Pension Schemes Bill

Lord Katz Excerpts

Wednesday 14th January 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to be opening for the Government on the second day of Committee on the Pensions Schemes Bill. Once again, for the sake of the record, I am not sure whether it is otiose but I repeat that I am a former councillor in Camden and, as such, a member of its councillors’ pension scheme—but for four years, so I am not going to retire rich on it.

I am grateful to all noble Lords who spoke in the debate on this probing stand part question on Clause 6. I recognise the intention to scrutinise the process to be followed if compulsory mergers of LGPS funds are undertaken.

As noble Lords are no doubt aware—and I hope this answers the question that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, raised about the history and rationale for including the clause—Schedule 3 to the Public Service Pensions Act 2013 confers powers on the Secretary of State to make regulations about the administration, management and winding up of any pension funds. Clause 6 amends the 2013 Act to clarify that, in the case of the LGPS, the Secretary of State’s existing powers include the power to make regulations about the merger of two or more LGPS pension funds, and this includes compulsory merger. At this point, I reassure the Committee that the Government do not currently have any plans to require the merger of LGPS funds and that their strong preference is that mergers take place by agreement between administering authorities. However, it is essential that the Government have sufficient powers in place to be able to fulfil their stewardship role towards the scheme.

The purpose of the clause is to ensure that sufficient powers are in place to facilitate the merger of pension funds if needed—for example, as a consequence of local government reorganisation, something that the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, spoke about. He referred to this in slightly less positive terms, but the Committee will be aware of the Government’s ambition to simplify local government by ending the two-tier system. A consequence of this is that in some areas a new administering authority, as he said, will need to be designated to administer Local Government Pension Scheme funds, because the existing administering authority will no longer exist. One potential solution to this may be the merger of two or more pension funds. These decisions are local ones, but any such change will require agreement from the Secretary of State to make legislation for transferring the pension assets and liabilities of the previous administering authority and other councils involved in unitarisation to the new administering authority. MHCLG will write to affected local authorities with guidance on what they should consider when deciding on their preferred approach to designating a new administering authority for their pension fund.

The power may also be used in the unlikely event that an independent governance review finds particularly grave issues with an administering authority’s governance of their pension fund. This intervention will be considered by the Secretary of State only in exceptional cases, as an option of last resort after discussions about governance and compliance with the administering authority, and where there is no credible action plan for improvement.

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[Lord Willetts (Con)]

I have one question following the Minister’s very helpful explanation. I was involved in the internal government discussion leading up to the 2013 legislation, and at the back of our minds was the whole issue of merging local government pension schemes for economic and investment reasons. The model that emerged of seven or eight umbrella bodies shaping their investment strategy was seen as the best way to deliver that. The Minister’s list of reasons why there might be compulsory mergers excluded any investment or economic argument, so is he assuring the Committee that the Government do not envisage using these powers to secure specific economic or investment objectives?

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I am seeking help from my noble friend Lady Sherlock in a helpful conference on the side. The investment assets are in pools, so that is not necessary. The backstop powers are very clear: if there is a need for a merger or we are worried about a failing scheme, there is that backstop power and this is why. It would not be used to direct particular investment strategies.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate, and I also thank the Minister for his full and detailed response to the questions that were asked. The Minister talked about perhaps using these powers when there are local government reorganisations; that is highly likely in the current climate, I would think.

The purpose of this stand part notice is not to resist sensible reform but to underline the importance of clarity, certainty and proper accountability where Parliament is being asked to confer powers on this scale. Clause 6 is framed at a very high level, yet it opens the door to decisions that could permanently reshape local government pension arrangements, where powers are capable of compelling structural change. It is vital that those affected understand not only that the power exists but the principles that will govern its use. Clarity matters for scheme managers, employers and, above all, scheme members, whose long-term interests depend on confidence in the stability and predictability of the system. Certainty matters because pension funds operate on long horizons, and opaque or open-ended powers can create risk.

