Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Lord Davies of Brixton Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th June 2025 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Brixton]

109A: Schedule 5, page 108, line 14, at end insert "following an affordability assessment in relation to the liable person and"
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to undertake an affordability assessment before making a direct deduction order.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My Amendments 109A and 109B address the twin issues of affordability and minimising social harm. Amendment 109A deals with the Government’s proposed “affordability assessment”, which is my term, not the Government’s. Amendment 109B requires a de minimis amount to be left in an individual’s bank account following the application of a deduction order. Neither amendment breaks new ground and both are within the terms of government policy. If we are going to pursue this policy, it has to be transparently fair and minimise social harm, which is the purpose of my amendments.

It needs to be stressed that both amendments are strongly supported by UK Finance, which is the collective voice for the banking and finance industry. These are the people who will have to undertake the hard work of implementing this policy, so their views should be taken seriously. I am not a natural proponent of UK Finance—I have spent much of my working life criticising insurance companies and banks for how they treat people—but it is a relevant participant in this process and its views should be taken most seriously.

On Amendment 109A, as I mentioned, there will be an affordability assessment. It is pretty well hidden—there is no reference to it in the Bill—but paragraph 52 of the Explanatory Notes states that direct recoveries

“will only happen once affordability and vulnerability checks have been carried out”,

so there will be checks. There is a more explicit reference in paragraph 723, which states specifically that

“prior to pursuing a direct deduction order”,

the Secretary of State will consider

“the affordability of recovery”.

That affordability assessment is an inherent part of the legislation, even though it is only implied in the Bill rather than required explicitly. My amendment is a probing amendment to press the Government on whether it would be better to have this in the Bill.

To paraphrase the Government’s position as I understand it, recovering benefit overpayments through the debt recovery measure will be a last resort and the Minister may make a direct deduction order only if satisfied that it will not cause a liable person to suffer hardship. Maybe the Minister could put the intention of the legislation into the Government’s words. UK Finance has said that it welcomes this intent but is concerned that the existing safeguards may not provide the level of protection that vulnerable consumers need in practice. Perhaps it knows its customers better than we do.

For this measure to be effective, an affordability assessment is essential: one that is carried out by the DWP and is accurate and realistic. I understand that the DWP is working with the Money and Pensions Service to flesh out the detail of the process. It is obviously essential that the DWP can understand the circumstances of vulnerable customers to ensure that the affordability assessment is fair and will not lead to social harm.

We know that organisations such as the Money and Mental Health Policy Institute—I declare an interest as a member of its advisory panel—the Money Advice Trust and Citizens Advice have been campaigning for some years for improvements in government debt practices. This is not a new problem. I mentioned in the previous sitting the comments made by the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, but it is relevant to repeat them. It said that the DWP

“does not understand well enough the experience of vulnerable customers and customers with additional or complex needs … We remain concerned about the potential negative impact on protected groups and vulnerable customers of DWP’s use of machine learning to identify potential fraud”.

This goes back to an earlier debate but it highlights that the evidence to hand is that the DWP is not very good at assessing affordability. It is reasonable, by means of proposing this amendment, for the Government to explain how the affordability will be assessed. If the proposals do not appear to be adequate, I will want to return to this issue on Report.

Similarly, Amendment 109B is a probing amendment. It lacks much of the detail that a specific proposal would need but proposes that there should be a de minimis amount left in an individual’s account following the application of a deduction order. The intention is that individuals should not be left without access to essential funds and should not suffer undue hardship.

This is not a new proposal because there are other circumstances in which debts owed to the Government, where the Government have powers to extract money from people’s bank accounts, permit a de minimis amount. There are the comparable HMRC direct recovery of debt measures where there is a de minimis balance of £5,000. There is a similar arrangement in Scotland. Scottish law is a mystery to me, but there is a parallel arrangement under Scottish law that, in circumstances where debts can be taken, they have to leave at least £1,000.

The problem arises—talking about both sorts of deduction orders—that there is a possibility of extracting money and leaving the individual with no income whatever to meet routine payments such as rent. Because the bank account is frozen, they may also have made prior commitments and, when those arise and these private arrangements seek money from the bank account which has been driven down to zero by the deduction order, the individual is left in an extremely difficult situation as debts that they have incurred are not able to be met. There is also the issue of money for routine costs. If someone depends on their bank account to feed their family and the account is driven down to zero, that will also incur considerable and unwarranted hardship.

It is quite clear that, following existing practice, this legislation should permit a de minimis amount to allow routine financial transactions to continue where barring them would cause social harm. There is a particular problem that, once the 28-day period has been triggered during which people can object to the proposed deduction order, the account is effectively frozen. In fact, it is frozen until the end of the unlimited period the DWP has in order to reply to the appeal against the deduction order. There is potential for considerable social harm and that is why it is important that at least some agreed sum of money is left. I suggest £1,000 in my amendment but I am really raising the issue in principle.

If the Government can come back on Report with a proposal along the lines I suggest, that would be good. If they do not, I will seek to raise this issue. Both these amendments seek to avoid social harm, and I hope the Government will take the points on board and come back on Report with suitable amendments to avoid the problems identified, not just by me but by bodies in membership of UK Finance which deal with the customers who will be caught by these provisions.

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[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Davies for raising this, and to the noble Viscount for his observations. I agree with my noble friend that affordability assessments should be conducted—he has made that clear, and we certainly want to do that as we think it is important—before a direct deduction order is issued, but we regard this amendment as unnecessary and duplicating existing provisions.

Paragraph 6 of new Schedule 3ZA, inserted by Schedule 5 of the Bill, provides that recovery must not cause hardship to the debtor, any joint account holder or dependant, and must be fair. Paragraph 3 requires the DWP to obtain, via an account information notice, bank statements covering at least the most recent three months in order to help make that assessment.

Further detail on how affordability will be assessed will be set out in the code of practice, a draft of which is available to Members; I am sure that my noble friend has had the opportunity to see it. It sets out the principles that will apply when affordability is assessed. They include ensuring that essential living expenses and other reasonable financial commitments are identified and protected. Officials are working closely with organisations such as the Money and Pensions Service to develop the code and, as required by Clause 93, a formal public consultation will be conducted on the draft before it is first issued.

As I have already outlined, affordability assessments must and will take place prior to enforcing a deduction order. These checks use banks statements, allowing DWP officials to consider expenses such as housing and utilities, enabling the deduction to be affordable, fair and based on individual circumstances, rather than a blanket approach of leaving a set amount in the account which could, if not set high enough, prevent the debtor from meeting those essential costs, as the amounts will vary from person to person.

For regular direct deduction orders, paragraph 6(3) of new Schedule 3ZA requires that any regular deductions made by the DWP each month must not exceed 40% of the monthly average amount credited to the account during the last period in which statements were assessed. Regulations will be made under paragraph 24(2)(d) to further set a maximum rate of 20% for all cases that have not arisen due to fraud.

These figures are maximums, rather than fixed deduction rates. Deduction rates will vary as officials take any affordability, hardship factors or other relevant circumstances into consideration. This approach mirrors that already used effectively in the DWP’s existing powers of deduction from earnings or benefits, and it is not obvious why it should be different in these circumstances. Given the safeguards outlined, requiring that £1,000 be left in one or more of the liable person’s bank accounts in every case where a DDO was sought is unnecessary, as the safeguards will already achieve the outcome intended by this amendment.

