Pension Schemes Bill

Lord Davies of Brixton Excerpts

Monday 26th January 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I support every word that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has said. I hope the Minister understands that this series of amendments is designed, once again, to help the Government.

The policy of excluding the very asset classes that the Government want to promote and want pension funds to invest in, just because they are held in a particular form, seems irrational. The process used to introduce it, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, outlined, was materially flawed. There was a lack of consultation and the policy is directly contrary to some previous ministerial Statements and to the stated policy intention. I cannot see how any reasonable person could argue that excluding these companies is a legitimate means of achieving the stated policy objective. The decision goes against common sense and defies economic logic. It opens pension scheme members up to less choice, higher long-term costs and, potentially, new risks such as gating or frozen investments.

Amendments 122 and 123 are designed specifically to ensure that, if a closed-ended investment company holds the assets in which the Government want pension funds to invest as a result of the Mansion House Accord, they can do so. Amendment 123 includes these as qualifying assets under the Bill and Amendment 122 talks about ensuring that, if securities are

“listed under Chapter 11 of the UK Listing Rules or the Specialist Fund Segment that provide exposure to the qualifying assets”,

they too can be included.

These amendments would not change the intentions of the Bill or the Government’s policy; they would reinforce them. If schemes cannot invest in listed securities, we will exclude the closed-ended funds that hold such assets, for no obvious reason other than, perhaps, the fact that the pension funds or asset managers that are launching the long-term asset funds will obviously prefer to have their own captive vehicle under their direct control, rather than those quoted freely on the market.

I would argue that, by excluding investment trusts and REITs as qualifying assets, we will fetter trustees’ discretion as to what assets they can invest in and how they can do so. I do not believe that the Government want to do this. I think this is an unintended consequence of wanting not to allow schemes just to say, “Well, I invest in Sainsbury’s and it has a lot of property in the UK, so that’s fine”. But this is a very different argument. I hope that the time spent by this Committee on these funds will prove worth while and that this dangerous, damaging exclusion can be removed from the Bill.

If the Government want—as they say they do—pension schemes to invest in UK property, the amendments on this topic would allow them to choose to hold shares in Tritax Big Box, for example, which is a listed closed-ended fund. It is a collective investment REIT, not a trading company, and UK regulators, the stock market and tax regulation recognise its functions as a fund. It is just like a long-term asset fund, but it is closed-ended instead of open-ended. Under the Bill, pension funds would not be able to invest in it, even though it holds precisely the type of private assets targeted by this section of the Bill.

The amendments would maximise schemes’ choice of investable assets within the target sectors. This would widen competition, which should bring downward pressure on asset management costs; it would reduce the risks of inflating asset prices, by channelling demand into fewer investment pathways; and it would enhance potential risk-adjusted returns. There is simply no reason why master trusts and other pension schemes should object to being given additional freedom to make investments to meet the requirements of these reserve powers. Why are we discriminating against a particularly successful British financial sector offering a proven route to holding the assets in which the Government want pension funds to invest? I have not seen any argument to say that, if we include these amendments, pension funds would have to invest in these companies, but they could use them if it suited their needs.

I look forward to the Minister’s answer. I know and accept that she is in a difficult position, but I have not heard a coherent answer as to why we are going down the route that we are. Tritax Big Box is just one example. It owns and develops assets worth £8 billion and controls the UK’s largest logistics-focused land platform, including data centres, which the Government designated as critical national infrastructure in 2024. Tritax Big Box announced that its data centre development strategy will be partnering with EDF Energy, which manages the UK’s nuclear power, to develop such infrastructure. It is remarkable that such a homegrown success story should be excluded from the opportunities available to pension schemes.

This sector has reinvented itself over the past few decades, from being a holder of diversified quoted equities to managing real illiquid assets. It is generally recognised that it is an ideal structure for holding illiquid assets—it has renewable assets, wind farms, solar farms and National Health Service GP surgeries. All these elements of the economy need significant investment and pension funds could be using their assets to support them. Surely that should be part of the Government’s intention for the Bill. I hope that this possible error in the Bill can be recognised and corrected so that we can move forward without further discussion on this topic.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, called on the support of reasonable people. I think of myself as a reasonable person, and I support her. I find the Government’s position on this totally inexplicable. I say in all honesty to my noble friend the Minister that the reasons given so far for these provisions do not in any way explain their position. It is inexplicable.