Most of all, the responsible exercise of delegated powers depends on transparency. When Parliament is asked to delegate authority in a highly technical and sensitive area, it is entirely reasonable to expect a clear account of how that authority will be exercised and what safeguards will guide it. However, in view of the response given by the Minister—I am sure that all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate will look at Hansard; if there are any issues, we will go back to the Minister—I beg leave to withdraw the stand part notice.

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[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I must first remind myself to declare that I am a member of the Local Government Pension Scheme: I could not fail to be, having been 28 years on the London Borough of Barnet Council, but I tend to forget about it because it is quite a while ago. A payment does come monthly into my bank account, so I must declare that I am a recipient. I also served on the pensions committee of the London Borough of Barnet, so I have some knowledge of the things that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has been very eloquent about.

These amendments propose reviews of the Local Government Pension Scheme, and I think we have to get back to exactly what these amendments are asking for, which is sustainability and actuarial practice. We on my Benches support both, in principle. The Local Government Pension Scheme is a long-term, open scheme with unique characteristics, and pressures on admitted bodies, including housing associations, merit careful examination.

The noble Lord, Lord Davies, spoke eloquently about the profession of actuaries. I have always found that actuaries do not have a unified view. There are different actuaries and different views, and as a chartered accountant I have always thought they were impressively prudent with what they said the funds needed to be protected against.

Similarly, actuarial practices such as desirability, stability and solvency are not always applied consistently, despite our applause for actuaries as a profession. Greater clarity would help employers plan and would reduce disputes. Reviews, which is what these amendments ask for, are not admissions of failure; they are tools of good governance. We on these Benches therefore see these amendments as constructive and not critical.

The noble Lord, Lord Fuller, spoke very eloquently about stabilisation and the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, talked about cost and stabilisation review. Excess prudence, or super-prudence, is not sensible, and it is so easy to be prudent as the easy way out. There is an argument for temporary respite. All these come into the question of review, which is what these two amendments ask for. Our question is whether the Government can accept the value of structured, evidence-based review in strengthening confidence in the Local Government Pension Scheme. Review is not a question of failure; it is a question of prudence, which I would have thought actuaries would be in favour of.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, this has been another interesting and wide-ranging debate, and I am sorry to see that the accord that we had on Monday— the horseshoe accord, I am going to call it—between my noble friend Lord Davies and the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, has broken down. Sadly, in my experience these things do not last that long.

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[Lord Katz (Lab)]

Where was I? I was simply going to say that I of course defer to the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, who was very much my senior partner in local government service. For the Committee’s information, I did not represent a neighbouring ward, but we are in neighbouring wards, although in different local authorities. It is good to know that north-west London—NW6 or NW2—is well represented in Committee this afternoon.

Before we look at the amendments relating to the triennial valuation of funds, it might be helpful to explain some of the basic principles relating to the valuation. The central principle and pride of the Local Government Pension Scheme is that it is a locally managed scheme. Administering authorities are responsible and accountable for meeting pension promises to members over their lifetimes. Striking the right balance between the cost to employers, risk management, intergenerational fairness and the needs of an open scheme is a matter for authorities.

This takes place through the fund valuation process, which is robust and well established, with strong safeguards. Administering authorities can work with their actuaries to develop assumptions and then carry out a valuation of the fund. Contribution rates are set for each employer, and administering authorities consult their employers as part of the rate-setting process. It is right that employers understand and are able to challenge their contribution rates and factor them into their medium-term financial planning. Valuations and rates are published and made available to all employers.

The valuations are reviewed by the Government Actuary’s Department, under Section 13 of the Public Service Pensions Act, which assesses whether compliance, consistency, solvency and long-term cost efficiency in the scheme have been achieved. Each fund and each employer is different. Valuations and rates will vary, depending on both the performance of investments and the make-up of each employer.

As we have heard from many noble Lords—including very forcibly from my noble friend Lord Davies—the 2025 valuation will conclude in a few weeks, setting rates for 2026-27 onwards. We should acknowledge the importance of that timing in our consideration of these amendments.