Regarding the specific questions, I reassure my noble friend that we are alive to the concerns of UK Finance, which we meet regularly. We are working with MaPS and relevant debt sector organisations on this. He mentioned a comparison with HMRC. HMRC has confirmed that its power is a one-off deduction of a tax debt, not a regular deduction. As a result, it does not assess customers’ affordability as part of the process. Its safeguard instead requires it to leave a minimum of £5,000 across the customer’s accounts to stop taxpayers being left with insufficient funds to cover basic needs. We are taking a different approach: we are assessing affordability, and we will have clear sight via bank statements of the debtor’s ability to repay.

In addition to the work we are doing with MaPS, we are working with relevant stakeholder organisations to make sure that our communications with debtors are clear, to help them understand what we are doing and to engage in the best possible way.

I remind the Committee that before any deductions are taken, account holders will be notified and given the chance to make representations. They can provide relevant information about their financial position and evidence relevant to affordability. Even at that stage, the department’s preference is to reach an agreed position with the debtor. If reasonable payment terms can be agreed and they are maintained by the debtor, the DWP will not make a deduction order.

My noble friend and I clearly want the same thing: to make sure that any recovery is affordable. We have taken different routes, but I hope that what I have said today will help him to accept that our route is doing the job and, in the light of that, he will withdraw his amendment.

I am sorry, I forgot to respond to the noble Viscount about destitution. I may have to come back to him on that, because it would depend very much on somebody’s circumstances. Although the household support fund is locally determined, some directions, steers and guidance are given by the centre by the DWP to local authorities. But the fund is significantly there to help with the cost of living. In relation to someone who is destitute and has committed fraud, people may still, if they have an ongoing entitlement to benefit, have been subject to a loss of benefit penalty as part of a process. So it would very much depend on the circumstances. But if I can find anything else useful, I should be happy to put that in writing to the noble Viscount.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I thank the noble Viscount and my noble friend the Minister for comments on my amendments. It has been useful to receive a coherent assessment and description of how this process will work. I will read carefully what was said and consider whether it is an issue that needs to be pursued at a later stage. I thank those who have spoken. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 109A withdrawn.

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Debate on whether Clause 92 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

We have an issue on this proposal to remove driving licences from people who fail to pay their debts to the DWP. We effectively had a debate on the issue at Second Reading, and I am sure that there will be a debate on this at Report. The purpose of having another prolonged debate at this stage, when situations and positions are so clear, is limited. Although there are clear arguments about effectiveness, and it was advanced that the experience of the child maintenance system, where such a power exists already, indicates the success of the policy, the problem is that we do not have a clear counter to that. We know what we know: very few driving licences are deducted or abolished because of action by the Child Maintenance Service. Is that because it is an effective policy and everyone complies, or because it is rarely used because it is ineffective? We simply do not know. The proponents of the proposal here will say that that demonstrates the policy’s effectiveness, but I think it is reasonable to continue to express doubts about that. However, that is a separate issue.

My objection, fundamentally, is about the philosophy of what is being achieved here and about the nature of state power. I am sure we all agree that the state should have the power to decide who is safe to drive on the public roads. I have no problem with that; that is the responsibility that we as a community have entrusted to the state. The issue is whether that right should be used for other purposes. Is the fact that you can or cannot have a driving licence related to other factors? In my view, it should not be used for other factors; that is an overextension of state power, which is the fundamental reason why I oppose this part of the Bill and why I am suggesting that the clause, and consequently the schedule, should not be passed. This is an issue of principle, as I have explained, and I am sure that we will return to it on Report—so enough said.

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[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

We are not proposing removal of passports on this occasion.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I thank noble Lords who took part in the debate. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, for her support. I am disappointed that the Conservatives, the party of individual freedom, did not see fit to support my argument.

There are a couple of issues that could be helpful to the debate which is likely to take place on Report. If it is possible to get further statistics from the Child Maintenance Service about people who were threatened and then gave in—I cannot totally see how that is possible—that would be good.

There is also the issue of the discriminatory nature of the punishment between different groups of people. As I have made clear, that is a practical objection, which is not why I am against this measure at heart. It would be useful in debate to know more of that practical question. As I have read the paper so far, it is about people who require a driving licence to carry out the functions of their job. However, my noble friend the Minister said that it would cover people who need to drive to work. Perhaps she could interrupt me if she is able to clarify.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

It is up to the court to determine if someone has an essential need for a licence. We have deliberately drawn it broadly so that the court can make that determination. Examples were given of somebody who needed a car to go to work or maybe had essential caring responsibilities. In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, I raised the possibility of somebody who lived somewhere so remote that there was no public transport. Again, that would be a case that they would make to the court. The position is deliberately drawn broadly to allow the court to make that determination.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

Thank you; that is helpful. I withdraw my objection to Clause 92 standing part of the Bill.

Clause 92 agreed.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Lord Davies of Brixton Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 16th June 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I speak to my Amendment 79B and thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, for her support for it. It is a very simple amendment that would make the giving of an eligibility verification notice subject to the same safeguard that already applies to all the other information-gathering powers within the Bill—namely, that the Secretary of State must be satisfied that issuing an EVN is necessary and proportionate for the purpose for which it is issued.

The Minister will no doubt have noticed that I have taken the liberty of inserting “reasonably” into the amendment, as we have just been discussing. Otherwise, the wording is aligned with the safeguard in Clause 3(1)(a), in relation to the Cabinet Office Minister requiring information, and to the wording in Clause 72, in relation to the Secretary of State for the DWP requiring information about suspected fraud under new Section 109BZB(1)(b). This safeguard applies everywhere in the Bill whenever the required information relates to suspected fraud. Rather strangely, however, it does not appear in Schedule 3, where there is no suspicion. That seems the wrong way round. Surely it is even more important that the giving of an information notice should be necessary and proportionate in cases where there is no suspicion.

I am assuming that this omission is in fact an oversight and that, given that it appears everywhere else in the Bill, the Minister will simply accept it. If not, she will need to explain why the exercise of these important and intrusive suspicionless information-gathering powers should not have to be, at the very least, necessary and proportionate in the same way as the exercise of the other information-gathering powers have to be. I will take a little bit of convincing, I am afraid.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 80. There is a certain amount of overlap with other amendments not just in this group, obviously, but in other groups. The mysteries of the grouping of amendments are beyond my pay grade, but we are in a situation where we are bound to discuss the same subject again and again—and, I suspect, again. I will read with interest what my noble friend the Minister said in replying to the previous debate. At the conclusion of all these overlapping debates it would be useful to the Committee if she could write a letter explaining how this whole thing fits together.

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[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I am grateful. The noble Viscount is quite right: there is some fraud in the state pension. It was a judgment about proportion, having compared the size and value of the case load. It is very small. The fact that the affirmative procedure is used means that there will have to be a debate. The Government cannot simply on their own start investigating new benefits without anyone knowing about it, so that makes a difference.

