Pension Schemes Bill
Monday 7th July 2025
(6 months, 4 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberPension Schemes Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
This Bill aims to deliver fundamental reforms to our pensions landscape, and it is good to see that the prospect of discussing a long, slightly technical pensions Bill has seen so many Members flooding into the Chamber. These are reforms on which there is a broad consensus across the pensions industry. They also build on at least something of a consensus across the House. In its principal focus on higher returns for pension savers, the Bill also responds to specific responsibilities that we hold in the House.
It is because of decisions of Parliament that something significant has happened over the past decade: British workers have got back into the habit of saving for a pension. Today, more than 22 million workers are building up a pension pot. That represents a 10 million increase since 2012, when Parliament introduced the policy of automatically enrolling workers. The rise is largest for women and lower earners. So there is lots to celebrate as more save, but there are no grounds at all for complacency about what they are getting in return.
The private sector final salary pensions that many of today’s pensioners rely on guarantee a particular income in retirement. If those pension schemes do not deliver good investment returns, that is a problem for the employer and not directly for the saver. But most of tomorrow’s retirees with a defined-contribution pension bear all the risk; there is nothing guaranteed. How well the pension scheme that they save into performs matters hugely, and because pensions are a very long game, even small differences in how fast a pension pot grows can make a massive difference over time.
That is the system that the House has chosen, so the onus is on us to ensure that it delivers. But the pension system that we have today is too fragmented, too rarely does it ensure that people’s savings are working hard enough to support them in retirement, and it is too disconnected from the UK economy. That is the case for change and the context for the Bill.
The UK has the second-largest pension system in the world, worth £2 trillion. It is our largest source of domestic capital, underpinning not just the retirement we all look forward—or at least most of us look forward to—but the investment on which our future prosperity depends. But our big pension system has far too few big pension schemes. There are approaching 1,000 defined-contribution schemes and less than 10 providers who currently have £25 billion or more in assets.
A consolidation process is already under way, with the number of DC schemes reducing by about 10% a year. What the Bill does is add wind to the sails of that consolidation. It implements the conclusions of the pensions investment review, creating so-called megafunds. For the DC market, we intend to use the powers provided for in clause 38 to require multi-employer schemes to have at least £25 billion in assets by 2030, or a credible pathway to be there by 2035. Bigger and better pension funds can deliver lower costs, diversified investments and better returns for savers. That supports the work that the industry is already doing to better deliver for savers.
As the House has discussed before, in May, 17 major pension providers managing about 90% of active defined-contribution pensions signed the Mansion House accord. This industry-led initiative saw signatories pledge to invest 10% of their main default funds in private assets such as infrastructure by 2030, with at least 5% in UK assets. That investment could support a better outcome for pension savers and back clean energy developments or fast-growing businesses. To support this industry-led change, the Bill includes a reserve power that would allow the Government to require larger auto-enrolment schemes to invest a set percentage into those wider asset classes. That reflects the reality that the industry has been calling for the shift for some time, but words have been slow to translate into actions.
Dame Meg Hillier (Hackney South and Shoreditch) (Lab/Co-op)
I draw the House’s attention to the fact that I am a trustee of the parliamentary contributory pension fund. Consolidation is absolutely the right direction of travel so that pension funds have better experts who are better able to advise. I still have a slight concern, though, about mandation. There will have to be schemes to invest in, and they will need to ensure that they are getting returns. How will the Minister ensure that the Bill actively delivers on both sides of the equation?
Torsten Bell
I thank my hon. Friend for her question and for her oversight of all our pensions, which I think is reassuring. [Laughter.] Sorry; it is reassuring! I will come directly to her point, because I know that is one question that hon. Members on both sides of the House will want to raise. Let me just say that the Bill explicitly recognises the fiduciary duty of trustees towards their members.
Mr Alistair Carmichael (Orkney and Shetland) (LD)
In the last Parliament, a number of us raised concerns about the administration of defined-benefit schemes by, among others, BP, Shell and Hewlett-Packard. It was obvious at that stage—I think this view was held by his right hon. Friend the Minister for Social Security and Disability, who was then the Chair of the Work and Pensions Committee—that one of the root causes of the problem was insufficient independence and oversight by defined-benefit pension trustees. What is there in this Bill that will protect the position of pensioners in their retirement under those schemes?
Torsten Bell
The right hon. Member invites me to skip quite a long way forward in my speech, and it is a long speech.
Torsten Bell
That was not the support I was hoping for from the Chair—understandable, but harsh. I will come to some of the points that the right hon. Member raises. I think he is referring particularly to pre-1997 indexation, which I shall come to.
As I said, the Bill includes a reserved power that will allow the Government to require larger auto-enrolment schemes to invest a set percentage into wider assets. That reflects the wider calls that have been made for this change but have not led to its taking place. What pension providers are saying is that they face a collective action problem, where employers focus too narrowly on the lowest charges, not what matters most to savers: the highest returns. I do not currently intend to use the power in the Bill, but its existence gives clarity to the industry that, this time, change will actually come.
Some argue—I will come to some of the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Hackney South and Shoreditch (Dame Meg Hillier)—that this somehow undermines the duty that pension providers have to savers. That is simply wrong. First, the Bill includes clear safeguards to prioritise savers’ interests and is entirely consistent with the core principle of trustees’ fiduciary duties. Clause 38 includes an explicit mechanism, which I have discussed with Members from the main three parties in this House, to allow providers to opt out if complying risks material detriment to savers. Secondly—this is the key point that motivates a lot of the Bill—savers are being let down by the status quo. There is a reason major pension schemes across the rest of the world are already investing in this more diverse range of assets.
Fragmentation within the pensions industry happens within providers, not just between them. Some insurers have thousands of legacy funds, so clause 41 extends to contract schemes the ability that trust-based schemes already have to address that. Providers will be able to transfer savers to another arrangement without proactive individual consent if, and only if, it is independently certified as being in the member’s best interest.
Another point that I hope is of common ground across the House is that we need to do more to realise the untapped potential of the local government pension scheme in England and Wales. We need scale to get the most out of the LGPS’s £400 billion-worth of assets. Again, the Bill will turn that consensus into concrete action. It provides for LGPS assets spread across 86 administering authorities to be fully consolidated into six pools. That will ensure that the assets used to provide pensions to its more than 6 million members—predominantly low-paid women—are managed effectively and at scale. Each authority will continue to set its investment strategy, including how much local investment it expects to see. In fact, these reforms will build on the LGPS’s strong track record of investing in local economic growth, requiring pension pools to work with the likes of mayoral combined authorities. In time, bigger and more visible LGPS pools will help to crowd private pension funds and other institutional investors into growth assets across the country.
Our measures will build scale, support investment and deliver for savers, but the Bill does more to ensure that working people get the maximum bang for every buck saved. To reinforce the shift away from an excessively narrow focus on costs, clause 5 provides for a new value-for-money framework. For the first time, we will require pension schemes to prove that they provide value for money, with standardised metrics. That will help savers to compare schemes more easily, and drive schemes themselves to focus on the value that they deliver. For persistently poor performers, regulators will have the power to enforce consolidation. That will protect savers from getting stuck in poorly performing schemes—something that can knock thousands of pounds off their pension pots.
We are also at last addressing the small pension pots issue. I was out door-knocking in Swansea earlier this spring, and a woman in her mid-30s told me that something was really winding her up—and it was not me knocking on the door. [Laughter.] This is a very unsupportive audience. It was trying to keep track of small amounts of pension savings that she had from old jobs; the only thing that was worse was that her husband kept going on about it. There are now 13 million small pension pots that hold £1,000 or less floating around. Another million are being added each year. That increases hassle, which is what she was complaining about, with over £31 billion-worth of pension pots estimated to currently be lost. It costs the pensions industry around £240 million each year to administer. Clause 20 provides powers for those pots to be automatically brought together into one pension scheme that has been certified as delivering good value. Anyone who wants to can of course opt out, but this change alone could boost the pension pot of an average earner by around £1,000.
Of course, once you have a pension pot, the question is: what do you do with it? We often talk about pension freedoms, but there is nothing liberating about the complexity currently involved in turning a pension pot into a retirement income. You have to consolidate those pots, choose between annuities, lump sums, drawdowns or cashing out. You have to analyse different providers and countless products. Choice can be a good thing, but this overwhelming complexity is not—77% of DC savers yet to access their pension have no clear plan about how to do so.
John Glen (Salisbury) (Con)
I agree with a lot of what the Minister is saying. Given what was said last week by the Financial Conduct Authority on targeted support, would he look again at what is being resisted by the Money and Pensions Service? It is not prepared to work with the pension schemes to allow automatic appointments so that pension savers can be guided to better outcomes. I realise that MaPS will say that it is too busy, but this is a key moment. If we could get people to engage at age 50, say, we would see vastly different outcomes for them if they invested properly, and in better ways, with their pensions.
Torsten Bell
I thank the right hon. Member for his question, and for the discussions that we have had on this important topic. He spent years working on this. The priority for MaPS right now is to ensure that we have the system set up to deal with the additional calls that are likely to come when pension dashboards are rolled out, but I will keep in mind the point that he raises. I think he and a number of hon. Members wrote to me about exactly that point. As I promised in my letter, I will keep it under review, but we must not overburden the system, because we need it to be able to deliver when pension dashboards come onstream.
Nick Smith (Blaenau Gwent and Rhymney) (Lab)
Will the Minister update us on when consumers will see the introduction of the pensions dashboard? [Laughter.]
Torsten Bell
I think recent progress on the pensions dashboard means that that deserves a little less laughter. What we are seeing at the moment is success, driving the first connections to the dashboards. Obviously, all schemes and providers are due to be connected by the autumn of 2026, but I will provide good notice of when we can give a firm date for that. My hon. Friend and near neighbour has secured himself early warning of exactly that happening.
We need to make the choices clearer for people as they move from building retirement savings to using them. The Bill gives pension schemes a duty to provide default solutions for savers’ retirement income—yes, with clear opt-outs. As well as reducing complexity and risk for savers, that will support higher returns because providers will be able to invest in assets for longer if they do not need to secure the possibility of having to provide full drawdown at retirement.
Each of these measures to drive up returns will have an impact on their own, but it is their cumulative impact that matters most, especially when it is compounded over the decades that we save for a pension. To give the House a sense of scale, someone on average earnings saving over their career could see their retirement pot boosted by £29,000 thanks to the higher returns that the Bill supports. That is a significant increase for something that should matter to us all.
The reforms that I have set out will transform the DC pensions landscape, but with £1.2 trillion-worth of assets supporting around 9 million people, defined-benefit schemes remain vital—they have already been raised by the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael). Their improved funding position is hugely welcome. Around 75% are now in surplus, which has enabled far more schemes to reach buy-out with an insurer. Many more intend to do so, welcoming the security that buy-out can offer. Others may not be able to reach buy-out or may value running on their scheme for at least a time. The Bill provides those trustees with a wider range of options. Clauses 8 and 9 give more trustees the option to safely share surplus funds, which is something that many can already do.
Alan Gemmell (Central Ayrshire) (Lab)
I thank the Minister for giving way and the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael) for raising this issue. What will the Bill do for my constituent Patricia Kennedy and the members of the Hewlett Packard Pension Association who are asking for more action on their pre-1997 non-index-linked contributions.
Torsten Bell
My hon. Friend has raised this issue with me on a number of occasions, and he is a powerful advocate for his constituents who have lost out through the discretionary increases that they were hoping to see on their pensions not being delivered. This is the same issue that the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland raised. One of the things that surplus release will allow is that trustees may at that point consider how members can benefit from any release that takes place. One thing I would encourage them to prioritise if they are considering a surplus release is the indexation of those that have not received it on their pre-1997 accrual. I hope that provides some clarity to the right hon. Gentleman and my hon. Friend.
Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
I am extremely grateful to the Minister for taking my intervention and for the very helpful letter he sent me on 30 June about schemes of this sort, and in particular the ExxonMobil pension scheme. His letter encouragingly states:
“Following our reforms, trustees will continue to consider the correct balance of interest between members and the sponsoring employer when making decisions about the release of surplus funds. Trustees will be responsible for determining how members may benefit from any release of surplus…and have a suite of options to choose from—for example, through discretionary benefit increases.”
The trouble is that these pensioners have received a letter from the trustees of the ExxonMobil pension fund stating:
“The power to award discretionary increases is held by Esso Petroleum Company Limited (the “Company”). Whether or not any discretionary increase is provided is for the Company to determine: the Trustee has no power to award discretionary increases itself.”
This may be a loophole that the Minister needs to address. If the trustees cannot award the surplus as benefits and the company says no, that is not going to benefit my constituents.
Torsten Bell
I thank the right hon. Member for raising that specific case. I will look at it in more detail for him as he has kindly raised it here, but he has raised a point that will have more general application, which is that lots of different schemes, particularly DB schemes, will have a wide range of scheme rules. He has raised one of those, which is about discretionary increases. One thing that is consistent across all the schemes, with the legislation we are bringing in today, is that trustees must agree for any surplus to be released. It may be the case that the employer, in the details of those scheme rules, is required to agree to a discretionary increase, but the trustees are perfectly within their rights to request that that is part of an agreement that leads to a surplus release.
Torsten Bell
In any circumstances, the trustees would need to agree to a surplus release, so they are welcome to say to their employer: we are only going to agree to it on the basis of a change to something that the employer holds the cards over. I am happy to discuss that with the right hon. Member further, and there may be other schemes that are in a similar situation.
Lincoln Jopp (Spelthorne) (Con)
The way in which the Minister is talking about insurance buy-out suggests that, in the Government’s mind, insurance buy-out is still in some way a gold standard. Can he reassure the House that he is seeking to flatten the playing field, such that the increased choice available to defined-benefit pension schemes will mean that for perpetuals who run on—such as OMERS, which started off as the Ontario municipal employees retirement system and is now worth 140 billion Canadian dollars—there is as much safety in superfunds as there is in insurance buy-out?
Torsten Bell
I shall come on directly to the question of superfunds, which I know the hon. Member has a long-standing interest in. There is obviously a distinction between closed and open defined-benefit schemes, which I think is relevant to the point he is raising. It is also important for trustees to have a range of options.
Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)
Obviously that can happen only where there are surplus funds, and there may not be surplus funds in all circumstances. I just want to give the Minister a heads-up in relation to the questions about employee benefits. It would be useful in Committee to have more information about the Government’s analysis of how many of these surplus releases will directly benefit the employees rather than the employers. I understand that the Government, with their mission for growth, want investment in growing the company as well, but what kind of split does he expect to see? I do not expect an answer to that today.
Torsten Bell
It is nice to sometimes be able to surprise on the upside. I would expect employees to benefit in most cases, because trustees are in the driving seat and I am sure they will want to consider how employers and employees will benefit from any surplus release. Obviously, the exact split between the two will be a matter for the individual cases, but I am sure we will discuss that further in Committee.
I want to reassure the House that this is not about a return to the 1990s free-for-all. DB regulation has been transformed since then, and schemes will have to remain well funded and trustees will remain in the driving seat. They will agree to a release only where it is in members’ interests and, as I said, not all schemes are able to afford to buy out members’ pensions with insurers.
The Bill also introduces the long-awaited permanent legislative regime for DB superfunds, which is an alternative means to consolidate legacy DB liabilities. This supports employers who want to focus on their core business, and, as the superfunds grow, they will have the potential to use their scale to invest in more productive ways. Crucially, trustees will be able to agree to a transfer into a superfund only where buy-out is not available and where it increases savers’ security.
The Pension Protection Fund is, of course, the security backstop for DB members. It celebrates its 20th anniversary this year, and it now secures the pensions of over 290,000 people. The Bill updates its work in three important ways: first, by lifting restrictions on the PPF board so that it can reduce its levy where appropriate, freeing schemes and employers to invest; secondly, by ensuring that PPF and financial assistance scheme information will be displayed on the pensions dashboard as it comes onstream, which my hon. Friend the Member for Blaenau Gwent and Rhymney (Nick Smith), who is now not in his place, is keen to see; and thirdly and most importantly, by making a change to support people going through the toughest of times. As several hon. Members have called for, we are extending the definition of terminal illness from a 6-month to a 12-month prognosis, providing earlier access to compensation for those who need it most.
Pensions are complex beasts, and so are the laws that surround them. That complexity is inevitable, but not to the extent that some recent court cases risk creating. The Bill also legislates to provide clarity that decisions of the Pensions Ombudsman in overpayment cases may be enforced without going to a further court. I have been clear that the Government will also look to introduce legislation to give affected pension schemes the ability to retrospectively obtain written actuarial confirmation that historical benefit changes met the necessary standards at the time.
Governments are like people in one important respect: they can easily put off thinking about pensions until it is too late. I am determined not to do that. We are ramping up the pace of pension reform. The past two decades have delivered a big win, with more people saving for their retirement, but that was only ever half the job. Today, too many are on course for an income in retirement that is less than they deserve and less than they expect. The Bill focuses on securing higher returns for savers and supporting higher income in retirement without asking any more than is necessary of workers’ living standards in the here and now.
The Bill sits within wider pension reforms as we seek to build not just savings pots but a pensions system that delivers comfortable retirements and underpins the country’s future prosperity. Legislation for multi-employer collective defined-contribution schemes will be introduced as soon as possible after the summer recess, and we will shortly launch the next phase of our pensions review to complete the job of building a pensions system that is strong, fair and sustainable. It is time to make sure that pension savings work as hard for all our constituents as our constituents worked to earn them. I commend the Bill to the House.
Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)
It is a great pleasure to be here with you, Madam Deputy Speaker, and I welcome the Minister to his place. He has been here a couple of days over a year and is already taking an important Bill through Parliament. It is good to see him, and I very much look forward to working constructively with him as the Bill progresses through the House.
While the Bill is not perfect, the Minister will be pleased to hear that there is cross-party consensus on many of the planned changes. That is because we all want our pension system to be working better. If we rewind back to 2010, we inherited from Labour—dare I say it—a private pension system that was not quite ideal. The move from a defined-benefit pension-dominated market to a defined-contribution system had left millions of people behind. Back in 2011, only 42% of people were saving for a workplace pension. The cornerstone of change was auto-enrolment, which has been an overwhelming success, as I am sure the Minister will agree. Now around 88% of eligible employees are saving into a pension, and the remaining 10% who opt out tend to do so because of sound investment advice.
The Conservatives are proud of our rock-solid support in government for our pensioners. The triple lock ensured that we lifted 200,000 pensioners out of absolute poverty over the course of the last Government. Workers deserve dignity in retirement, not just a safety net in old age. They deserve to look forward to their later years with hope, not anxiety, and with choice, not constraint. That is why before the last election, the previous Government had turned their attention to two central issues: first, getting the best value for money out of our pension schemes and, secondly, pensions adequacy. I will come to pensions adequacy later, but let me start by recognising some of the positive measures contained in the Bill to make our pension funds work better for savers.
When Labour gets pensions policy right, it is often by building on the Conservative legacy, recognising what works and seeking to extend it. That is why we broadly support the measures in the Bill that seek to consolidate and strengthen the gains of auto-enrolment. We also welcome the continued progress towards the pensions dashboard, which will revolutionise the way people access their pension information and plan for their financial future.
For too long, the complexity and fragmentation of pension pots has left savers confused and disengaged, as we have heard. If you are anything like me, Madam Deputy Speaker, and are thinking more actively, dare I say it, about your retirement income—actually not like me; you are a lot younger. [Interruption.] Mr Speaker is like me; he is thinking about his pension. He will have spent countless hours trying to track down old pensions. The dashboard, however, will put power back into the hands of savers, and we will support measures in the Bill to improve its implementation and delivery.
I want to highlight the creation of larger megafunds in both the public and private sectors, as well as the consolidation of the local government pension scheme, as sensible and pragmatic steps. The LGPS is one of the largest pension schemes in the UK, as we have heard. It has 6.7 million members with a capital of £391 billion, yet it is highly fragmented into 86 locally administering authorities. There is a great deal of divergence in the funding positions of those councils, even among geographic neighbours. They range from Kensington and Chelsea, which has a scheme funding level of 207%, to neighbouring local authorities like Waltham Forest, Brent, and Havering, which were underfunded in the 2022 triennial review. While we support the concept of these megafunds, there are legitimate questions that I hope the Minister will address in Committee. We do not want to see constituents from one council area unwittingly funding shortfalls from neighbouring areas.
Like many people in this House, I first cut my teeth in politics as a councillor. Soon after being elected, I was appointed chairman of the finance committee on Forest of Dean district council. One of our tasks was to oversee the performance of our local pension fund. Let me assure the House: the Forest of Dean is a truly wonderful place, but it is not the City of London. Our finance committee was made up of dedicated local councillors, but when it came to scrutinising the pension fund, we were—to put it kindly—out of our depth. Meanwhile, the pension fund managers, with their packed diaries and weary expressions, seemed to treat a trip to rural Gloucestershire as a rare expedition to the outer reaches of the Earth.
One thing struck me about small local government pension funds: they simply did not work. But it is not just in local government, small funds are—albeit with some notable exceptions for bespoke funds—not fit for purpose in a global investment environment, as we heard from the Minister. The creation of larger funds will enable greater scale, better investment efficiency and, ultimately, better value for money for members. It will allow our pension funds to compete on the world stage, to invest more in UK infrastructure and to deliver higher returns for British savers.
There are other areas of the Bill that we support and welcome. The consolidation of small, fragmented pension pots is a long-overdue reform. Bringing those together will reduce administrative costs and prevent the erosion of savings through unnecessary fees. The introduction of a value-for-money framework is essential to ensure that savers are getting the best possible deal, not just on charges, but on investment performance and retirement outcomes. We also welcome the development of guided retirement products. We cannot simply leave savers on their own to navigate complex choices at retirement. Changes to provide greater support for those facing terminal illness will provide comfort to those in extremely challenging circumstances. These are all positive steps, and we will work constructively with the Government to ensure they are delivered effectively.
While there is much to welcome, there are also significant areas where the Bill falls short and areas that require attention if we are to deliver a pensions system that is truly fit for the future. Most fundamentally, the Bill does not address pensions adequacy. The uncomfortable truth is that millions of people in this country are simply not saving enough for their retirement. The amounts people are saving, even with auto-enrolment, are too low to deliver a decent standard of living in old age. Research by Pensions UK shows that more than 50% of savers will fail to meet the retirement income targets set by the 2005 pensions commission. Closing the gap between what people are saving and what they will need must be the pressing concern of this Government. We urgently need the second part of the pensions review to be fast-tracked, with a laser-like focus on pensions adequacy. We need a bold, ambitious plan to ensure that every worker in this country can look forward to a retirement free from poverty and insecurity.
Dame Meg Hillier
The hon. Gentleman is not wrong on this point. In fact, the Public Accounts Committee looked a number of years ago at enrolment in pension schemes and found that a lot of young people were not enrolling because of the cost of living, which his Government have to take responsibility for. There is no easy answer to this, but I would be interested to know if the Conservative party now have policies to resolve this problem.
Mark Garnier
It is an important question, and one that I will come to in due course. Watch this space for a fascinating manifesto in the run-up to the next general election—I am sure everybody looks forward to it.
John Glen
Further to the point made by the hon. Member for Hackney South and Shoreditch (Dame Meg Hillier), in every election we all say that we cherish the triple lock, and we seek to gain electoral advantage from it, but do we not need to come to a settled collective view in society about the combination of the triple lock and the inadequacy of auto-enrolment? The 8% contribution is not enough, as the hon. Gentleman said; we need to get to Australian levels. One speaks to the other. Unless we can take a holistic view of those two elements and the third pillar, we are not being truly honest about some of the trade-offs, given that we are dealing with £70 billion of tax relief at the moment.
Mark Garnier
The former City Minister raises a good and important point. He tries to bring together a number of related but quite disparate issues that we need to think carefully about. I would not want to make Conservative party policy on the hoof at the Dispatch Box, though the Minister urges me to do so. These are important points, and I think my right hon. Friend would understand that I would not want to rush into anything without careful, considered thought. These are issues on which he and I—and the Minister, of course—might get together.
As I said, we need a bold, ambitious plan to ensure that every worker in this country can look forward to a retirement free from poverty and insecurity. That means looking again at contribution rates, the role of employers and how we support those who are excluded from the system.
Another omission in the Bill is the failure to extend the benefits of auto-enrolment to the self-employed. There are over 4 million self-employed people in the UK—people who are driving our economy, creating jobs and taking risks. Too many of them face the prospect of old age in poverty, with little or no private pension provision. Research by the Institute for Fiscal Studies found that only 20% of self-employed workers earning over £10,000 a year save into a private pension. With the self-employed sector continuing to grow, the Bill misses an opportunity to come up with innovative solutions for this underserved group in the workplace.
Kirsty Blackman
On auto-enrolment, the other missing group is those aged under 22. Auto-enrolment seemed to be set up with the view that people would go to university before entering the jobs market, but that is not the case for many people. It is possible that starting auto-enrolment earlier would mean much more adequate pension pots for people, because the earlier they save, the bigger their pot grows by the time they reach retirement.
Mark Garnier
The hon. Member makes an important point. The earlier people start putting money in, the better. As a result of compound interest, over many years they will end up with a bigger pension pot, even if at the beginning the contribution is quite small; the amount aggregates over a long period. We will discuss that in Committee.
We are concerned about the lack of detail in the Bill. Too much is left to the discretion of regulators and to secondary legislation. Parliament deserves to have proper oversight of these reforms. From my discussions with the industry, it seems there is tentative support for many of the reforms in the Bill. However, the message that keeps coming back is that the devil will be in the detail, so I hope that as this Bill makes progress through the House, the Minister will be able to fill in more of the blanks—and I am sure he will; he is a diligent individual.
I move on to the most important thing that this Bill hopes to achieve: growth. We want to support Labour Members on the growth agenda, but too often they go about it in slightly the wrong way. Surpluses in defined-benefit pension schemes are a great example. Interest rates have risen post-covid, and that has pushed many schemes into surplus. In principle, we support greater flexibility when it comes to the extraction of these surpluses, but there need to be robust safeguards; that is certainly the message coming back from the industry.
Under the legislation, there is nothing to stop these surpluses being used for share buy-backs or dividend payments from the host employer, for instance. Neither of these outcomes necessarily help the Government’s growth agenda. We would welcome a strengthening of the Bill to prevent trustees from facing undue pressure from host employers to release funds for non-growth purposes. In addition, to provide stability, the Government should carefully consider whether low dependency, rather than buy-out levels, will future-proof the funds, so that they do not fall back into deficit.
Although the Government are keen to extract surpluses from the private sector, there is not the same gusto shown in the Bill when it comes to local government pensions. The House has discussed in detail the Chancellor’s fiscal rules, not least earlier today. Under the revised rules introduced by the Chancellor, the measure of public debt has shifted from public sector net debt to public sector net financial liabilities. As a consequence, the local government pension scheme’s record £45 billion surplus is now counted as an asset that offsets Government debt. This gives the Chancellor greater headroom to meet her fiscal targets—headroom that, dare I say it, is shrinking week by week. I do not wish to sound cynical, but perhaps that is the reason why the Bill is largely silent on better using these surpluses. This may be a convenient accounting trick for the Chancellor, but the surpluses could have been used, for instance, to give councils pension scheme payment holidays. The Government could make it easier to follow the example set by Kensington and Chelsea, which has suspended employer pension contributions for a year to fund support to victims and survivors of the 2017 Grenfell Tower tragedy. These revenue windfalls could be redirected towards a range of initiatives, from local growth opportunities such as business incubators to improving our high streets. We could even leave more money in council tax payers’ pockets.
I turn to the part of the Bill on which we have our most fundamental disagreement: the provisions on mandation. The Bill reserves the power to mandate pension funds to invest in Government priorities. That not only goes against trustees’ fiduciary duties—although I appreciate and recognise the point the Minister made earlier—but means potentially worse outcomes for savers. Pensions are not just numbers on a spreadsheet; they represent a lifetime of work, sacrifice, and hope for a secure future. The people who manage these funds and their trustees are under a legal duty to prioritise the financial wellbeing of savers. Their job is not to obey political whims, but to invest prudently, grow pension pots and uphold the trust placed in them by millions of ordinary people.
That fiduciary duty is not a technicality; it is the bedrock of confidence that the entire pension system rests on. These pension fund managers find the safest and best investments for our pensions, no matter where in the world they might be. If things go wrong, we can hold them to account. But if this reserve power becomes law, we have to ask the question: if investments go wrong, who carries the can? Will it be the pension fund manager and the trustees, or the Government, who did the mandation?
Likewise, while the reserve power in the Bill focuses on the defined-contribution market, the shift in emphasis has potentially profound impacts across the sector. UK pension funds, along with insurance companies, hold approximately 30% of the UK Government’s debt or gilt market. If mature defined-benefit schemes move from the gilt market to equities, that potentially has a profound impact on the Government’s debt management, or ability to manage debt, and therefore interest rates and mortgage rates. For that reason, we would welcome the Minister confirming whether any concerns have been raised by the Debt Management Office, and possibly the Bank of England. There is widespread opposition from across the industry to this power—I am approaching the end of my speech, you will be pleased to hear, Madam Deputy Speaker. There are better ways for the Government to deliver growth, such as changing obsolete rules and removing restrictions.
In the annuity market, solvency rules prevent insurers from owning equity in productive UK assets. Wind farms, for example, deliver stable returns through contracts for difference and contribute to the Government’s green agenda. They could be an ideal match for long-term annuity investments, while also delivering clean energy. Releasing the limits on the ability of insurers to fully deploy annuity capital has the potential to unlock as much as £700 billion by 2035, according to research by Aviva. Rather than imposing top-down mandates, we want the Government to maximise growth opportunities from our pension industry by turning over every stone and seeking out the unintended consequences of old regulations, not imposing new ones.
I will conclude, Madam Deputy Speaker, as you will be delighted to hear. [Interruption.] Yes, I have taken a lot of interventions. We reaffirm our commitment to working constructively with the Government. Stability in the markets is of paramount importance, and we recognise the need for a collaborative approach as the Bill progresses through the House. We will bring forward amendments where we believe improvements can be made, and we will engage in good faith with Ministers and officials to get the detail right.
We want to go with, not against, the grain of what the Government are seeking to achieve through this Bill, and I look forward to working with the Minister in the weeks and months ahead.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
I call Chair of the Select Committee, Debbie Abrahams, after whom I will call Steve Darling.
Debbie Abrahams (Oldham East and Saddleworth) (Lab)
I want to make three points. First, we recognise that defined-contribution pension schemes have around £500 billion in assets under management. Around 20% of these assets are invested in the UK. That is down from 50% some 10 years ago. It is very welcome that the Government are focusing on this, so that we can ensure that these assets contribute to our growth.
The Committee received evidence in May from the Finance Innovation Lab, which told us that the UK has had the lowest level of business investment in the G7 for 24 of the last 30 years. The fundamental driver behind that is the fact that the financial system, including pension funds, does not support business investment as much as it should. That again emphasises the point that the Bill is very welcome. It should help us deal with that, particularly as it requires multi-employer DC schemes to have £25 billion in assets under management by 2030. That will give more schemes the advantage of economies of scale.
In a very welcome step, in the May 2025 Mansion House accord—I pay tribute to the Chancellor and her team for achieving this—there was a pledge from the 17 schemes that were part of that accord to invest 10% of their portfolios in assets that will boost the economy by 2030, with at least 5% of these portfolios being ring-fenced for the UK. This is expected to release £25 billion to the UK economy by 2030. None the less, the Bill includes a reserve power that the Government could use to mandate DC schemes to invest more in the UK economy. In evidence on 14 July, the Committee heard concerns that that would interfere with the fiduciary duty of trustees to prioritise investments that they judge will bring the best returns for scheme members.
In May, Yvonne Braun of the ABI told the Committee that it does not think the mandation is “desirable”. Instead, she said that the aim should be for it to be
“a rational choice—that the UK is an attractive environment for investing”.
The pensions industry wants the Government to concentrate on enabling the development of suitable assets for schemes to invest in, for example by improving the planning process and making the regulatory environment more predictable.
Rachel Croft, of the Association of Professional Pension Trustees, said:
“Forcing us to invest solely in the UK may run counter to that primary duty and focus, unless there is a pipeline of suitable investments in a format suitable for pension schemes to invest in. If that is the case, we will invest in them; if not, our primary duty will make us look elsewhere.”
Chris Curry, of the Pensions Policy Institute, thought that it was possible to create more UK investment opportunities and benefit members. He said:
“It still has to work in the interest of members—that is important—but if we are removing the barriers and making it easier to invest, and at the same time, providing more of a pipeline for investment and trying to package it so that it works well with how the pension system can operate, you are creating opportunity.”
He described mandation as “blunt” and “inflexible”, and said that it would be difficult to design a scheme that worked effectively in practice and did not give rise to unintended consequences. For example, he said that there would be a challenge in defining what counts as a UK investment. If the Government decided to mandate that schemes invested a particular percentage in the UK, how would the system respond to market movements that might temporarily reduce the percentage below that level? He wanted the Government to consider the unintended consequences of that. The liability-driven episode in September 2022 showed the potential risk of a lot of pension schemes effectively being asked to do the same thing at the same time.
The Bill includes a sunset clause preventing the use of the mandation power beyond 2035. Pensions UK wants to see that timeframe reduce, saying it should be just for the lifetime of the Parliament. It also wants to see the scope limited, so the investment mandation cannot be prescribed beyond the allocations voluntarily committed to in the Mansion House accord, in other words the 10% of default funds into private markets, of which 5% are in UK-based assets.
On fiduciary duties, Jesse Griffiths of the Finance Innovation Lab said that
“while the fiduciary duty should be paramount for the schemes, the Government has a different and broader mandate, and it needs to look at the collective interests of all pension savers as a whole…In particular, when you think about the deep inequality that is embedded in the system, the ONS estimates that the bottom half of the population holds just 1% of all pension assets and the top 10% holds almost two thirds. If you just focus on growing the financial returns, most people will not benefit from that. I would argue that a system that also supports a stronger economy and the green transition would benefit most people more than a system that is focused on higher returns.”
Will the Minister help us to understand the context for the criteria in which mandation powers might be used? What will be the success criteria, other than the 5% investment from this approach? Should the sunset clause, to prevent the use of this mandation power beyond 2035, be brought forward to the end of this Parliament, as I mentioned? Do the Government guarantee that mandations should go no further than the aims of the Mansion House accord?
Dame Meg Hillier
I share some of my hon. Friend’s concerns about mandation. I am happy that the Minister seems to be listening, and I hope that we will get some answers. I am interested in my hon. Friend’s thoughts about pulling forward the sunset clause. If these changes take place, they will have to happen over a long period of time, as trustees cannot just flip in and out of investments. She has set out the views of her witnesses, but does she have any views on pulling that date forward from 2035? I can see there are arguments both ways, but I am concerned that that might push trustees to make bad decisions.
Debbie Abrahams
I understand what my hon. Friend says. There is always a balance to be found with long-term financial decisions, but this is partly a political decision, so I point to the Pensions Minister to come up with a response.
Do the Government propose to consult on the design of the mandation power and how to mitigate against unintended consequences? Do the Government think that there is a case for changing the law on fiduciary duty to make clear that trustees can take account of wider issues, such as the impact of pension scheme investments on the economy and the environment? What would be the pros and cons of doing that?
Briefly, I would like to touch on the LGPS. I slightly disagree with some of the shadow Pensions Minister’s points. Since 2015, the 86 funds have been formed into eight groups. If the Pensions Minister is proposing to reduce that still further, will he set out the reasons behind that? What is the problem that merging them even further is trying to fix? Will he let me know about that in his closing remarks?
Finally, I would like to touch on the pre-1997 indexation, as the Pensions Minister knew that I would. At the end of March 2024, the Pension Protection Fund had a surplus of £13.2 billion. The PPF has taken steps to reduce the levy from £620 million in 2020 to £100 million in 2025. However, under current rules, if it made the decision to reduce the levy to zero, it would then be unable to increase it again. The 2022 departmental review by the Department for Work and Pensions recommended that the PPF and the DWP work together to introduce changes to the levy, so that the PPF would have more flexibility in reducing and increasing the levy level.
There is another issue, which the Pensions Minister will know about. PPF and financial assistance scheme members, particularly those in their later years, are really struggling. I came across a piece—I think it was in The Daily Telegraph—that said that one of the key supporters of the Pension Action Group and a FAS member, Jacquie Humphrey died a few days ago, just 11 weeks after the death of her husband. They were both employed by Dexion, which folded, and, like hundreds of others, refused to leave it there. Is there any comfort that we can provide? I understand and recognise what the Minister says about the PPF surplus being on the public sector’s balance sheet, but given that these people, who are in their 70s and 80s, are unable to live in dignity, what can we do to provide that for them in their later years?
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
Jennie seems to have captured the mood of the House, but I call the spokesperson for the Liberal Democrat party.
Steve Darling (Torbay) (LD)
As the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, I will not disappoint the Minister: I assure him that broadly agree with an awful lot in the Bill. However, as we touched on in our meeting earlier today, there are some areas where we have concerns that are similar to those expressed by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier), in more ways than one.
As Liberal Democrats, we want individuals to have confidence and be given the ability to invest in pension schemes that they know all about. We also want businesses to be supported to get their pensions out, supporting their employees. Elements of the Bill are about re-engineering to drive better outcomes for those who have pensions, which is to be very much welcomed, and about investment. We want to ensure that the individuals are front and centre of that support.
As others have said, we know that there are 12 million people who are not saving enough. In my own constituency of Torbay, some people have challenges just to get enough money to put bread on the table and cover their bills, and to save for a pension is beyond their wildest dreams. Reflecting on how we can drive that agenda of supporting people to make those changes around how they can save is absolutely essential.
My father was a haulage contractor—more commonly, a lorry driver—and self-employed. He saw the poverty that his father lived in, and in the 1980s he chose to save for a private pension, as Mrs Thatcher suggested. He put probably more than half of his income at times into savings, but because he was poorly advised, the stock market crashed and he was left with less money than he put in. That was horrific for him. Fortunately, the systems are now more protective of people who put into pensions, but that is a cautionary tale of what can go wrong. Ensuring that we support those individuals is absolutely essential.
As Liberal Democrats, we really welcome the development of larger pots, which will hopefully drive better outcomes for individuals. We know that in our more complex world of employment, many people will have small pots. While we welcome the idea of drawing these together in certain pots, we are not convinced that the pots should follow the pensioner rather than having certain pots that the Government would manage, but that is to be discussed elsewhere as part of the proposals before us.
The final area I will explore is investing in our economy, because growth is clearly absolutely essential. If our pension industry can be part of what oils the wheels of growth, that is to be welcomed. As Liberal Democrats, ensuring that we drive the social rented housing that is desperately needed and our high streets and see if those can be areas that benefit from investment is absolutely essential. However, we have concerns around mandation—colleagues have already raised this point, and I agree with them. The Minister has said positive things around mandation, and we look forward to unpicking that in Committee with him, but we believe that part of that is about ensuring transparency. As Liberal Democrats, we would like to ensure that there is clear evidence of how pensions are helping us to prepare for and tackle climate change in a positive way.
As Liberal Democrats, we want to ensure that the pensioner themselves is front and centre. We welcome the reorganisation, but driving that positive growth in our economy is absolutely essential as part of these proposals. We look forward to working with the Minister and his colleagues in getting this positive legislation through.
Sarah Edwards (Tamworth) (Lab)
I am delighted to speak in this debate. In a former life, I was a trustee of a pension scheme and sat on its investment sub-committee. In my new incarnation, I am the chair of the all-party parliamentary group on pensions and growth.
Pensions sound boring to many, and they sound far away to the young. It might be easier to engage people if we talk about income in retirement. People are not saving enough; it is typically hard to think about, and it is a scenario that could be 30 years away for some. Albert Einstein said:
“Compound interest is the eighth wonder of the world. He who understands it, earns it; he who doesn’t, pays it.”
Paying into a pension pot from an early age exponentially increases the pension pot. That is one of the reasons why I am passionate about people understanding pensions—or, rather, their retirement income—and what we can do as a Government to boost them. The sooner we start, the wealthier we can all be in retirement.
The Pension Schemes Bill aims to strengthen pension investment by supporting around 20 million people who could benefit from the reforms through better outcomes and greater value in private sector pension schemes, increasing the amount available to them. I support the aim of the Bill to enable the reforms of investment management in the local government pension scheme in England and Wales. The aim of these reforms is to ensure that the management of LGPS investments delivers the full benefits of scale, including greater expertise, better value for money and improved resilience.
One of the key engines of growth will be unlocking the potential in our local authority pension funds to direct investment towards the UK and, in particular, local regional development. It is vital that investment reaches beyond those areas that fall under mayoral control. I therefore encourage the Minister, in taking the Bill forward, to foster emerging ideas on how local authority pension pools can help to review potential local investment opportunities to achieve the best outcomes.
Matt Rodda (Reading Central) (Lab)
My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. She has convened a very powerful group—indeed, the former City Minister played an active part in its most recent meeting. Does she agree that this Bill is particularly important for our high streets and many other entrepreneurs in our local communities, to try to find new forms of investment to help them boost business?
Sarah Edwards
I thank my hon. Friend for that contribution. It is absolutely essential that we ensure that investment is getting to our high streets and towns, not just our cities, and that people see that change when they walk around.
I urge the Minister to take a supportive approach towards pools that are currently in transition, since they cannot necessarily reallocate assets while they are not members of the new pool that they are going to join. Their investment strategies are therefore effectively on hold until they join the new pool. I also ask him to liaise closely with colleagues in the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government during the process of local government reorganisation. Whatever the new framework is for local government in Staffordshire, the pension fund will still be there. Local authority workers in my Tamworth constituency are part of the Staffordshire LGPS. It is one of eight authorities that are jointly own LGPS Central, which last year reported £29.9 billion in assets under management. The sheer scale of such funds is what underlines the link between pensions and growth.
The British growth partnership, announced in October 2024 by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State for Business and Trade, sits alongside the British Business Bank, and its primary goal is to stimulate investment from UK pension funds into high-growth, innovative companies, thereby supporting the UK economy and creating new jobs. The partnership aims to raise hundreds of millions of pounds from institutional investors, including pension funds, to invest in UK venture capital. That will be supported by a cornerstone investment from the Government. Investments will be made on a long-term, fully commercial basis, independent of Government influence, leveraging the expertise and market access of the British Business Bank to identify potential companies. That will offer pension funds fruitful investment opportunities that deliver for their members as well as for the British economy.
By unlocking domestic investment, the partnership seeks to enhance the UK’s competitiveness in future industries, particularly in the technology and innovation sectors. I am fortunate that in my constituency I have an innovative technology company called PI-KEM, which has grown its business and workforce over the past 34 years. By linking pension funds to growth, it will be possible to have more such companies creating opportunities for skilled employment that sees Britain at the forefront of markets.
However, there is one area of caution: a trend towards Government finances being pooled into funds of which there is limited parliamentary oversight. While I understand and recognise the power of the larger funding pools, I must raise my concerns over how the funds will be reported on and how we will ensure that both taxpayer and pension member money is stewarded appropriately through the British growth partnership.
As the chair of the all-party parliamentary group on pensions and growth, it has been a great pleasure to meet with colleagues and hear from a variety of industry sectors about where they see the strengths and challenges in these proposals. I take this opportunity to thank the Minister for agreeing to attend a meeting of the APPG to assist us in gaining a greater understanding of the approach that he is taking in the next stages of the discussion of the Bill. I also take this opportunity to invite colleagues to come along and join us on Wednesday.
Chapter 2 in part 1 of the Bill reforms the regime governing trustee payments of surplus to employers and enables surplus to be paid out of more defined-benefit schemes. It is stated that trustee oversight and the regulatory framework will ensure the responsible and secure sharing of surplus funds.
The triennial revaluation of a scheme may determine that there is a deficit or a surplus, but despite being calculated by highly skilled actuaries, both are only a snapshot in time. For example, a scheme being evaluated this spring would have reflected the moment at which the US President’s decision to introduce tariffs hit asset prices. An alternative set of circumstances could have created an apparent surplus. I have been through this process as a trustee, and I have put on record—and must put on record again—my scepticism about whether the potential figure is the true one when it comes to the surplus. I ask the Minister to reassure my constituents, and pension scheme members in general, that he recognises that the interests of scheme members must always be the priority. It would also be welcome to understand how “surplus” is to be defined and calculated, as I have received at least four different versions by canvassing the pensions industry.
In chapter 4 of part 2, provision is made for providers of automatic enrolment and pension schemes regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority to change the way in which a pension pot is invested, to transfer a pot to a different pension scheme with the same provider, or to transfer a pot to another provider without individual member consent where it would be in the best interests of members, taken as a whole. I welcome the fact that the Bill states that a range of safeguards and procedures must be followed before an override or transfer can occur, as sadly, it is often difficult to engage members in the details of their pension. That is particularly true where a number of small pots are accrued early in a working life, which has become the norm in many communities with the rise of insecure work.
As such, I also welcome the efforts that this Government are making to create fair and secure work, because when that is coupled with a well-funded pension, working people are protected not just at work but when they sit on their retirement beach, thinking about how their working career contributed to that welcome rest. Will the Minister ensure that the safeguards are clear and given real prominence in discussion? There is a real need for such fallback powers, but there also needs to be a positive narrative about encouraging engagement.
Chapter 1 of part 2 confers powers on the Secretary of State to make regulations to evaluate and promote the provision of value for money by pension schemes. It will enable defined-contribution occupational schemes to be compared based on the value they provide, rather than just their cost. There is an argument that too high a focus on cost—management fees, for example—has had a detrimental effect on investment by pension funds. This stems from an approach that says that if the employer chooses a fund simply based on cost, the fund may look to minimise that cost, and may achieve that through the tracker funds that have come to characterise much of the market. That is potentially why little investment has occurred in the UK so far. Therefore, by pushing forward on the value for money agenda, the Minister can encourage more investment in the UK, strengthen competition in the sector, and ultimately offer better returns to members.
Chapter 3 of part 2 will require multi-employer DC pension schemes to participate in a default fund of at least £25 billion if they are to be used for automatic enrolment purposes. The aim is to encourage smaller funds to merge into larger ones that are more likely to invest in the productive finances of the UK. I suggest to the Minister that there are two issues here, the first of which relates to the market for assets. In any market, the price of a good rises if there is a shortage of that good. In this instance, the Government are being innovative and asking the pensions industry to invest in productive assets, which can include infrastructure and regeneration schemes that are vital to the places where people live. It is therefore vital that we balance the pace and scale of the development of new profitable investment opportunities with the use of any regulations to push investors in a particular direction.
To use an analogy, the Tamworth is a rare breed of pig. Unless an appropriate opportunity were available to expand supply first, any ministerial direction to buy stock of the Tamworth pig would just result in a spike in its price and poor returns for investors.
Matt Rodda
My hon. Friend is making a wonderful speech. May I also say that there is a wonderful pig from Berkshire as well, which has distinctive markings? However, moving away from animals, perhaps my hon. Friend wishes to say a little more about the success of the type of legislation she describes in Canada and Australia. It has delivered real value in those countries’ economies and real value for pension savers.
Sarah Edwards
Absolutely. There have been some really interesting changes arising from those countries’ reviews of their pensions markets, and I will be very interested to hear what the Minister has to say about what he has learned from those changes. Certainly, in the meetings that we have attended, we have learned a lot about some of the various initiatives that are driving real growth and real change in those countries.
I urge the Minister to focus on the process of expanding the pipeline of suitable projects, while building on the Chancellor’s success—and, I am sure, his own—in creating a voluntary framework for industry and Government through the Mansion House accord.
Dame Meg Hillier
My hon. Friend has referred to good opportunities. I think it was Islington council’s pension scheme that invested in social housing in its area. That gives a good return because, by and large, people pay their rent—it is a steady return over a long period of time. Given the desperate need for housing in this country, does my hon. Friend agree that that would be a real opportunity for these funds as they get bigger?
Sarah Edwards
I absolutely agree. It is incredibly important that we make sure those investments are being driven towards the things that are going to change lives, and building houses will change lives. The other thing that my hon. Friend will be very aware of is the fact that the state pension is calculated on the basis that people are going to own a house in retirement. As we know, we are heading to a point at which many people will not own a home and their income in retirement may therefore not be enough, so we need to be alive to that situation.
In conclusion, this Bill offers a great deal to my constituents, with the prospect of better pensions through investing for the future so that living standards are higher. For younger generations, there is a real need for investment now in the long-term future of the British economy, so that they can eventually retire with an appropriate income to sustain them. There is also a need to channel that investment beyond our major cities and mayoral authorities to our shire districts, in order to deliver the change that lies at the heart of this Government’s mandate, and the Bill offers an opportunity to do that. I believe that it offers lots of positive opportunities, but as always there will be challenges. Like a good pension fund trustee, I ask the Minister to take the Bill forward with a listening ear as he seeks to link pensions and growth for the long-term benefit of us all.
Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)
I congratulate the hon. Member for Tamworth (Sarah Edwards) on her speech. I am afraid, however, that you, Madam Deputy Speaker, will have to forgive me for puncturing the air of bonhomie and positivity about the Bill, because I am really not content with it.
Frankly, I feel it is my duty as an Opposition Back Bencher to be suspicious of consensus, particularly when the City of London is conspiring with a Labour Government to muck about with our pensions. We have seen that before. I am old enough to remember Gordon Brown’s so-called reforms in 1997, which struck a hammer blow to the British people’s pension funds. You will remember, Madam Deputy Speaker, that the late, great Frank Field—who was then the Pensions Minister—later called those changes a spectacular mistake that struck a hammer blow to the solvency of British pension funds and drove a dagger deep into the heart of the defined-benefit landscape, resulting in its extinction.
As such, I am afraid that must rise to raise some very significant reservations about this bit of legislation—and not just its technical execution, but the political instinct that it betrays. While the Bill is wrapped in the warm words of reform and modernisation, what it actually does is centralise control, unsettle previously settled rights, and risk disenfranchising precisely those people whom it purports to help.
To begin with the Bill’s technical aspects, I reiterate my point of order. I am a member of the local government pension scheme through my membership of the London Pension Funds Authority, and I am uniquely affected by this legislation, as are 6.5 million other former and current public sector workers. My view is that, under this Bill, those people’s rights are being denied, and that through the hybrid legislation process, they or their representatives should have the right to petition the Bill Committee and explain why they feel they are affected by investment pooling, the changes to fiduciary delegation and the asset consolidation. They are uniquely affected by this Bill, which strikes profoundly at the governance of the pension funds they have paid into in a way that it does not for other pension funds in this country. That is the definition of hybridity—if that is a word—so if we are going to stick to the rules in this House, we really should stick to them. I look forward to getting the letter that you promised me, Madam Deputy Speaker, and I know that you have asked me not to refer to procedure in the other place, but this is not the only Chamber that will be looking at this legislation.
The hon. Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth (Debbie Abrahams), who is just about to leave—I am sorry to detain her but will be brief—asked the Minister what the problem is. I repeat her question, but in relation to the local government pension scheme, I also ask what it has to do with him. It is my money, not his, and it is for scheme members to make decisions about how they wish their money to be used. It is not taxpayers’ money; it is my money. It is a defined-contribution and benefit scheme, and we have all paid into it. He is the second Minister in the space of 18 months to try to interfere with the local government pension scheme, and I stood in this Chamber and opposed Michael Gove, now Lord Gove in the other place, when he attempted to manipulate the local government pension scheme for political reasons. I urge the Minister to think twice before he does so.
Secondly, I believe that this Bill is conceptually flawed. If we are being generous—[Interruption.] By all means, the hon. Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth is free to go—I will not be mentioning her again. She was hesitantly rising to leave. If I am being generous, the ambition behind this Bill is to unlock capital that can be invested for the purposes of growth, but the methods it proposes are chillingly dirigiste and make the dangerous assumption that Whitehall knows best and that central direction by the Government can outperform the dispersed judgment of hundreds of experienced trustees managing diverse funds in varied contexts. Essentially, with this Bill the Minister is turning the pension fund industry into an element of Government procurement by the back door.
There are three further points that I want to put on the radar on Second Reading. I understand that the Bill will go through, but I hope the Minister will take them into account. First, it is simply not true that megafunds perform better. There is plenty of academic and empirical evidence that the picture is much more mixed. Often, smaller funds with better governance and a more focused investment strategy can perform better. These supertanker monopoly funds lose agility, lack accountability and become distant from pensioners and members of the fund. Their investment discretion and their ability to move quickly on investment decisions becomes sclerotic and bureaucratic. In particular, it is true that these megafunds specifically underperform when they invest in exactly the kind of illiquid assets that the Government are hoping to push them into: infrastructure and private equity. I urge the Government and the Minister please to examine carefully the evidence from the United States and elsewhere that shows that these very large funds do not necessarily produce better returns for investors. They may well be able to reduce costs because of scale, but I am afraid that the evidence is just not there on fundamental investment returns.
My second point is on the danger of politicisation. We have seen elsewhere in the world where pension funds have been pushed into the Government’s priorities to their own detriment. In Canada, large pension funds have come under significant Government pressure to invest in state infrastructure. In France, pension fund surpluses have been directed into Government bond-buying programmes effectively against their will. Once those assets become controlled and directed into state-favoured investment vehicles, which is what the Government are proposing through this Bill, the temptation for Ministers—not necessarily this Minister, but future Ministers—is to go further and push funds into politically convenient infrastructure projects that may prove to be financially disastrous. If that power had been available to the political team that decided to instigate the frankly financially disastrous HS2, and my pension fund had been put in it, where would I be now? I urge the Minister to think carefully about the responsibility for my retirement and my future. By me, I am referring to myself as a member of the local government pension fund. I am everyman for these purposes.
I am afraid that essentially what has happened in France and in Canada, and what may happen under this legislation in the UK, is that the pension fund system effectively becomes a tool of Government fiscal policy. Effectively, absent capital spending available directly from the taxpayer, the Government direct capital spending from pension funds—from private money—and plug holes that they create by writing cheques that they cannot fulfil. I would be interested in the Minister’s response to that.
Lincoln Jopp
I was just googling “dirigiste” and my right hon. Friend’s everyman quote. Will he comment on the fact that OMERS, which he would probably agree is one of these megafunds that he thinks are slow and unwieldy and invest in infrastructure and illiquids, returned a 7.1% net return over the last 10 years and the London Pensions Fund Authority returned a 7% return over the last 10 years?
Kit Malthouse
As I said, the evidence about performance across the population of funds is mixed. Some smaller funds do extremely well, because they have strong governance and a focused and nimble investment strategy. Some megafunds do reasonably well, because they can spread their risk across a variety of asset classes, but it is not a given that a big fund will perform better than a smaller fund. In fact, in certain circumstances smaller funds, because they have better accountability and can have a more focused investment strategy, may well perform better.
Frankly, and this speaks to my hon. Friend’s point, it is for me as a member of the pension fund to decide what I want to do, performance or otherwise, because it is my money. Given that I have contracted with this pension fund under circumstances made clear to me when I contracted with it as part of my employment or otherwise, it is not necessarily for the Government to steam in and tell me what I should or should not do with my own money. That means I carry a certain element of risk—absolutely—but unless we are going full-throated for the total financial infantilisation of the British people, I cannot see that we have any other way to preserve our financial freedom and autonomy.
Debbie Abrahams
Does the right hon. Member accept that he might be atypical among scheme members?
Kit Malthouse
That may well be true, but that is a different question. There is a question about financial education and the ability of large numbers of our fellow citizens to understand these financial complexities. We have a large and professional independent financial adviser community, and all pension funds are required to have pension advisers who can speak to members, tell them what is going on and explain the decisions before them. I do think that over the years, such steps have disenfranchised the British people from their financial decisions, yet we hold them responsible for their debts, their mortgages and their future. There is a larger question for us in this House about how much we have subtracted from the autonomy of the British people, and therefore how much blame attaches to us as politicians when their financial circumstances are not what they expect.
Torsten Bell
The right hon. Member is giving a lucid speech, as he always does—he speaks very well—but I am failing to understand exactly the point he is making. He is talking about a local government pension scheme, which is guaranteeing him an income in retirement, as if it is a defined-contribution scheme where he is the one at risk from changes in the investment performance. It is local taxpayers with their employer contribution who ultimately bear the risk in the scheme he is talking about. It is our job to make sure that those taxpayers have the best possible chance of not having bad returns, leading to bad outcomes for them. He is not at risk in the way he is talking about.
Kit Malthouse
Yes, I have. I paid contributions through my employment at City Hall, as did my employer. Admittedly, it was a scheme based on a defined benefit, rather than a defined contribution, but that was the deal done with me on a settled contract, saying that this was what I would be provided for from my contribution. Every year, I review my pension benefit forecast. I am consulted by the fund about how it should conduct its affairs. I am asked to turn up to my pensioners’ conference to discuss with trustees how they are looking after my future. The point is that the Government are steaming in with absolutely no consultation with me as a pensioner and I have no right to be represented, although I am uniquely affected, beyond other pension schemes. I consider that to be high-handed and, as the hon. Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth said, to be solving a problem that does not exist.
My third point was also raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier): who carries the can? What happens when the Minister tells my private pension scheme or the parliamentary pension scheme that it must invest in, for instance, HS2 and it turns out to be a disaster? What happens when whichever ministerial pet project rises to the top of the priority list for pension allocation—what rough beast, its hour come round at last, slouches towards Whitehall to get its finance—and it all goes horribly wrong? I am sorry to quote Yeats to the Minister, but who will pay when that happens? When there is a deficit in defined-contribution pension funds that have been so directed by the Minister, who will pay for that deficit?
Kit Malthouse
I have already given way to the Minister. He said that the Bill contained an opt-out for pension funds, but that is not strictly accurate. It does not create an opt-out for trustees; it creates an opportunity for them to request the ability to opt out from the regulator, with whom the discretion to opt out lies. It also reverses the burden of proof. Even if it is on their own judgment, the trustees must prove, empirically, that investing as the Minister so directs will be to the detriment of their fund. That is not a true opt-out. It is not at the discretion of the trustees. All they can do is request, and all they can do is try to offer whatever evidence they may have. We must reflect on the fact that an awful lot of investment decisions are made by trustees on their judgment—yes, on advice, but on their judgment—and that is a very hard thing to disprove.
I am afraid I feel that the Bill is bulldozing into an area of highly sensitive financial structure, and is not taking care of the interests of those whom it purports to protect. It is reclassifying risk, it is recentralising power, and it is rewriting contracts that have hitherto been extant for many years. It is too important to my future, and the future of millions of pensioners, for us to rush into this consensus-driven Bill without proper examination in Committee, with pensioners and pension funds themselves able to petition, as they should be, under a hybrid Bill structure.
Callum Anderson (Buckingham and Bletchley) (Lab)
I am probably a parliamentary oddity, given that I have been looking forward hugely to rising to support the Bill—and what luck to follow such a colourful and interesting speech from the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse).
I believe that this landmark piece of legislation, which builds on the progress made by the last Administration, has the potential to fundamentally reshape the trajectory of British capitalism by addressing one of the most important long-term challenges facing our country, namely how we can unlock and unleash the full potential of British savings to support growth and prosperity here at home. It is a challenge that we must overcome if we are to tackle a number of deep-rooted structural weaknesses in our economy: low productivity, low business investment and regional inequalities, as well as the financial insecurity that pervades the lives of too many of our older citizens, especially those who do not own their homes.
Before I go any further, I must pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Minister—the Bill bears the hallmarks of his serious and determined leadership—and also commend my hon. Friend the Member for Tamworth (Sarah Edwards) for her very interesting speech.
The Bill seeks to address the lack of alignment between our nation’s vast pool of domestic savings and the long-term investment needs of our economy. Over recent decades, that growing misalignment has become all too evident in communities across the United Kingdom. During that time, our domestic pension funds, which now amount to about £.3 trillion, have steadily retreated from investment in the UK, although the trend has not been replicated in other comparable developed economies. Despite taxpayer support amounting to more than £60 billion a year—or £70 billion, according to the right hon. Member for Salisbury (John Glen)—too little capital is finding its way into British companies, infrastructure and innovation.
Data from the Capital Markets Industry Taskforce—I must disclose the fact that I once worked for one of its member firms before entering this place—lays bare the scale of the problem. The data focuses primarily on public equity markets, but when we look at the largest pension schemes and funds in other countries and compare the size of their total equity allocations relative to their domestic equity markets, we see that Canada’s pensions are 2.5 times overweighting their home market, while France’s are nine times overweight, Italy’s 10 times overweight, Australia’s 27 times overweight, and South Korea’s are 30 times overweight. The UK is, massively, an international anomaly. Our domestic pension funds are underweighting our equity market by about 40%. That, I think, represents a structural weakness, with direct consequences for the global competitiveness of our economy, the vitality of our industries and, ultimately, our national economic resilience. If we are unwilling to invest in ourselves, we hold back our growth prospects.
The UK has long needed catalysts for a modern economic renaissance. The Government have taken important first steps through their industrial and infrastructure strategies, the artificial intelligence opportunities action plan and the reforms of our planning system, but the common ingredient that is required to ensure their success is a reliable source of long-term capital. Even a modest rebalancing of that £3 trillion could unlock billions in investment for domestic growth. In real currency that our constituents can understand, that means investment in digital, physical and social infrastructure, and it means greater opportunities for entrepreneurs to not only start up businesses but scale them into something globally consequential, providing better jobs and higher incomes for families throughout the country.
These investments are not just good for local economies. If we get the broader fundamentals right, they can also deliver stronger returns for tomorrow’s growing cohort of retirees, so the Government are right to propose tackling fragmentation across the UK pensions system. In particular, the private defined-contribution market and the local government pension scheme remain too fragmented. I must gently disagree with the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire: I think that there are too many small, sub-scale schemes that have not only driven up costs and created market inefficiencies, but resulted overall in suboptimal investment outcomes. I think that larger funds can manage risk better, and can invest in opportunities that can deliver higher returns for savers.
Kit Malthouse
I do not dispute the fact that there are too many small funds that are suboptimal; my question is whether it should be the Government who correct that. If, for example, I am a member of a small suboptimal pension fund and the Government, through the Bill, consolidate it with another pension fund, and it turns out that this reduces my return, who carries the can?
Callum Anderson
As I have said, I think that larger funds can manage risk better and deliver better outcomes for savers, which means that they can take greater ownership of how they spend their retirement years. I also think that the £25 billion threshold for megafunds in the defined-contribution market is the right level to deliver the objective. Other jurisdictions, especially Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands, have demonstrated that scale drives better governance, lower fees and stronger returns.
I welcome consolidation and the path towards the professionalisation of the local government pension scheme. I disclose that before I entered this place, I chaired a local authority pension fund, so I know at first hand the potential of pooling, and share many experiences of pension fund meetings with the shadow Minister. I fully acknowledge that there will be resistance to pooling in some quarters.
Matt Rodda
My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. Does he agree that there is a growing consensus in the pensions industry? Indeed, some of the trade bodies have been heavily involved in promoting the idea of consolidation for some time, and perhaps what he is describing is a growing body of opinion in the pensions industry.
Callum Anderson
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Stakeholders and firms that I have spoken to—in the local government pension sector, the private sector and the City of London—are unanimous that scale is very much an economic imperative. Have the Government considered what role fiscal incentives can play in helping to accelerate the consolidation of private DC funds, and whether there is scope to reduce the number of LGPS pools in the year ahead?
I particularly welcome the Bill’s proposal for a comprehensive value-for-money framework to guide DC consolidation, which my hon. Friend the Member for Tamworth (Sarah Edwards) mentioned. This correctly tackles head-on the trustee cost mindset, which too often prioritises the cheapest over the most appropriate asset allocation. That approach has frequently been tried and tested, and it delivers poorer returns for savers and missed opportunities for the wider economy, so I very much hope that DC consolidation can be implemented as soon as possible.
Finally, I want to address the issue of mandation, which, to be honest, probably warrants a debate all by itself. I appreciate the concerns that have been raised by Members from across the House, and by people in the investment industry. My hon. Friend the Member for Hackney South and Shoreditch (Dame Meg Hillier) referred to the parliamentary fund, and I note non-facetiously that the parliamentary fund, of which we are all ultimately beneficiaries, allocates barely 1% of its assets to UK companies.
Alex Brewer (North East Hampshire) (LD)
In Hampshire, we have a super-ageing population, so pension and post-retirement financial concerns are frequently raised in my North East Hampshire constituency casework. One of my constituents wrote to me to say:
“I want my pension to be put to work delivering sustainable, long-term growth and prosperity that allows every community in the UK to thrive.”
This Bill should require full transparency from pension schemes to empower people to support sustainable, long-term growth in their communities. Does the hon. Member agree that requiring transparency would be the most effective way of incentivising investment?
Callum Anderson
In all aspects of our financial system and our financial markets, and when it comes to either public activities or private markets, transparency is very much the best way to derive the most effective outcomes for those who benefit from pension schemes.
Initiatives such as the Mansion House accord, which has been referred to a number of times in this debate, have been welcome steps. When it comes to asset allocation, private sector leadership should always be preferable where possible, but we need to be candid about the fact that the challenge we face in the UK is stark and immediate. I now consider it necessary for the Government to signal to the markets that they will not ignore the reality that allocations by UK institutions to UK assets have fallen sharply over my lifetime, and certainly over the last 40 or 50 years, and that they are prepared to exercise a degree of agency, if required.
Ideally, any reserve power will not be required. If the Government succeed with their broader economic strategy, there will be a wealth of investable opportunities that will attract capital without the need for compulsion. Although the Government will need to exercise any reserve power in the most judicious and careful way, and in close consultation with the industry, we simply cannot stand by and allow our domestic markets to be hollowed out. I understand that not everyone is in favour of the state intervening in markets, and I am sure that the Minister, who worked at the Treasury, will remember that not everyone in the City wanted the Government to step in and rescue Lloyds Banking Group or the Royal Bank of Scotland, but sometimes the Government have to act decisively in the country’s long-term economic interests.
The Bill is a welcome and necessary step towards answering the question of how we inject greater confidence into our companies, our markets and our economy, while also providing people with a safe and secure retirement. That is why I am pleased to support it tonight.
Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)
I start with an apology to the Minister, because I had a bit of a giggle when the timeline for pensions dashboards was mentioned. I have been here quite a long time, and I feel like we have been talking about pensions dashboards for that entire time. It has been suggested that they are just around the corner for most of the last 10 years. It feels like this is something that we rehash on a regular basis. It would be great if they really were just around the corner; I look forward to seeing them.
The right hon. Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse) will not be surprised to hear that our political ideologies are slightly different when it comes to interventionism and what the Government should or should not do. It is completely acceptable for the Government to give some direction on the largest assets, but I am specifically not talking about the LGPS, because it does not exist in Scotland. That part of the Bill does not apply to my constituents, so I will not touch too much on that.
Kit Malthouse
I understand where the hon. Lady is coming from. She is keen on Government intervention in our pensions, but does she recognise that that represents a fairly significant transfer of investment risk, and that the Government should underwrite that risk in all fairness to pensioners, who may lose money as a result?
Kirsty Blackman
Auto-enrolment was a fairly substantial intervention by the Government in pensions. Since 1997, pensions have had to increase in line with inflation, and that was an intervention by the Government. There has been a long trail of interventions by the Government in how assets are managed and where they are held, but pension trustees are still required to get a return. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman about specific projects, and I would be particularly concerned if we were looking at specific projects, but the mandation relates to UK assets, and the funds in which they could be invested.
I would love to see much more investment of pension funds in social housing, for example, where the trustees can get a pretty great return, but they will still have a fiduciary duty and responsibility. For defined-benefit schemes, the member will always get what they have been promised they will get. No matter how the fund is managed, they have a defined benefit from the scheme, unlike in a defined-contribution scheme, where it depends on the size of the pot as it grows—but I am going to carry on, because I have a lot to cover that is not to do with mandation, and as I say, the LGPS does not apply in Scotland.
On value for money, I think the Bill is good, because comparing pension schemes is difficult. Comparing any financial schemes is difficult because they are all laid out in different ways and the fees are calculated in different ways, so it does not make sense to most people. Some of stuff on requiring the publication of information on value for money in certain ways is important, and the surveys are also important. I have slight concerns about the chapter on value for money because, in comparison with the small pots consolidation section, there is no requirement to publish the regulations in draft before they actually become regulations. There is a requirement for consultation, as there is in both those chapters, but not a requirement for publication in draft. I think it is important for those to be published, so the widest possible range of views can come forward, because value for money is so important for such a wide range of people, whereas some of the other stuff in the Bill is much more technical and will have an impact on far fewer people. The point about publishing the regulations in draft is important.
I am disappointed that the Government have not made more moves on adequacy, but given where we are in the cost of living crisis, I can understand why it may be difficult to get cross-party political consensus on the creation of adequacy provisions. This Bill could have taken more of a look at pensions in general, rather than being about pensions specifically, because in a lot of ways the Bill is seeking to do is improve every individual’s pension pot’s potential for growth. That is an admirable aim, but some of the larger picture could have been included—for example, in relation to auto-enrolment, the under-22s and people earning small amounts of money who do not qualify.
The right hon. Member for Salisbury (John Glen) alluded to the mid-life MOT, which I have previously shouted about. I agree that people should be sent an appointment for a mid-life MOT, in the same way as they are asked to get their bowel cancer screening sent through the post. It should be exactly the same with a mid-life MOT, which is so important, but so many people duck and dive about it. Millennials are coming up to reaching this point, but millennials are a generation particularly averse to thinking about retirement, because we do not think it will happen to us. We think we will die before we get there, because there is an incredible amount of cynicism among millennials. We tend to avoid thinking about it because we are not going to reach that point, so forcing millennials—in the nicest possible way—by giving them such an appointment and making it for them means they are much more likely to undertake it.
On guided retirement, again I think the Bill tackles the issue pretty well by ensuring that people have more information. I am particularly concerned about the people who draw down the 25% tax-free sum of money, and then do not have a plan for the rest of it. How many of them have just thought about the 25%, and have not thought about the rest of it, or about how complicated and unpredictable annuities can be depending on the year? I am thinking about somebody I know who does not smoke or drink and runs 10 km a couple of times a week, but they will get a smaller annuity than somebody who does the opposite. Do people know how unpredictable it is—how much they will get and the fact that they cannot tell from what the pot looks like the actual outcome to cover their living expenses? Any kind of understanding people can be given about that is really important. I do still have concerns about some of the issues with freedoms and how financially disadvantageous it can be for a significant number of people.
I agree with some of the stuff on the consolidation of small pots. I have a concern about the fact that the Secretary of State or the Minister can make changes to the definition of small pots by looking at some consultation and then bringing a statutory instrument to the House. I would appreciate some clarification, and agreement that the Minister will consult pretty widely before taking a decision about changing the definition of small pots in secondary legislation.
On surplus release, I would disagree with a chunk of the Conservative Members who would use it for slightly different things. I press the Minister on the balance between the economic growth mission and what employees will get as a result of surplus release. I am pleased to hear that trustees will have some flexibility, but I am concerned that that creates a system with a number of tiers, because it depends on how passionate the trustees are about helping the employees or helping the Government’s growth mission. I would ask for some guidance from the Government about what they expect. When they are making that deal with employers, they have to agree with the employer where that money will go—how much of the money will go to increasing the pension pots and how much into people’s salaries. There will need to be a significant amount of guidance for trustees on where the Government expect money to go. It would be appreciated if we could be involved in the creation of that guidance, or at least be consulted on what it is supposed to look like.
On megafunds, there is a bit of a “wait and see” on what megafunds, both master trusts and the superfunds, will look like and how they will pan out. I can understand looking at other places the Government consider to be successful in how pension funds are managed and the very large investments that could be created as a result of huge funds. I appreciate that overheads can be reduced and that funds can be run more efficiently as a result, and that investments can be made into very large, long-term patient capital projects if the fund is significant.
My specific question on superfunds is about new entrants to the market. The Bill states that there is an ability for transitions. Organisations likely to meet superfund status at some point, given a certain amount of time, will be given slack until they can reach that status, which is utterly sensible. But then it talks about new entrants coming in to become a superfund. There is a pathway and the ability to get approval to do that, but only if they are innovative. I am slightly concerned about what innovative means, because it is not defined—I think it will be defined in secondary legislation. Why should they be innovative? Surely, if a new entrant is excellent, that should be enough? Innovative concerns me. I do not really understand what it means, or why it is in the rules for new entrants. Anything the Government can say to explain what they think that is supposed to mean, and what they intend it to mean in the secondary legislation, would be helpful.
On the whole, the SNP is cautiously optimistic about the Bill. We believe there need to be some changes and we have specific questions in various areas, such as: on the rationale in relation to mandating; on the rules on value for money and how they will impact individuals; and on the consolidation of small pots and how they will ensure individuals have better outcomes. It is not in the Bill, but ensuring the pension dashboard happens so that people can see the consolidation of small pots happening in real time would be incredibly helpful. The best outcome we can get is for everybody to have an adequate pension when they reach retirement. We will not get that if people cannot see and cannot understand what they have in their pensions and if those small pots are not consolidated.
Several hon. Members rose—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
Order. Before I call the next speaker, I just want to be clear that it will be about an hour before the wind-ups. Nine Members are bobbing, so perhaps you can all reflect on that in your contributions so that I do not have to put on a time limit.
John Grady (Glasgow East) (Lab)
I rise to speak in favour of the Bill. On a policy basis, the Bill addresses a number of very important challenges.
The first is ensuring that the pension system delivers good outcomes for the millions of pension savers in Britain. That is absolutely critical. In my lifetime, the risk of pension savings has shifted from the employer to the employee—in other words, to our constituents. At the heart of the reforms is one essential fact: investment in a diverse set of assets leads to better returns and better outcomes than investment in a narrow set of assets. We need to move away from a focus on cost in the industry and on to a focus on overall value and the outcomes that savers get, so they have comfortable retirements. I am determined that the working people in Glasgow East have comfortable retirements and are properly rewarded for their hard work. Therefore, the Bill’s objective of ensuring that savers in Glasgow East and across the United Kingdom ultimately have access to a wider pool of investments, which have historically been restricted, is a good outcome and a good policy.
The second challenge the Bill seeks to address is growth. People in Glasgow East are very ambitious, as I know they are in Aberdeen North and in Hampshire. As I knocked on doors ahead of last year’s election, people would say to me, “Britain has lost its way.” And many people said that they felt their children would be better off working abroad, or that there were more opportunities for their children abroad. That is the challenge the Bill plays a part in addressing. We do not invest enough in our productive capacity so we have lower, sclerotic economic growth.
Pension savings are an essential source of finance for British industry and infrastructure. In that regard, the Bill includes, in chapter 3 of part 2, something that seems to be causing anxiety: the backstop mandation of investment by defined-contribution pension funds into private asset classes linked to the United Kingdom. Private non-listed shares and debt are now central to investment in a way that they were not when I started off as a junior lawyer many years ago. Growth companies in areas such as medicine, AI, technology and, of course, space remain in private hands for much longer, and list on public markets much later, if at all. The mandation power must be viewed in that context. If UK pension funds do not invest in those classes of domestic assets, working people may miss out on significant returns, and we risk losing the opportunity of growth and of developing the great innovations from our fantastic universities, including the University of Strathclyde.
Kit Malthouse
The hon. Gentleman is making a good point, but does he accept that illiquid investments, by their very nature, tend to be more volatile, and that from a risk-adjusted point of view they therefore represent much higher risk for investors? He mentioned investment in life sciences companies; he will be aware of the collapse a couple of years ago of the fund led by Neil Woodford, which was a significant investor in illiquid private sector life sciences companies and, because of that illiquidity, collapsed. The point is that if we are mandated to do that stuff—I ask the same question as I asked the Minister—who will pay? Who carries the can?
John Grady
I hope the right hon. Gentleman would accept that diversification is critical here. Of course, illiquid private assets are not something that one holds for a couple of years and then sells, but the funds are designed to be large enough to bear the risk from diversification. That is the critical point.
Pension funds are a statutory arrangement, with significant taxation and other legal benefits. That creates a business opportunity for pension providers—and quite right, too. Against that background, it is right that the Government review whether, under the existing arrangements, savers are getting a fair return from that special statutory and legal arrangement. Given the tax breaks, it is not unreasonable to address the question of whether there is sufficient investment in the United Kingdom.
Let me turn to our attitude to risk in the UK, on which the success of pension arrangements turns, as does our desire for more economic growth. We will not get more economic growth unless we take more reasonable risks, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer and others have made clear. It is essential for banks and fund managers to consider whether they take enough risk.
The chief executive of the National Wealth Fund, John Flint, made the point last Tuesday at the Treasury Committee, when he said,
“I would encourage the stewards of private capital to go back and challenge themselves on their risk appetite…the country’s growth outcomes are, for me, largely consistent with the country’s risk appetite generally.”
I venture to say that our great fund managers and banks need to turn their minds to whether they are taking enough risk, because that drives economic growth and drives successful outcomes for savers.
Another aspect of pensions reform and risk taking is the individual savers, as was brought home to me in a quite different context, when I was on a football history tour organised by Football’s Square Mile, which promotes the history of football in Glasgow East. As we stood mainly in Glasgow East—I must admit that some of it was in Glasgow South—the guides explained to us that when Queen’s Park decided to organise the first international football match between Scotland and England in 1872, the club had just over £7. It had a choice: the low risk was to hold the match at a rugby club, free of charge; the higher risk was to hold the match at the West of Scotland cricket club at Partick, an old, closed ground where tickets could be sold and there was potential revenue. The problem was that the West of Scotland cricket club wanted more by way of rent than the Queen’s Park had—much more than £7. The guides put the choice to us all as we stood just in Glasgow South constituency, and just outside my constituency. The vast majority of people on the tour picked the low-risk option: an indication, at the end of the week, of how risk-averse we have become in Britain.
Encouraging sensible risk taking is critical to pension saving and if we want more economic growth. In fact, Queen’s Park took the higher-risk option: it rented the cricket ground and made a huge profit. The game transformed the profile of football and was the foundation for Queen’s Park’s building the first international football stadium in the world, which opened a year later in 1873 in my constituency. Queen’s Park took a risk that was pivotal to the development of modern football, and modern football contributes billions to the Exchequer. My point is that risk is essential to economic activity, as Mr Flint explained and as was illustrated later in the week.
The Bill is critical for economic growth. It takes active steps to ensure that money flows to the entrepreneurs and risk takers who will create wealth across Britain. It ensures that working people have access to better pensions. On that basis, I support the Bill.
Lincoln Jopp (Spelthorne) (Con)
I regret that the Pensions Minister, the hon. Member for Swansea West (Torsten Bell), is no longer in his place; I wanted to pay him something of a compliment for getting the Bill here today with typical ambition and enthusiasm. I should, however, remind him of my grandmother’s favourite saying: an ounce of experience is worth a ton of enthusiasm.
I stand here to talk about part 3 of the Bill on the basis of about four years’ experience as a director of the first pensions superfund, having attempted to get it through the Pensions Regulator and the interim regime put up under the last Government. That was ultimately unsuccessful; part of the reason why we are going to need the Pensions Minister’s enthusiasm and ambition is that he will come up against a series of vested interests. When we attempted—[Interruption.] I welcome the Pensions Minister back to his place and am grateful that he is here to listen to this.
When we attempted to launch the pensions superfund, we were bombarded by people who wanted to strangle the superfund industry at birth: the Association of British Insurers; an extraordinary intervention by the Governor of the Bank of England—I am not sure whether the Minister has had a chance to reprogramme the Governor of the Bank of England recently, but I hope he is more enthusiastic about the Minister’s proposal than he was about the last Government’s—and lastly, the Pensions Regulator itself.
I think the Minister wants to create a thriving market in superfunds. However, under the current interim guidance, capital requirements for superfunds are about twice those for insurers providing buy-outs, so it is hardly surprising that we have seen a number of recent new entrants to the insurance market but no new superfunds. The Solvency II regime—apologies for the slightly technical language, but the Minister will appreciate it—that applies to insurers works off a one-year 99.5% confidence level, but over time the industry has been allowed to apply a number of important adjustments, including diversification, matching adjustments and deferred tax credits. All have had the effect of effectively reducing the capital requirement for insurers. In combination, that means that the capital buffer for a buy-out provider is approximately half that of a superfund under the current interim regime, even taking into account the fact that superfunds are proposed to have a one-year 99% confidence level.
The Bill must address that inherent unfairness if, as the Minister wants, the superfund market is to grow. At the moment, it is the proverbial baby who refuses to put on weight. Can the Minister assure me that the Bill will address the problem and create a more level playing field that will allow superfunds to offer the 10% to 15% pricing discount to insurers that his Department has said it is seeking? As the Minister knows, there are a number of techniques for achieving that. He might consider: specifying that superfunds should apply a 98% one-year confidence threshold; the creation of a rule similar to the matching adjustment that applies to insurers; extending a VAT exemption to superfunds for essential pension services, such as admin, actuarial and investment, including scheme origination and transfers of the scheme to superfunds; or—I suppose this is an “and/or”—allowing superfunds to use structured capital instruments such as subordinated debt and preferred shares to lower the cost of capital and enhance investment flexibility, without compromising quality.
Lastly, I turn to the Pensions Regulator’s process of assessing superfunds and giving them a licence to operate—this is the bit where I have the scars on my back. Will the Minister take a close personal interest in this and change the way that the Pensions Regulator works, so that there are stricter and shorter time limits for assessing suitability—shorter than the limits currently in the Bill, which are six months as a default and nine months as a stretch? In the case of the pensions superfund, we had three applications and a similar timescale was used. One can just imagine why the investors’ patience finally ran out and the whole thing was wound up.
I do not want the Minister to be in the position of his predecessor, Guy Opperman, who stood in this place and said that greenlighting superfunds was his greatest achievement during lockdown, yet as a result of a combination of the regulatory environment that was put in place and the vested interests of those who argued against the birth of superfunds, the whole concept was strangled at birth. I want the Minister to avoid that, so I encourage him to look back at the first efforts to produce superfunds and tell the Pensions Regulator a great deal more about how it should do its business.
The reason why the Pensions Regulator became risk averse was because the last Government refused to cover superfunds in their Pension Schemes Bill, now the Pension Schemes Act 2021. The Pensions Regulator did not see why it should take any additional risk if politicians were not going to. I encourage the Minister to have the strength of his convictions to use primarily legislation to tell the Pensions Regulator the market that he wants it to regulate. Then he will give pension superfunds a fighting chance of coming into existence and consolidating. Notwithstanding some of the concerns that others have had, 5,100 of anything is not a working marketplace; it is ripe for consolidation—it was then and it is now.
Rachel Hopkins (Luton South and South Bedfordshire) (Lab)
First, I want to declare an interest. I subscribe to my current parliamentary pension, have preserved benefits in previous occupational pensions and, like the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse), I too have preserved benefits in the local government pension scheme, though I do not propose to say much about that element of the Bill. I suppose that as a worker with a variety of pensions, I am going to benefit from the Bill.
I welcome the Government’s proposals under the Bill, as too many people have their hard-earned cash scattered across pension pots that deliver poor returns on their savings and leave them confused about their future and worse off in retirement. The Bill will deliver more money for savers by making pensions simpler to understand and easier to manage, and they will return better value over the long term. The new rules will bring together defined-contribution small pension pots, to cut costs for savers and industry and help people to view their full pension picture easily. That will protect them from getting stuck in underperforming schemes for years.
The Bill has been welcomed by the pensions industry, as it sets out a long-term plan to create bigger and better pension funds that will boost returns for savers and drive long-term investment across the country. As we have heard, in the UK pensions system there are more small pension pots than there are pensioners. Currently there are 13 million small pots holding £1,000 or less, with the number increasing by around 1 million every year. Small pots are costly for savers and industry, who can lose money through flat-rate charges or administrative costs, and they deliver poor returns because they are not big enough to invest in high-yielding productive assets.
The Bill will introduce a new value-for-money system to improve outcomes for savers. It will assess the DC schemes and the arrangements that they operate, based on cost, investment performance and service quality. This will identify and address poor-performing schemes or arrangements, encourage consolidation and improve member outcomes while promoting investment in a wider range of productive assets. It will also protect savers from getting stuck in underperforming schemes for years.
The Bill’s proposals will also help to unlock about £50 billion for investment in the UK economy. Easing the rules around surplus funds could help unlock billions for employers to invest in their businesses and deliver for scheme members. For many businesses, that may be the financial lifeline they need to free up capital for investment or debt reduction, although it is important to flag that pension scheme trustees working with employers will decide whether to release surpluses and act in the interest of scheme beneficiaries, and trustees will be required to maintain a strong funding position so that they can pay members’ future pensions when they fall due. Will Ministers ensure that member or worker representation on trustee boards is part of the plans?
Like many people, I bring lived experience to this space; I am speaking as someone who worked in human resources. I was often asked questions by employees about their pensions, and I always had to say, “I am not providing advice; this is solely information,” as I dished out their annual pension benefit statements. So I am very aware that most employees just want to understand more about their pensions: what their contributions are and how those will benefit them in the future. I therefore very much welcome the introduction of the long-awaited pensions dashboard, which will provide savers with their whole pensions picture—workplace and state pensions —securely and all in one place online. We hope that it will finally be with us next year. I commend the Bill to the House.
Manuela Perteghella (Stratford-on-Avon) (LD)
Although this Bill aims to strengthen pension investment, improve resilience and boost pension pots, many of my constituents are among the large number of individuals who face serious pension injustices right now. I welcome some of the reforms that the Government are introducing through the Bill, including the terminal illness and life expectancy measure. However, I am concerned that it does not go far enough to protect vulnerable pensioners in the UK now and tomorrow, or to ensure that we will not have future pension scandals.
I recently raised in the House the immoral Midland bank—now HSBC—pension scheme clawback, whereby long-serving employees are unfairly deprived of large portions of their DB pensions through a misleadingly labelled “state deduction”. The Government’s response was that the clawback is a legal process and they are powerless to assist former HSBC employees who have been financially impacted by those deductions. A disproportionate number of them are women.
Experts from Exeter University have put together a number of recommendations for the Government that would ensure that pension injustices such as the HSBC clawback scheme would no longer be able to operate. If the Government do not legislate against such injustices now, they are wilfully keeping pensioners—my constituents —in poverty.
The same can be said for the widows and widowers and partners of former policemen and women upon their remarriage or cohabitation, despite the fact that in Northern Ireland and Scotland, and for widows and widowers of armed forces personnel, survivors’ pensions are upheld regardless of remarriage or cohabitation. A court ruling in 2023 decided that was not to be the case for widows or widowers of policemen and women. Police force pensioners deserve consistency throughout the UK.
The most high-profile pension injustice is the one affecting the WASPI women—Women Against State Pension Equality Campaign—who saw rapid and steep increases to their state pension age without adequate notice, and for whom the Government have failed to provide adequate compensation despite the instruction of the ombudsman to do so. What is the point of re-establishing the ombudsman’s legal powers and restoring them as a pension court if the Government refuse to listen to such judgments? That is by no means an exhaustive list; many other pension scandals need addressing.
It is worrying that we do not see an explicit commitment in the Bill to support the divestment of pension funds from planet-wrecking industries. For example, local authorities invest about £10 billion in direct or indirect fossil fuel industries through their local government pension scheme funds. We must act now to protect pensioners and deliver prosperity for our future generations while protecting our planet.
Neil Duncan-Jordan (Poole) (Lab)
The Bill represents a timely attempt to create a system whereby fewer and bigger pension funds can provide better value for members and do more to support the UK economy. Key to this, though, will be ensuring that pensioners get a decent income in retirement, alongside creating the conditions that allow pension funds to invest in ways that benefit the UK, support good jobs and finance a just transition to a low-carbon economy.
The Bill needs to acknowledge, in the direction it takes, the scale of the task that we face. One in six pensioners today lives in poverty. Only 62% of pensioners receive an occupational pension of any kind, and those who do get an average of just £210 a week. Half of defined-contribution savers—around 14 million people—are not on track for the income they expect, and the 2017 auto-enrolment review recommendations have still not been implemented. Those challenges need to be addressed, along with the unfairness of the current rules around tax relief, which benefit higher earners and need reform.
As has been mentioned this evening, the Bill does not consider the specific issue of adequacy, and how the state pension interacts with defined-benefit and defined-contribution schemes. Given that the aim of a pension is to provide an income in retirement, it is vital that we look at pensions in the round, not just those associated with occupational or private schemes. A statutory review into retirement incomes every five years would give this and future Governments the oversight needed to regularly assess the adequacy of our pension system, including the opportunity to look at contribution rates for employers and employees. I am aware that the second stage of the pensions review will consider those points, but I would be grateful if the Minister gave a little more clarity on when that is likely to begin.
The Bill needs to be strengthened on the issue of climate change and the destruction of nature. UK pension schemes continue to hold around £88 billion in fossil fuel companies, including those involved in new coal, oil and gas exploration, and have investments in companies linked to deforestation around the globe. Over 85% of leading schemes lack a credible climate action plan. Consolidating smaller pension pots into larger megafunds provides the ability to invest in long-term infrastructure projects, but that must not be at the expense of the environment.
Caroline Voaden (South Devon) (LD)
Does the hon. Member agree that there is an opportunity here to do something transformational for our local communities by enabling funds, particularly local government pension funds, to invest in much-needed infrastructure like care homes, special schools or even our high streets, which would provide a secure long-term return and could be transformational for local communities that need investment?
Neil Duncan-Jordan
I think that what the hon. Member raises is the creativity that we need on this issue, so that we look beyond the obvious investments towards some that perhaps have more social worth. I hope that the Bill will allow for that.
For pension savers to have a secure future, we will need to phase out investments in fossil fuels. As the Chancellor has recognised, all financial sector regulation and legislation should integrate climate and nature. I would be grateful if the Minister could therefore address whether there will be legislative action, not just voluntary commitments, to phase out the destructive environmental investments that pension funds currently make, and to introduce an element of the Bill that acknowledges the connection between green investments, environmental protection and decent pensions.
Turning to the local government pension scheme, governance structures vary widely across the existing pools, and reporting has been inconsistent. Pooling arrangements have not always provided the power to influence investments, which is why the TUC, for example, is calling for a thorough review of the performance of existing pools to identify best practice in the relationship between funds and pools, as well as in governance arrangements, and for the introduction of clear and consistent reporting requirements before any acceleration and further consolidation takes place.
It is also important to point to the democratic deficit that exists within the scheme as a whole. While the role of member representatives within the LGPS is a great strength, they are largely absent from pool governance structures at present, and this legislation does not specify a role for those people. Given that pension funds are the deferred wages of the workforce, we must ensure that there is greater member engagement and democratic oversight by those involved in the scheme. Not only should this stretch to having guaranteed places on boards with full voting rights, but it must ensure that scheme members can have their say as to where their money is invested. There will undoubtedly be occasions when members are concerned about investments in particular industries, or, I would add, in particular countries, and they should have a mechanism by which those views can be expressed.
Jayne Kirkham (Truro and Falmouth) (Lab/Co-op)
Does my hon. Friend agree that it is good that, in the local government pension scheme, representatives of both employers and employees can sit on the pension committees, and that we often have trade union representatives on the committees as well?
Neil Duncan-Jordan
My hon. Friend is quite right. Trade unions do sit on many of the LGPS committees. I was making the point that it is on the pools where there is less representation for those member voices to be heard, and that is extremely important.
Finally, I want to talk about the pre-1997 pensioners. We know that those who have seen the biggest drop in income are those who built up pensions before 1997. They have not received an annual inflation-linked increase to their pension and, over time, particularly when inflation is high, the value of their pension is eroded. Some 80,000 Pension Protection Fund members, mostly older people and disproportionately women, including some of my constituents, find themselves in this position. I hope the Government will therefore consider legislating to provide inflation protection on pre-1997 benefits, and to give the PPF greater flexibility to use its surplus to give discretionary improvements to members.
In conclusion, the idea that workers’ pension funds can be used to build much-needed social housing and invest in green technology and jobs is something that a progressive Labour Government should be proud of, and I hope we can ensure that the Bill delivers a win for pensioners, a win for our environment and a win for society as a whole.
Mr Peter Bedford (Mid Leicestershire) (Con)
Cross-party working is essential to ensuring that there is public confidence in a system we will all need to use in our twilight years. That is why Conservative Members are ready to work constructively to improve this legislation and, where necessary, to provide a “critical friend” approach and challenge the Government’s thinking. When it comes to pensions and the long-term financial security of our constituents, we should not play party politics. It is in this spirit that I raise my own concerns with the Bill.
The Bill does not focus enough on increasing the amount of money flowing into people’s pension pots—something we literally cannot afford to ignore. I am proud that it was the last Conservative Government that led the introduction of auto-enrolment—a significant pensions reform that dramatically improved individuals’ financial wellbeing in later life. The 8% contribution was a game changer. Yes, the system relies on inertia, but for the first time, millions of workers began saving for their retirement. We must now confront an uncomfortable truth: the contribution rate looks less adequate by the day. Too many of our constituents are heading towards retirement without the income they will need. For example, the Pensions Policy Institute has highlighted that 9 million UK adults are currently under-pensioned.
Inaction is not an option. We are allowing people to sleepwalk into a retirement crisis. The level of auto-enrolment contribution was never intended to be a silver bullet. Instead, it was conceived as a foundation or starting point for pension savings. Importantly, that foundation was once supported by two key pillars: defined-benefit schemes, which offered guaranteed incomes to many, and higher levels of home ownership, which provided an asset to fall back on in later life. Both have eroded significantly over the last two decades. The 8% auto-enrolment rate on its own is woefully inadequate, and many workers will not realise that in respect of their own financial circumstances until it is too late.
It would be all too easy to simply raise the auto-enrolment rate to some arbitrary level, but we would find ourselves back here in 15 years’ time having the same conversation about a system where inertia and disengagement continue. If we truly want lasting change, we cannot focus solely on the percentage; we need to dramatically improve how people engage with their savings. That starts with improving financial education. As the sponsor of a private Member’s Bill on this precise topic and as a chartered accountant by background, this is a cause on which I place great importance. Shockingly, though perhaps unsurprisingly, Standard Life has highlighted that three in four people do not know how much they have in pension savings. That needs to change through increased engagement, but also by allowing savers increased control over their own savings. People should be able to easily view all their pots in one place, which is why it is frustrating to have seen delays to the roll-out of the pensions dashboard, which many hon. Members have mentioned.
The pensions dashboard will encourage individuals to make active choices, to understand their options and to assess whether their current savings are enough for their desired lifestyle in retirement.
Kirsty Blackman
On that note, does the hon. Member agree that we should also make it easier for people to understand what a defined-contribution scheme pot actually means for them in retirement—that is, how much income it will get them on a monthly or annual basis, rather than just, “This is the value of the pot”?
Mr Bedford
The hon. Member makes an important point. That goes back to financial education and ensuring that people truly understand their pensions and savings.
Increasing savings is important, but we need to ensure that it is driven by individuals who understand and can shape their own financial futures. Other countries have looked at increasing incentives for saving. South Africa and the US have schemes that enable people to draw from their pension pots in tightly defined circumstances, such as for emergencies or investment opportunities. Such flexibility would increase confidence in pension savings and help address the other concerning fact that 21% of UK adults have less than £1,000 set aside for emergencies, leaving them susceptible to economic shocks outside of their control and, in turn, less likely to prioritise savings in their pensions.
Poor pensions adequacy does not just harm retirees; it has serious implications for the state. As our life expectancy continues to rise, the state’s pension bill will continue to increase. Benefits like pension credit will increase exponentially as the lack of adequate private provision leaves more and more relying on the state. As we saw just last week, it is often incredibly hard to reform welfare. As a Conservative, I believe that the answer lies in personal responsibility and in encouraging and helping people to build up their own private pension provision for the benefit of themselves, their family and, ultimately, the rest of society.
Kit Malthouse
My hon. Friend is making a strong speech and some strong points. Does he agree that the alarm bells he is ringing about financial education, the under-provision of pensions and longevity are even more stark and alarming next to the demographic change that means that over the next 30 years, we will see the number of workers per pensioner plummet? We will go from about 3.6 workers per pensioner at the moment to well under three by 2070, which means that even if pensions are not enough, the country will not be able to afford to plug the gap as it does at the moment?
Mr Bedford
My right hon. Friend makes a compelling case. As I said in my speech, this goes back to financial education and ensuring that we all understand the implications of pensions adequacy.
My concern about adequacy does not mean that the Bill does not have its merits. The continuation of Conservative policy, the small pots consolidation and the creation of megafunds are sensible reforms that will increase individuals’ pension pots by reducing dormant pots and increasing economies of scale. However, this is a missed opportunity for a Government with a large majority. They could have acted more boldly, moved faster and improved pension adequacy throughout the United Kingdom.
I would like a clear commitment from the Government that they are actively looking at improving pensions adequacy. The Labour party has long professed to be the party of workers, yet some who look at the Bill will sense that it does not go far enough in preventing the UK from declining into being a society funded by welfare in retirement. Let us encourage people to strive, work hard and save more for a better future. I very much hope that the Government will work collegiately and cross party with His Majesty’s Opposition in Committee to ensure that our constituents do not sleepwalk into a retirement crisis.
Jayne Kirkham (Truro and Falmouth) (Lab/Co-op)
Having been lucky enough to chair a local government pension scheme committee and sit on a pool oversight board—purely because I was the only person left on the committee after the election, I think—I would like to talk about the Bill’s impact on local government pension schemes.
The Bill would consolidate LGPS funds into six pools, on the basis that that would be effective in achieving scale, diversification of assets and cost savings. LGPSs were recently merged into eight pools by the last Government, of course. Cornwall’s pool contained nine LGPSs from the south-west and the Environment Agency. It took a number of years to set up and transfer the funds over to the pool. Setting-up costs meant that the consolidation savings from acting at scale are starting to show only now, a few years later. Hiring an extra tier of staff on top of the LGPS staff, who were still needed to administer the fund, correspond with members and employers, and manage the investments, was expensive. Closing down our current pool and joining another is likely to be the same. There are also concerns, which I would like the Minister to address, that going to a larger pool may affect that local link. We have a strong south-west pool at present, and removing that link and scattering us across the country could impact the effectiveness of our pool at making local investments. That is what I want to talk about next.
Bringing schemes together enables them to invest in bigger local projects, from infrastructure to clean energy. That boosts returns for savers and helps communities. Cornwall was very good at that. We used our £2.3 billion, which is not a huge fund when we think about the size of the pools that we are talking about now, to do precisely that kind of thing.
Other Members have talked about responsible investment. We had a very strong responsible investment policy, and our carbon-neutral target date was earlier than that of the rest of the pool. We were able to maintain those policies and our environment, social and governance focus by having a strong presence on the oversight board. That enabled us to influence the pool. I hope that this influence will continue, so that pools are not dragged down to the lowest common denominator when it comes to ESG matters and responsible investment, but will instead be raised up.
Our local social impact fund was, in the end, 7.5% of our investments. We were able to channel our LGPS investment into affordable private rental housing and local renewables in Cornwall, as well as renewables more widely around the UK. Will local government pension schemes still be able to set their own targets in the pool in this way and do their own thing? Although we worked closely with the pool to ensure that pooling delivered scale advantages, we wanted to make sure that our local impact portfolio, as part of our social impact allocation, enabled us to combine our fiduciary responsibilities to our members with delivering that social and environmental positive change in Cornwall, where we were, and where our members worked and lived. That had a massive impact on how the funds were viewed locally. We hoped that it would provide a framework for others to follow, but within our pool of 10, we were the only ones who did it. Will the Minister confirm that local LGPSs will be able to set their own targets in a bigger pool, even if the area is geographically disparate?
I want to mention the measures that require regulations for the LGPS to include a duty for administering authorities to work with strategic authorities in their area to identify opportunities for investment. When we ran our social impact fund, it was difficult to organise that at arm’s length. Members who were part of the local authority wanted to direct where all investments went, but that had to be done at arm’s length through investment fund managers, who have little connection to the area. It was hard to stand back and watch them do that. How will the fiduciary duty allow local government pension scheme administration authorities to work with the strategic authorities in their area, particularly if, as in Cornwall, they are one and the same? Cornwall unitary authority was exactly the same size and had the same authority as the administrating authority of the LGPS.
To conclude, the scheme worked well in Cornwall and provided good results. I still drive past the houses in Camborne that were built by our local government pension scheme; local people live in them, doing local jobs. The good results were mainly down to good officers, to be honest, and a flexible pool that allowed us to do our own thing and take our own route. I hope that that freedom will remain under the Bill.
Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)
We all share in the ambition to ensure the sustainability of pensions, and to provide the best possible income for all our constituents in retirement. Given the time, I will keep my comments reasonably short, but having come to this place from the City—though I did not work in the pensions industry—and as an officer of the all-party parliamentary group for pensions and growth, I look forward to providing more detailed scrutiny of the Bill as it progresses through the House.
I rise to share concerns about the Bill, some of which have been shared with me by City institutions. First, I am concerned that this Bill demonstrates a broader problem with this Government’s approach to the economy. Rather than seeking to support free enterprise and entrepreneurship in order to grow our economy, the Government seek state-led interventions, and want to direct funding to Government-approved investments. That is the wrong approach, as many hon. Members have said this evening.
On scale and asset allocation reforms, I am concerned that the Government seem to believe that they, and regulators, should direct how pension funds invest, rather than schemes acting in the best interests of their members—a matter raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse). Trustees who are directed to invest in assets by the Government or regulators may need to be protected by safe harbour provisions in the event that their investments perform less well than alternatives that they may have chosen. Has any consideration been given to such safe harbours in the Bill? It is not clear why these reforms are necessary. In his closing remarks, will the Minister say why, given that policies such as the value-for-money tests and small pots consolidation are already in progress, he feels that these additional requirements are needed?
I am also concerned to find that Ministers propose making it a statutory requirement for schemes to follow a specific route when considering transferring into a superfund. Trustees have a fiduciary duty to their members—we have heard a lot about that in the debate—and this direction from Ministers runs counter to that duty. Will the Minister provide assurance to the House on those points?
Turning to the sustainability of UK pensions, I would welcome further clarity from Ministers on their proposals for powers to pay a surplus to an employer. How confident is the Minister that the thresholds set for the release of surplus are sufficient to protect member benefits? That is particularly important, given that scheme surpluses have emerged only recently. Does the Minister plan to specify the authorised uses for surplus return? For example, will surplus be protected from being paid to overseas parent companies?
I welcome the Government’s desire to ensure that our pensions system is sustainable and contributes to UK economic growth. I am just not as enthusiastic about some of the Government’s instincts to deliver Government-led investment, at the expense of market-led growth. I look forward to scrutinising the Bill further as it progresses.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
It is a real pleasure to speak on this Bill. Pensions and the regulation of private pensions are increasingly of national interest. I believe that regulation is needed, so I welcome the Bill. Obviously the small print will become more apparent during its passage, but it is good that we are introducing the Bill.
The Government’s intention of ensuring that people have a private pension to supplement their income when they eventually reach retirement is increasingly being realised. By and large, most young people—22 million, I understand—have a pension. The Minister will remember the story I told him about when I was 18. I think I am right in saying that I am the oldest person in this Chamber, so that was not yesterday. The fact is that pension advisers were almost unheard of then. I will tell hon. Members who the best pension adviser I ever had was: my mum. When I was 18, she took me down to the pension man in Ballywalter. She said, “You need a pension.” I said, “Mum, I’m only 18. What do I need a pension for?” She said, “You’re getting a pension.” We know how it is: our mum tells to do something, and we just do it, so I got a pension on her advice.
I ended up with four pensions over my working life, which were all beneficial. I did not understand the value of them until I came to the stage at which I was going to cash some of them in—I realised the value of them then. Today, we have an opportunity to advise young people of the need for a pension. When it comes to pensions, not everybody has my mum, but everybody has somebody, or an equivalent through Government.
Let me give a quick story about my office staff. I employ six ladies and one young fella. They are in their 20s, 30s, 40s, 50s and 60s. I will not get into trouble by naming the staff in each bracket, but their approach to their pension varies by age bracket, and that is a fact; they see it differently. Listening to their discussion highlighted to me the need to educate people on the importance of paying into their pension, because it is so important that we get this right. That is why the Bill is important: it is an opportunity to advise people.
One member of my staff has two children at primary school. She highlighted that she was paying an additional 5% into her pension on the advice of her older colleague, only to find that the tax on her savings this year meant that she actually had less money in her account each month compared with last year. The first thing to go was not the kids’ piano lessons or hockey camp—she said that those experiences shaped her children’s memories. The first reduction was scaling back on her pension additions. People might say, “My goodness me! That was not necessary,” but actually it was, if she wanted to preserve that lifestyle for her children. It seems that the tax on savings means that one mum has made the choice to stop supplementing her pension, and to instead sow the money into her children’s lives just now. That is not the aim of the Government or the Minister, but there is only so much that we can tax the middle class before they make cuts that are not in their best interests.
Apart from a number of clauses, this legislation does not directly affect Northern Ireland, but it should be noted that accompanying legislation and a number of legislative consent motions—statutory instruments—will come to this Chamber that will change the pension schemes in Northern Ireland. Ultimately, what we discuss here and what happens through this Bill will come to us in Northern Ireland, and the Northern Ireland Assembly will bring provisions in Northern Ireland in line with those here. I have therefore considered carefully the aims of this legislation, and whether I believe it will be effective in achieving those aims. The Minister has said that this Bill will fundamentally
“prioritise higher rates of return for pension savers, putting more money into people’s pockets in a host of different ways. For the first time we will require pension schemes to prove they are value for money, focusing their mindset on returns over costs and protecting savers from getting stuck in underperforming schemes for years on end.”
When we look at the issues, we understand the necessity for the Bill.
In his introduction, the Minister referred to 13 million small pension pots floating about in the UK pension system, with £1,000 in each. It seems logical to have a better pension system for people—I think it does, anyway, and maybe we all do. It is essential that the opt-out is iron-clad, and I will give a reason why. One of my office staff members would not be comfortable with her pension paying into any companies that test on animals, for example. Another has said that she wants the highest return, full stop, so we must ensure that the Bill enables people to follow their moral obligations as well as get a return on their work. I am concerned that consumers will be tied down and face difficulty in leaving pots, which is something that must be addressed. With that in mind, I welcome this Bill to regulate the pension market, but we must ensure that it does not become a mechanism for Government to control the private pension industry and direct pension pots into Government investment. We must ensure that this Bill simply protects pensioners, and I very much look forward to watching its progress.
Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)
It has been a privilege to hear so many well-informed and considered speeches this evening. I am sure we would all agree that there is clearly significant expertise in the Chamber.
The heart of this Bill is people doing the right thing by preparing for their future and saving into their pension pots. With auto-enrolment having been introduced by the Conservatives in 2012, there are now over 20 million employees saving into a workplace pension. That is 88% of eligible employees saving into a pension and preparing for later in life, which is a great achievement that I hope everyone in this House can celebrate. However, while the number of people who are saving has increased significantly, engagement has remained low, as we have heard this evening. Less than half of savers have reviewed how much their pension is worth in the past 12 months, while over 94% of pension savers are invested in a pension scheme’s default investment strategy. With people taking the right steps and starting to save for their retirement early thanks to our action, we must now ensure that the pensions market is working for them, so that they get the best returns on their savings and ultimately have the comfortable and secure retirement for which they were planning.
We have heard many contributions this evening. I will briefly mention the hon. Member for Tamworth (Sarah Edwards) and my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse), both of whom gave us lengthy and very detailed speeches presenting both sides of the argument. [Interruption.] They were very enjoyable speeches—that was not a criticism, just an observation of the way things have gone this evening. Both the hon. Member and my right hon. Friend clearly showed the expertise that they garnered earlier on in their careers and expressed some legitimate concerns, particularly about the consensus that there has perhaps been in the Chamber this evening. Some points have been made showing that that consensus is not entirely guaranteed, certainly among Conservative Members. We support the principles behind the Bill—indeed, much of what we have heard builds on the work that the Conservatives were doing while we were in government. We want to ensure that poorly performing pension schemes are challenged, excessive administration costs are removed, and savers receive the best returns on their investments. Ultimately, that is how we will ensure more people have a comfortable retirement.
However, we have concerns about some specific measures in the Bill, which we will scrutinise further as it progresses. In particular, we have significant concerns about the reserve powers that allow the Government to set percentage targets for asset allocation in core defaults offered by defined-contribution providers. In other words, a future Government could tell pension schemes where they must invest their funds, regardless of whether it delivers good returns for savers. This potentially conflicts with their fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of their members. While I know the Minister will stress that the Government do not intend to use those reserve powers, that neither addresses concerns about what a different future Government could do nor explains why those powers are being brought in. It could be asked why the reserve powers are being created at all.
We want to see more investment in the UK market. While this country is one of the largest pension markets in the world, only around 20% of DC assets are invested in the UK. However, the solution should be to make domestic investment more attractive—to create opportunities that deliver better returns for savers—not simply to mandate investment in assets that deliver lower returns. During our last term in office, we worked with the industry to introduce the Mansion House reforms as a voluntary agreement to boost investment in the UK, but this Bill goes further—it could mandate such investment against the wishes of the industry. Similarly, the local government pension scheme will have a new duty to invest in the local economy. While that is understandable at face value, it raises concerns about returns on investments if there are not suitable local opportunities.
We also have questions about some of the Government’s assumptions, and would like to understand more about how they were reached and the evidence used. For example, why is the minimum value for megafunds just £25 billion? Why is having fewer and larger pension providers better? We recognise the benefits of economies of scale, but what about competition and innovation? It has also been raised by the industry that a significant number of details are unknown, as they will come later in the form of regulations. Can the Minister set out some more details on when the various sets of regulations will be published, and whether that will be before the Bill has passed through Parliament?
Finally, the Bill fails to cover a number of areas, and we would like to understand why. Concerns about pension adequacy have been touched on this evening and whether people are saving enough to have the security and dignity in retirement they deserve. Auto-enrolment was a good start, but it will not be the only solution. Indeed, lots of people are still not eligible. When we passed the Pensions (Extension of Automatic Enrolment) Act 2023, the then Conservative Government confirmed their intention to reduce the lower age limit to 18, as has been mentioned this evening. As yet, the current Labour Government have not done so. Auto-enrolment does not apply to self-employed people, despite just 16% of self-employed people actively saving into a workplace or personal pension. The Bill does not look at whether people are saving enough and early enough, and I would be grateful if the Minister could set out whether that is deliberate and whether further action will be taken.
I briefly draw the House’s attention to my declaration in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests as a serving councillor, but I hasten to add that unfortunately I am not a member of the local government pension scheme. Sadly, I was elected after that provision was scrapped, but an entire chapter is given over to the local government pension scheme in this Bill. Indeed, it is a key element, enabling local authorities to use pension schemes to invest in their local economy. However, as with much of the legislation being taken through Parliament at the moment, the who, what and when remain unanswered. Without the English devolution Bill before us, for example, we are not entirely clear on what form local government will take, nor entirely clear on how compatible this Bill is with that forthcoming local government legislation.
We are in effect being asked to legislate on a moveable feast. Indeed, there is likely to be a considerable transition timetable for local government changes, which all raises questions about how the local government reorganisation transition fits in with the plans in the Bill. Following on from the comments of the hon. Member for Truro and Falmouth (Jayne Kirkham), how will asset pools work under local government reorganisation? Who gets the potential investment benefits or spending power, and where does all that investment take place?
The Bill also fails to mention any reforms to the local government pension scheme, which reached a record surplus of £45 billion in June 2024. One reason for that might be that it is being used to offset Government debt under the Chancellor’s current fiscal rule, which uses public sector net financial liabilities to measure that debt. That is a huge amount of money in local government terms, and it is not going towards local services, business support or regional projects. Can the Minister confirm whether the Government intend to reform the local government pension scheme beyond the measures outlined in the Bill? Finally on the local government pension scheme, I look forward to seeing more detail as to how newly created asset pools will work in practice with the local government pension scheme.
Local government treasury management over recent years has seen local authorities taking advantage of the investment opportunities available to them to acquire properties and the like, but often some distance from their local authority. That is something to tease out in Committee, but when the Government state that they wish local authorities to have finance available to invest locally to bring economic growth, what does “local” look like?
Finally, can the Minister confirm that fiduciary rules regarding investments and how they are assessed will prevail going forward? Overall, we will support a Bill that reduces administration costs, removes complexity for savers and maximises value for members, ultimately helping people who took the right action to save for their retirement to live in comfort and dignity. While this Bill makes the start, there is more to do to get it right, and we look forward to working with the Government to achieve that. There is plenty of food for thought for amendments to take us forward.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Andrew Western)
At the outset, I take the opportunity to declare my own interest. Unlike the hon. Member for South West Devon (Rebecca Smith), I was elected prior to Lord Cameron ejecting councillors from the local government pension scheme. As a former member of Trafford metropolitan borough council, I also have savings in the local government pension scheme. I am therefore set to benefit from the improved governance of the LGPS initiated by the Bill.
These measures are testament to our dedication to building a resilient, efficient and fair pension system, galvanising and creating the potential to boost our economy at every opportunity. It is our aim to build a future in which every saver can look forward to a secure and prosperous retirement.
I welcome the broad, if not entirely universal, support for the Bill. The open discussion in which we have engaged today is important because, as a responsible Government, we want the House to be assured that the new powers in the Bill come with appropriate mitigations. We understand that Members will have questions, and I have listened carefully to those that have been raised. I remind everyone that the highly fragmented pensions framework has not served savers well, and there is a need for improvement as both the industry and savers demand a better service. The Bill goes to the core of what is needed, providing big solutions to the big problems that are undermining so much potential for savers and the economy.
Let me now turn to some of the comments and queries that have arisen throughout the debate. I thank my hon. Friends the Members for Tamworth (Sarah Edwards), for Luton South and South Bedfordshire (Rachel Hopkins), for Buckingham and Bletchley (Callum Anderson), for Poole (Neil Duncan-Jordan), for Truro and Falmouth (Jayne Kirkham) and for Glasgow East (John Grady) for speaking in favour of some elements in the Bill, and for their recognition of the investment and growth opportunities that it can unleash.
I am grateful for the constructive support and consensus that we heard from both the hon. Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier), who opened the debate for the Opposition, and the hon. Member for South West Devon, who closed it. They were right to mention the specular success of automatic enrolment, but that was half the job, as pointed out by the Pensions Minister, and I think the hon. Member for South West Devon acknowledged that we now need to move on to the pressing task of dealing with pension adequacy, which will be taken forward by the pensions review. They were also right to refer to the complexity and fragmentation of pension pots.
I welcomed the support from the hon. Member for Wyre Forest for the long-awaited pensions dashboard, and was particularly pleased to hear of his support for changes in the local government pension scheme, although he expressed concern about certain parts of the Bill and the potential for propping up a failing scheme that arises from those changes. Let me reassure him that no cross-subsidising between administering authorities would be caused by any changes made by the Bill. As for the question of safeguards in respect of surplus release, we cannot stop share buy-backs and the like, but we have confidence in the ability of trustees to adhere to their fiduciary duties.
I understand that mandation has given rise to the fundamental objection of not just the hon. Gentleman but a number of other speakers, but I do not believe that it undermines fiduciary duties, and I do not agree with that analysis. The Bill contains clear safeguards that are consistent with those duties, not least in clause 38, which refers to an opt-out in the event of material detriment to members of a fund. The hon. Gentleman also raised questions relating to gilts; we believe that nothing in the Bill would undermine a well-functioning gilt market. However, as I have said, I welcome the broad support for the Bill, particularly with regard to value for money, small pots, guided retirement products and terminal illness changes.
Kit Malthouse
I want to be clear—so that the House is clear—about the opt-out to which both Ministers have referred. Is it a correct interpretation to say that it is not an opt-out at the discretion of the trustees of the fund, and that the Bill requires them to apply to the regulator with evidence for the regulator to make a decision to grant them the ability to opt out? The idea that trustees are somehow free to make a decision in the interests of the fund is not actually correct, is it?
Andrew Western
The right hon. Gentleman is correct in his interpretation, although I do not entirely agree with his characterisation. It is, I think, perfectly reasonable that we would ask trustees to explain how they feel that what is proposed would be to the detriment of their scheme members.
I welcomed the support of the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Torbay (Steve Darling), for many of the general proposals in the Bill. I entirely agreed with his comments about the need to give savers the best possible advice and protections. I also agreed with what he said about the opportunities to deliver further investment in our economy. As for social housing, which others also raised, he will know that many pension schemes already make such investments, and I certainly support their continuing to do so.
We then heard an excellent speech from my hon. Friend the Member for Tamworth. I particularly welcome her comments on the value-for-money changes, and she is absolutely correct to highlight the importance of looking at schemes in the round, not just on cost. On the pipeline of investments that she set out, I hope she is reassured by some of the steps that the Government are taking—for instance, through the Planning and Infrastructure Bill—to ensure that there are a range of exciting major projects, such a reservoirs and houses, that people will be able to invest in.
The right hon. Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse) is certainly correct to say that he punctured the air of consensus in outlining his reservations. I know that my hon. Friend the Pensions Minister has agreed to have a conversation with the right hon. Member next week, and I hope that he will find that incredibly helpful. Clearly, it is not for me to comment on whether this should be a hybrid Bill. On the question of megafunds, he is right that not all large schemes provide a better return, but the evidence shows that while that is not always the case, they do see better returns on average. That is an important point.
The hon. Member for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman) was correct to raise how long we have been waiting for the pensions dashboard, and I am similarly excited and anticipate its arrival. I promise that it will be worth the wait when it finally arrives. On her point about the scope of the Bill, the pensions review will take forward a number of the issues on which she and other Members said the Bill could have gone further. The pensions review is under way, and we will say more about that incredibly soon.
Kirsty Blackman
On the pensions review, there is a massive cross-party consensus that there is an issue with its adequacy, and we want to see it tackled. Will Ministers agree to take this forward in as cross-party a way as possible? We all care strongly about it.
Andrew Western
This matter is important to everybody in this House, because it is important to the constituents of everybody in this House. I would be very open to ensuring that Members of this House are able to feed as much as possible into the pensions review. It is an incredibly important piece of work.
I return to the question of my age. As a millennial, I am terrified of admitting that I have now reached an age when I should be thinking about my pension, having just turned 40. In any event, some of the work around the consolidation of small pots and so forth will help people.
A number of Members have asked about the balance of the distribution of any surplus release, and it is ultimately for trustees to decide on that balance. On the point made by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North about potential guidance coming forward—the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire (Blake Stephenson) touched on this as well—that is something that I will discuss with the Minister for Pensions. It may well be teased out in Committee.
I hope that the hon. Member for Spelthorne (Lincoln Jopp) will be a member of the Bill Committee and continue the dialogue with the Minister for Pensions. I am always keen to find volunteers, and I hope that he will put himself forward. On the question of regulatory decision making, I hope that the Pensions Regulator has heard what he said about pace.
On the issue of divestment from funds that invest in fossil fuels and so forth, it is a matter for trustees. Individual flexibility on investments is a cornerstone of the system, but we are consulting on UK sustainability reporting standards and on transition plans.
Finally, we heard from the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon)—we always save the best for last. I am very grateful for his support for the Bill. If he was not 18 yesterday, I am sure it was the day before. None the less, I wish that everybody had a mum like his. We may not have had some of the challenges with the adequacy of people’s pensions had they all received such superb advice from their parents at the age of 18.
Today we embark on a transformative journey with this Pension Schemes Bill. This legislation underscores our readiness to deliver fundamental changes to the pensions landscape, an endeavour that is not only urgent, but essential for driving a future in which savers and, indeed, our economy can derive the benefits of a better organised, less fragmented and easier to navigate pension system, and I am pleased by the widespread support for the Bill across the House.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read a Second time.
Pension Schemes Bill (Programme)
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),
That the following provisions shall apply to the Pension Schemes Bill:
Committal
(1) The Bill shall be committed to a Public Bill Committee.
Proceedings in Public Bill Committee
(2) Proceedings in the Public Bill Committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion on Thursday 23 October 2025.
(3) The Public Bill Committee shall have leave to sit twice on the first day on which it meets.
Consideration and Third Reading
(4) Proceedings on Consideration shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which those proceedings are commenced.
(5) Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day.
(6) Standing Order No. 83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings on Consideration and Third Reading.
Other proceedings
(7) Any other proceedings on the Bill may be programmed.—(Andrew Western.)
Question agreed to.
Pension Schemes Bill (Money)
King’s recommendation signified.
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 52(1)(a)),
That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the Pension Schemes Bill, it is expedient to authorise the payment out of money provided by Parliament of—
(a) any expenditure incurred under or by virtue of the Act by the Secretary of State, and
(b) any increase attributable to the Act in the sums payable under or by virtue of any other Act out of money so provided.—(Andrew Western.)
Question agreed to.
Pension Schemes Bill (Ways and Means)
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 52(1)(a)),
That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the Pension Schemes Bill, it is expedient to authorise—
(a) the levying of charges under the Pension Schemes Act 1993 for the purpose of meeting any increase in the expenditure of the Pensions Regulator attributable to the Act;
(b) the amendment of section 177(5) of the Pensions Act 2004 so as to increase the limit in that provision on the amount that may be raised by pension protection levies imposed by the Board of the Pension Protection Fund.—(Andrew Western.)
Question agreed to.
Pension Schemes Bill (First sitting)
Tuesday 2nd September 2025
(5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesPension Schemes Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 2 September 2025 - (2 Sep 2025)
The Chair
We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. I remind Members to switch electronic devices to silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed to be drunk during sittings. We will first consider the programme motion on the amendment paper. We will then consider a motion to enable the reporting of written evidence for publication and a motion to allow us to deliberate in private about our questions before the oral evidence session begins. In view of the time available, I hope we can take these matters formally and without debate. Time Witness Until no later than 9.55 am Association of British Insurers; Pensions UK Until no later than 10.25 am The Pensions Regulator; Financial Conduct Authority Until no later than 10.55 am Age UK; TUC Until no later than 11.25 am Legal and General; Aviva Until no later than 2.30 pm Local Government Pension Scheme Advisory Board; Hymans Robertson Until no later than 3.00 pm Pensions Management Institute; Society of Pension Professionals Until no later than 3.30 pm People’s Partnership; Nest Corporation Until no later than 3.45 pm Phoenix Group Until no later than 4.15 pm Pension Protection Fund; Brightwell Until no later than 4.45 pm Pensions Policy Institute; New Financial Until no later than 5.15 pm Deprived Pensioners Association; Pensions Action Group Until no later than 5.30 pm Border to Coast Pensions Partnership Until no later than 5.50 pm Department for Work and Pensions
Ordered,
That—
(1) the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 9.25 am on Tuesday 2 September) meet—
(a) at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 2 September;
(b) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 4 September;
(c) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 9 September;
(d) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 11 September;
(e) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 14 October;
(f) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 16 October;
(g) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 21 October;
(h) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 23 October;
(2) the Committee shall hear oral evidence on Tuesday 2 September in accordance with the following table:
(3) proceedings on consideration of the Bill in Committee shall be taken in the following order: Clauses 1 to 97; the Schedule; new Clauses; new Schedules; Clauses 98 to 102; remaining proceedings on the Bill;
(4) the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Thursday 23 October.—(Torsten Bell.)
Resolved,
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Torsten Bell.)
Resolved,
That, at this and any subsequent meeting at which oral evidence is to be heard, the Committee shall sit in private until the witnesses are admitted.—(Torsten Bell.)
The Chair
Before we hear from witnesses, does any Member wish to make a declaration of interest in connection with the Bill?
Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)
If the Government amendments in relation to the local government pension scheme go through, I have an interest as I am a deferred member of a local government pension scheme in Scotland.
Rachel Blake (Cities of London and Westminster) (Lab/Co-op)
I also wish to declare such an interest.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from Rob Yuille, assistant director and head of long-term savings at the Association of British Insurers, and Zoe Alexander, director of policy and advocacy at Pensions UK. We must stick to the timings in the programme motion that the Committee has agreed. For this panel, we have until 9.55 am. Will the witnesses briefly introduce themselves for the record?
Rob Yuille: Hello. I am Rob Yuille. I am head of long-term savings policy at the ABI. We represent several of the largest defined-contribution workplace providers across group personal pensions and master trusts, insurers in the pension risk transfer market and retail pension providers. Between them, they serve tens of millions of customers and manage hundreds of billions of pounds in assets.
Zoe Alexander: My name is Zoe Alexander. I am director of policy and advocacy at Pensions UK. We are a not-for-profit organisation run for the benefit of our members. Our members serve 30 million savers, who invest more than £2 trillion in the UK and abroad.
Mark Garnier
Q
I will start with the most controversial point: the mandation of local government pension schemes when it comes to amalgamation and being forced to go into assets. There are two parts to my question. First, is it fundamentally right to entrust trustees with looking after the interests of the members of pension schemes and then, separately, to tell them how they should be investing that money? Secondly, are there any guardrails to protect pension fund members from being forced to invest in unwise investments?
Zoe Alexander: We are concerned about the precedent set by the reserve power in the Bill. We realise that it might not be used, and we hope that that will be the case. We hope that the work the industry has done to create the Mansion House accord and get DC schemes on track to invest more in the UK will fulfil its promise. The presence of the power creates a series of risks, and certainly enacting it would create a series of risks for savers in terms of its impact on investments, on price and, ultimately, on the value that is accrued to savers in the market.
We are looking for more guardrails on the power. We would like it to be constrained to apply specifically to the commitments in the Mansion House accord, and no more than that. We think that is appropriate, because the market and the Government have together set out what “good” looks like. If we agree on that, let us put that in the Bill and make it clear that that is the extent of the power.
We would also like the sunset clause on the power to be brought forward from 2035 to 2032. That would give more than enough time for the industry to deliver on the commitments in the Mansion House accord, and for the Government to assess progress and whether the power is required. We feel that keeping it on the statute book until 2035 would introduce undue political risk.
Mark Garnier
Q
Zoe Alexander: We absolutely support the general direction of the policy. Our members are very committed to investing more in the UK and they are doing a huge amount of work on that. They have already invested heavily in the UK, with huge investments from schemes such as the local government pension scheme. On the DC side, schemes are maturing; they need time to get to the scale of investment of schemes such as the LGPS, but they are on the journey and they are committed to doing that. We do not take this position because we do not agree that schemes should be investing more in the UK; it is to do with trustee discretion to make the decisions about where to invest.
Mark Garnier
Q
Rob Yuille: Yes, there are better ways. The specific point that you mentioned about prudential regulation rules are not for this Bill, but other measures that could be taken, essentially to make the UK an attractive place to invest, are the kind of things that the Government are trying to do. Along with the Mansion House accord, which we were delighted to take forward with Pensions UK and the City of London Corporation, we agree with the Government’s assessment that use of the reserve power should not be necessary and will not be necessary.
Firms are already investing in the UK. The Pensions Policy Institute’s latest statistics show that 23% of DC assets are in the UK, and annuity providers say that it is around two thirds, so we are talking about hundreds of billions of pounds in the UK. There is the appetite to invest in the home market, because they know it best, in the kind of projects that the Government are trying to drive forward and provide policy certainty about. We share the concern about the precedent it sets and the potential impact on scheme members, and we would propose another guardrail.
There is already provision for a review, were this power to be used, of the impact on scheme members, which is right, and the impact on the economy, which is also fair enough, but they should also look at the impact on the pensions market and the market for the assets that would be mandated, because there is a risk that it would bid up prices in those assets, and that it would create a bubble in them. There are guardrails, but more important, there are other measures, including things that the Government are already doing, that make this power unnecessary.
Mark Garnier
Q
Zoe Alexander: That is right, but often those things are consistent, and our members would agree with that. Those things are not inconsistent.
Rob Yuille: I agree.
Sarah Edwards
Q
Rob Yuille: The challenge is aligning it with scheme members’ interests so that they are not put at risk. If a surplus turns to a deficit, which it can do because it is by no means guaranteed, and if an employer then fails, there is actual detriment to those scheme members. As we know, economic conditions can change. It is an opportunity for employers, though—that is the purpose of it—and schemes can and do extract surplus now, often when they enter a buy-out with an insurer.
It does need guardrails, and the Bill includes the provision that it has to be signed off by an actuary and it is the trustees’ decision. That is important, but there is a related challenge about the interaction of the surplus and superfunds. Each of those is okay: you can extract a surplus, for the reasons that we have discussed, and you can go into a superfund if you cannot afford a buy-out. The problem is, if a scheme could afford buy-out, extracts a surplus and then no longer can, and then it enters a superfund, the scheme members are in a weaker position than they would otherwise be. There are a couple of things that could be done about that: either leave the threshold for extracting surplus where it is—which is buy-out level, rather than low dependency—or change the Bill so that the combination of surplus and superfund cannot be gamed to get around that. In any case, as you say, it is important to monitor the market, and for the regulators to be alive to potential conflicts of interest.
Zoe Alexander: Pensions UK is content with the idea of using the low dependency threshold for surplus release. We think the protections are sufficient. Providing that the actuarial certification is in place, the sponsoring employer is in a strong financial position and a strong employer covenant is in place, we think there are real benefits to be had from surplus release. We highlight the fact that some employers and trustees will be looking to move benefits from DB to DC using surplus release, or even to a collective defined-contribution scheme. We are interested in the potential of that to bolster the benefits of those types of scheme, and we would like Government to look at the 25% tax penalty that applies when doing that, because if those funds are kept within the pensions system, that is to the benefit of savers, so perhaps that tax charge need not apply.
John Milne (Horsham) (LD)
Q
Zoe Alexander: There will of course be metrics in the value for money framework that look at the longer term, and looking at longer time horizons is really welcome. One concern at Pensions UK is about the intermediate rankings in the value for money framework meaning that schemes cannot accept new business. That may well result in schemes doing everything they can, at any cost, to ensure they do not drop from the top rating to the intermediate rating. That could cause damaging behaviours in terms of herding. We want to ensure that people in the intermediate ranking, whether that is within a couple of intermediate rankings—perhaps you have a top one and then a bottom one, but somewhere within that intermediate scale—you can continue to take on new business, and the regulator will perhaps put you on a time limit to get back into the green, back into the excellent rating. We think that if it is so binary that as soon as you drop into intermediate, you cannot take on new business, that will heighten the potential downside risks of investment behaviours that you are describing.
Rob Yuille: I agree with that. I strongly support the value for money framework—I think both our organisations do—and the intent to shift the culture away from just focusing on cost and to value for money more generally, but yes, there is that risk. There are multiple trade-offs here: it is about transparency and how much you disclose, versus unintended consequences of that. We want high performers but, for high performance, you need to take risks.
As well as what Zoe says, which we might build on, we do not want a one-year metric. One year is too short a period; pensions are a long-term business. There should be a forward-looking metric, so that firms can say how they expect to perform over the longer term and then regulators and the market can scrutinise it.
On the points that were raised about intermediate ratings, this is another area where there is a potential combination of two bits of the Bill. There is provision for multiple intermediate ratings. It was originally conceived as a traffic light system, so there would be three ratings. If there were four, it would be okay to say to schemes, “You are not performing; you need to close to new employers,” but if there are three, firms will do everything they can to play it safe and make sure they get the green. So the interaction of those is really important.
John Grady (Glasgow East) (Lab)
Q
Zoe Alexander: The small pots reforms are absolutely critical. The problem of small pots was foreseen by the Pensions Commission years ago. We all knew we would face that problem with automatic enrolment, and I think people would agree that it has taken too long to grasp the nettle. We at Pensions UK are really delighted to see the measures in the Bill to deliver the multi-consolidator model. It is really important that the pot size is kept low, as is proposed in the Bill, at least initially, to solve the problem of the smallest pots in the market. Pensions UK has undertaken a feasibility study, working with Government, to look at how that small pots system might be delivered in practice. That work is publicly available. It gets quite technical quite quickly, so I will not go into the details of it, but we believe there is a feasible model of delivering the small pots solution at low cost—one that should not involve Government in a major IT build.
Steve Darling (Torbay) (LD)
Q
Rob Yuille: We have both mentioned the Mansion House accord already. In addition to the ambition to which providers committed, there were a series of critical enablers. Several of those are in the Bill already—thank you for that—including value for money and the drive to consolidation. But there were other things in there as well, including the need for alignment by the Department for Work and Pensions and the Financial Conduct Authority of their rules and guidance in relation to the charge cap pipeline of infrastructure projects, which I know the Government are proceeding with separately; and the need to ensure that the whole market buys into the value-for-money framework. In the pension investment review, Government did not take forward regulation of intermediaries—employee benefit consultants and so on—and we think that they could keep that under review.
The Government are seeking to take other steps that will evolve over time, such as crowding in investments. There are examples such as the British Growth Partnership and the LIFTS scheme, where the Government are either convening or investing alongside providers, which we would like to see more of. Outside of DC, as has been mentioned already, it is about working with annuity providers on eligibility for certain assets.
Kirsty Blackman
Q
Rob Yuille: The most important thing is that trustees do have the power that is in the Bill—that power should stay there. Conflicts of interest were mentioned earlier; it is interesting what surplus release could do to make occupational schemes more like commercial schemes. With master trusts, commercial schemes and superfunds, if pension schemes could be run for the benefit of the employer by taking surplus, that gives rise to a different relationship and potential conflicts. The Pensions Regulator needs to be alive to that. In any case, TPR is becoming more like the FCA and the Prudential Regulation Authority as a regulator, and I think that needs to continue.
Mr Peter Bedford (Mid Leicestershire) (Con)
Q
Zoe Alexander: I would probably lean towards talking about the local government pension scheme in that context. There are some parts of the Bill where we feel powers are being taken that may not be required; one is around requiring funds to choose a particular pool, and one is requiring particular pools to merge. We think that the LGPS is moving in a very positive direction. Obviously two pools have been closed, and funds are merging with other pools already. We are not sure that those powers are actually required. We think that the direction of travel is set and that the LGPS understands that, so we feel that those powers might be overstepping the mark.
Rob Yuille: I have no view on local government. I think what I am about to say should have cross-party support, or at least cross-party interest. It is a macro Bill about how the market and the system work, but it is also about people and the decisions that they need to make. We are glad to see the small pots provision in the Bill, but it is on an opt-out basis, similar to the default pension benefits solutions. People have decisions to make, such as whether to stay in or not, and they need to be supported in the decision making. We are proposing a textbook amendment that would enable schemes to communicate electronically in a way they currently cannot and in a more positive way—even where people did not have a chance to opt in to that kind of communication, which is seen and regulated as direct marketing. We know that there is cross-party interest in the ability to communicate more clearly with customers, specifically in relation to those provisions.
Rachel Blake
Q
Zoe Alexander: If you put yourself in the position of pension scheme trustees, having the presence of the reserve power, which may or may not be exercised, to direct the way that you invest does not necessarily feel like a comfortable position to be in. We understand why the Government are taking that power. We understand the imperative to get more investment in the UK and we support that. Clearly, the longer the power abides on the statute book, the longer there is that risk hanging over those trustees. They may be required to invest in particular ways. We do not know where we will be politically in 2035. We do not know what Government will be in place. It pushes us potentially into another Government, another Parliament—it is the unpredictability. So we did talk with many of our members about this, and had lively debates about whether it should be 2030, 2032 or 2035. There was a really strong consensus around bringing it forward to 2032. We do not want it too early because it might pre-empt a decision that need not be taken. But 2035 felt too far away.
Rachel Blake
Q
Zoe Alexander: I think the trustees we have spoken to, of the schemes in our membership, would disagree. It is a significant point to them, which they have asked us to pass on.
Rachel Blake
Q
Rob Yuille: I am not sure there is, first of all. Canadian and Australian schemes have a big presence here, but I am not sure that they invest more, especially compared with our bigger schemes or in percentage terms. But will the Bill help that? Yes, it will. Driving scale and consolidation, which was happening anyway but which the Bill will accelerate, will open up different types of investment opportunities for those firms. They will be more likely to have in-house asset capability and bargaining power to invest in those kinds of assets. One caveat, however, is that they will be able to invest globally—the same as Canadians and Australians—so it is not a given that they will invest more in the UK. The UK still needs to work hard to be an attractive place to invest.
Callum Anderson (Buckingham and Bletchley) (Lab)
Q
Zoe Alexander: I am pleased to talk on this point. We are supportive of consolidation and we absolutely see the benefits of scale, but we are concerned that there are a very small number of very high value schemes in the market that are already adversely affected by the presence of the scale provisions in the Bill. EBCs are not sending business their way because they are under £25 billion or cannot necessarily show those that they are on a path to that number. It is really critical that the transition pathway is in place as early as it possibly can be, and also that EBCs are encouraged to understand the way that the market dynamics will work here. What we do not want is for really high-value schemes that are delivering great investment returns, that are really innovative and that may be investing very heavily in the UK to fail simply because of the scale test. We want those schemes to provide and to grow, in the interests of members.
Rob Yuille: I agree with that, but I would like to make a wider, related point about the route to 2030 and the importance of getting the sequencing right for—
The Chair
Order. That brings us to the end of time allotted for the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank our witnesses for their evidence. I apologise for having had to cut you off.
Examination of Witnesses
Patrick Coyne and Charlotte Clark gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from Patrick Coyne, director of policy and public affairs at the Pensions Regulator, and Charlotte Clark, director of cross-cutting policy and strategy at the Financial Conduct Authority. Again, we must stick to the timings in the programme order, which the Committee has already agreed. For this session, we have until 10.25 am. Would the witnesses please briefly introduce themselves for the record?
Patrick Coyne: Hello, everyone. My name is Patrick Coyne. I am the director with responsibility for pensions reform at the workplace Pensions Regulator. I am pleased to be here today to talk about the Bill, which we believe is a once-in-a-generation opportunity to make the system work for savers.
Charlotte Clark: I am Charlotte Clark. I am the director of cross-cutting policy and strategy at the FCA, where I have lead responsibility for pensions.
Mark Garnier
Q
Patrick Coyne: I think that question is more relevant to me. The reforms across the Bill could be good for savers, but they could also be good for the UK economy. What you are pointing to is a wider, systemic issue in the marketplace, where we have a patchwork quilt of regulation that has built up because the pension system is idiosyncratic, and in some cases 70 years old. The Bill is trying to give trustees the tools for the job. On surplus release, it is trying to give them a statutory override, to look across the piece and say, “When I am a well-run, well-funded pension scheme, is it right that I can extract surplus if it is safe to do so?” We think that is a really important principle.
Mark Garnier
Q
Patrick Coyne: Another important part of the Bill is making sure that we get implementation right. There will be a period now when we can consult, and all of us—Government, industry and the regulators—have a role to play to make sure that that happens. I would say that the Bill will actually prompt a discussion that might not have been had by many trustee boards over the last few years. If you look at the amount of surplus that has been released in recent years, it is in the tens of millions, not the billions. We now estimate that three quarters of schemes are in surplus on a low-dependency basis, which is an actuarial calculation of self-sufficiency. That means there could be up to £130 billion across the market. We think it is right that well-funded, well-governed schemes can consider releasing that surplus, if it is in the interest of members to do so.
Mark Garnier
Q
Patrick Coyne: I think it is highly unlikely that that scenario would happen. Our engagement with the marketplace tends to show that firms considering a different endgame option, which might include running on and releasing surplus, tend to be doing so on a basis where they have hedged their assets, so that they can manage economic volatility, and they are using growth assets above that limit to consider surplus release.
Mark Garnier
Q
Patrick Coyne: It is important that we have a regulatory framework that can cope with different economic conditions. Over a number of years, Parliament has introduced a number of pensions Acts to ensure that defined benefit schemes, which are mostly mature—mostly closed—are secure.
There is a real opportunity in the Bill to build on the fantastic success that we have had in creating a nation of savers—11 million more people putting something away for retirement—and turn that system into something that can provide an adequate income in older life. That means turning the focus of the DC system on to value for money. That is where I believe the real potential is.
Mark Garnier
Q
Charlotte Clark: It is not in this Bill, but there is a very large work programme going on at the moment around the advice guidance boundary review. As Patrick said, as pensions have changed—there have been big changes in the market over the last 10 years or so—more and more people have come to need support, particularly at the point of retirement, but also in thinking about how you build assets in pensions and more generally. All the targeted support work we are doing is about how you help people more to make these difficult decisions. This Bill is very much about, “How do you get the market right?” but at the same time, we want to make sure that savers have the right support to make the right decisions at the point of retirement or before.
Mark Garnier
Or, indeed, when they first start to work. As somebody once said, compound interest is the eighth wonder of the world.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)
Q
Patrick Coyne: Over a number of years, we have worked closely with the Financial Conduct Authority to ensure that when we deliver interventions within the pensions landscape, the outcomes are consistent. One way we have done that is through an update to a joint strategy. We also have almost daily calls with one another to ensure that when we consider interventions and how to enable the system to provide value for money and support people at retirement, we do so in a coherent and comprehensive way. We must really understand the different constituents of our marketplace, whether they be workplace versus non-workplace pensions, or, in the People’s Pension space, pensions analogous to the master trust offer.
Charlotte Clark: To add to Patrick’s point, we meet fairly regularly. There are various different forums and working groups. As you say, Minister, there is that sense that it does not matter where you save. Most people are probably saving in both the contract-based side and the master trust side, given that people have pots in lots of different places. It is important not that people understand where the regulation is, but that the regulation is consistent and there is no arbitrage between the two systems.
Steve Darling
Q
Charlotte Clark: I will talk a little about the value for money framework and then specifically about your concern on risk. The value for money framework, which is an area we are working on very closely, will have three aspects to it. One is costs. One is, as you say, investment performance and investment allocation, and one is service. All of those will be important aspects of getting the value for money assessment right.
On the investment side, I hear the opposite charge, actually, rather than dumbing down. There is a sense that a scheme could take too much risk so that it looked like value for money, but there is a trade-off between risk and return. If you are going to do that, and if you have high-risk assets in a downturn, there is a possibility of volatility. Within all these schemes, you still have trustees, independent governance committees and professional advisers who make sure that the investment allocation is right for the saver. That is almost the first part before you get to the value for money assessment. I do not think there should be a dumbing down of investment.
One of the other challenges, which links to the move into private assets that has been raised a couple of times, is the possibility of pension schemes getting more involved in things such as infrastructure. One thing that the industry has asked us to consider is whether, when you invest in those sorts of assets, there is a J-curve in terms of the returns; there might be a suppression at the beginning as projects get up and running. We have been looking at the Australian examples and we do not really see that happening in their data, but it is something we are considering and we are talking to the industry about how to get it right. We do not want the value for money assessment to stop people being able to invest in those sorts of assets.
Patrick Coyne: Just to add that the competitive pressure on the marketplace at the moment is on cost, and cost is not value. To illustrate that point, for the average saver, a 1% increase annually in investment returns would generate a pot that is 20% bigger at the end of a lifetime of saving. We have to move the competitive dynamic, but implementation, as Charlotte said, is critical.
Steve Darling
Q
Patrick Coyne: I think bringing consistent comparable metrics that matter to the marketplace in a format that people can trust can start to drive competitive pressures on what matters, which is holistic value. Trustees—and across the Bill—want to do the right thing. They want to act in members’ best interests, but they do not have the tools for the job. The starting point is to provide them with quality information to act on that intent.
John Grady
Q
Charlotte Clark: It is important to say that most people who are saving in a pension are probably saving in the default. When you say that they are choosing their investment, most of them are not. Whether it is the trustees of that scheme or whether it is the independent governance committee of that scheme, most people are going into that default, so the importance of the default is really crucial. While it is important to really think about engagement and talk about the advice guidance boundary review and some of the work that is happening there, it is also important that some people will not want to make those decisions. It is only people like us who seem to care about these sorts of things. Getting other people engaged in their investment is quite a challenge.
You are right that we are doing quite a lot of work, largely around the ISA area and the at-retirement area. One of the challenges at the moment is people taking money out of their pension and then putting it in cash. That may seem like a really wise decision if you are 55, but if you do not need that money for 20 years, it may keep track with inflation but you are going to miss out on asset returns, equity returns or other aspects of investment. So, we are really thinking about how we engage with people about those sorts of discussions. How can we make sure they are getting the right support? It comes back to the targeted support programme, which goes live in spring next year. So, working with providers at the moment on how they can support people when they are making these sorts of decisions, and just think about whether, if it is not full financial advice—I understand that can be very, very costly—are there other areas where we can give people help that is not as kind of extreme as that but allows people to think about those decisions in the round?
Patrick Coyne: I would just add that one of the reforms in the Bill around guided retirement is reflective of that default conundrum we face. We have a brilliant system—11 million more savers—but nobody making an active choice. That means that when people approach retirement, only one in five has a plan to access and when they do, as Charlotte said, half are taking it as cash. That cannot be the right outcome. Within the Bill, introducing a guided retirement duty enables those institutional investors to start to guide individuals or cohorts of members into the right kind of products for them, with clear opt-outs for them to choose a different way. As Charlotte said, the type of support and new form of regulated advice could really help inform savers and make good choices at that point.
Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)
Q
Charlotte Clark: Following on from Zoe and Rob—I think they have articulated this issue really well—I do not think anybody disagrees with the direction of travel: trying to get more assets into private markets and higher return markets, and making sure there is more diversity within portfolios and that the scale of pension funds in the UK are using that in an effective way on investment. The issue of whether mandation is the right tool to use is ultimately one for you and the Government. There are obviously challenges, which Rob and Zoe have articulated, around how you do that, when you have a trustee in place whose responsibility is to the member, and making sure that is paramount in the system?
Patrick Coyne: I agree with that. I think it is fair to say that there is a degree of consensus in the marketplace, among Government, industry and regulators, that we need to make structural reforms to the marketplace and put value for money at the heart of the system. A big part of that is a move towards fewer, larger pension schemes, because of some of the factors that Charlotte just outlined—the ability to in-house your investments; the ability to consider a broader range of investments, which can sometimes be quite complex; and broader governance standards. Mandation is of course a matter for Parliament, but clearly structural reform is needed within the marketplace.
Rebecca Smith
Q
As a supplementary question, do you think trustees and scheme managers should be provided with a safe harbour if they are required to invest in assets that underperform? I think that is probably what a lot of the public would be interested in as well. You do not want somebody to be mandated to put money into something that is doing worse than it was doing before it was moved.
Charlotte Clark: There is an exemption in the Bill, though, that basically says that if you are a trustee and you do not believe it is the right thing for your members then you should not put that money in. That is just going to be a very tricky assessment for the trustees or the scheme manager, and then for the regulators, at the point of addressing why they did not meet those levels. If they believe that it is not in the interests of the member, the Bill allows for that.
Rebecca Smith
Q
Charlotte Clark: The level of that process would be something that we would put into secondary legislation and rules. We would really have to think through what that process looks like.
Patrick Coyne: Yes, absolutely. Implementation is critical here. This will be something that is done with wide consultation with the industry.
Torsten Bell
Q
Torsten Bell
The question to the witness is to expand a bit more on that point. In reality, this provides a “comply or explain” power. In terms of the point Charlotte was just making there, it is absolutely right about the ability of the trustees to say, “This is not in the interest of our members.” It might be worth talking a bit about how when we move forward the consultation will allow us to set out how that would work in practice.
Charlotte Clark: It is an area that we would need to work through in terms of the road map. At the moment, our focus is very much on getting the value for money framework right. How the mandation would work and the process around it—as the Minister says, first, we would consult on it. We would have to have a look to see what information was given and how we would monitor it in the period from now to 2030 or 2035. We would have to work through all of those aspects of the process. We would do that in conjunction with the industry, making sure that what we were asking for was information that it could readily provide and that we felt confident that we could make a good assessment around.
Patrick Coyne: Our engagement with the marketplace so far already shows that many are considering investment strategies that have significant proportions of diversified investments, so the market is already responding based on some of the Mansion House accord commitments.
John Milne
Q
Patrick Coyne: I think that fiduciary duty is a powerful force for good. Across the Bill, this is about giving those trustees the tools for the job. I think there are a number of areas where that is true. Within the value for money framework, at the moment, it is very difficult for employers or schemes to effectively compare performance. As an anecdote, I was speaking to a provider recently. They were pitching for new business. They came in and pitched their investment data, and the employer said, “You’re the third provider today that has shown us they are the top-performing provider.” That cannot be right.
Then, when you are looking across the Bill towards the DB space, because of the funding reality that many schemes are facing at the moment, there is choice in end game options—so, “How do I enhance member outcomes at the same time as securing benefits?” Actually providing a statutory framework for super-funds as another option is a good first step, as is allowing the release of surplus, if it is in the members’ best interests to do so.
Kirsty Blackman
Q
Charlotte Clark: It is a good question. It is hard to get over the fact that the vast majority of people are very inert in the pension system. Of course, there are some who are not, specifically around ESG—environmental, social, and governance—investments, but most trustees take those things into account, and there has been clarification about how that aligns with things like the fiduciary duty. Obviously, within the contract-based scheme, there frequently are options, if somebody does not like something that is invested in within the default, to have their own investment strategy, if that is what they choose to do. Do I think this Bill changes that? I do not think so. I think what the Bill is essentially trying to do is use the power of scale and collectivism to get better returns and, really, a better service for most savers.
Kirsty Blackman
Q
Charlotte Clark: Almost certainly.
Luke Murphy (Basingstoke) (Lab)
Q
Patrick Coyne: TPR’s responsibility is not for the asset pools, which are FCA-regulated entities, but we do have responsibility for governance across public sector schemes, including LGPS funds. It is really important to recognise the member voice within good decision-making, as Ms Blackman’s question indicated, but there are a number of ways to do that within standardised corporate governance boards and reporting functions, and that is something that we would look to explore over the coming months. With the LGPS boards, like the rest of the Bill, there is the ability, through greater scale, to start hiring better colleagues, introduce better systems and processes, and put in place better governance practices, and we would expect to see that come to pass.
Sarah Edwards
Q
Charlotte Clark: As Rob says, sometimes it is slightly overplayed. There is a lot of investment from UK pension schemes, whether they are DB or DC, within the UK. Why does Canada look like it invests a lot? It is a very mature system. We have two systems—one is in decline and one is in the ascendancy—whereas the Canadian system has been established for 40 years. The auto-enrolment system is essentially 10 years old, so they have a much more mature system. You see within those schemes that they have scale—they are very large and very mature schemes—and, in terms of things such as their investment approach, it is frequently internalised. They have been looking at private assets for longer than we have, particularly in the DC master trusts, auto—
The Chair
Order. That brings us to the end of the time allotted for the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank our witnesses for their evidence and apologise to hon. Members whom I am afraid time did not allow me to call.
Examination of Witnesses
Christopher Brooks and Jack Jones gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now take oral evidence from Christopher Brooks, head of policy at Age UK, and Jack Jones, pensions officer at the TUC. Once again, we must stick rigidly to the timings in the programme motion, as the Committee has previously agreed. For this session, we have until 10.55 am. Could the witnesses please briefly introduce themselves for the record?
Christopher Brooks: I am Christopher Brooks, head of policy at Age UK. We are the national charity for older people.
Jack Jones: I am Jack Jones, pensions policy lead at the Trades Union Congress.
Mark Garnier
Q
Jack Jones: I believe that was aimed specifically at the LGPS requirements, but yes, I would certainly agree with that, and it probably extends to some other areas of the Bill as well. Unison is not alone; all the unions involved in the LGPS scheme would agree that the pooling structures mostly have a clear lack of member representation on their governance boards. There is a real mishmash of governance arrangements and of reporting and transparency arrangements across the different pools at the moment.
We have some examples of quite good practice—there are pools with a meaningful number of member representatives on them, but they are few and far between. Many have no representatives or only have observers that do not have any voting powers. Member representation has an important role in the LGPS, with a long history of ensuring that members’ interests are represented when investment decisions are made. Moving away from that has taken something away from the scheme.
It is particularly important when looking at measures that will make investment decisions more remote from members by pooling into larger geographical areas and larger funds, and by requiring—or expecting—them to invest in more complicated assets with higher up-front fees. That is the point at which it becomes even more important to have oversight, to give reassurance that members’ interests are at the heart of all those decisions.
Mark Garnier
Q
Jack Jones: That is a good question, and it is a wider issue. Member representatives are there to ensure that people with skin in the game are around the table when decisions are made. They are there to reassure members that people like them—those who will be relying on the scheme for their retirement income—are involved in those decisions. Yes, they cannot represent the full range of any large scheme’s membership. A lot of interesting work could be done around how you find out what members think about how their money should be invested and how we then take that into account in decision making.
That is one area where, at the moment, there is potentially a little bit of a gap. The trustees have clear guidance that they can take into account non-financially-material ESG factors, but we hear a lot from unions that there is a very high level of wariness from schemes about actually doing that. They quite often point to their fiduciary duty and say, “Actually, our primary responsibility is towards the financially material factors.” They quite often ignore the guidance that says they can take into account other factors where they know it is in their members’ interest. Work needs to be done on what the best mechanism is to find out what Members think, but there is also a job to make sure that trustees know that they can and potentially should act on that.
Mark Garnier
Q
Jack Jones: Well, it is the members’ money that is being invested. You have to make a balancing decision, but where you have clear evidence that the majority of members have these ethical beliefs that they want to see reflected in how their money is invested, you need to take that into account.
Mark Garnier
Q
Jack Jones: Clearly that risk is there, and it would have to be managed very carefully.
Mark Garnier
Q
Jack Jones: I think it puts a lot of responsibility on trustees to make that assessment. I think it is fair enough to set out the criteria under which trustees might consider surplus release—that is where you have sustained and high surpluses on quite a prudent basis. Whether you actually make that decision to release that surplus and whether you think that is in the members’ best interests relies a lot on trustees making that decision.
One particular weakness at the moment is around potentially allowing sole trustees to make that decision. This is usually where you have a closed DB scheme that, instead of having a fully constituted board with member representation, will have a sole corporate trustee appointed by the sponsor. There, the conflicts seem too great to possibly manage for that corporate trustee to make a decision on behalf of the members and say, “Yes, we think it is appropriate for surplus to be released.”
It would also be really useful for guidance to lay out the ways in which any kind of surplus release must benefit members as well as the sponsor. There is obviously the argument that if the sponsor then goes and invests that money in, for example, either higher pay or better contributions for DC members or investing in the business, that is in the members’ wider interests, but we need to recognise that although employers suffered quite a lot because of the really high deficits that we saw over a sustained periods by having to put in those employer deficit coverage contributions, members also suffered.
You saw schemes being closed and benefits being cut in various ways. We had reductions to accrual, changes to indexation and that kind of thing. Guidance should probably recognise that and say to the trustees, “If you are going to consider releasing surplus, it needs to be done in ways that both benefit the member directly by improving their benefits in some way.” It is a complex question: what is the best way of doing that? I would not want to prescribe that too much. However, the principle that trustees have to consider is how that money is used to actually improve benefits, as well as potentially to—
Mark Garnier
Q
Christopher Brooks: We do not work on final salary pensions, so I do not take a view on it.
Torsten Bell
Q
Christopher Brooks: I think they all work together, so I would say it is a combination of them, but scale seems to be one of the main drivers. I am thinking about NEST in particular, which has been leading the way in terms of investing in private assets. It is able to negotiate a good deal, because of its scale. If you can drive that with similar outcomes across the marketplace, it will be really beneficial to members.
Torsten Bell
Q
Christopher Brooks: NEST has essentially negotiated with the private finance industry, and is not paying the “two and 20” classic fee structure, so it is not paying the performance fees. It has incorporated it all into its existing charges. If the intention is to drive greater investment in private finance, that is the way to go about it. If that scale is replicated across the industry—across the 15 to 20, or however many, schemes remaining at the end of the consolidation process, which I fully support—then hopefully you would be in a position to replicate those types of outcomes for members across the board, in their DC savings.
Jack Jones: I would say something very similar. As a package, on the DC side, it is scale that potentially has the greatest power. It is probably important to look at the factors that would make sure that the scale results in the changes you want. It is interesting to look at NEST; it has scale, but it also has a business model and governance structure that incentivise it to go and build up its experience in investing in those markets, and to have an understanding of what its fiduciary duty is, which very clearly includes looking at the widest range of assets possible and investing in them. So I think it is scale, as long as you have everything else in place there to make sure that schemes are using that scale in ways that benefit members.
Steve Darling
Q
Christopher Brooks: That is a really good question. I think that first, I would flag the decumulation provisions, which are a really excellent idea. They are exactly what should be happening at the moment. Because it is a new regime, there are lots of challenges around designing and implementing it, which probably need quite a bit of thinking through, just to make sure we can get it right for members.
There are some tensions in that process: if you are defaulted into something at, say, 65, there would be some tensions around the point at which you should do certain things. I think the general consensus is that it will result in people purchasing an annuity further down the line—probably around, say, age 75 or 80. We have seen for many years, pre-freedom and choice, big issues with the annuity market, with people shopping around, or failing to shop around, to get a better deal. If you are encouraging people to do that at age 80, that is potentially a recipe for disaster. First, because people will be taking a decision that they are not familiar with, and it is alien to them. Secondly, at age 80, a number of people are experiencing cognitive decline, so it is going to be even more challenging than it would have been at 65. That kind of thing, exactly how it works, needs thinking through in more detail.
On that point, I still think that ultimately, if you are going to force people into the open market, you probably need some kind of clearing house, so that it removes the risk, because there will be scammers out there, listening to this session, I am sure, and rubbing their hands with glee at the thought of lots of people taking those decisions.
The second point is about the contractual overrides, which are clearly crucial to make the whole system work. I think we need to make sure that the best interests test is working for members. When I read the Bill initially, the thing that stood out most for me was that there seemed to be a lack of consumer protection at that point. When the provider undertakes the best interests test, if they are making an external comparison, they only have to compare with one other situation, one other scenario. That is what it says in the Bill. I do not think it is sufficient. I think the Bill should be amended, at least to say, “Make two comparisons,” or possibly to be a bit vaguer and say, “Make a reasonable number of comparisons,” so that it can be left open-ended and give a bit more scope for flexibility. That seems to be one area.
I think the best interests test needs to consider different classes of members as well. At the moment, it just looks at members as a whole, but there are different people in different situations within any scheme. For example, people approaching retirement are in a completely different position from people in their 20s or 30s, so any decisions about transfers need to make sure that all those interests are considered.
Probably the main point is about the independent assessor, who will then look at the best interests test and how it has been conducted and rubber-stamp it according to some FCA regulations yet to be written. We think quite strongly that the independent assessor should have some kind of fiduciary duty applied to them. I do not think there is any reason why this could not work, but at the moment they do not seem to be fully incentivised to act in the members’ interests or prioritise members’ interests above those of the scheme.
That is another really clear addition to the Bill that we think should take place. I think that would make the system so much more robust. There are potentially some really negative outcomes for members if they are transferred into inferior arrangements. I am sure it is not the intention of the Bill to do that, and it is probably not the intention of most providers, but it could still happen. I think putting some kind of fiduciary duty on the independent person would give this a lot more strength and make it fairly watertight for members.
Damien Egan
Q
Christopher Brooks: How the Bill tackles that is probably through the governance structures that will be put in place. When there is a fiduciary duty, the governance is reasonably strong. I believe it is stronger under a fiduciary duty than under the contract-based system. For example, the trustees are better placed than IGCs—independent governance committees. I think we will see IGCs potentially play a greater role in some of the transfers. That is an opportunity to make sure that IGCs can do their job more effectively and have better access to the necessary data, which was flagged previously by the FCA as not always being the case. Clearly they need to be independent, so it will not be appropriate to have employees of the firm sitting on them any longer. I believe a number of them do at the moment, but I do not think getting employees taken off will be an issue.
Once you are in retirement, you have a separate issue. Because the decumulation part of the Bill leaves a lot to the regulators to decide in the future, it has not been clearly specified how the governance will work, so there is an issue about making sure, when those regulations are written, that it does work well for people. There is clearly going to be a gap around information as well. We recently did some research with Aviva, and one of the recommendations was that we need some kind of intervention for people in their mid-70s about how they look after the rest of their lives and how they manage their pension. That kind of support is going to be crucial if people are expected to take a decision in their late 70s or early 80s with regard to annuitisation or how they draw down the rest of their money. There is a big gap there as well.
Mr Bedford
Q
Christopher Brooks: Providing information takes you so far, and it is really important to do that: there are some really big gaps, as we see with Pension Wise UK, which is a really good and well-liked service, but has a really low take-up. That is just an example, but we need to get more people into a position to access the information. However, they will then still need a lot of support, because pension decisions are really challenging for the vast majority of people.
Mr Bedford
Q
Christopher Brooks: It could lie either with Government and the Money and Pensions Service providing a widespread service, for example. It could lie with charities, or providers could be told to help people with these decisions—they could potentially commission charities. We are working with Aviva to look at running a pilot in the retirement space, which will hopefully go ahead soon and give us some insights into what kind of support people need. People think about their lives holistically, and they are not necessarily thinking about a pension as separate from their current accounts, so we need to think about how it works for people. That is the key thing.
Jack Jones: I think we look at this slightly differently. I am not convinced that any more financial education, guidance, or points at which we need to intervene in the system to ensure that people are equipped to make decisions is the way forward. This Bill recognises that, and the introduction of default retirement products is a recognition that everywhere else in the pension system, it works on the principle of default and generally works quite well. We have seen that that principle is really powerful; if people are defaulted into something, they will stay there, whether that is their contribution rate or the investment options. Defaults are really sticky; we rely on that and make use of it through auto-enrolment, to get people into saving schemes.
More and more, as we find ways in which that does not work, we need to go back and look at fixing the system a little bit so that it works better by default, rather than providing people with more education, because that is pushing against the grain of all of our experience of what works and what is effective. I think that Chris is right that it puts a lot on the governance structures and on the consumer protections there, but I think that is where this Bill has to work. It has to put in place something that will be appropriate for the vast majority of members, and that will work with the minimal amount of engagement—we have to have some kind of engagement on retirement, such as, “This is what I am going to retire and this is where my pension should be paid,” but not beyond that.
David Pinto-Duschinsky (Hendon) (Lab)
Q
Jack Jones: As Zoe said earlier, we should be here already. It has taken us a long time to get to the point where we have an agreed solution. It looks as if the mechanics of it will work. I think we need to let that bed in and prove that it works. The main concern from our perspective is the £1,000 definition of a small pot. Obviously, from a lot of angles, £1,000 is a lot of money—but as a pension pot it really is not. Looking at this once you have proved the concept and you have a system that works and that hoovers up the smallest pots and those most likely to become orphaned is one thing, but I think if you are looking at helping people to avoid accumulating 10 medium-small pots over their career, we need to look at how to increase that over time.
Christopher Brooks: I agree with Jack. I think the Bill is really strong on small pots and the system that is envisaged will really help. I guess my only comment would be that £1,000 is not a huge amount of money, so maybe over time that amount could be raised, and some kind of indication that that is the intention might be helpful.
John Milne
Q
Christopher Brooks: Yes; I think a lot of schemes do not interpret it broadly, so they probably take things literally regarding financial materiality—that is obviously very important, but they could probably do more. I think there is a very strong case for reform in fiduciary duties, just to make it clear in the law what it actually means. It is more of an enabling tool for providers, I think, rather than anything restrictive. When there needs to be some direction for schemes to invest in particular ways, I think there is sometimes a bit of reticence. That is true of investing in the UK, maybe with some private finance and maybe with regards to climate change. The larger schemes no doubt do understand it, but all schemes need to understand that they can invest in these things and that that is possible.
I am no expert on this, but, as I understand it the fiduciary duty is all over the place in the law, and sort of hinges on bits of case law and bits of very old legislation, so clarifying that would be a really good move.
Jack Jones: I would agree with that. I think there could be statutory guidance to make it very clear to trustees what their fiduciary duty actually involves, and that it does go beyond that kind of narrow interpretation. As I say, you should take into account your members’ quality of life more generally—for example, investing in ways that support the UK, when that is where your members are, is something that is in their wider interests, and managing systemic risks such as climate change is obviously very material financially, but also has an impact on the kind of world they will be retiring into.
As I said before, we do hear fiduciary duty occasionally being used as a reason not to do the hard stuff and not to think through that. There is nothing inherently problematic there, but clarifying and making sure that trustees are fully aware of the breadth of fiduciary duty would be helpful.
Rachel Blake
Q
Jack Jones: Like I said, I think the one specific measure is not allowing surplus extraction where you have a sole corporate trustee.
Rachel Blake
Okay, so that is the one specific measure.
Jack Jones: Yes, that is the one specific one. More generally, I think there should be guidance that makes it clear to trustees that they have to weigh up the benefits to members, or to make sure that any kind of surplus extraction benefits members through improved benefits, rather than just through improving the company or returning money to the sponsor in some way, which they may or may not then use to do things that would give the member more security in various ways as an employee. Those are the two areas.
Rachel Blake
Q
Jack Jones: It sounds plausible, but we have not really looked at that yet. However, that is certainly something that we can do, and we will look at including that in our written submission.
The Chair
Order. That brings us to the end of the time allotted. I thank the witnesses for their evidence, and we will move now to the next panel. Thank you very much indeed.
Examination of Witnesses
Colin Clarke and Dale Critchley gave evidence.
The Chair
Q
Please could the witnesses briefly introduce themselves for the record?
Colin Clarke: Good morning, everybody. I am Colin Clarke, and I am head of pensions policy at Legal and General.
Dale Critchley: I am Dale Critchley, and I am policy manager for workplace pensions at Aviva.
Mark Garnier
Q
Colin Clarke: It is a very good question. There are risks that an employer could extract surplus so that it puts the scheme in a position where something might happen in the future that caused them to be underfunded. It is quite key that, although the Bill has some very high-level rule-making powers at the moment, the guidance that comes out alongside that makes very clear the circumstances in which it would be appropriate for trustees to be able to do that.
Scheme rules aside, trustees today are able to extract surplus, and they have to follow fiduciary duty, follow a process and get advice from independent advisers to make sure that what they are doing will not jeopardise the security of members’ benefits. The Bill itself is mainly to override any sort of constraints that trustees have within their rules that might prevent them from doing that. However, trustees would still have to follow the same process they would follow today to make sure that they are in a good position from a funding perspective, that they do not take anything out too hastily and that they look a few years ahead. It is not just a case of being able to extract surplus from an affordability point of view today; they need to be looking ahead to the long-term funding position as well.
Mark Garnier
Q
Dale Critchley: It is a trustee decision to take. I do not necessarily think that the trustees need to take into account what the employer is using the surplus for. They are looking at whether it is appropriate to return the surplus to the employer.
If you look at a case from 2023 that went to the ombudsman, Aviva was involved in the buy-out for a company that subsequently returned £12 million of surplus to the employer. The trustees, the ombudsman found, had acted quite rightly by taking into account the fact that the company had made considerable contributions, including considerable deficit contributions, over the years, and that it was right, in the trustees’ opinion, that once all of the benefits promised to the members had been secured, the excess was delivered back to the employer. I am not sure that that company or those trustees took into account what that company was going to use the money for; they just looked at whether or not it was appropriate to return the surplus to the employer.
Mark Garnier
Q
Dale Critchley: I am not a defined benefit pension scheme trustee, but I would expect the trustees to look at the members first of all: are the benefits secured that were promised to the members? Is there room to reasonably augment those benefits? However, to say, “We will only give you this surplus back if you use it for x” is, I think, overstepping the duty of the trustees.