If I may, I will respond to Amendments 14 and 15 together. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger of Leckie, for tabling them. Amendment 14 would require a review into the affordability of the scheme. I recognise the concern that we have heard to ensure that the scheme remains affordable for employers, including local authorities and admitted bodies such as housing associations. But, to everyone’s credit—I will perhaps single out my noble friend Lord Davies but, to be fair, I include the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, and the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann—the LGPS is a success story. It has gone from deficit to surplus and currently has returns of 7% to 9%. It is in a strong financial position, with the majority of funds expected to show a surplus following the latest valuation. As a result, employer contributions are expected to reduce from April. Some reductions will be bigger than others, and that is part of the nature of the process that is in train. We should not pre-empt the result of that valuation.

The statutory cost control mechanism, which applies to all public sector schemes including the LGPS—which my noble friend Lord Davies referred to—ensures that the cost of benefits remains sustainable for employers. This mechanism operates on a four-year cycle, following the scheme-level valuation conducted by the Government Actuary’s Department. As we have heard, the most recent valuation was in 2024. An additional cost management process for the LGPS is operated by the scheme advisory board, with the aim of controlling the contributions paid by employers, which are set locally.

In addition, the Government Actuary’s Department, under Section 13 of the Public Service Pensions Act 2013, will undertake a review of all fund valuations for the Secretary of State and on whether compliance, consistency, solvency and long-term cost efficiency have been achieved across the scheme. An additional review into the affordability of the scheme would therefore simply replicate the existing processes built into the scheme. The Section 13 report will be based on the 2025 local valuations, which will conclude in a few weeks, and will deliver recommendations on the long-term cost effectiveness of the scheme, which the Government will consider carefully. We are very much not sweeping this issue under the carpet.

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[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I support these amendments because I believe that transparency is good. I will need to address some of the things that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said. He is right from an actuarial point of view, obviously. He said the decision is made by the council; in fact, it is made by the management committee of that council. The management committee of most councils will consist of councillors who are neither actuaries nor particularly great financial wizards. What happens in practice is that those people on the council’s management committee that is deciding take the advice of its pensions advisers, stockbrokers and actuaries. It happens on that basis. Do they understand it? My general view is that they are swayed by the people who make the arguments to that committee.

So this group of amendments addresses transparency, benchmarking and surplus. To most people, these are technical matters and ones on which the noble Lord, Lord Davies, speaks with great expertise from an actuarial point of view. But the impact on employer contributions and public services is real. Where valuations are materially more prudent than market benchmarks, we need to understand why.

My noble friend Lord Thurso talked about risk appetite. Most local authority pension committees will not have a great deal of appetite for risk. Their idea is that they are custodians of their employees’ pensions and they will naturally fall on the opposite side of taking risk. That is probably quite right. These amendments are a step in the right direction: they are a clearer explanation of assumptions and benchmarks, which strengthens the local government pension schemes by improving accountability and understanding.

Our question is whether the Government and the Minister agree that transparency is a safeguard and not a threat. This is what the amendments talk about—transparency. We need to make it as transparent to the management committees of these pension funds as it can be. That is what these amendments try to do: they would bring this on to a more generalised basis, not just picking the ones that do well in the Orkneys or wherever, but ones that maybe need guidance. Therefore, these Benches support these amendments, and I hope that they see some light at the end of the tunnel.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, this has been another interesting and wide-ranging debate. I am pleased to see that the horseshoe accord has, to some small measure, broken out again. I must say that I am not as pleased to see the conversion—maybe I am being unfair in characterising it as a Damascene conversion—of the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, and other Members opposite into the prudence of having well-funded local government to provide local services, after the underfunding of local authorities for a fair amount of time. Would that that sentiment had been shown by the Benches opposite when they were on our side of the Committee, but we are where we are.

These amendments show a clear desire to provide greater transparency in the triennial valuation and contributions rate-setting process. I agree it is important that all scheme employers understand how their contribution rates have been set, and members need to have confidence in the long-term sustainability of the fund.

These amendments also show a keen interest in the funding level of the Local Government Pension Scheme and the balance that administering authorities must strike between the long-term sustainability of the fund and affordability to its employers. As a public sector scheme, it is right that we are mindful of the costs to the taxpayer of funding the scheme.

