professor Brian Bell: Completely.

[Mr Forster]

Q How would the changes to His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs data sharing improve border security?

Professor Brian Bell: I do not have expertise in that area. I am confused as to how significant it will be. As I understand the Bill, it will allow HMRC to share customs data with other parties. It is not clear to me what that achieves. It would be wrong of me to imply that I have any particular operational understanding of how that will help operations.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (First sitting)

Angela Eagle Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

If we speak louder, is that better?

Mubeen Bhutta: Yes, that is helpful. I do apologise; it is a technical thing.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Dame Angela Eagle)]

Q I will try to speak louder so that everybody can hear. I must say, I am having trouble hearing some things because of the acoustics in this room, and it is quite full. Perhaps if our witnesses could speak a bit louder as well, that might help everybody.

Enver, thank you for your evidence. You welcomed the repeal of the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024 and the majority of the Illegal Migration Act, which this Bill accomplishes. Could you talk about your experience of trying to live with those Acts on the statute book? Some argue that those bits of legislation were the only deterrent that we could have had. Can I have your thoughts on whether they worked?

Enver Solomon: Absolutely. In short, they were a disaster. They were a disaster in terms of the lived experience of people who had come from places such as Sudan; we know about the civil war there. They created huge uncertainty and anxiety. Through our work, we saw a rise in levels of great mental distress, and even in suicide ideation, as a consequence of those pieces of legislation, which led to what we described as a system meltdown. That was a fundamental meltdown that resulted in the system pretty much coming to a standstill. The system slowed down, with productivity in asylum decision making at its lowest level since the height of the covid pandemic. It is absolutely right that steps were taken to address that and to ensure that the asylum system is functioning effectively.

The asylum system has to deliver integrity. It has to ensure that the public have trust in a system that functions. It functions by ensuring that decisions are fair—the great British value of fair play—by ensuring that decisions are taken in a timely fashion and by ensuring that taxpayers’ money is well spent. That means you do not have billions being wasted every year on housing people in hotels that become flashpoints for community tensions. The system also works effectively when it ensures that people are supported to integrate and to go on and contribute to communities across the country in the way that generations of refugees have done. Critically, you must also ensure that if people are not granted protection, there are appropriate pathways to support them to return to the countries they have come from.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q There are those—I would like the other witnesses to comment if they wish—who say that the only way of getting any coherence back into our system is to leave the European convention on human rights and disaggregate ourselves from all the human rights legislation. Do you think that that is an appropriate way forward?

Enver Solomon: I will let my colleagues come in.

Daniel O’Malley: In relation to the European convention on human rights, frankly, coming out will not help anyone—it will not make the system any more efficient. For example, when it comes to the human trafficking provisions in the Illegal Migration Act, we want to see more of those repealed because they undermine human trafficking protections in Scotland.

The broader repeal that has happened of the Illegal Migration Act and the statutory instrument laid down to alter that Act has aided, for example, the guardianship programme in Scotland, which gives a guardian to unaccompanied minors in Scotland and was put on to a statutory footing in Scotland under the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Scotland) Act 2015. It helps that programme because asylum claims were previously just not being made under the IMA, so that programme had thousands more people in it. The programme was operating, but it was getting overloaded with more and more people.

The wider point is that there are protections that we are signed up to—for example, the UN convention for refugees. Continuing with those is absolutely right; the repeal of them will not make the system any more efficient and it will not be a deterrent to anyone.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q Mubeen, do you have a comment?

Mubeen Bhutta: I do not have anything more to add to the important points that Daniel made.

[Mr Will Forster (Woking) (LD)]

Q I want to broaden this out. Enver highlighted the Refugee Council’s view on the Bill being too narrow. What is the view of the Scottish Refugee Council and the British Red Cross on that? What do you think of safe, legal routes?

Mubeen Bhutta: I did not quite catch the first bit of your question, but I think you are asking about safe and legal routes. I endorse some of the comments that my colleague Enver has already made. We welcome the Bill. We welcome the intention of the Bill around reducing the loss of life in the channel, but that is only half of the story.