Mark Garnier
Q
Both of you manage annuity funds. For the record, I have had a chance to meet representatives of your organisations and have had long discussions about this. One of the interesting points that has come out of conversations with many people and organisations in your position is that, while the thrust of the opportunity of this Bill is to bring together pensions and make them more efficient, and another is to be able to unlock opportunity to invest into the UK and into various opportunities, yet there are some rules that are not being addressed. As one of your colleagues mentioned to me, Dale, an annuity fund is not allowed to invest into equities, yet investing into something like a wind farm would be an ideal opportunity to get a predictable return. Do you think the Bill is missing out on some of these measures that could be updated?
Dale Critchley: I do not think it necessarily needs any change incorporating into the Bill. It is a matter for the Prudential Regulation Authority to allow us to make the investments that back our annuities. We would be quite happy to take that up afterwards, but I think that could be achieved through a change to PRA rules rather than incorporation into the Bill.
Mark Garnier
Q
The Chair
Can I ask for short answers now, please, because we need to move on to other Members.
Colin Clarke: It is an interesting question. It is not something I am a huge expert on, to be honest, and it needs careful thought, because there could potentially be some unforeseen consequences that I have not considered. If there were going to be any suggestions to change any rules in that regard, there would have to be evidence gathered to understand what the potential implications of that would be.
Torsten Bell
Q
Dale Critchley: Obviously, this is dependent on regulations, but DWP people have been very open in conversations. That has been really welcome, and we have a good picture of where we are headed. We launched a “flex first, fix later” solution called guided retirement. We are now looking at flexing that guided retirement solution to offer different flavours to fit the different cohorts and the amount of risk people can take in terms of fluctuations in their income, dependent upon guaranteed income from elsewhere, or the level of their fund. At one end, you might have a cohort of people who almost need a guarantee. We could go down the route of an annuity, but we are reluctant to do that, because we think that an immediate annuity purchase might put people off. We need to ease people into the idea of an annuity purchase, and that is where we are going. For those people who want more of a guarantee, it might be lower-risk investments and in a drawdown phase for a shorter amount of time. For people who can take more risk, it may be higher-risk investments in the drawdown phase and in drawdown for longer, with an annuity purchase later. That is where our thinking is at the moment.
Torsten Bell
Q
Dale Critchley: It is the ability to take risk.
Torsten Bell
Your metric for that is just other income sources plus size of pot?
Dale Critchley: It is those main two at the moment. We are also working with a guy called Shlomo Benartzi, who is a behavioural science expert, to look at the whole concept of defaults in retirement. It is one thing defaulting people into taking £120 a month from their salary; it is a very different thing to say, “I am now going to take the biggest amount of money you have ever seen in your life and use that to purchase an income.” That is what we want to test, because if the default is strong and if inertia works, we will get people moving away from the poor solutions they are choosing at the moment, but if people still think, “Well, I do not like the look of that,” they will go on to make the same poor decisions they are making now, and we will not achieve the policy aim. So we think we need to deliver what is right for customers and members, but also what is attractive to them—so looking at their wants as well as their needs.
The Chair
Could we have shorter questions and answers? Does Mr Clarke have anything to add?
Colin Clarke: We have been working a lot on the FCA’s targeted support proposals, which are very supportive of the measures proposed in the Bill. We have been doing a lot of research around member segmentation and looking at the different scenarios and outcomes, so potentially going a little bit further than looking just at age and pot value, and also looking at what sort of questions we need to ask people to ensure that they are guided to the solution that is appropriate for them.
I agree with Dale that decumulation defaults and accumulation defaults are completely different things. In accumulation, there is more of a “one size fits all” approach, because it is all about delivering the best returns for members, whereas when you get to decumulation, it is very personalised, and you do not want to put people into something where they cannot change their mind. It needs to be flexible; people have a wide variety of different needs, and we are doing a lot of research on member needs at the moment.
Steve Darling
Q
Colin Clarke: That is a good question. Both our companies have recently been on various trips, to Australia, in particular, and there are various references in the Bill impact assessment to measures that are being or have been done there. One of the key learnings is around improving adequacy. In the round, there are lots of measures in the Bill that will help achieve that—for example, the introduction of the value for money test and the potential for better returns. One of the learnings we took away was around Australia’s “Your Future, Your Super” test, how they define value for money and how appropriate it is to set certain benchmarks. What are the risks if you do set those benchmarks, like the risk of investment herding and things like that? I think the value for money framework, if it is done right, has the potential to improve outcomes for members.
Contributions, obviously, is one big thing—I know that is not in the Bill. The Pensions Commission is going to be looking at that for adequacy in the round. I think that the measures around performance and value, and ensuring that the focus shifts away from cost to value, are among the key things that the Bill will seek to deliver.
Alice Macdonald (Norwich North) (Lab/Co-op)
Q
Dale Critchley: What we have heard from Australia is that the thing to avoid is regulator-defined targets, which will probably lead to herding, and can lead to schemes avoiding certain investments. For example, in Australia, property includes social housing and commercial property, but there is one benchmark for everything. So pension schemes do not invest in social housing, because they cannot achieve the benchmark through investing in social housing, as the benchmark is common across all property. Those are things to watch out for.
The other piece is that if you have set benchmarks, people will look to achieve the benchmark and not exceed it—they do not want to be the white chicken among all the brown chickens. Those are the things to avoid, in terms of the value for money benchmarks.
Rebecca Smith
Q
Colin Clarke: I think it is right that the Bill, as I understand it, places the responsibility for member education and member communications on the provider, because ultimately the pension provider will be the organisation facilitating these things and making them happen. As was touched on in the previous panel, the availability of Pension Wise and other services like that is valuable, but I think pension providers ourselves have a responsibility to make sure that we deliver the right guidance and support for members.
Dale Critchley: The only thing I would add to that is that, if we start to edge towards guidance, we can come into an issue around marketing. If we sell the benefits of, for example, the default solution, rather than just say, “This is who the default solution is designed for,” and leave it to the customer to join the dots, we may have a better outcome, but it would be marketing, and we cannot do that, because of the privacy and electronic communications regulations. We would need member consent to deliver marketing communications, even though we are trying to help the customer.
Rebecca Smith
Q
Dale Critchley: Yes.
Rebecca Smith
The privacy piece came up earlier this morning as well, so that needs looking at.
Dale Critchley: If we deliver something that looks towards targeted support, where instead of just saying, “This is the solution you will go in if you make no choice,” we say, “This is the solution we think is best for you, and you will go in if you make no choice,” that would edge towards marketing, and we could not say that.
Sarah Edwards
Q
Colin Clarke: I do not think the Bill itself necessarily has the timescales in it, because it will be left to secondary legislation to look at when all these things actually fit together. A very helpful document was published alongside the Bill, with a potential road map. There is a logical order in which certain things have to happen. For example, the value for money test will require movement of members from historical defaults into something that will deliver better value. To achieve that, the contractual override for contract-based schemes would need to be in place in good time before the value for money exercise happens. Otherwise, there will be constraints that might inhibit the ability to do that.
Similarly, with small pots, a lot of the measures will lead to consolidation at scheme level. That will address some, but not all, of the small pots issue. The road map sets out small pots being at the end, and that is a sensible place to put them, because there will be a lot of other activity that happens first that will solve some of the problems. It does not make sense for small pots to be moved before they are moved again—you could see things moving around a couple of times.
On guided retirement, the potential timing of implementation is quite tight if it is going to be 2027 for certain schemes, when we do not have any secondary legislation yet. It is very important that that is consulted on as soon as possible so that we have clarity. Dale mentioned working on various different solutions. We have been doing something similar at L&G, and they may well be the right thing for members, but we know that we will have to fit them around regulations and make some adjustments, so having clarity on those early would be very helpful.
John Milne
Q
Dale Critchley: From a practical perspective, producing all the data. We need clarity in the regulations and clear definitions, so that everyone is producing the same data in the same way so that it can be compared.
Setting practical considerations aside, one of the risks is that there is a disjoint between the market and value for money. Value for money is looking at value. We still see lots of evidence in the market in terms of looking at price—“We want the cheapest thing possible”—not necessarily the best value. There is a potential tension there.
Longer term, there is the risk we pointed out around herding: if you set benchmarks, that creates a behaviour which, instead of optimising outcomes for members, produces an average. An example of that is in the metrics around service that are currently being thought about. They are what I have described as 20th-century metrics. Rather than metrics that are looking to engage members to drive decisions through electronic engagement, they are measuring, “How long does it take to change someone’s address? Have you got their national insurance number?” We think we could stretch things further, but that creates some challenges for some providers.
Colin Clarke: One of the other things that the industry as a whole needs to consider is around capacity. The value for money framework, if it is managed and regulated effectively, is going to result, ultimately, in members being moved into things that have the potential to deliver better value. All those kinds of projects take a lot of work and a lot of resource, so it would need to be managed carefully to make sure that the industry has actually got the capacity to manage the high volume of traffic that is going to be going through as funds consolidate.
Mr Bedford
Q
Colin Clarke: At a high level, the Bill, as it stands, is primarily rule-making powers. A lot of the detail is going to be in the secondary legislation. In terms of rule-making powers, as it stands, I think the Bill has the right provisions in place. The detail is going to be around the actual assessments that you have to follow for determining whether something is delivering value, not delivering, intermediate and so on. For me, getting that detail right in the secondary legislation is going to be quite key, as is having clarity at an early stage on what that is, so that it can go through the proper consultation paper and we can look at the risks and at whether there are any unforeseen consequences. At a high level, we know that the Bill’s rule-making powers set the right framework for that secondary legislation.
The Chair
If there are no further questions from Members, I thank our witnesses for their evidence. That brings us to the end of our morning session. The Committee will meet again at 2 pm in the Boothroyd Room to continue taking oral evidence.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Gerald Jones.)
Pension Schemes Bill (Second sitting)
Tuesday 2nd September 2025
(5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesPension Schemes Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 2 September 2025 - (2 Sep 2025)
The Chair
I remind Members that questions are not limited to what is in the brief, but your questions must be within the scope of the Bill. In line with this morning’s session, for each panel of witnesses I propose to call the shadow Minister first, then the Minister and then the Liberal Democrat spokesperson. I will then go back and forth between the Government and Opposition Benches; anyone who wants to ask a question should catch my eye.
We must stick to the cut-off times specified in the programme motion, so I will have to interrupt questioners if necessary. I remind Members that they must declare any relevant interest both when speaking in Committee and when tabling amendments to the Bill. If there are no further questions, I will call the next set of witnesses.
We will now hear oral evidence from Councillor Roger Phillips, chair of the Local Government Pension Scheme Advisory Board, and Robert McInroy, head of LGPS client consulting at Hymans. We have until 2.30 pm for this panel. Will the witnesses please introduce themselves for the record?
Councillor Phillips: Good afternoon. I am Councillor Roger Phillips. I chair the Local Government Pension Scheme Advisory Board and have done so for the last 10 years. Prior to that, I was on the working party that reformed the pension scheme from final salary to career average.
Robert McInroy: Thanks for inviting me. My name is Robert McInroy and I am the head of LGPS consulting at Hymans Robertson. We provide actuarial, investment and governance services to around 75% of LGPS funds, and it is pleasing to say that we have had some of those partnerships for many decades. In fact, Hymans Robertson was created over 100 years ago to provide services to the LGPS and local government.
Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)
Q
Councillor Phillips: I think there is general concern within the sector when language like that is used, because we are talking about a considerable sum of money that belongs to 6.7 million pensioners. You therefore have to treat that with utter respect. You have a fiduciary duty to look after that money and ensure that the investment is wisely made. The fiduciary duty of the funds and pools is there—the funds own the pools—so there will be concern if somebody wants to politicise it. That is a very dangerous road to go down.
When it comes to UK investment, the LGPS is already investing in the UK in a very big way. This is not a case where you use a stick and say, “You’ve got to invest in the United Kingdom.” It is about identifying risk, return and sometimes conflicts of interest. Certainly we should be investing where it is sensible to do so for the benefit of our pensioners and for the least obligation to our employers as well. That should be clearly understood by everyone.
Mark Garnier
Q
Councillor Phillips: Local investment is difficult because, again, I go back to this business of it being our duty to invest wisely, prudently and sensibly. That is important. With local investment, first of all, it depends on your definition of “local”, particularly given the current pooling arrangements. You could have a strategic mayoral authority that has three different pools, because the pools come from all over the geography of England and Wales, so that is a difficulty.
Secondly, it is about return and making sure the pipeline of potential projects is there and that those projects are investable. If LGPS is going to invest in them, surely the rest of the investment industry will also want to invest in them, including the Canadian people.
The other thing I would say, which I surely do not have to tell you as Members of Parliament, is that some local matters are controversial. You may think that a particular local investment is what an area needs, but actually a large part of your people do not. You have to show a little bit of discretion. You may invest in offshore wind, which is very popular, but getting the link to the grid, going across open countryside with massive pylons, is not popular. The LGPS will have to bear that in mind, because sometimes the members, the constituent authorities and the council tax payers will not appreciate it.
Mark Garnier
Q
Councillor Phillips: We go back to the importance of fiduciary duty. You are there to invest for the benefit of your pensioners and to make sure that you do that in a sensible and reliable way. As has been proved to date, the most popular element is probably affordable housing. Cornwall, which you mentioned, has invested very wisely in affordable housing. Together with its relationship with local government as the owners of much land, there is huge potential there, but it only comes right when the return is there. If the return is not there, you are not going to enter into it.
Mark Garnier
Q
Councillor Phillips: If you do not do that, I do not know where you are going with your pension investment.
Mark Garnier
Q
Councillor Phillips: We anticipate that the latest round of valuations will show a very good surplus for all the pensions. That is credit to the investments that have been made to date. That does pose some issues as to what you do with those surpluses, but we live in a very volatile situation, and circumstances can change. You have to be careful, because if you reduce contribution rates considerably, that is a great benefit at this moment in time, but if you then turn around and start to increase them again, that can be very difficult for all employers to deal with, including local government.
Mark Garnier
Q
Robert McInroy: Yes, on the last point about surpluses. I am a fund actuary. We are working through the 2025 valuations, and it is pleasing to see improvements in funding levels across the LGPS. We think that that, in turn, can mean lower contribution rates, particularly for councils—something in the region of 3% to 6% of pay, so that is positive. It is important to realise that the success of the current scheme has perhaps not been picked up in some of the language and assumptions built into the reforms that have been put forward.
Mark Garnier
Q
Robert McInroy: That has been discussed on a fund-by-fund basis—whether the funding target should be increased from something like 100% to 120%, for example. That has been actively discussed.
Mark Garnier
Q
Robert McInroy: I support looking at the range of options, which includes reducing employer contributions and flexing investment strategy, including for some of the areas that we have talked about and will be talking about, that could be available to the LGPS in terms of investments.
Luke Murphy (Basingstoke) (Lab)
Q
Councillor Phillips: Like the local government sector, the local government pension scheme operates in a goldfish bowl: constantly, on a weekly basis, an article is written about you or you receive a freedom of information request. So you are very conscious of the scrutiny, and that helps direct you to manage the investment risks as part of your fiduciary duties. What people do not realise is that there will be particular packages that Government and strategic mayors may think a fine investment that they should be in, but there might be some local problems. To go back to the previous question, it might be better for Northumberland to invest in it rather than Cornwall. That sensitivity has to be there.
Luke Murphy
Q
Councillor Phillips: The fiduciary duty would still be your main concern but in managing your risks you would have to take that into consideration as well.
Luke Murphy
Q
Councillor Phillips: That is problematic, but at the same time you know when there are things it is perhaps best to steer clear of—perhaps a bypass, or something hugely controversial. It goes back to the mandatory business. If you are forced to invest in something that does not go well locally, that is not going to sit right or do the reputation of the scheme any good. Ultimately, as my colleague has said, we are talking about a well-run scheme with good integrity. Our businesses supply pensions to some of the lowest paid people in the public sector.
Luke Murphy
Q
Councillor Phillips: Like a lot of judgments.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)
Q
Councillor Phillips: My understanding is that it is a back foot.
Torsten Bell
Q
Councillor Phillips: Right.
John Milne (Horsham) (LD)
Q
Councillor Phillips: The Government have a responsibility to support the strategic authorities in developing the pipeline and the vehicles for investment. Affordable housing is probably one of the best examples to use. The pensioner receiving a pension or paying into a pension from the local government sector would be quite proud of the fact that some of their pension money is being invested in providing homes for the next generation of key workers. That is probably one of the best examples you can ever get of local investment. There is real potential, but I go back to the fact that it has to provide the necessary returns. Just as you have to be careful about some of those controversial ones, there is one that you can absolutely lap up.
John Milne
Q
Councillor Phillips: There is great potential in all the activities that local government can do, but the fiduciary duty is where we need that clearly spelt out and some guardrails put in for that.
Robert McInroy: Where the LGPS can potentially bring an advantage to bear is by tapping into its local connections and local expertise—when it can see local investment opportunities that others potentially cannot. To come back to affordable housing and the fiduciary duty, if you are the asset owner, you have to be looking at the returns, and that is a difficult challenge for LGPS funds, particularly when it is in their local areas. You are talking about, for example, whether you push up rent and potentially displace a family or basically taking a lower return as a result of that. It is a very difficult thing to stack up. It is new to the LGPS. We need to make sure there are guardrails around it. Within the Bill it would be useful to bring fiduciary responsibility into the elements of local investment and how that overrides any of the local considerations.
David Pinto-Duschinsky (Hendon) (Lab)
Q
Councillor Phillips: Let us be quite clear. I think the Government’s frustration, which is shared by many of us, is that we are talking about what is generally accepted to be the sixth largest pension scheme in the world, and it does not punch its weight, which is what it needs to do. That is what pooling, which began in 2016, was meant to address, and to date, it has been successful, but it needs to be better. That is where I see a very big positive of coming together.
David Pinto-Duschinsky
Q
Councillor Phillips: From that point of view, it is very helpful. Because we are a very transparent pension fund, pressure will be put on some of the pools to make sure that their workings are done in a transparent manner. They are now, but there will be even more pressure because lobby groups will go straight to them rather than the funds.
Consolidation with regard to administration is not quite so easy. The last consolidation was between Northumberland and Tyne and Wear, and that was with maximum co-operation on both sides. This is a very well administered scheme, but bringing two administration authorities together is quite challenging. It needs to be done with co-operation and collaboration, never with a big stick behind it.
Certainly in London, there is a case for some rationalisation of the number of funds, and there is always going to be an issue about some of the smaller funds as they deal with it, but pooling is not just about consolidating your investments. It also brings the opportunity for the member funds that own the pools to start working more collaboratively, particularly on things like communications and other areas of work. There is great potential there. One of the things that the scheme advisory board is very keen to do is to make sure we develop and grow those chairs of funds to be the competent leaders that they are, and make them even better.
Robert McInroy: I think you were asking about the challenges of implementation. It is easy to see the direction on this and to think that there is not much change for the LGPS. There is a huge magnitude of change in these reforms. The LGPS funds and the pools already have a very full to-do list. They have stretched resources. They are asked to deliver an awful lot in a short period of time. They are transferring all of the remaining assets from the funds to the pools—there is still about 30% of those assets to come across in a short period of time.
Two pools have been asked to change their operating model to be FCA-regulated. Every pool has been asked to build advisory functions—that is all from scratch, apart from one. They have been asked to build local investment capabilities as well, which is of paramount importance to be able to kick-start and contribute to the UK economy, and to implement some of these governance reforms, and now we know that two of the pools are being asked to wind up, so there is £100 billion of assets to transfer, which is implicated across 21 funds.
That is a huge amount to do under any timescale. Some of what is envisaged in the consultation is that this would be completed in a little over six months’ time. That puts risk on some of these reforms, and I think that should be recognised.
David Pinto-Duschinsky
Q
Robert McInroy: At the moment, there are eight pools across the £400 billion-ish of assets. I believe the plan at the moment is to reduce that to six. You would imagine that that gives a big enough scale. Some of those pools will be £100 billion-plus; that should be able to punch its weight internationally, I would imagine. The LGPS itself is of course open to accrual and to new members joining, so that is just going to grow over time. In some ways, I think these reforms set the plan for the future as the scheme continues to grow.
Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)
Q
My question is about consolidation and local concerns that people might have. For example, they may not want a wind farm invested in because they are worried about the infrastructure that goes alongside that. If there is consolidation, will that remove the ability to take account of local concerns and to find great local investment opportunities? Will it dilute the input that people have locally, because it is taking it further away from them, or do you think it will be okay?
Councillor Phillips: As we already know, the establishment of the pools does take it away. There is no denying that. The important thing is to have member representation on pools. The scheme advisory board has always been supportive of that, although you need flexibility in how you do it; I certainly would not go for 50:50, because of the governance and regulatory responsibilities that the administration authorities have. I think Border to Coast particularly has employee representatives on there, and that works very well. In particular funds, you will have representatives on the committee and on the pension board. That is always important.
Getting the right engagement is always going to be a struggle, with all the rest of it, but, particularly with some of the ESG issues, that helps to better understand some of the issues. Of course, elected members that sit there are representatives of their community as well. They are aware as well. They are also aware that when they sit at the table on a pension, they have a responsibility first and foremost to that pension.
Kirsty Blackman
Q
Councillor Phillips: Absolutely. We laid recommendations from the board before Government some time ago. They have now been implemented and rolled out, and that is very much a crucial part of all of this. The headline is all about the pooling, but the Government’s changes, and training and developing your members, are absolutely critical because of the important decisions that they make.
Sarah Edwards (Tamworth) (Lab)
Q
Robert McInroy: It is important to point out that the members are not directly impacted by the scheme returns or cost: their benefits are set in statutes and are guaranteed. However, you can see how that might indirectly implicate them; for example, if there was a higher cost to employers because the scheme was not performing the way we would have liked, that could impact on their business.
Councillor Phillips: We know the deadline has been set for the transfer and it is very much business as usual until that happens. Of course, virtually all the funds have been contributing to their pools anyway, so it is just a case of transferring the rest. There are some sensible discussions going on about where it would cost money to pull out of an investment, and common sense must be the first rule, but the direction of travel is what the Government want to see: that the pool is effectively in charge of delivering that investment strategy, which still remains the responsibility of the fund.
Robert McInroy: Within the 21 impacted funds, there are two pools that are being wound up and they are to find a new home, and they do not know for certain where that will be. There is sometimes a degree of inertia in some of the decisions made: why would you make a new investment when you do not know whether that is going to fit into your new pool? I appreciate that is why there are some short timescales on this; we need to get clarity and move through this quickly, or there will be increased risk, but the short timescales create risk in themselves, so there is a balance to be made and a tension there.
The Chair
If there are no further questions from Members, I thank the witnesses for their evidence today. We will move on to the next panel.
Examination of Witnesses
Helen Forrest Hall and Sophia Singleton gave evidence.
The Chair
The Committee will now hear oral evidence from Helen Forrest Hall, chief strategy officer at the Pensions Management Institute, and Sophia Singleton, president of the Society of Pension Professionals. We have until 3 pm for this panel. Could the witnesses briefly introduce themselves?
Helen Forrest Hall: I am Helen Forrest Hall, chief strategy officer at the Pensions Management Institute. We are the leading professional body for those running pension schemes in the UK. We provide qualifications and training to the sector, as well as continued professional development, and have almost 8,000 individual members.
Sophia Singleton: I am Sophia Singleton, president of the Society of Pension Professionals, and in my day job I am a partner at XPS Group. The society represents providers of advice and services to pension schemes and employers. As such, we represent quite a broad range of the industry, from pensions lawyers and actuaries through to professional trustees, pension providers and administrators.
Mark Garnier
Q
Helen Forrest Hall: I would love to say that. I start by saying that the PMI supports the principle that larger pension funds are likely to lead to better outcomes for members. A great and growing weight of evidence, and obviously an awful lot of international experience, shows that they provide greater economies of scale and greater opportunities to invest in a broader range of assets. Unfortunately, we believe that the reserve power sets a dangerous precedent of political interference with a trustee’s fiduciary duty. The considerations of each individual pension scheme are a matter for the trustees, taking into account their members’ experience and what will drive the best outcomes for those members.
Obviously, significant progress has already been made in terms of pension schemes demonstrating their desire to meet the Government’s eagerness for them to invest in a broader range of assets, and the consolidation elements of the Bill should help with that. But I think that the reserve power provision runs a serious risk of cutting across that well-founded fiduciary duty, as well as creating all sorts of disruption to long-term investment planning—another thing that pension schemes are well set up to do—and creating market distortion.
Sophia Singleton: We are very much aligned with the Government’s objective around investing in these assets. We believe that they can deliver and, as Helen has said, the industry has already made quite a strong move towards investing in them. We are going to get there, and it is really about not forcing that to happen too quickly. Schemes need to deploy capital when the opportunities arise and when the right time is, otherwise we risk distorting the market. That is a real concern, because it could deliver poor outcomes for savers. I am sorry we cannot give you a different answer, but we have three concerns about the mandation. Who is legally accountable if there is underperformance? Underperformance is possible. Is it the Government? Is it trustees? How will it affect the markets? How will it affect public trust? At a time when people need to save more into their pensions, they will worry that their pension scheme is no longer investing for returns as a priority.
Mark Garnier
Q
Helen Forrest Hall: That is the problem with a reserve power. It does not have to be used to influence the decisions that trustees are making about their investment strategies, because they have to consider the instances—and there is not an awful lot of clarity in the Bill about what those instances would be—in which this power might be used. They might suddenly find their long-term, well-considered investment strategy outwith Government legislation. That is a dangerous place to be. Pension schemes, quite rightly, are doing their job when they are thinking about their members and their beneficiaries, and making long-term investment decisions. They have the capacity and the joy of being able to do so, but that means that they have to think about those kind of time horizons. That means that a reserve power with a sunset clause with that kind of short-term time horizon will start impacting decisions that people are making at the moment.
Mark Garnier
Q
Helen Forrest Hall: I am not sure that we would draw a direct correlation, but the point is that it will start to influence investment decisions. Those may be good decisions, or not, and they may be decisions that trustees would have made anyway; the challenge is that the reserve power exists, a good trustee and their legal advisers will be taking account of that at the moment.
Sophia Singleton: We believe that the threat—just the threat—of this power is the worst of all worlds, in a sense, because the lack of clarity about what trustees should do and take into account when investing for the long term makes it very difficult for them to carry out their fiduciary duties.
Mark Garnier
Q
Sophia Singleton: What I would say is that we are already moving in that direction. If you look back a few years ago, it was very difficult operationally for defined contribution schemes to invest in those types of assets. If you look at things now, both on the supply side and the demand side we see factors that are really supporting investment in those assets.
On the demand side, the new value for money framework really incentivised investment into private market assets because of the risk-adjusted metrics included within the framework, and the work that the industry and regulators have done to take away the operational barriers that existed. On the supply side, the Government have committed to help to create that pipeline of investments. Publishing the pipeline that is coming up is very helpful, because people can plan how to employ their capital, and having the British Growth Fund and so on to invest in alongside the private sector is also helpful.
We are already seeing it happen: we are seeing funds recruiting investment experts to help to manage those assets, so they are already gearing up and skilling up to do this, and we are seeing fund managers releasing private market funds suitable for DC schemes on a regular basis. We do due diligence on those funds, and there are more and more that we have to look at. So it is happening.
Mark Garnier
Q
That begs the question that, as the Government at any time is trying to attract foreign direct investment into the UK, not least to try to sort out the current account deficit, you as pension fund managers will find yourselves in competition with, hopefully, foreign investors coming into the UK. What is the hierarchy of offer? Do you think UK pension funds should be offered exciting investment opportunities before foreign direct investors?
Sophia Singleton: I do not think we should be interfering with the market; I think it needs to be a free market and, as trustees of pension schemes, we need to be exercising fiduciary duty to choose the right investments for our members and to give the returns.
Mark Garnier
But you would rather see the opportunities first?
Sophia Singleton: Absolutely—we would love to see the opportunities first.
Helen Forrest Hall: The other dynamic there is that international pension funds, for example, are often looking to invest in the UK for reasons different from the reasons UK pension funds might want to invest. For them, it is often a smaller part of their portfolio, and part of their own need to diversify where their assets are, in order to manage their own volatility risks. There has been a history of going after the same investments, and unfortunately that is the market and that is healthy competition. One of the challenges and one of the market distortions we see with things such as the reserve power is that you will have the same group of people fighting over what, for a short period of time, is inevitably going to be a short pipeline. That will have an impact on things such as the value for money that you are getting for those investments.
Torsten Bell
Q
Given that that is your logic, the question is why that has not happened. If you go and ask actual pension providers why that has not happened, they will tell you they have a collective action problem and an industry focused exclusively on cost and not on returns, and that they struggle to deliver against that. If you have a collective action problem, you need to ask how we resolve that.
You then get to the fact that the Mansion House accord is entirely industry led, with numbers set by them—it is not about distortion to the market; you might want to reflect on that, given the comments you have just made. You also spoke about a lack of clarity, but the Mansion House accord provides clarity about the objectives: everyone can see them and they are set by the industry. When it comes to savers’ interests, you know that the Bill includes a carve-out for trustees to say, “This isn’t in my members’ interests, so we won’t be doing it.” Reflect a bit on the consistency of the argument you have made about the real progress you want to see on investment in a wider range of assets—because it is in savers’ interests and should have happened in the past but did not—and the changes in the Bill. I would gently suggest you might want to think about the consistency of that.
Sophia Singleton: We are not a mature industry—the defined contribution industry—and in the past we have not invested in these assets because there have been operational barriers, including the focus on cost.
Torsten Bell
That is not the view of the whole industry, which points to the collective action problem of an exclusive focus on cost, as much as it is a barrier—
Sophia Singleton: The value for money framework in the Bill is extremely helpful—
Torsten Bell
It is.
Sophia Singleton: —and we have said that we need to move the focus from cost to value, and we are seeing that very much come through in the culture within the industry, to be focusing on value. I have given evidence about funds recruiting investment teams to invest in these assets, because they are not simple to invest in for DC schemes. If you look at the experience in Australia through the covid pandemic, there were some real challenges that those schemes had to face relating to stale pricing, intergenerational fairness and cross-subsidies. They are not simple assets for DC schemes to invest in. The market is moving, going, and will get there. What we are saying is the mandation power is not needed to achieve that, because we are, with your help, getting to the right place.
Torsten Bell
Q
Helen Forrest Hall: Just to give my own perspective, there are a number of structural issues with the development of the sector. Defined benefit has been in run-off, which has driven a particular type of investment strategy. DC has not been at scale, and a number of us in the sector have been calling for consolidation for a long time. I think it goes without saying that we are having this conversation in the context of being very supportive of the vast majority of provisions in this Bill.
Torsten Bell
I was encouraging you to say that; you got there.
Helen Forrest Hall: Apologies; we are very, very supportive of the vast majority. This is basically the one substantive issue from our perspective. As Sophia has said, the value for money and consolidation elements in particular are incredibly helpful in removing some of the barriers that have existed, including for trustees. They technically have the ability to operate within their fiduciary duty, but sometimes the legislation and the structure of the industry get in their way. Things such as value for money and scale will really help with that. This Bill is incredibly enabling in the vast majority of its provisions. There are just a small number—mandation being one of them—where we have a bit of concern.
John Milne
Q
Helen Forrest Hall: From a principles basis, yes, and just to address the funding point, they absolutely can. I know there will be a number of us in the room who have either experienced or been subject to the outcomes of what has happened when those significant events have taken place. In the context of where we are with DB now, a significant proportion of schemes are employing investment strategies that really do protect them against the kind of volatile market movements you might see.
The provisions in the Bill strike the right balance between, as I said earlier, giving trustees greater flexibility to exercise their fiduciary duty in discussion with employers, while also ensuring that they are considering the best interests of the members. One of the key considerations for trustees in that conversation is: how confident are we that our investment strategy would withstand significant market movements at the point when we might release a surplus? That is a key consideration.
We have seen that a number of pension schemes did not benefit from September 2022 in the way that others did, and that was because they had decided to protect themselves against that kind of market movement. There are things that schemes can deploy to give themselves that level of confidence.
Sophia Singleton: We were very pleased to see the stringent funding safeguards that are in the Bill in order to allow a surplus to be released. One thing I would say is that, as Helen says, it is giving the trustees the tools to properly exercise their discretionary power and, in a sense, fiduciary duty, but it has created an opportunity for trustees to negotiate and agree a win-win situation, in a sense. The conversations we are having with schemes is that they are now more likely to be able to feel comfortable in paying, and be able to pay out, discretionary benefits than they would have been before the Bill was in place. It gives schemes the opportunity to run on and for the employer to access the service, but also for members to have more access to discretionary benefits and to additional benefits.
John Grady (Glasgow East) (Lab)
Q
I would like to move on to a slightly different topic: small pots. Ms Singleton, the SPP made supportive comments in its submission about small pots. Would you like to elaborate on why you support the small pots element of the Bill, and are there any practical considerations you would like to draw to the Committee’s attention?
Sophia Singleton: Small pots are a challenge for both the industry and for individuals. You have got a much more mobile workforce, and more and more people have small pots and have lost sight of those pots. Obviously, the dashboard will help them to gain sight of them, but actually bringing them together will help them to manage it. We know that it is much easier for people to manage greater-sized pots of money. For the industry, it is a huge cost to manage lots and lots of very small pots of money. I think it benefits savers and it benefits the industry to have this.
This is a pragmatic solution that is within the Bill, as far as we are concerned. The industry has considered a number of different ways of addressing this problem, and we feel that this is actually a very pragmatic solution. It does rely on a technology platform, so we were pleased to see that it is further down in the timeline for the Government’s road map for implementation, because we all know that introducing technology platforms can take some time and there are a lot of other things that we need to be working through, including consolidation and so on.
We did put forward some small technical suggestions within the Bill. Did you want me to talk to them?
John Grady
No.
Sophia Singleton: Good. We are positive that this will help, and we are also positive about the timeline for it.
Damien Egan (Bristol North East) (Lab)
Q
Sophia Singleton: I might start on this because I think that the Bill should not set out what the product looks like. The policy should set the rules of the game, providers and pension schemes should be allowed to innovate and to develop solutions that meet the needs of their members, and then policy should obviously monitor and oversee product development to ensure that it is effective. When I say “set the rules of the game”, I mean clear guidance around the things that should be considered when developing these solutions. It should consider whether it should deliver an income and consider whether it should provide longevity protection. It should consider those factors, but an income for life might not be the answer for all schemes. It will probably be the answer for many, but not for all, so that is why there needs to be flexibility for providers and schemes to develop solutions.
Helen Forrest Hall: From a PMI perspective, obviously we recognise that with the shift from DB to DC, the choices that are facing people at retirement are growing ever more complicated, and at the moment, they are largely left to their own devices and that is a far from ideal situation so we very strongly support the proposals in the Bill to provide those default pathways, particularly for those who have not made an active choice. Actually, we support the focus on those default options as generating an income because, after all, that is what a pension is for. We do strongly support that.
We have a question around where this sits in the pensions reform road map. We very much share the desire to provide people at that point of retirement with a bit more support, guidance, help and some form of default pathways as soon as possible. But we are concerned that doing so in advance of trying to bring those small pots together and reaching scale in the market puts a burden on schemes, in terms of the number of DC schemes that might not meet the scale test having to put this in place in the meantime, and potentially confuses members. For example, if you have got 11 pots that all happen to be trust based, and you have got 11 different default solutions, that is potentially going to be confusing.
We do not think that nothing should happen in the meantime. Our proposal would be to extend the point at which the mandation requirement would come in, but use engagement from regulators, particularly for large schemes—those that are going to meet scale or be exempt from the scale test—to really start piloting what good looks like in terms of both the guided retirement requirements and the FCA’s proposals for targeted support. There is a really important piece of work to be done thinking about how all of those align into a better, but not perfect, pension saver member journey at the point of retirement. It is not about moving slowly; it is about thinking about the right time that the mandation kicks in so that schemes can plan effectively and things can be tested in the meantime.
Sophia Singleton: Just to add one other element to that point around timescale, I think master trusts are going to be required to comply by 2027. One of the solutions, which might be the right solution for schemes, is the decumulation CDC. We do not expect that the regulations to facilitate that will be in place by 2027. Ensuring that those align so that that option is available to schemes when they are considering their decumulation solution would be beneficial as well. I agree with everything Helen said, but just add that extra element.
Mr Peter Bedford (Mid Leicestershire) (Con)
Q
Helen Forrest Hall: I will take this opportunity to reiterate that we strongly support the vast majority of the provisions in the Bill: the consolidation, value for money and retirement provisions; finally legislating for DB superfunds, which we warmly welcome; and striking the balance on DB surplus—there was a better balance to be struck. To a certain extent we have already talked about our key issue where the Bill potentially goes too far, which is around the mandation requirement and the reserve power.
On value for money, I think that the Bill is doing the right thing. Value for money is going to be an everchanging set of circumstances, particularly if we build scale in the market. What might be required on day one for value for money—we probably want a core set of metrics that can be easily comparable across schemes—might really mature as the market consolidates into a small number of fairly significant defined contribution funds. You might quite rightly expect regulators and the regulations to ask an awful lot more of those schemes in terms of what they are doing under value for money.
We think it is only right and proper that they sit in secondary. There have occasionally been issues with putting too much in a pensions Bill, and creating problems with the market being able to adapt as we go. So I think that this is actually the right thing to do, albeit that we would welcome further clarity from regulators around the fact that they would like to start small and grow—at the moment there is very little detail on the value for money measurements. We are talking actively with them, but it is useful to get the reassurance that we will start from a principle small basis and move out, rather than potentially creating additional burdens for schemes during what will be, on a number of fronts, quite a busy pensions reform road map.
Sophia Singleton: We very much support almost all the provisions in the Bill; mandation, as we have already talked about, is the exception. Where would we go further? There are two things that we would ask for.
The first is in relation to DB surplus. We have talked about how we were pleased to see that the safeguards were in place—we feel that they are very robust. We would like some clarity in the Bill, though, that that provision overrides any existing restrictions in scheme rules, because as it is currently drafted there are some schemes that might not be able to utilise that provision. We have provided some more details about making it open to all in our submission—making it clear that the provision overrides any existing restrictions, subject to the safeguards being properly used and so on.
The second one is an addition that we would love to see to the Bill: the removal of the admin levy, which pays towards the Pension Protection Fund admin costs. The DWP did a review in 2022 that concluded that it was no longer needed—it is a cost to schemes and therefore to employers. We have prepared a simple draft for the legislation that we have shared with you and the DWP that would remove it, and it is a very easy way to remove a cost on employers.
Helen Forrest Hall: If I could just add one point on the DB surplus, because Sophia’s points reminded me of it, I think there are a couple of areas where there could be further easements. They are not necessarily for a pensions Bill—some of them are more Finance Bill-related—but in giving trustees full flexibility to consider all the beneficiaries of a scheme, it would be useful if there were further easements that enabled them to make, for example, one-off payments to members without being subject to extraneous tax charges and, similarly, that would allow employers to pay some of that surplus as DC contributions into another trust. At the moment, the legislation does not provide for that, and obviously that would be a way to help trustees, and actually employers, who might be looking to enhance their pension provision overall—not just being able to move money around within one legal structure.
Kirsty Blackman
Q
Helen Forrest Hall: Yes, I think at least one of us has something, but we can certainly provide more details if that would be helpful.
The Chair
If there are no further questions from Members, can I thank the witnesses for their evidence this afternoon? We will move on to the next panel. Thank you very much for your attendance.
Examination of Witnesses
Patrick Heath-Lay and Ian Cornelius gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from Patrick Heath-Lay, chief executive officer of People’s Partnership, and Ian Cornelius, CEO of NEST Corporation. We have until 3.30 pm for this panel. Will the witnesses please briefly introduce themselves for the record?
Patrick Heath-Lay: Good afternoon. My name is Patrick Heath-Lay. I am the CEO of People’s Partnership, a large DC master trust with £35 billion of assets under management and about 7 million members. Importantly, we are a not-for-profit organisation. Within that, we are an asset owner, not an investment manager, so our asset ownership activities are solely for the benefit of members and not commercially for ourselves.
Ian Cornelius: I am Ian Cornelius. I have been the CEO of NEST since May last year. I will say a few words about NEST. It was set up by the Government at the inception of auto-enrolment to make sure that every individual has access to a good-quality pension. It has been a great success story. It now looks after over 13 million members, which is a third of the working population, and manages over £53 billion of assets on their behalf. We receive about half a billion pounds of assets every month.
The focus of NEST has been, and will continue to be, on low to moderate earners, so the typical NEST member earns just under £25,000. In many ways, NEST is probably one of the best examples of the sort of megafund that the Bill is looking to create. It has been able to invest in private assets, invest in the UK and deliver good outcomes for members.
Mark Garnier
Q
Ian Cornelius: I do not think that the Bill particularly focuses on that problem, but the question is whether it is a problem. The pensions dashboard will help to provide more visibility of where people’s money is and help them to manage that more effectively. I think it is right to focus on small pots, because they are inefficient. It is much harder for consumers to track lots of small pots, and it is driving costs in the industry, so I think that that is the right initial focus.
Mark Garnier
Q
Ian Cornelius: Customers—members—can already do that if they choose to.
Mark Garnier
Q
Ian Cornelius: I think that is right. It probably goes back to dashboards. They are key to helping to increase visibility. That will get people thinking about the choices they can make, how they want to manage their pension and how they can consolidate their pensions. That will drive that type of activity naturally. At NEST, we have always had one pot per member to make it as easy as possible for our members. Ultimately, it is about member choice.
Mark Garnier
Q
Patrick, could I turn to you? We met and had a very interesting chat. One thing we discussed was the scale of the funds. There is a requirement in the Bill that funds such as yours will need to be valued at £25 billion by 2035. One thing we discussed at the time was whether that creates a barrier to entry for new asset managers, and a lack of competition among asset managers in order to provide the best value for those funds. Would you share some of your thoughts about the £25 billion minimum size?
Patrick Heath-Lay: Yes, of course. We have conducted research. Toby Nangle did some research for us in 2025, and WPI Economics has also looked at the issue of whether scale drives better economies. Generally, aside from all the international comparisons from Canada and Australia, it is proven that scale will drive better economies. You can leverage scale to drive a more efficient administration. If you are asset owners like these two organisations, we get to choose where we invest the money, which managers we use, who will come with the best solutions and who has the best routes and access to market to allow us to invest in a way that benefits and shares the benefit of that investment with the end saver, which for us as an organisation is the sole focus.
I believe that scale, utilised in the right way, does deliver those efficiencies, but this is where the package in the Bill, and particularly a key element like value for money, is critical to establishing that as this market evolves. You want to be reassured that the investment activity at that scale is delivering increasing value for members, which is really the sole purpose of driving that scale. From our own experience and the research that we have done, it is a proven model, but that scale needs to be harnessed in the right way.
Mark Garnier
Q
Patrick Heath-Lay: I do not want to be flippant in my response, but our scale already means that we are over that limit, so I have not really put too much thought into how they will do it. I believe that there is enough, within the business plans of entities that might be affected, to be able to make some reasonable assumptions as to what ongoing contributions will be coming through the door and how they will respond to some of the opportunities that may arise in this market over the next few years, from organisations that are choosing to move because of the extent of change that is coming.
I emphasise that I still think that the package of measures and that scale test is the right thing to instil that movement, because I think savers will be better off, provided that it is harnessed in the right way. That is why I come back to this: value for money is the proof point, and we need to make sure that we centre on that as an industry. Being able to evaluate how these changes have created a more competitive market in key areas going forward is really quite important.
Torsten Bell
Q
Ian Cornelius: It is one of the elements of the Bill that we very much welcome. I think guided retirement solutions are overdue. Certainly, our members have been opted into a retirement savings scheme, and they end up with a pot of money rather than an income. I think their expectation is an income. In fact, in the research we have done with our members, they say that the most important things for them are to have a sustainable income, confidence that it will not run out and an element of flexibility, because their circumstances can change very quickly in retirement. I think the guided retirement solution moves us in that direction.
At NEST, we have been working on this for some time, as we recognise that it is a core issue for our members. We therefore want to introduce a guided retirement solution—it is very much a work in progress—that delivers that sustainable income, but also gives them a guarantee that it will not run out. That will be some sort of deferred annuity, purchased probably when they are 75, to kick in when they are 85. We are actively working on that and will be looking to introduce it in 2027, aligning with the expectation in the Bill.
Patrick Heath-Lay: It is very similar from our perspective. We should not underestimate how much onus the shift from final salary to DC has put on individual savers, in terms of the decision that they have to make, in a very complex world that they really do not understand. Even if you surface a lot of information, your constituents will still struggle to navigate those decision points. We also should not underestimate the onus they have taken on, in terms of the risk of their own fund, when you think about the productive finance agenda and other things here. I think it is absolutely the right move. It is a good development for us to bring about guided retirement journeys in a way that is either “Do it for me” or “Do it with me” for policyholders.
Similarly, we are thinking about drawdown and how we can facilitate or help people to understand the implications of the actions they may take with accessing their funds, and then, when they get to later life, some sort of deferred annuity as an approach. The really important aspect is the guidance and how we can help, but have certain obligations on ourselves, as providers, to make sure that we are accountable for the help that we are giving as we go through the process.
Torsten Bell
Q
Ian Cornelius: It is difficult to speak for the industry, but I can speak for NEST. At NEST, we are very committed to investing in private markets: 18% of our assets are invested in private markets, and 20% of our assets are invested in the UK.
Torsten Bell
And that compares to the Mansion House benchmarks of 10% and 5%.
Ian Cornelius: The Mansion House commitment is 10% into private markets, with half of that into the UK, so we are already well ahead.
Torsten Bell
Q
Ian Cornelius: Absolutely. It is providing attractive returns, it diversifies risk and it also invests in the UK.
Torsten Bell
Q
Ian Cornelius: It is hard to speak for others, but scale is an important factor, as we have talked about. You need scale and sophistication to access these investment opportunities. NEST has that scale and is building that sophistication. It often involves quite innovative solutions and partnering. Partners want to partner with someone who has got scale and assets coming in at pace, and we have those things. There are some unique circumstances that have made it attractive for us. I will let Patrick speak for People’s, but it is on that journey as well.
Patrick Heath-Lay: Yes, we are, although we are much nearer the start of that journey. Again, it comes back to the scale point. Why is £25 billion or £30 billion about the right amount? Because it is about the right part that you can economically start investing in those items.
To answer your question, and to pick up a more general point, it is incredibly important that we work collaboratively on the issue, because, as an industry, there is not much point in us all sailing our own little boats around trying to find the right harbour to invest. There is a degree of collaboration that the industry, together with Government, can do to open up the opportunities where that investment needs to go and how it can be executed in the most efficient manner. The biggest risk with investing in private markets is that they are expensive. If the vehicles that are being used on a commercial basis are not sharing the economics of that investment well enough with savers, it will certainly not be an investment that we are interested in pursuing.
The other point is that putting down the foundations for this to be a pipeline of repeatable investment activity is critical. Because of its scale, NEST has got ahead of where we are today, but that is the phase we are in at People’s at the moment. There is over £1 billion a year from our scheme alone that will be invested in those markets on an ongoing basis. Given the scale that we are both experiencing, in terms of how we are scaling up, that will be an ever-increasing number, so it is important that we have reliable and very cost-effective routes by which we can deploy that capital.
Ian Cornelius: Going back to your original question, I think that the industry is moving in the right direction. The Mansion House accord had 17 signatories and we are seeing the right moves.
Steve Darling (Torbay) (LD)
Q
Ian Cornelius: There is no doubt that there is detail to work through across the whole Bill. One of the really interesting areas will be the interaction of targeted support and default solutions. There is now a consultation on targeted support, being led by the Financial Conduct Authority. That opens up lots of opportunities to provide an enhanced level of support to people who cannot afford to take advice. The fact is that financial advice is only available to about 9% of the population. Nearly all our members cannot afford to take financial advice, so they need that enhanced level of support, either to check that they are making the right choices—“Is the default solution the right one for me?”—or because they might have circumstances that mean that they want to explore something different. Targeted support is very welcome, and we look forward to engaging with the Pensions Regulator and FCA in making that a reality and making it work for low and moderate earners.
Patrick Heath-Lay: I am probably going to sound quite boring, but this is an area in which value for money and making sure the solutions are developed in the right way to support consumers can be really quite effective.
Mr Bedford
Q
Patrick Heath-Lay: The Government have put forward a default consolidator model. We are completely supportive of that; we think it is the right solution to tidy up the 13 million small deferred pots that are out there and those that are being created on a daily basis. That model has been done with extensive consultation with the industry.
To go back to the first question, which was about all the different options that have been considered before, we do think that this is the right approach. A couple of things around it are critical. First, we need to make sure that the technical solutions—the IT capability or infrastructure—should be as efficient as possible. We are contributing to the various pieces of research being done at the moment to evaluate which models are in existence and ready to be utilised. There is no doubt that the dashboard will contain some elements that will be helpful, such as a pension finder, that will be helpful, and I suspect that they will utilise pieces of that technology. But I do think—and I suspect the conclusion will be—that we need something new. Some of the expertise in the industry can be leveraged. I suspect that that is expertise that our organisations can provide. Given that we have already addressed the big pension savings gap for savers, we can help to develop that model.
On whether the solution is doable within the timeframe, 2030 is a big ask, but we should have that target to go after. We should try to be in a position where default consolidators exist in the market, we are developing the solution and we are able to solve the problem, because the number of small pots being created almost daily by the industry is a big problem for savers.
Ian Cornelius: I agree with Patrick. It is a problem that needs fixing. We also support the default consolidator approach. The sequencing is sensible: we want scheme consolidation first and then small pots, because there is no point in going through the complexity of consolidating small pots before consolidating at the scheme level. Dashboards will help, but they will not solve the problem. A solution is required, because this is driving a lot of cost and a lot of complexity. It would be nice if it were sooner than 2030. Given the ambition of the Bill as a whole, I think that that is probably realistic, but it does need to come after scheme consolidation, as I say.
Patrick Heath-Lay: The requirements on those organisations that choose to apply to be default consolidators need to be of a good standard. Our organisations operate a single-pot model. Whenever anyone rejoins from a different employer, their money goes into exactly the same pension pot. That is not a common model across the industry. Things like that should be thought through when defining the requirements for being a consolidator. Those that wish to apply need to hit a good regulatory standard to ensure that value is delivered through those models.
David Pinto-Duschinsky
Q
Patrick Heath-Lay: As a package, the Bill brings forward the concept of value for money in a general sense. We need to move the conversation in our industry, particularly the conversation around workplace pensions, to the subject of value. We are all here to deliver value for members. The bit that always gets a lot of conversation is what value really means, but you cannot walk past the three fundamental drivers of a pension proposition, which are the investment return we give our members, what we charge them for it, and how our service shows up for them, probably in those moments of truth when they need us for guidance. Those are the three core elements to value, which we should not walk past.
We see this as an incredibly important area. I certainly believe that we should try to get this right as an industry, as best we can, from day one, because I think that it will be an important measure that we—regulators, Government, everyone—will lean on to understand how these reforms are playing through.
As an organisation, we have led a pound-for-pound initiative that others have joined. We brought in expertise from Australia, which is about 20 years ahead of us, and brought together a group of providers that are effectively going to dry-run some value for money measures and utilise that concept to provide some findings to regulators and Government that will hopefully help the iteration of our value for money framework. We really do see this framework as an important area, and I would like to see those three elements at its core.
Ian Cornelius: The focus on value has to be the right thing for our members. That is what they care about; that is what we are here for. There is some complexity to work through, such as how you measure value and what timeline you measure it over. Quite lot of engagement is required. We are piloting and trialling it; we almost certainly will not get it right the first time. It will be important to make it as practical and simple as possible. As Patrick said, it has real potential, in combination with the rest of the Bill, to shift the focus from cost to value. In the past, there has undoubtedly been too much focus on cost and not enough on value.
Kirsty Blackman
Q
Ian Cornelius: It is definitely desirable. One of the challenges with auto-enrolment is—it is a positive and a negative—that people are not engaged. Inertia has worked really well, but you have to work to engage them to make sure they are contributing the right amount, thinking about what they will need in retirement and thinking about their circumstances. For example, at NEST, only 40% of our members are registered with us online, so we have a really big job to play to engage more of them, get them to register, and get them accessing the tools and support that are available to deliver the best outcome for them. It is our fiduciary duty to do that. There is a lot more that we can, need and want to do in that space. Guided retirement is a big step forward. Targeted support would be helpful. There is a big challenge for the whole industry there.
Patrick Heath-Lay: I agree. As this unwinds, we should think a little bit more about how engagement will help. It certainly is a big driver. Both the introduction of these propositions and the guidance and targeted support we can provide through those processes will be important, but we also have to accept that even in the most mature economies’ pension systems, people still do not engage very closely on this. Even when they do, they find it incredibly difficult to interpret what they are being told. How many people can do good compound interest calculations, for example? It is sometimes mind-boggling what we expect people to know. There has to be more onus on us through those processes, as an industry, for the guidance that we provide and the obligation on us to enable effective, accountable support to be there. There is much more, and this Bill goes a long way to enable us to do that.
Kirsty Blackman
Q
Ian Cornelius: Having a strong pipeline of investable assets is key. There is no doubt about that. Patrick touched on this earlier: one other inhibitor has been cost. It is actually quite expensive to invest in private assets. One of the things that NEST does successfully is to drive that cost down, but that is a barrier. The focus on cost rather than value in the past made it harder. The Bill shifts the focus towards value, which will be really helpful. There are a number of challenges that the bigger you are, the easier it is to work through. The Bill as a whole will therefore definitely be helpful, but collaboration with Government and across industry should help to unlock more of those attractive private market opportunities.
Patrick Heath-Lay: I have previously discussed this with the Minister. There is a role for Government to play here. It was even acknowledged within the Mansion House accord that this is for the benefit of savers, and there is a role for all of us to play in finding those efficient routes to deploy that investment through. The problem right now is not whether there is investment to come; there is. The Mansion House accord has created that. There is a wall of capital potentially available. The issue is connecting it in the right way with the investable opportunities—not only the planning and whatever is needed to create those investment opportunities in the first place, but the routes of access and the investment vehicles used. There are further conversations to be had about how we can do that as an industry. Efficient deployment is probably the biggest challenge for us as an asset owner in ensuring that we are sharing that benefit back with members.
John Milne
Q
Ian Cornelius: That is where we welcome the Pensions Commission. It has been set up to actively look at adequacy: what is right, and are people saving enough? There is no doubt that many people are not saving enough and there are a lot of people who are still excluded from retirement savings. There is a big issue and challenge with the self-employed. There is a challenge for the industry and the Government to work on, but the Pensions Commission creates the right environment to do that. Auto-enrolment has been a big success, but it is only a job half done. Completing that job through the Pensions Commission is incumbent upon the Government and industry.
John Milne
Q
Patrick Heath-Lay: I completely agree with what Ian just said. The review is the right way, and we need to look at the interaction between saving rates, state pension and the general economic conditions. One thing that we were concerned about with the Bill is this. There is a lot in here that is trying to create better value in the industry as a result of the transformation, but what we have very much seen over the last few years is the rise of retail consolidators, which encourage people to consolidate their lost pensions towards them and effectively put their pensions on their phone. They have taken control of that future. That is a positive thing in terms of people acting and doing something about the number of small pots they have. The issue is that the Bill ignores the rise of that market.
From our own research, we know people are consistently moving their pensions to these types of vehicles, which are much more expensive and, for an average earner, effectively mean that they will retire three or four years later than they could have done, because the value delivered through those models is not going to be anywhere near the level of the competitive workplace market as it operates today. We would like to see the extension of value for money and those types of issues into that market as soon as possible, as there are some bad outcomes where well-meaning people are trying to do the right things and do not understand the consequences of what they are doing. There is not sufficient obligation on providers in that market to make those people aware of the consequences of their actions.
Ian Cornelius: I wholly welcome the Bill. It will increase and improve standards across the workplace pensions market—but only across the workplace pensions market. The pensions landscape is already pretty complicated with contract-based schemes, trust-based schemes and personal pensions. Consumers do not understand the differences between those—and why should they? The fact that the changes only apply to workplace schemes, and that things such as value for money do not apply across personal pensions, is an issue for consumers. They will be confused and will not necessarily make the right decisions. We need to think about how the landscape can be equalised and made as simple and clear as possible for consumers.
The Chair
Thank you very much. That completes the questions from Members. I thank the witnesses for their attendance and evidence this afternoon.
Examination of Witness
Tim Fassam gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from Tim Fassam, director of public affairs at Phoenix Group. We have until 3.45 pm for this panel. Will the witness please briefly introduce himself for the record?
Tim Fassam: I am Tim Fassam from Phoenix Group. We are one of the country’s leading pension and long-term savings providers. We look after about £290 billion for our 12 million customers across a range of brands, most famously for Standard Life. We are a major player in the workplace automatic enrolment market as well as the bulk-purchase annuity market for DB schemes. We are also proud of our history as a consolidator of historical private pensions.
We have been passionate about the investment agenda. Our chairman, Sir Nicholas Lyons, took a year out of being chairman of Phoenix to be Lord Mayor, and the Lord Mayor who co-ordinated the Mansion House compact, which we were supportive of. We were also heavily involved in the development of the Mansion House accord. In order to facilitate that, we worked with the leading asset manager Schroders to create a joint venture called Future Growth Capital to deliver private market investments that are specifically designed for the pension market. We have made an initial commitment of £2.5 billion to that and are looking to invest up to £10 billion over the next five years. This is an agenda that we think is incredibly important, and we are very supportive of the focus that Parliament is giving this Bill.
Mark Garnier
Q
Tim Fassam: The short answer is yes, we are big fans of the value for money framework, but it is worth thinking about why that is. When we are looking at why we have not had the investment that we would necessarily expect, and that we see in other similar countries—so, exposure to private markets and exposure to productive assets—we think there are roughly three groups of reasons. Some are cultural and have been helped by things such as the accord and the compact. Some are regulatory, and that will be a major topic of conversation in this Committee. But some are market, and the market challenges are really around who is the buyer of automatic enrolment pensions. That is usually the employer.
Historically, we have seen most employers focus on the charge, and the charge alone. That means we are now seeing charges well below the price charge cap for automatic enrolment, which is a good thing for consumers, but it is at such a low level that it is very hard to offer more enhanced investment solutions, so that means they tend to be invested in more passive investments and trackers. The value for money framework is important because it should have an impact on those purchasers, making it easier for them to see a more holistic view of the value that they are getting from the pension that is being offered to them, in terms of investment, service and a wider range of metrics. We are not sure it is perfect, as currently developed, but it is certainly in the right direction.
Mark Garnier
Q
Where I begin to get slightly confused is that it then switches to member satisfaction surveys. I am curious as to what the member is. You raised the very good point that the customer is the business, but that is not the same as the member. Who is being asked whether they are investing in the right assets? That is quite a technical question by the time you start looking all of this. Can you see that there are anomalies and Gordian knots within this?
Tim Fassam: There is certainly a lot of detail to be worked through. That will include understanding the impact of all these factors. For example, investment return will be an incredibly important part of the value-for-money framework. It is very hard to do forward-looking investment return analysis, but if you do backward-looking, you cement the best of what we have today. The premise of the Bill is that we want to see a different investment pattern going forward. It will be very hard to, say, model a higher allocation to private markets in a forward-looking metric unless we have some creative thinking. Getting those investment metrics right is absolutely critical.
Service does matter to customers in terms of how easy it is to deal with and how much support they are getting to make good investment decisions. That will have a significant impact. When you combine it with things like the potential for targeted support, that could make a very significant difference in terms of the outcomes that the consumers get. We always think of the end customer being the individual. We have a close and important working relationship with the employer, and they are often working with employee benefit consultants to choose their scheme, but the most important stakeholder in all of this is the end user. We want them to get the best possible result to help them prepare for retirement.
Mark Garnier
Q
Tim Fassam: We are certainly concerned about the intermediate rating and the risk that that could cause a cliff edge if it means that, to get an intermediate rating, you are effectively closed for new business and potentially existing new joiners for a new firm. We think an intermediate rating that aligns with delivering value, but with a warning light that gives the firm a couple of years to get back into high value for money, will stop the perverse consequences. What I mean by perverse consequences is that if the cost of underperformance is significantly higher than the benefit of outperformance, you will see everyone herding in the middle. That will mean that you may well get a better outcome than today, but you will not get the competitive pressure to be the best of the best, which I think will see the better outcome in the longer term.
Mark Garnier
Q
Tim Fassam: Your value for money rating will be published.
Mark Garnier
Q
Tim Fassam: If you see very strong market or regulatory consequences for hitting an intermediate rating, the focus will be on not being intermediate rather than on being the best that you can be. We would like to see a focus on delivering the best value for money that you can.
Luke Murphy
Q
Tim Fassam: That is a very good question. One of the things that makes the Bill powerful but more complex is the number of elements that interact. Eventually, we hope, it makes the whole greater than the sum of its parts, but it does mean it is critical that you get the ordering right. For example, we need the value for money framework and transfer without consent as soon as possible, so that we are able to get in good shape for the 2030 scale test—so those deadlines brought forward. Small pots are part of that scale: we are seeing thousands of new small pots generated every year, so the quicker we can get on with managing small pots, the fewer of them there will be for us to manage going forward.
It is critical to think very carefully about the staging and phasing of the various elements of the Bill. That is the point we are trying to make. On the elements that help the market get to where we hope to get to by 2030, we need to get in as swiftly as possible, with enough time after the detail is in place for the industry to implement. I appreciate it looks like we are asking for things to be slowed down and sped up, but it is just making sure the ordering is correct and we have enough time to get into good shape for that 2030 deadline.
We think the scope should be extended partly because of how supportive we are of the measures. Being a historical consolidator of private pensions, we have millions of customers who are not workplace customers but who could benefit from being transferred into a more modern, larger scale scheme and from going into a consolidator of small pots, for example. We see that value in our own book. We look at the opportunity and think, “We wish we could do that for this group of customers. They would really benefit.”
The pensions market is quite complex, as others have pointed out. It is contract-based and trust-based. You also have workplace and private pensions. The more consistent we can be across all the different types of customer, who often do not think of themselves as being any different from each other, the more coherent a scheme we are likely to get at the end result.
Luke Murphy
Q
Tim Fassam: We see it predominantly as opportunity. We are not saying that the rules necessarily need to change. We are just saying these new opportunities should be extended to a wider group of available schemes, but the infrastructure we are putting in place regarding workplace auto-enrolment savers can be utilised across the piece.
Steve Darling
Q
Tim Fassam: I think eating an elephant is a very good way of putting it. I think £1,000 is certainly a good place to start. This will be an incredibly valuable part of the pensions ecosystem, but it will be complex and getting it right will require a lot of thought and a lot of close working between Government regulators and industry. Having that narrow and focused scope allows us to get it in place and get it working; then it would be perfectly reasonable to look at the level at a later date. For the time being, I think that is a very clear cohort of individuals who are likely to benefit from consolidation, because at the moment they are in uneconomic pools.
Kirsty Blackman
Q
Tim Fassam: That is another very good question. As the previous witnesses said, it is important to ensure that there is a pipeline of assets coming to us. A lot of what the Government are doing with the national wealth fund and the British Business Bank is helping with that. We would like to see—we would say this, wouldn’t we?—a little more focus on insurance versus banks. Banks are a vital form of capital—I am absolutely not suggesting they are not—but there is a skew towards banks. A few more insurance experts in the national wealth fund, and ensuring we have that pipeline of investable assets, could be valuable.
We are very lucky in the UK that we have fantastic start-ups, and amazing universities that are generating brilliant ideas. What we really need is scale-up capital. At the moment, about 70% of firms that need major scale-up capital go overseas for it, and then their head office moves. We need to make sure that we have an attractive environment for those firms to stay in the UK, and that is where scale comes in. A number of witnesses have talked about the benefits of economies of scale and professional asset management capability. That is absolutely right; they are critical benefits. One of the less discussed benefits is if you want to—
The Chair
Order. I apologise for the interruption, but that brings us to the end of the time allotted for the Committee to ask questions of this witness. On behalf of the Committee, I thank the witness for their evidence this afternoon.
Examination of Witnesses
Michelle Ostermann and Morten Nilsson gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear evidence from Michelle Ostermann, chief executive officer of the Pension Protection Fund, and Morten Nilsson, executive director and CEO of Brightwell. We have until 4.15 pm for this panel. Will the witnesses please briefly introduce themselves for the record?
Morten Nilsson: I am the CEO of Brightwell. We administer 380,000 members and about £35 billion of assets. Our largest client is the BT pension scheme, which we manage end to end.
Michelle Ostermann: I am the chief executive of the Pension Protection Fund. We were created by legislation in 2004; we have been in existence for 20 years. We manage a little less than Brightwell does, £30 billion. We are effectively a monitor of the entire DB system. We protect and backstop £1 trillion in it, pay compensation to almost half a million members, and enable the industry in general.
Mark Garnier
Q
Morten Nilsson: I see it as a good thing. I think it will change the pension industry quite a bit as a positive innovation. Closed DB schemes, which we focus on, might be seen more as an asset for sponsors, rather than a liability that they would like to get rid of as quickly as possible. I think that it will create quite a lot of innovation, and a lot of good things will come out of that.
Mark Garnier
Q
Morten Nilsson: I see it pretty much as you described. The main duty of the sponsors and the trustees is to ensure that there is enough money in the scheme to pay the benefits that were promised to members. If there are excess funds, it is reasonable that they can be invested back into the economy. In May, we surveyed 100 finance directors who are responsible for schemes with over £500 million of assets: 93% of them said that they would want to access the surplus, 49% said they would reinvest it in their local business, in the UK, to create jobs and do other good things, 44% said they would consider sharing it with members, 42% said they would invest it in their global operations, 40% said they would pay it back to shareholders, and 33% would invest it in DC. That is quite a wide range of uses. I think some of it will be paid back to shareholders, which may be local or abroad, but I expect a lot of it would be invested back into the UK economy in one way or another.
Mark Garnier
Q
Michelle Ostermann: Obviously, just as you describe, because we backstop the entire industry, what we are watching most closely is the fundedness of schemes, combined with the credit quality or the covenant, and the financial stability of the organisation itself. Those two combined are what help us to assess industry-wide risk and determine how much reserve we need to set aside for future claims on the PPF.
There is a spectrum of schemes out there, clearly—some that are very well funded, which you have been speaking of, and several that are not as well funded. On that spectrum, our focus is on the left side tail—the ones that are most underfunded, or nearing the potential to be underfunded. Given the measures that are being discussed for the release of surplus, we at the PPF feel comfortable with it not imposing a material amount of risk to us, as it is currently defined. It seems to find a nice prudent balance between allowing some flexibility for sponsors to use that money in hopefully a productive way, combined with the test to make sure they do not fall below a certain level, which would bring risk upon the industry and the PPF. We have been a constant participant in that conversation, and we would like to suggest that we will continue to play that role as a surveyor of the net residual impact to the industry.
Mark Garnier
Q
Michelle Ostermann: Yes—it is very similar.
Mark Garnier
And you war game it?
Michelle Ostermann: Yes. The biggest variable that we have a hard time predicting in those scenarios is the likelihood of this being used and the manner in which it is used, but we test deep into the tail. We try several scenarios that give us a high probability of it being abused or overused, and the opposite, and we have come out with pretty strong confidence. As it is defined today, we feel comfortable.
Mark Garnier
Q
Michelle Ostermann: Not here in the UK, but as you can tell by my accent, I am not a local. I worked in Canada for most of my career, at two of the largest Canadian “Maple Eight” pension plans, and those are things that we would assess quite regularly. In fact, the open DB schemes here in the UK function very similarly to those in Canada. I joined the PPF in large part because it is a mini-version of the Canadian model. It is exceptionally similar, to me. You will notice that during the liquidity crisis that occurred it was the liability-driven investment strategies, with the degree of leverage, that were most at risk, and it was interest rate-sensitive. Those open DB schemes that were using a more balanced degree of risk, including some equity risk, were unencumbered. It was Railpen, which I worked for when I was here previously. I was phoning back to my peers both there and at the universities superannuation scheme and PPF, and they all withstood that very well.
Mark Garnier
Q
Michelle Ostermann: It is definitely something that was on our radar. When we build the investment strategy for an open DB scheme, such as those I described, it is quite different and less susceptible to that type of risk.
Steve Darling
Q
Michelle Ostermann: I assume you are speaking of our levy?
Steve Darling
Yes.
Michelle Ostermann: We have several types of levies that support our organisation. If I may, I will just take a step back to help everyone to understand what role they play.
The PPF is not terribly well understood because we are a bit unique in this industry and there are only half a dozen bodies like us in the world. The UK is one of the few countries that have a protection fund such as this. In some ways we back as an insurer in that we collect premiums or levies from the industry from the 5,000 corporate DB schemes and backstop 9 million potential future members that still sit in those schemes. We collect the levies and hold them in reserve much like an insurance company. We are not an insurance company, but we do so much like they would mathematically and with similar models.
At the same time, if a corporation fails, we take its pension scheme, which is usually underfunded, and its orphan members and put them into a pension scheme. We are both a pension manager and an insurer of sorts. When there is a failure and a scheme comes to us with insufficient assets to make good on its pension liabilities, we take some of our reserves almost as a claim, and move them over to the pension fund so that it is fully funded at all times using a largely liability-driven investment-type strategy. The levies that we collect are twofold: first we collect a levy related to the risk of the industry. You may be familiar with our purple book and the industry-wide assessment we do. We monitor the risk of that entire complicated £1 trillion industry to decide how much to set aside as reserves.
Our reserves are often referred to as a surplus, but they are not a surplus; they are reserves sitting there for potential claims in 50, 80 or 100 years. We will be the last man standing in this industry. We are here as an enduring and perpetual solution. As long as there is DB in the industry, we will have to backstop it. We set aside those reserves for the 9 million members and current £1 trillion in case of future market environments that we cannot predict today. Those levies have been collected over 20 years from the constituents of that industry. We have collected just over £10 billion from that levy system and have paid out £9.5 billion of it as claims to the pension fund.
As those levies were coming in over that 20-year period we were investing them in an open DB growth-type strategy. As such, we have built up £14 billion of reserves and so now consider ourselves largely self-funding. We no longer need to collect that levy from the industry now that those reserves are sitting there—in so far as we can best tell with our models today. We prefer to reserve the right to turn it back on should we need it in the case of a market correction event, some unforeseen circumstance or an evolution in the industry. However, right now, those fees are no longer required by us; it is a risk assessment that is suggesting that.
Mr Bedford
Q
Michelle Ostermann: We have thought a fair bit about that. We do not see very many scenarios in which we would need to turn it on, although it is always difficult to predict. As you know, the industry evolves in many ways and over the 20 years we have seen quite an evolution, including the creation of new alternative covenant schemes and commercial consolidators. We will backstop those as well, and we will need to charge a levy for them. There could be an unforeseen market event, similar to that just described, so we need the ability to turn the levy back on—simply to keep it as a lever. Today, the legislation reads that if we were to lower it to 0%, we can only increase it year on year by 25%. However, 25% of zero is zero, so we are a bit cornered. We have asked for a measure that would allow us to increase it by as much as a few hundred million a year. The most we have ever charged in one year was just over £500 million.
As I said, we have collected £10 billion gradually over many years. The new measure allows us to increase it by no more than 25% of the ceiling number every year, which is currently £1.4 billion. That means we could go up as much as £350 million in a single year, if needs be. However, we are a very patient long-term investor. Even though we are taking on closed corporate DB schemes, we run it as if we were an open scheme, because we are open to new members all the time. As such, our investment strategy does most of the heavy lifting for our organisation now.
On our £14 billion reserves, we make over £1 billion a year in gains from that investment strategy, which funds the £1 billion we pay out in the pension scheme to members. We are now a mature organisation that should be able to maintain a steady state. The most we would be able to increase the levy by in one year is £350 million, but we would expect to be patient, wait a few years, and try to ride out the situation not needing it, only turning it back on should we need it. We consult before we turn it on and we take a lot of feedback on this. We are quite thoughtful, as we have always been, and I hope people agree.
Mr Bedford
Q
Michelle Ostermann: The biggest example is a macroeconomic shock that would affect the solvency of corporations. The failure of the corporation itself is more likely to have an impact than just a change in interest rates or equity markets. The change in interest rates can affect the fundedness of a scheme, but many of those schemes, over 75% of them now, are actually really well funded. And they have pretty well locked down their interest rate risk because they have put a good chunk of assets against their liabilities in a fairly tight hedge. Although we saw, as a result of the liquidity crisis a few years ago now, that things can change. The degree of risk, specifically leverage risk inside some of those strategies, does make them fallible. I would say the biggest shocks would be massive interest rate movements that are unforeseen, a very significant macroeconomic environment causing failure in many corporations, and technically, even a significant move in equity markets, but we would usually just ride that out. Markets can go down 20% or 30%. We would only go down 10% or 15% and we would be able to recover that in under five years, historically speaking.
John Milne
Q
Michelle Ostermann: We have been progressing on this quite a bit lately. It is one of the most prevalent discussions, both with our board and with our members. We speak very often with the entirety of the industry. Several are very strong advocates for it as well, a few of which are here today, and we have taken quite a bit of humble feedback. We have worked as best we can with the Work and Pensions Committee to estimate a significantly complex set of potential scenarios for making good on historical indexation needs for pre-’97. They range in price, are quite expensive and would require us to incur or crystallise a liability. They are not cheap. It would be difficult for both us and the Government to be able to afford. The taxpayer would have an implication to some of these, depending on how they are formed, and it is beyond our prerogative to make that decision but we have been facilitating and encouraging it to be made. We would welcome progress on that. I understand, in fact, an amendment was tabled earlier today in that regard, so I was warmed by that.
John Milne
Q
Michelle Ostermann: To clarify the word “using”, as I think it is important, the PPF is an arm’s length body and those assets are ringfenced. Our board has independence over those. It was set up that way—arm’s length—20 years ago to make sure that it was a dedicated protection fund for that industry. It so happens that we do fall under some of the fiscal measures, so both our assets and liabilities do show. However, there is a bit of a conflict there in that we manage them in the prudent, almost in a trusteed fashion, on behalf of our members and all of our stakeholders. But the use of them would have to be prescribed by the board, legislated, and then approved by the board for its affordability, so as to not put at risk the rest of the industry that we are backstopping.
The ability for us to be able to afford that and the risk to the organisation is the primary, most sacrosanct thing that our board does. We have very complicated actuarial models to figure out the affordability of all the risks that we take on in the entire industry. That is why we have gone through quite a bit of work to build, just recently, a much more sophisticated model to estimate both the asset and liability implication to us and have even started to form a plan for how we might implement it. So we stand at the ready, but it is beyond our responsibility to be able to legislate the necessary change for it.
Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)
Q
Michelle Ostermann: That is fascinating. I came to the UK, and back to the UK, because I have so much enthusiasm for the UK and the pension system. I am very fortunate to be the chair of the global pension industry association, so I study pension systems around the world and am quite familiar with many of them. The UK pension system is the second largest in the world by size if you include underfunded pensions. It is one of the most sophisticated, but it is the second most disaggregated. As I think a few of my peers mentioned before we got up here, it has fallen behind, frankly. I think the motives that are in this Bill are exceptionally important—they are foundational. I love that we are speaking on scale and sophistication. These are absolutely key, in both DB and DC. I want to underscore that; it is really key.
One thing that is not spoken of quite as much is the concept of an asset owner and the importance of governance. In relation to the successful countries that I have seen, which have mastered the art of pensions and the ability to translate pensions into growth, it is not a proven model, but there is a best practice such that countries are able to make growth by leveraging pension systems. I think that right now we are trying to solve a problem of two things: reshaping the pension system and trying to solve the need for a growth initiative. They are one thing in my mind; they really are one thing. It is not a surprise that as we have de-risked the pension system over two decades, it has, I suspect, quite directly, but at least indirectly, affected overall economic growth.
Making members wealthier pensioners in general and less dependent on social services is what many countries are trying to do and use their pension systems for. I see that out of the commission that is being started, so I am most excited about the next phase. I think there is a lot of potential, and we at the PPF are doing quite a bit of research and want to be able to feed some global ideas into that.
Morten Nilsson: I come from Denmark originally and I think, to echo some of what Michelle said, scale just matters in pensions. The Danish pension industry has been fortunate to have few and relatively large schemes. One of the things I saw when I came over to the UK 15 years ago was that the industry here is very fragmented, and that fragmentation means also that there are so many conflicts of interest in the market. That in a way makes it quite hard to get the best outcomes, and that of course leads into the governance models that Michelle talks about. So this Bill is something we very much welcome across what it is covering. I think it is a really good initiative, but I think scale matters, and governance really matters. I would not underestimate how big a change it is, in the defined benefit sector, that we are moving from two decades of worrying about deficit into suddenly worrying about surpluses and having very mature schemes, which is the other thing that is important. Most of the DB schemes are closed.
If I talk about the BT pension scheme, the average age is 71, so they are pretty old members and that means there is a risk level, from an investment perspective, that really matters. We are paying out £2.8 billion a year in member benefits. That means liquidity is really important. It is really important that we have the money to pay the members and that we do not end up being a distressed seller of assets.
So there is quite a lot in that evolution we are on, and when we go into surplus management or excess funds—Michelle was talking about this at macro level; we would be managing at our micro level in each scheme— I think it becomes really critical that we have the right governance to manage what is a new era. I would really recommend that the Pensions Regulator issue guidance as soon as possible on all this, because it will be quite uncomfortable for a lot of trustees. It will be quite difficult also for the advisers in how we manage this new era.
David Pinto-Duschinsky
Q
Conversations that I have had also flag up the importance of culture among trustees. We can give people the tools, the powers and the permission to invest, and we can be clear in the framework we set up, but, culturally, they may still be very risk averse. Of course, some of that is appropriate because they have to safeguard member benefits, but there is a point about whether they are overly cautious and about how one creates the appropriate culture to go with the change. From your perspective, what is needed to create the right culture to go alongside the right governance?
Michelle Ostermann: I have one small observation from when I first came to the UK. I recognise that there is a very strong savings culture, but not necessarily an investment culture, and there is a distinct difference there. I even notice the difference when we talk about productive finance targets. We speak in terms of private assets, but there is a difference between private equity and private debt, and between infrastructure equity and infrastructure lending. All those lending capabilities are here in this country. I feel that the debt sophistication is strong, but where it lacks is the equity.
I am a Canadian. With one of the largest Canadian schemes, we had no problem coming in and buying up assets here in the UK—you may have noticed. We own a lot of it, and with Australia, most of it. The supply was never an issue for us. We brought the scale and sophistication, but what we did not have was a local British anchor. We did not have an anchor investor. We did not have a home-grown Ontario Teachers, a Canada Pension Plan or even an ATP that we could use as the local one. I see that the PPF, NEST and Brightwell can be that. We are still not megafunds. I know that we are referred to as behemoths and megafunds at £30 billion and £60 billion, but the peers with £100 billion, £200 billion and £500 billion are those that are putting in £0.5 billion or £1 billion in one investment. They are not lending, but investing.
That is the biggest difference I notice: the definition of scale and the degree of sophistication. It is even about sophistication in the governance model, and having a board and a management team with that sophistication. It is about having a management team with some power that you are hiring out of investment, and being a not-for-profit and an arm of the Government that is allowed to put in that sophisticated capability, with a board that can properly oversee it so it is not done without proper consideration.
Morten Nilsson: I think it is quite critical that you have trustee boards that are supported well by regulation and guidance, as we talked about before. It would also be helpful to start to focus on the management teams that are supporting the trustees. Cultural change is always very difficult. We must acknowledge that we are coming out of a situation that was really quite difficult for a lot of trustees and sponsors in terms of finding out how to fix the big deficits that schemes had. We must acknowledge that that is where we are coming from and that is the mentality we have had for decades. Regulation and guidance is still all over the place, and we must work through how we move that forward. I really recommend more guidance from TPR and, sooner rather than later, more guidance on surplus extraction. That would help a lot of trustees to take more risk and think in a more balanced way about risks.
Of course, if we are considering allowing excess funding to go back, we need to ensure that we are doing that on a prudent and well-considered basis. It is an educational challenge more than anything, but it is also about the advisers. The market really needs to get comfortable with investing for the longer term. Within that, it is critical that we move away from being obsessed with a mark-to-market, day-to-day obligation. We measure our liabilities on one day of the year and then we might panic if there is a little swing in the market, but we are actually working through quite a long horizon and therefore we can smooth that out in a different way. We need to think about how we look through some of these blips.
The Chair
If there are no further questions from Members, I thank the witnesses for their evidence. We will move to the next panel. Thank you very much indeed.
Examination of Witnesses
Chris Curry and William Wright gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from Chris Curry, director of the Pensions Policy Institute, and William Wright, managing director of New Financial. We have until 4.45 pm for this panel. Would the witnesses kindly introduce themselves?
Chris Curry: Good afternoon. My name is Chris Curry, and I am director of the Pensions Policy Institute. The PPI is the leading UK research organisation working in pensions and retirement income, with a remit to provide an evidence base, analysis and data across all pensions issues.
William Wright: Good afternoon. Thank you for the opportunity to be with you today. My name is William Wright. I am the founder and managing director of New Financial, a think-tank that makes the case for bigger and—crucially—better capital markets across the UK and Europe.
Mark Garnier
Q
Chris Curry: We heard a little about that from the previous witness, who I think also has first-hand experience of the Canadian investment models, but there are a number of different reasons. First, there is the aggregation in the system that was talked about; the UK has a very fragmented pensions system. There are a number of different large sectors, but each large sector is not large internationally speaking. Scheme maturity, scheme size and scale generally are a factor. Very few individual schemes have the scale and the amount of assets to invest large-scale in some of the UK opportunities in the way that Canadian schemes have invested on a large scale—as has been said. Half a billion pounds to £1 billion in a single investment is very large by UK standards, compared with the size of schemes.
There is also, because of that lack of scale, a lack of development of the expertise required by some of those specialists—sophistication has also been mentioned—across some of the different individual schemes that we have in the UK. If you are larger, you can afford to have those specialist management teams or specialists on the board. It is not such a proportionate cost as it would be to a relatively small scheme.
Cost is another factor. As we heard from previous witnesses, in the UK a lot of focus on schemes has been on the cost of providing a scheme; in the workplace especially, by default a lot of competition is based on cost. With some of the opportunities we are talking about, especially in productive finance, in the UK space, investing in the UK would come at a high cost, so there is less scope for that cost to be absorbed in an overall larger fund. A lot of the things that the Bill is trying to address are probably some of the reasons why we have not seen that UK investment up until this point.
Mark Garnier
Q
William Wright: Certainly on the derisking side, while we are blessed to have the second or third largest pool of pensions assets in the world, the structure of our pensions system—the fact that so many DB schemes have closed or are running off—means that the overall risk appetite simply is not there. There is a danger in this debate of comparing the outcomes that we see in different types of pension fund systems around the world and thinking, “We like the look of that. Can we have a bit of that, please?” I am simplifying here, but we tend not to be too keen on looking at the inputs and the decisions, often taken 20, 30 or 40 years ago in different markets around the world, that have helped to lead to the development of those systems as they are today. The Canadian public sector defined-benefit model did not happen overnight. Michelle knows the history of it better than I do, but it goes well back into the 1980s. That is why so many of the aspects of the Bill should be welcomed. They look at the fundamental drivers of what will help to define pension fund outcomes for members and the structure of our system in 10, 20 or 30 years’ time.
On how other systems think about pension systems in relation to growth and economic wellbeing in their domestic markets, one of the things that we found particularly striking is that when you compare DC pensions in the UK with DC systems in other countries, or public sector DB in the UK with public sector DB in other countries, there tends to be, for DC pensions in other countries, a higher domestic bias. There tends to be more investment, whichever way you look at it, in their domestic equity market than we see from UK DC pensions in the UK equity market. You also see, almost universally, higher levels of investment in private markets. So much of that comes back to scale. Scale is a threshold—it is not enough on its own—and then there is the sophistication, governance and skillset that needs to be built over many years on top of that.
Mark Garnier
Q
William Wright: Yes. As a number of witnesses have mentioned today, because of the structure of the UK pension fund industry, there are many different perspectives, often not entirely aligned, shall we say, with each other. Every participant in the industry has responded perfectly rationally to the incentives in front of them and the regulation behind them in their investment behaviour and risk profile. International accounting standards, rather than just UK standards, have helped to drive that in the private sector. We have seen similar derisking in other corporate DB pension systems around the world. It has been an entirely rational response. It is really interesting to see which elements of which markets around the world seem to have found a more positive response. Canadian public sector DB, the closest comparison to LGPS in this country, is one example. Others are Australian DC or some of the Nordic models—the Swedish and Danish DC models.
Mark Garnier
Q
Chris Curry: First, I agree that we have seen lots of positive response to the value for money framework. Looking across international examples—Australia, in particular—it seems as if it will be very welcome in trying to ensure that, as part of the consolidation and what is potentially coming with the next Pensions Commission, with more investment going into UK pensions, that investment is going into a place that is actually going to work on behalf of the members who are investing their money. That is really important in what we are doing. I would also echo some of the views we heard earlier that it is really important in moving away from just a cost-based analysis of pensions and into value, and in looking at the whole range of different factors that are going to determine whether you get a good outcome rather than just at how much the investment costs.
There are challenges. What we have seen in particular, which Tim mentioned earlier and echoes what we have seen in Australia, is that where you have a very hard measure over a relatively short period of time, that will affect investment behaviour. Because there is such a penalty for falling behind over a short space of time, you do everything you can to avoid falling behind, and there is fairly conclusive evidence that that has led to herding of investments in Australia. That is not to say that a framework, or even an intermediate marker, necessarily has to lead to that; I think that depends on the parameters you set and whether you are looking at the returns over one year, three years or five years, and how that works.
Ideally, recognising that pensions are a long-term investment, you would not want to be looking too much at what happens over a short period of time in investment markets; you would want to be looking over a much longer period and at how the underlying strategy is performing. That is always very difficult, and one of the challenges is trying to get the balance right between what you can measure objectively and what you can measure subjectively. Where you are looking at things like an intermediate report, you tend to be looking at something that is objective, and it is quite difficult to do that over a long period of time. There is always a balance to be struck as part of this, and it would be good to investigate that more as we get further through this process, to work out the best way of doing it in order to achieve the best outcome for members.
Mark Garnier
If I remember rightly, the Bill allows for the detail to come in afterwards, so we will have a bit of work to do when this is all over. Thank you very much.
Torsten Bell
Q
Chris Curry: I listened with interest to some of the earlier witnesses talk about dashboards, and there certainly are some lessons that we can learn from the pensions dashboards programme, as it has been evolving over the past few years, for small pots in particular.
There are two issues that I would pull out. The first is on the technology front. I think someone suggested that the next five years or so could be quite a tight timetable to build a technological solution and get it in place. You have to be very careful—you cannot underestimate just how much complexity there is and how long it takes to do these things—but I would say that the work that we have done on pensions dashboards is giving us a bit of a head start. That is not to say that we necessarily need to build on or use parts of the system that we have already built, but it has helped us understand a lot about, for example, how you can find pensions—the way you can use integrated service providers rather than having to go direct to all the schemes, and use a syndicated model to find where people might have their pensions.
It has helped the industry get a long way down the path to where it needs to be, as well. One of the big challenges for pensions dashboards is the quality of data. Enabling individuals to find their pensions means data quality: it needs not only to exist and be there; it needs to be accurate and it needs to be up to date. When you are thinking about an automatic consolidator or default consolidator for small pots, that is even more important. You are not just transferring information, but transferring money, so it is really important that the data is high quality. The work that is being done on pensions dashboards will get people in the industry a long way to having part of that in place as well.
There are definitely lessons that can be learned from how we progressed on the pensions dashboards programme. It has got us much closer to where we would be if we had had a completely blank page to start from, but there is still a reasonable amount of work to do, because it is working in a slightly different way.
John Milne
Q
William Wright: I think it is a mix of both. It very much depends on what sort of assets we are talking about. For example, if we are thinking about the UK stock market or domestic equity markets, we tend to see that markets such as Canada and the Netherlands have an even lower allocation to domestic equities, whichever way you look at it, than comparable UK pensions have to the UK market.
Ultimately, this comes down to what you might call the accidental design of the UK system. It has evolved over 20, 30 or 40 years, whereas the systems with which we like to compare the UK system, or large parts of them, were actively designed anything from 30 or 40 to 50 or 60 years ago. We are now seeing the benefits of that active design in those systems. Their focus on scale enables them to invest in a far broader range of assets at a lower unit cost.
Going back to the value for money point, UK pensions have ended up in the worst of both worlds. Fee pressure, particularly in terms of winning and transferring new business between providers, is driving down fees, but the average fees on DC pensions today are very middle of the pack: 45 to 50 basis points a year. That is much higher than much larger schemes in Canada, such as the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, the big Canadian reserve fund, and much higher than large UK schemes, such as the universities superannuation scheme, but they are stuck in the middle: they are actually paying higher fees, but because of the fee pressure they have a very vanilla, almost simple asset allocation. As Tim Fassam from Phoenix pointed out, that tends to steer people towards the lowest cost investment option. Active design, focusing on scale and sophistication, enables pension schemes to take a much longer term and much broader view of what they should invest in and where they should invest in it, whereas in the UK we have tended to accidentally move from one system to another.
John Milne
Q
William Wright: Absolutely. One of the huge challenges in the UK pensions debate over the past 25 or 30 years has been that we sort of knew what was not working and where corporate DB pensions were going to go, and then there was a hiatus and no real active design of what was going to replace them. Auto-enrolment did not start to kick in for a couple of decades, and now we are beginning to see the benefits of that, but the opportunity to actively redesign the structure of the defined-contribution pensions system in this country, and the structure of public sector DB, is long overdue.
The Chair
If there are no further questions, I thank the witnesses very much for their evidence this afternoon. Given that the Committee has been sitting for a couple of hours non-stop, I will suspend the sitting for a brief period.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from Roger Sainsbury, founder member and pensions partner of the Deprived Pensioners Association, and Terry Monk, a member of the Pensions Action Group. We have until 5.15 pm for this panel. Will the witnesses kindly briefly introduce themselves for the record?
Roger Sainsbury: As the Chair said, I am a founding member and the lead organiser of the Deprived Pensioners Association, which was set up for the purpose of fighting for what we loosely know as pre-1997 indexation for Pension Protection Fund members.
Terry Monk: My name is Terry Monk. I have worn various hats over my almost 70 years in the industry. I am probably—with respect to Roger—one of the oldest people in the room. I have been a financial adviser, and I ran a financial services company that was part of Lloyd’s broking group. That group did the first compromise deal to try to save the group and therefore left a lot of its employees, including myself, with hardly any pension. My pension went down from 100% expectation when I was 59 or 60 to just 10% afterwards. Through the restructuring of Bradstock, I joined Independent Trustee Services, part of the Jardine Lloyd Thompson Group—the company that probably saved my life in many ways, and gave me a future. Through that, I became involved with companies that became insolvent.
I then began to work very closely with my colleague Alan Marnes—who is sitting behind me—in the Pensions Action Group, trying to fight for some kind of protection to reverse the disasters that ourselves and our families were facing. That included demonstrations. People ask about the history of the financial assistance scheme and how long FAS has been there. Well, I have brought a picture of my granddaughter when she was young—she is now 22—at one of our demonstrations in Whitehall. FAS started the thing. Alan, John Benson, Phil Jones and the like started the campaign—in Downing Street, on College green and at party conferences—to bring about the compensation that was needed to stop this happening to anybody else.
My take from today is that you guys are all doing what you are doing to make the future work. I am concerned for the people I work with and represent, and I want to make sure that their past is not forgotten, that their pension becomes secure—not one of the future, but one of the past—and that they can rely upon the past. I am afraid I will get emotional at this point— I apologise that I am not doing my introduction; I am doing a speech—because 5,343 FAS members have died since Richard Nicholl and myself gave a presentation to the Work and Pensions Committee. I said to someone just now that my tie is loose because I do not wear ties these days, but I have worn a tie twice in two months at the funerals of founder members of the Pensions Action Group. It just has to stop. I am sorry—I will keep quiet now.
The Chair
Thank you very much indeed. I will go immediately to the shadow Minister, Mark Garnier.
Mark Garnier
Q
Roger Sainsbury: In the light of Terry’s extended life history, I will just add that I am a fellow of the Royal Academy of Engineering and a former president of the Institution of Civil Engineers.
Before I come to your important question, I would like to feel sure that everybody in this room really understands the huge seriousness of the issue we are considering. This business of removing indexation from people who had pensionable service prior to 1997 has been going on for 20 years. Many of the people involved have seen the value of their payments eroded by maybe even more than 50% in that time. It is really very serious.
The second thing I would like to mention is that the scale of the problem is actually greater than the Post Office managers scandal. Of course, I am not suggesting for a moment that any of our claimants is suffering in the appalling way the postmasters did, but the numbers of our people are so huge compared with the postmasters that the actual amount of money at stake is greater. We have 140,000 PPF members who are affected by this bizarre clause of limiting the indexation, 60,000 of whom are 80 and have zero indexation, so it is a truly serious thing.
I would also like to mention one other dimension, which is timing. In our written submission to the Committee, we did not even bother to press the basic argument for why indexation should be awarded; we just focused on timing, because time is absolutely not on our side at all. Our claimants are dying, on average, at the rate of 15 a week—it is probably three while we have been holding this meeting this afternoon—or 5,500 a year. We have been told by the Department that the necessary amendment to the Pensions Act 2004 cannot be made by statutory instrument. There would have to be a new Bill and a new Act, and goodness knows how many years that might take or how many more thousands of people would have died. That is why we are pressing to get an amendment to this Bill to give a more timely answer.
Now I come to your question: what are the main arguments for and against using the reserves to benefit the members? Well, the first argument is simple, but really rather powerful: it is the only purpose that, legally, the PPF is allowed to spend its money on. The Act is very clear: unless some legal judgment was made against them, which is not on the horizon at all at the moment, the only way they are allowed to spend money is either on their own overheads or on giving benefits to members, such as the indexation that we are now talking about.
That is reason No. 1; reason No. 2, in my mind, is that expectations have not been met and promises have not been fulfilled. I go back to the Secretary of State who introduced the Second Reading debate on the 2004 Bill. He pledged that pension promises made, by the original schemes that people were in, must be met—that is, met by the PPF, which is the reason why the PPF was to be, by that Act, created. Yet that has not happened because, somehow, into schedule 7 to the Act came these dreadful words that have had the effect of not permitting the PPF to pay any indexation at all to people for time worked prior to 1997.
The third reason—ultimately, this is the important reason—is that the 140,000 people need this money. They desperately do, some of them. I mean, obviously not everybody’s condition is the same, but a lot of people will be suffering real misery and hardship. They need this money. I ask myself: “Were this Government elected on promises of governing with humanity and compassion? Are this Government going to meet that need? Or are they going to walk by on the other side?” I do not myself believe that they are; I believe that they will come up to the mark and find a way through the perceived difficulties that they have.
I think those are probably sufficient reasons to be going on with; as to the reasons against granting this, frankly, I cannot see any.
Mark Garnier
Q
Roger Sainsbury: Well, if—
Terry Monk: Can I have a go? Alan, who is sitting behind me, and all of us say that we did the right thing at the right time to secure our futures. There was no risk—we were guaranteed there was no risk. The minimum funding requirement was seriously flawed post-Maxwell. That changed it. We were told our pensions were safe. They were no longer safe—I found out to my cost, and many others did, that our pensions were not safe.
If I try to use the argument to our members that are still alive, “We can’t give you these increases because of the national accounts,” they will say, “Hang on, I did the right thing. I was told my pension was safe. I did the right thing all the way along in my life, and I saved for my future—for my comfortable retirement. I did not want to depend upon the state. I wanted to do it for myself. That is what I was proud to do.” To use the argument that the national accounts do not allow these people to get their benefits? I could not use that argument, whatever the reasons might be behind it.
Roger Sainsbury: May I try to answer your question more specifically? I think that indexation would have an impact upon Government finances. The impact would be that cash would flow into the Treasury, because if indexation is permitted and starts to be paid, there will be income tax paid on that money. The money will be going out from the private funds of the PPF, but the income tax and subsequently the VAT on expenditures will be coming into the Treasury coffers. I have yet to meet anybody, other than people in government, who can comprehend how it can be that when the PPF, from its private funds, meets an obligation, which has the incidental effect of bringing cash into the Government coffers, that can at the same time lead to a failure to meet the fiscal rules.
The fiscal rules, incidentally, are set up for a period of four years, when the unravelling of the indexation obligation will take many decades. We have been told in ministerial letters that it has been set up this way with a view to improving transparency. Well, I am sure you have all heard of the fog of war, but I think we are now up against the fog of transparency. I do not think it is real money that the Government are talking about. Even in their own letters, they say it is a statistical way of handling the figures.
The recent Government line on this is that it is the fault—I do not want to put blame on anybody—or the responsibility of the Office for National Statistics, because it was the Office for National Statistics that decreed that the assets and liabilities of the Pension Protection Fund should be counted as part of the public sector national financial liabilities, rather than as part of the public sector net debt, but that decision was made in 2019. We are therefore more inclined to hold responsible the present Chancellor, who, in her Budget of last October, made the decision that, for the Government financial rules, the metric should no longer be the public sector net debt, but the public sector net financial liabilities. It was that that brought the PPF, as it were, on to this part of the playing field.
Mark Garnier
That is very helpful, thank you. I am very conscious that other Members will almost certainly have questions, but I must say that I entirely agree with you that a sum of money set aside for compensation should not be brought into the Government’s balance sheet.
Steve Darling
Q
Terry Monk: We have looked at all sorts of scenarios. I do not know whether Michelle is still here, but the problem is that, although the PPF has done all sorts of “what if” calculations about all sorts of “what ifs”—we have had copies, and the Work and Pensions Committee has had copies—we do know what the “what if” is. We know what our members have lost, but we will not know, until such time as we hear from the Government, what they are proposing. We have offered time and again to meet not just the current Pensions Minister, but previous Pensions Ministers—I have to say that a few of them would not even meet us. This Minister has met us, and he knows the issues, but we do not know what is in the mind of the DWP or the Treasury in dealing with this issue. Once we know that, we will know whether we are fighting or we are working together, and what the answer will be. To answer your question, there is a net effect benefit of paying that amount, but we are in the dark—we do not know how long the bit of string is.
Roger Sainsbury: Incidentally, one of the benefits of the cash coming in, supposing we do get indexation, is that it would at least make a contribution if the Government had decided they were also going to pay money to the FAS members. It would be a contribution to help offset the Treasury payments that would have to be made for the FAS.
Terry has referred to the situation, but I think the key thing is that in 2023 the Select Committee asked the PPF to provide financial estimates for what it would cost to do indexation. The PPF then produced some really excellent tables that showed a number of different hypothetical systems for delivering indexation. It was a bit like a restaurant menu. There was a possibility to have a scheme that would not be hugely beneficial, but that would not cost all that much money to administer, right through the range to a Rolls-Royce scheme, which would obviously cost a lot more money.
We have been asking for RIPA. Just to be absolutely clear, we are not asking for the grim reaper; we have had enough of him already, with people dying. This the bountiful RIPA—retrospective indexation plus arrears. We are pressing for that, but we did not invent it. It was not invented by the DPA. It was part of the menu that the PPF produced, and we merely picked it from the menu. RIPA is reasonably high up the menu, but it is not at the very top. There are other things that we are not asking for that we might have asked for, so we are not being greedy.
With respect to Terry, we are not bothering too much about what is in the PPF’s mind or in the Government’s mind. We are much more concerned with what we are trying to put into their mind. When we decided to go for pushing for RIPA, it was because RIPA is the minimum scheme of indexation that would have the effect of doing away with what is presently a two-tier membership within the PPF. There are two classes of membership: those with indexation and those without. There is nothing in the Bill making any provision for that. It is grossly unfair and it needs to be done away with, and it just happens that the RIPA option is the minimum way of getting rid of that deplorable two-tier membership. I think that gives you perhaps a fuller answer about the situation.
Terry Monk: Are we virtually out of time?
The Chair
We are not quite out of time, but I am going to call other Members to ask questions of the panel. I call Kirsty Blackman.
Kirsty Blackman
Q
Roger Sainsbury: I have to say that there is a great range.
Terry Monk: I cannot remember what it is, but the average FAS member’s pension is something in the order of £4,000 or £5,000 a year, and if you look at the steelworkers, because they are our example, it is those sorts of guys. I worked in the City. I had a different job, but the majority of the people in the scheme had good benefits and good salaries but their pensions were important and they reflected the role they had in their life. I am not sure off the top of my head, but I think the average of the FAS pension is £4,500—some more, some less, obviously.
I want to make a point that I think Roger mentioned: at one stage, we were not at the table to talk as part of the pensions Bill. We lobbied hard. I know some of you have definitely put forward amendments to the pensions Bill to ensure that pre-1997 becomes part of the pensions Bill, which is why we are here today, but we had to work hard just to get that.
Sarah Edwards
Q
Terry Monk: FAS stopped when PPF opened its doors in 2005, so most of the people in FAS did not have much opportunity to accrue any increasing benefits post 1997. The majority of them are old—the average age of the FAS member is now 73, which is much younger than I am. It is that age group of people who would really benefit, and their widows and their spouses—let us not forget them—and they would therefore spend money that they currently do not have to spend. They can afford their council tax. They can afford their heating. It would change their lives, in terms of feeling that they have achieved this success on their behalf and on behalf of the members.
Roger Sainsbury: I would like to talk a bit about the concept of an amendment. We have observed that one amendment has already been offered: new clause 18 suggested by Ann Davies MP. Our team and I have had a bit of a look at that in the last couple of days. While we very much appreciate her good intention in putting the amendment forward, it actually does not do the job in a number of respects. I do not know how many of you have ever grappled with the obscure and complex language of schedule 7 to the Act, but it is mighty complicated. Some time ago, I and my team spent several days trying to work out what an amendment should be to deliver what we wanted. I have got some first class people on the team, but in the end we decided we actually could not do it, and would have to leave it to the expert drafters in the Department.
That is yet another reason why—I mentioned it in the written evidence—at a meeting I have already asked the Minister if he would himself table the requisite amendment. When you come up against the sheer complexity that Ann Davies has obviously already come up against, this is another reason why we think that would be a very good idea. It is slightly unusual for a Minister to table an amendment to his own Bill, but it is permitted, as the Minister said when I was talking to him about it. In a complex situation like this, it would absolutely be the best way of getting straight to the desired answer, so I plead with all of you to join me in urging the Minister to take this on.
John Milne
I think you have answered all my questions already. We have tabled an amendment, and I would really appreciate your input on whether we could improve it or argue around it between now and when it is raised in Committee.
Roger Sainsbury: Thank you.
Rachel Blake
Q
Roger Sainsbury: That is a very timely question, because for the past couple of years, we have been working on the basis that the RIPA scheme would cost £5.5 billion. That was the estimate given to us by the PPF. Now—I might almost say hallelujah!—about three days ago, the PPF notified us that they had redone the calculation using a much superior methodology. I think it is a phenomenally difficult calculation to do, but they have redone it, and the answer now is not £5.5 billion, but £3.9 billion, or possibly a bit less. Whereas for two years we have been arguing that £5.5 billion is eminently affordable, £3.5 billion, for example, is obviously even more affordable. We do not get that much good news, but that was definitely a bit of good news we recently received. I am pleased to be able to share it with you, if you did not know it.
Rachel Blake (Cities of London and Westminster) (Lab/Co-op)
Q
Roger Sainsbury: We would not have any ability to do that calculation at all. It all depends on the statistics held by the PPF of the age of all the members, the amount they have all been receiving and so on. It is way beyond us to make that calculation.
Terry Monk: I worked with FAS before FAS even came about—at the conception, rather than the birth, of FAS. The PPF and I have worked closely with them for over 20 years. I have immense trust and faith in what they do, how they do it, and what they deliver. Whenever we ask them for help, they give it to us as far as they are able.
Roger Sainsbury: I would support that. The PPF have been very helpful and I have had a good working relationship with them. I have to say, that was not always so—about three years ago, it looked as if we would be fighting a continual battle against them, but over time we have got to a really good working relationship, and they have been very helpful. In a question of challenging or doubting their ability to do this sort of calculation, when you look at the asset returns that they are getting, boy, they have got some people that know how to handle numbers, haven’t they?
The Chair
If there are no further questions from Members, can I thank the witnesses for their evidence this afternoon? I will move now to the next panel of witnesses.
Examination of Witnesses
Rachel Elwell gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from Rachel Elwell, Chief Executive Officer of the Border to Coast Pensions Partnership. We have until 5.30 pm for this panel. Would you kindly introduce yourself for the record?
Rachel Elwell: Thank you, Chair, and thank you, everyone, for your time today. My name is Rachel Elwell, and I am chief executive of Border to Coast Pensions Partnership, which is responsible for the assets of 11 of the local government pension schemes, although with due care and attention to governance, that may well become 18 LGPS funds and over £100 billion by April next year.
I would like to give a little bit of background to explain to the Committee why I feel so passionately about both the local government pension scheme thriving in the future, and pensions more generally in the UK. I am a pensions actuary by background, and I have worked in the industry now for 30 years. I took this role in Leeds for three reasons. One was because it is Leeds—you probably know that most people from Yorkshire will tell you that within five minutes of meeting them, so there you go: I am from Yorkshire—and Yorkshire has a fantastic financial services region, but we were missing asset management. For me, this was a fantastic opportunity to strengthen that, levelling up, and over the last eight years since I took on the role we have built the largest asset manager outside London and Edinburgh.
I am also passionate about learning and creating new opportunities. Again, this is something that the LGPS has built from scratch since the original policy intent of pooling was introduced about a decade ago. Finally, having worked in many different areas of the financial services industry over the last 30 years, for me the sense of being able to give something back, and doing that for a purpose, is really important. The LGPS, as I am sure you have already heard, has 7 million members—some of the lowest-paid people in the UK. It provides an important policy intent around low-paid earners, as well as potentially having the opportunity to provide real investment drive into the UK. So I am happy to answer any questions and to contribute to your thinking.
Mark Garnier
Q
Rachel Elwell: The LGPS is already investing significantly in the UK, as you have probably already heard. We invest more than 25% of the assets we look after on behalf of pension funds in the UK, and there is a very good reason for that, which I can explore a bit further if you would find it helpful.
To answer the specific question, I am not concerned that the power will instruct the LGPS to invest in specific things. I think there is a real intent; it would be helpful if the Bill were clear that it would not be against fiduciary duty and would not interfere with the FCA regulations that we are also subject to.
I am very thoughtful about how we carefully manage the weight of capital that might come into the market if there is mandation for the wider industry to move quickly into investing in the UK. Work will need to be done on the supply side as well as the capital side, to ensure that the UK can invest well the capital that should be being invested into the UK. So it is important that any use of mandation is very carefully considered, and that the laws of unintended consequences are really thought through.
Mark Garnier
Q
Rachel Elwell: I can understand why the Government would want to have a backstop power to direct pools, because the LGPS is significant—it is one of the top 10 globally by size. It has an impact on council tax, and on the economy more generally. If you have a pool that is not delivering and all the other mechanisms available to their stakeholders have failed, I can understand why that power would exist. But it is important that we clear the scenarios in which it is envisaged that it might be used.
Mark Garnier
Q
Rachel Elwell: History does not necessarily repeat itself, but it is important that we learn from that. The LGPS, and pensions more generally in the UK, have had many, many decades—including through the ’90s, having to manage the fact that there were contribution holidays taken that were using surpluses very quickly. Actuaries have the ability to work with all employers, including those in the LGPS, to smooth out that experience. Where you have a surplus, some of that could absolutely be used to help manage the costs over the long term, and when you have a deficit, you do not try to pay that all off very quickly, so I think there is an opportunity. I am not worried about it because I can see that the LGPS is a very well run, well governed scheme. It has good advice from its actuaries and is well used to making sure that both surpluses and deficits are smoothed over time.
Mark Garnier
Q
Rachel Elwell: I do think there is a fantastic opportunity for us to harness the benefits of scale that come from being one of the top 10 globally by size, but it is important, as we do that, that we maintain the link to local people who are the members of this.
Mark Garnier
Q
Rachel Elwell: Border to Coast, if we do have those 18, will stretch from the Scottish border to the southern coast. Even today, we have partner funds who are right across England, which is brilliant because those are people who have actively chosen to come together, form a partnership and work together.
Time permitting, if it is of interest to the Committee, we could talk a bit more about local investment and the way of getting investment that is truly local for each individual fund but also a way of crowding investment from other people into the slightly larger opportunities that might be in a region. Every investment we make is local—it impacts local people.
You do not need to only have, for example, Durham council investing in Durham. You want all of the LGPS and all asset owners to feel that they can do that. Some of the ways that we are working through doing local investment with our partner funds have really got an eye to the different ways in which you can crowd in versus something very specific that needs to be addressed in the region or locality.
Torsten Bell
Q
Rachel Elwell: Again, for all of us working in the LGPS, that sense of purpose is really important. I know my partner funds do a huge amount to make sure they are engaging directly with members, running events, as well as the importance of member representation on the pensions committees and on the pension boards, whether that is through union representation, pensioner representation or other scheme member representation.
We also have two fantastic scheme member representatives on our joint committee, which is the body that comes together across all of the partner funds to oversee and engage with what we are doing on their behalf. They are really bringing that voice into our considerations as a board and the wider organisation—the wider partnership.
Torsten Bell
Q
Rachel Elwell: This is before I was employed to bring it to life. This is a decision our partner funds made really early, because they recognised the real benefits that can come from being FCA regulated. This is really important. We will hopefully be managing over £100 billion on behalf of the LGPS, and a good proportion of that is managed directly within my team. We are managing that for, hopefully, 18 different customers—effectively, investors and our owners. We need to have those disciplines in place, and we need to make sure that we are following those regulations. We do not need another regulatory set. There are already some very good, strong regulations that exist, so we, as a partnership and as a company, think that is the right thing to do.
Steve Darling
Q
Rachel Elwell: There are some fantastic provisions in the Bill, particularly around implementing the good governance review, and the clarity of roles and responsibilities between the different parties within the LGPS. About five or six years ago, we, along with some of the other pools, commissioned some work looking at good practice internationally, so talking to about 15 others—from Australia, the Canadians, the Dutch, the Norwegians—and looking at the journey they had been on with this. They are about 15 years ahead of us, really, with that policy. We wanted to learn from what they had done.
There were various success factors, some of which Michelle shared with you earlier, but one of those was real clarity about the Government’s policy intent, and I think the Bill really does help with that. That will help us, in turn, engage with our pensions committees and partner funds to make sure that we are providing a holistic joined-up view. There are some areas in the Bill where, particularly for the LGPS, the detail will be in the regulations. I would just make a plea, given the timelines we are working towards, that we see the regulations sooner rather than later, please. I have already said that I think it would be helpful to maybe get a bit more clarity on the circumstances in which we may be directed by the Secretary of State.
Rachel Blake
Q
Rachel Elwell: The primary focus of the Bill is the consolidation of the assets in pools, but there are provisions, particularly when we see some of the wider things that are happening in policy such as local government reorganisation, where that might lead to closer working between funds and potentially merger. I am fortunate enough—I think Roger Phillips mentioned this earlier—that Tyne and Wear and Northumberland are part of the Border to Coast pool, so I was there and living that experience with them personally. They were working very hard together, with very joined-up thinking and close relationships, and it was still fairly hard work.
I suppose from that perspective, like any merger of entities, it comes down to relationships and people. Administration in the LGPS is complex, and many funds have been facing recruitment challenges. What we are seeing already is funds working closely together. For example, again within Border to Coast, Tyne and Wear has recently taken on the administration for Teesside, bringing it in-house. It was previously an outsourced arrangement. There are benefits from that, but it needs to be done very carefully and thoughtfully—it is not something we should rush at.
The Chair
If there are no further questions from Members, I thank the witness for their evidence, and we will move on to the next panel.
Examination of Witness
Torsten Bell gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from Torsten Bell, who is the Minister for Pensions at the Department for Work and Pensions. We know who you are, but for the record and for those in the Public Gallery and watching the broadcast, would you kindly introduce yourself?
Torsten Bell: I am Torsten Bell, and I am the Pensions Minister.
Mark Garnier
Q
Torsten Bell: No, obviously. The change that you are referring to is a 2019 change under the last Government. It was taken not by the last Government but by the Office for National Statistics, and it refers not just to the PPF but to funded public sector pension schemes. The same issues apply to the LGPS in the same way. It is a 2019 change made by the statistics body following international guidance on accounting. The changes you are talking about have affected public sector borrowing since then.
Mark Garnier
Q
Torsten Bell: In stark contrast to lots of my predecessors, I have to say, I have spent a lot of time meeting members of both the PPF and the FAS who have been affected by the issue of pre-1997 accruals. If I am honest, the issue has been a real one since then, but it is a significantly bigger one because of the recent phase of high inflation, which made the pace of inflation eating into the real value of those pensions significantly faster. As I said on Second Reading—this was raised then by a number of colleagues on the Committee—we are considering the issue, but it needs to be considered in the round because of the wider public finance implications. That applies to other issues in this space as well; you will have seen that in other pension schemes where the Government have a role.
Mark Garnier
Q
Torsten Bell: To be clear, that is just wrong—it is not. The 2004 Act is very clear about the purposes for which the board’s assets can be used, and there is no question about that. The Office for National Statistics does not get to countermand Acts of Parliament on the use of resources—the 2004 Act is very clear on that. It is nothing to do with that.
If you look at the public sector finances in the round, there are all kinds of different forms of funds that are classified in different ways. The classification within the public finances is not determining the use to which funds can be put. The same applies to whether things are classified as taxes or not. They do their job, and obviously those classifications exist for an important reason, which is that we need to have clarity about the public finances. We use those for discipline in terms of making sure that Government objectives in fiscal policy have metrics that they can be tied to. It is totally reasonable for different parties to take different positions on what those metrics should be. There have been different choices made on that by lots of different parties in recent years, but I think everybody in this room probably accepts that you need to have those metrics. When you accept that, you will be in a situation where classifications by the Office for National Statistics impact on those.
Mark Garnier
Q
We heard some interesting evidence from Phoenix, who referred to clause 15 and the consequences of an intermediate performance rating. While we are going to have big arguments about mandation—that is something we fundamentally disagree on—one thing I hope we can both agree on, as we progress this, is that certain elements of the Bill could have unintended consequences. It seems that this one, the intermediate rating, could have the effect of maintaining the derisking of pension funds, because you are trying to avoid getting an intermediate rating and therefore you will avoid doing the slightly more progressed growth. Sorry; I am being incredibly inarticulate after rather a long day, but you know the point I am trying to make.
Torsten Bell: I definitely get the point you are making. Let me say one thing about the big picture, and then I will talk about the specifics you raise with the intermediate rating. On the big picture, I absolutely agree that one thing we have done badly in the last 30 years is to think about how changes we make to our pension system, which exists to provide income in retirement for the vast majority of the population, also underpin our capitalism. That is a lesson we have learned painfully.
On the substance of risk reduction, I would put it slightly differently, because you have different things going on in the DB and DC landscapes. In the DC landscape, we have been building up a new system. Understandably, because it was starting from small scale, we did not jump to trying to solve all the problems that came with that system, not least getting it to scale, not least what happens in retirement, and not least small pots and the rest. I see this Bill as doing that—taking the next step forward and saying, “Right, we are building this new system. We made big progress in the last 15 years with that, but now is the time to put the change in place.”
On scale and on value for money, that will support the wider range of investments more broadly, not just in the UK, but with a wider range of assets. That is absolutely the right thing, in savers’ interests, to do. I also completely endorse your point on unintended consequences, and that is exactly why scrutiny of the Bill is important to make sure that we pick those up as we go. The last 40 years, not just in this country but in others, shows that that can be the case, for good and ill.
Specifically on your point about the intermediate rating, we are very much aware of the issue. We are not aiming to replicate a hard metric: “fall one side of this line, and suddenly you are de-authorised from taking auto-enrolment contributions”. That is exactly what we need to avoid, which is what we will be doing. There is a reason behind the provision for more than one level of intermediate ranking, and my view would be that you would not expect people who fall into some of those levels being banned from taking further contributions. It is absolutely right that you do not want an absolute binary—just one metric, one division. The consultations that the FCA and TPR have taken forward are all about making sure that we have worked all those issues through. There are lessons, for example, from what happened in Australia.
Mark Garnier
Q
Torsten Bell: I understand the point you are making. I think you have to step back to the big picture, which is a consensus right across the industry that savers’ interests would be better served by change. It does not make sense that the UK industry is a complete outlier compared with other pensions systems around the world when it comes to exposure to wider ranges of assets. What comes with that exposure to a wider range of assets? The nature of assets, where you are likely to see a larger home bias in that more of them would be in the UK.
There is a wider point: is there a good reason why the UK DC pension landscape has a particularly large exposure to equities rather than to a wider range of assets that we see around the rest of the world? No. That is why you have seen the Mansion House accord coming forward—because it is in savers’ interests to change how we are operating. The scale and value-for-money measures, and a lot of the other approaches that we are taking, will facilitate that, but the industry is saying that that is in savers’ interests, and it is right to do so.
Ultimately, we have to step back and say that we are not in the business of just making individual random decisions about the pensions system. The question is: what is there a consensus on about the world we need to move to that has a better equilibrium? One of the strong elements of that, along with larger scale, is investing in a wider range of assets because that is in savers’ interests. That is why there is a voluntary Mansion House accord, setting that out as the objective, with relatively low levels of target, particularly on domestic investment, compared with what we see in other countries. That is what is going on.
What we are saying is that when you speak to the industry, particularly in private, it is very clear that there is a risk of a collective action problem. Under previous Conservative Chancellors, it signed up to commitments that it has not been delivering. Why has it not been delivering? Because of the collective action problem—the risk of being undercut by somebody else who is not making that change because of the nature of a market that is too focused on cost and not focused enough on returns.
I make only one vaguely political point. It is easy to join people in being anxious, but we have to ask ourselves something. There is a reason why the first Mansion House compact was not delivered. Do we want to be here in 15 years saying, “Actually, we all signed up to it and said it needed to happen, but it hasn’t”? No—I am not prepared to do that. Change is going to come. Everybody says that change needs to come because it is in members’ interests. All the reserve power does is to say that it is going to happen.
Steve Darling
Q
The other area that I want to ask about relates to the information that we heard from Nest: only 40% of its members had signed up online. That demonstrates that the issue is about getting positive engagement from those who are perhaps less financially secure. Are you confident that we are doing all we can through the Bill to help those who are most financially challenged? How are you going to hold yourself to account as we proceed to ensure that that is the case?
Torsten Bell: Those are great questions. On regulations, you are absolutely right. This pensions Bill, like most recent ones—although there have been exceptions that have come with unintended side effects, to go back to what was just mentioned—does rely heavily on secondary legislation. My view is that that is the right thing to do and is almost in the nature of pension schemes. That is partly because the detail should rightly be consulted on and partly because things will change in the context.
You are right that there is a large reliance on secondary legislation. Yes, in some areas, as we go through the detail, clause by clause, we will be able to set out to you where our thinking is up to. In lots of cases you will already see consultations by the FCA and TPR, starting to develop the work that will then feed into the regulations—that is particularly true, for example, on value for money, which we have just been discussing. I also think that it is important for us to provide clarity on when we will bring forward those regulations and when we will consult on the input to them, so that people know that. That was why, when we published the pensions reform road map, and when we published the Bill itself, I set out when we anticipate bringing forward those regulations so that everyone in the industry and in the House can see when that will happen. Page 17 of the road map sets out how we envisage that happening, and it is absolutely right. When we come to the clause-by-clause discussion, there will certainly be things where we will not be able to say, “This is exactly what will happen,” and rightly, because there needs to be further consultation with the industry on those things.
On the broader question of engagement with people, particularly those with smaller pensions—there is a very heavy correlation between the chance of someone being engaged with their pension and the size of that pension pot, partly for obvious reasons, but for wider context reasons, too—the pensions dashboard that Chris Curry mentioned earlier is a large part of facilitating that engagement. Lots of countries have had versions of the dashboard; it does make a material effect. One of the lessons from Australia is that the average size of DC pots, as they start to build rapidly—as that becomes the default system in an auto-enrolment world—does have a material effect.
I was with someone who runs one of the big supers recently; her view was that they hit a tipping point when there was suddenly this huge engagement where people were looking at the app provided by the super every week. There are pros and cons to that, by the way. Remember that there is a reason why we default people into pension savings. There are good and bad ways to engage with your pension. We do not want people on an app, in the face of a short-term stock market downturn, making drastic decisions to do with their investments that have long-lasting consequences. It needs to be done right; that is exactly why, when it comes to the dashboard, we are user testing it extensively.
Kirsty Blackman
Q
Torsten Bell: I am happy to take that away. Obviously, the monitoring will need to be different for different parts of the Bill, which are on different timelines.
Kirsty Blackman
Q
Torsten Bell: Let me address that in two minutes before the Chair cuts us off. I definitely recognise that there is a large number of amendments. It is not unprecedented—the Procurement Act 2023 had 350 Government amendments, and 155 on Report.
Kirsty Blackman
I was on that one as well.
Torsten Bell: We have all made life choices. The thing that I am trying to avoid—and the reason why there are so many at this stage—is what has happened with other Bills, such as the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill in the last Parliament. I do not want to table loads of amendments on Report, after the line by line. That is the alternative. This is a very large Bill. The number of amendments, in part, reflects the fact that everyone has signed up to a Bill that is complicated and very large. My judgment was that it is right to get as many of those amendments down now, so that you have them for line by line. Also, I have gone out of my way over the last 24 hours to spell out to you all where the major changes are. The substance and the purpose of the Bill have not changed. In almost all cases, the amendments are relatively minor and technical.
Luke Murphy
Q
Torsten Bell: I understand why people say that but, as I say, it is for trustees. We are not going to legislate to change the offer made in scheme rules to savers, because that would be to fundamentally change the system. But trustees will want to consider that, and they will be in a very strong position to take a strong view about that when discussing with employers what happens with the surplus release situation.
The Chair
Thank you. That brings us to the end of the time allotted for the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank all our witnesses, including the Minister.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Gerald Jones.)
Pension Schemes Bill (Third sitting)
Thursday 4th September 2025
(5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesPension Schemes Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 4 September 2025 - (4 Sep 2025)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 12 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)
I beg to move amendment 7, in clause 1, page 1, line 6, leave out “for England and Wales”.
The amendment would secure that Clause 1 applies to a pension scheme for local government workers for Scotland, as well as a scheme for local government workers in England and Wales. Clause 1 does not extend to Northern Ireland (see Clause 100).
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 8, 10 to 12 and 16 to 24.
Torsten Bell
Before I turn to the amendments, I should briefly outline the reform of the local government pension scheme, for which chapter 1 provides the legislative underpinning. The LGPS is the largest pension scheme in the UK, with £400 billion of assets under management, projected to rise to almost £1 trillion by 2040. However, I think it is a matter of cross-party consensus that the LGPS has not realised its full potential, not least because it is too fragmented.
The first chapter of the Bill sets out the legislative basis for reform to modernise the LGPS’s investment framework and governance arrangements, setting robust new standards that all pools must meet, including Financial Conduct Authority authorisation, the capacity and expertise to manage 100% of their partner authorities’ assets, and the ability to deliver on local investment mandates. As part of the reforms, the LGPS will move from eight pools to six. We have set a deadline for the new pool partnerships to be agreed in principle by the end of this month, with new shareholder arrangements in place by March 2026.
The clauses in chapter 1 would mean that by this time next year we will see a world-class LGPS, made up of large pools of professionally managed capital, held to account by authorities who have confidence in robust and transparent governance structures, and who together are delivering the best value for members. I remind the Committee that LGPS members’ benefits are guaranteed in statute, and nothing that we discuss today will affect any of those benefits.
These amendments will extend the LGPS provisions to Scotland. There is a wide range of amendments, but they all have the same objective: to take the matters relating to England and Wales and ensure that those are provided for in the case of Scotland. The Government are making this provision following a formal request from the Scottish Government, and I have written again to the Scottish Government this morning for the legislative consent motion that they will need to put in train to go alongside it. Amendments will be needed in respect of clauses 1, 2, 4 and 7 to give effect to that objective, and that is what the Government amendments in this group do. I commend them to the Committee.
Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)
It is great to be starting what I hope will be quite a quick canter through today’s work, Sir Christopher. The Opposition welcome the broad grain of this entire Bill; it seeks to do a lot of very useful things in the pension industry across the UK. We have some contentious points, but those will not come up today.
Regarding clause 1, we welcome the creation of asset pool companies. These are sensible and pragmatic steps towards modernising the local government pension scheme, and much of the work had already been done under the previous Government. Consolidating funds represents a responsible approach that should deliver more effective management and investment of pension assets. The LGPS, as we have heard, is among the largest pension schemes in the UK, with 6.7 million members and £391 billion of capital. Before pooling, of course, it was 86 separate local authorities, which caused huge inefficiency, inequality of opportunities and, in some cases, poorer outcomes for pension beneficiaries.
I should mention at this point, Sir Christopher, that I am a member of the LGPS and also that, as a councillor on Forest of Dean district council, I was responsible for looking after some of this activity in terms of pension management. It was not an efficient way of doing things, so pooling is an incredibly good idea. We welcome the Government’s continuing our work to make these pension funds work more efficiently and deliver better returns for members, and ultimately we all want to see improved returns and lower employer contributions. Small funds, whether in local government or elsewhere, are rarely fit for purpose in the global investment environment.
We have some concerns. The broad framing of the powers contained in chapter 1, clause 1 could allow for the mandation of certain investments by Government. Pools should be investing in line with the investment approach set out by their underlying asset owners in order to deliver against the fiduciary duties of LGPS funds. Governments should not take powers that would erode fiduciary duty.
There are concerns about the costs of the Government’s decision to reduce the number of asset pools from eight to six. This is an administrative cost. We have heard from one council, Wiltshire, which is one of 21 LGPS funds in England now looking for a new pooling partner. Jennifer Devine, head of the Wiltshire pension fund, has said that the cost of closing its asset pool could come to as much as £100 million. There will be some costs incurred, but, none the less, the general thrust of the whole process is one that we support and we certainly would not stand in the way of these amendments.
Steve Darling (Torbay) (LD)
As the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, and echoing the hon. Member for Wyre Forest, I broadly welcome the thrust of the Bill. We heard in evidence that a lot of the industry is playing catch-up and is about 15 years behind those who are best in class. As Liberal Democrats, we are keen to make sure that we are supporting particularly those who are more challenged in being able to save or to make the right decisions, and that we use what levers we can to tackle issues such as climate change and cleaning up our environment. We look forward to working with colleagues on this Committee.
On the local government pension schemes and the pots, we welcome the direction of travel. However, for us it is about making sure that we keep local links to communities, and driving positive change through that investment in our local communities is absolutely essential. I look forward to the debates over the next few weeks.
Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)
I declare an interest as a holder of deferred membership of a local government pension scheme in Scotland, which will come into scope should the Government amendments go through, as I imagine they will. First, I thank the Government for working with the Scottish Government to make these changes and for taking the decision to agree with the Scottish Government’s request for these changes to be made. It is appreciated.
While I am on thank yous, the people who manage local government pension schemes are managing an incredibly significant amount of money and are ensuring that benefits are provided to many millions of people in those schemes. The hard work they do to steward those funds appropriately cannot be overestimated, so I say thank you to all the trustees who take that action on behalf of so many of us. Those working in the public sector tend to get a lower salary than they would in the private sector, but they often get access to a defined-benefit pension scheme or a career-average pension scheme, which is better than many people in the private sector get. There is a bit of give and take there.
On Tuesday, we heard from the Local Government Pension Scheme Advisory Board and also from one of the pension schemes. There was a commitment that came forward in the evidence to ensuring trustees are appropriately trained—I am not for a second saying that they are not appropriately trained right now, but we must ensure that level of training is provided when they have many other competing demands on their time. It is important that the Government ensure the correct monitoring, evaluation and also support of those organisations, so that if new training is required—for example, if environmental, social and governance provisions change, or decisions about where it is best to invest funds change—the Government commit to ensuring that trustees are given all the training they need. I believe that all pension trustees have a difficult job, but particularly those managing local government pension schemes, who are often local councillors—a task that, I know, is not a part-time job and is incredibly busy.
The other concern raised on Tuesday, and which was just mentioned by my Liberal Democrat colleague, the hon. Member for Torbay, is about the locality of the decisions made. It is important that the pooling of resources means more investment in important and key projects than would result from a smaller organisation. Hopefully, the reduction in administrative costs will ensure that those schemes are significantly more efficient, but I am keen that we do not lose the local voice within the pension schemes that we have now.
The case was made very eloquently on Tuesday that, while pension schemes take into account value for money—what we would have called best value in local government in Scotland—in decision making, they should ensure that they are not supporting projects that the community are absolutely up in arms about, because so many of their members will live in that community. Scheme members need that guaranteed return, but they also need their communities to be nice places for them to live.
I am slightly concerned that, with pooling, the ability for local projects to be put forward could potentially be lost. Although I am not asking for any specific changes, I would ask that the Government keep an eye on that. Should there be significant numbers of smaller projects that are not being supported because of the changes that previously might have been supported, the Government should consider whether they need to take action to ensure that those voices are better heard and that those smaller projects still have the opportunity for investment.
Thank you very much for allowing me to speak on this, Chair. I am assuming that we have also spoken on the clause stand part and are unlikely to debate that again at the end; I have therefore made most of my general comments here rather than particularly specific ones on the amendments.
Torsten Bell
I thank everyone who has spoken. I am grateful for the welcome for the Bill as a whole, for this chapter and for the amendments that particularly relate to Scotland. As the hon. Member for Wyre Forest pointed out, this Bill builds on progress that was put in train over the last decade, and I am glad to see that. It is only because of that progress that we are now able to accelerate quite significantly.
Questions were raised about mandation. I want to be absolutely clear that questions about asset strategy will sit directly with the administering authorities, as they do today. It is for them to set out those asset allocation decisions, which are, in the end, the biggest driver of returns for members. The investment decisions sit with pools, never with Governments. We will provide clarification, if we come on to one of the amendments later, to make clear that the Government will not be directing individual investment decisions of pools; that was never the intention.
Questions were raised about the administrative costs of transition. Those do exist, as they have in previous moves towards pooling, and will obviously need to be managed sensibly, but I think we all agree that those costs are small relative to the very large savings that will come from a much less fragmented system.
Points about the importance of trustees were powerfully made, and I absolutely agree. Stronger governance reforms have already been put in place for the LGPS trustees in England and Wales, and these reforms build on that through stronger governance more generally.
I also hear the argument about local voice. As I said, the administering authorities are responsible for setting the strategy in relation to local investments. Strategic authorities, because of a Bill that was passed earlier this week, will have a requirement to collaborate with the LGPS on those local investments. I take the points that were made, and I think there is consensus on these amendments.
Amendment 7 agreed to.
Amendment made: 8, in clause 1, page 1, line 12, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “responsible authority”. —(Torsten Bell.)
This amendment and Amendments 10 and 11 are consequential on Amendment 7. References in Clause 1 to the Secretary of State are changed to “the responsible authority”. That term is defined by Amendment 24 to refer either to the Secretary of State (as regards England and Wales) or to the Scottish Ministers (as regards Scotland).
Torsten Bell
I beg to move amendment 9, in clause 1, page 1, line 16, at end insert—
“(ba) enabling the responsible authority, in prescribed circumstances, to give a direction to an asset pool company specified in the direction, or to all or any of its participating scheme managers, requiring the company or scheme managers concerned—
(i) to take any steps specified in the direction with a view to enabling or securing compliance by a scheme manager with a direction requiring it to participate in, or to cease to participate in, the company (see paragraph (b)), and
(ii) to take any other steps necessary to enable or secure compliance with such a direction;”.
The amendment makes clear that scheme regulations can provide for directions to be given to prevent a direction of the kind mentioned in clause 1(2)(b) (requiring a scheme manager to participate in, or to leave, a particular asset pool company) being frustrated by a failure by the company or its participating scheme managers to take steps necessary to enable or secure compliance with its terms.
Torsten Bell
We turn now to three technical amendments concerning the powers to direct asset pools, which I mentioned in my previous speech.
Amendment 9 ensures that a pool must comply with the use of the power to direct administering authorities to join a particular asset pool, matching powers brought forward in clause 1 of the Pensions Bill. These are powers of last resort. Amendment 13 responds to feedback and removes the power to issue directions to asset pool companies relating to specific investment management decisions. It was never the Government’s intention to intervene in those decisions by pools, so we are removing that sub-paragraph to provide clarity. Amendment 14 adds a duty for Ministers to consult the affected parties before issuing directions more generally. I commend the amendments to the Committee.
Mark Garnier
In the interest of speed, I will not speak to these amendments, other than to say that we have no objection to them.
Torsten Bell
I beg to move amendment 15, in clause 1, page 2, line 34, leave out from “company” to end of line 40 and insert
“limited by shares and registered in the United Kingdom which is established for purposes consisting of or including—
(i) managing funds or other assets for which its participating scheme managers are responsible, and
(ii) making and managing investments on behalf of those scheme managers (whether directly or through one or more collective investment vehicles),
and whose shareholders consist only of scheme managers, and”.
The amendment revises the definition of asset pool company to clarify (a) that the company should be limited by shares held by scheme managers only and registered in any part of the UK and (b) that the mandatory main purposes described in sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii) need not be the only purposes of the company.
The amendment revises the definition of an asset pool company to clarify that they can be established anywhere in the UK and that only LGPS administering authorities can be shareholders of those pools. The amendment also removes limits on the purposes of an asset pool company, making it clear that asset pool companies are free to provide advisory services and perform other functions in addition to their primary purpose of providing management services. The Government do not want to stifle innovation from asset pool companies as they continue to evolve from strength to strength. The amendment makes sure that that is not the case. I commend the amendment to the Committee.
Mark Garnier
I have just one question for the Minister. How are the shareholdings to be decided? Will they be determined based on the size of the investment, and how will the Government decide between councils having shareholders or contracting with asset pool companies? That is my only comment.
Torsten Bell
It is for those forming the pooling companies to agree their own arrangements. The hon. Member rightly raises the question whether people are shareholders or clients of a pool. There is only one current administering authority that is a client rather than a shareholder of a pool, so in the overwhelming majority of circumstances we are talking about shareholders. However, the legislative basis for the pooling allows for that in future, if for some reason that was the way forward that some administering authorities and pools chose. Broadly, the same picture applies to most questions in this space: we expect administering authorities and pools to work together to agree their governance arrangements, and that is what they are doing.
Amendment 15 agreed to.
Clause 1, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 2
Asset management
Amendments made: 16, in clause 2, page 3, line 5, leave out “for England and Wales”.
The amendment would secure that Clause 2 applies to scheme regulations relating to pension scheme for local government workers for Scotland, as well as scheme regulations relating to a scheme for local government workers in England and Wales. Clause 1 does not extend to Northern Ireland (see Clause 100).
Amendment 17, in clause 2, page 3, line 23, at beginning insert
“in the case of a scheme for local government workers for England and Wales,”.—(Torsten Bell.)
The amendment would secure that, despite the general extension of the scope of application of Clause 2 to Scotland (see Amendment 16), subsection (2)(c) will remain of relevance only to scheme regulations relating to England and Wales.
Mark Garnier
I beg to move amendment 246, in clause 2, page 3, line 33, at end insert—
“(4A) Scheme managers must publish a report annually on the local investments within their asset pool company.
(4B) A report published under section (4A) must include—
(a) the extent, and
(b) financial performance,
of these investments.”
This amendment provides for scheme managers to report back on the financial performance of any local investments that they might make.
Clause 2 places important requirements on pension scheme managers regarding how they manage pension funds for local government workers, requiring formulation, publication and review of investment strategies. The Bill encourages investment through asset pool companies and emphasises local investments. However, the Opposition’s key concern is that the primary purpose must remain the delivery of strong financial returns for pension funds. Those returns ultimately belong to the pension fund members, but council tax payers also have a responsibility, as they support these schemes. Investment decisions must prioritise financial performance that ensures sustainable pensions while safeguarding public funds.
Although we acknowledge that local investments can bring benefits to local communities and local economies, they should only be a secondary focus and should not compromise returns. Local investment should be considered as an additional benefit, but the overriding duty of scheme managers is to act prudently and in the best financial interests of the scheme members and taxpayers. We caution against overweighing local investment priorities if that risks undermining the long-term financial health of these pension funds. In short, financial returns must come first; local investments can follow, but must not take precedence.
Pensions UK has questioned the need for these new powers and believes that they are too far-reaching. LGPS reform is already progressing at pace, and pools and funds are collaborating in line with the direction set by the Government. Pensions UK would like to understand what specific risks the Government are seeking to manage through the introduction of these powers, and it is seeking amendments to the Bill to ensure that if these powers remain in the Bill, they will only be exercised after other avenues have been exhausted, to guard against adverse outcomes for the pools, funds and scheme members.
The Pensions Management Institute has highlighted that the administering authorities will be required to take their principal advice on their investment strategies from the pool. Given that an administering authority is required to invest all of its assets via the pool, this is a major conflict of interest and puts a significant burden on the administering authority or scheme manager to ensure that the pool is performing effectively, with no independent checks and balances.
The Bill makes it clear that co-operation with strategic authorities, such as regional combined authorities, on appropriate investments will be required. However, there is a risk of investment decisions being influenced by political and local interests. The fiduciary duty should always prevail when local investments are considered. We do not oppose the clause, but we call on scheme managers to maintain discipline in prioritising sustainable returns, with local investments as a welcome but secondary consideration.
We are considering three amendments with this clause. There is uncertainty about what qualifies as a local investment for LGPS funds, how such investments are defined and what assets or projects will meet the requirements under the new rules. In addition, we do not want to shift the focus away from the fiduciary duty of trustees to local investments that might not deliver the best-value returns on schemes. Amendment 246 provides for scheme managers to report back clearly on the financial performance of any local investments that they might make. Scheme managers at local councils should charge the asset pool companies with finding the best value.
Although we are not opposed to local investment, the focus of trustees must clearly remain on achieving best value, and the better performance of a pension fund means that local councils can already use their powers under regulations 64 and 64A of the Local Government Pension Scheme Regulations 2013. Consequently, we can argue that LGPS megafunds with a focus on best returns can lead to more a fully funded council and therefore to employer contribution holidays.
Sir Christopher, would it be helpful for me to speak to the other amendments?
Mark Garnier
That is fine. It has been a few months since I last participated in a Bill Committee, Sir Christopher, so thank you for your advice.
We are not proposing to press this amendment to a vote, but I would be very grateful if the Minister could respond to my points and undertake to take them away and consider how advice can be given to these pool managers to ensure that the issues I have mentioned are taken into account.
The Chair
I refer Members to the Chair’s provisional selection and grouping of amendments, which should give them a guide as to which amendments are grouped and which are not.
Mr Peter Bedford (Mid Leicestershire) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Christopher. I hope that the Government consider amendment 246, which would require annual reporting by LGPS asset pools on the financial performance of local investments. This is not bureaucratic red tape; it is a necessary safeguard that would help trustees in upholding their fiduciary duties and responsibilities and protect the interests of scheme members and the people whose pensions are at stake. It would be a sensible addition to the Bill, especially when we consider the fact that the Government’s impact assessment offers very little on LGPS consolidation. There is no reference to the impact that the de facto mandation of local investment will have on the trustees’ fiduciary duty or on members’ outcomes. I urge the Government to consider the amendment, not only for those reasons but because it would give consolidated asset pools greater clarity over whether their investments are best placed.
Steve Darling
I start by wishing the Minister a happy birthday. [Hon. Members: “Hear, Hear.”] I am sure that for all of his life he has wanted to be sitting on a pensions Bill Committee on his birthday.
More seriously, when we were in desperate measures in my time as a local authority councillor in Torbay, we borrowed to invest and make money for the local authority—that was once upon a time, because it is no longer possible—so I know from experience that authorities often have to invest elsewhere in the country to get the best financial returns. Our experience in Torbay was that a lot of our investments in the south of England got in the money that we needed to keep the local authority ticking over.
I would therefore welcome the Minister’s thoughts on how we get the balance right. Clearly, investors would want to invest in the local area to drive economic development, but there is a need to balance that with getting positive outcomes for the pension fund. Some guidance from the Minister on how he sees that balance being struck, as the hon. Members for Wyre Forest and for Mid Leicestershire have alluded to, would be helpful.
Kirsty Blackman
I want to ask the Minister about the comments made on Tuesday in relation to the transparency already required of local government pension schemes. My understanding is that local government pension schemes are already pretty transparent, and that they are required to publish significant amounts of information.
On the amendment and the requirement for annual reporting, the case was made on Tuesday—I forget by who—that a particular moment in time may not give a true picture of what is going on. Investments may not provide an immediate return. In fact, pension funds are not necessarily looking for an immediate return; they are looking for a longer-term return so they can pay out to tomorrow’s pensioners as well as today’s. Pension schemes are one of the best vehicles for the patient capital that we need to be invested in the economy for it to grow, so I am little concerned that a requirement for annual reporting on specific investments may encourage short-term thinking. Can the Minister confirm what transparency regulations there are in relation to local government pension schemes and how they compare with those for other pension schemes?
Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)
I want to build on what the hon. Member for Torbay asked. As a former local councillor myself—I am not part of the pension scheme, I hasten to add, so I do not have an interest to declare—the bit from the evidence session that came out for me, thinking through this bit of the Bill, relates to the equivalent in treasury management. As a council, we often borrowed from the Public Works Loan Board to invest in, for example, a shopping centre to get the income from rent, business rates and so on. What safeguards or requirements will be put in place to ensure that any money spent from a pension fund goes on capital rather than revenue? I appreciate that council tax revenue increases could be used for that, but are there any safeguards to ensure that the money is not just spent and then does not exist anymore?
Torsten Bell
I will try to confine my remarks to the amendment and the points made about it; I am not going to encourage us to focus on the grouping provided. I thank the hon. Member for Wyre Forest for the amendment. I agree with him on many points he made, including that the LGPS is a success story for local investment, with authorities and pools already playing a major role in their communities. We are committed to ensuring that continues, but we also need to ensure it is done in the right way, delivering the right returns for each scheme.
As I said, every LGPS authority will be required to set out its approach to local investment in its investment strategy, providing some of the transparency that the hon. Member for Aberdeen North just set out, including their target allocation. They will need to have regard to existing local plans and priorities. I want to offer the hon. Member for Wyre Forest some reassurance—this goes directly to the point made by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North—that via regulations and guidance, we will already require each pool to report annually on local investments made on behalf of their authorities. The intention of the amendment will be delivered via those regulations and that guidance. On that basis, I am glad that he intends to withdraw his amendment, but I recognise his point.
On the wider question of pool advice, and whether there is a risk of pressure from strategic authorities to make investment decisions that are not consistent with their fiduciary duty, the hon. Member for Wyre Forest should see these reforms as supporting in that respect. Remember that these pools will now all be FCA-authorised. There are significantly improved governance arrangements. If anything, this should provide certainty. It should already not be the case legally, anyway, but the stronger governance arrangements will support that.
The hon. Member for Torbay rightly asked about how administering authorities and pools will think about the balance, weighing the impact on their local economy. As he will be aware, the fiduciary duties are clear about what the objective is, and the Bill is clear on the respective roles, both of the administering authorities in setting their strategic asset allocation, including to local investments, and of the pools in making those decisions, taking into account the available returns. I think that provides much of the balance that he rightly pointed out is an inevitable issue within this. I should also be clear that the LGPS will invest not just across the whole of the UK—rather than just in individual areas—as the hon. Member for Torbay talked about, but also around the world. That is what the LGPS does today and will continue to do.
Mark Garnier
I am reassured by the Minister’s comments. I beg to ask to leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Mark Garnier
I beg to move amendment 245, in clause 2, page 3, line 39, leave out from first “in” to end of line 39.
This amendment changes the definition of local investment to remove the reference to the benefit of persons living or working.
This amendment runs closely with amendment 246. Amendment 245 changes the definition of local investment to remove ambiguous reference to the benefit of persons living or working in the area. It is a small, technical amendment, but it is about giving more focus on the key need to members of the fund.
Mr Bedford
At present, the Bill arguably lacks a clear definition of how the priorities of the asset pools must follow, particularly on what qualifies as local investments. Our amendment seeks to address that gap by simplifying this. Put simply, we believe that local should mean local. These asset pools should prioritise investment in large-scale projects, actively promote local growth or make tangible improvements in local infrastructure—improvements that directly benefit the people in that local area.
Where no such opportunities exist, other investment options should be considered, but we cannot allow a situation where, for example, an LGPS fund raised in the midlands is continuously redirected elsewhere in the country. Unfortunately, the Bill appears to suggest that the other areas included in the consolidated LGPS schemes could benefit disproportionately. My constituents may ask me, “Why aren’t these funds being used locally by investing in local opportunities, rather than being gifted to councils in other areas of the country, assisting in the same way?” I believe the amendment will add clarity on that to the Bill, and I would welcome the Minister’s comments on it.
Kirsty Blackman
I was thinking about how the amendment would work in practice in my local area. I live in the Aberdeen city council area. We are landlocked. We are surrounded by the Aberdeenshire council area. If those local authorities were in separate local government pension schemes, the effect of the amendment would be that Aberdeenshire council could not class an investment in Aberdeen as a local investment despite the fact that its local authority headquarters are in Aberdeen. That is the only sensible place for them because Aberdeenshire goes all around Aberdeen, and it is the only place to which someone can reasonably get transport from all the areas in Aberdeenshire.
Although I understand what the hon. Members for Wyre Forest and for Mid Leicestershire are saying about the classification of local investments, I am not uncomfortable with the fact that the clause includes
“for the benefit of persons living or working in”
the area. If, for example, people in Aberdeenshire invested in a new swimming pool in Aberdeen city, I imagine that it would be used by a significant number of people in Aberdeenshire, and would absolutely be for their benefit.
We should remember that the local government pension schemes will have to prove that the thing they are investing in is for the benefit of local people living or working within the scheme area, although it may be slightly outside it. For example, if they invested in a small renewable energy project providing renewable energy to local people across a border, they would fall foul of this. It would not be classed as a local investment despite the fact that it would be very much for the benefit of people living or working within the scheme area.
The level of flexibility in the clause, and the fact that the schemes will have to justify their investments anyway, is more sensible than what the amendment suggests. I understand the drive to ensure that provision is made for local investment in local areas, but because of the nature of some of those boundaries, it makes more sense to keep the clause the way that the Government have written it.
Torsten Bell
I will give a very short speech because the hon. Member for Aberdeen North has just made every single point that I was going to make. I understand the motivation behind the amendment, but we do not support it because it would prevent investments that straddle boundaries—for example, investments in transport and infrastructure that would benefit people living in both Wales and neighbouring English counties. We have heard other examples as well. It would be wrong to limit authorities in where they could invest in this way. I ask the hon. Member for Wyre Forest to withdraw the amendment as it unnecessarily limits the remit of local investment.
Mark Garnier
I thank the Minister and wish him many happy returns. I hope that he has a happy birthday. We are satisfied with the Minister’s comments. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 31— Guidance on utilising surpluses—
“(1) The Secretary of State must publish guidance on the utilisation of surpluses within the Local Government Pension Scheme.
(2) Guidance must include—
(a) information about maintaining scheme members’ financial security;
(b) how the surplus can best support local fiscal needs.”.
This new clause requires Secretary of State to publish guidance on how surpluses can be deployed to balance member security with local fiscal needs.
Torsten Bell
Clause 2 sets out how assets will be managed in the LGPS under the reformed system of asset pooling. It requires that asset-pooling regulations introduced under clause 1 include requirements for all LGPS assets to be managed by pool companies. The clause would therefore introduce a statutory requirement to consolidate all LGPS assets into those pools, delivering the significant benefits that I know all hon. Members present agree on.
The clause also sets out that the regulations must require administering authorities to formulate, publish and keep under review an investment strategy for their authority’s assets. It also stipulates that regulations may set out from whom administering authorities can take advice on their investment strategy, a point raised by the hon. Member for Wyre Forest. The Government intend to use regulations to require that the pool be the primary source of advice. That will ensure that advice is provided on a consistent basis and free from competing interests, given that pools exist solely to serve their administering authorities. That is an important wider point to remember: the administering authorities are the shareholders of pools and are working together to deliver for members; they are not competing interests.
Regulations must also require administering authorities to co-operate with strategic authorities to identify and develop appropriate investment opportunities. This requirement will soon see the LGPS involved at an earlier stage on local investment opportunities. For the purposes of this provision, for England the definition of strategic authorities matches that in the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill, while for Wales it includes corporate joint committees. Members may wish to note that there is a reciprocal duty on strategic authorities in the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill.
In summary, the Government are introducing the provisions to finalise the consolidation of assets into pools, and to codify the role of the administering authorities in setting investment strategies and how that engagement with strategic authorities will happen.
I thank the hon. Member for Wyre Forest for tabling new clause 31, which would require the Government to publish guidance on how LGPS surpluses—of which there are now more, which is welcome—can be deployed to address financial needs in local authorities. I recognise that the hon. Member seeks to support local authorities in considering their financial positions against potential funding surpluses.
Decisions on employer contribution rates in the LGPS are rightly taken locally, not by central Government. Contribution rates for employers are set every three years as part of a valuation process—which hon. Members will know is approaching shortly—in which administering authorities will work with their actuaries and employers, including local authorities, to determine a contribution rate that is sustainable for employers and will allow the fund to pay out pensions in the future. As part of that process, a local authority is able to utilise a surplus in its funding position by reducing employer contribution rates. The LGPS is currently in a healthy funding position, as I said, and it is expected that some employers will follow that path. But crucially, again, that is a decision to be made locally on the basis of each employer’s needs.
The existing statutory guidance says that funds should set out in their funding strategy their approach to employer contributions, including a reduction of contributions where appropriate, and should carefully identify and manage conflicts of interest, including conflicts between the role of the particular administering authority and other local authorities that are participants.
Kirsty Blackman
This is a genuine question that I do not know the answer to. Is reducing the contribution made by employers the only way that the funds can currently utilise a surplus, or are there other methods by which they can spend it?
Torsten Bell
That is the only way that I have seen taken up by local authorities, and it is the main one that local authorities are discussing, although, as I have said, that is a decision for them. I hope that at least partially answers the hon. Lady’s question. I commend clause 2 to the Committee, and ask the hon. Member for Wyre Forest to withdraw his new clause.
Mark Garnier
On new clause 31, as we have heard, the local government pension scheme in England and Wales has reached a record surplus of some £45 billion, which is 112% of funding levels, as of June 2024, with some estimating that it will rise to more than 125% by the end of 2025. Despite that strong funding position, no measures have been introduced to make it easier to allow councils or employers to reduce contributions or take contribution holidays. The surplus could be used to create contribution holidays for local authorities, as we have heard, or potentially to reduce council tax or increase the money available for spending on local services.
The current Government focus remains on asset pooling and local investment strategies, rather than enabling the more immediate and flexible use of surplus funds. Councils can already reduce employer contributions under regulations 64 and 64A of the Local Government Pension Scheme Regulations 2013. The problem is that, in practice, actuaries and administering authorities hold the cards, and the guidance has been used to shut down reviews even when funding levels are strong.
The Minister needs to consider issuing better guidance to councils to make the process more transparent, to rebalance the power between councils and funds, and to ensure that actuaries properly consider reductions when the funding position justifies it. The mechanisms that are currently in place mean that the assumptions are overly prudent, reviews come only in cycles, and councils have no leverage in disputes.
New clause 31 seeks to introduce provisions to allow employers within the local government pension scheme to take contribution holidays or reduce employer contributions when surplus funding is confirmed, with actuarial valuations, subject to maintaining the security of member benefits. It would also require the Secretary of State to issue guidance on how surpluses could be prudently deployed to balance member security with local fiscal needs. That would enable councils to better manage budgets, support local services and stimulate local economies without compromising pension schemes.
However, the Minister seems to be working with the Opposition on trying to find ways to move all this forward, so for the sake of brevity we will seek to withdraw new clause 31.
Steve Darling
The Minister spoke of a couple of opportunities for regulation in this area, and we heard oral evidence about how an awful lot of this Bill is to be drawn out in secondary legislation. Will he give us timelines for when he plans to share the regulations, or at least begin the consultation on them, and say what he sees as the key elements of those regulations that will break cover in due course?
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 2, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
For the avoidance of doubt, new clause 31 will be put to the vote much later on. At that stage, the hon. Member for Wyre Forest will be able to withdraw it if he so chooses.
Clause 3
Exemption from public procurement rules
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss Government new clause 21—Exemption from public procurement rules.
Torsten Bell
Clause 3 concerns how procurement law relates to the LGPS. New clause 21 is intended to replace clause 3, and I will endeavour to explain why it is a technical but valuable amendment. The existing clause and the replacing new clause are identical in their purpose and desired outcome. The reason for the change is technical: rather than stating in the Bill how procurement law affects the LGPS, new clause 21 will instead move the LGPS exemption directly into schedule 2 to the Procurement Act 2023, thereby future-proofing it against changes to the Procurement Act itself.
The amended clause has two aims. First, to broaden the scope of cross-pool collaboration, and secondly, to put client authorities, of the kind mentioned by the hon. Member for Wyre Forest, on the same footing as share- holders. That is necessary because the Procurement Act effectively caps the potential for collaboration through joint ventures between pools, as the vertical exemption in schedule 2 to that Act requires demonstration that no more than 20% of a pool’s turnover can be generated on behalf of anyone other than that pool’s shareholders. That may limit the collaboration between pools that we expect to see more of.
Legislation should not act as a barrier to collaboration. The clause addresses that by exempting LGPS pools from the 20% limit, such that the relevant procurement rules are satisfied so long as a pool is acting in the interests of any LGPS authority. Furthermore, given that LGPS authorities can choose to participate in their pool as a contracting client or as a shareholder, the clause also enables all LGPS authorities to benefit from the exemption, regardless of whether they are a client only or a shareholder. This means that LGPS pools will be able to specialise as centres of excellence for particular asset classes and for other pools to access those services, thereby reducing duplication and enabling the investments at scale that we heard so much about in the evidence session.
I ask that clause 3 does not stand part of the Bill, but commend to the Committee new clause 21, which replaces clause 3.
Kirsty Blackman
The Government have requested to withdraw clause 3 and replace it with new clause 21. I am slightly confused as to how we got to the point where the Government did not make this decision in the first place, and how the Bill we discussed on Second Reading did not include the change being made to the Procurement Act, instead of the change being made directly in the Bill. Have the Government done significant consultation over the summer, or received input from various organisations that has made it clear that the new way they are now proposing is better than the original?
I can understand that there are two different ways and that there may be a toss-up about which one is best, but why have the Government come down on the side of changing the Procurement Act rather than making the change in primary legislation in the Bill? The Minister has made a little bit of that case, but if he could expand on why the Government have chosen to change their approach, it would be incredibly helpful.
Torsten Bell
I will be very straight with the hon. Lady, in answer to her fair question. It would obviously be preferable if the clause were not changing between Second Reading and Report, so it is a completely reasonable question to ask. The straight answer is that it is both because of consultation responses, or people’s feedback, and because the legal advice is that this is a more foolproof way to make sure that the intent of the Bill on Second Reading is put into effect.
As I set out earlier, the key change is that other changes to the Procurement Act will not have unintended consequences for the LGPS in future. I hope the hon. Lady understands that that is the motivation. There is nothing else going on here. The change has happened over that period because that is when comments came in and when legal advice was received.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
I put the Question that clause 3 stand part of the Bill and some people shouted aye and nobody shouted no—so that is it. I suggest that Members will have to deal with this on Report. The only way we learn how to conduct procedure in this House is through experience, and I am sure the Minister and the Government Whip will not forget this experience.
Clause 4
Scheme manager governance reviews
Amendments made: 18, in clause 4, page 4, line 35, leave out “for England and Wales”.
The amendment would secure that Clause 4 applies to scheme regulations relating to a pension scheme for local government workers for Scotland, as well as scheme regulations relating to a scheme for local government workers in England and Wales. Clause 1 does not extend to Northern Ireland (see Clause 100).
Amendment 19, in clause 4, page 4, line 40, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “responsible authority”.
The amendment and Amendments 20, 21, 22 and 23 are consequential on Amendment 18. References in Clause 4 to the Secretary of State are changed to “the responsible authority”. That term is defined by Amendment 24 to refer either to the Secretary of State (as regards England and Wales) or to the Scottish Ministers (as regards Scotland).
Amendment 20, in clause 4, page 5, line 1, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “responsible authority”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 19.
Amendment 21, in clause 4, page 5, line 19, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “responsible authority”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 19.
Amendment 22, in clause 4, page 5, line 33, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “responsible authority”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 19.
Amendment 23, in clause 4, page 5, line 38, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “responsible authority”.—(Torsten Bell.)
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 19.
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss Government new clause 22—Additional powers for certain scheme managers.
Torsten Bell
Thank you for the learning, Sir Christopher.
Clause 4 enables the Government to make regulations that require LGPS administering authorities to undertake and publish an independent review of their governance arrangements at least once every three years. I am sure that Committee members will agree that good governance is critical to the healthy functioning of a pensions scheme. The clause will ensure that authorities face external scrutiny of their governance processes. Many authorities already carry out governance reviews of this form and this measure will merely ensure consistent high standards.
The clause also enables the Secretary of State to direct an authority to undertake an ad hoc governance review if they are concerned by significant weaknesses in an authority’s governance or suspect that an authority is not complying with regulations. As a result of the amendments we have already discussed, the power can also be exercised by Scottish Ministers in relation to the LGPS in Scotland.
New clause 22 enables the Secretary of State to give specified LGPS administering authorities certain additional powers, which most administering authorities will already have by virtue of being local authorities. The new clause allows the powers to be extended to administering authorities that are not local authorities, such as the Environment Agency. The new clause will simply create a level playing field for all administering authorities in England and Wales.
Kirsty Blackman
What is the Government’s rationale for not including Scotland in new clause 22? Is it because the Scottish Government looked at the original Bill and had not seen the amendments? Or is it because the differential structures between Scotland and the rest of the UK mean that it would not help in the Scottish situation? If the Minister is not clear on the answer, will he please commit to ask the Scottish Government whether they want to be included in the new clause and the relevant changes to be made so that it applies in Scotland? If the regulatory systems are the same, it seems sensible that a level playing field apply. It would be incredibly helpful if the Minister could make the commitment to check whether the Scottish Government want to be included.
Torsten Bell
I am happy to give that commitment. I am not aware of any administering authorities in Scotland that would be affected, but I am happy to take that point away.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 4, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5
Mergers of funds
Mark Garnier
I beg to move amendment 244, in clause 5, page 6, line 6, at end insert—
“(2) In the case of merger of schemes for local government workers, the Secretary of State must consider the geography of scheme areas and ensure these areas align with strategic authority boundaries before implementing the merger.”
This amendment requires the Government to explicitly consider the geography of new LGPS areas in any reorganisation.
The amendment would amend the Public Service Pensions Act 2013 to explicitly empower the Secretary of State to make regulations if there was a merger, including a compulsory merger, of two or more LGPS-funded schemes. The change in clause 5 would support flexibility for structural consolidation to enhance fund management and efficiencies; however, there is uncertainty about how the Government will confirm geographical boundaries for the local government pension scheme asset pools amid local government reorganisation.
Currently, LGPS reform aims to consolidate assets and strengthen local investment, but concerns remain about the implementation timescales and risks of disruption. Stakeholders highlight the need for clarity on new geographical boundary definitions and on alignment with new or existing local authority boundaries. Potential challenges exist in meeting asset-pooling and Government deadlines if changes coincide with wider local government changes.
Amendment 244 would require the Secretary of State to explicitly consider, for any LGPS scheme merger, the geography of scheme areas, and ensure alignment with strategic authority boundaries. This would help to provide clarity, promote smoother transitions and reduce disruption from concurrent local government reorganisations. The amendment emphasises the importance of integrating pension scheme boundaries with local government structures to support effective government and investment strategies. We hope the Government will reflect on this issue as the Bill progresses through the House.
Steve Darling
As the Lib Dem spokesman for this part of the Bill, I welcome the direction of travel.
Kirsty Blackman
If the hon. Member for Wyre Forest can confirm that he does not intend the change to apply in Scotland, because we do not have strategic authorities, I am quite happy not to vote for or against it and to leave it to those who do have strategic authorities.
Torsten Bell
I thank the hon. Member for Wyre Forest for the amendment and for the points he raised. Amendment 244 would amend clause 5 to allow fund mergers only if the two funds are in the same strategic authority, so it would be a highly constraining power. I recognise the logic, but our view is that it is far too constraining.
I emphasise to Members that the Government do not have any plans to require the mergers of LGPS funds, and that our strong preference is that when mergers take place, that happens by agreement between the administering authorities. The Government would use the power to require a merger of pension funds only as a last resort, if local decision making failed to deliver satisfactory arrangements.
I reassure Members that during the reform process Ministers and officials have looked carefully at how local government reorganisation, which is ongoing and very important, as the hon. Member for Wyre Forest rightly pointed out, maps on to the existing LGPS geography, and we will continue to do so. There should not be any friction between the emerging unitary structures and the LGPS. I reassure the Opposition that the administering authorities that were in the Brunel and Access pools are already carefully considering their choice of a new pool in the light of local government reorganisation.
In summary, it is important that local government pension funds and Ministers retain flexibility in their decision making so that decisions can be taken in the best interests of the relevant scheme. I ask the hon. Member to withdraw amendment 244.
Mark Garnier
I am reassured by the Minister’s comments and appreciate that he wishes to make the measure work in the interests, geographically, of local government or local authorities as they undergo a transition through the reorganisation of local authorities. Obviously, this provision needs to work concurrently with that process, but I appreciate that it is up to the authorities in the first instance. We wanted to be reassured, and the Minister has made the point that there will be no or little Government interference unless they really do disagree with themselves. I am reassured.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Torsten Bell
Schedule 3 to the Public Service Pensions Act 2013 has already conferred powers on the Secretary of State to make regulations about the administration, management and winding up of any pension funds. Clause 5 amends the 2013 Act to clarify and provide certainty that, in the case of the LGPS, the Secretary of State already has existing powers to make regulations about the merger of two or more LGPS pension funds. That includes compulsory merger. The purpose of the clause is simply to ensure that it is put beyond doubt that sufficient powers are in place to facilitate the merger of pension funds if needed—for example, as a consequence of local government reorganisation.
The power could also be used in the unlikely event that an independent governance review finds particularly grave issues with an administering authority’s governance of its pension fund. Members will note that, as I have just pointed out, the Government do not have any plans to require the merger of funds at present, and our strong preference is that when mergers happen, that is done on the basis of agreement between the administering authorities. These powers can also be exercised by Scottish Ministers in relation to the LGPS in Scotland. I urge that clause 5 stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 6
Amendments of 2013 Act relating to scheme regulations
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Torsten Bell
The powers and duties to make local government pension scheme regulations under this chapter of the Bill are exercisable under the 2013 Act. Clause 6 sets out the amendments required to that Act to ensure that these powers operate effectively. Subsection (2) clarifies that the power to make scheme regulations under the Act is subject to the Bill’s provisions, and it ensures that scheme regulations can include any consequential, supplementary, incidental or transitional provision that is necessary as a result of the Bill. Subsection (3) further clarifies that the requirement to consult on scheme regulations made under provisions in the Bill, which must be satisfied before the regulations can be made under section 21 of the 2013 Act, can be satisfied by consultation carried out before or after the Bill comes into force. Just to spell this out, that is to say that consultation taking place before Royal Assent could contribute to the consultation required.
I hope that clause 7 provides a useful interpretation of the terms and definitions in chapter 1 as they relate to local government pension schemes. I urge that clauses 6 and 7 stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 7
Interpretation of Chapter 1
Amendment made: 24, in clause 7, page 7, line 7, at end insert—
“‘the responsible authority’ means (in relation to a scheme for local government workers in England and Wales or Scotland)—
(a) the Secretary of State, in or as regards England and Wales, or
(b) the Scottish Ministers, in or as regards Scotland.”—(Torsten Bell.)
The amendment defines the term “responsible authority” for the purposes of clauses in Chapter 1 of Part 1.
Clause 7, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 8
Power to modify scheme to allow for payment of surplus to employer
Torsten Bell
I beg to move amendment 25, in clause 8, page 8, line 2, leave out paragraph (b).
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 27. It removes the power to disapply the section in prescribed cases, as this is now contained in new subsection (5A).
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 26 and 27.
Clause stand part.
Torsten Bell
Thank you, Sir Christopher, for the progress through the local government pension schemes part of the Bill. We now move on to the defined-benefit clauses. Clause 8, which amends the Pensions Act 1995, enables trustees of private sector defined-benefit schemes to modify their schemes to safely share surplus funds with the sponsoring employer. Through that change, trustees will also be better placed to negotiate with sponsoring employers to get additional benefits from surplus for scheme members.
I know that Members here—that is, hon. Members rather than scheme members—are keen to ensure that the security of pensions is not impacted by these changes. We have consulted on this point and several restrictions are in place that are outlined in clause 9. I will outline the core protections.
First, trustees will remain in the driver’s seat, deciding whether to modify scheme rules to allow surplus release from their individual schemes in line with their duty to the interests of the beneficiaries. Secondly, a prudent funding threshold for surplus release will be set out in regulations, on which we will consult. Surplus will be released only where a scheme is fully funded at a low dependency, which means that the scheme funding is sufficiently high to allow trustees to meet future liabilities with a very low risk of future employer contributions. Thirdly, trustees must obtain actuarial certification to demonstrate that the scheme meets these funding requirements and members must be notified before surplus funds are released.
The amendments clarify two points. First, the treatment of particular cases, such as sectionalised schemes—schemes that have multiple parts to them—is usually set out in regulations. Amendment 27 enables regulations to specify how the new powers to modify by resolution will apply in such cases—for example, to ensure that each section in a sectionalised scheme is treated as a scheme in its own right for the purposes of this power specifically.
Secondly, the power in the clause is not intended to affect schemes in wind up where the majority of schemes will have existing rules about how surplus should be distributed at the point of wind up. The amendment clarifies that when trustees consider the exercise of the power to modify, any separate power to repay surplus on winding up is disregarded. Equally, the new power in clause 8 cannot be used to introduce a power or to modify an existing power to release surplus on winding up.
Mark Garnier
I thank the Minister for his comments. We agree that the law needs to be updated to reflect current circumstances, and it makes sense to ensure that companies that have not made pre-2016 resolutions are not unfairly penalised. We broadly support the update to the law because it corrects an important imbalance. However, it is crucial, as we move forward, that we maintain the necessary guardrails and uphold the independence of trustees to protect scheme members’ interests. These important aspects will be further discussed in relation to clause 9.