I will address up front why the surplus extraction measures in Clauses 9 and 10 do not apply to the LGPS, to avoid confusion. The LGPS already has a triennial valuation process where contribution rates for employers are set. This is effectively a point where surplus extraction can take place, as this is where contribution rates can be reduced in response to an improvement in the funding level. As we will come on to later, there is also an interim contribution review process for employers who find themselves in difficulty. Therefore, an additional surplus extraction process is not required.

Furthermore, I urge caution in viewing surpluses in the LGPS as a potential windfall or as a means of managing broader revenue pressures for scheme employers. As in all defined benefit schemes, surpluses are maintained to absorb future shocks, manage demographic risk and ensure that promises made to members are kept. Poor decision-making can now lead to higher costs for future generations of taxpayers.

For context, the 2025 valuation will conclude in a few weeks, as we have discussed, with employer contribution rates set for April 2026 onwards. Following this, the Government Actuary’s Department, under Section 13 of the Public Service Pensions Act 2013, will undertake a review for the Secretary of State of all fund valuations, on whether compliance, consistency, solvency and long-term cost efficiency in the scheme has been achieved. Under usual timeframes, the report will be published in mid-2027.

Although I appreciate that the Committee is concerned about rising surpluses in the scheme, it surely cannot be right that we make amendments that would have a material impact on future valuations without having a full review of the outcomes of the 2025 valuation. It is anticipated that there will be reductions in contribution rates for many employers from April, and we need to take account of how the current system has coped with the significant changes in market conditions since that 2022 valuation—we discussed that on both this and the previous group—before making changes to the valuation process.

The LGPS is a locally administered and managed scheme. It is administering authorities that are responsible for managing their surpluses through employer contribution rate changes, and for working with their actuaries to set appropriate assumptions as part of the valuation. Authorities are required under government regulations to provide valuation reports to employers to support them in their longer-term financial planning. So we must consider whether it is right for the Government to exert a more significant level of influence over the setting of contribution rates through these amendments, and whether this is compatible with local accountability.

It is right, in a locally managed scheme, that funds are able to set their own approaches to stability and prudence, reflecting both the needs of employers in understanding their medium-term financial obligations and the different risk profiles of their investments. The balance of these is key to delivering the intergenerational fairness mentioned by noble Lords opposite, particularly the noble Viscount, Lord Younger—and indeed we all want to see that.

On transparency, revised statutory guidance on the funding strategy statement, which all LGPS funds must publish, was issued by the scheme advisory board on behalf of MHCLG in January 2025. Under this guidance, administering authorities should consult all employers in the fund on their funding strategy statement, which should outline how administering authorities will manage surpluses and deficits, outline the approach to contribution rate stability, and summarise the main actuarial assumptions used at the valuation.

Amendment 16 would require the Secretary of State to set a statutory funding objective for LGPS funds, including considerations for administering authorities, setting their funding strategy and contribution rates. There is already detailed guidance on how funds should manage surpluses and deficits in their funding strategy, but, as locally managed schemes, it should be for administering authorities to consider how to strike the right balance in setting the contribution rates, with appropriate considerations of prudence and the long-term sustainability of the scheme and contributions. Furthermore, a funding objective would still require a degree of interpretation and so would not provide the clarity that the noble Lord seeks to achieve with his amendment.

In 2020, the Supreme Court found that LGPS money is not, in fact, public money, but that it belongs to its members, which further justifies why a statutory funding objective is not appropriate for the scheme.

Amendment 17 would require fund valuations to be benchmarked against insurer and gilt-based pricing, with a report laid before the relevant local authority. The triennial valuation and contribution rates-setting process is already a robust and collaborative process between administering authorities, actuaries and employers. Many authorities already follow best practice in consulting scheme employers alongside the contribution rate-setting process. This gives employers the opportunity to challenge contribution rates and consider whether they are sufficiently stable, or whether excessive prudence is built in.