It is really important that we look at the reasons why people are putting their lives in the hands of people smugglers in the first place. It is often because there is no other choice—there is no route that they can take. We would like to see more safe and legal routes, whether that is new routes, such as enabling people to apply for a humanitarian visa in the country that they are in to come directly to the UK and then be able to claim asylum, or expanding existing routes such as family reunion, so that there is more eligibility for people to use those routes.

It is really important to look at both sides of the coin. In a way, you could consider this Bill to be looking at the supply of this sort of activity, but it does not do anything about the demand. People will still need to make those journeys if no other routes are available.

Daniel O’Malley: For us, this is another migration Bill on top of many migration Bills. The system that people seeking asylum currently face is convoluted and arbitrary, and it is founded on hostility. As Mubeen rightly said, it is about the enforcement and stopping people crossing, rather than creating a more efficient asylum system. For us at the Scottish Refugee Council, that is what we are concerned about in the Bill. You talked about the Bill being quite narrow, but there are aspects of it that are far too broad and that can be applied in too broad a manner.

For the Scottish Refugee Council, the asylum aspects of the Bill do not address an updating of the asylum system. There are points on integration that should be considered as well. Nothing in the Bill talks about the integration of people seeking asylum while they are in the system. We commend the Government for speeding up the clearing of the backlog, which is great, but work needs to be done to help people who are in the system to integrate into the country. About 75% of people in the system will typically be granted refugee status, so work needs to be done to help them to integrate into communities, rather than having them in asylum accommodation or hostile environments.

The Government are rightly looking at asylum accommodation and the Home Affairs Committee is also doing an inquiry into it, so we know the work is being done. We would have liked to see the Bill contain a point about integration. The work in Scotland on this is the “New Scots Refugee Integration Strategy”, with an approach to integration from day one of arrival. We would like to see that extended to the UK level as well, mirroring what has also been done in Wales.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

Q Do you think the new endangerment offence will make any difference to channel crossings?

Dr Peter Walsh: Evidence from academic research shows that the impacts of deterrence policies are fairly small. The main reason for that is that migrants often do not have accurate or detailed knowledge of policies in destination countries. Their understanding of those policies is often lacking in detail and wrong, and it is often influenced by what they are told by their smugglers or handlers, who have a vested interest, of course, in downplaying risks.

There is also some statistical evidence that looks more broadly at what drives unauthorised migration and asylum applications around the world. That has found that domestic policy is not statistically one of the more important factors. Instead, geopolitical developments, conflict—civil, ethnic or international conflict—ecological disaster and regime change are all statistically much stronger drivers of unauthorised migration and asylum applications in particular countries.

Finally, rounding out the picture, when an asylum seeker decides which destination country to move to, that calculus is influenced not just by policy—policy is one of the things that they take least account of—but by things like the presence of family members, members of the community, friends, language and in some cases, in the context of small boat arrivals, escaping the Dublin system. Individuals may have claimed asylum in other EU countries—maybe those claims are outstanding or have been refused—and they understand that if they move to the UK they cannot be returned to the EU, because we are no longer a part of the EU and of the Dublin system that facilitated that.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q Dr Walsh, you have just argued that deterrence does not really work, yet one of the big arguments on Second Reading was that somehow by repealing the Safety of Rwanda Act and most of the Illegal Migration Act we had thrown away the only thing that would work. Would you care to comment on that?

Dr Peter Walsh: Because under the IMA the Government proposed not to process people’s claims, they would not have known whether returning those individuals to countries of origin would be safe or not. That is where Rwanda came in.

There were always questions about the deterrent effect of the Rwanda policy. For my part, whatever deterrent effect it would have had would have depended fundamentally on how many people were actually sent to Rwanda. You can imagine that if it was a large share of people arriving by small boat, that might make people think twice, but if it were a small share—only thousands a year when we have tens of thousands of small boat arrivals—that would imply that the chance of being sent to Rwanda was fairly small. You can imagine that the people then making the trip would view that risk as just one risk among many much greater risks—risking their lives, for example—so there were always real questions about the deterrent effect of the Rwanda policy and how many people would in fact have been sent there.