I will raise a couple of points made by people we have been engaging with while looking at the Bill. First, the Pensions Management Institute highlighted its disappointment that the Government did not take the opportunity of this legislation, which broadly talks about defined-benefit funds, to make it easier and more tax efficient for employers and schemes to use scheme surpluses to fund contributions under defined-contribution arrangements, including those not held in the same trust. That would have opened up possibilities for many entities that have long since moved their ongoing DC provisions to a master trust or contract-based arrangement.
The Phoenix Group also highlighted an issue. To protect funding levels after surplus release, schemes may adopt more cautious investment strategies, reducing allocations to private and productive assets. That could undermine the Government’s growth objectives. Aside from those points, we are happy with the clause.
Steve Darling
I very much echo what the hon. Member for Wyre Forest said. Clearly, surpluses have built up over a number of years since the last crash. There has been a level of overcaution. It is important for our economy that those surpluses are appropriately released, which could drive economic growth. I am sure that all of us in the room want to see that.
Kirsty Blackman
Perhaps it reflects my ideological position that I am much more comfortable seeing this happen with local authorities than I am here, and I am looking for more guardrails. In fact, there are more guardrails around how local government pension schemes do this. It can be done pretty much only if it is to reduce employer contributions, which increases the amount of money that local authorities have for either reducing council tax, as the hon. Member for Wyre Forest said, or for spending on whatever it is that they want to spend money on a day-to-day basis.
I would like to see more power go to trustees. I am concerned—this was raised previously—about the level of employer pressure that could come to bear on trustees about releasing surplus, when it may not be in the best interests of all the scheme members but the employer might be really keen to use the money. I am also concerned that we have had quite a lot of different ideas about what the surpluses could be used for. The Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Torbay, made the same point as the Government about ensuring that employers could invest more to grow the economy, whether that is in bits of tech that make the company more productive or workplace benefits for those who are scheme members.
Why did the Government decide not to strengthen the powers of trustees in relation to the surplus release? Could the Government look in future at tightening what surplus release could be used for? Trustees have a fiduciary duty to ensure that members’ pensions grow as promised, and that they get the benefits that they were promised or that their defined-contribution scheme in other circumstances grows at the right level. However, if the fiduciary duty applies, why is there not a similar application in terms of surplus release? Why is there not a similar requirement on trustees to ensure that that surplus release goes the way that we think it should go?
On Second Reading, I said that there had not been enough clarity from the Government about how they want that surplus to be released. Are they encouraging or instructing trustees to release surplus to employers if it will be invested in the business, or if it is being done to invest in workplace training schemes? I am not convinced that there is enough clarity on this issue.
Given the Government’s drive to ensure that more people are working and that there is a reduction in the amount of economic inactivity, they could say, “Actually, if you are going to use this to improve access to work, to ensure that you can employ more disabled people, we will absolutely sign off a surplus release, provided that you have met all the other criteria.” The Government could encourage trustees to do that. I feel as though there are more levers that the Government could use and that they are not taking this opportunity.
I have not tabled any amendments on this issue, but I raised it on Second Reading. It would be great if the Government gave me some comfort that they are considering whether—in the future with the Bill or, down the line, in the guidance that is given to trustees—to strengthen the hand of trustees, so that they can direct employers better and so they do not come under pressure from employers; or whether the Government will take policy decisions or directions, and point them out to trustees so that they are encouraged to go in a certain direction to ensure that there is growth in the economy, which is apparently the Government’s first mission.
Torsten Bell
I welcome the broad consensus about the direction of travel from everyone who has spoken. I will come first to the remarks from the hon. Member for Aberdeen North, who made some key points. She understandably makes the direct comparison with the LGPS. To a large respect, that reflects the fact that the LGPS is an open scheme where the ongoing contributions are much more of a live question, but I take her point.
I will make a few remarks on her more controversial points about the role of trustees and what funds are used for. The powers of trustees are very strong. Trustees have an absolute veto on any surplus release under the clause, as they do currently, and they have fiduciary duties about how they should use their powers. That is stronger than was implied in some of the remarks that we have heard.
As for the wider point about pressure on trustees from employers, that can affect lots of issues and is not specific to the one we are discussing today. That is what the fiduciary duties of the trust system exist to protect against and what the regulatory work of the Pensions Regulator ensures does not happen. If there was inappropriate pressure on trustees, it would be a very serious issue. That is not specific to the surplus question—that applies to trustees just doing their job. My strong impression with every trustee I talk to is that they take that duty very seriously indeed. I agree that we should always keep that under review.
Kirsty Blackman
There is an absolute veto power—a yes or no—but it is also about the power for trustees to be able to say to employers, “This is how we would like you to use the money.” There is less flexibility for trustees there. Once the money is handed over to the employers, there is no comeback for trustees if employers do not use it as suggested.
Torsten Bell
That is a factually accurate description of the situation. The hon. Lady is not the first person to have raised that point with me, and I understand the wish for greater certainty about how funds will be used. My view is that looking for that certainty through legislation is wishful thinking. Funding sitting within companies is fungible. The monitoring and enforcement of those things would not be practical in any sense. I am sure that part of the discussion between trustees and firms will be about exactly the kind of points that the hon. Lady is raising, particularly for open schemes, where there is a large overlap between employees and scheme. Members will be part of the discussion, but I do not think that that is practical for legislation. I am liberal enough, although I am certainly not a Liberal Democrat, to think that that is quite hard for legislation to manage, and that it is the role of trustees and employers to work through that.
On the hon. Lady’s wider point, I offer her some reassurance that the Pensions Regulator is taking very seriously its job of providing guidance for trustees about how they think about the questions of surpluses. I think that will offer her quite a lot of reassurance, particularly about how members benefit—she has focused on how employers benefit—from release.
Amendment 25 agreed to.
Amendments made: 26, in clause 8, page 8, line 2, at end insert—
“(4A) Any power to distribute assets to the employer on a winding up is to be disregarded for the purposes of subsections (2) and (3); and a resolution under subsection (2) may not confer such a power.”.
This amendment ensures that the scope of section 36B is confined to powers to pay surplus otherwise than on the winding up of the scheme.
Amendment 27, in clause 8, page 8, line 6, at end insert—
“(5A) Regulations may provide that this section does not apply, or applies with prescribed modifications, in prescribed circumstances or to schemes of a prescribed description.”—(Torsten Bell.)
This amendment, which inserts provision corresponding to section 37(8), allows for the application of section 36B to be modified in particular cases (for example, in the case of sectionalised schemes).
Clause 8, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 9
Restrictions on exercise of power to pay surplus
John Milne (Horsham) (LD)
I beg to move amendment 5, in clause 9, page 8, line 18, at end insert—
“(2AA) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (2A), regulations made under that subsection must include provision that takes into account the particular circumstances of occupational pension schemes established before the coming into force of the Pensions Act 1995 which, prior to that Act, possessed or were understood to possess a power to pay surplus to an employer.”.
This amendment would allow schemes where people are affected by pre-97 to offer discretionary indexation where funding allows, with appropriate regulatory oversight.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 6, in clause 9, page 8, line 23, at end insert—
“(aa) prohibiting the making of a payment until annual increases to payments in line with Consumer Prices Index inflation have been awarded to members,”.
This amendment requires that payments in line with CPI inflation are awarded to members before all other considerations.
John Milne
The purpose of amendment 5 is to ensure that regulations take account of the particular circumstances of occupational pension schemes that were established before the Pensions Act 1995. There is effective discrimination against certain pre-1997 pension holders. That is a long-standing grievance and has remained unresolved for far too long. This has been reflected considerably in my postbag, as I am sure it has been for pretty much every MP.
In the evidence session on Tuesday, we heard moving testimony from Roger Sainsbury of the Deprived Pensioners Association and Terry Monk of the Pensions Action Group. As they told us, many of those affected are, literally, dying without ever seeing satisfaction. Many of these pensioners are receiving a fraction of what they are entitled to and what somebody who paid the exact same sums is currently receiving. It is causing genuine hardship.
Members of the pre-’97 schemes are often in a different position to those in later schemes. These schemes were designed under a different legal and regulatory framework. Current legislation does not always reflect those historical realities, which creates unintended inequities.
The amendment would require regulations under clause 9 to explicitly consider these older schemes. It would allow such schemes, with appropriate regulatory oversight, to offer discretionary indexation where funding allows. The key impacts would be to provide flexibility while ensuring safeguards are in place, give trustees the ability to improve outcomes for members in a fair and responsible way, and help to address the long-standing issue of members who miss out on indexation simply because of the scheme’s pre-’97 status. It also ensures that members can share in scheme strength where resources permit.
Clearly, safeguards are needed, and the amendment makes it clear that discretionary increases would be possible only where schemes are well funded. Oversight by regulators ensures that employer interests and member protections remain balanced. The intention behind the amendment is to bring fairness and flexibility into the treatment of pre-’97 scheme members and to modernise the system so that it works for today’s savers without undermining scheme stability.
Mark Garnier
I will not take up too much of the Committee’s time, but suffice it to say that we all heard the evidence that was presented on Tuesday, and we in the Conservative party agree with the Liberal Democrats’ amendment. We will support it.
Kirsty Blackman
I will not say much just now. I would like to hear what the Minister says, and I might bob again after that, Sir Christopher.
Torsten Bell
I thank the hon. Members for Torbay and for Horsham for their amendments and for giving us the opportunity to discuss the matter of defined-benefit members and pre-1997 accruals. I should be clear that clause 9 and the related amendments refer to defined-benefit schemes, not to the questions of the Pension Protection Fund and financial assistance scheme compensation, which were discussed at such length—and, as several hon. Members have said, powerfully—at the evidence session on Tuesday.
The Government understand the intent behind the amendments. It is crucial that the new surplus flexibilities work for both sponsoring employers and members, for example through discretionary benefit increases where appropriate. That point was raised several times on Second Reading before the summer recess.
On pre-1997 indexation, it is important to be clear that most schemes—as I said, these schemes are not in the PPF or receiving FAS compensation—pay some pre-1997 indexation. Analysis published last year by the Pensions Regulator shows that only 17% of members of private sector defined-benefit pension schemes do not receive any pre-1997 indexation on their benefits, because different scheme rules specify whether someone receives that indexation.
Under the Bill, decisions to enable the scheme to release a surplus will always rest with trustees, who have a duty to act in the interests of scheme beneficiaries. Trustees, working with the sponsoring employer, will be responsible for determining how members should benefit from any surplus release, which may include discretionary indexation. My personal view is that, in lots of cases, it should, but that is where the discussion takes place. The Government are clear that trustees’ discretion is key to this policy. Trustees are best placed to determine the correct use of the surplus for their members, not least because that will involve making some trade-offs between different groups, particularly of members, and it is trustees who are in the position to do so.
It would not be appropriate for the Government to mandate that schemes provide uncapped indexation, in line with the consumer prices index, to all members prior to the making of a surplus payment. Where trustees plan to award discretionary increases, they are best placed to identify what increase is affordable and proportionate for the scheme and its members.
Although scheme rules may require an employer to agree to a discretionary increase—this point was made by several Members who were anxious about it on Second Reading—the trustees will have the final say when deciding to release surplus, and they are perfectly within their rights to request such an increase as part of any agreement that leads to a surplus release. That is a powerful power for trustees to hold on to.
The Pensions Regulator will publish guidance for trustees, as I previously mentioned, and for their advisers, noting factors to consider when releasing surplus and ways in which trustees can ensure that members and employees can benefit. That will happen following the passage of the Bill. These measures already give trustees the opportunity to secure the best outcomes for their members, which could include discretionary increases. I am grateful for the contribution from the hon. Member for Horsham, but on those grounds, I ask him to withdraw the amendment.
Kirsty Blackman
As I said, I wanted to hear from the Minister. I agree that trustees should be the ones making the decision on how to spend any surplus and whether to make an uprating. However, as some schemes are barred by their scheme rules from making such an uprating, my concern is about allowing them the flexibility to make it in any circumstances if they decide that that is the best thing to do. It is not about tying their hands and saying that they have to make an uprating; it is about allowing every single scheme the flexibility to make it if they decide that that is the best thing to do.
Where there are employer blockers or other issues in the scheme rules, can anything be done, in the Bill or anywhere else, to remove those blockers so that we can ensure that trustees have an element of choice and remove some of the unfairness that we heard about on Tuesday?
Torsten Bell
I think I can offer the hon. Lady some reassurance. It is true that within some scheme rules it will be clear that discretionary increases of the kind that we are debating would require employer agreement. I know that that has worried some hon. Members who think that that could be a veto against such releases in a surplus release situation.
My view—and the guidance to be released by the TPR will make this very clear—is as follows. It may formally be for the employer to agree to those discretionary increases. The scheme rules may apply to that, although in some schemes the trustees may be able to make that decision on their own—that will be a distinction that will depend on the scheme rules. However, even when the scheme rules say that the employers must agree, they will have a strong incentive to agree with the trustees if they are asking the trustees to release. That is why I say that the process of surplus release will change the dynamic of those discussions, which I recognise are currently not proceeding in some cases because employers are saying a blanket no to discretionary increases. We do not need legislative change to make that happen.
Kirsty Blackman
Would the Minister encourage those schemes that find that they want to release the surplus in relation to the uplift, but are struggling to get that process across the line, to go to the TPR, look at the guidance that is coming out and ask for assistance with making those discretionary uplifts?
Torsten Bell
I absolutely would. I have been making exactly those points to anyone who will listen.
John Milne
I thank the Minister for his comments. Over the coming weeks, as he will be aware, we will be discussing several amendments that relate to the same issue. It will be interesting to see whether we can reach a satisfactory solution. In the meantime, we will press our amendment to a vote, because we feel that the issue has remained unresolved for such a long time that it needs everything we can give it to get it across the line, but we hope that in the next couple of weeks of debate we can find the best possible solution.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Mark Garnier
I beg to move amendment 247, in clause 9, page 8, line 23, at end insert—
“(aa) prohibiting the making of a payment unless the scheme’s assets have exceeded a buyout valuation,”.
This amendment requires that surplus extraction is only permitted once buyout funding levels are achieved.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 260, in clause 9, page 8, line 30, at end insert—
“(e) requiring the trustees to provide a prescribed notification, as set out in (f) below, with the members of the scheme (or their representatives) not less than 60 days before making any payment under this section;
(f) the prescribed notification should include—
(i) the proposed amount of surplus to be paid to the employer,
(ii) the reasons for the proposed payment,
(iii) the impact on member benefits,
(iv) the scheme's funding position after the proposed payment, and
(v) how members may make representations regarding the proposal;
(g) requiring the trustees to have regard to any representations made by members or their representatives having received the prescribed notification.”
This amendment would require trustees to notify members at least 60 days before making surplus payments to employers. It ensures members receive full information about proposed surplus payments, enabling informed participation.
Amendment 265, in clause 9, page 8, line 30, at end insert——
“(e) requiring the trustees to provide a prescribed notification to members of the scheme, or members’ representatives, not less than 60 days before making any payment under this section,
(f) requiring the prescribed notification under subsection (e) include—
(i) the proposed amount of surplus to be paid to the employer,
(ii) the reasons for the proposed payment,
(iii) the impact on member benefits,
(iv) the scheme's funding position after the proposed payment,
(v) how members may make representations regarding the proposal, and
(g) requiring the trustees to have regard to any representations made by members or their representatives having received the prescribed notification under subsection (e).”
This amendment would require trustees to notify members at least 60 days before making surplus payments to employers.
Amendment 267, in clause 9, page 8, line 30, at end insert—
“(e) requiring that, where the scheme actuary certifies under subsection (a) that the scheme’s assets exceed the cost of securing each member’s accrued rights with an authorised insurer for a continuous period of at least six months, the trustees must first secure a full buy-out of those rights before any payment of surplus may be made to the employer or any other person, and
(f) requiring that subsection (e) does not apply if the scheme actuary certifies that any surplus extraction would, after the extraction, still leave the scheme’s assets exceeding the cost of securing each member’s accrued rights with an authorised insurer.”
This amendment inserts a requirement to ensure that surplus extraction prior to a buyout does not adversely impact the scheme’s ability to reach buyout.
Amendment 261, in clause 9, page 8, line 36, at end insert
“and including confirmation that the proposed payment (surplus access) will not adversely impact members' benefits and that the prescribed notification has been completed in accordance with regulations made under subsection (2A).”
This amendment would aim to strengthen an actuary's role and oversight of schemes accessing surplus, by requiring confirmation that member notification has occurred before certifying surplus payments.
Mark Garnier
Any decision to release surplus funds from defined-benefit pension schemes should rest firmly, as we have discussed, with the trustees. It is important to emphasise that trustees bear the ultimate responsibility for such decisions. We believe that surplus repayments to employers should be permitted only when members’ benefits are fully protected and robust safeguards are in place to maintain the security and sustainability of the scheme.
The Bill notes that the detailed criteria for surplus payments will be set out in forthcoming regulations, and those regulations must be subject to close scrutiny with a primary focus on safeguarding members’ benefits before any funds can be released. There remain important unanswered questions regarding what appropriate guardrails for surplus release should look like. One firm belief is that defined-benefit pension funds should be funded to buy-out levels, to the extent that they are capable of securing members’ benefits with an insurer. Additionally, any surplus extraction should demonstrably provide clear benefits to scheme members, rather than simply serving the employer’s interest—although we heard evidence on Tuesday that did not necessarily agree with that.
We acknowledge that there are broader issues facing defined-benefit pension schemes that we intend to explore further when the Committee considers the new clauses. In particular, the post-Maxwell accounting framework is a significant constraint on defined-benefit pension funds. The requirement to show deficits on company balance sheets suppresses growth potential. The Bill should not miss an opportunity to address those structural hurdles.
One of the behavioural outcomes we have seen is that defined-benefit pension funds have been investing large amounts of money into bonds, including Government bonds, and not into equities where there is the greatest growth potential in the economy. That throws up a couple of problems in this area. First, the money is not going into equities, which are much more volatile than bonds. Secondly, if we see surplus extraction from some of those funds, that money will come from the Government bond market—the gilt market—and there may be an impact on the Government’s ability to borrow funds, which is something we will hear more about on 26 November. Crucially, the Minister will now be part of that, and I suspect he will be taking into account the bond market’s ability to meet Government borrowing requirements when he gets close to that date.
Moreover, there is nothing in the current legislation to prevent surpluses from being used for purposes that do not support economic growth, such as share buybacks or dividend payments by the host employer. Neither of those outcomes necessarily aligns with the Government’s growth agenda, although it could be argued that the money is going back into the wider economy and finding its way back. None the less, we would like to see more guidance on how that money is to be spent. Simply repaying—potentially—private equity funds a large dividend will not necessarily help the greater good.
The Bill proposes new flexibilities for defined-benefit schemes in surplus. Currently, the Bill is unclear on the level at which employers can extract that surplus and there is concern that, once a scheme is fully funded on a low-dependency basis, buy-out could happen. That is a lower threshold than for a gold standard buy-out and, while it may free up capital for employers and support investment, there are concerns that the change could risk members’ security, as buy-out remains the safest way to guarantee benefits. Amendment 247 would provide strong protection against a change of environment where DB funds start to slip back into deficit positions.
Our amendments 260 and 261 are linked. Just Group plc wrote to the Committee to highlight that members of pension schemes that undertake employer surplus extractions should receive proper notification. Engagement with members should be undertaken before extraction, because ultimately any decisions on surplus extraction could be impactful on them. Setting out clearly in legislation what effective engagement would look like, including the role of the actuary in the process, would help trustees to understand their obligations and Parliament’s intent.
Amendment 260 requires trustees to notify members at least 60 days before making surplus payments to employers, and ensures that members receive full information about proposed surplus payments, enabling informed participation. Amendment 261 aims to strengthen an actuary’s role in oversight of schemes accessing surplus, by requiring confirmation that member notification has occurred before certifying surplus payments. Both amendments strengthen the guardrails around DB surplus extraction, as part of our overall strategy of putting member interest first and protecting trustees. We will be pressing these amendments.
Steve Darling
I rise to speak in respect of amendments 265 and 267, which echo the issues already covered by the shadow Minister. Allowing 60 days’ notice to scheme members is extremely important to the Liberal Democrats—and, to be fair, I am sure it is also important to the Government—and the central intention is to protect outcomes for members of schemes and ensure that there is enough flexibility. That 60 days’ notice is really important to us.
Ensuring that there is enough money in the scheme for any buy-out is the second element, which the hon. Member for Wyre Forest has already alluded to. We think it is very important that the finances are there and that we put scheme members at the centre of the proposals before us. I look forward to hearing from the Minister what reassurance he is able to give us on those points.
Kirsty Blackman
I will speak specifically to amendments 260 and 265. Any communication with scheme members is a good thing, particularly if there are to be changes such as those we have been discussing. Sometimes, surplus extraction may not be for the benefit of scheme members; sometimes it may be for other reasons, and trustees have a duty to make clear what they think it is for and to release a surplus only if they think it is a reasonable thing to do. However, they may not have a full understanding of how members feel about what the surplus could be used for. For example, scheme members who are active members might feel that they would love their company to invest in something to make their lives and their jobs easier, and might be keener on that extraction than the trustees might think, so it would be great to have that input.
Amendments 260 and 265 are incredibly similar—surprisingly similar, in fact—and I am happy to support both, were they put to a vote. Amendment 261 is consequential; on amendments 247 and 267, I do not feel I have enough information on what trustees think to make a reasonable judgment on whether either amendment would be a sensible way forward for trustees to meet their fiduciary duty, which is to provide the best guaranteed return for scheme members. I will step out of votes on amendments 247 or 267, but I will support the amendment that requires members to be consulted in advance.
Mr Bedford
I rise to speak to amendment 260. I thank my hon. Friend the shadow Minister for outlining our rationale for the amendments. My comments regard informing members. I support the right to pay surplus to employers—I think that is the right thing to do, so long as the correct safeguards are in place—but it is right to inform members of that decision. Not only is it the right thing to do, but it will improve member engagement in the whole pensions process. I made a point in Tuesday’s evidence session on the importance of financial education, and a number of witnesses supported that position. By more actively engaging with members, we will ensure that they take part in their own pension provision and ensure that the right decisions are made in their own interests.
Torsten Bell
My overall reflection on the amendments is that in most cases what is being requested is already happening, or risks reducing flexibility for trustees. I will set that out in a bit more detail, but I am grateful to hon. Members for their contributions and for the amendments targeting important areas of concern.
Amendments 247 and 261 aim to maintain the buy-out funding threshold for surplus release from DB schemes. Member security is at the heart of our changes, as I have already set out. We are clear that the new surplus flexibilities must both work for employers and maintain a very high level of security for members, as we all agree. Under these proposals, surplus sharing will remain subject to strict safeguards, including the actuarial certification and the prudent funding threshold, which is the same threshold that the TPR under the previous Government had put in place for defined-benefit schemes to aim for more generally. The defined-benefit funding code and underpinning legislation require that trustees aim to maintain a strong funding position more generally, leaving aside the question of surplus release. They do that so that we have very high confidence that members’ future pensions will be paid.
However, the Government are minded to amend the funding threshold at which surplus can be released from the current buy-out threshold to the full funding on a low dependency basis, as I mentioned earlier. That is still a robust and prudent threshold that aligns with the existing rules, as I have just said. The goal here is to give more options to DB scheme trustees. Again, that is true across the Bill: we are aiming to provide trustees with more options about how they proceed.
Many schemes are planning to buy out members’ benefits with an insurer. In many cases that is the right thing for them to do, but other schemes might want to continue to run on their scheme for some time without expecting future contributions to be required from an employer. The low-dependency threshold will give flexibility to trustees to do so. It is right that they have a variety of options to choose from when selecting the endgame for their scheme.
The Government will set out the details of the revised funding threshold in draft regulations, on which we will consult. More broadly, we think it right that that is done via secondary legislation, not primary legislation.
Steve Darling
Can the Minister give us some timescales? I asked previously about timescales, regulations and secondary legislation. I would be grateful if the Minister could address that.
Torsten Bell
The hon. Member rightly returns to an important question. As I set out at the evidence session on Tuesday, our pension policy road map, published at the same time as the Bill, details exactly when we are planning to bring forward regulations. My understanding is that these particular regulations should be consulted on in the spring of next year—if that is not right, I will make sure we come back to him with further details. As I say, the road map provides the details of that timeline. It is a very important question for people to be clear on. In that consultation, I am sure the evidence we have heard will be taken into account.
Amendments 260 and 265 correctly aim to ensure that members are well informed and represented when it comes to their pension schemes and retirement. The new paragraphs would be inserted into clause 9 of the Bill, which amends section 37 of the Pensions Act 1995. Section 37 already provides that regulations must require members to be notified in relation to a surplus payment before it is made.
This is therefore not about the flexibility of trustees; it is redundant, given the requirements already in the Bill. It is similar to the existing requirement under section 37 of the Pensions Act 1995, and we will again consult on these draft regulations following Royal Assent. Furthermore, trustees already have a clear duty to act in all matters in the best interests of the beneficiaries of their scheme, and they are best placed to decide, in consultation with the sponsoring employer, what actions are best for members—I will not keep repeating that point as we go through the rest of this Bill.
Finally, I thank the hon. Member for Wyre Forest for proposing amendment 261, with its requirement for actuarial confirmation that proposed payments from a DB surplus to employers will not adversely affect members’ benefits, and that members have been notified ahead of that release. Those are valuable objectives, but they are already achieved by the robust safeguards in place, including trustee discretion, the prudent funding threshold —on which we will consult—and the actuarial certification that a scheme is well funded.
In addition, the defined-benefit funding code and the underpinning legislation already require trustees to aim to maintain a strong funding position, and that is actively overseen by the Pensions Regulator. I believe the safeguards we have put in place put members at the heart of the policy, which is a point of cross-party agreement, and will allow trustees to continue to be the people who strike the correct balance between the benefits for employers and members. I hope this offers some reassurance to the Committee that, for the reasons I have outlined, these amendments are unnecessary; I urge hon. Members not to press them.
Kirsty Blackman
The Minister has said that trustees are required to act in the interests of and to the benefit of scheme members. However, they are required to act so that members will get the benefits that they are promised under the pension. They are not required to act to the benefit of scheme members. As I said earlier, there is a distinct possibility—particularly with surplus, which is not going into the pension scheme and which can only be paid if those benefits are already guaranteed—that the surplus is only a surplus in the case where members are definitely going to get those benefits anyway.
It is the case that trustees might not know what is to the benefit of members. Requiring them, or asking them, to consult members on what they would like, or to provide members with information about how money is going to be spent, could get better results for those members. It is not going to change the amount of pension they will get, which is the trustees’ requirement; however, it may change their lives in a more positive way. Whether or not they are people currently paying into the scheme and actively employed, there are ways that the surplus could be spent that would benefit or disbenefit their lives.
In making that case, I think there should be a consultation with members. The hon. Member for Mid Leicestershire made the point very well that we should encourage people to take more interest in and have more input into their pensions, so that they have a better idea of what is going on, of the possibility of surpluses and of how they are spent. I would appreciate it if the Minister, when he is considering the regulations and the changes being made, could think about how best to consult scheme members. Given that trustees have a duty to act not in the best interests of members, but in the best interests of members’ pensions, I would love to see, around the surplus, arrangements that benefit scheme members—whether they are currently paying, future or deferred members, or those already getting their pensions—rather than solely the employer and the employer’s intentions.
Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Gerald Jones.)
Pension Schemes Bill (Fifth sitting)
Tuesday 9th September 2025
(4 months, 3 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesPension Schemes Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 9 September 2025 - (9 Sep 2025)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we begin, I remind hon. Members to switch electronic devices to silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings.
Ordered,
That the Order of the Committee of Tuesday 2 September be varied, after paragraph 1(d),
by inserting—
“(da) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 16 September;”.—(Taiwo Owatemi.)
Clause 27
Authorisation of consolidator schemes etc by the Pensions Regulator
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)
It is a pleasure to serve under you today, Ms McVey. We recommence our consideration of the small pots part of the Bill. I thank all Members for their engagement during the sittings last week.
Clause 27 is fundamental. It allows regulations to be made to create an authorisation and supervisory framework for pension schemes to become authorised consolidators. This framework will allow master trusts to apply to the Pensions Regulator to become authorised, on the basis that they meet certain conditions and standards, including the value for money test we discussed at length last Thursday.
The clause also ensures ongoing oversight. If a scheme no longer meets the standards, regulations can enable the Pensions Regulator to step in to require the trustees to take prescribed steps and, ultimately, to withdraw authorisation if necessary. That ensures better outcomes, not just fewer pension pots. The clause represents a vital safeguard in the small pots framework.
Clause 28 provides a definition of a “consolidator scheme” and “consolidator arrangement”. A “consolidator scheme” can either be an authorised master trust or a Financial Conduct Authority-regulated pension scheme that appears on a designated list published by the FCA. A “consolidator arrangement” refers to a specific part of the scheme that is intended to receive small pots.
This reflects the structure of pension providers that operate in the UK. Some pension providers offer multiple arrangements within their scheme whereas others may have a single arrangement or offering. The clause caters for both scenarios to ensure that regulators can focus on the particular arrangements that will require authorisation.
To simplify: in practice, all schemes will be authorised by specific arrangement, but there will be some occasions where schemes may only have a single arrangement so the whole scheme will be authorised. By having at least one authorised arrangement, schemes or providers will be authorised consolidators.
Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)
This is a very uncontentious and highly technical part of the Bill. We have no objections to any of these provisions and so will be supporting them.
Steve Darling (Torbay) (LD)
As the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, I echo that this is a direction of travel that we welcome. The vast majority of the proposals that are before us today are uncontentious. They follow the correct direction of travel in growth and change that we want to see in our pensions system in the United Kingdom.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 27 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 28 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 29
Further provision about contents of small pots regulations
Torsten Bell
I beg to move amendment 36, in clause 29, page 27, leave out lines 14 and 15.
This amendment clarifies that small pots regulations may confer rights of appeal more broadly than just in relation to the refusal of an application for authorisation.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 37 to 40.
Clause stand part.
Torsten Bell
Clause 29 will make the small pot consolidation framework work in practice, through allowing the small pots regulations to cover a range of operational, administrative, data protection and consumer protection matters. It enables the Pensions Regulator to charge a fee for authorisation and gives applicants the right to appeal if their application is refused. Regulations will be able to require trustees and scheme managers to maintain and improve records, and they will protect members from high transfer fees. The clause enables the delegation of functions and powers to the Pensions Regulator, the FCA and the small pots data platform operator. It ensures that data protection and privacy obligations are respected, while allowing necessary data processing to support the scheme’s efficient operation.
The clause will allow the Government to amend existing legislation to support the small pots consolidation framework. Examples of uses of the power include giving the Pensions Ombudsman new powers to investigate member complaints, and ensuring that the small pots data platform is properly funded through the general levy. Pensions law is complex and technical, and needs to evolve with time, so the Government need the flexibility to respond to those changes and regulators’ operational experience without having to table a new Bill every time.
The Bill clearly sets out the multiple default consolidator framework. With targeted amendments, the clause will allow us to fine-tune the framework over time, ensuring operational effectiveness. Any use of so-called Henry VIII powers will be subject to the affirmative procedure. The clause is essential for the practicality, reliability and integrity of the small pots consolidation framework to ensure it is fit for purpose now and for the future.
The Government amendments to the clause are purely technical drafting improvements. Amendment 36 clarifies that appeal rights for schemes are not limited solely to decisions regarding an application for authorisation, so one could appeal on other grounds. Amendment 37 provides further clarity on the liability framework that will be established to ensure that members are protected. It makes it clear that the small pots data platform operator or the trustees or managers of a relevant pension scheme can be made responsible for paying compensation to an individual who has suffered a loss as a result of a breach of the small pots regulations. Amendments 38 to 40 take account of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025, which was passed by Parliament subsequent to the introduction of this Bill. The amendments do not alter the policy, and I ask the Committee to support them.
Mark Garnier
Perhaps it is exciting for those who enjoy dry reading. We in the Opposition have no objections.
Amendment 36 agreed to.
Amendments made: 37, in clause 29, page 27, line 30, leave out—
“a relevant person, other than the FCA,”
and insert—
“the small pots data platform operator or the trustees or managers of a relevant pension scheme”.
This amendment ensures that the FCA cannot be required to pay compensation under small pots regulations.
Amendment 38, in clause 29, page 27, line 39, leave out “Subject to subsection (4),”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 39.
Amendment 39, in clause 29, page 28, line 3, leave out subsection (4).
This amendment removes provision that is no longer needed because of the general data protection override in section 183A of the Data Protection Act 2018, which was inserted by section 106(2) of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 and came into force on 20 August 2025.
Amendment 40, in clause 29, page 28, leave out lines 8 and 9.—(Torsten Bell.)
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 39.
Clause 29, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 30
Enforcement by the Pensions Regulator
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendment 41.
Clause 31 stand part.
Government amendment 42.
Torsten Bell
Clause 30 seeks to ensure that the rules and conditions set by the regulations are, in practice, followed. These regulations can allow the Pensions Regulator to issue three types of notices: a compliance notice, requiring a person to take specific steps to comply; a third-party compliance notice, directing someone to ensure another party’s compliance; and a penalty notice, imposing a financial penalty for non-compliance or a breach of the regulations. If a scheme fails to comply with the regulations or with a notice issued under them, the Pensions Regulator can impose a financial penalty capped at £10,000 for individuals and £100,000 in other cases. The clause also enables regulations to provide for appeals to the first-tier or upper tribunal, ensuring procedural fairness and accountability. All those are standard approaches to pensions legislation.
Clause 31 gives the Treasury the power to make regulations to enable the FCA to monitor and enforce compliance with the small pots consolidation framework for contract-based schemes. It ensures that the FCA can act decisively to protect consumers and uphold the integrity of the system. Clauses 30 and 31 ensure consistent standards across the pensions market as we look to enforce these measures. Any regulations made under clause 31 must go through the affirmative procedure, ensuring parliamentary oversight.
Amendments 41 and 42 seek to clarify the definition of the term “FCA regulated” when referring to an authorised person in the context of the legislation. The amendments seek to provide greater clarity by ensuring harmony and removing any ambiguity between clause 30(1) and clauses 31 and 34. They ensure that the Pensions Regulator is not inadvertently prevented from regulating a trustee of a pension scheme solely because that trustee is also regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority in a separate capacity. The amendments are purely technical clarifications, and I ask the Committee to support them. I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Mark Garnier
Again, I have no real comments, apart from to ask the Minister, perhaps when winding up, if he could explain how the Government came to the penalty levels of £10,000 for individuals and £100,000 for others. It would be useful to understand what the thinking was behind that.
Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)
My question was not dissimilar to the shadow Minister’s question on the amounts of the penalties—£10,000 for an individual and £100,000 in any other case. There is no delegated authority to raise it beyond those levels. There is an ability to set the amounts, provided they do not go above those. Would the process have to be in primary legislation should the Government wish to raise it above those levels? I am not generally in favour of a level of delegated authority, but if we end up in a situation where inflation is out of control, £10,000 may not seem a significant amount for an individual and £100,000 may not seem significant for a larger organisation. They may not be enough to prevent people or create the level of disincentive we wish to see. Have the Government looked at whether £10,000 and £100,000 are the right amounts?
On the clarification about FCA regulation, and the fact that if somebody is FCA regulated in another capacity, it may stop them from being subject to this, it is absolutely sensible that the Government have tabled the amendments. I am happy to support the changes and the clauses.
Torsten Bell
I thank the hon. Members for Wyre Forest and for Aberdeen North. The main question raised is about the level of the fines. To provide some context, the answer is yes—that would need to be amended by further primary legislation; there is not a power in the Bill to change that. It is an increase on previous levels of fines for individuals and organisations—from £5,000 to £10,000 for individuals, reflecting the high inflation we have seen in recent years. On that basis, it gives us certainty that we have seen a substantial increase, and we would not need to change it in the near future, but I take the point that in the longer term, we always need to keep the levels of fines under review, and we will need to do that in this case. I hope that provides the answers to hon. Members’ questions.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 30 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 31
Enforcement by the FCA
Amendment made: 41, in clause 31, page 29, line 38, leave out subsection (4) and insert—
“(4) For the purposes of this Chapter a person is ‘FCA-regulated’ if they are an authorised person (within the meaning of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000) in relation to the operation of a pension scheme.”—(Torsten Bell.)
This amendment clarifies that the definition of “FCA-regulated”, in relation to a person, refers to the person being FCA-regulated in respect of the operation of a pension scheme (as opposed to in a capacity unrelated to small pots regulations).
Clause 31, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 32
Power to alter definition of “small”
John Milne (Horsham) (LD)
I beg to move amendment 4, in clause 32, page 30, line 12, at end insert—
“(4) The Secretary of State must, at least once every three years, review the amount for the time being specified in section 20(2) to consider whether that amount should be increased, having regard to—
(a) the effectiveness, and
(b) the benefit to members
of the consolidation of small dormant pension pots.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to review and consider increasing the level of small pension pot consolidation every three years.
The purpose of the amendment is to require the Secretary of State to review at least once every three years the threshold for small dormant pension pot consolidation. It aims to ensure that the level set in clause 20(2) remains effective and relevant over time. The Minister will be aware that we have already considered the right level at which to set the consolidation; we tabled amendment 262 as a probing amendment, which would have changed the small pot consolidation limit from £1,000 to £2,000. As we have discussed, industry has a very wide range of views on what would be the best figure.
However, this amendment asks for a review, not a particular figure. As before, we do not intend to push it to a vote. To us, a formal review process seems sensible, but whether it should be set at three-year intervals or any other figure is open to question. Given the lack of certainty about what figure industry would like, it seems a good idea to review the threshold after we have seen the measure working in practice.
The pensions landscape evolves quickly, with more job changes and rising numbers of small inactive pots. Therefore, a static threshold risks becoming out of date and undermining the policy’s effectiveness, whereas a regular review keeps the system responsive to members’ needs. It would consider effectiveness—whether consolidation is working to reduce fragmentation and improve efficiency, and the benefit to members, so whether savers are seeing clearer statements, reduced charges and better value for money. It would also simplify retirement saving by reducing the number of scattered small pots, would help members to keep track of their savings and avoid losing pensions altogether, and would improve efficiency for providers, which could reduce costs for savers.
I stress that the amendment does not dictate that there should be an automatic increase. It simply requires the Secretary of State to consider whether the amount is still appropriate. Therefore, in our view, it strikes the right balance between flexibility and accountability. To summarise, this measure would keep consolidation policy up to date, effective and beneficial for pension savers. A regular, three-year review is a simple, proportionate step to ensure that the system works as intended.
Kirsty Blackman
I am happy to support the Liberal Democrat amendment. I have already mentioned the Regulatory Policy Committee’s impact assessment—it considers the monitoring and evaluation plan to be weak, saying:
“The policies are all due to be reviewed in 2030. More detailed plans are needed, outlining success metrics, reporting requirements, and methodologies, across the policies.”
The amendment fits quite neatly into what the RPC said, which looks for an understanding and acceptance that there needs to be regular reviews, given that the Government have not committed to a three-year—or shorter—time period on this issue.
There seems to be widespread support for the small pots consolidation across the House. This amount has been picked, and as I said in a previous sitting, there is not necessarily a perfect answer. It could be that change is required, or that all the companies and organisations that are consolidating small pots immediately manage to do it amazingly. It could happen as smoothly as possible, as a result of which the Government could decide to increase the threshold.
I think that compelling the Secretary of State to look at this is completely reasonable to ensure that they are doing it on a relatively regular basis, so that the threshold can be changed if necessary. There is potentially widespread support across the House for ensuring that there is a requirement to monitor the threshold on an ongoing basis. It is not that we do not trust, agree with or appreciate the Secretary of State’s work, but it would give us a level of comfort that it would be done regularly should the Minister accept that, consider something similar on Report or, at the very least, make a commitment from the Dispatch Box that a written statement will be made to Parliament on a fairly regular basis explaining the reasons for keeping or changing the level.
Torsten Bell
I thank the hon. Member for Torbay for tabling the amendment. The Government share his commitment to ensuring that the pot limit remains appropriate. As we have just heard, it is a matter of consensus, and it is good to debate how we best do that. The Government’s view is that the amendment is not necessary at this stage. Clause 32 already enables the Government to undertake a review at any time. That is a deliberately flexible approach that allows us to respond to developments in the market—not least reflecting on the question from the hon. Member for Aberdeen North about inflation—but also to any other material changes, and it empowers the Government to act when needed.
The amendment risks creating unintended consequences with a rigid cycle of Government reviews, which might mean that reviews do not happen when there is a good reason for looking at the matter, and that the Secretary of State is forced to carry them out when there is no rationale for doing so. We favour a more flexible approach. I take seriously the request for clarity that there will be regular reviews, and I can give that clarity. That is the intention.
A wider question has been raised about the success of the policy and its monitoring, which is separate from the level of the threshold. Changes to the threshold might be one response to success metrics, but others might be about the operation of the consolidation process more generally. I commit to actively monitoring those—not least what is happening to people’s pots as they are moved, how people are responding to that and levels of awareness. That is exactly what we need to be doing, irrespective of what happens on the scale of the threshold over time. There is cross-party consensus on the objective here. We have taken a slightly different view on the flexibility of that review and how often it happens, but I give all hon. Members a commitment that that will happen.
Kirsty Blackman
I have just one more brief comment. It drives me completely mad that whoever is standing at that Dispatch Box seems to believe that they will be in government in perpetuity. Given that this is the second colour of Government I have faced across the Committee floor, it may be that the Minister and his Secretary of State—who has changed, by the way—are very keen on doing a regular review, and I appreciate the Minister committing to it. However, it is not that easy for him to commit a Secretary of State of a different political stripe. Therefore, to give us all certainty, it would be great if the Minister went away and considered the possibility of including a more regular review on Report, so that a Secretary of State of any party is required to conduct one more regularly.
Torsten Bell
I thank the hon. Member for that comment. The nature of every piece of legislation means that a future Government can take a different decision. Thanks for the reminder of the nature of British politics—that is how it operates. I am slightly more relaxed than she is, because there will be significant pressure from the industry, and from everybody, to keep this under review. That is not a matter of controversy. It is conceivable that there may be a Government who are steadfastly against ever again looking at the small pots threshold, but having lived through the last 15 years, I would put that low down the list of uncertainties in British politics. However, I take the intention behind the hon. Lady’s point, and I promise never to assume that Labour will win every election from now until eternity.
John Milne
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clauses 33 to 36 stand part.
Government amendment 43.
Clause 37 stand part.
New Clause 36—Automatically amalgamated pension pots—
“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations provide for the establishment of a scheme to ensure that an individual’s pension pot is linked to the person and upon a person’s change in employment the pension pot automatically moves into the pension scheme of the new workplace.
(2) All employees in the UK will be automatically enrolled into the scheme defined in subsection (1) upon its establishment but must be given the option of opting out.
(3) Where a person opts out, they are able to nominate their qualifying scheme of choice for pensions contributions.”
This new clause allows pension pots automatically to follow members from job to job, consolidating with each new workplace scheme rather than relying on a single lifetime provider.
Torsten Bell
The clause provides the flexibility, as I have just said, to increase or decrease the threshold without requiring new primary legislation, enabling the Government to move quickly and efficiently as developments—whether it be wage growth or changes in contribution patterns—change our pensions landscape. Under the clause, any change to the pot limit must always be approved by Parliament through the affirmative procedure, something that we also discussed last week.
The Government are committed to engaging with industry and consumer groups to ensure any adjustments are evidence-based and informed by the relevant data at the time, enabling us to consider wider impacts such as market competition. Under clause 32, the Secretary of State must undertake public consultation, publish details of the proposed amendments and the reasons for making the proposal, and consider any representations made—putting flesh on the bones on the kind of review that would take place, as we have just discussed.
New clause 36 seeks to introduce a new provision to the Bill, which would establish a “pot follows member” model for pension consolidation. The new clause proposes that, on changing employment, an individual’s pension pot would automatically transfer into their new workplace’s pension scheme. This proposal is not aligned with the Government’s established policy direction, and it would present significant practical and operational challenges, although I recognise that that approach has been discussed extensively over the last 20 years. The approach taken in the Bill has been shaped through extensive engagement and formal consultation with industry, regulators and consumer groups. As part of that policy development work, largely under the last Government, they and we carefully considered the “pot follows member” approach, including its potential benefits and risks. Our impact assessment shows that the multiple default consolidator solution in the Bill is projected to deliver greater net benefits. The evidence in the impact assessment supports our view that that route offers the best value for savers and for the system as a whole.
New clause 36 would require a fundamental overhaul of the current framework that the Bill seeks to introduce. It is not consistent with the rest of the Bill. It would introduce a parallel mechanism that risks duplicating effort, creating confusion and undermining the coherence of the consolidation system. Two of its main downsides are significant administrative barriers for employers, if employees choose to opt out, and the risk that pots are transferred into schemes that offer poor value for money—or, at least, poorer value for money than the ones they are sitting in before they move between employers. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Wyre Forest not to press new clause 36.
Clause 33 makes it clear that the small dormant pots consolidation measures in this chapter apply equally to pension schemes run by or on behalf of the Crown and to Crown employees, as we have discussed previously. Clause 34 provides clear definitions for key terms used throughout the small pots legislation to ensure clarity and consistency of interpretation, and clause 35 provides a definition of what constitutes a pension pot. That might be thought to be straightforward, but for the purposes of small pots consolidation we want to provide clarity on the accurate identification and treatment of individual pension pots. To provide an example, if someone is enrolled into the same pension scheme through more than one job and the scheme keeps the accounts separate, each is treated as a separate pension pot so that they can be consolidated together.
As Members will be aware, the Pensions Regulator oversees the trust-based schemes and the Financial Conduct Authority oversees contract-based schemes. Clause 36 amends the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to ensure that the FCA has the powers required to support the small pots consolidation framework through the existing financial regulatory system. This is a vital enabling provision to provide the FCA with the necessary statutory powers to regulate contract-based schemes that wish to act as authorised consolidators in the years ahead. It allows the FCA to make rules requiring pension providers to notify them if they intend to act as a consolidator pension scheme, and it allows the FCA to maintain a list of consolidator schemes and to apply appropriate regulatory standards to them.
More broadly, clause 36 ensures that members of FCA-regulated pension schemes benefit from the same level of protection, transparency and accountability as those in the trust-based system, while also avoiding regulatory gaps and ensuring that all consolidator schemes, regardless of their structure or legal framework, are subject to robust oversight.
Consistent with my arguments on clause 36, clause 37 repeals unused provisions of the Pensions Act 2014 related to automatic transfers, also known as “pot follows member”. This is tidying up the statute book. It was the previous Government who initially legislated for “pot follows member”, but they then decided that that was not the policy they wished to pursue and moved away from it between 2014 and 2024. The amendment recognises that and makes sure we do not have powers on the statute book that confuse the situation.
Finally, Government amendment 43 is a minor and technical amendment necessitated by the repeal of schedule 17 to the Pensions Act 2014 by clause 37(1)(b) of the Bill. The amendment is necessary to update the statute book and clarify a reference in section 256 of the Pensions Act 2004, which otherwise would have been unclear and was making hon. Members nervous. The amendment does not alter policy, and I ask the Committee to support it. I commend clauses 32 to 37 to the Committee.
Mark Garnier
I will speak to our new clause 36. I am grateful to the Minister for his comments; I will come to those in a minute. The Government dropped plans for the lifetime provider or “pot for life” model, which would have allowed individuals to direct all workplace pension contributions into a single, personally chosen pension pot throughout their career. That was first proposed by the Conservative Government. Although we appreciate that the initial lifetime pot model has not had support from the current Government or, to be fair, from the industry, we believe there is much merit in exploring a model that would allow for pensions to follow individuals between jobs. The new clause would ensure that fragmented small pots are not left as workers move between jobs. By changing our current proposals from a lifetime pot to a magnetic pot proposal where the pot follows the individual, we hope we can bring down some of the administrative costs of the initial lifetime pot proposal.
Our new clause 36 will provide for a pension pot that would follow members from job to job, consolidating with each new workplace scheme rather than relying on a single lifetime provider. This approach could reduce fragmentation while retaining the advantages of employer oversight and collective governance. This would have similarities with the Australian system, where a person can staple to their first chosen pension provider so that it follows them from job to job. That helps to reduce the administrative burden on individuals and the number of small pots, and that can reduce costs for consumers and help the overall consolidation of the market. These changes have been backed by some in the industry, including Hargreaves Lansdown, which has said that having a single pot would simplify someone’s pension investment, bringing transparency and clarity. It has said that for those who move jobs frequently, a single pension pot would be invaluable.
The Minister made a couple of points. The first was about the substantial overhaul of the system to be able to deliver reform. Although I appreciate that this may be outside the scope of the Bill, we should not worry about substantial overhauls to make things better for people who are saving for their retirement. It is incredibly important that we get this right. Just because it is a lot of work does not necessarily mean it is a bad thing to do, so I urge him to think about it.
The Minister made a very important point: somebody could move from one job to another and find that their pension moves from a fund that offers good value for money and is performing well to a fund that is performing worse. But exactly the opposite is also the case. If somebody frequently changes jobs, the law of averages and statistics means that over their lifetime they will get the average rate, which means they do not get stuck in one or the other. One would cancel the other out—it is a maths problem.
The Minister has made his points. This is not something we want to press, but we feel very strongly that the Treasury and Treasury Ministers should think very carefully about it, because, as I say, hard work is not a reason not to do the right thing. There is much more support from the industry for the magnetic pot rather than the lifetime pot, which stays with one provider.
Mr Peter Bedford (Mid Leicestershire) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms McVey. As a proud Englishman, it is not often that I admit the Australians are better than us at something. I am talking not about cricket, but about the immensely important issue of pensions adequacy. The Australians do it better, and what underpins their success is the super stapling model, a system that fundamentally changes how savers interact with their pensions. That is why our new clause 36 seeks to follow in Australian footsteps by establishing a model that would automatically amalgamate pension pots through an individual’s working life. Although I recognise and commend the Government’s work on small pot consolidation, I believe that real engagement and adequacy benefit lies in moving towards a lifetime pension pot model. It is a bolder, more engaging and more adequate model that would benefit pension funds and savers alike.
Steve Darling
As Liberal Democrats, one of the key lenses through which we look at the legislation is: how does it simplify the world for those who are not the most financially literate savers into their pensions? As Liberal Democrats, we strongly support the “pot follows member” approach, as it would simplify matters for people. It would ensure a clearer mechanism for savers to be aware of the level of their pension as their life moves on, and allow investments to be drawn together more easily. It would be interesting to hear the Minister’s reflections on that, and on why the Australian model is unsuitable for the United Kingdom.
Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms McVey. I want to add a few things to what my hon. Friends have said, and to reflect on the Minister’s rejection of our new clause as a significant administrative burden. I think we are talking about two sides of the same coin, because to have to keep hunting out small pension pots is a little like looking for things in the dark.
First, we are effectively advocating for a “Who Wants to be a Millionaire?” approach, where someone banks at each stage. I have done that while moving jobs over my lifetime, but I am fairly financially literate. It would be helpful if there were a box to tick on a form when changing job to say, “Yes, I want to move it to this company,” a bit like we do with our P45—we are quite capable of taking our tax with us from job to job. If there were a way of taking our pension with us as well, that would be helpful.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Leicestershire said, that approach would put ownership in the hands of the employee, and it would mean that they did not have a niggling feeling in the back of their mind that they had missed a pot that they had forgotten about. Anything to enable people to have ownership of that pot, rather than be constantly on the back foot trying to hunt it down, would make significant sense. Allowing people to choose rather than having to accept what is offered to them would be incredibly helpful. Ultimately, it is up to them to do what they wish, but they would at least have the choice.
We heard a lot in the evidence sessions about the challenge of communication. We have seen that with Equitable Life and all sorts of other things to do with pensions. When someone changes employer, if there were a simple way to say, “I wish to take the pension with me to the new job,” that would reduce, not increase, the administrative burden. I appreciate what the Minister said, but although we are not looking to push our new clause to a vote, it is an incredibly pragmatic suggestion that warrants further reflection.
Torsten Bell
I thank hon. Members for their reflections. I agree with the sentiment of what everybody has put forward, including the hon. Member for Mid Leicestershire—apart from his worryingly weak patriotism.
Torsten Bell
It was self-professed weak patriotism. But the hon. Gentleman is completely right to raise the adequacy issue, which is obviously the role of the Pensions Commission, launched in July, to take forward. He and several others are also right to say that making things easier for savers is a really important objective. That is what the pensions dashboard aims to do in the coming years as well.
Let me make a set of reflections directly on the question being raised. To be clear, the policy in 2014 was “pot follows member”. That is also the policy within new clause 36. The policy being more supported here is a lifetime pot, which is a different policy. The “pot follows member” is still that the employer chooses the pension scheme and the pot moves to the new employer’s scheme as the employee goes, so it is still an employer-to-a-single-scheme model. The lifetime provider model, also advocated by many in the industry but never part of Government policy—it was not in the 2014 Act—is that each individual holds a pension pot, and, on joining an employer, provides the details of that scheme to the employer, and the employer then pays to multiple pension schemes whenever it does its PAYE.
The comments I made refer to the “pot follows member” approach. There is a consensus across the industry that that is not the right way to go; I totally hear the points made in favour of a lifetime provider model. That is not the approach being taken forward by this Bill, but it needs to be kept under review in the longer term. I give hon. Members the reassurance that I will continue to do that.
Mark Garnier
I think the Minister has got this the wrong way round. It was the lifetime pot, which was being paid into as people went around, that the industry did not like, because that was administratively quite difficult. The stapled pot—stapled to the lapel, or whatever, to be dragged around like the Australian one—is what we are proposing this time round, which is the new version that the industry does agree with. I think the Minister might have got his notes upside down.
Torsten Bell
Never! No. We should clarify what we mean by “industry”: in a lifetime provider model, employers take on a significantly greater administrative burden, because they have to engage with potentially every pension scheme in the country. Admittedly, we are limiting the number of those in future, but still, that is what employers find burdensome about a lifetime provider model. That was the preferred model of the right hon. Member for Godalming and Ash (Sir Jeremy Hunt) when he was Chancellor, but it was never actioned as Government policy.
As I said before, the 2014 Act was about “pot follows member”—for good reason, to try to address the small pots worry. I hope that that at least reassures the hon. Gentleman that my notes were the right way up.
Kirsty Blackman
I am now entirely confused. Can the Minister please clarify for all of us what the Bill actually does in terms of the consolidation?
Torsten Bell
I am glad we are all thoroughly confused. Three broad approaches have been set out to this small pots problem. The first is the one that the Bill takes forward, which is the multiple default consolidation solution—the automatic sweeping up of small pots into consolidated schemes to make everyone’s lives easier. Members would have one large scheme, or several larger schemes, but no really small schemes that they had to consolidate themselves. They could then choose to consolidate those larger schemes as they wished; there is a debate to be had about the size of the threshold in future. That is an automated approach.
One thing that is really important, about the point on average returns made by the hon. Member for Wyre Forest earlier, is that this is not about average. A scheme can only be a consolidator if it offers good value, so a pot cannot be swept into one that does not.
There has been much debate about other approaches over the years, and I have tried to distinguish between two of them. They aim to provide more of what has been debated here, which is slightly more ownership of one pot by the individual. However, “pot follows member” is, in practice, still maintaining the relationship between an employer and a single provider. It is not the individual but the employer who chooses the scheme. That is the approach we are rejecting today.
There is then a longer-term discussion about whether there are attractions to a lifetime provider. That is the case in some of the countries that have been mentioned—the “stapled to your lapel” model—where it is the individual who chooses their provider; obviously to some degree individuals can opt out now if their employer is happy. That is not on the table here. It needs to be considered, but it is a much more fundamental change to the relationship between the employers and the pension schemes.
Kirsty Blackman
I thank the Minister for that clarification. These are almost two different stages in the same process: we need to do the consolidation of the small pots right now, and then look at what we are going to do so that small pots will not ever exist and nobody will end up with a small pot, because we do one of the two options or some other option presented for the next step.
My understanding is that if we were to move to what the Conservatives have proposed in new clause 36, that would solve future problems but probably not deal with the situation where somebody has five small pots already. It does not schoomp them all together—I do not know how you are going to write that, Hansard; I am really sorry.
I appreciate what the Minister says about ensuring that the next step is kept under review and not automatically ruling out some of the options presented for the future. I tend to agree that we need to get this bit done—get rid of all those tiny pots that are dormant right now—and then move on to having that discussion, perhaps as part of the sufficiency and adequacy discussions, so that we have a pensions system that ensures that people are as well off as they possibly can be in late life.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 32 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 33 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 34
Interpretation of Chapter
Amendment made: 42, in clause 34, page 31, line 1, leave out
“No. 42, ‘FCA-regulated person’”
and insert
“‘FCA-regulated’, in relation to a person,”—(Torsten Bell.)
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 41.
Clause 34, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 35 and 36 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 37
Repeal of existing powers
Amendment made: 43, in clause 37, page 34, line 20, at end insert—
“(3) In consequence of subsection (1)(b), in section 256 of the Pensions Act 2004 (no indemnification for fines or civil penalties), in subsection (1)(b), for ‘that Act’ substitute ‘the Pensions Act 2014’.”—(Torsten Bell.)
This amendment amends section 256(1)(b) of the Pensions Act 2004 in consequence of the repeal of Schedule 17 to the Pensions Act 2014 by clause 37(1)(b) of the Bill, including uncommenced amendments of section 256(1)(b) on which the reference to “that Act” in section 256(1)(b) relies.
Clause 37, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 38
Certain schemes providing money purchase benefits: scale and asset allocation
Torsten Bell
I beg to move amendment 44, in clause 38, page 34, line 27, leave out
“‘other than an authorised Master Trust scheme’”
and insert
“‘that is not a relevant Master Trust and’”.
This amendment clarifies a verbal ambiguity in the amendment of section 20(1) of the Pensions Act 2008.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 45, 46, 50, 52, 56, 60, 65, 67, 73, 76, 77, 79, 81, 82, 86 to 89, 110 and 111.
Torsten Bell
We now come to the sections of the Bill that bring in the pensions investment review measures, particularly those on setting minimum scale levels required by schemes.
Before I briefly describe these amendments, I remind the Committee of the purpose of clause 38, which we will probably be discussing for a substantial period. The clause will insert new scale requirements, which we do intend to use, and asset allocation conditions, which we do not, into the Pensions Act 2008. Specifically, it inserts them into section 20, which deals with the quality requirements in UK money purchase schemes for master trusts, and section 26, which provides equivalent requirements for group personal pension schemes.
Mark Garnier
I would like to speak to the wider clause before coming to our amendments. It is important to get on the record that this is a very bad clause. The Minister mentioned asset allocation, and this measure, which is known as mandation, has gone down incredibly badly with the pensions industry.
Mandation risks undermining the core obligation of trustees, which is to act in the best interests of savers. Pension savings reflect decades of work and are not an abstract figure on a balance sheet—they are the hope of a secure future for millions of people. Trustees and fund managers bear a legal responsibility to protect and grow these savings, investing wisely where the best opportunities may be found. Their role is not to follow political direction but to uphold the trust placed in them and the fiduciary duty they owe, which is the foundation of confidence in the pension system.
As has been said in multiple responses to the Bill, clause 38 as currently written undermines the UK’s reputation as a predictable and rules-based investment environment. When trustees select investments, they must find the safest and strongest options for beneficiaries. Can we even be confident that the Government will be able to provide a pipeline of investment opportunities? Pension funds could end up being forced to fight against each other for a selection of low-performing assets. If these powers are used, it changes accountability. If mandated investments fail, is it the trustees or the Government who should answer for those losses? Savers deserve clarity about who ultimately protects their hard-earned pension pots.
It has been said that this merely provides the powers to do mandation and does not necessarily force firms to do this, but I will come to that later. Our amendment 275 highlights the fact that there is a political party, whose Members are not in attendance here, which has already said that if it gets into government—and, let’s face it, it has a fighting chance—it will mandate pension funds to invest in the UK water industry in order to support the Government renationalising the UK water industry.
I would like to highlight some of the issues that have been raised. The Pensions Management Institute has said:
“this provision sets a dangerous precedence for Government interference in the fiduciary duty of trustees to act in members’ best financial interests.”
Pensions UK has said:
“this ambition is subject to fiduciary duties and is dependent on supporting actions by Government, namely that there will need to be a strong pipeline of investable UK assets. Without this, schemes will be competing against each other for the same assets, which risks asset bubbles and poor value for money.”
The Investment Association has said:
“It comes with significant risks for members in the form of capital being poorly allocated if political preferences take priority over member needs. Any resulting poor investment outcomes will be borne by the member. By creating the risk of political interference in capital allocation, the power undermines the UK’s global reputation as a predictable and rules-based investment environment”.
Which? has said that this measure
“may result in schemes making worse or riskier investment decisions that may not be in the best long-term financial interests of savers.”
Aviva has said:
“as currently drafted in Section 28C, the power in the Bill goes far beyond this policy intent and the scope of the Accord, with very limited constraints on how, and under what circumstances, the requirements could be introduced.”
The Institute and Faculty of Actuaries has said:
“We are concerned about the introduction of investment mandation powers, and potential interference of those powers—or their threatened use—with trustees’ fiduciary duties.”
Unison has said:
“We have significant concerns about these clauses. Fiduciaries are best placed to set the correct balance between asset classes, and equities have liquidity, governance, transparency of pricing, equality of treatment between investors, and other advantages for pension funds.”
Finally, the Association of British Insurers said:
“A mandation reserve power would undermine trust in the pension system and create a risk of political interference in capital allocation, which would undermine the UK’s reputation as a predictable and rules-based investment environment.”
I understand that this is a reserve power of mandation, but it sets a very bad precedent, so we will oppose the clause.
Mark Garnier
We have no objection to the technical amendments, but we will oppose the whole clause.
Steve Darling
We have no issue with the technical amendments. However, for us the crucial issue in the Bill is driving an environment of positive investment, and a system in the United Kingdom that individual investors—as in, would-be pensioners—can believe in.
The mandation element causes concern. As has been alluded to, there are assumptions that Ministers are reasonable people; however, we do not have to look that far across the Atlantic ocean to see politicians behaving unreasonably. It concerns us as Liberal Democrats that giving powers in the Bill without clear management of them is potentially a step too far. While the Minister, and other Ministers in the current Government, may be reasonable, who knows what is coming down the line in a very turbulent political system?
We therefore continue to have grave concerns around mandation, and look forward to hearing what assurances the Minister is able to give. The key outcome for us is making sure that there is a stable pensions system in which people can have confidence, because confidence is crucial for driving the positive investment that I am sure everybody in this room wants to see.
The Chair
I remind all Members that we are talking about the technical amendments. There will be a chance to talk about the clause later.
Kirsty Blackman
Thank you, Ms McVey—I was about to start by saying that I will not talk about clause 38; I will just talk about the technical amendments.
I have made the point before about the significant number of amendments. I do not know why the Government chose to table this number of amendments rather than submit a new clause that would replace the entirety of clause 38 and make all the changes that they wanted to make. I appreciate that the Government got in touch with us with some briefing information in relation to the changes to this clause, but we had that information very recently rather than significantly in advance. Given the huge number of technical amendments, it is very difficult to picture what the clause will look like with them all. Would the Minister agree that there could have been a better way to approach amending clause 38?
Torsten Bell
Let me first respond to the thrust of the comments from the Opposition; I will then come directly to that question. I am conscious that, having sat through Second Reading, most hon. Members have heard my views, and the Government’s views, on this, but let us set out the facts. It is the industry itself that set out the case for change. That is what the Mansion House accord does: it says that a different set of asset allocations is the right way to go in the longer term.
I support the industry’s judgment. The previous Conservative Pensions Minister has welcomed its judgment. I think it is the view of every senior Conservative ex-Minister sitting on the Opposition Back Benches that that change needs to come. [Interruption.] I am not speaking for the Opposition Front Bench; the hon. Member for Wyre Forest has just spoken eloquently for himself. I am speaking for former Conservative Ministers, including former Chancellors. If anything, they accuse me of being too timid—I am not sure what the characterisation of their current Front Bench would be in that regard. That is the status of the debate on this.
Why is there consensus? Leaving aside some of the points that have been raised, it is because this is in savers’ best interests. That is the motivation and the goal. It is also wrong to set out the conflict in terms as broad as the hon. Member for Wyre Forest has just used, because there is a clear savers’ interest test within the Bill that enables trustees or scheme managers to say that proceeding in a certain way would not be in the interests of their savers, and the asset allocation requirements would not bite.
Turning directly to the question about unreasonable Ministers—I have heard rumours of such things. They can exist, and there are protections against them: there are the usual judicial review protections, but in the Bill there are specific requirements to provide a report justifying any use of the reserve power and how it would play out. There are significant limits on the assets—it is broad asset classes—that can be set out in an asset allocation and there are limits to which assets can be covered.
There is the savers’ interest test, and importantly, there is a sunset clause for exactly the reason that we cannot predict what 2040 looks like today. I recognise that hon. Members will not support that part of the clause, but I hope they recognise that the goal is the same, which is that a change in investment behaviour is in savers’ interests. That is what the industry is telling us. As I said last Tuesday, the danger of a collective action problem—the problem that saw commitments made by the industry and the previous Conservative Government not delivered—is partly what this reserve power helps to overcome.
I have absolutely heard the points made about the volume of amendments. They are on the record, as will be all the points made during this process. To answer the question directly, the reason there are so many is that we had lots of useful feedback from industry over the summer, and I wanted to provide more clarity through the clause and make sure that we had the best version of it. We did not want to leave it until Report, so people have had a chance to see it as we go through Committee. I absolutely recognise the points made, and the specific point about the drafting choice of a large number of amendments versus an additional clause. I am sure the drafters will have heard that comment.
Amendment 44 agreed to.
Amendments made: 45, in clause 38, page 34, line 32, leave out “Conditions 1 and” and insert “Condition 1 and Condition”.
This amendment makes a minor verbal change to facilitate differential commencement of the scale and asset allocation conditions.
Amendment 46, in clause 38, page 34, line 37, leave out “of that scheme”.—(Torsten Bell.)
This amendment reflects the fact that a main scale default arrangement may be used by multiple schemes.
Torsten Bell
I beg to move amendment 47, in clause 38, page 35, line 1, at end insert—
“(ba) has previously been approved under section 28D (transition pathway relief) and is to be treated in accordance with regulations as if it had approval under section 28A,”.
This amendment allows for relevant Master Trusts that have previously received transition pathway relief to be treated as if they had scale approval.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 48, 49, 51, 54, 55, 57 to 59, 62, 130 and 132.
Torsten Bell
This group amends sections 20 and 26 of the Pensions Act 2008, which deal with the quality requirements that a master trust and a group personal pension scheme must satisfy. The amendments will improve the operability of the new sections. In particular they will allow, via regulations, relevant master trusts and GPP schemes that have previously received transition pathway relief—the relief that allows schemes that do not reach the £25 billion threshold in 2030, but are on course to do so soon—afterwards to be treated as if they had scale approval on a temporary basis once the pathway ends.
The amendments will also allow the Pensions Regulator to determine that a relevant master trust may be treated as meeting condition 2 of new section 20(1A) of the 2008 Act without a direct application from the master trust concerned. The effect of that is to allow the regulator to delay the impact of not meeting the scale or asset allocation requirements and to enable steps to be taken to protect members and support employers. A similar requirement for GPPs will be inserted into section 26.
Government amendments 130 and 132 amend the provision in the 2008 Act that deals with the parliamentary scrutiny process relevant to regulations made under the Act. These amendments make sure that all significant powers to make regulations as part of the scale and asset allocation measures are subject to the affirmative procedure.
Amendment 47 agreed to.
Amendments made: 48, in clause 38, page 35, line 16, leave out from “determine” to “Master Trust is” in line 17 and insert “that a relevant”
This amendment means the Regulatory Authority can determine that a relevant Master Trust is to be treated as meeting Condition 1 of subsection (1A) without an application from the Trust.
Amendment 49, in clause 38, page 35, line 18, after “1” insert “or Condition 2”
This amendment means that regulations can allow the Regulatory Authority to determine that a relevant Master Trust is to be treated for a period as meeting Condition 2 (the asset allocation requirement) as well as Condition 1 (the scale requirement).
Amendment 50, in clause 38, page 35, line 20, leave out from “Authority” to end of line 21
This amendment removes some unnecessary wording for consistency with the corresponding amendments to section 26 of the 2008 Act.
Amendment 51, in clause 38, page 35, line 28, at end insert—
“(c) make provision about the Regulatory Authority requiring the trustees or managers of a relevant Master Trust to give the Regulatory Authority a plan showing how they propose to meet or continue to meet the scale requirement under section 28A or the conditions for approval under section 28C.”
This paragraph allows regulations to give the Regulatory Authority a power to require the trustees or managers of a relevant Master Trust to give the Regulatory Authority a plan showing how they propose to meet or continue to meet the scale requirement.
Amendment 52, in clause 38, page 35, line 32, leave out “28A(1)” and insert “28A(12)”.—(Torsten Bell.)
This amendment updates a cross-reference.
Torsten Bell
I beg to move amendment 53, in clause 38, page 35, leave out lines 35 and 36.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 129.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 61, 106, 116, 125 and 129.
Torsten Bell
The Committee is being very patient so I shall speak briefly to this group. This group is centred around amendment 129, which sets out the interpretation of a number of terms used throughout the clause and consolidates them in new subsection (14). Key among these is the interpretation of “group personal pension scheme”, which is amended after discussion with the Financial Conduct Authority to ensure that only schemes where all members select their investment approach are excluded from the application of clause 38, to ensure that the vast majority of workplace schemes are covered by the clause. The remaining amendments in this group are consequential to amendment 129.
Amendment 53 agreed to.
Amendments made: 54, in clause 38, page 36, leave out line 12 and insert—
“(a) has previously been approved under section 28D (transition pathway relief) and is to be treated in accordance with regulations as if it had approval under section 28B,”
This amendment allows for group personal pension schemes that have previously received transition pathway relief to be treated as if they had scale approval.
Amendment 55, in clause 38, page 36, line 15, leave out “(7C)(a)” and insert “(7A) or (7B)”
This amendment ensures that new subsection (7D) applies both to exemptions from the scale requirement and to exemptions from the asset allocation requirement.
Amendment 56, in clause 38, page 36, line 20, leave out “authorise” and insert “permit”
This amendment ensures consistency with the equivalent language used for Master Trusts.
Amendment 57, in clause 38, page 36, line 20, leave out “, on an application by the scheme concerned,”
This amendment means the Regulatory Authority can determine that a group personal pension scheme is to be treated as meeting the scale or asset allocation requirement without an application from the scheme.
Amendment 58, in clause 38, page 36, line 22, leave out “and sixth conditions” and insert “or sixth condition”
This amendment allows for a determination by the Regulatory Authority under subsection (7E) to be made in relation to one or other of the scale and asset allocation requirements (rather than only in relation to both).
Amendment 59, in clause 38, page 36, line 31, at end insert—
“(c) make provision about the Regulatory Authority requiring the provider of a group personal pension scheme to give the Regulatory Authority a plan showing how they propose to meet or continue to meet the scale requirement under section 28B or the conditions for approval under section 28C.”
This paragraph allows regulations to give the Regulatory Authority a power to require the provider of a group personal pension scheme to give the Regulatory Authority a plan showing how they propose to meet or continue to meet the scale requirement.
Amendment 60, in clause 38, page 36, line 35, leave out “28A(1)” and insert “28B(12)”
This amendment updates a cross-reference.
Amendment 61, in clause 38, page 36, leave out lines 36 and 37
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 129.
Amendment 62, in clause 38, page 37, line 4, at end insert—
“(c) in paragraph (c), at the end insert “, except so far as those requirements relate to Condition 1 or 2 in section 20(1A)””.—(Torsten Bell.)
This amendment ensures that the requirements mentioned in section 28(3)(c) of the Pensions Act 2008, so far as they relate to the new scale and asset requirements, are not a “relevant quality requirement” for the purposes of that section.
Torsten Bell
I beg to move amendment 63, in clause 38, page 37, line 11, after “requirement” insert
“by reference to the main scale default arrangement”
This amendment clarifies how the concept of a main scale default arrangement fits into the approval framework under section 28A.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 64, 66, 68, 69, 71, 72, 74, 75, 78, 80, 83, 85, 90 and 91.
Torsten Bell
I offer reassurance, as we will shortly come to the end of the amendments for substantive debate.
This group of amendments deals with the main scale default arrangement, along with the scale test and penalties. The MSDA is the pool of investments against which scale will be assessed. As I mentioned, the definition of that is obviously central to the effective enforcement of the scale requirements.
Key among these amendments are Government amendments 72 and 91, which set out some of the details of the MSDA for master trusts and group personal pensions, including that it can be used for the purposes of one or more pension schemes, and that the assets held within it are those of members who have not chosen how they are invested. Regulations will be made that cover other matters, including the meaning of “common investment strategy”. The details we set out in these amendments reflect the invaluable input we received from pension providers and regulatory bodies.
The remaining amendments in the group relating to the MSDA largely clarify how it fits into the wider approval requirements in the new sections 28A and 28B.
Moving on to scale, Government amendments 69 and 85 clarify the circumstances in which assets held by connected master trusts and group personal pension schemes, or where the same provider runs a GPP and master trust, can count towards the scale test. This is to ensure that, where appropriate, assets managed under a common investment strategy where there is a family connection between the master trust and GPP scheme, and where they are used for the same purpose, can be added together to achieve the £25 billion requirement.
Government amendment 71 ensures that the provisions governing penalties are consistent between the TPR and the FCA. Government amendment 90 ensures that regulations can provide for appeals to the tribunal in respect of penalties under regulations under new section 28C(9)(c).
Amendment 63 agreed to.
Mark Garnier
I beg to move amendment 250, in clause 38, page 37, line 12, at end insert
“or
(c) the relevant Master Trust meets the innovation exemption requirement.”
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 251, in clause 38, page 37, line 16, at end insert—
“(3A) A relevant Master Trust meets the innovation exemption requirement if the Trust can demonstrate that it provides specialist or innovative services.
(3B) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for a definition of ‘specialist or innovative services’ for the purposes of this section.”
Amendment 252, in clause 38, page 39, line 11, at end insert
“or
(c) the relevant GPP meets the innovation exemption requirement.”
Amendment 253, in clause 38, page 39, line 15, at end insert—
“(3A) A relevant GPP meets the innovation exemption requirement if the Trust can demonstrate that it provides specialist or innovative services.
(3B) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for a definition of ‘specialist or innovative services’ for the purposes of this section.”
Amendments 250, 251, 252 and 253 create an innovation exemption for pension funds that provide specialist or innovative services, as part of the new entrants clause.
Mark Garnier
The Bill sets a minimum asset threshold of £25 billion for workplace pension schemes to operate as megafunds by 2030. This is not, in itself, particularly controversial, and we are all fully aware of the arguments about scale being effective when running pension funds. The requirement is intended to drive consolidation, improve economies of scale and boost investment in UK assets, but there is concern that such a high threshold could disadvantage boutique or niche funds or new entrants into the market that provide specialist services to cater for financially literate members who prefer a more tailored approach to their pension management. For example, Hargreaves Lansdown has highlighted that its £5 billion fund serves members who value investment autonomy and expertise. The risk is that the policy could reduce competition, limit consumer choice and stifle innovation by making it harder for smaller, specialist providers to operate or enter the market
Clause 38 provides little detail of the meaning of the “ability to innovate” and how “strong potential for growth” will be measured, but it is essential that the Bill provides a credible route to support innovation. If we tie the pensions market up by restricting it to a handful of large providers focused on back-book integration and building scale, there will be less space for innovation aimed at pension member engagement. The benefit of the existing market is that its diversity provides choice and creates competition, and competition is an important part of this. Smaller schemes are chosen by employers for specific reasons. If we lose that diversity and essentially create a handful of the same scheme propositions, employers and members will lose out on this benefit.
Realistically, it will be extremely challenging for new entrants to the market to have a chance of building the required scale. Our amendments create an innovation exemption for pension funds that provide specialist or innovative services as part of the new entrants clause. This will allow boutique or niche providers to continue operating if they demonstrate diversity in the market or serve a specific member need, even if they do not meet the £25 billion threshold.
Kirsty Blackman
Amendments 250 to 253, as well as Government amendment 113, which we will discuss later, clarify the word “innovation” and look at how best to define it. There are two different approaches from the Government and the Opposition to what innovation means. I raised the issue of defining innovation on Second Reading, so I am glad that both parties are trying to clarify it here, but I am not entirely happy with the way in which the Government have chosen to do so.
When we come to Government amendment 113, I do not feel that the chosen definition of “innovative products” is necessarily right. There could be a way of working that is innovative not in the product but in the way people access the product. For example, some of the challenger banks that we have had coming up are not necessarily providing innovative products, but they provide innovative ways to access those products, and in some cases, their pitch is that they provide a better interface for people to use. I think there is potentially a niche in the market for innovative services rather than innovative products. Government amendment 113 perhaps ties too much to products, although it depends on what the definition of “products” is.
Obviously regulations will come in behind this that define “innovative”, but I think the pitch made by the Opposition for the addition of “or specialist” is helpful. “Innovative” suggests that it may be something new, whereas there could be specialist services that are not of that size but are specific to certain groups of people who value the service they are receiving, one that is very specific to their circumstances, and who would prefer that operation to keep running and to keep having access to it because of the specialist service that is provided.
I am concerned about Government amendment 113. My views are perhaps closer to the Conservatives’ amendment, but thinking particularly about services rather than the products, and the way in which the services are provided to people and the fact that there could be innovation in that respect. Also, as the hon. Member for Wyre Forest said, there could be particular niche areas that do not need to be that size in order to provide a truly excellent service to perhaps a small group of people. It depends on how the Government define “innovative” and what the regulations may look like this, but I am inclined to support the Conservatives’ amendment.
Torsten Bell
I thank the hon. Member for Wyre Forest for tabling these amendments. We all recognise the importance of innovation in the pension landscape, but I respectfully oppose the inclusion of the amendments in the Bill.
One point that is at risk of being lost from the discussion so far is the central insight that is the motivation for this clause, which is that scale really is important. Scale really does matter. It has the potential to unlock a wide range of benefits, from better governance to lower costs, to access to a wider range of assets. All of those are integral to improving member outcomes, and if we provide many carve-outs, every scheme will say it is a specialist provider that should not be covered because its members value its inherent difference from every other, and we risk undermining the premise that I think has cross-party agreement, which is that we need to move to a regime of bigger schemes.
One of our aims in this Bill, which is relevant to the asset allocation discussion we just had, is to provide clarity that the change will happen, people will not duck and dive around for years attempting to litigate what is and is not a specialist provider and so on. Innovation is really important, as is competition in the market, but we need to do this in a way that does not undermine the purpose of the scale requirements, which I think is a matter of cross-party consensus.
Having said that, while innovation in the market is important, the Government’s view is that it is not an alternative to achieving scale. That is why we have provided for a new market entrants pathway. There, the innovation grants a temporary exemption from scale requirements, not a permanent exemption as the amendments would enable. That is because scale is very important indeed. Applicants to the pathway will be able to enter the market if they can demonstrate they have strong potential to grow to scale, and if they have some kind of innovative design. That is not a permanent exemption from scale requirements, and there should be cross-party consensus on avoiding that.
To provide reassurance on some of the points that have been raised, I emphasise that the scale requirements apply only to providers’ default offers. Providers of specialist offers and the rest, and self-invested personal pensions, are all able to continue to offer those specialist services, but the main offer in the workplace market does need to meet scale requirements. I hope with that explanation, hon. Members will not press the amendments.
Mark Garnier
I am not entirely happy with the Minister’s comments. I am slightly surprised, and I thought he might have listened a bit more carefully. We absolutely understand the economies of scale. A large, £25 billion pension fund can do amazing things. We are 100% behind that. We have not disagreed with that at all. However, I somehow feel myself listening to the Minister and hearing the reverse of the arguments we were making as we tried to allow new-entrant banks into the market after the financial crisis.
Those of a certain age—and the Minister turned 43 the other day, so he will remember the financial crisis—know that the problem was that a few very big banks were spreading the contagion. I remember being on the Treasury Committee and the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards after the financial crisis, when we were trying to sort out Labour’s previous mess, and not a single ab initio banking licence had been issued for 100 years. The only way that companies could get into the banking market—as Virgin and Metro were doing—was by buying dormant banking licences. I remember having long conversations—successfully, as it turned out—in order to try to allow companies such as Starling into the market. I think that Starling received the first ab initio banking licence for 100 years.
Having learned over the past 10 or 15 years about the effects of having large scale only, we are now having an argument about potentially stifling the pensions equivalent of companies such as Starling, Metro, Revolut and other innovators coming into the pensions market. I was hoping that from debating the amendments I could be convinced that the Minister would take away the thinking behind what we have come up with: that innovation should be good, and that there should permanently be new, fresh blood coming through. However, I do not think that he has got it. I was not going to push the amendments to a vote, but I now feel motivated to do so.
Kirsty Blackman
I want to make a brief comment about the definition of “specialist”. I appreciate the Minister’s clarification about the default products provided, but there could be a sensible definition of “specialist” that included, for example, that if providers can demonstrate that over 75% of their members engage in the management of their pension fund every year, that would be a very specialist and well-liked service. I understand that the scale is incredibly important. However, if a provider can demonstrate that level of engagement in its pension scheme, because of its innovative product or service, I think it would be sensible to look at the scale requirements, even if that provider does not yet meet them.
The Opposition have kindly left it up to the Minister and the Government to define what “specialist” would be, so I will support the Opposition amendments on that matter. However, when we come to Government amendment 113, I will require some clarification from the Minister about the definition of “products”.
Torsten Bell
I am reassured that our agreement that scale is the desirable outcome is clear. It is great to have that on the record. I also put on the record that there is agreement about the value of innovation and about new entrants. I think that the only distinction is between a new entrant that then grows and a new entrant that does not. Our approach is to allow new entrants, but they need to be ones with a plausible sense that they can get to scale. Inherent to most of the innovation in the market—for example, in collective defined-contribution schemes—is that they would have to operate at scale to be effective. I think that the banking analogy is actually quite apt.
Steve Darling
Would the Minister be kind enough to reflect on a situation currently at play in the market, whereby Phoenix Group is withdrawing the management of billions of pounds from Aberdeen Group? These master products offer opportunities that could significantly impact on viability. Could the Minister reflect on that?
Torsten Bell
Let me just finish the point about the financial crisis, then I will come to the hon. Member’s question. The lesson from the financial crisis was that banks were too big, and the lesson that we all agree about is that pension schemes are too small. That is the distinction—that is why we are doing this Bill now and why the previous Conservative Government introduced different changes after the financial crisis. We are in a very different situation. That said, we need to prepare for the future and, when there are bigger pension schemes, we want a world where new entrants can come into them. I hear what has been said. I want to reassure the hon. Gentleman that we want to see new entrants offering innovative products. I take the point about services, which we will come back to when we come to amendment 113, but that needs to be a pathway, not a permanent carve-out that risks undermining the scale requirements.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Mark Garnier
On a point of order, Ms McVey. Might it be easier, for brevity, if we vote on amendments 251 to 253 together?
The Chair
The amendments are consequential on amendment 250, so I cannot do that. I will now suspend the sitting while we consider how and whether to meet the hon. Gentleman’s request.
Torsten Bell
I beg to move amendment 70, in clause 38, page 37, leave out lines 39 and 40 and insert—
“(b) what it means for assets of a pension scheme to be managed under a "common investment strategy" (including in particular provision defining that expression by reference to whether or how far the assets relating to each member of the scheme are allocated in the same proportion to the same investments).”
This amendment provides more detail as to how the power to define “common investment strategy” may be used.
Torsten Bell
I will be brief. The link between the definition of a main scale default arrangement and the common investment strategy is key to ensuring that the scale requirements apply to the correct elements of a pension scheme. Amendments 70 and 84 provide more detail on how the power to define a common investment strategy may be used to provide further information on the Government’s meaning when referring to that term.
Amendment 97 removes the “common investment strategy” element from the definition of default funds to avoid confusion with how that term is used in the main scale default arrangement approval in new sections 28A and 28B. I commend the amendments to the Committee.
Amendment 70 agreed to.
Amendments made: 71 in clause 38, page 38, leave out lines 32 to 38 and insert—
“(d) permitting the Authority to impose, on a person who fails to comply with a requirement under paragraph (c), a penalty determined in accordance with the regulations that does not exceed £100,000;”.
This amendment ensures that the penalties language used in section 28A is consistent with that used in new section 28B.
Amendment 72, in clause 38, page 39, leave out lines 1 to 4 and insert—
“(12) In this section ‘main scale default arrangement’ means an arrangement—
(a) that is used for the purposes of one or more pension schemes, and
(b) subject to which assets of any one of those schemes must under the rules of the scheme be held, or may under those rules be held, if the member of the scheme to whom the assets relate does not make a choice as to the arrangement subject to which the assets are to be held.”
This amendment defines “main scale default arrangement” for the purposes of new section 28A.
Amendment 73, in clause 38, page 39, line 7, leave out “relevant”.
This amendment removes an unnecessary tag.
Amendment 74, in clause 38, page 39, line 10, after “requirement” insert—
“by reference to the main scale default arrangement”.
This amendment clarifies how the concept of a main scale default arrangement fits into the approval framework under section 28B.
Amendment 75, in clause 38, page 39, line 12, after “requirement” insert—
“by reference to a main scale default arrangement”.
This amendment clarifies how the concept of a main scale default arrangement fits into the approval framework under section 28B.
Amendment 76, in clause 38, page 39, line 16, leave out “subsection (6)” and insert “subsections (5) and (6)”.
This amendment adds a further cross reference to new section 28B(4).
Amendment 77, in clause 38, page 39, line 17, leave out “held in funds”.
This amendment removes some unnecessary wording for the sake of consistency.
Amendment 78, in clause 38, page 39, line 18, at end insert—
“(ia) are held subject to the main scale default arrangement, and”.
This amendment clarifies how the concept of a main scale default arrangement fits into the approval framework under section 28B.
Amendment 79, in clause 38, page 39, line 20, leave out “held in funds”.
This amendment removes some unnecessary wording for the sake of consistency.
Amendment 80, in clause 38, page 39, line 24, at end insert—
“(ia) are held subject to the main scale default arrangement, and”.
This amendment clarifies how the concept of a main scale default arrangement fits into the approval framework under section 28B.
Amendment 81, in clause 38, page 39, line 27, leave out “held in funds”.
This amendment removes some unnecessary wording for the sake of consistency.
Amendment 82, in clause 38, page 39, line 27, leave out—
“one (and only one) relevant”
and insert “a qualifying relevant”.
This amendment corrects a reference to a relevant Master Trust in new section 28B(4)(c) to take account of new section 28B(8).
Amendment 83, in clause 38, page 39, line 30, at end insert—
“(ia) are held subject to the main scale default arrangement, and”.
This amendment clarifies how the concept of a main scale default arrangement fits into the approval framework under section 28B.
Amendment 84, in clause 38, page 39, leave out lines 38 and 39 and insert—
“(b) what it means for assets of a pension scheme to be managed under a ‘common investment strategy’ (including in particular provision defining that expression by reference to whether or how far the assets relating to each member of the scheme are allocated in the same proportion to the same investments).”
This amendment provides more detail as to how the power to define “common investment strategy” may be used.
Amendment 85, in clause 38, page 40, line 3, leave out from “(4)” to end of line 6 and insert—
“(a) a group personal pension scheme is ‘qualifying’ in relation to the GPP if the provider of the GPP is also the provider of the group personal pension scheme;
(b) a relevant Master Trust is ‘qualifying’ in relation to the GPP if the provider of the GPP is also the scheme funder or the scheme strategist in relation to the relevant Master Trust (within the meaning of Part 1 of the Pension Schemes Act 2017).”
This amendment clarifies the circumstances in which assets held by connected Master Trusts and group personal pension schemes can be counted for the purposes of the application of the scale test to a group personal pension scheme.
Amendment 86, in clause 38, page 40, line 19, leave out “relevant Master Trust or”.
This amendment removes an unnecessary reference to a relevant Master Trust.
Amendment 87, in clause 38, page 40, line 25, leave out—
“managers of the GPP that their”
and insert—
“provider of the GPP that its”.
This amendment replaces a reference to the “managers” of a GPP with “provider” (reflecting normal usage in relation to personal pension schemes).
Amendment 88, in clause 38, page 40, line 27, leave out “the managers” and insert “the provider”.
This amendment replaces a reference to the “managers” of a GPP with “provider” (reflecting normal usage in relation to personal pension schemes).
Amendment 89, in clause 38, page 40, line 35, leave out—
“considered by the Authority to have failed”
and insert “who fails”.
This amendment ensures consistency with the new language in section 28A.
Amendment 90, in clause 38, page 40, line 38, at end insert—
“(e) providing for the making of a reference to the First-tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal in respect of the issue of a penalty notice or the amount of a penalty.”
This amendment ensures that regulations can make provision for appeals to the Tribunal in respect of penalties under regulations under new section 28C(9)(c).
Amendment 91, in clause 38, page 40, line 42, leave out from beginning to end of line 3 on page 41 and insert—
“(12) In this section ‘main scale default arrangement’ means an arrangement—
(a) that is used for the purposes of one or more pension schemes, and
(b) subject to which assets of any one of those schemes must under the rules of the scheme be held, or may under those rules be held, if the member of the scheme to whom the assets relate does not make a choice as to the arrangement subject to which the assets are to be held.” —(Torsten Bell.)
This amendment defines “main scale default arrangement” for the purposes of new section 28B.
Mark Garnier
I beg to move amendment 248, in clause 38, page 41, line 4, leave out from beginning to end of line 9 on page 43.
This amendment would remove the ability of the Government to set mandatory asset allocation targets for certain pension schemes, specifically requiring investments in UK productive assets such as private equity, private debt, and real estate.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 275, in clause 38, page 41, line 31, at end insert—
“(5A) A description of asset prescribed under subsection (4) may not be securities in any UK water company.”
This amendment would ensure that the prescribed percentage of asset allocation would not include assets in the water sector and fund trustees will not be compelled to allocate scheme assets to the water sector.
Amendment 249, in clause 38, page 45, line 3, leave out from beginning to end of line 27 on page 46.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 248.
New clause 4—Establishment of targeted investment vehicles for pension funds—
“(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for the establishment or facilitation of one or more investment vehicles through which pension schemes may invest for targeted social or economic benefit.
(2) Regulations under subsection (1) must specify the descriptions of targeted social or economic benefit to which the investment vehicles are to contribute, which may include, but are not limited to, investment in—
(a) projects that revitalise high street areas;
(b) initiatives demonstrating social benefit;
(c) affordable or social housing development.
(3) The regulations must make provision for—
(a) the types of pension schemes eligible to participate in such investment vehicles;
(b) the governance, oversight, and reporting requirements for the investment vehicles and participating pension schemes;
(c) the means by which the contribution of such investments to targeted social or economic benefit is measured and reported;
(d) the roles and responsibilities of statutory bodies, including the Pensions Regulator and the Financial Conduct Authority, in authorising, regulating, or supervising such investment vehicles and the participation of pension schemes within them.
(4) The regulations may—
(a) make different provision for different descriptions of pension schemes, investment vehicles, or targeted social or economic benefits;
(b) provide for the pooling of assets from multiple pension schemes within such vehicles;
(c) require pension scheme trustees or managers to have regard to the availability and suitability of investment vehicles when formulating investment strategies, where consistent with—
(i) their fiduciary duties, and
(ii) the long-term value for money for members.
(5) In this Chapter, ‘pension scheme’ has the same meaning as in section 1(5) of the Pension Schemes Act 1993.”
This new clause would allow the Secretary of State to establish investment funds to encourage investment in areas such as high streets, social housing and investments with clear social benefits.
Mark Garnier
Amendments 248 and 249 talk about removing mandation—something I spoke about when we debated clause 38, so I will not cover those amendments other than to say that it is something we feel strongly about. Amendment 275 concerns mandation with regard to the water industry. It comes as a result of an announcement from the leader of Reform about potentially using pension fund money to invest in Thames Water, and part of Reform’s manifesto talked about nationalising the water industry, but using pension fund money to own 50% of those holdings. To a certain extent, that is performative because we are talking about a specific sector. This amendment specifically talks about the water companies, but it could be carried forward to any other potentially nationalised sector.
John Milne
I will speak to new clause 4 on targeted investment vehicles. Its purpose is to empower the Secretary of State to establish or facilitate targeted investment vehicles for pension funds. Overall, the pensions industry is supportive of the Bill, as are the Liberal Democrats, but some sections have expressed concern that a requirement to invest in UK infrastructure and assets could lead to excess demand for a limited stock of investment, especially in the early days when the economy is adjusting. In a worst-case scenario, it could lead to overpaying for investments or difficulty in reaching Government targets. Government assistance to ensure a healthy flow of investment vehicles would therefore serve to prevent that from happening.
Furthermore, there is a unique opportunity to create vehicles that would allow schemes to invest in projects with clear social and economic benefits. It could include many different types of investments. For example, the Government could support the development of investment vehicles designed to revitalise high streets and local communities, provide affordable and social housing development, provide care home accommodation or support other projects that deliver long-term value while strengthening society.
The new clause sets out regulations that would set clear rules on which schemes can participate. Different provision could be made for different schemes and types of investment vehicles. The Pensions Regulator and the Financial Conduct Authority would be given defined responsibilities in authorising, supervising and regulating these vehicles. To be clear, trustees would only be expected to consider the investments where consistent with their fiduciary duties and long-term value for money for members. Pension funds are among the largest sources of long-term capital in the UK, so harnessing even a small proportion for socially beneficial investment could deliver real economic and community impact. Pooling of assets would also facilitate open access for smaller schemes. Done properly, that could align members’ retirement interests with a wider public good.
To summarise, the new clause is designed to ensure a constant supply of suitable investment vehicles so that pension funds can invest at scale in areas that are currently not receiving sufficient attention. At the same time, it would create a framework where pensions could be a force for social renewal and financial security. The clause ensures opportunities with safeguards in place for schemes to contribute to national priorities, while still securing value for members.
Kirsty Blackman
Although I am delighted by the intention of the hon. Member for Wyre Forest to get one over Reform with amendment 275, and I am quite happy to back that notion, I am also pretty happy with nationalised water in Scotland. Scottish Water is significantly better performing than the other water companies, so I would not automatically say that nationalised water is a bad thing, given that our water is lovely in Scotland. However, we could do with a little more rain on the north-east coast, given that we have had the driest spring and summer for 40 years, which is not ideal. I gently disagree with the hon. Member because the amendment does not take into account the Scottish context. I would love to see more investment in Scottish Water from pension funds or from Government-led investment vehicles or decision making.
On amendments 248 and 249, I am much more relaxed about mandation than the Conservatives are, as Members might expect given my ideological position. I have much less of an issue with going in that direction. I have heard all the Government have said about not planning to use those powers. It is reasonable for the Government to direct the economy in certain directions—that is what tax and Government spend are for. A good chunk of that is about ensuring that we make interventions so that the economy grows in the way that we want it to.
In many cases, Governments have historically refrained from picking winners when a decision to do so could have grown the economy faster. For example, historically, the Government could have given more backing to certain ports to ensure that they could grow, particularly through renewable energy or by building offshore wind farms, because we could do with more local capacity throughout the UK. Had Governments of all colours been clearer about which areas and regions they were backing, that understanding could have enabled those areas to win more contracts.
On new clause 4, the options for how mandation could work and the investment vehicles that are in place, I have talked about affordable and social housing development. The biggest thing the Government could do to encourage social housing, in particular, is to cancel the right to buy, which would allow local authorities to build significant levels of social housing. That is how we are managing to increase our housing stock in Scotland. We are not there yet—nobody says that we are—but we are able to build new social housing in Scotland at a scale that most local authorities south of the border are not, because cancelling the right to buy has made it affordable. I would love to see more investment in social housing.
I would have liked renewable energy to be included in the Lib Dems’ new clause 4. I appreciate that we cannot include everything, but it would have been nice, particularly when it comes to smaller renewable energy projects and in combined heat and power initiatives. Large-scale CHP makes a really positive difference in Aberdeen city. We have a large combined heat and power network, which heats a significant number of our multi-storey blocks at far lower prices. They are still seeing an increase in prices, absolutely, but they do not need to worry about putting money in the meter, because they know they will have hot water and heating for a fixed monthly fee, rather than paying more in winter and less in summer.
Lastly, harking back to the Future Generations Commissioner for Wales, it would be interesting for the Government to consider whether any potential mandation benefits future generations, given the intergenerational gap and given that people my age and younger are increasingly of the view that we will never get a state pension, because it will simply not exist by the time we reach retirement age—I am sorry if not everybody is at that level of cynicism, but most people my age and younger are. Looking at where our private pensions are invested and at the Government’s direction of travel, it would at least be an interesting thought exercise, in advance of any Government decision on mandation, to consider whether that money would benefit future generations or make things worse for them. In Wales, decisions can be called in for judicial review, should a public authority act against the wellbeing of future generations.
Looking at whether investments that could be directed by the Government would benefit or have a detrimental impact on future generations would be an interesting way to tie the Government’s hands. That way, we could see investment not simply in massive motorways, High Speed 2 or dual carriageways, but in things that have a demonstrable benefit, or at least no adverse impact, on the wellbeing of future generations. Surely that should be a positive thing for us all, given our huge responsibilities for the future of the planet and to those who will be living on these islands. Requiring that to be considered when the Government look at mandation could be a great way to do it.
I am not sure what I will do when we come to new clause 4—it will be voted on at the very end because it is a new clause. I like the idea, but I am not convinced that I would go down that exact route. I will not be supporting the Conservative amendments in this group, which I understand the shadow Minister is terribly shocked about, but there are places where we can have significant ideological disagreements, and this is definitely one of them.
Mr Bedford
I refer the Committee to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests, having worked in the water sector before being elected to Parliament. I will be speaking predominantly to amendment 248. The Committee heard evidence from industry experts who expressed concerns about the Bill’s mandation power. They were consistent and clear in raising concerns about the reserve powers in the Bill. I would like to reiterate some of those concerns raised by the industry, which I believe hon. Members should support today.
At the heart of clause 38 is its impact on the fiduciary duty of trustees—not just a mere technicality, but a duty that has been at the heart of trust-based governance for centuries. Trustees have a legal duty to act solely in the best interests of their members. However, the Government believe it is acceptable to tear up that duty through a ministerial power grab. If the Bill is passed in its current form, Ministers will have the power to override the judgment of trustees, which I do not believe is appropriate. That is not to guide or support, but to mandate them—to potentially force them to act against what are arguably the best interests and returns for their members.
That leads me to the potential impact on pensions adequacy in the UK. We are facing a pensions adequacy crisis, as I and other members of this Committee have said before. The majority of people are not saving anywhere near enough for retirement, and the cost to the state pension will only continue to rise, yet we have seen that the Government are willing to take investment decisions out of the hands of pension fund trustees.
David Pinto-Duschinsky (Hendon) (Lab)
As the Minister has previously said, there will be a savers’ interest test. There will be a series of safeguards, including the fact that if the Government want to exercise the power, they will have to file a report. This is a power ringfenced with safeguards. What Opposition Members have not said is what they would do instead to raise the returns of the pension market, because that is the issue. The hon. Member for Mid Leicestershire is exactly right that there is not enough pension saving, but that is exactly because we are not seeing those returns. If not this power, what would the Opposition do instead to raise investment levels?
Mr Bedford
I will come on to some of those points later, so I will address them then.
Mark Garnier
This is rather strange, because I wanted to intervene on the intervention, but I hope that my hon. Friend will come on to the various other things that we have proposed. For example, we have proposed looking at the Maxwell rules, which are driving the incentive of pension fund trustees to invest in gilts because of the implications of volatile markets for balance sheets. We are trying to look at the wider regulation that is driving certain behaviour, and I hope that my hon. Friend will raise that in due course. We are 100% behind the Bill—not every single part of it, although the thrust is very good—but, as my hon. Friend will mention, there are areas that could be changed to achieve its aims.
Mr Bedford
I hope to address some of those points.
The Government are willing to take investment decisions out of the hands of pension fund trustees to force investments into projects that may be politically convenient for them, but may potentially lead to financial loss for members. They are directing investment on the backs of ordinary UK savers. When people save into a pension scheme, they are entrusting their future security to a system that is working supposedly for them and not for political gain. To answer the point made by the hon. Member for Hendon, rather than coercing trustees to follow conditions set by Ministers, would it not be better to create the right economic conditions to make trustees want to invest in the UK?
The last Conservative Government, through their Mansion House reforms and the work of my right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash, brought in active commitment from the pension fund trustees who want to invest. We did not need to mandate that, and the Government should learn from that approach. Amendment 248 will preserve the fiduciary duty, but continue the trajectory to increase pension fund investment in the UK.
John Grady (Glasgow East) (Lab)
Would the hon. Member accept that pension trustees should, in accordance with their fiduciary duties, actively consider investing in such things as private equity, private patient capital and interests in land? The fact that so many people have agreed, under the Mansion House arrangements, to invest in such classes of assets, which have grown exponentially in scope over the last 25 years, makes the basic point that they will yield much better returns for my constituents. The thrust is simply to get better returns for pension savers in the United Kingdom.
Mr Bedford
I trust the pensions industry to make those judgments because they are the experts in this area, not Government Ministers, who often have short-term views. On Second Reading, one of my hon. Friends raised the example of HS2 and how Government priorities and policies can change over time. Would the hon. Member be happy for his constituents to have their money invested in a Government project or a large infrastructure scheme that is then scrapped, and to see huge losses to their pension scheme? I have huge concerns about the mandation point.
Clause 38, in its current form, undermines the trust that I mentioned earlier. I therefore urge hon. Members to back our amendment to ensure that the fiduciary duty remains and that we protect the security of millions of savers.
Kirsty Blackman
I corrected the Minister the other day on the definition of fiduciary duty, and the hon. Member for Mid Leicestershire just made a similar error. The fiduciary duty is not to act in the best interests of scheme members but to act in the best interests of getting them the pensions they were promised, or of growing their pensions. It is not necessarily about their best interests; it is about the best interests of their pension and the size of it.
We spoke about this quite a lot in relation to the local government pension scheme. There could be investments that make a person’s life significantly better than having an extra fiver a year in their pension. These are two different things. I appreciate that fiduciary duties should be what they are—I am not arguing with that; I am saying that the definition is not about acting in the best interests of scheme members but simply about growing their pension pots.
In terms of the two Lib Dem amendments and the points made about the investability of projects, we could argue about chickens and eggs and what will come first: will it be the economy growing in order that pension funds can find more investable projects, or will it be a pipeline of projects ready for funds to invest in, which is what the witnesses giving evidence last Tuesday suggested they need? If the Government are clear, not necessarily that they will include mandation but that there is a stick at the end of the process if the carrots do not work, confidence in that pipeline will grow in order for those projects to be there. I would love those projects to include what the Liberal Democrats are suggesting—housing and regeneration of town centres, for example—as well as investment in renewable energy and an increase in energy efficiency measures.
John Milne
Renewable energy schemes—particularly community energy, which I am a big fan of—are a very good addition, so we would support that.
Torsten Bell
I shall speak briefly because I am conscious that we need to adjourn shortly for Treasury orals, which I know everybody will be joining us for. I will not rehearse the arguments I have already set out against the purpose of amendments 248 and 249, other than to note that I do not agree with the characterisation by the hon. Member for Mid Leicestershire.
Amendment 275 seeks to prevent the Government from designating securities in UK water companies as qualifying assets for the purpose of the asset allocation requirement. I recognise the points that the hon. Member for Wyre Forest made, and I am not surprised to hear that Reform has not thought through its policies in this regard. The Government have set out the safeguards we have put in place around the use of this power. We do not think we should single out a particular sector in primary legislation, so I ask Members not to press their amendments.
I thank the hon. Member for Horsham for introducing new clause 4. The investment he references is exactly the kind that we think would raise financial returns and improve quality of life at retirement. That is the purpose of these changes. He rightly raises the bringing together of the demand side—that is, the Mansion House accord and the change in investment behaviours—with the supply side. That is exactly what the Government are doing via planning permissions and everything else, to ensure that the pipeline of projects is there, including via the British Growth Partnership work, which is intermediating all of that. On that basis, we think that the new clause is unnecessary, but I completely agree with much that it contains.
Steve Darling
Reflecting on events over the weekend, may I congratulate the Minister on being one of the few who remained in post? There is talk of the Prime Minister using all levers of power to drive forward work on certain wicked issues. One of the big wicked issues is the lack of affordable housing. In my constituency of Torbay, only 8% of our housing stock is social-rented, compared with a national average of 17%. I encourage the Minister to reflect again on this and take the opportunity of new clause 4—surely socialists should vote for clause 4. This is another opportunity to apply all the pressure we can to drive more social-rented housing, to support our communities and those most in need in society.
Torsten Bell
I just point out that many of the measures in the Bill will support exactly that kind of investment in social housing, including those on scale and the local government pension scheme. On that basis, I think these amendments are unnecessary.
Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Taiwo Owatemi.)
Pension Schemes Bill
Wednesday 3rd December 2025
(2 months ago)
Commons ChamberPension Schemes Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 3 December 2025 - large print - (3 Dec 2025)
17:11 - The House divided: - Ayes: 87 / Noes: 299 - Question accordingly negatived.
17:24 - The House divided: - Ayes: 77 / Noes: 298 - Question accordingly negatived.
17:36 - The House divided: - Ayes: 143 / Noes: 304 - Question accordingly negatived.
17:38 - The House divided: - Ayes: 154 / Noes: 303 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new clause 31—Indexation of periodic compensation for pre-1997 service: Great Britain.
Government new clause 32—Indexation of periodic compensation for pre-1997 service: Northern Ireland.
Government new clause 33—Financial Assistance Scheme: indexation of payments for pre-1997 service.
Government new clause 34—Exemption from public procurement rules.
Government new clause 35—Funding of the Board of the Pension Protection Fund.
New clause 1—Independent review into pension losses incurred by former employees of AEA Technology—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act, commission an independent review into the pension losses incurred by former employees of AEA Technology who—
(a) transferred their accrued pension benefits out of the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) public service scheme to AEA Technology (AEAT) on privatisation in 1996, and
(b) suffered financial losses when AEA Technology went into administration in 2012 and the pension scheme entered the Pension Protection Fund (PPF).
(2) The review must examine—
(a) the extent and causes of pension losses incurred by affected individuals,
(b) the role of Government policy and representations in the transfer of pensions during the privatisation of AEA Technology,
(c) the findings of the Public Accounts Committee and the Work and Pensions Select Committee,
(d) the adequacy of safeguards provided at the time of privatisation,
(e) potential mechanisms for redress or compensation, and
(f) the estimated financial cost of any such mechanisms.
(3) The review must be—
(a) conducted by an independent panel appointed by the Secretary of State, with relevant expertise in pensions, public policy, and administrative justice, and
(b) transparent and consultative, including engagement with affected pensioners and their representatives.
(4) The panel must report its findings and recommendations to the Secretary of State and lay a copy of its final report before Parliament within 12 months of its establishment.
(5) The Secretary of State must, within 6 months of the publication of the report under subsection (4), lay before both Houses of Parliament a statement setting out the Secretary of State’s response to that outcome.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into the pension losses incurred by former employees of AEA Technology.
New clause 2—Transfer of British Coal Staff Superannuation Scheme investment reserve to members—
“(1) Within 3 months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for the transfer of the British Coal Staff Superannuation Scheme investment reserve to members of the scheme.
(2) Those regulations must include—
(a) a timetable for transferring the total of the investment reserve to members of the scheme, and
(b) plans for commissioning an independent review into how future surplus will be shared.
(3) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to set out in regulations a timetable for transferring the whole of the BCSSS investment reserve to members and committing to review how future surplus will be shared.
New clause 3—Terminal illness: means of demonstrating eligibility—
“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision about how a person may demonstrate that they are terminally ill for purposes relating to compensation or assistance from the Pension Protection Fund or Financial Assistance Scheme.
(2) In making regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must seek to minimise the administrative burden placed upon the person with a terminal illness.
(3) Regulations under this section must provide that, where the Department of Work and Pensions (“the Department”) holds a valid SR1 form in respect of a person seeking to demonstrate that they are terminally ill for purposes relating to compensation or assistance from the Pension Protection Fund or Financial Assistance Scheme, the Department must share that form with the Pension Protection Fund or the Financial Assistance Scheme.
(4) Regulations under this section must require the Pension Protection Fund and the Financial Assistance Scheme to make the appropriate payment or payments within a specified time of receipt of a valid application.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to provide, by regulations, for the use of a valid SR1 form to make it easier for a person to demonstrate that they are terminally ill for purposes related to compensation from the PPF or FAS.
New clause 4—Review into investment in defence companies—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, carry out a review into investment in defence companies within Local Government Pension Schemes.
(2) The review must consider how the investment in defence companies—
(a) impacts on, and
(b) aligns with,
the UK Government’s international obligations.
(3) The Secretary of State must prepare a report of the review and lay a copy of that report before Parliament.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to conduct a review into investment in defence companies within Local Government Pension Schemes and how that impacts and aligns with Government international obligations.
New clause 5—Review into defined benefit schemes’ social impact—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, carry out a review into the social impact of defined benefit schemes.
(2) The review must include an assessment of—
(a) the efficacy of investment strategies in delivering social good, and
(b) the potential impact of increasing investment in—
(i) social housing, and
(ii) green technology.
(3) For the purposes of this section—
“social good” means something which benefits society as a whole, and
“green technology” means the use of technology and science to create environmentally-friendly products and services.
(4) The Secretary of State must prepare a report of the review and lay a copy of that report before Parliament.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to review the efficacy of investment in terms of delivering social good and the benefits of directing more investment towards social housing and green technology.
New clause 6—Indexation of pre-1997 service—
“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for indexation on compensation in respect of pre-1997 rights for members of the Pension Protection Fund and the Financial Assistance Scheme.
(2) Those regulations must specify that—
(a) pension payments from the PPF and FAS are increased each year in line with Consumer Prices Index (CPI) inflation for pensionable service before and after 6 April 1997,
(b) where a PPF or FAS member has pensionable service prior to 6 April 1997 which has not increased each year in line with CPI inflation, but which their scheme provided for, the scheme manager must—
(i) determine the annual increase attributable to that service for each year since the date on which the annual payment was first payable, and
(ii) reimburse the member for the amount determined under paragraph (b)(i), and
(c) increased payments must also apply to transferee members, to ill health payments and to payments to surviving dependants.
(3) Regulations under this section—
(a) shall be made by statutory instrument, and
(b) may not be made unless a draft has been laid before and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to provide, through regulations, for indexation on PPF and FAS compensation in respect of pre-1997 rights.
New clause 7—Report on indexation of pre-1997 Pension Protection Fund and Financial Assistance Scheme benefits—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, publish a report on options for providing indexation to pension rights relating to pre-1997 service in the Pension Protection Fund (PPF) and the Financial Assistance Scheme (FAS).
(2) The report must consider—
(a) the current absence of indexation on pre-1997 accrued rights and the financial impact on affected pensioners;
(b) the number of pensioners affected and the mortality rates since the establishment of FAS and PPF, including evidence from the Pensions Action Group;
(c) the feasibility of introducing indexation, in full or in part, for pre-1997 rights;
(d) the potential use of scheme reserves, including residual funds from failed schemes transferred into the FAS, and the implications for taxpayers;
(e) the urgency of reform given the age profile of affected members and the social impact of frozen incomes;
(f) alternative funding mechanisms that could deliver indexation without undermining the sustainability of the PPF; and
(g) comparative approaches to legacy benefit indexation in other jurisdictions.
(3) In preparing the report, the Secretary of State must consult—
(a) the Pensions Regulator,
(b) the Pension Protection Fund,
(c) representatives of Financial Assistance Scheme members,
(d) the Pensions Action Group, and
(e) such other stakeholders as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
(4) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before both Houses of Parliament.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish a report examining options for addressing the lack of indexation on pre-1997 pensionable service in the PPF and FAS, with particular regard to evidence provided by the Pensions Action Group, mortality data, scheme reserves, and the urgency of the issue.
New clause 8—Universal Pension Advice Entitlement—
“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations establish a system to ensure that every individual has a right to receive free, impartial pension advice at prescribed times.
(2) Regulations under subsection (1) must provide for individuals to be offered advice—
(a) at or around the age of 40; and
(b) at a prescribed age, not more than six years before the individual's expected retirement age.
(3) The regulations must make provision about—
(a) the content and scope of the free, impartial pension advice, which may include, but is not limited to, guidance on—
(i) pension types (including both defined contribution and defined benefit schemes),
(ii) investment strategies,
(iii) charges,
(iv) consolidation of pension pots, and
(v) retirement income options;
(b) the qualifications, independence, and impartiality requirements for any person or body providing advice;
(c) the means by which individuals are notified of their entitlement to receive the advice and how they may access it;
(d) the roles and responsibilities of pension scheme trustees, managers, and providers in facilitating access to advice;
(e) the sharing member information with prescribed persons or bodies subject to appropriate data protection safeguards.
(4) Regulations under this section may—
(a) make different provision for different descriptions of pension schemes or different descriptions of individuals;
(b) confer functions in connection with the provision or oversight of the advice on—
(i) the Pensions Regulator,
(ii) the Financial Conduct Authority,
(iii) the Money and Pensions Service, or
(iv) other prescribed bodies;
(c) require the provision of funding for the advice service from prescribed sources.
(5) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This new clause makes provision by regulations for everyone to receive free, impartial pension advice at age 40 and again around five years before their expected retirement.
New clause 10—Independent review of forfeiture of survivor pensions in police pension schemes—
“(1) The Secretary of State must commission an independent review into the impact and fairness of provisions within police pension schemes that result in the forfeiture, reduction, or suspension of survivor pensions on the grounds of—
(a) remarriage or entry into a civil partnership by the surviving partner of a deceased scheme member; or
(b) cohabitation with another person as if married or in a civil partnership.
(2) The review must examine—
(a) the legal and policy basis for such provisions;
(b) the financial, social, and emotional impact on affected individuals and families;
(c) consistency with other public sector pension schemes, including schemes for—
(i) the Armed Forces,
(ii) the NHS, and
(iii) the civil service;
(d) potential options for reform, including retrospective reinstatement of pensions;
(e) any other matters the Secretary of State considers relevant.
(3) The Secretary of State must—
(a) appoint an independent person or panel with relevant legal, pensions, and public policy expertise to conduct the review; and
(b) publish the terms of reference no later than three months after this Act is passed.
(4) The person or panel appointed under subsection (3) must—
(a) consult with relevant stakeholders, including—
(i) the National Association of Retired Police Officers (NARPO),
(ii) survivor pension recipients,
(iii) police staff associations, and
(iv) pensions experts;
(b) consider written and oral evidence submitted by affected individuals; and
(c) publish a report of its findings and recommendations within 12 months of appointment.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into the impact and fairness of provisions within police pension schemes that result in the forfeiture, reduction, or suspension of survivor pensions.
New clause 11—Independent review into state deduction in defined benefit pension schemes—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act, commission an independent review into the application and impact of state deduction mechanisms in occupational defined benefit pension schemes.
(2) The review must consider—
(a) the origin, rationale and implementation of state deduction in the Midland Bank Staff Pension Scheme,
(b) the clarity and adequacy of member communications regarding state deduction from inception to present,
(c) the differential impact of state deduction on pensioners with varying salary histories, including an assessment of any disproportionate effects on—
(i) lower-paid staff, and
(ii) women,
(d) comparisons with other occupational pension schemes in the banking and public sectors, and
(e) the legal, administrative, and financial feasibility of modifying or removing state deduction provisions, including potential mechanisms for redress.
(3) The Secretary of State must ensure that the person or body appointed to conduct the review—
(a) is independent of HSBC Bank plc and its associated pension schemes;
(b) possesses relevant expertise in pensions law, occupational pension scheme administration, and equality and fairness in retirement income; and
(c) undertakes appropriate consultation with—
(i) affected scheme members,
(ii) employee representatives,
(iii) pension experts, and
(iv) stakeholder organisations.
(4) The person or body conducting the review must—
(a) submit a report on its findings to the Secretary of State within 12 months of the date the review is commissioned; and
(b) the Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before Parliament and publish the report in full.
(5) Within three months of laying the report before Parliament, the Secretary of State must publish a written response setting out the Government’s proposed actions, if any, in response to the report’s findings and recommendations.
(6) For the purposes of this section—
“state deduction” means any provision within a defined benefit occupational pension scheme that reduces pension entitlements by reference to the member reaching state pension age or by reference to any state pension entitlement;
“defined benefit pension scheme” has the meaning given in section 181 of the Pension Schemes Act 1993;
“Midland Bank Staff Pension Scheme” includes all associated legacy arrangements and any successor schemes administered by HSBC Bank Pension Trust (UK) Ltd.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into clawback provisions in occupational defined benefit pension schemes, in particular, the Midland Bank staff pension scheme.
New clause 12—Section 40 commencement—
“(1) The provisions in section 40 shall not come into force except in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of State.
(2) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (1) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This new clause would require that the provisions in clause 40 could only be enacted once agreed through secondary legislation.
New clause 13—Targeted Advice Access for Under-Saving Cohorts—
“(1) The Secretary of State must make regulations to provide enhanced access to pension advice or guidance for cohorts identified as under-saving for retirement.
(2) Regulations may make provision for—
(a) identifying under-saving groups, including but not limited to—
(i) women,
(ii) ethnic minority groups, and
(iii) others affected by long-term pay or pension gaps;
(b) mechanisms to fund and deliver targeted support;
(c) reporting and evaluation requirements to assess take-up and effectiveness.
(3) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This new clause allows for the creation of targeted pension advice or guidance interventions for groups at risk of under-saving for retirement.
New clause 14—Cap on cost of advice for pension holders—
“(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations introduce a cap on the cost recoverable for providing pension advice per pension holder under any scheme operating free or subsidised advice.
(2) The cap may vary depending on—
(a) the value of the pension pot;
(b) the type of pension scheme;
(c) the complexity of advice required.
(3) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This new clause enables the introduction of a cost ceiling for advice provision to members of pension schemes.
New clause 15—Independent review into the British Coal Staff Superannuation Scheme—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act, commission an independent review into the treatment of members of the British Coal Staff Superannuation Scheme (BCSSS).
(2) The review must consider—
(a) the origin and operation of the Government’s surplus-sharing arrangements with the BCSSS since 1994,
(b) the adequacy of communication to scheme members regarding the use of surpluses,
(c) the impact of the Government’s retention of scheme reserves on members’ retirement income,
(d) representations made by the Trustees of the BCSSS calling for reserves to be released to members, and
(e) options for reforming how any future surpluses in the BCSSS are shared between the Government and scheme members.
(3) The person or body appointed to conduct the review must—
(a) be independent of the Government and the BCSSS Trustees,
(b) possess relevant expertise in pensions law and scheme administration, and
(c) consult with affected members, Trustees, pension experts, and stakeholder organisations.
(4) The review must report to the Secretary of State within 12 months of being commissioned, and the Secretary of State must lay the report before Parliament and publish it in full.
(5) Within three months of publication, the Secretary of State must publish the Government’s response to the review’s findings.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into the treatment of members of the British Coal Staff Superannuation Scheme, including the handling of scheme reserves and future surplus-sharing arrangements.
New clause 16—Report on Pension Scheme Eligibility and Access—
“(1) The Secretary of State shall, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament a report into the operation of occupational pension schemes where certain categories of employees have been excluded on the basis of job classification or employment start date.
(2) The report must examine the case of employees and former employees of Fife Joinery Manufacturing (a subsidiary of Velux), including—
(a) whether affected workers were provided with opportunity to join existing pension schemes,
(b) the adequacy of record-keeping and employer accountability, and
(c) potential remedies to ensure equal access to workplace pensions.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to report on the Velux Pensions case.
New clause 17—Clarification of pension scheme investment duties—
“(1) The Pensions Act 1995 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 36 (Choosing investments), after subsection (9), insert—
“(10) Regulations under subsection (1) must provide—
(a) that when interpreting the best interest or sole interests of members and beneficiaries for the purposes of this section and the regulations, the trustees of a trust scheme may (amongst other matters) take the following into account—
(i) system-level considerations,
(ii) the reasonably foreseeable impacts over the appropriate time horizon of the assets or organisations in which the trust scheme invests upon prescribed matters, including upon members’ and beneficiaries’ standards of living, and
(iii) the views of members and beneficiaries;
(b) that investment powers or discretions must be exercised in a manner that considers and manages the matters specified in subsection (10)(a)(i) and (ii) where they are financially material; and
(c) a prescribed definition of the term “appropriate time horizon” for these purposes.
(11) For the purposes of this section, “system-level considerations” means, over the appropriate time horizon, risks and opportunities relevant to the scheme that—
(a) cannot be fully managed through diversification alone, and
(b) arise from circumstances at the level of one or more economic sectors, financial markets or economies, including but not limited to those relating to environmental or social matters.
(12) Regulations under subsection (1) must come into force no more than one year after the passing of the Pension Schemes Act 2025.
(13) In complying with requirements imposed by this section and regulations, a trustee or manager must have regard to guidance prepared from time to time by the Secretary of State.”
(3) The Financial Conduct Authority must make general rules with effects corresponding to the provisions of subsection (1) for providers of pension schemes to which Part 7A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (inserted by section 48 of this Act) applies.
(4) The Secretary of State must make regulations with effects corresponding to the provisions of subsection (1) for scheme managers of the Local Government Pension Scheme.
(5) The rules and regulations under subsections (3) and (4) must come into force no later than the date on which regulations pursuant to section 36(10) of the Pensions Act 1995 (as amended by this Act) come into force.”
This new clause gives the Secretary of State a duty to make regulations clarifying investment duties of occupational pension schemes, including system-level considerations and other matters including impacts of investee firms, beneficiaries’ standards of living and views. It also imposes duties on the FCA and the Secretary of State to make corresponding rules and regulations for workplace personal pension schemes and the Local Government Pension Scheme respectively.
New clause 18—Report on indexation of pre-1997 benefits—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 6 months of the passing of this Act, publish a report on whether the Pension Protection Fund and the Financial Assistance Scheme should provide indexation on compensation in respect of pre-1997 rights, where pension schemes provided for that.
(2) The report must consider—
(a) the potential benefits for affected pensioners;
(b) approaches of occupational pension schemes to indexation of pre-1997 benefits;
(c) the impact on compensation schemes’ surpluses and on public finances;
(d) international approaches to indexation of legacy pension benefits.
(3) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before both Houses of Parliament.”
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to report on whether the PPF and FAS should provide indexation on compensation in respect of pre-1997 rights, where scheme rules provided for that.
New clause 19—Fossil fuels and climate change risk—
“(1) The Pensions Act 1995 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 41A (Climate change risk), after subsection (6) insert—
“(6A) Regulations under subsection (1) must, within 1 year of the Pension Schemes Act 2025 receiving Royal Assent, prohibit the trustees or managers of schemes of a prescribed description from holding relevant assets.
(6B) The relevant assets in subsection (6A) are issuance by issuers which, in relation to thermal coal—
(a) derive 10% or more of annual revenue from its production, transport or combustion,
(b) produce annually 10 million tonnes or more, or
(c) have 5GW or more of power generation capacity.
(6C) Within 2 years of the Pensions Act 2025 receiving Royal Assent, and every 3 years thereafter, the Secretary of State must carry out and publish a review on whether the definition of relevant assets should be extended to include—
(a) issuance by issuers which, in relation to thermal coal, derive a smaller proportion of revenue, produce a smaller amount or have a smaller amount of power generation capacity than the proportion and amounts specified in (6B),
(b) some or all new issuance by issuers of a prescribed description deriving a prescribed proportion or amount of their revenue from the extraction, transport, trading or combustion of prescribed fossil fuels, or
(c) some or all new or existing issuance by issuers of a prescribed description investing a prescribed proportion or amount in exploring for, or expanding the extraction of, prescribed fossil fuels.
(6D) Regulations under subsection (1) may implement the conclusions of the review referred to in (6C).”
(3) In subsection (8), at end insert—
““thermal coal” means coal and lignite used in the generation of electricity and in providing heat for industrial or residential purposes;
“issuance” means all investable assets, including equity and debt.”
(4) The Financial Conduct Authority must make general rules with effects corresponding to the provisions of subsection (1) for providers of pension schemes to which Part 7A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (inserted by section 48 of this Act) applies.
(5) The Secretary of State must make regulations with effects corresponding to the provisions of subsection (1) for scheme managers of the Local Government Pension Scheme.
(6) The rules and regulations under subsections (4) and (5) must come into force no later than the date on which regulations pursuant to section 41A(6A) of the Pensions Act 1995 (as amended by this Act) come into force.”
This new clause would require Government and the FCA to make regulations and rules restricting exposure of some occupational and workplace personal schemes to thermal coal investments and to regularly review whether the restrictions should be extended to other fossil fuel investments.
New clause 20—Pensions and savings advice allowance—
“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for a tax-free pensions and savings advice allowance which individuals between the ages of 30 and 50 can withdraw from their pensions to access financial advice.
(2) Regulations must specify—
(a) the maximum amount for the pensions and savings advice allowance,
(b) the content and scope of the pensions and savings advice,
(c) the qualifications and independence requirements of any person or body providing pensions and savings advice,
(d) the means by which individuals are notified of their entitlement to the pensions and savings advice allowance and how they may access—
(i) the allowance, and
(ii) advisers who meet the requirements under subsection (2)(c),
(e) the roles and responsibilities of pension scheme trustees, managers, and providers in facilitating access to the pensions and savings advice allowance, and
(f) whether the pensions and savings advice allowance counts towards the Individual Lump Sum Allowance.
(3) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to introduce, by regulations, a pensions and savings advice allowance which individuals between the ages of 30 and 50 can withdraw from their pension savings tax-free to access appropriate financial advice.
New clause 21—Significant life event lump sum—
“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for a significant life event lump sum of up to £5,000 which a person is entitled to before they attain normal pension age.
(2) The regulations may prescribe circumstances in which, and conditions subject to which, a person may become entitled to a significant life event lump sum, including—
(a) purchasing a first home;
(b) getting married;
(c) unexpected loss of employment.
(3) The regulations must specify that the significant life event lump sum counts towards the Individual Lump Sum allowance.
(4) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to introduce, by regulations, a significant life event lump sum of up to £5,000 tax-free which individuals can take from their lump sum allowance prior to reaching pension age.
New clause 22—Indexation of pre-1997 pensions—
“(1) The Pensions Act 1995 is amended as follows.
(2) In Section 51 (Annual increase in rate of pension), omit subsections (1)(b) and (1)(c)(ii).
(3) In subsection (2), leave out from “pensionable service,” to “or”.
(4) In subsection (2), leave out from “commencement day]” to “—".
(5) In subsection (2)(b), leave out from “pensionable service” to “, so much of”.
(6) In subsection (4ZE), leave out from “pensionable service” to “in subsections (3) to (4ZD)”.
(7) In subsection (5)(a), leave out “6 April 1997 or”.
(8) In subsection (8)(a) and (b), leave out “at any time on or after 6 April 1997”.”
This new clause would remove references to 6 April 1997 from section 51 of the Pensions Act 1995 in order to require that annual increases to pension payments in line with CPI and RPI apply to pensionable service both before and after 6 April 1997.
New clause 23—Indexation of pre-1997 service—
“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for the use of Pension Protection Fund surplus/reserve funds for the indexation on compensation in respect of pre-1997 rights for members of the Pension Protection Fund and the Financial Assistance Scheme.
(2) Those regulations must specify that—
(a) pension payments from the PPF and FAS are increased each year in line with Retail Prices Index (RPI) inflation for pensionable service before and after 6 April 1997,
(b) the cap on the annual increase is raised to 7%,
(c) where a PPF or FAS member has pensionable service prior to 6 April 1997 which has not increased each year in line with RPI inflation, the scheme manager must—
(i) determine the annual increase attributable to that service for each year since the date on which the annual payment was first payable, and
(ii) reimburse the member for the amount determined under paragraph (c)(i), and
(d) payments made to reimburse members under paragraph (c)(ii) must be made from Pension Protection Fund surplus funds and future funds.
(3) Regulations under this section—
(a) shall be made by statutory instrument, and
(b) may not be made unless a draft has been laid before and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to provide, through regulations, for indexation on PPF and FAS compensation in respect of pre-1997 rights, for indexation to follow RPI inflation with a cap of 7%, and for retrospective payments to be funded from PFI surplus and/or reserve funds.
New clause 24—Indexation of pre-1997 pensions—
“(1) The Pensions Act 1995 is amended as follows.
(2) In Section 51 (Annual increase in rate of pension), omit subsections (1)(b) and (1)(c)(ii).
(3) In subsection (2), after “52” insert “52A”.
(4) In subsection (2), leave out from “pensionable service,” to “or,”.
(5) In subsection (2), leave out from “commencement day]” to “—”.
(6) In subsection (2)(b), leave out from “pensionable service” to “, so much of”.
(7) In subsection (4ZE), leave out from “pensionable service” to “in subsections (3) to (4ZD)”.
(8) In subsection (5)(a), leave out “6 April 1997 or”.
(9) In subsection (8)(a) and (b), leave out “at any time on or after 6 April 1997”.
(10) After Section 52 (Restriction on increase where member is under 55) insert—
“52A Restriction on increase where a pension scheme is not in surplus
No increase under section 51 in the annual rate of a pension shall not be paid or shall not be paid in full unless the pension scheme is in surplus.””
This new clause would remove references to 6 April 1997 from section 51 of the Pensions Act 1995 to require that annual increases to pension payments in line with CPI and RPI apply to pensionable service both before and after 6 April 1997, with the restriction that annual increases would only be paid if the pension scheme is in surplus.
New clause 25—Review of impact of this Act—
“(1) Within five years of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must carry out a review of the impact of the provisions of this Act on actual and projected retirement incomes.
(2) The review must consider—
(a) the impact of the provisions of this Act on actual and projected retirement incomes, and
(b) whether further measures are needed to ensure that pension scheme members receive an adequate income in retirement.
(3) The Secretary of State must prepare a report of the review and lay a copy of that report before Parliament.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to review the impact of this Act on retirement incomes and whether additional measures are needed to ensure the adequacy of retirement incomes.
New clause 26—Establishment of targeted investment vehicles for pension funds—
“(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for the establishment or facilitation of one or more investment vehicles through which pension schemes may invest for targeted social or economic benefit.
(2) Regulations under subsection (1) must specify the descriptions of targeted social or economic benefit to which the investment vehicles are to contribute, which may include, but are not limited to, investment in—
(a) projects that revitalise high street areas;
(b) initiatives demonstrating social benefit;
(c) affordable or social housing development;
(d) capital projects that meet essential public needs, such as care homes;
(e) clean, renewable energy projects.
(3) The regulations must make provision for—
(a) the types of pension schemes eligible to participate in such investment vehicles;
(b) the governance, oversight, and reporting requirements for the investment vehicles and participating pension schemes;
(c) the means by which the contribution of such investments to targeted social or economic benefit is measured and reported;
(d) the roles and responsibilities of statutory bodies, including the Pensions Regulator and the Financial Conduct Authority, in authorising, regulating, or supervising such investment vehicles and the participation of pension schemes within them.
(4) The regulations may—
(a) make different provision for different descriptions of pension schemes, investment vehicles, or targeted social or economic benefits;
(b) provide for the pooling of assets from multiple pension schemes within such vehicles;
(c) require pension scheme trustees or managers to have regard to the availability and suitability of investment vehicles when formulating investment strategies, where consistent with—
(i) their fiduciary duties, and
(ii) the long-term value for money for members.
(5) In this Chapter, "pension scheme" has the same meaning as in section 1(5) of the Pension Schemes Act 1993.”
This new clause would allow the Secretary of State to establish investment funds to encourage investment in areas such as high streets, social housing, care homes, clean renewable energy, and other investments with clear social benefits.
New clause 27—Review of proposed mandated investment powers and their impacts—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, before making any regulations under this Act relating to mandated investment requirements for pension schemes, lay before Parliament a report reviewing the potential impacts of such powers.
(2) The report under subsection (1) must include an assessment of—
(a) the extent to which any mandated investment requirements may conflict with the fiduciary duties of trustees and managers of occupational and personal pension schemes;
(b) the potential effects of such requirements on the long-term financial returns of scheme members, including—
(i) risks relating to illiquid or politically directed assets,
(ii) risks to diversification, and
(iii) any expected increase in costs borne by savers;
(c) the risk that mandated investment requirements could lead to politicisation of pension scheme decisions or undermine public confidence in the private pension system;
(d) the adequacy of parliamentary oversight and scrutiny of the exercise of powers to mandate investment allocations, including whether additional safeguards are required;
(e) the question of accountability in circumstances where mandated investments perform below expectations, including whether liability would rest with trustees, fund managers, or the Government;
(f) the potential for market distortion arising from requirements that schemes invest in specific UK-based assets, including the risk of asset inflation or the creation of investment bubbles; and
(g) alternative policy measures that could encourage pension scheme investment in the United Kingdom without the use of mandatory requirements, including the removal of regulatory barriers and the creation of suitable investment opportunities.
(3) The report must include a summary of views received from—
(a) industry bodies representing pension schemes, trustees, and fund managers;
(b) relevant financial regulators; and
(c) any other persons the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
(4) The Secretary of State must publish a response addressing the findings and any recommendations contained in the report.
(5) No regulations requiring pension schemes to meet mandated investment allocations may be made under this Act until the report under subsection (1) has been laid before Parliament and the response under subsection (4) has been published.”
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to review the potential effects of mandated investment powers including on risks to returns, fiduciary duties, market distortion, and accountability before any powers can be exercised.
New clause 28—Pension Protection Fund: members who have not attained normal pension age at assessment date—
“(1) Schedule 7 of the Pensions Act 2004 is amended in accordance with subsections (2) to (7).
(2) In sub-paragraph 3(3), for “the appropriate percentage” substitute “100%”.
(3) Omit sub-paragraph 3(4).
(4) In sub-paragraph 11(3), for “90%” substitute “100%”.
(5) In sub-paragraph 14(3), for “90%” substitute “100%”.
(6) In sub-paragraph 15(3), for “90%” substitute “100%”.
(7) In sub-paragraph 19(3), for “90%” substitute “100%”.
(8) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for the retrospective payment of compensation to PPF members, as if the amendments made by this section to Schedule 7 of the Pensions Act 2004 had had effect on the day on which that Schedule came into force.”
This new clause would provide that pension scheme members who have not reached Normal Pension Age by the Pension Protection Fund assessment date receive compensation at a rate of 100% instead of 90%, and provides for retrospective application.
New clause 29—Pension Protection Fund: estimate of cost of increasing compensation for surviving spouses or partners of members—
“(1) The Pension Protection Fund (PPF) must prepare and publish an annual estimate of the cost of increasing the value of compensation paid to surviving spouses or partners of PPF members to a sum equivalent to the value of any payments to which they would have been entitled had the scheme not entered the PPF.
(2) The first assessment under this section must be published before the end of the 2025/26 financial year.”
This new clause would require the Pension Protection fund (PPF) to publish annually an assessment of the costs of increasing compensation to the spouses or partners of PPF members to equal the amount they would have received if the pension scheme had not entered the PPF.
New clause 36—Local Government Pension Scheme: expenses and duties of administering authorities—
“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for—
(a) a cap on the management expenses that can be claimed by administering authorities, such that they do not exceed ten basis points of the asset base of the pension fund,
(b) a cap on the investment management expenses that can be claimed by administering authorities, such that they do not exceed five basis points of the asset base of the pension fund,
(c) a cap on the general administrative expenses that can be claimed by administering authorities, such that they do not exceed five basis points of the asset base of the pension fund.
(2) Regulations under this section must also require administering bodies to provide to the Local Government Pension Scheme Advisory Board—
(a) evidence that they have considered and acted on any guidance issued by the Local Government Pension Scheme Advisory Board, and
(b) evidence of the steps that they have taken to comply with their fiduciary duties in respect of pension scheme members and Scheme employers.
(3) In making regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must consult the Local Government Pension Scheme Advisory Board.
(4) In this section—
“administering authorities” has the meaning given by Schedule 1 to the Local Government Pension Scheme Regulations 2013, and
“Scheme employer” has the meaning given by Schedule 1 to the Local Government Pension Scheme Regulations 2013.”
Amendment 1, in clause 1, page 3, line 7, at end insert “, or
(b) secure employee representation on the company’s board.”
This amendment would add employee representation on boards as a requirement on asset pool companies for Local Government Pension Schemes within the scheme regulations under clause 1.
Government amendments 20 and 21.
Amendment 2, in clause 2, page 4, line 7, at end insert—
“(ba) the funds or other assets for which a scheme manager is responsible (other than money needed for making payments under the scheme from the pension fund maintained by that scheme manager) should be invested in a way that is compliant with the UK’s duty not to aid or assist serious breaches of international law, including genocide and other atrocity crimes, and illegal military occupation.”
This amendment would require that investments of the local government pension scheme should be compliant with the UK’s duty not to aid or assist serious breaches of international law.
Amendment 3, page 4, line 7, at end insert—
“(ba) the funds or other assets for which a scheme manager is responsible (other than money needed for making payments under the scheme from the pension fund maintained by that scheme manager) must be divested from any oil and gas companies within 5 years of the passing of this Act.”
This amendment would require that local government pension schemes divest from oil and gas companies within 5 years.
Government amendments 22 and 23.
Amendment 17, in clause 9, page 9, line 25, leave out from “does” to the end of line 25 and insert
“apply to a scheme that is being wound up unless the trustees determine by resolution that it shall not apply.”
This amendment would ensure that the principles for surplus extraction shall also apply to surplus release after further wind-up, so that employers are not incentivised to wind-up funds rather than release surplus to pensioners.
Amendment 18, in clause 10, page 10, line 21, after “notified” insert “and consulted”
This amendment would ensure that members of pension funds have to be consulted on surplus extraction.
Amendment 4, page 10, line 36, at end insert—
“(e) about the proportion of any surplus that may be allocated, or the manner in which it may be determined, for the purpose of contributing to the provision of free, impartial pension advice and guidance services for scheme members.”
This amendment enables a proportion of surplus funds to be used to fund free pension advice.
Amendment 19, page 10, line 36, at end insert—
“(e) that the trustees are satisfied that it is in the interests of the members that the power to pay surplus is exercised in the manner proposed;
(f) that the trustees have taken full account of—
(i) the extent to which members’ pensions have kept up with the cost of living and inflation (as defined in the relevant rules and deeds), and
(ii) any previously rejected requests for discretionary pension increases.”
This amendment would reinstate the current requirement that ensures trustees consent to the paying of surplus as proposed, and creates an obligation on trustees to take account of any erosion in members’ standards of living.
Amendment 5, in clause 11, page 11, line 38, at end insert—
“(aa) make, publish and keep under review the consistency of—
(i) regulated VFM schemes, or
(ii) regulated VFM arrangements,
with the goals of the Paris Agreement on climate change and clean energy;”
This amendment would require pension funds and managers to show whether their portfolio investments are consistent with the Paris Agreement.
Amendment 6, page 11, line 38, at end insert—
“(aa) make, publish and keep under review the compliance of—
(i) regulated VFM schemes, or
(ii) regulated VFM arrangements,
with statutory and regulatory targets for reducing sewage discharges by water and sewerage undertakers,”
This amendment would require pension funds and managers to monitor and report on the compliance of water and sewerage companies they invest in with targets for reducing sewage discharges.
Amendment 7, page 12, line 10, at end insert—
“(d) publish or share with prescribed persons, for the purpose of enabling VFM assessments to be made, prescribed categories of information (referred to as “climate alignment metric data”) regarding the scheme’s exposure to climate-related financial risks and the alignment of its investments with the goals of the Paris Agreement on climate change and clean energy.”
This amendment, with Amendment 5 would require pension funds and managers to show whether their portfolio investments are consistent with the Paris Agreement.
Amendment 8, page 12, line 10, at end insert—
“(d) publish or share with prescribed persons, for the purpose of enabling VFM assessments to be made, prescribed categories of information (referred to as “sewage discharge compliance data”) regarding the scheme’s exposure to, and investment in, companies holding permits to discharge sewage, including those companies’ performance against statutory and regulatory targets for reducing sewage discharges.”
This amendment, with Amendment 6, would require pension funds and managers to monitor and report on the compliance of water and sewerage companies they invest in with targets for reducing sewage discharges.
Amendment 9, page 12, line 41, leave out “that provides money purchase benefits”
This amendment, together with Amendment 10, would ensure that the value for money provisions introduced by this Bill apply to all occupational pension schemes.
Amendment 10, page 13, line 5, at end insert—
“(14) Value for money regulations may make different provision for different descriptions of relevant pension schemes and must make provision for the application of the value for money assessment with a VFM rating to defined benefit occupational pension schemes.”
This amendment, together with Amendment 9, would ensure that the value for money provisions introduced by this Bill apply to all occupational pension schemes.
Amendment 11, in clause 13, page 14, line 13, at end insert—
“(iv) the consistency of the investment portfolio with the goals of the Paris Agreement on climate change and clean energy, including metrics for assessing climate-related financial risks and opportunities;”
This amendment would require pension funds and managers to show whether their portfolio investments are consistent with the Paris Agreement.
Amendment 12, page 14, line 13, at end insert—
“(iv) the compliance of the investment portfolio with statutory and regulatory targets for reducing sewage discharges by water and sewerage undertakers, including metrics for assessing related environmental and financial risks and opportunities;”
This amendment would require pension funds and managers to monitor and report on the performance of water and sewerage companies they invest in against targets for reducing sewage discharges.
Government amendments 24 to 49.
Amendment 16, in clause 40, page 43, line 38, leave out from beginning to end of line 27 on page 46.
This amendment would remove the ability of the Government to set mandatory asset allocation targets for certain pension schemes, specifically requiring investments in UK productive assets such as private equity, private debt, and real estate.
Amendment 15, page 46, line 9, leave out from “Before” to the end of the subsection and insert
“implementing the first set of regulations under subsection (1) the Secretary of State must—
(a) prepare and publish a report regarding—
(i) what barriers pension funds, based in the United Kingdom, are facing that are preventing them from investing back into the United Kingdom due to—
(A) legislation introduced after The Pensions Act 1995;
(B) regulations introduced by the Financial Conduct Authority, Prudential Regulation Authority, HM Treasury, or Bank of England;
(C) cultural and market behaviours;
(ii) how financial interests of members of relevant Master Trusts and group personal pension schemes would be affected by the proposed regulations;
(iii) what effects the proposed measures could be expected to have on economic growth in the United Kingdom;
(iv) any other matters the Secretary of State considers appropriate; and
(b) respond to any recommendations or issues raised in the report.”
This amendment prevents use of the reserved mandation powers in this Bill until the Government produces a report on the reasons why the powers are needed and the effects of the use of the powers and resolves any issues raised in the report.
Amendment 14, page 48, line 15, leave out paragraphs (a) to (c) and insert—
“(a) The scheme in question demonstrates strong potential for growth and an ability to innovate, and”
This amendment would revert the text of section 28F(2) on the eligibility conditions for new entrant pathway relief to its form in the Bill as introduced.
Government amendments 50 to 85.
Amendment 13, in clause 117, page 120, line 19, leave out “2035” and insert “this Parliament”
This amendment provides that if section 40 is not commenced before the end of the current Parliament in respect of the insertion of certain provisions, then the insertion of those provisions would be automatically repealed at that time.
Government amendments 86 to 89.
Torsten Bell
I start by thanking all hon. Members for their valuable contributions during the Bill’s passage to date. In particular, I thank members of the Public Bill Committee who offered line-by-line scrutiny. They have challenged the Government, but always constructively—that includes the shadow Economic Secretary to the Treasury, the hon. Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier), who is not with us today. That reflects the broad consensus across the House that the Pension Schemes Bill is an important piece of legislation, and it is a consensus for which I am very grateful. The same consensus underpinned the introduction of automatic enrolment under the previous Government.
It is exactly because we as legislators have more than gently nudged people into pension savings that the Bill’s most fundamental job is to drive up returns on those savings. The case for this focus is clear: those retiring in 2050 are currently set to do so with lower private pension income than those retiring today. The Bill also recognises that, with the second largest pension system in the world, pensions matter not just to deliver an income in retirement but for the whole economy as the largest source of domestic capital. With those goals in mind, this Bill builds a solid foundation on which we can build, not least via the Pensions Commission over the next year, exactly as several hon. Members called for on Second Reading.
The vast majority of the amendments tabled by the Government are minor technical amendments, and there are two substantial areas on which I would like to dwell. The first is on pre-1997 indexation within the Pension Protection Fund and the financial assistance scheme.
The PPF is one of the most important legacies of the last Labour Government, but we have all heard about the challenges caused by the lack of indexation of compensation related to pre-1997 pensions. I am grateful for the time that affected pensioners have given me in discussing their experiences directly. I have listened carefully to them and to hon. Members who have kept attention on this issue.
I particularly acknowledge the contribution of my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth (Debbie Abrahams) and her Work and Pensions Committee, as well as my hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Luke Murphy) and the hon. Member for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman) who raised this matter in Committee. I am also grateful to the hon. Members for Didcot and Wantage (Olly Glover), for Caerfyrddin (Ann Davies), for Torbay (Steve Darling) and for Belfast South and Mid Down (Claire Hanna), and my hon. Friend the Member for Poole (Neil Duncan-Jordan), for their proposed new clauses and amendments related to this matter.
Olly Glover (Didcot and Wantage) (LD)
I welcome that the Government have tabled these amendments to strengthen the Pension Protection Fund arrangements. However, that will be of little use to those such as the AEA Technology pension campaigners, about whom I have met the Minister. Despite many Select Committee reports and National Audit Office findings, they were badly advised by past Governments and have not been given a route to redress. I invite the Minister to reconsider his past decision and consider new clause 1.
Torsten Bell
I do not agree with the premise of the hon. Gentleman’s question, because I think that members of the scheme he mentions will benefit from the improvement in pre-1997 indexation within the PPF, albeit I am sure they would rather not be within the PPF, which applies to most people who have fallen into it. All I would gently say is that the change we are introducing was refused by Liberal Democrat Pension Ministers during the coalition Government, so this is a big step forward and will make a difference to others.
Sean Woodcock (Banbury) (Lab)
I am delighted by the Chancellor’s announcement in last week’s Budget, having had decades of Tory Governments dithering and delaying while pensioners lost out. It is a great sign of what this Labour Government are delivering on pensions. Could the Minister confirm how much, or by what amounts, those affected are likely to benefit from the changes he has incorporated into this Bill?
Torsten Bell
My hon. Friend has been a powerful campaigner on this issue in the run-up to the Budget, and he brings me on to my next point. We are not just listening; we are acting. We have tabled new clauses 31 to 33 and Government amendment 87 to introduce prospective indexation of Pension Protection Fund and financial assistance scheme payments that relate to pensions built up before 6 April 1997. And directly to his question, these will be consumer prices index linked, capped at 2.5% and apply to members whose former schemes provided for such increases. I thank the Pension Protection Fund for its support on this measure and its implementation, which rests with the PPF.
Dr Al Pinkerton (Surrey Heath) (LD)
I have been contacted by many Surrey Heath constituents who often worked for very large American companies such as Atos. These companies are refusing to offer the pre-1997 uplift, and from what I understand, the pensions fall outside both the PPF and the FAS. Can the Minister offer any reassurance to those pensioners today and explain how they can continue to survive on such diminishing returns from the pensions they paid into?
Torsten Bell
The hon. Gentleman asks an important question, and I shall come to exactly that issue when I finish discussing the changes within the PPF, because as he rightly notes there are wider indexation questions for solvent pension schemes.
On the PPF itself, this issue has been long running and many campaigners have long campaigned on it. Our changes aim to bring the matter to a conclusion. It is a step change that will make a meaningful difference to over 250,000 members. Over five years, the average PPF compensation will be boosted by £400 a year. Of course, I recognise that this does not go as far as some affected members would have wanted, but this change is real progress and rightly balances the interests of eligible members, levy payers, taxpayers and the Pension Protection Fund’s ability to manage future risk. I hope all hon. Members will support this step forward, and on that basis, that those with related amendments will feel content not to press them today.
New clauses 22 and 24 and amendment 19 concern that issue of discretionary increases or pre-1997 indexation in solvent defined-benefit pension schemes more generally. I put on record that we all recognise the impact of the high inflation in recent years on the value of some pensioners’ retirement income in exactly the way that has just been set out.
I want to be straightforward with the House that we do not support retrospectively changing scheme rules. Neither did previous Conservative or Liberal Democrat Governments, given that contribution levels were set on the basis of the scheme rules at the time they applied. As I have said before, and as I discussed recently with my hon. Friends the Members for Llanelli (Dame Nia Griffith) and for Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock (Elaine Stewart), wider changes in the Pension Schemes Bill relating to surplus release will put trustees in the lead in a way that will help on this issue.
Dame Nia Griffith (Llanelli) (Lab)
The Minister will understand just how sceptical pensioners are because, quite frankly, they have seen their trustees try to make the companies do the right thing time and again. Will he agree to meet me and trustees from companies such as 3M and Hewlett Packard Enterprise to explain what mechanism he thinks will be available to them that will actually force the companies to give a decent, index-linked rise to their pensioners?
Torsten Bell
Absolutely, is the short answer. I am always very happy to meet my hon. Friend and near constituency neighbour. I will explain how the change may help in that situation, but I am very happy to take that meeting.
The changes give those trustees overseeing schemes without pre-’97 indexation greater leverage in discussions with employers on discretionary increases, should those trustees see fit. I would encourage them to do so.
The other substantial amendments are on the Pension Protection Fund administration levy paid by DB schemes, allowing the Secretary of State to recover the PPF’s administration costs. It also covers the costs of administering the Fraud Compensation Fund. The levy was initially introduced to allow transparency when these administration costs were significant relative to the PPF’s reserves, but this is no longer the case, with the levy standing at around £18.5 million while the PPF manages over £10 billion-worth of reserves. The PPF is now more than able to cover its administration costs, and transparency can be achieved in the normal way through annual reports and accounts. These amendments therefore abolish the levy, simplifying the pension levy landscape.
I will now briefly cover some minor amendments, starting with those on the local government pension scheme. Amendment 22 exempts the Environment Agency, as a national body, from the requirement on other administering authorities to co-operate with strategic authorities on local investment opportunities.
New clause 34 introduces new wording to clause 4, with amendment 23 deleting the existing wording. Rather than stating in this Bill how procurement law affects the LGPS, new clause 34 will instead move the LGPS exemption directly into schedule 2 to the Procurement Act 2023, future-proofing the exemption from future changes to that Act.
Amendment 28 is the central amendment on small pots. It introduces the concept of a destination proposer. This allows for either a single entity or multiple entities to be designated as the proposer of pot transfers. This reflects recent work by the DWP and Pensions UK to consider a federated model as a potential alternative to a centralised data platform for delivering the small pots policy. I want to add that there is no change to the desired policy intent; this is about the mechanism by which we deliver it. We are committed to exploring both models in full.
Amendments 37 to 53, on the scale clauses, are minor in nature. They include clarifying the circumstances in which schemes may count assets held in other schemes towards the scale condition—the requirement to have at least £25 billion-worth of assets under management by 2030—and clarifying when the transition pathway relief will end. On guided retirements, amendment 54 simply removes a redundant interpretation provision. Government amendments 55 to 86 relate to clauses 100 and 107 of the Bill, on the validity of certain alterations to salary-related contracted-out pension schemes—more often referred to as the Virgin Media case.
Steve Darling (Torbay) (LD)
Would the Minister be kind enough to share the timescale he is working to for these proposals?
Torsten Bell
I thank the hon. Member, who was one of the contributors to our debates on this matter in Committee. I hope to bring forward clarity on the next steps in a matter of months.
Peter Swallow (Bracknell) (Lab)
I thank the Minister for making this important announcement about a consultation on the role of trustees. As part of that consultation, will he keep in mind the important issue of pre-1997 indexation so that we can ensure that trustees are acting in the best interests of their pensioners?
Torsten Bell
My hon. Friend has discussed this challenge with me many times and is a powerful campaigner for his affected constituents. I give him absolutely that assurance, and I extend to him the same offer I have given to other hon. Friends: I will be happy to meet him and affected constituents, or trustees who have been affected by this issue.
Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
The Minister has indeed been most accessible, and I am extremely grateful to him for the meeting he held with members of the ExxonMobil pensioners group. I am still being lobbied very hard by ExxonMobil pensioners who are concerned that whereas changes introduced in the Budget will benefit members of the FAS and PPF schemes, private defined-benefit scheme members will not benefit. He knows far more about the subject than I do, but can he not see that there is a feeling that they are being discriminated against? Is there nothing he can offer to make them feel somewhat more included in the beneficial steps being taken for members of other schemes?
Torsten Bell
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that and for our conversations on this matter in recent months. Although I think it is completely reasonable that people would feel like that—so would many of us if we had seen the high inflation of recent years eat into our non-index-linked pension payments—let me explain the consistency of the Government’s position. We are providing pre-’97 indexation on compensation relating to pensions now held within the PPF to those who were in schemes that did provide for indexation. There is no question of retrospectively changing the entitlement within the schemes; we are simply requiring that the compensation within the PPF and the FAS recognises that the schemes that people were in did previously recognise the need for indexation.
Other schemes within PPF and outside the PPF, including the one that the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) mentioned, did not provide for indexation in their scheme rules. He is right to say that, on those matters, the changes that I have outlined today on the PPF do not provide relief. I have gone on to say that because of the changes we are bringing forward in the surplus rules, I think the trustees—as was discussed with some of his trustees—do have more ability and more leverage with which to ask for those discretionary increases, but I completely appreciate that that is different in form from the compensation indexation that we are providing within the PPF.
Sir Julian Lewis
The problem, as the Minister knows from our meeting, is that the trustees are rather hemmed in by not having the leverage or the freedom to act if the company itself—particularly if it is headquartered abroad—is disinclined to pass on any surpluses that it might have available.
Torsten Bell
I recognise the right hon. Member’s point. I think the level of pessimism may be overstated. My view is that our changes on surplus, which put trustees clearly in the driving seat, provide for more ability for trustees to seek to change that balance of power within their relationship. I do not want to prejudge the individual discussions between all trustees and their employers—those will be different in different circumstances—but trustees are in a stronger position given the changes on surplus release that we are introducing through this Bill. But I am not pretending for a second that that solves overnight the points that the right hon. Member is making.
Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)
To take us back to the consultation and action to provide guidance for trustees, we all think that is a good thing, as trustees have a difficult job to do and providing them with more guidance is incredibly helpful. On the timeline for the consultation and the legislation arising from it, it would be incredibly helpful if the Minister could, as soon as possible, provide us with a road map for what that will look like when it returns to the House and, in particular, set out whether it will involve primary or secondary legislation.
Torsten Bell
The hon. Member brings me back to the part of my speech I was coming to. The direct, quick answer to her question is that I would envisage taking powers in primary legislation and then consulting on the statutory guidance relating to the powers provided to the Government. That is the order in which I would think about it, but, exactly as she has asked for, I will endeavour to provide more clarity on the timeline.
As I said, I think there is good support for such a change across the industry—actually, I heard calls for it long before I became Pensions Minister—and it is time that we get on with setting out more details and providing that clarity to trustees so that, rather than debating whether trustees have the ability to invest with these longer-term structural or systemic factors in mind, they can get on with doing so, if they so wish. I should say that this is about giving trustees that ability and not specifying that they must do so.
I hope I have usefully set the scene for the debate. Let me close my opening remarks by reiterating my thanks to everyone who has engaged with the Bill so far. I look forward to hearing hon. Members’ further contributions this afternoon.
James Wild (North West Norfolk) (Con)
Before speaking to new clauses 24 and 25 and amendments 14, 15 and 16, I shall begin by reiterating the position adopted by my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier), the shadow Economic Secretary to the Treasury—he is not here today, as the Minister acknowledged—which is that we support many of the planned changes in the Bill because, fundamentally, we all want a pensions system that is more accessible to the average person and gives all our constituents dignity in retirement. We want to see a Bill that helps make the system work better, and some of its measures will undoubtedly do that.
Equally, the higher-tax Budget, of which the Minister was a controlling mind, is relevant. We know from media reports that he feels passionately about the Budget—he used industrial language that is perhaps more expected from industry than from a think-tanker, and it is certainly not for the Chamber. We also know that, because of the briefings that appeared in the press, hundreds of thousands of people drew down their pensions prematurely, damaging their savings income as a result. The Budget also increases taxes on pension contributions. Taxing people’s incomes, savings and pensions more is the wrong political choice.
There is much in the Bill that we agree with, but some fundamental issues remain. Arguably the most pressing issue is the fact that the Bill does not address pensions adequacy. Research from Pensions UK shows that over 50% of savers will fail to meet the retirement incomes set by the Pensions Commission. The simple, uncomfortable truth is that this will affect millions of people, and that is despite the introduction of auto-enrolment and the triple lock introduced under the last Conservative Government.
The Bill was an opportunity to do more, but it does not currently do so. We are therefore giving the Government another chance through new clause 25, which would require the Secretary of State to conduct a review within five years and to recommend further measures. We recognise that the second phase of the pension review is ongoing, and we have faith in Baroness Drake to lead that review, but we have concerns that it will not report until 2027. We maintain that this part of the pensions review should be fast-tracked, so could the Minister at least clarify in which quarter of 2027 we can expect that report to be published?
Amendment 14 would change the wording on the eligibility conditions for new entrant pathway relief back to the form it was in when the Bill was first introduced. This means that schemes would qualify for relief if they simply demonstrated strong growth potential and an ability to innovate. All of us on these Benches understand the economies of scale and agree on the need for them, but we have concerns about the changes to the eligibility requirements. The benefit of the existing market is that its diversity provides choice, creates competition and incentivises innovation. As it stands, though, the Bill will disadvantage niche or boutique funds. Specifically, if the amendment made in Committee is enacted, existing companies that previously qualified for the pathway will now be excluded.
An example is Penfold, whose workplace pension was launched in 2022 and has grown quickly to over £1 billion of assets under management, tripling the rate since the start of 2024. Even with this trajectory, the timing of the scale test gives insufficient time to reach the £10 billion threshold for the transition pathway. We therefore agree with the chief executive officer of Penfold when he said:
“The original drafting created the scale that everyone agrees is vital, while still leaving room for challengers to innovate without the threat of a hard scale deadline that deters private investment”.
He is right. These are exactly the type of businesses that the Government should be supporting.
I shall turn now to the issue of indexation to pre-1997 pensionable service. We all want pensioners to have dignity in retirement, but when people have done the right thing by putting money in their pension and it is not followed through, that does not give pensioners the dignity they deserve. The issue around the pre-1997 indexation is also time-sensitive, like the infected blood scandal, and the longer the can is kicked down the road, the smaller the problem will become, sadly. We therefore broadly welcome the Minister’s commitment to taking primary powers through Government new clauses 31, 32 and 33. Our new clause 24 was seeking to achieve a similar outcome.
We pay tribute to the lobbying from groups including the Pensions Action Group and the Deprived Pensioners Association. Also, my hon. Friend the shadow Economic Secretary to the Treasury wanted to acknowledge our right hon. Friend the Member for Herne Bay and Sandwich (Sir Roger Gale) for his continued representations on this issue. The Minister has already been pressed by a number of Members about the concerns of organisations, such as the Esso Pensioners Working Group, that want to understand further how the Government will ensure that these groups are not forgotten.
Finally, I want to turn to the part of the Bill with which we have our most fundamental disagreement: namely, the part that deals with mandation. Amendment 15 would prevent the use of the reserve mandation powers until the Government produced a report on the reasons why the powers were needed and the effects of the use of such powers, and resolved any issues raised in that report. It simply asks the Government to undertake an analysis of the barriers that pension funds are facing, rather than rushing to use mandation as perfectly reasonable. Amendment 16 would remove the power altogether.
Dame Nia Griffith
I rise to speak to my new clause 22. There is a group of pensioners who have worked hard for very prestigious companies, and those companies have grown rich and successful on the back of the work that those pensioners have done. These are companies with good reputations. People think of them as being honourable and successful. Many of us will have a computer with “HP” on it. Companies such as Hewlett Packard Enterprise, 3M and a number of others that have already been mentioned have treated their pensioners very shabbily indeed, because they are refusing to index-link the pensions of former employees that were accrued before 1997. In other words, people who worked hard to help build up the success of those companies have had no increase for as long as 23 years. Just imagine how much less they can buy with that pension now compared with 23 years ago. The cost of living crisis over the past few years has exacerbated their problems, eroding their pensions at a frightening rate. What is absolutely terrifying for many of those pensioners is how on earth they are going to manage in the next few years.
Through new clause 22, we are asking for the index-linking to take place from now on, not retrospectively for all the years when there have been no increases, nice though that would be. This is not about some form of compensation for the past. It is about going forward and trying to future-proof these pensions so that they at least they maintain the value they have now. It would not be a retrospective measure; it is about how we want the companies to behave from now on in respect of their pension funds, just as any other legislation would apply from now on.
When the employees were recruited to these companies, they would have thought, “Oh, this is a good job. It’s a good company and it’s got a pension scheme.” They would have assumed that any pension scheme worth its salt, particularly from a reputable company, would be index-linked. Sadly, however, these companies have found a loophole in the Pensions Act 1995, because it refers to 1997 as the start date for its provisions. In other words, the companies have been able to say that, according to the letter of the law, they do not have to index-link pensions accrued pre-1997, even though it would be in the spirit of the Act to do so. New clause 22 would amend the Pensions Act 1995 by removing references to 6 April 1997 from section 51 of that Act, thereby requiring annual increases to pension payments in line with CPI and RPI to apply to pensionable service both before and after that date.
Why do we need to legislate? We need to do so because efforts by trustees over many years have failed. We have had instances of unanimous votes by trustees for inflation-based rises being rejected by companies. We have had trustees appointed by companies. Essentially, the power structure is such that the company has the final word, no matter how healthy the pension funds are.
A recent newsletter for 3M pensioners said,
“Given that the Scheme’s financial position is very positive, and the funding level exceeds the regulatory expectations for solvency levels… we had hoped that the Company would permit some discretionary increases to affected members. Sadly, the Company did not agree to this and has not changed its position on the matter.”
Time and again, pensioners have been given that type of answer to a very reasonable, rational request.
Sir Julian Lewis
May I applaud the hon. Lady’s speech? That is exactly what has happened to so many ExxonMobil pensioners in my constituency and beyond.
Dame Nia Griffith
Indeed, the right hon. Member mentions yet another world-renowned, multinational, household name.
Our Labour Government have just announced that we will change the law to enable the payment of inflation increases on the pre-1997 pensions to Pension Protection Fund and financial assistance scheme members. That is an important principle. If we are doing it for pensioners whose companies have gone bust, we should ensure that successful multinationals like Hewlett Packard Enterprise and 3M pay up for former employees.
Alan Gemmell (Central Ayrshire) (Lab)
Will my hon. Friend allow me to put on the record my thanks to my constituent Patricia Kennedy and the pre-1997 pensions justice campaign for asking for exactly what she suggests? The Minister has taken a brave decision on the Pension Protection Fund pensions, and we should try to do that now for those pre-1997 pensioners.
Dame Nia Griffith
Indeed. I thank my hon. Friend for mentioning Patricia Kennedy, who has been incredibly hard-working and has really tried to put the facts and figures together.
Let me give the House an example now that I had intended to quote later. The number of companies that have reneged on giving out index-linked pensions is extraordinary. Listen to this list, citing the number of years for which companies have not indexed pensions: Goldman Sachs—10 years; KPMG—15 years; Lloyd’s Register—nine years; Johnson & Johnson—11 years; NCR (Scotland)—11 years; Chevron—13 years, 3M—16 years; Pfizer—16 years; AIG—18 years; American Express—20 years, Atos/Sema—20 years; STMicroelectronics—21 years; Hewlett Packard Enterprise—22 years; and Wood Group—23 years. Given that, we can imagine the loss in value of those pensions now.
Dr Pinkerton
The hon. Lady mentioned Atos. I have several constituents who worked for that company who find themselves in precisely the situation she describes. I thank her for the speech she is making and, on behalf of my constituents, I hope that those on the Front Bench are listening to her suggestions.
Dame Nia Griffith
As I said, it is an important principle on the PPF; if we are doing it for those pensioners for the companies that have gone bust, we really should be doing it for the successful companies, too.
Peter Swallow
My hon. Friend is being extremely generous in giving way. Effectively—not legally—the Government act as the trustee for the PPF, which is why they have been able to take this decision. Does she agree that if the Government see fit to use their role to increase PPF pensions, trustees of these companies should act just as the Government have done to address this injustice?
Dame Nia Griffith
The problem is that many of the trustees are trying to get these increases, but the difficulty they are encountering is that the power structure is such that the company has the last word. Sometimes trustees are actually appointed by the company; sometimes it is a unanimous decision that is then rejected by the company, as I mentioned with the 3M trustees. We see time and again the efforts of trustees totally decimated.
I was interested in what the Minister said in his opening speech about the new powers. What we really want from the Front Bench is some support to help these trustees to use the legislation to which the Minister refers—that is, part of this Bill—and to try to make it work.
Torsten Bell
Just reflecting on the excellent speech that my hon. Friend is making, I should add that the Pensions Regulator will be bringing forward guidance to provide exactly that kind of clarity to trustees.
Dame Nia Griffith
I thank the Minister for that, but it is a matter of action and ensuring that it really happens. We are too used to regulators not having the powers they are supposed to have or not being effective in using them. We need some action, and hopefully the Minister will help us to see how it could be done.
There is a bitter irony that the Pension Protection Fund is funded by a levy on the very same companies that are refusing to index-link their own pensioners’ pensions. We know from lots of evidence that the only way the companies will listen is through legislation. These companies are multinationals, and in countries where there is legislation, they pay up—so they do respond if there is a law.
As I was saying, saying that the trustees have the powers is sadly very far removed from the reality. Trustees of various countries have asked repeatedly for indexation, and before handing over any surplus to the companies, they will be very wary because they do not trust them at all. They will want cast-iron guarantees on indexation.
Let us look at the scale of the problem. Seventy-five per cent of UK defined-benefit schemes already provide pre-1997 indexation. The remaining 25% represents approximately 1.5 million members, including some 734,000 pensioners, with 80% of all pensioners concentrated within just 200 large schemes with strong employers. As we have seen, employer discretion has failed in practice, and many pensioners have had years of zero increases.
New clause 22 would set the statutory principle that there should be indexation. The Government can then design proportionate safeguards—for example, phasing in, exemptions and triggers—in order to protect genuinely weak schemes and to ensure, as the Society of Pension Professionals says, that schemes are not pushed into having to be picked up by the Pension Protection Fund.
We want action on this. We are talking about a small, manageable number of schemes, but we want the trustees really to be given the powers to force those companies to make that indexation. If the Minister is not minded to put this provision into the legislation, as we want, we want to see some concerted action and a genuine way forward. If that proves not to work, there needs to be an opportunity to come back and put this into secondary legislation instead.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.