Statutory guidance already sets out that funds should publish the actuarial assumptions used as part of the funding strategy statement. The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, referenced the role of the Financial Reporting Council in the valuation. The valuation reports, which are publicly available, will include Financial Reporting Council compliance statements that technical actuarial standards have been complied with. In addition, I have already raised the Section 13 report by the GAD, which reviews the fund-level actuarial valuations. As part of the review into the 2022 valuation report, for example, when assessing consistency, there was a review of assumptions, including the discount rate.

Finally, this amendment points to a perceived excessive risk aversion undertaken by the LGPS. This is not an accurate characterisation. In fact, around three-quarters of LGPS assets are invested in return-seeking assets, vastly outweighing the equivalent figures in private schemes, which are heavily geared towards matching assets.

Amendment 18 would require administering authorities to publish and justify their approach to the treatment of surpluses over 120%. First, we must consider if this is the level that we would wish to set in the context of the LGPS. Elsewhere in defined benefit schemes, the Government are considering the funding threshold for surplus release, and there has already been consideration of what this would be. But we must remember that the valuation process already provides a route to return surplus to employers, which allows for changes every three years, whether or not a threshold—whatever it is—has been met.

Furthermore, each valuation is prepared on a local basis, meaning that the funding level will depend on the discount rate set. The discount rate converts the value of future benefits to a current value so it can be compared to the current value of assets; it is used to determine the employer contribution rate required to pay future benefits. It is based on the assumed future returns of the individual fund’s investments, taking into account the portfolio of assets held by the fund, the demographic profile of its members and its attitudes to risk. That means that a funding level of 120% in one fund will simply not be comparable to that of another if the discount rates applied are significantly different.

I think that the Committee will surely agree that the purpose of a buffer is to provide a surplus in well-funded times and guard against a fall into deficit in more challenging times. As a locally managed scheme, it is for the funds, not for the Government, to decide what the right level of surplus is. Introducing these additional reviews and requirements would risk undermining the valuation process and the locally managed nature of the scheme.

On Amendment 19, we had an interesting discussion on transparency—certainly transparency and accessibility is something that we should all seek. I appreciated the discussion between my noble friend Lord Davies and the noble Baronesses, Lady Altmann and Lady Noakes, on the accessibility of the actuarial statements. Maybe I would say this, but I thought that my noble friend put up a good defence of the professional standards that actuarial firms set themselves with regard to matters of accessibility.

I appreciate that the intent of Amendment 19 is to increase the transparency of actuarial valuations for all scheme employers and for members of the public. In addition to the requirements that I have already mentioned, regulations also require the administering authority to publish and send copies of any valuation, report or certificate made under Regulation 62, or Regulation 64, to all employers. I do not recognise that as limited transparency, but I concede that there is scope for greater visibility—and that is something that we should always seek to pursue. While there is scope to look at whether these publications could be made easier to understand for employers, that should be considered in the round—I suggest following the conclusion of the 2025 valuation.

The noble Viscount, Lord Younger, asked me to comment on his example of valuations increasing despite surpluses, and I would say that there is a robust valuation process in place into which employers feed. We must wait for completion of the scheme valuation and its formal result—but if this is the case as set out by the noble Viscount, the Government Actuary’s Department will review the results in the valuation under regulations in Section 13.

The noble Lord, Lord Fuller, asked about funds not using a discount rate that is more prudent than a gilt basis. I have already talked about the wider inaccurate characterisation of excessive risk aversion, but at this point I add that the LGPS is a funded scheme with diversified assets and its discount rates are set by fund actuaries on a scheme-specific, prudent basis that reflects long-term expected returns. The valuations are reviewed nationally by the GAD on compliance, solvency and long-term cost efficiency. Without the results of the 2025 valuation or the Section 13 review, we cannot say for certain what the current approach is, taken across all funds.

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[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

At the risk of receiving a glare from my Whip, I feel I have something to contribute to this group as well.

I will first make a general point. If noble Lords and noble Baronesses are going to quote specific examples, we need chapter and verse in order to understand what is happening. If we are just given figures, we are meant to absorb and draw some conclusion from them, which is not possible; we need to know chapter and verse of any examples that noble Lords quote so we can analyse and see what is really going on in that particular case. I have to say that my assumption is that, with all the examples we have been given, there is a readily available, understandable situation, and somewhere along the line there has been a failure of understanding.