The last Government said that the scheme was uncapped, and the Rwandan Government said, “We can take as many people as you can send.” But there were logistical challenges there, not least among them where people would be detained. At that time we had about 1,800 people in immigration detention in the UK, with a capacity of 2,200. You would have to detain people if you were threatening to remove them to Rwanda, so that was a very big initial stumbling block, putting aside whatever the capacity of those Rwandan facilities would have been, and more broadly the capacity of the Rwandan asylum system to process large numbers of claims. Typically it processed only a few hundred a year, not 10,000 or 20,000, so there were real questions there.

The big risk was what to do with people who are neither deterred from arriving nor able to be removed to Rwanda. That would be a sub-population in the UK without legal status who would be here indefinitely, so they would for ever have no legal right to remain in the UK, but we would be required to provide them with asylum accommodation and support at great cost. That was the risk when it came to Rwanda and the IMA.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q You said something really interesting in your first comment: that you felt some of the people arriving on small boats are doing so because we are out of the Dublin system—in other words, because of Brexit. Were you surprised, perhaps, that in the withdrawal agreement there was no provision to try to opt into Dublin III and a half or whatever it might have been called?

Dr Peter Walsh: I was not surprised, because I think that was consistent with the attitude at the time on the part of the Government. I did note that they did decide not to pursue a similar kind of agreement, which hampered them in a certain sense because there was no longer a mechanism to return asylum seekers arriving by small boat to the EU. It is true that in the last five years or so that we were a part of Dublin, we were actually a net receiver of asylum seekers under the system: we received more than we sent out. That is for various reasons, including administrative ones. But yes, it was striking that a similar kind of agreement or remaining a part of the Dublin system was not pursued because that appeared to hamper the Government in that aim—namely, to remove people arriving without authorisation to the EU.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q Zoe, what is your view on the idea that has gained traction in certain areas of this debate—that the Human Rights Act and the ECHR are effectively preventing us from having a reasonable system, and that the only way to have an asylum system that works is to pull out of those international agreements?

Zoe Bantleman: As the witnesses in the previous session have already said, those are not the only international legal agreements by which we are bound. The UK has voluntarily agreed to be bound by a great many international legal agreements, including in relation to the rights of children, the convention on action against trafficking and the conventions on the rights of stateless persons. There are a whole host in addition to the refugee convention and the European convention on human rights.

One of the hallmarks of the new Government has been this new-found commitment towards our international legal obligations, and also restoring the UK’s position as a leader in the international rules-based order, which all three of the previous Acts—the Safety of Rwanda Act, the Illegal Migration Act and the Nationality and Borders Act before it—eroded. I think it is fundamental to retain our commitment towards our international legal obligations. But there was also a case in the High Court in Belfast, brought by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission in relation to the Illegal Migration Act, that found that it was not only the convention on human rights that was breached by the Illegal Migration Act, but also the Windsor framework itself.

At a time when His Majesty’s Government are trying to reset the relationship with Europe, it seems a very strange thing to do—to try to back out of our human rights obligations. Again, the Good Friday agreement and the trade and co-operation agreement with the European Union are both based on our compliance with the European convention on human rights.

[Mr Forster]

Q If I may, I will turn away from these historic strategic issues back to the wording in the Bill. I would welcome your thoughts on clauses 13, 14 and 16 about the new offences. How effective do you think they would be? Zoe, what do you think of the drafting? Dr Walsh, how commonly do you think they would be used given that so much of the preparation is done abroad?

Zoe Bantleman: The offences are drafted in quite broad terms and the defences are quite narrow. There is a real concern, particularly on behalf of the legal professions, as to what would constitute a defence. For example, one of the defences is where a person was

“acting on behalf of an organisation which—

(i) aims to assist asylum-seekers, and

(ii) does not charge for its services.”

Would a legal aid firm charging the legal aid fund for services come within the scope of this defence? That is a real question.

We could also imagine the much more practical question of someone who is, for example, in Calais with their family member, and their family member wants to get on to a small boat and they are saying, “No, don’t get on to the small boat. Look here—this is what the weather is going to be today” and they show them on their phone what the weather is going to be. That could be useful to that person in helping them to prepare for their journey to the UK, and it would be the collection, recording and viewing of that information. It is not clear that such a person would have a defence if they were to reach the UK by a safe route, if a safe route was available to them. Even though that was done in France rather than the UK, they could potentially be prosecuted once here because of the extraterritorial scope of the offences, subject of course to prosecutorial discretion.