Steve Darling
For people who are lucky in the lottery of life, their pension can be one of their biggest assets, but, sadly, we know that 12 million people across the United Kingdom are not saving enough. That is around the population of Belgium. Talking more broadly, there is much about the legislation to be welcomed. I am sure the Minister had his best birthday ever by spending it in the Bill Committee. I am sure that as a 14-year-old, he dreamed of that day, on Committee corridor—sadly I am not joking.
Steve Darling
Thank you for the audio description!
There is much to be welcomed in the Bill, and the way that we rattled through it in Committee demonstrated that there is lots of good within it. However, as a constructive Opposition and a critical friend, I will spend most of my time reflecting on where there could be improvement.
We Liberal Democrats still feel that there are chances to ensure a mid-life MOT on investment opportunities, including five years before retirement. We think that that could be strengthened significantly. I come from an area of sadness in respect of my father, who saw the poverty of his father, a lorry driver, and threw significant amounts of his income into his personal pension just before the 1998 stock market crash. He saw the value of his investment halved. Nobody would expect a lorry driver to understand the full ins and outs of investing in the appropriate manner. It is important to reflect the fact that people live their lives without really understanding financial markets, and further strengthening that part of the Bill would be welcome.
Sir Julian Lewis
I applaud what the hon. Gentleman has said about the AEAT pensioners’ difficulties. It is quite shocking that, despite the fact that a previous Conservative pensions Minister, Paul Maynard, said that he would instruct his civil servants to work on a redress scheme, changes of Minister and Government have meant that the machine has carried on as before, even though a parliamentary Committee did an investigation, found in favour of the pensioners and said that they should get redress.
Steve Darling
The right hon. Member makes a powerful point. I am sure that the Minister will take note and reflect on it further.
I would like to reflect on the proposals to enhance pre-1997 pensions by up to 2.5%, which the Chancellor announced last week. Amendments providing for those measures have now been tabled. We know that there is significant surplus in the Pension Protection Fund. We question whether it is right for the Government to balance their financial books on the backs of that pension pot. I understand that their argument is that, because those billions are taken into account as far as Government finances are concerned, it is not possible to release as much as could be released from that pot to support pensioners with the cost of living crisis, but I urge Ministers to reflect on that.
Colleagues have also highlighted new clause 22 and pensioners who worked at American Express, Esso and Hewlett Packard. Those companies—strangely enough, it seems to be overseas companies—have left pensioners out in the cold. I hope that that consultation is able to pick up on that and give clear guidance to trustees on how they ought to support those members.
Surplus funds is another area that the Bill addresses. It is about getting the balance right. In winding up, will the Minister reflect on how surplus funds could support members and oil the wheels of the economy? That is important. Pensions should be about driving the economy. They are a big beast that should be an engine for change. In fact, the last area that I will touch on is how pensions should be the engine for change. As colleagues have alluded to, mandation feels a bit like the cold hand of Big Brother on the economy. I trust the Minister implicitly in respect of mandation, when he says, “Honestly, guv, it’s not really something I want to do,” but who knows who will walk in his footsteps? We need only look to the other side of the Atlantic, and at the gentleman in the Oval Office, to see the extraordinary things happening there.
Sarah Olney (Richmond Park) (LD)
Does my hon. Friend agree that, although it is certainly advantageous to encourage pension funds to invest in the UK, mandation creates the risk of reducing returns on investments? Would it not be better to incentivise pension funds to invest more productively—in housing and social care—through the creation of appropriate investment vehicles, and to encourage investment in British start-ups to allow them to scale up and create an attractive environment for investment?
Steve Darling
It is almost as if my hon. Friend had just seen the next section of my speech. We see such investment as an opportunity to drive social rented housing, our high streets and other investment in our communities. We need to ensure that UK institutions are the first, second and third investors in opportunities in the UK so that overseas investors see that we are backing ourselves and then pile in after us. That is essential.
We will vote against mandation. There is much to welcome in the Bill, but the devil is in the detail.
Cameron Thomas (Tewkesbury) (LD)
My hon. Friend speaks well about what is good in the Bill, but there is room for improvement. A number of my Gloucestershire constituents were employees of Gulf Oil before its merger with Chevron. Following the merger, they were moved on to the Chevron pension scheme. Between them, they have hundreds of years of service, but they are not protected against inflation, and over years of inflation, the value of their pensions has been eroded significantly. Does my hon. Friend agree that his new clause 7 is a genuine opportunity for pension justice—one that we hope the Labour Government support?
Steve Darling
I wholeheartedly agree with my hon. Friend. I am sure that the Pensions Minister is listening. Politics is all about calling out injustice, and my hon. Friend does a good job of that for his constituents.
Neil Duncan-Jordan (Poole) (Lab)
I will speak to a number of amendments tabled in my name. I thank the Pensions Minister for discussing them with me yesterday. I look forward to his comments later in the debate.
I spent a number of years as a regional trade union official with responsibility for the local government pension scheme, and I think it is important that we see pensions as a force for social good. My amendments aim therefore to make our occupational pensions more progressive. We should remember that such funds represent the deferred wages of millions of workers, and directing pension funds toward socially beneficial projects is one way in which the Government can rewire our economic model, so that it delivers for ordinary people.
In my view, workers’ money should be invested in sectors such as green technology and social housing—stable, reliable sectors that build a better future for the very people whose contributions fund them. Whether this is done through an expanded National Wealth Fund, which could direct investment into socially useful projects, or some other mechanism, it would clearly boost much-needed growth and GDP. What could be more progressive than using workers’ pension funds to build the council houses we so desperately need? That would be a tremendous step forward which not only ensured a solid investment for the funds, but provided decent homes at affordable rents. I designed new clause 5 to address this issue, and I hope the Minister will do more to encourage schemes to redirect their investments in that way.
Likewise, amendment 3 recognises that the voluntary approach to disinvestment in fossil fuels has not worked. The LGPS currently invests over £16 billion in fossil fuels, while 85% of all pension schemes lack a credible climate action plan. The environmental crisis is the great challenge facing us all. Workers’ wages should not be fuelling the climate catastrophe. Fundamentally, there is no retirement without our environment, and I hope the Government will emphasise that position to trustees more forcefully. We need a commitment from all LGPS schemes and pools to having a five-year plan to end their relationship with these harmful investments.
The overwhelming majority of the public would also be horrified to learn that their savings were invested in illegal wars abroad, such as the genocide in Gaza. We know that over £12 billion of LGPS funds are invested in companies that support the illegal settlements in some way, or produce arms or fuel for fighter jets used in the war. We must ensure that pension funds are not complicit in war crimes and human rights violation, whether in Gaza or elsewhere in the world.
The Minister will have noticed the strong cross-party support for my amendment 2, and I urge him to give a statement in the strongest possible terms that the LGPS should not be involved in funding breaches of international law in any form. I understand that many of the pools have money in tracker funds that are connected to arms companies, but that needs to be challenged. If that means disinvesting from arms manufacturers implicated in these breaches, so be it.
That brings me to the important matter of worker representation. Having a seat at the table is one way in which we can influence how money is invested. That is why it is important that we ensure trade unions have a voice on all future pension boards and committees, as outlined in my amendment 1. There is currently no requirement for worker representation on the boards of LGPS pools; the Government reducing the number of pools to six gives us an ideal opportunity in law to guarantee proper worker representation. Fundamentally, it is vital that the workers who pay into the funds have a fair voice in decisions on how their money is invested. I hope the Minister will begin talks with local government trade unions to see how we can bring that about.
Last week’s budget announcement on the pre-1997 pension indexation was welcome, and many have already quoted that this afternoon, but only those whose schemes were eligible for indexation and are members of the Pension Protection Fund and financial assistance scheme will see the benefit. Hundreds of thousands of retired workers whose pension funds were taken over by other companies, such as Hewlett Packard in the case of some of my constituents, and are still in operation will not be protected as was intended in the Budget for that other group; and the money they put into their company pensions before 1997 will continue to be frozen. I know the Minister recognises that over this period their pensions have become virtually worthless. That is why the Government must put pressure on trustees of all schemes to pay some of their surplus funds and ensure that their former staff get the pensions they deserve.
The Pension Schemes Bill offers a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to help the environment and society more generally by the way we invest. The £3 trillion in UK pension funds could be used to address the historical transfer of wealth away from ordinary working people toward the wealthiest individuals and corporations in our society. Given that pensions account for 40% of wealth in this country, change must include consideration of how this vast pool can be used to improve the lives of those whose payslips created it. The call to use our money and make pensions more progressive is therefore overwhelming. I look forward to hearing the Minister set out in the strongest possible terms the commitments the Government are making to bring that about.
Sir Roger Gale (Herne Bay and Sandwich) (Con)
There is clearly a great deal of good in the Pension Schemes Bill; that is why it went through Committee relatively easily. I do not wish to be a dog in the manger about that, but instead to recognise the good in the Bill. I shall focus on the issues raised in new clauses 22 and 24.
I do not pretend to be expert in these matters, but I do know injustice when I see it. As you know, Madam Deputy Speaker, I fought for many years for the uprating of frozen pensions for ex-pat citizens overseas. That is a shame from which the reputation of this country will take a long time to recover, and I fear that we are about to endorse yet another such shame.
There is absolutely no doubt in most people’s minds that the Pensions Act 1995 was flawed. This issue is an unintended consequence that was not foreseen. That it has taken this long to get to grips with it is wrong, but we now have the opportunity to set things right. The hon. Member for Llanelli (Dame Nia Griffith), in an excellent speech, set out the stall very clearly indeed. I have huge sympathy with her new clause. Were it to be called, I would vote for it without any question.
The right hon. Lady made it very plain—it is indeed very plain—that there is no suggestion that any redress should be retrospective; there is no question of any vast back payments to those whose pensions have been affected. I listened carefully to what the Minister said about retrospection—by the way, I agree that retrospective legislation normally ends in tears—but the proposed measure is not retrospective in that sense.
We come to how to get this right. It seems to me that the Government’s proposals are hugely complicated—unnecessarily so—and do not actually do the job. New clause 24, tabled by Opposition Front Benchers, who I know have put a lot of effort into trying to get this right, gives a get-out in the form of a lack of surplus, which I believe would enable those companies that have neglected their duties until now to carry on neglecting their duties. For that reason, my personal preference is for new clause 22.
I represent the remains of the Pfizer empire in Sandwich. Not entirely surprisingly, I have therefore a significant number—one is a significant number, by the way—of constituents who were affected by the pre-1997 section in the 1995 Act. I find it quite appalling that companies of size and international importance that have been named today—including Pfizer in my own constituency, which is a good employer—should have put themselves in the position that they are in when in some cases, for up to 25 years, pensioners have not been rewarded in the manner to which I believe them to be entitled. As I say, for my money, Pfizer is an excellent company. It does good work and is a good employer, but somewhere along the line, in the back office—probably in the United States—a decision was taken not to uprate pensions. That is quite simply wrong.
While I understand that the Minister comes to this issue with a reasonably open mind and a good heart, I do not think that his proposal does the job and I am not certain that the Opposition Front-Bench amendment does the job. I believe that new clause 22, in the name of the hon. Member for Llanelli, would do the job. I hope that further and very serious consideration will be given to adopting that resolution.
Debbie Abrahams (Oldham East and Saddleworth) (Lab)
I rise in support of the Government’s new clauses, particularly those that relate to the pre-1997 pensionable service indexation where scheme rules allow. That will mean that pensioners whose pension schemes became insolvent through no fault of their own and that have failed to keep pace with inflation will have that rectified. As I mentioned yesterday in my speech on the Budget, that will benefit more than 250,000 Pension Protection Fund and financial assistance scheme members.
I pay particular credit to the Pension Action Group, the PAG. It was formed in 2003 following the collapse of the Allied Steel and Wire pension scheme, which left thousands of workers without employment or their promised occupational pension. They are not covered by the Pension Protection Fund, which was introduced by the Pensions Act 2004 for members of defined benefit schemes whose employer went bust after 6 April 2005. The Pensions Action Group campaigned first for the financial assistance scheme to be set up for members of schemes that went bust, then for improvements to FAS benefits to bring them into line with those of PPF members.
In the last Parliament, members of the Pensions Action Group gave evidence to the Work and Pensions Committee on the hardship experienced due to the policy of not indexing pre-1997 benefits. As a relatively new Select Committee Chair, I remember hearing from them at a separate meeting, and it was so moving. Within weeks, unfortunately, different members were dying because of their age. Benefits were not going to their families, and they were not going to have the benefits that we see rightly being given to this group.
FAS members did most of their service before 1997, and most were in schemes that provided for indexation on all members’ pensionable service. Non-indexation of FAS compensation meant that the average award—about £2,700—was progressively lower than the amount expected from the original pension schemes. Terry Monk told the Committee that
“people should get what they paid for—end of story.”
Richard Nicholl said that
“people paid extra effectively, for full indexation…it is only fair that it goes to those who have paid for it.”
I pay credit to the Deprived Pensioners Association, which gave evidence to the Committee about the impact of the non-indexation of pre-1997 on PPF members. Having heard their evidence, the Committee recommended that the Government legislate to allow both compensation schemes, FAS and PPF, to provide indexation on pre-1997 benefits where scheme rules allowed.
I am incredibly grateful to the Pensions Minister for listening and to the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, who came to the Committee a couple of weeks ago and listened to concerns from members, including the hon. Member for Torbay (Steve Darling). What has happened is right, and I reiterate my thanks.
Manuela Perteghella (Stratford-on-Avon) (LD)
I rise to speak to two new clauses that stand in my name. The first is new clause 3, which concerns the use of the special rules for end of life form to ease the burden on people with a terminal illness seeking support from the Pension Protection Fund or the financial assistance scheme; the second is new clause 19, which deals with fossil fuels and climate risk. Those issues are very different in nature, but they share a common thread: both seek to improve the governance, fairness and long-term resilience of our pension system. I will also speak in support of new clause 11, as it seeks to remedy HSBC’s unjust clawback policy that the Midland Clawback Campaign has been fighting against.
New clause 3 concerns terminal illness and the use of the special rules for end of life form, or SR1. This amendment was born out of the experience of one of my constituents, Nigel. Nigel was diagnosed with incurable stage 4 pancreatic cancer. He told me about the issues he faced in providing several forms, applications and other bits of paper to providers just to demonstrate eligibility and his terminal illness. He told me his story and about the hurdles he encountered following his diagnosis, at what was a very stressful time.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
I have been contacted by some Members of the Northern Ireland Assembly about this issue—the thresholds in cases where a death occurs unexpectedly or suddenly, or when an illness comes on very quickly. When the Minister sums up at the end, I hope he will address that issue, for the sake of those Northern Ireland Assembly Members who asked me to raise that very question today. The hon. Lady is right; well done to her for highlighting this issue.
Manuela Perteghella
I thank the hon. Member for his intervention. When people get terminal illnesses, it is a time full of grief and stress, so new clause 3 aims to address the bureaucratic barriers those people face in accessing compensation or assistance from the Pension Protection Fund or the financial assistance scheme. At a moment when time is precious and stress is already immense, too many people are forced to navigate repeated administrative hurdles simply to demonstrate what another arm of the state has already accepted.
The new clause would require the Secretary of State to set out a clear, fair and straightforward process for demonstrating terminal illness—one that places the least possible administrative burden on the individual. Critically, where the Department for Work and Pensions already holds a valid SR1 form confirming a terminal diagnosis, that form must be shared with the PPF or the FAS; the person should not have to start again from scratch and provide several forms or applications again. Once the necessary information has been received, the PPF and the FAS should be required to make payments within a defined timeframe.
These are not abstract procedural improvements: they would materially affect the quality of the precious time a terminally ill person has left. New clause 3 reflects the explanatory statement’s intent to allow a valid SR1 form to serve as sufficient proof of terminal illness for these purposes, reducing duplication and speeding up support. It is a modest, humane and pragmatic change, and I hope the Minister will consider it in his concluding remarks.
I turn now to new clause 19, which deals with fossil fuels and climate risk. The new clause would require the Secretary of State to make regulations that would require specific schemes to exit investments in firms that are significantly exposed to thermal coal, and thereafter to review whether that restriction should extend to oil and gas expansion. This is a financial risk measure as much as it is a climate one. Despite the welcome climate reporting requirements in the Pension Schemes Act 2021, schemes remain heavily invested in the most damaging fossil fuels. These investments are doubly harmful. They risk becoming stranded as technology and policy move on, and they depress returns across the rest of the portfolio by contributing to climate damage that ultimately, as we have already heard, drags down the entire global economy.
Edward Morello (West Dorset) (LD)
I thank my hon. Friend for speaking to this important new clause, which relates to the fundamental fact that pensions are about planning for the future, and climate change is about making sure that we have a future for all. Having pension funds supporting anything that undermines the outlook for future generations should be prevented in any which way we can. I just wanted to lend my support to her wonderful amendment.
Manuela Perteghella
I thank my hon. Friend for his important intervention. New clause 19 would not create a precedent for ministerial direction of investments more broadly, if that is an issue. In fact, it would be much narrower than the Government’s own proposed reserve power. Existing measures cannot substitute for action now. Large schemes remain invested in the most dangerous fossil fuels, and the Government have not yet even consulted on transition plan requirements for pension schemes, meaning that enforcement is unlikely before the end of this decade.
I urge the Minister to acknowledge that transition plans alone are too little, too late, and we must address pension fund climate risks this decade. New clause 19 would provide a route to do so responsibly and effectively. Taken together, these two new clauses—one addressing long-term systemic financial risk and the other addressing immediate human need—would make our pension system more responsible, more resilient and more compassionate. I hope the Minister will consider them both in that spirit.
Finally, I will speak in support of new clause 11, which would introduce an independent review into state deduction in defined benefit pension schemes. That is necessary because Midland bank’s—now HSBC—outdated clawback policy has misled 51,000 former employees and deprived them of the pensions they were promised. This policy, which was abandoned by most organisations in the 1980s, allows HSBC still to deduct the value of an employee’s state pension using a 77-year-old formula, with payslips disguising it as “state deduction”. It hits the lowest-paid staff hardest and disproportionately affects women. For the same reason of long-standing injustice, I also support all the new clauses and amendments in relation to the indexation of pre-1997 benefits. In conclusion, this Bill is a chance to make pensions fairer, greener and more ethical and to put some of this historic injustice right.
Liam Byrne (Birmingham Hodge Hill and Solihull North) (Lab)
I begin by congratulating the Minister on bringing the Bill forward to this stage. He has been one of the country’s practical idealists since I first began working with him in 2008, and he is demonstrating those credentials once again in stewarding this Bill through the House today with such expertise and intelligence. He, like me, has long been concerned not only by the endemically low investment rates in this country—now languishing at the lowest in the G7—but that we should build up a system of universal basic capital, so that the wealth we create in this country is more fairly shared.
I rise to speak to clause 17, which is in my name, and I give enormous thanks to the 33 Members from all parts of the House who have added their names to it. That depth of cross-party support tells us something important: that here in this House is broad and deep support for the principles enshrined in the new clause. There is a shared belief across this House that working people should be able to use their savings to build a richer and stronger country in which to retire.
My new clause calls for something very simple. It calls for something that has been missing for far too long. As we know, pension fund trustees have fiduciary duties to the people they represent and the people they serve, but those duties need clarity, and for too long that clarity has been missing. What we have instead is confusion, and from that confusion comes a caution, and from that caution comes a world in which pension scheme providers are simply not investing what they could and what they should in the productive assets of our country.
The flight of British savings from investment here has long bedevilled the country. It is a sight to behold. We are not short of savings, but we are desperately short of investment. We have somehow magicked a situation in which we have £3 trillion-worth of long-term savings, but we have the lowest investment rate in the G7. I think the Bill will help to turn that around. I think it will help to break that curse. There is much in it that is welcome: the consolidation of funds, the consolidation of pots, the simplification of structures, and a stronger framework for long-term investment. For all its virtues, however, as it is drafted today we are still left with the core problem, and unless we solve that core problem, the Bill’s noble ambitions will be defeated by its notable omissions. We risk creating bigger and better-managed funds that still fail to invest in our country, and still fail to invest in our country’s future.
The Bill will fail to channel the investment that we need in affordable homes, in net-zero investments, in cleaner power systems, in affordable transport systems, in the social care that we all need for the future, in regeneration, and in the national infrastructure of growth. It will fail because it fails, as currently drafted, to clarify exactly what it is that pension fund trustees can consider. We want those trustees to have the freedom to invest in good things here, not out of some patriotic flourish but because it is plainly in members’ best interests. When national investment grows, our national productivity rises, and when pension pots get bigger, they will get bigger faster if we have a country that is more productive and growing faster than it is today. When a country grows, the returns that shape retirement grow with it.
Many scheme providers today simply do not feel that they have the permission to make those investments. They are unsure of the law. They fear litigation. They worry about the possibility that looking at system-level risks, from low productivity or high housing costs or climate stress, might fall outside their legal remit. This is where the problem lies. It is a paradox that I think we can no longer ignore. We ask trustees to act in members’ best interests, yet the law today is so unclear that many of them feel unable to invest in the very things that could secure the long-term interests of their members: growth, productivity, and the living standards on which those members will one day rely. Today’s rules were built to ensure prudence, but what they are doing is creating paralysis. A framework that was meant to safeguard the future is, in practice, preventing pension savers from shaping that future. Scheme providers want to do more, members expect them to do more and our country needs them to do more, but all that can only happen if Parliament now provides the clarity that the courts have not provided.
This is not an academic matter. At a recent conference, fewer than one in five practitioners said that fiduciary duty was “completely clear”. I believe that 31 industry leaders have now written to the Minister for Pensions to request that legal clarification, including a dozen chief executives. Publicly, the chief executive of Nest, the provider of the UK’s largest defined-contribution scheme, has said much the same.
Fiduciary duty dates back to case law that is centuries old, back to a 19th-century brick factory in Pontefract and, before that, the inheritance of a market lease at some point in 1726. I am afraid that these cases simply cannot answer the questions that trustees must answer today, and they cannot help with the challenges that trustees face today: globalised portfolios, system-wide risks, intergenerational impacts, and the real-world living standards of their members. That is why the spirit of new clause 17 is so important, modest though it is. It does not alter the statutory purpose of pension schemes, and it does not ask a single saver to accept lower returns. What it does is cut through the confusion and allow the Government to produce regulations and guidance that spell out clearly and consistently what trustees must consider, and what they may consider, when making investment decisions.
I warmly welcome the Minister’s commitment to introduce new legislation. I hope that if he gets his skates on, he can table an amendment in the other place once the Bill moves from our precious hands, but mere guidance is not enough, because sometimes it can be ignored. Guidance does not eliminate liability risk and does not give trustees a solid statutory floor, so I urge the Minister to ensure that the legislation he brings forward delivers guidance that is statutory in its bite. I urge him to go big, by pairing guidance with underpinning regulation that gives trustees legal clarity; to go broad, by ensuring that every single kind of scheme falls within the ambit of the legislation; and to be specific, by explaining precisely what those powers can be used for and the way in which they can be allowed to ensure productive investment. That clarity, if we get it right, could avoid the need to resort to the mandating powers that some Members of this House have objected to. It could unlock investment by giving schemes confidence to act, rather than making them fearful and hesitant.
We in this House have a profound duty to ensure that the maximum amount of pension savings in this country not only yield a return to give comfort to savers in their golden years, but do a double duty: they should help to provide the productive investment that we need to build a bigger and richer country. After all, a nation that invests is a nation that builds, and a nation that builds is a nation that will grow its pension pots to help ensure that pension savers enjoy their golden years in comfort.
The steps that we have heard from the Minister go some distance towards helping us deliver on the spirit of new clause 17. I am very grateful to him for his announcement today, which could unlock billions of pounds for affordable homes, clean energy and comfort in retirement for millions of the people we came to this House to serve.
Ann Davies (Caerfyrddin) (PC)
I thank the Minister for his opening remarks this afternoon. The Bill has provided an opportunity for the Labour UK Government to address long-standing pension injustices. Such injustices include the British Coal staff superannuation scheme scandal, whereby surplus sharing arrangements saw billions of pounds heading to the Treasury while former mineworkers’ pensions were eroded, and the lack of indexation for pre-1997 pension accruals under the financial assistance scheme and the Pension Protection Fund, which has caused hardship for pensioners. Addressing such scandals is exactly what my new clauses 2 and 6 set out to do.
New clause 2 would require the Secretary of State to set out a timetable for transferring the whole of the BCSSS investment reserve to members, and to commit to a review on how future surplus will be shared. The coal mining legacy of south Wales extends to my constituency of Caerfyrddin, with the Amman and Gwendraeth valleys bearing the scars of previous industry, so it is of no surprise that my constituents were among those whose funds had been withheld, causing immense hardship for pensioners who had paid into the system for decades. In fact, it affected over 180 residents in my constituency, 20 of whom came to a drop-in earlier this year to share their stories of how this long-running issue has affected their lives.
When the hon. Member for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman) kindly moved new clause 2 on my behalf in Committee, the Minister’s answer gave some hope for long-awaited action. I therefore welcome the recent confirmation that the UK Government have finally listened and have implemented the transfer of the full £2.3 billion reserve to trustees. I pay tribute to my constituents for their hard work, and to former mineworkers everywhere for their long-fought campaign to make this day a reality. On behalf of 180 of my constituents, I thank the Minister.
Former Allied Steel and Wire workers have also campaigned tirelessly to receive their rightful dues in retirement. When the company went bust in 2002, ASW employees lost not only their livelihoods, but the pensions they had worked hard for, and which they were relying on for security later in life. The financial assistance scheme and the Pension Protection Fund were introduced to provide some relief to pensioners in such a situation, but pension contributions made before April 1997 were not inflation-proofed, leaving pensioners without the secure retirement that they were promised.
Dr Scott Arthur (Edinburgh South West) (Lab)
I thank the Minister for introducing the debate. I want to speak in support of Government new clauses 31 to 33, and in the context of new clause 22. Before I do so, let me say that I think it is really good that today’s debate has brought people together after four days of debate on the Budget. There seems to be a lot of agreement today, which is good. In particular, we are agreeing on the pre-1997 measures that were announced in the Budget last week. Nobody mentioned them much in their speeches over the past few days, but today we are all talking about them, which I think is really good.
I warmly welcome the Government’s confirmation in the Budget that we will legislate to allow the Pension Protection Fund and the financial assistance scheme to provide some inflation protection for pre-1997 pensions. This is an issue I have campaigned on, alongside Members from across the House, and I am genuinely pleased to see concrete progress included in the new amendments to the Pension Schemes Bill before the House. I thank the Minister for meeting me in the Treasury in the week running up to the Budget, and for drawing the Chancellor into that discussion. We had our picture taken in the Chancellor’ office, and one of my constituents spotted that there was a mouse trap, which shows that the Treasury hangs on to even the crumbs, as well as to the pounds and pennies.
For years, more than a quarter of a million PPF and FAS members have seen a significant part of their pension frozen—left to lose value year after year—and last week’s announcement begins to right that wrong. It matters deeply for people in Scotland. More than 26,000 pensioners will be helped by this change, which is 26,000 former workers in manufacturing, retail, hospitality and countless other industries. Having spoken to many constituents in this position, I know that many of them have felt forgotten. This reform sends a message that they have not been forgotten, and also that they have been listened to, which I think is even more important.
This decision is important not only for what it delivers, but for what it signals. By acting, the Government have effectively acknowledged that the lack of pre-1997 indexation was an injustice. By recognising that injustice in the public system, I feel that the Government have established an expectation that the private sector must also look at this matter.
The private sector requires encouragement in this area, as a number of companies—primarily under US ownership, in my assessment—are not currently providing regular discretionary increases on pre-1997 pension payments. Many of my constituents, pensioners who used to work for the likes of ExxonMobil—it has been mentioned a few times—and Johnson & Johnson, have told me of sponsoring companies taking a 10-year funding holiday from pension payments into the fund, while simultaneously blocking the indexation in payments. I take the view that the money in the funds belongs to the pensioners and that the funds themselves have a responsibility to move that money from the funds into pensioners’ pockets—and hopefully into the tills of local businesses in my constituency.
The Pensions Regulator itself notes that 17% of pre-1997 pensioners receive no inflation protection, not because of actuarial need but because scheme rules enable companies to do so. For a long time this was an academic matter because inflation was so low, but over the past five years it has eaten some pensions alive, and affected pensioners in Edinburgh South West are now really feeling it. I hope very much that the private pension schemes that do not already provide significant indexation to pre-1997 pensions but have the financial capacity to do so—many do—will see the signal from the Government’s changes to the PPF and the FAS schemes and improve their own schemes for the benefit of those pensioners. I have some slight concerns about the Bill, in that it might not go far enough in forcing them to make those improvements, but I have great faith in the Minister’s negotiating powers.
It is hoped that the surplus release enabled by the Bill will help to underpin additional corporate investment in the UK, but there is a risk that in cases such as ExxonMobil it may simply enable such companies to move the money in those funds outside the UK and into the bank balances of shareholders in other countries. That money really does belong in pensioners’ bank accounts, but there is a credible argument for also using it to invest in the UK. It does not seem like a good outcome for that money to be lost to our economy.
That can be avoided by addressing the issues of trustee governance. Some trustees undoubtedly act in the interest of scheme beneficiaries, but scheme rules do not always allow it and contrary guidance from the Pensions Regulator may be non-binding. Additionally, trustee boards often lack independence, particularly when we see a majority or even all members have been appointed by the employer—perhaps a conflict of interest. Mindful of that, I commend the Minister for announcing that his Department will consult on trust-based pension scheme governance, strengthening the member voice and supporting lay trustees working closely with the Pensions Regulator to ensure that trustees act in the interests of all beneficiaries, and comply with the law and their scheme rules. Again, the money belongs to those beneficiaries.
I have high hopes for the review, as we need significant reform if we are to secure meaningful protection for these pensioners. The urgency is clear: many of these individuals and their spouses are of an advanced age—I hope none of them hears me say that and thinks it is an insult—and we need to act quickly if they are to benefit. Addressing this injustice requires not only technical improvements in governance and trusteeship, but the political will to act. I am proud that this Labour Government are stepping up to act and looking at this issue in detail. We saw progress last week in the Budget and there is a commitment to do more.
Before I end, I want to touch on two slightly aligned issues. First, we have spoken a lot, across the House, about people who have pre-1997 private pensions and we worry that those pensions are not enough to support them. Each week, in Oxgangs in my constituency, I go to a community meal where I meet people who do not have any private pension. They survive on the state pension, often in quite difficult circumstances. When we talk about poor pensioners, it is right that we think about pre-1997 and others with private pensions who are struggling, but we should never forget who is really feeling the cost of living crisis.
Secondly, I have to thank my union, the University and College Union, for the work it has done over many years to protect my pension. I know I will benefit from that. Hardly a month goes by without me getting an email from it saying that there is some risk to pensions in a university somewhere in the UK. I commend it for its work.
Kirsty Blackman
I appreciate the chance to speak in this debate, especially without time limits—it is lovely. I absolutely love a very technical debate in the Chamber, but unfortunately not enough Members do. It would have been nice to see huge numbers delighted to talk about the technical aspects of legislation, but being a veteran of previous Finance Bills, I am aware that there is not often a huge turnout for these debates.
I am thankful for—but have a few criticisms of—the Government’s position throughout the Bill. I will start with a couple of issues around timing. It is appreciated that the changes are being made. The hon. Member for Edinburgh South West (Dr Arthur) mentioned the Budget debates, and I mentioned in my speech then how delighted I was that the change had been made, and how great it was that pre-1997 indexation would be taking place.
However, when I made my speech last Thursday, we had not yet seen the Government amendments. I was aware that there would be Government amendments, because it had been announced, but we did not have the opportunity to properly scrutinise them, or to consider whether those amendments should be amended, because of the timeline of when the details were provided. I appreciate that the Minister tabled the amendments in advance of the deadline, which is great, but there are questions that I potentially would have asked, and I may have tabled some probing amendments, if I had seen those Government amendments in advance.
On the 1997 indexation, I apologise that on Thursday, when I was talking about this, I mentioned the FSA instead of the FAS—I apologise to the Food Standards Agency; I did not mean anything by it. If I do that again, I apologise. In terms of the PPF and the FAS, the PPF got in touch with me last week, and I had a good meeting with it about what the indexation will look like and how many members would potentially be impacted. It suggested that it was getting in touch with 165,000 members, which I thought was a very significant number, with an impressively fast turnaround in the time it was looking to reach out to them. Those are significant numbers, and I appreciate that.
However, I am concerned that the uplift does not involve a one-off payment in order to bring the pre-1997 contributions up to some sort of level. The contributions were made pre-1997, so the compound interest on that would be unbelievable—it would be very significant. If there is no one-off payment to be made, and no recognition of the fact that the indexation has not taken place, then we are looking at adding 2.5% a year on to a tenner—or whatever—instead of 2.5% every year up until now, which would be a significantly different sum.
I appreciate that the change has been made, and I also appreciate that the PPF levy is still going to have the potential to reduce to zero. The PPF’s plans are still intended to go ahead, and it is still able to meet its financial obligations, even with the changes that have been proposed by the Government. However, I would appreciate it if the Government considered the possibility of a small one-off addition to the pre-1997 accrual that members have, in order to bring them closer to what the pension should have been if they had had that indexation previously.
Older pensioners are the group affected, some of whom are very unwell. As was mentioned by the Chair of the Work and Pensions Committee, the hon. Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth (Debbie Abrahams), a number of them are no longer with us. The Chair also mentioned Terry Monk, who has been in regular contact with me via email, and I thank him and all of the members who have fought so hard for this change. They have achieved something, although I expect they will probably go on fighting for more. I can understand that and I will be happy to back them in the search for more justice.
On some of the other issues that have been brought up in this debate, around the fiduciary duties, the right hon. Member for Birmingham Hodge Hill and Solihull North (Liam Byrne) and I probably have a similar idea of what “best interests” looks like, what the words “best interests” mean, and what the interests of scheme members are. Some of the ideas that he was talking about around investments are ideas that I would fully align with.
However, we can all define best interests in different ways. The shadow spokesperson, the hon. Member for North West Norfolk (James Wild), talked about the fact that fiduciary duties mean having to get the best returns—he said something like that—but it is not the best returns, but the best interests. Some people may define best interests as best returns, but some people may not. Some might define best interests as better transport systems for the majority of the scheme beneficiaries who live in a certain area, for example; if there were a more efficient transport system, more housing and better schools and hospitals, that would significantly benefit those members in that area.
Liam Byrne
The hon. Lady is absolutely right. Many members would say that they wanted their investments to help to create a more equal country—a less unequal country—not least because we now know from the work of the OECD and the International Monetary Fund that more unequal countries grow more slowly.
Kirsty Blackman
Absolutely. Productivity and growth are real possibilities if there is better patient capital investment, not just in social housing and renewable energy projects, which I would dearly love to see and have spoken a lot about—in particular social housing—but in tech and appliances, so that companies can use capital investment that is invested for the long term. That could have a significant impact on productivity.
Turning back to the Minister’s announcement around fiduciary duties and that definition, although there will of course be political argument about what best interests mean and how we define best interests, trustees will at least have the benefit of the guidance and will not necessarily labour under the misapprehension that they have to get the best possible financial return.
I draw the Government’s attention to the Well-being of Future Generations Act 2015 in Wales, which I talk about a lot, and which is about making the best decisions for the future. It is not necessarily about chasing economic growth at any cost; it is not necessarily about building certain things. Instead, it is about ensuring that future generations are best provided for. Some of the lessons that could be learned from that could be put into the fiduciary duties consultation that is coming forward about what the term best interests actually means and how it could be defined.
We have largely covered the mandation powers and their direction in the discussion of fiduciary duties. I am pretty relaxed about there being some mandation and some requirement, not least because of the points the right hon. Member for Birmingham Hodge Hill and Solihull North made about the growth in the economy that is likely to occur should capital be invested more in things that will increase productivity. There probably is a balance to be struck between benefiting pensioners of today and the future; if there is a lower return for pensioners 30 years in the future, we might again be causing a level of generational unfairness that we need to think about. How does that balance up? Does that new hospital or that new social housing provide enough of a benefit for those younger people, who will become pensioners in 30 or 40 years? Does that stack up? I do not think that will be an easy decision to make.
However, generally I think we can look at mandation; I do not take an ideological position against it like some with Conservative beliefs. I am, though, happy to support the Conservatives in their amendment that would require a report on what those mandation powers look like, because the more transparency from the Government—the more transparency from everybody in this place, frankly—the better. I therefore think a report on that would be absolutely grand.
I will mention a couple of other things. New clause 3 about terminal illness is a really neat solution to a problem. My local authority has implemented a “Tell us once” policy, whereby if someone has had a bereavement in their family, for instance, they have only to tell their distressing story to the local authority once and everything will be changed—their council tax and benefits—and they will no longer get various charges. I therefore think the solution proposed in new clause 3 is neat.
The Minister might come up with some issues around potential data sharing between the PPF and the DWP. However, if he could come up with a solution so that people do not have to tell their distressing story numerous times—having to explain again to somebody else that they are terminally ill and having to provide a huge amount of paperwork to do that when they have already had to do that with the DWP—that would be hugely helpful.
My understanding from my conversation with the PPF on Friday is that it is pretty good at supporting members, and I felt that it would be willing to be flexible about this should it get direction from the Minister and should the data-sharing issues be sorted out, but I am just guessing—I am not putting words in the PPF’s mouth. I just feel that it is a very member-focused organisation and might be quite keen to support its members in that regard.
Dr Arthur
This is a very slight aside, but is it not interesting that, when it comes to claiming benefits, there are so many silos and barriers to organisations, councils, Government agencies and Departments talking to each other, but they suddenly start speaking to each other and the benefits are stopped overnight when someone passes away?
Kirsty Blackman
I would like to see much more conversation. Gateway benefits allow people eligibility for other things, and sometimes those do not work either. A person might be eligible for universal credit, but they do not necessarily get the follow-through to free school meals, for example. Anything we can do to make that path smoother, either in the cessation of benefits or in agreement on eligibility, would be really helpful. I agree with the hon. Gentleman; we have seen issues with carers, for example, being chased for overpayments that were not their fault.
Again, I support the Government’s move on the consolidation of small pots, which I think is incredibly sensible. I am famously a massive supporter of the pensions dashboard and have never been at all critical of its timelines, but when it comes online there will be a rush for consolidation anyway. This is all about consolidation for people who have not touched their small pots, and making sure they get a return from that is totally sensible.
Guided retirement and the mid-life MOT are mentioned in a number of amendments, and ensuring that people are given the correct advice at the correct time is incredibly important. When the Government do their sufficiency review—when we are looking at the adequacy of pensions and what people will get when they hit retirement—I would be very surprised if that and the consultation do not conclude that more people need more advice earlier. The more advice that people have on their pension, and the more money they put into their pension at the earliest time, the bigger their pension will be.
I have already mentioned compound interest: if we put £100 into our pension when we were 21, it will be significantly bigger by the time we retire than if we put £100 into our pension when we are 40. That is just a fact. The more advice that we can give people at various important life stages, but particularly significantly before retirement, would be really helpful. That is another thing that should be included.
Finally, the hon. Member for Boston and Skegness (Richard Tice) spoke at a press conference about the local government pension scheme and how terrible it is that it is spending so much money on fees. That was in September, after Second Reading, at which he did not speak about that. He did not table any amendments on it before the Committee stage, and he has not shown up to raise it on Report. It is almost as if Reform MPs are saying things in press conferences and not doing any actual work. [Interruption.] I told him I was going to mention him. It is almost as if they make statements in press conferences and do not do anything, just as they have not shown up today.
Should a Reform Member have been particularly keen to make changes to the LGPS—such as to cap the level of fees it can pay, which are probably not unreasonable, as the LGPS is phenomenally successful in its returns for members—they could have amended the Bill, but they would have had to show up to do so. I suggest that the media organisations who are happy to cover press conferences ask the Members giving those press conferences what they will actually do to get their policies implemented. If such Members have an opportunity, they should use it rather than just shouting from the sidelines.
As I think I have made clear, I am largely supportive of an awful lot of things in the Bill, the direction of travel and many of the technical measures, which are great fun to have a good look at. I have some concerns about pre-1997 indexation. I am delighted that it has happened, but more could have been done. I will be interested to follow the progress of the fiduciary duty statutory guidance and the sufficiency and adequacy review and whether there will be mandation powers.
Lastly, on new clause 3, can we please make it easier for members who are terminally ill to have that conversation? I would very much appreciate the Minister committing to taking that away and considering how the PPF and FAS can get that information more easily without requiring people to jump through significant hoops.
Jayne Kirkham (Truro and Falmouth) (Lab/Co-op)
I welcome the real progress made on the pre-1997 fund. I do not have as much specific technical knowledge as most hon. Members in the Chamber, and I was not on the Bill Committee, but I have looked at the amendments and would like to comment on them, as I was lucky enough to chair a local government pension scheme committee—I think it was very well run—and sit on a pool oversight board. I will use that experience as an example.
Our LGPS in Cornwall was a good example of responsible investment and good practice in the sector. The Bill will consolidate LGPS funds into six pools from eight on the basis that that will be effective in achieving scale and diversification of assets and cost savings. Brunel—the pool that Cornwall is in—is not to go forward. Forming Brunel was costly and, as I said on Second Reading, the Cornwall fund was due to break even following the forming of that pool only this year. The costs involved in moving to another fund are expected to be high, which concerns me, as that may impact members, though we hope those costs will be recouped by investment growth as a result of the consolidation.
Being in a bigger pool did enable funds to invest in local infrastructure such as housing, transport and clean energy. Cornwall was good at that: we used our £2.3 billion—not a huge fund when we think of the size of many of these pools—to invest in affordable rental housing near Camborne, where 67 new homes were built on a brownfield site. I am looking forward to seeing the infrastructure projects that further consolidation will make possible.
On Second Reading, I raised concerns that moving to larger funds may affect local links. Brunel is a strong south-west pool and, although it covers as far up as Oxford, we have managed within that pool to be effective on a local level.
The Environment Agency—I noted the amendment on that—was part of our pool, and it did have slightly different rules, which was tricky and somewhat impacted on our pool. I am pleased that the scheme managers will now have a duty to co-operate with strategic authorities, as the inability to do that often led to perhaps unintended consequences. In social housing, for example, we may have been looking at investments that were the same as the local authority’s. It would make sense to be able to talk about such investments so that we are not doing silly things like competing against each other.
In Cornwall, we had a strong responsible investment policy, and our carbon-neutral date was earlier than the rest of the pool by five years. We were able to maintain those policies and our environmental, social and governance focus by having a strong presence on the oversight board, which enabled us to influence the pool and be a bit different within it. I hope that will continue so that pools do not end up following the lowest common denominator when it comes to things like social impact, investment and ESG matters, but instead will be raised up to the highest level. In our local fund, we had employers and employees on our pension committee, and that worked well. The union reps and the employers gave some very valuable input, and I think that would be valuable for the larger pools as well.
Our local social impact fund was, in the end, 7.5% of our investments. We could channel our investment into rented housing and local renewables in Cornwall, as well as more widely around the UK, and I hope that local government pension schemes will still be able to set their own local investment targets in that way, even when working with local authorities.
Vikki Slade (Mid Dorset and North Poole) (LD)
I welcome the overall thrust of the Bill. Measures such as the pension pot consolidations are long overdue and will make a real difference to savers, particularly small savers. Every new year, I try to tidy up the numerous tiny pensions from jobs I had in my 20s and 30s, but the pots are so small that the cost of a financial planner and the exit fees would wipe them out, so this reform is great news for consumers who have been on low incomes and have moved from job to job. I urge the Government to go further by lifting the threshold. After all, a pension pot of £10,000 will generate a payback of only around £50 a month, which is barely enough to cover a basic weekly shop. The Bill goes in the right direction, but it does not go far enough or move fast enough. I am concerned that it leaves groups of pensioners who did the right thing by saving for the future considerably out of pocket.
Like others in the Chamber, I welcome the long-overdue decision to provide some indexation for pre-1997 pensions in the PPF and FAS, but let us be clear: this is not full justice. These pensioners have endured decades without inflation protection, and a CPI increase capped at 2.5% starting in two years’ time, at a time when the cost of living has soared, is still going to leave people struggling. They expected fairness and parity with post-1997 benefits, but what they have received is a compromise that falls short of restoring their full dignity and security in retirement. I call on Ministers to support the calls of many people, including the hon. Member for Llanelli (Dame Nia Griffith), to ensure that pensioners outside the PPF and the FAS are fully supported.
The case of AEA Technology pensioners is a long-running injustice that I have been dealing with since my first days in this place. Employees, who were often nuclear scientists and safety engineers, were promised pensions “no less favourable” than the civil service scheme, and many worked at the Winfrith atomic energy establishment, just outside my constituency in Dorset. I have met and talked to a number of them, including Peter, Phil, Sally and Michael, as well as Jonathan, who wrote to me saying that
“nearly 20% of AEAT pensioners have died since the campaign started in 2012, including my colleague and campaigner Derek Whitmell. This has echoes of the Post Office and infected blood scandals. Delay by the Government is simply unacceptable…this is now in sharp focus for me with Derek’s passing”.
Those pensioners trusted the promise that the Government gave them at the time, yet after AEAT collapsed, their pensions were cut by almost half, with inflation protection stripped away. Today, the fund holds far in excess of what is needed to restore their pensions in full, yet thousands of them remain short-changed.
I recognise the changes in the pre-1997 pensions announced last week, but they are woefully inadequate. That is not just unfair; it is a breach of trust. New clause 1, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Didcot and Wantage (Olly Glover), calls for an independent review so that we can finally deliver justice for those pensioners, just as the Government have started to deliver justice on many other historical scandals, which I welcome. This is one of those scandals.
I turn to another. While the Government’s intention to allow surplus sharing of defined benefit schemes is welcome, the Bill as drafted leaves pensioners exposed. UK DB schemes hold an estimated £222 billion in surplus, yet 88% of those funds have failed to use those surpluses to restore pensions eroded by inflation. Companies such as BP transfer the assets to insurers in bulk annuity deals worth £50 billion annually, while pensioners see their living standards fall.
My amendments 17, 18 and 19 seek to put fairness at the heart of the process. Amendment 17 would ensure that surplus sharing principles applied even when schemes were wound up. Amendment 18 would require consultation with members before the surplus was extracted, and amendment 19 would reinstate trustee consent and oblige trustees to consider whether pensions had kept pace with inflation and past requests for discretionary increases.
Mr Alistair Carmichael (Orkney and Shetland) (LD)
I have several BP pensioners, with BP obviously having operated the Sullom Voe terminal in Shetland for many years. The injustice they suffered, which left them with a pension worth about 11% less than it should have been because of the decisions of the trustee in 2021 and 2022, showed the inadequacy of the control and independence of the trustee in relation to the company. Does my hon. Friend agree that that requires urgent attention?
Vikki Slade
I thank my right hon. Friend for his intervention—he has stolen my next line.
John, who works at the BP depot at Wytch Farm, which is the largest onshore oil site in England in Poole harbour, told me that his pension has been eroded by 11%—he probably got the same letter as my right hon. Friend’s constituents. Even modest requests for discretionary increases made by the trustees have been refused by the parent company. Those discretionary increases were affordable; they would not have required any additional funds from the company. Another of my constituents, Suzie, who sits on the steering group, told me that the issue affects 56,000 pensioners from BP alone, but the change—a small one—would support pensioners from many other companies.
I will end by talking to new clause 3, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Manuela Perteghella). I do so in memory of my mum Lin Foster, who died before she could access her pensions, and in support of my constituent Judith, who came to see me about her sister Alison, who died after receiving a terminal brain tumour diagnosis. Alison found that the paperwork required to access her lump sum meant that she would have to articulate and confront her impending death—something that she simply could not do on top of everything else. It meant that, as a result, she missed out on funds that could have made her last few months more bearable, as well as on potentially accessing treatments that might have given her a bit more time with her family. This simple clause would have allowed her medical team to make that declaration on her behalf via an SR1 and to reduce the administration for all concerned.
The Bill goes a long way in improving the lives of pensioners, but for the pensioners who are missing out, small changes could make a huge difference. I urge Ministers to think about the impact they could have on lives by little tweaks that will not cost the Government anything, or very much, at all.
Peter Swallow
Can I say at the outset how much I have enjoyed the debate? I particularly want to highlight the contributions of my hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli (Dame Nia Griffith), who powerfully raised some of the issues that I will go on to address, and—purely because I enjoyed the fiscal geekery—the contribution from the hon. Member for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman), who rivals the Minister himself in her enthusiasm for financial issues. What a delight it was to experience that.
I welcome the opportunity to speak on this Bill, which touches on several issues close to my constituents in Bracknell Forest. It is also worth acknowledging the strong action that the Chancellor took in the Budget to support all pensioners by raising the state pension by up to £550. That is possible only thanks to Labour’s steadfast commitment to the triple lock on pensions. That is real action on pensioner poverty, at a time when the Conservatives and Reform have flirted with scrapping the triple lock.
Similarly, the Bill delivers real benefits to private pension savers across the country by simplifying and streamlining the system. The measures will increase their returns—around 3,300,000 workers on defined contribution schemes in the south-east alone stand to benefit by about £29,000 more for their retirement—while helping to unlock around £50 billion of investment in the UK economy. Hon. Members need only follow the Minister on Twitter to see why it is so important that we increase investment in the UK economy after many years of under-investment by the previous Government.
I thank the Minister for the work to get the Bill to this stage. I welcome in particular the measures providing for action on an issue close to the hearts of many in Bracknell Forest: the slow erosion of pre-1997 defined benefit pensions. It is for that reason that I will focus on new clause 22, which calls for the indexation of pre-1997 pensions. I sympathise deeply with the spirit of the new clause. The erosion of those pensions is an injustice—one that urgently needs addressing. It is important to say that not all pre-1997 schemes are in surplus. Although I agree that that is not the fault of their members, legislating to index would put entire schemes at risk, and I believe that that is not a risk that any sensible Government would take. However, it is vital that the Bill marks the beginning of further action to bring justice to those with pre-1997 defined benefit pensions whose schemes are now in generous surplus.
I was delighted when the Chancellor announced at the Budget statement that members of the Pension Protection Fund will have their accruals protected from inflation, ending years of degradation. That has been carried through in amendments before us. I welcome the recognition in principle that those with pre-1997 pensions are indeed facing an injustice, and that action must be taken to rectify it. I have met many constituents who were formerly employed by HP and later HPE, which used to be based in Bracknell. They are now members of the HPE pension scheme, and have seen their returns decimated. I have spoken with other pensioners in other schemes, too—many of which have been mentioned by others Members across the House. It is not right that people who have worked hard and paid into their pensions now face ever-diminishing life savings through no fault of their own, despite many schemes, including HPE, having significant reserves.
One of my constituents, Ed, began drawing from his pension nine years ago. In that time, his pension has increased only three times, by three separate percentage increments: 3%, 1%, and 1%. He says that, had his pension risen in line with inflation, he would have seen his pension increase by around 38% over the years to 2025. As a result—this is the real-life impact—he has seen a dramatic fall in his living standards. Ed is not alone. Constituents in Bracknell and across the country should not have to fight any more to make themselves heard and achieve justice.
This is an opportune moment to do what we can to put that right. In the Bill, the Government are reforming the use of surpluses, rightly strengthening the hands of trustees to act, as the Government themselves have done for the PPF scheme, for which they effectively act as the trustee—they are leading by example. I thank the Chancellor and the Pensions Minister for meeting me to discuss that before the Budget. The Minister has been clear on his expectations of trustees following the passage of the Bill, including in his contribution today, and I thank him for his comments, specifically on strengthening guidance for trustees.
Today must be the beginning, not the end, of the story. I have written to the trustees of the HPE scheme urging them to use the powers in this Bill to right the wrong.
I wanted to take this opportunity to call once more on the trustees of the HPE scheme, and other schemes similarly in surplus, to do everything in their power to ensure that pre-1997 pensions are protected from inflation, and I wanted to do so on the Floor of this House because I think it important that we are as clear as possible that trustees will be given the powers they need to act and should follow through with concrete action to protect pensions. That is the right thing to do, and with the powers the Government are granting in the Bill, it is now in their hands to do it.
John Milne (Horsham) (LD)
I shall speak to new clauses 8 and 13, which stand in my name, among others.
With its title, the Pensions Schemes Bill, this piece of legislation was probably never destined to grab headlines—sorry, Minister, but that is the case—which is a pity, because it contains some genuinely intelligent measures, developed over years with significant cross-party support, and could go some way to boosting UK plc, as we all want. Directing more of our pension fund savings into UK investments is a long-overdue mission; however, it is not just about what you do, but how you do it, and as I argued in Committee, I am not convinced the Government have struck the right balance with their plan to take sweeping powers of mandation. Yes, we should be concerned about very low pension fund investment into the UK, but the reason behind that is not some form of trustee treason; rather, it is a logical and predictable response to the UK’s regulatory framework and a market that over-emphasises costs, which discourages any kind of active management strategy.
Mandation is the wrong solution. There are other ways to reach the same outcome through partnership, building on the consensus achieved in the Mansion House accord. I strongly urge the Government to look again at creating more ready-made investment vehicles. The biggest risk in mandation is that it could force pension funds to make sub-optimal investments, because they are chasing the same limited supply of UK assets as everyone else.
In addition to more support for innovation and start-ups, like others who have spoken today, I see a fantastic opportunity for large-scale investment in social housing, care homes, high streets, environmental schemes and infrastructure. That would bring huge social rewards, as well as boosting growth, which is the Government’s mission. That will not happen, though, unless the Government help local and regional authorities to pump prime the system with a stream of investable products. To me, that seems like a small ask, and I hope the Government will reconsider.
I am pleased by Ministers’ positive response to some of the amendments we fought for in Committee. That does not always happen. The scandalous treatment of pre-1997 pension savings has been left unresolved for decades, so I welcome this Government being the first to act and their decision to link compensation payments from the PPF and FAS to CPI inflation. Of course, this is far from a complete solution, and indexation applies only going forward, but given that until now there had been no sign of compensation of any kind or of any group, I will take this as a partial win. I pay tribute to persistence of all my Horsham constituents who have raised pre-’97 indexation with me time and again.
Compensation by the PPF is certainly a solution, but we are in danger of missing a one-off opportunity to access pension surpluses. The Bill will give trustees increased access to surplus savings, which have built up in many funds in recent years, which is good, but without some sort of extra push from the Government, it seems to me likely that none or little of the money will go toward pre-1997 pension injustices. In the Work and Pensions Committee last week, I asked the Secretary of State whether he truly believed that the Bill as it stands would help people, and I got a “Yes, Minister” kind of answer:
“I am not going to call stumps on brand new legislation before it has had a chance to have an effect, so let’s see what effect it has.”
That is not good enough. The companies that have not been shamed into action in a quarter of a century are not miraculously going to discover altruism today. Some form of compulsion is required.
I hope that the pre-1997 section will be taken further in the Lords, where the balance of power gives the Liberal Democrats somewhat more leverage than we had in Committee. [Interruption.] It is a wonderful institution—so democratic, is it not? I also welcome the decision to abolish the Pension Protection Fund levy, which had become effectively redundant; that was the subject of another Lib Dem amendment. That move will reduce hidden fees for pension schemes and pass those savings directly to savers.
However, other things are still missing. As someone with a professional background in pensions communications, I argued in Committee for the Government to enable free universal pension guidance at the age of 40, among other stages, when there is still time to change outcomes, rather than waiting all the way to the moment of retirement itself. There is a ticking time bomb of pension inadequacy that must be addressed today, and pensions guidance is an incredibly low-cost way to improve outcomes. The Pension Wise service would be an excellent vehicle for that, and it is ready and waiting for us to use it. If the Government will not back new clause 8, will the Minister meet with me and members of industry to look at how an auto-enrolment trial could finally move this proposal forward?
That brings me to new clause 13, tabled by myself and my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay (Steve Darling), which seeks to strengthen the people-focused elements of the Bill by using pensions services to offer free, accessible guidance to the groups we know are under-saving. If we look at minority ethnic savers, we see that their pension pots average £52,000—less than half of the £115,000 that applies to white British savers. Let us also consider that women are on average set to retire on just £13,000 a year, compared with £19,000 for men—a third less. Disabled workers are approaching retirement with average pension savings of £47,980—just a third of the UK average. The Government rightly say that they want people to be independent, financially resilient and able to pay their own way, but that cannot happen if entire groups—women, ethnic minorities and disabled people—are destined to retire on a fraction of what others are provided with.
There is a lot to like in this Bill, but legislative opportunities come up only once in a blue moon, and a lot more could be done here. I ask the Government to support new clauses 8 and 13.
Elaine Stewart (Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock) (Lab)
I rise to speak to new clause 22. Let me begin by recognising the work of the Hewlett Packard Pension Association, particularly the work of Patricia Kennedy from Ayrshire—she hoped to be in the Gallery today, but she was too ill to travel. Patricia has been a driving force to keep this issue alive, but of course this is not about only one individual; it is about all pre-1997 pensioners.
Earlier this year, I was proud to host Patricia and many of her fellow campaigners in Parliament. That meeting made clear the human cost of inaction—pensioners seeing their incomes erode for decades, and families struggling because the system has failed them. That is why new clause 22 matters. At its heart, the new clause sets a simple principle: pensions earned before 1997 should not be left to wither away. It also follows a principle that the Government have already adopted.
I welcome the Minister’s commitment in his opening remarks to work with trustees to ensure that schemes in surplus, such as Hewlett Packard Enterprise, work to benefit pensioners. If good co-operation is not forthcoming, will the Government look to other legislative means to correct this course? Many of these schemes are backed by profitable multinationals, yet discretion has failed. It has failed with Wood Group, Hewlett Packard Enterprise, STMicroelectronics, Atos/Sema, American Express, AIG, Pfizer, 3M, Chevron, NCR Scotland, Lloyd’s Register, and Johnson & Johnson.
Some pensioners have gone for 10, 15 or 23 years without a single increase. That is not fairness. NC22 would correct that. I am sure all Labour Members agree that pensioners should not depend on the whims of employers, and we should be wary of accidentally creating an entrenched situation in which pensioners in failed schemes receive protection while those in solvent schemes remain unprotected—to me, that seems inconsistent. New clause 22 would address that inconsistency, ensuring that every pensioner has the security and dignity they deserve, regardless of when their service was accrued. I thank the Minister for meeting me to talk over my worries about this Bill.
Susan Murray (Mid Dunbartonshire) (LD)
I start by thanking my hon. Friends the Members for Torbay (Steve Darling) and for Mid Dorset and North Poole (Vikki Slade), who have clearly devoted a lot of time and care to scrutinising the Bill—along with others, of course—and tabling constructive amendments.
As we have heard, the UK pensions market is currently worth around £3 trillion—a staggering sum. The right hon. Member for Birmingham Hodge Hill and Solihull North (Liam Byrne) has already highlighted the opportunity for national investing, as well as to improve the quality of life for pension holders. For too many people, though, the rules and regulations that determine what they will receive in retirement are opaque—as anyone who has worked through the Bill will know—and often deeply confusing. That is why I welcome the Liberal Democrat proposals to introduce a simple traffic light system, which will help people to understand their scheme and how well their pension is performing.
However, understanding is only one part of the picture; people must also be confident that their pension is being managed legally and ethically. I therefore welcome the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Poole (Neil Duncan-Jordan), which would ensure that British pension funds are compliant with the UK’s duty not to aid or assist serious breaches of international law. After the horror we have witnessed in Gaza over the past two years, and judging by the strength of feeling expressed both by my constituents and by Members across this House, I believe that safeguard would be warmly welcomed.
Like other Members, I cannot speak in this debate without raising the topic of pre-1997 pensions.
Peter Swallow
I apologise for interrupting the hon. Lady just as she is getting on to a point that, as she knows, I care deeply about, but I wanted to tease out a point about ethical investment. What I am struggling with is that her Front-Bench spokesperson, the hon. Member for Torbay (Steve Darling), has spoken against mandation, but the hon. Lady has talked passionately about the need to ensure ethical investment. Will she address the fact that there is a conflict here? I am deeply sympathetic to both viewpoints and understand both of them, but I also recognise that there is a conflict. We either have a system in which pension schemes are given clear guidance about where they should invest and what they should invest in, or we do not; we cannot have both. Will the hon. Lady address that conflict and come down on one side of the fence or the other, not—if I may very gently say so—do the Lib Dem thing of sitting on that fence too much?
Susan Murray
I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s point, but the important thing is that there is clear guidance for pension funds to make sure we do not assist breaches of international law. I think that would make things very clear, and quite easy for pension funds to understand and implement.
My constituency of Mid Dunbartonshire has many pensioners who are reliant on schemes that do not provide annual indexation. That is why I was pleased to add my name to Liberal Democrat new clause 7, which takes a nuanced and responsible approach. It calls for an assessment of the position faced by pre-1997 pensioners, and of options to address the reality that their pensions have effectively been frozen for many years. As the hon. Member for Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock (Elaine Stewart) mentioned, when schemes that are in surplus are able to ensure that pension holders have a better quality of life, we should fully support as many of them as possible.
Ultimately, this is about fairness and openness in our system. Pension schemes hold an almost unimaginable amount of money and are among the most powerful financial actors in our economy, which could help to reduce the inequity in our communities. They are too large and too complex for any individual saver or campaign group to challenge alone, and it therefore falls to us in this House to ensure that schemes operate fairly, ethically and transparently, and that the people who contribute to them and rely on them can retire with dignity and confidence.
Clive Jones (Wokingham) (LD)
My constituent David worked for 3M for 31 years, 23 of them pre-1997. His pension payment for service prior to 1997 has not increased since 2008, since when it has lost 40% of its purchasing power. Other constituents have lost more. Another constituent worked for ExxonMobil, which he says gave him written documentation that he would receive annual increases at 80% of RPI. However, since legislation changed in 1995, that has not happened. Those are just two of the 40-plus constituents who have contacted me about the injustice experienced by pensioners whose pension schemes are failing to provide an inflation increase on their service prior to 1997. I know that many more across the country face the same injustice. Their stories are deeply troubling. Rather than enjoying a well-earned retirement, pensioners are left struggling to keep pace with the cost of living, often while their pension scheme is in surplus.
Helen Maguire (Epsom and Ewell) (LD)
I have a similar constituency case with a similar example of discretionary increases. Those were 80% of RPI, but in 2023 that was reduced to half. That has left my constituent, among others, unable to afford their bills and their home. Although I am pleased to see the pre-1997 pension indexation in the Budget for PPF and FAS members, I remain concerned for constituents such as mine. Does my hon. Friend agree that there needs to be a plan for those impacted by a sudden decrease in inflation payments?
Clive Jones
I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend. There needs to be some sort of plan, and sooner rather than later.
The Government appear to recognise the injustice and are proposing to use surplus funds in the PPF to provide inflation increases on some pre-1997 pensions. Why are we not seeking to resolve the same issue for company defined-benefit pension schemes? Many of these pension schemes have a funding surplus but choose not to use it to support their former employees, despite often being asked to do so by trustees who are ignored by foreign-based employers. Surely that cannot be right.
Research by the Pensions Regulator has revealed that even among schemes whose rules allow for discretionary benefits, less than a third had provided those benefits in the previous three years. Employer discretion has failed in practice and will continue to fail unless Parliament acts. The Pension Schemes Bill fails to address this issue.
Only by amending the original legislation can we ensure fairness for those with pre-1997 service. The Society of Pension Professionals argues that legislation on pre-1997 benefits is unnecessary, but the evidence is clear: discretion, more often than not, is exercised to the detriment of pensioners. As I have said, trustees lack the authority to act and pensioners are left behind. The problem appears to be concentrated in a small number of large companies. They were meant to provide long-term financial security for their employees. We must remember that all defined-benefit schemes paid levies into the PPF, creating a surplus that now funds indexation. If pensioners in the PPF deserve protection, so do those in live schemes who helped build the surplus in those schemes.
The Government have taken the first step by restoring indexation for some. They must now take the logical next step by extending inflation protection to all pre-1997 pensioners in live schemes. I believe that pre-1997 pension service should receive inflation protection on the same statutory basis as post-1997 service. This is about fairness, dignity and justice for those who worked hard, paid into schemes, were made promises, and now deserve security in retirement. Pensioners affected by this injustice live in every constituency, and they deserve the support of this House of Commons and the Government. Our constituents affected by these injustices simply ask for fairness, and hopefully the Minister will make sure that it happens soon.
Ayoub Khan (Birmingham Perry Barr) (Ind)
I hope to devote a large portion of my speech to new clause 36, which stands in my name, but let me first swiftly acknowledge the new clauses tabled by the hon. Member for Poole (Neil Duncan-Jordan), the right hon. Member for Birmingham Hodge Hill and Solihull North (Liam Byrne), the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Manuela Perteghella) and the hon. Member for Llanelli (Dame Nia Griffith).
While pension fund managers should no doubt ensure that they deliver sufficient returns to their clients, they must also reflect on the duties that they have not only to those who make contributions, but to society at large. That means not using public money to prop up industries that rail against our primary objectives, be they preventing violations of human rights, upholding our commitment to net zero or delivering unfettered justice for those who have been wronged, as in the case of those whose pension contributions made before 1997 have not risen with inflation. I wholeheartedly align myself with the hon. Member for Mid Dunbartonshire (Susan Murray) on the need for ethical parameters.
In tabling new clause 36, I hoped to bring a focus to the practices relating to pension funds that fall under the local government pension scheme—those that make provision for the employees of schools, universities, local authorities and police forces, to name just a few. Those pension fund managers preside over £390 billion in assets, under the management of members of the investment banking sector. Given that much, if not all, of the funding that flows from our schools, councils and the like comes from taxpayers’ money, we have a right to ensure that none of it is being put to waste. I regret to report, however, that these local government pension funds are heading for an absolute embarrassment of riches. While public money sits idle in a vault, lining the pockets of the investment bankers who manage the funds, we are experiencing deep funding crises in our schools, our universities and our local councils.
Year after year, since the moment when these pension funds were established, we have seen the same tactics deployed by those who preside over them. Councils, schools and others end up putting too much of their budgets towards employer contributions, leaving them with less money to spend on the things that matter, while obscene amounts of money are left to be used as a lucrative plaything for the investment banking sector.
When calculating the money that councils, schools and the like must pay into their employees’ pensions, the pension fund managers first estimate the annual rate of return that they expect to get from their assets. To do that, they enlist the work of an actuary firm—usually one of the “big four”—which takes into account market conditions and various risk factors in order to come up with a figure. The work of these actuaries is incredibly precise, yet every year they end up drastically underestimating the amount by which the local government pension funds will grow over the next year. Why? Because the local pension boards set the assumptions and parameters on the basis of which they make such calculations, often with the intention of overstating elements that may hit the fund’s assets, such as market volatility and uncertainty. From there, by default, they then skim a substantial percentage off the fund’s assets, usually about 0.5%. While that may not seem a lot, given that, for example, West Midlands Pension Fund holds £21.2 billion-worth of assets, it means that at least £1 billion is being scraped off the top every year.
When a highly conservative estimate for growth is combined with lofty management expenses, the result is one thing, and one thing only: our councils, schools and key institutions end up putting more than they need into the banking sector, under the guise of securing their employees a comfortable retirement. Then, once they get to the end of the year and have mysteriously exceeded their artificially conservative projections for growth, the pension fund managers are left with an even bigger pot of money, from which they take their mandatory percentage fee.
It is this repeated cycle of grossly inflating the contributions of our state institutions that is resulting in more and more taxpayer money being used not to fix our crumbling public services that benefit society as a whole, but for city bankers to make big bets on the market and make profits. It is the equivalent of pension funds setting the rules of the game, marking their own homework and keeping the proceeds for themselves, rather than refunding those who put into the system. It has got to the point that even the LGPS Scheme Advisory Board, which advises local pension boards, has said that they need to stop overcharging their clients and underestimating their growth. Unfortunately, however, all the power lies in the hands of the Secretary of State to make the changes that would put much-needed investment back into our schools, councils and the like.
I will give an example. Research by David Bailey, of the University of Birmingham, and John Clancy, of Birmingham City University, has shown that Birmingham city council has handed over £1.2 billion in employer contributions to the West Midlands Pension Fund in the past 10 years. By 2022 the council was being asked to pay an extra 37% on top of its standard bill, whereas the nine other core city councils in the UK were asked to pay an average of around 17%. Birmingham city council is calculated to have overpaid the West Midlands Pension Fund by roughly £547 million. In 2023 the council declared section 114 bankruptcy, and this year it has approved council tax rises of 21% and £300 million in cuts to vital services.
Hypothetically, had that payment never been made, Birmingham city council would have needed neither to declare bankruptcy, nor to approve budget cuts that reduced its offer to bare-bones skeleton services. The implications that clamping down on the excesses of local pension boards would have for local councils, schools and universities, and for the British taxpayer, are truly incomprehensible, yet as things stand we are shying away from rebalancing the books and from deploying as much of the Government’s investment into public services as we can.
That leads me to my new clause 36, which would put a cap on the investment expenses that can be claimed on LGPS pension funds. In the case of the West Midlands Pension Fund, the management expenses that are charged amount to an increase of four percentage points in employer contributions. Because the fund charges 60 basis points in management fees, Birmingham council tax payers are paying £13.4 million to the investment managers, which works out at £50 on every band D council tax payer’s bill. However, if new clause 36 were to be put in place, only £3.30 would be charged to every council tax payer’s bill. In the same period, the pension fund has consistently failed to report where the investment management expenses that it charges go, and whom they benefit.
As I say, my new clause 36 would implement a cap on the fees that investment bankers can take from pension funds. While that would certainly mark a great step forward in ensuring that excessive wealth gets put into the hands of the private sector, we must also do more to ensure that our schools and councils pay no more in employer contributions than they must, so that they can put more investment into things that really matter—whether that is local government funding for adult social care or for schoolchildren with special education needs, or being able to put more teaching staff in our classrooms.
Torsten Bell
With the leave of the House, I will respond to as many of the points raised as I can manage.
I thank hon. Members for their speeches today. They have shown not only the depth of knowledge in this House, but the breadth of pensions issues that matter to all of us and to our constituents. I start by thanking those who have welcomed some of the changes that we have introduced and set out today. My hon. Friends the Members for Oldham East and Saddleworth (Debbie Abrahams) and for Edinburgh South West (Dr Arthur) spoke about the PPF, and I appreciate their remarks. On the changes we have set out on the statutory guidance for trustees, the speech by my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Hodge Hill and Solihull North (Liam Byrne) is much appreciated, as is that from the hon. Member for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman).
Claire Hanna (Belfast South and Mid Down) (SDLP)
Like others, I was delighted to see in the Budget the pre-1997 indexing. The Minister will know that that softens but does not correct a wrong, and it leaves tens of thousands of former employees of Harland & Wolff and Visteon, including my constituents, without indexation. New clauses 28 and 29, in my name, would address that, and I hope the Minister might be able to incorporate them in the future.
Torsten Bell
I thank my hon. Friend for her intervention. I covered that extensively in my opening remarks.
I want to mention two points raised in the debate. The hon. Member for North West Norfolk (James Wild) asked about the timeline for the Pensions Commission. I can assure him that nothing is going slowly, so the final report will be delivered in early 2027, which is significantly quicker than the last one in the 2000s. I will update the House as soon as I have more to say on that front. The hon. Member for Caerfyrddin (Ann Davies) asked how many people will benefit from the change to the PPF indexation and how many will not benefit. The answer is that 250,000 members will benefit and 90,000 will not benefit, because their schemes did not provide for indexation in the scheme rules in the first place. I hope that answers the question she raised.
Neil Duncan-Jordan
I want to press the Minister slightly more on the need for UK pension funds not to invest in companies that could be guilty of war crimes and breaking international law. Would he like to reflect on that?
Torsten Bell
Specifically on the question of having regard to international law, I emphasise that compliance extends far beyond the LGPS, and it obviously reaches right across Government. That said, the LGPS, as a public sector scheme, has particularly high expectations on responsible investment, and I have heard the points my hon. Friend has made.
The hon. Members for Torbay (Steve Darling), for Horsham (John Milne) and for Stratford-on-Avon (Manuela Perteghella) broadened this debate beyond the LGPS, not least on questions of climate change and the wider social impact of investments. The Department for Work and Pensions is currently conducting a review of the task force on climate-related financial disclosures requirements, and we have also asked the Pensions Regulator to assess the practicalities of transition plans for pension schemes. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, we will also bring forward legislation to clarify that trustees can take systemic factors into account when making their investment decisions. I hope this provides hon. Members with significant reassurance on those points.
The hon. Members for North West Norfolk and for Torbay returned to the issue, which we discussed extensively in Committee and on Second Reading, on the limited reserve or backstop asset allocation power. As I have repeatedly made it clear to this House, we do not currently anticipate it will need to be used. That is precisely because of the industry’s commitment to the Mansion House accord and wider support from the pension industry for greater investment in private assets.
I welcome the recognition of the importance of the pipeline of projects by the hon. Member for Horsham, and I encourage him to make sure that no Liberal Democrat anywhere opposes construction projects—I have seen the leaflets—be they for energy, roads, housing or anything else.
A crucial point was raised in Committee about the importance of monitoring these commitments, and I can confirm that since then the ABI and Pensions UK have committed that they will work together to track progress. I hope that helps answer some of the questions raised in Committee.
The proposals to add to the matters on which the Government must report are, I believe, unnecessary, as any exercise of the power would be subject to a wide range of safeguards—not only the production of a report about the impacts on savers and growth, but a savers’ interest test.
The hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon spoke powerfully to her new clause 3, as did the hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole (Vikki Slade). I believe the PPF works hard to make sure that it can deal quickly with payments for people with terminal illness, and the Bill contains other measures that mean it can do that at an earlier point in someone’s prognosis. The SR1 form would already be sufficient for the PPF to provide the certainty that the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon is looking for. I have checked with the PPF to ensure that currently within the PPF and the FAS we do not currently have any outstanding requests for such payments where they have been unable to make them, for example for the reasons of not having sufficient evidence. That said, she has spoken powerfully on that point and I will speak to the PPF at my next meeting with the chief executive and the chair to see what more can be done. I thank her for raising those issues.
I also thank the hon. Member for Horsham for bringing us back to the question of advice and guidance. Most of us do need help in preparing for retirement. However, I take a slightly more positive view of the current provision of free guidance through the Money and Pensions Service. I also agree a bit more with the hon. Member for Mid Dunbartonshire (Susan Murray) that the task of Government is to reduce the complexity in our pensions system, rather than just hoping that ever more advice will help savers to navigate it. That is exactly why the parts of the Bill on guided retirement and small pots are so important as we move forward.
I would just like to cover some of the commitments I made in Committee. [Interruption.] I know this is going to be electric for all Members. That is the kind of enthusiasm I hope to see from more Members across the House. I will make a quick update on pensions dashboards, which at least one Member will appreciate. User testing on pensions dashboards has begun. I know that will thrill everybody in this House. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] That is the attitude we need! [Laughter.] It will ramp up over the course of the next year, with greater volumes and more focus on consumer behaviour. We will be conducting a full evaluation of pensions dashboards over the coming years as the service goes live. That will include the impact of dashboards on engagement with pensions. I commit to update the House on that work in due course.
Following on from other issues raised in Committee, I am pleased to report that following the findings of the curriculum and assessment review, the Government will make financial education compulsory in primary schools in England.
One issue raised in Committee was the Department’s monitoring and evaluation plans for the policy programme set out in the Bill, not least the guided retirement measures. Those comments have been taken on board; an updated impact assessment this week lays out how we intend to approach monitoring impact.
I have endeavoured to do justice to the very wide range of different issues raised during the debate today. I hope hon. Members will support Government amendments that build on policies that will make a real difference to all our constituents in the decades to come.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 30 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 31
Indexation of periodic compensation for pre-1997 service: Great Britain
“(1) Schedule 7 to the Pensions Act 2004 (pension compensation provisions) is amended in accordance with subsections (2) and (3).
(2) In paragraph 28—
(a) for sub-paragraph (2) substitute—
“(2) Where a person is entitled to periodic compensation under any of those paragraphs, the person is entitled, on the indexation date, to an increase under this paragraph of—
(a) where sub-paragraph (2A) applies, the aggregate of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2C) and the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2E);
(b) where sub-paragraph (2B) applies, the aggregate of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2D) and the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2E);
(c) in any other case, the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2E).
(2A) This sub-paragraph applies where, immediately before the assessment date—
(a) the admissible rules of the scheme included a requirement for all or any part of so much of the annual rate of a pension in payment under the scheme as is attributable to a person’s pre-1997 service to be increased annually,
(b) that requirement did not apply only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme, and
(c) that requirement applied in relation to pre-1997 service in respect of which the compensation is payable.
(2B) This sub-paragraph applies where—
(a) the scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period,
(b) that accrual was in relation to GMP indexed service in respect of which the compensation is payable, and
(c) immediately before the assessment date the admissible rules of the scheme—
(i) did not include a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), or
(ii) included such a requirement only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme.
(2C) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is—
(a) the appropriate percentage of the amount of the pre-1997 underlying rate immediately before the indexation date, or
(b) where the person first became entitled to the periodic compensation during the period of 12 months ending immediately before that date, 1/12th of that amount for each full month for which the person was so entitled.
(2D) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is—
(a) the appropriate percentage of the amount of the notional pre-1997 underlying rate immediately before the indexation date, or
(b) where the person first became entitled to the periodic compensation during the period of 12 months ending immediately before that date, 1/12th of that amount for each full month for which the person was so entitled.
(2E) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is—
(a) the appropriate percentage of the amount of the post-1997 underlying rate immediately before the indexation date, or
(b) where the person first became entitled to the periodic compensation during the period of 12 months ending immediately before that date, 1/12th of that amount for each full month for which the person was so entitled.
(2F) In any case where it is unclear to the Board whether, immediately before the assessment date, the admissible rules of the scheme included a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), this paragraph has effect as if the scheme included such a requirement.
(2G) In any case where it is unclear to the Board whether, immediately before the assessment date, a requirement of the scheme of a kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a) (including such a requirement included by virtue of sub-paragraph (2F)) applied in relation to particular pre-1997 service, this paragraph has effect as if the requirement applied in relation to such service.
(2H) In any case where it is unclear to the Board whether the scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period, this paragraph has effect as if the scheme so provided.
(2I) In any case where it is unclear to the Board whether the accrual of a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme (including by virtue of sub-paragraph (2H)) was in relation to particular GMP indexed service, this paragraph has effect as if the accrual was in relation to such service.”
(b) in sub-paragraph (3)—
(i) in the opening words for “sub-paragraph (2)” substitute “sub-paragraphs (2) to (2E)”;
(ii) for both definitions of “underlying rate” substitute—
““notional pre-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 3 or 22, the aggregate of—
(a) a prescribed percentage of so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service, and
(b) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amount within paragraph (a) of this definition immediately before the indexation date;
“notional pre-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 5, 8, 11 or 15, the aggregate of—
(a) a prescribed percentage of so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service,
(b) a prescribed percentage of so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(aa) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service, and
(c) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amounts within paragraphs (a) and (b) of this definition immediately before the indexation date;
“post-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 3 or 22, the aggregate of—
(a) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to post-1997 service, and
(b) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amount within paragraph (a) of this definition immediately before the indexation date;
“post-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 5, 8, 11 or 15, the aggregate of—
(a) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to post-1997 service,
(b) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(aa) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to post-1997 service, and
(c) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amounts within paragraphs (a) and (b) of this definition immediately before the indexation date;
“pre-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 3 or 22, the aggregate of—
(a) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service, and
(b) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amount within paragraph (a) of this definition immediately before the indexation date;
“pre-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 5, 8, 11 or 15, the aggregate of—
(a) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service,
(b) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(aa) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service, and
(c) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amounts within paragraphs (a) and (b) of this definition immediately before the indexation date.”;
(c) in sub-paragraph (5)—
(i) in paragraph (a), for “sub-paragraph (2), each definition of “underlying rate”” substitute “sub-paragraphs (2C) to (2E), each definition of “notional pre-1997 underlying rate”, “post-1997 underlying rate” and “pre-1997 underlying rate””;
(ii) in paragraph (c), for “sub-paragraph (2), the definition of “underlying rate”” substitute “sub-paragraphs (2C) to (2E), the definition of “notional pre-1997 underlying rate”, the definition of “post-1997 underlying rate” and the definition of “pre-1997 underlying rate””;
(d) in sub-paragraph (6), before the definition of “post-1997 service” insert—
““GMP indexation period” means the period beginning with 6 April 1988 and ending with 5 April 1997;
“GMP indexed service” means—
(a) pensionable service which is within paragraph 36(4)(a) and occurs during the GMP indexation period, or
(b) pensionable service which is within paragraph 36(4)(b) and meets such requirements as may be prescribed;
“guaranteed minimum pension” has the same meaning as in the Pension Schemes Act 1993 (see section 8(2) of that Act);”;
(e) in sub-paragraph (7), for “and “pre-1997 service”” substitute “, “pre-1997 service” and “GMP indexed service””.
(3) In paragraph 29, for sub-paragraph (2) substitute—
“(2) The Board may also determine the percentage that is to be—
(a) the appropriate percentage for the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2C) and (2D) of paragraph 28;
(b) the appropriate percentage for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2E) of that paragraph,
(and where it does so, the definition of “appropriate percentage” in paragraph 28(3) does not apply in relation to the sub-paragraph in question).”
(4) Schedule 5 to the Pensions Act 2008 (pension compensation payable on discharge of pension compensation credit) is amended in accordance with subsections (5) and (6).
(5) In paragraph 17—
(a) for sub-paragraph (2) substitute—
“(2) Subject to sub-paragraph (3), the transferee is entitled, on each indexation date, to an increase of—
(a) where sub-paragraph (2A) applies, the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2E);
(b) where sub-paragraph (2B) applies, the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2F);
(c) where sub-paragraph (2C) applies, the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2G);
(d) where sub-paragraph (2D) applies, the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2H).
(2A) This sub-paragraph applies where—
(a) the transferor's PPF compensation is payable in accordance with paragraph 3, 5, 8, 11, 15 or 22 of Schedule 7 to the Pensions Act 2004 (“the relevant Schedule 7 provisions”), and
(b) immediately before the assessment date—
(i) the admissible rules of the scheme in respect of which that compensation is payable included a requirement for all or any part of so much of the annual rate of a pension in payment under the scheme as is attributable to a person’s pre-1997 service to be increased annually,
(ii) that requirement did not apply only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme, and
(iii) that requirement applied in relation to pre-1997 service in respect of which that compensation is payable.
(2B) This sub-paragraph applies where—
(a) the transferor's PPF compensation is payable in accordance with the relevant Schedule 7 provisions,
(b) the scheme in respect of which that compensation is payable provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period,
(c) that accrual was in relation to GMP indexed service in respect of which that compensation is payable, and
(d) immediately before the assessment date the admissible rules of that scheme—
(i) did not include a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(b)(i), or
(ii) included such a requirement only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme.
(2C) This sub-paragraph applies where—
(a) the transferor's PPF compensation is payable in accordance with the relevant Schedule 7 provisions, and
(b) neither sub-paragraph (2A) nor sub-paragraph (2B) applies.
(2D) This sub-paragraph applies where the transferor's PPF compensation is payable otherwise than in accordance with the relevant Schedule 7 provisions.
(2E) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is the aggregate of the appropriate percentage of the pre-1997 underlying rate and the appropriate percentage of the post-1997 underlying rate.
(2F) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is the aggregate of the appropriate percentage of the notional pre-1997 underlying rate and the appropriate percentage of the post-1997 underlying rate.
(2G) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is the appropriate percentage of the post-1997 underlying rate.
(2H) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is the appropriate percentage of the general underlying rate.”
(b) in sub-paragraph (3), for “(2)” substitute “(2E), (2F), (2G) or (2H) (as the case may be)”;
(c) after sub-paragraph (3) insert—
“(3A) For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2A) to (2C)—
(a) in any case where it is unclear to the Board whether, immediately before the assessment date, the admissible rules of the scheme included a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(b)(i), those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme included such a requirement;
(b) in any case where it is unclear to the Board whether, immediately before the assessment date, a requirement of the scheme of a kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(b)(i) (including such a requirement included by virtue of paragraph (a)) applied in relation to particular pre-1997 service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the requirement applied in relation to such service;
(c) in any case where it is unclear to the Board whether the scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme so provided;
(d) in any case where it is unclear to the Board whether the accrual of a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme (including by virtue of paragraph (c)) was in relation to particular GMP indexed service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the accrual was in relation to such service.”
(d) in sub-paragraph (4)—
(i) in the opening words, for “sub-paragraph (2)” substitute “sub-paragraphs (2) to (2H)”;
(ii) for the definition of “the underlying rate” substitute—
““the general underlying rate” , as at an indexation date, is the aggregate of—
(a) the general indexed proportion of the aggregate of the initial annual rate of compensation and (in the case of compensation payable under paragraph 6), the revaluation amount,
(b) so much of any actuarial increase under paragraph 16A as relates to the amount in paragraph (a), and
(c) so much of any annual increase to which the transferee is entitled under this paragraph in respect of earlier indexation dates as relates to the amounts in paragraphs (a) and (b);
“the notional pre-1997 underlying rate” , as at an indexation date, is the aggregate of—
(a) the notional pre-1997 indexed proportion of the aggregate of the initial annual rate of compensation and (in the case of compensation payable under paragraph 6), the revaluation amount,
(b) so much of any actuarial increase under paragraph 16A as relates to the amount in paragraph (a), and
(c) so much of any annual increase to which the transferee is entitled under this paragraph in respect of earlier indexation dates as relates to the amounts in paragraphs (a) and (b);
“the post-1997 underlying rate” , as at an indexation date, is the aggregate of—
(a) the post-1997 indexed proportion of the aggregate of the initial annual rate of compensation and (in the case of compensation payable under paragraph 6), the revaluation amount,
(b) so much of any actuarial increase under paragraph 16A as relates to the amount in paragraph (a), and
(c) so much of any annual increase to which the transferee is entitled under this paragraph in respect of earlier indexation dates as relates to the amounts in paragraphs (a) and (b);
“the pre-1997 underlying rate” , as at an indexation date, is the aggregate of—
(a) the pre-1997 indexed proportion of the aggregate of the initial annual rate of compensation and (in the case of compensation payable under paragraph 6), the revaluation amount,
(b) so much of any actuarial increase under paragraph 16A as relates to the amount in paragraph (a), and
(c) so much of any annual increase to which the transferee is entitled under this paragraph in respect of earlier indexation dates as relates to the amounts in paragraphs (a) and (b).”;
(e) omit sub-paragraphs (5) and (6);
(f) before sub-paragraph (7) insert—
“(6A) For the purposes of paragraph (a) of the definition of “the general underlying rate”, “the general indexed proportion” is such proportion as is determined in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of State.
(6B) For the purposes of paragraph (a) of the definition of “the notional pre-1997 underlying rate”, “the notional pre-1997 indexed proportion” is such proportion of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph of Schedule 7 to the Pensions Act 2004 under which the transferor’s PPF compensation is payable that is attributable to pre-1997 service as may be prescribed.
(6C) For the purposes of paragraph (a) of the definition of “the post-1997 underlying rate”, “the post-1997 indexed proportion” is the proportion of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph of that Schedule under which the transferor’s PPF compensation is payable that is attributable to post-1997 service.
(6D) For the purposes of paragraph (a) of the definition of “the pre-1997 underlying rate”, “the pre-1997 indexed proportion” is the proportion of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph of that Schedule under which the transferor’s PPF compensation is payable that is attributable to pre-1997 service.”;
(g) in sub-paragraph (7), for ““the underlying rate”” substitute ““the general underlying rate”, the definition of “the notional pre-1997 underlying rate”, the definition of “the post-1997 underlying rate” and the definition of “the pre-1997 underlying rate””;
(h) in paragraph (9)—
(i) before the definition of “post-1997 service” insert—
““GMP indexation period” means the period beginning with 6 April 1988 and ending with 5 April 1997;
“guaranteed minimum pension” has the same meaning as in the Pension Schemes Act 1993 (see section 8(2) of that Act);”;
(ii) in the definition of “post-1997 service” for “has” substitute “, “pre-1997 service” and “GMP indexed service” have”;
(iii) after that definition insert—
““the assessment date” , in relation to a pension scheme, has the same meaning as in that Schedule (see paragraph 2 of that Schedule);”.
(6) In paragraph 20, in sub-paragraph (1)(b), for “for the purposes of paragraph 17(2)” substitute “—
(i) of the pre-1997 underlying rate and of the notional pre-1997 underlying rate for the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2E) and (2F) of paragraph 17;
(ii) of the post-1997 underlying rate for the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2E), (2F) and (2G) of that paragraph;
(iii) of the general underlying rate for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2H) of that paragraph.””—(Torsten Bell.)
This new clause makes provision for certain compensation paid by the Pension Protection Fund in respect of a person’s pre-1997 pensionable service under legislation extending to England and Wales and Scotland to be increased annually.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 32
Indexation of periodic compensation for pre-1997 service: Northern Ireland
“(1) Schedule 6 to the Pensions (Northern Ireland) Order 2005 (S.I. 2005/255 (N.I. 1)) (pension compensation provisions) is amended in accordance with subsections (2) and (3).
(2) In paragraph 28—
(a) for sub-paragraph (2) substitute—
“(2) Where a person is entitled to periodic compensation under any of those paragraphs, the person is entitled, on the indexation date, to an increase under this paragraph of—
(a) where sub-paragraph (2A) applies, the aggregate of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2C) and the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2E);
(b) where sub-paragraph (2B) applies, the aggregate of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2D) and the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2E);
(c) in any other case, the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2E).
(2A) This sub-paragraph applies where, immediately before the assessment date—
(a) the admissible rules of the scheme included a requirement for all or any part of so much of the annual rate of a pension in payment under the scheme as is attributable to a person’s pre-1997 service to be increased annually,
(b) that requirement did not apply only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme, and
(c) that requirement applied in relation to pre-1997 service in respect of which the compensation is payable.
(2B) This sub-paragraph applies where—
(a) the scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period,
(b) that accrual was in relation to GMP indexed service in respect of which the compensation is payable, and
(c) immediately before the assessment date the admissible rules of the scheme—
(i) did not include a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), or
(ii) included such a requirement only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme.
(2C) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is—
(a) the appropriate percentage of the amount of the pre-1997 underlying rate immediately before the indexation date, or
(b) where the person first became entitled to the periodic compensation during the period of 12 months ending immediately before that date, 1/12th of that amount for each full month for which the person was so entitled.
(2D) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is—
(a) the appropriate percentage of the amount of the notional pre-1997 underlying rate immediately before the indexation date, or
(b) where the person first became entitled to the periodic compensation during the period of 12 months ending immediately before that date, 1/12th of that amount for each full month for which the person was so entitled.
(2E) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is—
(a) the appropriate percentage of the amount of the post-1997 underlying rate immediately before the indexation date, or
(b) where the person first became entitled to the periodic compensation during the period of 12 months ending immediately before that date, 1/12th of that amount for each full month for which the person was so entitled.
(2F) In any case where it is unclear to the Board whether, immediately before the assessment date, the admissible rules of the scheme included a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), this paragraph has effect as if the scheme included such a requirement.
(2G) In any case where it is unclear to the Board whether, immediately before the assessment date, a requirement of the scheme of a kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a) (including such a requirement included by virtue of sub-paragraph (2F)) applied in relation to particular pre-1997 service, this paragraph has effect as if the requirement applied in relation to such service.
(2H) In any case where it is unclear to the Board whether the scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period, this paragraph has effect as if the scheme so provided.
(2I) In any case where it is unclear to the Board whether the accrual of a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme (including by virtue of sub-paragraph (2H)) was in relation to particular GMP indexed service, this paragraph has effect as if the accrual was in relation to such service.”
(b) in sub-paragraph (3)—
(i) in the opening words for “sub-paragraph (2)” substitute “sub-paragraphs (2) to (2E)”;
(ii) for both definitions of “underlying rate” substitute—
““notional pre-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 3 or 22, the aggregate of—
(a) a prescribed percentage of so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service, and
(b) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amount within paragraph (a) of this definition immediately before the indexation date;
“notional pre-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 5, 8, 11 or 15, the aggregate of—
(a) a prescribed percentage of so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service,
(b) a prescribed percentage of so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(aa) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service, and
(c) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amounts within paragraphs (a) and (b) of this definition immediately before the indexation date;
“post-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 3 or 22, the aggregate of—
(a) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to post-1997 service, and
(b) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amount within paragraph (a) of this definition immediately before the indexation date;
“post-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 5, 8, 11 or 15, the aggregate of—
(a) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to post-1997 service,
(b) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(aa) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to post-1997 service, and
(c) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amounts within paragraphs (a) and (b) of this definition immediately before the indexation date;
“pre-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 3 or 22, the aggregate of—
(a) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service, and
(b) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amount within paragraph (a) of this definition immediately before the indexation date;
“pre-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 5, 8, 11 or 15, the aggregate of—
(a) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service,
(b) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(aa) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service, and
(c) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amounts within paragraphs (a) and (b) of this definition immediately before the indexation date.”;
(c) in sub-paragraph (5)—
(i) in paragraph (a), for “sub-paragraph (2), each definition of “underlying rate”” substitute “sub-paragraphs (2C) to (2E), each definition of “notional pre-1997 underlying rate”, “post-1997 underlying rate” and “pre-1997 underlying rate””;
(ii) in paragraph (c), for “sub-paragraph (2), the definition of “underlying rate”” substitute “sub-paragraphs (2C) to (2E), the definition of “notional pre-1997 underlying rate”, the definition of “post-1997 underlying rate” and the definition of “pre-1997 underlying rate””;
(d) in sub-paragraph (6), before the definition of “post-1997 service” insert—
““GMP indexation period” means the period beginning with 6 April 1988 and ending with 5 April 1997;
“GMP indexed service” means—
(a) pensionable service which is within paragraph 36(4)(a) and occurs during the GMP indexation period, or
(b) pensionable service which is within paragraph 36(4)(b) and meets such requirements as may be prescribed;
“guaranteed minimum pension” has the same meaning as in the Pension Schemes Act (see section 4(2) of that Act);”;
(e) in sub-paragraph (7), for “and “pre-1997 service”” substitute “, “pre-1997 service” and “GMP indexed service””.
(3) In paragraph 29, for sub-paragraph (2) substitute—
“(2) The Board may also determine the percentage that is to be—
(a) the appropriate percentage for the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2C) and (2D) of paragraph 28;
(b) the appropriate percentage for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2E) of that paragraph,
(and where it does so, the definition of “appropriate percentage” in paragraph 28(3) does not apply in relation to the sub-paragraph in question).”
(4) Schedule 4 to the Pensions (No.2) Act (Northern Ireland) 2008 (pension compensation payable on discharge of pension compensation credit) is amended in accordance with subsections (5) and (6).
(5) In paragraph 17—
(a) for sub-paragraph (2) substitute—
“(2) Subject to sub-paragraph (3), the transferee is entitled, on each indexation date, to an increase of—
(a) where sub-paragraph (2A) applies, the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2E);
(b) where sub-paragraph (2B) applies, the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2F);
(c) where sub-paragraph (2C) applies, the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2G);
(d) where sub-paragraph (2D) applies, the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2H).
(2A) This sub-paragraph applies where—
(a) the transferor's PPF compensation is payable in accordance with paragraph 3, 5, 8, 11, 15 or 22 of Schedule 6 to the 2005 Order (“the relevant Schedule 6 provisions”), and
(b) immediately before the assessment date —
(i) the admissible rules of the scheme in respect of which that compensation is payable included a requirement for all or any part of so much of the annual rate of a pension in payment under the scheme as is attributable to a person’s pre-1997 service to be increased annually,
(ii) that requirement did not apply only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme, and
(iii) that requirement applied in relation to pre-1997 service in respect of which that compensation is payable.
(2B) This sub-paragraph applies where—
(a) the transferor's PPF compensation is payable in accordance with the relevant Schedule 6 provisions,
(b) the scheme in respect of which that compensation is payable provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period,
(c) that accrual was in relation to GMP indexed service in respect of which that compensation is payable, and
(d) immediately before the assessment date the admissible rules of that scheme—
(i) did not include a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(b)(i), or
(ii) included such a requirement only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme.
(2C) This sub-paragraph applies where—
(a) the transferor's PPF compensation is payable in accordance with the relevant Schedule 6 provisions, and
(b) neither sub-paragraph (2A) nor sub-paragraph (2B) applies.
(2D) This sub-paragraph applies where the transferor's PPF compensation is payable otherwise than in accordance with the relevant Schedule 6 provisions.
(2E) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is the aggregate of the appropriate percentage of the pre-1997 underlying rate and the appropriate percentage of the post-1997 underlying rate.
(2F) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is the aggregate of the appropriate percentage of the notional pre-1997 underlying rate and the appropriate percentage of the post-1997 underlying rate.
(2G) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is the appropriate percentage of the post-1997 underlying rate.
(2H) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is the appropriate percentage of the general underlying rate.”
(b) in sub-paragraph (3), for “(2)” substitute “(2E), (2F), (2G) or (2H) (as the case may be)”;
(c) after sub-paragraph (3) insert—
“(3A) For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2A) to (2C)—
(a) in any case where it is unclear to the Board whether, immediately before the assessment date, the admissible rules of the scheme included a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub- paragraph (2A)(b)(i), those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme included such a requirement;
(b) in any case where it is unclear to the Board whether, immediately before the assessment date, a requirement of the scheme of a kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(b)(i) (including such a requirement included by virtue of paragraph (a)) applied in relation to particular pre-1997 service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the requirement applied in relation to such service;
(c) in any case where it is unclear to the Board whether the scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme so provided;
(d) in any case where it is unclear to the Board whether the accrual of a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme (including by virtue of paragraph (c)) was in relation to particular GMP indexed service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the accrual was in relation to such service.”
(d) in sub-paragraph (4)—
(i) in the opening words, for “sub-paragraph (2)” substitute “sub-paragraphs (2) to (2H)”;
(ii) for the definition of “the underlying rate” substitute—
““the general underlying rate” , as at an indexation date, is the aggregate of—
(a) the general indexed proportion of the aggregate of the initial annual rate of compensation and (in the case of compensation payable under paragraph 6), the revaluation amount,
(b) so much of any actuarial increase under paragraph 16A as relates to the amount in paragraph (a), and
(c) so much of any annual increase to which the transferee is entitled under this paragraph in respect of earlier indexation dates as relates to the amounts in paragraphs (a) and (b);
“the notional pre-1997 underlying rate” , as at an indexation date, is the aggregate of—
(a) the notional pre-1997 indexed proportion of the aggregate of the initial annual rate of compensation and (in the case of compensation payable under paragraph 6), the revaluation amount,
(b) so much of any actuarial increase under paragraph 16A as relates to the amount in paragraph (a), and
(c) so much of any annual increase to which the transferee is entitled under this paragraph in respect of earlier indexation dates as relates to the amounts in paragraphs (a) and (b);
“the post-1997 underlying rate” , as at an indexation date, is the aggregate of—
(a) the post-1997 indexed proportion of the aggregate of the initial annual rate of compensation and (in the case of compensation payable under paragraph 6), the revaluation amount,
(b) so much of any actuarial increase under paragraph 16A as relates to the amount in paragraph (a), and
(c) so much of any annual increase to which the transferee is entitled under this paragraph in respect of earlier indexation dates as relates to the amounts in paragraphs (a) and (b);
“the pre-1997 underlying rate” , as at an indexation date, is the aggregate of—
(a) the pre-1997 indexed proportion of the aggregate of the initial annual rate of compensation and (in the case of compensation payable under paragraph 6), the revaluation amount,
(b) so much of any actuarial increase under paragraph 16A as relates to the amount in paragraph (a), and
(c) so much of any annual increase to which the transferee is entitled under this paragraph in respect of earlier indexation dates as relates to the amounts in paragraphs (a) and (b).”;
(e) omit sub-paragraphs (5) and (6);
(f) before sub-paragraph (7) insert—
“(6A) For the purposes of paragraph (a) of the definition of “the general underlying rate”, “the general indexed proportion” is such proportion as is determined in accordance with regulations made by the Department.
(6B) For the purposes of paragraph (a) of the definition of “the notional pre-1997 underlying rate”, “the notional pre-1997 indexed proportion” is such proportion of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph of Schedule 6 to the 2005 Order under which the transferor’s PPF compensation is payable that is attributable to pre-1997 service as may be prescribed.
(6C) For the purposes of paragraph (a) of the definition of “the post-1997 underlying rate”, “the post-1997 indexed proportion” is the proportion of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph of that Schedule under which the transferor’s PPF compensation is payable that is attributable to post-1997 service.
(6D) For the purposes of paragraph (a) of the definition of “the pre-1997 underlying rate”, “the pre-1997 indexed proportion” is the proportion of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph of that Schedule under which the transferor’s PPF compensation is payable that is attributable to pre-1997 service.”;
(g) in sub-paragraph (7), for ““the underlying rate”” substitute ““the general underlying rate”, the definition of “the notional pre-1997 underlying rate”, the definition of “the post-1997 underlying rate” and the definition of “the pre-1997 underlying rate””;
(h) for sub-paragraph 9 substitute—
“(9) In this paragraph—
“GMP indexation period” means the period beginning with 6 April 1988 and ending with 5 April 1997;
“guaranteed minimum pension” has the same meaning as in the Pension Schemes Act (see section 4(2) of that Act);
“post-1997 service” , “pre-1997 service” and “GMP indexed service” have the same meaning as in paragraph 28 of Schedule 6 to the 2005 Order (annual increase in periodic compensation);
“the assessment date” , in relation to a pension scheme, has the same meaning as in that Schedule (see paragraph 2 of that Schedule).”
(6) In paragraph 20, in sub-paragraph (1)(b), for “for the purposes of paragraph 17(2)” substitute “—
(i) of the pre-1997 underlying rate and of the notional pre-1997 underlying rate for the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2E) and (2F) of paragraph 17;
(ii) of the post-1997 underlying rate for the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2E), (2F) and (2G) of that paragraph;
(iii) of the general underlying rate for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2H) of that paragraph.””—(Torsten Bell.)
This new clause makes provision for certain compensation paid by the Pension Protection Fund in respect of a person’s pre-1997 pensionable service under legislation extending to Northern Ireland to be increased annually.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 33
Financial Assistance Scheme: indexation of payments for pre-1997 service
“(1) The Financial Assistance Scheme Regulations 2005 (S.I. 2005/1986) are amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph 7(1)(b) of Schedule 2 (determination of annual and initial payments), after “(b)(i)” insert “, (ia) and (ib)”.
(3) Paragraph 9 of that Schedule is amended in accordance with subsections (4) to (6).
(4) In sub-paragraph (2)—
(a) in paragraph (a) of the definition of “underlying rate”, after sub-paragraph (i) insert—
“(ia) where sub-paragraph (2A) applies, the product of X multiplied by so much of the expected pension as is attributable to pre-1997 service;
(ib) where sub-paragraph (2B) applies, the product of X multiplied by the relevant percentage of so much of the expected pension as is attributable to pre-1997 service;”;
(b) in paragraph (b) of the definition of “underlying rate”—
(i) omit the “and” at the end of sub-paragraph (i);
(ii) after that sub-paragraph insert—
“(ia) where sub-paragraph (2A) applies, so much of the expected pension as is, proportionally, attributable to pre-1997 service;
(ib) where sub-paragraph (2B) applies, the relevant percentage of so much of the expected pension as is, proportionally, attributable to pre-1997 service; and”;
(c) after the definition of “post-1997 service” insert—
““pre-1997 service” means—
(a) pensionable service (whether actual or notional) which occurs before 6th April 1997; or
(b) where the annual payment is payable to, or in respect of, a qualifying member who is, or was, a pension credit member of the scheme, pension credit rights deriving from rights attributable to service (whether actual or notional) which occurred before 6th April 1997;
“relevant percentage” means such percentage as may be determined by the Secretary of State;”.
(5) After sub-paragraph (2) insert—
“(2A) This sub-paragraph applies where, immediately before the qualifying pension scheme began to wind up—
(a) the scheme rules included a requirement for all or any part of so much of the annual rate of a pension in payment under the scheme as is attributable to a person’s pre-1997 service to be increased annually,
(b) that requirement did not apply only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme, and
(c) that requirement applied in relation to pre-1997 service in respect of which the annual payment is payable.
(2B) This sub-paragraph applies where—
(a) the qualifying pension scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period,
(b) that accrual was in relation to GMP indexed service in respect of which the annual payment is payable, and
(c) immediately before the scheme began to wind up the scheme rules—
(i) did not include a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), or
(ii) included such a requirement only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme.
(2C) For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2A) and (2B)—
(a) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether, immediately before the scheme began to wind up, the scheme rules included a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme included such a requirement;
(b) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether, immediately before the scheme began to wind up, a requirement of the scheme of a kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a) (including such a requirement included by virtue of paragraph (a)) applied in relation to particular pre-1997 service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the requirement applied in relation to such service;
(c) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether the scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme so provided;
(d) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether the accrual of a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme (including by virtue of paragraph (c)) was in relation to particular GMP indexed service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the accrual was in relation to such service.
(2D) In sub-paragraphs (2B) and (2C)—
“GMP indexation period” means the period beginning with 6 April 1988 and ending with 5 April 1997;
“GMP indexed service” means—
(a) pensionable service (whether actual or notional) which occurs during the GMP indexation period; or
(b) where the annual payment is payable to, or in respect of, a qualifying member who is, or was, a pension credit member of the scheme, pension credit rights deriving from rights attributable to service (whether actual or notional) which occurred during the GMP indexation period.”
(6) In sub-paragraph (3)—
(a) after “attributable to” insert “pre-1997 service or”;
(b) for “that amount” substitute “the amount in question”.
(7) In paragraph 7(1)(b) of Schedule 2A (determination of ill health and interim ill health payments), after “(b)(i)” insert “, (ia) and (ib)”.
(8) Paragraph 9 of that Schedule is amended in accordance with subsections (9) to (11).
(9) In sub-paragraph (2)—
(a) after the definition of “E” insert—
““EA” means so much of the expected pension as is attributable to pre-1997 service;
“EB” means the relevant percentage of so much of the expected pension as is attributable to pre-1997 service;”;
(b) after the definition of “post-1997 service” insert—
““pre-1997 service” means—
(a) pensionable service (whether actual or notional) which occurs before 6th April 1997; or
(b) where the ill health payment is payable to, or in respect of, a qualifying member who is, or was, a pension credit member of the scheme, pension credit rights deriving from rights attributable to service (whether actual or notional) which occurred before 6th April 1997;
“relevant percentage” means such percentage as may be determined by the Secretary of State;”;
(c) in paragraph (a) of the definition of “underlying rate”, after sub-paragraph (i) insert—
“(ia) where sub-paragraph (2A) applies, the product of X multiplied by (C x EA);
(ib) where sub-paragraph (2B) applies, the product of X multiplied by (C x EB);”;
(d) in paragraph (b) of the definition of “underlying rate”—
(i) omit the “and” at the end of sub-paragraph (i);
(ii) after that sub-paragraph insert—
“(ia) where sub-paragraph (2A) applies, so much of the amount “A” for the purposes of paragraph 2 as is, proportionately, attributable to pre-1997 service;
(ib) where sub-paragraph (2B) applies, the relevant percentage of so much of the amount “A” for the purposes of paragraph 2 as is, proportionately, attributable to pre-1997 service; and”;
(10) After sub-paragraph (2) insert—
“(2A) This sub-paragraph applies where immediately before the qualifying pension scheme began to wind up—
(a) the scheme rules included a requirement for all or any part of so much of the annual rate of a pension in payment under the scheme as is attributable to a person’s pre-1997 service to be increased annually,
(b) that requirement did not apply only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme, and
(c) that requirement applied in relation to pre-1997 service in respect of which the ill health payment is payable.
(2B) This sub-paragraph applies where—
(a) the qualifying pension scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period,
(b) that accrual was in relation to GMP indexed service in respect of which the ill health payment is payable, and
(c) immediately before the scheme began to wind up the scheme rules—
(i) did not include a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), or
(ii) included such a requirement only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme
(2C) For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2A) and (2B)—
(a) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether, immediately before the scheme began to wind up, the scheme rules included a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme included such a requirement;
(b) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether, immediately before the scheme began to wind up, a requirement of the scheme of a kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a) (including such a requirement included by virtue of paragraph (a)) applied in relation to particular pre-1997 service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the requirement applied in relation to such service;
(c) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether the scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme so provided;
(d) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether the accrual of a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme (including by virtue of paragraph (c)) was in relation to particular GMP indexed service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the accrual was in relation to such service.
(2D) In sub-paragraphs (2A) to (2C)—
“GMP indexation period” means the period beginning with 6 April 1988 and ending with 5 April 1997;
“GMP indexed service” means—
(a) pensionable service (whether actual or notional) which occurs during the GMP indexation period; or
(b) where the ill health payment is payable to, or in respect of, a qualifying member who is, or was, a pension credit member of the scheme, pension credit rights deriving from rights attributable to service (whether actual or notional) which occurred during the GMP indexation period;
“guaranteed minimum pension” has the meaning given in section 8(2) of the 1993 Act.”
(11) In sub-paragraph (3)—
(a) after “attributable to” insert “pre-1997 service or”;
(b) for “that amount” substitute “the amount in question”.
(12) In paragraph 6 of Schedule 3 (determination of certain annual payments)—
(a) in sub-paragraph (2)—
(i) in the definition of “underlying rate”, after paragraph (a) insert—
“(aa) where sub-paragraph (2A) applies, the product of X multiplied by—
(i) where the beneficiary is a qualifying member or a survivor or surviving dependant of a qualifying member who died on or after the calculation date—
(aa) where the qualifying member is not a qualifying member to whom regulation 17D applied, so much of the revalued notional pension as is attributable to pre-1997 service; or
(bb) where the qualifying member is a qualifying member to whom regulation 17D applied, so much of the sum of R-A as is attributable to pre-1997 service; and
(ii) where the beneficiary is a survivor or surviving dependant in respect of whom a survivor notional pension has been determined, so much of the survivor notional pension as is attributable to the qualifying member’s pre-1997 service;
(ab) where sub-paragraph (2B) applies, the product of X multiplied by—
(i) where the beneficiary is a qualifying member or a survivor or surviving dependant of a qualifying member who died on or after the calculation date—
(aa) where the qualifying member is not a qualifying member to whom regulation 17D applied, the relevant percentage of so much of the revalued notional pension as is attributable to pre-1997 service; or
(bb) where the qualifying member is a qualifying member to whom regulation 17D applied, the relevant percentage of so much of the sum of R-A as is attributable to pre-1997 service; and
(ii) where the beneficiary is a survivor or surviving dependant in respect of whom a survivor notional pension has been determined, the relevant percentage of so much of the survivor notional pension as is attributable to the qualifying member’s pre-1997 service;”;
(iii) after the definition of “post-1997 service” insert—
““pre-1997 service” means—
(a) pensionable service (either actual or notional) which occurred before 6th April 1997; or
(b) where the pension was payable to, or in respect of, a qualifying member who is, or was, a pension credit member of the scheme, pension credit rights deriving from rights attributable to service (whether actual or notional) which occurred before 6th April 1997;
“relevant percentage” means such percentage as may be determined by the Secretary of State;”;
(b) after sub-paragraph (2) insert—
“(2A) This sub-paragraph applies where immediately before the qualifying pension scheme began to wind up—
(a) the scheme rules included a requirement for all or any part of so much of the annual rate of a pension in payment under the scheme as is attributable to a person’s pre-1997 service to be increased annually,
(b) that requirement did not apply only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme, and
(c) that requirement applied in relation to pre-1997 service in respect of which the annual payment is payable.
(2B) This sub-paragraph applies where—
(a) the qualifying pension scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period,
(b) that accrual was in relation to GMP indexed service in respect of which the annual payment is payable, and
(c) immediately before the scheme began to wind up the scheme rules—
(i) did not include a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), or
(ii) included such a requirement only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme.
(2C) For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2A) and (2B)—
(a) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether, immediately before the scheme began to wind up, the scheme rules included a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme included such a requirement;
(b) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether, immediately before the scheme began to wind up, a requirement of the scheme of a kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a) (including such a requirement included by virtue of paragraph (a)) applied in relation to particular pre-1997 service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the requirement applied in relation to such service;
(c) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether the scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme so provided;
(d) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether the accrual of a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme (including by virtue of paragraph (c)) was in relation to particular GMP indexed service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the accrual was in relation to such service.
(2D) In sub-paragraphs (2A) to (2C)—
“GMP indexation period” means the period beginning with 6 April 1988 and ending with 5 April 1997;
“GMP indexed service” means—
(a) pensionable service (whether actual or notional) which occurs during the GMP indexation period; or
(b) where the pension was payable to, or in respect of, a qualifying member who is, or was, a pension credit member of the scheme, pension credit rights deriving from rights attributable to service (whether actual or notional) which occurred during the GMP indexation period;
“guaranteed minimum pension” has the meaning given in section 8(2) of the 1993 Act.”;
(c) in sub-paragraph (3), after “attributable to” insert “pre-1997 service and”.
(13) In paragraph 6 of Schedule 5 (determination of certain ill health payments)—
(a) in sub-paragraph (2)—
(i) in the definition of “underlying rate”, after paragraph (a) insert—
“(aa) where sub-paragraph (2A) applies, the product of X multiplied by (C x VA);
(ab) where sub-paragraph (2B) applies, the product of X multiplied by (C x VB);”;
(ii) after the definition of “post-1997 service” insert—
““pre-1997 service” means—
(a) pensionable service (either actual or notional) which occurred before 6th April 1997; or
(b) where the pension was payable to, or in respect of, a qualifying member who is, or was, a pension credit member of the scheme, pension credit rights deriving from rights attributable to service (whether actual or notional) which occurred before 6th April 1997;
“relevant percentage” means such percentage as may be determined by the Secretary of State;”;
(iii) after the definition of “V” insert—
““VA” means—
(a) where the beneficiary is a qualifying member or a survivor or surviving dependant of a qualifying member who died on or after the calculation date—
(i) where the qualifying member is not a qualifying member to whom regulation 17D applied, so much of the revalued notional pension as is attributable to pre-1997 service; or
(ii) where the qualifying member is a qualifying member to whom regulation 17D applied, so much of the sum of R-A as is attributable to pre-1997 service; and
(b) where the beneficiary is a survivor or surviving dependant in respect of whom a survivor notional pension has been determined, so much of the survivor notional pension as is attributable to the qualifying member’s pre-1997 service;
“VB” means—
(a) where the beneficiary is a qualifying member or a survivor or surviving dependant of a qualifying member who died on or after the calculation date—
(i) where the qualifying member is not a qualifying member to whom regulation 17D applied, the relevant percentage of so much of the revalued notional pension as is attributable to pre-1997 service; or
(ii) where the qualifying member is a qualifying member to whom regulation 17D applied, the relevant percentage of so much of the sum of R-A as is attributable to pre-1997 service; and
(b) where the beneficiary is a survivor or surviving dependant in respect of whom a survivor notional pension has been determined, the relevant percentage of so much of the survivor notional pension as is attributable to the qualifying member’s pre-1997 service;”;
(b) after sub-paragraph (2) insert—
“(2A) This sub-paragraph applies where immediately before the qualifying pension scheme began to wind up—
(a) the scheme rules included a requirement for all or any part of so much of the annual rate of a pension in payment under the scheme as is attributable to a person’s pre-1997 service to be increased annually,
(b) that requirement did not apply only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme, and
(c) that requirement applied in relation to pre-1997 service in respect of which the ill health payment is payable.
(2B) This sub-paragraph applies where—
(a) the qualifying pension scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period,
(b) that accrual was in relation to GMP indexed service in respect of which the ill health payment is payable, and
(c) immediately before the scheme began to wind up the scheme rules—
(i) did not include a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), or
(ii) included such a requirement only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme.
(2C) For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2A) and (2B)—
(a) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether, immediately before the scheme began to wind up, the scheme rules included a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme included such a requirement;
(b) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether, immediately before the scheme began to wind up, a requirement of the scheme of a kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a) (including such a requirement included by virtue of paragraph (a)) applied in relation to particular pre-1997 service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the requirement applied in relation to such service;
(c) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether the scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme so provided;
(d) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether the accrual of a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme (including by virtue of paragraph (c)) was in relation to particular GMP indexed service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the accrual was in relation to such service.
(2D) In sub-paragraphs (2A) to (2C)—
“GMP indexation period” means the period beginning with 6 April 1988 and ending with 5 April 1997;
“GMP indexed service” means—
(a) pensionable service (whether actual or notional) which occurs during the GMP indexation period; or
(b) where the pension was payable to, or in respect of, a qualifying member who is, or was, a pension credit member of the scheme, pension credit rights deriving from rights attributable to service (whether actual or notional) which occurred during the GMP indexation period;
“guaranteed minimum pension” has the meaning given in section 8(2) of the 1993 Act.”;
(c) in sub-paragraph (3), after “attributable to” insert “pre-1997 service and”.”—(Torsten Bell.)
This new clause makes provision for certain assistance paid under the Financial Assistance Scheme Regulations 2005 in respect of a person’s pre-1997 pensionable service to be increased annually.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 34
Exemption from public procurement rules
“(1) After paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 to the Procurement Act 2023 (general vertical arrangements exemption from public procurement rules) insert—
2A “(1) A contract between a local government pension scheme manager and an asset pool company providing for the company—
(a) to manage the funds and other assets for which the scheme manager is responsible,
(b) to make and manage investments on behalf of the scheme manager, and
(c) if the contract so provides, to carry out other investment management activities for or on behalf of the scheme manager,
if each of the conditions set out in sub-paragraph (2) is met.
(2) The conditions are—
(a) that more than 80% of the activities of the company are investment management activities carried out for or on behalf of local government pension scheme managers;
(b) that no person exercises a decisive influence on the activities of the company (either directly or indirectly) other than—
(i) the participating scheme managers in the company, acting in their capacity as local government pension scheme managers, and
(ii) where the only shareholder in the company is another company (see section 1(9)(a) of the Pension Schemes Act 2025), that other company;
(c) that the company does not carry out any activities that are contrary to the interests of—
(i) the participating scheme managers in the company, in their capacity as local government pension scheme managers, or
(ii) where the only shareholder in the company is another company, that other company.
(3) The contracts covered by this paragraph include a contract where the local government pension scheme manager concerned is already a participating scheme manager in the company (as well as one where the scheme manager concerned will become a participating scheme manager in the company as a result of entering into it).
(4) An appropriate authority may by regulations make provision about how a calculation as to the percentage of activities carried out by an asset pool company is to be made for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2)(a).
(5) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (2)(b), a person does not exercise a decisive influence on the activities of the asset pool company only by reason of—
(a) being a director, officer or manager of the company, acting in that capacity, or
(b) where the only shareholder in the company is another company, being a director, officer or manager of that other company.
(6) In this paragraph—
“asset pool company” has the meaning given by section 1(7)(a) of the Pension Schemes Act 2025;
“investment management activities” means activities involved in or connected with the management of funds or other assets for which a scheme manager is responsible (including making and managing investments on behalf of the scheme manager);
“local government pension scheme manager” means a person who is, by virtue of section 4(5) of the Public Service Pensions Act 2013, a scheme manager for a pension scheme for local government workers in England and Wales;
“participating scheme manager” , in relation to an asset pool company, means a local government pension scheme manager who participates in the company within the meaning of section 1(9)(b) of the Pension Schemes Act 2025.””—(Torsten Bell.)
This new clause amends the Procurement Act 2023 to create a new category of exempted contract covering certain investment management contracts between a local government scheme manager and the asset pool company. This is intended to replace Clause 4 in the current print of the Bill.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 35
Funding of the Board of the Pension Protection Fund
“(1) The Pensions Act 2004 is amended in accordance with subsections (2) to (5).
(2) Omit section 116 (power of Secretary of State to pay grants to Board of Pension Protection Fund).
(3) Omit section 117 (power of Secretary of State to impose administration levy on pension schemes).
(4) In section 173 (Pension Protection Fund), in subsection (3), before paragraph (a) insert—
“(za) any sums required to meet expenditure of the Board that is attributable to the operation or administration of the Pension Protection Fund,”
(5) In section 188 (fraud compensation fund), in subsection (3), before paragraph (a) insert—
“(za) any sums required to meet expenditure of the Board that is attributable to the operation or administration of the Fraud Compensation Fund,”
(6) No amount is payable to the Secretary of State by virtue of section 117 of the Pensions Act 2004 (administration levy) in respect of the financial years beginning with 1 April 2023 and 1 April 2024.
(7) In the Pensions Act 2008, in Schedule 10 (interest on late payment of levies), omit paragraph 3 (which makes an amendment about interest for late payment of the administration levy that has not been brought into force).”—(Torsten Bell.)
This new clause (which is intended to be added after clause 112) enables administrative expenses of the Board of the Pension Protection Fund to be paid out of the Pension Protection Fund and the Fraud Compensation Fund, and removes the existing administration levy mechanism; it also clarifies that no administration levy is payable for 2023/24 or 2024/25.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 3
Terminal illness: means of demonstrating eligibility
“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision about how a person may demonstrate that they are terminally ill for purposes relating to compensation or assistance from the Pension Protection Fund or Financial Assistance Scheme.
(2) In making regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must seek to minimise the administrative burden placed upon the person with a terminal illness.
(3) Regulations under this section must provide that, where the Department of Work and Pensions (“the Department”) holds a valid SR1 form in respect of a person seeking to demonstrate that they are terminally ill for purposes relating to compensation or assistance from the Pension Protection Fund or Financial Assistance Scheme, the Department must share that form with the Pension Protection Fund or the Financial Assistance Scheme.
(4) Regulations under this section must require the Pension Protection Fund and the Financial Assistance Scheme to make the appropriate payment or payments within a specified time of receipt of a valid application.”—(Manuela Perteghella.)
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to provide, by regulations, for the use of a valid SR1 form to make it easier for a person to demonstrate that they are terminally ill for purposes related to compensation from the PPF or FAS.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Torsten Bell
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
Pensions matter. They are the means by which we deliver on some of the biggest promises we have made to the public: that the prospect of a comfortable retirement, with the option of leisure—hon. Members may choose not to take it—in later life, is there for the many, not just the few. We need not only to encourage people to save, but to ensure that those savings work as hard as possible for them to deliver that comfortable retirement. That is ultimately what this occasionally technical Bill is all about. Better returns mean better retirements, and there are few things more important than that.
The Bill adds wind to the sails of some of the major changes already under way in our pension landscape. Most importantly, it pushes ahead with the shift towards larger, better-governed schemes, better able to access and deliver returns for savers and to invest in a wider range of assets. It introduces a new value for money framework, so that schemes are judged on performance and service, not just cost. It removes one of the big barriers to people engaging with their pensions by consolidating small, inactive pension pots. It delivers reforms to ensure people are building up a pension, not just a savings pot, with simple default pensions that do not require each of us to become a financial expert as we approach retirement.
For defined benefit schemes, the Bill strengthens the local government pension scheme, puts more trustees in the driving seat for managing scheme surpluses, and addresses the lack of pre-1997 indexation within the PPF and the FAS. Those are real improvements shaped by constructive debate and detailed scrutiny in this place and across the pension industry.
I again thank Members from all parts of the House for their contributions and I thank the Clerks for taking us through Committee. I also thank the Bill team—Jo, Amanda, Mike, James, Sagar, Saadia and Steve—and the many officials across DWP and the Treasury who have worked behind the scenes to support the Government in bringing forward this important legislation. I appreciate that it is not a short Bill. The PPF, the Financial Conduct Authority and the Pensions Regulator have also played important roles for which I am grateful. I commend all of them, and this Bill, to the House.
Helen Whately (Faversham and Mid Kent) (Con)
As this Bill nears the end of its journey through our House, I take a moment to acknowledge some of the people who have played their part, whether that is former Pensions Ministers, including my right hon. Friend the Member for Sevenoaks (Laura Trott), the former hon. Member for Hexham, my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier), who cannot be with us today, or my hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon (Rebecca Smith), who also cannot be here today. My hon. Friend the Member for North West Norfolk (James Wild) did such a brilliant job speaking earlier this afternoon. I also thank the hard-working members of the Bill Committee, including my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Leicestershire (Mr Bedford). Many civil servants will have worked on this Bill and pensions experts will have contributed, and I thank them all for their hard work and expertise. May I also finally offer congratulations to the current Pensions Minister, the lucky one who gets to be here to see this Bill off to the other place?
We on the Conservative Benches do not agree with all of the Bill, but there is a lot in it that we do welcome, particularly the parts that the Minister inherited from us, including the consolidation of fragmented pension pots, the introduction of the value for money framework and the pensions dashboard. Those will help people to manage their pension savings and get better returns. We also welcome the Government’s amendment of the Bill, reflecting our new clause, to index pre-1997 pensions, for which there was significant consensus across the House. That will provide some dignity for pensioners who have seen their pensions eroded over the years, and we hope that the Government continue to work with campaign groups to see that through. I also thank my right hon. Friends the Members for Herne Bay and Sandwich (Sir Roger Gale) and for Hereford and South Herefordshire (Jesse Norman) for their representations on that.
The Bill also has some serious flaws. Nestled within the sensible reforms that the Government inherited is a power that no Government should wield: the power to mandate how pension funds invest. Today, the job of a pension fund manager is to make the best possible decisions for their fund members about where to invest. Their sole objective is the interests of those members. That is their legal duty, and mandation would change that, because mandation means the Government will be able to tell pension funds how to invest their assets. We should not for a minute underestimate the significance of that. Ministers have insisted it is merely a backstop and a tool they hope never to use, but a threat made just in case is still a threat, and pension trustees know it. I say to the Pensions Minister that a Minister should always consider the worst thing that someone else might do in their position—in essence, “I am not a bad man, but what might a bad man do?” He might be confident that he would not abuse the power, but what if someone else had it?
Those in the pensions sector do not support this plan. Earlier in the year the Minister told them to “chillax”. He may be intensely relaxed, but I must say to him that he is also intensely wrong. Trustees are the custodians of people’s life savings. They are not there to carry out manifesto pledges or pet projects, and the Minister should not put himself or any future pensions Minister in a position to tell them to do so.
Instead of forcing pension funds to invest in the UK, Ministers should ask why they have not been investing and then do something about that. Our amendment 15 gave them the opportunity to diagnose these problems and resolve them, but, as we have just seen, they voted it down. In any event, they should stop making Britain a worse place in which to do business, ramping up taxes on employment, slapping on red tape, and briefing out bad Budget news for months in advance to kill confidence in every sector of the economy.
As my hon. Friend the Member for North West Norfolk (James Wild) said earlier, our other concern with the Bill is the relationship between scale and innovation. We agree with the need for scale, but the Government should avoid blocking the emergence of new entrants and the scaling up of existing smaller players.
Finally, there is the question of pension adequacy. While the Bill should help people to manage their pension savings and boost their returns, it falls short when it comes to tackling the serious problem of people under-saving for later life. Millions of people simply are not saving enough for old age. The Government should be acting now in this regard, rather than delaying the next phase of the pensions review and attacking pension savings at every turn. First they came for pensioners’ winter fuel payments, then they came for self-invested personal pensions, and last week they came for salary sacrifice—and that was not a small tweak. The cap on salary sacrifice will net the Treasury nearly £5 billion of extra tax revenue in 2029-30—money that would otherwise have gone into people’s pensions.
We have made our points, argued our position and put amendments to a vote, so we will not be voting against the Bill on Third Reading. However, I urge the Government to listen to the wise and the many expert words that will be spoken when it is debated in the other place, and to use that opportunity to fix it.
Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)
I figured that, as I had only about 17 minutes in which to speak on Report, the House deserved to hear from me again on Third Reading, but I shall be very brief in expressing my views and those of my hon. Friends.
Members spoke earlier about people’s understanding of pensions, and I continue to have concerns about people’s understanding of defined contribution schemes. People who are given a figure for how much money is in their defined contribution scheme are often confused about what that will actually mean when they hit retirement. Those schemes are very different from defined benefit schemes, and, given the massive increase in the number of people investing in defined contribution schemes rather than defined benefit schemes, those issues will continue unless an incredible amount of education is provided so that people can understand what they might receive in their pensions, rather than just the amount in the total pot.
The Minister has made a number of changes to the Bill that I appreciate, not least the pre-1997 indexation for the Pension Protection Fund. The fiduciary duty announcement that he made today is, I think, extremely helpful in clarifying for trustees what their objectives are. He also mentioned that the Association of British Insurers had come up with an agreement. In my experience of serving on a significant number of Bill Committees, it is very unusual for so many changes to be made. I appreciate the fact that the Committee members were listened to, and that some of the concerns raised by Members in all parts of the Committee have been tackled during the Bill’s progress. I have already raised concerns about the short notice that we had for some of the amendments and new clauses and the fact that we were not properly able to scrutinise the Government changes, both in Committee on Report.
Finally, let me thank Matt and Fergus, who helped me with some of this. We rarely see pension Bills presented, and I would love to see another—shortly, probably. Given that the Minister has made commitments in relation to fiduciary duty, and given that he said he expected such a measure to appear in primary legislation with guidance to follow, I assume that a Bill will follow those commitments. I also think that the adequacy review may—hopefully—kick up some requirements for legislation.
This House should get used to talking about pensions. As the generations shift, the state pension will become a smaller percentage of what people rely on in retirement, and auto-enrolment and defined contribution schemes mean that significantly more people will rely on private pensions. Ensuring that they have the best possible outcomes for retirement is something that all Members of the House can support, and we need to have a legislative framework that keeps pace with how people are actually investing for the future, rather than one that reflects how people invested 20 or 30 years ago.
As the Minister will be aware, I would be delighted to debate more pensions Bills as they come forward. We will do our best to provide cross-party support wherever we can.
Bill read the Third time and passed.
Pension Schemes Bill
Friday 5th December 2025
(1 month, 4 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberPension Schemes Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 3 December 2025 - large print - (3 Dec 2025)
Pension Schemes Bill
Thursday 18th December 2025
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberPension Schemes Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 3 December 2025 - large print - (3 Dec 2025)
Baroness Sherlock
Northern Ireland and Welsh legislative consent sought. Relevant document: 42nd Report from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee
The Minister of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Sherlock) (Lab)
My Lords, it is a privilege to open the Second Reading of the Pension Schemes Bill. I am grateful to noble Lords for the engagement we have already had, and I look forward to working constructively together as the Bill progresses through this House. I also very much look forward to the maiden speech of the noble Baroness, Lady White of Tufnell Park.
Pensions are really important, and the Bill will transform our pensions landscape for the better. It will play its part in delivering growth, as well as helping to raise living standards in every part of the UK. It will assist the pensioners of the future to feel more confident about the economy in general, as well as their own futures.
Pensions are the promise we make to millions of people that their years of hard work will be rewarded with security and dignity in retirement. UK pension schemes invest hundreds of billions of pounds in our country. The reforms outlined in the Bill will make those pounds work harder for pensioners by making schemes more efficient—more money invested, and less on overheads and administration.
The first Pensions Commission laid the groundwork for a new pensions landscape, with a simpler state pension and automatic enrolment into retirement savings. This transformed private pension saving in the UK. The Bill, along with the work of the pensions investment review, moves our private pensions system forward. Bigger, better pension schemes will drive better returns, as well as tackling inefficiencies in our system.
The new Pensions Commission is looking at the issue of adequacy across the state and private pensions systems, with a clear objective of building a strong, fair and sustainable pension system. I look forward to this debate on the Bill, which is all about making every pound saved work harder for members, unlocking investment for our economy and restoring confidence in the promise of a decent retirement.
I will now outline the main measures in the Bill. First, the Bill addresses the fragmentation of the Local Government Pension Scheme, which is currently spread across 87 funds in England and Wales. This fragmentation limits efficiency and scale. Through these reforms, all assets in the Local Government Pension Scheme, or LGPS, will be managed through FCA-regulated investment pools, ensuring professional oversight and better value for money. Administering authorities will set clear targets for local investment, working with strategic authorities to align with regional growth plans.
Of course, LGPS members’ pensions and benefits are protected, as they are guaranteed in statute and are not affected by the performance of investments. These reforms are about the LGPS being well governed and well invested to deliver efficiency and value for money.
Next, the Bill introduces powers to enable more trustees of well-funded defined benefit, or DB, schemes to share some of the £160 billion of surplus funds to benefit sponsoring employers and members. This will enable employers to drive growth through investment and higher purchasing power, but it will be subject to strict safeguards. The measure will allow trustees, working with employers, to decide how surplus can benefit both members and employers, while maintaining security for future pensions.
The defined contribution, or DC, workplace pensions market prioritises competition on cost rather than on the overall value. The Bill introduces a value-for-money framework to enable a shift in focus away from cost towards a longer-term consideration of value. This new framework looks to standardise how value is assessed, in a transparent, consistent and comparable way. It will require schemes to disclose standardised metrics, undertake a holistic assessment of value, and take improvement actions where needed.
Automatic enrolment has been a huge success, ensuring that millions more people are now saving for their retirement. However, frequent job changes mean that individuals are often enrolled into a new pension scheme by each employer, leaving them with multiple small pots over their working life, often with very small amounts saved. This has created a challenge across the workplace pensions market, with current estimates suggesting that within the system there are more than 13 million pots worth less than £1,000 each. This is hugely expensive for pension schemes to administer, with an estimated cost of £240 million a year, ultimately resulting in poorer value for members.
Through the Bill, we are taking powers to introduce automatic consolidation of these dormant small pension pots through a multiple default consolidator model. Opportunity for member choice will be built in; members can choose a consolidator scheme or choose to opt out entirely if they wish. This will simplify the system, reduce costs and support members so they can better track their retirement savings.
There is strong evidence that larger pension schemes mean better outcomes for members through efficiencies of scale, stronger governance and better investment opportunities at lower cost. The Bill will therefore drive scale by accelerating the consolidation of multi-employer DC schemes.
From 2030, schemes used for auto-enrolment must reach at least £25 billion in assets in a single main scale default arrangement, or £10 billion on a transition pathway with a credible plan to reach £25 billion within five years. This is about harnessing the power of scale: larger schemes can negotiate better deals, access more diverse investments and deliver better outcomes for savers.
On asset allocation, earlier this year, the Mansion House Accord was signed by 17 major pension providers, which, between them, manage about 90% of active savers’ DC pensions. This initiative was led by industry, and the signatories pledged to invest 10% of their main default funds in private assets, such as infrastructure, by 2030. The purpose of this voluntary commitment is, as the signatories put it,
“to facilitate access for savers to the higher potential net returns that can arise from investment in private markets as part of a diversified portfolio, as well as boosting investment in the UK”.
The Bill includes a backstop provision that would permit the Government, with Parliament’s approval, to require DC pension providers of auto-enrolment schemes to invest a fixed percentage of their default funds in specific asset classes. The Government do not anticipate exercising the power, unless they consider that the industry has not delivered the change on its own. There are also strong safeguards around it.
All workplace pension schemes are required to have a default arrangement, where contributions are invested if members do not choose an investment option. Most members go into a default arrangement and remain there throughout their scheme membership. There are currently thousands of different default arrangements in pension schemes, creating fragmentation, inefficiency and poorer outcomes for members.
The Bill introduces new requirements to review those default arrangements, with a power to make regulations as needed, following the review, to require default arrangements to be consolidated into a main scale default arrangement. There is also a power to make regulations for new default arrangements to be subject to regulatory approval. That will ensure that savers benefit from economies of scale and improved governance by reducing the fragmentation in the pensions market.
Many pension schemes, especially legacy ones, are not delivering good outcomes for savers. As contract-based schemes rely on individual contracts between firms and members, firms usually need individual members’ consent to make any changes, even when the change would improve outcomes for members. Obtaining this consent is often difficult and costly, especially when members are disengaged, even when a scheme offers poor value. This leaves members stuck in poor-value schemes.
To address that, the Government are introducing the contractual override power in the Bill. It will allow the providers of FCA-regulated DC workplace pensions to transfer members to a different pension arrangement, make a change which would otherwise require consent, or vary the terms of members’ contracts without the need for individual member consent, but only when the legal and regulatory requirements are met. That includes rigorous consumer safeguards such as the best interests test, which must be met and certified by an independent expert before a contractual override can take place.
At retirement, DC scheme savers face complex financial decisions. They need to evaluate the different options to suit their own individual circumstances, assess risks and uncertainty in financial products, and factor in their own estimation of their life expectancy. We know that savers do not always use the support available: only 16% used a regulated source, such as Pension Wise or a professional financial adviser.
The Bill puts new duties on trustees to develop and provide one or more default pension plans at retirement to help members access their savings without these complex decisions. These plans will provide a straightforward income solution for most members, with opt-out rights for those who prefer alternatives. Trustees must design plans based on member needs, communicate options clearly and publish a pension benefits strategy, which will be overseen by the Pensions Regulator. The Bill also requires the FCA to make rules that deliver default pension plans in relation to pension schemes regulated by the FCA, ensuring consistency and better outcomes for savers.
Superfunds are commercial consolidators that offer a new route for employers to secure the legacy liabilities of closed DB schemes that cannot secure an insurance buyout. Building on the current interim regime, the Bill establishes a permanent legislative framework for superfunds. It introduces an authorisation and supervisory regime with robust governance, funding and continuity arrangements, so that members of those schemes can have the confidence that their pensions are properly protected. Superfunds may invest more productively because of their scale, expertise and buying power, so they are good for members, employers and the wider economy.
Part 4 contains a range of important measures. Following the Virgin Media court case, certain DB pension benefit alterations could be treated as void if schemes cannot produce actuarial confirmation that they met the minimum standards in place at the time. This affects schemes that were contracted out between 1997 and 2016. The court judgment has the potential to cause pension schemes significant cost and uncertainty, even where the schemes did, in fact, meet the minimum standards required. To resolve that, the Bill allows schemes to ask their actuary to confirm that past benefit alterations would not have caused the scheme to fall below the relevant minimum standards.
The Chancellor announced in the Budget that the Government will introduce pre-1997 indexation into the Pension Protection Fund and the Financial Assistance Scheme—the PPF and the FAS—to address the long-standing issue faced by members. As noble Lords will be aware, those are the compensation schemes that provide a safety net for members of DB schemes. Currently, payments in respect of service before 1997 are not uprated with inflation, and affected members have seen the real value of their compensation decrease significantly in recent years.
The Bill will pave the way to introduce increases on PPF and FAS payments for pensions built up before 6 April 1997. These will be CPI-linked and capped at 2.5%, and will apply prospectively for members whose former schemes provided for these increases. That will help those members’ pensions keep pace with the cost of living. This is a step change that will make a meaningful difference to over 250,000 members. Incomes will be boosted by an average of around £400 for PPF members and £300 for FAS members after the first five years. Our changes strike an affordable balance of interests for all parties, including eligible members, levy payers, taxpayers and the PPF’s ability to manage future risk. The Bill makes some other changes to the PPF and the FAS that will benefit the members of these schemes and the levy payers supporting the PPF, including around terminal illness and the levies.
Finally, some noble Lords may have seen that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee published its report on the Bill last night. I emphasise that the Government recognise the importance of getting the right balance when taking delegated powers and using them appropriately. The pensions industry is highly technical and rapidly evolving, and there is a complex interaction between legislative requirements, regulatory oversight and changes in practice or innovation. In pensions legislation, it is common for a mix of requirements and principles to be set out in primary legislation, with finer detail, which is liable to frequent development, to be set out in secondary legislation. That allows for a quicker response to developments in the industry, including to protect scheme members. We think we have the right balance in the Bill, but I thank the committee for its report and will respond in due course.
This Bill will initiate systemic changes to the pensions landscape, with the aim of building a pensions system that is fit for the future—one that is strong, fair and sustainable, and that delivers for savers, employers and the economy. At its core, the Bill is about making sure that people’s hard-earned savings work as hard for them as they have worked to save, while galvanising the untapped benefits that private pensions can offer the economy at large. I look forward to our discussions today. I beg to move.
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
My Lords, I too look forward to the maiden speech of the noble Baroness, Lady White. I have every confidence that she will make a great contribution, including to the work of the House generally. Having had some interface with her at the DWP, I am very confident that will happen.
Although the Bill is not perfect, I hope the Minister will take comfort from the broad cross-party consensus that exists around many of its core measures. Across your Lordships’ House, we share a common ambition: having a pensions system that delivers strong returns for those it serves.
In 2010, we inherited from the previous Labour Government a private pensions system that was not fit for purpose. The shift from defined benefit to defined contribution had left millions behind and, in 2011, just 42% of people were saving into a workplace pension. The cornerstone of reform was auto-enrolment—a Conservative innovation and an undeniable success. Today, around 88% of eligible employees are saving for retirement, with most opt-outs made on the basis of sound financial advice.
Workers deserve dignity in retirement, not merely a safety net. That is why, before the last election, the Government rightly focused on two enduring challenges: value for money and pensions adequacy.
Let me begin by acknowledging what the Bill gets right. We welcome progress on the pensions dashboard, which will help savers access their information more easily and plan for retirement. We also support the Bill’s emphasis on consolidation, including larger pension funds, the consolidation of the Local Government Pension Scheme, and the long-overdue merging of small, stranded pots—all of which have the potential to improve efficiency and value for money, provided that risks are properly managed. Finally, we welcome the humane and necessary measures to improve access to pensions for those facing terminal illness. Taken together, these provisions represent steps in the right direction.
However, while there is much to commend, there are also areas where we believe the Bill falls short, and in ways that matter deeply to the millions depending on it. The most striking omission in the Bill is the absence of any meaningful progress on pension adequacy. The uncomfortable truth is that too many people are simply not saving enough to secure a decent standard of living in retirement: a situation made all the more difficult in the current economic circumstances.
Auto-enrolment was never intended to be the finished article. It was a foundation, not the building itself. Yet the Bill proceeds as though the task were complete. The central question of whether current savings levels are sufficient is not confronted but deferred: pushed into the second stage of the review. This is not reform: it is a holding space, in which difficult but necessary decisions risk being postponed rather than resolved.
Adequacy should have been the organising principle of this legislation. Instead, it has been quietly parked for another day. In its place, the Government have focused on taxing pension contributions, increasing the cost of employment, and layering additional regulation on to the terms and conditions of work. We are regulating, taxing and constraining the very mechanisms through which retirement savings are generated, yet we have failed to address the most basic and consequential question of all: are people saving enough to retire with security and dignity?
A further missed opportunity is the failure to support the self-employed with new and innovative ways to save affordably for their retirement—more than 4 million people who drive our economy, create jobs and take risks, yet too often face retirement with no provision at all. Only around one in five self-employed workers earning over £10,000 a year currently saves into a pension. This is not a marginal problem; it is a structural gap in our pensions system. We need practical and pioneering solutions to support this growing group, and the Bill should have set that direction. We have spoken directly to the self-employed in preparation for this legislation, and in Committee we stand ready to assist the Minister by bringing that engagement and evidence to bear.
Our wider engagement also brought into sharper focus the Bill’s treatment of public sector pensions. This Bill is, in our view, decidedly LGPS-light. We will therefore table amendments to address that omission, ensuring that the scheme operates with greater clarity, flexibility and accountability. At the heart of our concern is the need for a more transparent, simpler and reformed approach to reviewing employer contribution rates for local authorities. This is not about loosening discipline or weakening the scheme. It is about prudent financial management and giving councils the tools they need to govern responsibly. This is what local authorities deserve and it is good financial governance.
The Bill shows no enthusiasm for addressing excessive prudence and the record surpluses within the Local Government Pension Scheme. We are not naive enough to suggest that the LGPS surpluses can be extracted or treated in the same way as those of private defined benefit schemes. But, under the Chancellor’s revised fiscal rules, those surpluses are now treated as assets offsetting public debt. That may be fiscally convenient but it represents a missed opportunity to enhance councils’ resilience. In appropriate circumstances, those surpluses could—and should—be used to support reductions in employer contribution rates. However, too often, overly cautious actuarial methodologies, excessive prudence and a lack of transparency have locked councils into contribution rates that are simply too high.
Proportionality and openness in how assumptions are set and decisions are reached are pivotal. Without transparency, those assumptions cannot be properly challenged through due diligence, and Section 151 officers cannot fully discharge their statutory duties. We must therefore ensure that interim reviews of employer contributions are more accessible, transparent and accountable, through clearer statutory trigger conditions, published policies, improved actuarial transparency and strengthened statutory guidance.
Kensington and Chelsea demonstrated precisely that approach in the aftermath of the Grenfell tragedy. Yet, across the country, councils are still forced into an exhausting and uncertain process to navigate the existing regulatory framework simply to secure interim contribution reductions after a formal valuation. We look forward to engaging constructively with the Government to ensure that councils are properly supported in delivering services while fully meeting their LGPS obligations.
Finally, I turn to what I regard as the most troubling element of the Bill: the proposed reserve power to mandate pension fund investment strategies within master trusts and group personal pension schemes used for automatic enrolment. Mandation is not a neutral tool; it is the quiet nationalisation of pension investment strategy. It is a fundamental shift in who ultimately controls investment decisions. Automatic enrolment has succeeded because it is trusted. Mandation threatens that trust: automatic enrolment is trusted by employers, by industry, and above all by millions of ordinary savers who have neither the time nor the confidence to manage complex financial decisions themselves.
It is therefore deeply concerning that this power is targeted specifically at automatic enrolment default funds. These are the schemes used disproportionately by those with the least means and the least financial confidence: the very people who rely most heavily on the integrity and independence of the system we have built over decades.
This is where the injustice bites. Those with the fewest means and the least financial confidence are the ones Labour’s mandation would trap. The savviest can opt out; the poorest get locked in. That is the injustice of mandation. Those savers need our protection, not a situation in which their pension outcomes become indirectly shaped by ministerial preferences, however well intentioned. Conservatives built automatic enrolment; Labour now stands a chance of threatening it.
We built automatic enrolment on a simple settlement: the state sets the framework, but trustees make the investment decisions. The Bill risks blurring that line. At stake here is trustee independence and fiduciary duty, principles that sit at the very heart of pensions policy. Trustees are bound, both legally and morally, to act in the best financial interests of their beneficiaries. Pension schemes exist to serve savers, not to serve the shifting political priorities of the day.
In this context, I am reminded of the warning offered by the respected pensions expert Tom McPhail, who invoked Chekhov’s famous dramatic device: the gun on the wall. If the gun is hung on the backdrop of the stage in the first act, it will be fired by the third. Once a Government arm themselves with a power, no matter how benignly it is presented, history suggests that it will eventually be used. If the Government do not intend to use the power, why is it in the Bill?
Rather than relying on the logic of “mandation as a backstop”, I urge the Minister and her team to step back and address the underlying reasons why pension funds are not investing more in the UK in the first place. Low domestic investment is not simply a collective action problem, as the Government suggest. It reflects real structural barriers, and the Government should compile the relevant evidence and report back on how those obstacles might be removed.
Will the Minister undertake to do this? There are better and far less constitutionally troubling ways to unlock long-term investment. I offer her just one example. Solvency rules continue to constrain insurers from investing in productive UK assets that offer stable long-term returns. Reforming those outdated rules could, according to Aviva, unlock billions of pounds over the next decade. That is how we should be driving growth, by removing barriers to investment and not by inserting the state into decisions that properly belong to independent trustees acting solely in the interest of savers. It is therefore striking that the Government have chosen to expend so much political capital on a mandation policy that commands little support beyond the DWP and lacks a wider consensus across the industry. Can the Government provide assurances that savers in auto-enrolment pension schemes will not subsequently discover that their pension providers have been instructed to invest in specific entities such as Thames Water?
I close by reaffirming our commitment to work constructively with the Government. Stability and confidence in the pensions market are paramount. It is in that spirit that we approach this Bill. Where improvements can be made, we will table amendments. We will engage in good faith to ensure that the detail is right and that the framework ultimately serves savers, schemes and the wider economy. We broadly support the direction of travel that the Government are pursuing. However, as today’s debate has made clear, there remain important questions around the detail, the intent of forthcoming regulations and what has been omitted from the Bill.
When closing today’s debate, my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie will expand on these points, set out further concerns and put several direct questions to the Minister. We hope that the Government will reflect carefully on those issues as the Bill progresses. I look forward to working with the Minister in the weeks and months ahead and to continuing this constructive, robust dialogue as we seek to strengthen the legislation.
Lord Sharkey (LD)
My Lords, I join the Minister and the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, in saying how much I look forward to the maiden speech of the noble Baroness, Lady White, especially since I too live in Tufnell Park.
It is always a pleasure to follow the Minister. We welcome an important set of proposals for reform. We would support many of these proposals, but several merit serious examination and probing in Committee. As things stand, I should say upfront that we cannot support the mandation proposals in the Bill. I hope that we can constructively modify these proposals during the Bill’s passage through the House.
The Minister will know that stakeholders have expressed significant concerns about risk to member security, trustee independence and long-term saver outcomes that may be contained in the Bill’s proposals. For example, there are worries that easing access to DB surpluses of employers could undermine member benefits. Phoenix has noted that surplus release thresholds will be set in secondary legislation. It believes that a post-release funding level is essential to protect members and limit covenant risks. It opposes lowering the threshold to “low dependency” and believes that surplus should only be released above buyout affordability. Some MPs and the ABI have called for stricter oversight, including retention of the three “gateway tests” to prioritise buyouts over superfunds.
The ACA also recommends that trustees have a formal role in assessing and agreeing any rule changes and in determining any refund of a surplus to an employer. The CEO of TPR, Nausicaa Delfas, whose name I googled—it means “burner of ships”—is on record as saying that:
“Where schemes are fully funded and there are protections in place for members, we support efforts to help trustees and employers consider how to safely release surplus if it can improve member benefits or unlock investment in the wider economy”.
It is not entirely clear how those two outcomes may be traded off, but I would be grateful if the Minister could say more about government thinking on member protection in release and distribution of surplus. I know that my noble friend Lord Thurso, who cannot be here today because he is undergoing a medical procedure in Inverness, will also wish to test the Government’s thinking in this area in Committee.
Then there is the critical question of mandated asset allocation. This Bill, as everyone knows, contains a reserve power to authorise DC master trusts and group personal pensions used for automatic enrolment to invest a minimum proportion of assets in “productive” investments, including UK assets. On the face of it, this cuts directly across trustees’ fiduciary duties and members’ best interest tests. It risks political direction of asset allocation. Does anyone really believe that the Government would be better at allocating funding than the markets? This mandation may well create significant market distorting effects if, for example, the demand for such “productive” assets outpaces their availability.
There is also the risk that such a power may be extended over time to influence allocation on an even larger scale than might be currently envisaged. It is worrying that the Governor of the Bank of England has been reported as saying that he does not favour mandation. The Institute and Faculty of Actuaries has said in a written submission:
“The criteria for Master Trust authorisation were intended to produce a safe and reliable savings environment and we do not believe the concept of qualifying assets belongs there”.
This power to mandate
“introduces a commercial conflict between pension providers and trustees over asset allocation, weakening the fiduciary accountability of the trustees … It is also premature to give the Government a sweeping power it does not expect to make use of (we note the percentage of mandated assets cannot be increased after 2035 but that might encourage a government to ‘use it or lose it’.) We would urge Parliamentarians to consider the implications of a future government—of any configuration—having a power to define qualifying assets as any project that the government of the day can meaningfully define, charging the capital costs to the auto-enrolled pension savings of the nation … Should mandating schemes to invest in accordance with Government direction proceed, it needs to be made clear what the respective responsibilities of Government and trustees are”
as the finances work themselves through.
I would be very grateful if the Minister could set out for us how mandation and fiduciary duty can be reconciled without complicating or diluting the proper exercise of fiduciary duty. Perhaps a definition of “productive” would be a useful start. My noble friend Lady Kramer, who is attending a funeral this afternoon, had intended to speak to this point and wanted to ask for a detail and risk profile of assets that will qualify as “productive”.
Most people contribute through auto-enrolment into default funds. They have few resources and should not be in high-risk investments—and certainly not without their permission. Ministers have promised statutory guidance to help resolve the issue of potential conflict between mandation and fiduciary duty. On Report in the Commons, Torsten Bell said
“I intend to bring forward legislation that will allow the Government to develop statutory guidance for the trust-based private pensions sector”.—[Official Report, Commons, 3/12/25; col. 1043.]
He did not specify what kind of legislation or when. The Minister has told us that this guidance will not amount to direction and will have the usual force, or lack of force, present in the many existing “have regards” that exist in the financial services arena. She has also told us that this draft guidance will not be available before Committee begins. This is surely not ideal.
Can the Minister reassure us that, at the very least, this draft guidance will be available before the end of Committee stage? We need to be able to discuss the details of the guidance before we agree to legislation. That is especially the case if the Government intend to rely on the use of SIs, which would of course deprive Parliament of any effective means of scrutiny at all. May I ask her to take another look at the timing, so that we may be able to take guidance properly into account in our discussions of mandation?
Perhaps the Minister can also explain why the mandation currently has sunset provisions for expiry in 2035 if no regulations are in fact made. Why not use, for example, the Mansion House targets to generate a significantly earlier cut-off?
Then there are questions of value for money and consolidations, which have been discussed already. The ABI, as I am sure the Minister knows, pushes for regulatory mechanisms to force consolidation only when it clearly benefits customers. I heard the Minister endorse that approach. The key word here is “clearly”—what does this mean? What will be the test, and who will be doing the testing?
As important as any of these things is the question of pensions adequacy or inadequacy. It is very disappointing that the Bill does nothing to tackle such things as low contribution rates, self-employed exclusion and early savings barriers. The question of whether people are saving enough is probably easy enough to answer, but what to do about it is entirely absent from the Bill. We will want to discuss this further.
Finally, there is no substantive mention of climate issues in the Bill and no reference to, for example, the Paris Agreement. There is an obvious asymmetry here. The Bill provides for increasing investment in productive assets, which are to be defined. It says nothing about which assets should be avoided or minimised. Industry analysts caution that, if the mandation favours domestic growth sectors without, or which do not have strong, climate screening, schemes could be nudged into assets misaligned with the 1.5 to 2 degrees pathway. That would certainly conflict with the spirit, if not the letter, of the Paris Agreement, and it would damage everybody and every enterprise.
Proposed new Clause 19, brought forward at Third Reading in the Commons by my honourable friend Manuela Perteghella, addresses this issue. This new clause, not voted on, would have required the Government and the FCA to make regulations and rules restricting exposure of some occupational and workplace pension schemes to thermal coal investments, and to regularly review whether the restriction should be extended to other fossil fuels. We will bring forward a similar amendment in Committee.
This is a very important Bill with some obviously welcome proposals but also some deep causes for concern, especially as regards mandation and the failure to address pension inadequacy. We look forward to a constructive discussion with the Government and detailed examination of the Bill.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
My Lords, it is about five years since we last saw a Pension Schemes Bill in this House, and it is good to see so many familiar faces, albeit sitting in different places in the Chamber. It is also good to be welcoming some new faces to our small band of pension enthusiasts, and I am particularly looking forward to hearing the maiden speech of my noble friend Lady White of Tufnell Park.
This is a big Bill, and there is a lot in it, much of which is to be welcomed and is not particularly controversial. I am going to restrict my comments to two areas of the Bill, one of which I think we will hear quite a lot about.
First, I understand and agree with the reasons and the desire to consolidate small dormant pension pots, but I have some concerns about the details. We are all aware of the problem of lost pensions, whereby a person has forgotten about a pension, perhaps from a long-ago short period of employment. This is one of the problems that the much-delayed pensions dashboard is designed to solve. Compulsorily moving a small pot from one provider to another risks increasing that problem: it will be much more difficult to track down a pension that you dimly remember if it has been moved, perhaps with any correspondence having been sent to an out-of-date address.
The definition of “dormant” is also slightly concerning: a pension pot will be considered dormant if no contributions have been made into the pot during the last 12 months and the individual has taken no steps to confirm or alter the way the pension pot is invested. I have a couple of pension pots that would be considered dormant under that definition, but that is simply because I am happy with the choices I made in the past; I would not consider them to be dormant. In the opposite direction, £1,000 seems a rather low definition of small, although I see it can be changed by regulation.
I am not clear when the Secretary of State intends to make the relevant regulations, but to avoid making the problem of lost pensions worse, I would suggest that it should not be done until the first pensions dashboard is fully operational and accessible to the public. As I understand it, that will not be until late 2027. Perhaps the Minister could provide a brief update on that. Also, there should be a clear requirement that any such transfer, carried out in a situation where no response has been received from the individual, should be clearly flagged on the dashboard to help people track them down.
The second issue I want to raise is more important. Here, I fear that a trend is beginning to emerge already—and that, most unusually, I am going to find myself in disagreement with the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. This is the power for the Government to mandate the asset allocation of a master trust or group personal pension scheme. Pension schemes should be managed for the benefit of the beneficiaries. The trustees have a fiduciary duty to that effect. The Government mandating that a proportion—and there is no limit to this in the Bill—should be directed into types of assets and locations chosen by them rides a coach and horses through that principle. Who will be liable if such investments are not suitable or go badly wrong? I do not see any indemnification of trustees here. What makes the Government think that they know better than a professional qualified pension manager as to what is best for scheme members? The track record of government investing is not stellar, to say the least.
Of course, the reason for this is to push more pension funds into UK assets, often described as “productive assets”. Like the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, I have that in inverted commas here, but even that makes little sense in this respect. Let us look at the sorts of assets that the Bill refers to. The first is private equity. Now, private equity may be a good place for a pension fund to put some of its money. Over time, returns have generally exceeded public markets and bonds, primarily because of the use of leverage, but I would love to understand why the Government think this would be a good thing for the country.
What private equity does is buy existing assets, then leverage them up with high levels of debt, thereby gearing up the possible returns that can be made on normal levels of growth. That reduces the corporation tax payable by the company because debt interest is tax-deductible, and the debt is often located in overseas low-tax jurisdictions. Typically, then, overheads and costs are reduced as far as they can be to make the company appear more profitable for sale after three to five years, and that often has the effect of reducing investment in the company and often leads to job reductions.
So where is the benefit to the country from this? If noble Lords do not believe me, I give them Thames Water, left underinvested and indebted by Macquarie, which took out billions in the process, or Debenhams, where the three private equity owners collected £1.2 billion of dividends financed by debt and property sales that left the company to go bust. Others we could mention would be Southern Cross Healthcare and Silentnight, where, ironically, pensioners also lost out, and we have the current anti-competitive situation with veterinary practices. Of course, this is a generalisation, and there are exceptions, but the idea that PE generates growth is doubtful at best—venture capital, development capital, growth capital, yes; PE, not so much. Why do the Government think it would be a good idea to force pension funds to invest in private equity?
Amazingly, the Bill does not actually set out that allocations must be made into UK assets. The wording is drafted so widely that the only assets globally that cannot be prescribed are assets listed on a recognised exchange; nor does it set any limits to what percentage should be allocated into the assets the Government prescribe. In theory, 100% could be allocated. The only safeguard in the Bill—contrary to the Minister’s comment that there are many safeguards—is that the Secretary of State must review the effects of any such regulation within five years of the regulations coming into force. We should note that this is not an independent review; it is a review by the Secretary of State, the very person who made the regulations. That does not fill me with huge confidence. Anyway, if things have gone wrong after five years, what can be done? Is the Secretary of State to be liable for the losses that scheme members have incurred because of the Government overriding the fiduciary duty?
We are an outlier in terms of our pension funds investing in their own country’s productive assets, especially when compared with countries such as Canada and Australia, so I understand why the Government wish to change that, but the way to achieve that is first to understand why it is not happening now. I would be interested to hear from the Minister why she thinks that is. I suspect it is down to a number of issues, including demographic issues, the attractiveness of our markets versus others, regulation, taxation—Gordon Brown’s dividend stealth tax has a lot to answer for—and, I am sure, others. The better solution, surely, is to identify and deal with the barriers that exist to make UK productive assets a more attractive investment prospect, not to take the frankly lazy and inefficient route of mandating without addressing the underlying reasons. Neither Canada nor Australia mandates. Rather, they promote domestic investment in infrastructure and projects through collaboration, not by forcing specific allocations. We should learn from those examples.
The Minister has been clear that the Government do not expect to use this mandation power. This raises a wider point of principle, one that the Minister and I have debated in other contexts in the past, which is that the Government should not give themselves powers that they do not intend to use. As the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, said, there is a tendency to use them regardless at some point, even if it is another Government who use them. This is becoming a bit of a trend, and one that I feel should be strongly resisted. There are two potential solutions to this part of the Bill. Either we need to clarify the whole fiduciary duty principle and improve safeguards, or we should remove the power altogether, and I must say that I favour the latter.
With that, I look forward to working with Members from all around the House, as ever, and the Minister on the Bill. In the meantime, I wish everyone a very happy Christmas.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and to take part in this Bill, which is a historic measure proposed by the Government with noble intentions. I need to declare my interests as an adviser to NatWest Cushon and a non-executive director of Capita Pension Solutions. I too look forward to the maiden speech of the noble Baroness, Lady White, who has so much success and experience to offer the House. I thank the Pension Protection Fund, CityUK, Pensions UK, the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries, and the Pensions Action Group for their helpful briefings and information for this speech.
The Bill introduces reforms that aim to improve pension outcomes for members of defined benefit schemes, defined contribution schemes and local government schemes and to increase investment in UK productive assets via the route of consolidation into a few larger asset pools or by ensuring default arrangements for direct pension funds in a way that the Government will mandate. I certainly support the aim of increasing UK investments by UK pension funds and the aim of improving pension outcomes. I warmly welcome many of the Bill’s provisions, but I believe that some of the assumptions underlying these reforms could prove dangerously false and that there is a real risk that there will be a lack of innovation in future as smaller, newer providers drop out or do not even start, while the Government could and should be bolder in encouraging pension schemes to support UK growth than the measures in the Bill provide for.
Using both unlisted and listed investment seems to make far more sense than just requiring a specific exposure to private unlisted assets. I hate to disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, but I think we are on a similar page when it comes to the Government’s specific proposals. Many of our listed companies are selling at attractive ratings or discounts to their real asset value.
There are many aspects of the Bill that my remarks today could cover, but I will have to try to concentrate on a few and leave the rest for Committee. The aim of increasing UK pension fund support for UK growth is right and long overdue. However, much more could be done with the Bill. According to the Government’s workplace pensions road map, the UK has the second largest pension system in the world, and it is clearly the largest potential source of domestic long-term investment capital. Taxpayers provide £80 billion a year of reliefs to add to individual and employer contributions, but most of that money helps other countries, not ours. If taxpayers were presented with the question, “Would you like £80 billion of your money to build roads and fill potholes in other countries, rather than keeping it here in Britain?”, I am not convinced that they would answer in the positive.
UK pension funds have stopped supporting British companies, large and small. I believe that the future of British business can be successful and I believe in Britain, but it seems like our own pension funds do not. Even the parliamentary pension scheme has about 2.8% of its equity exposure in the UK. The Bill does not address that, as the Government are focusing on DC and local government schemes. One of the proposals that I would like to put to the Government is to see whether there are ways in which, instead of mandating specific areas that the Government want pension funds to invest in—which happen to be, in my view, some of the riskiest areas that they could support—the Government should require, let us say, at least 25% of all new contributions into pension schemes to be put into UK assets, listed or unlisted.
The UK listed markets have become exceptionally undervalued in a global context because our pension funds no longer support our markets. We used to have a reliable source of long-term domestic investment capital. If schemes want taxpayers to put huge sums into their pension funds each year, and if managers and providers wish to continue to receive such sums, is it so unreasonable to ask that they put, as I say, maybe just one-quarter of those contributions into the UK? That could include unlisted assets, listed assets or infrastructure—that would be up to trustees to decide—and if they wanted to put more than 75% overseas, they could go ahead, but should not expect taxpayers to give them money to do so. That seems to me to be not mandation but a proper incentivisation, using the incentive mechanism that we already have of tax relief, which does not have to support Britain at all.
We find ourselves in constrained fiscal circumstances. New Financial recently showed that each bit of the UK pension system has lower allocations to domestic equities as a percentage of assets, as a percentage of their equity allocation and relative to the size of the local market than other countries. What is wrong with Britain? I believe in Britain, and there are reasons to expect that pension schemes—after all, 25% of the pension is tax free—should do far more now to protect and boost our growth. This would not have to wait until 2030, either; it could happen immediately.
If I may, I want to cover the question of relying on consolidation as the answer to driving better returns, and what that might do to the marketplace. Defined contribution workplace schemes and the LGPS are supposed to somehow automatically generate better long-term returns by being bigger. Well, there is a case for that, and some studies would support it, but the figure of £25 billion that must be reached by default funds, and the £10 billion by 2030 that is required, are totally arbitrary. There is no rationale that says that is the right number, yet we are putting it in primary legislation. That is most unwise. What if there is a market crash between now and 2030, for example? What is magic about that number?
Can the Minister say what evidence there is that scale is a reliable future predictor of returns? What consideration have the Government given to the damage to new entrants by favouring these large-scale incumbent funds? The risk of schemes herding and all doing the same thing with such large pools of capital, especially in global passive funds, could distort markets. What consideration has been given to that? What level of confidence is attached to the predictions that the Government have made for improvements in outcomes?
I have heard from new entrants to the market, such as Penfold, which say they are now unable to get new business because they are growing fast but may not reach the £10 billion by 2030—and of course people cannot recommend that employers now invest in them. That company has innovative financial methodologies and is offering a new way of reaching out to pension scheme members, as are Cushon and Smart Pension, which may be further down the line in reaching the target. I have concerns that the Bill will stop new competition and new entrants coming in. An oligopoly is not normally the best way for a market to succeed.
I am particularly puzzled by the explicit exclusion of closed-ended listed companies within the Bill. Part 2 says that none of those investment trusts that have invested in precisely the types of investment that we need, and that the Government want to encourage to boost the UK economy, are excluded from the Bill. I do not understand why the Government would be doing this. I know that they want to encourage long-term asset funds, which are open-ended structures, but there are enormous reasons for and benefits from having closed-ended structures when holding such illiquid assets and long-term growth assets. These are proven companies that have produced very good returns in net asset value yet have shrunk to discounts, due partly to macro factors but also to regulatory overkill, which needs urgently to be reviewed.
Investment in just UK infrastructure and renewables by this investment company sector has exceeded £18 billion. Overall, in the kind of assets that the Government want to encourage—funding solar and wind projects, energy efficiency initiatives, social housing, biotech, property and private equity—these companies have put more than £60 billion to work. But they are now struggling to survive and having to buy back their shares, rather than invest in the kind of growth assets that they could otherwise be selling and managing for pension funds in this country.
I hope that the Minister will help us understand whether the Government are going to reverse this particular exclusion and recognise the benefits of this long-standing, world-leading investment sector. Unquestionably, it can be part of the answer in this scenario. I also urge the Government to clarify what fiduciary duty means. I know that there have been many calls for that to be put into statutory guidance, and I would support this.