On Amendment 20, my question for the noble Baroness, which she sort of answered, was: why is this amendment required? I think we were told that it is all too difficult, but of course it is not all too difficult. There is a big example: the London Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, which has a Conservative-controlled council, earlier this year made an interim change in its contribution rate to zero because its investment policy had been so successful. It is worth noting that it has a very successful investment policy and it is one of the smallest local government funds—something to bear in mind during the other debates on the Bill.

There is a question: how often should you undertake a valuation? There is a strong argument for three years because that provides some level of stability to the council’s finances. You have to remember that, over the last year or two years, a council may be paying too much or it may be paying too little, but that is not money down the drain; it either goes into the fund or does not, and it will be available or not available at the end of the three-year period. The money does not disappear if contributions are up, and it will be reflected in the future contributions that that council will pay.

I am also concerned that of course an employer will seek a review when it thinks its contribution is going to go down. I bet it will not seek a review if it thinks its contribution is going to go up, which provides exactly the sort of ratchet effect that the noble Baroness said she wanted to avoid. So it would be perfectly practical to do a valuation every year with the strength of the computers we have available now. It a long time since the day when I had to sit at a large square sheet of paper and do all the figures by hand: you just run the computer and there are the figures. I am sure the consulting firms will be happy to get all the additional fee income, but does it actually produce the advantages that we are told will be achieved through this amendment?

I note the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Scott of Bybrook. I think it is a very valid point. It is a shame that whatever the local government department is called nowadays has not been involved with the Bill; it could have brought some perspective to where we are.

On Amendment 20A and benchmarks, I draw the attention of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, to a regular report from a group whose name I shall not get right—but there is a national group of local government pension schemes. Following each valuation, it produces a detailed report providing all the information she asks for. Again, the information is available. She is asking for this information, when it is already easily available online. On my iPad, I can look up all the information which it is being suggested is being hidden away. The importance of the Local Government Pension Scheme is obvious, and obviously there should be transparency, but the idea being promoted that we do not know what is going on in these funds is gravely unfair to the pension schemes concerned.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall now respond to Amendments 20 and 20A. I am grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Younger of Leckie, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Stedman-Scott and Lady Altmann, for tabling them. Amendment 20 seeks to revise the existing LGPS regulations to make it easier for employers in the scheme to request interim reviews of contribution rates. I welcome the intention to increase flexibility in how surpluses in the LGPS are treated, but it is crucial for any flexibility to be underpinned by robust safeguards to protect the long-term funding position of those funds. It is important, equally, to make the distinction between how surpluses are treated in the LGPS scheme and in other defined benefit schemes. At the risk of repeating my words on the previous group, within other defined benefit schemes, trustees can choose to release surplus where scheme rules allow. Clauses 9 and 10, which we cannot wait to get to, will increase that flexibility.

In the LGPS, the triennial valuation process already ensures that contribution rates are reviewed every three years and enables withdrawal of surplus through reduced contribution rates where it is prudent to do so. The interim review process is available as an additional mechanism to allow scheme employers, particularly those at risk of exiting the scheme, to seek lower contribution rates between valuations. Interim reviews may take place if it appears likely to the administering authority that the liabilities have changed significantly since the last valuation, if there has been significant change in the ability of employers to meet their obligations or if the employer has requested a review.

I welcome the call from noble Lords opposite to make interim reviews easier to understand and more transparent. I agree that regulations on interim reviews require revision, including on these points. Indeed, the department has already stated this in a letter to administering authorities—that was in March 2025. I understand the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, was making about the vicissitudes of the market and other changes that occur. Without wishing to be overly sarcastic, we could posit having reviews on an almost continual basis to try to anticipate market movements, changes in demographics or other external shocks. I am not for a minute suggesting that that was the intention behind the amendment, but it proves the point that, if we are going to break up the cycle of valuation, when and how we do it is a question for further debate. That possibly addresses some of the points that the noble Baroness, Lady Scott of Bybrook, was making as well. It is important that any changes to regulations are properly considered and avoid unforeseen consequences.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

The reorganisation is very different from the day-to-day running of the local authorities. Once they are reorganised, it will calm down and balance out again. But what worries me is whether the Government are working with local government pension schemes on the impact of these changes. If not, why not and will they do so?