In my view, it is possible to make an argument that closed-end funds of this sort are more suitable than some other sorts of investments for pension investment because of the possibility of there being additional liquidity. That makes it even more inexplicable. A further problem is that pension funds could invest in an investment company that is not a closed-end fund but holds these investments. However, if it decided to float on the stock exchange, it could not do so because it would lose all the pension fund investments. So there is not logic at all to the Government’s position. There may be some logic, but we have yet to hear it.

[Lord Remnant (Con)]

My Lords, I very much support the amendments in this group, tabled variously in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Altmann and Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted. They all seek to ensure that closed-ended funds, in the form of UK-listed investment companies, are not disqualified from being eligible to invest in the private market assets targeted by the Bill, alongside open-ended funds. I say this not only as a private investor in both types of funds but as one who has sat on and chaired boards responsible for managing both types of investment.

They each have their relative advantages and disadvantages, which I will not enumerate here, but it is in fact investment companies that, over the long term, tend to have lower fees and better performance records, to the advantage of their investors. It seems perverse to exclude them from the Bill, seemingly solely on the grounds that they have listed status, when the nature of their underlying investments is identical to those held by open-ended vehicles. Indeed, investment trusts are particularly suited to the type of investments envisaged by this Bill and the Mansion House Accord—namely, assets that are essentially illiquid. Investment companies hold well over £100 billion-worth in private assets, and unlisted infrastructure and renewables have been among the fastest growing segments in recent years.

As the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, indicated, it is this ability more effectively to offer liquidity in illiquid assets that particularly distinguishes closed-ended vehicles from their open-ended cousins. It is in times of stress, whether within the investment vehicle itself or more broadly due to general economic or financial conditions, that some of the more unfortunate investment failings occur. They tend to relate to liquidity or lack thereof, they have happened in the recent past and they have occurred in open-ended structures.

Noble Lords will need little reminding of the demise of the Woodford Equity Income Fund. Suffice to say that, in two years, it lost two-thirds of its value; it became increasingly and disproportionately reliant on unlisted investments, which could not be sold to meet investor redemptions; and it was suspended in June 2019, leaving investors unable to access their money.

Noble Lords may be less familiar with the travails afflicting open-ended property funds. Property is an asset class specifically targeted by the Mansion House Accord. The writing was on the wall for them ever since they suspended in the depths of the Covid crisis. That triggered funds in the sector to begin to close down, given the evident problems with liquidity that resulted in a fundamental mismatch in the demands of investors against the liquidity of the underlying asset. These investors are mainly not faceless institutions but retail investors—the same individuals who save for their pensions. The only way in which the managers of the fund can mitigate these liquidity issues is by holding substantial cash holdings, which cuts across its investment objectives and dilutes returns. Once an announcement to close is announced, properties are likely to be sold at fire sale prices into difficult markets, and investors may have no access to their money for well over 12 months.

Institutions running open-ended funds attempted to address these liquidity problems by establishing the long-term asset funds referred to earlier, but their structure is still such that they cannot solve the problem but only rather crudely mitigate it through having more restricted dealing windows than the daily dealing offered by more traditional open-ended funds. They have been authorised by the FCA only since 2023 and are unproven. They are described by one prominent investment platform as high-risk investments recommended for experienced investors who have already accessed the more traditional investment options, yet they qualify under this Bill to the exclusion of investment companies which have proved their worth for over 150 years. I do not understand the rationale for this.

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[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I wanted to speak after the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, because, while I agree with what he said, I slightly disagreed when he talked about the favourable returns achieved by private equity. There is a massive problem with survivorship bias in those figures because the ones you never hear of again do not enter the figures.

I have a question for my noble friend the Minister. It seems an odd bit of drafting to say: “may for example”. Is “for example” doing anything in that sentence? Clearly it is not intended to be all encompassing, so others must be possible; it suggests that the person doing the drafting was not really sure that they liked what they were doing. It is pussyfooting about a bit. Secondly, what do these terms actually mean? I have an idea about “private equity”, but what about “private debt”, “venture capital” and “interests in land”? Goodness knows what the last one means. Are these terms defined anywhere? Can we get a clear definition of these things before we confirm this part of the Bill?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 146 to 150. This group of amendments is all about trustees. Although I submit that nothing in this Bill should unsettle the basic foundation of our trustee law, there remains extensive debate in the courts and academic literature, and among trustees, on how far wider policy objectives and emerging risks can be taken into account. I am trying to address some of those.