Finally, as regards the Pension Protection Fund and the Financial Assistance Scheme, I welcome the flexibility that is being put in to allow the levy to be changed. I welcome the change in the terminal benefits. I welcome the acknowledgment of the injustice of the pre-1997 frozen payments, with the oldest people both in the Pension Protection Fund and particularly in the Financial Assistance Scheme, suffering most. I also welcome the flexibility that will mean that, where a scheme is unsure whether the previous rules would have granted increases on the pre-1997 benefits, it will be assumed that they will. The terminal illness increase, from six to 12 months, is again very welcome. But I would urge the Government to look carefully at how we can recognise the injustice to the pre-1997 members, such as Terry Monk, Alan Marnes, Richard Nicholl and John Benson, who gave years of their lives to achieve better outcomes in the Financial Assistance Scheme, and promote the PPF, which has been such a success. I have also heard from Carillion workers who were in the Civil Service pension scheme and have ended up in the PPF, losing their pre-1997 benefits. This injustice hurts, especially in light of the Government’s generosity to mineworkers and the British Coal Staff Superannuation Scheme, which has been given a 30% to 40% increase to pensions that is effectively publicly funded. I hope that the Government will think again about potentially one-off increases, or some other way of helping the pre-1997 members who lost their benefits.
Lord Willetts (Con)
My Lords, I welcome many features and proposals in this substantial and significant Bill. It does, of course, draw on the work of the previous Government, and indeed continues progress on pensions that has long been conducted on a cross-party basis. I think back to my time as shadow Work and Pensions Secretary 20 years ago, when I worked with the then Pensions Minister James Purnell as he investigated auto-enrolment; I then served in the coalition Cabinet with Sir Steve Webb implementing these proposals. I remember also many years of debating with my noble friend Lady Altmann, and I agree with a lot of what she has just said. I look forward to the maiden contribution from the noble Baroness, Lady White, and I rather suspect that during her time in the No. 10 Policy Unit she may have also been engaged in some of these debates.
The Bill comes before the proposals from the re-established Pensions Commission, and I hope that it will have the flexibility to make it possible to implement ideas that emerge from the Pensions Commission. There is a still a crucial question hanging over the original Pensions Commission work, and it is great to see the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, in her place. She knows that I agonise over whether there was a scenario where defined benefit pension schemes could have been saved 20 years ago. They had become very onerous, and over decades successive Governments had added to the regulations to make the defined benefit promise more and more generous and more and more cast iron. Eventually, they had become so onerous that companies closed them to new members, so what had always been intended as an intergenerational contract was made so generous that it became a once-off special offer for the members of those schemes when they closed. It is possible that a significant reduction in the burdens on employers might have enabled some version of those schemes to survive. That is relevant to today’s debate on measures such as collective DC, which is an attempt to recreate some of those strengths. We went instead to pure DC, and younger employees have not been able to enjoy anything like the pension promise of older members of company schemes.
We did some work on this at the Resolution Foundation back in 2023. I cannot remember what has happened to the chief executive at the time, but perhaps I can quote some figures from our intergenerational audit in 2023. We estimated that millennials born in the early 1980s will reach the age of 60 with, on average, £45,000 less in pension assets than boomers born 20 years earlier. That is the challenge of boosting the pensions savings of the younger generation, which I hope is the cross-party basis for this legislation.
A particularly acute example of how this generational unfairness can work is that some of those defined benefit schemes closed to new members were in deficit. The company plugged the deficit gap by using revenues generated by all of its workers, including the younger workers, which it put into the defined benefit scheme available only to some of the workers. We now have some very interesting examples of what happens when these schemes find themselves now, thank heavens, in surplus. The recent Stagecoach deal is a very interesting example; it has been widely welcomed in the media, and in many ways it is good news. However, the Stagecoach pensions scheme closed to new members in 2017. After that, the younger workers had no opportunity to join it. There will now be a distribution of the surplus. I hope the Minister might comment on the feasibility of some of the uses for that surplus, which are not in the current provisions. We heard from my noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott about the importance of pension adequacy. Would it be acceptable for one use of the surplus to be to pay increased auto-enrolled employer contributions into the pension schemes of employees of Stagecoach who joined post 2017 and were therefore not in the earlier scheme? Some of their work will have generated the revenues that created the surplus. Would helping them through the successful auto-enrolment model not be one way forward? Another use, which is being talked about, is funding a collective DC pension arrangement to help get those schemes going. I very much hope we will move beyond the single CDC we have at the moment with Royal Mail. Pensions UK has an interesting proposal for some tax waivers for extra contributions going into CDC, especially out of pension surpluses. Again, I hope the Minister might be able to give that a welcome.
The closure of DB schemes and the creation of pure DC was the background to some of the big shifts we have been talking about. There has been a massive shift from equities into bonds and away from UK assets into assets held abroad. We are talking about this as if it is just rational capitalism working and trustees exercising their discretion, but I have a lot of sympathy with the points that my noble friend Lady Altmann made, because the British model is a very unusual model. I believe it is largely to be explained, not by some higher economic rationality, but by the strange features of the closure of DB and moving to pure DC. It means that the percentage invested in UK equity fell from 50% 20 years ago to 5% now. That makes us a complete outlier across the OECD for the willingness of our pension funds to invest in UK assets.
This is not what the pension fund members and contributors expect. As we know from recent polling published by the London Stock Exchange, when you do a survey of 1,000 current members of workplace pension schemes and ask them how much of their pension contributions they think are going into British business, their estimate is 41%—nearly 10 times larger than what is actually happening. If you ask them whether they think their pension scheme should invest more in British industry, even if this would involve some sacrifice in their future pensions, 61% say yes.
Most funded pension schemes in other advanced western countries are much more deeply rooted in their own national economy and realise that part of what they are trying to do is create the environment in which their national pensioners thrive in a healthy economy in a generation’s time. It is absolutely right to have this debate now in Britain and, for me, having been involved—and still being involved, in different ways—in the science base and research, it is deeply frustrating that we have one of the world’s great research bases and one of its great financial centres but we have totally failed to link the research base with the commercial investors in the City. That needs to change.
Successive Chancellors have been trying to do this, and of course we have had the Mansion House compact and now have the Mansion House Accord. There is now a fraught debate about mandation, and I realise all the delicacies about it. I personally think that the recent proposal from the London Stock Exchange is a very interesting way forward: not specifying the asset allocation by type of asset but saying that, whatever asset allocation has been decided upon, 25% should go into UK assets—absolutely not with full mandation but expecting this as a provision for UK DC default funds. So I hope the Minister will say that the Government are considering this proposal from the London Stock Exchange, now backed by 250 founders and chief executives of UK companies. I hope she will assure the House that, if that proposal were to go forward, this Bill would provide the necessary legislative framework, which I am assured is not an ambitious set of changes. There are things that can be done to secure a far greater understanding of the value of investing in British industry and other British assets than we have seen over the last few years.
I will briefly raise one other issue involving the other Pensions Commission: the investigation of pension age. I hope the Minister may be able to say something about this, because the clock is ticking. There was a half-hearted partial announcement of the decision that the pension age should go up further under the previous Government, which has not been followed up. My view is that that debate has got totally trapped in a preoccupation with life expectancy and using projected life expectancy as the only metric—what I call RIP minus X—or formula that has to be used. What pension age you set is not simply a mechanical calculation around life expectancy but an important fiscal decision. As in all other decisions, there are other factors, including long-term public expenditure costs and the likely income of pensioners from other sources.
I hope therefore that we will not find that we look back on this debate and ask why we missed another opportunity to prepare the ground and properly consider whether, given the fiscal constraints that any Government face, we should also be considering increases in the pension age.
Baroness Warwick of Undercliffe (Lab)
My Lords, I too look forward to the maiden speech of the noble Baroness, Lady White of Tufnell Park. I was delighted to discover that we are both honorary alumni of the University of Bradford.
An adequate pension must be the goal for everyone to ensure a happy and secure retirement. This Bill aims to achieve higher returns for pension savers. As many millions more people are now in pension schemes through automatic enrolment, it is imperative that we ensure they get good value for the money they are saving from their hard-earned incomes. At the same time, those savings must provide the best possible support in their retirement.
Both the previous and current Governments recognised that, if we are to achieve the growth our country needs, domestic markets must be stimulated to invest in the UK. This inevitably led to a review of the pension system. The pension sector is a major allocator of capital, which has a direct impact on the efficiency of the wholesale financial markets in driving innovation and investment in our economy.
The pension systems in most other advanced economies invest significantly more in their domestic economies than does the UK, as has already been said, where pension savings, as we should remind ourselves, are also supported by tax relief of over £70 billion per annum. The UK has deep savings pools, yet we have seen a reduction in domestic investment in the UK. The UK has one of the largest pension systems in the world. As the parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions reminded us in another place, it is our largest source of domestic capital, underpinning not just retirement of millions of people but the investment on which the country’s future prosperity depends. It makes so much sense to seek better to harness that capital, to invest in a more diverse range of assets that would benefit the UK economy, but also not to place savers at risk. This Bill is a serious and most welcome attempt to address both issues of concern: domestic capital investment in the UK and improving the outcomes for millions of workers saving for their retirement.
The pension sector’s role as a major allocator of capital will come increasingly from defined contribution schemes. There is momentum behind the need to focus on the DC pension sector’s ability to deliver good value for pension savers. In addressing these twin challenges of improving the outcomes for pension savers and achieving sustainable economic growth, there is general agreement that we need market consolidation, to see fewer pension providers operating at scale, and to deliver higher returns to savers and greater investment in UK productive assets. The Bill introduces the enabling powers to achieve that structural reform and greater consolidation in the market. But that raises major issues in respect of regulation and the governance standards required in both the management and administration of those schemes and the oversight of them by those with the fiduciary duty to protect the scheme members.
The case for consolidation is compelling, but will the Government give further consideration to the governance and regulatory requirements that need to be placed on those fewer scale pension providers managing billions, even trillions of assets over time so that downside risks are controlled and the desired outcome is achieved?
On the specific issue of trustees in these consolidated schemes, in another place, Liam Byrne MP called out the risk that in creating scale through fewer and bigger pension funds, there would still be a failure to deliver desired levels of investment in the UK. He called for greater legal clarity on trustees’ fiduciary duties, their ability to consider systemic factors and their impact on members pension savings when taking investment decisions. The Minister, Torsten Bell, advised that the Government will bring forward legislation to clarify that trustees can take systemic factors into account. Can the Minister advise the House as to the timescale for bringing forward that legislation?
The Bill aims to improve the returns workers receive on their retirement savings. We know that the DWP, the regulator and the FCA are working together to create a disclosure framework for assessing value for money that is to apply across the whole DC market, enabling consistent and comparable assessments of workplace pension schemes. To fully implement that framework, however, will require primary legislation in addition to the provisions in this Bill. When do the Government anticipate fully rolling out a new framework for assessing value for money?
I turn to the issue of accessing pension savings on retirement. In a DC world, UK savers are not well supported at retirement in making the complex decisions they face. They must manage their own longevity, inflation, and investment risk, and many struggle. Which? rightly points out that these decisions may have severe consequences and can mean that an individual outlives their savings. So it is good news that the Bill requires trustees of pension schemes to provide their scheme members with default retirement solutions that are relevant to their needs, and to help them manage the risks they face when they move into retirement. But we have to ensure that those solutions are fit for purpose. Are the Government actively considering additional guidance and regulation on the assessment of the value and benefit for members of the default retirement solutions to be provided by the schemes?
There are now many millions of small pension pots, as workers move from employer to employer, and the numbers are increasing. It is a major inefficiency in the pension system, as the Minister herself pointed out. The welcome advent of the pensions dashboard will help savers to take action to consolidate their pension pots. Characteristically, however, inertia means that many will not. The Bill provides for very small pots to be automatically transferred into qualifying consolidator schemes, which should reduce administration costs and deliver better returns for consumers through lower costs and charges. Can the Minister say what the Government’s current thinking is on the timetable for implementing the necessary regulation to allow this to happen?
There are several other important changes in the Bill which other noble Lords have already raised, but I finish by highlighting one of the changes to the PPF—the Pension Protection Fund—compensation. The decision to introduce legislation to enable prospective annual increases on pre-1997 compensation to PPF and FAS members is welcome. It could benefit more than a quarter of a million PPF and FAS members, but I am concerned that it will leave an unfairness, because no retrospective increases are applied to pre-1997 accrued pensions. The prospective increases will not apply to those members whose schemes did not provide increases to pre-1997 pensions prior to entering the PPF, and there is no recognition in any form of the major past loss of pension value, particularly given the incidence of high inflation and the acute financial impact on those affected. In its foreword, a recent PPF levy policy document concludes:
“The likelihood of the PPF encountering significant funding problems in the future … is low and is expected to continue to reduce over time … if funding problems did arise, these could be resolved over a multi-year period with our investment returns likely to be the most significant contributor”.
I go back to the points made by my noble friend Lady Drake on 23 April, when she raised this issue. Taking into account the considerable confidence in the funding level and investment returns, that £32.2 billion of assets, £19 billion in liabilities and reserves of £13.2 billion are held by the PPF, and the reduction in the levy to zero, the level of fairness set in the striking of the balance between levy payer and PPF/FAS member does not appear right. As my noble friend said:
“Not only has the levy in quantum declined hugely; the levy has also declined as a proportion of the PPF’s funding mix. Roughly one-third of the funding comes from the assets transferred to the PPF from those members’ pension schemes. Similarly, another third comes from the investment returned on assets, and 11% comes from assets recovered by the PPF on behalf of those schemes. Less than a quarter—23%—of the funding comes from the levy, and that is going to fall”.—[Official Report, 23/4/25; col. GC 32.]
Can the Minister take back to the Government consideration of an ad hoc payment to those members of the PPF with pre-1997 service, in recognition of the considerable real loss of pension that they have experienced? Such a payment should be well within the funding levels of the PPF. Payment of the prospective increases to pre-1997 pensions accrued to those whose original scheme may not have made provision for such increases.
Baroness Coffey (Con)
My Lords, there is a lot in this Bill. Some of it is to be welcomed—there are quite a few crackers in it. However, there are also large elements of it that feel—dare I say it at this time of Christmas?—like a little bit of a turkey. It is such a skeleton Bill that it is more appropriate for Halloween than the time in which we find ourselves.
I am not the only person here who believes that. I must say that the report from the DPRRC is one of the most damning that I have seen on a piece of primary legislation coming to your Lordships’ House. Indeed, the committee says that
“we have found it exceedingly difficult to provide meaningful comment on the Bill precisely because it is so skeletal”.
This extent of delegated powers—there are nearly more delegated powers than there are clauses—does not feel like the right place to be. Of course, I know that trying to work with the pension industry and see the scope of what it is trying to achieve means that a bit of flexibility may be needed, but it is important that we do not just, candidly, hand things over to almost a ministerial diktat, which I am afraid that parts of this Bill do.
I was Secretary of State when the previous Pension Schemes Act was passed in Parliament, and my noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott took it through this House; in fact, it started in this House. It built on—and this Bill continues to build on—the idea that where consensus comes together, we can get a very good product. Indeed, that continuity of thought is important, not just for the pensions industry but for the current and future pensioners that we seek to serve.
It has been useful to see the variety of consultations there has been, going back even to 2015, including about local government funds, and the actions taken when consolidation started to happen. There was a consultation in 2022 about other aspects of small pot consolidation. The clause I probably welcome the most is about value for money. It is really important that we make sure that we address these issues. In particular, the power to effectively shut down underperforming funds is good because, regardless of how little or how much people put in, many people are putting into their pensions all the time but do not necessarily realise quite how little will come out at the end of it. We will see more communication with the pensions dashboard, but the value-for-money framework will be a critical part of that.
There has been quite a lot of talk about trustees, and I know that a number of bodies have been trying to see if we can move to having solely professional trustees. That would be a mistake. I appreciate that is not what the Bill is calling for, but one of the challenges is that trustees, driven by a certain type of asset adviser, have been attracted to low-cost and low-risk pension schemes, but too often that has led to low return. So many of the gradual changes we have seen and that will start to come through in response to some of this legislation will be able to address that. That is vital and I will support measures to achieve it.
However, there is an underlying issue here about the mandation clause. From my experience in government, I remember a meeting in Downing Street with a bunch of pension providers, which was mainly driven by insurers. People had been told that they could not raise the issue of Solvency II being a problem. One or two were brave and did so, and were later chastised by Treasury officials. Nevertheless, it was important that they did. I understand the frustration of Government Ministers at the very top of government. People saying “We need investment” is all well and good, but why do they not put some of their money into it? I include the Local Government Pension Scheme in that. Ultimately, our traditional approach is one of state pensions not being particularly generous and trying to incentivise people to put into the private pension market, as well as what has happened historically with the defined benefit industry. That is why we have the system that we do, which has grown to the extent that it has so far—so much so that, as has been recognised, trillions of pounds in assets could be deployed to greater use, but it still must be for the benefit of current, future and, indeed, deferred pensioners.
Further, there is a missed opportunity in this Bill. Having two different regulators for pensions is a wasted opportunity. I know that the two bodies, the FCA and the Pensions Regulator, have been working on joint strategies, but fundamentally we still have significantly different rules on what can or cannot happen with pension funds, depending on how they are regulated. That just does not make sense.
This is the moment to try to change that. Frankly, the FCA has enough to do. Under their different rules, TPR allows a particular investment but the FCA does not, although it may seem to be a very similar product. We should not leave that element of complexity to be solved via delegated powers but take the opportunity to fix it in this Bill. That will need primary legislation and I hope that, although she may not welcome it—and, as I am trying to get it all out of the Treasury and the FCA, they certainly will not welcome it—the Minister will try to get it into one regulator to make a difference for the prosperity of our pensioners.
I am conscious that this is a missed opportunity in how pensions can help our planet. I strongly promoted the concept of planet, prosperity and people. These are mutually beneficial and there is no doubt that investment by the industry can play a part. That is why we put in place world-leading, pioneering regulations making the link to the TCFD and net zero. However, crucially, they did not mandate how investments were to be made or the drawing from a variety of assets but, basically, put a much greater duty of transparency on what was happening in the long term. The same needs to happen with nature and the TNFD. I will explore that in Committee.
In terms of what we want to achieve from this, I think your Lordships will share with the Government the outcome of having a good, robust and fully functioning pensions industry that generates prosperity, but let us not go down this tricky route of mandation. In particular, the DPRRC singles out that Ministers keep saying, “We don’t intend to use it”. In that case, let us not legislate for it. Let us make sure that we keep that blunt instrument away and continue to have a productive pensions industry. Nest, which was originally provided for in legislation prior to 2010 and came into effect within the last decade or so, has been a fantastic source to drive and make sure that we have private asset allocations. Let us celebrate that, work out why it worked so well and, as I have already suggested, make sure that we get rid of the stuff that is massively underperforming when prospective pensioners do not realise it.
It is going to be an interesting time in Grand Committee. I am afraid there will be a lot of amendments—this is not the only Bill I will be tabling amendments to—but I hope the Government will think again on the themes we will get into. If a lot of this is just about getting investment in Britain, the Government will need to answer why they scrapped the British ISA, which was a ready-made model. It is almost because it was not invented here. Fortunately, on the pensions journey, there is normally good cross-party consensus, but I fear that mandation has blown that out of the water. Nevertheless, let us see if we can try to fix it.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, and to hear nature-positive sentiments from the Conservative Benches. We are hearing a wide range of perspectives in that space, and I am glad to hear those. I declare my position as a vice-president of the Local Government Association and the National Association of Local Councils.
I echo the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, in enjoying seeing so many familiar faces on the pensions trail. My first ever Committee was on the Pension Schemes Bill some six years ago. It is also nice to welcome new faces such as the noble Baroness, Lady White of Tufnell Park. I very much look forward to her speech as someone who, when in London, stays just across the border in Kentish Town. I also join the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, in his expressions of concern about any forced investment in private equity. It is an extractivist, exploitative model which benefits a few at the cost of the many and does not have the long-term perspective that we surely need when talking about pensions.
I will start by looking at the context. We are starting from when the Chancellor initiated a pensions review in August 2024, led by the DWP and HMT, aimed at bolstering investment in the UK and dealing with pension adequacy—or rather, the significant levels of pension inadequacy that so many now suffer from.
Picking up the point about pension age raised by the noble Lord, Lord Willetts, although from an opposite perspective, I note that when the state pension age rose from 65 to 66, between December 2018 and October 2020, the percentage of 65 year-olds in income poverty more than doubled from 10% to 24%. A quarter of a million more 60 to 64 year-olds are now in poverty than in 2010, when the state pension age began rising. These figures are from a report by the Standard Life Centre for the Future of Retirement. According to the research, the poverty rate for 60 to 64 year-olds increased from 16% to 22% from 2009 to 2024. There are now 8 million people in their 60s in the UK, up from 6.7 million in 2010, and that is expected to peak at 8.7 million in 2031. Many of those are pre-pensioners now, but they are very soon going to be pensioners. Some are pensioners already, and we have a huge poverty problem there. The noble Lord, Lord Willetts, said that this has to be a fiscal consideration. I am afraid we have to look at it much more broadly and consider the state of public health in the UK, whether many of those people are indeed fit to work, and the huge inequality of health at age 60, 65 or 70 that operates across different communities and social groups.
We also have to acknowledge that 2.8 million pensioners are now living in households below the minimum income standard. I note that the House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee said in July:
“No older person should be unable to have a minimum, dignified, socially acceptable standard of living”.
The Green Party concurs with that. I know the Minister will be interested that women make up 67% of those pensioners in poverty. There has been some improvement in the situation with the new state pension but, as the committee noted in July, there are “blind spots” in policy-making. The reality of women’s lives is still insufficiently recognised. I cannot see anything in this Bill that deals with that, but I would be interested if the Minister could contribute anything on it.
Staying with the context, because it is important that we think about where we are before we get to the detail, according to ONS data we now have 44% of adults aged 16 and over actively contributing to a pension pot. This compares to 34% a decade earlier. Obviously, auto-enrolment is a really important factor, but according to the recent Scottish Widows 2025 Retirement Report, 39% of working-age adults are not on track to achieve what the Pensions and Lifetime Savings Association deems a minimum lifestyle in retirement, and that is a 1% increase since 2024, so we are headed in the wrong direction.
The Minister said this is all about security and dignity in retirement. Before we start talking about private pensions, we have to acknowledge that the financial sector’s private pensions are not going to meet everybody’s needs. There are great risks with the financial sector in this age of shocks, and we have to acknowledge that the state pension must be the anchor of security, certainty and freedom from fear for everybody in our society.
Picking up the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, on our Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee report, there are a couple of extra facts from that report that I think are telling and concerning. At 149 pages, the Bill’s delegated powers memorandum is nearly as long as the Bill itself, which is 161 pages. The number of delegated powers in the Bill—119—nearly exceeds the number of clauses, which is 123.
I have spent quite a bit of time on context because I think it is important, but I turn now to a couple of points that I expect to raise in Committee and possibly later. One of those is the term “fiduciary duty”. Lots of people have been asking me, “What are you doing in the last week before Christmas?” and I have said, “I am going to be talking about fiduciary duty for pension schemes”. I have then got lots of blank looks.
But this is something I have actually long been familiar with as a Green, as we have been struggling over many years to ensure that local pension schemes in particular are able to avoid investing, say, in the merchants of death, big tobacco, because that is bad for pensioners in a broader context, or able to avoid investing in fossil fuels because of their health and environmental impacts, and also because of the financial risks of the carbon bubble. So things like “fiduciary duties” roll off my tongue so easily.
Noble Lords will know that this was debated very strongly in the Commons. They have started the work in some ways but have left us with an unfinished piece of work. In response to the amendment in the Commons supported by 34 MPs, including all four Green MPs, the Pensions Minister has now committed to legislate to bring forward statutory guidance—again—on fiduciary duty. However, as I understand it—I am happy to be corrected by the Minister—the statutory guidance provided by the Government would not apply to the whole range of pension schemes and would not provide the legal clarity that schemes would need to wish to act on these issues. Any statutory guidance of course need not be followed and is at risk from potential future Governments.
Although this sounds technical, it is of course terribly important. I note that Liam Byrne in the other place said that there is currently confusion—and what the Government are proposing does not seem to deal with that confusion. With confusion comes caution. Then, we see trustees understandably following the safe path, rather than the one they can actually see is the right path.
The noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, has covered a lot of what I was going to say about nature, so I will not repeat that. But it is worth looking at this from my perspective of six years in this place. I am delighted to see the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, in her place, because she has been a leader in finally getting successive Governments to put climate and nature into Bills. To get the climate and nature bit in because the Government initially left it out has become almost the standard part of the role of your Lordships’ House. That is something I am sure we will return to.
I have one final point to make on the Bill. The Financial Conduct Authority has, to be charitable, a chequered regulatory history. The Minister said that the FCA would have this extra responsibility and that extra responsibility, which is deeply concerning. I am interested in the suggestions from the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, on how we might look at that regulation. I do not have a view on that yet, but I would be interested in the debate.
I note that, a year ago, the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Investment Fraud and Fairer Financial Services—I declare I am a Member—published a report on the effectiveness, or not, of the FCA, and blamed it for doing too little, too late, and doing nothing to prevent or punish alleged wrongdoing, with errors being all too common. That is really important, given that we are giving it oversight over some significantly increased powers for trustees, where trustees will not be referring back to members of the scheme.
Finally, I come to the fun bit. Given that this is the last contribution from a Member of the Green group for this session before Christmas, I sincerely thank all the staff—the doorkeepers, clerks, Library, catering, security and cleaning staff—for the many hours they have laboured for us, all too often hours very late in the evening. To offer a wish for all of them and all of us, my hope for 2026 is that we might see more sensible working hours for your Lordships’ House and for all our staff.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. But, not for the first time, she will find that I disagree with practically everything she has just said.
I have a few problems with the Bill, which has a number of sensible things in it. I will focus on aspects of the Bill that are being sold as supporting UK business investment and hence the Government’s growth mission.
I have big concerns about pension scheme money being seen as available for investment in ways that the Government choose but which conflict with the views of trustees, who have a duty to act in members’ best interests. I am as patriotic as anybody, but I do not think it is right to allow the Government to require investment in the UK. There have been times when investing in the UK was a terrible idea financially. I can remember the 1970s, when the only reason anyone held assets in the UK was the existence of exchange controls—we could not get money out. I say to my noble friend Lady Altmann that forcing or incentivising pension schemes into listed UK assets does absolutely nothing to enhance UK growth. These are existing assets; they have nothing to do with new investment.
The Government’s proper role is to create the economic environment where businesses want to invest. That requires confidence in the economic future, taxes that are predictable and low, and regulatory burdens that are kept in check. Anti-business and anti-growth Budgets, and changes to employment laws, are the main drags on investment in the UK at the moment, and no amount of playing around with pension fund assets will change that. With the exception of scale-up financing, which is a problem in the UK, there is no evidence that funds are not available to back profitable business investment in the UK. The powers in the Bill need to be judged against that background.
The part of the Bill that concerns me most, in line with many other noble Lords who have spoken, is Chapter 3 of Part 2, which deals with scale and asset allocation. These provisions go much too far. I get the benefits of scale, both in terms of cost efficiency and the ability to diversify into alternative asset classes. However, I do not think that there is any conclusive evidence that £25 billion is a magic threshold. I am concerned that the Bill will have the effect, after first having consolidated the market, of ossifying the pensions landscape. As I have said many times in your Lordships’ House, I am a believer in competition and markets.
Large players love regulations that create barriers to entry, because they insulate them from market disrupters. The Bill says that subscale players—new entrants—have to be regulated. Risk-averse regulators are not the best people to judge growth potential or the power of innovation. The Bill should encourage new entrants into the pensions market, even if that means a prolonged period of operating below scale. We need to look at how the long term for pensions investment can be protected and I will want to explore that in Committee.
The real shocker, of course, is asset allocation. Put simply, I believe that mandating asset allocation is wrong in principle and carries a significant risk of moral hazard. Pension trustees have a clear fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of their members. The Government should have no right to say to trustees that they must invest in particular things, especially if that conflicts with trustees’ views. I do not doubt the sincerity of the Government’s desire to get pension schemes to invest in a wider range of investments to improve returns for their members: that is broadly what scale facilitates. The danger comes with eliding that desire to facilitate higher returns for members with wanting to direct the investment into particular things, which may or may not turn out to deliver those higher returns. Legally requiring certain types of investment will inevitably result in calls for the Government to pick up the tab if the returns from those sorts of investments fall short. The moral hazard implications of these provisions for mandation are huge.
I am also disturbed to read proceedings in another place where some MPs wanted to direct pension schemes assets into their pet projects; they talked about social housing, hospitals and net zero. Such investments may well be socially desirable but there is no confidence that they will yield high returns for members of pension schemes. If the Bill does not rule out that kind of mandation, I am sure that it should. At the end of the day, trustees need to seek the best possible returns for their members, because it is investment performance that drives the retirement income of defined contribution members.
The drafting of the mandation clause is also a horror story; I will not weary the House with a commentary on that today, but I give notice that I shall want to examine it in Committee. I am sure that in Committee we will also want to look at capping the percentage which could be mandated—if indeed we wish to keep mandation at all, which I suspect we will not.
The other area that I wanted to talk about today is Clause 9, which creates a welcome ability to extract surpluses from defined benefit schemes. While only a tiny number of private sector DB schemes are still open to new members, very many employers are still burdened with schemes which have been long closed to new members or indeed to future accrual. Gordon Brown’s tax raid in 1997, followed by the prolonged period of low interest rates, meant that for the last 25 years, employers have had to pay large amounts to support the funding status of their defined benefit pension schemes. Recently, the good news is that some of those have swung back into surplus. It is only right that there should be an opportunity for those employers, who have borne this burden for such a long time, to get some of that surplus back. Doubtless, trustees will want to argue for further benefits for members in return for returning surpluses, but I hope that they will be mindful of the fact that the corporate sector has borne significant costs of keeping the defined benefit pension promises intact over many years, and they deserve a major share of those surpluses.
The Government have portrayed this as supporting business investment in the employing company, which it might do if the business environment is right for those companies to invest, but it may also be entirely rational for those companies to return excess money to their shareholders because that would be the best outcome for those shareholders. There is a provision in Clause 10 which allows conditions to be set on making payments. I shall want to ensure in Committee that this power cannot be used to direct what companies do with liberated pension surpluses once it has been agreed that it is safe for those surpluses to be removed from the pension scheme.
The Bill focuses on pension schemes, but it does not deal with many of the other problems that continue to exist in the pensions world. The Pensions Commission will tackle some but not all of those problems. In particular, around £1.3 billion of unfunded public sector pension obligations will weigh very heavily on future generations—that is currently largely hidden from sight at the moment. Into that category I would also put the continuation of the triple lock. This Bill is not the end of the pensions story.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
It is always a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes; I still worry on those occasions when I find myself agreeing with what she says. No doubt we will have interesting debates in Committee.
It is a real pleasure to take part in this debate, which is a perfect start to the festive season. I declare my interest as recorded in the register as a fellow of the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries, and I look forward to the maiden speech of the noble Baroness, Lady White of Tufnell Park.
I thank all the individuals and organisations that have written to me about the Bill. They have raised too many issues to deal with them all today, but I and others will seek to raise them in Committee.
I welcome this Bill. It is the first leg of the route to better pensions that was set out in the Government’s pensions road map. It seeks to make existing provision work more effectively and to ensure that people derive the maximum benefit from their pension savings. These objectives are to be welcomed. The second leg of this journey will be the outcome of the Pensions Commission. Part 2 will address the adequacy of retirement incomes and the fairness of a system that currently contains persistent inequalities. I welcome my noble friend the Minister repeating that it will look at state as well as private pensions.
It is worth pointing out, particularly given the welcome presence of the noble Lord, Lord Willetts—though he is not in his place—that this Bill marks the effective end of personal pensions and sets out how we can move to a better system of collective provision, leading to improved, fairer and appropriate outcomes for members.
Taking the various proposals in turn, the Bill takes important steps to remove inefficiencies in the current system. They include the consolidation of small dormant pension pots, contractual overrides for FCA-regulated schemes and the resolution of the issues that have arisen from the Virgin Media judgment through the validation of certain amendments. Each of these changes affects individual member’s rights without their active involvement and therefore must be handled with care, supported by appropriate regulation and professional oversight. These measures will require careful scrutiny in Committee.
Next, the Bill requires defined contribution schemes to offer default retirement arrangements for members. I welcome this initiative and consider it to be the most significant part of the Bill—potentially, as it is still unclear how these arrangements will operate in practice. The Bill provides broad regulation-making powers. We have now had the helpful report from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, but the details, as the committee emphasises, will depend on what is in the regulations. I therefore hope that we will be able to explore these issues in Committee and identify the main parameters that will apply to these default arrangements.
Turning to the value-for-money proposals, I have some reservations about what they can achieve. Greater and clearer disclosure based on defined parameters is undoubtedly desirable. However, value for money is not a simple or uniform concept. It varies significantly from individual to individual, reflecting different circumstances, attitudes to risk and personal needs. The problem is that there is no simple metric that can adequately capture this diversity. While charges are relatively straightforward to identify and compare, investment returns are inherently uncertain and can be assessed only by reference to the past. Beyond these factors, value for money is also shaped by the quality of the scheme administration, the level of service provided to members and the effectiveness of communication and support. Crucially, it also depends on how benefits are adopted and delivered and whether they meet differing members’ needs. Bringing these factors together, deciding how to weight them and reaching meaningful conclusions of value to members is highly complex. Therefore, while everyone is in favour of the concept of value for money—no one favours its opposite—its practical delivery is far more challenging than the Bill appears to acknowledge. The fear is that the process will simply end as a justification for making higher charges and hence lower benefits.
As a number of previous speakers have explained, the Bill contains provisions relating to pension scheme investments, which the Government consider a central element of the Bill. Other noble Lords have addressed, and will address, this in some detail, but I will make a couple of points.
I have no objection in principle to mandation, unlike other speakers. However, it is very important that the Government understand the implications of directing how members’ money is invested. Doing so carries responsibilities; this is where I found myself agreeing with the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. I do not think that that aspect has been sufficiently recognised by the Government. I am also concerned, as other Members have mentioned, about the provisions that would be inserted into the Pensions Act 2008 by Clause 40 that refer to specific classes of investment that will be the subject of mandation. I do not believe that this belongs in the Bill.
I have a general concern about the Government in effect providing investment guidance—so much can go wrong—but my particular concern is the appearance of private equity in that clause. Private equity has a mixed performance record and presents significant liquidity and transparency challenges for pension provision. Where members have pension rights, illiquidity raises a question about who ultimately carries the risk that is inevitably involved: is it the member, the scheme or other members? I think the point was made by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden.
There are, of course, other issues that require careful consideration, alongside broader concerns, such as climate and systemic risk. I am sure these will be touched on by other Members.
I turn to my two principal concerns about the provisions in the Bill: first, the provisions relating to the release of surplus, and secondly, the provision for pension increases where no statutory guarantee currently exists. On the release of surplus, ministerial Statements have suggested clearly that members are intended to share where surplus is released—I have a series of quotes, but I am running out of time. If that is the case then this objective should be set out clearly in the Bill. This is particularly important as there is a requirement under the existing legislation that the release of surplus should be for members’ benefits, and that is being removed. The Government justify this on the grounds that trustees’ responsibility to members is sufficient. I am afraid my experience in the industry tells me that that is not correct. It needs to be in the Bill if that is the Government’s intention.
Also, where employers are involved in the process of releasing surplus, it is absolutely right that it should involve the independent recognised trade unions that represent the affected employees. This is established practice elsewhere in pensions legislation, where unions must be notified and, in some cases, consulted before decisions are taken. This should clearly apply. If it applies to benefit and changes, it should apply in the case of surplus release.
I turn to my other area of concern: pension increases. It is important to understand the context. Prior to 1997, there was no general statutory requirement for increases in payment, other than those associated with contracting out. However, by the mid-1990s, particularly after the Scott and the Goode reports, it had become standard practice for pensions in payment to be increased annually by at least a minimum amount. In some schemes, this was set out in the rules; in others, it depended on trustee discretion. Which approach was adopted was largely a matter of chance. Either way these increases were funded, members paid for them during their working lifetime as part of their pension contributions, and they had a reasonable expectation that they would receive increases when they retired.
Although scheme finances have fluctuated since then, in general schemes now have sufficient resources to pay increases. It is therefore reasonable to expect them to provide those increases, whether guaranteed or discretionary. This reflects the reasonable expectation members acquired when they accrued benefits in the 1980s and 1990s. This applies in two overlapping contexts. The first is to benefits provided by the Pension Protection Fund and the Financial Assistance Scheme, where the original legislation in both cases excluded any allowance for pre-1997 increases, regardless of rules or practice. The second aspect is members of active schemes: the scheme is continuing, but they no longer receive the discretionary benefits to which they have a reasonable expectation given their service in the 1980s and 1990s.
I welcome the provisions in the Bill relating to the PPF/FAS. They are clearly a response to the current financial state of the PPF. Without the surpluses in the PPF, I doubt that these measures would have come forward, so they are welcome. However, as I have explained, making a distinction between those for whom the rules say they are going to get increases and those for whom the practice was making discretionary increases is invidious. All affected members should receive the same increases. The benefits from these schemes have never been or been intended to be an exact copy of the benefits that were provided by the schemes that were lost. They were always a broad-brush approach to what is fair to provide.
Given the current financial circumstances, it is absolutely fair that all members should benefit from those surpluses. The Bill provides for employers to share in those surpluses by the suspension of the PPF levy. Employers are sharing in the surplus; members should also, whatever the precise details of their entitlement to past increases. Crucially, none of these members is getting any younger and many, sadly but inevitably, will benefit from the Government’s proposals for only a limited period. For 28 years they have suffered a loss and they are now going to benefit from the change in policy but, for many of them, it will be for far too short a period.
Finally, I turn to the circumstances of defined benefit schemes that are continuing to run. Many are in a healthy financial state but are failing to provide discretionary increases for members’ benefits that were accrued before the statutory requirement was introduced in 1997. I believe that it is now reasonable to expect schemes in general to provide these members with discretionary increases, and we need to investigate ways in which we can make sure that that will happen in Committee. I look forward to hearing my noble friend’s response to these and other points that have been made in the debate.
Lord Ashcombe (Con)
My Lords, like other noble Lords, I very much look forward to the maiden speech of the noble Baroness, Lady White of Tufnell Park. I declare an interest as an employee of Marsh, the sister organisation to Mercer, a pension and investment advisory and management company.
I welcome many parts of the Bill. The Government’s ambition to reduce fragmentation, lower costs and secure better outcomes for savers is clear, and I am sure that Members across the House share the desire for a system that functions more effectively. Some measures in the Bill will undoubtedly support that aim.
However, from my discussions with those in the industry, it is clear there are substantial concerns about elements of the Bill. The central purpose of the Bill, as I see it, is to create scale that unlocks access to a broader range of asset classes, including private markets and UK-based investments. Scale is not an end in itself; it is a mechanism to strengthen negotiating power, secure better pricing and deliver improved outcomes for savers. Equally important, it is the potential for operational efficiencies that reduces costs and complexity across the system.
It is crucial, however, that the Bill does not become entangled in prescribing or favouring any particular business model. The pensions market is dynamic and diverse, with multiple viable routes to achieving the Government’s objectives. Flexibility is essential if innovation and competition are to flourish, allowing the best solutions to emerge in a live market environment.
I welcome the amendments made at Third Reading in the other place, which removed from the Bill detailed structures concerning the relationships between product lines and their contribution to the main scale default arrangement. That is a positive step. These issues are complex and better addressed through secondary legislation, where they can be explored with the nuance they require, and which is difficult to capture fully in primary legislation. However, these future regulations will have a profound impact on the efficiency, pace of change and cost across the pension system. It is therefore essential that the Government commit to a full and transparent consultation. I invite the Minister to assure the House that examples included in the Bill will not become exclusionary, and that the regulatory framework will be developed in a way that supports, rather than hinders, the delivery of the policy’s core objectives.
The policy in the evolving legislation must engage constructively with market realities and good industry practice. If that engagement does not occur, the result could be inefficiencies and additional costs that bring no tangible benefit to savers. We must avoid creating a system that is overly rigid or prescriptive and risks stifling innovation, increasing administrative burdens and potentially causing some large funds to lose auto-enrolment eligibility through no fault of their own.
In practice, many pension providers operate multiple product lines, such as group personal pensions and master trusts, while making investment decisions and negotiating prices at an overarching level across these products. That is not fragmentation; it is a sensible and efficient approach that leverages scale and expertise to the benefit of savers. The regulatory framework must recognise and support this reality.
For that reason, I urge the Minister to confirm that the approach to regulation will be principles based. The MSDA and common investment strategy tests must avoid creating unnecessary fails or imposing constraints that do not deliver real value for savers. A principles-based approach would provide the flexibility needed to accommodate different business models and market practices while ensuring that the policy’s objectives were met.
I turn to the Local Government Pension Scheme. I note with concern the significant reserve powers delegated to the responsible authority. While these powers are intended to provide flexibility, there is a risk that political motivations could influence the management of LGPS assets. What protections will be in place to ensure that these reserve powers cannot be used, or threatened, to pursue political objectives regarding LGPS investment decisions?
Alongside the introduction of governance reforms, it is paradoxical that the draft secondary legislation and guidance appear to control and limit external scrutiny and challenge of the enlarged pools. Independent external challenge is a vital component of robust governance, ensuring transparency and accountability.
Another area of concern is the balance between rules-based and principle-based legislation. While clarity is important, again, the current draft secondary legislation appears overly prescriptive and directive.
Almost all noble Lords have hit on the point about mandation. Many in the industry, including Mercer, signed the Mansion House Accord, but the Government should be aware that voluntary support for that accord does not equate to support for mandation, which I know the industry strongly believes poses a conflict with fiduciary duty. I hope that the Minister understands that and will consider it as the Bill moves forward.
In closing, it is vital that secondary legislation governing group personal pensions, the LGPS and the wider Bill remains flexible and not overly prescriptive. Multiple models and approaches can effectively achieve the policy aims. I hope that the Government recognise these market realities and will ensure that regulations support innovation, efficiency and practical implementation while delivering the intended outcomes. Striking this balance is essential to avoid unnecessary burdens and secure the best possible results for savers across all pension schemes.
Baroness Penn (Con)
My Lords, we have had a wide range of expertise in the speakers today, although I suspect that the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, might be the only one of us who could not think of a better Christmas present than a pensions Bill. I am also conscious that my remarks stand between the House and the much anticipated maiden speech from the noble Baroness, Lady White of Tufnell Park, to which I too am looking forward, so I will try to be brief and focused.
I want to touch on three areas but before that, like many others, I welcome many aspects of this Bill, including on consolidation and value for money. However, there are important areas of detail that the Government need to provide for us to understand how they will better work; in particular, around the requirements on scale and value for money, and what they mean for competition and market dynamism, as the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and my noble friend Lady Noakes have spoken to. There is also the risk that, at some point, scale no longer promotes investment in innovation and scale-ups, as those businesses would no longer be able to meet the minimum investment thresholds for very large funds.
The first area I want to focus on, which may be no surprise, is mandation. I am not convinced about the decision to include a mandation power in the Bill, as others have said. I will not repeat those arguments, but if I was convinced of the case for mandation, I would not be convinced of how it is being legislated for in the Bill as it stands. We are told that it has a sunset clause, but that is not the case. The 2035 deadline is only for increasing the maximum allocations set out by regulation and before this sunset moment, as I read it, there is no maximum limit on what proportion of investments can be mandated. I ask the Minister: why not? If the Government want to use the existence of this power to drive delivery against the Mansion House Accord, why not set a maximum level of mandation in line with those commitments made in the accords? There is also absolutely no clarity on what assets may be mandated for investment, only that they are not listed assets. In doing so, the Government have excluded a potentially important class of productive asset, as raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and surely to be raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. I would also like to hear from the Minister whether the Government intend to change course here.
As to what can be included within mandation, the answer appears to be: absolutely anything else. There are examples, of course, as to what the Government want to do but no legal limits whatever, and the prescribed assets can be altered at any time by regulation, in perpetuity. Normally, the argument for such an approach is to maintain flexibility. But given this is a power that the Government themselves say they do not want to use, surely the case for constraining it to the limits of what the Government intend could not be stronger. If a future Government wanted to go further than this, it would also seem reasonable to put forward further primary legislation to do so, because it is important not to think about the use case one might agree with, but the one that one might disagree with.
I can think of credible cases being put forward for mandating for portions of assets significantly above 5% or 10% for investment in net zero or defence, to name two examples. I make no judgment on the values of these: rather, I ask whether, even if noble Lords might support one of those use cases or scenarios, they would support the other.
In explaining the need for the power that the Government do not expect to use, the Pensions Minister has said that its existence will provide clarity to industry. But, for clarity, we need more detail than is included in the Bill: the definition of a qualifying asset and the percentage required. To provide that clarity, you would need to provide draft regulations. Is that the intention of the Government, will we see them during the course of the Bill and can the noble Baroness set out a timeline for us?
If the Government do not wish to use mandation, perhaps I might ask the Minister what feedback she has had from pension providers on the barriers to investing in the UK economy, and what action the Government are taking to address those, both to increase the pipeline of investment opportunities but also, specifically, regulatory barriers that have been raised by providers. Are the Government committed to looking at those also, and over what timeline? I also ask the Minister what happens if valuations change, over time or in response to a specific shock? There is a lot of detail to be looked at with regard to how the mandation powers will work, as well as the principle of them.
The second area I want to touch on is fiduciary duty. This was something that noble Lords discussed in some detail during the passage of the Financial Services and Markets Act, during which I committed to this House that the Government would consider the work of the Financial Markets Law Committee and host their own round tables to consider whether further action was needed. One of those round tables did take place, but I am afraid further ones did not. The Financial Markets Law Committee reported in 2024, however, and made it clear that, in its view, it is proper for pension fund trustees to consider climate change, along with other factors, when discharging their fiduciary duties. As the Pensions Minister conceded in the Commons, however,
“more clarity about the ability of trustees to take into account such factors would help”.—[Official Report, Commons, 3/12/25; col. 1043.]
The Minister committed to bringing forward legislation that will provide statutory guidance in this area. Could the Minister confirm whether that legislation will be in this Bill and, if so, when we can expect to see those amendments, and also the timescale for the statutory guidance to be produced? Given that there will continue to be different interpretations of the underlying law in this area, I ask the Minister why an amendment in primary legislation would not be preferable to address the issue?
Finally, in the same discussions around fiduciary duty during the Financial Services and Markets Bill, the issue of deforestation-linked finance was discussed, including in relation to pension funds. Could the Minister update the House on the Government’s plans to bring forward regulations under Schedule 17 of the Environment Act 2021 to ban the import of forest-risk commodities and conduct a subsequent review to assess whether the financial regulatory framework is adequate for the purpose of eliminating the financing of illegal deforestation, and to consider what changes to the regulatory framework may be appropriate in this context? The EU’s framework on deforestation-linked finance is coming into force this month, so it would be a timely moment for the Government to set out their plan in this area.
Finally, the Bill does nothing to address pension adequacy, as we have heard. My noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott and the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, have highlighted in particular the issue of self-employed people and pension adequacy. I will be focusing in particular on the women’s pension gap, which remains at over 30%. My understanding is that there has been little progress on narrowing that gap over the years, and what progress has been made is as a result of men’s contributions falling, rather than any improvement in contributions from women, and I do not think that is the right way to be narrowing the gap. We are storing up huge inequalities in retirement unless further action is taken. Can the Minister reassure me and this House on the action that the Government are planning in this area, both potentially through the commission but also alongside and in advance of its work.
Baroness White of Tufnell Park (CB) (Maiden Speech)
I rise to address your Lordships’ House for the first time. I want to start by saying a little bit about myself. I am a child of the Windrush generation. My mother came from Jamaica to London aged 19. In fact, my grandfather sold a field to fund her passage. My father arrived as a 26 year-old and they met and married here in London. I spent most of my childhood in Leyton, east London, and it was something of a dilemma whether to take the name of the place I grew up or the name of the place that I have chosen to live with my husband and two boys, Tufnell Park. Noble Lords will see that I chose the latter.
At a time when the national discourse is so full of division, I hope that the successful integration of the West Indian community into the UK serves as a reminder of those close, common bonds that tie together so many communities, many from the previous British Empire. Thanks to this country, I was able to get a free education at Cambridge and then in London—an education my parents did not get. My mother left school as a 10 year-old and my father as a 15 year-old. It has enabled me to enjoy what is charitably described as a rather eclectic career between the public and the private sectors. I have a rather wide range of interests across public policy, economics and business and I hope your Lordships will be tolerant of those over the coming years.
I am both humbled and privileged to be making my maiden speech as part of the Pension Schemes Bill debate. For me, pensions are both personal as well as professional. They are personal as I creep ever closer to pension age myself, but also because I am scarred by my father’s experience. Probably the single worst financial decision he made was leaving the British Rail defined benefit pension scheme and joining the little-known SERPS many years into his working career.
It is professional because, as the noble Lord, Lord Willetts, mentioned, I have spent quite a lot of my career working on pensions. I was trying to remember the first time, which was the Goode report in the aftermath of the Maxwell pension scandal. The equalisation of the state pension age was when I was at the Treasury. The reform of SERPS was when I was at No. 10, and I am currently advising one of the big Canadian pension schemes.
As we have heard already in the debate, the country desperately needs to increase its productivity and growth. It is the only way, sustainably, to raise living standards in this country across communities—living standards which, extraordinarily, have not budged in real terms since the great financial crisis of 2008. As is well known, we lose too many companies to the US, where growth capital is more plentiful. Again as the noble Lord, Lord Willetts, has already said, this is no accident. It is rooted in past regulation, which was well intentioned and aimed to de-risk defined benefit schemes. But it has had the result, as we have heard, of dramatically reducing the proportion of pension assets going into UK equities, from around 50% to, broadly speaking, 5% today.
Plans put forward by this Government and championed by the former Government to require UK pension funds to invest more of their funds in the domestic economy and within domestic businesses are, in my view, a positive and important step. We have heard already that several UK funds have voluntarily made commitments through the so-called Mansion House Accord, and it is welcome that the Bill provides a legislative backstop to ensure that what is promised is actually delivered. I note the controversy that this particular set of legislative recommendations has raised already in the House, and I look forward to being part of the debate in the future.
In a similar vein, the consolidation of the myriad diffuse local government schemes should improve efficiency—efficiency not just for its own sake but to release more funds to invest in the UK. However, the move falls short of the creation of the sort of mega funds in Australia and Canada that have driven a more wholesale move of public sector pensions into private funds.
I thank your Lordships. Joining the House is one of the privileges of my life, and I look forward, over the coming months, to listening, learning and, over time, contributing in some small way. Like others today, I take a moment to thank the many Members of the House of Lords and its staff. I am spatially dyspraxic, so finding my way around over the last few months has not been without its challenges, and the team has been incredibly kind, patient and generous. I thank them.
Lord Wood of Anfield (Lab)
My Lords, it is a pleasure and an honour to follow the noble Baroness, Lady White, and her excellent maiden speech. I congratulate her on her appointment and her debut outing here in the Chamber and say how much all of us look forward to her future contributions. I am sure her family, not for the first time, is extremely proud of her today.
On that subject, if noble Lords ever worry about the limited breadth of their professional experience, I advise them not to look at the noble Baroness’s CV. In her extraordinary career so far, she has—strap in for a minute—studied at the University of Cambridge and University College London. She worked at Her Majesty’s Treasury twice, at the British embassy in Washington, as a senior official at Downing Street, at the World Bank, at the Department for International Development, at the Ministry of Justice—I have not finished yet—and at the Department for Work and Pensions, before becoming the third chief executive of Ofcom and then the sixth chair of the John Lewis Partnership. She then became the chair of Frontier Economics and a senior managing director at a Canadian pension fund. That is exhausting just to read. I think I am right in saying, however, that her first job after studying was in a church in Birmingham. She has spoken publicly and movingly about the importance of faith to her and her family.
If noble Lords talk to former colleagues of the noble Baroness, Lady White, some of whom are here today, they will find universal agreement that she is someone who faces professional challenges in her career with calmness, humanity to those around her, sound judgment, expertise and a warm inviting intelligence that most of us can only admire. She once told an interviewer:
“You often learn more from things that did not quite go to plan than things that did”.
As a former adviser to Gordon Brown for many years, alongside my noble friend the Minister, I can only endorse those as the wisest of words. We are truly fortunate to have the noble Baroness, Lady White, in our midst, and I am sure everyone agrees that this House’s work will be the richer for her wide-ranging experience, expertise and generosity.
Like the noble Baroness, I strongly welcome aspects of this Bill—most of it, in my case—and the way in which it has been welcomed across the political divide, almost. It will make a positive difference to savers, increasing the value of their savings through pot consolidation and driving greater scale, improving the range of guided retirement products and strengthening the value for money framework—all issues on which other noble Lords have spoken with much greater expertise than I can.
I want to focus my comments on the ambition in this Bill to make UK pension funds a greater driver of investment in UK infrastructure companies and communities, as the noble Baroness, Lady White, said. There is a wide consensus, whatever your view on the measures in the Bill, that we have a big problem in this country with the interface between pension funds as value generators for their clients and their investment contribution to the UK’s real economy.
The statistic has been cited a number of times that, 25 years ago, UK pension funds allocated half their assets to UK equities. That figure is now under 5%. This alarming fall is not for want of scale or size, as many colleagues have mentioned. The UK has, as the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, remarked, the second largest pool of pension capital in the world. Indeed, UK DC pension assets are set to grow from around £500 billion in 2021 to £1 trillion by 2030. That is a 100% increase in under a decade, with growth predicted to accelerate further after that date. Yet DC pension funds have only 9% of their overall equity allocation in the UK. The global average is 30%. Across all types of domestic pension funds’ equity portfolios, UK equities make up 15% of the total. In Australia, the figure for domestic equities is 52%; in Japan, it is 48%.
We know a lot about why we have become such a worrying outlier in this respect. The £1.5 trillion corporate DB sector has been derisking for some time, as it has approached meeting its liabilities. At the same time, DB schemes have pivoted, for reasons of value generation, from a UK-biased equity approach 30 years ago or so to a global market cap approach in the past 20 years.
One side effect of this move is that the proportion of overseas investors in UK equities has risen to well over 50%, and, because of scarce domestic capital, UK companies have therefore become more reliant on debt for financing expansion. This combination of a growing reliance on debt finance and foreign capital is a matter of concern. As the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, has written, it is a matter of concern from the point of view of national economic security. There is no simple response to this, but this Bill takes some first important steps to reconfiguring the structure of the industry, the regulatory environment that fund managers face and the incentives that confront them.
One key challenge is to create larger, more powerful and more strategic investment capacity. The last Government made welcome progress on this, and the current Chancellor’s Mansion House Accord, as many colleagues have said, has built further on that. The Bill builds on that accord by gripping the issue of generating scale and simplicity where there is currently too much fragmentation. Like other noble Lords, I welcome the LGPS consolidation, strengthening asset pooling and improving administering authorities’ governance structures. I welcome the requirement for master trusts to reach a minimum size of £25 billion, but I share the concern of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and echo her question to the Minister to assure us that this threshold will not be to the detriment of innovation and new entrants, and to tell us how these two objectives that we all share can be reconciled. The noble Baroness, Lady Penn, also mentioned this.
Lastly, there is the issue of pension mandation, undoubtedly the most contentious issue. It raises issues about the tension between government policy, regulation and fiduciary duties. Again, whatever your view on mandation, our starting point has to be that we have a real problem on our hands here—and the public agrees. The noble Lord, Lord Willetts, mentioned data from a survey on this showing that two-thirds of all UK savers think pension funds should increase investment in UK companies, even if returns are lower. Why do we not listen to them?
The Government in this Bill are taking a reserve power to mandate pension fund investment, but are accompanying it with ministerial protestations that they do not intend to use that power. At the very least, I thank the Government for giving me an excellent case study that I can present for the coming years when I teach my students in the real-world use of game theory. More seriously, I think that I understand the logic of taking the power to do something when you have no intention of using it. The spectre of a big stick locked away in a cupboard, but still on view, is designed to have an incentivising effect on fund managers to reorient their strategies to start to take UK investment much more seriously. Critics might say you cannot have your big stick and eat it, to mix my metaphors—that you cannot have a power and then credibly say that it will never be used, or, to flip it the other way round, that you cannot hope that taking the power will have a chastening effect on the industry while also saying that you will never use it.
My own explanation for what the Government are doing here—I am sure that my friend the Minister will have a better explanation—is that it is a strategy based on sequencing the necessary changes. So, first, the fund industry needs to be defragmented, consolidated and scaled up, which this Bill is primarily about. Secondly, collective reorientation of the UK pension fund industry is incentivised through these reforms but also the accompanying reserve power. Thirdly, alongside the strategic capacity that is being built up, the Government know that they have work to do to make investment in UK equities and non-listed destinations more attractive, which involves lots of measures. By the way, one down payment on these measures that is to be warmly welcomed is the Chancellor’s decision in the Budget to introduce a three-year stamp duty holiday for new listings on the stock exchange. We will see whether this works. For my own part, I am a subscriber to the view of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, that 25% of new contributions should be invested in UK public markets.
This Bill is a building block in the attempt to make progress through what we might think of as pressured voluntarism rather than straightforward compulsion, and I welcome that very much. However, we need to be clear that this is a change that, from a UK plc point of view and a public finances and public services point of view, must happen one way or the other.
Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con)
My Lords, before I make my few remarks, I also congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady White, on her most excellent maiden speech. I declare my interest as a trustee and a director of pension funds for a number of years. I acknowledge that this Bill is, in general, a good idea; however, as has been said by many people—I hate to repeat it again—it is a complex multifaceted set of proposals, and the devil is in the details. As I said, I have read this in almost every report so far at this stage of the Bill.
To most working people, their pensions are prospectively there simply to support them when they retire. Good employers, whether in the public or private sector, know that pension provision is often measured carefully when job opportunities are considered. Whether it is a defined benefit plan or a defined contribution plan is quite often a matter of good luck rather than good management and is often determined as a result of historic tradition in the particular industry or business.
In this legislation, the Government have the good general intentions of assisting members in DC schemes, including the enhancement of opportunities to get better returns through increasing the size of schemes and returning surpluses to employers. They also want to encourage schemes to invest in UK asset classes, thus hoping to help the economy, which I am sure is a laudable aim, particularly at present. All well so far, but let me at this early stage of our deliberations just put down one or two markers for later debate.
Increasing DC schemes to £25 billion—an arbitrary figure—has some real downsides. I suspect that this will reduce competition due to consolidation, leaving less choice and barring entry for new schemes, and will increase vulnerability, especially to cyber attack. DC schemes have been the preferred formula now for over 20 years and master trusts for only about 10 years and, of those, only a handful have achieved that magic £25 billion.
Next is the question of surpluses in DB funds. When interest rates were low, many employers put billions into schemes to repair a large number of deficits. They became less competitive than employers who did not have any DB schemes. I therefore hope that, in the Bill’s changes, we might find ways in which some of these surpluses could be returned to be utilised to fund capital expenditure, and I hope the Minister might be able to agree to that.
There are examples of surplus sharing and, in that context, I mention the Aberdeen Group’s adoption of the Stagecoach pension scheme less than two weeks ago—perhaps already mentioned by noble Lords. Members there will get two-thirds of future surpluses and Aberdeen one-third. I have no doubt that this will give great pleasure to bus drivers all over the UK but, like so many other aspects of pensions, there must be safeguards. It is the trustees who must always decide to distribute surpluses and they must act independently of employers, remembering that the basic principle is always to act in the best interest of the members. The intentions in the Bill for the allocation of surpluses in DB schemes seem to extend quite widely and to include enhancement of contributions in DC schemes. This crossover needs some care and further explanation.
Superfunds should be respected as an alternative destination, but advisory costs can be enormous. Also, actuaries must follow their obligations under Technical Actuarial Standard 300 and give advice on alternatives when consideration is taking place to transfer pension scheme obligations to insurers under buyout contracts. Improving the superfund regime is all well and good, but the Government must deal with the barriers around adviser intransigence and those potentially enormous costs. Without that attention, the idea of growing superfunds is a non-starter, as is evidenced by there being only one such fund in the UK at present.
Regarding encouragement to invest in UK assets, I also retain great reservations on mandation powers. As I said at the beginning, in theory it is a good idea that investing to help the UK should be given greater priority, but I remain concerned about the conflict of interest that might arise. This issue was raised by my honourable friend Mark Garnier at Second Reading in the other place. I go back to the strict obligation on trustees to always perform their role in the best interests of beneficiaries. That might suggest a new concentration on UK investment, but not necessarily. We need some more help for trustees for this responsibility. In response, the Minister in the other place suggested an opt-out if there were to be material detriment to members in taking such preferential decisions. I suggest that that would not satisfy the need for trustees to consider a wide list of things in determining those best interests of members.
On the powers for the ombudsman, we need to delve further into the intentions of the Government. Moving the ombudsman to become a form of court or tribunal changes to some extent the nature of its work. The relationship between the regulator, trustees and the ombudsman is currently very clear. We need a better explanation of their future respective roles and powers. My experience is that, although the Pensions Regulator imposes and controls duties and reminds pension trustees of their obligations, it is always, of course, ultimately up to the trustees themselves to decide what they believe is a proper course. Putting the regulator or the ombudsman into an enhanced role will not only diminish the absolute responsibility of trustees; it could also put those bodies into invidious situations of decision-making between themselves. No doubt there are also substantial resource issues to consider.
Lastly, I mention the pensions dashboard to the Minister, which has no doubt been referred to. A progress report would be welcome, as would an assurance that, as was clearly stated by the Minister at Second Reading in the other place, it will be completed and ready by autumn next year.
No doubt we can perfect matters as the Bill proceeds, as is the way with this House. The intentions are fine; the logistics and implementation to meet those intentions may well take quite a lot of work.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
My Lords, I declare my interests as a director of the London Stock Exchange and of Valloop Holdings Ltd. I also have experience engaging with local authorities and their pension funds, in relation to both funding proposals and policy. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady White of Tufnell Park—she is no longer in her seat—on her excellent maiden speech. I welcome her to this House and look forward to her future contributions.
Like other noble Lords, I welcome much of this Bill, and my reflections are directed at what is missing or where small but significant adjustments could deliver real benefits for scheme members. I shall give some examples. When engaging with local authority fund managers on social impact investing, I found that while they valued local options, they also wanted diversity through investing in similar localised assets but beyond their immediate region. An amendment to reflect that flexibility, perhaps in Clause 2, concerning local and localised investments, may be worth considering.
On scale tests and value for money, should there not be some kind of linkage? Presently, some of the best performers in the DC market have assets under £10 billion. If such schemes deliver outstanding benefit for members, as demonstrated in value for money assessments, should they not be allowed to continue? Other issues in this space include whether the definition of “hybrid” is wide enough and whether the focus on forward looking metrics risks dismissing past performance, which surely still has relevance.
I also hope that some solution can be found for the many schemes in the charity and social housing sector that are disallowed from using retrospective confirmation measures due to an ongoing legal review. Concerns also remain about the PPF’s recent pre 1997 increases in the wind up trigger for DB superfunds, which create issues for funding levels and viability. Additionally, gateway test 1—that if a scheme is funded to buyout level it cannot enter a superfund—seems to prevent schemes augmenting member benefits via a superfund. Is that fair?
I turn to trustees’ fiduciary duty. It is undeniable that the Government have opened a Pandora’s box by taking the power of mandation, even if it is intended as a reserve power. I happen to think it is about time Pandora’s box was opened, emptied and hope allowed to get out, at least on interpretation of fiduciary duty. However, it is essential that this be done in primary legislation. Regulatory guidance or an SI is not enough. We are already seeing banks stung for compensation on car loans when lenders followed flawed guidance from the FCA.
Systemic issues such as the resilience of the UK economy and ESG are not abstract considerations; they directly affect pension scheme members’ long term retirement outcomes. Climate breakdown, financial crises and economic instability all influence the value of investments, the type of investments that need to be made in future and the returns available to members over time. They also determine how far pensions will stretch when drawn. These factors should already be integral to fiduciary considerations, requiring trustees to balance risk mitigation with support for long term stability. Yet trustees remain concerned about how to demonstrate alignment with member outcomes, even though investment results of any kind can never be guaranteed. Clarifying in this Bill that systemic factors are legitimate concerns would help.
At the same time, by naming and favouring certain vehicles, the Bill risks going too far and putting trustees in jeopardy. It could cause herding, market distortions and valuation bubbles and discriminate between comparable structures while failing to provide a safe harbour for trustees regarding financial benefit. The only way to achieve definite financial benefit would be through tax penalties for failing to meet mandated allocations, a possibility noted by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann.
We have already seen the dangers of herding in both DB and DC schemes, driven by regulatory and advisory consensus. Advice focused on global indices, coupled with regulatory encouragement, led to a retreat from UK equities, an overreliance on gilts and the use of nested leverage through repo borrowing, culminating in the LDI crisis. The only accepted defence that trustees have is that they take advice, but it is from unregulated advisers. While many are excellent, some were noticeably reticent when this House’s Industry and Regulators Committee investigated LDI. We found it striking that such influential advice was not regulated, unlike advice to individuals. This should be addressed, perhaps by making it a designated activity under FSMA.
I turn now to the discrimination against listing. The Government mandate investment into private assets but exclude that investment from being via listed entities, despite their ability to provide superior liquidity. Not all listed entities operate in the same way, and I am going to have to explain that later. It is openly acknowledged that the Mansion House provisions reflected in this Bill are tailored to LTAFs, the new long-term asset funds, which are themselves a variation on the EU’s LTIFs—the long-term investment funds developed during my time as chair of the EU’s ECON Committee. At that time, the UK rejected implementing LTIFs, with the Treasury assuring me that we did not need them because we had listed investment funds, also known as investment companies and trusts, which were better. Yet, under this Bill, they are explicitly excluded, even when investing in the prescribed assets, as the alt sector does.
This exclusion is extraordinary. Before the mistaken, and now nearly corrected, regulatory cost disclosure and cost cap debacle, listed investment funds were favoured by local authority pension funds precisely because they financed local UK infrastructure such as schools, hospitals and renewables, and provided venture capital to growth companies. Those local authority pension funds were major investors at IPO and follow on stages, often for the local infrastructure they were subscribing to. Many retail investors hold listed investment funds in their portfolios for similar reasons.
I have recently been told that somewhere in the Treasury there is a belief that listing and then trading shares is not new money. Interestingly, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, whom I very much respect and often find myself in common cause with, also made that point. That is not the proper story if you are looking at a listed investment fund. Listing is what keeps the underlying investment funding in place so that it is not sold out for redemptions, as happens with open ended funds like LTAFs. In fact, the way in which money is raised and then put into investments is a similar procedure to that of an LTAF or any other open-ended fund. The only difference is a clever trick: instead of having to sell off the investments if somebody wants to get liquidity and withdraw their shares, the shares can be traded on the market and there is no damage to the underlying investment. That does not seem to have been recognised in the provisions in the Bill.
It is interesting that even some LTAF providers have contemplated investing in listed investment companies because they want the liquidity, and that will enable them to stay listed in productive assets for longer while still having the safety of being able to trade and get their money if they need more money for paying pensions, so why discriminate against them? The fact is they are complementary investments. They are often going to be smaller and local-sized, as opposed to massive. They can be used in combination with LTAFs and it is very foolish and stupid thing to exclude them. I will certainly be tabling an amendment to try to adjust that.
Overall, it is about time that the Government’s discrimination and denigration of listed investment companies end. I say “denigration” because there is damage done to these companies by this wording in the Bill. How many times has this House talked about having to improve the state of our stock exchange, both for listed companies of the operating variety and for listed funds? What do we do at every turn? The Government and the Treasury do not understand and, here, seem to be undoing a lot of the good work they have tried to do in all the listing reviews.
The Bill contains important reforms, but it must not undermine fiduciary duty, encourage herding or exclude proven vehicles that deliver value. With constructive amendments, we can ensure that it strengthens pensions while saving members’ long term outcomes and delivering for the UK economy.
Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth (Con)
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness. She speaks with great experience and knowledge, and I certainly very much agree with the points she made on fiduciary duties and the need for clarity on them.
I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady White of Tufnell Park, who is not in her place at present, on a maiden speech of great humour and informed with important principles and pointers to what we should be seeking in this legislation. We will certainly look forward to her future contributions in your Lordships’ House.
I want to make some generalised points about the Bill—echoes, inevitably, of what has been said previously in the debate. But I would also like to focus on four specific areas: first, mandation of investment; secondly, fiduciary duties; thirdly, addressing the wrongs suffered by the pensioners of the former Allied Steel and Wire company; and fourthly, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee report. The Minister, whom I greatly respect, referred to this in opening but dismissed it somewhat breezily—possibly not; maybe I am being unfair. There are some important concerns there that we have to address.
The Bill proposes many sensible reforms. It is a largely good piece of legislation. The creation of megafunds delivering lower-cost, diversified investments and better returns is sound and sensible. The consolidation of the Local Government Pension Scheme is also very sensible. There is much to welcome in this legislation.
My fundamental concern, along with many others who have spoken from around the House—almost universally—is the objection to defined contribution schemes and the Government’s backstop power to mandate investment. This really concerns me. It is potentially in conflict with the fiduciary duties of pension trustees. I would like to hear in the Minister’s response what the Government are proposing for that potential conflict.
Government-dictated investment risks undermining trustees’ fiduciary duty and risks distorting markets. Far more preferable, surely, is the voluntary approach that we have in the Mansion House Accord—built on reforms of July 2023 and based on, later again, the approach of my right honourable friend, the then Chancellor, Sir Jeremy Hunt MP—a voluntary agreement of 17 of the UK’s largest workplace pension schemes, signing up to committing at least 10% of their default funds to private markets by 2030, with a minimum of 5% in UK private assets. That is surely the preferred approach. It may well be the Government’s preferred approach, but I have real concerns about the backstop approach that is also in this legislation. The approach in the Mansion House Accord is expected to unlock up to £50 billion for high-growth UK companies and major infrastructure. That seems to be the sensible way forward, and it is based on the approach of Australia, for example, and other states.
Another area I want to touch on, which has also been touched on by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, is the fiduciary duties and the need for clarity here. These duties are in many ways similar to the duties that company directors owe to their companies. The fiduciary duties of company directors are in many ways based on case law, but there is also a statutory framework since the Companies Act 2006, which is very important to underpin the case law that is vital in interpreting the duties. It seems sensible to have a statement of duties on which the case law then elaborates and on which it rests.
There is a need to set the duties of pensions trustees in a broader context. How do they take account, for example, of the impact of climate change, the local community and the views of pension savers? The Government talk of guidance, but in my view there is a very strong case for the introduction of a statutory framework, as we have in company law.
I also want to raise the case of the wrongs suffered by pensioners of the former Allied Steel and Wire company, and indeed others, who have lost out because of the pre-1997 pension compensation not being index-linked. Allied Steel and Wire, a company largely based in Cardiff at the time, went into liquidation in 2002, affecting around 1,000 workers in Cardiff but also in Belfast and Sheerness.
A pensions action group was set up 2003, after the collapse, by those who had lost not just their jobs but their occupational pensions. These workers’ pensions are not protected by the Pensions Act 2004, which helped members of defined benefit schemes that went into liquidation but after 6 April 2005—so obviously it preceded that. In fairness, a government scheme, the Financial Assistance Scheme, was set up and helped to provide some relief for these pensioners—up to 90%—but it was not inflation-proofed. This led to the erosion of the pensions’ value over time. As the pensions built up before April 1997 were not linked to rising prices, that failure for index-linking meant that they have suffered massively and continue to suffer.
I know the incoming Government promised to re-examine the situation, but the Minister will realise that there is still real hurt among these pensioners that this has not been recognised in proper compensation. These pensioners played by the rules; they deserve the pensions they invested for. It seems the Pension Protection Fund has a considerable surplus, which could be used to right this very obvious wrong, and I hope the Government will take this unfinished business on board.
Lastly, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee report, to which my noble friend Lady Coffey and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, referred, outlines some very serious concerns. There are almost as many delegated powers, 119, as there are clauses in the Bill, 123—that is serious. It is a pretty damning report, I have to say. It refers to a licence for the Minister to make subordinate legislation. I feel that is something we will inevitably have to return to as we go through Committee and Report, and I would be very interested in hearing what the Minister has to say on that.
I otherwise welcome the legislation. There is a lot to be welcomed in it—it is good legislation—but I have those reservations.
Baroness Hayman (CB)
My Lords, I declare my interests as a past chair and present director of Peers for the Planet. It is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord in what he has just said. We have worked together on these issues before, and I feel somehow that on the issue to which I will return, fiduciary duty, we have the very good beginnings of a cross-party amendment with him, me and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles—and I hope we will recruit from the Labour Benches as well.
The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, some hours ago—not long hours, interesting hours—mentioned the absence in the Bill of any reference to the Paris Agreement and the Climate Change Act. The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, mentioned the previous Pension Schemes Bill, in which we both participated six years ago.
That Bill, thanks to a cross-party amendment and great support from the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, who was the Minister at the time, included references to the Paris Agreement and the Climate Change Act. I am assured that it was the first piece of pensions legislation in the world that mentioned those things, and it has been followed by many pieces of pensions legislation in many jurisdictions since then. Therefore, I am hopeful that we may make some progress on this.
As the Pensions Regulator has said, pension schemes are
“uniquely placed to understand that short-termism in the face of systemic risk is not the right approach for … pension savers”.
Successive Governments have recognised that the UK’s long-term prosperity will depend on our ability to lead the transition to a greener financial system. However, financial experts, such as the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries and the Pensions Regulator, warn that many schemes continue dramatically to underestimate climate and environmental risks. The Pensions Regulator has stressed that climate change and nature loss are not “abstract concerns” and that
“awareness of and managing systemic risks is … a core part of effective trusteeship”.
The Chancellor recognised the centrality of the issue in her Mansion House speech last year. In letters to the Bank of England and financial regulators, she said:
“The climate and nature crisis is the greatest long-term global challenge that we face”.
She recommended that they
“consider how these risks could impact financial stability over the near and longer-term”.
She also reaffirmed her commitment to make the UK a global leader in sustainable finance.
There are clear benefits to placing the UK at the centre of global financial flows that will drive the economy of the future, creating high-quality jobs and enabling the investment we so urgently need in the face of ongoing economic and cost of living pressures. The pension sector must be central to that endeavour. With the third-largest stock of pension assets in the world, the UK has the capacity to set a global benchmark for responsible investment. The £3 trillion held in UK pensions represents an enormous opportunity to align long-term investment with long-term risks and long-term economic stability.
However, significant exposure to environmental and supply chain risks and fossil fuels leaves savers at risk of holding stranded assets or seeing significant reductions to their pension pots in the years ahead. This is neither in members’ interests nor in our national interests. Therefore, in our discussions on the Bill, I will be very interested to hear how pension schemes investments can align with our climate and nature goals.
As the Bill stands, it remains silent on how the major pension reforms it contains will support the delivery of our nature and net-zero targets, despite the risk to both savers and our economic prosperity that institutions, such as the International Energy Agency and the Climate Change Committee in this country, have highlighted. UKSIF has estimated that approximately £88 billion-worth of UK pensions are directly invested in fossil fuel assets, and that, even if the limited decarbonisation pledges made so far by countries are fulfilled by 2040, £15 billion of UK pensions are at risk of loss due to stranded assets.
The Bill offers a practical, incremental opportunity to put a direction of travel in statute on the need to move away from investment in carbon-intensive assets in a managed and orderly way. It could send a clear signal about the long-term risks we face and help pension schemes to prepare for the transition in a considered way.
One of the measures we could take, and something that I will certainly be focusing on, as I said, as we go through the remaining stages of the Bill, is the clarification of fiduciary duty. For too long, many pension schemes’ trustees have reported confusion about what they should take into account when making investment decisions, particularly when those decisions involve long-term structural risks such as climate change, nature loss and other systemic factors. This can lead to unnecessary and unjustified caution and reinforce a bias towards short-term financial returns, even when the long-term risks are clear.
I think we all absolutely understand and agree that trustees of pensions have a fundamental responsibility to act in their members’ financial interests. However, the clarification of fiduciary duties in legislation, far from detracting from that responsibility, would enable trustees to fulfil it more effectively. So, while I welcome the commitment made on Report in the other place for guidance on this issue to be brought forward, guidance alone falls short of providing the legal certainty that is needed, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, said so clearly.
Guidance can be challenged, ignored, and reversed without primary legislation. The legal ambiguity to which trustees are currently exposed will remain, even if in a slightly lesser degree, if there is only guidance on which to rely. Legislative clarification would dispel that uncertainty and future-proof the system to ensure that pension schemes are better able to recognise and to manage the systemic risks of climate change and nature loss. It would support trustees to act in the long-term interests of all beneficiaries and address issues of intergenerational fairness that are becoming of increasing importance as the longer-term consequence of the climate and nature crisis becomes clearer. It could also lead to better returns and increase new investment in the areas we need to future-proof our economy: clean energy, clean transport, clean infrastructure and, crucially, to unlock the economic opportunity of investing in nature-positive solutions.
I very much look forward to pursuing those issues as the Bill proceeds through your Lordships’ House.
Viscount Trenchard (Con)
My Lords, I too congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady White of Tufnell Park, who is not in her place, on her excellent and well-informed contribution. It is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, who just made a most interesting and informative speech.
I thank the Minister for introducing the Bill today. Reforms to the structure of the pension schemes market introduced over the last 14 years have been generally beneficial. In particular, I am sure the Minister will agree that introduction of auto-enrolment into a pension scheme is the principal reason why the number of people saving into such a scheme has increased from 42% of the workforce back in 2011 to 88% today. That is a huge change and one of which the last Government can feel proud. Of course, the 8% of income invested into these schemes is not enough, but it is a start on which we can build.
While current economic conditions necessitate a review of the triple lock, it has been successful in restoring the relative position of pensioners in our society and has lifted 200,000 pensioners out of poverty. As my honourable friend Mark Garnier said at Second Reading in another place,
“the previous Government had turned their attention to two central issues: first, getting the best value for money out of our pension schemes and, secondly, pensions adequacy”.—[Official Report, Commons, 7/7/25; col. 722.]
There are some positive measures in the Bill which I welcome, but I want first to remind the House that it was a Labour Government who did enormous damage to our defined benefit pension system, which was previously a jewel in our financial services crown and the envy of the world.
Shortly after his appointment as Chancellor in 1997, Gordon Brown launched a stealth tax raid on our pensions by abolishing dividend tax credits. The removal of the dividend tax credit has been estimated to have cost occupational pension schemes over £3 billion annually. This led to increased contributions required from employers and employees to maintain pension levels. The consequences of the change were, first, reduced investment in UK companies. Following the abolition, pension funds have been less incentivised to invest in British companies, with their ownership of UK-quoted shares dropping from about 50% in 1997 to just 4% in recent years. This shift is one of the main reasons for the failure of the London Stock Exchange to value new listed companies competitively or to provide the necessary investment to support economic growth.
Secondly, the abolition of the dividend tax credit resulted in the double taxation of corporate earnings, since dividends are paid out of post-tax income whereas loan interest is deductible from corporate tax. This harmful move effectively destroyed many final salary-linked pension schemes by making them too expensive for companies to run. It has been estimated that the tax rate destroyed around £200 billion of the value of the nation’s pensions. Besides the abolition of the dividend tax credit, which was a fatal blow to DB pensions, the continuing restriction of the tax-free allowance for dividends provides an additional disincentive to investment in equities. The dividend allowance was £5,000 per annum in 2016-17 but was reduced to only £500 in 2024-25. Besides that, the income tax rate applied to dividend income has been increased by 2%. A higher rate taxpayer now pays 35.75%.
Take the example of an entrepreneur who has established a successful small business. He does not take a salary but pays himself through dividends when his company can afford it. The company has paid 20% corporation tax, and the 35.75% dividend tax means that the income that the business owner takes out of the business that he has built is now taxed at a rate of 55.75%. Leaving the entrepreneur aside, for years, dividend tax has been a second-tier concern—something that mainly affected company directors and high net-worth investors. That is no longer the case. Dividend tax is now a mainstream issue and hits ordinary people with modest portfolios who have never thought of themselves as investors in the past. If you hold shares outside an ISA, receive dividends from your own company or invest through funds and ETFs, dividend tax now matters.
There have been ongoing discussions about the potential reinstatement of the dividend tax credit to stimulate investment by pension funds into listed equities. That would encourage more domestic investment and help to restore London’s previous status as the best stock market for innovative new technology and other companies to list on. In Australia, as I am sure that the Minister is aware, dividend tax credits have been reintroduced as part of the dividend imputation system. This is designed to prevent double taxation of company profits.
Does the Minister recognise that it is a missed opportunity not to introduce a measure which would be warmly welcomed by the City and would certainly help the London Stock Exchange recover its lost position? Have the Government considered reintroducing dividend tax relief, and if not, why not? Surely this kind of radical measure is exactly what our financial services industry needs. Reintroducing tax credits on dividend payments and cutting stamp duty on UK share purchases are among the 10 recommendations that the Pensions and Lifetime Savings Association has made for using investment and fiscal incentives to encourage pension schemes to allocate more of the nation’s savings to British assets.
I welcome the measures in the Bill which seek to consolidate and build on auto-enrolment and the encouraging progress towards the pensions dashboard, which will greatly assist people’s access to their pension information and help them plan more effectively for their financial future. As the noble Baroness said, larger schemes generally perform better than smaller ones. I believe that the measures enabling the consolidation of small pots and the creation of superfunds are sensible, although regulations must ensure that protection for scheme members is not weakened.
The Association of British Insurers, the Society of Pension Professionals and other industry groups in the main support many of the measures contained in the Bill, including the value for money framework. Will the Minister introduce a requirement that it will be regularly reviewed to ensure that it operates as intended? Referring to the point on the consolidation of small pots, I suggest that the definition of small pots should be revised to £5,000 rather than £1,000, because the latter is too small.
The biggest problem with the Bill, as well explained by my noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott and others, is the proposal to empower the Government to mandate asset allocation within large multi-employer defined contribution schemes. I am not aware that the Government is a well-qualified fund manager with a spectacular track record, and it is absolutely not right to interfere with trustees’ fiduciary duties. It is all the more unacceptable because it applies only to those very large schemes and will therefore affect only pensioners of relatively modest means. This is unfair. This Government are pickpocketing the pensions of poorer people. Fund managers and the trustees who appoint them are under a legal duty to prioritise the financial well-being of savers. Their job is not to obey political whims but to invest prudently, grow pension pots and uphold the trust placed in them by millions of ordinary people. While I hold the noble Lord, Lord Wood of Anfield, in the highest regard, I am afraid I do not agree with his view on this matter. It may be that many pensioners would like to invest in UK assets, even if the returns are low, but they should take action separately to achieve that end.
The fiduciary duty is not a technicality; it is the bedrock of confidence that the entire pension system rests on. Rather than impose new regulations and take powers to do things that they are not qualified to do, I would like to see the Government free up insurers from solvency rules which prevent them owning equity in productive assets. Indeed, following the Mansion House Accord, the pension sector is already moving towards greater investment in productive assets. Seventeen of our largest workplace pension providers have already committed to invest 10% of their main default funds in private assets by 2030. Mandation is not required to achieve this trajectory. To attempt to define and enforce allocation thresholds risks concentrating activity too narrowly, crowding investment into specific asset classes and inadvertently restricting investment in broader activities.
The Government seek to take a power that is unnecessary. Their possible intervention in the market creates operational ambiguity. How schemes and pension providers will prove compliance with requirements lacks clear thresholds and enforcement logic, and creates reputational risk for pension schemes. The clause offering opt-out in cases of material financial detriment is too vague. The best solution to the problem is for the Government to drop this reserve power from the Bill entirely. If the Minister will agree today to do this, it will save us all a lot of time and trouble. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say about this.
Concerning local government pension schemes, I welcome the proposal to consolidate the pensions of 86 different authorities, which should contribute to enhanced performance. But, as my noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott explained, surpluses should be used to reduce the burden of contributions going forward, particularly as councils are faced to go through deeply damaging and expensive reorganisation.
Lastly, I am happy that the Bill attempts to find a solution to the problem of defined benefit surpluses. As drafted, it does not provide sufficient safeguards. In this area and others, I look forward to working with noble Lords to improve the Bill in the months ahead. I entirely agree with what my noble friend Lady Noakes had to say on this matter. I look forward especially to hearing the Minister’s winding-up speech.
Lord Evans of Guisborough (Con)
My Lords, I should preface my remarks by declaring an interest in that I am a member of the Local Government Pension Scheme. I am, of course, much too young to be drawing any benefits from that scheme as yet.
It is a great pleasure to follow my noble friend Lord Trenchard, who gave us a good, detailed critique of the Bill and made a number of constructive suggestions. Indeed, it is even more of a pleasure to be following—well, everybody, really. The Minister pointed out the generosity of the Whips this morning; when I looked at the list, I discovered they had been even more generous in giving me basically the last slot of the last debate of the year, at least from the Back Benches—the Front Benches can follow up afterwards. Bearing that in mind, I will keep my remarks mercifully brief and focus on a couple of the contributions that people have made during this extremely informative and interesting debate.
First, I congratulate and thank the noble Baroness, Lady White of Tufnell Park, for her excellent maiden speech. It was interesting and, I think, will be inspiring to people from outside this place who see that clip. I know that she will bring a great deal of expertise to us here, and I look forward to her future contributions.
Secondly, I thank my noble friend Lady Noakes, who raised the spectre of the dead hand of regulation, as it has been referred to at times in the past, and the concern that if we regulate schemes too much, we will discourage new schemes or even make it impossible for them to open up and operate, which will harm competition. We have already seen this in recent years with the situation that pertains to challenger banks in the UK, because a lot of the financial rules that were set up after the market crash made it very difficult for new banks and new financial institutions to gather the capital and put in place the administration they needed to start up. I believe that the Treasury has relaxed some of those rules recently to enable more people to take part in the financial market. I hope that the Government will reflect on that and not repeat mistakes that have been made in the past.
I shall refer briefly to the contribution from my noble friend Lady Altmann, who gave us an informed and passionate plea to encourage pension providers to invest more of the money they have in UK assets. I was quite persuaded by that, but saying to investors, “We’d like you to invest a percentage of your assets and you get to decide, with all your expertise, knowledge and experience, what you invest them in”, is very different from being asked to give the Minister permission to make a much more detailed investment decision on their behalf, with what, in effect, is other people’s money. I think that is what we are being asked to do in the Bill.
I hope we will revisit the whole mandation issue and help to moderate it or even remove it from the Bill altogether. I would go out on a limb and say that I would trust the Minister to make investment decisions on my behalf, but that does not mean that I would trust future Ministers and future Governments to do so. That is not just about the sort of people with the sort of ideas who might occupy those posts in the future; it is also about the sort of challenges that the Government may face and the sort of temptations that this legislation may lay open to them at a time when future years are looking difficult and unpredictable.
I mostly welcome what is in the Bill. There has been a tendency today to focus on the things we do not like about it; that is the job of scrutiny. Back in the 1990s, I worked for a visionary entrepreneur, and he used to say that in the future there will be no such thing as security of employment but there will be security of employability. He was running a training company, so your Lordships can maybe understand why he said that, and we have moved a long way towards embracing the new jobs market since then, but the pensions market needs to catch up. A lot of the measures in the Bill will help us to do that.
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)
Yes, my Lords, we are getting towards the end. I thank all noble Lords who have who have spoken. My particular thanks and congratulations go to the noble Baroness, Lady White of Tufnell Park, who made a marvellous first speech, which I am sure will be one of many.
There is much to welcome in the Bill; let us start positively. My noble friend Lady Kramer—as noble Lords know, she cannot participate today because she is at a funeral—is seeking the detail and the risk profile of the assets that will qualify under the Mansion House compact. Most people contributing through auto-enrolment into default funds have few resources and should not be in high-risk investments, certainly not without their permission.
My noble friend Lady Bowles, with great expertise, emphasised that fiduciary duty must remain the overriding principle of pension governance. She warned that mandating specific investment vehicles risks undermining trustees’ discretion, encouraging herding and discriminating against proven structures such as listed investment funds. Drawing on lessons from the LDI crisis, she argued that statutory preference cannot guarantee financial benefit and may expose pension members to unnecessary risk.
My noble friend further highlighted the Bill’s unjustified exclusion of listed investment companies and trusts, despite their track record in financing UK infrastructure and growth businesses. She also cautioned that lobbying pressures appear to have shaped the preference for long-term asset funds and urged that legislation should not be dictated by sectoral interests. Her message was clear: fiduciary duty must not be subordinated to lobbying or legislative preference, because it is pension members who will ultimately bear the cost.
My noble friend Lord Sharkey raised many important matters, many of which I will mention, including mandation, DB surpluses and DC master trusts. My noble friend Lord Thurso, who cannot be present—he is up in Inverness—was particularly keen to ensure proper guardrails and governance in relation to DB surplus release, mandation and adherence to the stewardship code, as well as seeking to improve the lot of pre-1997 pensioners who have not benefited from inflation uplifts. He will pursue these matters. Noble Lords can therefore see a lot of amendments lining up.
We will need to consider any action in the Bill to remedy pre-1997 pension erosion. The absence of discretionary increases for pre-1997 pensioners has clearly resulted in an erosion in the real value of their pensions. That is not the only injustice that has impacted on many pensioners. I draw attention to the AEA Technology Pensions Campaign’s work fighting for pensioners who were misinformed by the Government and ended up losing out as a result, as recognised by the Committee of Public Accounts in its June 2023 report on this issue. Although that is not the only example of injustice in our pensions system, it illustrates the challenges many pensioners have faced uniquely. Therefore, we will look to scrutinise these elements of the Bill in detail.
Legislation to formalise the framework around defined benefit superfunds is long overdue and is in the Bill. A main question is how the gateway test for DB funds—in other words, which DB schemes are allowed to enter them—compares with other options such as a buy-out. I hope the Minister can elaborate when she replies on when a new option is created, so that what might be considered the appropriate schemes use it and the wrong schemes do not.
The Bill provides for master trusts to have a default retirement solution so, having built up a pension pot, schemes need to assist in managing it. Can the Minister provide details on how the new advice or guidance will work in practice? The noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, made that point. Broadly speaking, extraction of surplus funds from DB schemes as if in surplus is mostly paid in by the employer. At present, it is difficult to access the surplus. Can the Minister elaborate on, and perhaps estimate, whether these new powers will be taken up? Will they just be there to be looked at?
Creating defined contribution megafunds sounds okay, but can the Minister elaborate on schemes being too big to fall, and whether new entrants will struggle to enter the market? We need to have the value-for-money framework elaborated on. In Australia, where there are league tables, there is evidence of investment herding, as mentioned in another context, where everyone invests in the same way. That is hardly a dynamic, competitive market, which is what seems to be one of the purposes of the Bill.
We will, I am sure, discuss mandation at length. Mandation is a reserve power to force pension schemes to invest at the whims of the Government, but I state clearly that I oppose this, as it crosses a dangerous line. It is fine saying that the Government do not plan to use the power, but we have to provide for the actions of future Governments: for instance, a Government who do not believe in climate change, a point made by the noble Baronesses, Lady Stedman-Scott and Lady Hayman.
The Bill’s idea of auto-consolidating small pots of less than £1,000 sounds good, but it is a big effort resulting in very little change and not much happening until 2030. Perhaps I have that wrong, but it was a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and I wanted to emphasise it.
The pensions system is evolving. We see what is happening; we are trying to let it evolve in the correct way. There are few easy solutions and, as noble Lords have mentioned, there will be a lot of scope for amendments to the Bill to make it absolutely right. I hope we can work collaboratively, throughout the House, on improving the Bill so that it can be built on and relied upon by pensioners, pension funds and everybody else.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, who, like me, has become a regular on the pensions circuit here. As this debate draws to a close, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed with such seriousness and expertise this afternoon. For my part, I will try to touch on the key themes raised but, before I do, I would like to pay my own tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady White of Tufnell Park, because she gave an assured, charming and exceptional speech. She comes with a distinguished career record and I have no doubt that we will be hearing much from her here in future.
The seriousness of this debate was exemplified by my noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott, who set out with great clarity our central concerns raised by this Bill. Those concerns, however, point to a wider issue with the legislation itself. This is a framework Bill, light on detail and heavy on intention, which has left your Lordships debating concepts and hypotheticals rather than the Government’s concrete plans. That is not only unsatisfactory but disappointing. These points were made by my noble friend Lady Coffey. Certainty in legislation comes from detail on the face of the Bill. When that detail is repeatedly altered, deferred and subject to numerous government amendments—by the way, there are over 50—even the limited certainty we believed we had is further diminished. I look forward to the Minister’s response, not just on the preparation of the Bill, or perhaps lack of it, but, as has been raised, on the report from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee.
Nowhere is the lack of certainty more evident than in the proposed value-for-money framework. This was one of the first themes raised, not least by the noble Baroness, Lady Warwick, the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, and my noble friend Lady Penn. This element of the Bill is thin, almost skeletal, yet it is pivotal—again, my noble friend Lady Coffey spoke about this. In practice, much of what this legislation seeks to achieve will stand or fall on how the value-for-money framework is designed and applied. If it is to drive genuine improvement rather than box-ticking, its methodology must be transparent, robust and genuinely comparable across schemes. Cost alone cannot be allowed to dominate decision-making at the expense of outcomes. A scheme that is cheap but delivers persistently poor returns is not offering value to savers, however attractive its headline fees may appear.
Against that background, I have two specific questions for the Minister. First, do the Government envisage the value-for-money framework operating as a standardised pro forma, with clearly defined and comparable metrics covering costs, net investment performance, and cost-to-return ratios applied consistently across schemes? Secondly, how will the Government ensure meaningful comparability between very different types of schemes? In particular, what steps will be taken where schemes meet fee thresholds but nevertheless deliver consistently weak investment outcomes? My noble friend Lord Trenchard touched on this.
This feeds into a wider concern about the order of priorities in the Bill. Rather than committing to the notion of the reserve power—so-called mandation, which I will touch on later—the Government should have concentrated first on getting value for money right. That should have been the central driver of this legislation. If value for money is properly defined, transparently measured and rigorously applied, it can strengthen outcomes for savers without trampling on the fiduciary duties of trustees. We have heard quite a bit about that this afternoon.
As the Minister for Pensions himself has said, trustees must remain free, and indeed obliged, to act in the best financial interests of their members, but I say that this should be guided by evidence and judgment rather than direction by mandate. We should be confident enough to demonstrate the benefits and drawbacks of widely used default strategies, such as global passive equities, which underpinned many DC schemes’ investment approaches. That case should be made openly and empirically, yet the Government have underplayed the extent to which a robust value-for-money framework could drive improvement without compulsion. If value is genuinely improved and transparently measured, much else should follow.
My noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott has already clearly set out the Opposition’s wider concerns about mandation. I will not repeat them at length, but the subject was raised by my noble friends Lord Ashcombe and Lady Noakes, the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and a number of noble Lords. However, I wish to raise one further point that reflects a broader theme running through today’s debate: the need to strike the right balance between flexibility and discipline. My noble friend Lord Ashcombe spoke on this.
Beyond the constitutional and fiduciary issues already raised, there is also a practical market risk that should not be overlooked. This matter was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, about market distorting effects, as the noble Lord put it. Mandation risks inflating asset prices if multiple funds are required to allocate to the same asset classes at the same time. I believe that the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, raised this matter too. Markets may also interpret Government direction as an implicit signal of future price support, potentially amplifying distortions rather than improving capital allocation.
Against that background, I have two specific questions for the Minister. First, have the Government assessed the risk that mandated investment could lead to asset price inflation or wider market distortion? If so, what conclusions have they reached? Secondly, how do the Government intend to ensure that mandated allocations remain aligned with changing economic conditions, particularly in cases where schemes may reach a mandated threshold only after the relevant asset class is no longer aligned with economic need or the Treasury’s broader objectives?
There are a few further questions on this important subject. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, asked this as well. If, after mandation, or, in the case of mandation, if investments underperform or indeed fail, who takes responsibility, the Government or trustees? My noble friend Lady Penn asked how the qualifying assets will be defined. I think other Peers may also have asked that. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, asked some important questions in this sphere, so I am looking forward to the response from the Minister.
I should say also that I noted the constructive advice and ideas from the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, on how the Government could better encourage pension funds to invest in the UK, short of introducing the reserved power. There were also some suggestions from my noble friend Lord Trenchard.
Next, let me touch on the treatment of surpluses in defined benefit schemes. I agree that surpluses can present opportunities, but they are not windfalls: they exist to absorb future shocks, manage demographic risk and ensure that promises made to members are kept. Flexibility in how surpluses are treated is sensible, but only if it is underpinned by robust safeguards. None of us wishes to see surpluses eroded by ill-judged extraction or quietly diverted into activities that weaken long-term scheme resilience. In that context, the forthcoming guidance from the Pensions Regulator will be pivotal. Can the Minister confirm when that guidance will be published, whether it will be subject to consultation and how Parliament will be able to scrutinise the balance it strikes between prudence, flexibility and long-term security?
Much of today’s debate has also rightly returned to auto-enrolment. The question of paucity of pensions adequacy has been highlighted by the noble Lords, Lord Sharkey and Lord Davies of Brixton, and my noble friend Lady Penn. Introduced by a Conservative Government, auto-enrolment has been one of the quiet successes of the past decade. I would like to remind the House that the operational aspects of this were progressed and tested going back as far as 2012. Participation among eligible employees now stands at around 88%. I would argue that this is a remarkable achievement. But success should not breed complacency, because upwards of 8.5 million people remain undersavers, and the question of adequacy remains unresolved. There is still work to be done, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, said.
Crucially, auto-enrolment is highly sensitive to labour market conditions. Every percentage point increase in unemployment pushes more people out of workplace pension saving altogether. Against that backdrop, the recent “benefits Budget” is concerning. Unemployment is rising and, with it, the number of people falling out of pension saving. I therefore ask the Minister whether the Government have undertaken updated modelling on the impact of higher employment on future pension adequacy, whether those projections differ from earlier assumptions and whether they will be published so that Parliament can properly understand the long-term consequences of the Government’s policy choices.
As many noble Lords have noted, pension engagement remains the missing leg of the stool. Millions are saving, but fewer than half have checked the value of their pension in the past year. This is not simply apathy; it reflects a system that has become increasingly complex and opaque to ordinary savers. The pensions dashboard, which has been mentioned this afternoon, is therefore not a technical adjunct. It is central to enabling informed decision-making, and various questions have been raised about that. Can the Minister confirm when the revised staging timeline will be published, whether clear delivery milestones will be set out and how Parliament will be able to track progress so that savers can have confidence that this long-delayed reform will finally be realised?
Engagement, however, is also constrained by the current regulatory environment. In consultation with industry, we heard compelling evidence that FCA and the TPR regulation makes genuine member education extraordinarily difficult to design. The boundary between advice and marketing has become so blurred that most communications fall into a grey area, leaving schemes with very few compliant touch points for meaningful engagement. If we are serious about improving outcomes, the Government must enable better education and clearer communication. Perhaps the Minister could comment on this and what work is under way to review these constraints and how the Bill supports rather than frustrates the goal of informing saving.
I turn to salary sacrifice, because this decision strikes at the heart of pensions adequacy, individual engagement and, ultimately, trust in the system itself. The recent disappointing Budget has taken a sledgehammer to a mechanism that has for many years made pension saving both affordable for workers and sustainable for employers. For millions of people saving at or near the minimum auto-enrolment rate, salary sacrifice is not a perk but the difference between saving and not saving at all. Removing this relief will mean lower take-home pay, lower pension contributions and, over time, materially smaller pension pots. This is a short-sighted political choice—one that appears designed to plug immediate fiscal pressures while storing up greater dependency on the state in retirement.
The impact on employers is equally concerning. By reimposing employer national insurance on previously sacrificed earnings, the Government are increasing the cost of labour at precisely the wrong moment. For many medium-sized firms, this will translate into tens of thousands of pounds in additional annual costs—money that could otherwise have supported wages, investment or workforce expansion. The decision to charge both employer and employee national insurance on salary-sacrifice contributions above £2,000 introduces a sharp and, I believe, irrational cliff edge. The OBR estimates that 76% of the burden will fall on employees. Once again, private sector workers bear the cost, while public sector employees in defined benefit schemes remain largely insulated.
The figures are stark. An employee earning £45,000 and saving 5% through salary sacrifice will be £58 worse off in the first year and more than £15,000 worse off over the course of a working lifetime. In the light of this, can the Minister confirm whether the Government have undertaken a sector-by-sector distributional analysis of these changes, whether they will publish an assessment of the long-term impact on pension adequacy and future welfare expenditure and whether she accepts that this measure operates in effect as a tax on work and on responsible long-term saving?
Some noble Lords have rightly raised the broader macroeconomic implications of pension reform. UK pension funds and insurers together hold around 30% of the gilt market—this point was made earlier. If mature defined benefit schemes are nudged away from gilts into equities, the consequences for debt management, interest rates and mortgage markets could be profound. It would therefore be reassuring to hear from the Minister whether the Debt Management Office and the Bank of England have been consulted on these potential effects and whether their views will be made available to Parliament.
I realise that time is marching on. I hope the Government will reflect carefully on all the concerns raised across your Lordships’ House today and respond with the assurances that savers and schemes alike are entitled to expect—we owe them nothing less. However, in the spirit of Christmas, and as this is the season of good will—I am feeling more Christmassy now than I did before the Question this afternoon—I say to the Minister that, despite everything I have said, and in a rare outbreak of festive generosity, there are parts of the Bill that we agree with, such as the PPF changes and the terminal illness time extension. As others have said, we will work constructively with the Government in the weeks and months ahead. I look forward to the Minister’s response and wish Peers and staff in the House a very happy Christmas.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful for the incredible range of thoughtful and constructive contributions we have heard during today’s debate. I should declare that I am a member of the parliamentary pension scheme; otherwise, I have a private pension.
I am so grateful to have heard the maiden speech of the noble Baroness, Lady White. I realise we have quite a bit in common: we are children of migrants, I too have spatial dyspraxia—I have never yet found my way around here—and we both engage with a church. I am afraid that there it ends; no one will ever ask me to chair John Lewis, which may be just as well for anybody who likes shopping there. She may have had an eclectic career but, now that she has joined this House, it will get a lot more eclectic still. It is a joy to have her on board and, if there is more of that to come, I look forward to it.
The range of views around of the House reflects the significance of the Bill for savers, employers and the pensions industry. The level of interest underscores how important pensions are to savers and the UK economy, and we need to help people get the best from their savings. There were some fascinating discussions in the debate today. I could have listened to the noble Lord, Lord Willetts, and my noble friend Lord Wood for a lot longer, and I shall not be able to do justice to what they said. But I shall go back and read it very carefully and I hope that we can continue to have some really interesting conversations.
There were a lot of questions, and I will not be able to respond to all of them. I shall do my very best, but I have only 20 minutes and it may be that noble Lords have to listen back to this at half-speed, if I am not careful.
I will start with adequacy, as that is where the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, began. I was grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Willetts, for setting out that this has been very much a cross-party journey that we have been on together, and I hope that we can keep it that way. I am sure that the noble Baroness did not mean to presume that auto-enrolment started with the last Conservative Government, when in fact it was legislated by the previous Labour Government—and there was also the Pensions Commission. I am sure that she did not mean to say that. What we have done is provide some remarkable continuity in the journey, and I hope that we can carry on doing that.
I was delighted by the work done by the last Pensions Commission, on which my noble friend Lady Drake served with such distinction—and I know that she will serve with equal distinction on the next Pensions Commission. That is the place where adequacy will be addressed fully. The Government are committed to that—it is a key priority for us—but it is also important that we get the market into the right shape so that, if savers are saving more, they will get the returns on their money.
I turn to the issue of surplus. I listened very carefully to the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and my noble friend Lord Davies, and thought, “I can’t make them both happy on this front”. That is generally true, I think, but it is illustrated particularly on the subject of surplus. I shall say two things. First, to the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, I say that we are very careful about what surplus extraction will do. Schemes are currently enjoying high levels of funding, with three in four in surplus on a low-dependency basis. They are also more mature, with the vast majority having a hedge to minimise the risk of future volatility with investment strategies: they are protected against interest rate and inflation movements. The DB funding code and underpinning legislation introduced in 2024 require trustees to maintain a strong funding position.
The decisions to release surplus are of course subject to trustee discretion and underpinned by strict safeguards, including the requirement for a prudent funding threshold, actuarial certification and member notification. Of course, as part of any agreement to release surplus funds, trustees are in a good position to negotiate, and it will be down to trustees to negotiate with their employers about the way in which surplus is released.
My noble friend Lady Warwick rightly pressed me on the questions of scale. As outlined in the impact assessment for the Bill, there is a range of evidence showing that scale can help deliver better governance, with economies of scale, investment expertise and access to a wider range of assets all helping to improve outcomes. We may not be heading for the sunlit uplands of Aussie megafunds, described by the noble Baroness, Lady White, but we are pushing in that direction. In response to her question, we will ensure that the governance and regulatory requirements needed for these much bigger pension schemes will be robust. We will develop those with the industry going forward.
On the question of whether the scale measures are going to be tougher on smaller schemes, the problem is that our evidence shows, across a range of studies, that scale is what makes the difference. We are asked why there is a magic number of about £25 billion. The evidence from a number of studies shows that a greater number of benefits can arise from a scale of £25 billion to £50 billion of assets under management, including investment expertise and sophistication and the balance sheet to provide a more diverse portfolio to savers. We have not seen sufficient evidence that other approaches will enable the same benefits for savers and the economy, so we do believe that scale is the best way to realise benefits across the market for savers. However, there will be a transition pathway to enable those schemes that are not there now to have a route to scale where they have a credible plan to achieve it in five years, and we will consult the industry on what a credible plan may look like as part of the development of regulations.
A number of noble Lords, including the noble Baronesses, Lady Altmann and Lady Noakes, and the noble Lord, Lord Ashcombe, as well as my noble friend Lord Wood, mentioned the position of new entrants. The potential for future market innovation is really important; we are very conscious that scale requirements could, if not done correctly, prevent this future innovation. So the Government have provided for a new-entrant pathway, designed specifically to provide a route for this future innovation. We will monitor future movement in the market to ensure that the pathway is working as intended. In addition to innovation, these schemes will be required to have the strong potential to grow to scale over time.
I dive in briefly to the reserve power and asset allocation. I am clearly not going to satisfy the House today; we will have plenty of time in Committee to discuss this. But I shall make a few points now about it in general and the interaction with fiduciary duty. Questions were raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Stedman-Scott, Lady Penn and Lady Noakes, the noble Lords, Lord Sharkey and Lord Vaux, my noble friend Lord Davies, the noble Lords, Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth and Lord Evans—and I am going to stop saying these names now.
There is widespread recognition of the benefits that a diverse investment portfolio can bring for savers. That is exactly why the signatories to the Mansion House Accord are committing to invest in private markets. This reserve power will help to ensure this change happens, but we have built in a number of safeguards. Let me just knock one thing on the head. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Ashcombe, that this asset allocation power does not apply to the LGPS. Following an amendment in the House of Commons, the Bill no longer allows a responsible authority, such as the Secretary of State, to direct asset pool companies to make specific investment decisions. I hope that reassures the noble Lord on that point.
On the wider question, the making of regulations under this power will be subject to a raft of safeguards contained in the Bill. To respond to the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, I say that the Government anticipate that we will not have to use this power if all goes well. Were the Government ever to use it, there are a series of safeguards, and we would have to consult and produce a report. We would at that point look at developing how it would be done. Let me briefly touch on the safeguards: first, the power is time limited, and I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, that it will expire if it has not been used. Any percentage headline asset allocation requirements enforced beyond that date will be capped at their current levels. Secondly, and crucially, the Government are required to establish a savers’ interest test in which pension providers will be granted an exemption from the targets where they can show that meeting them would cause material financial detriment to savers. Finally, the regulations will obviously be subject to parliamentary scrutiny but, before that, the Government will need to consult and publish a report on the impact of any new requirements on savers and economic growth both before exercising any power for the first time and within five years of it being exercised.
I am going to have to rush through. I turn to the points raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Altmann and Lady Bowles, about qualifying assets and investment trusts. I can see that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, feels very strongly about this—I listened carefully to the points that she and the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, made. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, in particular that the Government recognise the role that investment trusts play in the UK economy and in supporting the Government’s growth agenda, and we are committed to supporting this important sector. We put that on the record very clearly. However, when it comes to qualifying assets in a reserve power, we have aimed to stick closely to the scope of the Mansion House Accord, which itself is limited to investments made by unlisted funds. That is consistent with our general approach to this part of the Bill, where we deliberately ensure that the powers are suitably targeted and contain guardrails. In other words, they are not intended to be open-ended but should be capable of serving as a backstop to the commitments that pension providers have voluntarily made.
There were a number of points made by my noble friend Lord Davies about consumer protections. I reassure him that consumer protection is a priority for the Government, and ensuring that there are strong consumer safeguards is something we take very seriously. That is why the Bill introduces a number of robust consumer protections, including in the contractual override process, in small pots and in DB surplus. I look forward to discussing these in more detail with him and others in Committee.
My noble friend Lady Warwick raised the question of VFM. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, for welcoming that; my noble friend Lord Davies raised it as well. The noble Viscount, Lord Younger, asked about the interaction in different parts of the scheme. The pensions road map, which I am sure he has had the opportunity to read, shows very clearly how the different measures that we are proposing connect and how they are all necessary. They are all key parts of a machine necessary to achieving the Government’s objective of moving the pensions landscape forward. I can tell him that the next step will be a joint consultation by the FCA and the Pensions Regulator, which will be published early next year. This will then inform our draft regulations on value for money, which we intend to consult on during 2026. We expect the VFM framework to be implemented in 2028, with the first set of VFM metrics published in March 2028. The first VFM assessment reports and ratings will then be published in October 2028. On that basis, we would expect to see poor performing schemes starting to exit the market from November 2028.
On the pre-1927 indexation in the Pension Protection Fund and FAS, I listened very carefully to the comments that have been made by my noble friend Lady Warwick, the noble Lord, Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth—I thank him for his thoughtful reflection—and many other colleagues. We are laying the groundwork for the first major step forward in this area, and I think that some credit should be given to the Government for doing that. However, I understand that this will not go as far as many had hoped.
We need to recognise that the PPF maintains a substantial financial reserve. It is not a surplus; it is a financial reserve to protect against future risks. The cost of retrospection and arrears is significant and would greatly reduce that reserve. Any change that reduces the PPF’s reserves will, by definition, reduce the vital security the PPF provides to its current and future members. The PPF has very successfully navigated the past 20 years. It is well regarded as a prudent fiduciary acting in the best interests of pension savers, and we need to ensure that it can continue to do so.
I am going to disappoint my noble friend Lord Davies on the matter of pre-1997 indexation in wider DB schemes. I need to tell him clearly that the Government have no plans to change the rules on pre-1997 indexation for DB schemes. These rules ensure consistency across all schemes, and changing them would increase liabilities and costs. Over three-quarters of schemes pay some pre-1997 indexation because of scheme rules or as a discretionary benefit, but reforms in the Bill, as we have mentioned, will enable more trustees of well-funded DB pension schemes to share surplus with employers and deliver better outcomes for members, which may include discretionary indexation.
I turn to the questions on fiduciary duty, raised by many noble Lords, including the noble Baronesses, Lady Hayman, Lady Bowles and Lady Penn, the noble Lords, Lord Sharkey and Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth, and my noble friend Lady Warwick. It is often said that fiduciary duty is the cornerstone of trust-based pension schemes and that trustees should invest in the best interests of their members. That principle remains fundamental. The Government believe that the current legal framework gives trustees flexibility to adapt and protect savers’ interests. However, at the same time, we acknowledge the calls for more clarity on considering systemic factors, such as climate risk and members’ living standards, when making investment decisions.
My colleague the Minister for Pensions set out in the Commons that we intend to develop guidance for the trust-based private pension sector to provide this clarification. I know that he plans to come forward shortly with more details on what the guidance will look to cover. He has already confirmed how he intends to start engaging with a wide range of stakeholders in producing the guidance, starting with a series of industry round tables early in the new year.
Through guidance, the Government are trying to address a barrier that some trustees say they face when investing in savers’ best interests. Guidance has the potential to support climate and sustainability goals, and our wider goal to improve saver outcomes and unlock pension investment in UK growth. We are still in the early stages of undertaking consultation and exploring options on this, and we will provide further updates in due course.
The noble Lord, Lord Bourne, and the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, asked why we do not just change the primary legislation. It is the Government’s view that introducing statutory changes to refine investment duties could risk creating rigid and complex obligations, which would reduce the ability of trustees to respond to changing investment landscapes and circumstances. On the questions of how and when, we are exploring possible options for taking this forward if and when parliamentary time allows.
The noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles and Lady Coffey, raised the position of trustees, and others also alluded to it. Successful implementation of the Bill’s reforms will rely on highly skilled trustees operating independently, applying good governance and focusing on delivering the best outcomes for savers. That is why we launched a consultation on stronger trusteeship and governance earlier this week. It aims to bring all schemes up to the required standard and explore what changes might be needed to raise the bar for all trustees. The industry has welcomed the consultation and there seems to be a consensus that high-quality trusteeship and governance is vital to ensuring good outcomes for pension scheme members. I encourage anyone with an interest in this area to respond to the consultation.
A number of other points were raised. The noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, talked about the need for a single regulator. I say simply that the Government recognise the importance of clarity and co-ordination in the regulation of workplace pensions. The FCA and the Pensions Regulator work effectively together, including through joint working groups and consultations. They have shared strategies and guidance, and regular joint engagement with stakeholders. The Government keep the regulatory system under review.
The noble Lord, Lord Ashcombe, made some interesting points. The Government are committed to appropriate regulation, and to do that we need to engage regularly with stakeholders and industry to make sure that we get it right. There are some genuine questions, which we will go on to debate in Committee, about getting the balance right between primary legislation, secondary legislation, regulation, supervision, governance and guidance. We need space to be able to engage with industry, because any regulations we produce have to work and the details of the scheme will have to be worked through. That will inevitably mean that there will be times when the House will want more detail than we are able to give. One of the challenges is that it should not be possible both to criticise the Government while they are trying to make their mind up on everything at the same time in some areas and to criticise them for not being open to consultation. We will see how it goes and continue to consult extensively with industry and other stakeholders as we move through this.
A few more points were raised. The noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate, asked about the Pensions Ombudsman. It is important to clarify that the measure on the Pensions Ombudsman neither increases nor widens their powers, nor that of the TPO, beyond what was originally intended. This is reinstating the original intent of the ombudsman’s powers in pension overpayment dispute cases, which were debated in Parliament when the ombudsman was established in 1991. There was a High Court ruling; we are amending the existing legislation because that ruling stated that the TPO is not a competent court in pensions overpayment cases. The aim is to reinstate the original policy intent and reaffirm the government view and that of the pensions industry. I hope that reassures the noble Lord. It restores the original policy intent—that is all. It is not designed to try to widen it. I hope that is an encouragement to him.
On the question of small pots, the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, and the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, queried the pot limit. We had to choose somewhere. The initial pot limit of £1,000 will address 13 million stock of small pots, which we think strikes the right balance between achieving meaningful levels of pot consolidation and reducing administration costs for pension providers without distorting the market. However, the Secretary of State will keep the threshold under review to ensure that it remains appropriate as the market continues to develop following the reforms made in the Bill.
A number of noble Lords asked about the position on pensions dashboards. The Government have committed to regular updates to the House—we will be doing another one of those—but let me put some headlines on the record for now. The House will be glad to know that good progress has been made with the pensions dashboards. The first pension provider successfully completed connection to the pensions dashboards ecosystem on 17 April this year, forming a crucial step towards making dashboards a reality. More than 700 of the largest pension providers and schemes are now connected to the dashboards ecosystem; over 60 million records are now integrated into dashboards, representing around three-quarters of the records in scope.
Further, state pension data is now accessible, representing tens of millions of additional records. The pensions dashboards programme is confident that pension providers and schemes in scope will connect by the regulatory deadline of 31 October 2026. When we have assurances that the service is safe, secure and thoroughly user tested, the Secretary of State will provide the industry with six months’ notice ahead of the launch of the Money Helper pensions dashboard.
A number of noble Lords mentioned the gender pensions gap, including the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. Auto-enrolment has delivered substantial progress in increasing pension participation among women, which has meant, as the noble Baroness said, that workplace pension participation rates between eligible men and women in the private sector have now equalised. However, it is absolutely right that gaps remain in pension participation and wealth, reflecting wider structural inequalities in the labour market. A gender pay gap leads to a gender pensions gap. Women now approaching retirement still have, on average, half the private pension wealth of men. The Pensions Commission will consider further steps to improve pension outcomes for all, especially women and groups identified as being at greater risk of undersaving for retirement.
That is probably about as far as I can go. I am really grateful to be part of a House with so much interest and knowledge in a subject that not everybody—noble Lords will be shocked to hear—finds as interesting as those of us here today do. However, we do, and I look forward to lots of really interesting discussions in Committee. This Bill marks a decisive step in modernising the pensions system, strengthening security for members, driving better value and enabling innovation across the sector. It combines ambition with safeguards, ensuring schemes can deliver improved outcomes while maintaining confidence and trust. I look forward to working with noble Lords—after they have had a very happy Christmas—and to continuing constructive engagement. I commend the Bill to the House.
Baroness Penn (Con)
The Minister has made a valiant attempt to answer all questions. Can she commit to writing to the noble Lords in this debate on the questions she did not reach, and to that letter reaching us before we start Committee?
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
This is the last sitting day before we finish. I will look at what I can put in writing before we get to Committee. I have never been asked so many questions in such a short period—and I have talked to church youth groups. I will see what we can do on that front.
Baroness Sherlock
That the bill be committed to a Grand Committee, and that it be an instruction to the Grand Committee that they consider the bill in the following order:
Clauses 1 to 118, the Schedule, Clauses 119 to 123, Title.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now adjourn and, in doing so, wish everyone in the House, and all those working in the House, chag sameach, a very happy Christmas, a restful break and a happy new year.
Pension Schemes Bill
Monday 12th January 2026
(3 weeks, 2 days ago)
Grand CommitteePension Schemes Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 152-I(b) Amendments for Grand Committee (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (12 Jan 2026)
“Purpose of the Act(1) The purpose of this Act is to—(a) deliver higher and more sustainable returns for pension savers;(b) address fragmentation across the pensions sector;(c) improve transparency and comparability in value for money;(d) enable clearer and fairer communication with members;(e) support greater consistency across pension provision;(f) support innovative and flexible approaches to saving;(g) provide employers with greater clarity to support their employees’ pension provision;(h) enable responsible and innovative use of pension scheme surplus;(i) improve understanding of pension liabilities and costs for local authorities;(j) strengthen actuarial transparency and routes to challenge contribution rates in the LGPS.(2) The Secretary of State, and any other persons taking actions under the provisions of this Act, must have regard to the purpose specified in subsection (1).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment sets out the overarching purposes of the Act, including improving returns for pension savers, addressing fragmentation, strengthening value for money and transparency, supporting innovation and flexibility in pension provision, and improving outcomes for members, employers, and local authorities.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, it is a privilege to open today’s debate and to begin what I am sure will be five engaging and constructive days of scrutiny on this Bill in Committee. The proposed new purpose clause, in my name and those of my noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, is not an attempt to rehearse the arguments advanced at Second Reading. Rather, it is intended to address a specific issue arising from the way in which the Bill has been framed and from the legislative approach that the Government have chosen to adopt.
The debate I seek to initiate is a principled one about legislative clarity and certainty, particularly in the context of what is, by any reasonable definition, a framework Bill. We believe that the Bill, as currently drafted, is light on detail and relies heavily on delegated powers. This has inevitably left your Lordships debating intentions, aspirations and hypothetical outcomes, rather than the Government’s settled policy. In those circumstances, is it not all the more important that Parliament is clear on the face of the legislation about what it actually intends to achieve?
The purpose clause amendment therefore intends to establish an overarching statement of intent, setting out the objectives against which the Bill and the regulations made under it should be understood and scrutinised. Where detailed provision is deferred to secondary legislation, such a statement provides Parliament, regulators and stakeholders with a clear point of reference. Without it, how are we to assess whether the powers being taken are exercised consistently with the will of Parliament, rather than merely within the scope of ministerial discretion?
More broadly, the amendment invites the House to reflect on whether Parliament is being asked to confer wide-ranging powers without sufficient clarity as to how they are intended to be used. At what point does flexibility begin to shade into uncertainty? How can proper legislative certainty be maintained when substantive policy choices are deferred, potentially amended repeatedly and then removed from direct parliamentary scrutiny? If there were an alternative procedural route that allowed the House to engage meaningfully with these questions, we would of course be willing to consider it. However, in the absence of such a mechanism, is it not reasonable to seek to debate these matters through a proposed new purpose clause, which would allow the House to test the Government’s intent within the normal amending stages of the Bill?
This concern is particularly acute in relation to value for money. Much of what this legislation seeks to achieve will ultimately stand or fall on the effectiveness of the value-for-money framework. Yet the provisions before us are thin and largely skeletal, despite the central role that the framework is expected to play. How can Parliament properly assess the merits of this approach when so much turns on detail that has yet to be set out?
I say at the outset that we are supportive of the value-for-money framework in principle, but its success will depend almost entirely on the detail of its design, the consistency of its application across schemes and the robustness of its enforcement. Without greater clarity on these points, how are trustees, regulators and members to understand the standards against which they will be judged?
That leads me to a wider question about the long-term purpose of the Bill. How do the Government envisage the pensions landscape to look like in 10, 15 or even 20 years’ time? Is the objective consolidation, greater scale, improved outcomes for savers or some combination of all three? How will we know whether this legislation has succeeded in delivering that vision?
We wish to engage not only with the immediate legislative mechanisms but with the broader strategic direction that underpins them. We fully accept that legislation must allow Ministers a degree of flexibility to respond to changing circumstances, but flexibility without a clear, articulated destination risks leaving Parliament and the industry uncertain about the direction of travel. Is it unreasonable to ask for the House to be told not only what powers are being taken but to what end they are intended to be used? It is in that spirit that this purpose clause has been tabled and I very much look forward to the debate that I hope it will provoke.
I wish to return briefly to the question of mandation, which, although I have not directly mentioned it, is an underlying issue in the Bill. It illustrates precisely why questions of purpose, process and limitation matter so greatly in the context of a framework Bill of this kind. We will of course turn to this in greater detail later in Committee but, as we are discussing the purpose of the Bill in this clause, it would be remiss of me not to mention it here at the outset as one of the most contentious provisions in the Bill—as we heard, broadly around the House, at Second Reading.
As drafted, the Bill establishes a broad enabling framework but leaves a great deal of substantive policy to be determined later through regulation. That approach inevitably creates uncertainty. It also places a heightened responsibility on Parliament to ensure that any powers taken are clearly bounded, carefully justified and firmly anchored to a stated purpose. In that context, we do not consider there to be a compelling case that asset allocation mandates are necessary to increase productive investment in the United Kingdom. Indeed, mandation risks cutting across the fundamental principle that investment decisions should be taken in the best interests of savers by trustees and providers who are properly accountable for the outcomes. I am sure that we will hear more about these arguments in Committee.
When the Bill itself provides only a skeletal framework, the absence of clarity around how such powers might be used becomes all the more concerning. If any future Government were ever minded to pursue mandation, it is essential that any such power be tightly limited, that savers’ outcomes are clearly protected and that asset allocation decisions are insulated as far as possible from political cycles and short-term pressures. Investment decisions should remain with those charged with fiduciary responsibility and not be directed by Ministers, however well intentioned. Those safeguards cannot simply be assumed; in a framework Bill, they must be explicit.
Moreover, the case for mandation is further weakened by the existence of credible and constructive alternative routes to unlocking greater levels of UK investment. Industry participants, including Phoenix Group, have identified a number of areas where policy reform could make a meaningful difference without recourse to compulsion. Government institutions such as the National Wealth Fund and Great British Energy could play a significant role by aligning guarantee products with insurers’ matching adjustment requirements, by engaging institutional investors earlier so that projects are structured to meet long-term investment needs and by continuing collaboration with the ABI Investment Delivery Forum to deliver investable infrastructure pipelines.
Similarly, the Mansion House Accord, building on the 2023 compact, has already driven tangible industry action. In our view, the priority now should be delivery, rather than the creation of new and potentially far-reaching powers. That includes implementing a robust value-for-money framework with standardised metrics; introducing minimum default fund size requirements, whether £25 billion or £10 billion, with a credible growth plan; and aligning the defined contribution charge cap with the Pensions Regulator’s approach by excluding performance fees where appropriate.
More broadly still, stronger capital markets are essential if the United Kingdom is to attract both domestic and international investment. This includes supporting the work of the Capital Markets Industry Taskforce, exploring measures to foster a stronger home bias in UK equities, considering whether stamp duty on share transactions is acting as a drag on competitiveness, and examining targeted tax incentives for pension fund investment in UK infrastructure. Ultimately, rather than mandating investment, policy should focus on understanding why UK investment has lagged. That requires serious engagement with questions of market structure, regulatory design, the quality of investment pipelines and the underlying risk-return characteristics of UK assets. Mandation risks treating the symptoms rather than addressing the causes.
I look forward to the Minister’s response. I make no apology for laying out certain aspects that I believe fit with the purpose of the Bill. However, as I said at the outset, I hope that we have a productive and interesting Committee. I beg to move.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
It is a pleasure to be here. Although for a while I was feeling a bit lonely, I very much welcome my noble friends; what we do not make up in numbers, I am sure my friends will more than make up for in the quality of their contributions. I declare an interest as a fellow of the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries.
It is worth at this stage spelling out that I have spent a lifetime advising people about pensions. I was the TUC’s pensions officer for a number of years. I was also a partner in a leading firm of consulting actuaries, and I worked for a number of years with a scheme actuaries certificate undertaking scheme valuations. In terms of sheer experience, I can fairly say that this is unique to noble Members of this House. I will not go on at length on future occasions, except when it is directly relevant.
The noble Viscount, Lord Younger of Leckie, declared his intention to avoid repeating a Second Reading speech—it is arguable as to whether he achieved that intention—but, in a sense, I welcome the opportunity to look at the Bill as a whole. While I support the Bill and I support my noble friends—there are some really good measures in here—the text underlying the opposition amendment suggests that we have a pensions system in chronically bad condition.
It suggests that returns are inadequate, that the system is fragmented and that it lacks transparency, with people unable to assess what they are getting. It provides inadequate communications. It is inconsistent across the different forms of provision. It prevents, or makes hard, innovative and flexible solutions to the problems that are faced. It needs to provide greater clarity for employers. It currently does not achieve responsible and innovative use of pension surpluses. To me, this suggests a system at risk of chronic failure.
To be honest, I accept those criticisms because underlying this system is the personal pension revolution introduced by the Conservative Government 40 years ago, which has proved to be unfit for purpose. We are having to make all these changes because of the failure of the system that the Conservative Government introduced. We need these changes because personal pensions did not work out. Collective provision is the answer to decent pension provision, and the Bill supports and develops collective provision and moves across this idea that everyone can have their own pot which they look after for themselves. I oppose the amendment and look forward to further discussions on the individual issues as they arise.
Lord Fuller (Con)
My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton. He reminds me of that old joke about the dinner of actuaries where they are all complaining that everyone is living longer and it is getting worse.
I agree with this purpose clause, although I am surprised that it does not establish the balance between risk and reward, where pensions help people build secure futures by taking appropriate qualified risks. The pensions industry seems obsessed with risk minimisation, but without any form of risk there can be no reward; even cash is at risk from inflation.
The success of this Bill and why we need a purpose clause is to be grounded in how it makes it easier for people to take personal responsibility, to save for their futures, themselves and their families and to make their savings secure while permitting appropriate and manageable returns and providing risk capital to grow the economy. Inspiring people to save for their future is important, and pensions are long-term savings plans. Long-term returns dynamised through dividends, and boosted by employer contributions in many cases, are the best way to set yourselves up for later life.
Viscount Thurso (LD)
My Lords, I am not entirely certain that I am wholly in favour of the concept of a clause at the beginning of a Bill that sets out its purpose in the way that the noble Viscount has set down, but I appreciate the opportunity to speak to one of the points that it makes.
First, I am not sure whether it is a declarable interest but I will declare it anyway: I am a trustee of the Parliamentary Contributory Pension Fund, for which I do not get remunerated—none of us does. As far as I am aware, nothing in the Bill affects that scheme, and therefore I am declaring it just in case. Secondly, I apologise for not having been here at Second Reading. I had to attend something extraordinarily rare: a hospital appointment in Inverness. I am afraid that not even I could get from Inverness to here in the required time for the Second Reading. I apologise for that, but I have read the Second Reading debate and was very taken by what was said.
The specific point that I want to come to is the point that the noble Viscount makes in proposed new subsection (1)(h) and his reference to
“responsible and innovative use of pension scheme surplus”.
What does he mean by an innovative use of the surplus? When the Minister comes to respond, will she say what the Government’s purpose was behind what they are doing on surpluses? I know we will come to that in much greater detail later on.
It seems to me that two things are behind this. One is doing something with a surplus, which begs the question: how much of a surplus should actually be taken? Also, how is that surplus calculated, bearing in mind that a range of actuarial factors—including the strength of the employer covenant, the level of risk of the investment, the actuarial factors regarding life and death, and so on—go into making up a surplus? All those factors can, at each valuation, move the surplus considerably. Therefore, how much is considered surplus surplus, as it were, as opposed to prudent management by the trustees?
The second thing is, I think, the underlying thought that the money given back to the employer will be used for investment. I see no evidence to suspect that will be the case. I have a horrible suspicion that, although we might have a desire to have more money for companies to invest, with the best will in the world, it is more likely that they will take the money, run it through the P&L and use it to pay dividends.
Those are the two issues I am looking at: the quantum of surplus and, in general terms, the principle behind that; and, secondly, the extent to which the Government expect it to be used for investment. If they do expect it to be used for investment, how do they hope that will happen?
Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con)
My Lords, I declare my interests as a current member and director of a pension trust. I want to take us back to the amendment for a moment. I shall refer to the reference to surpluses made by the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, because it is an indicator of how this Bill is going to move; I suspect we shall get a surplus of comments about surpluses.
I go back to the amendment. We are starting to hear remarks suggesting that this amendment is critical. I do not criticise it at all because this is an enormously complex and comprehensive piece of legislation. Bringing our minds closely to the purpose of what we are going to debate, if ever a piece of legislation required it, this amendment is an essential ingredient. I fully support all parts of this amendment, which seem to encapsulate all the different areas to which we shall give more detailed consideration as we proceed.
However, I want to refer briefly to something already referred to: the matter of pension scheme surpluses under subsection (1)(h) of the proposed new clause to be inserted by Amendment 1. I referred to this at Second Reading; I will not repeat word for word what I said then—that would not be appropriate—but I want to probe my noble friend and, in particular, the Minister on this matter a little.
We all know that, historically, when we had low interest rates in this country, deficits often used to be repaired with any surpluses that might occur in schemes. As a result, employers that did not have DB schemes were obviously at a disadvantage. I am interested in how we might deploy surpluses in future. For instance, will they be deployable for capital expenditure? That seems quite desirable, particularly looking at the economy at present.
My second point concerns crossovers, referred to here, enhancing the contributions that already exist in DC schemes. How on earth can crossovers be legitimately and properly handled? That seems rather difficult to me.
Finally, I turn to surplus sharing. There is a case going on at the moment; I referred to it in my speech at Second Reading so I will not go back to it now. The encouragement of surplus sharing between employers and between members is terribly important. How can that be done fairly and equally? Will we be able to rely—as we should, I believe—on the powers of trustees always to do everything in the best interests of members? Pressures from employers, for instance, must be curbed when it comes to those decisions that might be taken.
It is a difficult area. I know that we will look at it in more detail, but it is worth mentioning at this starting point because this list is perhaps another example of how complicated things are and how we need to get a grip. Whoever has been responsible in the past for legislation in this field, this is an ideal opportunity, which I greatly support, for us to get this right. I therefore fully support Amendment 1 and hope that, as we move forward, we will use those objects as the basis for our discussions.
Lord Wigley (PC)
My Lords, I apologise that I, too, missed Second Reading, for reasons outside my control. When you are in a party with two or three Members, it is very difficult to spread yourself in all directions. I have an interest in this area going back to when I was a trustee of the National Assembly’s pension scheme some years ago and, before that, I had involvement as financial controller of the Hoover Company and with Mars Ltd, which is one of the foremost companies in these islands.
I want to flag up one point as we look at the generalities in this comprehensive umbrella amendment—the position of employees such as those of Allied Steel and Wire in Cardiff in 2002, who found themselves on their backs without adequate safeguards for the pensions that they had. Over the almost quarter of a century since, those still surviving did not get justice out of the system. Whatever balance we have to strike in terms of risk—which is inevitably part of the equation—benefits, security and the longer term against the shorter term, we must also have some safety nets for those who fall through, through no fault of their own, as did the employees of Allied Steel and Wire.
I commend the Government for the steps they have taken for the coal miners, who have been in a difficult position, but if the coal miners were justified so are the workers at Allied Steel and Wire. I draw to the Government’s attention that the First Minister of Wales, the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, spoke about this last month and called on them to take action to recompense those who have lost out so badly.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
I no longer have any financial interests to declare, having retired from the board of the London Stock Exchange at the end of 2025 after a long tenure, although that indicates that I have some history in that regard. I also have a history of policy engagement with local authority pension funds, the Local Authority Pension Fund Forum and IPO test marketing with various local authority pension funds. That is for background, so that people can understand some of where I have obtained my information.
I added my name to this amendment because I thought it was a good idea to have a list of purposes. We have before us a very long list of regulatory empowerments and, in some places, to do with value for money, I put a little list on the front of them. Somewhere or other, whether in this proposed list at the front, listed throughout or as a mixture of both, it would help us with structure and understanding. We ought to make our Acts of Parliament as readable as possible for the non-specialist. It is also quite important in that regard. It may not be a perfect list; you could ask for “more” instead of “greater” or take the “-er” off the end of words and make it look like it is not criticising. I do not want to go into that, but I did not take it as a criticism. I thought it was a list of what we are trying to do to make things better and, on that basis, I support it.
I would be very pleased if we could all work together to build a list that we were all happy with and that reflected a true convergence of minds. During the passage of the previous Pension Schemes Act, there was an awful lot of working together to try to find the right wording. The Minister was on this side then, and we went through it together with many of the other people in this Room. We should be getting something good up front that tells everybody what it is about, not using it as a way to tie the Government’s hands. I do not look at it like that; I look at it as something that is explanatory. But if it helps in the interpretation, so be it.
If we cannot produce a list like that, I have reservations about whether one should go forward and jump straight into a list. If you do not want it here, you have to put one in every clause, so maybe it is better to try to do a shorter one here. Those are the reasons why I support the amendment. I support the principle of it, and I am more than happy to work at trying to make it something that everybody could sign up to.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I will be brief. I declare my interests as a board adviser to a pension scheme and a non-executive director of a pension administration and consultancy firm.
I support this amendment because, with such wide Henry VIII powers, it is really important to have some framework to hang our discussions and thoughts on or for future people looking at the Bill to understand its intentions. I was tempted to try to amend this amendment to change the word “savers”, which pervades the discussion about the Bill and lots of the background reading about it. Anyone who thinks that someone who is invested for the long term in a pension is a saver has misunderstood what saving is about. It should be “investors”, “members” or “customers” rather than “savers”. That is an important distinction when talking about providing for the long-term future of retirees in this country via a savings or investment mechanism which uses money that is put in to build up funds for the long term.
I would also have added to this list something that I think is really important. I hope, perhaps against hope, that we might be able to improve the excellent measures in the Bill by improving the compensation and payments for pre-1997 accrual by the Pension Protection Fund and the Financial Assistance Scheme, in particular for members who have been denied inflation protection. We ought—within this Bill, I hope—be able to give them extra for the future.
Viscount Trenchard (Con)
My Lords, I support this amendment, which was so well introduced by my noble friend Lord Younger and so well spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted. The Bill is very complicated. It is not absolutely clear to me what it means. It is also, as my noble friend Lord Younger explained, a skeletal Bill without a clear purpose to improve the outcomes for savers. In particular, looking at the value-for-money part of the Bill, it is not clear how this is going to work, what the metrics will be and how they will be assessed.
I think it is right to table this amendment in order to understand the purpose of the Bill. I am not clear that the Bill is primarily intended to improve the outcomes for pensioners or to find ways to fund government initiatives to make certain investments with pension savings that the trustees and managers might not have decided to make, which may require them to compromise on what should be their complete and clear duty to exercise their fiduciary responsibilities.
Can the Minister tell the Committee how the Bill is certain to improve outcomes for pensioners beyond what they would have been without government interference in the management of these funds? The Bill interferes with the trustees’ fiduciary duties not only with the mandation powers to direct investments, which apply only to very large DC schemes—the kind to which less well-off pensioners have contributed—but with the powers to require the 93 local government pension schemes to pool their funds together. How is this going to work if, at the same time, the Government are forcing many local authorities to merge or demerge under local government reorganisation?
I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response and approach to this amendment.
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)
My Lords, I thank everyone for their contributions. I do not intend to go on at length.
It is a novel view, is it not, that a Bill should have a purpose? This ought to be applied to many other Bills to show what their purposes are. This Bill has a wide range of powers affecting consolidation, investment, surplus extraction, defaults and retirement outcomes, but nowhere is a clear statement of purpose listed. I do not think that is symbolic; it is very useful. I have a simple question for the Minister: what is lost by clarity? We are looking here for a piece of clarity that does not undermine the Bill in any way but sets out what people are meant to see and expect from the Bill. It would set a pathway for other Bills to set out their purposes. From these Benches, I support this amendment.
The Minister of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Sherlock) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, for introducing his amendment, and all noble Lords who have spoken. It is a particular delight to hear from so many colleagues so early in Committee.
I should begin by saying two things. First, I am a member of the parliamentary pension scheme, so I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, for his service and urge him to give the scheme even greater attentiveness in future; I would be very grateful for that. Secondly, I am about to disappoint most Members of the Committee, but I may as well start as I mean to go on. Many of the points made and questions asked will come up in subsequent Committee days—that is what Committee is for—so I hope that noble Lords will forgive me if I do not go into the detail of how surplus operates, how value for money operates or how asset allocation will work; I will come back to all of those. I should probably apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, because I cannot promise to go back to Star Wars figurines, but I will try to pick up most of the rest of the points at some stage.
The Bill delivers vital reforms to strengthen the UK pensions system, safeguarding the financial future of around 20 million savers while driving long-term economic growth. The Bill focuses on improving value and efficiency for workers’ pension savings, with an average earner potentially gaining up to £29,000 more by retirement. These measures will accelerate the shift towards a pensions landscape with fewer, larger and better-governed schemes that deliver for both members and the wider economy.
To support market consolidation, the Bill introduces superfunds, megafunds and Local Government Pension Scheme pools, creating scale and resilience. The value-for-money framework will ensure that schemes provide the best outcomes for savers, while guided retirement provisions will help members when accessing their savings. Other measures in the Bill will enable pension schemes to operate more effectively by streamlining governance, improving transparency and reducing unnecessary complexity. The reforms delivered through the Bill will create a more efficient, resilient pension landscape; they will also lay the foundation for the Pensions Commission to examine outcomes for pensioners and set out how to develop a fair and sustainable system, ultimately benefiting both individual savers and the UK economy.
To achieve these ambitions, the Bill makes a number of essential changes to the framework of law relating to private pension schemes and the LGPS, rather than pursuing a single overarching objective. To insert a purpose clause could cause legal uncertainty as a court could assume that a provision included in a Bill was intended to have some additional operative effect. The practical effect of the requirement to have regard to the purpose of the Bill, as expressed in this proposed new clause, is unclear.
The purposes of individual provisions are instead made clear through their drafting and the accompanying explanatory material, including the Explanatory Notes and the impact assessment. There is no need for an additional new clause at the start of the Bill setting out the purposes, as this is covered elsewhere more appropriately. This approach is in keeping with established practice; for example, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 was twice the size of the Pension Schemes Bill. Like the Bill, it deals with a complex legal landscape and made a number of separate and necessary changes to the law relating to financial services and markets. There is no purpose provision in that Act, just as no overarching purpose clause has been included in the Pension Schemes Bill. We will return to matters related to secondary legislation in the debate on a subsequent group of amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey.
I will pick up the point made by the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, about this being a framework Bill; he used that as an argument for a purpose clause. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, that, if he has not seen a purpose clause debate, he has not been in many debates in the Chamber recently, because they have appeared; unfortunately and inadvertently, they mostly resulted in long Second Reading debates at the start of many other pieces of legislation. I stress that that was neither the purpose nor the result here, but many of those debates have happened.
We do not consider this to be a framework Bill. The noble Viscount mentioned the idea of setting legislation now and setting policy later. Manifestly, that is not what is happening. The Bill clearly sets out the policy decisions and the parameters within which delegated powers must operate. It brings together a broad package of reforms in pensions into a single piece of legislation. Many of those reforms build on long-established statutory regimes, where Parliament has historically set the policy in primary legislation and provided for detailed measures that will apply to schemes to be set out in regulations. The policy direction is clearly set out here.
As we all know, the successful implementation of pensions depends heavily on trustees, schemes, providers and regulators, which makes engagement and operational detail essential rather than optional. There has been extensive consultation and there will be further extensive consultation. I do not think that this matter will be solved any further by adding a purpose clause.
Finally, the Long Title of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 was also described in neutral terms—
“to make provision about the regulation of financial services and markets”—
rather than providing a practically unworkable narrative explanation of the purpose of that legislation. The same applies here.
While I welcome the comments and look forward to returning to many of them in our debates, I hope that I have made the case not only for the Bill as a whole but as to why it is unnecessary and unhelpful to add a purpose clause. I ask the noble Viscount to withdraw his amendment.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this relatively short debate. Many of the points raised strongly reinforce the view that my noble friend and I are seeking to advance: that this is indeed a framework Bill, which in its current form would benefit from greater explanation, greater articulation of purpose and more fully developed safeguards. I believe that the debate has drawn out views on some of those listed purposes and that it has been helpful at the outset of Committee.
As my noble friend Lord Trenchard said, it is complicated—that adds to my argument. I was very grateful to have the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. I am grateful to the Minister for her response and for beginning to provide some additional context around the Government’s intentions. It has been helpful up to a point, but I am not quite sure why she thinks a purpose clause would provide some uncertainty.
I remain of the view that a broader and more holistic articulation of where the Government would like the pensions system to be in five, 10 and 15 years’ time is still lacking. In fairness, that is likely to extend beyond what the Minister can reasonably be expected to provide today; I understand that. I accept her valid point that Committee is for delving into the detail of these matters, which we will be doing.
I will pick up just a few points from the debate. First, my noble friend Lord Fuller is absolutely right that we need a purpose clause to inspire people, particularly young people, to save for the future. That is a very valid point; it levels us, or brings us down to base, in terms of what we are trying to do here with this complicated Bill.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to probe why the Secretary of State requires the power in subsection (2) to direct scheme managers to participate in, or withdraw from, particular asset pool companies, given the need to preserve their independence and fiduciary duty to act in members’ best interests.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, the amendments in this group begin a series of groups related to the Local Government Pension Scheme. We start with amendments that seek to improve what is already in the Bill. However, as later groups will demonstrate, the Bill remains light on the LGPS.
I am sure that the Minister and other noble Lords will have noticed that we have de-grouped a number of our amendments ahead of today, where they are most relevant to this group. I shall briefly explain our reasoning at the outset. We have no intention of frustrating the passage of the Bill. Rather, we have de-grouped those amendments where we felt it would facilitate a clearer and more focused discussion, enabling noble Lords to put more targeted questions to the Minister without requiring her, or indeed other noble Lords in Committee, to traverse an undue amount of technical detail in a single debate. I hope that our intentions on this point have been made clear.
I do not accept the characterisation that this is simply a private pensions Bill—the Local Government Pension Scheme is clearly included within its scope—nor do I accept the argument that addressing the problems of the LGPS is either too complicated or not a priority. If we are legislating on pensions, we must be prepared to deal properly with the LGPS. I will refrain at this stage from going into the specifics, but later we will bring forward six additional proposed new clauses about the LGPS aimed at making the scheme operate in a more coherent, transparent and practical way. We very much hope that the Minister will engage seriously with these proposals. They go to the root causes of the problems facing the LGPS: how contribution rates are set; how these rates can be challenged; why transparency matters; how opacity undermines confidence in the system; why valuations and methodologies are so important; and, crucially, why many employers are currently getting a bad deal.
However, let us begin with what is already before us in the Bill and why it must be properly probed. These amendments give rise to specific and important questions that we wish to put to the Minister. They concern not only the intent of the provisions but how they will operate in practice, how they will interact with existing LGPS governance and funding arrangements, and whether they genuinely address the problems that they are purported to solve. Clarity on these points is essential if we are to ensure that the Bill strengthens, rather than inadvertently weakens, confidence in the Local Government Pension Scheme.
The first amendment in this group, Amendment 2, would remove subsections (2) to (8) of Clause 1 in order to probe the breadth and necessity of the powers being taken by the Secretary of State. As drafted, Clause 1 goes far beyond enabling regulation. It gives the Secretary of State the power to direct individual scheme managers to participate in or withdraw from specific asset pool companies and to issue binding directions not only to those scheme managers but to the asset pool companies themselves. Trustees have clear and well-established fiduciary duties to act in the best interests of their members and beneficiaries. Decisions about investment structure, risk, performance and value for money are central to those duties. The question this amendment seeks to pose is therefore simple: why does the Secretary of State require the power to override those fiduciary judgments by direction?
The Government have already made clear their policy objective of encouraging greater pooling. What is not yet clear is why compulsion, backed by direction-making powers of this breadth, is considered necessary. I am also concerned about the precedent this sets. Once Ministers have the power to dictate where pension assets must be pooled, it is not difficult to imagine future pressure, real or perceived, for an overinvestment strategy, asset allocation or wider policy objectives, even where these may conflict with members’ best interests.
The amendment therefore invites the Minister to explain, first, what safeguards will exist to ensure that any direction does not conflict with the fiduciary duty of scheme managers to their members. Secondly, over what timeframe will a scheme manager be expected to comply with a direction to enter or leave an asset pool? How will this align with long-term investment strategies? Thirdly, have the Government consulted the Border To Coast Pensions Partnership and other LGPS pools about the potential impact of this power? Fourthly, does the Minister recognise that forced entry or exit from asset pools could disrupt investment strategy, reduce stability and deter private sector partnerships? Have the Government considered this risk?
I am afraid there are a lot of questions, but they are worth putting. How do the Government propose to deal with the risks of cross-subsidisation of employers with very different funding positions that are merged into the same asset pool by direction of the Secretary of State? What safeguards will be put in place to ensure that deficit management remains fair and proportionate across employers after such a merger? Will administering authorities be given the ability to ring-fence liabilities or negotiate separate funding arrangements if they are compelled to merge? Have the Government undertaken any modelling of the financial consequences of merging employers with very different funding positions? If so, will this analysis be published? Can the Minister set out what these prescribed circumstances might be?
I appreciate the letter the Minister sent to noble Lords last week, in which she set out the Government’s recognition of the importance of fiduciary duty. I recognise that and I am sure the whole Committee would therefore welcome some clarity on this question and how these powers can operate while satisfying that duty.
I appreciate that I have asked a lot of questions of the Minister. I do not expect a reply to them all now, but will she write to me to address any points she is unable to speak to today, copying in those who are in Committee today? As she will be aware, these questions are being asked by the industry as well as by noble Lords in Committee, and it is important that we get proper responses to them. This is a probing amendment, intended to elicit reassurance and clarity. Asset pooling can and should be done well, but it must be done in a way that respects trustee independence and preserves confidence in the governance of the Local Government Pension Scheme.
The second amendment in this group, Amendment 4, would remove Clause 2(2)(b), not because we are necessarily opposed to asset pooling but to probe why the Bill places a clear and binding destination in primary legislation while saying almost nothing about the journey required to get there. As drafted, Clause 2 requires the vast majority of Local Government Pension Scheme assets to be held and managed by asset pool companies, with the only acknowledgment of the practical complexities of that transition being a brief reference to
“transitional arrangements permitted by the regulations”.
We are talking about the transfer of very substantial sums across multiple funds with differing asset mixes, contractual arrangements and liquidity profiles. The question that this amendment poses is straightforward: why are transitional arrangements not set out in the Bill, even at a high level? Parliament is being asked to approve a mandatory structure without being shown how legacy assets, illiquid investments, existing mandates and contractual obligations will be unwound or migrated, and over what timescale. That is a significant delegation of policy detail to secondary legislation, particularly given the scale of assets involved.
I would be grateful if the Minister could explain how the Government envisage this transition being managed in practice, what safeguards will be in place to prevent forced or value-destructive transfers and how scheme managers can be confident that they will not be required to move assets in a way that conflicts with their fiduciary duties. The approach set out in our amendment would avoid ambiguity, provide greater clarity for scheme members and reassure taxpayers that pension funds are being managed in a consistent and accountable manner.
Local government pension schemes vary significantly in size, resources and operational approach and without clear statutory provision, there is a risk that practice could diverge across schemes. Given that pension funds involve very substantial sums of public money, it is appropriate that the most fundamental rules governing their management are set out in primary legislation rather than left solely to regulations. Doing so would ensure a higher level of parliamentary scrutiny and durability and help guard against the risk of standards being diluted in future through ministerial discretion.
This is also a probing amendment intended to elicit reassurance. We are clear, and I know the Minister appreciates, that confidence in the system depends on clarity about the transition, not simply an end state written into primary legislation. I hope she will take this opportunity to address that point today.
My Amendment 5 would remove Clause 2(2)(c). To be clear, this is not because we are opposed to local or place-based investment. Rather, it is a probing amendment designed to explore how the Government envisage the relationship between scheme managers and so-called strategic authorities operating in practice. Clause 2 introduces a new statutory duty requiring scheme managers to co-operate with strategic authorities to identify and develop appropriate investment opportunities. However, the Bill does not define what is meant by “appropriate” or set out the process by which this co-operation is to occur, the weight to be given to the priorities of strategic authorities or how disagreements are to be resolved. This vagueness will create a degree of ambiguity which could prove problematic in practice, particularly where different actors may have very different interpretations of what constitutes an appropriate investment.
One obvious question, therefore, is whether such opportunities are intended to be those defined by a fund’s investment strategy statement. As the Minister will know, the investment strategy statement sets out the fund’s objectives, asset allocation, risk management framework, ESG considerations and approach to pooling. If “appropriate” is not clearly anchored to that framework, there is a risk that scheme managers, strategic authorities and Ministers could each apply the term in rather different ways. This matters because scheme managers are trustees, bound by fiduciary duties to act in the best financial interests of scheme members. Strategic authorities, by contrast, have mandates to pursue local growth, regeneration and wider place-based objectives. Those aims may often align, but they will not always do so. Without clarity, there is a risk of politicisation, however unintended, whereby investments that are politically attractive or locally popular, such as particular infrastructure projects, are promoted despite not meeting the risk and return criteria appropriate for pension funds.
This amendment therefore seeks to probe how the Government will ensure that the statutory duty to co-operate does not place scheme managers under implicit pressure to prioritise wider government or regional objectives over their core fiduciary obligations. Is this duty intended to be advisory or directive? Will scheme managers be expected to justify decisions not to invest in opportunities advanced by strategic authorities? What safeguards will exist to ensure that pension investment strategies remain firmly anchored in members’ best financial interests?
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
My Lords, I share some of the concerns that have been expressed. I added my name to Amendment 6, and I could have added it to Amendment 5 as well. Before I go further, as it is an early part of discussing this Bill, I should say that I am a great supporter of the notion that there should be investment in productive assets that support the UK economy. Although I am not that heavy on mandation, if anything I lean in that direction quite a lot. It is obviously done through advisers, and maybe that is one reason for being concerned about advisers—perhaps they have pushed it too much the other way in times past. Noble Lords can take it as background that I am very supportive.
I am concerned about too much forcing of particular kinds of investment, and restricting the routes to those investments or the resistance of the opportunity if the trustees think that it is not the right thing to do. That is why I have some support for Amendments 5 and 6, because I think they may go too far. One of the good things about Clause 2(3) and (4) is that they are optional. However, it still hints at a lot of things that could be done.
I am concerned about any kind of dictation on which advisers can be used, because they have been very powerful. If there is any control over which advisers are used, that is another way of controlling the fund. Given the obligations of trustees to consult advisers, and the liabilities attached to that, they have to remain independent. That is the direction that I am coming from; therefore, I do not want the Bill to give powers that could go too far. That is why I added my name to Amendment 6, and why I have some sort of regard for the content of Amendment 5 around the investment opportunities.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
This group is about asset pools in the Local Government Pension Scheme. I had not intended to intervene on this group, but I want to comment on the remarks made by the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, in introducing this group of amendments on the Local Government Pension Scheme. I am relatively agnostic about asset pools. I am not sure that I am totally convinced by the Government’s line that big is necessarily beautiful, but I am open to that debate.
In introducing this group, the noble Viscount set it in the context of a large group of amendments introduced on much wider issues around the Local Government Pension Scheme than were originally expected—it was really just about investment in the Local Government Pension Scheme—and at a very late stage. It makes no difference to me personally, but fundamental questioning of the structure, running and management of the Local Government Pension Scheme was introduced at such short notice; we found about it only on Thursday or Friday. I can live with that, but I think that it was a little unfair to the people working in and running the scheme suddenly to produce this level of uncertainty. That was unwise. When you want to discuss these things, you start talking to the people involved first, but it is my understanding that it came out of the blue and everyone was totally surprised. Obviously, the issue was always there for discussion, so the fact that it has come up is not a surprise, but doing things at this moment and in this way was unfortunate and is causing problems for those trying to provide the pensions.
I believe that the fundamental premise introduced by the noble Viscount is wrong. The Local Government Pension Scheme is a notable success. Rather than setting up inquiries to discover what went wrong, we should be inquiring about what it got right, because it provides good pensions for a large number of people providing essential services. The average pension in the Local Government Pension Scheme is £5,000; that is because the scheme provides pensions mainly for people on low pay. It provides good pensions for people—often, for women with part-time jobs. It does so in a way whereby, in the forthcoming valuations—as I will expand on and discuss at greater length when we get on to the eighth group of amendments, because that is where the substantive discussion will take place—it faces a better record than private sector occupational pension schemes. We should be looking at its success and not, as the noble Viscount argued, the difficulties and failures.
Lord Fuller (Con)
My Lords, once again, I follow the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton. I wish, perhaps uncharacteristically, to associate myself with many of his comments. I support the thrust of Amendment 2, and offer wider support for the other amendments in this group.
My qualifications to speak on this Bill as far as the LGPS elements are concerned is that I led a local authority for 20 years and have been a member of the Norfolk Pension Fund’s Pensions Committee since 2007. I have also been a member of the Local Government Pension Scheme’s advisory board since its inception in 2014. I am a past member of the fire service scheme’s advisory board, as well as a trustee of a number of private schemes. I also benefit from my own SSIP.
Today is about the LGPS. It is different, because not many of the public sector schemes have money put aside for their members’ retirements—although I accept that the scheme for MPs is one of them. In aggregate, the LGPS comprises 89 separate schemes cast throughout the entirety of the four home nations. Collectively, the 2024 scheme census reports a total of 6.7 million members, a third of whom are, directionally speaking, active; a third of whom are deferred; and a third of whom are actually in payment. In 2024, its total assets under management were worth £390 billion; it is much more than that now. These things change but, by whatever measure, the LGPS is the world’s fourth-largest or fifth-largest pension scheme.
When I came on to the Norfolk board in 2007, assets under management were £1.8 billion. They are now more than £6 billion. I echo the comment of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that if only the UK economy had risen in that proportion. The LGPS delivers significant value. The typical member is a 47 year-old woman earning about £18,000 a year, for whom the pension is, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said, about £5,000. It is incredibly efficient. Operational costs are about half those of typical unfunded schemes. In the Norfolk scheme, of which I am a member, the cost per member is less than £20 per head. I accept that other schemes have costs higher than that, but it is an enviable record. We have saved for our future, but you would not know any of this from the thrust of the Bill and its overbearing tinkering.
What is the problem to be solved here? After some difficult times when interest rates were low, most schemes are now fully funded. It is a British success story that will be undermined by fettering the independence of schemes to make the best long-term investment decisions for their members and local taxpayers, muddling accountabilities by divorcing assets from liabilities and introducing new conflicts of interest. That cannot be right. The success has been delivered despite being buffeted by complications such as McCloud, the pre-2015 and post-2015 schemes, GMP, the rule of 75, dashboards, changing rules on inheritance and divorce and all the other things that happen when you have the best interests of 6.7 million workers in mind. The truth is that the LGPS is a million miles away from the fat cattery that the popular newspapers would have you believe.
That brings me on to the substance of Amendment 2. I have the greatest concerns that the fiduciary duty contemplated to members in this Bill, fairness to the taxpayer and ham-fisted interference from a merry-go-round of Local Government Finance Ministers will weaken this jewel in our economic crown. Taken together, subsections (2) to (8) promote the notion that the government nanny knows best, with broad powers down to the level of detail to determine the fine structure of the pooled schemes. This approach has already damaged the scheme for no good reason. The exemplar ACCESS band has been told to disband. It was doing a good job. With nearly £40 billion-worth of assets under management, it rented the best globally viewed FCA-qualified professionals in the City of London, one of the world’s top three financial centres. Now it is being forced to join a pool of other authorities headquartered miles away in the provinces, miles away from the cut and thrust and that leading intellectual property. There is a provision in subsection (7) that these pools should take steps to get FCA accreditation—I suppose we should be grateful for that—but these pools have no business even being on the battlefield until they are FCA qualified. Thus is the muddle of this Bill. In essence, this enforced uniformity means that star strikers have been replaced by subs from the reserve team. A global success story has been weakened with the risk of lower returns for members.
Moving on, this Bill talks about local government members, but the scheme is not about just councils. In the Norfolk scheme, which I know best, there are eight principal councils, but we now have more than 500 sponsoring employers—parish councils, care homes, catering companies, youth and social workers, classroom assistants and charities. Each has different scale, covenant strength and longevity. It is complex. Yet ministerial interference wants to shove them all into a one-size scheme that cannot fit all. In subsection (5) we see touching faith in the judgment of the experts and regulators who forced private schemes into LDIs and ruined them. I do not know why the Pensions Regulator and GAD are not on the Government’s list. I suppose we should be grateful that they are not. This whole Bill promulgates pensions groupthink on the altar of reduced risk and lower returns.
I will deal with Amendment 5 later because it talks about investment and there is a later group for that. I have heard the Minister say that bigger is better. Here again, I align myself with the noble Lord, Lord Davies. It is the thrust and the theme of this Bill more widely. Indeed, I heard the noble Baroness at the Dispatch Box lionise the Ontario teachers’ scheme in the week that it was rinsed for £1 billion in the collapse of Thames Water.
We see in Clause 2 that there will be directions as to what things can be invested in. When they tried that in Sweden, the public schemes lost another £1 billion in the Northvolt disaster, where virtue-signalling political investment directions made the members and taxpayers poorer. The harsh lesson is that the schemes become the plaything of meddlesome Ministers to require or prohibit, or to opine on lofty ideas, but without the responsibility or accountability of paying out. It is wrong.
Captain of the King’s Bodyguard of the Yeomen of the Guard and Deputy Chief Whip (Baroness Wheeler) (Lab)
Order. The noble Lord can see that he has reached his 10 minutes.
Lord Fuller (Con)
I am coming to a conclusion. I spent 20 years at the coalface with some of the brightest and smartest professionals from around the world. If we persist with subsections (2) to (8), we will be further in hock to a Treasury that has demonstrated that it does not understand the interplay between revenue and capital, or the underlying principles of a capitalist economy. If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it. Now is not the time to meddle in the LGPS.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I will be brief. I have added my name to Amendments 2, 5 and 6. I support the thrust of these amendments. I agree wholeheartedly with the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that the local government pension schemes have been successful. One reason is that they have been able to take higher risks—in other words, earn higher returns—than many of the traditional private sector pension schemes, which were so constrained and had the problem of LDI.
I have concerns about the cost to taxpayers because the Bill effectively suggests that, by reducing the number of asset pools for local government pension schemes from eight to six, somehow the returns will magically improve and the Government will be able to direct local authority pension schemes into the right place. As we have heard from so many noble Lords, it does not appear to me that the Government are best placed to direct where people invest.
With £402 billion in these schemes at March 2025, with about a quarter of council tax being spent on contributions into them and with so many areas of the economy needing investment, it is right that we expect local authority schemes to be able to support the local—and, potentially, the national—economy. The Government might well be tempted to turn this £400 billion into a sovereign wealth fund, given that taxpayers at the national scale underwrite local authority pension schemes—they do not belong to the PPF; they do not pay a PPF level. If a council goes bust, taxpayers bail it out and the pensions are still paid. I argue that, unless the Government want to do that—
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I had basically finished—I just wanted to say that, if we are not going to turn the £400 billion or so into a sovereign wealth fund, it would be preferable if the Government did not try to direct the investments.
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)
I simply ask the Minister to explain how local accountability will be preserved, how fiduciary duties will be protected in practice and why so much of this is not in the Bill.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for these amendments in the names of the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Stedman-Scott, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted and Lady Altmann. Before I proceed, as we have had a bout of putting things on the record and making declarations, I should say that I served for a mercifully short time as a councillor in the London Borough of Camden from 2010 to 2014 and, as a consequence, am a member of that council’s pension scheme, but I think that has pretty scant bearing on our discussions this afternoon.
On Amendments 2 and 6, I recognise the intention to preserve the independence of the Local Government Pension Scheme administering authorities and to reduce the burden of regulation on their function. I will say now, so that I do not forget, that I appreciate that the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, asked a great deal of questions on amendments not just in this group but in groups to come. It was very helpful to have his explanation about degrouping; we are very happy to debate the Bill in the way the Committee sees best. I also put on record the welcome recognition by many Members who spoke on this group, particularly the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Fuller—although in slightly different ways—of the importance and success of the LGPS. It is worth being clear that the Government are determined to make sure that success continues.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Watkins of Tavistock) (CB)
There is a Division in the House. The Committee will adjourn and resume after 10 minutes.
The Division has been cancelled. If noble Lords are content that everybody is back who needs to be, the Committee stands resumed.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, the Government share the noble Viscount’s aim of ensuring that administering authorities can continue to comply with their fiduciary duty to act in LGPS members’ best interests. I assure the Committee that the Government are not seeking to undermine the fiduciary duty of local pension funds in any way. The responsibility to set an investment strategy, which is the key driver of investment returns, will remain with funds.
As part of the reforms, we are consolidating all assets under the management of the LGPS asset pools; internal advisory capability is a key benefit of that scale. Integrated models in which strategic advice and investment management are both delivered by the same fiduciary manager are commonly used both in private sector schemes and internationally. These models can deliver greater value for money and economies of scale, and can reduce conflicts of interest. The Government recognise that there will be situations where administering authorities may feel that the advice of pools needs to be supplemented with or tested against advice from other sources. However, the Government are clear that such cases should be exceptional rather than routine.
This is probably a good point to address a couple of questions. The noble Viscount, Lord Younger, asked about cross-subsidising. It is fair to say that asset pooling does not lead to one administering authority subsidising the surplus of another. Administering authorities will remain responsible for the surplus or deficit of the fund that they manage, and each fund will continue to be valued separately.
The noble Lord, Lord Fuller, asked about the scale of the pools disincentivising investment in smaller British businesses and creating bubbles; he used the example of AI. Pools will be able to invest in small companies, including small and growing businesses that contribute to the economy. This could be achieved at scale by using actively managed funds, which aggregate opportunities. As set out in the Pensions Investment Review: Final Report, there is
“clear evidence that, in general, larger schemes are better able to invest in productive asset classes”.
This includes investment in private markets, which are key to financing fast-growing British companies. So I believe that the new pooling model will see more money invested in small British companies.
The Government are pleased that decisions about which of the six continuing asset pool companies LGPS funds wish to work with have been made on a voluntary basis and at a local level, and certainly do not intend to intervene in these decisions. However, the Bill provides for regulations to include powers to direct which asset pool a pension fund participates in, so as to be able to safeguard the scheme in future in the unlikely event that satisfactory arrangements cannot be agreed at the local level; this may include where relationships have broken down within a pool or where an administering authority finds itself without a pool willing to accept it.
The noble Viscount, Lord Younger, asked about consultation on the powers; basically, he asked why we are introducing a power to direct which asset pool an administering authority participates in. The Government’s strong preference is for decisions on pool membership to be made on a voluntary basis and at a local level. However, the Government need to be able to safeguard the scheme in the unlikely event that satisfactory arrangements cannot be agreed at a local level, such as if an administering authority were to find itself without a pool willing to accept it or, as I said, if relationships break down. Regulations are expected to require consultation; that is carried out prior to using the power, of course.
The noble Viscount, Lord Younger, also asked about the transition of assets that are held or managed. The guidance allows room for pools’ discretion where transfer of ownership is not reasonably practical, so there will not be any need for authorities to make such unnecessary losses in the process of pooling.
More generally, the noble Viscount and other noble Lords asked about the fiduciary duty and it being undermined. This provision is not a new power. It replicates a provision in the existing Local Government Pension Scheme (Management and Investment of Funds) Regulations 2016, which will be repealed when the new Local Government Pension Scheme (Pooling, Management and Investment of Funds) Regulations come into force.
I do not want to single out anyone in particular, but the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, talked about meddling. To be clear, this power is a backstop power that would be used only as a last resort to safeguard the scheme, following, as I said, consultation with the relevant administering authority.
On Amendment 4, I recognise that the noble Viscount’s intention is to test why transitional arrangements for LGPS administering authorities are not set out in the Bill. There is more than 50 years’ precedent for the rules of the Local Government Pension Scheme being set out in secondary legislation, going back to the Superannuation Act 1972. We therefore consider that it is more appropriate to change what may and must be included in the rules of the Local Government Pension Scheme through the use of secondary legislation created using existing powers and, where necessary, new powers provided in the Bill, rather than using primary legislation to amend existing secondary legislation. Moreover, given the range of circumstances faced by administering authorities and asset pool companies, the Government will retain some flexibility by setting out transitional arrangements in regulations and can work with the sector to ensure that new requirements are workable and agreeable.