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

Actually, the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, anticipates this, which is actually useful on the point that my noble friend made. I will come to that in a second. I was just about to say that of course we are aware. I am afraid that the noble Baroness was not in her place when we discussed local government reorganisation in the first group, earlier this afternoon in Committee.

Actuaries are aware of the local government review and the potential impact on contribution rates. In response to this, actuaries could have a number of options. They could calculate a harmonised contribution rate for the new unitary authorities proposed, set out a path to target harmonised contribution rates if desired or continue to treat them separately and do a contribution review when the local government reorganisation position is clearer.

This is probably as good a point as any to reassure my noble friend Lord Davies of Brixton, whose mastery of technology never fails to impress: my colleagues from the MHCLG very much support the DWP on this Bill and we are working collectively on elements that relate to the Local Government Pension Scheme; so do not worry about that.

It is important that any changes to regulations are properly considered and avoid unforeseen consequences. The views of employers, funds and others within the sector are a vital part of this process, and making amendments to this Bill would prevent the sector and scheme employers from having their say on whether the change will work for them. The department has already committed to launching a consultation this year, which will cover the full range of issues with the current rules.

Amendment 20A, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, seeks to benchmark Local Government Pension Scheme employer contributions on an annual basis. I recognise the noble Baroness’s desire to increase transparency on employer contributions and to set them in a wider context, including council tax. LGPS funds are already required to publish a valuation report and a rates adjustment certificate following each valuation. This certificate sets out the employer contribution rates as a percentage of pay to be paid by each employer in the fund in each of the three years of the valuation period. Employer contribution rates are set locally and vary widely across the scheme, depending on the funding level of the fund and the covenant of the individual employer. It is not appropriate to set a benchmark for employer contributions for funds as this would compromise local accountability.

I will come on to talk a little about council tax rates and contributions, because they have been mentioned by many noble Lords. Before that, I repeat the point I made in the previous group. I am afraid that the amendment seems to neglect the fact that 50% of LGPS employer contributions are paid by employers that are not local authorities, so we cannot focus on just council tax as the be-all and end-all.

However, those local authority employers do make up half that funding. Those local authority employers in the LGPS meet the cost of employer contributions from their total income, of which council tax is only a proportion. It varies considerably among different councils across the country, depending on their other sources of income, which are myriad. They include business rates, grants, Section 106 contributions and CIL. They can include any income gained from other charges and levies, whether parking or licensing. The list goes on. I defer always to the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, and his decades of experience on my next-door council, Barnet. He and noble Lords in the Room will understand the wide range of income sources that councils have.

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[Viscount Thurso (LD)]

May I ask one point of clarification from the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, when he comes to wind up at the end of this debate, again on risk? I read this amendment as being about the risk register—the list of risks faced by the organisation and how they are dealt with—rather than the level of risk that is taken in investing assets, which will determine the return level. I wonder whether he could give us clarity on that.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, for tabling these amendments and, as the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, said, for giving us this short but sweet opportunity to discuss the management of the schemes.

I join the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, in using this opportunity to pay tribute to all those who are involved in the work of running the LGPS. He is absolutely right that it is a thankless and hard task; this is an opportunity for me to put on record that I am in complete agreement with him on that matter, although I say gently, as we are on the last group for today, that his definition of “sexy” differs from mine somewhat—but each to their own.

I recognise that the intention behind these amendments is to ensure the robust management of funds and assets in the LGPS. The Government share this aim and are taking steps to ensure that the reforms are implemented soundly. I am happy to confirm to the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, that “management”, as established in Clause 8, is not a narrow administrative concept but a comprehensive responsibility encompassing governance, oversight and compliance. The Government are clear that administering authorities and asset pool companies must regard adherence to all applicable laws and regulatory requirements as a core, non-negotiable element of their management duties.