Amendment 146 would simply reinforce the obvious: fiduciary duty remains the overriding principle of pension governance and trustees must act in the best financial interests of members. That is the cornerstone of trust law. The courts have been clear for decades that trustees must prioritise members’ financial interests above all else. Yet the combination of the Mansion House rhetoric, promotional language in the Bill and the possibility of future regulations has created real anxiety among trustees about whether they are expected to prioritise government preferences over member outcomes. This amendment aims to remove that ambiguity. It would restate the law, reassuring trustees that their primary duty has not changed.

Amendment 147 follows on from that in seeking to introduce a safe harbour. Trustees are increasingly worried about being second-guessed, not for misconduct but for failing to meet expectations that are not clearly defined. Many are lay trustees. They act in good faith, take professional advice and follow their fiduciary duties. They should not face penalties or adverse consequences because they did not meet a quota or chose a different route to the same underlying assets. A safe harbour is a standard legal mechanism used in other regulatory regimes. It protects trustees who do the right thing, prevents retrospective reinterpretation of policy signals and ensures that trustees can make decisions based on evidence, not fear.

Amendment 148, also tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, addresses systemic risk. Trustees already consider systemic risks: climate change, economic resilience, supply chain fragility and other long-term factors that materially affect pension outcomes. The Pensions Regulator already expects trustees to consider these issues, but the statutory framework is uneven and expectations are not always clear, so this amendment would codify best practice. It would ensure that trustees consider systemic risks as part of their fiduciary duties, while making it explicit that this does not mandate investment in any particular vehicle. It is about risk management, not direction of capital. Trustees are careful and sensible people and will observe the policy direction, including on private assets. As I said last week, before we had the devil’s clause, there was broad agreement that it would be far better to trust the trustees.

Amendment 149, again from the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, addresses structural discrimination. I have already dealt extensively with how the Bill risks creating unequal treatment between different collective investment structures. Trustees should be free to choose the most appropriate structure for their scheme, whether listed or unlisted, based on liquidity, valuation, discipline, governance or member outcomes. The amendment would simply ensure a level playing field. It would prevent distortions, protect competition and ensure that trustees are not nudged away from structures that have served savers well for over a century.

Finally, Amendment 150 deals with herding risk. Regulatory herding is a known danger, which we have seen most recently and dramatically with LDI, where regulation, guidance or professional advice pushes everyone in the same direction at the same time and systemic risk increases, not decreases. The Mansion House agenda, if interpreted too narrowly, risks creating precisely that kind of clustering. This amendment would require the Secretary of State to avoid mandating or promoting investment in a way that induces herding and ensure that any guidance emphasises diversification and risk management. It is a simple “Do no harm” provision which learns from recent history. It is also embedded in the terms of the Mansion House Accord, as spoken to last Thursday by my noble friend Lord Sharkey. Trustees must not be forced to purchase assets that do not exist, do not exist safely or do not exist at a fair price.

None of these amendments would obstruct the Government’s objective. None would prevent investment in productive finance. None would limit trustee discretion. What they would do is ensure that trustees remain protected, that their duties remain clear and that the Bill does not inadvertently distort markets, undermine competition or create new systemic risks. These amendments are modest, sensible and protective. They would strengthen the Bill, support trustees and safeguard the long-term interests of pension savers. It is what we should all be thinking about.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I support mandation. I am in favour of the Government introducing the measures in this Bill, in principle. All Governments have a duty, not just a right, to deal with market failure. If the current investment advice and structures that we have are failing to deliver investments in the growth that we need in our economy, then the Government have a duty to act. I am not yet convinced that they have all the mechanics of mandation right, but that is the process we are going through at the moment in investigating how it will be achieved.

I am not so sure—I ask my noble friend the Minister to guide the Committee on this—about a question raised at Second Reading to which there was no answer, which applies to this part of Bill. Do the Government understand that the inevitable corollary of mandation is responsibility for the outcome? Outcomes may be better. We are told at length that this will improve things; the aim is to grow the economy to achieve good investments.

The Government may not have a legal responsibility to make sure that happens, but they certainly have a moral responsibility when they are saying how members’ money should be invested and they also, inevitably, have a political responsibility to ensure that they produce a system that enjoys broad public trust. A failure to achieve the Government’s objective will break that trust. Do the Government appreciate and understand the implications of what they are doing?