My noble friend Lord Davies of Brixton raised the spectre of this introducing uncertainty. We collectively have a duty to ensure that every penny of members’ hard-earned money is well invested and that the LGPS’s extraordinary scale is harnessed. That includes making the best use of some of the excellent capabilities that exist in the LGPS, rather than building from scratch, which is why we are moving to fewer pools. We recognise that implementing these reforms may cause significant upheaval and require resources, but the reward is enabling a bigger and better LGPS to fulfil its potential as an engine for growth. The Government are considering responses on the proposed transitional arrangements included in the recent technical consultation on the pooling, management and investment of funds regulations and will set out their response in due course.
Regarding Amendment 5 in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, I recognise the intention to examine the practicalities of co-operation between administering authorities and strategic authorities, especially in the light of the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill. The English Devolution White Paper published in December 2024 set out our plan to rewire England by devolving power and funding from central government to local leaders who know their area best. A key aspect of this is the development of ambitious local growth plans by mayoral strategic authorities, including local investment opportunities for institutional investors, including the LGPS.
Clause 2 includes a requirement for LGPS administering authorities to co-operate with strategic authorities, including corporate joint committees in Wales, in order to identify and develop appropriate investment opportunities. This will mean that the investment potential and requirements for pension investments are factored into thinking on local strategic projects from the beginning. It will be for the asset pools, not politicians, to conduct due diligence and take the final decisions on whether to invest. I hope that that addresses the questions posed by the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, around ensuring that schemes are acting in their members’ interests and the interplay between strategic authorities and other authorities.
This high-level requirement to co-operate allows strategic pools and administering authorities to design the most effective ways of working. To ensure a clear, firm trajectory to consolidation and benefits of scales for the scheme as a whole, along with the assurances that I have provided, I think that it is important to understand that the intention behind the LGPS clauses that we have been discussing is to get a balance between retaining flexibility and introducing scale.
There is one remaining question that I have yet to respond to, which was from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, about using the power to direct asset pools as to the manner of their investments. The Government are introducing the backstop power to be used, as I said, as a last resort to protect the scheme in the unlikely event that a pool’s decision-making puts it or the underlying pension funds at risk. This power is consistent with existing powers that the Government have to direct administering authorities in specified circumstances, which include powers to give directions about how they should exercise their investment functions. To safeguard the scheme, these powers will need to apply to asset pools instead of administering authorities in future. The Government’s intention is that scheme regulations will require all LGPS asset pool companies to be authorised by the Financial Conduct Authority. It would not make sense for government direction to contradict any requirements of such authorisation.
As I said when I began responding to this group of amendments, there were a lot of questions. I hope that I have answered most of them, but we will of course revisit Hansard after the debate, and I undertake to write to anyone whose questions I have missed. Given that, I respectfully ask the noble Viscount to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Fuller (Con)
May I gently invite the Minister to review the comment he made about the ACCESS pool voluntarily asking to disband itself and then, if necessary, write to me afterwards and make a correction on the record? My understanding is that the ACCESS pool did not wish to be disbanded and, in fact, the response to the fit-for-the-future consultation was that the ACCESS pool’s
“proposal does not meet the Government’s vision for the future of the LGPS”.
There was compulsion; it was not voluntary.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I had better write to the noble Lord. I am afraid I do not have the details of that particular case to hand, but it is our understanding that it was coming from a voluntary perspective. But rather than speculating—I do not have the details here—I am very happy to write to him with more detail.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
I listened carefully to the Minister’s response, but I am not sure that he answered the question about why the Government need to take power to specify the sources of advice that scheme managers must take and whether that would result in a closed list of scheme advisers that had to be used in any event. Not only is that undesirable from a competition standpoint; it also seems likely to work against producing better returns longer term, because you will just ossify the situation as you find it at the point that the Government decide to make that decision.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I thank the noble Baroness for that question. I do not know whether this will give her complete satisfaction, but I understand that requiring funds to take advice from their pool could potentially be a conflict of interest. I would say that, first, asset pool companies will be required to have robust conflict of interest policies and procedures for identifying and managing those areas of conflict. As I said fairly early on in my remarks, integrated models—
Baroness Noakes (Con)
It has nothing to do with conflicts of interest; it is about whether the Government can specify a limited number of sources of advice that can be given to scheme managers, what the purpose of that is and whether that does not in fact work against achieving the best returns for members over time.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I am sorry; I probably misunderstood the direction of the noble Baroness’s questions. I had better write to her to set that out. I think it is fair to say that—this might help a little—in contrast to external advisers, because asset pools are solely owned by old GPS administering authorities, they exist to provide services of their interests and they do not stand to gain financially, even from partner funds taking their advice or providing poor-quality advice. I am not entirely sure that that gets at her question, but the point is that we do not feel that there will be that impact from limiting sources of advice. I will write to her to provide more detail on that point.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
I got a bit lost in the explanation, because the Minister also mentioned internal advisers. In replying, will he lay out where he thinks the advice is and what that power is doing? If it is providing a sort of override, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, suggested, to a particular type of adviser, as I was trying to suggest it might, then that is unacceptable. Perhaps if the Minister just lays out exactly what is there, that might clarify it. I hope that he will tell us that he will not override anything.
Lord Katz (Lab)
That is very helpful. When I write to the noble Baroness, I will certainly make sure that we address the point around independent advisers. I appreciate the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, asking for that kind of clarification, so my written remarks will address that point.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his responses; I am also grateful for the debate we have had on this group of amendments.
I am grateful to all noble Lords beyond me who have asked further questions, particularly in the latter stage of this short debate. It is fair to say—I am saying this against myself—that, with so many questions having been directed originally to the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, but applying to both Ministers, it would be extremely helpful to have a full letter with the answers. This has been an important debate; some clear issues have been spoken to, and answers are required.
I will start by picking up some points made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies. He gave the impression—indeed, he said this; I cannot remember his expression—that I was being negative about the Local Government Pension Scheme. I reiterate the point made by my noble friend Lord Fuller: the Local Government Pension Scheme is efficient and is very much a British success story. In addition to that, my noble friend Lord Fuller set out—very eloquently, I thought—the concerns around both the complexities in the Bill and the unintended consequences. There are two clear sides to this. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies, on the success aspect; I want to be quite clear that he knows my position on this.
What unites the amendments in this group is not opposition to reform, nor hostility to pooling local investment or good governance. Rather, it is a concern about how far the Bill reaches into areas that have traditionally, and rightly, been the responsibility of trustees exercising fiduciary judgment. The noble Lord, Lord Katz, said that intervention by government is very much a last resort. I accept what he says but, as the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, asked—very tellingly—are the Government best placed to direct? Further, she made an interesting point on whether the £400 billion should be part of a sovereign wealth fund. That just shows that it is worth having this sort of debate on this important area of the Bill.
Across these clauses, the Bill moves from setting a framework to conferring powers of direction, compulsion and prescription; direction over participation in asset pools; compulsion towards a particular end state without a clear transition; duties to co-operate with strategic authorities without defined boundaries; and regulation-making powers that reach into advisory pathways and the content of investment strategies themselves. I feel from the debate that each of these elements raises the same underlying question: how will these powers be exercised in a way that is genuinely compatible with fiduciary duty, rather than merely being stated to be so?
With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment, but I also acknowledge that there is much work to be done in this area.
Lord Sharkey
“(7A) Scheme regulations made under this section are subject to the super-affirmative procedure, as defined by section (Super-affirmative procedure).”Member’s explanatory statement
This probing amendment seeks to clarify the Government’s willingness to subject regulations made under this section to the super-affirmative procedure, as defined in another amendment in the name of Lord Sharkey to after clause 120. It is connected to other amendments to clause 120 in Lord Sharkey’s name.
Lord Sharkey (LD)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 3, I will speak also to Amendments 221 and 222. These amendments would enable meaningful scrutiny of any of the Bill’s nearly 130 delegated parts when it seemed appropriate to Parliament.
The Bill before us is a skeleton Bill. The DPRRC says that the test for a skeleton Bill is whether it is
“legislation containing so many significant delegated powers that the real operation of the legislation depends entirely or in very large part on regulations made under it”.
This Bill, with nearly 130 delegated powers, clearly passes that test; in fact, it is an obvious and extreme example of a skeleton Bill. This means that parliamentary scrutiny of the Bill is severely restricted. That is because, as things stand, statutory instruments cannot be amended and, by convention, are not rejected. As a result, the Government are taking powers to make policy before they have decided what that policy should be or before critical policy details are in place.
The Constitution Committee was clear in its 2018 report The Legislative Process that:
“Without a genuine risk of defeat, and no amendment possible, Parliament is doing little more than rubber-stamping the Government’s secondary legislation. This is constitutionally unacceptable”.
The DPRRC, in its recent report on the Bill, is equally critical and alarming. It says, among other things:
“We take the view that this Bill is in large part a licence for Ministers to make subordinate legislation … We would have found helpful an explicit declaration from the Department that the bill is a skeleton bill, accompanied by a full justification for adopting that approach, including why no other approach was reasonable to adopt and how the scope of the skeleton provision is constrained”.
The committee’s report, one of the most damning and disturbing that I have read, goes on to say:
“We would also have welcomed an opportunity to examine indicative regulations for at least some of the more important delegated powers given the large part played by delegated powers in this Bill”.
Can the Minister say whether and when the Government will comply with the committee’s suggestion on indicative regulations? We have seen no such indicative draft regulations. I understand that such drafts were circulating among government and industry after the summer. Is that the case? If it is, why has Parliament not been included in the circulation? It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Parliament is being deliberately bypassed.
The affirmative procedure proposed in my Amendments 3, 221 and 222 is designed to deliver a measure of real scrutiny. Together, they would deliver a form of super-affirmative statutory instrument. Paragraph 31.14 of Part 4 of Erskine May characterises the super-affirmative procedure like this:
“The super-affirmative procedure provides both Houses with opportunities to comment on proposals for secondary legislation and to recommend amendments before orders for affirmative approval are brought forward in their final form. (It should be noted that the power to amend the proposed instrument remains with the Minister: the two Houses and their committees can only recommend changes, not make them”.
The noble Baroness, Lady Penn, who is not in her place at the moment, when a Minister gave this House a helpful summary of how the procedure would work in practice, once the House had decided that the procedure should be followed in a particular case. She said that
“that procedure would require an initial draft of the regulations to be laid before Parliament alongside an explanatory statement and that a committee must be convened to report on those draft regulations within 30 days of publication. Only after a minimum of 30 days following the publication of the initial draft regulations may the Secretary of State lay regulations, accompanied by a further published statement on any changes to the regulations. They must then be debated as normal in both Houses and approved by resolution”.—[Official Report, 19/10/20; col. GC 376.]
According to the Library, the last time I asked, the last recorded insertion into a Bill of a super-affirmative procedure was by the Government in October 2017 into what became the Financial Guidance and Claims Act. When they are not doing it themselves, they have traditionally opposed its use on any or all of three grounds. The first is that it is unnecessary because the affirmative procedure provides sufficient parliamentary scrutiny. The second is that it takes too long and the third is that it is cumbersome. We may hear any or all of these objections from the Minister today.
The first objection, that the affirmative procedure provides sufficient scrutiny, is plainly and simply wrong—unless the Government regard no effective scrutiny as sufficient. The second objection, that it takes too long, is to misread its purpose; the super-affirmative procedure takes longer, but that is because it contains provisions for real scrutiny, which necessarily takes time. This is not a negative—it is the merit of the procedure and the point of it. The third traditional objection, that the super-affirmative could turn out to be cumbersome and a disproportionate use of parliamentary time, has no force in the proposed use of the super-affirmative procedure set out in my three amendments. The procedure would be used only if either House decided that an issue was important enough to require the extra scrutiny that the procedure provides.
The House has debated the use of super-affirmatives before. In 2021, we addressed the matter in Committee and on Report on the Medicines and Medical Devices Bill and other notorious skeleton Bills. There was very broad support for using super-affirmatives from around the Chamber, including from the late and much-lamented Lord Judge, who said:
“The wider use of the super-affirmative process would ensure better parliamentary scrutiny and control of the Executive, which for too long have simply ignored the constant urgings of the parliamentary committees in this House”.—[Official Report, 12/1/21; col. 654.]
When the proposal on that Bill was put to a vote, the result was: Content 320, Not-Content 236. Many distinguished Members voted for the use of super-affirmatives, including the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock. I beg to move Amendment 3.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
I will speak simply to support the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. It seems to me that there is an extraordinarily wide use of delegated powers in the Bill and, for all the reasons that he set out, we should look at that again. If the Government do not feel able to make a change to respond to his very persuasive points, we should at least have a full list of every delegated power that will be used, what the plans are in each case, and perhaps some specimen regulations of the kind that we have seen in some of the Department for Business and Trade legislation.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, this group of amendments focuses on scrutiny, clarity and responsibility, and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, for setting out the merits of the super-affirmative procedures and their historical context. It was interesting to hear what he had to say.
As the Committee will have seen, the provisions to which these super-affirmative procedures would pertain allow Ministers, through secondary legislation, to impose requirements and prohibitions on scheme managers, to direct participation in asset pool companies, to require withdrawal from them and to impose obligations on those companies themselves. These are significant powers, exercised in an area that is highly technical, operationally sensitive and financially consequential.
This is precisely the sort of context in which unintended consequences can arise, as alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. These clauses are dense, complex and interconnected. They interact with fiduciary duties, local accountability, financial regulation and long-term investment strategy. Small changes in drafting or approach could have material effects on risk, returns, governance or market behaviour.
That is why I am glad that the amendment places particular emphasis on representations. The ability for Parliament, and expert stakeholders, to examine draft regulations, to make these representations, and for those representations to be meaningfully considered before regulations are finalised, is essential to the responsible exercise of these powers.
The super-affirmative procedure would ensure that Parliament is not simply asked to approve a finished product but is given the opportunity to understand the Government’s intent, to hear from those with deep expertise in pensions, asset management and regulation, and to see how concerns raised have been addressed. That is especially important where the primary legislation quite deliberately leaves so much to be filled in by regulation, as I explained earlier in Committee.
I hope the Minister will engage constructively with this point and explain why the Government believe the ordinary affirmative procedure provides sufficient scrutiny in this case, given the scale, complexity and potential impact of the powers being taken. I appreciate the short debate on this matter.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, for introducing his amendments, and to all noble Lords who have spoken. This gives us an opportunity to talk about how best to balance the way we structure matters between primary and secondary legislation. However, the proposals from the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, would significantly expand the way Parliament scrutinises regulations made under the Bill. I understand why he would want to do that, but his proposals would introduce a level of rigidity into the process that is not only unusual in this area but obviously would be markedly more elaborate than the Bill currently provides for.
The super-affirmative procedure is generally reserved for exceptional circumstances, such as legislative reform orders or remedial orders under the Human Rights Act. I am not aware of any examples of it being applied to pensions regulations, but I am very open to being advised on that. In our view, it would be disproportionate to the nature of the powers conferred by the Bill, and I will explain why.
I will look first at Clause 1. The coalition Government introduced the Public Service Pensions Act 2013. Through that, Parliament established the way it would go about governing the making of scheme regulations. It was a comprehensive and well-tested scrutiny framework. It still operates today, including where new powers were created, for example, by the Public Service Pensions and Judicial Offices Act 2022. The framework created by that Act provides extensive safeguards, including mandatory consultation, enhanced consultation if changes have or might have retrospective effect, and Treasury consent. Introducing a substantially more onerous procedure for regulations under Clause 1, as proposed by Amendment 3, would sit uneasily alongside that established approach.
There are also practical considerations. Administering authorities and asset pool companies are preparing for regulations to be introduced shortly after the Bill has passed its parliamentary scrutiny. The Government have already published draft regulations on the LGPS measure. They were open to public consultation, which has recently closed. Adding a 30-day pre-scrutiny stage through the super-affirmative procedure would clearly extend that timetable and risk creating more uncertainty at a critical moment for those involved in implementing this.
Amendment 221 would allow either House to require that any affirmative regulations made under this Bill be subject to the super-affirmative process. That would already represent a significant expansion of parliamentary involvement compared with the long-standing approach to pensions.
Amendment 222 would go further still. It does not simply describe how the super-affirmative procedure would operate in this context; it would create a new statutory scrutiny process, more prescriptive and more inflexible than the mechanisms Parliament has used to date for pension regulations—or indeed most regulations. It would require a fixed 30-day scrutiny period in any case where either House decided to impose the new procedure. It would mandate a committee report, even for minor or technical regulations, and would prevent regulations being laid until Ministers had responded formally to all representations. The result would be a significant departure from the flexible way Parliament normally manages delegated legislation.
I hear the concerns the noble Lord has expressed about the way Parliament deals with secondary legislation, but scrutiny procedures are normally determined by the House through its practices and Standing Orders. Replacing those arrangements with a rigid statutory framework of this kind for this Bill would set a far-reaching precedent for delegated legislation more broadly, extending well beyond the requirements of this Bill.
I would submit that such a process would also make it harder for Parliament to focus scrutiny on the most significant instruments and would slow down the making of regulations in areas where timely and predictable implementation is crucial for funds, administering authorities and scheme members.
A certain amount of this comes down to whether the Committee accepts that the level of delegated powers is appropriate. I fully understand that the noble Lord does not. I disagree and I will tell him why. In answer to the noble Viscount, Lord Younger of Leckie, in the previous group I said that the Government do not regard this as a framework or skeleton Bill, because it sets out clearly the policy decisions and parameters within which the delegated powers must operate. The Bill brings together a broad package of reforms. Many of those reforms build on long-established statutory regimes set out by previous Governments—Governments of all persuasions, as well as previous Labour Governments—in which Parliament has historically set the policy in primary legislation and provided for the detailed measures that will apply to schemes to be set out in regulations.
The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, asked for a full list of delegated powers. My department produced a very detailed delegated powers memorandum, which went through all the delegated powers at some length and in some detail, explaining what they meant. I would be very happy to direct the noble Baroness to that if that would be helpful.
One of the key questions the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, asked was: why are there so many delegated powers? Our view is that this is not out of kilter with other similar transformative pension Bills. We counted 119 delegated powers covering 11 major topics plus some smaller topics. For example, in the Pension Schemes Act 2021, there were almost 100 delegated powers covering three major topics. In the Pensions Act 1995, which was a transformative Bill, there were approximately 150 delegated powers.
This Bill brings together a number of distinct pensions measures in a single legislative vehicle, many of which amend or build on existing regimes that are already heavily reliant on secondary legislation for their detailed operation. In many areas, we are simply reflecting a similar framework to previous pensions legislation or amending it, so there is continuity rather than a step change.
A crucial point I want to lodge is that pensions policy is not delivered directly by government. Implementation depends on trustees, pension schemes, pension providers, administrators and regulators who have to design systems, processes and administration that work in practice. That level of detailed operational design can begin only once there is sufficient certainty that legislation will proceed. As noble Lords who have worked in or with industry will recognise, before there is sufficient certainty, industry cannot reasonably commit the significant time and resources needed to work through complex delivery arrangements where the legal basis may still change or not materialise. Delegated powers therefore allow the Government to set the policy framework in primary legislation and then work with those responsible for delivery to ensure that the technical detail is workable in practice, rather than attempting to prescribe detailed operational rules in primary legislation. That reflects established pensions practice and good lawmaking in a complex and fast-moving regulatory environment.
Lord Fuller (Con)
I am conscious that this is not the Minister’s area of specialism, because we are talking about the Local Government Pension Scheme, which is under MHCLG, not the DWP, so I do not expect her to be fully up to speed with this part of the Bill. Members of the various pensions committees of the administrating committees—by and large within county councils, but there are some joint arrangements as well—are legally not trustees. I accept that what the Minister said is correct for the generality of private schemes and some other schemes, but I do not believe it is for the LGPS. I do not expect her to respond immediately, but it is important. It is a shame that we do not have an MHCLG Minister here, because this scheme is the closest we have to a national wealth fund and we are transacting this business without the appropriate expertise here. However, clarity on that is important.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
I was going to say that I am grateful to the noble Lord, but I am not sure that I am, really. I am sure he has not missed the fact that the amendments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, do not apply simply to the LGPS provisions in the Bill. They would have widespread application throughout the Bill and implications beyond it. I say that they would have all these implications and I am talking about trustees because they would have a significant impact on the way that all those actors in the pension space would be able to engage in future.
In the past, I have heard people around the House criticise Governments for making decisions at the centre without engaging with those in industry and business who have to deliver them. I know that, if the Government had given huge amounts of certainty and left nothing out there, the criticism would simply be the reverse of what we have heard today. We have to find a balance. The Government believe we have found the right balance. Some Members of the Committee will disagree. I have looked carefully into this, and I am defending the balance that the Government have come to, but I accept that if noble Lords disagree, we will have to come back to this in due course.
We think the existing framework already strikes the right balance between scrutiny and practicality, enabling Parliament to oversee policy development while allowing essential regulations to be made in a timely and orderly way. In the light of my comments, particularly about the proportionality of this, its comparability with previous pensions legislation and the degree to which it is in continuity with the way pensions legislation has traditionally been made by successive Governments, I hope the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Sharkey (LD)
I am grateful to all those who have contributed to this brief debate. The complexity described by the Minister is obviously real and clearly important, but one of the ways of dealing with complexity is to have the instruments to simplify it and discuss it. My response to the scenario painted by the Minister would be to say: let us have super-affirmative procedures and accept that they will take up a bit more time and involve a bit more work, but, as I pointed out, that is their entire point.
Skeleton Bills always limit parliamentary scrutiny, and the Pension Schemes Bill is not an exception to that; in some ways, it is a confirmation of it. I understood the Minister’s case, but the Government’s desire to limit parliamentary scrutiny is a mistake. The SIs generated by this Bill will have real consequences for the real economy. We cannot usefully discuss these consequences until we have the detail. It seems to me as simple as that. Of course, having the detail helps only if we can do something about it, and the super-affirmative procedure provides that opportunity.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
I am still mystified as to why Amendment 220 is not included in this group. It is left bereft, right at the end of the Marshalled List. Is there a reason?
Lord Sharkey (LD)
If the noble Lord is asking why it is there, I am afraid I will have to plead the Public Bill Office.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
I am advised that Amendment 220 had been withdrawn, not just not debated. We will look into that, and the noble Lord will need to clarify it.
Lord Davies of Brixton
Member’s explanatory statement
This is a probing amendment that seeks to explore how and to what extent LGPS assets might be used to provide social housing as an investment.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
I emphasise that this is not about mandation. Mandation is a big issue, but this is not about that; it is about the possible ways in which Local Government Pension Scheme assets could be invested. It is a probing amendment and I am sure that it is not word perfect in achieving its objective.
It arises under subsection (4) of this clause. It mentions various issues with how the strategy that is set out should be implemented. It is a probing amendment that seeks to explore how, and to what extent, Local Government Pension Scheme assets might be used to provide social housing as an investment. The oddity about this debate is that I am sure we all share the belief—tell me if I am wrong—that housing is an ideal investment for a pension fund. What I want to know from the Government is the extent to which that will be possible within the structure being established by this Bill.
I start with the fund, which is a long-term defined benefit pension scheme with inflation-linked liabilities. Social housing assets provide long-dated stable income streams that closely match this profile, so the sheer logic of these funds investing in local housing is clear. This issue has been debated extensively, within the relevant field, among the think tanks and so on that support local authorities and are interested in the investments of the Local Government Pension Scheme. For example, a think tank called Localis produced a report recommending that council pension assets should be a funding solution to the UK’s affordable housing crisis; that issue is widely discussed and widely supported.
Of course, that has already happened and is already happening. The London CIV has a substantial investment on behalf of the London pool of investments in social housing. I refer to social housing; personally, I have a preference for council housing, but the issue is broader and includes all forms of social housing. For example, the head of real estate at the London CIV says:
“Our UK Housing Fund is designed to help increase the supply of good quality affordable housing while delivering income-driven returns to our Partner Funds”.
Again, in the heart of the industry and the sector, the value of this approach is strongly supported.
More specifically, are funds investing in local housing? They might be investing in housing, but it could be anywhere. However, the synergy with a local fund investing in local housing has a massive attraction in terms of both the councils involved and the members of a scheme seeing how their funds are being invested in the local community. That is a very attractive perspective on how the funds should be decided.
At the same time—this point does not need spelling out—we face a severe housing crisis. There is a need for extensive housebuilding. We have the resources and the need, so why do we not just get on and do it? Council pension funds are, by their nature, patient, long-term investments; that is such a good match for housing delivery. Of course, it is accepted, from the number of funds that have already gone this way, that the fiduciary responsibility is suitable. The committees managing these funds see that investing in housing matches their fiduciary responsibility.
Everyone agrees that there is a great deal of synergy here. Local pension schemes investing in social housing is financially prudent and low-risk, provides a long-term strategy and delivers clear public value. What is there not to like? Can my noble friend the Minister assure the Committee that this synergy will be recognised in the forthcoming regulations and the accompanying statutory guidance?
We are debating this matter in terms of the Bill here, but, as the previous debate made clear, it is the regulations that count. The regulations that will govern how these pools can invest are currently being discussed—an extensive consultation is taking place—but, alongside that, is a closed consultation on the statutory guidance that will accompany the regulations. There may be a debate as to why it is not a public consultation on the statutory guidance, because the two things—the regulations and the guidance—mash together closely.
The problem is that the draft statutory guidance limits the extent to which local funds can set requirements on the actual decisions that will be taken by the pools. I am getting into the detailed structure of how the administering authorities and the investment pools will work together. The point relates generally to all forms of local investment but it is particularly acute in this area, where we are talking about building houses for local people. More specifically, does the proposed pooling framework act as a potential barrier to Local Government Pension Scheme investment in social housing?
There is a broader, more general issue here; I am gear-shifting. The specific issue is whether the pooling arrangements interfere with local investments, particularly in housing, but there is the general issue of whether administering authorities—local councils, in effect, for these purposes—can pass their ESG considerations, for example, on to the pooling arrangements. We need to be clear at this stage. I have raised this issue specifically in relation to housing—it would be good to get a clear answer on that—but there is a wider point around the other ways in which these funds should be investing in the local community. Are the new structures going to stop that happening in practice?
On the other amendments in this group, I think that I agree with Amendment 9, but I will listen to my noble friend the Minister’s response on it. I look forward to hearing the reasons for Amendment 10; I do not understand it, but I shall listen carefully. I do not really understand Amendment 11 either, so, again, I look forward to the explanation from the noble Viscount. In the meantime, I beg to move the amendment standing in my name.
Baroness Warwick of Undercliffe (Lab)
My Lords, I have no extant interests to declare—my interest in pension schemes is in the past—but I have considerable sympathy with my noble friend Lord Davies’s Amendment 7.
We suffer from chronic underinvestment in genuinely affordable and social housing, which is undermining the social fabric of this country and limiting the opportunity for the growth that we so badly need. The Government have vowed to build 1.5 million homes by the end of this Parliament, with a longer-term aim of resolving the housing crisis; other Governments have attempted to do the same. The Government have already committed substantial sums towards that aim, but demands on public funding are increasing and more resources will clearly be needed to deliver it.
I had a particular interest in housing associations in the past. These raise private debt to put alongside public grant to fund social housebuilding, and currently have more than £130 billion of debt facilities in place. The social housing sector is a great example of harnessing public and private investment to drive economic growth and build the homes that we need. Net additional dwelling figures for the 2024-25 financial year showed that 208,600 homes were added to England’s stock—well short of the 300,000 homes a year needed to meet the Government’s target of 1.5 million homes by the end of this Parliament. With the right funding, investment and financial capacity in place, social and affordable housing can play a key role in boosting supply and meeting that ambitious homes target.
There is a general recognition of the need to increase institutional investment in the UK and that pension schemes, with their long-term characteristics, could and should be part of that solution. This part of the Bill refers specifically to the LGPS. The Chancellor has already cited the LGPS as a means of achieving that necessary level of investment. In fact, several LGPS funds already have a strong track record of co-investment in affordable housing, and that potential needs to be maximised. I hope that the Government will ensure that all large pension schemes have the right incentives and strategic tools, coupled with an effective regulatory regime, to provide returns to the scheme while protecting scheme members’ interests and ensuring enduring social impact.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 12 in this group. I hate to disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Davies, but he will have to wait a while before we get to Amendment 10.
As I mentioned earlier, a few years ago I had engagement with local authority pension funds concerning investment opportunities that could be tailored to their own areas. I discovered that they did not want it only in their own areas. They wanted to look at wider areas that included nearby local authorities, in some instances, as well as those further away where the economic responses to recession had fared better. There were some that wished that they had not just invested in some shopping centres in their own area but also in some in London and the south-east that had not lost so much money. That is not what I was trying to involve them in at the time, but these were the examples that came to me.
Those that were in more rural areas wanted some action from the cities. They viewed local investment through a broader lens of meaning things that help localities generally. They wanted to invest in local-sized infrastructure, but not necessarily only in their own areas—especially where some of these things could serve their areas from the outside. There is an example of waste management in Milton Keynes that goes beyond its area. Another example is that of a local waste management facility that recycles all the waste from kitchens. Normally, because there is quite a lot of toxic stuff in it, that waste will go to landfill, but this facility deals with all the nasties and converts it into energy. That facility is not just of interest to the local authority area in which it sits but to other ones too.
There is no suggestion that I wish to compel this in any way; I just want to draw attention to the fact that my personal experience brought this, which I was quite surprised about at the time. There was a focus on saying, “Do good in your own area”, but there was also a desire for the diversity to do good in other areas as well. Maybe you need it under a separate heading, but I just thought I would table this amendment to draw attention to this point and to make sure that, when it comes to regulations, maybe it is in the mind of the Minister and others that there should be some wriggle room around what is defined as local.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I added my name to the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and I endorse his remarks. There is a clear need for social housing and I would be grateful if the Minister could explain to the Committee the impact of asset pooling and whether it perhaps interferes with funds from local authority pension schemes being invested in social housing.
There is a clear need across the country for improvements in the housing stock. Local areas can know what the need for build-to-rent might be or the need for social housing that is disability friendly or friendly for an ageing population. These areas are not necessarily the focus of some of the private sector housebuilders. Using this resource to improve the lives of local residents—perhaps it would improve the futures of pension scheme members themselves—as well as areas around the country, would be important and I would be grateful to hear the Minister’s views.
I also support Amendment 12, which was so well introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. It is essential that the resources in both local and national pension schemes are invested to benefit local and national growth. The diversification benefits of investing in areas much wider than just the local area are clear in terms of using pension fund assets to boost long-term growth, which is an aim the Government rightly have.
I know the Government want to use pension fund assets to benefit Britain, and it seems that local authority pension schemes offer an ideal opportunity for that. If these asset pools can invest more broadly than just the local area, and local authority pension schemes are encouraged to have a diversification spread across the country, I hope that would be a significant improvement and a tangible benefit from the funding that goes into these schemes and from the strong position they have built.
Lord Fuller (Con)
My Lords, I want to focus in this group on the nature of local investment. Once again I find myself in broad agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Davies; I am not quite sure whether I should be concerned or he should be.
Clause 2 of the Bill places a duty on LGPS administering authorities to co-operate with strategic authorities, which are defined in the Bill, to
“identify and develop appropriate investment opportunities”
in relation to local investments.
The Bill defines what a local investment is and encourages co-operation, but does not define what constitutes appropriate investment opportunities, how co-operation is to be structured and what the core governance is. Of course, governance leads to covenant strength—in turn to coupon and thus to viability, so this is quite important—and the metrics for assessing local impact. We need further explanation of the duty to co-operate between LGPS authorities, not just within the pool but possibly elsewhere.
If you restrict investment opportunities just to a local area, as other noble Lords have said, it leads you to concentration risk, which is bad for two reasons. First, it is inherently more risky, but it also locks other investors out of the closed shop that then exists between the local pool and its home strategic authority. I have to ask the Minister, who I assume is going to respond here: why would the Government want to make it harder for a northern pension fund to invest in the south—or, probably the other way around, why would they make it difficult for a southern pool to be able to invest in a northern opportunity? As we heard in the previous group, there are provisions in the Bill that will prevent a scheme being involved in any more than one pool.
For “co-operation” I sometimes read “connivance”, and that can never be a good thing when you get a statutory and enforced failure of the separation of duties between those selling investment opportunities and those buying them. Thinking more widely, we know that there is a national infrastructure bank, which is to morph into the National Wealth Fund—I am possibly not the only noble Lord to have been invited to a reception it is holding in our House on 28 January. But the clue is in the name: it is the National Wealth Fund, not the local one. So, where might the order of priority be in the funding and financing here: national or local? When we think about local, we need to have a deep understanding, if we are to start making these investments, of greenfield versus brownfield, and I am concerned about the capacity and capability of funds to manage greenfield development, especially under pooling. That is another perverse consequence of getting too big.
This is where I align myself with the noble Lord, Lord Davies, because during the passage of the Planning and Infrastructure Act, I proposed amendments so that mayoral development corporations could have the financial instruments to go to bodies such as local pension funds and issue debt, so we could build affordable housing or new towns and so on. I divided the House, and noble Lords on the government side defeated us. So, now that the principle of development corporations for the purposes of new towns or affordable housing has been taken off the table, can the noble Lord say how they intend to legislate to enable these local investments with strategic authorities? By their votes they have shown that they are dead against that.
However, there is more, because I am very anxious about the definition of a “responsible investment”, which is in Clause 2(4). Clearly, nobody wants irresponsible investment, but what is responsible? Do we prohibit investments in alcohol, tobacco or sugar, or in supermarkets because they sell the sugar, tobacco and alcohol, or in arms, oil or bookmakers? I have seen it all before. Everybody has an opinion, and some beneficiary members sometimes think they own the scheme. There is much virtue signalling to be had, where long-term returns take a back seat, which results in fewer returns and less business ideas with solid, repeatable cash flows, and the poor member and the taxpayer ultimately suffer from the vanity.
I have seen with my own eyes the letter writing from these people who purport to tell pension committee members and trustees what they should invest in, but where does it end? It ends in the limits of the constellation of investment ideas, so that everybody else ends up chasing the same stocks in a value-destroying bubble, creating systemic risks when everyone does the same thing. It also ends up with the so-called ethical investment funds that disproportionately have gone into ESG investments, putting those ahead of returns, being the lemons in the market. Yet that is what the Bill encourages. There should be no role for ministerial direction in the type of investments. If we want a dynamic economy, you do not create it by wrapping the flow of capital in red tape.
If the Government wish to make infrastructure more investible, whether nationally or locally, they need to create investible opportunities. I know that toll roads are not popular and that a flood defence does not pay rent, but the Government would be better employed creating new asset classes where desirable investments can be matched with long-term returns, rather than herding them into the same old asset classes.
I realise that this is a probing amendment, but I accept that the Government should seek to promote the alignment between pension funds, affordable housing, new towns and other investment opportunities. However, by their actions, they put every obstacle in the way. Can the Minister say what steps will be taken, presumably when we get to Report, to breathe fresh life into the possibility, which was contemplated in the Planning and Infrastructure Act, whereby local bodies may issue local bonds for debt or whatever else, so that we can get the flow of capital to make this country richer, rather than just herding into the same old asset classes that we compete with everybody else for?
Viscount Thurso (LD)
My Lords, I will briefly give my support to the noble Lord, Lord Davies. I believe that many schemes would absolutely like to put money into social housing. The scheme of which I am a trustee, and which I mentioned earlier, has recently put 5% into social housing—it is entitled to do that, and it did so based on an investment case. It has put a further 5% into social infrastructure—it has also done that based on an investment case; it is part of the protection assets within the fund. We are allowed to do that, so can the Minister therefore say whether anything in the Bill prevents the funds that we are discussing from doing exactly the same thing?
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
My Lords, we come to another group of largely probing amendments, which I welcome. A good deal of the process on the Bill will be about unpacking what the Government intend, how these provisions will work in practice and what the industry can anticipate. Certainly, those are the questions that have been raised with me in my engagement with representatives.
I will speak briefly to the amendments in the names of other noble Lords, many of which are clearly probing in nature and raise important and legitimate questions about how Local Government Pension Scheme assets might be deployed to support wider economic and social objectives. We welcome that debate. It is right that Parliament explores how long-term patient capital can help support UK growth, infrastructure and social outcomes. I recognise the spirit in which these amendments have been brought forward.
However, from our side, we believe that it is important to be clear about a central principle: LGPS funds are, first and foremost, fiduciary vehicles. Scheme managers have a legal duty to act in the best financial interests of members and beneficiaries, and that duty must remain paramount. However, I note that the Local Government Pension Scheme’s advisory board has already warned that:
“New government regulations could ‘directly usurp’ the most fundamental duty of council pension funds”.
Could the Minister address that in his response?
Opportunities for investments in areas such as UK growth assets or social housing should therefore be presented, structured and made investable in a way that meets risk-adjusted return requirements and not mandated or directed through statute. There is a clear difference between creating a strong pipeline of investable opportunities and compelling capital allocation. Once we move from encouragement to prescription, we risk undermining trustee independence.
Many of the amendments in this group helpfully test where that boundary should sit, and I hope that the Minister can reassure the Committee that the Government’s approach is to enable, not to direct, in order to attract pension investment through quality and value, not through compulsion. If we keep fiduciary duty at the centre and focus on making UK opportunities genuinely competitive investments, growth and good pensions will go hand in hand. That is the balance that we are keen to see maintained.
I shall speak to my two amendments in this group, Amendments 9 and 11, which are intended to improve clarity, accountability and future-proofing in Clause 2, rather than to change the underlying investment powers of the scheme managers.
Amendment 9 would require scheme managers to publish an annual report on the local investments held within their asset pool companies, including both the extent of those investments and their financial performance. If local investment is to play an increasing role within LGPS portfolios, transparency is essential. Members, employers and taxpayers are entitled to understand not only where capital is being deployed but how it is performing. This amendment would not mandate local investment; nor would it direct decision-making. It simply asks that where such investments are made, they are visible, measurable and open to scrutiny. The question it poses to the Government is straightforward: is transparency, rather than compulsion, the right way to build confidence in local investment? We believe that it is.
I add at this point that a great many Bills are coming before your Lordships’ House in which the interaction with post-devolution structures is far from clear. The Government should be making more of an effort to provide clarity on the post-devolution picture when drafting legislation. I therefore ask the Minister—here come the exam questions—how do the Government intend to keep the definition of strategic authorities under review as devolution evolves? What assurances can be given that future legislation will align properly with the new devolved arrangements? Do the Government accept that there is a risk of confusion and overlap if these definitions are not regularly updated to reflect constitutional changes? More broadly, what steps are the Government taking to ensure a coherent and consistent approach to the interaction between the new powers and devolution settlements? Crucially, how will assets and liabilities be carved up post devolution, and can the Minister assure us that this will be done independently? I am very happy for the Minister to write, rather than bombarding him with a massive amount of work now—although maybe we should; I do not know.
Amendment 11 is probing in nature and concerns the definition of strategic authorities. Currently, the Bill hard-codes a specific list of bodies in primary legislation, yet the architecture of English devolution is changing rapidly, not least through the forthcoming English devolution Bill. This amendment therefore asks whether that definition is sufficiently agile and future-proofed or whether it risks becoming outdated almost as soon as it is enacted. It invites the Minister to explain how the Government intend to ensure that LGPS governance can adapt to evolving local and regional structures without requiring repeated primary legislation.
Taken together, these amendments seek to strengthen Clause 2 by reinforcing accountability on the one hand and flexibility on the other, while preserving the core principle that investment decisions must remain firmly rooted in fiduciary duty. I look forward to the Minister’s response to the questions the amendments raise and his reassurance that the Government’s approach is to enable good investment decisions through transparency and clarity rather than prescription.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for these amendments and for the probing and helpful debate that we have had on this group.
I turn first to Amendment 7 in the name of my noble friend Lord Davies of Brixton, which explores how LGPS assets might be used to provide social housing. The Government aim to ensure that LGPS investments support the prosperity and well-being of their local communities, just as members did throughout their working lives—an aim that is certainly reflected in my noble friend’s amendment. However, the Government do not wish to direct asset pools as to the manner of their investments—to be fair to my noble friend, he said that this was not about mandation. To respect the independence of LGPS funds, it remains the responsibility of administering authorities to set their investment strategy.
The reforms will require administering authorities to co-operate with strategic authorities to identify and develop appropriate investment opportunities, which may include social housing-related investments. While social housing is a high priority for local areas and may provide suitable opportunities for investment, it should be for strategic authorities to consider and set priorities appropriate for their areas.
My noble friend asked whether the revised regulations might act as a barrier to investing in social housing. We would say that that is not the case; there will not be a barrier. Administering authorities will continue to set the investment strategy for their fund, including local investment priorities. They must have regard to local growth priorities in setting their investment strategy and can recommend opportunities to their pool. Local investments are not restricted to any asset classes. The Government see housing as one of as the investment sectors with the greatest potential for local government impact.
My noble friend Lady Warwick of Undercliffe spoke cogently and with some passion on the importance of increasing social housing. That is something the Government would align with. She asked whether we were confident that, without reference to social housing in the Bill, the LGPS will invest in it. I say to her—to be fair there was some acknowledgement of this in her comments and in those of my noble friend Lord Davies—that there is a long history of local investment by the LGPS. Cornwall Pension Fund, for example, has committed more than £100 million to a local impact fund with a focus on solar farms and affordable housing. Greater Manchester Pension Fund has backed major housing and regeneration projects in the north-west, to which it commits 5% of its total assets. The LPP pool is a major investor in the Haweswater Aqueduct Resilience Programme. The London and LPP pools have established the £250 million London fund, to which my noble friend Lord Davies referred. It invests in opportunities in London, including in residential property and affordable housing, as well as community regeneration, digital infrastructure and clean energy.
My noble friend Lady Warwick asked whether the Government would ensure that all LGPS have the right tools to provide the best returns for members. The Government’s expectation is that the reforms will deliver the wider benefits of professionalised asset management, including long-term savings and efficiency. We are also aiming to strengthen LGPS fund governance. Better governance ensures decisions are more effective, with decision-makers able to be agile, better at managing risk and able to pick up opportunities.
Amendment 11 was mentioned by a number of noble Lords and was tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott. I agree that the definition of strategic authority should be consistent across all relevant legislation. This Bill and the draft regulations that the Government have prepared will ensure that the authorities that are treated as strategic authorities in England for the purpose of the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill are treated as such for the purpose of LGPS investments. If any new authorities become strategic authorities, the Government will use the regulation-making powers to ensure that their treatment remains the same. I hope that addresses some of the concerns raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott. She talked about her concerns about potential confusion over a changing and emerging landscape. I am happy to write to her with more details, as she was so kind in setting so few exam questions compared with her Front Bench colleague on my earlier group. Her restraint is commendable.
Regarding Amendment 12, I understand the noble Lord’s intention is to encourage greater domestic investment across the whole of the UK and, indeed, growth is the number on mission of this Government. The LGPS already invests approximately 30% of its assets in the UK. Greater consolidation will build on this success story as the pools will have greater capacity and expertise to invest domestically, including in infrastructure and unlisted assets.
The noble Lord, Lord Fuller, asked about the duty to co-operate and whether it would make it difficult for schemes to invest outside their locality. I reassure him that the proposals do not prevent investment outside the area of the funds or the pool. Administering authorities are free to set whatever local investment target they consider appropriate. While investment across the UK is strongly encouraged, the purpose of this requirement is to promote investment that has tangible benefits to the fund or its pool. Expanding the definition to the whole of the UK would go too far and local benefits would be diluted.
Viscount Thurso (LD)
Does the Minister agree that ESG and responsible investing is perhaps best summed up in the stewardship code, which most responsible investors use?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I could not have put it better myself. We have to be careful in regarding ESG as fashionable politics, inserting itself into a fashionable investment space. We have to be careful not to throw the baby out with the bathwater and to really appreciate that there are good reasons why certain investments are more popular and investments in other areas are being shunned. There are trends in industry and society as to what products and classes of investment are popular. Sometimes, we can overthink these things.
I am pleased that the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, popped up because I was just about to address his question about the Bill preventing funds setting targets on local investment, on this theme. I hope this answers his question: they must set a target, but it can be any value that the fund considers appropriate. They retain that element of flexibility, which I hope is helpful.
Regarding Amendment 9, the Government will require some administering authorities to report on their local investments, including the total investment, and on the impact of investments, in their annual reports through guidance. We consider that Amendment 9 would be an unnecessary duplication of a requirement that was already set out in guidance and in regulations. We think that it would not add anything to the Bill, as that regulation is already good practice—it is already there.
Amendment 12, spoken to by noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles and Lady Altmann, seeks to expand the definition of local investments beyond stretching point: it could mean investments for the benefit of persons living or working in any of the administering authorities’ local areas. Our fear here is that the amendment would, in effect, break the definition of local investment, as it could mean any investment in England and Wales. We contend that local investment, as it stands, has a broad definition, as it can refer to investments that have measurable beneficial impact for people living or working in areas local to, or in the region of, the administering authority, or of its pool partner administering authorities. As a consequence, this is broad enough to capture an appropriately wide geographic range while ensuring that there are still benefits for the local area.
To ensure a clear and firm trajectory to consolidation and benefits at scale for the scheme as a whole, along with the assurance I hope I have provided to the noble Lords in discussing these amendments, I respectfully ask my noble friend Lord Davies to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
I thank my noble friend the Minister for his reply. As I made clear, my amendment was not about mandation or compulsion but the ability for local authority funds to invest in ways which are seen as socially beneficial. There was general agreement about the synergy, as I put it, between investing in social housing and the investment needs of local authority funds. The Minister was clear that it should not be a barrier, but, as the regulations are still being discussed, and as the statutory guidance has not been agreed yet, this is a moving feast. I hope that, at some stage, we will be able to get a specific statement on the ability of funds to invest in housing, and in the other ways which have been suggested. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Altmann
“(d) specifying the percentage of new contributions which must be invested in United Kingdom growth assets.”Member's explanatory statement
This probing amendment would allow investment strategies to require a particular percentage of new contributions, which include added taxpayer reliefs, to be invested in UK assets which could improve the outlook for UK growth and provide a better retirement environment for members in future.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 8, I will speak also to Amendment 13, in my name. The aim of this amendment is to focus on the flow of money going into these schemes, rather than just the investment of the stock of assets that are already held, which has been the focus so far and is generally the focus of everything else in the Bill. Both are important.
Take, for example, value for money for taxpayers and members. With so much money going in each year—the latest estimates are £10 billion a year of employer contributions alone, let alone the members who are local workers—there seem to be strong reasons why we should expect targets to be set. If we are setting targets for other types of areas of investment, and for the investment of new contributions, we should have a local or national focus, or both.
This is obviously a probing amendment. As I declared at Second Reading, I support all private pension schemes also having an incentive to invest a certain percentage—I have suggested 25%—in UK growth assets. I have described UK growth assets in Amendment 13 as including listed and unlisted equities, infrastructure and property, as we have been discussing, all designed to boost long-term UK growth. I hope that the Minister will be able to explain whether the Government have specific objections to this idea and, if so, why?
If the Government are intent on mandating specific asset pools to invest in certain ways, why would they be reluctant to set certain aims or requirements for the new contributions of what are, in effect, publicly underwritten pension schemes? If we are intent on having mandation, requiring asset pools to invest in certain ways and requiring these funds to invest in them, and if we are not, as we will come to later, looking at ways of permitting employers to either significantly reduce their contributions or have a contribution holiday, would it not be sensible for the Government to look at directing those contributions—which are being paid into a scheme that does not need the money, as far as the actuarial certifications are concerned—to invest to boost long-term growth? I beg to move Amendment 8.
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)
This is an important, basic matter. Directing investment by asset types raises difficulties. If pension funds or individuals knew which assets were going to go up, there would be no problem, but there is no guarantee of that, so, my question to the Minister is: are pension funds primarily long-term investors acting for members or instruments of policy delivery? The answer matters a lot for confidence in Local Government Pension Scheme governance. I am all for productive investment, but it can be a slippery slope if you get it wrong. I wonder whether the Minister can give us some guidance on that.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, for her two amendments in this group, for the remarkably brief discussion that has been prompted and for the opportunity that they provided for her and us to probe the Minister on these important issues. Noble Lords will be pleased to hear that I will not rehearse the arguments at length, as I touched on them in some detail earlier. However, I wish briefly to reiterate what I regard as a central and non-negotiable principle: the Local Government Pension Scheme exists first and foremost as a fiduciary vehicle. Scheme managers are under a clear legal duty to act in the best financial interests of members and beneficiaries, and that duty must remain paramount.
Against that background, Amendment 13 raises a particularly important question, one that has been put to us repeatedly by industry representatives from a wide range of backgrounds; namely, what type of assets do the Government have in mind in which funds should be directed to invest? I think this is the essential argument of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. Is the intention to focus on infrastructure, debt servicing or supporting new towns and similar developments? The noble Baroness also raised the point of what percentage should be invested in UK assets. As she pointed out, perhaps 25% should be invested in UK growth assets, and, therefore, what is the definition of growth? Lots of questions arise from the noble Baroness’s amendments.
I recognise, and I think the noble Baroness alluded to this, that we will return to this issue in greater detail when we come to consider the reserve power, but like the noble Baroness, I wish to flag this matter at this stage as it has been a theme this afternoon on this first day of Committee and a live and pressing question not only for us but, I reiterate, for the many third-party stakeholders with whom we have engaged.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, for tabling these amendments. I cannot speak on behalf of the whole Committee, but I would say that it is most people’s intention to encourage greater investment in UK assets. Growth is certainly the number one mission of this Government. If you did not realise that, you have probably been hiding under a rock these past few months and years.
These amendments would direct LGPS funds to make investments in certain UK asset classes. Supporting UK growth by making investments in such assets, in tandem with seeking appropriate returns, is a valuable function of the scheme and the noble Baroness is right to be interested in this important topic. As I have mentioned, the LGPS already invests around 30% of assets in the UK. Greater consolidation will build on this success story, as the pools will have greater capacity and expertise to invest domestically.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
I stress that the amendment is a “may” or “must”; the group does not require a “must”. This was intended to help the Government understand that there are merits in considering the flow and the stock. If there is new contribution flow of a particular size going into an area—this can be part of regulations; it is not required—that could well have a less damaging impact on the market than mandating or aiming. For example, Clause 2(4)(c) talks about “target ranges” for strategic asset allocation to growth assets and income assets. With a fund of this size, when talking about a target range for growth assets or any other assets, we might be moving the markets, because so much money would need to be shifted around. That is much less of an issue with the new contribution flow, but it could still achieve some of the objectives that the Government are seeking to attain.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I thank the noble Baroness for that intervention and clarification. I do not want to comment specifically on whether the scale of that investment would be market moving; I do not have the expertise to say that. I want to underline that, ultimately, we think it is for administering authorities and the pools to decide where these investments are made. That is right, because it is the way they fulfil their fiduciary duties. I am happy to look at her contribution again and, if I can add to that explanation, I will happily write to her.
The noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, asked whether pension funds are investments of policy delivery. As I stated earlier, the responsibility for setting investment strategy remains with the funds. The Government are not taking powers to direct asset pools to make or not make investments in specific projects. To be clear, it goes back to the fact that it is for those administering authorities and pools to make those decisions.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
I am so sorry, but this is a really important point. In Clause 2(4), paragraphs (a), (b) and (c)—in particular paragraph (c), to which my amendment seeks to add something—state that we are talking about
“strategic asset allocation or target ranges for growth and income”.
That absolutely sounds as though the Government could—it is “may”, not “must”, so it may not happen—leave the door open to directing investments in the way the Minister says the Government do not wish to do. I would be grateful for some clarification; I do not need it now, as I am happy either for the Minister to write or for us to meet to discuss it.
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)
I have always reckoned that the duty of pension fund managers is to the members. What we are trying to do now is say that they have other duties; however, it is not very clear where the borderline is.
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
I know how frustrating it is when Members keep getting up to ask questions, but I have to do this. The Minister referred to a backstop. For what purpose? In what circumstances would it be used? Can the Minister help us understand that?
Lord Katz (Lab)
The backstop power relates to our earlier discussion on previous amendments. It would be used in extremis. The problem is that the noble Baroness is asking me to conject on what are hypothetical situations. Some of these issues will be set out in some of the regulations that will follow.
I am happy to go back a couple of interventions and pick up the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. I would be happy to write to try to clarify the distinction that we are making. Of course we want to see good levels of investment in a range of different asset classes, but we are absolutely not saying that this is a slippery slope to taking powers of direction or mandation. We are very clear on that. Ultimately, this is the nature of pensions legislation: some of the clarity comes down stream. We are clear that the Government’s intention in the Bill is purely to provide the framework to ensure that we can harness the potential of these asset pools to make some meaningful investments.
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
This is in the Bill. I know that the Minister cannot do this now—I accept that he can write to me—but can he please help us? If it is in the Bill, we need to know what it means before regulations come.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I am not sure whether I can provide much more clarity than I have done so far, so I would be very happy to write to the noble Baroness to spell that out.
I realise that I have not given the levels of satisfaction and clarity that Members perhaps wanted but, as these are probing amendments, we contend that they would have a minimal impact. On that basis, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
I thank the Minister for his answers; I feel for him in his position. I am happy to withdraw the amendment; we can have further interaction at a later stage.
“(4A) An investment strategy under subsection (3)(b) may not specify preferences between comparable or competing investment vehicles.”
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 10 says simply:
“An investment strategy under subsection (3)(b) may not specify preferences between comparable or competing investment vehicles”.
This concerns the same part of the Bill that we were discussing in the previous group. In other words, if the Government are taking powers over what assets pension schemes may hold, even if that is a reserve power, those powers must not discriminate between comparable routes to access those assets.
It is a defensive amendment. Why do I need to table such a basic safeguard? It is because, later in the Bill, in new Section 28C of FSMA, the Government do discriminate for DC default funds. It excludes listed investment companies even when they can hold exactly the same underlying assets as the favoured long-term asset fund, the LTAF wrapper. That is how creeping cartels begin. Who is to say such direction will not next be targeted at a local authority pension fund, many of which have historically favoured listed investment companies as ideal for local infrastructure investment?
The Minister’s letter, which arrived on Friday, explains how the Government are now creeping the cartel onwards. The letter puts this front and centre. The Minister confirms that the exclusion of listed investment companies is deliberate and that the purpose of these powers is to
“support the Mansion House Accord”.
We have already been alerted to the competition law risks around the Mansion House Accord. An article by competition lawyer Matthew Hall in the Times last May warned that the accord risked co-ordinated investment intentions that could raise competition law concerns, and that government encouragement does not create a legal exemption. Those comments came before we learned about exclusions. Government legislation—which would mean regulations, not just the framework of this Bill—could override competition law, but only with a clear public interest justification and far more scrutiny than cosy discussions behind closed doors.
Let us look at the public record. In public, the accord—from the ABI, the City of London and the Pensions and Lifetime Savings Association—refers simply to
“allocating at least 10% to private markets … and within that, at least 5% … to UK private markets”.
At the bottom, it defines UK private markets as being
“where the underlying assets are based in the UK”.
Thus, it is not looking at the wrapper they sit in; it does not exclude listed investment companies; and it does not require the use of LTAFs. It explicitly acknowledges looking through to the underlying assets.
In the Bill, that has been transposed to an exemplary asset list and a definition that deliberately excludes listed securities, and for that to cover listed investment companies, despite the fact that they are slightly different as they have exemptions for growth markets. Rhetoric has followed that anything listed is excluded. If the accord does not say it and no consultation or public document has said it, but according to the Minister it is being done in the name of the accord, something has happened in private—what and with whom?
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I strongly support the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and all that she has said so far on the ramifications and the importance of this issue to the Bill—indeed, to the wider UK financial market landscape.
The Government require from the Mansion House Accord investment in unlisted assets, private equity, infrastructure and so on. The Minister stressed in writing that she can confirm that the aim is broadly limited to unlisted assets and consistent with the scope of the Mansion House Accord. If that is the aim of the reserve powers and an overriding objective of this Government, it makes the explicit exclusion later on of this particular asset type—the wrapper, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, called it—even more mystifying.
I have amendments later to the relevant clauses that would specifically make the Bill include these closed-ended investment companies, rather than exclude them, which is more opaque.
As regards the LGPS, using closed-ended listed companies is an ideal way for these funds to invest in local infrastructure where the council and local residents can see the impact. It fits with the Government’s aim too. But by explicitly excluding closed-ended funds and because of the regulatory undermining of this type of fund, which makes up one-third of the FTSE 250 and is an important element of the asset management industry of the City of London and, in particular, of Edinburgh, we are starting to see—I am told that West Yorkshire is an example—that local authorities which have previously invested are disinvesting from these investments.
At the moment, there is a regulatory driver making these closed-ended investment companies appear more expensive than they are. Trying to favour open-ended structures over closed-ended structures, even when the closed-ended structure is the most suitable for holding long-term illiquid investments, makes no sense to me or to many in the industry. Why should investors have to be told that investing in a closed-ended company is costly to them when the costs are paid by the company? They are merely a shareholder. They are not directly charged. With an open-ended fund they are, but not with a closed-ended fund.
Will the Minister explain or write to me to explain—I recognise that there are complexities here that he may not wish or be able to deal with at the moment—why the Bill has excluded these types of investment, reassure the Committee that local authorities will not be directed to exclude these investments and explain why our Government seem to be moving in the opposite direction from other countries, which are apparently now considering launching closed-end investment companies to invest in these kinds of assets?
The FCA designed and authorised the long-term asset funds which the Government seem to favour. They are open-ended structures. One argument that illustrates perfectly the perversity of the Government’s position and the importance of this issue—I make no apology for labouring the point because it is so important to pension scheme investments—is that long-term asset funds will be allowed to hold up to 50% in listed assets. Although the Government want long-term asset funds specifically to promote and guide the investment of long-term pension funds into unlisted assets, their favoured structure—the long-term asset fund, or open-ended funds in general—will have to have listed assets to help manage their liquidity. Closed-ended funds are not constrained in the same way.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
This is really a debate by proxy on Section 40 and new Section 28C; I am sure that we can all look forward to a repeat of this discussion.
I am not against mandation in principle; it is entirely reasonable for a Government to adopt that approach. What worries me here is that, for some reason, they are putting investment classes into statute. That is just wrong. The point here is broader than the one just made by the noble Baronesses. To pick out sectors of investment, the Government are giving their imprimatur to these particular classes of investment; however, they will go wrong at some stage, and the Government will be on the hook for having advocated for them. I am against having any of these references in the Bill. I do not want to see anything added; I want them to be taken out.
Lord Fuller (Con)
My Lords, now I am really worried—every time I have followed the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, I have tried to amplify the points he has made.
I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, on her masterful exposition of a technical piece of detail; she brought it down to the ground and made it alive. She put her finger on it when many of us have not been able to put our finger on what makes us so uncomfortable about the Bill. We know that it is not right. When you get meddlesome Ministers fiddling around in stuff where they do not really know what they are doing, there is not just co-operation but—as the noble Baroness exposed—a connivance and a cartel. She explained how those two things have led to conflicts of interest; there will be a lot of Cs in the words I am about to use. It is anti-competitive, and it has restricted choice.
The noble Baroness has wedged open the door because, later on in the Bill, there are provisions—I will not defer to them too much now—for the existing operators to lock out new entrants. I was instinctively uncomfortable with that but, now, I am worried because there seems to be a guiding hand here to reduce choice, stifle innovation and damage the reputation of the City. I do not think that that was purposeful, but this is what happens when you get a Bill that is so overly complicated and takes people away from saving for their long-term retirement.
I nearly feel sorry for the noble Lord, Lord Katz, because I have never seen such an evisceration. I am sure he is going to defend it and do the best he can. But what the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has shown is that it is rather like the Chancellor, who now says she had no idea what was really happening when she put the rates on the pubs. It was a mistake, and she did not have all the information to hand. While I accept that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has said we will come back to this on another day, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, because she has given an opportunity—a breathing space or an air gap—for the Government to now go back to look at this in more detail.
The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, also laid out the import of this amendment when she said that one-third of all the FTSE 350 is engaged in this. I expect the Minister in winding to say, for a third time, that growth is the number one priority of this Government. Let us hope he does say that because, if he does, he will either accept this amendment here and now, or give an undertaking that, at some stage before we get to this in the main part of the debate, it will be accepted and we can move on.
It is not just casting a shadow over the LGPS and the parts of Yorkshire which are disinvesting; it is accidentally casting a shadow over the City of London, which is the world’s second or third largest financial centre. It must be stopped. I think the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has done the Committee and our nation a great service in the last half an hour, and she is to be congratulated for it.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I was due to give a very short speech. It is still short, but it has got slightly longer in terms of the content of this debate. I am particularly grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted and Lady Altmann, for tabling Amendment 10, which we welcome and which I understand to be a sensible and proportionate safeguarding measure. I want to go a bit further because there were two particularly powerful speeches, in particular that from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles.
As we read it, the amendment seeks to ensure that investment strategies cannot be used to favour particular investment vehicles over comparable or competing alternatives. In doing so, it would help to guard against strategies becoming a back-door means of directing capital, rather than serving their proper purpose as high-level statements of investment policy.
That distinction matters. Investment strategies should guide objectives, risk appetite and approach and not hardwire specific vehicles or delivery mechanisms into statute or regulation. Preventing the embedding of such preferences also reduces the risk of political or regulatory pressure or—I will use the word—interference, being reflected in investment strategy documents and helps to preserve trustee independence and proper decision-making. Although it is a serious subject, the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, gave us a succinct, well-argued speech with her bucket wrapper analogy. She gave a hard-hitting speech with some important questions which I hope the Minister will be able to answer.
One issue that has been made clear today, which has arisen in a number of debates, and was encapsulated in this short debate, is the opaqueness of “government direction”. I was very taken by the equally hard-hitting speech from my noble friend Lord Fuller. The confusion—by the way, the C is for confusion, just to add that in—is over the responsibility with the grey areas, notably in respect to the understandings, or not, from the Mansion House Accord and those who were the signatories.
One question to ask is whether those signatories now realise what they have got themselves into, or what their understanding was then and what it is now. I ask that as an open question, particularly in relation to the inclusion or exclusion of different types of investment. The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, focused particularly on open-ended or close-ended. There is a lot of emphasis here. Most unusually, I was in total agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Davies. I am not sure that that has happened with me in the past.
To conclude, we therefore welcome the intent of Amendment 10. It would be very helpful if the Minister could indicate whether—and if so, how—the Bill as currently drafted already guards against this risk. It is a crucial question and relates to all the questions that have been asked. What assurances can be given that investment strategies will not be used to prescribe or favour particular investment vehicles in practice?
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted and Lady Altmann, for this amendment. I agree with them that funds in the LGPS should not be specifying preferences between similar investment vehicles in their investment strategies. I fear that the rest of my response may well disappoint the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and—though perhaps not to such a great extent—the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. I say in passing to the Committee that it is always good to hear consensus breaking out, even if it rather gets to the horseshoe theory of politics when it is my noble friend Lord Davies and the noble Lord, Lord Fuller. But let us try to end today’s Committee session on a positive note.
I will now go into the detail. Under our reforms, decisions on implementation of strategies, including selection of appropriate vehicles and managers, will be made by the LGPS pools, which will have the capacity and expertise to deliver the benefits of scale that we have discussed. It is the Government’s view that the draft regulations are already clear in that respect. This will be supported by guidance, setting out that investment manager selection is solely the responsibility of the pool. LGPS pools will make the decision on whether to invest through external managers and which managers to use, and there is nothing whatever to prevent them using investment trusts should they consider it beneficial.
This is where the space for disappointment potentially arises. I am aware of the concerns expressed in relation to the treatment of listed investment funds, notably investment companies and trusts, under the reserve asset allocation powers, which are relevant to DC pension schemes. That was set out very powerfully by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. The Committee will have the chance to debate these concerns when we reach Clause 40 and discuss Chapter 3, which deals with asset allocation for DC schemes.
To get to the heart of it, the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, asked about the impact on the LGPS. To give reassurance, we are not excluding closed-ended investment funds from the LGPS. I can be absolutely clear that that is the case. We are not excluding them, and neither will local authorities be directed to exclude them. I hope that provides clarity as we discuss the LGPS elements of the Bill.
Having said that, we have had comments around investment and asset types, particularly from my noble friend Lord Davies, as well as others, on this group of amendments. We will take what has been said and consider it in time for the debate on this issue when we get to it in greater detail. In anticipation of that day—which we are all looking forward to, particularly at two minutes to Committee rising—I ask the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
I will be as brief as I can. I thank all those who have spoken in the debate, particularly for the support that I have received. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, is to some extent correct in that this is a proxy for what comes later, but I wanted to give the Committee that reflection time over competition law issues, because it is not necessary: exactly the same will happen without defaming listed investment companies and doing them down. The channels of how the investments are going to go will be the same. But the Minister has still not answered the question. Who asked for the exclusion? It is not in the accord. We have been told that it is in the accord but, as I have explained, the wording gives the opposite direction.
We have been told by Ministers that it is the pension funds, or anybody except the Government. It is somebody’s fault that it is there. I regret that I think it is deliberate rather than accidental but never mind that as long as it goes because it is not necessary to defend what the Government want to defend. That would be fine by me. It is relevant to local government funds because they invest so much that way. Therefore, it was a genuine concern that a reserved power could begin to replicate the reserved power in new Section 28C. It was not a totally bogus proxy, if I could put it that way. I have elaborated the point; as I have said I can do much more yet. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Pension Schemes Bill
Wednesday 14th January 2026
(3 weeks ago)
Grand CommitteePension Schemes Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 152-II(b) Amendments for Grand Committee (Supplementary to the Second Marshalled List) - (14 Jan 2026)
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to open today’s debate on the remaining groups of amendments relating to the Local Government Pension Scheme. We are conscious that Ministers have already undertaken to write to the House on a number of points, and we do not wish to add unduly to that correspondence or set exam questions. However, we hope that today’s debate may allow some of these issues to be addressed in real time.
Let me be clear at the outset that this is a probing stand-part notice intended to seek clarity from the Government. Clause 6 is striking in its brevity, but the power it confers is anything but modest. It would allow scheme regulations to provide for the merger explicitly, including a compulsory merger, of local government pension funds. Compulsory merger is a significant and, in many cases, irreversible intervention. It has profound implications for governance, funding positions, local accountability and, ultimately, the retirement savings of millions of scheme members and the obligations of employers. We are dealing here with very substantial sums of public money and the livelihoods of millions of people.
Before such a power is afforded to a Secretary of State who may have little or no specialist expertise in pensions, it is only right that the Committee understands clearly how this power will be exercised and what safeguards will apply. The clause itself, however, tells us very little. It provides no indication of the process that will be followed, the criteria that will be applied or the protections that will be in place for members, employers and administering authorities. I therefore hope that the Minister can assist the Committee on a number of points.
First, on expertise and decision-making, pension scheme governance is highly complex and technical. What confidence can the Government offer that the Secretary of State is the appropriate decision-maker for imposing compulsory mergers, particularly in the absence of any requirement in the Bill to obtain independent expert pensions advice?
Secondly, on process, what precise procedural steps will be required before a compulsory merger can be ordered? Will there be a statutory consultation and, if so, with whom? Will affected scheme managers, administering authorities, employers and scheme members have a formal opportunity to make representations before a decision is taken?
Thirdly, on safeguards and accountability, what independent checks and balances will exist to ensure that the Secretary of State cannot act unilaterally? Will decisions be required to meet defined tests, such as necessity or proportionality, and to be supported by evidence? Will there be any right of review or challenge where a fund believes a compulsory merger is not in the best interests of its members?
Fourthly, on financial risk, given the scale of the assets involved, what assurances can the Government provide that members’ savings will not be exposed to undue risk or that decisions will not be influenced directly or indirectly by political or short-term considerations rather than long-term fiduciary interest?
Finally, on precedent, does the Minister accept that conferring such a broad enabling power sets an important precedent for ministerial intervention in pensions governance more widely? If so, how do the Government justify that approach, and why are the limits of this power left entirely to secondary legislation?
We ought to have answers to these questions before the conclusion and passing of the Bill. Clause 6 confers wide discretion in a highly technical and sensitive area, with potentially far-reaching consequences. It is therefore entirely appropriate for the Committee to press the Government to explain how this power will be exercised, what safeguards will be in place and how the interests of scheme members will be protected. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)
My Lords, as has been stated, this clause introduces compulsory mergers of Local Government Pension Scheme funds, and the word “compulsory” worries me. We on these Benches accept that consolidation can sometimes improve efficiency and governance, but compulsion—I emphasise this—is a serious step that demands strong justification and clear safeguards, as the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, stated.
At present, the Bill establishes the power without clearly setting out the criteria, process or routes of challenge. That sequencing matters. Trustees, employers and members need confidence that mergers will occur only when there is compelling evidence of benefit to the people—that is, the pensioners themselves. We on these Benches are concerned that forced mergers, if poorly handled—and some may well be poorly handled—could undermine trust rather than strengthen it. Before endorsing compulsion, which we are asked to do, Parliament should understand how decisions will be made, how dissent will be treated and what protections exist if a merger proves detrimental.
At this stage, it is quite right that there should be probing as to what is behind all this and what will happen in all the various circumstances that need to be in place to protect members of the Local Government Pension Scheme. I wait to see further information as the Bill progresses.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I apologise for speaking after the Liberal Democrats—the noble Lord got up rather quickly.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
I endorse everything that both speakers have said about understanding more about the use of this power. I want to go back to the Explanatory Notes. They say that Clause 6 amends Schedule 3, et cetera,
“to clarify that, in the case of the LGPS, the responsible authority’s powers also include the power to make regulations”.
That implies that the Government believe that this is a declaration of an existing power. If that is the case, can they explain why they feel it is necessary to put Clause 6 in this Bill? Can they also explain the history of mergers with the involvement of the regulatory authority and what problems, if any, have led to the need to insert this in Clause 6? As the noble Lords who have spoken said, it looks like a very draconian power to be taking and yet the Explanatory Notes imply that they already have the power. It would be useful to have some more background.
Lord Fuller (Con)
My Lords, Clause 6, as your Lordships have just heard, includes the powers to merge funds. It is a slim clause, so I will be briefer than you might expect, but I want to ask the Minister what the circumstances are in which these powers would be used and to what end the Minister would require the compulsory merger of funds.
On Monday, when we debated the earlier groups, I pointed out that the country’s smallest fund, the Orkney fund, has the best performance of all the funds in the LGPS. I think that there are lessons to be learned from that—and, furthermore, it has never changed its investment manager. What would happen if the two funds happen to be in different asset pools? What steps would be taken to indemnify the losing and the gaining members and taxpayers for the quite exceptional transition costs in these circumstances? You would be ramming some schemes together, having split them asunder beforehand.
In another Bill before your Lordships’ House, we will shortly contemplate local government reorganisation. I do a bit of work on this and I can certainly contemplate that mergers of councils across county boundaries could be contemplated. With Wiltshire already unitised, it is not unthinkable for Swindon to be placed either in Oxfordshire or perhaps in Berkshire. Paradoxically, the efficiencies of merging councils under LGR may result in the demerging of pension funds to different pools. What discussions have been had and what contingencies have been put in place as Ministers start to take decisions on local government reorganisation?
Going back to scheme mergers, can the Minister tell us whether similar criteria have been published, as with LGR, and how we would consider comparing the relative merits of different proposals for schemes merged? Having announced that schemes are candidates for merger, it is not unthinkable that several competing bids may come forward: “We want this particular scheme”, or rather, “We don’t want that particular scheme, for all sorts of reasons”.
What criteria might be published so that, on an evidential and neutral basis, the decisions can be justified? Are we going to consider population size, assets under management, the number of members, the cost per member, or geography? That is important, because under the earlier parts of the Bill a scheme may be a member only of a single pool, and those pools have become geographically focused, because there are provisions, if the Bill is enacted, for the schemes to connive with their local strategic authorities. You can see straightaway that there could be a mismatch between the host strategic authority and its pool, which may not be local.
This is a small clause, but with big consequences. Following a merger, how might decisions be taken as to which successor authority would be the administrating authority? That begs the LGR question of which authority will assume the pension administration if all the councils in that territory have been abolished. How will we ensure that appropriate governance structures are in place so that all parts of the disaggregated territory are appropriately represented? We see this in local government, at parish council level when two parishes come together. So that not all the members of this community council come from one parish and none from the other, there is a process of warding: the representatives on the board must be distributed from among the previous constituent authorities. What steps might be taken in that case?
I do not think that this clause has been thought through at all. If I think of the Norfolk scheme for a moment, of which I have been a board member since 2007, we have over 100,000 members and I am sure that they would all want to know who is going to be sending P60s, helping with IHT valuations and answering questions. I have previously complained about the length of the Bill, but this shortest of clauses may have the biggest impact. It will directly impact up to 6.7 million workers in our nation, so I support my noble friends because, without the detail that I, as well as the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, and other Members who have spoken, have asked for, Clause 6 is inadequate and cannot and should not stand part of the Bill as currently constructed.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to be opening for the Government on the second day of Committee on the Pensions Schemes Bill. Once again, for the sake of the record, I am not sure whether it is otiose but I repeat that I am a former councillor in Camden and, as such, a member of its councillors’ pension scheme—but for four years, so I am not going to retire rich on it.
I am grateful to all noble Lords who spoke in the debate on this probing stand part question on Clause 6. I recognise the intention to scrutinise the process to be followed if compulsory mergers of LGPS funds are undertaken.
As noble Lords are no doubt aware—and I hope this answers the question that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, raised about the history and rationale for including the clause—Schedule 3 to the Public Service Pensions Act 2013 confers powers on the Secretary of State to make regulations about the administration, management and winding up of any pension funds. Clause 6 amends the 2013 Act to clarify that, in the case of the LGPS, the Secretary of State’s existing powers include the power to make regulations about the merger of two or more LGPS pension funds, and this includes compulsory merger. At this point, I reassure the Committee that the Government do not currently have any plans to require the merger of LGPS funds and that their strong preference is that mergers take place by agreement between administering authorities. However, it is essential that the Government have sufficient powers in place to be able to fulfil their stewardship role towards the scheme.
The purpose of the clause is to ensure that sufficient powers are in place to facilitate the merger of pension funds if needed—for example, as a consequence of local government reorganisation, something that the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, spoke about. He referred to this in slightly less positive terms, but the Committee will be aware of the Government’s ambition to simplify local government by ending the two-tier system. A consequence of this is that in some areas a new administering authority, as he said, will need to be designated to administer Local Government Pension Scheme funds, because the existing administering authority will no longer exist. One potential solution to this may be the merger of two or more pension funds. These decisions are local ones, but any such change will require agreement from the Secretary of State to make legislation for transferring the pension assets and liabilities of the previous administering authority and other councils involved in unitarisation to the new administering authority. MHCLG will write to affected local authorities with guidance on what they should consider when deciding on their preferred approach to designating a new administering authority for their pension fund.
The power may also be used in the unlikely event that an independent governance review finds particularly grave issues with an administering authority’s governance of their pension fund. This intervention will be considered by the Secretary of State only in exceptional cases, as an option of last resort after discussions about governance and compliance with the administering authority, and where there is no credible action plan for improvement.
Lord Willetts (Con)
I have one question following the Minister’s very helpful explanation. I was involved in the internal government discussion leading up to the 2013 legislation, and at the back of our minds was the whole issue of merging local government pension schemes for economic and investment reasons. The model that emerged of seven or eight umbrella bodies shaping their investment strategy was seen as the best way to deliver that. The Minister’s list of reasons why there might be compulsory mergers excluded any investment or economic argument, so is he assuring the Committee that the Government do not envisage using these powers to secure specific economic or investment objectives?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I am seeking help from my noble friend Lady Sherlock in a helpful conference on the side. The investment assets are in pools, so that is not necessary. The backstop powers are very clear: if there is a need for a merger or we are worried about a failing scheme, there is that backstop power and this is why. It would not be used to direct particular investment strategies.
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate, and I also thank the Minister for his full and detailed response to the questions that were asked. The Minister talked about perhaps using these powers when there are local government reorganisations; that is highly likely in the current climate, I would think.
The purpose of this stand part notice is not to resist sensible reform but to underline the importance of clarity, certainty and proper accountability where Parliament is being asked to confer powers on this scale. Clause 6 is framed at a very high level, yet it opens the door to decisions that could permanently reshape local government pension arrangements, where powers are capable of compelling structural change. It is vital that those affected understand not only that the power exists but the principles that will govern its use. Clarity matters for scheme managers, employers and, above all, scheme members, whose long-term interests depend on confidence in the stability and predictability of the system. Certainty matters because pension funds operate on long horizons, and opaque or open-ended powers can create risk.
Most of all, the responsible exercise of delegated powers depends on transparency. When Parliament is asked to delegate authority in a highly technical and sensitive area, it is entirely reasonable to expect a clear account of how that authority will be exercised and what safeguards will guide it. However, in view of the response given by the Minister—I am sure that all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate will look at Hansard; if there are any issues, we will go back to the Minister—I beg leave to withdraw the stand part notice.
Baroness Stedman-Scott
“Review of the cost and sustainability of the Local Government Pension Scheme(1) The Secretary of State must conduct a review of the long-term cost and sustainability of the Local Government Pension Scheme.(2) The review must give particular consideration to admitted bodies, including housing associations.(3) A report must be laid before Parliament within 12 months of the day on which this Act is passed.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Government to review the long-term cost and sustainability of the Local Government Pension Scheme, with particular consideration given to admitted bodies such as housing associations, and to report its findings to Parliament.
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
My Lords, this group of amendments is the first of three groups that together seek to ensure that the Local Government Pension Scheme operates more effectively and proportionately, protecting member benefits, supporting long-term sustainability and remaining affordable for employers.
The context is critical. The financial position of the scheme has changed profoundly. On a low-risk basis, the LGPS was around 126% funded in March 2025, rising to around 147% by September, with surpluses of £87 billion and £147 billion respectively. This is a striking shift from the 2022 valuation, when the scheme stood at around 65% funded. In short, the scheme has moved decisively from deficit recovery into sustained overfunding.
That shift has unavoidable implications for contribution rates. On prudent assumptions, future services costs are around 15%—falling closer to 6% once surplus is taken into account—yet employers continue to pay contributions of around 21%, costing roughly £9 billion a year across the scheme. Even under highly cautious assumptions, those levels now appear materially higher than is necessary to maintain long-term solvency. These amendments do not seek root-and-branch reform; they ask whether the regulatory framework is still operating as intended and whether contribution setting remains fair, transparent and proportionate.
Amendment 14 therefore requires a review of Regulation 62 of the Local Government Pension Scheme Regulations 2013, which lie at the heart of how employer contributions are determined. The concern here is not actuarial prudence in valuing liabilities but contribution prudence—the policy choice to extract additional buffers from employers, even where funds are demonstrably in surplus. At the centre of this issue are the undefined concepts in Regulation 62(6): desirability, stability, long-term cost efficiency and solvency. Their ambiguity has allowed increasingly conservative interpretations to become embedded in valuation practice, driving contribution rates beyond what the funding position alone would justify.
So I would like to ask the Minister three questions. How do the Government define “desirability”? How do they define “stability”? And how do they define “solvency” in this context? If the Government cannot clearly articulate what these terms mean, how can they be applied consistently when determining contribution rates? If Ministers cannot explain their intent, how can those responsible for applying the regulations be expected to reflect the Government’s wishes rather than their own interpretation? Does the Minister accept that, in the absence of clear guidance, it will be pension funds and actuaries that end up defining these terms in practice? This interpretation will shape outcomes.
In practice, expansive interpretations of “stability” and “long term cost efficiency” can justify unaffordable contribution rates, diverting resources from adult social care, housing delivery and other front-line services, while offering employers little scope to make legitimate trade-offs. There is also a clear imbalance of power. Employers bear the full cost of contributions yet often have limited influence over outcomes. Practice on the treatment of surpluses varies widely, with some funds permitting release and others prohibiting it on opaque grounds. Does the Minister agree that greater clarity and consistency would plainly be beneficial?
Amendment 15 asks a simple but necessary question: is the Local Government Pension Scheme affordable in the long term? It requires a review of long-term costs and sustainability, including impacts in respect of admitted bodies such as housing associations, with the findings reported to Parliament. This is an attempt not to undermine the LGPS but to ensure transparency, proportionality and long-term affordability—principles this House has always upheld.
This analysis is not abstract; a growing body of concrete cases now demonstrates how these regulatory interpretations are operating in practice. I would be very happy—indeed, delighted—to share the full set of these examples with the Minister, should he not already be aware of the scale and consistency of the issue. I trust that he will feel free to take up this offer if it helps.
I will briefly outline one such case. In this instance, the fund in question is assessed as being 107% funded on a gilts minus 0.2% basis. This compares with the previous valuation basis of gilts plus 2.3%. At the current valuation, the council had a reported surplus of £57 million. Despite that clear surplus, measured on an exceptionally prudent valuation basis, the contribution outcome is, frankly, striking. Under the fund’s stabilisation policy, the employer’s primary contribution rate is permitted to reduce by no more than 2%. At the same time, the employer is still required to pay approximately £20 million per year in secondary, or so-called deficit recovery, contributions. That outcome is extraordinarily difficult to justify. Secondary contribution rates exist for one purpose only: to repair deficits. In this case, there is no deficit. Assets exceed liabilities, even under assumptions more conservative than those typically employed by insurers, whose pricing is generally close to a gilt-flat basis. Yet, notwithstanding that surplus position, the employer is still being required to make substantial deficit recovery payments. The council involved has been forced to seek exceptional financial support from MHCLG.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
The noble Baroness cited a particular case and gave considerable detail about the circumstances. Is there any reason why the Committee cannot be told which authority it concerns? As things stand, there is no way that I or any other Member of the Committee could comment on that case. If the noble Baroness can tell us which authority it is, in the interest of transparency, I urge her to do so.
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
I have always been a supporter of transparency. I do not know the answer to the noble Lord’s question, but I will find out and let him know either the name of the council or the reason why I cannot give it to him. We have other examples that we are happy to share. I hope that answers the noble Lord’s question. I beg to move.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
It is a pleasure to take part in this debate. It is an important issue and public money should always be open to scrutiny and deep thought about how we approach these issues. The noble Baroness, in introducing the amendments, quoted the significant switch round in the financial state of the Local Government Pension Scheme. She will be able to have an interesting discussion with her former colleagues, Liz Truss and Kwasi Kwarteng, as to why exactly that has happened. They have had more influence on it probably than the actuarial profession.
My message essentially is, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”. What we have here is the Official Opposition attempting to make a crisis out of a significant success. The Local Government Pension Scheme has been successful, as attested to by the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, yet here we are being presented with it as if there is some crisis to address. We should recognise that, in actuarial terms, the financial management of the scheme has been a significant success. It is up to those suggesting reviews—two in this group of amendments and two more in the following group, which should more accurately be here—to explain, rather than providing anonymous details, what the problem is.
The context is that, compared to private sector funded schemes, where contributions have been increasing, what we are going to see in the coming year is the opportunity of significant cost reductions. This is for two reasons. First, it is because of the successes of Local Government Pension Scheme investments, with returns of around 9% per annum since the last valuations. As a result, that has generated significant surpluses—significant excess of assets over liabilities. I shall come back to that in a later group. Following the latest set of triennial valuations, substantial reductions will be available. It is up to individual authorities to make their decisions, but the opportunity will be there, certainly for most funds.
As far as actuaries who support and work within the local government sector are concerned, as I explained on Monday, this discussion comes as a bolt from the blue. What we really need in this area is stability. It would be far better to promote discussion first within the sector, with those who know what they are talking about, before producing these proposals, which inevitably lead to uncertainty.
It is not a surprise, given the environment we are in, that there has been no consultation on this, unlike the investment changes, because it is part of a programme that we see with amendments submitted later in this Bill. There are some people who just do not like successful collective pension provision. There is an agenda at work here. As I say, I do not oppose consideration of the issues, but we should understand where it is coming from.
It is important to understand that the last valuations were in 2022. The current valuations, as at 31 March last year, are under way and we do not yet have the full results. Early results have been provided and we know the direction of travel, but we do not know the final results, which is why I question the figures being quoted. We do not yet know the results over the sector as a whole of the current series of valuations. Any speculation about that outcome misses the point.
The second point I want to make is that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to the funding of local government pension schemes. They vary widely in their size. The staff membership has to be taken into account, and that varies, and you also have to understand that some of these funds have significant numbers of non-local government members through the admitted body process and each of those has to be assessed in a proper way. There is no way you can have a one-size-fits-all approach to the actuarial management of these funds. You need the professional knowledge and judgment of actuaries—you may think I am promoting my own profession—to decide what is the best approach.
Clearly, that judgment should be open to review and, of course, it has been reviewed. That is what is so nonsensical about these proposals. Under Section 13 of the Public Service Pensions Act 2013, the Government can ask for reviews of the funded public service schemes, which effectively means local government schemes. Indeed, such a review has been carried out and a full detailed report produced by the Government Actuary, setting out the approach that has been adopted, comparing the different approaches—there are four firms of actuaries, which all have slightly different approaches—reconciling them and judging the assumptions that have been made.
Broadly speaking, the Government Actuary has given these valuations a clean bill of health. Therefore, any suggestion that there is anything wrong about the actuarial approach that is being taken is denied by the Government’s own actuarial adviser. Funds need to take account of local needs and public interest has a role in deciding how services can be employed in these funds. There is no question of refund in these funds, but the way in which it affects contributions is crucial.
Another point, which I think the noble Baroness ignored, is that these funds are all subject to the cost- capping arrangements set out in the coalition Government’s review of public service pensions of 14 or 15 years ago. There is a cost cap. I made a note of what the noble Baroness said: that the full cost of the contributions “bears on the employers”. That is just wrong. It bears on the employers and the members together. It is the employers’ costs that are capped under legislation and it is the members who bear the risk of increasing costs and stand to enjoy the benefit of reducing costs. The cost cap is crucial in these schemes and to ignore its important role fails to understand what we are doing. I am sorry—I could go on, but I think the situation is clear.
There was just one other point—I will go on. It arises under the next group and it is the idea of a statutory funding standard. Of course, we tried that with private sector pension schemes and it was a disaster. Everyone agreed it was a disaster and we had to have a new system—whether the new system was any better is a matter for debate. However, the idea of having a statutory funding standard just did not work.
To conclude—I hope it is a conclusion this time—there is no evidence that the existing system has failed. Indeed, we expect to see the benefits of the current approach when we decide what these funds should be in the light of the forthcoming valuation results.
Lord Fuller (Con)
My Lords, I knew my love-in with the noble Lord, Lord Davies, could not last, having got on so well with him on our first day in Committee on Monday. I want to come to the defence of my noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott because I do not think that she was talking about a disaster. It is common ground that the Local Government Pension Scheme—by some measure, the fourth-largest or fifth-largest scheme in the world, although it is in 89 separate pots, all of them aggregated—is a strong British success story. There is wide alignment on that on all sides of this Committee.
Having defended my noble friend, I shall part company slightly with some of the points she made—but only in one small regard. My noble friend spoke of a council—we do not know which one it is, but that does not really matter; it is illustrative—whereby the numbers were fixed in time, and that led, as the result of a revaluation, to an exceptionally high contribution rate. I do not want to trespass on the next group of amendments, but I will return to this idea. My noble friend almost came to a point where she wanted to deny—she did not say this, but I took it this way—that we should have some sort of stabilisation. I want to talk for stabilisation in the periods between revaluations in the LGPS.
We have done this in our scheme in Norfolk, so you avoid the peaks and the troughs. There is a stabilisation method whereby you take, if you like, a floating average over a number of things to give stability in the public finances. I accept that, as my noble friend said, if you have these huge differences—and it is not small change; you have to find lots of money—if it is overly variable every three years, that is not conducive to the public good. So I shall speak in favour of stabilisation, which is partly to do with longevity risk, which is referred to in Amendment 16.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies, accurately stated that the LGPS valuation that is currently under review was dated 31 March 2025—10 months ago. I am sure that noble Lords do not need reminding that, on the very next day, the President of the United States announced a whole load of trade barriers and the stock market fell like a stone. You might say that the LGPS got away with it. Had the President made his announcement just one day earlier, those reductions in stock market values would have been crystallised in a much less favourable outcome than we hope will be the case, or are expecting, for this current valuation.
Given the vicissitudes of all of these varied changes and events, it is important that we have attenuation and stabilisation between things. I do not think that my noble friend quite made that point, so I want to make it. The further points made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, will be covered in our debate on a later group, but I want to talk for stabilisation as a counter, if you will, to the case made by my noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I support Amendments 14 and 15; I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, for her explanation of the thinking behind them. I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that on this occasion I find it difficult to agree with much of what he said.
I agree that these schemes have been a success. I do not see these amendments as suggesting that there is a massive failure, but I am frightened that we could be about to snatch defeat from the jaws of the victory that these schemes have so far been able to provide. It is vital that there is a cost and sustainability review, as well as a review of the actuarial valuation methodologies. I do not feel that this issue can be swept under the carpet; to some extent, there is, or has been, a desire to do just that.
Excessive prudence and hoarding of excess assets are not, in my opinion, good governance. At least part of the surplus belongs to the employer, who is the council tax payer. This series of amendments, and indeed the whole Bill, need to be approached with the view that defined benefit pension schemes are no longer a problem that needs solving. We had that mindset for so many years that it seems we cannot easily get away from it but, actually, these funds have turned into a national asset, which needs to be stewarded responsibly. It can help to deliver both good pensions and long-term support for the economy, if we just use the opportunity that is presenting itself now.
The LGPS has very much changed position, especially because the needs of local and national economies have also changed. Council tax should be used responsibly and not to keep putting money into pension funds that already have more than they need. The risk of non-payment of these pensions is extremely low anyway, but the risk of council failure has been rising. The same is true for some other employers that are contributing here, such as special schools, academies, care homes and housing associations; a number of authorities and groups that are really important to our national well-being have also been caught up in this situation.
I must thank Steve Simkins of Isio, who has been helping me to understand some of what is going on at the local authority level. I have found his insights extremely valuable. Although the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said that we had the 2013 review under the local authority regulations—I think he quoted LGPS Regulation 62. That is in place but, as the years have gone on, the review and its terms have been used as a smokescreen for super-prudence. I have something of a problem with the argument about stability, because we were not as worried when we thought there were massive deficits in schemes, but we do not seem to want to take even a temporary respite from the ongoing contributions, which actuaries say are not needed, when things have become better.
I support the comments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, about the need for these regulations. They are meant, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, suggested, to help review contributions in the interim, but it is not clear what the definitions on which the review is based mean. The word “desirability” is so vague: desirable to whom? Even the word “stability” can be interpreted differently, depending on whether you are talking about stability immediately or over the long run. Does “long term cost efficiency” include the cost of holding too much money? Is that efficient? We also have “solvency”, of course; on what basis is that measured?
I have enormous sympathy with the noble Lord, Lord Davies, in imploring the Committee to have supreme confidence in the actuarial profession’s conclusions about these funds—I have to declare an interest in that my daughter is an actuary, although I stress not on the pension side. Of course, actuaries are a very professional, well-educated group, but the issue for me is not so much with the wording of the regulations but the mindset that is behind what is done with those valuations. The LGPS, the scheme advisory boards, the MHCLG and even the LGPS officers, advisers and investment managers themselves seem to want to interpret everything in the most negative way, so I think that the noble Baroness has done the Committee a service in raising these issues.
We will talk more about this in the next group, but I urge the Minister to consider carefully, in the context that councils are running out of money and cannot afford basic services, that 20% to 25% of council tax goes on employer pension contributions into schemes that do not, as I say, seem to need the money. Could we be stewarding this national resource, and even the local authority budgets, far better and use the opportunity of the pension success to drive better growth and better local well-being?
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)
My Lords, I must first remind myself to declare that I am a member of the Local Government Pension Scheme: I could not fail to be, having been 28 years on the London Borough of Barnet Council, but I tend to forget about it because it is quite a while ago. A payment does come monthly into my bank account, so I must declare that I am a recipient. I also served on the pensions committee of the London Borough of Barnet, so I have some knowledge of the things that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has been very eloquent about.
These amendments propose reviews of the Local Government Pension Scheme, and I think we have to get back to exactly what these amendments are asking for, which is sustainability and actuarial practice. We on my Benches support both, in principle. The Local Government Pension Scheme is a long-term, open scheme with unique characteristics, and pressures on admitted bodies, including housing associations, merit careful examination.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies, spoke eloquently about the profession of actuaries. I have always found that actuaries do not have a unified view. There are different actuaries and different views, and as a chartered accountant I have always thought they were impressively prudent with what they said the funds needed to be protected against.
Similarly, actuarial practices such as desirability, stability and solvency are not always applied consistently, despite our applause for actuaries as a profession. Greater clarity would help employers plan and would reduce disputes. Reviews, which is what these amendments ask for, are not admissions of failure; they are tools of good governance. We on these Benches therefore see these amendments as constructive and not critical.
The noble Lord, Lord Fuller, spoke very eloquently about stabilisation and the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, talked about cost and stabilisation review. Excess prudence, or super-prudence, is not sensible, and it is so easy to be prudent as the easy way out. There is an argument for temporary respite. All these come into the question of review, which is what these two amendments ask for. Our question is whether the Government can accept the value of structured, evidence-based review in strengthening confidence in the Local Government Pension Scheme. Review is not a question of failure; it is a question of prudence, which I would have thought actuaries would be in favour of.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, this has been another interesting and wide-ranging debate, and I am sorry to see that the accord that we had on Monday— the horseshoe accord, I am going to call it—between my noble friend Lord Davies and the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, has broken down. Sadly, in my experience these things do not last that long.
Lord Katz (Lab)
Where was I? I was simply going to say that I of course defer to the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, who was very much my senior partner in local government service. For the Committee’s information, I did not represent a neighbouring ward, but we are in neighbouring wards, although in different local authorities. It is good to know that north-west London—NW6 or NW2—is well represented in Committee this afternoon.
Before we look at the amendments relating to the triennial valuation of funds, it might be helpful to explain some of the basic principles relating to the valuation. The central principle and pride of the Local Government Pension Scheme is that it is a locally managed scheme. Administering authorities are responsible and accountable for meeting pension promises to members over their lifetimes. Striking the right balance between the cost to employers, risk management, intergenerational fairness and the needs of an open scheme is a matter for authorities.
This takes place through the fund valuation process, which is robust and well established, with strong safeguards. Administering authorities can work with their actuaries to develop assumptions and then carry out a valuation of the fund. Contribution rates are set for each employer, and administering authorities consult their employers as part of the rate-setting process. It is right that employers understand and are able to challenge their contribution rates and factor them into their medium-term financial planning. Valuations and rates are published and made available to all employers.
The valuations are reviewed by the Government Actuary’s Department, under Section 13 of the Public Service Pensions Act, which assesses whether compliance, consistency, solvency and long-term cost efficiency in the scheme have been achieved. Each fund and each employer is different. Valuations and rates will vary, depending on both the performance of investments and the make-up of each employer.
As we have heard from many noble Lords—including very forcibly from my noble friend Lord Davies—the 2025 valuation will conclude in a few weeks, setting rates for 2026-27 onwards. We should acknowledge the importance of that timing in our consideration of these amendments.
If I may, I will respond to Amendments 14 and 15 together. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger of Leckie, for tabling them. Amendment 14 would require a review into the affordability of the scheme. I recognise the concern that we have heard to ensure that the scheme remains affordable for employers, including local authorities and admitted bodies such as housing associations. But, to everyone’s credit—I will perhaps single out my noble friend Lord Davies but, to be fair, I include the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, and the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann—the LGPS is a success story. It has gone from deficit to surplus and currently has returns of 7% to 9%. It is in a strong financial position, with the majority of funds expected to show a surplus following the latest valuation. As a result, employer contributions are expected to reduce from April. Some reductions will be bigger than others, and that is part of the nature of the process that is in train. We should not pre-empt the result of that valuation.
The statutory cost control mechanism, which applies to all public sector schemes including the LGPS—which my noble friend Lord Davies referred to—ensures that the cost of benefits remains sustainable for employers. This mechanism operates on a four-year cycle, following the scheme-level valuation conducted by the Government Actuary’s Department. As we have heard, the most recent valuation was in 2024. An additional cost management process for the LGPS is operated by the scheme advisory board, with the aim of controlling the contributions paid by employers, which are set locally.
In addition, the Government Actuary’s Department, under Section 13 of the Public Service Pensions Act 2013, will undertake a review of all fund valuations for the Secretary of State and on whether compliance, consistency, solvency and long-term cost efficiency have been achieved across the scheme. An additional review into the affordability of the scheme would therefore simply replicate the existing processes built into the scheme. The Section 13 report will be based on the 2025 local valuations, which will conclude in a few weeks, and will deliver recommendations on the long-term cost effectiveness of the scheme, which the Government will consider carefully. We are very much not sweeping this issue under the carpet.
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
My Lords, I thank those taking part in this interesting debate, and the Minister for his response. I completely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, that discussion and consultation is best first. I will take advice on the naming of the authority, and I will certainly take advice on speaking to Kwasi Kwarteng. This is not a matter of political inheritance; it is a matter of changed circumstances. In 2022, when many Local Government Pension Scheme funds were still in deficit, higher employer contribution rates were, on balance, the correct and responsible course of action. At that point, the application of prudence, both actuarial and contribution-based, were broadly aligned with the financial position of the scheme.
What has changed is the context. Market conditions have shifted materially in recent years. Higher interest rates, improved funding positions and stronger asset values have transformed the balance sheets of many funds. This has been underscored by the most recent triennial valuation in 2025, which has revealed the scale of surplus that was neither anticipated nor problematic in earlier cycles. It is precisely at this point that the interpretation of the regulations, particularly Regulation 62(6), has come to the fore. The issue is no longer whether prudence is appropriate but how it is being applied in a materially different financial environment. Rules that operated sensibly when schemes were in deficit are now, through interpretation rather than legislation, producing outcomes that risk becoming disproportionate and unaffordable.
That is why the amendment matters. It is not an attempt to rewrite history or to relitigate past policy decisions; it is a forward-looking attempt to ensure that a regulatory framework designed for balance and sustainability remains fit for purpose as conditions change. This should not be a partisan issue. It is about ensuring that regulation keeps pace with reality, that prudence remains proportionate and that employers are not locked into contribution levels that no longer reflect the underlying financial position of the scheme. I hope noble Lords have appreciated the spirit in which we have tabled these amendments but, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“Local Government Pension Scheme: statutory funding objective(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations specify a statutory funding objective for the Local Government Pension Scheme. (2) The funding objective must have regard to—(a) the long-term ability of scheme employers to meet contribution costs,(b) the fair distribution of costs and risks between current and future taxpayers,(c) the open and ongoing nature of the Scheme, and(d) the appropriate management of investment and longevity risk.(3) In setting or revising the funding objective, the Secretary of State must publish an assessment of the extent to which the objective prioritises—(a) risk elimination,(b) contribution stability and affordability, and(c) intergenerational equity.(4) Administering authorities must have regard to the statutory funding objective when commissioning actuarial valuations.(5) Regulations under this section are subject to the affirmative procedure.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to set a clear statutory funding objective for the Local Government Pension Scheme, clarifying the balance between prudence, affordability and intergenerational fairness.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, we have a changing of horses: I will speak to the four amendments standing in my name and under the name of my noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott, which together develop and expand on the arguments already made from this Dispatch Box on the LGPS. These amendments address four specific concerns, each going into greater depth on the holistic and wider interpretation of Regulation 62(6) of the local government regulations discussed in the previous group.
I should at the outset address a point made on the last group by the noble Lord, Lord Davies. I reiterate that we are not questioning and never have questioned the success of the LGPS. I made that clear on Monday, as he will know, because indeed it is a British success story. But surely he would agree that it is right to debate and to challenge the Government on what happens next in the context of this Bill and the future of the LGPS, not least concerning decisions over the increasing values of the surpluses and their management. The noble Lord, Lord Fuller, has raised the important point about stability as a debating point. That has to be a good thing, and I am sure that it will be returned to.
The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, also made some basic, high-level points about the importance of and challenges around long-term planning and opacity in solvency definitions and actuarial valuations. I mention this because it is relevant in the context of these four amendments.
I want to be clear at the outset on what these amendments do and do not seek to achieve. They do not seek to weaken the scheme, undermine members’ security or prescribe a particular actuarial approach. Rather, they are intended to probe policy discipline, transparency and proportionality in a framework in which prudence has increasingly become an end in itself, and to bring four specific and important debates to the fore.
I begin with the first amendment, on funding objectives. At present, the LGPS has no explicit statutory funding objective. That is an extraordinary omission given the scale of public money involved and the consequences for employers, taxpayers and local services. In practice, actuarial valuations have defaulted to ever greater conservatism without any clear statement of what that conservatism is intended to deliver or whose interests it is prioritising.
This amendment would, therefore, require the Secretary of State to set a clear statutory funding objective for the scheme—one that explicitly has regard to affordability for employers, fairness between current and future taxpayers, the open and ongoing nature of the LGPS, and the appropriate management of investment and longevity risk. Crucially, it would also require Ministers to be transparent about trade-offs. Prudence is not value-neutral. Prioritising the near-elimination of risk will inevitably come at the expense of contribution affordability and intergenerational equity. That may be a legitimate policy choice, but it is a policy choice none the less and should be made consciously, openly and with accountability.
Without such an objective, risk aversion can ratchet in one direction only. Funding assumptions increasingly resemble those of a closed insurance scheme, despite the LGPS being open, long-dated and, ultimately, tax-backed. The absence of a statutory objective allows this drift to continue unchecked, regardless of value for money or wider public sector affordability. So I ask the Minister: does he see merit in such an objective? If not, how does he believe we can otherwise ensure that the balance between prudence, affordability and fairness is being struck correctly? It is not clear to us how the fund has reached this conclusion, based on the information provided to date.
I turn to my second amendment, which addresses a closely related concern: the absence of effective bench- marking in the valuation of liabilities. It would require administering authorities to publish benchmark liability valuations, based on insurer pricing and gilt-based discount rates, alongside their primary funding valuation. This amendment would not require LGPS funds to adopt insurer pricing, and it would also not impose any particular funding outcome. It simply poses a reasonable and necessary question: why is an open public service scheme so often valuing its liabilities more conservatively than insurers, which actively assume, price and manage longevity and investment risk for profit? I would be grateful for the Minister’s view as to whether that position is genuinely appropriate.
From the most recent valuation cycle, we have seen numerous case studies in which actuarial assumptions appear to value liabilities as though they were safer than sovereign-grade certainty of payment. In one case study that was shared earlier, the councils in question had liabilities measured at gilts minus 0.2%. In another, liabilities were measured at gilts minus 0.1%. We even encountered an admitted body whose cessation basis was funded at gilts minus 2.5%. That single difference in assumption resulted in a £70 million cessation debt were the employer to exit, compared with a £30 million credit if the liabilities were valued on an insurer-aligned basis—namely, gilts flat.
This has direct consequences for the measurement of surpluses, and we know that reported surpluses would be materially higher under less extreme assumptions. In the latter case, the outcome is, in effect, regulatory deadlock. The employer cannot afford a £70 million cessation debt. The regulations do not permit exit on an insurer-aligned basis. Buyout is not permitted. The employer is therefore overfunded, legally trapped, and compelled to continue paying unaffordable contributions.
The LGPS is a long-term open scheme, explicitly linked to investment growth and supported by a strong employer covenant. Earlier today, we discussed the scale of reported surpluses—which are measured on assumptions approaching sovereign-grade certainty. There is a clear tension here, and it merits proper scrutiny.
At present, there is no obligation to show how LGPS assumptions compare with market pricing, no requirement to justify materially higher levels of prudence, and no visibility of the opportunity cost, most notably in the form of higher employer contributions borne by councils, and ultimately by taxpayers. Benchmarking would bring those assumptions into the open, render prudence contestable rather than axiomatic, and strengthen democratic scrutiny of decisions with substantial fiscal consequences.
Even in policy areas far less complex than public service pensions, we readily acknowledge that different measures and benchmarks can produce materially different outcomes. Given the scale, the duration and complexity—
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, even with policy areas as complex as public service pensions, we readily acknowledge that different measures and benchmarks can produce materially different outcomes. Given the scale, duration and complexity of the LGPS, it is surely reasonable to expect those comparisons to be made explicit, so I would welcome the Minister’s reflection on that point.
My third amendment relates to the treatment of surplus. In a growing number of funds, funding levels now exceed 150%, yet employer contribution rates often remain high, surplus is not meaningfully released, and employers are sometimes required to inject fresh cash to meet strain costs—even when substantial excess assets are already being held. There is currently no public interest test governing these decisions; as a result, surplus can become effectively trapped, while councils face rising costs and local taxpayers face higher council tax bills.
This amendment would not mandate the release of surplus or weaken member security; it would simply require administering authorities to publish and justify their policy on contribution flexibility and the use of surplus, where funds are materially overfunded, and, crucially, to explain how they have balanced prudence, affordability and the interests of taxpayers. Requiring authorities to give reasons when surplus is retained as a matter of principle is, I believe, a modest step, but it is also a necessary one if we are serious about transparency, proportionality and accountability in the stewardship of public money.
Let me be clear: the 120% funding level refenced in this amendment is not intended to prevent councils or admitted bodies from reducing surplus through lower employer contributions. It is a signalling threshold, one that identifies funds where surplus is clearly material and where policies on its use should be made explicit and open to scrutiny.
I turn to my fourth amendment, which concerns transparency, accountability and actuarial assumptions. Actuarial judgments now determine billions of pounds-worth of public expenditure, yet transparency remains pretty limited. Consistency is weak and changes in assumptions are too often left unexplained. In practice, the actuaries’ view has become decisive but rather opaque; assumptions harden over time, the impact on contributions is insufficiently set out, and there is no clear or consistent standard of proportionality.
I fully accept that the Minister cannot comment on the specifics of a case that he has not seen. However, in the interests of the Committee I wish to share a further example raised with the shadow team by an admitted body within the Local Government Pensions Scheme—and this example is, mercifully, relatively straightforward. That body recently received its valuation results as at 31 March 2025, and the results show the following. Its section of the fund was in surplus, as at 31 March 2022; both the funding level and the surplus in cash terms have increased since then and are larger at 31 March 2025, yet employer contributions are set to increase from 1 April 2026.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I support these amendments and I have added my name to Amendments 19 and 20, which deal with issues around surpluses and distribution.
There are important issues in all these areas, in particular when there is a surplus and councils are considering how to spend the money that they have under their control or will be receiving from council tax payers. We have to ask: where is the balance of interest between national and local taxpayers? Who picks up the tab if council tax cannot cover the costs of the local authority and its expenditure needs, whether it is on social care, filling potholes, providing housing or whatever? These are vital national services.
It is important when we are discussing this Bill that we seriously consider these issues, because there is a mindset within local government that seems to ignore the principles of accountability, openness and good governance when it comes to their pension funds. I do not quite understand why, but that seems to be the case. In Amendment 18, when we are talking about the use of the LGPS excess funds, I would like to understand whether the Government object to the idea of having a review or a report into whether and how contributions can be reduced or offset against other employer spending needs. What is the balance between prudence, affordability for the employer and the council tax payer interests—and indeed the national taxpayer interests? National taxpayers underwrite the schemes.
On transparency around actuarial assumptions, as the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, said, there is no proper transparency around how any of the assumptions feed through to the conclusion on contributions. Would the Government object to the administering authorities being required to publish statements showing the actuarial assumptions; comparing them between now and previous valuations; providing justification for the changes and for any prudence level; or explaining the impact and showing that they have considered the impact on the various scheme employers? These employers are struggling in the current environment because there is not enough resource to cover the commitments that these important bodies are being required to make.
I hope that the Minister can help the Committee understand the Government’s view on how these pension schemes should be run in future—including, perhaps, a mindset change away from how we have been thinking about them up to now.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
There is a phrase, “esprit d’escalier”—is that how you say it?—for when you are walking down the stairs and you suddenly think of the thing you wish you had said in a previous discussion. Well, this group of amendments provides an ideal opportunity to avoid that very problem.
I do not want to delay the Grand Committee unnecessarily but I feel forced to say something. In essence, these amendments are fundamentally misconceived. I do not object to these questions being asked, but have the two previous speakers ever looked at a Local Government Pension Scheme valuation report? All the information for which they are asking and more is set out in those reports, in accordance with the professional standard that all actuaries must meet.
It is worth saying that that professional standard is set not by actuaries but by the Financial Reporting Council, which sets technical standards for the actuarial profession. The profession looks after professional standards but technical standards, and specifically what should appear in a valuation report, are set by the Financial Reporting Council, which is not part of the actuarial profession. Obviously, there is big actuarial input, but the final decision is made by the council, and all the information called for by the noble Viscount and the noble Baroness is in those reports. Of course, there may be cases where it does not appear in those reports, in which case that is a case of technical malpractice and the Financial Reporting Council should be told.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
I apologise for intervening, but I feel that there is a bit of misdescription here. Yes, it is true that Regulation 64, for example, includes this information, but the FRC does not have the authority to insist on these issues being fed through. Indeed, there is non-statutory guidance that seems to override all this. For example, it says that you should not consider changes in contribution rates on the basis of liabilities that have changed due to market changes, so the interest rate environment, which has changed so fundamentally, is supposed not to feed through to the conclusions on contribution rates. That is part of this mindset which, I feel, it is so important for us to try to adjust as we go forward, given the fundamental changes that have happened.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
I apologise, but I do not understand what the noble Baroness is saying. Actuaries have to comply with these professional standards; any valuation report they produce has to meet them—that is not a question for debate. If a report does not meet those standards, it should be pursued on its merits. To claim that this information is not available is simply untrue: it is there in the valuation reports. I always have problems with the word “transparency”, because to me it looks like something you can see through and you cannot see it, but I take it to mean that a full explanation of the degree of prudence, a wide evaluation of the assumptions chosen, what effect different assumptions would have and the outcome in terms of the contribution rate all have to be set out. They are publicly available.
The second point is that actuaries do not decide on the valuation assumptions; the management committee decides, on actuarial advice, what the assumptions should be. The local, democratically elected representatives take the decisions, including about what the contribution rate should be. We are currently in an odd state where lots of information on the situation is becoming available, but that is because we are at the end of a three-year cycle of valuations. By the end of this year, all these issues will have been resolved. Not everyone will be pleased; it is entirely possible that some admitted bodies will find that their contributions go up. Perhaps they had significant changes in their workforce—who knows? But the mere fact that some contribution rates go up while the overall move is a reduction does not in itself mean that the system is broken.
I find it difficult to understand what exactly these amendments intend to achieve. The information is available, the decisions are made by the local government bodies involved, and they take the decisions based on their democratic responsibility. What more could we want?
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
Perhaps I could assist the Committee. These amendments are asking for a publicly available report that clarifies and sets out all this information on a basis that council tax payers, for example, whose money is being used, can see with clarity: it is provided to them. With all due respect, they will not read the actuarial report, but having a properly set-out review that explains all this clearly, in language that people can understand, would have huge value.
Viscount Thurso (LD)
My Lords, I am sure that my noble friend on the Front Bench will give our view on the generality of these amendments. I have one small question that I want to put to the noble Viscount in respect of Amendment 16.
Broadly, I am in favour of clarity of investment function, and I suggest that any well-run fund has a very clear statement of its objectives that everybody can see. My question is simply about the use of the phrase “risk elimination” in subsection 3(a) of the proposed new clause. This goes to the heart of one of the problems of discussing surpluses and everything else: it seems to me that anybody making investments who is seeking to eliminate risk is in the wrong industry. They really ought to be doing something else, because you cannot have any reward without risk. I humbly suggest that it should refer to “risk appetite”. It is perfectly correct for any set of investing trustees or any fund to have clarity as to the risk appetite that they wish to have to achieve the investment objectives that their pension fund has; I just question the use of the word “elimination”.
Lord Fuller (Con)
Your Lordships will be pleased to know that peace has broken out again: I agreed with much of what the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said, and I do not accept the characterisations that the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, laid out in full.
I have sat on five triennial actuarial revaluations of the Norfolk scheme over 20 years, and I can tell noble Lords that we are not unique. We agonise over how we deal with the valuation over months. We look at the assumptions, the different types of employer and the different scenarios that we might realistically use. There is a fan of opportunities that the actuaries run; I would say a thousand or a very substantial number—many hundreds—of different potential scenarios based on membership of the scheme, the sponsoring employers and even the life expectancy per member calibrated by postcode, using the Club Vita methodology. Of course, we think primarily about governance as well.
To a certain extent, if that is going on, one might ask why we need these amendments at all. We do because, as those of us who are involved in the LGPS know, brighter days ought to be ahead after some pretty tricky periods over the last 20 years. But just because the sun is coming over the horizon today, it does not mean it might not set in the future. A Bill like this will have longevity, so we need to get it right rather than be overly optimistic. Overoptimism is the counter to excessive prudence.
I support many of the amendments in this group, but I will start with Amendment 18. I have seen schemes with valuations in the low 70s, when interest rates were low, but some schemes are now funded well into the 130s or 140s. We have heard today about a scheme that is funded 150%. Without excessive prudence, more of them might have been in that bucket.
The sums of money for these fluctuations are enormous. For a mid-sized county scheme with £5 billion under management, 10% could still be £0.5 million—a large sum that can go a long way. So there is a temptation to trim employer contributions when times are good, safe in the knowledge that there is still a substantial cushion to fall back on. I have no problem with that as a principle: after all, when times were bad, employers had to chip in a lot more, so it is only fair that there is a two-way street and hoarding is no good to the member, employer or taxpayer when there is a bypass to pay for.
The problem is how you apportion that rebate or discount to the members if there is a surplus. When times were bad and more contributions were needed, the contribution rate was calculated differently for each employer depending on the maturity of that scheme, the number of members of the employer, the covenant strength of the employer and their individual deficit and funding position. Clearly, a tax-raising council, which does most things itself and can jam-spread those changes over many employees, will have a lower contribution rate for the deficit than a largely contracted-out services authority with much fewer staff. That is why one authority that used to employ a lot of people, but had to let them go by outsourcing most of their services to private contractors, has a contribution rate of 50% on salaries. That is a huge sum of money. However, a well-run council like my own—we do most things ourselves—was in the 20s. That is not unfair; it is just the arithmetic.
As an aside, I would say that outsourcing is all very well but, as the litany of failed outsourcers has shown—Carillion, Connaught, Mears, Steria and many more—when they go bust, those pension liabilities come boomeranging back to the host council that thought it was being smart but was not. One city not far from where I live has had to learn that painful lesson on more than one occasion. At least those councils that are tax-raising bodies, with ratings typically one notch below sovereign, can stand those shocks.
Let us consider one class of admitted body: the academies, which are admitted to the scheme of local government workers for their classroom assistants. There are maybe only a few per school, but they benefit from a Department for Education underwriting. That is a pretty good state-backed guarantee there. They may not be able to raise taxes, but their liabilities are gilt edged. However, when you then think of the small youth work charity which could go bust tomorrow if its local authority cuts its funding, there is a risk there. My point is that all the employers play a different contribution rate within each scheme that relates to their circumstances. That is for one scheme, but there are 89 such schemes, each with their own circumstances. Yes, it is untidy, but matching assets and liabilities to the exact and precise needs of those cohorts provides the best value to the taxpayer and accuracy in computation. So, when you add or take away those contributions, if you are in surplus, the value of the rebate can be calculated accurately.
I am not just trying to be difficult; I am just providing the reality of the situation. To focus on Amendment 18 for a moment, which requires the repayment of surpluses, it is a good proposal, but we need to allow for a much greater degree of complexity there. I hear what my noble friend has said, and there is a specimen number of 120% there. My instinct is that it is significantly more complicated than that, and there should be some sort of covenant-strength weighting—a hard-coded number is not right. Different schemes need different numbers. The underlying principle that, when the surplus gets to a certain amount, there should be a rebate is sound, but I am just really concerned that we overly simplify it and miss the target there.
We certainly need to be aware, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, mentioned in an earlier group, about the cost cap, and be aware of the situation, which is mainly in the statutory unfunded schemes, where valuations are split between the employer and employees. I was a member of the fire services scheme, an unfunded scheme, and we nearly got into the situation in 2018-19 where there was an excess and we had to take money away from the employees; then in 2023, I think it was, or possibly four years later, it was going the other way. Mercifully, it was so complicated that nothing was done, so we ended up where we were. Just the cost cap in and of itself is a blunt tool. But I am getting ahead of myself.
Each scheme needs its own methodology for its own circumstances, and, of course, there are four separate actuarial companies in competition, so there is innovation which we must welcome—it is invidious to mention their names; some of us know who they are. They get their fees by constantly becoming more and more accurate and refined, and that is a good thing, not just for them but for the taxpayer, the members and employers. So, we need to have that combination of flexibility, but I can see the virtue of standardisation, or at least a standard method of expressing those particular schemes on a common basis so they can be consistently compared, so that my good friend Roger Phillips—who is newly OBE-ed, for the record—can publish his scheme advisory board census annually.
I have explained why each scheme needs its own bespoke valuation, but that does not help Roger. And, in the non-LGPS schemes, the GAD—the Government Actuary’s Department—provides figures because they are a provision for risk sharing between government and members, and so forth.
Amendment 19, and to a certain extent Amendment 17, on benchmarking, are important, but they cannot be the substitute nor override for bespoke measures in each scheme. In the case of benchmarking, the amendment would have been strengthened had we been able to look at cost per member, and there are other metrics too which can help people develop confidence in the schemes.
It is in the public interest that the amendments are accepted. Just because brighter years are ahead—we hope—does not mean that there is no value to these amendments. We need to allow for circumstances when those silver linings may have clouds again, to mix metaphors. I do not want to dilute the thrust and importance of the statutory funding objectives for the LGPS, because it ultimately provides a method by which we can balance appropriate risk with reward for each of the scheme members and the taxpayer who underwrites it all in the end—and that is a good way of doing it.
To a certain extent, the thrust of these amendments would put on a statutory footing the work that the LGPS advisory board does on a voluntary basis. That would be a very good thing for transparency and confidence, demonstrating further the success that is the local government scheme in this country. It is the closest thing that we have to a sovereign wealth fund, and anything that improves its standing has to be a good thing, so I commend this set of amendments.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
I shall just comment on Amendment 19. To summarise what the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, said, there are actuaries’ reports that have all this information, and actuaries understand those reports. Amendment 19 concentrates on publishing something in a form accessible to employers and the public, and I think that that is very important, because actuarial practice is quite difficult to understand sometimes. It cannot be assumed that a member of the public could understand actuarial language. We need to be able to communicate in a way that is accessible to the people who actually bear the costs of the local authority pension scheme—the council tax payers. I do not think that that is met by the actuaries’ reports, which doubtless comply with all kinds of standards issued by the FRC and long-standing actuarial practice but, in my limited experience of looking at these things, are pretty difficult to understand.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
I do not think that I said that it was okay if actuaries understood the report even if no one else did. I have in front of me the last valuation report from the pension panel of the London Pensions Fund Authority. I have been looking through it and I think that it is a wonderful example of presenting difficult actuarial information in a way that is understandable to any member of the fund who is prepared to put a modicum of effort into understanding it. The report starts with a very clear and concise executive summary, picking out the important points, then goes through all the issues that need to be explained, around levels of prudence and why particular assumptions have been made. It is all in there, with lots of appendices alongside if you want a deep dive into the detailed data.
I do not think I said that these reports were understandable only by actuaries; these are big commercial organisations which support their clients by providing information in an accessible manner. That is part of their job and it is what I always tried to do when I was a scheme actuary. The feedback that I received was that people were pleased to understand what was happening to their money.
Lord Fuller (Con)
In my scheme, and in the one that the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, talked about, we take pride in what we do—but if only all the schemes did that. The value of these amendments is in taking the best schemes, which set the bar, and making sure that other schemes meet that bar in terms of transparency. Just a few of them doing it is not good enough; we want all of them to be doing it.
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)
My Lords, I support these amendments because I believe that transparency is good. I will need to address some of the things that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said. He is right from an actuarial point of view, obviously. He said the decision is made by the council; in fact, it is made by the management committee of that council. The management committee of most councils will consist of councillors who are neither actuaries nor particularly great financial wizards. What happens in practice is that those people on the council’s management committee that is deciding take the advice of its pensions advisers, stockbrokers and actuaries. It happens on that basis. Do they understand it? My general view is that they are swayed by the people who make the arguments to that committee.
So this group of amendments addresses transparency, benchmarking and surplus. To most people, these are technical matters and ones on which the noble Lord, Lord Davies, speaks with great expertise from an actuarial point of view. But the impact on employer contributions and public services is real. Where valuations are materially more prudent than market benchmarks, we need to understand why.
My noble friend Lord Thurso talked about risk appetite. Most local authority pension committees will not have a great deal of appetite for risk. Their idea is that they are custodians of their employees’ pensions and they will naturally fall on the opposite side of taking risk. That is probably quite right. These amendments are a step in the right direction: they are a clearer explanation of assumptions and benchmarks, which strengthens the local government pension schemes by improving accountability and understanding.
Our question is whether the Government and the Minister agree that transparency is a safeguard and not a threat. This is what the amendments talk about—transparency. We need to make it as transparent to the management committees of these pension funds as it can be. That is what these amendments try to do: they would bring this on to a more generalised basis, not just picking the ones that do well in the Orkneys or wherever, but ones that maybe need guidance. Therefore, these Benches support these amendments, and I hope that they see some light at the end of the tunnel.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, this has been another interesting and wide-ranging debate. I am pleased to see that the horseshoe accord has, to some small measure, broken out again. I must say that I am not as pleased to see the conversion—maybe I am being unfair in characterising it as a Damascene conversion—of the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, and other Members opposite into the prudence of having well-funded local government to provide local services, after the underfunding of local authorities for a fair amount of time. Would that that sentiment had been shown by the Benches opposite when they were on our side of the Committee, but we are where we are.
These amendments show a clear desire to provide greater transparency in the triennial valuation and contributions rate-setting process. I agree it is important that all scheme employers understand how their contribution rates have been set, and members need to have confidence in the long-term sustainability of the fund.
These amendments also show a keen interest in the funding level of the Local Government Pension Scheme and the balance that administering authorities must strike between the long-term sustainability of the fund and affordability to its employers. As a public sector scheme, it is right that we are mindful of the costs to the taxpayer of funding the scheme.
I will address up front why the surplus extraction measures in Clauses 9 and 10 do not apply to the LGPS, to avoid confusion. The LGPS already has a triennial valuation process where contribution rates for employers are set. This is effectively a point where surplus extraction can take place, as this is where contribution rates can be reduced in response to an improvement in the funding level. As we will come on to later, there is also an interim contribution review process for employers who find themselves in difficulty. Therefore, an additional surplus extraction process is not required.
Furthermore, I urge caution in viewing surpluses in the LGPS as a potential windfall or as a means of managing broader revenue pressures for scheme employers. As in all defined benefit schemes, surpluses are maintained to absorb future shocks, manage demographic risk and ensure that promises made to members are kept. Poor decision-making can now lead to higher costs for future generations of taxpayers.
For context, the 2025 valuation will conclude in a few weeks, as we have discussed, with employer contribution rates set for April 2026 onwards. Following this, the Government Actuary’s Department, under Section 13 of the Public Service Pensions Act 2013, will undertake a review for the Secretary of State of all fund valuations, on whether compliance, consistency, solvency and long-term cost efficiency in the scheme has been achieved. Under usual timeframes, the report will be published in mid-2027.
Although I appreciate that the Committee is concerned about rising surpluses in the scheme, it surely cannot be right that we make amendments that would have a material impact on future valuations without having a full review of the outcomes of the 2025 valuation. It is anticipated that there will be reductions in contribution rates for many employers from April, and we need to take account of how the current system has coped with the significant changes in market conditions since that 2022 valuation—we discussed that on both this and the previous group—before making changes to the valuation process.
The LGPS is a locally administered and managed scheme. It is administering authorities that are responsible for managing their surpluses through employer contribution rate changes, and for working with their actuaries to set appropriate assumptions as part of the valuation. Authorities are required under government regulations to provide valuation reports to employers to support them in their longer-term financial planning. So we must consider whether it is right for the Government to exert a more significant level of influence over the setting of contribution rates through these amendments, and whether this is compatible with local accountability.
It is right, in a locally managed scheme, that funds are able to set their own approaches to stability and prudence, reflecting both the needs of employers in understanding their medium-term financial obligations and the different risk profiles of their investments. The balance of these is key to delivering the intergenerational fairness mentioned by noble Lords opposite, particularly the noble Viscount, Lord Younger—and indeed we all want to see that.
On transparency, revised statutory guidance on the funding strategy statement, which all LGPS funds must publish, was issued by the scheme advisory board on behalf of MHCLG in January 2025. Under this guidance, administering authorities should consult all employers in the fund on their funding strategy statement, which should outline how administering authorities will manage surpluses and deficits, outline the approach to contribution rate stability, and summarise the main actuarial assumptions used at the valuation.
Amendment 16 would require the Secretary of State to set a statutory funding objective for LGPS funds, including considerations for administering authorities, setting their funding strategy and contribution rates. There is already detailed guidance on how funds should manage surpluses and deficits in their funding strategy, but, as locally managed schemes, it should be for administering authorities to consider how to strike the right balance in setting the contribution rates, with appropriate considerations of prudence and the long-term sustainability of the scheme and contributions. Furthermore, a funding objective would still require a degree of interpretation and so would not provide the clarity that the noble Lord seeks to achieve with his amendment.
In 2020, the Supreme Court found that LGPS money is not, in fact, public money, but that it belongs to its members, which further justifies why a statutory funding objective is not appropriate for the scheme.
Amendment 17 would require fund valuations to be benchmarked against insurer and gilt-based pricing, with a report laid before the relevant local authority. The triennial valuation and contribution rates-setting process is already a robust and collaborative process between administering authorities, actuaries and employers. Many authorities already follow best practice in consulting scheme employers alongside the contribution rate-setting process. This gives employers the opportunity to challenge contribution rates and consider whether they are sufficiently stable, or whether excessive prudence is built in.
Statutory guidance already sets out that funds should publish the actuarial assumptions used as part of the funding strategy statement. The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, referenced the role of the Financial Reporting Council in the valuation. The valuation reports, which are publicly available, will include Financial Reporting Council compliance statements that technical actuarial standards have been complied with. In addition, I have already raised the Section 13 report by the GAD, which reviews the fund-level actuarial valuations. As part of the review into the 2022 valuation report, for example, when assessing consistency, there was a review of assumptions, including the discount rate.
Finally, this amendment points to a perceived excessive risk aversion undertaken by the LGPS. This is not an accurate characterisation. In fact, around three-quarters of LGPS assets are invested in return-seeking assets, vastly outweighing the equivalent figures in private schemes, which are heavily geared towards matching assets.
Amendment 18 would require administering authorities to publish and justify their approach to the treatment of surpluses over 120%. First, we must consider if this is the level that we would wish to set in the context of the LGPS. Elsewhere in defined benefit schemes, the Government are considering the funding threshold for surplus release, and there has already been consideration of what this would be. But we must remember that the valuation process already provides a route to return surplus to employers, which allows for changes every three years, whether or not a threshold—whatever it is—has been met.
Furthermore, each valuation is prepared on a local basis, meaning that the funding level will depend on the discount rate set. The discount rate converts the value of future benefits to a current value so it can be compared to the current value of assets; it is used to determine the employer contribution rate required to pay future benefits. It is based on the assumed future returns of the individual fund’s investments, taking into account the portfolio of assets held by the fund, the demographic profile of its members and its attitudes to risk. That means that a funding level of 120% in one fund will simply not be comparable to that of another if the discount rates applied are significantly different.
I think that the Committee will surely agree that the purpose of a buffer is to provide a surplus in well-funded times and guard against a fall into deficit in more challenging times. As a locally managed scheme, it is for the funds, not for the Government, to decide what the right level of surplus is. Introducing these additional reviews and requirements would risk undermining the valuation process and the locally managed nature of the scheme.
On Amendment 19, we had an interesting discussion on transparency—certainly transparency and accessibility is something that we should all seek. I appreciated the discussion between my noble friend Lord Davies and the noble Baronesses, Lady Altmann and Lady Noakes, on the accessibility of the actuarial statements. Maybe I would say this, but I thought that my noble friend put up a good defence of the professional standards that actuarial firms set themselves with regard to matters of accessibility.
I appreciate that the intent of Amendment 19 is to increase the transparency of actuarial valuations for all scheme employers and for members of the public. In addition to the requirements that I have already mentioned, regulations also require the administering authority to publish and send copies of any valuation, report or certificate made under Regulation 62, or Regulation 64, to all employers. I do not recognise that as limited transparency, but I concede that there is scope for greater visibility—and that is something that we should always seek to pursue. While there is scope to look at whether these publications could be made easier to understand for employers, that should be considered in the round—I suggest following the conclusion of the 2025 valuation.
The noble Viscount, Lord Younger, asked me to comment on his example of valuations increasing despite surpluses, and I would say that there is a robust valuation process in place into which employers feed. We must wait for completion of the scheme valuation and its formal result—but if this is the case as set out by the noble Viscount, the Government Actuary’s Department will review the results in the valuation under regulations in Section 13.
The noble Lord, Lord Fuller, asked about funds not using a discount rate that is more prudent than a gilt basis. I have already talked about the wider inaccurate characterisation of excessive risk aversion, but at this point I add that the LGPS is a funded scheme with diversified assets and its discount rates are set by fund actuaries on a scheme-specific, prudent basis that reflects long-term expected returns. The valuations are reviewed nationally by the GAD on compliance, solvency and long-term cost efficiency. Without the results of the 2025 valuation or the Section 13 review, we cannot say for certain what the current approach is, taken across all funds.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
I thank the Minister for his remarks and explanations. I will look carefully at his replies in Hansard, given the technical nature of the debate—in fact, I think it is fair to say that about all the debates we are having. In closing, I emphasise that these amendments are united by a single, simple concern that decisions of very large fiscal consequence are being taken within a framework that we believe lacks sufficient clarity, transparency and accountability. It has been helpful to have this debate, and I hope that view is shared by those who have contributed, particularly on this side of the Committee.
I will pick up on a number of points. I am grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, and the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, for these amendments. It is fair to say that they have had slightly more lukewarm support from my noble friend Lord Fuller, but I appreciate his thoughtful comments, particularly on Amendments 18 and 19. Again, we will look carefully at his responses in Hansard.
I am of the opinion that at my peril do I get caught between the opinions of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. I listened carefully to the exchange about the quality of reports. My noble friend Lady Noakes made the very good point that it is important to have reports that are full of clarity and are understandable to those who are new to this or do not understand it. As the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said, some reports may be very clear to read, but reports vary, as my noble friend Lord Fuller rightly said. It is an important point to raise.
The noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, made a very fair point about subsection (3)(a) of the proposed new clause in Amendment 16, picking up on the description of risk elimination and seeking to change it to risk appetite. I might even add a third one: risk minimalisation. That is probably the wrong term, but it is a serious point. It may be that the term I have used, risk elimination, is the right one but refers to minimal risk. He made a very fair point which I will take away.
To conclude, the Local Government Pension Scheme is open, long-dated and underwritten by the public sector. Yet we believe that, over time, the practice has drifted towards assumptions and behaviours more consistent with a closed insurance arrangement, often without those choices being clearly articulated or justified. When prudence becomes the default, rather than a consciously chosen balance, the costs fall quietly but heavily on employers, taxpayers and local services.
Therefore, if the Government believe that the current framework already achieves that balance, explaining why would be valuable—this debate has been valuable as far as it has gone. If not, I suggest that these amendments offer a measured and constructive way of restoring discipline, transparency and trust in a system that matters enormously, I believe, to local government and to taxpayers alike. However, for the moment, I wish to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Stedman-Scott
“Interim reviews of employer contribution rates in the Local Government Pension Scheme(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations made under section 3 of the Public Service Pensions Act 2013 (scheme regulations) amend the Local Government Pension Scheme Regulations 2013 (S.I. 2013/2356) as follows.(2) After regulation 58(4), insert—“(5) The funding strategy statement must comply with regulation 64A(2) and be published in a form accessible to non-specialist readers.”(3) Regulation 64A (revision of rates and adjustments certificate: scheme employer contributions) is amended as set out in subsection (4).(4) For paragraphs (1) and (2), substitute—“(1) The administering authority may obtain a revised rates and adjustments certificate where the funding strategy statement sets out the administering authority’s policy on revising contributions between valuations and one or more of the following conditions is met—(a) there has been a significant change in the liabilities arising or likely to arise since the last valuation;(b) there has been a significant change in the employer’s ability to meet its obligations to the Scheme, consistent with that employer’s obligations to deliver value for money and services for local taxpayers;(c) the employer requests a review and agrees to meet the reasonable costs of that review.(2) The funding strategy statement must include a clear and accessible policy on revising contributions between valuations, including—(a) the process and evidential requirements for employers to request a review,(b) indicative timescales for the administering authority to determine such a request,(c) the criteria the administering authority and fund actuary will apply (including risk appetite and prudence levels), and(d) the approach to apportioning reasonable costs of any review.(2A) Where an employer makes a request under paragraph (1)(c), the administering authority must—(a) acknowledge the request within 10 working days,(b) determine the request within 12 weeks (or such longer period as is agreed with the employer), and(c) provide written reasons for its decision.(2B) For any review under this regulation, the fund actuary must prepare an Actuarial Methods Statement which— (a) explains, step by step, the models and methodologies used to project liabilities, assets and funding needs,(b) sets out all material assumptions, including discount rates, inflation, salary growth, mortality, longevity improvements and any smoothing or damping mechanisms,(c) specifies the level of prudence applied and how that prudence has been determined, and(d) provides sensitivity and scenario analysis showing potential outcomes under varying market conditions and employer covenant assessments.(2C) The administering authority must publish the Actuarial Methods Statement alongside the decision under paragraph (3)(c), subject only to the redaction of information which is commercially sensitive or relates to individuals. (2D) The Secretary of State must issue statutory guidance on—(a) how councils and other employers may make requests under paragraph (1)(c),(b) the matters administering authorities should take into account when considering such requests, including the balance between Scheme solvency and local taxpayers’ interests in the continued delivery of core services, and(c) the minimum standards for actuarial transparency under paragraph (5).(2E) Administering authorities must have regard to guidance issued under paragraph (6)(a).(2F) The Secretary of State must publish the guidance within six months of the day on which this Act is passed and keep it under review.””Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause aims to strengthen Regulation 64A of the Local Government Pension Scheme Regulations 2013 to make interim reviews of employer contribution rates more accessible and transparent.
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
My Lords, I hope the Committee will forgive me for the length of this amendment, which is tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie.
Despite its length, its purpose is in truth a simple one. It seeks to ensure that the provision for interim reviews of employer contribution rates under the Local Government Pension Scheme is not merely available in theory but genuinely usable in practice. At present, while the regulation allows interim reviews, the circumstances in which they may be triggered are so narrowly framed and so conservatively interpreted that many employers find them effectively inaccessible. The consequence is that contribution rates can remain detached from the financial reality and workforce profile for prolonged periods, even when there has been a clear and material change in circumstances.
I will not revisit the funding position of individual schemes, but it is important to note, once again, how sharply the position of the Local Government Pension Scheme has changed. Recent low-risk analysis shows the scheme moving from around 65% funded in 2022 to significant and sustained overfunding in 2025, with all funds now above 100%. That shift has clear implications for contributions. Even on prudent assumptions, implied future service rates are far below the roughly 21% that employers currently pay, at a cost of around £9 billion a year.
The difficulty is that the formal valuation process is not designed to respond quickly to changing circumstances. In this case, the 2025 valuation cycle in a number of cases has already concluded. As a result, councils now face contribution rates based on assumptions that no longer reflect current financial conditions, with no realistic prospect of adjustment through the normal valuation timetable. In those circumstances, the interim review mechanism becomes the only viable route to a fair and proportionate outcome.
Valuations are infrequent by design, but financial reality does not always conform to that schedule. Where there has been a material change in funding position, workforce composition or employer risk, interim reviews are intended to act as a safety valve, allowing contribution rates to be reassessed before costs are locked in for years at a time. In practice, however, access to that mechanism is so constrained that it often fails to perform the role it was created to serve. For that reason, although previous amendments address the deeper structural drivers of the current contribution pressures, I will turn to the interim mechanism.
The proposed new clause before us does not change the intent of the law. It seeks only to ensure that the safeguards Parliament has already provided can be used effectively by councils whose contribution rates may no longer be justified by the scheme’s underlying financial position. Specifically, it strengthens Regulation 64A of the 2013 regulations by addressing the practical barriers that councils face when seeking a review. It clarifies when a review may be requested, requires funds to set out clearly how requests are made and assessed, introduces transparency around the actuarial assumptions and underpinning contribution rates, and promotes greater consistency through statutory guidance.
Taken together, these changes do not weaken prudence or undermine solvency, but they make the process intelligible and navigable for the employers expected to engage with it. The underlying problem, therefore, is not that councils lack the right to request an interim review but that they lack a realistic means of exercising that right. Processes are unclear, evidential thresholds are opaque, and actuarial models are often presented in ways that make meaningful engagement extremely difficult.
In those circumstances, Regulation 64A functions less as a practical safeguard and more as a theoretical reassurance. That matters, because the financial consequences for councils are immediate and real. Pension contributions represent a significant and growing share of local authority expenditure. When contribution rates remain misaligned with financial reality, they absorb resources that would otherwise support front-line services. Yet councils remain fully accountable to local taxpayers for their financial decisions, even when the assumptions driving those costs are neither transparent nor consistently applied. The result is a system that undermines sound financial management at precisely the moment when many authorities are already under severe strain.
This brings us directly to the statutory duties that already rest on local government. Section 151 of the Local Government Act 1972 requires every authority to appoint a Section 151 officer, typically the chief financial officer, who bears personal responsibility for the proper administration of the authority’s financial affairs. These officers are legally obliged to ensure that expenditure is lawful, prudent and sustainable, and that duty does not stop at pension cost. Where long-term liabilities appear misaligned with risk, or where contribution volatility threatens service delivery, it is entirely reasonable that a Section 151 officer should be able to seek closer scrutiny through an interim review.
If such an officer believes that the assumptions underpinning contribution rates warrant examination, the system should enable that scrutiny rather than obstruct it. This clause does not ask actuaries to abandon prudence or funds to compromise solvency; it simply ensures that those charged with financial stewardship are given the transparency and procedural clarity necessary to discharge their existing legal responsibilities. Indeed, this is the most significant change made by the amendment. It clarifies the trigger conditions for an interim review by amending the second condition so that an employer’s ability to meet its LGPS obligations is assessed in a way that is consistent with its statutory duties to deliver value for money and to maintain services for local taxpayers.
At present, actuarial assessments tend to treat local authorities as possessing an effectively risk-free covenant, on the assumption that central government would ultimately step in to prevent failure. As a result, actuaries are understandably reluctant to accept that a council might be unable to meet its pension obligations, and contribution rates are set on the basis that payment is in practice guaranteed. However, that assumption does not reflect the financial reality facing local government. The strength of a council’s covenant is not unlimited; it is ultimately constrained by its local tax base and its legal obligation to balance its budget. Councils cannot borrow indefinitely to meet pension costs, and they also cannot insulate those costs from their wider responsibilities to residents.
This amendment would require the actuarial assessments to recognise that balance. Prudence must not operate as a one-way ratchet, where contribution levels can only ever rise or remain elevated, regardless of changing circumstances. Instead, prudence must be weighed alongside councils’ duties to local taxpayers, while continuing to protect and secure the benefits of scheme members. In short, this change does not undermine member security but simply ensures that assessments of affordability reflect the real-world constraints under which councils operate rather than an abstract assumption of unlimited state backing. The law already allows interim reviews in principle but, in practice, the system makes them inaccessible. This proposed new clause would close the gap, clarify the rules, improve transparency, introduce consistency and strengthen accountability, ensuring that interim reviews function as a real safeguard rather than a theoretical one.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
My Lords, in speaking to my Amendment 20A, I shall also speak in support of Amendment 20, to which I have added my name. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, for both her clear exposition and her support for my amendment.
Amendment 20A seeks to benchmark the Local Government Pension Scheme’s employer contributions rather than just the liabilities. It asks the LGPS to
“report publicly the employer contribution rates being paid by each scheme and establish a benchmark for employer contribution rates”
as a proportion of, for example, salary. It also asks the LGPS to
“collect and publish data from each local authority council employer in the scheme, to report the percentage of council tax receipts that are represented by employer pension contributions”.
I have struggled long and hard to compile some information that would give us a picture, across local authorities, of what proportion of council tax receipts is spent on pension contributions in each area. I have to say that I ended up coming back to a national average, because that was the only figure that I could readily find.
I thank Steve Simkins at Isio, who told me about a council where the actuarial valuation implied an employer contribution of zero but the council was asking for a 15% contribution anyway. Unless you have a benchmark for this kind of information, you would not know it. Before the noble Lord, Lord Davies, asks me about this, let me say that I will have to seek permission to let him know which council it is; if I am able to do so, I will, of course.
The Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Davies, have suggested that those of us who are laying these amendments are somehow concerned about the surpluses. I do not believe that there is concern about the surpluses; the concern is around how the surpluses are dealt with. We have concerns that there have been significant overpayments, amid pressure on both local and national taxpayers, while urgent local and national expenditure has had to be either cut or not made, and while councils remain underfunded and government borrowing keeps rising. Those are the consequences of not allowing the surpluses to feed through to the expenditure on the employer contributions—and that, I think, is the concern that this suite of amendments is trying to address.
When we are talking about these pension schemes, we are talking about a funding level that is an estimate. The assets make no allowance for future returns, for example, even though they are invested to earn future returns, as would be expected of any long-term investment. However, the liabilities fully build in assumptions— expectations—of what the future liabilities will be over the very long term. The money for the contributions is required now and has to be paid today, but a one-year or two-year cessation of extra contributions surely does not undermine a scheme that is already overfunded for the next 50 years, never mind the next two years. And of course it can improve local well-being.
I hope that the Minister will consider accepting these amendments on the basis on which they are proposed, which is in seeking not to cause problems but to help both local and national funding. Yes, it is true that local authority employers pay varying percentages of salary into the different schemes, but it would help the public and councillors themselves to have some kind of comparison of the rates that they are paying and of the funding level of the scheme and the implications that that might have for future funding, rather than to continue with the current range. I am told that councils such as Avon pay rates of between 15% and 40%, depending on the employer, into a scheme that, based on all conventional funding measures, does not require that money at this time.
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
My Lords, I declare my interest as a vice-president of the Local Government Association and of the National Association of Local Councils. I support my noble friend’s Amendment 20. I do not intend to relitigate the arguments that have already been so clearly set out, but I wish to underline how pressing this issue becomes in the context of local government reorganisation.
Local government reorganisation introduces a level of structural uncertainty that pension schemes are simply not designed to absorb without flexibility. In particular, the costs facing pension schemes will not be ring-fenced during the LGR. In those circumstances, it is not inevitable that administrating authorities will respond with increased prudence. If so, does that not risk higher contribution rates being locked in? This would not be because of deteriorating fundamentals, but because of the uncertainty created by this Government.
There is also a timing problem. We do not yet know when the LGR will take place. It may well fall outside the actuarial valuation window, which would make access to interim contribution reviews not merely helpful but essential. Without them, schemes and employers can be left operating on assumptions that no longer reflect the reality of the structures beneath them.
I would also be grateful if the Minister would clarify the position on valuation cycles. In 2025, we did not set contribution rates for a three-year period. We face the very real prospect that some councils, whose rates are now being set, may not even exist by the time the next triennial valuation takes place.
This leads me to funding strategy statements. In the Minister’s view, have councils been given sufficient guidance from the Government to prepare these statements appropriately in the context of the LGR? These documents underpin long-term funding assumptions, yet many authorities are being asked to draft them without clarity on their future form or boundaries.
Finally and critically, the treatment of assets and liabilities following reorganisation must be handled with absolute care. Ensuring that these are carved up fairly and accurately post-LGR is vital to maintaining confidence in the system. That process must be demonstratively independent, transparent and robust, not left to negotiation under pressure.
Amendment 20 seeks not to obstruct reform but to ensure that, during a period of structural upheaval, pension schemes are not forced into unnecessary rigidity, excessive prudence or long-term misallocation of risk. For these reasons, I strongly support the principle behind the amendment.
Lord Fuller (Con)
My Lords, I rise ahead of the noble Lord, Lord Davies—perhaps he can follow me and say how much he agrees with me this time. I support my noble friend’s Amendment 20 and will echo some of my noble friend Lady Scott’s points. Although promises made to members, once earned, are inviolate, the costs fall on the local taxpayer and employees, based on regular re-evaluations. These re-evaluations come thick and fast, rather like painting the Forth Bridge: once you have completed one, you start the next. I strongly support my friends in advancing the new clause, because it would place interim reviews on a statutory basis. However often and regularly they come, there will always be exceptional circumstances where a valuation is needed.
Like my noble friend Lady Scott, I think that structural change is an obvious circumstance where an interim review is not just needed but required. I will give an example. Local government workers can retire early on a full pension, having attained the age of 55, if they are made redundant on efficiency grounds. Local government reorganisation is nearly always, automatically, retirement on efficiency grounds. I estimate these strain costs, to be borne by the employer and local taxpayers, to be in excess of £1 billion, and we know that none of these figures have been taken into account in any of the financial analysis that the department has relied on to advance its plans for local government reorganisation.
That aside, the extreme turbulence caused by a comprehensive LGR—not just the odd county here or there but a comprehensive LGR by 2028—may require an interim review of employers’ rates, because of the different styles of councils being rammed together, as I explained earlier: operating versus outsourced. Without a reworking, schemes and employers could be operating not just on assumptions that no longer reflect the reality but on councils that do not even exist any more.
Administering authorities are being left in limbo as it is, so there must be at least the option to recalibrate the treatment of assets and liabilities following the reorganisation, representing a new landscape. This is important, as the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, said, partly because of such a dramatic variation between the contribution rates of particular employers. But I do not agree with her reasoning because, as I tried to say on an earlier group, this is important because you cannot have one employer cross-subsidising another. I know it is not my role to debate the noble Baroness—that is for the Minister—but I seek to be helpful on this. The contribution rates have to bear in mind all the variabilities from one employer to another. There is a world of difference between a charity that is nearly bankrupt, for which the contributions are payable at that point, and a large tax-raising council with many thousands of employees to jam-spread the contributions over.
That is why it is proper that there are these variations; they are there for a good reason. Unfair as it may seem, that is the arithmetic. Otherwise, we end up with the moral hazard of the weakest employers, with the poorest covenant strength, going bust and everybody else having to pay for it. I realise that is not entirely encompassed by Amendment 20, but I wanted to respond to the noble Baroness because I have been in this situation in a fund of which I am a trustee, and that is what we had to do.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
I just wanted to say that I completely agree with my noble friend. All these amendments are asking for is a level of transparency that we do not currently have. Obviously, if an employer needs a different contribution rate from another one, we would not expect everybody to pay the same rate. But at the moment, I do not think the general public know what the rates are—and I am talking only about rates for local authorities, not for the charities and so on; it is up to them whether they produce that. If you look at Amendment 20A, it is talking about the local authorities specifically rather than the other employers in the scheme.
Lord Fuller (Con)
I was coming to a conclusion anyway, so I will not detain your Lordships any further. I have made the points that I wanted to make.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
At the risk of receiving a glare from my Whip, I feel I have something to contribute to this group as well.
I will first make a general point. If noble Lords and noble Baronesses are going to quote specific examples, we need chapter and verse in order to understand what is happening. If we are just given figures, we are meant to absorb and draw some conclusion from them, which is not possible; we need to know chapter and verse of any examples that noble Lords quote so we can analyse and see what is really going on in that particular case. I have to say that my assumption is that, with all the examples we have been given, there is a readily available, understandable situation, and somewhere along the line there has been a failure of understanding.
On Amendment 20, my question for the noble Baroness, which she sort of answered, was: why is this amendment required? I think we were told that it is all too difficult, but of course it is not all too difficult. There is a big example: the London Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, which has a Conservative-controlled council, earlier this year made an interim change in its contribution rate to zero because its investment policy had been so successful. It is worth noting that it has a very successful investment policy and it is one of the smallest local government funds—something to bear in mind during the other debates on the Bill.
There is a question: how often should you undertake a valuation? There is a strong argument for three years because that provides some level of stability to the council’s finances. You have to remember that, over the last year or two years, a council may be paying too much or it may be paying too little, but that is not money down the drain; it either goes into the fund or does not, and it will be available or not available at the end of the three-year period. The money does not disappear if contributions are up, and it will be reflected in the future contributions that that council will pay.
I am also concerned that of course an employer will seek a review when it thinks its contribution is going to go down. I bet it will not seek a review if it thinks its contribution is going to go up, which provides exactly the sort of ratchet effect that the noble Baroness said she wanted to avoid. So it would be perfectly practical to do a valuation every year with the strength of the computers we have available now. It a long time since the day when I had to sit at a large square sheet of paper and do all the figures by hand: you just run the computer and there are the figures. I am sure the consulting firms will be happy to get all the additional fee income, but does it actually produce the advantages that we are told will be achieved through this amendment?
I note the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Scott of Bybrook. I think it is a very valid point. It is a shame that whatever the local government department is called nowadays has not been involved with the Bill; it could have brought some perspective to where we are.
On Amendment 20A and benchmarks, I draw the attention of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, to a regular report from a group whose name I shall not get right—but there is a national group of local government pension schemes. Following each valuation, it produces a detailed report providing all the information she asks for. Again, the information is available. She is asking for this information, when it is already easily available online. On my iPad, I can look up all the information which it is being suggested is being hidden away. The importance of the Local Government Pension Scheme is obvious, and obviously there should be transparency, but the idea being promoted that we do not know what is going on in these funds is gravely unfair to the pension schemes concerned.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I shall now respond to Amendments 20 and 20A. I am grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Younger of Leckie, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Stedman-Scott and Lady Altmann, for tabling them. Amendment 20 seeks to revise the existing LGPS regulations to make it easier for employers in the scheme to request interim reviews of contribution rates. I welcome the intention to increase flexibility in how surpluses in the LGPS are treated, but it is crucial for any flexibility to be underpinned by robust safeguards to protect the long-term funding position of those funds. It is important, equally, to make the distinction between how surpluses are treated in the LGPS scheme and in other defined benefit schemes. At the risk of repeating my words on the previous group, within other defined benefit schemes, trustees can choose to release surplus where scheme rules allow. Clauses 9 and 10, which we cannot wait to get to, will increase that flexibility.
In the LGPS, the triennial valuation process already ensures that contribution rates are reviewed every three years and enables withdrawal of surplus through reduced contribution rates where it is prudent to do so. The interim review process is available as an additional mechanism to allow scheme employers, particularly those at risk of exiting the scheme, to seek lower contribution rates between valuations. Interim reviews may take place if it appears likely to the administering authority that the liabilities have changed significantly since the last valuation, if there has been significant change in the ability of employers to meet their obligations or if the employer has requested a review.
I welcome the call from noble Lords opposite to make interim reviews easier to understand and more transparent. I agree that regulations on interim reviews require revision, including on these points. Indeed, the department has already stated this in a letter to administering authorities—that was in March 2025. I understand the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, was making about the vicissitudes of the market and other changes that occur. Without wishing to be overly sarcastic, we could posit having reviews on an almost continual basis to try to anticipate market movements, changes in demographics or other external shocks. I am not for a minute suggesting that that was the intention behind the amendment, but it proves the point that, if we are going to break up the cycle of valuation, when and how we do it is a question for further debate. That possibly addresses some of the points that the noble Baroness, Lady Scott of Bybrook, was making as well. It is important that any changes to regulations are properly considered and avoid unforeseen consequences.
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
The reorganisation is very different from the day-to-day running of the local authorities. Once they are reorganised, it will calm down and balance out again. But what worries me is whether the Government are working with local government pension schemes on the impact of these changes. If not, why not and will they do so?
Lord Katz (Lab)
Actually, the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, anticipates this, which is actually useful on the point that my noble friend made. I will come to that in a second. I was just about to say that of course we are aware. I am afraid that the noble Baroness was not in her place when we discussed local government reorganisation in the first group, earlier this afternoon in Committee.
Actuaries are aware of the local government review and the potential impact on contribution rates. In response to this, actuaries could have a number of options. They could calculate a harmonised contribution rate for the new unitary authorities proposed, set out a path to target harmonised contribution rates if desired or continue to treat them separately and do a contribution review when the local government reorganisation position is clearer.
This is probably as good a point as any to reassure my noble friend Lord Davies of Brixton, whose mastery of technology never fails to impress: my colleagues from the MHCLG very much support the DWP on this Bill and we are working collectively on elements that relate to the Local Government Pension Scheme; so do not worry about that.
It is important that any changes to regulations are properly considered and avoid unforeseen consequences. The views of employers, funds and others within the sector are a vital part of this process, and making amendments to this Bill would prevent the sector and scheme employers from having their say on whether the change will work for them. The department has already committed to launching a consultation this year, which will cover the full range of issues with the current rules.
Amendment 20A, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, seeks to benchmark Local Government Pension Scheme employer contributions on an annual basis. I recognise the noble Baroness’s desire to increase transparency on employer contributions and to set them in a wider context, including council tax. LGPS funds are already required to publish a valuation report and a rates adjustment certificate following each valuation. This certificate sets out the employer contribution rates as a percentage of pay to be paid by each employer in the fund in each of the three years of the valuation period. Employer contribution rates are set locally and vary widely across the scheme, depending on the funding level of the fund and the covenant of the individual employer. It is not appropriate to set a benchmark for employer contributions for funds as this would compromise local accountability.
I will come on to talk a little about council tax rates and contributions, because they have been mentioned by many noble Lords. Before that, I repeat the point I made in the previous group. I am afraid that the amendment seems to neglect the fact that 50% of LGPS employer contributions are paid by employers that are not local authorities, so we cannot focus on just council tax as the be-all and end-all.
However, those local authority employers do make up half that funding. Those local authority employers in the LGPS meet the cost of employer contributions from their total income, of which council tax is only a proportion. It varies considerably among different councils across the country, depending on their other sources of income, which are myriad. They include business rates, grants, Section 106 contributions and CIL. They can include any income gained from other charges and levies, whether parking or licensing. The list goes on. I defer always to the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, and his decades of experience on my next-door council, Barnet. He and noble Lords in the Room will understand the wide range of income sources that councils have.
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to the debate on these amendments; I also thank the Minister for his response. I thank in particular my noble friend Lady Altmann for both her amendment and the way in which she explained it. Her expertise, track record and knowledge of this industry are second to none; I know that others in the Room are equally in that position.
My noble friend Lady Scott made a very important point about local government reorganisation, which is bound to have an impact on pension schemes. The question that she asked on financial statements was pertinent.
I have been intrigued to watch the relationship between my noble friend Lord Fuller and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, develop. I am sure that it will become even more interesting as the Bill carries on. I can tell the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, that we have chapter and verse on the information to which we have referred today; where we are able to share it, we will do so.
The Minister made the important point that the markets change; the skill is in knowing at what point to intervene and review matters, but it is important that we have the right process and framework in place to do so.
In closing, I reiterate that this amendment is ultimately about making the system work as Parliament intended. Interim reviews exist on the statute book for a reason. They are meant to provide flexibility where circumstances change materially between formal valuations, and to prevent contribution rates becoming detached from economic reality. Yet where a safeguard exists in law but cannot be exercised in practice, it ceases to be a safeguard at all.
This amendment seeks not to weaken the Local Government Pension Scheme or to second-guess actuarial judgment but to ensure that prudence operates as a balanced discipline rather than an inflexible default. Where funding positions have strengthened significantly and where contribution rates place growing pressure on local services, it is reasonable that employers should be able to access a clear, transparent and intelligible process to seek reassessment. Clarity matters here. Councils are legally required to manage their finances prudently, deliver value for money and protect essential services for local taxpayers. They cannot discharge those duties effectively if contribution-setting processes are opaque, thresholds are unclear or review mechanisms are practically out of reach.
This amendment would simply align pension governance with those existing statutory responsibilities. It would make explicit how interim reviews may be requested, how they will be assessed and on what basis assumptions will be scrutinised. In doing so, it would strengthen confidence that decisions affecting billions of pounds of public expenditure are being taken proportionately, transparently and in full recognition of the real-world constraints under which councils operate. In short, it would turn a theoretical right into a usable one and restore the balance between member security, financial sustainability and the proper stewardship of public funds. That, I suggest, is not unreasonable but a modest and responsible objective. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Wilson of Sedgefield) (Lab)
My Lords, before we move on, I say that we would like to finish the next group by 8.15 pm, which is when we need to wind up. I would hate to think that we broke mid group.
Clause 8: Interpretation of Chapter 1
Amendment 21
“(h) ensuring activities follow the relevant laws and regulatory rules;”Member’s explanatory statement
This is a probing amendment. It expands the definition of “management” of local government pension scheme funds and assets to test whether the Bill adequately reflects the full range of responsibilities involved in administering pension assets and seeks clarification from Ministers as to whether the Bill as drafted sufficiently captures these aspects.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, in response to the noble Lord opposite, I can confirm that my opening remarks will be relatively short. Amendments 21 and 22, tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott, are largely probing amendments, directed not at altering the policy intent of the Bill but at testing the completeness of the framework that it sets out.
Clause 8 is an interpretation clause. It defines what is meant by the management of Local Government Pension Scheme funds and assets for the purposes of this chapter, and it does so by listing a number of illustrative activities. As drafted, those activities focus primarily, though not exclusively, on investment decision-making—that is, buying and selling assets, setting asset allocation, establishing pooled vehicles, selecting investments and so on. We fully accept that the clause makes it clear that this list is non-exhaustive. The phrase “include (among other things)” is well understood. None the less, what appears in a Bill still matters. It signals what Parliament understands to be central to the concept being defined and it shapes how subsequent powers are interpreted, exercised and defended. That is the purpose of these amendments.
Amendment 21 would make it explicit that “management” includes ensuring that activities comply with relevant laws and regulatory rules. Amendment 22 would similarly make it explicit that “management” includes handling risks, including how they are identified, assessed and kept under review. Neither amendment seeks to impose new duties or redefine existing obligations. Both simply ask whether the Government agree that compliance and risk governance are not peripheral but intrinsic to asset management.
Local Government Pension Scheme managers are fiduciaries; they operate within a dense web of statutory, regulatory and prudential requirements. Ensuring compliance with those requirements is not an administrative afterthought but a core managerial function. Likewise, risk management is not something that follows investment decisions; it informs them at every stage.
The reason why we raise this issue is not theoretical. Elsewhere in the Bill, powers are framed by reference to the management of scheme assets, and it therefore seems reasonable to ask the Minister to confirm on the record, if he could, that when the Government use that term it is intended to encompass the full spectrum of responsibilities that scheme managers already discharge, including legal compliance and risk oversight. In other words, is the Bill deliberately neutral as to those aspects because they are already assumed, or does the narrower emphasis of the illustrative list reflect a more constrained conception of management, one focused primarily on asset pooling and allocation? Our amendments invite that clarification.
In legislation of this kind, when significant powers are being taken and fiduciary duties are central, it is important that Parliament is clear about the assumptions that underpin the language being used. Therefore, I hope that the Minister can reassure the Committee that the Government agree that compliance with law and active management of risk are integral to the management of the LGPS assets, and that nothing in the Bill is intended to narrow or sideline those responsibilities. On that basis, I look forward to the Minister’s response and clarification, and I beg to move.
Lord Fuller (Con)
I speak as the vice-chair—former chairman—of the Local Government Pension Committee, the body that represents the employers’ part of the LGPS in the scheme advisory board. I welcome this set of amendments because it gives us an opportunity to place on record the breadth of what it takes to run a pension scheme: not just the sexy bits—investment and all that sort of stuff that you might read about in the Financial Times—but the real boilerplate of operating a scheme for nearly 7 million people.
It is wise to put on record some of the nuts and bolts that hold that boilerplate together. It is not just about risk management, governance, data quality, member engagement or the huge dashboard project. There are benefits statements, which have to be calculated accurately of course, within timeframes, and engaging with the department—I see in the Box some faces that I recognise in that respect. It is about advising on bulk transfers in and out, AVCs, commutation, tax, survivor benefits, McCloud, GMP, the exit cap, ill health adjustments and subject access requests—to name a small subset of about 100 different activities that pension fund administrators undertake. There is interpretation of regulations and helping software providers to keep up with the torrent of regulations so that pensions can be paid to the beneficiaries accurately and in a timely manner.
This work often encompasses helping bereaved families at a difficult time in their lives to navigate changes in benefits, inheritance tax and so forth. It is also a very important part of it that the scheme works together to train up a new generation of administrators alongside engaging with the Local Government Association, their Welsh colleagues, COSLA in Scotland and the Northern Irish scheme. I have had the pleasure of meeting many of these people engaged in these activities, and when you meet them you realise the fragility of the behemoth that is the LGPS. I pay tribute to their dedication, which is completely unsung, which ensures that the promises made to local government workers are kept and will be kept.
All those things that I have mentioned the Bill is silent on, which is a real shame. While it is not the purpose of a Bill to enumerate every single detail, more could have been said about the breadth of the work that is involved in running a pension scheme, which goes beyond fund management. These amendments from my noble friend seek to right that wrong, and I commend them.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, without wishing to take anything away from what my noble friend Lord Fuller has just said, it is true that this definition of management relates to the funds and assets of the scheme, not the totality of the operation of everything that is managed within a scheme. Having said that, non-exhaustive lists are always problematic. However, the issue raised by my noble friend Lord Younger is crucial to the management of assets, and its absence seems strange to me.
Viscount Thurso (LD)
May I ask one point of clarification from the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, when he comes to wind up at the end of this debate, again on risk? I read this amendment as being about the risk register—the list of risks faced by the organisation and how they are dealt with—rather than the level of risk that is taken in investing assets, which will determine the return level. I wonder whether he could give us clarity on that.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, for tabling these amendments and, as the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, said, for giving us this short but sweet opportunity to discuss the management of the schemes.
I join the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, in using this opportunity to pay tribute to all those who are involved in the work of running the LGPS. He is absolutely right that it is a thankless and hard task; this is an opportunity for me to put on record that I am in complete agreement with him on that matter, although I say gently, as we are on the last group for today, that his definition of “sexy” differs from mine somewhat—but each to their own.
I recognise that the intention behind these amendments is to ensure the robust management of funds and assets in the LGPS. The Government share this aim and are taking steps to ensure that the reforms are implemented soundly. I am happy to confirm to the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, that “management”, as established in Clause 8, is not a narrow administrative concept but a comprehensive responsibility encompassing governance, oversight and compliance. The Government are clear that administering authorities and asset pool companies must regard adherence to all applicable laws and regulatory requirements as a core, non-negotiable element of their management duties.
This expectation reflects the principle that robust compliance is fundamental to safeguarding assets, maintaining public confidence and ensuring accountability throughout the system. In particular, under the provisions of this Bill, all investment management activity beyond setting high-level investment strategy will be delegated to the asset pool company, which will be required to seek authorisation from the Financial Conduct Authority. FCA authorisation and supervision will provide vital assurance to members and employers that very large pools of capital will be managed properly, including ensuring that robust procedures for identifying and managing risk are in place. The Government have written to the asset pools to set out the new requirements in Clause 1 and are engaging closely with pool company leaders to monitor progress on meeting them in good time. In addition, subject to the passage of the Bill, the Secretary of State intends to make regulations and issue guidance on asset pooling and fund governance, which will set out the expectations on LGPS funds and pools.
On strengthening fund governance, administering authorities will continue to be responsible for holding pools to account on their performance, including on how risks are managed. To strengthen governance and accountability further, regulations will require administering authorities to appoint the new positions of “senior officer” and “independent person”, subject to the outcome of the consultation. Senior officers will take the leading role in representing their funds in the governance of the asset pool in which they participate, and independent persons will offer professional expertise to support pensions committees on investment strategy, governance and administration—including holding the pool to account.
Administering authorities will be better able to manage risk and ensure compliance as a result of the new powers relating to independent governance reviews set out in Clause 5. Independent governance reviews will ensure that administering authorities review their governance and their compliance with the legislation, supported by independent scrutiny, to provide assurance to members and employers. In response to the question from the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, on whether we are attempting to constrain the concept of management, the answer is that we are not. The list provided is an inclusive one, not an exhaustive one. As I have said, compliance with laws and regulations and effective risk management are assumed in the Bill, as they are in existing LGPS legislation, with the latter also provided in the requirement for asset pools to be regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority.
The provisions in this Bill are already adequate to ensure that asset pool companies and administering authorities are compliant with the law and have adequate controls in place with regard to the identification and management of risks. Given that, as well as my explanations, I hope that I have satisfied the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, and provided the assurances that he sought. I respectfully ask him to withdraw his amendment.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
I am grateful to the Minister for his response and for answering the questions that I posed—I think there were only one or two, but, again, I will check Hansard for my questions and his responses.
The Committee will be pleased to know that I have little to add to what I said earlier, but I would like to reiterate a broader point. The more clarity we can place in the Bill and the more we can place clearly on the record, the greater the certainty we will provide to trustees, funds and employers about changes to a landscape that profoundly shapes how they operate and discharge their responsibilities.
In this very short debate, I was particularly grateful for the points made by my noble friend Lord Fuller, backed up by my noble friend Lady Noakes. I appreciated my noble friend Lord Fuller’s focus, which it is important for the Committee to put, on what pension fund administrators actually have to do, and he was quite right to highlight the breadth and detail required in undertaking the role.
That leads me nicely on to answer a question raised by the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, on Amendment 22. I will need to check, but my understanding is that when it comes to the role of a pension fund administrator, management includes handling risks. The question is how we define “handling”. My understanding is that it includes how risks are identified, assessed and kept under review, but it is quite possible that there is somebody above that level who takes full responsibility. Otherwise, my understanding is that it involves handling both the risk register and how risk is assessed and decided on in providing a return to investors, but I will investigate and come back to the noble Viscount.
In concluding, although today we might be debating definitions and interpretation, I have no doubt that those affected by this legislation are following our proceedings closely and are keen for as much clarity as possible from the Government on definitions, duties and responsibilities. For that reason, I would very much welcome any further clarification the Minister is able to give the Committee throughout our subsequent proceedings on the questions we raise on these matters. That would provide reassurance not only to this Committee but to those beyond it who are looking to these proceedings for guidance and certainty. I finish by saying that that really is true, in that we have been in touch with a number of third parties and those in the industry, and many of the comments made today and on Monday absolutely reflect their issues and concerns. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Wilson of Sedgefield (Lab)
My Lords, I think that this is an appropriate moment to adjourn. It is 8.08 pm and we are supposed to finish by 8.15 pm, so I think it is too late to start another group.
Pension Schemes Bill
Monday 19th January 2026
(2 weeks, 2 days ago)
Grand CommitteePension Schemes Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 152-III(b) Amendments for Grand Committee (Supplementary to the Third Marshalled List) - (19 Jan 2026)
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Scott of Needham Market) (LD)
Before I call the noble Lord, Lord Davies, I point out to the Committee that there is an error on the Marshalled List, in that Amendment 30 is to Clause 10 and not Clause 9, as it says here. It makes no practical difference to the debate, but it will do when we call the amendments later.