The Bill is clear that, to help make this measure proportionate, only the minimum amount of information necessary is shared with DWP by the banks. That can include only details about the account, such as an account number and sort code; details to identify the individuals, such as names and dates of birth; and details about how the individuals appear to be breaching the eligibility criteria for their benefit. But still at that point, no one is suspected of having done anything wrong; the presumption of innocence remains, because further inquiries are needed to establish whether a benefit has been incorrectly paid.

Some people may have disregards in place that mean they are allowed to have more money than is normally used in the benefit rules. For example, normally you are allowed to have only £16,000 maximum in capital to be entitled to universal credit, but there are reasons why you might have more than that. Some forms of compensation payments are disregarded, for example. There may be a perfectly good reason, which will be investigated at that point—and that will be that. Others may have made a genuine mistake that has led to an overpayment of benefits, which it is important to correct as quickly as possible for the individual and the organisation.

However, there will be some cases, especially in the early stages, that ultimately lead to fraud being identified; that conclusion will never be drawn from these data alone. As is the case now, any claim where a suspicion of fraud arises is referred to our specialist investigation team, which has to undertake a thorough investigation, following all reasonable lines of inquiry before any determination can be drawn.

Just to reassure my noble friend, whether he accepts it or not, in fraud and error cases, decisions on entitlement will be made by a DWP staff member.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

It is clear that we are talking about two different stages here. The first intervention into the bank accounts of individuals will be done algorithmically. The DWP will provide the banks or whoever with the set of criteria that they should apply, and the banks will run it through their computers and that will throw up cases. No individual will be involved at that stage. Cases that are highlighted then referred to the DWP are the ones where human intervention will start. But there are the two stages, and the human intervention is at the second stage, not the first.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I think that we are going to repeat ourselves at each other. This is essentially a data-requiring measure—it is a data push. The data is coming across to DWP, and that data will be used with other data, and where there is an indication that there may be an overpayment, it will be dealt with either by reaching out to the individual or, if there is a possibility that it is fraud, it will be referred for a fraud investigation. Any decision on benefit entitlement and fraud and error is made by a DWP staff member.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I hope that the Minister will forgive me for making the point, but it is crucial. The bank will send a data file with cases that it has flagged. Will cases from that data file be identified by humans or by the DWP algorithmically?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I think that we are talking at cross-purposes here. The information will be sent across to DWP, and DWP will take information on an individual and, if there is a signal that an individual may have a breach in eligibility criteria and may have more money in their bank account than is permitted, that information will be looked at and taken together with other information and a DWP staff member will make a judgment about what to do about that. I do not think that I can be any clearer than that.

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[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My Amendment 83 is a probing amendment. I want to know more about the Government’s thinking on this. As the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, indicated, this is sparked by the comments of UK Finance, which represents, broadly speaking, those who will have to comply with this legislation, interrogate customers’ bank accounts and provide the DWP with information, so its views are very germane. It submitted a briefing for Second Reading, and a number of its points still stand, except to the extent that there has been any engagement between the DWP and UK Finance since Second Reading. I would be interested if the Minister could brief the Committee.

It is still, however, relevant to mention my points. I will focus on one in particular, as my amendment does. UK Finance raised a range of concerns that need to be taken seriously. I will outline them, just to put this into context. It is concerned about the potential conflict with its duties to deal with financial crime. It regarded this as a diversion from its capacity to deal with economic crime, and it was concerned that there were insufficient safeguards for bulk data access. I would be interested if the Minister could address those issues, either now or in correspondence.

My amendment focuses on the other point that it raised. It said:

“Risks of financial harm: Tensions between the Bill and firms’ existing obligations under the FCA’s Consumer Duty and Vulnerability Guidance could result in harm to vulnerable consumers. Bad actors learn workarounds quickly, so the powers may end up impacting most acutely people inadvertently making—or subject to—errors”.


That is a massive criticism of the Bill’s provisions, and it is important that it should be addressed explicitly, either in correspondence or in reply to this debate. I want to paraphrase in very broad terms the attitude of UK Finance towards the Bill. The truth—although it would not say it in quite these terms—is that it does not like it. It wishes that it was not here because of the pressure that it would place on it in all sorts of ways. That is outlined in its briefing.

I will address more directly the issue of financial harm to vulnerable customers. The Government need to say extensively and explicitly how they expect financial institutions to reconcile their undoubted duty of care towards their customers and their obligations under the Bill. To put this into context, the Child Poverty Action Group says that

“the eligibility verification measure would mean people face more suspicionless surveillance and intrusion into their privacy simply by virtue of being benefit recipients. We believe it is fundamentally unfair and potentially unlawful to subject these families to surveillance that the rest of the population does not face, simply because they are on a low income”.

I already quoted the concerns of Helena Wood of CIFAS. There is no doubt that the provisions of the Bill will be of massive concern to individuals, and that should be a major issue in how the Government implement the Bill—I have made plain my objections in principle—and how it will be handled in relation to vulnerable customers.

I have an amendment—let us hope we get to it on Wednesday—about the affordability assessment. Having an affordability assessment is not my idea; it is in the Government’s briefing note, but they do not explain what they mean by it. We will have a debate on Monday about the nature of that affordability assessment. But that in itself will put pressure on customers. Just being there, it will create pressure, particularly for people struggling with poverty and who have problems with their mental health.

It is essential that the affordability assessment will be able to understand the individual circumstances, but the process of implementing that assessment will in itself create harm for the consumer. I cannot see an easy way through on this, but the Government need to address the issue and tell us what they will do to ensure that this conflict is avoided.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, there was extensive conversation about the role of banks in the debate on a previous day in Committee, and I probably got carried away with my own hyperbole when I said that they were being coerced into being involved, on which the noble Baroness, Lady Anderson, corrected me. However, I think we can say that they are compelled to be involved and that financial penalties, which will become increasingly punitive, will be levied if they do not do as the Government request. If they get those penalties, the cost might not be an issue but there would certainly be reputational damage. We need to have some context here and recognise that the banks are not queuing up to do this. That is an important point, which the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, has made. There is a reluctance about some of the things that are happening with the Bill, which I think the Government can admit to.

In all the literature they have produced and in conversations we have had so far, the Government have reassured those of us who are worried about privacy. We are constantly being reassured that there are limitations on the type of data the banks will share. On the other hand, the way in which the Government are dealing with that is by saying that the banks will be fined—there will be a penalty—if they overshare or if they provide inaccurate information, so I fear that this penalty will, again, have the impact of pushing the blame or responsibility on to banks for any errors.

That makes me nervous, because it is not clear to me how they will not see anyone on benefits as just a pain in the neck for them, since they will now have to go through the exercise of checking, which they are being compelled to do or they will be fined or get into trouble, and if they get the information wrong or hand over the wrong information, they can be fined again. Inevitably—this is why I am interested in these amendments—the banks will associate these eligibility verification notices and the work being asked of them for those on benefits, and they will view such people as creating more work and more jeopardy.