There is a very large scope to the offences and the defences are potentially not sufficient and holistic enough to account for all situations in which persons should not be prosecuted and should not be criminalised for their behaviour.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We will now hear oral evidence from the Children’s Commissioner for England. Once again, we must stick to the timings in the programme order. We have until 1 pm for this panel. Could the witness please introduce herself for the record?

Dame Rachel de Souza: Good afternoon. I am Rachel de Souza. I am the independent Children’s Commissioner for England. It is my job to protect and promote the rights of children. Since I took up the role, I have made working with illegal immigrant children who arrive in Kent one of my top priorities. I go down to the Kent intake unit. I talk to all the children who are in hotels. My independent advocacy body has supported hundreds of these young people. I have used my entry powers to go in and look at their situation, and I have used my data powers to track safeguarding issues. It has been really thoroughgoing work for the past four years.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q What is your general opinion of the changes that would be introduced to the current immigration law structures with the repeal of the Safety of Rwanda Act and the vast majority of the Illegal Migration Act? What is your opinion on strengthening the powers of the Border Security Command, which are a central part of the Bill?

Dame Rachel de Souza: I do not want to see any child crossing the channel in a small boat. I have sat in those small boats myself. I have talked to children who have come across on them. I have seen eight-year-olds, blind children and children with Down’s syndrome come across on them. The crossings are dangerous. One case that sticks in my mind is that of a young Iranian lad who saw his parents killed in front of him. He was taken by smugglers and did not know where he was going, but he came across on a small boat. Anything to stop these wicked traffickers is good in my book, as long as we are protecting and safeguarding children.

You will know that I was very vocal about the Illegal Migration Act, particularly the bits that conflicted with the Children Act 1989. When a child is on this soil, up to the age of 18, the Children Act has authority over them. I was very worried about the Home Office accommodating children, and I am pleased to see that has now been changed. Every Home Office official was working hard to do their best by those children, but the Home Office accommodation and the hotel accommodation were not suitable. Children were languishing without proper safeguarding in inappropriate places. Children’s social care must look after unaccompanied children, so I am pleased to see that change.

From a children’s perspective, I am pleased to see the Rwanda Act repealed. Children told me that it would not have stopped them coming; they were just going to disappear at 18. It would have ended up putting them at more risk. I had concerns about that. I also had concerns about children who had been settled here for a number of years then, at 18, being liable to be moved to Rwanda, so I am pleased to see that changed.

In general, I am really supportive of this Bill. There are some things that I would like to see it go further on, and I do have some concerns, but in general I am very supportive.

[Mr Forster]

Q What are the things that you would like to see the Bill go further on? We just heard from the legal director at the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association that they have some concerns at least about the Government’s rhetoric, if not some of their actions, against the international law, particularly on children. Could you comment on that as well?

Dame Rachel de Souza: Because I see so many of these children and work with them directly, I am often thinking practically about what their lives are like and how to ensure that they are okay, so I tend to come at your questions from that approach. One of the things that I am worried about is the potential for getting the scientific age assessment wrong.

There was a fantastic debate in the other House, where Lord Winston and others talked about the British Dental Association and the lack of clarity and slight vagueness around age assessment procedures. What I will say is that the social work team down at the Kent intake unit are fantastic and they have developed a strong approach to and knowledge about how to get those age assessment decisions right, with an understanding of school systems and other things about young people. I think we need to be really careful on the age assessment side.

You know that I am also going to be worried about safe and legal routes. Let me give you two examples two young ambassadors out of my large group. One is from Ukraine. She came under the Ukraine scheme, managed to complete her Ukrainian education and her UK education at the same time, and is going to King’s College. She has had nothing but support. The other is from South Sudan and, with no safe and legal route, came as an illegal immigrant. Female genital mutilation was an issue; there were some really serious issues. She found it hard to find somewhere to live and hard to get a job. She is now at Oxford University, because we have supported her and she is brilliant. Those are just two completely contrasting cases.

I stood and welcomed off the boat the first child who came from Afghanistan, who spent his nights weeping because he did not know whether his parents were alive. There is that safe and legal routes issue, particularly for children we know are coming from war-torn areas—we know that they are coming. We really need to think about that and think about support for them. That perhaps answers your tone question as well.