Clause 9: Power to modify scheme to allow for payment of surplus to employer
Amendment 23
Lord Davies of Brixton
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
This group raises important issues about the purpose of these proposed changes to the legislation on pension schemes. I am going to move my Amendment 23 and speak to my Amendments 25, 27, 28, 29 and 30—and I thank the Chairman for the correction. I look forward to the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, on his Amendment 26, which on the face of it asks a perfectly valid question.
The main amendment in this group, Amendment 25, seeks clarification from my noble friend the Minister about the purpose of Part 1, Chapter 2 of the Bill. This chapter is headed
“Powers to pay surplus to employer”.
Other than that, the Bill and the Explanatory Notes are silent on why the law is being changed. I will come back to that, but first I will address my Amendments 23, 27, 28, 29 and 30, which simply seek a change in the terminology used in the Bill, leaving out the word “surplus” and inserting the word “assets” instead.
I make no apologies for what may appear a pedantic point. Words are important. Later amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, would also change the wording, so I think that there is an understanding that words are important, but what do I mean in this specific case? Let us consider the difference from the point of view of a scheme member between being told that their employer has taken some surplus from their pension fund and hearing the statement that their employer has taken some assets from their pension fund. I believe that the latter statement is a much better reflection of what is happening. “Surplus” suggests that the money is not needed, which is never true in a pension scheme; “assets” suggests something far more concrete.
It is worth emphasising that there is no certain meaning of what constitutes a surplus. It is not a technical term in actuarial speak; it was not a word that I ever used when devising pension schemes as a scheme actuary. It is widely used in general conversation—I sometimes use it myself—but it does not appear in the technical actuarial guidance, except as required by a cross-reference to legislation on surpluses. I suggest that using the word “assets” is a much clearer and more honest reflection of what is happening and I urge my noble friend the Minister to accept the change.
Amendment 24 was tabled to make it clear that the intended purpose of releasing assets is to be for the benefit of scheme members as much as for the benefit of scheme sponsors—if not more, in my view. As mentioned, there is no indication in legislation of why scheme assets might be released. What are the purposes for which surplus assets will be released? What is the purpose of the change in legislation and the facilitation of such release? It is left entirely in the hands of scheme trustees exercising their fiduciary duty. Government Ministers during the passage of the Bill have made reference to that on numerous occasions.
However, I believe that this is highly problematic. Experience tells us that we cannot rely on all trustees to interpret the appropriate purposes of the release of assets. It has to be in the Bill. The title of the chapter,
“Powers to pay surplus to employer”,
illustrates the problem. I have been advised by the clerks that it is not possible to amend those parts of the Bill, but it simply reflects the content of that particular chapter. As I said, this illustrates the problem. It only talks about the employer but says nothing about scheme members.
The absence of any reference to scheme members in the Bill contrasts with what Ministers have told us on numerous occasions. There has been a consistent message from Ministers throughout the passage of this Bill that the change will be of benefit to members. On the release of surplus, ministerial statements have suggested consistently that it is intended that members will share in the benefits of releasing assets. For example, my noble friend the Minister said at Second Reading,
“the Bill introduces powers to enable more trustees of well-funded defined benefit, or DB, schemes to share some of the £160 billion of surplus funds to benefit sponsoring employers and members”.
So it is not just about employers. In the Government’s own words, it is about members as well as employers. My noble friend went on to say:
“The measure will allow trustees, working with employers, to decide how surplus can benefit both members and employers, while maintaining security for future pensions ”.—[Official Report, 18/12/25; col. 875.]
Scheme members hearing this must assume that, if the employer benefits from a release of assets, they will as well. But there is nothing in the Bill that will make that happen. The Minister for Pensions made a similar statement many times. He has argued consistently, and rightly, that the release of assets—surpluses, if you will—is not just about employers but about delivering better benefits for scheme members.
Look, for example, at the Government’s road map for pensions. It states under the heading “Surplus flexibilities”:
“We will allow well-funded … pension schemes to safely release some of the £160 billion surplus funds to be reinvested across the UK economy and to improve outcomes for members”.
But there is nothing in the Bill that delivers on that promise. The DWP press statement about the Bill said:
“New freedoms to safely release surplus funding will unlock investments and benefit savers”.
Again, there is nothing in the Bill.
Then we find a statement by the Minister for Pensions on 4 September during Committee on the Bill in the Commons:
“It is crucial that the new surplus flexibilities work for both sponsoring employers and members”.—[Official Report, Commons, Pension Schemes Bill Committee, 4/9/25; col. 130.]
Yet again, there is nothing in the Bill. I could go on—there are plenty of examples—but I hope that I have made the point.
If that is the case and the intention is that members as well as scheme sponsors are expected to benefit when assets are released, this objective should be set out clearly in the Bill. This is particularly important because the Bill, as drafted, removes the existing requirement on trustees only to release surplus where this is in the interests of members. We will come to this again when we reach Amendment 37 in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso. I will support that amendment, but I think that it would be better to put the requirement for members to benefit as well as employers clearly and unambiguously in Clause 9. A defined benefit scheme is a joint endeavour, involving both employees and employer. They should be treated on an equal basis. I ask my noble friend the Minister to accept the point and bring forward a suitable amendment on Report. I beg to move.
Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con)
My Lords, I will briefly intervene because the probing amendments here are important to how we look at the precise nature of surpluses. Clearly, the principle of making it easier to return a genuine pension scheme surplus to employers is worthy of support, particularly given how much has historically been paid by employers into DB schemes, often at the expense of capital investment. But safeguards are absolutely critical—this is the point I want to make about the relationship between employers and trustees in this area. It must be a trustee decision to distribute surplus, and trustees must be required to consider how the surplus has accumulated, as was touched on by the proposer. Was it due to employer contributions, member contributions or strong investment returns?
Under the proposed legislation, employers will no doubt apply immense pressure to steer the distribution towards them and not the members. In exercising their discretion, trustees must be unencumbered, properly advised and protected from the undue and inappropriate pressure that sponsoring employers will no doubt place on them. That is a real concern to me. We must be wary of employers exercising their powers to put in place weak trustees, who will not act in members’ best interests. We must also be wary of making it harder for trustees to distribute surplus to members in favour of employers.
Surplus distributed to members through increased benefits will directly improve the position of the real economy through increased domestic expenditure and of course increased tax receipts. If we are to restrict the use of surplus assets away from scheme memberships to employers, we must ensure that surplus distributed to them is used for reinvestment in the UK economy through capital expenditure. I would like to hear the Minister’s view on that.
On what a surplus is, the changes made by the Pensions Regulator to the DB funding code of practice in November 2024 have codified the requirement for pension scheme trustees to fund DB pension schemes very prudently—I think that those are the words that he used. Further, the investments that trustees are strongly encouraged to hold, through that code of practice, mean that the investment strategies are usually much lower risk than the insurance companies that many pension schemes are now being transferred to en masse under bulk annuity contracts.
In June 2025, the Pensions Regulator issued guidance that suggested that excessive prudence or hoarding of surplus could be considered poor governance by trustees. If we are to make it easier to distribute surplus from pension schemes, the bar for that should not be so low that the security of member benefits is weakened and it should not be so high that it requires schemes to be excessively funded. The current bar of buyout funding is, in my opinion, far too high.
Safeguards are important. It is absolutely critical that trustees are required to take appropriate advice and that actuarial advice is compliant at all times with the relevant technical actuarial standards. Trustees must be able to make informed, evidence-based decisions, unencumbered by the interests of the insurance industry and free from undue employer pressure. That particular relationship concerns me most in our probe into the functions of the surpluses. I hope that the Minister can give reassurances about the position of trustees—how they will be protected and by whom—in this particular contest or area of decision-making.
Viscount Thurso (LD)
My Lords, we come to three groups of amendments. The next two deal with what you might do with the surplus, and I have amendments in those. This group deals with the principle of what a surplus is. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for giving us the chance to consider that.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I will say a little more in our debate on the next group about how surpluses should be used, but we must recognise that employers in defined benefit schemes underwrite defined benefit scheme finances; they are the ones who have been putting in very large sums of money to keep these schemes going for the past 20-odd years. It is only right that we should recognise the interest that employers have in taking money that is no longer required within a scheme.
We have had so many years of deficits in pension schemes that we have rather forgotten that this was like an everyday happening in the pensions world, if you go back to the 1990s, when surpluses arose. Indeed, pension schemes were not allowed to keep pension surpluses; there were HMRC rules which made that rather difficult to do. These were perfectly ordinary transactions in the pensions world which we have just forgotten about because of the deficits that have existed for the last 20 or 30 years, which employers—not employees—have had to bear the burden of.
On the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, I understand the technical point about removing assets rather than surplus, but surplus is the language that has always been used in the context of pension schemes; it is in the 1995 Act. The noble Lord’s amendments amend only this Act; as I understand it, they do not go on and amend the earlier Act. It is just language that has been used for a long period; I think people know what it means, and it will be very confusing at this stage to change the language.
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for putting these amendments down and speaking in detail about them. We also heard good words from the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. I almost thought, “Is there any point in getting up and speaking?” but I am a politician.
This group goes to first principles. What is a defined benefits pension surplus and what is it for? For us, DB surplus is not a windfall or an accident, as I think others have said. It is a result of long-term assumptions, member contributions, employer funding decisions and investment outcomes—all those—but above all, it exists within a framework of promises made to members in return for deferred pay. We are therefore concerned about renaming—we keep on coming back to this—“surplus” as simply “assets” available for redistribution.
Language matters here because it shapes both legal interpretation and member confidence. Treating surpluses as inherently extractable risks weakening the fundamental bargain that underpins DB provision. Our position is not that surplus should never be accessed, but that it should be considered only after members’ reasonable expectations have been fully protected. That includes confidence in benefits security, protection against inflation erosion, and trust and accrued rights not being retrospectively interpreted. I have always thought that with DB pensions you need prudence. How far do prudence and good governance go?
Finally, the question for Ministers is whether the Bill maintains the principle that DB schemes exist first and foremost to deliver promised benefits or whether it marks a shift towards viewing schemes as financial reservoirs once minimum funding tests are met. In that case, one has to think, “What is the minimum for the funding tests?” We shall come on to that in an amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, has put down later in the Bill on where companies fail. It is a question of when those surpluses are available, if they are ever available.
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
My Lords, when I entered the department in July 2019, defined benefit pension schemes did, on occasion, report surpluses. However, those surpluses were neither of the scale nor the character that we are now observing. If one looks back over the past quarter of a century and beyond, it is evident that both the funding position of defined benefit schemes and the methodologies used to assess that funding have changed materially.
The surpluses reported today are not simply large in absolute terms but different in nature. They are measured against significantly more prudent assumptions, particularly in relation to discount rates, longevity and asset valuation, than would have been applied historically. It is therefore right that these emerging surpluses are examined with care and transparency. Bringing them into the open is necessary, and I say at the outset that the Government are right to have raised this issue explicitly in the Bill.
That said, we consider that the Bill does not yet fully reflect a number of the practical and operational issues faced by both trustees and sponsoring employers when seeking to make effective use of those provisions. In that respect, our position is not materially distant from that of the Government. Our concerns are not ones of principle but of application and implementation. We recognise that issues relating to potential deadlock between trustees and sponsors are important, but we are content for those matters to be considered at a later stage in the Committee’s proceedings. Our immediate focus is on understanding how the proposals are intended to operate in practice, how decisions are expected to be taken within existing scheme governance arrangements and how these new powers interact with established trustee fiduciary duties and employer covenant considerations.
This is a busy group, and noble Lords have done a sterling job in setting out their reasoning and rationale. I shall, therefore, not detain the Committee further by relitigating those points but will speak to my Amendment 25 in this group. Like a number of our amendments in this part of the Bill, it is a probing amendment intended to seek clarity. Clause 9 inserts new Section 36B into the Pensions Act 1995. The new section gives trustees of defined benefit trustee schemes the ability by resolution to modify the schemes’ rules so as to confirm a power to pay surplus to the employer or to remove or relax existing restrictions on the exercise of such a power.
The clause contains one explicit limitation on that power. New Section 36B(4) provides that the section does not apply to a scheme that is being wound up. In other words, wind-up is the only circumstance singled out in the Bill in which the new surplus release modification power cannot be used. Amendment 25 would remove that specific exclusion, and I want to be clear that the purpose of doing so is not to argue that surplus should be released during winding-up; rather, it is to test the Government’s reasoning in identifying wind-up as the sole circumstance meriting an explicit prohibition in primary legislation.
By proposing to remove subsection (4), the amendment invites the Minister to explain whether the Government consider wind-up to be genuinely the only situation in which surplus release would be inappropriate or whether there are other circumstances where the use of this power would also be unsuitable. If those other safeguards are already captured elsewhere, it would be helpful for the Committee to have that clearly set out on the record. Equally, if wind-up is used here as a proxy for a broader set of concerns, the Committee would benefit from understanding why those concerns are not addressed more directly.
Surplus release is a sensitive issue. The way in which the boundaries of this new power are framed therefore matters. Where the Bill chooses to draw a line in the legislation, it invites scrutiny as to why that line has been drawn there and only there. This amendment is intended to facilitate that discussion and to elicit reassurance from the Minister about how the Government envisage this power operating in practice and what protections they consider necessary beyond the single case of wind-up. On that basis, I look forward to the Minister’s response and any clarification she can provide to the Committee.
The Minister of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Sherlock) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Davies of Brixton and the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, for explaining their amendments, and to all noble Lords, who have spoken so concisely—we positively cantered through that group; may that continue throughout the day.
It is worth saying a word about the Government’s policy intent, but let me start by saying that the DB landscape has changed dramatically, a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott. Schemes are currently enjoying high levels of funding. Three in four schemes are running a surplus and there is around £160 billion of surplus funds in the DB universe. Schemes are also now more mature. The vast majority minimise the risk of future volatility with investment strategies that protect against interest rate and inflation movements. In addition, the DB funding code and the underpinning legislation require trustees to aim to maintain a strong funding position so that they can pay members’ future pensions. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, that is the primary purpose of DB funding schemes: above all, they must be able to pay members’ pensions. That is what is set out quite clearly in the DB funding code and the underpinning legislation. That is overseen by the Pensions Regulator.
Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con)
I am sorry to interrupt the Minister. I raised the question of safeguards. There is a lot of evidence in the industry that there is a lot of pressure. The Minister talks about the driving seat, but the actual installation of the driver into the car is at the behest of employers. It seems to me that there is likely to be some pressure here, perhaps more pressure than before. I just want to be sure that the safeguards are in place—we are perhaps going to be discussing these later—including safeguards for the trustees, who have the basic obligation of doing the best for the beneficiaries of the scheme. To what extent are they going to be protected in circumstances like that?
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
I am coming on to that, but I am grateful to the noble Lord for pressing me on it. All trustees are bound by duties which will continue to apply when making decisions on sharing surplus. They have to comply with the rules of the scheme and with legal requirements, including a duty to act in the interests of beneficiaries. If trustees breach those requirements, the Pensions Regulator has powers to target individuals who intentionally or knowingly mishandle pension schemes or put workers’ pensions at risk. As the noble Lord knows, that includes powers to issue civil penalties under Section 10 of the Pensions Act 1995 or in some circumstances to prohibit a person from being a trustee.
The key is that the Pensions Regulator will in addition issue guidance on surplus sharing, which will describe how trustees may approach surplus release, and that can be readily updated. That guidance will be developed in consultation with industry, but it will follow the publication of regulations on surplus release and set out matters for trustees to consider around surplus sharing, as well as ways in which members can benefit, including benefit enhancement. That guidance will also be helpful for employers to understand the matters trustees have to take into account in the regulator’s view. I hope that that helps to reassure the noble Lord.
We will come on to some of the detail in later groups around aspects of the way this regulation works, but I hope that, on the first group, that has reassured noble Lords and they feel able not to press their amendments.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
I thank my noble friend the Minister for her reply and other speakers who have contributed to this debate, which I think was worth having. I am pleased that I raised the issue on terminology. I recognise that it is a lost cause, but I have never been afraid, like St Jude, to support lost causes. It is an important point that we need to understand the vagueness of the concept of surpluses and that it is actual assets that disappear from the fund.
On the substantive point, I am afraid that I did not find my noble friend’s response satisfactory. As she said—I made a note of it—trustees remain the heart of decision-making. That exactly is the point. I am afraid that I do not share the Panglossian view of trustees. Many of them—large numbers of them—do a difficult job well, but it is not true of them all.
It is enough of a problem, as I can attest from my own experience of many years in the pensions industry, that we cannot rely on trustees to deliver in all cases. The balance of power between members and trustees is totally unequal. Members, effectively, are not in a position to question trustees’ discretion and responsibilities, and they cannot take it to the ombudsman, because it falls outside the remit.
When my noble friend says that the Government have been clear, that was exactly my point: they have not been sufficiently clear and have frequently given the members a reasonable expectation that they will share in the release of assets. With those words, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Altmann
“(7A) Regulations may provide that payment of surplus to the employer may only be made to the employer on the condition that—(a) enhancement to member benefits particularly relating to provision of pre-1997 inflation increases, or (b) one-off payment to reflect lack thereofis simultaneously provided by the employer.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would allow regulations to require employers to enhance member benefits (including provision of pre-1997 inflation protection or offer a one-off payment) if they want to extract surplus payments from the scheme.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 26, I shall speak to my similar Amendment 39, to both of which I am grateful for the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, adding her name. To follow on from the words of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, I am introducing these amendments as a marker, because I genuinely believe that it is important, if we are talking about distributing assets—I agree with the noble Lord on that terminology—to employers, that members should participate in the benefits that the excess funding has delivered.
My particular concern revolves around protecting members’ pensions against rises in the cost of living over many years. To go back to the Goode committee report of 1993, which followed the Maxwell scandal, that was the first talk of protecting private pensions in a similar way to state pensions, which would automatically be expected to have some kind of protection against either rising living standards or the rising cost of living. The protections put in place for pension schemes, however, were watered down to some degree and not introduced until 1997, so there are many people now retired who have a significant chunk of their private pension without any inflation protection at all. As inflation has become a much greater concern in recent years particularly, I hope we will be able to agree that attention should be paid to looking after what will be the most elderly of the pensioner population—those with pension accruals since before 1997. If there is to be an enhancement of member benefits, I would argue that the first consideration should be helping to rectify and remediate the shortfalls that many of these people face when trying to afford to live in 21st-century Britain.
I have included in the amendment the option of a one-off payment instead of enhancing the actual pension. In Amendment 26, it is a “may” rather than a “must”. The aim would be to make sure that some money is received by the member who has lost out, while bearing in mind that immediately lifting the pension from the pre-1997 accrual—which could be half or more of the person’s pension—up to a new level and then requiring the employer scheme to continue enhancing from that position, could add a significant extra strain on the scheme in the future if funding deteriorates.
However, we know that currently, in a scheme considering distributing surpluses, there is much more than is required on the current expectations, and for the likely nearer-term future, to meet the liabilities that will arise in, say, the next five to 10 years. Thereafter, one does not know; many of the members affected will not, sadly, be with us in that timeframe. But if actuaries are concerned about a permanent rise in the base level of pensions that must be paid by the scheme and then ongoingly increased over the very long term, payment of a one-off surplus amount to reflect the lack of inflation linking that the member has suffered over past years would, in my view, be easier to absorb but would also significantly enhance the well-being of the members themselves.
These amendments do similar things, although one is more definite than the other. I hope the Government and Minister can confirm that there is sympathy with this idea. Obviously, in a wider context, we will talk about enhancing members’ benefits more generally—I will come back to that on the next group—but, on that basis of the need for inflation protection in particular, I beg to move.
Viscount Thurso (LD)
My Lords, I rise principally to speak to my Amendment 38 in this group and to support my noble friend’s Amendment 44, to which I added my name. I am in broad sympathy with the mover of Amendment 26.
I think we can all agree that we would like to deal, if possible, with inflation eroding the purchasing power of a pensioner. As was said on the last group, there is basically a contract between the employer and the employee in a DB scheme, where the employee expects to receive a certain pension. The case I raise in my amendment stems from the many pension schemes that do not offer an absolute inflationary rise as part of their terms and conditions. Quite a number do, but some say in their terms that there would “normally” be an increase of an inflationary amount, but it is not guaranteed. There are a number of schemes where the literature at the time the person went into the scheme—in the 1980s, 1990s or whenever—indicated that they may reasonably expect to get inflationary increases, but they did not.
In this instance, I am grateful to the BP Pensioner Group, which brought its case to my attention and helped with the drafting of this amendment and my others. Broadly behind its request is the fact that the BP scheme, which is now closed, is an extremely good scheme with quite a large surplus in it. It is very well funded and therefore, as per the last group, may well be something that could go back to the company in part. But it has chosen for a number of years to refuse the request of the trustees to make discretionary increases.
It is worth noting just how pernicious the effect of inflation is on these incomes. I used the Bank of England inflation calculator to see what had happened. Bearing in mind that the statutory amount is 2.5%, if you go back with the inflation calculator to 2005, it is 2.8%—you might say that is not too bad—but inflation from 2015 to 2025 was 3.11% and, from 2020 to 2025, it was 4.35%. In every year there has been a modest but rising and quite large difference between what the statutory cap would allow and what the actual inflation was.
Of course, that compounds every year. So, every year, the loss is compounding up. Today, a pensioner may well be significantly worse off than if they had been getting something. By definition, surpluses comprise funds in excess of those required to meet the totality of members’ entitlements in full; they are, therefore, the resource out of which discretionary payments can be made. As such, any payment of surplus to the employer could prejudice the possibility of a discretionary payment to members. What I am seeking, and what my amendment seeks, is to make sure that that is in balance.
As I mentioned, since 2021, inflation as measured by CPI has been well over 4%, much ahead of the cap of 2.5%. The Pensions and Lifetime Savings Association’s survey indicated that, during the recent period of exceptional inflation, only 12% of UK pension funds made permanent discretionary increases to protect the purchasing power of members. In looking at surplus being distributed in part to employers and in part to members, the economic good if the part of the surplus that goes to the employer is used in investment is obvious, but let us not forget the economic good in increasing the purchasing power of the pensioners. There is an equal economic good on both sides of this argument.
The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, made the valid point that a great many companies supported their pension schemes during the difficult times of the late 1990s and early 2000s, but I would argue that that was in their contracts because they had contracted to make the payment at the end. We are now in a situation where, through the far better quality of trustees, the training offered by the Pensions Regulator—I have taken it and can attest that it is well worth doing—and the governance rules that have been brought in, we have the ability to make those surpluses available.
What this amendment would do is add to Clause 10 that the regulations to be made by the Secretary of State would include the words on the Marshalled List, which would mean simply that the Secretary of State could regulate to ensure that trustees took inflationary pressures into account. That is pretty modest, on the scale of the amendments that are being put forward, to deal with the surplus. Although the amendment is probing at this stage, if it is not met with some sympathy now, it may become a bit more than probing as we go on.
My noble friend Lord Palmer’s Amendment 44 is along the same lines, although it addresses pre 1997, which my amendment does not specifically do; I will leave my noble friend to argue the case for that. In passing this legislation, we owe it to those pensioners who have been left behind to do something to help them catch up.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I understand the motivation behind the amendments in this group, which call, in one way or another, for inflation protection, in particular for pre-1997 pensions that do not benefit from indexation to have a first call on pension scheme surpluses. I do not, however, support these amendments.
When compulsory indexation was first introduced by statute, it was applied only to pension rights which accrued after April 1997. That was a deliberate policy choice by government at the time. Although the cap and the index have been tinkered with over time, the basic policy choice has remained intact. The 1997 change was itself quite costly for those employers that had not previously included indexation or inflation protection in their pension offer to employees, which was quite common at the time. I am sure that the Government at the time were aware that imposing indexation on all accrued pension rights would have been very expensive for employers and would very likely have accelerated the closure of DB schemes.
The period after 1997 saw the evaporation of the kind of surpluses that used to exist, which, incidentally, vindicated the 1997 decision to exclude the pre-1997 accrued rights, because if they had been included, that would almost certainly have accelerated the emergence of deficits, which led in turn to employers considering how they could cap their liabilities by closing schemes entirely or future accrual. As we know, the period of deficits lasted until the past couple of years; they lasted a very long time.
Alongside this period of deficits emerging, there was a mutual interest among trustees and employers to de-risk pension schemes. That is why they shifted most of the assets into things such as gilts, which, in turn, increased the sensitivity of the defined benefit schemes to gilt yields, as we saw in the LDI crisis, and resulted, when interest rates started to rise again, in the surpluses starting to emerge. It was not the only cause but a very significant cause of the surpluses that we now see. We now have schemes in surplus: DWP figures suggest £160 billion—that figure will probably change daily as interest rates change—but that was only after significant employer support throughout the 1990s and the noughties was required, when significant deficit recovery plans had to be signed up to by employers to keep their defined benefit schemes afloat.
The amendments in this group seem to be predicated on the thought that these surpluses are now available for member benefits, as though employers had nothing whatever to do with funding their emergence. Because DB pension schemes are built on the foundation of the interests of members, it is obvious that the surplus will have to be shared between the two—that was partly covered in the previous debate—but the one thing we must always remember is that they have emerged largely from the huge amount of funding that has had to be put in since 1997 to keep the schemes afloat. That the surpluses have emerged does not mean that they are available for whatever good thing people want to spend them on. I certainly do not think it is right to use surpluses to rewrite history to create rights that deliberately were not created in 1997, for the very good reasons that existed at the time. For that reason, I do not support these amendments.
Lord Willetts (Con)
My Lords, I want briefly to enter this discussion to identify another group not captured in the neat divide of employers and scheme members. When there is £160 billion knocking around, people tend to work out elegant arguments for why some group or another has a claim on that money. I understand the arguments for the pre-1997 claims, but I have to say that what my noble friend Lady Noakes just said is a very accurate account of the history and the thinking at the time. There is indeed an argument that, looking back, there was a fundamental change in the character of the defined benefit pension promise with that legislation then, which probably ended up as the reason for their closure. A with-profits policy became one where you had a set of rights, which were more ambitious and have proved in many cases too onerous for employers.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
May I ask my noble friend a couple of questions? I totally accept the rationale for the change happening only post-1997, but does he accept that because we now have surpluses and there is this gap, a one-off payment would be a potential way of recognising the problem faced by the pensioners without changing the long-term funding position of the scheme?
Lord Willetts (Con)
I am not against such payments. As I say, I think this is highly discretionary—there would be a negotiation. I absolutely understand that argument, and we have all received letters from the people suffering financial distress in some circumstances because of not having pre-1997 inflation protection. But I just want to bring in another consideration and try to find out where it would fit in when the employers or the trustees are reaching a decision.
The Government have a policy, or rather we now have on a cross-party basis, a successful policy of auto-enrolment. The levels of pension contribution to the next generation, who are not in these schemes, are way lower than the pension contributions that have generated these large surpluses. It would be great if we could see increasing contributions. Where might a decision fall if an employer says, “We have now turned our scheme into surplus because of the work of the company, and one thing we could do with the money is to put some enhanced contribution into the auto-enrolment pensions of the next range of employees, whose pension rights at the moment will be far lower than those of the people covered in this debate”?
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
I am quite pleased to follow the noble Lord, Lord Willetts, because I feel that we are fishing slightly in the same pond. I added my name to the amendment proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and I support doing something for the pre-1997 people. When you look at something as long-term as pensions and you have different cohorts coming in, moving along and coming out, you have to somehow get into cohort fairness. You will always have the circumstance that people have paid into something and then they get something out when there is something else in the pot. We will come to this even more so when we start to deal with private assets, so I shall not go on at length here, because I will go on at length there. I am in the same camp as the noble Lord, Lord Willetts, in thinking that you do not say that it is clean cut and these people are in and those people are out—you have to look at fairness more broadly across the piece.
Lord Fuller (Con)
My Lords, I first became a pension fund trustee in 1997. The trustees at the time knew that there was a turning point, and it was probably just as well to get someone who might be alive 30 years later at least tutored in the principles of pensions at that moment—so it was clearly a moment in time. How right they were, because 30 years later, here I am.
I recall that it was a difficult moment for the scheme of which I was a member, and the private company for which I worked. Since the Barber reviews of 1991, with regard to the benefits payable in the final salary scheme, which was still open, it was the will of the directors that at all costs the final salary scheme should remain open and open to new accruals. Progressively, the benefits were diluted from RPI to RPI capped at 5% to RPI capped at 2.5%. Every step was taken and every sinew strained to keep that scheme open. But in 2003, the actuary reported that, on a scheme with assets of just £5 million, £4 million extra had to be tipped in; that was a sucker punch, and the scheme was inevitably at that stage closed to new members.
It turns out that the assumptions that were made, with the benefit of hindsight, were overly prudent. The deficit was exaggerated. But notwithstanding having put more than £4.41 million—that is the number that sits in my mind—into the scheme, three years later there was another £2.6 million to find as well. My goodness, the company could have made much better use of that capital to grow the business, rather than to fill a hole that history tells us was not there to the extent that it appeared.
We are in a situation where our scheme, which we kept open as long as we could, could not stand it any longer when we got to 2003. There was another turning point in 2006, in “A-day”, but I shall park that to one side. All that money was tipped in—and the suggestion that all the money that has gone into the scheme is some sort of pot to be shared now down the line, equally or in some proportion with the members as well as the company, is a false premise. Without the commitment of these private companies in those darkest days, the schemes would have closed much earlier and members would not have participated for those extra increments that they did.
I listened carefully to the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, who asked what happens for all those people in the pre-1997 schemes. Well, here is the GMP rub. Astonishingly, I received a payment in the past six months, wholly unexpectedly, from my pre-1997 accrual, for the guaranteed minimum pension. So the suggestion that members are not sharing in any of the benefits of the pre-1997 scheme is a further false premise.
I am no longer a trustee of the scheme, but I know the trustees. The professional and actuarial costs associated with calculating these GMPs have been quite extraordinary. In fact, it would be much better for the trustees to have just made an offer, forget the GMP, and everybody would have been much better off.
The GMP issue illustrates the folly of going down the path that this amendment would lead us. All it is going to do is drive trustees into having more expensive calculations, actuarial adjustments, assessments and consultations, whereas, for the most part, the trustees are minded to make some sort of apportionment and that apportionment needs to be balanced, individual for the scheme in its own circumstances, based on how much excess money was tipped into the scheme for all those years in the post-1997 world. It is about having some sort of fair assessment, a fair apportionment. For the most part, the trustees of private schemes have the benefits and the interests of the members completely at heart and I do not see any circumstance when that does not happen.
This amendment is unnecessary for two reasons. On the one hand, trustees take these things into account. Secondly, that money is truthfully the employers’ money because they went above and beyond, listening in good faith to the professionals, the actuaries and everybody else who had put their oar in on the overly prudent basis, as it now turns out, to make good deficits that were not actually there. I say to noble Lords that for all the pounds that were put in post-1997, when other things happened in the macroeconomy and the Budget—which I will not detain noble Lords with—this country’s pension schemes could have been in a significantly stronger position than they are now had the trustees carried on as they were and not listened to some of the siren voices in government and the so-called professional advisers.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
I strongly support Amendments 26 and 39 from the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. I have a question on Amendment 39, the proposal that trustees should be able to make one-off enhancements. I understand that there has been some recent change in the tax treatment of such payments, and I wonder if my noble friend could update the Committee on where we are with that.
The noble Lord, Lord Willetts, made the point that we are referring to an issue which will depend on the regulations—one of the problems we face is that this is a skeleton Bill. As I understand it, the question is, in essence: can the trustees use the surplus assets to pay the DC contributions of people who are not in the DB scheme? There is a particular quirk with that. Purely randomly, some schemes established the DC arrangement as part of the DB scheme, and other employers established the DC arrangement as a separate legal entity. It is pure chance which way they went; it depended on their advisers. I have questions about it in idea and principle, but if we are going to admit that, it would be wrong to distinguish between the chance of the particular administrative arrangements that were adapted. I wonder if my noble friend is in a position to comment on that point.
I have significant reservations about the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, for free advice being paid for by surplus. Most members of DB schemes do not need advice—which is the entire point of being in a DB scheme. You just get the benefit. That is what is so wonderful about them. Advice rather than guidance is extremely expensive. The idea that a free, open-ended offer of providing advice should be made needs to be looked at extremely carefully. We have the slight difficulty here in that I am replying to the proposals of the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, before he has made them, but I have to get my questions in first, and maybe he will comment on that point.
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)
This seems like a good moment to come in. I first ask the Minister: do the Government agree that a responsible use of surpluses should strengthen confidence in DB schemes and not leave members feeling that prudence has benefited everybody but them? In this, I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, because people do feel aggrieved.
I have three amendments here. Amendment 32 is designed to ensure that regulations take account of the particular circumstances of occupational pension schemes established before the Pensions Act 1995. Members of pre-1997 schemes, so often referred to in this debate, are often in a different position to those in later schemes. These schemes were designed under a different legal and regulatory framework. Current legislation does not always reflect those historical realities, creating unintended iniquities.
Amendment 32 would require regulations under Clause 9 to explicitly consider—that is all—these older schemes. It would allow such schemes, with appropriate regulatory oversight, to offer discretionary indexation where funding allowed, so it would provide flexibility while ensuring that safeguards were in place. It would give trustees the ability to improve outcomes for members in a fair and responsible way, and it would help to address the long-standing issue of members missing out on indexation simply because of their scheme’s pre-1997 status. It would also ensure that members could share in scheme strength where resources permitted. Obviously, safeguards are needed, and Amendment 32 would make it clear that discretionary increases would be possible only where schemes were well funded. Oversight by regulators ensures that employer interests and member protections remain balanced.
My Amendment 41 is about advice. When you are as knowledgeable as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, you do not need the advice, but many pensioners are missing it. This amendment would allow a proportion of pension scheme surplus to be allocated towards funding free—
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
The amendment talks about surpluses, so it is talking specifically about defined benefit schemes. It is not talking about DC schemes because such schemes do not have surpluses. I just want to be clear.
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)
I thank the noble Lord; it is just that impartial pension advice for members is not always available to everybody. Many savers struggle to navigate pension choices, whether around a consolidation investment strategy or retirement income. Without proper advice, members risk making poor financial decisions that could damage their long-term security. If you are in the business, you have to take the good with the bad, but we would like to give members a bit of advice if the money is available. Free impartial advice is essential to levelling the playing field.
Surpluses in pension schemes should not sit idle or be seen simply as windfall funds. Redirecting a small—I stress “small”—proportion to fund member advice would ensure that surpluses are used in a way that benefits members directly. Amendment 32 would not mandate a fixed share; it would simply give the Secretary of State powers to determine what proportion may be used. This would, I hope, create flexibility and safeguards so that the balance between scheme health and member benefit can be properly managed. Further advice from surpluses reduces the need for members to pay out of pocket and it builds trust that schemes are actively supporting member outcomes beyond the pension pot itself.
Amendment 44, to which my noble friend Lord Thurso referred, would insert a new clause requiring the Secretary of State to publish
“within 12 months … a report on whether the fiduciary duties of trustees of occupational pension schemes should be amended to permit discretionary indexation of pre-1997 accrued rights, where scheme funding allows”.
It aims to explore options for improving outcomes for members of older pension schemes. I maintain that this amendment is needed because many pre-1997 schemes were established before modern indexation rules. Trustees’ current fiduciary duties may limit their ability to avoid discretionary increases, which is what this amendment is about. Members of these schemes may be missing out on pension increases that could be sustainable and beneficial. I will not go on about what the report would do, but there would be many benefits to this new clause. It would provide an evidence-based assessment of whether discretionary indexation can be applied safely; support trustees in making informed decisions for pre-1997 scheme members; and balance members’ interests with financial prudence and regulatory safeguards.
The amendments in this group are clearly going to progress on to Report in some way. Sometime between now and then, we are going to have to try to amalgamate these schemes and take the best bits out of them in order to get, on Report, a final amendment that might have a chance of persuading the Government to take action on these points. Many of the amendments in this group—indeed, all of them—follow the same line, but there needs to be some discipline in trying to get the best out of them all into a final amendment on Report.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, for their amendments in this group. I also thank other noble Lords for all their other contributions in Committee so far this afternoon. Our debate on this group has stimulated a most valuable discussion. Of course, I look forward to the Minister’s responses to the points that have been raised.
I wish to start off by saying that I thought it was helpful that the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, steered the Committee—my words, not hers—towards a focus on scheme members. The debate went a lot beyond that, but I just wanted to make that point at the outset. I wish also to take this opportunity to set out our stance on indexation, as well as some of the related questions that we for the Opposition have for the Government on this point.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, said, these amendments raise understandable concerns about fairness, inflation and the use of defined benefit surpluses. But our core line is simple: mandating how trustees and employers use DB surpluses would be overly prescriptive and risks being actively anti-business. Many employers are already using surpluses constructively, improving DC provision for younger workers, supporting intergenerational fairness, strengthening scheme security through contingent assets, SPVs or insurance-backed arrangements, or reducing long-term risk in ways that benefit members as well as sponsors. Employers have also borne DB deficit risk for many years, as we have heard a bit about this afternoon. If they carried the risk in the bad times, it is reasonable that they can share in the benefits in the good times, provided that decisions are taken jointly with trustees.
I will explain this through a simple analogy—I say at the outset that it will not be up to the standard of the buckets analogy utilised previously in Committee by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, but here we are. The employer and members walk into the casino together. The bets are placed and the investment strategy, funding assumptions and longevity risk are collective decisions overseen by trustees. If the bet goes wrong, the employer must cover the losses, often over many years, through additional contributions and balance sheet strain. If the bet goes right, however, some argue that the employer should be excluded from any upside and that all gains must automatically be distributed to members.
That is not, we believe, how risk sharing works. In any rational system, the party that underwrites the losses must surely be allowed to share in the gains—I know there are other arguments, but I believe this was the one posed by my noble friend Lady Noakes—otherwise, incentives are distorted, future participation is discouraged and employers become less willing to sponsor schemes at all. The fair outcome is that neither the employer nor the members take everything and that surplus is discussed and allocated jointly by trustees and employers in a way that balances member security, scheme sustainability and the long-term health of the sponsoring employer. I think this was the central argument of the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, and, in a different way, my noble friend Lord Fuller. Legislation should support that partnership, not override it.
My noble friend Lord Willets made an interesting point. He asked whether it is fair that, in DB schemes, current employees often contribute to enhancing or rescuing the surplus position of pension schemes, making up for past mistakes—or deficits, perhaps—and the potential consequence of that linking to lower remuneration for those current employees. I add one more thing, which is probably a bit unfair because it is slightly hypothetical: if that current employee, having perhaps been paid less, is then made redundant, that is a double whammy for them. The question is whether the surplus should be used for helping current employees or giving them a better deal, as well as, or instead of, looking to help the pre-1997 members. That is the way I look at it.
Against that backdrop, amendments that would make benefit uplifts—whether pre-1997 indexation or lump sum enhancements—a statutory condition of surplus extraction raise real concerns. Automatic uplift would ignore wider economic impacts, including higher employer costs; increased insolvency risk, ultimately borne by the PPF; knock-on effects on wages, investment and employment; and potentially higher PPF levies.
For PPF schemes, mandatory uplift is manageable because the employer covenant has gone and Parliament controls the compensation framework. Imposing similar requirements on live schemes risks destabilising otherwise healthy employers. Uplift should therefore be an option and not an obligation. That said, focusing on choice does not mean ignoring power imbalances. In some schemes, there is genuine deadlock. Trustees may be reluctant to deploy surplus for fear of sponsor reaction or member backlash, so instead sit on it and de-risk further. That may be a rational defensive response, but it is also a deeply inefficient outcome. The Government should be looking at how to enable better use of surplus by agreement, rather than mandating outcomes.
My questions to the Minister are as follows. How do the Government intend to preserve flexibility while avoiding blunt compulsion? How will they support trustee-employer partnership rather than hardwiring outcomes into legislation? What consideration has been given to mechanisms for breaking deadlock—including overprudence, if that is a term that can be used—so that surplus can be used productively rather than simply locked away?
To conclude, these amendments raise important issues. Our concern is not with the objectives but with the method. Choice, partnership and proportionality should remain the guiding principles. I look forward to the responses from the Minister.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords— that was a very interesting debate. I will come to some of the detail in a moment. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, and the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, for explaining their amendments.
We do not have a smorgasbord here, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, observed. Essentially, Amendments 26, 32, 38 and 39 would, in different ways, allow regulations to require member benefit enhancements prior to surplus release, require regulations to do so, and require trustees to consider indexation and the value of members’ pensions before making a surplus payment.
I say at the outset that I understand the concerns of scheme members whose pensions have not kept pace with inflation. They may have made contributions for many years and are understandably upset at seeing inflation erode the value of their retirement income. But I am afraid that I am not able to accept these amendments, for reasons I will explain.
I will give a bit of context first, because it is worth noting that over 80% of members of private sector DB schemes currently get some form of pre-1997 indexation on their benefits. However, as I explained in the previous group, we think the way forward is that our reforms will give trustees greater flexibility to release surplus from well-funded DB schemes and will encourage discussion between employers and trustees on how those funds can be used to benefit members.
In response to the final question from the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, about deadlock-breaking, we do not think it is necessary because, in a sense, it is not a balanced position between employers and trustees. Trustees are in control. Employers cannot access surplus directly. Trustees are the ones who make a decision. If the trustees do not agree to release the surplus, the surplus is not being released. In a sense, it is quite intentional for the power to sit with the trustees, and that is the appropriate way to manage that issue. We think that that way of putting trustees in the driving seat is a better approach than legislating for how surplus should be used. I found that discussion of history, from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, the noble Lords, Lord Willetts and Lord Fuller, and others, very helpful.
The DB landscape is a complex situation. It has a varied history and there are variations within it: within schemes, over time, between schemes, across time and across the landscape. Benefit structures have varied, in many cases over the course of a scheme’s history. Although some schemes may not provide pre-1997 indexation, they may have been more generous; they may have been non-contributory or may have provided a higher accrual rate at different points in time. All schemes are different. That is why we do not think it is possible to provide an overall requirement on schemes for indexation. We think it is better that trustees, with their deep understanding of the knowledge of individual schemes, their characteristics and history, remain at the heart of decision-making in accordance with their fiduciary duties. In addition, of course, as I keep saying, they must act in the interests of scheme beneficiaries.
Viscount Thurso (LD)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her explanation. However, does she agree that a case where the employer has the right to prevent the trustees making a payment—with some surpluses, the trustees may wish to make a payment but the employer can stop it if it is not going to them—is a special case, which needs to be looked at slightly differently?
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
I will need to come back to the noble Viscount on that specific point. Obviously, at the moment, a minority of trustees have the power in the scheme rules to release surplus; our changes will broaden that out considerably. If there is a particular subcategory, I will need to come back to the noble Viscount on that. I apologise that I cannot do that now—unless inspiration should hit me in the next few minutes while I am speaking, in which case I will return to the subject when illumination has appeared from somewhere.
It is worth saying a word on trustees because we will keep coming back to this. It was a challenge in the previous group from my noble friend Lord Davies. The starting point is that most trustees are knowledgeable, well equipped and committed to their roles. But there is always room to better support trustees and their capability, especially in a landscape of fewer, larger consolidated pension funds. That is why the Government, on 15 December, issued a consultation on trustees and governance, which, specifically, is asking for feedback on a range of areas to build the evidence base. It wants to look at, for example, how we can get higher technical knowledge and understanding requirements for all trustees; the growth and the use of sole trustees; improving the diversity of trustee boards; how we get members’ voices heard in a world of fewer, bigger schemes; managing conflicts of—
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
Sorry. Corporate trustees are a specific issue. Does the consultation include the particular responsibility of single corporate trustees?
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
Absolutely. There may be—I am not saying that there are—risks that need to be explored around the use of sole corporate trustees. The consultation will look at that, and at generally improving the quality and standards of administration to improve service quality and so on. That runs until 6 March. My noble friend may wish to contribute to it; I commend it to him.
On safeguards, trustees will need to notify the regulator when they exercise the power to pay surplus. As part of that notification, we anticipate the provision to be made in regulations for trustees to explain how, if at all, members have benefited because that will help the regulator monitor how the new powers are being used.
In response to the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, the Pensions Regulator has already set out that trustees should consider the situation of those members who would benefit from a discretionary increase and whether the scheme has a history of making such increases. Following this legislation—and as I may have said in the previous group—TPR will publish further guidance for trustees and advisers, noting factors to consider when releasing surplus and ways in which trustees can ensure members and employers can benefit.
On that broader point, we feel that it must be a negotiation, because increasing indexation would increase employer liabilities, so it is right that it ends up being a negotiation. All the safeguards are already there. My noble friend Lord Davies asked what advice trustees should take. We expect trustees to take appropriate professional advice when evaluating a potential surplus release and making a payment. As well as actuarial advice, this should also include legal advice and covenant advice to enable trustees to discharge their duties properly. Let us not forget that a strong covenant is the best guarantee a scheme has; not undermining the covenant, or the employer that stands behind it, is crucial to this.
Amendment 44 would require the Secretary of State to publish a report on whether trustees’ duties should be changed to enable trustees to pay discretionary increases on pre-1997 accrued rights. It is not clear to us why this would be needed as the scope of trustee fiduciary duties do not prevent trustees paying discretionary increases, where scheme rules allow them to do so. We expect trustees to consult their professional advisers, including lawyers, on their duties if they are not sure.
Amendment 41 from the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, highlights the importance of ensuring that members have access to good quality pensions advice. Although we understand the intention, we remain clear that we will not be mandating the use of surplus released from schemes. My noble friend Lord Davies made the good point that, in some ways, the greatest need for support is on the DC side rather than the DB side. DB scheme members expect to receive a lifelong retirement income, which trustees must regularly and clearly communicate to members. This is typically based on salary and length of service, offering strong financial security. For DB, the benefits they will receive on retirement are generally known.
The Government recognise the importance of robust guidance, however, and we already ensure that everyone has access to free, impartial pensions guidance through the Money and Pensions Service, helping people to make informed financial decisions at the right time. The MoneyHelper service offers broad and flexible pensions guidance that supports people throughout their financial journey.
A couple of other questions were asked, including what employers will use the surplus for. The Pensions Regulator published a survey last year, Defined benefit trust-based pension schemes research. In a sample of interviews, it found around 8% of schemes with a funding surplus reported having released a surplus in the last year. That equates to nine schemes. Of those nine, seven schemes used the surplus to enhance member benefits. One used it to provide a contribution holiday for future DB accrual and one to make a payment to a DC section established in the same trust. None of the nine schemes stated that the surplus was released to the employer.
In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Willetts, and my noble friend Lord Davies, it was always the case that it depends on the scheme rules. I want to make sure I get this right. I had a note somewhere about it, but I am having to wing it now so I will inevitably end up writing and correcting it. If there is a DB and a DC section in the same trust, it could be possible, depending on the scheme rules, for trustees to make a decision to release funds from one to the other. But trustees may not be able to agree to that; it would obviously depend on the circumstances. However, as I understand it, there is nothing to stop an employer releasing funds—surplus released from a DB scheme back to an employer. The employer could then choose to put that money in, for example, a DC scheme. I understand the tax treatment would be such that the tax payable on one can be offset as a business expense on the other, making it a tax neutral proposal. In any case, as noble Lords may have noted, the tax treatment of surplus rate has dropped from 35% to 25%. A decision has been made to make that drop down. If by winging it I have got that wrong, I will clarify that when I write the inevitable letter of correction.
My noble friend Lord Davies asked about tax treatment. I will read this out, as it is from the Treasury, and I will be killed if I get it wrong. Amendments to tax law are required to ensure these payments—one-off payments—qualify as authorised member payments and are taxed as intended. The necessary changes to tax legislation will have effect from 6 April 2027. Changes to tax legislation are implemented through finance Bills and statutory instruments made under finance Acts. There will be consequential changes to pensions legislation where necessary, which will be dealt with through regulations. I hope that satisfies my noble friend. If it does not, I will write to him at a later point.
I hope I have covered all the questions. I am really grateful for that contribution; it is one of the ways in which this Committee illuminates these matters. But I hope, having heard that, the noble Baroness feels able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
I thank the Minister for her explanation. Although it is rather disappointing, I understand where she is coming from. I also thank all noble Lords who have participated in this group. There is a general feeling across the party divides—but obviously not unanimity—that lack of inflation protection is an issue. How or whether it is dealt with is the big question. I hope that maybe we can all meet and discuss this and how it could best be brought back on Report, if it is going to be brought back. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Member’s explanatory statement
This is a probing amendment which seeks to determine why the Secretary of State is permitted to change the conditions for paying surplus using the negative procedure after the initial conditions are first set using the affirmative procedure and to question the extent and scope of the Secretary of State’s regulatory power in setting the conditions for surplus release.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, we come to another busy group, in which the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, and I have amendments. I will speak only to our amendments so that other noble Lords have time to set out their reasoning and questions to the Minister. I look forward to hearing them. Essentially, this group covers surplus release, how it will operate and precisely who will oversee the rules of this. We are also concerned about the very wide delegated powers within this area.
Viscount Thurso (LD)
My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 34 and 37 and will briefly comment on the other amendments. Quickly, before I do that, I seek to assist the Minister with the question I asked her on the last group. I was written to by people who came together as a small group to protest against the failure of a trustee and an employer to award discretionary increases, contrary to their joint policy of matching inflation, originally published in 1989 and repeated in pensions guides and newsletters over the years. For the last four years, the employer has refused consent to modest discretionary increases recommended by the trustee and supported by the independent actuary. That is the situation I am looking at. I hope that is helpful.
I turn to the current group. Let me say, first, in response to the noble Viscount’s amendment and his Clause 10 stand part notice—as he said, both are probing amendments—broadly speaking, I concur with him. If we had had regulations, draft regulations or just something to look at, an awful lot of these questions would not have needed to be put at this stage. As a matter of principle, I am always in favour of the affirmative procedure, rather than the negative one; I shall leave that there.
I know that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, will speak eloquently to his own amendments in a moment, but they are a bit of a variation on the theme of the ones in my name. My Amendment 34 would, in Clause 10 and at line 23,
“after ‘notified’ insert ‘and consulted’”.
What that would do is to say that the trustees would have not only to notify the members but to consult them. My Amendment 37 is very much along the same lines. It would insert, at the end of proposed new subsection (2B), a new paragraph—paragraph (e)—
“requiring that the trustees are satisfied that it is in the interests of the members that the power to pay surplus is exercised in the manner proposed in relation to a payment before it is made”.
Both amendments seek to explore the relationship between the employer, the members and the trustees.
I have listened to the arguments where it has been put forward that the employer has underwritten the surpluses, almost, and is at the mercy of the trustees. The case that I have put forward shows that, actually, there is often a power imbalance between the members—they are probably at the bottom of the pile—the trustees and the employer. I completely concur that the idea of mandating a response is wrong, but it is open to have regulations that require the trustees both to have regard to and to look at that, so that we reach a situation where members’ interests have at least equal value, in the eyes of the trustees, as the requirements of the employer.
I feel that these amendments are very modest. Who knows what might happen later on, but this stage the amendments are designed to reinforce members’ ability to be consulted and know what is going on.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
My amendments address how members’ interests can best be represented whenever a release of assets is under consideration.
As the Bill stands, the first members will know about such proposals is when they are a done deal—that is, when the decision has been made by the trustees, having talked to the employer. That is what the Bill says, and that is clearly wrong. There is also nothing in the Bill about any involvement of members in the process, such as consultation. This is obviously unacceptable; they should be involved fully from the start. I support the amendments in this group in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso.
I would probably oppose Amendment 42 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, but, obviously, I shall wait to hear what she says before coming to a conclusion—although the noble Baroness’s remarks on the previous group gave me the gist of what is proposed. Finally, I shall await my noble friend the Minister’s response to the questions raised by the amendments in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Younger of Leckie.
My Amendment 36 is relatively straightforward and, I hope, uncontentious. Members need to be told before, not after, a decision is made by the trustees and agreed by the employer. This is a point of principle. Scheme members are not passive recipients of their employers’ largesse; they should be equal partners in a shared endeavour, and they have the right to be involved.
My other two amendments would bring scheme members’ trade unions into the process. A question has been asked a number of times during the passage of the Bill in the Commons: who represents members when a release of assets is proposed? The answer, of course, is their trade unions. This is a matter of fact. Consultation is inherently collective and there is now extensive and detailed legislation on how members are to be represented collectively. This applies here, as it does to all other terms and conditions of employment. I should emphasise that this is a requirement to consult on the employer, not the trustees. It applies to trade unions recognised for any purpose under the standard provisions of employment law.
Amendment 36 is relatively straightforward. It would simply require the employer to inform recognised trade unions at the same time as scheme members of the proposals that it is considering in discussion with trustees to release scheme assets. Amendment 40 would go further; it would require an employer to consult with those recognised trade unions before reaching any agreement with the trustees. The requirement to consult with trade unions about changes in pension arrangements that they sponsor is not a new provision. I am not proposing anything radical or new. Pension law already requires consultation with trade unions in this particular form; it requires them to take place before major changes in employees’ collective arrangements. My case is simply that the decision to release assets is a major change and hence it should be brought within the consultation requirements that are already set out in legislation.
This is all in accordance with Section 259 of the Pensions Act 2004 and the regulations under the Act. These are the Occupational and Personal Pension Schemes (Consultation by Employers and Miscellaneous Amendment) Regulations 2006, that is SI 349 of 2006. These regulations require employers with at least 50 employees to consult with active and prospective scheme members before making major changes—known as listed changes in the legislation—to their pension arrangements.
The key requirements set out in the legislation includes a mandatory consultation period. First, employers must conduct a consultation lasting at least 60 days before a decision is made. Secondly, there must be a spirit of co-operation. Employers and consultees are under a duty to work in the spirit of co-operation and employers must take the views received into account. Thirdly, the affected parties consultation must include active members, those currently building benefits, and prospective members—eligible employees not yet in the scheme. Deferred and pensioner members are generally excluded, which I have always regarded as a shortcoming in the legislation.
The listed changes that currently trigger statutory consultation are: an increase in the normal pension age; closing the scheme to new members; stopping or reducing the future accrual of benefits; ending or reducing the employer’s liability to make contributions; introducing or increasing member contributions; changing final salary benefits to money purchase benefits; and reducing the rate of revaluation or indexation for benefits. It should be noted that this is not just about changes in benefits; it is about changing the financing of the scheme. A release of assets is a change in the financing of a scheme, and so it should be included in the list in these regulations. My amendment would simply direct that regulations should be laid that will add release of assets to the list of these listed changes.
There are consequences under the legislation for employers that fail to comply with it, but the spirit here is one of setting out a process of working together, in order, as far as possible, to reach changes to the scheme that are accepted to both sides of the employment relationship.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
I want to comment briefly on Amendment 35, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, where he seemed to characterise the need to have members in the room alongside employers and trustees. He seems to forget that trustees’ responsibility is to act for the members. The members are fully part of the negotiation through the trustees. I personally do not agree with his amendment requiring formal consultation, as with some of the existing listed changes to pension schemes. But there was a good reason why the release of surpluses was not included when that legislation was first drafted, and I have seen no reason to change that.
My Amendment 42 is rather unlike other amendments in this group, which is why I spoke in the previous group and probably should have asked for my amendment to be grouped there. I reiterate my remarks in that group on the importance of the interests of the sponsoring employers, who have for the most part provided the funding which has now led to the surpluses emerging, which is the subject of these clauses in the Bill. My Amendment 42 simply says that regulations made under new subsection (2A) of Section 37 of the 1995 Act may not replace restrictions on employers once surpluses have been paid to them.
The DWP’s post-consultation document on the treatment of surpluses said:
“Employers could use this funding to invest in their business, increase productivity, boost wages, or utilise it for enhanced contributions in their Defined Contribution (DC) schemes”.
The noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, referred to that being used elsewhere as a justification for these new release powers. I agree that they could use it for those things, but there are also other things that they could use it for. For example, they could use it to fund a reduction of prices in the goods and services they sell to gain a competitive advantage in the marketplace.
The thing that concerns me in particular is whether the funds are used to pay dividends or to make a return of capital, because companies have shareholders and that would be a fairly normal use of surplus funds. My key concern is that the Government would use the power in new subsection (2A) to specify that employers could not use the money in the way they chose, and in particular in relation to dividends and share buybacks.
I completely understand the Government’s desire to see more investment, but holding money within the company might be the economically illiterate thing to do. Businesses make investments in assets, productivity or people if they think they have a reasonable prospect of making a return. They do not invest because they happen to have some surplus cash lying around. If they cannot be reasonably sure of making a decent return themselves, the right thing to do is to return the money to the shareholders and let the shareholders recycle that into other investment opportunities which make a reasonable return. That is why low-performing companies are often under pressure to return capital to the shareholders. In the context of the whole economy, that is the sensible thing to do, because it gets capital to the right place in the economy. Therefore, I hope the Minister can reassure me that new subsection (2A) will not be used to restrict what companies do with the surpluses extracted from pension schemes.
The Minister made some quite helpful remarks in the first group about the Government not telling people what to do with the surpluses, but I hope she can be specific in relation to the use of the power in new subsection (2A) that that would not be used to restrict what companies can do.
Lord Fuller (Con)
I support my noble friend Lady Noakes in her assertion that members’ interests are already taken into account on many trustee boards. In fact, all but the very smallest schemes have procedures and requirements to appoint member-nominated trustees. It is almost so obvious that it is hardly worth saying, but it is the truth. It is the job of the member-nominated trustees, not the unions or the members themselves, to represent the interests of that cohort. Even the local government scheme has arrangements whereby the needs of the employers and the employees are balanced, so it is not just a question of the private schemes; all schemes have those balances as a principle, and that is entirely appropriate.
I am disappointed to disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies, because I felt we got on so well in the previous two days in Committee, but, on this occasion, I part company with him. I do not think his amendments are needed, because of the existence of that member-nominated trustee class. It is their job, and if the members do not like it, they can get another one.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken on these amendments to Clause 10. Having previously set out the Government’s policy intent and the context in which these reforms are being brought forward, I start with the clause stand part notice tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Younger. As he has made clear, it seeks to remove Clause 10 from the Bill as a means of probing the rationale for setting out the conditions attached to surplus release in regulations rather than in the Bill. It is a helpful opportunity to explain the scope and conditions of the powers and why Clause 10 is structured as it is.
The powers in the Bill provide a framework that we think strikes the right balance between scrutiny and practicality, enabling Parliament to oversee policy development while allowing essential regulations to be made in a timely and appropriate way. It clearly sets out the policy decisions and parameters within which the delegated powers must operate. As the noble Viscount has acknowledged, pensions legislation is inherently technical, and much of the practical delivery sits outside government, with schemes, trustees, providers and regulators applying the rules in the real-world conditions. In pensions legislation, it has long been regarded as good lawmaking practice to set clear policy directions and statutory boundaries in primary legislation, while leaving detailed operational rules to regulations, particularly those that can be updated as markets and economic conditions change and scheme structures evolve, so that the system continues to work effectively over time.
In particular, Clause 10 broadly retains the approach taken by the Pensions Act 1995, which sets out overarching conditions for surplus payments in primary legislation while leaving detailed requirements to regulations. New subsection (2B) sets out the requirements that serve to protect members that must be set out in regulations before trustees can pay a surplus to the employer—namely, before a trustee can agree to release surplus, they will be required to receive actuarial certification that the scheme meets a prudent funding threshold, and members must be notified before surplus is released. The funding threshold will be set out in regulations, which we will consult on. We have set out our intention and we have said that we are minded that surplus release will be permitted only where a scheme is fully funded at low dependency. That is a robust and prudent threshold which aligns with the existing rules for scheme funding and aims to ensure that, by the time the scheme is in significant maturity, it is largely independent of the employer.
New subsection (2C) then provides the ability to introduce additional regulations aimed at further enhancing member protection when considered appropriate. Specifically, new subsection (2C)(a) allows flexibility for regulations to be made to introduce further conditions that must be met before making surplus payments. That is intended, for example, if new circumstances arise from unforeseen market conditions. Crucially, as I have said, the Bill ensures that member protection is at the heart of our reforms. Decisions to release surplus remain subject to trustee discretion, taking into account the specific circumstances of the scheme and its employer. Superfunds will be subject to their own regime for profit extraction.
Amendment 37, tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, seeks to retain a statutory requirement that any surplus release be in the interests of members. I am glad to have the opportunity to explain our proposed change in this respect. We have heard from a cross-section of industry, including trustees and advisers, that the current legislation, at Section 37(3)(d) of the Pensions Act 1995, requiring that the release of surplus be in the interests of members, is perceived by trustees as a barrier because they are not certain how that test is reconciled with their existing fiduciary duties. We believe that retaining the status quo in the new environment could hamper trustee decision-making. By amending this section, we want to put it beyond doubt for trustees that they are not subject to any additional tests beyond their existing clear duties of acting in the interests of scheme beneficiaries.
I turn to Amendments 31 and 43, which seek to clarify why the power to make regulations governing the release of surplus is affirmative only on first use. As the Committee may know, currently, only the negative procedure applies to the making of surplus regulations. However, in this Bill, the power to make the initial surplus release regulations is affirmative, giving Parliament the opportunity to review and scrutinise the draft regulations before they are made. We believe that this strikes the appropriate balance. The new regime set out in Clause 10 contains new provisions for the core safeguards of the existing statutory regime; these are aligned with the existing legislation while providing greater flexibility to amend the regime in response to changing market, and other, conditions.
Amendments 35 and 36 seek both to prescribe the ways in which members are notified around surplus release and to require that trade unions representing members also be notified. I regret to say that I am about to disappoint my noble friend Lord Davies again, for which I apologise. The Government have been clear: we will maintain a requirement for trustees to notify members of surplus release as a condition of any payment to the employer. We are confident that the current requirement for three months’ notification to members of the intent to release surplus works well.
However, there are different ways in which surplus will be released to employers and members. Stakeholder feedback indicates that some sponsoring employers would be interested in receiving scheme surplus as a one-off lump sum, but others might be interested in receiving surplus in instalments—once a year for 10 years, say. We want to make sure that the requirements in legislation around the notification of members before surplus release work for all types of surplus release. We would want to consider the relative merits of trustees notifying their members of each payment from the scheme, for example, versus trustees notifying their members of a planned schedule of payments from the scheme over several years. Placing the conditions around notification in regulations will provide an opportunity for the Government to consult and take industry feedback into account, to ensure the right balance between protection for members and flexibility for employers.
I understand the reason behind my noble friend Lord Davies’s amendment, which would require representative trade unions to be notified. They can play an important role in helping members to understand pension changes. However, we are not persuaded of the benefit of an additional requirement on schemes. Members—and, indeed, employers—may well engage with trade unions in relation to surplus payments; we just do not feel that a legislative requirement to do so is warranted. The points about the role of trustees, in relation to acting in the interests of members in these decisions, were well made.
Amendment 34 would require member consultation before surplus is released. I understand the desire of the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, to ensure that members are protected. The Government’s view is that members absolutely need to be notified in advance, but the key to member protection lies in the duty on scheme trustees to act in their interests. Since trustees must take those interests into account when considering surplus release, we do not think that a legislative requirement to consult is proportionate.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
Just to be absolutely clear, the three-month notification period relates to the notice of implementation; it is not three months’ notice of the decision being made.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
I believe so; if that is not correct, I shall write to my noble friend to correct it. Coming back to his point, the underlying fact is that we believe that the way to protect the interests of members is via the trustees and the statutory protections around trustee decision-making.
I apologise to the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, as I misunderstood his question in our debate on the previous group. I am really grateful to him for clarifying it; clearly, he could tell that I had misunderstood it. At the moment, when a scheme provides discretionary benefits, the scheme rules will stipulate who makes those decisions. In many cases, that involves both the trustees and the sponsoring employer, as may be the case in what the noble Viscount described.
When considering those discretionary increases, trustees and sponsoring employers have to carefully assess the effect of inflation on members’ benefits. But, as the noble Viscount describes, if it is not agreed, the employer may effectively in some circumstances veto that. We think the big game-changer here is that these changes will give trustees an extra card, because they will then be in a position to be able to put on the table the possibility for surplus being released not to the member via a discretionary increase but to the employer. However, they are the ones who get to decide if that happens, and therefore they are in a position where they suddenly have a card to play. I cannot believe I am following the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, in using the casino as a metaphor for pensions, which I was determined not to do; I am not sure that that takes us to a good place. But it gives them an extra tool in their toolbox to be able to negotiate with employers, because they are the ones who hold the veto on surplus release. If they do not agree to it, it ain’t going anywhere. So that is what helps in those circumstances.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Committee for the discussion on this group, which goes to the heart of how Clause 10 is intended to operate in practice. I have a few closing remarks, but I just say at the outset that I think we all realise that it was for the Minister to answer the very concise questions raised by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, and my noble friend Lady Noakes. Across these amendments and our stand-part notice, our concern has been a consistent one, which is that Clause 10 confers wide powers on the Secretary of State to determine the conditions under which surplus may be paid to an employer and to alter those conditions over time, largely through regulations. That is a significant delegation of authority in an area both technically complex and deeply sensitive for scheme members.
Although we recognise the case for flexibility, that flexibility must be balanced with proper safeguards. When changes to the surplus regime could materially affect member protections or the balance of interests between employers and members, it is not unreasonable for Parliament to expect a meaningful and continuing role in scrutinising those changes, not merely at the point when the framework is first established.
I listened very carefully to the Minister in her responses in terms of the legislative process, and I take note of the fact that she says that the measures are in line with existing legislation. I will reflect on that and read Hansard, and I will look more deeply at her points about the negative procedures having been used in the past, and the fact that she says that this is different and the Government are bringing forward an affirmative procedure before the negative procedure, if your Lordships see what I mean. I shall look at that.
As I said at the outset, our amendments have been probing in nature. They are intended to test the rationale for the proposed approach to parliamentary procedure and seek reassurances that the level of scrutiny will remain commensurate with the importance of the decisions being taken.
Finally, given the nature of the Bill as a framework Bill—a theme that we have been promulgating on the first two days in Committee, and which the Minister herself explained on Monday—I hope that the Minister will anticipate that we and other noble Lords will be bearing these questions in mind on many other parts of the Bill. I hope that in raising this and flagging it, she can continue to respond to these issues in the round, explaining why this structure was adopted in the first place throughout the Bill, what constraints the Government envisage placing on the use of these powers, and how Parliament will be able to satisfy itself that future changes to the surplus regime remain appropriate and proportionate. With that rounding off, I withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Altmann
“(ca) requiring the relevant actuary to confirm that work to comply with Technical Actuarial Standards issued by Financial Reporting Council on risk transfer processes has been completed,”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment will ensure that prior to a surplus payment being made the trustees and sponsor have considered the impact on bulk transfer and run-on strategies currently required under TAS300V2.1 P5 other financial considerations for the scheme and the sponsor.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I hope that noble Lords will understand as I go through my remarks that I believe my Amendments 33 and 33A are incredibly important to the future of defined benefit schemes and the aims of the Bill.
Clause 10, which is about the restrictions of power to pay surplus, specifies in new subsection (2B)(c) a requirement for
“the relevant actuary to give a certificate”.
My Amendments 33 and 33A seek to add a strengthening of the trustee considerations of alternatives, rather than just having a certificate from the actuary. Amendment 33 would state that the actuary must confirm that the required technical actuarial standards work has been completed. Amendment 33A is about the trustees, who must ensure that they receive the report on the relative merits and consider alternative options such as buyout, superfunds or even a change of sponsor—I will come to that in a moment—before making payment of surplus.
Why are these amendments required? There are standards in place, but I have been careful not to specify a number for the standard. I am talking about today’s technical actuarial standard, TAS 300, but of course these standards change—there is already version 1 and version 2—so the amendments aim to see that the standards are applied, taken notice of and fed into the consideration before any irreversible changes are made to the scheme.
The trustees obviously have a fiduciary duty to consider members’ best long-term interests, but it seems that they do not already receive the depth of analysis required in many cases. The calculations done for the TAS 300 are not consistent; they are not applied consistently, according to the information that I have received from those in the market. There is no standard calculation methodology, but the DWP regulations that were changed recently require trustees to set funding and investment strategies. In my view, TAS 300, as it stands, should be part of that.
Before any surplus is paid out, or a decision to buy annuities, enter a superfund or change sponsor is made, a proper risk assessment should be carried out looking carefully at the downside risks of any potential move versus the upside potential. The actuarial calculations to quantify these, which are specified in the Financial Reporting Council’s technical standards, do not necessarily become applied, and there are regulatory gaps. The technical standards require actuaries to provide TAS 300 comparative advice, but it is not clear how, when or whether the trustees must consider them.
Consistent application of the assessment, in my view, could be significant in changing the standard mindsets about the best choice for the future of DB schemes. But, even today, there is no consistency, no agreed pro forma, no standard template and no detailed implementation guidance, even, from the Financial Reporting Council or other bodies. It has long been recognised that there is a lack of co-ordination and scrutiny of technical actuarial standards. The Kingman report in 2018, the Morris report and the Penrose report, dating back to 2000, all proposed urgent improvements but not much has changed.
There are seven regulators reporting to three government departments. The Pensions Regulator and the PPF report to the DWP; the FRC and the CMA to the Department for Business and Trade; the PRA and the FCA to the Treasury; and the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries is self-regulating. These regulators need to work together to address this massive pool of assets and national wealth. My amendments are an attempt to help this integration and move it along.
Currently, there is over £1 trillion-worth of assets in these schemes. Since 2018, £350 billion of the value in defined benefit schemes has been transferred to insurance companies, many of which are now offshore. The scrutiny and regulatory control over those massive amounts of money is being diluted, and that has not been recognised. It is still considered that the gold standard for the future of defined benefit schemes is annuities, whether a buy-in or a buy-out; that is meant to be the no-risk option. That is not necessarily the case any more. The Bank of England itself has stated that there are risks in terms of the offshore insurers.
This TAS 300 exercise could become part of a crucial element in deciding what the future of these schemes will be. Currently, the transfer of assets to insurance companies, which is so frequently being carried out—we are told that there may be another £500 billion in their sights from DB schemes in coming years—is handing the surplus assets of these schemes to the insurance companies. I argue that proper use of the TAS 300 exercise could help the surplus be used for national investments, for improving member benefits and for improving the resources of corporate UK.
It is estimated that the scheme assets which are currently being transferred to insurers are invested in such a low-risk manner that their aim—this is the Pensions Regulator’s recommended strategy for low dependency to attain a return of gilts plus a half or so—as soon as the insurer takes these assets in, is to re-risk, invest in other assets, and sell the gilt and aim for a return of gilts plus, say, one and a half. Every £100 billion of assets transferred to an insurance company is the equivalent of about £200 million of scheme assets that are not going to members or employers but are transferring offshore.
Stagecoach, which uses this TAS 300 exercise, actually managed to justify changing the sponsoring employer, while enhancing member benefits and paying extra out in surplus. That could be the way of the future if we get away from the current obsession, which states that the no-risk option is annuities and everything else is risky. This is a huge amount of money. These schemes have changed fundamentally. The outlook has changed fundamentally: we are no longer worried about deficits and employer covenants. We should be talking about using this national pool of wealth to boost Britain.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
I find myself in some difficulty in speaking to these amendments. First, although I declared my interests as a fellow of the Institute of Actuaries at the beginning of Committee, it is appropriate, in accordance with practice where there is a specific interest involved in the amendment, to declare it again. I am not a practising actuary at the moment, but I could be, and this would bear directly on my ability to earn money.
I support what I think is behind the proposals being made by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. We should consider ways of strengthening trustee consideration of the way forward, whatever it is. More specifically, an automatic response to go to annuitisation is clearly wrong. If trustees do not consider the other options, they are not acting properly and are not discharging their fiduciary responsibility. The suggestion is that this is happening too often at the moment.
Broadly speaking, I agree that there has been a rush to buy out, but that has happened for a wide variety of reasons, of which I would suggest that the presence or absence of particular actuarial advice is only a small part. To overemphasise this part without looking at what else is going on is a problem. Trustees should be supported to make better decisions, and part of that process is the actuarial report that they produce from their scheme actuary.
Just to provide a bit of background, we need to understand that actuarial regulation is just a little confusing. We have two regulators for actuaries. There is the institute itself, which is responsible for professional standards—“you should not bring shame on the profession and you should make sure that you know what you are talking about before you provide advice”. All that side of things is handled by the profession itself. Technical standards, such as what should be in a valuation report, are the responsibility of the Financial Reporting Council, a completely separate body that is not part of the actuarial profession. Although there are actuaries involved in the work of the FRC, it is not an actuarial body but an independent body. I will not go into the history, but, for whatever reason, it was decided to take that technical supervision away from the institute and place it with the Financial Reporting Council.
The particular standard referred to here is the technical actuarial standard, or TAS 300. That does not mean that there has been a previous 299; it starts at 300. There is a 100, and there are other numbered standards that come and go. This is the one that relates to advice to trustees, not just for valuation purposes but for calculating what basis the fund should use to calculate transfer values, commutation rates and so on. So there is this technical standard, set by an independent body.
I understand that that standard is controversial, and the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, reflected some of that controversy in her speech. It would be fair to say that views differ. It is also important to understand that the current edition of TAS 300 was issued after extensive consultation last July and came into effect only on 1 November last year. It is always open to debate what the standard should say. My concern is that that standard is intended for actuaries, to tell them how they should provide actuarial advice to trustees. Its role is not to tell trustees how to behave. The problem, which I recognise, and which has been suggested as a reason for these amendments, is that trustees are not behaving properly—or it could be that they are being ill-advised by actuaries. That is not something that I am going to endorse but, if that is true, there is a disciplinary process under the Financial Reporting Council. Again, that is not part of the actuarial profession; it is a separate disciplinary process for anyone identified as not complying with the TAS. The issue can be raised with the FRC, and it may well be that it should have been raised more often, because that is really the first port of call if you think that the advice is wrong. It is not to put it into a piece of legislation.
I am very sorry to find myself in contention with the noble Baroness but, if trustees need to be regulated, it is not the job of the Financial Reporting Council to do it. It is not its job to tell trustees how to do their job. That is an issue that I am sure that we could debate extensively. I recognise the problem, but I am not convinced that we have been presented with the correct answer.
Lord Fuller (Con)
My Lords, I know that this is a technical amendment, and in the last group I disagreed with the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, but on this one I totally agree with her analysis, particularly her identification of the groupthink that trustees suffer, bamboozled and pressured by the FCA, TPR and actuaries, and sometimes investment managers, to be overly risk-averse in some of their investments. In particular, there is a drive—it is explained that it is prudential and that the regulations require it, which means that we need to look at the regulations—for pension funds to apply an increasing proportion of their assets to liability-driven investments.
If your scheme happens to be in deficit, these LDIs will anchor you in deficit for the rest of time, because that is how they work. That is wrong, because the trustees have no control over what the interest rate, discount rate or gilt rate might be. They can adjust—plus or minus, in the case of gilts—but, ultimately, liabilities are driven by the gilt rates. They have no control over that, but they do have control over how the assets in their scheme are invested for the greatest return.
However, that is not how their schemes are valued at the triennial, which is valued on the gilt rate. As the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, said, the value of their assets is depressed by virtue of being in a scheme. As people buy out and are forced to buy out—Amendment 33A contemplates what happens when you approach a buyout—schemes are being mugged. Members are being short-changed by this artificial diminution in the value of the assets, which at the moment pass into the hands of an insurance company, as the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, said. No longer impeded, weighed down or anchored from being in a scheme, they can be let rip. The uplift happens quickly, and there is an immediate profit to the insurance company.
It is perverse that the entire regulatory advisory industry is mandating schemes to go into overly prudent investment products, almost suckering them down so that they have to pay a premium to be bought out, and all the profits go somewhere else. That is not prudence; it is short-changing the members of the schemes and diverting huge amounts of productive capital for the engine of our economy and the private businesses that generate wealth and pay taxes.
Regarding Amendment 33A, it is really important that trustees have imagination and are encouraged to think as widely as they possibly can, asking, “What does this mean? Are we in the appropriate asset mix? Should we be rammed into LDIs because we are chasing a deficit, or should we be invested in growth to pay benefits for members?” That is the dilemma, and this amendment shines a light on it almost for the first time in the Bill. Trustees in as many schemes as I can think of are being misdirected, ostensibly to reduce risks. But they are not reducing risks; they are reducing the sustainability of their schemes and their ability to pay for today’s members, including, most importantly, the youngest members of their scheme, who have the longest to go to retirement. Following the dismal, dead hand of these regulators is prejudicing the ability of these schemes to pay out for their youngest members in 20, 30 or 40 years’ time.
I notice that the noble Lord, Lord Willetts, is not in his place, but he made this point in a previous group. This is the generational problem that we have, between the eldest and the youngest people in the scheme. We need to strengthen and empower our trustees to play their roles simply and straightforwardly and not as though they are not competent or do not feel confident to resist the so-called advice they are getting from regulators, which are acting in groupthink and not in the scheme’s best interest, or the interests of either members or companies.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, we understand that these amendments are doing something that is really quite straightforward and, in our view, sensible. The amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, would ensure that, before any surplus is extracted, the relevant actuary has confirmed that the work required under the Financial Reporting Council’s technical actuarial standards of risk transfer has been completed. In other words, they would ensure that trustees and sponsors have properly considered the scheme’s credible endgame options, whether that is bulk transfer, run-on or another long-term strategy, rather than looking at surplus in isolation.
I was pleased to listen to this interesting debate, commenced by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, with her strong reference to the TAS 300 exercise and the link to insurance. She mentioned the reinsurance market and the subsequent debate, as well as the amount of money potentially in play—£200 million, I think. Surplus extraction ought to sit within a wider assessment of the scheme’s long-term direction, the securities of members’ benefits and the financial implications for both the scheme and the sponsor. Requiring confirmation that this work has been done would help anchor surplus decisions in that broader context.
This has been a very brief speech from me. We see these amendments as a proportionate safeguard, reinforcing good governance and ensuring that surplus payments are considered alongside—not divorced from—the scheme’s long-term endgame strategy. I look forward to the response from the Minister.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, for setting out her amendments. I am also grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken. I must admit that I have learned more about actuaries in the past week than I ever knew hitherto, but it is a blessing.
Three different issues have come up. I would like to try to go through them before I come back to what I have to say on this group. In essence, the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, has us looking at, first, actuaries: what is their role, what are the standards and how do they do the job? Secondly, what are the right endgame choices—that is, what is out there at the moment? Finally, what should be in the surplus extraction regime? We have ended up with all three issues, although the amendments only really deal with the last of those; they deal with the others by implication. Let me say a few words on each of them, then say why I do not think that they are the right way forward.
We have just finished hearing from the noble Lord, Lord Fuller. Obviously, we are talking about the position now. DB schemes are maturing and, as such, are now prioritising payments to members. Given this context, they are naturally more risk-averse, as they are now seeking funding to match their liabilities. Since the increases in interest rates over the past five years, scheme funding positions have—the noble Lord knows this all too well—improved significantly in line with their corresponding reductions and liabilities.
However, when setting an investment strategy, trustees must consider among other things the suitability of different asset classes to meet future liabilities, the risks involved in different types of investment and the possible returns that may be achieved. The 2024 funding code is scheme-specific and flexible. Even at significant maturity, schemes can still invest in a significant proportion of return-seeking assets, provided that the risk can be supported.
On actuaries, actuarial work is clearly an important part of the process. It helps set out the picture, as well as highlighting the risks, the assumptions and the available options, but it does not determine the outcome. My noble friend Lord Davies is absolutely right on this point. Decisions on how a scheme uses the funds are, and will remain, matters of trustee judgment. The role of the actuary is to support the judgment, not replace it. Trustees are the decision-makers, and they remain accountable for the choices that they make on behalf of their members.
Of course, in providing any certification, actuaries will continue to comply with the TAS standards set by the Financial Reporting Council. I am not going to get into the weeds of exactly how the standards work but, on the broader points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, we agree that the requirements and the regulations must work together. As my noble friend said, after the funding regime code was laid, the FRC consulted on revisions to TAS 300 covering developments; it has now published the revised TAS. These are complex decisions. Regulators need to work together. We will come back to this issue later on in the Bill, following an amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey.
In terms of the endgame choices, the independent Pensions Regulator has responsibility for making sure that employers and those running pension schemes comply with their legal duties. Obviously, the Government are aware of the recent transaction that resulted in Aberdeen Asset Management taking over responsibility for the Stagecoach scheme; we are monitoring market developments closely. Although we support innovation, we also need to ensure that members are protected. Following the introduction of TPR’s interim superfund regime and the measures in this Pension Schemes Bill, we understand that new and innovative endgame solutions are looking to enter the DB market and offer employers new ways to manage their DB liabilities. I assure the noble Baroness that we continue to keep the regulatory framework under review to ensure that member benefits are appropriately safeguarded.
Then, the question is: what is the right thing to be in the surplus extraction regime? I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, is concerned that, following these additional flexibilities to trustees around surplus release, trustees continue to consider surplus release in the context of the wider suite of options available to their scheme, including buyout, transfer to a superfund or other options beyond those. Following these changes, trustees will remain subject to their duty to act in the interests of beneficiaries. As such, we are confident that trustees will continue both to think carefully about the most appropriate endgame solution for their scheme and to act accordingly. For many, that will be buyout or transferring to a superfund, rather than running on.
Let me turn to what would happen with these amendments specifically. Amendment 33 would link the operation of the surplus framework to existing standards on risk transfer conditions in TAS. In essence, it seeks to ensure the scheme trustees have considered a potential buyout or other risk transfer solution before surplus can be released. Amendment 33A has a similar purpose; again, it aims for trustees, before they can release surplus, receiving a report from the scheme actuary assessing endgame options and confirming compliance with TAS.
Although I appreciate the noble Baroness’s intention to ensure that trustees select the right endgame for their scheme, these amendments are not needed because trustees are already required, under the funding and investment regulations, to set a long-term strategy for their scheme and review it at least every three years; that strategy might include a risk transfer arrangement. Furthermore, although I know the noble Baroness has tried to minimise this, hardwiring any current provisional standards into the statutory framework could have unintended consequences, including reducing flexibility for trustees and requiring further legislative or regulatory changes to maintain alignment as these standards evolve over time.
We are back to the fact that, in the end, trustees remain in the driving seat with regard to surplus release. As a matter of course, TPR would expect trustees to take professional advice from their actuarial and legal advisers; to assess the sponsor covenant impact when considering surplus release; and to take into account relevant factors and disregard irrelevant factors, in line with their duties. We are working with the Pensions Regulator regarding how schemes are supported in the consideration of surplus-sharing decisions. The new guidance already considers schemes as part of good governance to develop a policy on surplus. TPR will issue further guidance on surplus sharing following the coming into force of the regulations flowing from the Bill, which will describe how trustees may approach surplus release and can be readily updated as required. Alongside the Pensions Regulator, we will work with the FRC to ensure that TAS stays aligned.
I am grateful for the noble Baroness’s contribution and the wider debate, but I hope that she will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
I thank the Minister and everybody else who has spoken. I have enormous respect for the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and take what he says seriously. I am most grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Fuller.
I make no apology for the technical nature of these amendments, but I apologise that they had to be shoehorned in; this is such an important issue, though. This environment of higher inflation risk, excessive prudence and hoarding of surpluses is damaging pension adequacy. The de-risking overshoot has sucked innovation, energy and impetus out of the pension system and the economy. Indeed, the chair of the trustees of Stagecoach described to me that he faced what he termed co-ordinated and insidious behind-the-scenes lobbying against the trustees’ aim to try to obtain better pensions for their members; he also said that the lobbying was in favour of annuitisation as the best option for the scheme.
There is no lobbying for either improving member benefits or giving a lot more money back to employers at the moment. If we were able to get an amendment such as this one into the Bill, so that everybody must consider the range of available options plus innovative strategies, I would hope that the outcome of the Bill would be much better, more productive use—which is the aim of the Government: the Minister, Torsten Bell, has rightly talked about using surpluses in a productive manner.
The FSCS backs annuities. It has no government guarantee. I hope that, on Report, we may come back to the spurious safety of the current recommended future for this enormous amount of assets and find ways in which the Bill might be able to accommodate the need for a mindset change in this connection. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“Independent review into state deduction in defined benefit pension schemes(1) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the day on which this Act is passed, commission an independent review into the application and impact of state deduction mechanisms in occupational defined benefit pension schemes for banks.(2) The Secretary of State must by regulations set out the terms of reference for the review, including the bank or banks to be investigated.(3) The regulations in subsection (2) must make provision for the terms of reference to include —(a) the origin, rationale and implementation of state deduction in bank pension schemes,(b) the clarity and adequacy of member communications regarding state deduction from inception to present,(c) the differential impact of state deduction on pensioners with varying salary histories, including an assessment of any disproportionate effects on—(i) lower-paid staff, and(ii) women, (d) comparisons with other occupational pension schemes in the banking and public sectors, and(e) the legal, administrative, and financial feasibility of modifying or removing state deduction provisions, including potential mechanisms for redress.(4) The Secretary of State must ensure that the person or body appointed to conduct the review—(a) is independent of the banks investigated and its associated pension schemes,(b) possesses relevant expertise in pensions law, occupational pension scheme administration, and equality and fairness in retirement income, and(c) undertakes appropriate consultation with—(i) affected scheme members,(ii) employee representatives,(iii) pension experts, and(iv) stakeholder organisations.(5) The person or body conducting the review must—(a) submit a report on its findings to the Secretary of State within 12 months of the date the review is commissioned, and(b) the Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before Parliament and publish the report in full.(6) Within three months of laying the report before Parliament, the Secretary of State must publish a written response setting out the Government’s proposed actions, if any, in response to the report’s findings and recommendations.(7) Regulations under this section are subject to the negative procedure.(8) For the purposes of this section—“state deduction” means any provision within a defined benefit occupational pension scheme that reduces pension entitlements by reference to the member reaching state pension age or by reference to any state pension entitlement;“defined benefit pension scheme” has the meaning given in section 181 of the Pension Schemes Act 1993.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into clawback provisions in occupational defined benefit pension schemes, for example, the Midland Bank staff pension scheme.
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)
This proposed new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into the application and impact of state deduction mechanisms in occupational defined benefit schemes. It is a very narrow request that focuses specifically on clawback provisions in the Midland Bank staff pension scheme.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Morgan of Drefelin) (Lab)
My Lords, there is a Division in the House—we all knew it was coming—so we need to adjourn. If it is acceptable to the Committee, we will adjourn for 20 minutes because there is, I believe, a number of Divisions coming.
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)
My Lords, I will try to make this quick. Proposed new clause in Amendment 45 requires the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into the application and impact of state deduction mechanisms in occupational defined benefit pension schemes. It focuses on the clawback provisions, particularly in the Midland Bank staff pension scheme and associated legacy arrangements.
Why is this review needed? State deduction provisions can reduce members’ pension entitlements, sometimes in ways that are complex or unclear. There are concerns about fairness and transparency and a disproportionate impact, particularly on lower paid staff and women. It ensures members, regulators and Parliament have clarity about the origin, rationale and effects of these provisions.
The review will examine the history and rationale for state deduction in a Midland Bank staff pension scheme and assess clarity. It will be conducted by a person or body independent of HSBC and associated schemes. We will also try to ensure that it must consult affected scheme members, employee representatives, pension experts and stakeholder organisations. I beg to move.
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
My Lords, we are broadly supportive of the purpose behind this amendment. It raises an important set of questions about whether members of defined benefit schemes have been given clear, timely and accessible information about state deduction or clawback provisions, and whether the rationale for those provisions has been properly explained to them over time.
Of course, individuals must take responsibility for managing their own finances and retirement planning. But that responsibility can only be exercised meaningfully if people are properly informed in advance about what will happen to their pension, when it will happen and why. When changes or reductions are triggered at state pension age, members need adequate notice so that they can make sensible and informed financial decisions. In that context, a review of the adequacy of member communications, the transparency of the original rationale and the accessibility of this information is welcome. While we may not necessarily agree with some of the more precise parameters and timetables set out in the amendment, as a way of posing the question and prompting scrutiny, it is a reasonable approach.
That said, we have spoken to someone who has intimate, working knowledge of the Midland Bank pension scheme and has experience of the workings of the scheme. They confirmed to us that they were fully aware of this provision, because it was in all the literature they were sent when they were enrolled. Given this, can the noble Lord give some more insight into why he thinks some members of this scheme were aware, and others not, and how could this be addressed?
I would be interested to hear from the Minister whether she has any initial views on the issues this amendment raises. In particular, how accessible is this information to members in practice today, and what steps, if any, would the Government or Department for Work and Pensions take if it became clear that these arrangements are not well understood?
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, for introducing his amendment and drawing attention to this issue, which is of real importance to some members in integrated schemes. After a lifetime of work, people rightly expect their pension to provide security and stability in retirement. For many, their occupational pension forms a key part of that.
Integrated schemes can feel confusing or unexpected to those affected, particularly when their occupational pension changes at the point when their state pension is paid. These schemes are designed so that the occupational pension is higher before state pension age and then adjusted downwards once the state pension is paid, because the schemes take account of some or all of a state pension when calculating the pension due. However, if it is not clearly explained, the change could come as a surprise. I acknowledge that and the worries some members have expressed. It is important to be clear that members are not losing money at state pension age. The structure of these schemes aims to provide a smoother level of income across retirement by blending occupational and state pension over time.
Concerns have been raised that deductions applied within integrated schemes may represent a higher proportion of income for lower-paid members, many of whom are women. This reflects wider patterns of lower earnings during their working lives, rather than any discriminatory mechanism within the schemes themselves, but I appreciate why this feels unfair to those affected. The rules governing these deductions are set out in scheme rules. Employers and trustees can decide on their scheme’s benefit structure within the legislative framework that all pension schemes must meet. The Government do not intervene in individual benefit structures but do set and enforce the minimum standards that all schemes must comply with.
Although this type of scheme is permitted under legislation, it is essential that members understand how their scheme operates. Therefore, it is extremely important that people have good, clear information about their occupational pension scheme so that they can make informed decisions about their retirement. What matters just as much as the rules is that people understand them. Good, clear information is essential so that members are not taken by surprise when they reach state pension age.
If a member believes that the information they received was unclear or incomplete, they are not without redress. They can make a complaint through their scheme’s internal dispute process or, if needed, escalate their case to the Pensions Ombudsman for an independent determination.
The Government absolutely share the desire for people to have confidence in the pensions they rely on, but, given the protections already in place and the long-established nature of schemes, we do not believe that a review is necessary. For those reasons, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)
I thank the noble Baroness and withdraw the amendment.
Lord Sikka
“Insolvency within 10 years of payment of surplus: prioritisation of pension scheme above other creditors (1) Where—(a) an employer has received payment of surplus under section 36B of the Pensions Act 1995 (inserted by section 9 of this Act) and goes into insolvency within 10 years of receiving such payment, and(b) at the point of insolvency, the employer’s pension scheme has a deficit,the Secretary of State must, by regulations, make provision to ensure that when the employer sells assets to repay creditors, the pension scheme from which the surplus was initially distributed is paid before any other creditor.(2) In order to fulfil their duty under subsection (1), the Secretary of State may amend the Insolvency Act 1986 and the Enterprise Act 2002 to alter the hierarchy of creditors in the circumstances described in subsection (1)(a) and (b).(3) Regulations under this section are subject to the affirmative procedure.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to ensure that, if a company goes into insolvency within 10 years of receiving a payment of surplus from the pension scheme and the pension scheme has a deficit at that point, then the pension scheme must be prioritised as a creditor.
Lord Sikka (Lab)
My Lords, this amendment deals with a gap in the Bill. The transfer of surplus to employers could leave employees in jeopardy, especially when an employer enters bankruptcy. I will lay out a scenario. Suppose a pension scheme surplus is distributed to an employer but, soon afterwards, the pension scheme is in deficit and the employer enters bankruptcy. Under the pecking order at insolvency, as specified in the Insolvency Act 1986 and the Enterprise Act 2002, pension schemes rank as unsecured creditors, which is near the bottom. This usually means that they will receive little or nothing from the sale of assets of the bankrupt entity, and employees could lose some of their pension rights. A pension scheme with a deficit can be bailed out by the Pension Protection Fund, but the bailout is restricted to a maximum of 90%. This means that future retirees will lose some of their pension rights. Those already retired may lose some value compared with their original scheme, as the PPF annual increase could be lower than the rate of RPI or CPI.
There is nothing in the Bill that enables a pension scheme to claw back surpluses taken by employers during the last few years—the amendment mentions 10 years, but I am happy to change it to five if that persuades some noble Lords to support it. In any case, if the employer is insolvent, there is no chance of recovering the deficit from the employer anyway, so the only possibility is to prioritise payment to the pension scheme from the sale of the assets of the bankrupt entity. In other words, the pension scheme must be paid before any other creditor.
Lord Sikka (Lab)
Just to recap quickly, I was looking at a scenario where an employer had received a surplus from a pension scheme but soon afterwards became bankrupt. Normally, the PPF will rescue, but that is limited to 90%, which means that employees will face a haircut in their pension rights. So the only possibility to help to protect employee pension rights is to prioritise payment to the pension scheme from the sale of the assets of the bankrupt entity. In other words, pension schemes must be paid before any other creditor.
Deficits on pension schemes of bankrupt companies are not uncommon. I was adviser to the Work and Pensions Committee on the collapse of BHS and Carillion, and we looked at that closely. I also wrote a report on the collapse of Bernard Matthews for the same committee. Basically, they showed all kinds of strategies used by companies to deprive workers of their hard-earned pension rights.
This probing amendment seeks to protect employees by ensuring that pension scheme deficits not met by the PPF are made good by being first in line to receive a distribution from the sale of the assets of the bankrupt company. This applies only where the employer has taken a surplus in the last 10 years. As I indicated earlier, there is nothing sacrosanct about 10 years; if noble Lords wish to support this, it could be changed.
From a risk management perspective, it makes sense to put pension scheme creditors above other creditors. Unlike banks and financial institutions, employees cannot manage their risks through diversification. Their human capital can be invested only in one place. Employer bankruptcy is a tragedy because employees lose jobs and pension rights. For those of your Lordships who are not familiar with portfolio theory, the basic message is that there is a correlation coefficient of plus one, and it multiplies their risks. As human labour cannot be stored, employees will have no time to replenish their pension pots, and as we all get older, our capacity to work is also eroded. So, despite making the required contractual payments, employees will face poverty and insecurity in old age.
I urge the Government to protect workers’ pension rights. They should not be left in a worse position after the extraction of surpluses by employers. I beg to move.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I do not support Amendment 45A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka. I am not sure that the kind of regulations envisaged in this amendment could actually create a creditor which has a priority in insolvency where a creditor does not exist at present. At present, a deficit in a pension scheme is generally not as a matter of law a creditor if the sponsoring employer goes bust.
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)
This amendment raises a very important point. The question, though, is when the surpluses could be paid out. If the company seems to be in a robust way, there is no reason why the pension fund should be overprotected. While everything in the garden is lovely, there is no reason to give them a 10-year position when things may have deteriorated in subsequent years. So, I agree in principle with the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, but 10 years is far too long, because in those 10 years, all sorts of things can happen. If it was five years or fewer, it would be very good, but while everything in the garden—in the company—is lovely, the pension fund should not be overprotected for the extent of 10 years.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I have enormous sympathy with the thoughts behind the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka. However, I share the concerns expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, in that it is not clear how that would work, because this would then need to be a contingent payment or some kind of conditional payment which can be recouped, and that would impact creditors or debt holders of the company as well. Does the noble Lord feel that if, as a consequence of the surplus payment, members also got enhanced benefits, that would in some ways compensate for the future eventuality of what he is concerned about?
Finally, in the days before we had a Pension Protection Fund, I was very much in favour of increasing the status of the unsecured creditor position of a pension scheme. But in the current environment, where there is a Pension Protection Fund, and where the Bill will be improving the protections provided by it, it is much less important to increase the status on insolvency of the pension scheme itself than it would have been in past times. I certainly agree with the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, that if there were to be any such provision, it should be a lot less than 10 years.
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, for tabling this amendment, which is clearly motivated by a desire to protect scheme members and guard against the risk that pension surpluses are extracted prematurely, only for employers to fail some years later. I suspect that there is broad sympathy with this objective across the Committee. However, I have a number of questions about how this proposal would operate in practice and whether it strikes the right balance between member protection, regulatory oversight and the wider framework of insolvency law. My noble friend Lady Noakes, the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, and the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, have all raised points connected to this amendment. I hope I am not duplicating their questions, but I will ask mine.
First, can the noble Lord say more about how this amendment would interact with the existing hierarchy of creditors under the Insolvency Act 1986? As drafted, it appears to require pension schemes to be paid ahead of all other creditors, including secured creditors and those with statutory preferential status? Does the noble Lord envisage this as a complete reordering of creditor priorities in these cases? If so, what thought has he given to the potential consequences for lending decisions, access to capital or the cost of borrowing for employers that sponsor defined benefit schemes?
Secondly, I would be grateful for further clarity on the choice of a 10-year clawback period, which other noble Lords have raised. As has been said, 10 years is a very long time in corporate and economic terms, and insolvency occurring at that point may bear little or no causal connection to a surplus payment made many years earlier, perhaps in very different market conditions. What is the rationale for that specific timeframe, and how does the noble Lord respond to concerns that this could introduce long-tail uncertainty for employers and their directors when making decisions in good faith?
Thirdly, how does the amendment sit alongside the existing powers of the Pensions Regulator? At present, trustees must be satisfied that member benefits are secure before any surplus is paid, and the regulator already has moral hazard powers to intervene where it believes scheme funding or employer behaviour to be inappropriate. Does the noble Lord consider those tools insufficient and, if so, can he point to evidence of systemic failure that would justify addressing this issue through restructuring insolvency priorities rather than through pension regulations?
I am also interested in the practical operation of this provision. Proposed new subsection (2) would allow amendments to both the Insolvency Act 1986 and the Enterprise Act 2002 to achieve the intended outcome. That is a very broad power, even acknowledging the use of the affirmative procedure. Has any thought been given to how this would operate in complex insolvencies; for example, where surplus has been paid to a parent company, where assets are held across a corporate group or where insolvency proceedings involve cross-border elements?
Finally, although I understand the protective instinct behind this amendment, I wonder whether there is a risk of unintended consequences. Might the creation of a potential super-priority for pension schemes discourage legitimate surplus extraction, even where schemes are demonstrably well funded, trustees are content and regulatory requirements have been met? If that were to occur, could it inadvertently weaken employer covenant strength over time rather than strengthen it?
None of these questions is intended to diminish the importance of member protection or suggest that concerns about surplus extraction are misplaced. Rather, they are offered in the spirit of probing whether this amendment is the most proportionate and effective way of addressing those concerns, or whether there may be alternative approaches, perhaps within the existing regulatory framework, that could achieve similar objectives with fewer systemic risks. I look forward to hearing the noble Lord’s response and the Minister’s comments.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Sikka for introducing Amendment 45A. For clarity, I will speak to the amendment as if intended to address the power to pay surplus under Section 37, as Section 36B contains the modification power.
I fully recognise the concern that members’ benefits must remain protected when surplus is paid and that trustees take a long-term view of scheme funding and employer covenant. This is why there are strong safeguards, which I have described, as set out in Clause 10. Before the release of any surplus, trustees will need to make sure that the scheme is prudently funded and seek advice and sign-off from the scheme actuary, and other advisors, about the viability of any release and the impact that may have on the long-term health of the scheme.
While trustees perform an essential role in safeguarding members’ benefits, prioritising them above all other creditors in these circumstances risks distorting the already established insolvency regime. It creates uncertainty for businesses, ultimately harming the very members we all seek to protect.
On the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, it is our concern that placing trustees ahead of other unsecured creditors could create significant uncertainty, increased borrowing costs and restricted access in future to finance, especially for smaller businesses. In the long term, this could potentially weaken employer support for pension schemes and threaten their sustainability, rather than strengthen it.
It is important to recognise that the current system already provides significant security for pension scheme members. Pension funds in UK occupational schemes are held in trust and are legally ring-fenced from the employer, so they cannot be accessed by creditors in an insolvency. The PPF exists precisely to offer a safety net to members who would otherwise risk losing their pensions when their employer fails.
Following the Chancellor’s announcement at the Budget, this Bill will also introduce annual increases on compensation payments from the PPF and FAS on pensions built up before 6 April 1997.
The insolvency regime is designed to operate alongside the compensation system. The structure of the pension protection levy already reflects the risk of employer failure and spreads that risk fairly across eligible schemes. The PPF assumes the creditor rights of the pension scheme trustees in the event of insolvency of the sponsoring employer and seeks to maximise recoveries from the insolvent employer’s estate.
Pension schemes, backed by a strengthened PPF, are already in a stronger position than many unsecured creditors. Giving trustees priority would leave small suppliers, contractors and even some employees with significantly reduced recoveries, despite having far fewer protections. We should not create a system where small businesses and individual workers bear disproportionate losses because a pension scheme deficit overrides all other obligations. There is also the risk of moral hazard, where trustees could be less prudent when deciding to release surplus, knowing that, under employer insolvency, they would have guaranteed priority above other priorities.
The amendment could affect the employer’s business plans as creditors may be less likely to lend money to the employer. Equally, banks may place conditions on borrowing to prevent surplus release if trustees were given priority. That dynamic could push companies towards insolvency earlier, not later, having a knock-on effect on members.
The only other thing I will add is that there are other tools open to trustees that are concerned about the strength of the employer covenant and the security of benefits. It is open to trustees during funding discussions or other negotiations to seek a fixed or floating charge over the employer’s assets, which would, in effect, elevate the scheme’s position in the insolvency priority order, providing additional protection should the employer become insolvent.
I want to be clear that trustees will have the final decision on whether to release the surplus. Before they can do so, the Bill stipulates statutory safeguards before a surplus can be released. I thank the noble Lord for his concern but for the reasons I have outlined, I ask that he withdraw his amendment.
Lord Sikka (Lab)
I thank all noble Lords for their observations, comments, suggestions and many questions. I will briefly address some. Does this risk distorting insolvency law? It is already distorted. Pension scheme members are unsecured creditors. People who cannot hold a diversified portfolio lose their job, lose some of their pension rights and have no opportunity to rebuild their pension part. It is already distorted and already against them. I am trying to offer something right to, generally, the weakest of the creditors. Sure, banks that are secured creditors may get a little less if you pay pension scheme creditors first, but banks hold diversified portfolios. They are in a better position to manage the risks compared to employees. Creditors are less likely to lend money to companies.
Do we have any evidence to show that, if you change the order and empower some creditors, somebody takes secure charge number one, somebody takes number two and somebody takes number three—the whole hierarchy? That does not seem to persuade creditors to lend less just because there is a new hierarchy; it does not seem to support that. Changing it to five years is a possibility. A pension scheme creditor comes into existence as and when an employer goes into bankruptcy. Therefore, the pension scheme is basically a creditor.
Pension Schemes Bill
Thursday 22nd January 2026
(1 week, 6 days ago)
Grand CommitteePension Schemes Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 152-IV(a) Amendment for Grand Committee (Supplementary to the Fourth Marshalled List) - (22 Jan 2026)
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, who has tabled the lead amendment in the first group, is not currently here. Before I call it, I ask whether any other Member present wishes to move her amendment. I give the Committee a moment to think about that, because if no one wishes to move it, I will have to regard it as not moved. Given that the next amendment in the group is, helpfully, consecutive to the first, with the permission of the Committee I will move to the next amendment, having called the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, which we have to assume will be not moved. Does the Committee accept that as a way forward?
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
I thank noble Lords.
Clause 11: Relevant schemes: value for money
“(4A) Value for money regulations must take account of—(a) a VFM assessment over 3, 5 and 10 years;(b) the nature and spread of assets and their purpose in the portfolio including diversity, stability and risk management;(c) the characteristics of the members of the scheme;(d) whether comparisons, benchmarking, scaling and advisory consensus risk herding, market movements, lack of diversity or systemic risk;(e) fee structuring, including performance fee management and inter-cohort fairness, including managing how the J-curve effect and consolidation can shift costs or benefits between different cohorts of pensioners.”
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
My Lords, those noble Lords who have examined the Marshalled List will know that Amendment 46A constitutes what was in Amendment 46 but with an extra paragraph (e) in the proposed new subsection; that is the difference. The amendment proposes a small number of matters that value for money “must”, rather than merely “may”, take into account. The Bill ultimately leads to schemes being graded as performing or non-performing, so the framework must be sophisticated enough to reflect long-term investment reality, not just short-term metrics.
Value for money is a judgment about appropriateness, risk, purpose and fairness. Paragraph (a) of the proposed new subsection is based on long-term assets requiring a long-term view. I suggest assessments over three, five and 10 years, but that is to illustrate the point, rather than being a fixation. Private assets often show negative early returns and we need a way of understanding valuations through the cycle, especially where valuations drive fees. As more investments are moved into private assets, especially if back books have to be adjusted to meet authorisation percentages, there will be cluster effects. I worry about that and its effect on value for money.
How can we check valuations in the private equity context as well? There is a lot of literature around how it is useful to have a market price comparator for what is an otherwise opaque and infrequent exercise. Listed investment companies are routinely used in institutional analysis as a valuation cross-check for private assets because they provide daily pricing for similar underlying exposures and frequent net asset value valuations. For example, the ICAEW’s 2020 report, Fair Value Measurement by Listed Private Equity Funds, notes that listed funds provide observable market prices for benchmarking unlisted investments. The Bank of England has noted in several financial stability reports that market price vehicles, including listed funds, provide useful information about liquidity conditions and valuation dynamics in private markets, particularly when model-based valuations adjust slowly. These valuation and transparency credentials make it all the more extraordinary—and, I dare say, suspicious—that the Bill shuts them out.
My second point—paragraph (b)—is that value must be assessed in the context of the nature, spread and purpose of the assets. Long-term infrastructure behaves differently from assets for liquidity or inflation protection. The question is whether the assets are good value for what they are meant to do. Some assets, or the way in which they are packaged, serve hybrid purposes—as listed investment companies have long done—combining private asset exposure with market liquidity. Directly held assets have fewer fees, but selection and achieving wide diversity are more challenging. LTAFs will package a mix of illiquid and liquid assets and it will be interesting to see how it works over time.
My third point—paragraph (c)—is that value must be seen in the context of the characteristics of members. Those on lower incomes cannot afford excessive risk or prolonged losses; they are more likely to remain in default funds, and trustees will be mindful of that. A more cautious strategy in lower returns may be entirely legitimate for value for money. Trustees must retain the ability to choose strategies that are appropriate for their members, not strategies that score well on a narrow template. This is particularly relevant because assessments created for the DC default funds may well be adopted more widely.
My fourth point—paragraph (d)—concerns the risk of herding. Too much measurement, comparison and advisory consensus can drive correlated strategy. The Bank of England has repeatedly warned about pro-cyclical behaviour and systemic vulnerabilities. A value-for-money framework must not unintentionally reinforce those behaviours; not going with the crowd is sometimes the value-preserving strategy. If we reduce value for money to consensual metrics, we will distort behaviour and risk repeating the mistakes of the charge cap era.
My final point—this is the new one, paragraph (e)—concerns fairness between cohorts. Private assets, especially private equity, typically follow a J-curve: early losses or flat value followed by rising value and, often, high late gains. Gaming or late realisation of value scores high in performance fees. That can be emphasised deliberately or just through the valuation timetable. Thus early cohorts end up bearing the set-up losses while later cohorts—these are long-term assets, so it may be 10 or 20 years later—are the ones that benefit from the late-stage gains. This will be exaggerated, too, if there is back-book adjustment. Performance fees and valuation-linked fees distort fairness over time. If value for money is to be fair, these effects need to be managed—as, indeed, they do for the payment of the pensions.
Additionally, as funds scale, investment will shift from external vehicles to internal management—the models used in Australia and Canada and, increasingly, by Nest and USS in our own pension funds. It will be important to observe how that affects fees and performance.
I strongly support the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, on member services, which I would have added to my essential list if I had thought of it first—but I did not steal it. I have added my name to the amendment of the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, on fee transparency, with the caution, again, that we must not repeat the mistakes of the current cost disclosure regimes, which do not properly recognise where costs are borne. I note that it will take more ingenuity than fee percentage transparency to get the full picture out of private equity. I beg to move.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I strongly support Amendment 46A from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, to which I have added my name and which she so eloquently explained. I will speak to my own Amendment 47, which she referred to and which looks at the value-for-money ratings from the point of view of members. For me, that is an extremely important element that is often overlooked when concentrating on the investment side alone—not that that is not important.
I draw the Committee’s attention to some of the specifications that I have made in my Amendment 47, which I think are crucial to understand when one is choosing a pension scheme for one’s workforce. The quality of service for members can be extremely important and can indeed drive adequacy in ways that are not recognised by the investment side. The investment side is of course important, but if quality of service and the education, guidance and support provided to members are working well, that can be a driver to encourage members to increase their contributions. Ultimately, that can be at least on a par in importance with investment performance over time. If members gradually build up their contribution levels to, say, twice what they were before by adding 1% a year every time they get a bonus, that combined with the investment performance can be an extremely powerful driver for value for money over the long run, which is of course where we are meant to be examining and assessing the schemes.
On communications with members, I have specifically included in that what I call “jargon-light” communications, because I have not yet seen a communication with members about pensions that does not include baffling or off-putting terms, including—I will come to this later—the very term “default funds”. We all know what this refers to, but if you are talking to a young worker or someone in later life who is not on a high salary and does not know a lot about pensions and you tell them that what they are supposed to do with their money is to put it into a default fund, that may not sound terribly attractive to them. The last thing that most people want to do with their money is default.
The Minister is looking somewhat askance at my remarks, but this is just one example. I apologise—perhaps she is just looking at something in her notes. Certainly, those are the kind of looks that one sometimes gets from the pensions industry, which does not tend to understand that the ordinary person has never heard of a default fund and it does not sound particularly attractive. If we can include, in communications, words in plain English that may sound more enticing than the usual pension jargon, I think it could be helpful. I would argue that that is potentially a measure of the value offered in a workplace scheme, which is what the ratings are going to be looking at. I hope that the Committee will understand the aims of my specifications in Amendment 47 and, perhaps as we go through, Members of the Committee may suggest other elements.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I will be exceedingly brief. I may participate on an occasional basis on this Bill, despite the fact that it is very important. However, we have many people with exceptional expertise in the Room, for which I am extraordinarily grateful.
I have Amendment 167 in a later group on its own, which has relevance to one of the issues raised by my noble friend Lady Bowles in Amendment 46A, in which she introduces the concept that value-for-money regulations must take account of certain factors. Proposed new paragraph (c) particularly interests me, on
“the characteristics of the members of the scheme”.
In all the discussions that I have heard in the Mansion House compact and in the Bill, very little attention is paid to the characteristics of the members of the schemes, because they differ widely. I am particularly concerned that people on low salaries, whose primary savings for pensions and then investment is through auto-enrolment and default funds, have a very different risk profile from those of many people who otherwise engage in pension savings.
This is a group for whom the downside has far more serious consequences than for other groups. Many of us can afford to take a chance with parts of our pensions: if we lose some money, we are still going to be in relative comfort. That is essentially not true for this group. The upside benefit of taking risk and doing well from that risk is nice, but the consequences of taking risk and losing because of that risk are far more serious. I want to draw the Committee’s attention to that issue. As I said, I will pick it up again in Amendment 167, because to me it has been overlooked.
It is key that, when we devise pension arrangements, we recognise the very different risk profiles of members, so that what they are required to do—auto-enrolment and default schemes are in effect a requirement—matches their risk profile. I hope that we will begin to start to shift some of our thinking. There are amendments, in this group and in others, that could help very much with that issue.
Baroness Coffey (Con)
This group of amendments is quite interesting in starting to sketch out what is important in the value-for-money approach that is being adopted through the Bill. I did not know when the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, would speak to Amendment 49 and I will be interested to hear what he has to say on this, because the only other form of occupational pension is, in effect, the defined benefit, where you know what you are getting. I was a bit surprised that he felt that that would need to go further, because that is a direct relationship between somebody and their employer. Nevertheless, I am sure he will explain further.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, has tabled Amendments 55 and 56 to Clause 12, which are sensible, but one thing that concerns me at the start of that clause is the word “may”. We should be beyond that at this stage, which is why I also support my noble friends on the Front Bench in opposing Clause 13 standing part of the Bill. There are just too many ifs, buts and maybes, but when it comes to Clause 13 there is nothing at all. It is just a blank cheque for the future. I am conscious that things can vary over time, but we should be in a position where we are getting some clarity on what will be in these value-for-money assessments so that people can make choices. We should be getting that clarity now. If necessary, we can put down regulations for affirmative procedures but, candidly, I do not think it is good enough that we have this sort of approach to defining what is there for the future.
I say to the Minister that I appreciate that this is a real step forward and I welcome that. People put their money in, they are not exactly sure what return they are getting and they might look every now and again at where it is coming out. I appreciate that there is a whole journey to go on in pensions education, as well as for the trustees, in terms of what is really happening with their advisers who continue to do low-risk, low-reward. I encourage the Minister, however, to come back on Report with a much stronger sketching out of what will be in these assessments, as required by Clause 13. For example, instead of just having the word “may”, have some “must” in there and then open up the power later to adjust as necessary. It is also valuable to be able to repeal.
Amendment 74 concerns the “Duty to formalise the Value for Money framework”; I know that my Front Bench will speak to that shortly. It is a useful exercise to check whether it is working. There are other amendments which basically make comparisons with other pension providers. That gets trickier if it is done at such a detailed level because, again, people might want some basic information on what is happening with their money. To pick at random, they might want their money with Standard Life instead of Scottish Life; if there is some variation, they might want to make a change. It is those sorts of things that I encourage the Minister to have more detail on by the time we reach Report.
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)
My Lords, as has been expressed, this group establishes the foundation of the value-for-money framework. We welcome the ambition to improve outcomes for savers. However, the effectiveness of value for money will depend on how it is defined, measured and implemented, and I welcome the comments from the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles, Lady Altmann and Lady Kramer, which elaborated on these points.
I shall concentrate on Amendments 49 and 54 and I hope I can persuade the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, that they are of value. These amendments will extend the scope of the Bill’s value-for-money provisions. They ensure that they apply not only to defined contribution schemes but defined benefit occupational pension schemes as well.
The arrangements make it clear that regulations can make different provision for different types of scheme. Critically, however, all schemes must be covered by the value-for-money assessment, with a proper value-for-money rating. Members of DB schemes deserve the same transparency and assurance about value for money as members of DC schemes. DB schemes still represent a significant part of the pensions landscape. Excluding them risks creating an uneven playing field and less scrutiny where it is still needed.
A single, consistent framework across occupational pensions improves comparability, avoids regulatory gaps and ensures that all savers benefit from the same standards of accountability. The two amendments in my name would ensure that the Bill delivers on its promise of value for money across all pension schemes. The measure is simple: every saver in every scheme, whatever its type, deserves value for money. Other noble Lords have expressed this in detail.
The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, spoke about pensions jargon. We are here in a very rarefied atmosphere, where people have some knowledge—I have less than many in the Room—of what pensions are about and what phrases such as “default pensions” mean. We need to make it clear to people who have no interest in pensions other than receiving a cheque at the end of the month at a certain age what it all means. Some people need to be clear about the choices they make, and we need to do as much as we can. These amendments, both those that have been spoken to already and the two in my name, seek to protect people’s interests.
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
My Lords, we come again to a varied group. I shall focus my remarks on the amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie. I welcome the contributions from other noble Lords and I look forward to the Minister’s response. We have a few amendments in this group: Amendments 50, 51, 52, 53, 57 and 74, and the Clause 13 do not stand part proposition.
Before I turn to the amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie, I will say a few words about the value-for-money framework that sits at the heart of the Bill. The introduction of a value-for-money framework has the potential to be genuinely transformative for workplace pensions if it is designed and implemented well. We support the principle of value for money. However, much of what this legislation seeks to achieve will stand or fall on how the framework is designed, applied and enforced.
As drafted, the provisions are relatively skeletal, despite the pivotal role that value for money is expected to play. If value for money is to drive real improvement rather than box ticking, it must be transparent in its methodology, robust in its metrics and genuinely comparable across schemes. Cost alone cannot be the determining factor. A scheme that is cheap but delivers persistently weak net returns does not represent good value for money for savers. Comparability will be key. Without clear, standardised metrics, there is a risk that value for money simply reinforces price-chasing behaviour rather than improving outcomes. My amendments are therefore intended not to oppose the concept of value for money but to strengthen it, to ensure that it is implemented in a way that improves saver outcomes, respects fiduciary duty and avoids unintended consequences.
I turn to the amendments in more detail. Amendments 50 to 53 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted in the case of Amendment 53, are probing amendments that go to the heart of whether the value-for-money framework established by Clause 11 will operate as a genuinely effective tool for improving saver outcomes.
Clause 11 creates a very broad enabling power. It allows for the creation of a value-for-money framework, but is largely silent on what value for money should actually consist of. Given the centrality of value for money to the Bill as a whole, it is important to test the Government’s intentions on the minimum elements that will underpin the framework.
Amendment 50 would require value-for-money regulations to include publication of a fees-to-returns ratio. The purpose here is straightforward: cost on its own is not value. As I have said, a scheme that is cheap but delivers persistently weak net returns cannot sensibly be said to offer good value to members. If value for money is to be outcome-focused, it must show what savers are receiving relative to what they are paying, rather than allowing headline charges to dominate decision-making.
Baroness Warwick of Undercliffe (Lab)
My Lords, I am sympathetic to the probing amendments in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger—Amendments 47 and 51 respectively—on value for money, which I alluded to at Second Reading. With any Bill or set of regulations, it is important to have clarity on the intentions and in minimising any unintended risk. That is particularly so when looking at the protection of citizens’ lifetime pension savings.
The FCA, the DWP and TPR have just published their consultation on their detailed proposals for the new value-for-money framework for DC schemes. These proposals come with real bite. When introduced, all relevant DC schemes will have to report on the value that they provide to members across a range of metrics. That assessment report will provide the basis for comparing the value that the scheme provides against other schemes. If a given scheme offers poor value, the firms and trustees must deliver improvements or otherwise transfer their members to a scheme that does provide good value. The framework requires an online central database to capture the disclosure of value-for-money data.
The Bill mandates the framework for contract-based schemes regulated by the FCA. The DWP and TPR will consult on draft regulations for the trust-based schemes. The first value-for-money assessments are expected in 2028. The framework provides for consistent measurement and disclosure on investment performance, costs and service quality; objective and consistent comparison against the market; transparency and disclosure; and action to be taken where a scheme is not delivering value. However, there are clearly concerns—we see them expressed in the briefings that noble Lords have received—that the framework could give rise to problems, which I, too, would like to probe.
The VFM framework provides for forward-looking metrics to be considered alongside backward-looking metrics, with the stated aim of allowing for
“a holistic approach to investment to deliver the best possible long-term outcomes”.
There is a risk that the value-for-money framework could result in herding, as others have alluded to, as schemes seek to avoid poor value assessments. There is also a risk of forward-looking metrics being used to game a scheme’s assessment. I ask the Minister: what guardrails are explicitly allowed for in this Bill to control these risks?
On quality of service, the recently published VFM framework takes a more limited approach to quality service and administration metrics. Furthermore, metrics on how members engage with their pensions have not been included in the framework, but they will be important in informing schemes’ responses to changes, such as guided retirement and the targeted support regime.
Looking ahead, how will these concerns be addressed? Poor-performing schemes that are rated “red”—meaning that they cannot be improved—must transfer out members where it is in their best interests. This is stronger than the originally proposed wording to consider a transfer. It is made possible by the Bill’s provision for a contractual override to allow transfers for contract-based arrangements without members’ consent. However, it is worth noting that some members will have safeguarded benefits. My final question to the Minister is: what will happen to those benefits? It is not clear what mitigations this Bill provides to protect members.
The Minister of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Sherlock) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for introducing their amendments and for the debate that followed. The amendments rightly seek an assurance that the VFM framework is strong and effective and they try to clarify how it will take account of a range of important factors that can affect the value that a scheme provides. I regret that I cannot accept them, but I am going to go through the reasons why, as some interesting issues are being raised. Obviously, if I told the Committee that I was going to accept them, noble Lords would all fall over in shock, but this is a good opportunity to get these issues out there.
Let me say at the outset that the aim of the VFM framework is simple: we want to ensure that all savers are in schemes that deliver the best possible long-term outcomes for their retirement. The framework seeks to raise standards across the DC market by driving transparency, comparability and competition on genuine value rather than just on cost—a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott.
Clause 11 is deliberately drafted to provide enabling powers that allow the regulations establishing the VFM framework to be developed in consultation with industry and to be adapted as markets evolve. However, the VFM framework must be able to adapt to future financial market developments and to align with the FCA requirements for contract-based schemes. The risk is that hard-wiring any detailed technical criteria or rigid deadlines into primary legislation takes away the flexibility that is genuinely needed. It could get in the way of effective regulation and risks locking in concepts that could become outdated. However, I accept that there is a question around how Parliament gets to scrutinise the detail.
Clauses 11 and 14 set out key features of the VFM regime and provide enabling powers for the Secretary of State to make regulations on how VFM assessments will operate, including the metrics, the benchmarks and the processes that they will have to follow. The regulations will be subject to formal consultation with industry and regulators before being laid in draft for parliamentary approval under the affirmative procedure. In our view, this strikes the right approach: the Bill has the overarching framework in primary legislation while the technical detail is developed transparently through secondary legislation.
However, the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, made an important point: Parliament needs to be able to understand what the assessment process will look like. A joint consultation was launched in early January by the FCA and the Pensions Regulator; it will run until 8 March. This consultation is the next step in the process of consultation on the technical-level detail of the framework, which will help to inform development and consultation on draft regulations and draft FCA rules—those are, of course, legal instruments.
I am conscious that some of the amendments were tabled before that consultation was launched. Those noble Lords who are up to their ears in the pensions world will no doubt have read the consultation in detail, but I will make sure that we send any noble Lord who has not done so a summary of, as well as a link to, it. I would be happy to answer any questions, if that would be helpful, but I will unpack the basics of this now.
The consultation sets out updated proposals and detailed draft FCA rules for implementing the VFM framework in the workplace DC pensions market and it reflects stakeholder feedback from the previous FCA consultation. FCA rules will apply to contract-based schemes, whereas regulations made under the powers in the Bill will apply to trust-based schemes. By bringing them together, responses to the consultation will help to inform both the draft DWP regulations and the FCA rules, with the obvious aim of ensuring consistency across trust-based and contract-based schemes. We do not want to end up with any kind of regulatory arbitrage in this or any other area. It is important that we do not pre-empt the outcomes of that process to make sure that we get the details right. Draft regulations will be consulted on.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
My Lords, it falls to me to do the summation as a stand-in. I thank the Minister for her comprehensive reply. I wish I could speak that fast. It answered quite a lot of the points that I raised. It is obviously quite irritating for us when we commence a Bill and then consultations that provide a lot of the key points and information trail behind the Bill. We spend some time thinking about it and then discover we have to do a consultation response. I do not know how the timings for these things would fit together. Nevertheless, it would be quite nice for some of those key points that are being consulted on to perhaps find their way into the Bill somehow. I just point that out.
What is an Act of Parliament supposed to do? It is supposed to give you the front-end lead-in to what people’s expectations are. They cannot easily be expected to go wandering around on regulator websites and rulebooks, because, my goodness, I find those difficult. Talking about finding things difficult, when I retired from being a Member of the European Parliament, I got a booklet sent through because, for some of my time there, I was in the UK pension fund that applies to MPs and MEPs. This was just after I had finished negotiating all the post-financial crisis financial services legislation. I looked at the scheme rules and I gave up. I lost the will to live and thought, “Well, I’ll just take what comes, thank you very much”. If it is going to do that to me, what is it going to do to the ordinary person? We have to take a lot more care about more gentle lead-ins and simple ways of explaining things. Of course, that was some time ago.
I think we have had quite a good trot around the factors. I would still like to see something distilled from the work that has gone on which is accessible and where people might look for things if they are curious—they might be people representing people—and not have to resort to complicated scheme books and complicated regulator rules. Maybe we will have an update by the time we get to Report on the timings and dates and what has come out of these consultations. I suppose it will be a bit early for that. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Altmann
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to simplify the language in Value for Money assessments, to make them more intuitively understood by members, especially as 'fully delivering' may give an expectation that all required metrics are being fully met.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 58. My remarks will apply to all the other amendments in this group, apart from Amendments 64 and 65, to which I will speak shortly, and Amendment 69 in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, which I also support.
My views on this group of amendments follow on from the comments I made earlier about jargon and trying to make pensions more member-friendly—more intelligible to the ordinary person. I believe that this is an extremely important area, having met so many members who simply do not understand what they are being told. The remarks from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, encapsulate some of that: if we cannot understand what we are being told in the communications, neither can members.
It was interesting to see that the original consultation suggestions of red, amber and green, which people would have at least a good chance of understanding, have instead been put into the Bill as “fully delivering”, “intermediate” and “not delivering”. Delivering what? We are talking about value; this is not Ocado or Amazon. The noble Baroness, Lady Warwick, in her remarks on the first group used the terms “good value” and “poor value” as if they were in the Bill—but they are not. My proposals in these amendments—to change the term “fully delivering” to “good value”, and “not delivering” to “poor value”—simply respond to what most people would expect this clause to tell them. I hope that the Minister understands that. Obviously, this is a probing amendment, so she may prefer other ways to express what we are trying to achieve here, but I hope that the intention behind these amendments will, in some way, feed into both the Bill and how the value-for-money framework will be considered when we develop it. It is a very sketchy framework at the moment.
I take the point about the consultation, but I have a related question. The critical players in moving away from the idea of cost to value, when assessing the merits of any particular scheme being used for the workforce in auto-enrolment, will be the employee benefit consultants. They advise the employers that they currently simply use cost as their major recommendation metric. They are not, in any way, properly scrutinised or regulated. Having done all this work to develop a value-for-money framework, will any attention be given to ensure that the people advising the employers on whether a scheme should be used will properly use the value-for-money framework that we will devise?
Amendments 64 and 65, which are also probing amendments, specifically address the “intermediate” rating, which is designed to have many levels or gradations. However, it seems that all of them could lead to scheme closure. They will all certainly lead to significant costs for a scheme rated “intermediate” due to the extensive reports and explanations that need to be given. My amendments simply seek to avoid significant extra costs, or the risk of scheme disclosure, for schemes that receive an “intermediate” rating on a shorter-term basis. It seems that it is almost possible that a “not delivering” rating will have a similar outcome to an “intermediate” rating because of how the Bill is phrased.
My suggestion is—and it is, as I said, probing and open for discussion and change—that you have to have an intermediate rating every year for, say, four years before the extensive requirements of this section kick in, so that in cases of up to five years you would need to notify the employer if you have changed from a good value to intermediate and the scheme would need to explain why this rating has been given and what plans it has for improvements. That would not be an extensive report, but it would obviously be helpful and would focus the minds of the scheme without the draconian implications that seem implied by the consequences of the intermediate rating as specified in the Bill. That brings me briefly to my support for Amendment 69, tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, and the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, which probes what the penalties are, how they have been assessed and whether they are appropriate. I beg to move Amendment 58.
Baroness Coffey (Con)
My Lords, this is an interesting group of amendments. My noble friend has explained the importance of clarity in who decides whether something is fully delivering. I want to ask about the different assessments being made at this point. We are now, effectively, on Clause 15 onwards. We have the ratings coming through. My noble friends on the Front Bench will explain why they do not agree with certain elements. There is merit, however, in trying to work out whether something is taking a nosedive and whether it is it fixable, but we need to be more specific about a reasonable period, and then a prescribed number of VFM periods needs to be put in the Bill, which it is not at the moment.
Thinking through what has been suggested, I am trying to understand how this will work. Clause 13, which we have discussed briefly, has a certain amount of potential calculations. We then have the trustees doing their own assessment, and then we jump forward to Clause 18 and the Pensions Regulator may check. This is all feeling quite random. Normally when we do ratings, the CQC or Ofsted make that judgment, so I am trying to understand how this will work in practice. Are the guidelines going to be fixed—for example, the average or the benchmark across all pension schemes is this, or the FTSE 100 index has changed this much, or the costs are this percentage? It would be helpful to start to get a proper pitch. I appreciate that the consultation may have gone out, but there must be thinking in the Government’s mind, not just the regulator’s, on what “good” looks like. There are risks, as identified by my noble friends, that we may be overburdening to the point that the minutiae become an industry in their own right. I am surprised to see the penalties put in primary legislation, which is unusual nowadays, although I agree that we need a better sense of how that compliance element, as set out in Clause 18, will work alongside the other amendments. My noble friend is right to say that we need to keep this straightforward and simple for people to be able to understand.
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)
These are obviously probing amendments. They are all to do with the jargon: if we are arguing about the jargon, how much more confused will the normal punter be in trying to understand the jargon. This group focuses on how value for money is expressed, enforced and communicated.
We support the principle that members should be able to understand whether their scheme is performing well. However, value-for-money ratings also carry significant power. They will influence trustee behaviour, in particular, as well as employer decisions and market structure. That makes proportionality and precision essential.
I am particularly concerned about overreliance on short-term performance metrics. Saving for a pension is, or certainly should be, inherently long-term. Schemes should not be penalised for temporary underperformance driven by market cycles or responsible long-term investment strategies.
We also question whether compliance mechanisms become blunt instruments. Labelling schemes “poor value” without clear context may drive consolidation for the wrong reasons, reducing competition without improving outcomes. Clear language matters—I use the word “jargon” once again—but so does nuance. Members need information they can trust, not simplified labels about market complexity.
I have some questions for the Minister. How will this regime distinguish between persistent structural failure and short-term variation? How will it use this intermediate rating? How will it encourage genuine improvement rather than defensive behaviour by trustees? Trustees are meant to be very careful; they will be cognisant of the intermediate position. I will be interested to hear the Minister’s views on that.
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
My Lords, again, this is a substantial group. I will not detain the Committee for too long but, before I turn to my amendments, I briefly welcome those tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. As she set out so clearly, her amendments seek to simplify the language used in value-for-money assessments so that they are more readily and intuitively understood by scheme members. This goes to a point that has arisen repeatedly during our discussions in Committee: many of the concepts in this Bill, as well as the language used to describe them, are dense, technical and difficult to grasp. A considerable level of prior knowledge is often required simply to understand what is being proposed, let alone its practical effect. I am reminded of a remark attributed to Joseph Pulitzer. He said that information should be put before people,
“briefly so that they will read it, clearly so that they will understand it … picturesquely so that they will remember it, and, above all, accurately”.
Surely that is the standard to which we should aspire, in not only this Bill but more broadly in our legislative work. Clarity, intelligibility and accessibility should be central objectives. The language we choose and the way in which we define key terms in legislation are fundamental, yet they are too often treated as secondary concerns.
I therefore warmly welcome the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, precisely because they address this issue head-on. Jargon is easy to reach for, but it is also, in a sense, lazy. When we are constructing a value-for-money framework whose purpose is to communicate value for money, we must be vigilant about terminology that obscures rather than illuminates and about euphemisms and phrases that sound authoritative but fail to convey real meaning. Many noble Lords will be familiar with Eric Blair’s essay, Politics and the English Language, and the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness serve as a timely reminder of some of the lessons it contains.
The first amendments in this group to which I have added my name—Amendments 60 and 61—would remove sub-paragraph (ii) from Clause 15(1)(b) as well as subsection (2). These amendments speak to a simple point: where responsible trustees or managers have determined that a scheme is not delivering value for money, that judgment should be sufficient to justify a rating of “not delivering” without the need to satisfy additional statutory conditions that risk being overly prescriptive.
Trustees already sit at the centre of this framework. They are charged with assessing investment performance, costs, charges, service quality and long-term member outcomes. They are subject to fiduciary duties and regulatory oversight. It is therefore entirely reasonable to trust their professional judgment when they conclude that a scheme is failing to deliver value for money. As the Bill is currently drafted, that judgment must be supplemented by one of a series of defined conditions, whether persistent intermediate ratings, a lack of realistic prospect of improvement or regulatory non-compliance. While well-intentioned, those conditions risk turning what should be a principles-based regime into a mechanistic one, encouraging trustees to focus on meeting thresholds rather than acting decisively in members’ best interests.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, I again thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Altmann and Lady Stedman-Scott, and all noble Lords who have spoken. Let me start with the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. I completely appreciate her desire to make the VFM framework easier for everybody to understand. I recognise there is a need for clarity here and a role for regulators to support member engagement with something as complex as this, but our concern with her proposals is that they would reduce precision and could unintentionally weaken regulatory accountability and undermine comparability across schemes, and those are three pillars on which the VFM framework depends. There is a genuine challenge here, which is to balance technical accuracy with clarity for members. Obviously, the latter will help to overcome the kind of behavioural inertia that we all see and so will ensure that VFM assessments result in meaningful action, not just awareness.
That is distinct from the regulatory precision required for the VFM system, which is why these terms are in the Bill. That current wording of “fully delivering” and “not delivering” is not accidental: it is designed to reflect objective compliance with all the mandated metrics: costs and charges, investment performance, governance and member outcomes. The terms provide clarity for trustees and regulators about whether a scheme meets the required standards. Replacing them with “good value” and “poor value”, even if it sounds attractive on the surface, would introduce subjectivity. Good value is not a regulatory test. It risks creating ambiguity about what triggers action when a scheme falls short.
Members deserve clarity and I absolutely agree that language should be understandable. However, the right place for explaining concepts to members is in disclosures and guidance, not primary legislation. We intend to work with the Pensions Regulator, the FCA and industry to ensure that member-facing communications such as rating notifications to employers and the regulator-supporting guidance, which will be aligned with the implementation of VFM, explain these outcomes in plain English that is suitable for its intended audience. I take the challenge from the noble Baronesses, Lady Altmann and Lady Bowles, about how to make sure that happens. That is something I am really happy to reflect on quite carefully. However, changing the statutory terms dilutes precision, creates inconsistency and risks uncertainty. Our approach preserves enforceable standards while committing to clear, accessible explanations for members.
Amendments 64 and 65 from the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, would limit the powers the Government have to specify the consequences for pension schemes that have had an intermediate VFM rating for fewer than five years in a row. Let me pause before I answer that to come back to the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, who always asks clear questions. One of her questions was “How is this going to work, anyway?” Let me give a very quick rundown, subject to time. The consultation sets out updated proposals—they were updated in response to the previous consultation—and draft FCA rules, showing how the VFM framework will work. The paper sets out the proposed metrics for performance, costs, charges and service quality. It outlines how the assessment process will work. It gives more details around the ratings structure and the consequences associated with each rating. Basically, trustees of in-scope DC workplace pension schemes and arrangements will have to publish standardised performance metrics and follow a consistent and comparative assessment of value to assign an overall VFM rating. The regulator will ensure compliance with those obligations and will have the ability to enforce transfer of savers—I will come back to that in a moment—from consistently poorly performing arrangements.
I said that the consultation had changed. There were five key changes from the previous consultation. The most relevant one here proposes, in response to feedback, the adoption of a four-point rating system: red, amber, light green and dark green. There was strong pressure to have more granularity, so that it was not quite as stark. I make it clear that it is only amber that could lead to possible enforced transfer. I hope that is helpful.
A good question is “How will members know what ‘fully delivering’ means?” Obviously, we are not proposing to use the Bill’s terminology when communicating ratings to members. Instead, the schemes will use the four-point RAGG rating. Red corresponds to not delivering, amber and light green to intermediate performance and dark green to fully delivering. It is proposed that this more accessible and granular terminology will be used in the assessment reports published by all schemes at the end of 2028, and the reports will be made publicly available. Guidance will also include plain English explanations and a summary of metrics so that members understand what the outcome means for them.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
In what the Minister has just described, I do not quite understand how dark green and light green fit with “fully delivering”. Only dark green would be fully delivering, so why is light green not in the intermediate category? To me, this is quite confusing. I understand what the Minister is saying, but I urge her to work with whoever is devising this to iron out this kind of confusion at this stage, rather than running with it, as seems to be the intention here.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
We are still consulting on this. We consulted on the initial proposal and the response came back that more granularity was needed. We have to accept that clarity pulls in one direction and precision and granularity pull in the other, so the job of the Government is to support the regulator in making sure that we end up with a framework that does its primary job, which is not just to work out where a scheme is now but what the right consequences are for that scheme and then to make sure that is communicated to those who need to know in ways that are appropriate. On the one hand, the noble Baroness wants clear, strict categories, and on the other she wants to have different consequences for schemes depending on their circumstances. We think it is important to be able to judge appropriately and come up with a scheme. I would be happy to write to point out all the areas and explain more about how this works, but the point is that this needs to be understood by those who will do the assessments and the communication of the results of that has to be in the right language for those who need to understand them. As the noble Baroness knows as well as I do, it is the nature of pensions that the challenge is that marketing simple language does not map neatly onto precise legal language. I hope that at least explains what we are trying to do on that.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
My worry is we have a term “fully delivering” in this legislation. It does not seem to me that very many schemes are likely to be fully delivering, even in a light green capacity. Therefore, I think we are already sowing the seeds of confusion if we go along this route. That is all.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
I am going to explain a little bit about the consequences because the thing that matters most is the consequences. Amber schemes may be required to close to new employers. Red schemes must close to new employers. I am just getting that down for the record, which suggests that I probably did not say that a moment ago. Just to be really clear, amber schemes may close to new employers; red schemes must close to new employers. Much nodding, I hope, from behind me. Great sighs of relief all round. Excellent.
Let me come on to the consequences of this. On Amendments 64 and 65 from the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, we think that making reporting less comprehensive, even for schemes with intermediate ratings, could reduce the early warning signals on which regulators will rely to protect savers. I fully understand her desire to make this reporting proportionate. The current framework is designed to strike a balance. Powers are designed to enable the Government to ensure that trustees keep sponsor employers informed and that any issues are addressed promptly via the improvement plan without putting unnecessary burden on schemes. The noble Baroness may want to note this bit. The Secretary of State has discretion under Clause 16 on the consequences of an intermediate rating and could require different consequences to flow from different levels of intermediate rating. It is not the intention that a requirement to close the scheme to new employers would necessarily flow from all intermediate ratings. I think that is what she is shooting at, so I hope that helps to reassure her. That enables some flexibility around the consequences for pension schemes that have, for example, received an intermediate rating for fewer than five years, which is the space that she was shooting into just now.
Changing the powers as suggested risks missing the signs that a scheme may be heading into trouble. Early sight of any negative impact on a scheme’s performance and value really matters. I am sure that the Committee agrees that it is better to catch problems sooner rather than later and to put in a plan to remedy things, ensuring that schemes provide value and avoiding harm to members and greater costs in the long run.
The amendment suggests that schemes should face full reporting only if performance issues continue for five years or more, but five years is a long time for problems to go unchecked. I think members deserve better protection than that. We certainly would not want to see situations where savers are left in a poorly rated scheme for many years. That is why we propose to give schemes in the intermediate rating a period of up to two VFM assessment cycles to make the improvements needed to provide value to their savers.
I know that Amendments 60, 61 and 69 from the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, are probing amendments that want to challenge and clarify the terms “reasonable period” and “relevant period”. The relevant period is the VFM period, or rather the annual reporting timescale for data collection assessment against VFM metrics, which we expect to run from January to December of the preceding calendar year. We expect to set that out in regulations following consultation. The reasonable period is a period during which the regulator would normally expect the scheme to deliver value for money. Due to the level of detail this will involve, this will all be outlined in regulations. We will, of course, formally consult on draft regulations, and I am more than happy to make sure that we engage with interested noble Lords during the consultation to provide an opportunity to feed thoughts into that. The finer proposals behind the VFM ratings, such as the conditions under which each rating will apply and when they should be used, are outlined in the joint consultation which is currently open and will be provided in full in regulations.
Turning to Clause 18, Amendment 69 seeks to understand the rationale for the maximum penalty levels for non-compliance set out in subsection (5). As pension schemes grow in size, it is vital that the fines we impose on schemes carry real financial weight. This ensures that compliance and enforcement remain effective, safeguard members’ interests and, of course, maintain confidence in the system. These figures represent a significant deterrent against non-compliance while not being overly excessive in the current market landscape. We have worked closely with regulatory bodies and taken care to ensure the penalties align with other powers taken in Part 2 of this Bill. We believe the figures are proportionate to both the current and future scale of schemes.
Baroness Coffey (Con)
I am keen to get a sense of what the Government think the current spread is between the different ratings. For example, what proportion might be red? Is there any sense of this at all?
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
I am absolutely not going to answer that. If there is answer which is known to me, then I will be happy to share it with her, but it certainly not known to me.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken and the Minister for her responses and patience with the comments made, especially by me. I have ongoing reservations but will obviously look carefully at the consultation. I would be grateful if we might have a further discussion before Report, because this is a crucial area, for employers and members. Perhaps we can bring this back in some form to iron out this huge intermediate range that could have a wide variety of implications that might be quite costly—I know how much these reports cost when you try and commission them—to schemes that may be having a bad performance patch for a year or two, but for understandable reasons. I thank the Minister and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Member’s explanatory statement
This probing amendment would replace the 12-month dormancy period with an 18-month period in order to test the rationale for the Government’s chosen timeframe.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, supported by my noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott, I am glad to be leading off in another group of amendments, largely designed to probe the Government and clarify their thinking, plans and rationale on the small pots regulations in the Bill. Indeed, I know that many industry bodies are watching our proceedings with interest and will be taking note of what the Minister says. This is after we had a series of meetings with those at the sharp end in the industry, as she will probably guess.
I will speak briefly to the other amendments in this group before turning to my own. First, I speak to the amendment in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, who is not in his place, and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. Ensuring that a qualifying dashboard service has been available for a period before small pots can be consolidated seems an entirely sensible and proportionate measure. If we are to move pension savings automatically, often without an active decision by the member, it is surely right that individuals should first have a practical opportunity to see and trace their pots in one place and to engage with them themselves.
I also welcome Amendment 81 from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, which, as I understand it, would ensure that a pot is not treated as dormant where contributions have ceased for a legitimate and expected reason, such as a temporary break from employment with an intention to return. This strikes me as a pragmatic refinement that would better reflect real-world working patterns and help to ensure that consolidation targets genuine dormancy rather than planned inactivity. I have no doubt the Minister will explain that in more elegant terms than me.
Amendment 88, in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes, addresses the definitions set out in Clause 34, which itself gives the Secretary of State a broad power to alter the definition of a “small” pension pot, including increasing the threshold, with no upper limit set in the Bill. The amendment would retain flexibility but place a clear ceiling on how far that power could be used. I look forward to my noble friend’s remarks. I know that my noble friend will expand on that point, but I would be grateful if the Minister could also explain why an upper limit is not currently included and how the Government envisage safeguarding against this power being used to capture significantly larger costs in the future. That is an important question that I hope will be raised.
I turn to my first amendment in this group, Amendment 79, which would replace the 12-month dormancy period in Clause 22 with an 18-month period. This is a probing amendment intended to test the rationale for the Government’s choice of a 12-month timeframe. The definition of “dormant” is critical, because once a pot meets that definition it may become eligible for automatic consolidation with no active decision by the member. Many savers engage with their pensions only intermittently, often on an annual basis, and employment patterns do not always follow neat or predictable cycles. Therefore, extending the period to 18 months would allow the Committee to explore whether a full year of inactivity is genuinely sufficient to infer disengagement, or whether it risks capturing individuals who are simply between roles or engaging on a longer cycle.
I want to be clear that this amendment does not seek to undermine the policy of small pots consolidation, which, as the Minister knows, we broadly support. Rather, it is intended to probe how the Government have balanced administrative efficiency with member protection, and what evidence has informed the choice of a 12-month period rather than a longer one. I would therefore welcome the Minister’s explanation of how this timeframe was determined, and whether alternative periods were considered.
Amendment 80 would leave out Clause 22(3)(b). This too is a probing amendment; it is intended to explore what the Government mean by the reference to “prescribed exceptions” in the definition of a dormant pension pot. As drafted, Clause 22(3)(b) assumes that a pot may be treated as dormant not only by reference to contribution inactivity but by whether a member has taken steps to confirm or alter how their pot is invested, subject to exceptions that are left entirely to regulations. Many savers remain in default investment arrangements by choice and engage with their pensions only intermittently, often in ways that are not easily captured by scheme records. Therefore, it is not clear what types of member action the Government intend should prevent a pot being treated as dormant, nor what kinds of behaviour might be carved out as exceptions.
This amendment is intended to prove whether investment-related actions are an appropriate proxy for engagement, how prescribed exceptions will operate in practice and whether the approach adequately reflects real-world member behaviour. I would welcome the Minister’s clarification on how these exceptions are envisaged and why this test has been included in the definition of dormancy.
Finally, my Amendment 82 concerns the level of parliamentary scrutiny applied to regulations made under Clause 22. As drafted, the Bill applies the affirmative procedure to only the first set of small pots regulations or regulations that meet certain specific triggers. Thereafter, changes to the consolidation regime may be made under the negative procedure. This amendment is probing and is not dissimilar to one raised previously in Committee. It is intended to test whether that approach provides sufficient ongoing parliamentary oversight. The regulations made under Clause 22 will govern when and how small dormant pension pots may be consolidated, often without an active decision by the member, and they therefore go to the heart of member protection and confidence in the system itself.
The amendment would require all such regulations to be subject to the affirmative procedure, ensuring that Parliament has the opportunity to scrutinise and approve changes to this framework wherever they are made, not just at first use. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain why the Government consider the negative procedure appropriate for subsequent regulations in this area, and whether there are safeguards to prevent significant policy changes being made without fuller parliamentary scrutiny. I thank in advance the Minister for her comments and answers and all other noble Lords for their contributions on this group, which I feel concerns an important matter. I beg to move.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
My Lords, my Amendment 81 is very small; I hardly need to say anything about it. It came from one of those occasions when you are going through the Bill and you write a little query which you then convert into an amendment. It concerns Clause 22(3)(b), which says that a pension pot can be moved into a consolidator if
“the individual has, subject to any prescribed exceptions, taken no step to confirm or alter the way in which the pension pot is invested”.
There are instances in which a person may want to stay attached to a pension fund they have in a workplace, particularly if they do not necessarily have a long relationship with an employer or have done some intermittent work and then gone off to have a family, because they may have an informal agreement to go back. How do you cater for that? I realise that it might just fall under “any prescribed exceptions”, which you write in a note to deal with, but that is the basis of the amendment. I am sure it will be very simple for the Minister to say, “Yes, that is covered”.
While I am on my feet, I support Amendment 83. I also support Amendment 88 from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, because it is worth having some guardrails for things that are doing very well.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, my Amendment 88 proposes to limit the power in Clause 34 to increase the size of the pot classified as small so that it is limited to £10,000. I welcome the fact that the power to make regulations under Clause 34 has to be consulted on and that they will be subject to the affirmative procedure, but we know that Parliament has close to zero power to alter the content of regulations, so it is important that the guardrails around the power are sufficiently strong.
There is widespread acceptance in the industry that there should be consolidation of small pots of £1,000 or less. I understand that there are already around 13 million pots of that size, and that is predicted to rise to over 30 million in only a few years’ time, so this is clearly an important issue. There is a concern, however, that the Clause 34 power could be used beyond its core purpose, which is to ensure that multiple small pots do not accumulate within pension providers and that individuals do not lose track of their own pension pots. It is one thing to use the power for sensible tidying up, but it would be quite another if the power were used to drive further consolidation, for example, which would not necessarily be in the interests of either savers or pension providers.
Baroness Coffey (Con)
My Lords, this is an interesting part. It recognises a lot of our labour market, where people are working with multiple employers over a variety of time periods. Even those young people who were on the Kickstart scheme will have got contributions to a pension scheme, which they may completely forget about once they go to their next, perhaps longer-term, job.
I remember a few years ago the lovely people over in the Department for Culture, Media and Sport. They have a “good purposes” fund where they go after dormant assets all over the place and take them away, with a general promise that the money will come back if somebody tries to get it. I seem to recall telling them to jog on when it came to pension funds, although some negotiation might have been arranged.
I am just trying to understand how all of this is going to fit together. That is why I think Amendment 83 is particularly helpful; basically, it says that the pensions dashboard must be in place. This is about making an informed choice. One of the things I am trying to understand is whether Clause 22(3)(b), which my noble friends on the Front Bench have suggested should be removed, is passive and non-engaged. Will the trustees running the scheme be required to make some effort to try to contact that person so that it does not just slide away without people even realising?
In terms of the other aspect, I assume, under Amendments 80 and 81, it is right to try to get into some more detail about prescribing, which could perhaps be further enhanced by just getting to understand in Clause 25 what the Minister is thinking at this point, especially when it suggests that the trustees or managers of a scheme can determine whether it is the best interests for this to transfer or not. Are we talking about, say, people who are in prison, people who have gone abroad or people who are on a career break? It would be helpful to have a sense of what Ministers are thinking in terms of having this variety of powers, first, to be able to do it, but then to say, “Actually, we’ll leave it to the managers or trustees of the scheme to determine whether it is that person’s best interests”. I would be grateful for some understanding, again, of how this might work in practice, but the solution will definitely be Amendment 83 and I hope that the Minister will give that consideration for Report.
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)
My Lords, this is an appropriate time to stand, because Amendment 83 is signed by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and by me. In the absence of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, today, and having discussed the matter with him, I speak on my behalf and his to Amendment 83. As has been stated, it is intended to deal with the risk that consolidating small pots might worsen the problem of lost or forgotten pensions.
We are all aware of the problem of people losing track of small pension pots: a problem that has increased in recent years as people tend to move between jobs more frequently, and may therefore end up with several small pensions, perhaps from many years ago. Chapter 2 of the Bill allows the Government to make regulations to consolidate small, dormant pension pots. I, and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, support this as we believe that providing additional scale to small, dormant pots should enable greater efficiencies and a reduction in costs.
However, a possible unintended consequence could be to make it more difficult for a person to trace a forgotten pot if it is moved to a consolidator without their knowledge: for example, if any notice is sent to an old address. The introduction of a pension dashboard, as enabled by the Pension Schemes Act 2021, was intended to make it easier for people to identify pensions that they have lost track of or even forgotten. This has been somewhat delayed, but progress does, at last, seem to be happening. The connection deadline is October 2026, so hopefully people may start to be able to access the dashboard in the not-too-distant future.
In order to avoid making the problem of lost pensions worse, Amendment 83, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and myself, simply says that the regulations that would mandate the consolidation of a dormant, small pot could not be made until the dashboard had been available for at least three months. The three months is designed to give a bit of time to ensure that it is actually working and that any teething issues have been resolved. I think it prudent to ensure that we do not cause unintended consequences from what is otherwise a good policy, I hope the Minister will be sympathetic to the intention of the course outlined in Amendment 83.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I support the amendments in this group, particularly Amendment 83, which has received wide support. I think it is really important, as is the idea of lengthening the 12-month period for so-called dormant pots, and Amendment 81 from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, where, for example, a woman may take time off to care for children or other loved ones and intends to return, but her pension will have been moved before she gets back. Those are distinct possibilities under this scheme. We are talking about moving somebody’s savings—or investments; I am doing it myself—from one place to another, just because they have not done anything with their pension for a while. The pension fund is not meant to have anything done with it when you are younger; it is meant to just sit there and stay there.
Of course, the big problem that needs to be solved here is the costs to providers of administering all these very small pots. But the aim of the dashboard itself is meant to be to help people move their pots from one place to another. It seems to me that this particular section of the legislation is trying to deal with something that is meant to be dealt with by a different policy area. The consolidators, of course, will be attractive to providers to establish, and the money saving from not administering these small pots will also be attractive to the providers. But have the Government given any consideration to the idea of making, for example, NEST the consolidator? That is a Government-sponsored scheme. It has obviously had to have reasonable charges. Any transfers do not incur an upfront fee. That would run less of a risk of having consolidators that end up perhaps not performing well.
Baroness Coffey (Con)
I understand what the noble Baroness is saying about NEST. It is a brilliant organisation. But my recollection is that it does charge 2% on the transfer of assets into it. That is not something we should be particularly encouraging.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
No. I was just saying, if you transfer assets in, that 2% charge does not apply and will not apply. Otherwise, obviously, it would be uneconomic. But I understand that the idea of NEST is that the transfer in of a pension from another provider does not incur the upfront charge of, I think, 1.8%. So that would not be an issue. It is just a 0.3% flat fee. I hope the Minister will be able to respond on that element. There is a residual risk to government in moving somebody’s long-term assets from one provider to another if the other provider eventually proves not to deliver good value.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken on this. I will start by addressing the proposed amendments to Clause 22. I will say at the start that we regard this clause as being a vital measure to tackle the structural inefficiency caused by the ever-greater proliferation of small, dormant pension pots in the auto-enrolment market. It empowers the Secretary of State to make regulations to consolidate these pots into authorised consolidator schemes, improving outcomes for pension savers and reducing unnecessary costs to providers.
Amendments 79 and 80, from the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, seek to extend the dormancy period for a pot to be considered eligible for automatic consolidation from 12 months to 18 months. We concluded that the 12-month period strikes the right balance between legislative clarity and administrative practicality. The timeframe was consulted on extensively with industry in 2023, under the previous Government. I suspect the noble Viscount was the Minister, so he may recall this well. Twelve months represents a supported middle ground: long enough to ensure that pots are genuinely dormant but not so long as to delay consolidation unnecessarily. Extending the period to 18 months would create inefficiencies and higher costs for both savers and providers, and slow progress towards consolidation.
Amendment 80 proposes removing subsection (3)(b) from Clause 22 as a means of probing the circumstances in which a pot should not be treated as dormant. This was picked up, slightly glancingly, by the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, as well. I make it clear that the scope of the policy is deliberately aimed at unengaged savers in default funds, where fragmentation poses the greatest risk to value for money and retirement outcomes. It is not designed to consolidate pots from those who are engaged and have made active decisions about their pension.
The exceptions provision is designed for cases where investment choices have been made that are driven by factors other than active financial management, such as religious belief. For example, following the consultation in 2023, sharia-compliant funds emerged as a suitable case for this. The aim was to ensure that savers in those funds remain eligible for consolidation and the benefits it brings, because, even though they have made a choice to be in a sharia-compliant fund, Clause 22 would allow schemes to differentiate that choice from other forms of pension engagement which might indicate that the member would not want their pot to be moved. I make it clear that anyone brought into scope under these exceptions will retain the option to opt out, so member autonomy is preserved, and consolidated schemes would need to offer a sharia-compliant option for consolidation to ensure that members’ wishes continued to be recognised and respected.
Although the power allows for wider exceptions in future, proportionality is key. For example, it would not be appropriate to consolidate members in ethical funds into a default fund; nor is it feasible for consolidators to cater to every ethical fund in the market. However, this flexibility would ensure that the framework could evolve if another religious or other fund reached sufficient scale. It balances the inclusion of disengaged savers with the need to limit complexity, cost and operational burden for authorised consolidator schemes; that is crucial to ensure that the automatic consolidation model remains viable.
Again, to be clear, this is not about bringing into scope people who do not want to be consolidated; it is about ensuring that those who are likely disengaged on pension saving are not automatically excluded from consolidation and its benefits simply because of their religious beliefs. For clarity, I note that, similarly, this clause does not allow or compel a pension scheme to move someone who has not selected a sharia-compliant fund into a sharia-compliant fund.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I will conclude fairly briefly. I thank all noble Lords for their contributions and the Minister for her reply. I thank in particular the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lady Coffey, and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. I see, as the Minister pointed out, that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, is in his place, which has, if I may put it this way, hitherto been dormant.
As we have discussed, the amendments in this group are designed to test how the framework will operate in practice and whether the balance struck is the right one. In particular, they probe how dormancy is defined; how member behaviour is interpreted; and how far Parliament will continue to have oversight as the regime evolves.
I have a few points to make in winding up. First, it would be helpful to hear from the Minister more details about how members can be reunited with their dormant pots—or, indeed, find their missing pots. I particularly look forward to hearing an update about the dashboard. May I make a request? It would be helpful to have more granular detail on how it would work and the different aspects of an individual’s experience in using the dashboard service. I remember that, when I was in the department, I was thoroughly briefed on it; it is a very big, important and interesting project. I am sure that the Committee would appreciate that particular type of update.
My second point was made by my noble friend Lady Noakes when she said that Clause 22 gives significant powers. She was right in saying that there is no real underlying purpose and that there are concerns around the constraints. More granular detail on the definition of small pots is required; as my noble friend said, bearing in mind their value and growth in future, more clarity needs to be given.
Finally, I want to make two points about the 12-month dormancy period that the Minister raised. We will consider what she said about 12 months being the right balance rather than extending, as we proposed. I will also read Hansard concerning her points about the affirmative procedure versus the negative one; I carefully noted what she said.
To conclude, the powers in this chapter are substantial. The point we are making—and, indeed, the points that other noble Lords have made—is that clarity around definitions, proportionality in timeframes, transparency, and how exceptions and future changes will be handled will be essential if members are to feel secure, rather than sidelined by the process. With that summary, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
“(6) Transfer notices must be clear, concise, and accessible to all members, including those with low financial literacy or limited digital access.(7) Transfer notices must also be provided in prescribed alternative formats for digitally-excluded, visually-impaired, or otherwise vulnerable members.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures transfer notices are easy to understand and available in alternative formats so that all members, including vulnerable or digitally-excluded individuals, can engage meaningfully with transfer decisions.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I shall address each amendment in this group briefly in turn to provide some of the context and rationale for why we have introduced them. First, Amendments 84 and 85 relate to Clause 24. These amendments are concerned with how this policy will operate in practice and whether it does so in a way that is fair, comprehensible and properly accountable. Clause 24 places significant weight on the transfer notice. It is the principal mechanism by which an individual is informed that their pension pot may be transferred automatically if they do not respond. In many cases, silence will result in action, which makes the quality and accessibility of that notice critical.
Amendment 84 therefore seeks to ensure that transfer notices are clear, concise and accessible to all members, including those with low financial literacy or limited digital access. It also requires that notices be available in prescribed alternative formats for members who are digitally excluded, visually impaired or otherwise vulnerable. I took note of the Minister’s remarks about definitions that may need to be properly defined—better defined than I can define them—in legally recognisable terms, and I recognise that.
As we discussed earlier today, we are all aware that pensions communications can be complex and intimidating, even for those who are relatively engaged. We need only to remind ourselves of the challenges experienced in recent years over pension credit communications. I think my noble friends Lady Coffey and Lady Stedman-Scott have had some experience of that. I will leave it at that.
For individuals with small dormant pots, often lower earners, those with fragmented work histories or those disengaged from pensions altogether, the risk is that they simply do not understand what is being proposed or do not realise that inaction has consequences. Often, it is fair to say that pension communications, when received, are by default put in the too-difficult box or the another-day box or in a convenient receptacle placed on the floor—I will leave it at that. The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, made a similar point in her remarks on an earlier group, but it is a serious point. If the policy depends on member engagement, it is only reasonable that the communication is genuinely capable of being understood. Amendment 84 would simply put that principle in the Bill.
Amendment 85 addresses a different but related concern about oversight and accountability. As drafted, the clause requires transfer notices to be issued, but does not require anyone to monitor how many notices are sent, how members respond or what outcomes are produced. Amendment 85 would place a duty on the Secretary of State through regulations to record and report annually on the number of transfer notices issued and the outcomes arising from them. This matters for two reasons. First, it allows Parliament to assess whether the policy is working as intended. Are members actively choosing options or are transfers overwhelmingly occurring by default? Are certain cohorts disproportionately disengaged? Without data, we simply cannot know. Secondly, it ensures that responsibility for this policy does not rest solely with schemes and regulators but remains subject to ministerial oversight and parliamentary scrutiny, which is particularly important where automatic processes affect individual savers. I hope the Minister will see these amendments as seeking to address important points that will make this part of the Bill work more effectively, and I look forward eventually to hearing her response. I listened very carefully to her remarks on communications and customer service in an earlier group.
Let me now address our Clause 31 stand part notice; noble Lords will be aware that, as set out in its explanatory statement, this is intended as probing. This clause contains a wide enabling provision that allows Ministers, through regulations on small pots, to confer functions; create appeal rights; require extensive data processing; amend primary legislation; and, most notably, authorise the Pensions Regulator to charge prescribed fees in connection with authorisation under the regime. My concern is not that these powers exist at all but that the clause gives us little indication of how they will be constrained in practice. In particular, can the Minister explain how the fee-charging power for the Pensions Regulator will operate? Will fees be strictly limited to cost recovery? How will their level be set? What parliamentary scrutiny will apply?
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
My Lords, the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, and the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, have done the Committee a great service. I wish to flag up that these amendments are really important for us to consider before we come back on Report.
The noble Viscount’s comments on Clause 31 potentially being dangerous are right on the mark. Many of the wide powers suggested here should say “must” rather than “may”, but they say only “may”. We are talking about moving somebody’s money, potentially without their knowledge; yes, we will have to write to them, but we know very well that many schemes have dormant pots because either they have lost track of the members or the members have lost track of the scheme. There is a danger here in public policy terms.
In connection with this policy area, the Minister mentioned at the beginning of the debate that there are risks to members and providers. I understand the risks to providers of having small pots, as well as the costs of administering them being higher than the fees they receive from managing them, but what is the risk to the member of having their money stay where it is until they come along and ask for it to be moved? There are risks in leaving as well as in staying if they are moved into a scheme that is less suitable for them, performs less well or has a different charging structure.
What if the member is away for a couple of years on a secondment, for example? What kind of protections will there be? Pensions are typically designed to be left alone. Having default funds, making regular contributions and not being able to take any of your money back until you are 55, for example, are part of the whole structure—indeed, the intention—of private pensions. Is there any intention to ensure, for example, that the member and the dashboard have been operational? I know the Minister said—we talked about this in the previous group—that there might be conflicts between the intention of the small pots legislation and the timing of the requirements relative to the timing of the dashboard, but if a member is moved and it is discovered that they are suffering a loss as a result of the move because their scheme was better or because they have come back to that scheme after a temporary absence, is there any consideration of who might be responsible for any compensation due for money that was moved when the member might well have known nothing about it?
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Younger of Leckie, for introducing his amendments. I should have said at the beginning of the previous group that I thank him for his support for this policy. I recognise that he has tabled his amendments in the spirit of exploring how best to make this work.
Let me start with the proposed amendments to Clause 24, which is a key part of the framework to enable the consolidation of small dormant pension pots. It sets out requirements for transfer notices: communications that inform members when their pot is due to be moved into an authorised consolidator scheme. These notices are an important safeguard, ensuring transparency and giving members the opportunity to opt out if they wish to. Amendment 84 proposes that the transfer notices must be clear, concise, accessible and so on and must be provided in prescribed alternative formats for digitally excluded or visually impaired members.
I fully support this principle, but we think the amendment is not needed because the objectives are already embedded in the Government’s approach. The Bill provides powers to set detailed requirements for transfer notices in secondary legislation, and we have committed to consult to ensure that notices are simple, jargon-free and easy to understand. Moreover, existing regulatory standards and guidance already require schemes to provide communications in accessible formats for vulnerable members, including those who are digitally excluded or visually impaired. We do not think that overlaying additional prescriptive requirements in primary legislation is helpful, but the underlying point is very strong. We need a framework that can evolve as technology and members’ needs change. Locking rigid requirements into the Bill could hinder that process, so we think the right place for these detailed standards is in guidance and regulation, where they can be updated as best practice develops.
Amendment 85 would require the Secretary of State to record and report annually on the number of transfer notices issued and the outcomes arising from them. Again, although I understand the intent, we do not think this amendment is proportionate, given the administrative burden that it would impose. The DWP already has robust mechanisms for monitoring the implementation and effectiveness of pensions policy, including through regular engagement with the Pensions Regulator and industry reporting. We will continue to publish updates on the progress of small pots consolidation as part of our wider reporting on pensions reform. The focus should remain on ensuring that the policy delivers better outcomes for members, reducing fragmentation, improving value for money and supporting a market of fewer, larger schemes. We believe that this can be achieved through existing oversight arrangements and targeted evaluation, rather than setting rigid reporting requirements in primary legislation.
I recognise that the Clause 31 stand part notice has been tabled to probe the extent and scope of the small pots regulations enabled by this clause, with particular focus on the powers conferred on the Pensions Regulator to levy fees. For clarity, Clause 31 does not create new powers beyond those already set out within the small pots measure. Its purpose is to provide clarity and detail on how those powers can be exercised to deliver the small pots consolidation framework effectively. This mirrors the approach taken with the authorisation of master trusts, for example, under the Pension Schemes Act 2017, where fees were introduced to ensure that the costs of regulatory oversight are borne by those seeking authorisation, not by the taxpayer. This is a well-established and proportionate mechanism that supports robust regulation while maintaining fairness.
As already discussed elsewhere, we believe that the clauses within this chapter strike a careful balance. They ensure that key regulations get full parliamentary scrutiny through the affirmative procedure, while allowing the Government to act quickly on minor or technical changes via the negative procedure when necessary.
Clause 31 sets out the circumstances where the use of a Henry VIII power may be required. To be clear, this is about ensuring that the legislation delivers a workable and proportionate framework. The Henry VIII power provides necessary flexibility to apply existing technical and procedural legislation to small pots regulation in order to ensure the effective implementation of the small pots regime. I shall give an example. It may be necessary to make consequential amendments to the Pensions Act 2004 so that the Pensions Regulator’s existing administrative powers can extend appropriately to the small pots framework. An example in the Bill is the amendment to Section 146 of the Pension Schemes Act 1993 to ensure that the remit of the Pensions Ombudsman is broad enough to investigate complaints or disputes in relation to the destination proposer, but this cannot be legislated for before final decisions around the delivery model are made. That is a good example of why this would work. Of course, any regulations made under this power will be subject to the affirmative procedure.
We think that that flexibility is essential for the effective implementation of the small pots regulations. Any regulations made under this power will be affirmative, but it is also worth noting that, given what I have said, removing Clause 31 would reduce the clarity for members and pension schemes on how the power to make small pots regulations may be used.
Finally, I will address the proposed amendments to Clause 32. Clause 32 is essential to maintaining trust and integrity in the small pots consolidation framework. It ensures that the Pensions Regulator can take direct action to uphold compliance with the regulations, protecting members and supporting the volume of transfers required accurately. Amendment 86 seeks to remove subsection (2) as a means of probing the expansion of regulatory powers conferred on the Pensions Regulator. Subsection (2) provides transparency for stakeholders by setting out the types of enforcement tools that may be included in regulations, such as compliance notices, third-party compliance notices and penalty notices. These are not new concepts; they align with the Pensions Regulator’s existing practices and procedures in other areas of pensions regulation. Removing this provision would not prevent enforcement powers being introduced in regulations, but it would remove clarity for schemes and members. Without it, we risk creating ambiguity and undermining confidence in the framework. This clause is not about overreach, but about ensuring that the regulator can act proportionately and effectively where schemes fail to meet their legal duties.