I also think the banks are being held responsible for things they should not necessarily be responsible for. I would be interested to know how the Minister feels, because I think it is a reasonable query at this point to ask, “Isn’t there a problem with private banks being asked to be government inspectors?” I think it was one of the MPs who said that the purpose of banks is not to act as an arm of the state. How should private banks respond to the fact that the state is asking them to do a huge amount more in relation to this clamp-down on DWP welfare fraud? It seems to me that, ultimately, we are asking the banks to do what the Government should be doing, and the banks will get the blame if things go wrong. They are the ones who will be doing the surveillance, no matter which way we look at it.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Lord Davies of Brixton Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th June 2025 Grand Committee

I commend these amendments as constructive, proportionate and entirely consistent with the Government’s broader goals. I hope that the Minister will reflect on their value and give serious consideration to incorporating them in the final version of the Bill. I beg to move.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Sikka very much regrets not being here today, for totally understandable personal reasons.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

That matter is not in this group.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

Could the noble Lord wait, please?

As the noble Lord has reminded me, my noble friend’s amendments are in the next group. My noble friend Lord Sikka will not be here and the lead amendment will not be moved; however, the issues raised in those amendments are directly relevant to this group. In order for us obtain further clarification, it would be helpful to the Committee if my noble friend the Minister could, in our discussion on this group, give a broad indication of the response that would have been made to the following group so that those Members who are interested can consider what has been said and take a view on whether the specific issues that would be raised in the next group, but are germane to this group, should be raised on Report. I think that it would be helpful to have the matter that would be raised in the following group clarified in answer to this group because, to be honest, they totally overlap.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I will speak now, as I think it is probably the appropriate moment; I am sorry if I have jumped in over the noble Viscount, Lord Younger. On the next group, I was going to apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, and say that I would have signed his amendments had I seen them and organised myself in time; however, the noble Lord, Lord Davies, is absolutely right that the two groups fit together.

There are just a couple of things that I want to say in relation both to the amendments addressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and to those tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka. Independence is absolutely crucial but I am not sure that writing in the word “independent” is quite the right way to approach this. I am not a lawyer but how you define whether someone is independent strikes me as a difficult task; it might exclude someone who has donated a large amount of money to a political party in order then to be appointed to that job, for example, but there are a lot more finer cases than that. This is why I preferred the amendments put down by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, which would allow a review by the Treasury Committee; to me, that is genuinely independent oversight of a body to ensure that it is independent. None the less, I will address this group of amendments, together with those from the noble Baroness, Lady Finn.

I will pick up the points made earlier by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, who is not currently in her place, about the level of public distrust that has arisen since the situation with Covid procurement. I was recently on LBC television talking about defence procurement—a subject that is very much in the news at the moment—when I was quite surprised to see, across a broad political spectrum of people, the level of distrust that there is around government defence procurement and the issues that have arisen in that space. As the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, said, these are really important issues of public trust. We know that we have a huge problem with public trust in our institutions at the moment.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Lord Davies of Brixton Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 15th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

First, I welcome the noble Baroness, Lady Spielman, to the House, particularly as a fellow spreadsheet lover. The Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill—can I call it PAFERB?—has significant implications for privacy, justice and the rights of vulnerable individuals. I welcome parts of the Bill, but there are significant concerns. I apologise to my Front-Bench friends for highlighting the problems and not the many things in the Bill which are to be strongly welcomed.

The concern is that the Bill will introduce an unprecedented system of mass financial surveillance. We should understand that this is something new. It undermines the presumption of innocence that anyone accused should have and it will disproportionately affect people who, by definition, are poor, whether because they have inadequate pensions, are disabled and find it difficult to get a job, or generally struggle to find employment.

Attempts have been made to paint a picture of the fraudster. To me, it is the person on a low income who is struggling to cope with their situation. Perhaps they are not as well organised as Members of this House and live in a state of chaos. That is the person I see being affected by this Bill. Clearly, fraud is wrong, but to paint the Bill as dealing only with bad-thinking people is misleading to the House. Who are the fraudsters? Under Part 2 of this Bill, they are people who are already in financial difficulties. Navigating the welfare system is already challenging. Those entitled to benefits will be only further deterred by the threat of surveillance and potential penalties that will exacerbate their difficulties.

There is a real concern, which I hope we can address in Committee, that the Bill will create a second-tier justice system for people on the poverty line, treating them differently from the rest of the population. We will no doubt be told of the extensive safeguards being put in place. Unfortunately, for those opposed to the principle of snooping, there is a Catch-22 here: the more safeguards you introduce, the more I worry that those safeguards are required and the proposals are problematic. To the extent that the safeguards weaken the effectiveness of the Bill, it raises the question of whether the measures are required at all. More safeguards clearly mean the Bill is less essential.

My first concern relates to the mass financial surveillance—make no mistake, that is what this involves—and the extensive powers being granted to the DWP to assess and monitor the bank accounts of benefit claimants. Such powers amount to what has been described as a “chilling” and “disturbing” level of intrusion, with a surveillance system that treats all claimants as suspects, without any evidence of wrongdoing. Those concerns have been expressed by speakers around the House. My major concern, which we will have to consider in detail—that is why it is so important that we see the codes of practice—is that some of the things that my noble friend said in introducing the Bill are not in the Bill. We need assurances on those issues before we can sign these provisions of the Bill off as acceptable.

The key to this is the lack of the need to demonstrate probable cause, which has been widely criticised by civil liberties groups, including Big Brother Watch. They argue, and I agree, that suspicionless financial surveillance treats all claimants as potential fraudsters, infringing their right to privacy without, I emphasise, having to demonstrate due cause. The concern is that this will set a precedent for further unwarranted state intrusion into individuals’ financial affairs in the future. The Information Commissioner’s Office has come back on the Bill and said that some of its concerns have been addressed, but emphasised the word “some”. It still has concerns about the Bill that we have to address.

My second concern is about direct deduction orders and the extent to which the legislation will allow the DWP to directly deduct funds from individual bank accounts without a presumption of innocence and what I would regard as proper due process. How can we allow an administrative body to exercise punitive powers without appropriate due practice? Decisions to recover funds or impose penalties should be subject to judicial oversight, to prevent miscarriages of justice. We should remember that the great majority of people who will be affected by the removal of the need for judicial oversight are poor, inevitably in difficult financial circumstances and often in a chaotic administrative state. It is bound to lead to hardship.

The Minister said in her introduction that a decision would always be made by a human. I am sorry, but the Bill does not say that. If you read the relevant clause in the Bill, you see that there is no requirement for a human to be involved. Again, this is an issue we must return to in Committee.

My third area of concern is the disqualification from driving and the fact that the Bill gives the Secretary of State power to apply to courts to disqualify individuals from holding a driving licence if they have been given too much in benefits and refused to repay the excess. I cannot conceive how anyone thinks this is anything like a good idea, except in trying to achieve a headline in the Daily Mail. Even in principle, how can the ability to drive a motor vehicle be determined by the debts that someone happens to owe to the state? The right to drive a motor vehicle should not be contingent in that way. It is a fact: either you are safe to drive or you are not safe to drive. That is the only criterion that should apply.

Even in practical terms, justice should always be applied in an even-handed fashion. Taking away a driving licence will have grossly disproportionate effects on different people. Those who rely on a car to get to work—not for work, but to get to work—will be much worse affected than those who can walk to work. People who run their children to school will be affected much more than those who live round the corner from the school. People who live in urban areas with good transport links, such as we have in London, will be much less affected than those who live in remote rural areas. How can it be just that this form of punishment— and it is punishment—should be handed out in such an uneven fashion? It will also inevitably lead to greater poverty and social problems.