This expectation reflects the principle that robust compliance is fundamental to safeguarding assets, maintaining public confidence and ensuring accountability throughout the system. In particular, under the provisions of this Bill, all investment management activity beyond setting high-level investment strategy will be delegated to the asset pool company, which will be required to seek authorisation from the Financial Conduct Authority. FCA authorisation and supervision will provide vital assurance to members and employers that very large pools of capital will be managed properly, including ensuring that robust procedures for identifying and managing risk are in place. The Government have written to the asset pools to set out the new requirements in Clause 1 and are engaging closely with pool company leaders to monitor progress on meeting them in good time. In addition, subject to the passage of the Bill, the Secretary of State intends to make regulations and issue guidance on asset pooling and fund governance, which will set out the expectations on LGPS funds and pools.

On strengthening fund governance, administering authorities will continue to be responsible for holding pools to account on their performance, including on how risks are managed. To strengthen governance and accountability further, regulations will require administering authorities to appoint the new positions of “senior officer” and “independent person”, subject to the outcome of the consultation. Senior officers will take the leading role in representing their funds in the governance of the asset pool in which they participate, and independent persons will offer professional expertise to support pensions committees on investment strategy, governance and administration—including holding the pool to account.

Administering authorities will be better able to manage risk and ensure compliance as a result of the new powers relating to independent governance reviews set out in Clause 5. Independent governance reviews will ensure that administering authorities review their governance and their compliance with the legislation, supported by independent scrutiny, to provide assurance to members and employers. In response to the question from the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, on whether we are attempting to constrain the concept of management, the answer is that we are not. The list provided is an inclusive one, not an exhaustive one. As I have said, compliance with laws and regulations and effective risk management are assumed in the Bill, as they are in existing LGPS legislation, with the latter also provided in the requirement for asset pools to be regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority.

The provisions in this Bill are already adequate to ensure that asset pool companies and administering authorities are compliant with the law and have adequate controls in place with regard to the identification and management of risks. Given that, as well as my explanations, I hope that I have satisfied the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, and provided the assurances that he sought. I respectfully ask him to withdraw his amendment.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

I am grateful to the Minister for his response and for answering the questions that I posed—I think there were only one or two, but, again, I will check Hansard for my questions and his responses.

The Committee will be pleased to know that I have little to add to what I said earlier, but I would like to reiterate a broader point. The more clarity we can place in the Bill and the more we can place clearly on the record, the greater the certainty we will provide to trustees, funds and employers about changes to a landscape that profoundly shapes how they operate and discharge their responsibilities.

In this very short debate, I was particularly grateful for the points made by my noble friend Lord Fuller, backed up by my noble friend Lady Noakes. I appreciated my noble friend Lord Fuller’s focus, which it is important for the Committee to put, on what pension fund administrators actually have to do, and he was quite right to highlight the breadth and detail required in undertaking the role.

That leads me nicely on to answer a question raised by the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, on Amendment 22. I will need to check, but my understanding is that when it comes to the role of a pension fund administrator, management includes handling risks. The question is how we define “handling”. My understanding is that it includes how risks are identified, assessed and kept under review, but it is quite possible that there is somebody above that level who takes full responsibility. Otherwise, my understanding is that it involves handling both the risk register and how risk is assessed and decided on in providing a return to investors, but I will investigate and come back to the noble Viscount.

In concluding, although today we might be debating definitions and interpretation, I have no doubt that those affected by this legislation are following our proceedings closely and are keen for as much clarity as possible from the Government on definitions, duties and responsibilities. For that reason, I would very much welcome any further clarification the Minister is able to give the Committee throughout our subsequent proceedings on the questions we raise on these matters. That would provide reassurance not only to this Committee but to those beyond it who are looking to these proceedings for guidance and certainty. I finish by saying that that really is true, in that we have been in touch with a number of third parties and those in the industry, and many of the comments made today and on Monday absolutely reflect their issues and concerns. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.