Finally, Amendment 87 seeks to remove Clause 32(4) to probe the rationale behind the maximum penalty limits. Subsection (4) provides clear, proportionate caps on financial penalties: £10,000 for individuals and £100,000 in any other case. These limits have been increased compared to existing frameworks to reflect the importance of compliance in this area. As pension schemes grow in size, it is vital that the fines we impose on schemes carry real financial weight. This ensures that compliance and enforcement remain effective, safeguard members’ interests and maintain confidence in the system. These amounts align with the wider compliance regime across the Bill. Without this subsection, regulations could still introduce penalties, but without any statutory cap. That would create uncertainty for schemes and could lead to disproportionate outcomes. By contrast, the current approach provides transparency and safeguards, ensuring penalties are significant enough to deter non-compliance but not excessive. It also enables appeals to the First-tier or Upper Tribunal, guaranteeing procedural fairness and accountability.
In conclusion, Clause 32 is not about granting unchecked powers; it is about providing clarity, proportionality and effective enforcement to protect members and deliver the outcomes this policy is designed to achieve. Removing this provision would create uncertainty and risk undermining confidence in the system.
The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, asked me a question that I think related more to the previous group, but let me see what I can do. Why do we need small pot consolidation if we have the pensions dashboard? I think her question was slightly underpinned by the question, why do we need this at all, why can we not just use dashboards? We think they serve different but complementary roles in strengthening the system.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I will be pretty brief in closing. Across this group, the common theme is not opposition to the direction of travel—I give further reassurance to the Minister on this point and I appreciate her remarks—but a desire for clarity, proportionality and accountability as these powers are taken and exercised. I am very grateful for the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and indeed for her extra questions on this group. The small pots regime will rely heavily on automatic processes, regulatory discretion and secondary legislation, which makes it especially important that Parliament understands how these measures will work in practice and where the guardrails sit.
The amendments that we have brought forward are deliberately probing, as I said at the outset. They seek reassurance that members will be able to engage meaningfully with decisions that affect their savings, that Ministers will retain visibility and responsibility for how the system operates once it has gone live, and that the regulators’ powers, whether in relation to fees, enforcement or penalties, will be used in a way that is targeted, proportionate and subject to appropriate oversight. I respect the fact that the noble Baroness has given much time to addressing the amendments, and indeed those particular points, for which I am very grateful. It has been a short debate, and I hope a helpful one, and we will consider the responses given. But, for the moment I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to scrutinise the scale of the Secretary of State’s powers to exempt schemes from Conditions 1 and 2 set out in subsection (4), and to probe whether these exemption powers are intended to apply to Collective Defined Contribution (CDC) schemes.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, this is a busy group and I shall not detain the Committee by speaking to all the amendments therein, but I do want to welcome the amendments that have been tabled by other noble Lords, which will allow us to have a detailed and, I hope, fruitful debate and discussion on these important matters.
Amendment 89 is a probing amendment. It would leave out new subsection (1B), which allows the Secretary of State, by regulations, to exempt descriptions of relevant master trusts from the approval requirements in conditions 1 and 2, covering both the scale default arrangement and the asset allocation approvals. The purpose here is to understand the intended scope of this power and the safeguards that will govern its use. As drafted, new subsection (1B) is very broad: it permits exemptions for
“any description of relevant Master Trusts”
and gives examples, including schemes designed to meet the needs of those with protected characteristics and hybrid schemes.
I have three straightforward questions for the Minister at the outset. First, why is it necessary to take such wide exemption powers in the Bill, rather than tightly defining the circumstances in which exemptions may be granted? Secondly, how will the Government ensure that exemptions do not create a route by which schemes can avoid the central policy intent of this chapter: namely, improving outcomes through scale and an appropriate approach to asset allocation?
Thirdly, can the Minister clarify whether these exemption powers are intended, in whole or in part, to apply to collective defined contribution schemes, or other non-standard money purchase arrangements? If so, what is the rationale; and if not, will she put that clearly on the record? I am mindful of the recent debate that we had in this Room on the CDCs. I hope the Minister can respond to those points.
I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, will set out her reasoning for Amendment 92, so I do not wish to pre-empt or emulate what I know will be a very well-reasoned and informative set of remarks. But, as I have added my name to the amendment, I will briefly say that I welcome this proposal. It would put in the Bill a clear signal that a trust which provides “exceptional” value for money—as assessed by the regulator under its VFM framework—could be a legitimate basis for exemption from the new approval requirements. It seems sensible that trusts that already provide exceptional value for money should be trusted to carry on their good work under the established framework in which they are already operating.
Amendment 100, in my name and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, to whom I am grateful, seeks to provide helpful clarity, not to weaken regulation, by making clear that schemes offering genuinely specialist or innovative services can demonstrate that they meet the exemption. This is important because innovation in pensions does not always mean novel technology alone; it can include specialist provision for particular workforces, new approaches to member engagement or delivery models that better serve groups who might otherwise be poorly catered for. Without clarity, there is a risk that worthwhile innovation is discouraged simply because schemes are uncertain about how the exemption will be interpreted.
The amendment also gives the Secretary of State the power, through regulations, to define “specialist or innovative services”. That provides appropriate flexibility, allowing the definition to evolve over time, while ensuring proper scrutiny and regulatory oversight. The amendment supports innovation without undermining member protection, and it gives both trustees and regulators greater certainty about how the exemption is intended to operate. I therefore hope the Minister will look favourably on it and speak to the point that is raises.
Amendments 105 and 107 are intended to ensure that group personal pension schemes are treated fairly and proportionately under the new scale requirements in Clause 40. We are clear that scale alone is not always a reliable proxy for quality or value. There are group personal pension schemes that are smaller by design yet provide highly specialist or innovative services, for example, to particular sectors, workforces or member needs, and that deliver good outcomes despite not meeting a blunt asset threshold. Amendment 105 creates an additional route for relevant GPPs to meet the quality requirement, by allowing those that satisfy an innovation exemption not to be automatically required to meet the scale requirement.
Amendment 107 provides the necessary framework for that exemption. It allows a GPP to demonstrate that it offers specialist or innovative services, and gives the Secretary of State the power, through regulations, to define what those terms mean. That ensures flexibility as the market evolves, while retaining appropriate regulatory and parliamentary oversight. I hope the Minister will see these amendments as a constructive way of balancing scale with innovation, competition and member outcomes, and I look forward to her response.
Amendment 135 would revert the eligibility test for new entrant pathway relief under Clause 40 to the simpler principle-based formulation contained in the Bill as introduced. The purpose of the new entrant pathway is clear: to ensure that credible, innovative schemes are not locked out of the market simply because they are new and have not yet had the opportunity to build scale. As the Bill is currently drafted, that test has become more prescriptive, with a risk that genuinely innovative entrants could struggle to qualify despite having strong growth potential. By refocusing the test on whether a scheme can demonstrate strong potential for growth and an ability to innovate, this amendment would restore the original balance between safeguarding member outcomes and allowing healthy competition and innovation in the market. This amendment would simply ensure that the pathway for new entrants remains realistic and proportionate and is aligned with the policy intent.
Finally, Amendments 165 and 166 are probing amendments about parliamentary scrutiny—back to that subject. Clause 41 gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations setting out how the Pensions Regulator will assess whether master trusts meet the scale requirement and have sufficient investment capability. These assessments will have a direct bearing on which schemes can operate, which must consolidate and how the market develops over time. As drafted, the Bill provides that the first set of regulations is subject to the affirmative procedure, but all subsequent regulations may be made under the negative procedure. I think we have heard this before. Amendments 165 and 166 would remove that distinction, so that any regulations in this area would require affirmative approval.
The question that these amendments pose is simple: if the initial framework is considered significant enough to warrant full parliamentary scrutiny, why should later changes, potentially just as consequential, receive a lower level of oversight? These regulations are not mere technical updates; they go to the heart of how scale and capability are judged, and therefore to the structure of the pensions market itself. It therefore seems reasonable that Parliament should retain the guaranteed opportunity to debate and approve changes of that kind whenever they are made. I look forward to the Minister’s explanation of why the negative procedure is considered sufficient for subsequent regulations and whether there is scope to strengthen ongoing parliamentary scrutiny in this area. I look forward to contributions from other Members of the Committee and particularly to the Minister’s response. I beg to move.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
My Lords, I will speak very briefly to Amendment 92 because it is a “what it says on the tin” amendment. It arose during a conversation. Somebody asked me what happens if a scheme is doing very well but is forced into consolidation because it does not meet the scale requirements. Would there be any legal consequences if it did not do quite so well under consolidation? On whom would those legal consequences fall if, as a result, somebody received a worse pension? Is there any comeback on the scheme because it was not big enough and so got consolidated? Is there any indemnity? Is there any making up? Let us take a theoretical situation in which the consolidator it goes into ends up doing very badly—I would hope that would never happen, but this is just to probe the safeguards around such circumstances. I could not answer the questions. It may be that there is something in the vast number of papers I have not read and the Minister can advise me. There is nothing terribly special or secretive behind it, it is just something that could happen, and can I obtain clarity about what comeback there may or may not be?
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, Amendments 134, 137 and 138 in this group are in my name. I thank my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for adding her name to Amendment 137; unfortunately, she needs to be in the Chamber imminently so was unable to stay in the Committee.
I support the other amendments in this group. I am very sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, is not in his place; I hope he has not been silenced by his Front Bench. On our first day in Committee, I found myself in near agreement with the noble Lord—that is quite unusual for me—when he said that he was not totally convinced by the Government’s line that big is necessarily beautiful. He said that he was open to that debate, but my position is less nuanced: I am absolutely certain that big is not always beautiful. There are plenty of examples of big being beautiful. The US tech industry is probably a good example of that, at least from a shareholder perspective. On the other hand, there are many examples of where being big is not good. Big can be bureaucratic and low-performing. It can be hampered by groupthink, unresponsive to customer needs and hostile to innovation and competition; we can all name organisations in that category, I am sure.
I buy, as a general proposition, that an investment management scale has many attractions, including efficiency of overhead costs and the ability to diversify into a wider range of asset classes in order to achieve superior investment returns, but I have absolutely no idea whether £25 billion is the right threshold for forcing people into certain kinds of investment. I am absolutely certain that we should not dogmatically force all organisations towards that asset threshold in order to leave the door wide open for new entrants and players who can demonstrate good returns for savers and innovation.
My Amendment 137 would widen the qualification for the new entrant pathway relief so that it can include schemes that will produce above-average performance. If smaller, more agile providers can provide equal or better returns than the big boys, why should they be excluded? If a provider has a winning formula, why must it also demonstrate that it will achieve scale? What benefit is there for pension savers in restricting the market in this way? Noble Lords should also ask themselves why the big providers in the market, in their emails to us, have generally not challenged the scale proposals. The answer is very simple: this Bill acts as a barrier to entry, and large players love barriers to entry. We must not let them get away with it.
Amendment 134 probes why subsection (2)(a) of new Section 28F, which is to be inserted into the Pensions Act 2008 by Clause 40, restricts new entrant pathway relief for schemes that do not have any members. The main scale requirement is to have assets of £25 billion under management by 2030. The transitional pathway is for existing smaller players, provided they have assets of £10 billion under management by 2030 and have a credible plan for meeting £25 billion by 2035. The new entrant pathway relief is available only to completely new schemes—that is, those with new members—and only if they have strong potential to reach £25 billion. This leaves a gap in which new players that have been set up very recently, or will emerge between now and when this bit of the Bill comes into force, will not qualify for new entrant pathway relief and may also not qualify for transitional pathway relief. They may well have strong potential to pass the new entrant test—that is, if they were allowed to because they had no members—but they would not satisfy the regulator that they have a credible plan for transitional pathway eligibility.
Growing a business is not a linear matter. At various points, additional capital will generally be needed, but the Bill will make it difficult to raise funds because of the significant uncertainty about whether a pension provider would satisfy the transitional pathway test; and failing that test would mean that the business could not carry on and would thus be very risky for investors or lenders. Do the Government really intend to drive out of the market new providers that have only recently started or will start between now and the operation of the scale provisions? I am completely mystified by this.
My Amendment 134 deals with the substance of Amendment 136 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, which she has degrouped into a separate group and which will not come up until later. I think they deal with the same issue, but I will wait to see what she has to say on her amendment in due course.
Finally, my Amendment 138 seeks to delete subsection (4) of new Section 28F in order to probe why the Government need a regulation-making power to define “strong potential to grow” and “innovative product design”. The Government are probably the last place I would go to find out about growth or innovation. The regulators that will implement the new entrant pathway are, or ought to be, closer to their markets and therefore will understand in practice how to interpret the terms for the providers they regulate. Why can the Government not simply leave it to them? What value can the Government possibly add to understanding how these terms should be implemented in practice? I look forward to the Minister trying to convince me that the Government know about growth and innovation.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, said, my Amendment 136 is in a later group and was degrouped deliberately to explore the issues that she has just raised. If the Committee is comfortable for me to deal with Amendment 136 here today, I do not mind doing so, but that would potentially cause a problem for the Ministers or other Members of the Committee. May I do so? Alternatively, I could speak to it later; whatever the Committee decides is fine with me.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
Okay. I have not fully prepared for it, but I am happy to do that; it will save us time later on.
The concerns expressed in Amendment 136 and the amendments that the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, mentioned—some of which I added my name to—revolve around schemes that are already established. There is uncertainty about whether the schemes that are currently below the level will be permitted as new entrants or be able to access new business.
I am already being told that advisers are opting to advise employers only to join schemes that are already almost at or above the current £25 billion default fund threshold, which is creating market disruption and preventing schemes currently below the scale threshold from growing, as they cannot access the amount of new business they would otherwise have anticipated. Therefore, the risk is that these schemes will close prematurely but could offer good value to members who would otherwise be able to benefit from a scheme that is potentially on track to enter the transition pathway but will not quite be there.
I will offer the Committee an example. One of the recent new entrants, Penfold, which was established in 2022, will not have the time that other new entrants, established a few years before it, will have—such as Smart Pension, which may well be on track to reach the goal by 2030. Penfold faces a cliff edge because it launched only in 2022, has already surpassed the £1 billion asset-under-management mark and could well quadruple business over the coming few years, which would be an extremely positive achievement, but it will not qualify it not to have to close.
There are other new potential entrants that were planning to enter the market in the next three or four years, but they cannot now do so unless they are able to enter the pathway. That is why Amendment 136 suggests that schemes that have been established for, let us say, less than 10 years—again, that is a probing figure—would be able to enter either the transition or new entrant pathway if there is a demonstrable case that they will be able to grow. However, I am completely aligned with the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, that big is not necessarily best and that there are risks of an oligopoly developing in this connection, which I hope the Government would not have intended. I am convinced that that would not necessarily be in the interests of the market, innovation or pension savers more generally.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for introducing their amendments. As this is the first time we are going to debate scale, let me first set out why we think scale matters. I hope to persuade the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, with my arguments, but she is shaking her head at me already, so my optimism levels are quite low given that I am on sentence two—I do not think I am in with much of a chance.
Scale is central to the Bill. It adds momentum to existing consolidation activity in the workplace pensions sector and will enable better outcomes for members, as well as supporting delivery of other Bill measures. These scale measures will help to deliver lower investment fees, increased returns and access to diversified investments, as well as better governance and expertise in running schemes. All these things will help to deliver better outcomes for the millions of members who are saving into master trusts and group personal pension plans.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
Will the Minister say what the evidence base is for the assertions she just made?
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
I was going to come on to that, but I am happy to do so now. Our evidence shows that across a range of domestic and international studies, a greater number of benefits can arise from scale of around £25 billion to £50 billion of assets under management, including investment expertise, improved governance and access to a wider range of assets. This is supported by industry analysis, with schemes of this size finding it easier to invest in productive finance. International evidence shows funds in the region of £25 billion invested nearly double the level of private market investment compared to a £1 billion fund. Obviously, we consulted on these matters and we selected the lower band, but there is further evidence that demonstrates the greater the scale, the greater the benefits to members. We did go for the lower end of that.
I turn to the amendments to Clause 40 from the noble Viscount, Lord Younger. This probing of how exemptions might operate, especially in relation to CDC schemes, is helpful. Our intent is clear: to consolidate multi employer workplace provision into fewer, larger, better run schemes. To support this, exemptions will be very limited and grounded in enduring design characteristics; for example, schemes serving protected characteristic groups or certain hybrid schemes that serve a connected employer group. I can confirm that CDC schemes are outside the scope of the scale measures. Parliament has invested considerable effort to establish this innovative market, and we will support its confident development while keeping requirements under review.
I turn to the broader point about why the exemptions are intended for use for schemes for specific characteristics; for example, those that solely serve a protected characteristic or those that serve a closed group of employers and has a DB section—hybrid schemes. I agree with the noble Lord that, if we were to have too many exemptions, it would simply mean the policy had less impact, but we need to have some flexibility and consultation.
Amendment 92 from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, proposes that master trusts delivering “exceptional” value under the VFM framework could be exempted from scale and asset allocation requirements. Exemptions listed in new Section 20(1B) relate to scheme design and are intended to be permanent. Introducing a performance based exemption tied to ratings would be inherently unstable for members and would risk blurring two parallel policies. Scale and VFM complement each other, and both support good member outcomes. However, we do not agree that VFM ratings should be used to disapply structural expectations on scale, and we do not wish to dilute either measure.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
I am struggling to understand why the Government are setting their face against good performance. They seem to be obsessively pursuing scale and consolidation of the industry, unable to see that, for pensioners and savers, equally good or better returns can be achieved from sub-scale operators. That is a question of fact. The evidence that the Minister gave earlier merely points to there being a correlation between size and returns; it is not an absolute demonstration that, below a certain scale, you do not achieve good returns for savers. I hope that the Minister can explain why the Government are so obsessed with scale rather than performance for savers.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
I feel that we will have to agree to disagree on this point. The Government are not obsessed with scale; the Government believe that the evidence points to scale producing benefits for savers. We find the evidence on that compelling. I understand the noble Baroness’s argument, but the benefits of scale are clear. They will enable access to investment capability and produce the opportunity to improve overall saver outcomes for the longer term.
I cannot remember whether it was this amendment or another one that suggested that a scheme that did well on value for money should be able to avoid the scale requirements; the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, is nodding to me that it was her amendment. The obvious problem with that is that schemes’ VFM ratings are subject to annual assessment and, therefore, to change. It is therefore not practical to exempt schemes from scale on the benefit of that rating alone.
We are absolutely committed to the belief that scale matters. It is not just that we think big is beautiful—“big is beautiful” has always been a phrase for which I have affection—but I accept that it is not just about scale. It is not so for us, either. We need the other parts of the Bill and the Government’s project as well. We need value for money; we need to make sure that schemes have good investment capability and good governance; and we need to make sure that all parts of the Bill work together. This vision has been set out; it emerged after the pension investment review. The Government have set it out very clearly, and we believe that it is good.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
The remarks that the Minister is making are of concern to me—and, I think, to other Members of the Committee—because they are just what the big providers would say. They have the power. I have seen this in the pensions landscape for years: the big players have this incredible advantage and lobbying power and the power to get their way on legislation somehow. That is not always bad for members; I am not saying there is something terribly wrong with the big providers. What I am saying, though—this is an important point—is that there is a real need for innovation, new thinking and new ideas in this space. Huge sums of money are under discussion here. If we are bowing to the existing incumbents and not making provision even for those small businesses that are currently established but will not necessarily reach that scale in time, I am not convinced that we are improving the market overall. I would be grateful for a thought on that, or for the Minister writing to me.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
I am going to push back on the premise of the noble Baroness’s comments. I understand that she feels very strongly about this, but the Government are not doing this to benefit large pension schemes. The Government are doing this to benefit savers. The Government established an independent pension investment review, looked carefully at the evidence and reached the view that the best thing for savers is, via these measures, to encourage and increase the consolidation that is already happening in the marketplace. It is our view that that, combined with the other measures in the Bill, will drive a better market for savers and better returns for savers in the long term. That is why we are doing it—not because we want to support any particular players in the market; that is not what we are about.
The noble Baroness mentioned her Amendment 136; I want to respond to that as well as to the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. There is an issue around whether schemes already in the market have enough time to make scale. From when the Bill was introduced in 2025, schemes have up to 10 years, if we include the transition pathway, to reach scale. We project that schemes with less than £10 billion in assets under management today could still reach the threshold based simply on historical growth rates. For example, a £5 billion fund today, growing at 20% a year, broadly in line with recent growth in the DC market, could reach £25 billion within 10 years—and that does not take account of the impact of consolidation activity, which we expect to see within the single employer market as a result of reforms brought forward in the Bill, such as VFM, which we expect to lead to poorly performing schemes exiting the market.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
Is there a reason why the Government will not even consider allowing some transitional entry for schemes that are already established, such as the one I mentioned, which may or may not reach that number? This is not a magic number—£10 billion or £25 billion are not magic numbers—but these are businesses that are already established. It will put people off entering the market if suddenly, with no warning, a company that started in 2022 is under pressure. Let us say that there are bad markets or that it takes longer; as I was saying, at the moment, employers are not going to give these companies new business. If the Government could look at some minimum period of establishment that could get new entrants into the 2010 transition, that would be good.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
The important thing here is clarity. The noble Baroness mentioned a single scheme. I am not going to comment on individual schemes, for reasons she will appreciate—she would not expect me to do so, I know—but we have to set some clear boundaries. The boundary has to be somewhere. As I said, we have actually gone for the bottom end of what was consulted on. We have created a transition pathway precisely to give schemes the opportunity to grow; they need to be able to persuade us that they have a credible path to do that.
In the case that the noble Baroness mentioned, if there were some particular market conditions that caused problems across a sector, she will be aware that in the Bill there is something called a protected period. There are powers in Sections 20 and 26 of the Pensions Act 2008 that give regulators the ability to delay temporarily the impact of the scale measures. That is to ensure that the consequence of a scheme failing to meet the scale requirement—having to cease accepting any further contributions—is planned and managed. There is a range of reasons why that might happen. It might be about an individual scheme that has been approved as having scale but has failed to meet the threshold or it might be a market crash that affects all schemes. There is flexibility there for the Government.
However, the principle is that we have to set some boundaries around that. The Government have reviewed the evidence carefully, and we have concluded that the point that we have chosen is appropriate. We have created a transition pathway in order to do that, and we have created new entrant pathways in order to accommodate those situations. We believe that that will protect members’ interests.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
The Minister has not yet mentioned whether there is any kind of indemnity or legal consequence. What the legislation does is not neutral in the sense that it provides cut offs and reasons not to invest. Is a company doing something wrong by continuing when it should say that it will not be able to make £25 million and it should roll up now? These are issues about which questions have come to me. It has not been looked at in the research. Could the Minister write to me to say whether there are any legal dangers for either side and whether there would be any compensation if the value of the pension becomes less than expected?
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
We expect schemes with scale in a future landscape to deliver better outcomes for members. Consolidation is not created by the scale measures. It is already happening in the market, but we expect it to accelerate. Those running schemes are expected to carry out due diligence and act in the interests of their members in any consolidation activity. If there is anything else I can say on that, I will write to the noble Baroness. I am happy to look at it. The core question is whether it is a matter for those running schemes to make those judgments.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
Does the Minister understand that if you are currently a small scheme, unless you have certainty about being able to qualify to go into transitional relief, you will not be able to raise any money to facilitate your growth? It becomes a Catch-22. The Bill is creating uncertainty, which is destroying the businesses of those who might well be able to come through, but will not be able to convince equity or debt providers that they will be a viable business at the end because of the hurdles that the Government are creating in this Bill.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
I understand the noble Baroness’s concerns, but I contend that we are doing the opposite. We are creating certainty by being clear about what the intention is, what the opportunities are and where we expect schemes to be able to get to and in creating transition pathways but making it clear that people will have to be able to have a credible plan to do that. We are making that clear now. I have given the reasons why I anticipate that there is a pathway to scale for schemes that are around at the moment, but that is a judgment that schemes will have to make. If they do not believe that they can make scale, they will need to look at alternative futures in a way that is happening in the market already through consolidation. I accept that it may accelerate it, but it is not creating it.
Amendment 134 seeks to remove the no-members requirement entirely, accepting that it would potentially allow any existing DC workplace scheme to claim new entrant status, circumventing the scale policy, which, while contested, is the point of our proposal. Our inclusion of the no-members provisions in Committee in the Commons clarified the original intent and prevented a loophole.
Amendment 137 would mean that existing schemes would be able to access the new entrant pathway if they had stronger investment performance than can be achieved by schemes with scale, which we have touched on. While I understand the intention to reward and maintain strong investment performance, the focus there would be on short-term rather than long-term outcomes. There are various practical problems with doing that in any case, but I am also conscious that there will be occasions where a scheme that depends on its investment performance does not deliver and no longer qualifies on the pathway. That is then not a stable position for employers that use the scheme or its members. At the heart of the requirement is the need to create buying power for schemes to drive lower fees and increase returns. A small scheme simply cannot generate the same buying power, and schemes with scale are expected to deliver better outcomes over the long term.
Amendment 138 would strip the power to define “strong potential to grow” and “innovative product design” in regulations. The Government believe that these are key attributes of a successful new entrant in the market. Like other noble Lords, I know about the importance of ensuring that the measures we implement will be clearly understood and workable in the complex pensions landscape. The form that innovation will take is, by definition, difficult to predict; we would not seek either to define its meaning without input from experts and industry or to fix that meaning in law without retaining some flexibility. Consultation with industry will be important in ensuring that schemes can demonstrate these attributes; to be clear, we will consult on this and other aspects of the new entrant pathway relief first, before regulations determine the meaning of these terms.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I will be brief in closing as I suspect that the Committee is keen to get on to the next group.
Across this group, with the focus on scale—looking at both the merits and the demerits—the consistent theme has been a desire to ensure that the framework we are putting in place is proportionate, intelligible and capable of accommodating diversity in the pensions market. There has also been the theme of “big is not necessarily beautiful” in the course of this debate. My noble friend Lady Noakes was supported in particular by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann; they were assiduous in their questions on scale.
I should just remind the Committee that the Minister for Pensions has stated that return on investment is paramount, so this has been a very interesting debate. What if suboptimal scale produces better returns than merely big scale? That was one of the themes in this debate. Is there not a tension here? I would say that there clearly is.
From the remarks made by a number of Peers in this Committee, I think that more thought needs to be put into the threshold, including the criteria for reaching the threshold and whether the threshold level is right in itself. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, pointed out, a question on legal dangers has been posed.
A number of issues here absolutely need to be explored further. I have no doubt that this will be done prior to Report—indeed, we will look at what we might bring back on Report. Several of these amendments seek reassurance that sensible exemptions will be exercised narrowly and transparently without undermining the policy intent; others are concerned with ensuring that innovation, specialisation and strong value for money are not inadvertently crowded out by rigid thresholds.
Finally, there is an understandable concern that, where regulations will shape market structure and regulatory judgment over time, Parliament should retain meaningful oversight in how these powers are exercised.
I am grateful to noble Lords for their thoughtful contributions on this group. I thank the Minister for her attempts to answer the questions covering the CDCs on exemptions criteria and on innovation. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, linked to others in the name of Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted, is consequential on an amendment leaving out the inserted section 28C from Clause 40. That amendment removes the Government’s broad mandation power.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
My Lords, I did not expect to lead this group, but due to the diligence of the Public Bill Office in tracking down consequential amendments, my Amendment 90 has come to the top.
My Amendment 110, which is my main amendment in this group and on which I will focus my remarks, seeks to delete new Section 28C of FSMA. At the heart of new Section 28C is the asset allocation definition, which is flawed not because of its aspiration but because it rests on a complete misunderstanding of what investment trusts or listed investment companies actually invest in, and it excludes them.
Last Monday, I explained the anti-competitive and reputational effects of encouraging the flow of investment exclusively via the new LTAF vehicle and excluding the long-standing listed investment company structure. Today I have touched on the role that they play in valuation. Before turning to the wider reasons why this clause is fundamentally flawed, I will dispel another misconception I hear in circulation: “Investment trusts do not do infrastructure”. Well, I do not know what you call the Thames Tideway Tunnel, Sizewell C, utility-scale onshore and offshore wind, schools, hospitals, hydroelectric schemes, solar and nuclear energy, space, communications and satellites—but I call them infrastructure. All are substantially invested in, at the building stage, by investment trusts. Perhaps the Minister would accompany me to see some of these, although maybe not in space.
I also hear the claim that they do not do the big infrastructure projects that the Government are focused on. That is not really true, but there is nothing in the asset list of private equity, private debt, venture capital and interests in land that says, “Only the mega size”, or that stops them being qualified assets when held by another route. Anyway, we all need all scales of infrastructure investment and ongoing funding for expansion.
On Monday this week, our much-vaunted new prospectus rules came into effect; they make it easier, cheaper and faster to raise both IPO and follow-on capital. This applies to listed investment companies, too. What was this for? It was precisely so that companies can grow faster, bigger pools of capital can be raised more efficiently and larger infrastructure projects and bigger funds can be built. What is the point of celebrating our new financial market regulation if the Government then block the very vehicles it was designed to support? Why are some people in charge of investment—yes, some of them are to blame, too—still of the mindset that investment trusts do not do primary investment, at the very moment when rule changes are being made to build on the boom in primary infrastructure investment that has come through this route in recent years?
I come on to mandation more generally. I am not against the underlying intent of encouraging more pension investment in private assets. However, there is already a far greater awareness of the need to do that. The policy argument is won, but we have only just got to setting up LTAFs and the listing rule changes. The Government have not given the financial industry the chance to show what it can do. It is hardly a vote of confidence in our largest industry—financial services. What message does that send to the world? It says, “Go somewhere else; we have to bully to get things done in London”. What does it say about our famous and canny asset management in Edinburgh? If the Government want to add encouragement, use “comply or explain”—or, better still, “always explain”—to add transparency and understanding to the system. My goodness, neither the Government nor parts of the pensions industry seem to know what goes on in the wider asset management industry. Do not just ask the same people who have driven the old pension investment strategies.
Then we come to trustees. I have amendments elsewhere in the Bill aimed at clarifying that they can and should look to wider systemic and economic effects, but they should not be overridden. At their core, members’ interests are paramount for trustees. New Section 28C does not have members’ interests paramount. It threatens deauthorisation and the disruption and cost that that would cause if, in the judgment of trustees and in full knowledge of the characteristics of their members, they consider that a little less infrastructure or private equity is appropriate. What if the phasing of big projects means that there is a dip when investments exit? What if you are still in the J-curve dip? If some things perform badly, or the rush to invest exaggerates prices, do trustees have to keep pumping money in at poor value? No, that is the moment for explanation and perhaps a modification of strategy, not compulsion or deauthorisation.
Let us be clear: a deauthorisation power of this kind is not neutral. It creates a structural pressure towards consolidation. If a scheme risks losing authorisation simply because its trustees judge that a different phasing or balance of assets is appropriate for its members, they get closed down or forced to merge. That is backdoor consolidation, not member-focused governance.
These are some of the reasons why I want to remove new Section 28C entirely. It does nothing but harm. It is economically inept, competitively unfair, legally unprincipled and blind to the regulatory opportunities that have only just come on stream. I beg to move.
Lord Sharkey (LD)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow—and I did—my noble friend discussing the reserved mandatory powers in the Bill. I will speak to my Amendments 111, 161 and 162. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for adding his name to all three and the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, for adding his name to the first.
The purpose of these amendments is to remove the reserve power of mandation from the Bill. The case against these reserve mandatory powers has been set out by a large number of important institutions. Most criticism seems to focus on the issue of conflicts with fiduciary duty. Critics of mandation have argued, correctly in my view, that directing trustees to hold a fixed share of specified assets conflicts with the trustees’ duty to act solely in the interests of their members. Mandation of investment in specific asset classes for policy reasons rather than on a risk/return consideration risks subordinating members’ interests to political objectives.
This also exposes trustees to legal liability for breaching their duty, especially if the investments are seen as politically motivated or fail to deliver competitive returns. The lack of legal clarity around the scope of fiduciary duty, particularly regarding systemic risks or broader economic impacts may well exacerbate trustees’ concerns about litigation and regulatory risk.
I know that the Government are alive to the fiduciary duty issue and have promised to produce statutory guidance to help. At our meeting before Second Reading, I asked the Minister whether this guidance would have binding provisions. The answer was no. The guidance will have, apparently, the same force as the many other “have regards” in our financial services sector. I also asked the Minister whether we could see a draft of this guidance before the end of Committee, but I have not had a reply to date. I therefore ask the Minister again whether we will see draft guidance so that we may scrutinise it before the end of Committee, or at least on Report. It is easy to understand, in these circumstances, why some legal experts and industry groups have called for a statutory clarification of fiduciary duty and argue that only primary legislation can provide the cover that trustees need to invest confidently, as the Government wish, without breaching their duties.
There is also the question of definition. What is the appropriate test for “productive” when applied to mandated assets? What is the appropriate test for “UK investment”, or even “qualifying assets”? Can the Minister say what these tests are and when they are likely to be available to Parliament for examination? There are other significant concerns with mandation. For example, it may produce lower returns and higher costs if it drives crowded trades, pushing schemes into lower-quality or overpriced assets simply to hit targets. As the large DC providers have noted, if there are not enough good-quality opportunities in the mandated classes, schemes may be forced into illiquid or sub-optimal funds. This concern has been made clear as a condition of voluntary participation in the Mansion House Accord. Then there may be a risk in reducing diversification. Concentrating pension assets in restricted geography or restricted asset classes inevitably increases vulnerability to UK-specific economic shocks.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
My Lords, before I start, I apologise to the Grand Committee for failing to be here to speak a previous amendment. It was unavoidable, unfortunately. I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, for stepping into the breach. I have had an exciting afternoon moving from R&R to pension schemes. I apologise that I am afraid I am going to be in the same position next week, so it will not be me speaking to my Amendment 119. Anyway, there we go.
I speak in support of Amendments 111, 161 and 162, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, to which I have added my name. To be honest, I support all the amendments in this group that seek to remove the asset allocation mandation powers, which is probably the most controversial part of the Bill. The trustees or managers of pension schemes have an obligation to act in the best interests of scheme members. That is their fiduciary duty. It is not their job to carry out government policy and they should not be forced to act in a way that they may believe is not in the best interests of scheme members. That is the clear implication of mandation. If the assets that the Government wish to mandate are so suitable or attractive for the relevant scheme, the trustees would presumably already be investing in them. If mandation is required to force trustees to invest in such assets, it implies that they have decided that they are not suitable assets for the scheme. That drives a coach and horses through the whole fiduciary principle. As we will come to in a later group, personally I would feel very uncomfortable about taking up a trustee role in such circumstances.
It begs a range of questions. Who will be liable if the mandated assets perform poorly? The Bill is silent on this. Why should scheme members take a hit because of government policy? Are the trustees liable for any below-par performance? Why do the Government feel they know better than professional managers and trustees? I do not see any evidence at all that the Government are a better manager of investments. Who will decide on the asset allocation, and based on what criteria? There is nothing in Bill that sets out the purpose or criteria for the asset allocation: just some examples, including private equity, which the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, mentioned, which will be looked at in a different group. All the Bill says specifically is that the allocation may not include securities listed on a recognised exchange. How will the impact be measured and reported? The Bill does require the Secretary of State to publish a report setting out the expected impacts on scheme members and UK economic growth, but there are no reporting requirements on the actual outcomes.
Surely it would be better to try to understand why pension schemes are not currently investing in these so-called productive assets. What are the barriers to them doing so? That is not a rhetorical question; I would very much like to hear why the Minister thinks this has not been happening. What is, or has been, stopping the pension schemes investing in those assets they believe are so desirable? Surely, the better answer must be to try to remove those barriers, to make the assets more investable, rather than mandating, perhaps by refining regulation or adjusting tax—Gordon Brown’s dividend tax raid has, I am sure, quite a lot to do with this—or taking whatever other actions may be required to remove or reduce the identified barriers. Mandation is, frankly, the lazy option. We should identify and deal with the root causes if we want a sustainable solution.
The Government say they do not intend to use the mandation powers and, in some ways, that is worse than using them. The powers are there as a stick in the background, to force trustees to invest as they want, but without giving the trustees any of the protections that might exist if they could at least show they were acting as required by law. In any case, as a matter of principle, Governments should never take powers that they have no intention of using. This mandation power drives a coach and horses through the fundamental fiduciary duties of trustees. The Government say they do not intend to use it; it should be removed.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group. I echo the words of noble colleagues in the Committee about the dangers of the Government mandating any particular asset allocation, especially the concerns about mandating what is the highest risk and the highest cost end of the equity spectrum at a time when we are aware that pension schemes have probably been too risk-averse and are trying to row back from that.
What is interesting, in the context of the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, is that I was instrumental in setting up the Myners review in 1999, which reported in 2001, under the then Labour Administration. As Chancellor, Gordon Brown’s particular concern was about why pension funds do not invest much in private equity or venture capital. That was the remit of the review. The conclusions it reached were that we needed to remove the investment barriers, to change legislation, to encourage more asset diversification, to have more transparency and to address the short-term thinking driven by actuarial standards—at the time, it was the minimum funding requirement, which was far weaker than the regime established under the Pensions Regulator in 2004.
So this is not a new issue, but there was no consideration at that time of forcing pension schemes to invest in just this one asset class. The barriers still exist. In an environment where pension schemes have been encouraged, for many years, to think that the right way forward is to invest by reducing or controlling risk and to look for low cost, it is clear that the private equity situation would not fit with those categories. Therefore, I urge the Government to think again about mandating this one area of the investment market, when there are so many other areas that a diversified portfolio could benefit from, leaving the field open for the trustees to decide which area is best for their scheme.
I am particularly concerned that, as has been said in relation to previous groups, private equity and venture capital have had a really good run. We may be driving pension schemes to buy this particular asset class at a time when we know that private equity funds are trying to set up continuation vehicles—or continuation of continuation vehicles—because they cannot sell the underlying investments at reasonable or profitable prices and are desperately looking for pools of assets to support those investments, made some time ago, which would not necessarily be of benefit to members in the long run.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group. When I came to draft my own amendments, I discovered that this area of mandation was a rather crowded marketplace, so I decided not to enter it. I will not speak at length on the subject, but I endorse everything that has been said so far and wish to commit my almost undying belief that mandation must not remain in the Bill.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott and I have only one amendment in this group: Amendment 109, which would remove the Government’s broad mandation power. That has been very much the theme of this debate, of course. I want to be absolutely clear at the outset that we are also seriously and fundamentally opposed to investment mandation in the Bill, which I sure will come as no surprise to the Minister.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, the broad, combined effect of these amendments would be to remove from the Bill the ability of the Government to require certain pension schemes to hold a prescribed percentage of their assets in qualifying assets. I confess that, after Second Reading, the reaction of some noble Lords has not been entirely a surprise to me. However, I have to say at the start that, although the provisions divide opinion, they deliver an important element of the pensions investment review that the Government concluded last year.
I will make two headline points. First, as I have said, we do not presently expect to have to use the powers, as we are confident that the industry will deliver voluntarily on its commitments made under the Mansion House Accord. Secondly, the Government would not be proposing these powers if there were not strong evidence that savers’ interests lie in greater investment diversification than we see today in the market. DC pension providers recognise that a small allocation to private markets can improve risk-adjusted returns as part of a diversified portfolio. Despite this, in many cases providers are holding back, not because it is necessarily in savers’ best interests but, among other reasons, because of a lack of scale or because of competitive pressure to keep fees low. That problem, alongside the potential economic benefits of this sort of investment, is why we have made investment diversification such a big focus of these reforms and why we have welcomed the Mansion House Accord. It is also why it is so important that the industry is pulling in the same direction and why it is necessary that the Government have taken reserve asset allocation powers as a backstop to be used only if necessary.
Noble Lords have raised various concerns about the powers, which we will no doubt explore in much more detail on Monday—I look forward to that. However, as an opening point, I emphasise that the Government have taken care to build in appropriate guardrails. First, the power is time limited. It will expire in 2035 if it has not been used, and any percentage headline asset allocation requirements that are in force beyond that date will be capped at their current levels.
Secondly, the Government are required to establish a savers’ interests test, in which pension providers will be granted an exemption from the targets, where they can show that meeting them would cause material financial detriment to savers. The Government will need to consult and publish a report on the impacts of any new requirements on savers and economic growth, both before exercising the power for the first time and within the five years following the power being exercised. The regulations implementing this framework will be subject to parliamentary scrutiny.
A number of points have been raised. I will keep my response fairly high level; I know that some of those points will come up again next week, so I will return to them then, given that we have limited time before the Grand Committee must end. I start with the question of whether this is necessary. The Government are strongly encouraged by the Mansion House Accord, which is an industry-led, voluntary commitment by 17 of the UK’s largest pension providers to invest 10% of their default funds in private markets, with at least half of that in the UK, by 2030. It means that savers will benefit from greater diversification and the potential for better long-term returns. In view of this progress, the Government do not currently expect to need to use these powers.
In response to the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, I note that there is a continued risk of a failure of collective action here. Individual providers are under competitive pressure to keep costs as low as possible, which can discourage them from investing in the full range of asset classes, even where it may be in savers’ interests to do so. The reserve powers signify to the industry that change is happening across the market, and in that way—together with our other reforms—they support the transition to which the industry has itself committed. That is the top line as to why we are taking the power and the circumstances in which we think we would use it. I will come back to the issue of private markets when we have a debate on private markets next week.
We will have a longer debate on trustees and fiduciary duty, particularly the issues around regulations, when we come back next week, if that is okay with the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. However, the Government do not accept that this proposal cuts across fiduciary duty. There is widespread recognition of the benefits that a diverse investment portfolio can bring for savers. Indeed, that is exactly why the signatories to the Mansion House Accord are committing to investing in private markets. However, if the reserve powers did come to be used, the Bill provides for a savers’ interest test to ensure that schemes can deviate from any asset allocation requirements where they can demonstrate that savers would suffer material financial detriment. The Minister for Pensions has committed to working with the sector to ensure that guidance gives trustees the confidence they need to invest in the best interests of savers and the UK economy. A stakeholder-wide round table will begin this work early next month, and I will keep noble Lords informed on that.
The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, asked what happens if a scheme makes losses. Trustees continue to be responsible for investing in their savers’ interests. We will come back to this in more detail, but the headline is that this means savers would continue in all circumstances to be protected by the core fiduciary duties of trustees. Trustees would also continue to be subject to a duty to invest in savers’ best interests in line with the law. We would expect that duty certainly to apply to the selection of individual investments in a portfolio, the balance of different asset classes in a portfolio and to any decision to apply for an exemption under the savers’ interest test.
The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, asked about sorting out other barriers first. Last year, we completed a comprehensive review of pensions investment, which identified that greater scale, as well as a greater focus on value rather than cost, has the potential to unlock significant additional investment that benefits both savers and the economy. The measures in the Bill tackle that. However, that does not mean that the work stops on barriers and investment opportunities. For example, the FCA announced last month that it will consult on rolling out to the pension funds it regulates a target exemption from the 0.75% charge cap, to accommodate the sorts of performance-based fee structures often used in private market investment. The signatories to the accord have explicitly called for that.
The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, asked about enablers and whether there are enough investment opportunities. The answer is yes. We will continue to engage closely with the industry on the steps it is taking and any obstacles it is encountering. At this point, we are encouraged by early signs of progress and are confident that the momentum will continue. On future investment opportunities, I draw the noble Lord’s attention to one example of the role that the Government are playing: the Sterling 20 Group of leading pension providers launched by the Chancellor at the October regional investment summit. That group, convened by the Office for Investment, includes all the Mansion House Accord signatories and has already met twice to discuss specific investment opportunities in venture capital and energy generation.
The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, asked about the consumer duty. The FCA’s consumer protection objective will continue to apply to FCA-regulated schemes. The FCA will apply it in parallel to any asset allocation requirements: in other words, where it does not believe there is a conflict. Or at least, where we do not believe there is a conflict. Or someone does not believe there is a conflict. Savers’ interests tests will be available for FCA-regulated firms, just as for TPR firms.
Lord Sharkey (LD)
Can the Minister respond to the point I made about statutory guidance?
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
I will answer that next week, if that is okay, when we discuss the issues of fiduciary duty.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
I have a couple of points to raise. The Minister mentioned that the reserved power was designed to be a signal, and I would argue that it is a pretty strong signal to put in the Bill. Will she strongly consider whether there are other ways to encourage investments in the UK other than using this, and what might they be? This is one of the things that we will want to press.
Secondly, she did not answer my question about the dangers of a future Government taking up these powers, even though she mentioned the sunset clause of 2035, which is, frankly, some time off.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
I am sorry I did not namecheck the noble Viscount in responding to the second point. I intended to respond by pointing to the safeguards and the guardrails that have been built in. That was the nature of the response to that.
In response to the first question, I thought I said that the Government accept that this is not the only issue and that we are addressing the other ways. We have been looking at the other barriers and investment opportunities. We also mentioned that the FCA has looked at examples. It is not the only thing; we are looking at the other things as well. We think there is already significant progress, but we think this reserve power is a way of ensuring that progress goes forward and not backwards on this issue.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
My Lords, I will be brief. There is a lot that could be said, but we will have other opportunities later on in this Bill.
This should have been a happy Bill, doing good for ordinary workers and building the economy, looking after the future in two interconnected ways. For the main part, we had cross-party policy consensus and continuity. We had public and industry support, which is just what you need for issues such as pensions and long-term investment, aided by significant and consensual regulatory changes—culminating this week—that should enhance diversity, choice and transparency in investment decisions.
However, at the heart, we got this devil’s clause. The Government have not given development a chance and such a reserve power is a massive intervention. It is a clause that, where there was unity, brings division; where there was trust, brings doubt; where there was confidence, brings concern; and where there was hope, brings despair. No wonder noble Lords oppose it. It ticks every bad box. I urge the Government to think again. They have not given policy and process any due regard and therefore I am sure that many of us will return to this on Report. But, for now, I will withdraw my amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Viscount Stansgate) (Lab)
That concludes the business of the Committee today. However, I will say that we have had a distinguished young visitor with us for most of today’s Committee: a school student who is learning about pensions at school. I thank the Committee for presenting such a very good example of the serious way in which this House deals with public Bills. The Committee stands adjourned.
Pension Schemes Bill
Monday 26th January 2026
(1 week, 2 days ago)
Grand CommitteePension Schemes Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 152-V(a) Amendment for Grand Committee (Supplementary to the Fifth Marshalled List) - (23 Jan 2026)
Baroness Noakes
“(c) able to demonstrate that they deliver investment performance which exceeds that achieved by the average of all Master Trusts which hold an approval under section 28A in respect of a main scale default arrangement.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment allows Master Trusts which deliver good investment performance to be excluded from the scale requirements.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 91 and 95. I thank my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for adding her name to them. Having had a little detour into asset mandation in the last group, we now return to scale. My Amendments 91 and 95 relate to master trusts and group personal pension plans, respectively, returning to the theme of size not being everything. They are intended to exempt from the scale requirements those schemes that deliver investment performance which exceeds that achieved by the average of all master trusts or all group personal pension plans.
We debated the general theme of size not being everything on the last day of Committee. I firmly believe that we should not let an obsession with size squeeze good performers out of the market. The Minister’s arguments on that day, despite protestations to the contrary, show that the Government have an obsession with size that overrides their professed desire for better outcomes for savers. If they really care about outcomes for savers, they should not be fixated on structural issues such as the size of assets under management, because good investment returns are not the exclusive preserve of schemes that reach the magic £25 billion of assets. The evidence for the Government’s policy cited by the Minister last week merely indicates that there is a correlation between size and returns achieved. That evidence, however, categorically does not demonstrate that good returns are obtained only by those which pass a size threshold.
At the heart of this debate is the problem that the Government are trying to use this Bill to force pension schemes to divert investment resources into things that the Government think will improve the UK economy, while at the same time claiming the objective of good outcomes for savers. I remind the Minister of Tinbergen’s rule: if policymakers wish to have multiple policy targets, they must have an equal number of policy instruments under their control. One instrument—mandating the size of pension provider—will not achieve the separate targets of improving savers’ outcomes and increasing UK productive investment without risking policy effectiveness and reduced transparency and accountability. By ignoring Tinbergen’s rule, the Government are actively inviting policy failure in this area.
I also strongly support Amendment 98 in the names of my noble friends Lord Younger and Lady Stedman-Scott. Innovation will not thrive in the pension sector if it has to pass arbitrary size tests. We should do everything that we can in this Bill to promote innovation. I beg to move.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I, too, have a number of amendments in this group and I will address my remarks mainly to them. Amendments 99 and 106 recommend removing the specific figure of £25 billion from the Bill and replacing it with a figure to be determined by the Government nearer the time, I hope, after detailed consultation.
On the last day in Committee, when we debated Amendment 88 on small pots, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, which proposed a monetary limit of £10,000, the Minister rejected the amendment on the grounds that
“the Government are not persuaded that it is sensible to hardwire the cap in primary legislation”.—[Official Report, 22/1/26; col. GC 188.]
Quite right. The same applies here: my amendment follows exactly that principle. I am concerned about the risks involved in tying primary legislation to a fixed monetary sum.
First, a change in market conditions could render it inappropriate. Secondly, such a large sum risks stymieing the development of newer companies and gives an exceptional competitive advantage to those providers already of the required scale. There is no evidence—I have been searching—to suggest that big is always best and there is certainly no academic proof that £25 billion, £10 billion or any other number is the right dividing line between successful funds and failing funds.
Newer entrants with an interesting approach to member service, digital engagement or innovative investment may well take time to break into the market, but just because they have not reached what the Bill determines is the magic number should not mean that they are forced to close, which is what the Bill would do, in effect.
The Minister said that consolidation and scale will mean
“better outcomes for members … lower investment fees, increased returns and access to diversified investments, as well as better governance and expertise in running schemes”.—[Official Report, 22/1/26; col. GC 202.]
That may well be the case for many, but deliberately disadvantaging innovation and putting up barriers that damage recent or newer entrants, regardless of their merits, runs counter to those intended outcomes over the longer term. Using collective vehicles, for example, run by already established experts such as closed-ended investment companies, can replace the need for in-house expertise at each of the big pension funds. Indeed, that option is already available but is being discouraged by the Bill.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, said, a correlation is not the same as a causative impact. Putting £25 billion into the Bill creates a big issue with some of the newer companies that will fall into the vacuum between the new entrant pathway, which does not start until a scheme is established after 2030, and the transitional pathway, which requires this fixed £10 billion—I could have tabled amendments on that, but £25 billion is the same principle—if they have not reached that level.
What is worse—I tried to indicate this last week—is that, although I know that the Government want to inject certainty by including these numerical figures, unfortunately they are also blocking the progress and potentially forcing the closure of a number of schemes that have digital-first methodologies right now but have not been established long enough to reach the required scale and to which the market to raise growth capital is currently shut. Who would lend money to a newer company that may or may not reach the scale required by the particular date?
The Government need to think again about the merits of using a fixed number, as the Minister mentioned last week. I would be happy to meet officials or Ministers to go through the rationale that has had this damaging effect in the market. I hope that we will not give a hostage to fortune by specifying a particular number in the Bill that may or may not prove to be right, wrong or damaging. I hope that the Minister will help the Committee to understand whether the Government might consider this principle.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I support Amendments 91 and 95 in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes, to which I have added my name. I apologise for not being able to contribute to the Committee’s discussions on Thursday because of competing business on the Floor of the House. I have read Hansard and I should record that I share the reservations expressed about mandation, a subject on which I have received many well-argued requests and emails. I commend the arguments that have been well put by my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie on the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. I particularly dislike powers delayed into the future. If the Government decide that they need to legislate later, they can bring in another Bill that the House can scrutinise in the light of contemporary evidence.
I turn to the amendments in this group, so well argued by my noble friend Lady Noakes. I am uneasy, as others are, about the overemphasis on creating size and scale in the Bill: £25 billion is a big fund and, as my noble friend Lady Altmann said, it does not seem to be well evidenced. It is a Labour trend that needs to be treated with some scepticism. We see it in local government reorganisation, in rail nationalisation and now in the proposals for the police. I know from my business experience, which noble Lords know I always come from, that mergers of any kind always have substantial costs and that you need smaller, pushy innovators to keep sectors competitive. This might be contentious, but Aldi was good for Tesco because it kept us on our toes—and even better for the consumer, the equivalent of the saver in this case. The point is that reorganisations of any kind always have costs and only sometimes have benefits.
We have seen the growth in recent years of money purchase funds that are almost entirely digital, and they have brought beneficial competition to the market. We risk eliminating the next generation of innovation, real value creation and indeed British unicorn funds, generated by competition, if we leave the Bill as it is.
We must not allow good performers to be snuffed out by the movement to bigger schemes. That is why we are asking the Minister to look at excluding master trusts and group pension plans that deliver good investment performance from the scale and size requirements. Performance is, after all, what matters to those saving for a pension. Size, scale and growth are not everything, popular though they tend to be with the fund managers who benefit. Returns matter more, but the Bill at present rather underplays them in favour of scale. My noble friend Lady Noakes’s amendments are just what is needed, and I look forward to hearing how the Minister is going to solve the problem that she has identified.
Lord Fuller (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 99 in particular but I generally associate myself with all the amendments in this group, including Amendments 95 and 98 in the names of my noble friends.
As we have heard, there is no conclusive evidence that bigger is best when it comes to investment management. Of course there are some large funds that do rather well, but, as I explained on a previous day in Committee, within the Local Government Pension Scheme it is the smallest fund in the Orkneys that has outranked the performance of all the 88 other schemes in the LGPS, and there is something to be said for that. It has never changed its investment manager, and there is a lesson there.
In my experience, the best returns are to be made in investing in companies where you either buy the product or know the management—not so that you can tap them for inside information, of course, but because it hardly ever pays to invest in bad people. I also like to buy when prices fall because, let us face it, buying high and selling cheap is never a good investment strategy. But there is no evidence at all that scale in and of itself is good. There is plenty of evidence that it is worse. As they say, the larger they are the harder they fall, and small ones are more juicy.
Viscount Trenchard (Con)
My Lords, I will not go into too much detail. I should, because I was not here last week, declare an interest, in that I am a director of a Guernsey-based, open-ended protected cell company and a London-listed, closed-ended investment company. Neither of them begins to approach the necessary size to qualify under the scale criteria that this Bill introduces.
I agree entirely with the points made by my noble friends Lady Noakes, Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lord Fuller and the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. Scale is nothing to do with this. I find it quite extraordinary that the Government assume that big is good and small is bad. All big funds were once small: they started with nothing and built up. There is also some evidence that, if you get really big, you become a big complacent and do not have to be quite as sharp as you do when you are making a small fund bigger and more successful and establishing its reputation.
Interfering with the fiduciary duties of pension fund trustees in this way is risky, bad, potentially dangerous and unlikely to be in the interests of the pension beneficiaries, so I strongly support all the amendments in this group. I do not think that the minimum size of a master trust should be specified in the Bill. Trustees will have their own criteria for the maximum proportion of funds that they may own in any one fund, and for the maximum percentage of their funds’ assets that may be invested in any one fund. I think these are better ways to achieve the obvious need to reduce risk, and pension fund trustees are the right people to deliver them.
Lord Ashcombe (Con)
My Lords, I remind the Committee of my interest as an employee of Marsh, which owns Mercer, a pension and investment advisory management company.
I did not intend to speak on this group but I do not believe that financial size is the be-all and end-all. In my world, working for a very large insurance broker, we think we have advantages in the marketplace. However, it would be remiss of me to ignore not only the smaller operations but the many small boutique entities that are experts in a very narrow and small field. It is very unlikely that they will ever become one of the large operations. Although size can be useful, the smaller experts are essential to the marketplace and, you might argue, keep the larger operations honest.
I do not believe this picture is anything different from that of the pensions industry. These amendments address the benefits of the new and smaller entities being a necessary part of the market, and should be welcomed.
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. As we know, this group addresses the use of scale, as measured by assets under management or monetary value, as a determinant of scheme quality.
The noble Lord, Lord Fuller, gave the example of the Orkney trust. I ask myself: what is the reason? Is it size? Personally, I think it is the calibre of the single malt whisky. Then we go to the other end of the country, to Guernsey. Is it because trusts are at the extremes of the country that causes the good benefits, or is it something else? You can always look for a reason: it could be size, location or anything else—or, indeed, the quality of the whisky.
We accept that scale can bring efficiencies, but there is a strong question over whether size alone is a reliable proxy for value. Amendments 91 and 95 recognise that some master trusts and group personal pension schemes deliver strong investment performance despite being below prescribed thresholds. Amendment 98 similarly acknowledges that innovation and specialism do not always depend on scale, location or whatever else.
We are also concerned about the rigidity of fixed monetary thresholds in the Bill. Amendments 99, 101, 106 and 108 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, are concerned about the rigidity of fixed monetary thresholds in the Bill. These amendments probe whether the figures chosen are evidence-based and future-proofed, or whether they risk being outdated—that is the point—as the market evolves. It is not cast in stone, and we should not try to see it as such.
Amendments 101, 104 and 108 in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and others, raise an additional concern: the risk of mandating common investment strategies. Diversity of approach is a strength of a pension system. Forcing schemes into uniform strategies risks herding behaviour and systemic vulnerability. My question to the Minister is this: is the Government’s objective genuinely better member outcomes—which I believe we all want—or prioritising administrative simplicity at the expense of innovation, competition and resilience? All the amendments in this group tackle this problem, and those in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, particularly stress that. I hope we will continue to push these through to the next stage of the debate on this Bill.
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
My Lords, today’s groups build directly on the issues explored in last Thursday’s debate. That discussion was both stimulating and constructive, and the contributions made, particularly on mandation, highlight the value of the scrutiny that this Bill continues to receive in Grand Committee. On this group, in the interests of brevity—I am sure that will please the whole Committee—I shall keep my remarks focused on the amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie. A number of significant and related issues have been raised by other noble Lords, and we will wish to return to these later today. We will listen carefully to the Minister’s response to the points made on this group.
Amendment 98 would introduce a clear and proportionate innovation exemption for relevant master trusts under Clause 40, so that schemes delivering genuinely specialist or innovative services are not automatically required to meet the scale threshold simply because of their size. We have been challenged today not to be obsessed with size. We recognise the policy aim of improving outcomes through scale. However, as I said, size is not always a reliable proxy for quality or value: there are master trusts that are smaller by design yet deliver strong member outcomes through innovation, whether in investment approach, governance or engagement with particular workforces. As the Bill is currently drafted, such schemes risk being forced to consolidate or exit, not because they are failing members but because they do not meet a blunt asset size test.
Amendment 98 provides a sensible alternative route, recognising that innovation and specialisation can also deliver high-quality outcomes. This amendment simply ensures that size alone is not determinative. I hope the Minister will see this as a constructive amendment that supports innovation and choice while remaining fully aligned with the Bill’s objective of improving outcomes for savers.
Amendment 102 is, again, a probing amendment. Clause 40 gives the Secretary of State the power to determine by regulations the method for calculating a master trust’s total assets for the purposes of this provision. That is a potentially significant power, because the way that total assets are defined and measured will determine which schemes fall within scope and which may benefit from exemptions.
The Minister of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Sherlock) (Lab)
I am grateful to noble Lords who have introduced and spoken to amendments. Clause 40 delivers the Government’s commitment to ensure that DC workplace pension savers benefit from the advantages that flow from scale and consolidation. It establishes a clear, measurable threshold and a framework centred on a single main scale default arrangement—MSDA—so that governance and investment decisions can be applied consistently across large pools of assets. This approach is integral to securing better member outcomes, improved access to productive investment and stronger in-house capability.
We had a preliminary conversation about all this on Thursday, but I know that not all noble Lords were there so, before I dive into specific points on the amendments, I will pick up a couple of the headlines. In response to the noble Lords, Lord Ashcombe and Lord Palmer, the UK’s workplace pension industry accounts for more than £2 trillion in assets, serving more than 16 million savers who have been automatically enrolled and are not engaged in pension savings. It is particularly important that these assets are working as hard as possible to provide better saver returns and security in retirement and, to do that, scale and provision really matter.
Evidence suggests that there are direct benefits derived from scale; they include better governance and economies of scale, whereby greater size reduces average cost per member and creates the ability to move investment in-house, which reduces investment costs in turn. It also enables access to a wider range of assets, including diversification and the ability to invest directly in assets rather than having to be part of a pooled fund. With improved bargaining power, schemes can negotiate lower investment fees, improving net returns.
There is a lot more that I could say, but I have said quite a lot of this before. I will say just a word just about the level of scale and why it is £25 billion. As I explained last week, our evidence shows that, across a range of domestic and international studies, a greater number of benefits can arise from a scale of around £25 billion to £50 billion of assets under management, including investment expertise, improved governance and access to a wider range of assets.
That is supported by industry analysis, showing that schemes of this size find it easier to invest in productive finance. International evidence shows that funds in the region of £25 billion invest nearly double the level of private market investment compared to a £1 billion pound fund. We selected the lower band, but there is further evidence that demonstrates that the greater the scale, the greater the benefits.
I can point to a range of studies. Analysis from Australia’s pensions regulator found that funds with around £25 billion were able to spread costs over their membership, keeping fees lower. Pensions UK reported that schemes with £25 billion to £50 billion of assets have considerable governance capability and find it easier to invest directly. The Conexus Institute again found in favour of funds of £25 billion to £50 billion. We have been transparently reporting the evidence via the impact assessment and the previous publication of Pension Fund Investment and the UK Economy, which outlined the evidence.
The noble Lord, Lord Fuller, will have to forgive me; I am not going back to LGPS. We spent two entire days in Committee on the first 10 pages of the Bill and I am not going back there. We can do it on Report. He is not going to stand up; I have not responded to a word he has said yet. Give me a moment. The noble Lord’s point is about scale. The evidence shows that larger schemes are better placed to invest—
Lord Fuller (Con)
The Minister invites me to stand up. The only reason I mentioned the LGPS is because the LGPS funds have been put into pools of £25 billion to £50 billion. We have a real economy experiment of what might happen if these provisions are enacted on the rest of it. The noble Baroness said that there are lower costs of investment. Then she went on to say, just now, that it is transferred with in-house teams. You will therefore have to substitute an externalised team for an in-house team at a scale of £25 billion. You are trying to compete with Fidelity, which has £900 billion in its team. You are setting these people up to fail; you have got the wrong scheme. You need the ability to go to the largest fund managers with the hugest assets under management, not try to recreate the City in aspic on footprints of £25 billion by duplicating all the procedures, staffing, HR and everything else. You have the B team and, guess what, they are always away on holiday in the first two weeks of August when the last three market crashes have happened and there is no one to answer the phone. That is the problem. You are saving one risk and applying the other.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, I made these arguments at some length on Thursday. I have made them again now. The noble Lord disagrees with them; I can tell from his tone. He can read Hansard and pick up the relevant bits with me if he would like to.
Let me come back to the amendments. I will start with Amendments 91 and 95 from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. I thank her for introducing them with her customary clarity and brevity. These would create an exemption from the scale of requirements for master trusts and GPPs that can demonstrate investment performance exceeding the average of schemes that meet the scale conditions. I recognise the intent to reward strong performance, but obviously I am concerned the proposal would undermine the Government’s objective, which is a market of fewer, larger, better-run schemes, where economies of scale deliver sustained benefits to savers.
I should clarify the point about objectives. The Government’s primary objective is saver outcomes. I want to be clear about that. While I am here, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, that this is not about administrative simplicity but about member outcomes. At the centre of our policy is the drive for better membership outcomes. That does not mean a simple scheme, but one that has strong governance and is well run, including strong administration, because scale supports the scheme to have the resources and the expertise to do this.
To respond to the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, in considering scale in the pensions landscape today, we have all shapes and sizes of schemes, in which value for members is important. We know that performance can be delivered across different sizes of scheme, but scale changes the landscape. Schemes that have scale will have the tools to deliver on value and performance in a way that a small scheme will not be able to in this future landscape. That is because scale enables greater expertise, efficiencies and buying power than a small scheme. That is the landscape we need to deliver for members because we want better outcomes for them. In considering the issue, it is therefore important to focus on the future landscape, the market at scale, and not the current landscape. In our view, there is not sufficient evidence that other approaches can deliver the same benefits for members and the economy.
On the specifics of the noble Baroness’s amendment, there are also some concerns around the impact; it could create an unstable landscape if we were to focus on the performance at any point in time. Of course, the intention for any exemption is that it is a permanent feature of the scheme and is not subject to regular assessment. As we all know, past investment performance is not a guarantee of future success. If we went down this road, there would be times when exempted sub-scale schemes found that they were no longer delivering investment performance that exceeds the average of those at scale. That is not stable for members or employers, and does not support their interests.
Amendment 98 proposes an innovation-based exemption from the scale requirement for master trust schemes offering specialist or innovative services. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, that innovation really matters; that is precisely why the Bill provides for a new entrant pathway so that novel propositions can enter the market and scale responsibly. But creating a parallel innovation pathway as an alternative to scale would dilute the fundamental objective of consolidation and risk maintaining a long tail of small schemes, with fragmented governance and limited access to productive investment.
I should say a few words on competition. Actually, I might come back to that.
Amendments 99 and 106 from the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, would remove the £25 billion threshold from the Bill. We believe the threshold is a central pillar of the policy architecture. It has been set following consultation with industry and government analysis of the emerging evidence, to which I referred earlier, on the point at which the benefits of scale are realised. We believe that this is a key policy decision that should be in the Bill. We also believe, as the noble Baroness indicated, that it is very important that there is certainty for industry on this threshold at the earliest possible point. Putting the £25 billion on the face of the Bill assures industry that it cannot be changed without full parliamentary engagement.
I know the noble Baroness wants me to reassure her that this matter is open for further discussion. I regret that I will have to disappoint her. The Government are committed to this and have put it in the Bill for the reasons I just explained.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
If the intention is to maintain these specific limits in the Bill, I hope that consideration will be given to an existing new entrant pathway—rather than only a new entrant pathway from 2030 onwards—and some kind of innovation pathway, as suggested by my noble friends Lord Younger and Lady Stedman-Scott, so that schemes that either are already in existence or will come through over the next few years, if they are able to do so, will not be forced out of business or prevented even beginning.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
The noble Baroness makes an important point about innovation. We recognise the importance of a proportionate approach to scale, which is why we created the transition pathway. I know that the noble Baroness thinks the number or scale is not right, but that is the purpose of the transition pathway: to give schemes that can reach scale within a reasonable time the chance to do so.
On innovation, although we want to see a market of fewer, larger pension schemes, the policy still encourages competition through allowing innovative schemes, such as CDCs, to develop and by enabling brand new innovative schemes to enter the market via the new entrant pathway. I know the noble Baroness is not satisfied with that, but that is our answer to her question: the new entrant pathway.
Amendment 102 from the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, would delete the regulation-making power on what values can be counted towards the scale threshold in order to probe how assets will be calculated. The market contains varied and complex arrangements. It is both prudent and necessary that affirmative regulations, consulted on with industry, set out the assets that may be included or adjusted when calculating the total value in the MSDA, with a focus on assets where members have not made an active choice.
Let me be clear on that point: the choices that will be made here are the ones that will create the big fat wallet, if you like, which will in turn drive the benefits of scale. The intent is that the regulations will focus on the default arrangement that the vast majority of members will be in. We want to see members of the same age who join the scheme at the same time get the same outcome, but the regulation-making power enables practical realities of how the market operates now—especially at the margins. We know that there is a variety in practice in the market, so engagement and consultation are crucial.
Amendment 104 from the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, would remove the regulation-making power to define “common investment strategy” and to set evidentiary requirements for the scale condition. I understand that the aim here is both to probe this power and to require the Government to define “common investment strategy” prior to Royal Assent. A common investment strategy will help to deliver a single approach to maximise the buying power of a scheme in terms of fees and the diversification of its investments. We think that is crucial because allowing, for example, multiple potentially divergent strategies within the MSDA would maintain fragmentation and drive away from the consolidation that we want members to benefit from.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who took part in this debate, which has demonstrated that there is unanimity on this side of the Committee on scale not being the most important thing—in direct contrast to the Government’s dogged attachment to scale.
We will probably return to innovation next week, so the Minister will not escape it, but I do not think the Government yet understand how innovation works and what it takes to scale a business: the timescales involved, the way you need to raise finance during the growth of a business, and the impact that what they have put in the Bill will have on those processes. We will need to explore that in much more detail. The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, who wished to do so, is absolutely right, because I do not think the Government really understand what is involved in this area.
On “big is best”, which we on this side of the Committee certainly do not subscribe to, the Government said that the primary objective was savers’ outcomes, but a couple of minutes later the Minister said that the objective was consolidation. Is there a hierarchy of objectives in this Bill? It is not clear to me that there is. A few sentences away, she talked about the benefits that derive from scale, but the Government seem to have closed their mind to this: if you can get equivalent benefits without scale, why should you not?
That was immediately followed by the Minister saying that when you are in a £25 billion-plus fund, you put double the money into productive finance. There we are into the real objective of this Bill: to funnel savers’ money into productive investment. I refer the Minister to my comments on each policy objective needing a policy instrument and getting into terrible trouble when you try to get one policy instrument to meet more than one objective. I was reminded of this by one of her Back-Benchers, who kindly pointed out that clear rule, which is well evidenced. I will not disclose his identity, and he is not going to get up and say it, but I really think the Government should look again at how they are using the instruments in this Bill to achieve what are clearly multiple objectives, not disclosed in a hierarchy and not even acknowledged as being potentially in conflict. We will clearly not progress any further in Committee, but the Minister should be in no doubt that this will be a feature of our discussions on Report. I beg leave to withdraw.
Baroness Altmann
Member’s explanatory statement
This probing amendment seeks to ensure that this legislation does not exclude Master Trusts or other pension funds from offering members the chance to invest in default pension arrangements which are more suited to their own circumstances, including age, retirement intentions, health conditions, plans for future retirement income options etc.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I will speak to all the amendments in this group, which are basically on exactly the same topic. I hope that the Minister understands the spirit in which they are all intended. I also hope that the Committee will be minded to support them. In a way, they follow from my Amendment 108 in the previous group, which sought to get away from the idea that one size fits all in pensions and that a common investment strategy is a recipe for success for either a group of members or all members.
My concern is that the approach to auto-enrolment pensions hitherto was to assume that there is a standard fund that is suitable for all classes of members, which can then be safely invested in by everybody. Of course, it is easiest for providers to have a common investment strategy or a common investment approach in the default fund, but enforced uniformity does not mean that all groups of members are served well.
These amendments seek to anticipate the possibility that some of the large pension providers, either existing ones or, I hope, new ones, will follow an approach in which they have a number of default funds that can be suited to different classes of member on the basis of three or four basic questions that might be relevant to their circumstances. I hope that we get to a position—I know some of the new providers intend to do this—where the pension provider does not look just at your chronological age, for example, and make an assumption about what investments suit you, but asks you whether you intend to stop working at a particular date, whether you have other pension funds and what your state of health is. Just those three basic questions can be critical to the success of an investment strategy for that group of members, but they are all lumped together at the moment.
In addition, it would be helpful to use the Bill not to close down the option of a scheme offering a number of default funds. At the moment, the danger is that everybody thinks that we have to get to £25 billion, even if it is by a range of different approaches. I know that there is an option potentially to aggregate assets, but my amendments seek to ensure that, if the £25 billion number stays in the Bill—the noble Baroness unfortunately seems intent on that being so—the Bill directly allows for a number of default funds to be added up.
I say that because we have seen in recent years the “lifestyling” approach, for example, in which all members are put into one default fund with a lifestyle approach, or a target date fund approach. This has let members down significantly. Although it is not widely reported, I am sure that many other noble Lords have had emails or letters from people coming up to retirement in 2022, who had a pension fund statement that told them they were in a safe fund and the size of the pension they could expect to receive in a few months’ time. By the time they came to, let us say, later in 2022, however, their so-called safe fund had lost up to 30% of its value. Suddenly, they were unable to stop work because they had been put in an approach that was not suitable in the end or did not do exactly what it said on the tin in its results.
If the current approach is that, just because you are 50 or 55, no other questions are asked and you are in a big default fund that says you will be stopping work within the next five to 10 years, and therefore you should not be invested in high-risk assets, which is another name for higher expected return assets, but should be moved into low-risk assets, which is another name for low expected return assets, you are not necessarily being provided with a suitable option. One size fits all does not work if, for example, the member is 55 or even 60, has no intention of stopping work in the foreseeable future, perhaps has a guaranteed defined benefit pension somewhere else that they can rely on, or, at the other end of the scale, is in very poor health and may have to stop work soon, so should be in a different pool. I hope that the Minister will understand that the intention is to anticipate innovation in that regard. I feel that, at the moment, pension companies are not even asking members what their intentions or circumstances are, or even the basic three or four questions.
I declare an interest as an adviser to Cushon, which is looking to introduce an approach of that nature. Other innovative companies also intend to improve member engagement by reaching out to members and trying to put them in segregated pools, rather than just one big pool. The Bill, using just one default fund, or a standard fund, as I prefer to call it, will preclude that kind of development, which could be in members’ interests, could have avoided the catastrophes that we saw with the current one-size-fits-all approach and could encourage providers to explain more clearly what exactly is happening to the members’ money in the investment pools that they are in, which currently does not take place—low risk is not explained, nor is high risk. Therefore, I hope that this principle can be put in the Bill. It is a very minor change, to talk about more than one default fund for a provider, rather than saying “the” default fund. I beg to move.
Lord Fuller (Con)
My Lords, I will speak only briefly, because the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, has put her finger on it. There is a choice here—the choice of the members. If we believe that the members have a say in their own retirement, having saved for it, so that they are stakeholders in that respect, they have a choice, or they are forced into groupthink. It is masterfully explained. The nonsense that gilts are low risk is a fantasy. We heard how the move into gilts resulted because the markets moved into a 22% loss in the underlying asset value.
But the groupthink in the pensions industry is that you have to go to gilts as you approach retirement. As you approach retirement nowadays, you have 30 years to go—30 years of growth. Yes, I do not deny that you need something in gilts and bonds, but there is still a long way to go. Especially in an inflationary period, as we have been through, cash, cash-like and bond/gilt-like investments will not be enough.
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, on having a group of nine amendments all on her own. We normally share groups rather than have them all on our own. This group considers how scale requirements interact with default pension arrangements where most savers remain invested. I have listened to the debate and, having spent a large part of my career in accountancy and advising clients, I know that the trouble is that the majority of clients are not expert enough to know what they should do with their pension. They seek advice from various organisations on what they should do. We should make sure that the quality of the advice they get suits their position in life. As other noble Lords have said, we are concerned about the overly rigid scale test, which could unintentionally narrow choice within defaults and push schemes towards one-size-fits-all designs.
Amendment 97 highlights the importance of allowing defaults that reflect members’ differing ages, health conditions, retirement plans and risk profiles. Amendments 97A to 101B probe—this is the point—whether the authority can take account of the combined value of assets across multiple default arrangements, rather than assessing each in isolation. Without this flexibility, schemes that offer well-designed cohort-based defaults could be penalised simply for tailoring provision.
Amendments 168A and 170A reinforce this point, seeking to ensure that schemes are not excluded from the market for moving beyond crude uniform defaults. Our concern is that defaults should be designed around member needs, not regulatory convenience. I hope the Minister will explain how the Bill avoids pushing schemes towards uniformity at the expense of suitability and long-term outcomes.
I hope the Minister does not regard the series of amendments in this group as combative. They are meant to try to help pensioners or future pensioners. It is wrong if the Government look for a simple process but do not look at the benefit for the people concerned. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, who talked about what happens in gilts and the like. I come from a period in the chartered accountant profession when you always went into gilts in what you thought were the last few years of your working life. Now, things have changed. We have to look at what you do and when you do it, and those things depend on the people involved.
I hope the Minister will see that these amendments are trying to say that things should not be too prescriptive. They are not against what the Government are trying to do, which is look after people. But are doing it on a one-size-fits-all basis, which does not work in the real world that we are in. I hope the Government go back and think about this a little more so that, when we come to Report, we can be a little more innovative.
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
My Lords, I wish to speak briefly in support of this group of amendments in the name of my noble friend Lady Altmann. She has once again demonstrated her expertise and the value that she brings to our scrutiny of these important issues. Most importantly, she explained the spirit in which these amendments were tabled.
Throughout our proceedings on this Bill, a consistent theme across the Committee has been the need for proportionality in the steps we are taking on scale and value for money, and for definitions that are sufficiently comprehensive to reflect how the market actually operates in practice. I do not intend to repeat the points already made by the noble Baroness or ask the questions she has posed, but we will listen carefully to the Minister’s response on these issues.
Clause 40, as drafted, risks applying the scale test in an overly narrow and mechanical way by requiring the regulator to assess each default arrangement in isolation without regard to the wider context in which it is offered. That approach is not necessarily proportionate; nor does it reflect the economic reality of how master trust providers operate. This amendment would allow the regulator to take into account the combined assets of several non-scale default arrangements offered by the same provider. In doing so, it would not dilute the principle of scale; rather, it would ensure that scale is assessed in a comprehensive and realistic way, focusing on the resilience, governance and efficiency of the provider as a whole.
That matters because, without this flexibility, we risk forcing consolidation for its own sake and potentially requiring well-run, well-performing defaults to be wound up simply because they fall on the wrong side of an arbitrary threshold—even where the provider clearly operates at scale overall. This amendment therefore speaks directly to the principles that we have already raised in Committee: that regulations should be outcome-focused rather than box-ticking, and that they should avoid unintended consequences that could undermine member confidence rather than enhancing it. For those reasons, I believe this is a sensible and proportionate refinement of Clause 40, and I hope the Minister will give it serious consideration.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, for the clarity of the exposition of her amendments, and I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. I will try to explain what the Government are trying to do here and then pick up the specific points that the noble Baroness raised.
To maintain the policy on scale and secure its benefits for pension scheme members, there will need to be centralised decision-making over a large pool of assets. The Bill sets out that this will be delivered by the main scale default arrangement, which is subject to a common investment strategy. I recognise that the noble Baroness has raised concerns about the common investment strategy being able to accommodate different factors, but I will tell the Committee why it is there. A key purpose of the policy is to minimise fragmentation in schemes and to have a single default arrangement at the centre of schemes’ proposition. Fragmentation is an issue, not because it is a piece of government dogmatism but because it is in the interests of members that those who run their schemes have a big wallet at the centre to give the scheme the buying power and expertise they need, because that enables them to deliver on the benefits of scale.
When we consulted, the responses told us that there were schemes with hundreds of default arrangements that have been created over a long period of time and that this is a problem. Members in these arrangements get lower returns and pay higher charges, which some consultation responses also told us. It is important that we deal with that fragmentation and that we improve member outcomes.
However, the Government also recognise that there are circumstances where a different default arrangement is needed to serve specific member needs only—for example, for religious or ethical regions. These will be possible through Chapter 4 but they will not count towards the main scale default arrangement. If the scale measure encompassed multiple default arrangements or combined assets, as these amendments would allow, it would not drive the desired changes or support member outcomes derived from the benefits of scale. Following consultation, there was clear consensus that scale should be set at the arrangement level as that is where key decisions about investments are made. Simply put, centralised scale is the best way to realise benefits across the market for savers.
The pensions industry has told us there are too many default arrangements in some schemes, and that fragmentation—
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
I am going to answer the point and then come back, if that is okay. Just give me another two minutes.
That fragmentation does not benefit savers but can lead to increased charges and lack of access to newer, higher-performing investments. The Government are committed to addressing this fragmentation, which exists predominantly in DC workplace contract-based schemes.
To prevent further market fragmentation, Clause 42 allows for regulations to be made to restrict the creation of new non-scale default arrangements. To be clear, this is not a ban nor a cap on new default arrangements. There will be circumstances where they will be in saver interests and meet the needs of a cohort of members. As the noble Baroness says, this is not a one-size-fits-all approach.
On the point about choice, auto-enrolment has moved many members to save for the first time. The vast majority enter the default fund and do not engage in their schemes. Those who do can choose their own funds, and these measures do not interfere with that, but they are a minority, and these measures aim to support the millions who do not engage.
The noble Baroness is right that one size of default arrangement does not fit all, but the Bill requires a review to consider the existing fragmentation and why multiple default arrangements exist. That will inform us of which default arrangements should continue and the characteristics they possess that deliver better member outcomes or meet a specific need.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
The Minister has raised many points that I would like to ask further about, if that is okay. The fragmentation applies to legacy schemes: the contract-based schemes, as she says. These are the old personal pension-type arrangements—SIPPs, GPPs and so on—which were developed a long time ago. Typically, the more modern schemes have just one default, with one investment approach that is meant to suit all members. It is that approach that I hope and expect to be refined as we move forward so that there can be different types of default fund for different types of member. I do not anticipate that they will be people choosing their own. It will be on the basis of information that the provider seeks from its members, using that to send them down a slightly more appropriate investment route for their money. That does not stop the providers having large pools of money that they allocate members to, but it would not be in just the one central fund, as I say. Of course that is easier for the provider, but I think the providers owe members a different duty, which is to try to tailor a little more for those who do not choose, based on wider circumstances than just their chronological age, what is best for their investment and pension outcomes.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
I have heard the noble Baroness’s explanation and understand the point she is making. The point about choice was not actually directed at her; it was directed at a colleague who mentioned choice and I was trying to explain that this is not about choice. I accept the point the noble Baroness is making that this is for those who do not engage.
If having a single default fund were simpler for the pension schemes, and that is what drove this, we would not have the number of defaults we have at the moment. We have huge numbers of defaults. I accept that many of those are the product of history, but the key is that we have to consolidate. To be clear, as I have said, we are not banning or capping the new default arrangements, but we want to ensure that any new arrangements meet the needs of members, so any new non-scale default arrangements will have to obtain regulatory approval before they can accept moneys into them. We have said that we are going to consult and we need evidence to look at whether anything else should be included, and that will come up when we consult.
I understand the point that the noble Baroness is making and I am happy to reflect on it, but we need consolidation and we need to consult to make sure that we have allowed for the right things. With that reassurance, I hope she feels able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
I thank the Minister for her constructive engagement on these issues. There is something slightly missing here because, if one consults before this approach enters the market, one will not know that that might be the appropriate approach. Indeed, the providers that one would consult will not necessarily recommend more than one approach, because that does not necessarily suit their business interests, and members will not know what it is because by definition they are not particularly engaged.
I am trying to address this issue and I very much appreciate that the Minister is engaging constructively and has listened carefully. Perhaps we can continue this at some point. This would be a very small change to the Bill; it would not stop the unsuitable dispersion of numerous different legacy funds from being consolidated, but it would potentially stop these new approaches entering the market. That is the concern. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Sherlock
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment corrects an error.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to align provisions in the Bill with the Mansion House Accord definition used for UK private markets to mean the underlying assets.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 111A would add the words
“as determined by the underlying assets in any structure or fund”
after “qualifying assets” in new Section 28C(1). Its purpose is simple: to ensure that when measuring investment in private markets via collective investment vehicles, we look at the underlying assets, not the wrapper in which they are held; we look at where the money goes, not the route it takes.
In debates on the Bill, I have been tracing the consequences of the Government’s approach to private markets. On the first day, I set out the competition concerns inherent in the Mansion House Accord as transposed in the Bill. Last Monday, I explained the role that listed investment companies play in transparency and valuation of private equity, as recognised by the Bank of England and the ICAEW. On Thursday, I explained the range of infrastructure that they fund and the regulatory changes that are designed to make investment easier but that have not been given time to work.
Today, I turn to the policy history of how long-term asset funds, LTAFs, were developed as an open-ended alternative to the closed-ended listed investment company and what was and was not agreed. The LTAF was developed through the productive finance working group, co-chaired by the Governor of the Bank of England, the chief executive of the FCA and the Economic Secretary to the Treasury. It was supported by senior representatives of the PRA, pension schemes and investment managers. It was an unusually high-level and accelerated process, driven in part by the then Chancellor’s public commitment to have the first LTAF launched within a year.
Precisely because of that elevated framework and compressed procedure, it is all the more important that we adhere to what the working group actually agreed. The record is remarkably consistent. Across almost every meeting of the working group, the minutes recognise that there were two established routes for accessing long-term illiquid assets: the new LTAF and the long-standing listed investment company. From the very first steering committee meeting on 26 January 2021, the minutes record that
“closed-ended funds facilitate investment in productive finance assets … Some members believed existing fund structures, such as investment trusts, were sufficient … several members suggested … adapting existing vehicles, such as investment trusts, rather than developing a new open-ended fund structure”.
At the first technical expert group meeting on 12 February 2021, the Investment Association stated explicitly:
“The proposal does not intend to replace existing structures”.
At the technical working group on 20 April 2021, it was confirmed that the LTAF was to
“complement, rather than replace, existing structures”.
Later in the process, on 4 May 2021, the steering committee agreed:
“The LTAF is not the only structure for investment in less liquid assets”.
The final road map, published in September 2021, reinforces this, stating:
“There are a range of ways to invest in less liquid assets, and all of them play important roles”.
In practice, for DC schemes and retail investors, those routes are the LTAF and listed investment company. Nothing in this policy process—not the minutes, road map, FCA contributions or the IEA’s own presentation—ever suggested that Parliament should legislate a single wrapper preference or exclude the listed wrapper route to private assets. On the contrary, the working group recognised two parallel structures capable of holding productive finance assets. It was explicit that the LTAF was to complement not replace the existing one.
When the public policy process is this clear, it is difficult to see why a private agreement should be allowed to override it. Yet the Bill does that, and the Minister says it is because of the Mansion House Accord. The effect of the Bill is therefore threefold. It is anti-competitive because it removes a functioning structure from the market and mandates a single route for accessing the same underlying assets. It is anti-policy, because it contradicts the working group’s own record—a record developed by the Bank of England, the PRA, the FCA and the Treasury, all of which recognise that listed investment companies already perform this role and were never intended to be displaced. It is anti-transparency, because it excludes the only structure where private assets are accessed, with all the benefits of public market transparency, daily market valuations, regular auditor disclosure and shareholder engagement, including AGMs and independent boards to hold managers to account.
The consequences do not stop at the DC default funds. Last night, one of the most senior asset management figures emailed me to say that this is not just a matter for pension schemes. Excluding listed investment companies will widen discounts to net asset value, with direct detriment to retail investors.
Next, let us examine the evidence of the origin of this exclusion. At Second Reading, the Minister said,
“we have aimed to stick closely to the scope of the Mansion House Accord, which itself is limited to investments made by unlisted funds”.—[Official Report, 18/12/25; col. 938.]
That is at best an approximation and, in substance, not true. There is no such definition in the accord. It points to underlying assets, explicitly defining that:
“UK private markets means where the underlying assets are based in the UK”.
It knows the difference between an asset and a wrapper.
The Minister’s letter after Second Reading says that the exclusion is to support the Mansion House agreement. That is even more approximate and perhaps an admission that it is not in the accord after all, but something done afterwards and now being justified in its name.
Treasury officials have said in meetings that the pension funds want it, but there is no public record of any such request. If the accord itself does not say it, the Government are doing it on the basis of something else. I must ask again: who asked for this exclusion? Where is the written evidence? It is not in the accord, any consultation or any published policy. It is not in the working group minutes, the road map or any regulatory framework on LTAFs or listed investment companies by the FCA. I have elaborated publicly available evidence showing that the policy process recognised two parallel structures. What written evidence can the Minister show the Committee that supports the exclusion of one of them? If the Government are relying on private representations, Parliament is entitled to know what they were and who made them.
I have written evidence from DC default pension providers and Mansion House Accord signatories, representing a substantial majority share of the auto-enrolment market. They say that the exclusion of listed invested companies was not something they agreed to or understood to be part of the accord. Some have been going back through their meeting records to check. Others have said that they had not realised that this was a provision in the Bill; that they are neutral on the wrapper; and that they thought that the exclusion meant only listed equities, not investments within a wider listed investment company wrapper, and would be against that exclusion. Others said that they use listed investment companies and would not want this.
I have my evidence and more is still coming. Where is the Government’s? This exclusion was devised within government without a proper evidential basis, or it is being done to please interests that have not been put on the public record, or Ministers have simply not appreciated the implications of what is being proposed. None of those possibilities is a sound basis for legislating away a long-standing structure with a clear history of positive economic outcomes.
It is explained as suitably targeted guard-rails. These are the kind of guard-rails over which you are thrown to the lions. We are being asked to legislate a single-wrapper mandate on the basis of assertions not supported by the public record. If the Government wish to exclude a structure that the Bank of England, the PRA, the FCA and the Treasury itself recognised as valid, they must show the evidence.
My amendment would restore the position that the working group adopted: what matters are the underlying assets, not the wrapper in which they are held. I beg to move.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I support every word that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has said. I hope the Minister understands that this series of amendments is designed, once again, to help the Government.
The policy of excluding the very asset classes that the Government want to promote and want pension funds to invest in, just because they are held in a particular form, seems irrational. The process used to introduce it, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, outlined, was materially flawed. There was a lack of consultation and the policy is directly contrary to some previous ministerial Statements and to the stated policy intention. I cannot see how any reasonable person could argue that excluding these companies is a legitimate means of achieving the stated policy objective. The decision goes against common sense and defies economic logic. It opens pension scheme members up to less choice, higher long-term costs and, potentially, new risks such as gating or frozen investments.
Amendments 122 and 123 are designed specifically to ensure that, if a closed-ended investment company holds the assets in which the Government want pension funds to invest as a result of the Mansion House Accord, they can do so. Amendment 123 includes these as qualifying assets under the Bill and Amendment 122 talks about ensuring that, if securities are
“listed under Chapter 11 of the UK Listing Rules or the Specialist Fund Segment that provide exposure to the qualifying assets”,
they too can be included.
These amendments would not change the intentions of the Bill or the Government’s policy; they would reinforce them. If schemes cannot invest in listed securities, we will exclude the closed-ended funds that hold such assets, for no obvious reason other than, perhaps, the fact that the pension funds or asset managers that are launching the long-term asset funds will obviously prefer to have their own captive vehicle under their direct control, rather than those quoted freely on the market.
I would argue that, by excluding investment trusts and REITs as qualifying assets, we will fetter trustees’ discretion as to what assets they can invest in and how they can do so. I do not believe that the Government want to do this. I think this is an unintended consequence of wanting not to allow schemes just to say, “Well, I invest in Sainsbury’s and it has a lot of property in the UK, so that’s fine”. But this is a very different argument. I hope that the time spent by this Committee on these funds will prove worth while and that this dangerous, damaging exclusion can be removed from the Bill.
If the Government want—as they say they do—pension schemes to invest in UK property, the amendments on this topic would allow them to choose to hold shares in Tritax Big Box, for example, which is a listed closed-ended fund. It is a collective investment REIT, not a trading company, and UK regulators, the stock market and tax regulation recognise its functions as a fund. It is just like a long-term asset fund, but it is closed-ended instead of open-ended. Under the Bill, pension funds would not be able to invest in it, even though it holds precisely the type of private assets targeted by this section of the Bill.
The amendments would maximise schemes’ choice of investable assets within the target sectors. This would widen competition, which should bring downward pressure on asset management costs; it would reduce the risks of inflating asset prices, by channelling demand into fewer investment pathways; and it would enhance potential risk-adjusted returns. There is simply no reason why master trusts and other pension schemes should object to being given additional freedom to make investments to meet the requirements of these reserve powers. Why are we discriminating against a particularly successful British financial sector offering a proven route to holding the assets in which the Government want pension funds to invest? I have not seen any argument to say that, if we include these amendments, pension funds would have to invest in these companies, but they could use them if it suited their needs.
I look forward to the Minister’s answer. I know and accept that she is in a difficult position, but I have not heard a coherent answer as to why we are going down the route that we are. Tritax Big Box is just one example. It owns and develops assets worth £8 billion and controls the UK’s largest logistics-focused land platform, including data centres, which the Government designated as critical national infrastructure in 2024. Tritax Big Box announced that its data centre development strategy will be partnering with EDF Energy, which manages the UK’s nuclear power, to develop such infrastructure. It is remarkable that such a homegrown success story should be excluded from the opportunities available to pension schemes.
This sector has reinvented itself over the past few decades, from being a holder of diversified quoted equities to managing real illiquid assets. It is generally recognised that it is an ideal structure for holding illiquid assets—it has renewable assets, wind farms, solar farms and National Health Service GP surgeries. All these elements of the economy need significant investment and pension funds could be using their assets to support them. Surely that should be part of the Government’s intention for the Bill. I hope that this possible error in the Bill can be recognised and corrected so that we can move forward without further discussion on this topic.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, called on the support of reasonable people. I think of myself as a reasonable person, and I support her. I find the Government’s position on this totally inexplicable. I say in all honesty to my noble friend the Minister that the reasons given so far for these provisions do not in any way explain their position. It is inexplicable.
In my view, it is possible to make an argument that closed-end funds of this sort are more suitable than some other sorts of investments for pension investment because of the possibility of there being additional liquidity. That makes it even more inexplicable. A further problem is that pension funds could invest in an investment company that is not a closed-end fund but holds these investments. However, if it decided to float on the stock exchange, it could not do so because it would lose all the pension fund investments. So there is not logic at all to the Government’s position. There may be some logic, but we have yet to hear it.
Lord Remnant (Con)
My Lords, I very much support the amendments in this group, tabled variously in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Altmann and Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted. They all seek to ensure that closed-ended funds, in the form of UK-listed investment companies, are not disqualified from being eligible to invest in the private market assets targeted by the Bill, alongside open-ended funds. I say this not only as a private investor in both types of funds but as one who has sat on and chaired boards responsible for managing both types of investment.
They each have their relative advantages and disadvantages, which I will not enumerate here, but it is in fact investment companies that, over the long term, tend to have lower fees and better performance records, to the advantage of their investors. It seems perverse to exclude them from the Bill, seemingly solely on the grounds that they have listed status, when the nature of their underlying investments is identical to those held by open-ended vehicles. Indeed, investment trusts are particularly suited to the type of investments envisaged by this Bill and the Mansion House Accord—namely, assets that are essentially illiquid. Investment companies hold well over £100 billion-worth in private assets, and unlisted infrastructure and renewables have been among the fastest growing segments in recent years.
As the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, indicated, it is this ability more effectively to offer liquidity in illiquid assets that particularly distinguishes closed-ended vehicles from their open-ended cousins. It is in times of stress, whether within the investment vehicle itself or more broadly due to general economic or financial conditions, that some of the more unfortunate investment failings occur. They tend to relate to liquidity or lack thereof, they have happened in the recent past and they have occurred in open-ended structures.
Noble Lords will need little reminding of the demise of the Woodford Equity Income Fund. Suffice to say that, in two years, it lost two-thirds of its value; it became increasingly and disproportionately reliant on unlisted investments, which could not be sold to meet investor redemptions; and it was suspended in June 2019, leaving investors unable to access their money.
Noble Lords may be less familiar with the travails afflicting open-ended property funds. Property is an asset class specifically targeted by the Mansion House Accord. The writing was on the wall for them ever since they suspended in the depths of the Covid crisis. That triggered funds in the sector to begin to close down, given the evident problems with liquidity that resulted in a fundamental mismatch in the demands of investors against the liquidity of the underlying asset. These investors are mainly not faceless institutions but retail investors—the same individuals who save for their pensions. The only way in which the managers of the fund can mitigate these liquidity issues is by holding substantial cash holdings, which cuts across its investment objectives and dilutes returns. Once an announcement to close is announced, properties are likely to be sold at fire sale prices into difficult markets, and investors may have no access to their money for well over 12 months.
Institutions running open-ended funds attempted to address these liquidity problems by establishing the long-term asset funds referred to earlier, but their structure is still such that they cannot solve the problem but only rather crudely mitigate it through having more restricted dealing windows than the daily dealing offered by more traditional open-ended funds. They have been authorised by the FCA only since 2023 and are unproven. They are described by one prominent investment platform as high-risk investments recommended for experienced investors who have already accessed the more traditional investment options, yet they qualify under this Bill to the exclusion of investment companies which have proved their worth for over 150 years. I do not understand the rationale for this.
Lord Fuller (Con)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Davies, found the Government’s position inexplicable such that these amendments have become necessary. I can understand that. The point is that the Government do not—they do not understand finance. Perhaps they should have had a few more prawn cocktails before the election; they might have got some learning inside them. This group demonstrates that there is ignorance in this Bill about investment, asset classes and asset allocations.
New Section 28C(5) treats private equity as if it is just one class, but it is not. That is why I welcome Amendment 121, specifically proposed new paragraphs (f) and (g), which would lay out the appropriateness of scale-up capital and quoted and unlisted companies.
There is no doubt that you can make a lot of money in private equity. High risk leads to high rewards; the big hitters can and do make money. The early backers of Revolut turned a million into a billion, as the FT reported last week. On that basis, everybody should be having a go. What could go wrong? We all know that, in many cases, companies get loaded with debt and dividends are extracted; we have ended up with serial bankruptcies in the casual dining sector, for example, and Claire’s has gone bust twice in the last four months. I am not exactly sure the Government should be mandating this sort of thing by statute.
Putting that to one side, I have some experience through my membership of the Norfolk Pension Fund in private equity investment. I have been a board member since 2007. There are some big firms in this space; HarbourVest might be a name familiar to noble Lords but others are available, as it says in the adverts.
To participate in this space, you typically enter a 10-year commitment for quite a lot of money as a fund. You provide the fund manager cash certainty. He can go ahead and acquire smaller firms within the fund. You do not pony the money up front necessarily; it just needs to be available when the fund manager calls you to chip in. By and large, the fund manager finds the firms and invests that money, typically over the first four years of the indicative 10-year period. They then grow and nurture those firms until they can be sold for a profit—unless they go bust in the meantime, which many do.
At some point, 10 to a dozen years later, after all the surviving companies have passed on and the fund closes, all the money is returned to the pension fund. It is a well-trodden path and a proper asset class. This is why proposed new paragraph (g) in Amendment 121 is so important. These opportunities should be available to pension funds, but the Bill as currently constructed excludes them. It is madness. This is not what we need as a nation.
We need to go further. We need to be able to step in and help those founder-owned companies, together with local business angels, their families and friends, to get to the stage where HarbourVest can have a nibble. We need to make the small nibbles into larger fish. It is the scale-up issue. The exam question here is to identify good founder-led businesses locally and grow them. I declare an interest; I have been a director of New Anglia Capital Ltd, which was public sector, 100% owned by councils in Norfolk and Suffolk for the purposes of investing in early stage companies, taking them from a glint in the eye to the stage at which private equity might get involved. My goodness, it is hard. We have invested in bright prospects in life sciences, engineering, medical technology and clean energy. It is high risk, and I am told it carries the opportunities to make big returns—not that we have found them yet. But at least it carries that opportunity. As a nation we need to turn those cygnets into swans and those small acorns into mighty oak trees. The Bill should aim to do that, but it does not.
The conflict is with the press release that accompanied the Mansion House announcement. The Government’s own presser boasted:
“More than 50 scale-up businesses have signed a joint letter to the Chancellor welcoming the reforms as a ‘significant milestone in ensuring British institutions back British businesses at the scale required to generate growth, employment and wealth’”.
I feel sorry for the people who signed up that letter, because they were suckered. The Bill does little to scale up businesses and it has taken the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, to put proposed new paragraph (f) into the amendment so that the Government’s own press release can form part of the law.
Forcing everything to be large, as we have heard, makes it harder to get the boost for start-ups. Amendment 121 would remedy this. We need it not just for those start-up businesses: the founders, their families and friends and all those angels—important though they are. We need it for our provincial cities and market towns. These are the places with the gems that need to grow in pursuance of
“UK growth assets rather than wider overseas assets”,
as it says in the Member’s explanatory statement.
Without this amendment, Mansion House is a mirage. By this Bill the Government have done a confidence trick on those who believed there would be a flow of capital to these businesses. It is not too late to change course. I echo strongly the comments of the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles and Lady Altmann, and note that we are in Committee. I think this Committee is doing valuable work, because it has set up the conversations we all need to have between now and Report. The Government can reflect on what they are trying to achieve and recognise that it will not be achieved by the Bill as currently constructed. We may then need to have a compromise that will actually do the thing we are here to do, which is to invest in Britain and have better, more secure futures for people who want to invest in pensions, not Lego sets or Star Wars characters.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, for her forensic analysis of both the Mansion House Accord and the ways in which there is a significant mismatch between what is in that accord and what is in this Bill. I confess that I was not aware of the extent of that, so that analysis is really important; I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say.
I would like to comment on whether investments in listed securities should be excluded; here, I will part company with many of my colleagues on this side of the Committee. I understand why they are excluded. It is because buying and selling shares in listed companies is just buying and selling a financial asset. The buying and selling of shares in UK-listed assets does nothing to put money into the UK economy.
However, the way in which this measure is drafted probably goes too far, because it is possible that companies could raise new capital—for the purpose of investing in some of the things where the Government wish to encourage new investors—and that those vehicles could be listed. The way in which the Government have approached this is possibly too extensive, but I certainly do not think that the simple buying and selling of financial assets aligns with getting productive investment into the economy. As the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, knows, I do not think that is a valid objective for this Bill—certainly not one that should override the need to get good returns for savers.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
I apologise, but I think that the noble Baroness’s characterisation of the impact of buying and selling, as she said, on listed companies—whether that puts money into the economy, to use her words—does not necessarily apply in the way she believes, particularly with closed-ended investment companies.
One of the problems with which they have had to deal, because of the regulatory constraints that we have been trying to help the Government address over the past two or three years, is that if people are selling these closed-ended investment companies but no one is buying them, they sink to a discount to their net asset value. At that point, they cannot invest in new opportunities; they cannot IPO or raise new capital. That has had a dramatic impact on the economy because these closed-ended companies, which were investing significantly in infrastructure across the country, have been unable to raise new money to invest in new opportunities.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
If this is an intervention, it is quite a long one. I ask that interventions be kept brief; they should just be questions, really.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
The noble Baroness knows that she and I disagree on this subject. I hold to my view that the buying and selling of shares is simply the exchanging of financial assets.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
May I intervene so that I do not have to take up time later? I cannot see the difference between the follow-on funding that you get with a listed investment company, if you have an IPO, and the subsequent follow-on funding rounds. With an LTAF, you have initial fundraising and subscriptions. With a listed investment company, you buy and sell on the market. With the open-ended LTAFs, you have redemptions, purchases and flow matching. If you are watching the money, those are equivalent processes.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
If the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, had listened, she would know that I said I thought what the Government were doing had gone too far, because there were instances where there was a necessary flow between the raising of funds and that flowing into new investment.
A number of noble Lords on this side of the Room have been talking as though this Bill stops pension schemes investing in listed assets or investment companies. It certainly does not; it merely says that they do not qualify if asset mandation is introduced. We ought to be concentrating on whether this is a valid policy objective—the Minister knows that I do not subscribe to that—to get money out of pension funds and into the real economy. We then ought to concentrate on which flows achieve that; certainly not all flows of buying investment trusts or other listed vehicles will achieve that.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I rise to speak in strong support of a number of carefully drafted amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and once again ably supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. I will also speak to my Amendment 127.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
That was fun. I will have a go at explaining the Government’s narrative on this, which is an alternative to the narrative that has been established so far. I will then try to go through and answer as many of the questions as I can.
Let me start by stating the obvious. The amendments relate largely to the part of Clause 40 that determines which types of investment are deemed as qualifying assets for the purpose of meeting any asset allocation requirements were we to use the power. I stated in my opening reply to the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, that he said “when” mandation comes in, but it is very much “if”; we do not anticipate using this power but, if it were used, we would need to be clear about what happens next.
The most relevant provisions are found in new Section 28C(5). This broadly limits qualifying assets to private assets. The subsection provides by way of example that qualifying assets may include private equity, private debt, venture capital or interests in land—that is, property investments. It also clarifies that qualifying assets may include investments and shares quoted on SME growth markets, such as AIM and Aquis.
In contrast, according to this subsection, qualifying assets may not generally include listed securities, defined as securities listed on a recognised investment exchange. That approach reflects the aim of the power to work as a limited backstop to the commitments that the DC pensions industry has made, which relate to private assets only.
That brings me to the subjects of the amendments from the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles and Lady Altmann. I start by reminding the Committee of the rationale for this approach, because it stems from the Mansion House Accord. The accord was developed to address a clear structural issue in our pensions market. DC schemes, particularly in their default funds, are heavily concentrated in listed, liquid assets and have very low allocations to private markets. That is in contrast to a number of other leading pension systems internationally, which allocate materially more to unlisted private equity, infrastructure, venture capital and similar assets.
The reason the Government are so supportive of the accord is that it will help to correct that imbalance and bring the UK into line with international practice. A modest but meaningful allocation to private markets can, within a diversified portfolio, improve long-term outcomes for savers and support productive investment in the real economy, including here in the UK.
The reserve power in Clause 40 is designed as a narrow backstop to those voluntary commitments. For that reason, any definition of “qualifying assets” must be clear, tightly focused on the assets we actually want to target and operationally workable for schemes, regulators and government. That is the context on the question of listed investment trusts and other listed investment companies.
I recognise the important role that investment trusts play in UK capital markets and in financing the real economy. Pension schemes—as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, pointed out—are, and will remain, free to invest in wherever trustees consider that to be in members’ best interests.
However, the clear intention of this policy has been to focus on unlisted private assets. This is reflected in industry documentation underpinning the accord, which defines private markets as unlisted asset classes, including equities, property, infrastructure and debt, and refers to investments held directly or through unlisted funds. That definition was reached following a number of iterative discussions led by industry, as part of which the Government supported the definition being drawn in this way.
Bringing listed investment funds within the qualifying asset definition would be out of step with the deliberate approach of the accord and its focus on addressing the specific imbalance regarding allocation to private assets. It would also raise implementation challenges, requiring distinctions to be made between the different types of listed companies that make or hold private investments or assets. It would introduce uncertainty about what we expect from DC providers. We might justly be accused of moving the goalposts, having already welcomed the accord, with its current scope, in no uncertain terms.
But the line has to be drawn somewhere. This is not a judgment on the intrinsic qualities or importance of listed investment vehicles, nor does it limit schemes’ ability to invest in them. It is simply about structuring a narrow, targeted power so that it does what it is intended to do: underpin a voluntary agreement aimed at increasing exposure to unlisted private markets in as simple a way as possible and without cutting across schemes’ broader investment freedoms.
The legislation draws a general distinction between listed securities and private assets; it does not single out investment trusts. Any listed security, whether a gilt, main market equity or listed investment company, is treated in the same way for the purposes of this narrow definition.
Crucially, this concerns only a small proportion of portfolios. Under the accord, the remaining 90% of default fund assets can continue to be invested in any listed instrument, including investment trusts, where trustees and scheme managers judge that that would benefit their members.
I am just coming to the answers, but please ask some more questions.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way. In a situation where trustees do not wish to put more than the prescribed amount in the qualifying assets, and they want to hold those through a listed closed-ended company because they are concerned about the structure of an open-ended fund and do not have the ability to invest directly, why would the Government want to fetter their choice in that way? I thank the Association of Investment Companies, which has helped me to understand some of the things that these companies do.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, trustees will have to make their own decisions on that. I understand that, were mandation to come in, there would be constraints on this, but let me see whether I will pick up some answers to help with that as we go.
The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and, I think, the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, suggested that the Bill explicitly discriminates against listed investment funds. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, made this point previously. That concern is perhaps reflected in Amendment 124, which would remove the language that in general serves to exclude listed securities. Nothing in this language refers directly to investment funds or should be construed as a signal of discrimination, but I have listened carefully to the arguments made and I recognise that some people clearly feel otherwise. I am happy to take that away and consider further the arguments about signalling.
A number of noble Lords, starting with the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, emphasised the issue of underlying investments, pointing out that the Mansion House Accord includes specific language on this. It defines UK private markets as meaning
“where the underlying assets are based in the UK”.
Accordingly, new Section 28C(6) provides the mechanism to reflect this aspect of the accord. Amendment 127 relates to this point, and I will say more when I return to it. I have already recognised that DC funds may invest directly or through funds. That means that, if we ever came to exercise these powers, we would need to implement the regulations under new Section 28C in a way that suitably reflects this. However, we do not consider it necessary to amend the clause to achieve this, since there is sufficient flexibility in new Section 28C to prescribe descriptions of qualifying assets in a way that reflects this, subject to the constraints in new Section 28C(5).
On the matter of competition, the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, made a more constrained speech than she did last week, and I commend her for that. The question of competition law was raised. For the record, there has been no breach of competition law by the Government, nor are we encouraging a breach of competition law. We strongly welcome the Mansion House Accord; I make that clear for the record.
I turn back to Amendment 127 in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, because it picks up some of these points. This amendment would remove the provision that allows the Government, if exercising these powers, to specify that a proportion of assets subject to an asset allocation requirement should be invested in the UK. This aspect of the clause was developed with the Mansion House Accord firmly in mind. Under the accord, half of the 10% of default fund assets committed to private markets is intended to be invested in the UK. This provision simply ensures that the powers can operate as a backstop to that commitment. What constitutes a UK investment will vary by asset and will be set out in due course, with new Section 28C(6)(b) making it clear that this can be done through regulations.
Amendment 121, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, also relates to the definition of qualifying assets. Its effect would be to add to the list of examples of private asset classes that may be prescribed as qualifying assets in regulations made under new Section 28C(4). As the noble Baroness is aware, the Government have designed these provisions to mirror closely the asset classes covered by the Mansion House Accord. The clause does not perfectly correspond, word for word, with the drafting of the accord, but the effect is the same. To be clear, I can confirm that UK infrastructure assets, UK scale up capital and UK SME growth market shares, which I assume is what the noble Baroness meant when she referred to quoted companies, are all capable of being designated as qualifying assets, provided that they are not listed on a recognised investment exchange. They are very good examples of the sorts of assets in which these reforms should encourage investment; none the less, it is not necessary to list them individually in the Bill.
I have listened carefully to the many considered points and arguments that have been made in relation to qualifying assets. I recognise that there is not unanimity in the Committee, although it is always interesting when my noble friend Lord Davies agrees with the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and, at least in part, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, agrees with me; all things are possible, we discover, in Committee in the House of Lords. Given that, and given the arguments that have been made both here and previously, I hope that noble Lords will feel able to withdraw or not press their amendments.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have participated in this debate; I also thank the Minister for, from my perspective, attempting to defend the indefensible.
The Minister mentioned the industry documentation underlying the accord. I would be grateful if that could be forwarded to me, made a matter of public record and, perhaps, placed in the Library. As I said in my opening speech, if noble Lords want to know, I have had some 70% of the people representing the default funds—if you take their turnover—say that they did not think that they have agreed to the exclusion of listed investment companies. So something is going wrong here.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
I should have quoted what I was referring to; I meant to do so but forgot, so I apologise. I was referring to the question and answer materials that accompany the accord on the ABI’s pensions website, which I am sure the noble Baroness has read. They say:
“The definitions of both global and UK private markets assets include directly held, or via investment through unlisted funds in property, infrastructure, private credit, private equity and venture capital”.
The Government understand that this reflects the intention of the accord to exclude investment in listed investment funds. I would be happy to send these materials round to noble Lords.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
I am not sure that “directly held” applies to an LTAF either. The fact is that you have wrappers and underlying assets. It is discriminatory, and that should be tested. I still do not see how, when you have the public policy laid out by the high-level working group set up to create LTAFs, you can then say, “A private negotiation overrides that”. I stand by that.
I know that the Pensions Minister received a letter from a past lord mayor, Alastair King, who is one of the architects of the Mansion House initiatives, on 22 October last year. He relayed that he had encountered both support for the investment trust market and concerns that the Bill did not acknowledge the potential of the investment company structure. That evidence—one of the architects asking, “What’s going on here?”—also seems to have been ignored.
I come to the same basic point: for me, the Government have not provided a clear, public or specific rationale for this exclusion. I would say that neither has the ABI, but I did not know that it runs the country. All of the evidence points the opposite way to what the Government have done. Officials have confirmed in meetings that no assessment of using listed investment companies has been carried out, despite the clear steer of the policy in the working group to do so. It seems that this Q&A from the ABI overrides a Bank of England/FCA/government working group. That cannot be so. The only explanation ever offered is that there are “suitably targeted guardrails”—a phrase that has never been defined, evidenced or justified. What do you have to guard from in a listed investment company? Competition? Transparency? That is a very strange thing to say; it is an instrument of division and discrimination, protecting secrets.
Let us remind ourselves of what we are dealing with: two collective investment vehicles, each of which is a wrapper holding protected assets of net asset value for the pension scheme. That is where they differ from an ordinary equity. An ordinary equity does not have any protection for the assets; if the company goes bust, it is bust. If the listed investment company goes back to the net asset value, the assets are still there for the pension fund. That is the difference, which is why a collective investment vehicle such as a listed investment company belongs with the LTAF; it does not belong with an equity.
I still do not see why they stick so closely to some Q&A but, whether by design or by accident, they have produced a proposal that I still say is without foundation, without evidence and, frankly, without integrity. It is irrational and procedurally unfair, and it fails to take account of relevant and public considerations, relying instead on things that have not been consulted on and that have been presented through private industry discussions. I have never seen anything like this before. There are simple ways to make it fair in various proposed amendments in the rest of this group, spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann—
Lord Katz (Lab)
The noble Baroness has spoken for five and a half minutes now. Whether she is pressing or withdrawing her amendment, this should be brief.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
I have only two more lines. I will just remind noble Lords that there are simple ways to make this fair and reasonable, as spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. These give a free choice of instrument, with no compulsion—and yet there is still resistance, with no rational explanation. This is, of course, not the end, unless the Government see their error, but for now I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Altmann
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment and others to Clause 40 in the name of Baroness Coffey seek to cap the prescribed/mandated asset allocation to 10% and limits the time for this power till the end of 2032.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
On behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, who is unable to be here today, I am happy to move her Amendment 112 and speak to the others in this group. My remarks on Amendment 112 also apply to the noble Baroness’s Amendment 117 and Amendment 114 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh.
The aim of this amendment is merely to ensure that, in new Section 28C, which says that master trusts or GPPs will require regulatory approval of their asset allocation—and that that will require that at least the prescribed percentage by value of the assets held in the default funds of the scheme are qualifying assets—the maximum value should be no greater than the Government’s expressed aim of 10%. As far as Amendment 114 is concerned, the UK element of that should not be more than 5%. The aim is to avoid policy creep. If there is mandation and it prescribes a percentage in particular assets, this should not then be used as the basis for perhaps increasing the element of mandation, given that there is no figure in this instance in the Bill.
My Amendment 113 is on a slightly different aspect. In the case of regulatory approval being required for asset allocation and a prescribed amount of qualifying assets being required, I would like to add the possibility—this is a “may” not a “must”—of the minimum amount in prescribed assets being part of the flow rather than the stock. My concern—it has been mentioned on other groups, and I am sure we will come back to it—is that, by prescribing a percentage of assets in a very illiquid range of assets as the proportion of the already-existing stock of funds in a default fund, there is a danger that all the new contribution flows will need to be directed to that particular type of asset to end up with an overall percentage of the whole fund in the required prescribed assets. My suggestion is that the Government might want to have the option of just mandating—if they do so, which they may or may not—a proportion of the new contributions, which will perhaps be less disruptive to the market in the underlying assets.
I support all of the amendments in this group. I am also supportive of the idea that the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, and the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, are recommending and which the noble Lords, Lord Vaux and Lord Palmer, are suggesting, of moving away from the idea of mandating just private equity—or, indeed, just private equity and private debt—and having a wider range of options for meeting the Government’s intention, which I support, of bolstering pension fund support for new companies and growth assets in the UK that can help support and boost both the long-term growth of this country and the returns of the UK’s pension funds over the long term. I beg to move.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
My Lords, this is the first time I have been able to speak on the Bill. I am delighted to follow my noble friend, who I still consider the pension tsar and who is so knowledgeable in this field. I apologise for being absent when Amendments 132 and 133 were reached; unfortunately, with all the business in the House, there are inevitable clashes, and we cannot be in two places at one time.
I thank the ABI and others who have briefed me in advance of the Bill proceedings. I have to say, I agree with their conclusions. I believe that they are right when they say that the Government are right that it is not necessary to mandate asset allocation by pension funds.
This amendment is intended as a probing amendment for debating purposes; I am sure that the debate will represent the broad consideration of views in Committee this afternoon. The aim, really, is to provide reassurance to pension providers by capping the mandatory asset allocation at a total of, say, 10%, which is a figure that my noble friend Lady Coffey and I independently happened upon; I also added 5% for geographical locations, such as the UK, as a proportion either of total assets or of a subset of assets.
It is true to say that the industry is generally opposed to mandating asset allocation at all. This amendment would provide some reassurance, which is what I shall seek from the Minister when she comes to respond to this debate, to pension providers of that by capping the mandatory asset allocation to a total of these two figures—10% and 5%—as a proportion either of total assets or of a subset of assets.
There has been much talk of the Mansion House Accord this afternoon. I would like to chip in also and say that this power would align with the accord, which had widespread support across the industry—as well as from government, as it was supported by the Chancellor. I understand that the accord was led jointly by the ABI, Pensions UK and the City of London Corporation. It followed extensive discussion between the industry and the Pensions Minister and had a 17 signatories, who committed
“to the ambition of allocating at least 10% to private markets across all main DC default funds by 2030; and … within that, at least 5%”—
and I have now lost my briefing, so I am completely at sea.
I hope that I have given a little taste of where we are. I am not saying that these are the definitive figures; I am just throwing into the wash that this afternoon would be a good opportunity to give some reassurance to the pension providers in the way I and my noble friend Lady Coffey have sought to do.
Baroness Penn (Con)
My Lords, I will speak briefly in support of Amendments 112, 114 and 117 in the names of my noble friends Lady Coffey and Lady McIntosh of Pickering, which aim to set a cap on asset allocation.
In response to our debate on the previous group, the Minister consistently described the mandation power as seeking to achieve a “modest but meaningful” investment in private assets; and said, importantly, that it was designed as a “narrow backstop” to delivering the Mansion House Accord. If that is the case, why is the proportion of assets that can be mandated under this power not capped in line with that accord? Indeed, as I read it, it could be up to 100% of assets. Why is that? The Minister may point to consultation and other measures that will constrain the use of the power but, for something so controversial and which the Government say they do not want to use, I cannot understand why they are not constraining it in primary legislation.
I will touch on timescales in our debate on the next group, but the Minister says that this Government do not want to use this power. However, as things currently stand, it would be open to the next Government to use the power, and the one after that—as well as a couple of Governments in between if we do not go to full Parliaments, as we have not always done in recent years. In those circumstances, it would also be sensible to limit the power to delivering what the Government say they want it to do.
Why do the Government not want a maximum limit in primary legislation? What is their objection to it? The cynic in me wonders whether the power is so widely drawn that, when we remove mandation on Report—I might be getting ahead of myself but that is on the cards—the Government could bring forward a series of concessions at ping-pong to limit the use of the power to what they say they want it to do. I am sure that that is not the case, but it might be better than the position in which the Government think that this power, as it appears in the legislation, has been drawn appropriately. I am really interested in the Minister’s response on this.
Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)
My Lords, I will come in at this moment because I wish to speak in favour of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, which I have co-signed, because he is unable to be with us today. These words are both mine and the noble Lord’s, more or less.
I am not in favour of the asset allocation mandation clauses generally. Amendment 119, however, seeks to probe the reasons why the Government have chosen a particular asset class for mandation: private equity. I have no problem with pension schemes choosing to invest in private equity; historically, it has generated good returns, in large part because of the use of debt to leverage those returns. Private equity may be a good investment for pensions schemes, and this amendment would not prevent that.
However, my understanding is that the principal motive of the Government for mandating asset allocation is to drive greater economic growth. I agree that venture capital and private debt—two other asset types listed in the Bill—may indeed create growth, but I do not understand why the Government believe that private equity is a growth driver. I have to assume that this is because the Government have fallen for the story that the private equity industry often tells about how much investment it makes, how many people it employs, what great returns it generates, and so on. What private equity actually does is buy existing companies or assets, allowing the previous owners to cash out.
Very rarely, I believe, does a private equity company provide new equity into a company. Rather, it typically does the opposite: it funds the acquisition with a very high proportion of debt. The leveraged buy-out is the basic model of most private equity activity. That debt is not borrowed by the private equity itself; rather, it is pushed down into the underlying company, and the interest and any debt repayments are made from that company’s profits.
One effect of this is to reduce the taxable profits—in other words, the debt interest is tax deductible—and therefore the tax is payable by the company. The debt itself is often located in offshore low-tax locations, so tax is not paid on the interest by the private equity or the lender, which may well be related. This is a direct loss to the Exchequer. I hope the Minister can reply to that.
The high leverage also has the effect of reducing investment by the company in its products or services. Instead of investing in its future growth, the company now has to use much of its cash flow to pay the interest. What often happens is that the private equity undertakes a cost-rationalising exercise so that the profits are improved in the short term with a view to selling the business again as soon as possible. The leveraged effect of the debt means that private equity can make a substantial gain even if the underlying business grows only in line with inflation.
The cost rationalisation often invokes workforce reductions. Studies indicate that private equity-owned companies typically have lower levels of employment even five years after the original buy-out. This certainly tallies with my experience, although I have not had the benefit of the experience of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, who worked for private equity-owned companies during his career.
In the meantime, if there are any profits left, rather than being invested in growth they are usually paid out as dividends. In fact, it is not uncommon, if a company has managed to reduce its debt ratio, for a PE to recapitalise the company to put in more debt in order to allow the payment of a dividend. Of course there are exceptions, but, as many examples show, such as Thames Water—indeed, much of the water industry—Debenhams, Southern Cross and Silentnight, private equity cannot legitimately claim to be a force for growth. Are there good returns for its investors, and particularly its partners? Yes—but is it a force for growth? It is not really. It is said that £29.4 billion was invested in UK firms by private equity in 2024. Yes, but that investment was almost entirely in buying out existing businesses, which is very different from providing capital for growth.
So the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and I are baffled as to why the Government think that mandating pension funds to invest in private equity will be good for the country. It may be good for someone but not necessarily for the country. I repeat that I have no problem with a pension fund investing in private equity if the trustees believe it is right for the fund and its members, but I see no benefit, and probably a downside, for the country as a whole. If we must mandate allocation, let us at least target it to asset types that generate growth, such as venture capital or infrastructure. If the Government’s primary motive for mandation is to drive UK growth, we should exclude private equity from the list. I hope the Minister and her colleagues will give thought to this, because we are on the same wavelength and we want the same answer, but not in the way that the Bill proposes at the moment.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
I wanted to speak after the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, because, while I agree with what he said, I slightly disagreed when he talked about the favourable returns achieved by private equity. There is a massive problem with survivorship bias in those figures because the ones you never hear of again do not enter the figures.
I have a question for my noble friend the Minister. It seems an odd bit of drafting to say: “may for example”. Is “for example” doing anything in that sentence? Clearly it is not intended to be all encompassing, so others must be possible; it suggests that the person doing the drafting was not really sure that they liked what they were doing. It is pussyfooting about a bit. Secondly, what do these terms actually mean? I have an idea about “private equity”, but what about “private debt”, “venture capital” and “interests in land”? Goodness knows what the last one means. Are these terms defined anywhere? Can we get a clear definition of these things before we confirm this part of the Bill?
Lord Remnant (Con)
My Lords, I will comment briefly on the amendments in this group, tabled by several noble Lords, relating to the suitability of private markets and a potential cap on the allocation of funds to those markets. Equity and debt markets often now tend to be positively correlated; in other words, they move in the same direction. That was not normally the case in the past, when negative correlation brought better balance to a portfolio and to its risk and reward characteristics. So-called alternative investments—of which private markets form a part—that fall outside the traditional investments of stocks, bonds and cash can offer a sensible diversification.
The Mansion House Accord refers to the higher potential net returns that can arise from investment in private markets, but that comes with higher risks, less liquidity and, typically, less regulation. Given the disadvantages of the open-ended nature of the vehicle that would deliver such investments, to which I referred on an earlier group—and given that private markets, however defined, should be part only of a portfolio’s allocation to the alternatives class—I would certainly be in favour, as a matter of principle and practice, of a cap not exceeding the 10% mooted by my noble friends Lady Coffey and Lady McIntosh of Pickering. I cannot envisage any well-run, prudently managed and appropriately diversified pension fund wishing to exceed such a percentage in normal circumstances.
Viscount Trenchard (Con)
My Lords, briefly, it is not appropriate for legislation to tell the trustees of pension funds, in any case, that they can make investments in some types of structure but not in others. It should be entirely up to the trustees, in exercising their fiduciary duties, to determine what investments they make and the structures through which they make them to deliver a maximum level of risk that they are happy to accept.
The Government will succeed in realising their target of increasing pension fund investment in UK infrastructure by adopting fiscal and economic policies that encourage growth. We will then see a natural return to the much higher levels of UK equity investment by pension funds that used to obtain many years ago. If the Government require, nevertheless, some potential or possible mandation, it is right that there should be a cap. But, as my noble friend Lord Remnant said, it is inconceivable that any pension fund manager would be likely to invest more than 10%—I would say considerably less than that—in asset classes traditionally defined as alternative assets.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, briefly, this group again underlines a central point that we have been making: mandation should not be in the Bill. Time and again, we have heard concerns about the risks of picking winners and the unintended consequences that inevitably follow. I raised these issues on the previous group, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles and Lady Altmann, have today and previously put those concerns firmly on record.
However, I am grateful to noble Lords for their thoughtful efforts to limit or mitigate the impact of the mandation power. I thank my friend, the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, supported by my noble friends Lady McIntosh of Pickering and Lady Penn in particular, for their remarks on these issues. However, our view remains unchanged and, for reasons already rehearsed at length, asset allocation mandates have no place in this legislation. There is no compelling evidence that they are either necessary or effective in increasing productive investment in the UK.
If we are serious about addressing the barriers to UK investment, we must be honest about where those barriers lie. They include governance and regulatory burdens; risk-weighting and capital requirements; liquidity constraints and scheme-specific funding; and maturity considerations. None of these challenges is addressed, let alone solved, by mandation. If, notwithstanding these concerns, the reserve power is to be retained, significantly stronger safeguards are essential: a clear cap on the proportion of assets that may be mandated; more robust reporting and evidential requirements before regulations are made; explicit conditions for access to any transition pathway relief; a strengthened savers’ interest test; and rigorous post-implementation review. The question of when and on what basis the power should be sunsetted is one that we will return to on the next group, but the fundamental point must be clear: mandation is the wrong tool and the Bill risks embedding unjustified and anti-competitive discrimination between equivalent investment vehicles, driven not by evidence or public interest but by a narrow and self-interested approach. I will address those issues in more detail in a later group but, for now, I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to the specific amendments raised.
However—before she gets up—I wish to turn to Amendment 118 in my name. It probes the power that allows regulations made under new Section 28C to include assets of various classes under the broad heading of private assets and to permit the future inclusion of additional asset classes. I appreciate the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, on this part.
I touched on this matter in some detail in the previous groups, so I will not repeat those arguments here. However, this amendment once again draws attention to our concern about the specific types of asset that the Government have chosen to list on page 46 of the Bill. It remains an issue about which we are deeply concerned, and one on which we will continue to work closely with other noble Lords though to Report.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, I apologise to the noble Viscount for jumping up prematurely. These amendments relate to the level of any asset allocation requirements and the potential treatment of investments in private equity and private debt as qualifying assets for the purpose of any asset allocation requirement.
I will start with the with the level of any asset allocation requirement, a question raised by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh in her Amendment 114 and the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, in Amendment 112. Both would cap the percentage of default fund assets that could be required to be invested in qualifying assets. I understand why noble Lords were keen to table these amendments and to look for a cap. I have to say to the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, that I am shocked by such cynicism in one so young. I will explain the—perfectly rational—reason the Government have not done this; I hope that she will find it very satisfying and feel suitably chastened at that point. We do not expect to need to exercise the power, but to do so would be a significant step and, as noble Lords may have picked up by now, the Government’s general approach has been to design the power so that it can be used as a backstop to the commitments used in the Mansion House Accord. I underscore that point.
The aim has been to create a backstop to that rather than to fix a numerical cap in primary legislation. That is what it is designed to do. The accord is not a legal document, and its terms and definitions are not of a kind that could simply be lifted into statute. If the Government were ever to exercise these powers, we would need to define key terms precisely, and it is at least possible that those definitions might have some bearing on the precise percentage levels that are appropriate. We have therefore not taken the step of hard-wiring a fixed cap, although I underline that we have included various other safeguards, which I have repeated more than once, so will not repeat again in the interests of time.
In relation to Amendment 113 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, the Mansion House Accord commitment has informed the design of these powers, including the ability for government to require a proportion of assets to be invested in specified qualifying assets. I understand the point that she was making, but our approach has been deliberately limited, going no further than necessary to support the commitments already made. That caution is important, given that this is a novel—and, I discern, a not entirely uncontroversial—part of the Bill. Although we are aligned on the objectives, I would not want to suggest a change in policy direction where none is intended. Our aim is to give the DC pensions industry reasonable clarity about our expectations.
Amendment 119, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, interrogates the inclusion of private equity as an example of a qualifying asset. Its effect would be to remove private equity from the illustrative list in new Section 28C(5). Amendment 120 from my noble friend Lord Sikka would do the same, as well as removing private debt.
Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)
I thank the Minister and all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. We have had a good rehearsal of the views and concerns about mandation and the need for a specific limit. I understand that the Minister is not keen on having a specific limit, but I hope that we can meet ahead of Report to go through some of these issues, which are keenly felt by many noble Lords in Committee.
The same is true of the concern about private equity or private debt and the dangers of being invested in them. It strikes me as rather strange that the Government think that the risk-return opportunities in private equity are suitable for mandation but that that would not extend to quoted listed investment companies, which have long proven their track record without the disasters that we have often seen with private equity. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment probes the reasons behind the provision allowing the Secretary of State until 2035 to exercise the mandation power.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to open what I hope and assume will be another interesting debate. Once again, I hope it will shine a light on the flaws of mandation from new and specific angles that merit discussion.
Amendment 115 in my name is a probing amendment, which goes to the architecture of the power itself. The Bill allows the Secretary of State to exercise the mandation power up until 2035. Why has 2035 been chosen for sunset? Why is it that particular year? Was that date chosen because it aligns with some evidenced policy rationale, a defined market transition or a known obstacle that is expected to have fallen away by then? A sunset date sets the constitutional balance between Parliament, Ministers and the pensions industry. A sunset clause extending to 2035 runs beyond the life of this Parliament and would allow very broad discretion for a Secretary of State, not merely to encourage investment but to direct it, in effect, by setting targets and conditions. That is an extraordinary proposition when we are dealing with the retirement savings of millions of people.
I put a simple set of questions to the Minister. What analysis underpins the choice of 2035? Was it recommended by the department’s own evidence base? If the concern is a temporary set of barriers, for instance, a collective action problem, why is the power not time-limited to a shorter period, with a requirement for Parliament to renew it if, and only if, the evidence remains compelling? If the Government believe the power is genuinely a reserved power, why does it need such a long reserve? If the Minister cannot explain the logic of the date, it becomes harder to accept that the scope of the power has been calibrated with care.
Amendment 152 relates to the review process following the exercise of powers under Section 28C—the mandation power. This is another probing amendment intended to test why the Government consider a five-year period an appropriate timeline for regulations to be reviewed and why an earlier review has not been proposed. Five years is a long time in pensions and financial markets. It is a very long time in the life of a saver, because compounding does not wait politely while Whitehall decides whether its intervention has worked. If an allocation has been distorted, returns have been impaired, costs have risen or liquidity has been compromised, five years is long enough for the damage to become embedded in outcomes. It is also long enough for market conditions to have changed so significantly that any review risks becoming a rear-view mirror exercise rather than a real safeguard.
I ask the Minister directly, why five years? What is the justification? Is there evidence that a shorter review period will be impractical? Why are the Government not willing to commit to a more immediate post-implementation assessment, perhaps—let me be helpful to the Minister—within 12 months or two years, to ensure that any harm to savers is identified early? If Ministers believe the power is low risk, surely a quicker review should not trouble them.
There is a further point. The Bill speaks of not only assessing the effect on the financial interests of members of master trusts and savers in group personal pension schemes, but of such other matters as the Secretary of State may consider appropriate. What precisely do the Government envisage falling within those other matters? Does it include costs to schemes, liquidity, operational complexity, market impact and whether compliance has forced schemes away from diversified strategies that would otherwise have been in members’ best interests? Does it include, as many fear, political metrics dressed up as economic analysis, such as whether a mandated allocation has supported a preferred sector or class of domestic asset?
Most importantly, what happens if the review reveals that the financial interests of members have been harmed? What is the mechanism for redress and the practical remedy? Do the Government anticipate compensating schemes or savers? As the Committee will appreciate, we will return to the question of redress later in our proceedings.
I now return to the subject of market risk through Amendment 115, which is intended to ensure that any review explicitly considers two linked dangers. The first is that mandated investment requirements may become misaligned with economic conditions. The second is that directing multiple schemes into the same assets could cause market distortion or asset price inflation.
Mandation can distort markets in ways that are entirely foreseeable. If multiple large schemes are required, either explicitly or implicitly, to invest in the same asset class, the demand shock can inflate prices. If market participants interpret government direction as a signal of future price support, price movements can be amplified further; these arguments have been rehearsed not only in Committee but at Second Reading. Artificial price inflation then risks reducing long-term returns for pension savers because you are requiring schemes to buy after prices have been driven up, rather than allowing them to invest on value and fundamentals. It is picking winners and losers, not through the discipline of markets but through the blunt force of regulation.
So I have further questions for the Minister, I am afraid. Has the department modelled the potential for asset price inflation in any asset class that might be subject to a mandated allocation? Has the department assessed the risk of crowded trades in which schemes find themselves paying more for the same exposure because the Government have forced them to compete with one another? Has the department consulted the Bank of England or the FPC on the risk that mandated flows could contribute to procyclicality or instability, particularly in less liquid markets? What is the Government’s plan if mandated allocations coincide with an already elevated valuation environment?
There is a second risk: that of regulation falling behind economic reality. Mandated asset allocations risk becoming misaligned with economic conditions because compliance takes time. Requirements to hold a specified percentage in a particular UK asset class within a fixed timeframe may no longer be appropriate by the time schemes comply. Economic conditions, market valuations and government priorities can change far more quickly than regulatory mandates. This creates a real risk of locking savers into allocations that are no longer in their best financial interests.
So, again, what mechanism will ensure that mandated requirements remain compatible with changing economic conditions? Will there be a duty to pause or suspend requirements when market conditions deteriorate? Will there be an explicit test that requires Ministers to show why a mandated allocation is consistent with the fiduciary duty at the point when it is imposed, not merely when it is first conceived? If Ministers insist that their fiduciary duties remain paramount, how do they reconcile that with a policy that, by design, substitutes government preference for trustee judgment? I am reverting back to that argument.
Amendment 209 would require the Government to review the barriers that may prevent pension and investment funds investing in the UK, including regulatory, tax and fiduciary constraints; and to report their findings to Parliament. Instead of beginning with mandation then asking later whether it has caused harm, the Government should have started here. If Ministers genuinely wish to increase productive investment in the UK, their first duty is to diagnose the barriers properly. Stakeholders have emphasised repeatedly to us that limited UK investment by pension schemes is not a failure of willingness but reflects real constraints: government and regulatory burdens; risk weighting and capital requirements; liquidity constraints; scheme-specific funding and maturity considerations; fixed fees; and the economics of administering more complex, perhaps even less liquid, investments at scale. Many of those may be solvable issues but they require the hard work of reform, not the easy headline of compulsion. Addressing these barriers is far more likely to increase investment sustainably than imposing mandation, and care should be taken to avoid adding further unintended obstacles through legislation.
Baroness Penn (Con)
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Younger has asked many of the questions that my Amendments 116A and 130A seek to probe on the rationale for the Government’s timescales in the Bill. They are also intended to shorten those timescales and implement an absolute sunset; I want to be clear to the Minister that I do not think that a deadline by which the maximum asset allocation cannot be raised further is a sunset.
I heard what the Minister said in our debate on the previous group about introducing a maximum allocation cap. I am not sure that I really buy into that argument but, if that is the rationale, are the Government really saying that it might take 10 years to work out what the definite figures agreed under the Mansion House Accord are and that that is why they have their timescales in place? Are the Government really saying to those who signed up to the Mansion House Accord—or, indeed, to those who did not—that the figures that could be mandated under this power could go above 10% and 5%? That would make it an even harder power for people to swallow. Further, this could be over by an unlimited amount—not even a variance of maybe up to 15%, but up to any level.
The Government have used the argument for the mandation power that it creates certainty for those pension funds but, the more we discuss it, the more uncertainty there seems to be. The figures of 10% and 5% do not seem to be the figures of 10% or 5% any more. Under the Government’s approach, we will get a cap, but maybe in 10 years’ time, while the assets required to be invested under that cap can still change in perpetuity. I used the example at Second Reading of one Government wishing to mandate investment in net zero and the other wishing to mandate investment in defence assets; both are conceivable things that we might see happen in the longer term. The point is that, the longer this power is in place, the greater the risk that it is used not for this Government’s intention but for something else.
On the guardrails outside of the primary legislation, which the Minister referred to but rightly did not go into in our debate on the other group, I have a question about one: the requirement to consult. At Second Reading, the Minister said that the Government would be required to consult before using these powers for the first time. I want to check whether this means that they will not be required to consult when amending them subsequently or they will be required to consult each time they bring forward regulations under this power. I had thought that it was the former—consulting each time they used the powers—but, if it is not, and it is only the first time when they are used, I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify that point.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie for introducing this group and setting the scene so eloquently, and to my noble friend Lady Penn for speaking to her amendment. I shall speak to the amendments in my name and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, for lending her support to Amendments 129, 153 and 156. They follow on neatly from the other amendments about which we have heard. The Bill requires the Government to publish a report before the introductory regulations are brought into force to bring in the reserve powers, but it covers only how the financial interests of savers will be affected and the effect of the regulations on economic growth.
The purpose of my Amendment 129 is to set out additional items to be covered in the report, to ensure that the Government properly and comprehensively assess the impacts of any future regulations, such as, for example, the functioning of workplace pensions markets and impacts on the market of assets to be mandated and other requirements. What I am proposing in Amendment 129 is to test whether the Government have done enough to justify using such a drastic power. I am also suggesting, taking up the point of my noble friend Lord Younger, that the first report should be in less than five years: the first report should be after two years, because a lot of damage could be done in the first two years and even more damage could be done if there is no report for five years.
Amendment 156 continues on this theme, looking at a different part of Clause 40 for these purposes. Amendment 153 says that there should be a review, as I have mentioned, which should take place within at least two years, in addition to a review within at least five years. While the review in the Bill allows for mandation to be in place for five years before the Secretary of State must review its impact, I believe that that is too long and that it could potentially allow for negative effects to set in under the regulations under the Bill for affected default schemes. Taken together, Amendments 153 and 156 bring forward the review of regulations to take place within two years after those regulations have been in force, as well as after another three years to stop any further damage being done. We set out here what those reviews should look at
“the functioning of the market for Master Trusts … what effects the measures have had on that market … what effects the measures have had on the markets for qualifying assets”,
and so on, as set out in these amendments.
I hope the Minister will look favourably on these amendments, particularly since there is a mood on this side to coalesce around a review within the first two years.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, all the amendments in this group raise important issues. I hope that none of them will be necessary, because I hope that we will have got rid of the power from the Bill, so these will become irrelevant details. I have Amendment 130 in this group, which would modify the mandation power by removing new Section 28C(15). This subsection “overrides any provision” of a trustee or scheme rules that conflicts with the mandation power. Thus, if the scheme had been set up with investment parameters that, for example, ruled out investing in private equity, and the Government then specified private equity, the wishes of the employer expressed in the scheme’s governing documents would be completely overwritten. Since there is no requirement in the Bill, as I understand it, for the Government to specify more than one asset class, it is quite possible that the Government could specify a required asset class that conflicted with things that had been deliberately set up when the scheme was set up.
I can understand, of course, why the Government want to encourage pension schemes to consider investing in alternative asset classes. I do not think you will find much resistance to the concept of investing in alternative asset classes. But I simply cannot understand why the Government think they should have a power to force schemes to invest in a particular way, if a conscious decision has already been made not to invest in that asset class. The Government might not agree with that decision, but I hope we do not live in a world where the Government can simply ignore the clearly expressed wishes of those they govern. I hope that we still live in a free society. Subsection (15) seems to me to extend the powers of the state too far, and we ought not to go along with it.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
My Lords, I have several amendments in this group: Amendments 154, 157, 158 and 159, which I will not say much about because I am fishing in the same pond as everybody else. If there is this mandation, we are anxious to know how it works, and we think the review should come earlier—I have put in some of the things that I think it should look at. I will spend more time on my Amendment 131, which is about prior steps that would have to be taken before there was any exercise of the mandation and regulations were made. It is about the prior steps that must be taken before the Secretary of State can exercise the regulation-making power in new Section 28C—what I termed the devil’s clause once before, although we now know that it is the ABI clause.
It is probably worth pausing here to remind ourselves whom the ABI represent: it is the Association of British Insurers and it represents the insurance companies, which are the manufacturers of the LTAFs, as was indicated earlier. It had a meeting in which, as usual, it displayed the slide that says, “We’re not colluding and breaking competition law, but we’re just going to agree that we won’t be investing in the other vehicle that has protected net asset value, and we’ll do a Q&A that says that’s not happening”. Interestingly, the insurers present at that meeting seem to have either forgotten about it or are telling me that they did not agree to anything. However, I leave that hanging.
If the Government wish to enforce a power of this potential scope, which, as has been explained, is much wider than the example in the Bill—a power that could reshape asset allocation across the pension sector—it must be subject to proper safeguards. These prior steps are not obstacles but constructive checks that should support the Government’s own objectives.
Proposed new paragraph (a) would require the Secretary of State to
“review the effect of any voluntary agreements or coordinated commitments relating to asset allocation”.
We have had a lot of policy alignment, pledges and so forth, and we all want the voluntary method to succeed. But if the point comes that regulations are contemplated, it is essential to understand what the voluntary route has already achieved, where the evidence points and why it did not happen.
Proposed new paragraph (b) would require an assessment of
“the impact of any such agreements on asset allocation, pricing and valuations”.
If the Government are concerned about market functioning, they should be equally concerned about how co-ordinated commitments affect pricing signals and valuation discipline. This is simply good policy hygiene because it ultimately affects workers’ pensions.
Proposed new paragraph (c) would require a review of
“the likely effect on returns to pensions savers”.
We all hope for the double benefit: better long-term returns for savers and productive investment that supports the UK economy. But we must analyse whether that is happening in practice, and if not, why not, before moving to a regulatory footing.
Proposed new paragraph (d) would require the Secretary of State to “obtain clearance” from the Competition and Markets Authority, and that is entirely consistent with the CMA’s pro-competition remit and with the competitiveness and growth objectives embedded in FSMA. Any use of this power must reinforce the UK’s competition framework, not bypass it, and where co-ordinated commitments already exist in the market, the Government must be certain that any regulations they bring forward meet a clear public interest justification.
Lord Ashcombe (Con)
My Lords, it is a privilege to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, after that. I support Amendments 115 and 152, in the names of my noble friends Viscount Younger of Leckie and Lady Stedman-Scott, concerning the Government’s draft powers to mandate. The matter before us is not, in essence, a question of technical refinement but one that touches directly upon the principles of parliamentary sovereignty and the standards of scrutiny that this House has long upheld.
As has been evident during the deliberations of this Committee, we are all acutely aware that the pensions industry forms the very foundation of the long-term financial security of millions of people across the United Kingdom. It is therefore essential that any mandates imposed upon this sector are framed with clarity, certainty and due consideration for the practical realities—of which we have heard a lot this afternoon—faced by industry participants and savers alike. The sector quite reasonably seeks early and unambiguous direction so that businesses and individuals may plan prudently and with confidence. Ambiguity serves only to sow uncertainty and to heighten risk; it also almost always reduces the probability of the desired outcome.
Clarity alone, however, is insufficient. The process by which such mandates may be introduced or amended must itself be transparent, accountable and subject to full and proper parliamentary oversight. Under the current provisions, potentially substantial changes to the scope of mandation powers could be affected through negative secondary instruments. Such a mechanism falls short of the constitutional rigour expected in matters of this significance. These instruments, as the Committee well knows, may pass with limited visibility and without the robust debate and testing that both Houses are uniquely equipped to provide.
The amendments before us seek to remedy that shortfall by requiring that any future changes to mandation rules receive the express consent of Parliament, rather than proceeding without a vote. This proposition is not, I emphasise, a question of party-political alignment but a question of sound governance, institutional responsibility and public trust.
We must not lose sight of what is fundamentally at stake. Effective parliamentary scrutiny protects not only the interests of the industry and the Government but, most importantly, the millions of individuals, including myself, who have saved faithfully into the pension system and rely on its long-term stability. I therefore urge the Committee to lend its support to these amendments. In doing so, we would strengthen the clarity and certainty required by the pensions and lifetime savings sector; uphold the enduring principle of parliamentary consent; and ensure that the governance of our pension system reflects the transparency, diligence and integrity that the public rightly expects and deserves.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, for his introduction to his amendments in this group and all noble Lords who have spoken.
I will start with the sunset provisions. Amendment 115, from the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, would remove one element of these, but I understand that it is obviously tabled for probing purposes. There are two distinct elements to the sunset provision. The first is the element identified in the amendment: the provision in new Section 28C(3), which means that if percentage asset allocation requirements have been brought into effect by the end of 2035, they cannot be increased beyond that date. The second is what I call the “main” sunset provisions, in Clause 122(6), which automatically removes the power from the statute book altogether if it has not been used by the end of 2035. I fully recognise that there is a legitimate debate about where to set those sunset dates. Through her Amendment 116, the Baroness, Lady, Coffey, would prefer it to be shorter. The noble Baroness, Lady Penn, proposes bringing forward to 2030 the date beyond which the requirements cannot be raised. Her Amendment 130A would ensure that not only the enabling powers but any requirements in effect would expire in 2035. This is a significant power that would potentially be at the disposal of different Governments and such restrictions would seek to ensure that it is not on the statute book any longer than required.
The noble Viscount made the point about this being in a subsequent Parliament. In a sense, that is inevitable, because the Mansion House commitments are only to make those commitments by 2030 and, because this is meant as a backstop to the Mansion House Accord, the timeframe is shaped by the timescale within the Mansion House agreement and the Government’s own reform plans. We obviously do not want it on the statute book for longer than it is needed but, on the other hand, the Government do not want—nobody would—to create a situation in which a future Secretary of State felt compelled to use the power prematurely just to avoid it lapsing. It was therefore a genuine judgment about where to land it. In my view, it would not be logical to have the ability to implement a requirement, only for it to expire very shortly afterwards, as Amendment 130A might permit. The Government had to make a judgment between those competing considerations and we came down on 2035. I accept that it is matter of judgment and the Government’s may differ from that of noble Lords, but I hope that explains the competing pressures that made us land in that space.
The Committee has also focused, through a series of amendments, on the requirements for reviewing any asset allocations before and after they are implemented. The Government are acutely aware of the need to both design any regulations with great care and ensure that, if they are every introduced, they work as intended. That is why we have embedded not one but two statutory reporting requirements in Clause 40. The first is the ex ante report, which must be published under new Section 28C(12) before the power is exercised for the first time. In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, her first understanding was correct. The requirement to consult is on first use. This requirement arises from a combination of new Section 28C(12) and (14), but the approach was designed so that the compulsory report and the critical first use of the power are informed by the consultation, and that is why it was put up front.
The second is the post-implementation review, which must be carried out and published under new Section 30A no later than five years after the first regulations come into force. Amendment 154 tabled by noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, would bring forward the mandatory post-implementation review of any asset allocation requirements from five years to three. The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, would require an additional review within two years as well as the existing five-year review. The amendment tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, would remove the time limit altogether.
I understand why noble Lords would want a shorter deadline for the post-implementation review, especially as many have strong reservations about the power in general. Again, the five-year deadline is a matter of judgment, and I accept that we may land at different points, but our concern is to allow enough time for the arrangements to bed in, so that their effects can be properly understood. Markets can take time to adjust. It is possible, for example, that some providers might seek an exemption under the savers’ interest test. Those applications might be granted on a time-limited basis or be subject to an appeal process. That all means that the full impacts of the measure might not be visible after only a short period. On the other hand, by choosing 2035, we have deliberately kept the deadline short enough that it serves as a meaningful check.
I turn now to the content of the pre-implementation and the post-implementation reports. A number of amendments, in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady McIntosh and Lady Bowles, and others, seek to specify additional matters that the Government should be obliged to review. In the main, I do not demur from the importance of any of the topics that noble Lords have identified; they cover many of the kinds of issues that any responsible Government would want to consider either before or after using a power of this kind. Indeed, it is worth recalling that the Government have already conducted a wide-ranging review of pensions investment that considers many of these topics. The review reported last year and, as noble Lords know, led to many of the measures in the Bill.
However, the Bill already places clear duties on the Secretary of State to look at the key overarching questions: how many measures are expected to affect, and then have actually affected, the financial interests of members in the relevant schemes, and how they affect economic growth in the UK? Both the ex ante and post-implementation reports must cover those core matters, and both are expressly permitted to cover “any other matters” the Secretary of State considers appropriate. That formulation is designed precisely to allow the Government to take account of the kinds of issues included in many of these amendments, but to do so in a way which can be adapted to circumstances at the time, rather than being hard-wired into primary legislation.
I stress that these reporting requirements are not the only safeguards built into the framework. The savers’ interest test provides a route by which providers can apply to the regulator for an exemption, where they consider that complying with the asset allocation requirements would cause material financial detriment to their members. If, for example, the kinds of market distortions or misalignments described in Amendment 155, from the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, were to arise in such a way as to raise material concerns about the impact on savers of meeting the targets, providers might well choose to apply for an exemption.
The issue of transparency was raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and implicitly by the noble Viscount, Lord Younger. I absolutely agree that it is good practice to be clear about the evidence and submissions that have informed policy decisions in this area. That has been the Government’s practice to date. In taking forward the pensions investment review, from which these measures have arisen, the Government consulted extensively and then published a 47 page response, including a full list of the 107 organisations that responded. If further formal consultations are carried out to inform the work required under the Bill, they will be conducted in the same spirit of openness. However, I do not think that we need detailed prescriptive publication requirements in primary legislation to achieve that.
Amendment 131 from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, would impose a further list of “prior steps” that the Secretary of State must take before using the power. One is a requirement that the Government must obtain clearance from the Competition and Markets Authority prior to exercising the powers. I will not rehearse the debate on investment trusts; we have done that already today. However, I stress again that this mandation clause is neither the work of the devil nor the work of the ABI; it is the work of the Government acting as a backstop to a voluntary Mansion House Accord, which is an industry-led initiative by 17 pension providers, aimed at securing better financial outcomes for DC savers and boosting investment in the UK. It is for the participants of the Mansion House Accord to ensure that they comply with competition law, and I have no reason to believe that they are not doing so. For our part, the Government will of course continue to comply fully with competition law in relation to any actions taken under these powers. I do not think a statutory requirement to seek specific CMA clearance is necessary or justified.
Amendment 130 from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, is a probing amendment to understand why we need to override any contrary provisions in scheme trust deeds. New Section 28C(15) simply clarifies that, where there is a conflict between the statutory asset allocation requirements and restrictive provisions in a trust deed, the statutory requirements take precedence. It is designed to give trustees legal certainty, not to dilute their general duties. As I have said, we do not expect to have to use this power but, were it to be exercised, we would want to ensure that there is certainty for trustees that these requirements may be met without inadvertently causing a conflict with a provision in a trust deed or rules.
Obviously, we do not have sight of every set of deeds or rules that schemes operate under, and it may well be that no relevant conflicting provisions exist. The provision is essentially a precaution. It means that it is not necessary for trustees or providers to spend time or money to scrutinise the interaction between the asset allocation provisions and their deeds. It also addresses the risk that a scheme might find itself at risk of closure to new auto-enrolment business due to a trust deed provision that prevents it from complying with the asset allocation requirements, which it may well want to do.
However, I want to draw a clear distinction between any specific provisions within the trust deed and the broader responsibility of trustees to select investments that operate in the best interests of members. That does not change, and trustees would continue to be subject to a duty to invest in savers’ best interests in line with the law.
Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)
My Lords, I will be brief in closing this debate; I am conscious that I spoke at some length when opening this group.
First, the point raised by my noble friend Lady Noakes was a sound one. Amendment 130 probes the extent to which it is appropriate for regulations to override the trust deed or rules of a pension scheme. I listened carefully to the response from the Minister but I think—my noble friend may agree with me—that this is a fundamental issue that goes to the heart of scheme governance and trustee responsibility. I know it is an issue that she feels strongly about, and we do too, because it is vital that trustees retain clear and accountable responsibility for investment decisions made in members’ best interests. I will reflect on Hansard, as I am sure my noble friend will too.
I also just touch briefly on Amendment 153, tabled by my noble friend Lady McIntosh. As she highlighted, this amendment seeks to ensure that a review of the asset allocation mandation powers takes place within at least two years, as well as within five, and of course it reflects the same concern that I raised. I also listened when the Minister said that it was a matter of judgment by the Government. I take note of what she said—I will not give a view on that but, again, we will reflect carefully on it. Despite the best efforts of the Minister, I remain with the feeling that there is not a clear rationale or sufficient assurance, but we will reflect.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, raised a number of technical and specific points. Taken together, this group once again demonstrates the complexity of this particular area, the necessary safeguards and the prior steps required, and the degree of intervention that the Government risk embarking upon through this mandation power. Once mandation is introduced, it inevitably draws policymakers into ever more detailed interventions, and with that comes a cascade of unintended consequences, as I said before. We will therefore reflect on the Minister’s responses but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to remove the time limit for savers’ interest exemptions to the asset allocation requirements that would be set by the Authority.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
My Lords, I hope that this little group is fairly self-explanatory.
In Amendment 141, I am again seeking to provide more certainty in relation to the savers’ interest test for exemptions to the asset allocation requirements and ensure that providers are not required to alter their asset allocation until the authority has made its determination or they have received the outcome of the referral to the Upper Tribunal. This is a probing amendment for debating purposes. I hope that we will get further light from the Minister when she replies.
My noble friend Lady Noakes has just reminded me that I would also like to speak to Amendment 140, the “starter for 10” in this group. Here I am seeking to remove the time limit for savers’ interest exemptions to the asset allocation requirements that would be set by the authority. I thank the Committee for its forbearance in allowing me to speak to Amendment 141 as well.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 146 to 150. This group of amendments is all about trustees. Although I submit that nothing in this Bill should unsettle the basic foundation of our trustee law, there remains extensive debate in the courts and academic literature, and among trustees, on how far wider policy objectives and emerging risks can be taken into account. I am trying to address some of those.
Amendment 146 would simply reinforce the obvious: fiduciary duty remains the overriding principle of pension governance and trustees must act in the best financial interests of members. That is the cornerstone of trust law. The courts have been clear for decades that trustees must prioritise members’ financial interests above all else. Yet the combination of the Mansion House rhetoric, promotional language in the Bill and the possibility of future regulations has created real anxiety among trustees about whether they are expected to prioritise government preferences over member outcomes. This amendment aims to remove that ambiguity. It would restate the law, reassuring trustees that their primary duty has not changed.
Amendment 147 follows on from that in seeking to introduce a safe harbour. Trustees are increasingly worried about being second-guessed, not for misconduct but for failing to meet expectations that are not clearly defined. Many are lay trustees. They act in good faith, take professional advice and follow their fiduciary duties. They should not face penalties or adverse consequences because they did not meet a quota or chose a different route to the same underlying assets. A safe harbour is a standard legal mechanism used in other regulatory regimes. It protects trustees who do the right thing, prevents retrospective reinterpretation of policy signals and ensures that trustees can make decisions based on evidence, not fear.
Amendment 148, also tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, addresses systemic risk. Trustees already consider systemic risks: climate change, economic resilience, supply chain fragility and other long-term factors that materially affect pension outcomes. The Pensions Regulator already expects trustees to consider these issues, but the statutory framework is uneven and expectations are not always clear, so this amendment would codify best practice. It would ensure that trustees consider systemic risks as part of their fiduciary duties, while making it explicit that this does not mandate investment in any particular vehicle. It is about risk management, not direction of capital. Trustees are careful and sensible people and will observe the policy direction, including on private assets. As I said last week, before we had the devil’s clause, there was broad agreement that it would be far better to trust the trustees.
Amendment 149, again from the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, addresses structural discrimination. I have already dealt extensively with how the Bill risks creating unequal treatment between different collective investment structures. Trustees should be free to choose the most appropriate structure for their scheme, whether listed or unlisted, based on liquidity, valuation, discipline, governance or member outcomes. The amendment would simply ensure a level playing field. It would prevent distortions, protect competition and ensure that trustees are not nudged away from structures that have served savers well for over a century.
Finally, Amendment 150 deals with herding risk. Regulatory herding is a known danger, which we have seen most recently and dramatically with LDI, where regulation, guidance or professional advice pushes everyone in the same direction at the same time and systemic risk increases, not decreases. The Mansion House agenda, if interpreted too narrowly, risks creating precisely that kind of clustering. This amendment would require the Secretary of State to avoid mandating or promoting investment in a way that induces herding and ensure that any guidance emphasises diversification and risk management. It is a simple “Do no harm” provision which learns from recent history. It is also embedded in the terms of the Mansion House Accord, as spoken to last Thursday by my noble friend Lord Sharkey. Trustees must not be forced to purchase assets that do not exist, do not exist safely or do not exist at a fair price.
None of these amendments would obstruct the Government’s objective. None would prevent investment in productive finance. None would limit trustee discretion. What they would do is ensure that trustees remain protected, that their duties remain clear and that the Bill does not inadvertently distort markets, undermine competition or create new systemic risks. These amendments are modest, sensible and protective. They would strengthen the Bill, support trustees and safeguard the long-term interests of pension savers. It is what we should all be thinking about.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
I support mandation. I am in favour of the Government introducing the measures in this Bill, in principle. All Governments have a duty, not just a right, to deal with market failure. If the current investment advice and structures that we have are failing to deliver investments in the growth that we need in our economy, then the Government have a duty to act. I am not yet convinced that they have all the mechanics of mandation right, but that is the process we are going through at the moment in investigating how it will be achieved.
I am not so sure—I ask my noble friend the Minister to guide the Committee on this—about a question raised at Second Reading to which there was no answer, which applies to this part of Bill. Do the Government understand that the inevitable corollary of mandation is responsibility for the outcome? Outcomes may be better. We are told at length that this will improve things; the aim is to grow the economy to achieve good investments.
The Government may not have a legal responsibility to make sure that happens, but they certainly have a moral responsibility when they are saying how members’ money should be invested and they also, inevitably, have a political responsibility to ensure that they produce a system that enjoys broad public trust. A failure to achieve the Government’s objective will break that trust. Do the Government appreciate and understand the implications of what they are doing?
Lord Sharkey (LD)
My Lords, I will speak briefly under the auspices of Amendments 146 and 147 when we resume some of the discussions the Minister promised last week to continue, notably on mandation and statutory guidance. In our debate last week, I tried to establish the evidence base for the Minister’s assertion that
“the Government would not be proposing these powers”—
mandation—
“if there were not strong evidence that savers’ interests lie in greater investment diversification than we see today in the market”.—[Official Report, 22/1/26; col. GC 218.]
The key words here are “strong” and “evidence”. There are certainly those whose opinions would align with the Minister’s assertion, but opinion is not the same as evidence and not nearly the same as strong evidence.
As I said last week, the DWP recently commissioned the Government Actuary’s Department to model four variations of pension scheme strategies. I will not list them again, but the study concluded that across a range of economic scenarios the model portfolios deliver very similar projected pension pot sizes. But it also showed that if the current underperformance of the UK versus global equities persists, UK-heavy allocations will underperform the baseline. The Government Actuary’s Department said in a post on GOV.UK on 15 November 2024:
“Our analysis showed that a greater level of exposure to private markets may deliver slightly improved outcomes to members. However, there is considerable uncertainty, particularly with the assumptions for projected future investment returns”.
That does not sound like strong evidence for anything.
The Institute and Faculty of Actuaries makes the same point. It says that, based on the Government’s own impact assessment, “We do not think there is strong, clear evidence that in most foreseeable scenarios savers’ interests lie in greater investment in private markets and infrastructure”. It believes that there exists a very uncertain central estimate of an extra two percentage points over 30 years, equivalent to 0.066% a year compounded. It goes on to say: “Given the inherent uncertainty in such estimates, this is almost negligible and could easily turn out to be negative over the next 30 years or indeed much higher”. The IFoA goes on to say: “The point is that it is far from clear that there would be a material benefit”. That does not sound like strong evidence commendation either, yet this is the basis on which the Government seek to mandate investment, which raises as a consequence significant concerns about the operation of fiduciary duty.
The proposals in this Bill, for there is a power to mandate investment, cause uncertainty about trustees’ duties to their members. That uncertainty is understandable, especially because the case for mandation is weakly evidenced, if evidenced at all. The uncertainty is also unnecessary in many ways because of the existence of the Mansion House Accord for which, as others have said, 17 leading pension providers have already signed up. How will the anticipated statutory guidance, for example, contribute to the model of co-operation embedded in the Mansion House Accord? Is it no more than a useful threat? What role will the statutory guidance play in modifying the application of fiduciary duty? In fact, can the Minister confirm that the promised statutory guidance will have something to say about the possible clashes between mandated action and fiduciary duty, if only to confirm the primacy of fiduciary duty?
Minister Bell responded on 22 January to a Written Question from my honourable friend the Member for Stratford-upon-Avon about the scope of the coverage of the upcoming guidance on fiduciary duties. His reply did not refer to the mandation powers at all. Will the Minister confirm that the guidance will be non-binding and have the same have force as many other “have regards” that exist in the financial services sector? If the guidance has, or could plausibly be read as having, detectable, real-world influence, it should come before Parliament for scrutiny, and it should come before us when we can recommend changes.
Minister Bell’s Written Answer, as I mentioned a moment ago, says of the guidance that:
“Work will commence shortly beginning with an industry roundtable to gather views and technical expertise to ensure the guidance meets the identified need”.
I suppress my astonishment at this rather late start for thinking about statutory guidance. I notice that, in the reply, there was no mention of Parliament and the role it might play or of timescale in all this, except we now know that it has either just started or is about to start. In other words, as things stand, the likelihood of effective parliamentary scrutiny of anything to do with statutory guidance is unlikely. This is entirely unsatisfactory for the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Ashcombe, has argued so forcefully.
There is no compelling evidence that mandation will work. If the Mansion House Accord is to be taken seriously and the Government play their part, mandation will be unnecessary. Mandation would interfere with or complicate the principal of fiduciary duty. It is also opposed by major stakeholders including, as I mentioned previously, the Governor of the Bank of England.
The Institute and Faculty of Actuaries ends its latest assessment of the situation by saying that trustees should not be leaned on to invest in ways that conflict with their own best judgment. Instead, those investments and markets that the Government wish to promote should continue to be made more attractive through initiatives such as LTAFs and so on. The pension schemes will freely choose to follow in a way that is right for them and their members. We agree with that and will continue to try to convince the Government that the reserve power is not necessary or desirable—activated or not—and that there is no sound basis for using it.
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
My Lords, I will speak briefly on the other amendments in this group before turning to Amendment 145 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie. As noble Lords have already set out, Clause 40 represents a significant extension of regulatory influence over asset allocation in defined contribution default arrangements. Given the scale of that change, it is both reasonable and necessary that we consider carefully how risk, responsibility and accountability are apportioned within the framework the Bill creates.
The amendments in the name of my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted and Lady Altmann, seek to introduce greater certainty and procedural fairness into the operation of the savers’ interest test. Removing an automatic time limit on exemptions, ensuring that schemes are not compelled to alter asset allocations while determinations or appeals are ongoing and requiring the authority to give reasons for its decisions are all, in my submission, entirely sensible propositions. They make the framework that the Bill creates more robust, transparent and defensible.
In a similar vein, allowing schemes to apply for the savers’ interest test over a limited number of consecutive years, while demonstrating a credible pathway to compliance, reflects a realistic understanding of how long-term investment strategies are developed and implemented. It recognises that good outcomes for savers are not always delivered by abrupt or mechanically imposed changes.
Several of the amendments in this group speak directly to the core point of fiduciary responsibility, which, as was powerfully reinforced during our debate on the final group last Thursday, is an absolutely central point to the approach being adopted by noble Lords across the Committee. The amendments reinforcing fiduciary duty and proposing a safe harbour for trustees acting in good faith on professional advice and in accordance with their duties are an attempt to clarify that nothing in this Bill should place trustees in an impossible position, caught between regulatory direction on the one hand and their fundamental obligation to act in the best financial interests of members on the other.
Related to this, the probing amendment from the noble Lords, Lord Vaux of Harrowden and Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, asks an important and unresolved question: where investment decisions are mandated by the state, in effect, where does liability sit if those investments underperform? Even if the Government do not accept the mechanism proposed, the question itself cannot simply be wished away; I hope that the Minister will address it directly.
I also wish to touch on the amendments that deal with systemic risk, structural neutrality and herding behaviour. Requiring trustees to have regard to long-term systemic risks, including economic resilience and climate change, is entirely consistent with existing best practice and does not mandate investment in any particular asset or vehicle. Ensuring that listed investment funds are not structurally disadvantaged helps preserve choice and diversification. The amendment on regulatory herding speaks to a well-understood risk: overly prescriptive frameworks can drive homogeneity of behaviour, amplifying systemic risk rather than mitigating it.
I hope, therefore, that the Minister will engage seriously with the questions these amendments ask around process, liability, fiduciary duty and risk. Even where the Government may not be minded to accept the amendments, as drafted, they highlight issues that, given the provisions in the Bill, deserve clear and careful answers.
As has been our consistent approach throughout these days in Committee, my own amendment seeks to probe the Government on a key question: why have they provided for a maximum civil penalty of £100,000 for failure to comply with the mandation requirements set out in this chapter? Given the nature of those requirements and the breadth of discretion that they confer on the authority, it is not at all clear in the Bill how the Government have arrived at that figure or why it is considered proportionate. We are dealing here with decisions around long-term asset allocation in pension default arrangements—areas where reasonable, professional judgment may legitimately differ and where the consequences of regulatory direction may not be apparent for many years. In that context, a six-figure penalty is not a trivial matter.
This amendment is designed to invite the Government to explain the rationale for the level of the penalty; how it is expected to be applied in practice; and whether sufficient regard has been had to scheme size, intent and the nature of any alleged breach. I hope that the Minister can set out clearly why £100,000 is the appropriate ceiling; how proportionality will be ensured; and what safeguards will exist to prevent penalties being applied in a blunt or mechanistic way.
Lord Katz (Lab)
We have to have a hard stop at 8 pm, I am afraid, so I move that the Committee do now adjourn.