The House has to consider this Bill with a precautionary perspective, highlight potential overreach by the Government and identify the risks to individual freedoms and privacy.

Someone asked the question: why have the banks not been asked whether they want these obligations? Well, they have been asked. UK Finance, which represents the financial industry as a whole, has provided us with detailed comments on the Bill—as it did on the previous occasion—from which it is clear that the industry does not want to do this. If it has to do it, and it accepts the right of the Government to make the requirement, it sets out a number of criteria that need to be addressed.

I am running out of time, even though I have more to say on other issues. The point that really strikes home is that the banks have a duty of care towards their account holders. They tell us that reconciling that duty of care with the obligations under the Bill poses considerable difficulties for them. We have to listen to them: they have been asked and they have expressed considerable practical reservations. My objections are based in principle, but they are still raising practical obligations.

Finally, this Bill on fraud and error is currently silent on the errors made by the DWP—I reflect here the remarks made to me by my noble friend Lady Lister of Burtersett, who regrets not being here today. She points out that in 2023-24, almost 700,000 new universal credit official error overpayment debts were entered into the DWP’s debt manager system. Research from the Public Law Project indicates that the DWP’s default approach is to recover all official error overpayments on universal credit, with relief dependent on individuals being able to request inaccessible discretionary measures. The Bill provides an opportunity to correct this unfairness, and my noble friend plans to table an amendment in Committee that would alter the test for the recovery of universal credit official error overpayments so that they could be recovered only where the claimant could reasonably have been expected to realise that there was an overpayment.

To conclude, there is much to welcome in this Bill. Public money should be used appropriately, but, ultimately, the measures have to be exercised with greater compassion than we have seen so far.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I have heard accounts of people saying that disabled people will worry that DWP will know that they go to Pret and therefore cannot really need the money, et cetera, so it is important to make it clear that DWP will not have access to their bank accounts through this EVM.

DWP knows the bank accounts into which benefits are paid, so DWP will tell the banks to look specifically at the bank accounts into which those benefits are paid. It will tell them specifically the criteria they are looking for, and all they are being asked to provide is enough information to identify accounts which may, on the face of it, be in breach. Then, that information will be used along with other information that DWP holds, and it will be examined by—to reassure the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Lichfield—a human being, who will make a decision on whether to investigate. There could be a number of outcomes. The outcome could be that the person may have had, for example, more money in their account than the benefit allows, but for one of the many acceptable reasons. There could be a perfectly good reason. The person may have made a genuine error, and that will be dealt with in a different way, or in some cases there may be evidence of fraud, and that might move into a fraud investigation.

I accept that some noble Lords may not think this proportionate. We believe it is proportionate, with those safeguards wrapped around it, but I want to be clear that we are arguing about the same thing, not about different understandings of what is going on at the time.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My noble friend referred to an acceptable reason. Who ultimately decides what constitutes acceptability?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

This may be a matter that we might more usefully explore in Committee, but I shall give my noble friend a simple example. There are certain compensation payments that are not taken into account in terms of eligibility for benefits. They are excluded from the capital limits. So it may be that somebody has received a compensation payment. There is guidance about circumstances in which people may have money in their account. The point is that cases will be looked at individually before they are pursued. There is a requirement on fraud investigators to look at all information and chase down all avenues of information, so they will do that and make an appropriate decision.

Just to be clear, on benefits in scope, the initial use of the power is focused on three benefits: universal credit, employment support allowance and pension credit. The reason why is that that is where the highest levels of fraud are at the moment. The noble Lord, Lord Palmer, will have noticed that carer’s allowance is not on the list for the EVM. The two types of fraud and error we are targeting initially—breaches of capital and the living abroad rules—are significant drivers of fraud and error in those benefits. For universal credit, nearly £1 billion was overpaid last year as a result of capital-related fraud. Once fully rolled out, that measure alone will save £500 million a year. The state pension is expressly out of scope and cannot be added even by regulations, and that is sensible given that the rate of state pension overpayment is just 0.1%.

Somebody asked me whether we plan to add any other benefits. The answer is no. We cannot rule them out because fraud may change in the future and different benefits may be subject to different levels of fraud.

A number of noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Lichfield and the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, raised the use of AI and automated decision-making. To be clear, we are not introducing any new use of automated-decision making in the Bill, so no such new use will happen as a result of it. The DWP and the PSFA will always look at all available information before making key decisions about the next steps in fraud investigations or inquiries into error. Fraud and error decisions that affect benefit entitlement will be taken by a DWP colleague, and any signals of potential fraud or error will be looked at comprehensively.

Given the arguments made by those who think we are not going far enough, and by those who think we are going too far, we appear to be Goldilocks in this. I think we have got the balance right now. Goldilocks is not always right, I accept that, but I think we have landed in the right place because of the safeguards the Bill includes to ensure that its measures are effective and proportionate. Those safeguards provide protection but also accountability and transparency.

I will not go back over all the different kinds of oversight, but on the appointment process, I assure the House that the process for the independent people who will oversee EVM and the PSFA’s measures will be carried out under the guidance of the Commissioner for Public Appointments and will abide by the Governance Code on Public Appointments throughout.

I am grateful for my noble friend Lady Alexander’s compliments. I would suggest that she herself apply, but she might not qualify for the independence threshold entirely, as one might hope.

I shall say a brief word on safeguards. The Bill includes new rights of review and appeal. The DWP will still provide routes for mandatory reconsideration of decisions relating to overpayment investigations, followed by the opportunity to appeal to the First-tier Tribunal. For direct deduction orders, again, there are new routes for representation and review, followed by appeal to the First-tier Tribunal, while the court’s decision in relation to a disqualification order can be appealed on a point of law.

On driving licences, I take the point made by my noble friend Lord Sikka: why driving licences and not membership of a political party? I hate to break it him, but it is just possible that not being allowed to join a political party does not have the same deterrent effect as losing a driving licence—not for us, obviously, but we are not typical, although it is touch and go. I assure the House that this measure has been used for a long time in the Child Maintenance Service. As the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, said, its effectiveness is shown in that it almost never needs to be used.

As a final reminder, this is about debt recovery. It is about people who, by definition, are not on benefits and not in paid employment. The reality is that if you owe DWP money and you are on benefits, the DWP can already deduct it from your benefits, and if you get a wage packet the DWP can deduct it from your wages. However, if you are none of those things—if you are privately wealthy, self-employed or paid through a company—and you owe the DWP money, the department does not have the same ability to go after that money as it does for those who are on benefits or in PAYE. The Bill gives the department the opportunity to use measures such as deduction orders and other tools to try to bring people to the table. If someone comes to the table to have a conversation, we will begin to arrange a payment plan. The other measures are there only if people refuse to engage and simply will not come along and do what they ought to do.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I am annoying the Whip. Does my noble friend have a response to the point I raised on behalf of my noble friend Lady Lister about the position of people who reasonably assume that the money received in error was rightfully theirs?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I have a wodge of answers to questions asked by a lot of noble Lords, and I am afraid time has run out. But to be clear, we need to not ally fraud and error. This is just a data pull. If data comes from the banks to the DWP, it will be used with other data to make an individual assessment of someone’s position and appropriate decisions will be made at that point about how to deal with it. It may be an overpayment, a genuine mistake, an act of fraud, or there may be no problem. Cases will be looked at individually.

This Bill delivers on our manifesto commitment. It is expected to save £1.5 billion over the next five years as part of wider action at the DWP to save a total of £9.6 billion. The Bill will bring in new powers for the PSFA to tackle fraud and it will deliver the biggest upgrade to the DWP’s counterfraud powers in over 14 years. We believe it is proportionate and demonstrates that we will take action against those who willingly defraud our public services, providing the right tools so that we can step up to prevent, detect and deter criminal activity. I very much look forward to working with so many noble Lords across the House—it says here—during the passage of this important Bill. I look forward to seeing many of them in Committee. I beg to move.

Pension Protection Fund and Occupational Pension Schemes (Levy Ceiling) Order 2025

Lord Davies of Brixton Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd April 2025 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Brixton]

That the Grand Committee takes note of the Pension Protection Fund and Occupational Pension Schemes (Levy Ceiling) Order 2025, laid before the House on 3 February (SI 2025/103).

Relevant document: 18th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My Lords, this order is routine and has little practical impact on the PPF. It sets the potential cap on the levy, but the levy as is currently payable is only a small percentage of the cap, so in itself it is of no significance. However, having the order before us provides an opportunity to discuss the operation of what is becoming, a bit under the radar, one of the country’s biggest financial institutions, and one that is receiving increasing comment.

Those among us who feel a sense of déjà vu are right, as we had a similar debate almost exactly two years ago. There is an important difference, of course, in that the Front Benches have swapped places. I will not touch on the Financial Assistance Scheme—FAS—although it is worth saying that many of the same points will apply. But that will be a debate for another day.

The issues being discussed in the context of the Pension Protection Fund include the practical problem with the legislation preventing a zero levy. There is the issue of the Government’s general policies to increase productive investment by the pension universe as a whole. There is the issue, which has been raised, of fund consolidation and whether the PPF is a suitable vehicle for that. There are also the limits on the benefits that the PPF can pay. Noble Lords will be glad to know that I will not deal with the first three, although it is worth flagging them up. I will say a bit about the legislation, but my focus will be on the limit to the benefits payable to members of the PPF and what, if anything, could be done about it.

We have to thank the PPF for its extremely helpful briefing note. I do not think that anyone is here from the PPF, but one can always watch online nowadays, so I hope they are watching us. I emphasise that the briefing note was helpful and showed that the PPF was aware of and alive to the issues that I am raising, which is good to know. Having read through the fund’s annual report in preparation for this debate, I welcome its commitment to DEI policies and the requirements of climate change. It is worth putting that on record, because it is doing a great job.

In a sense, this debate is a taster for the forthcoming debates we will have on the pensions Bill. Perhaps the Minister can give us a slight hint about when and, as importantly, where we will get that Bill. But the one thing that we are almost certain to see in the Bill— because the Pensions Minister has said so—is some legislation on the calculation of the levy. I think the Minister has gone as far as is possible to say that that will be in the Bill.

However, there are other issues that can be raised in the context of the Bill. I give due warning: I think that there will be scope in the Bill to discuss the issue I am raising today—that of the increases in benefits for members of the PPF. We have not seen the Bill yet, including its Long Title and what will be in scope, but, given the issues that have already been mentioned as likely to be in the Bill, I think that it will provide an appropriate and important arena in which to discuss what I am going to raise in relation to benefit increases.

I shall make a point on the regulations and the zero levy. As I say, the Minister, Torsten Bell MP, has gone as far as he can. He mentioned the Government’s intention to allow the PPF greater flexibility in reducing the levy that it collects on pension schemes, particularly when it is not needed, but he went on to highlight the PPF’s critical role as a safety net for pension savers—on the one hand, seeking to avoid unnecessary levies on pension schemes, but, at the same time, with the intention of allowing pension scheme employers to invest, supporting savers in growth but recognising the need to maintain a secure PPF. He also drew attention to the PPF’s strong financial position. Can the Minister here tell us anything more specific about the proposals to introduce the regulations?

I move on to the PPF’s finances. I have here something in quotation marks; I think I am quoting the Minister. It says that the PPF is in “robust financial health”. In all the information that the PPF provides us with—it is a lot of information—there is a wonderful fan chart showing the future progress of the funding levels and its perception that, as things stand, those levels will continue to increase. It is already strong, and the prospects are that it is going to continue to increase over the coming 10 to 15 years.

So, an issue is bound to arise—people always raise it when they see that a pension fund has what people tend to refer to as a surplus; that is a questionable concept but people refer to surplus—which is that, if a surplus is there, people are always pretty keen to spend it on all sorts of things rather than on the prime purpose of any pension arrangement, which is obviously to provide benefits for the members. It is notable— I checked this in the annual report and accounts of the PPF—that it never actually uses “surplus” in this context. It quotes the Government’s use of the word, but the fund itself refers not to surpluses but to its reserves. That is a much more appropriate way of thinking about this. “Surplus” implies that you do not really need it, but a reserve is there for the purposes of the fund and to protect members’ benefits. It is much better to talk in terms of reserves rather than of surpluses.

It is worth recalling that, two years ago, when we last discussed this issue, we had just had the departmental review of the Pension Protection Fund, done jointly by officials of the department and the PPF. This was a particular recommendation:

“That the DWP and the PPF work together to understand the implications of the PPF’s funding position in light of expected future developments in the population of Defined Benefit (DB) pension schemes and plan well ahead for any legislative changes that might be needed; for example, to address what happens to any funding which is surplus to requirements”.


So, the departmental review uses “surplus”, which, as I have explained, I do not like, but it was asking what we are going to do about this level of reserves: is it the correct level of reserves or are there other ways in which this money could be implied?

The problem, of course, is that the legislation does not say anything at all about those resources. Given the PPF’s understandable policy of building up a substantial buffer, we have to give that issue some attention, particularly as the PPF’s figures show that buffer increasing year by year, as I said.

What could you do with it? I have seen one suggestion that it could go back to the employers, but I cannot see how that is practical. In a sense, it can go back to the employers by reducing the amount of the levy—that is for the PPF—but there is no way in which the actual cash could go back because many of the employers who paid it are no longer here and we are now in a different world compared to when the levy was being paid, up to 20 years ago. I do not think it is an option to make cash payments back to employers. The extent to which, by reducing the levy, employers have more cash in their hands is a separate issue.

It would be equally wrong, or even worse, for it to go to the Government, but that is what would happen as things stand. This is a fund, and if it ever ran out of people to pay—way in the future, of course, because we are already anticipating that benefits already in payment will still be in payment in 2100, so it is a long term—even the prospect of that money ultimately going to the Government is just wrong and it should be rejected explicitly. From my perspective, the obvious place where that money could be used is to improve the benefits for members.

There are, obviously, two ways in which members’ benefits can be increased. First, there is the 10% haircut, which is applied to members who join from deferment. Of course, those who are already receiving pensions from age, retirement or ill health get 100%, but the deferred suffer this blunt 10% haircut, which was introduced as part of the deal when the legislation was introduced. It is a real live issue: do we still need to apply that 10% haircut? You have a retention on insurance policies to reduce the premiums and to discourage people from making claims. I do not think that really applies. We have already got the levy down to minimal amounts, so we do not need it for that reason, and the idea that employers will behave recklessly in order that their ex-employees can get 100% rather than 90% benefits does not need to be taken seriously. The need for the haircut has clearly gone. It is there, but it is not needed. That is the first thing that you could do.

The second thing, and the one that perhaps gets most discussion, is providing better protection against inflation. That is the central issue that I am talking about. There is a very important distinction between what can be done under existing legislation and what would require additional legislation. That falls quite neatly into benefits accrued post 1997, where the fund has the power to make some discretionary increases. It has never exercised it, but it now says in its annual reports that it is an issue that it considers. It has always reached the conclusion that it will not make the increases, but it has the power. For pre-1997 benefits it has no right to make any increases and to do so would require legislation, which is where we come back to the pensions Bill. I very much hope that the provisions in the pensions Bill will at the very least give the PPF equivalent power to make discretionary increases for pre-1997 benefits, as it has the power to do for post-1997 benefits.

Until four or five years ago, the PPF operated in a period of relatively low inflation, so the issue did not bite so much—goodness me, I have spoken for 15 minutes already—but then we had three or four years of high rates of inflation. This had a significant impact on members’ benefits and a particularly severe impact on members with pre-1997 accruals, who got no increases. Their benefits have fallen in value by something like 40%. Benefits accrued after 1997 do get increases, but, because of the 2.5% cap on increases, the reduction they have suffered is significantly less but still material—in excess of a 20% cut. That is a reduction for ever; there is no way in which those reductions are made up subsequently, unless the PPF board were so to decide.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Drake (Lab)]

My Lords, I refer to my interest as a trustee of a defined benefit pension scheme. I thank my noble friend Lord Davies for facilitating this debate.

Two of the restrictions placed on the PPF by the Pensions Act 2004 are, first, the levy ceiling and, secondly, that any increase in the actual levy is limited to a 25% increase year on year. If the PPF sets a zero levy one year, it can never subsequently raise it because 25% of zero remains zero. Although the order that we are taking note of today increases the ceiling, in reality, the levy has been systematically falling as the PPF’s position has strengthened. That 25% limit, however, inhibits setting a very low levy: if economic circumstances change, it will take longer to raise that levy back to a material level.

The Government have said that they will consider legislative changes to make it easier to set a zero levy; I hope that the Minister can confirm that that is still the disposition of the Government. However, given the stronger funding position of the PPF and the prospect of the Government removing the 25% limit, the PPF board halved its £100 million levy estimate for 2025-26 to £45 million—its lowest ever. That is the point I want to take up in the rest of my contribution.

In its foreword to its levy policy statement, which sets out the £45 million, the PPF states:

“The likelihood of the PPF encountering significant funding problems in the future … is low and is expected to continue to reduce over time … if funding problems did arise, these could be resolved over a multi-year period with our investment returns likely to be the most significant contributor”.


Taking into account that level of confidence in the funding level and investment returns, and taking into account the £13.2 billion funding surplus—

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

Reserves.

[Baroness Drake (Lab)]

Yes, reserves. Taking into account that and the levy reduction, it triggers the need to reflect that it is equally important to have regard to what is a fair striking of the balance between levy payer and member interests. This is the issue that I want to pause on, because it is something that the Government should reflect on—particularly regarding, as others have mentioned, the PPF indexation rules as they apply to compensation for service pre 1997.

As my noble friend Lord Davies set out, the Act sets the annual increase for PPF compensation in payment for pensionable service accrued after April 1997; that is set at the CPI and capped at 2.5%. However, that is the limit of the PPF’s power, which means that, for pension benefits accrued for service pre 1997, compensation payment does not increase at all—it just does not. No matter what the year or the economic circumstances, there are no means of increasing the compensation payments for pension benefits accrued prior to 1997. Over the period of retirement, particularly given recent high inflation, the rules on pre-1997 service compensation have had a significant, even acute, financial impact on those affected.

The PPF provided some information on the costs of improving compensation rules in a published letter in December 2024, in response to requests from the Commons Work and Pensions Select Committee. Unlike my noble friend, I shall, if I may, refer to some figures. Using those figures, if the Government allowed the PPF to apply prospectively CPI capped at 2.5% to pre-service compensation payments, it would increase liabilities by £2 billion, reducing the reserves from £13.2 billion to £11 billion but still keeping a 150% funding level even if that was done. However, for an ad hoc increase to the pre-1997 compensation payment, recognising that period of higher inflation we have been through, the figures would be significantly lower than those I have quoted.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, said, the rules set in 2004 were set cautiously because nobody was really clear on the level of schemes that would fall into the PPF. There was a lot questioning about the sustainability of the PPF; it is a compliment to the PPF that it has proved it is sustainable. So some of the rules were set very cautiously, but the PPF is now in a strong financial position, with some £32.2 billion of assets: £19 billion in liabilities and reserves of £13.2 billion. The risk of future claims has fallen, either because, as the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, pointed out, there is a big shift to buyout, or because the funding of schemes is much stronger. The risks are falling correspondingly: the annual levy has declined from £648 million in 2023 to £45 million in 2025-26, with further reductions anticipated.

Not only has the levy in quantum declined hugely; the levy has also declined as a proportion of the PPF’s funding mix. Roughly one-third of the funding comes from the assets transferred to the PPF from those members’ pension schemes. Similarly, another third comes from the investment returned on assets, and 11% comes from assets recovered by the PPF on behalf of those schemes. Less than a quarter—23%—of the funding comes from the levy, and that is going to fall. However, the benefits of the PPF’s strong funding are deployed more to move the levy towards zero, and consideration is being given to abolishing the industry-funded PPF administration levy. This inevitably raises the question of fair balance between levy payer and member interest, particularly for pre-1997 service, as it is quite tough that there is no facility to improve those compensation payments and they never increase.

Like others, I absolutely support the Government’s priority to deliver growth, driving employer investment in their businesses. I also recognise that the PPF liabilities are captured in the whole of government accounts, which obviously introduces a sensitivity. I am not disregarding those issues, but I note that the PPF’s own three-year strategy has set a goal of working with government to progress a review of the indexing of compensation. There is a growing concern, given the level of funding and reserves, about the fact that, at the moment, service accrued pre 1997 can never be increased. It is something that starts to tilt a fair balance between levy payer and member interest. Although I recognise that these things are not easy, will the Government give further consideration to a fair striking of balance of interests?

--- Later in debate ---

I thank noble Lords for the opportunity to respond to this wide-ranging debate on issues affecting our system. The Government are determined to make our pension system work as well as it can as part of our mission to shape the pension system to serve the interests of savers and pensioners, ensuring decent, secure retirement incomes for all. I hope that is a goal we can all get behind.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I will not tire the patience of the Committee by giving the half of my speech that I had to drop when I introduced the debate. I shall just thank my noble friend the Minister for her reply. It was what had to be expected, and I understand the situation. We look forward to continuing these discussions in the pensions Bill, whenever it comes.

Motion agreed.

National Insurance Pension Underpayments

Lord Davies of Brixton Excerpts

Thursday 13th March 2025 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Davies of Brixton]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking to reduce the number of underpayments of National Insurance pension where entitlement to that pension is based on a spouse’s National Insurance record, and the underpayment is caused by “official error” by the Department for Work and Pensions.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Sherlock) (Lab)]

My Lords, everyone should receive the state pension payments to which they are entitled. This Government understand the importance of putting right any errors. DWP became aware of issues with historic state pension underpayments in 2020 and took immediate action to investigate and correct the problem. A legal entitlements and administrative practices exercise—LEAP—began in January 2021, and DWP completed the vast majority of cases by December 2024 as planned. The exercise has now closed.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I thank my noble friend for her Answer and welcome the good news. The problem is that this is only one aspect of the sheer complexity of state pension entitlement for spouses’ pensions. Because of the history, that largely affects women. Does my noble friend agree that the department should perhaps be doing more to inform people so they can find their way through the maze of entitlement?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My noble friend raises a really important point. There is a lot of complexity, particularly in the old basic state pension. With the new state pension, your entitlement depends on your own national insurance contributions in the majority of cases, so in future it gets a lot more straightforward. Most people claim their new state pension online, so getting it is mostly automated. However, under the old state pension, if you did not have enough pension in your own right, you could inherit it from a civil partner or a spouse, or a divorced partner or a late spouse. That has led to all kinds of complexities. We are making sure that before someone reaches state pension age, the Pension Service writes to them to tell them what they have to do to claim their state pension. As part of that process, they have to give us the details that enable us to work out if they are still carrying forward any entitlements from partners’ contributions as well as their own.

So, we are really committed to making sure there is clear, accurate, accessible information out there about the state pension. There is lots of it online, on GOV.UK. There is even a tool called “Your partner’s National Insurance record and your State Pension”, which, while not imaginative, is a pretty clear description of what it does. If anyone would rather not go online, they can ring the Pension Service, which will talk them through it. We are really determined to help people get this right.

Pension Review: Phase 2

Lord Davies of Brixton Excerpts

Wednesday 18th December 2024 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Davies of Brixton]

To ask His Majesty’s Government whether they have paused phase 2 of their pension review, and if so, why.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Sherlock) (Lab)]

My Lords, this Government are committed to enabling tomorrow’s pensioners to have security in retirement, which is why we announced the landmark pensions review days after coming into office in July. The first phase will boost investment and economic growth, with two consultations live since November, and we are committed to a second phase focused on retirement adequacy, of which we will provide further details in due course.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I very much welcome my noble friend the Minister’s reply, but of course she will be aware of how this works. Last weekend there was a series of stories in the national press, from the FT to the Sun, suggesting that the second phase had been put on hold, presumably to provide some assurance to those who are concerned about the high costs of employment. The problem is that without an urgent definition of an adequate pension on a clear and evidence-based basis, much of the debate that we can have on pensions is facile and empty of content. You cannot know which way to go unless you know where you are going. Does the Minister agree?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I think I can agree with the last statement firmly. I will try to avoid being facile and empty of content; I cannot make permanent promises, but I will do my best. I understand the point my noble friend is making, but I can perhaps offer him some reassurance. The pensions review is going to be conducted in two phases, and it matters that they are structured in the right way. The first phase, which was launched by the Chancellor in July, is aiming to boost investment, so it offers a win-win. It will boost investment for the country and provide better saver outcomes, alongside economic growth.

Phase 1 launched two significant consultations: one about DC schemes and the other about the Local Government Pension Scheme. It is right that we focus on delivering the first phase before moving on to phase 2. But the second phase, my noble friend will be glad to know, will focus on pensions adequacy and further measures to improve outcomes for pensioners. I take his point about the need to be clear about what adequacy means, and I will take that back. The scope of the second phase will be announced in due course, but I will take that comment back to my colleagues as that is being developed.

Women’s State Pension Age Communication: PHSO Report

Lord Davies of Brixton Excerpts

Tuesday 17th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I would like to talk to the noble Viscount outside to understand exactly what he is asking about AI. If he can clarify the question, I will be very happy to write to him with an answer.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My Lords, could I—

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I apologise to the noble Lord, but he was not present at the start of the Statement, so he cannot participate.

State Pension: Age Increase

Lord Davies of Brixton Excerpts

Thursday 14th November 2024 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Davies of Brixton]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what preparations they are making to inform people born on or after 6 April 1960 about the increase in their state pension age from 66 to 67 which will be implemented over the period 6 April 2026 to 5 April 2028.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Sherlock) (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government recognise that information about the state pension age is crucial to retirement planning and are committed to communicating planned state pension age changes effectively. The department undertakes a range of activities, including awareness campaigns, digital tools such as “Check your State Pension age” and sending personalised letters. We are developing our strategy to communicate information and assessing the most effective ways to raise awareness about state pension age changes.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I thank my noble friend for her Answer. I remain concerned that we are only 17 months away from when people discover that they are not able to retire at the date that they thought they would. We know where this ends up: a finding of maladministration by the ombudsman and mass discontent. I urge the noble Lord, the noble Minister, the Baroness, to make sure that a mass campaign is initiated soon. Many people have an aversion to opening brown envelopes; we need this to be highlighted in the press for the next 17 months.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I answer to anything really. The Government have already used an array of methods to communicate state pension age changes, including leaflets, advertising campaigns, digital tools and directly writing to everybody affected. Between December 2016 and May 2018, DWP wrote to all those in the group my noble friend is talking about—that is, those born between 6 April 1960 and 5 April 1961, which includes me—who have state pension ages between 66 and 67. In 2016, DWP launched a tool “Check your State Pension age” on GOV.UK and also “Check your State Pension forecast”. More than 31 million digital forecasts have been done plus another 1.5 million paper forecasts. I think it is working. The 2021 Planning and Preparing for Later Life survey talked to exactly those people and found that, of those with a pension age between 66 and 67, 94% either correctly identified their state pension age or overestimated it.

Social Security Advisory Committee: Winter Fuel Payment

Lord Davies of Brixton Excerpts

Thursday 14th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, the situation is different in different parts of the country. In Scotland, it is complicated by the fact that this is the first year it is devolved, so we have had to legislate in a different way to enable us to do that for Scotland but not for elsewhere in the UK. The Government have sought to make sure, by writing, across the piece, to 12 million pensioners, that we are directly engaging and that people are as aware as possible. There are also campaigns going on with partners in local government and voluntary organisations, as well as a media campaign on radio, television and social media. I will certainly check, go back and review that, and if I have any concerns that it is not being done appropriately in some parts of the United Kingdom, I will very happily come back to the noble Lord.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

As my noble friend says—I will get it right this time—we now have the letter from the Secretary of State. I am sorry to have to press her on this, but the Government consistently fail to answer the first question raised by the committee. I asked the same question in a Written Question during the recess and, again, it was not answered. The committee wants to know,

“the offsetting cost of different levels of additional Pension Credit take-up”.

I too asked that question, and saying that the OBR has signed off the figures is not an answer.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I understand that the OBR listed certified costings if nobody claimed pension credit, and costings on the assumption, which was also our assumption, that there would be a five percentage-point increase in that. It seems to me that that gives the entire range, and between that, presumably one could do the sums. I think that that does answer the question.