Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Baroness Sherlock Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 16th June 2025 Grand Committee

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I offer my support for most of the proposals in this group of amendments, which strike me as largely thoughtful, proportionate and consistent with the principles that we have returned to time and again throughout this Committee stage: clarity in law; accountability in process; and fairness in the exercise of power. As we know, we have spent three days carefully scrutinising the powers set out in this Bill—powers that are, by any measure, significant. In that context, it is right that we continue to ask whether the safeguards accompanying these powers are sufficient and, where they are not, how they could be strengthened in a practical, proportionate and legally coherent way. We believe that these amendments are consistent in furthering that principle.

First, I have taken note of the cautionary tale arising from the Australian experience, as raised by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka. Amendments 76 and 78, which seek to clarify liability for errors or omissions in information provided under Clause 72, are rooted in a basic but essential legal principle: parties need to know where responsibility lies. If someone is being compelled to provide information under threat of penalty, it must be clear whether they or a third party acting on their behalf will be held liable for any inaccuracies. Without clear statutory guidance, we risk confusion and, worse still, unjust outcomes where individuals may be penalised for honest mistakes or information errors outside their control. These amendments would address that problem in a measured way by introducing transparency and clarity into the process.

Amendment 77 addresses a slightly different but equally important concern. As the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, outlined so eloquently, we are focusing on proportionality and reasonableness in the exercise of investigatory powers. The amendment would insert a reasonableness test requiring that an authorised officer must reasonably consider the request for information to be necessary and proportionate. To my mind, this is simply good law. It reflects what is already expected in broader public law standards, but writing it clearly into the legislation would give both officials and the public confidence that such powers are bound by objective legal norms. It would strengthen decision-making, improve accountability and, perhaps most important, provide a clearer basis for redress if powers are exercised in an overly broad or inappropriate manner. However, I note from the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, that we cannot—or should not—say, “Oh, joy of joys”, in respect of the guidance provided.

With clarity established as to where responsibility lies, by necessity a process will have to be put in place and be tested to make sure that there is oversight and sign-off. If the Minister is not minded to accept Amendments 76 and 77, can she outline in detail what the process is? If she cannot do so, I ask her to write to me and to copy in all those noble Lords who are involved in today’s Committee. The Minister may say that this is all part of the as-yet-unfinished “test and learn”, but a full answer is requested. I think I have picked up that she may be able to enlighten us in this respect at the beginning of this fourth day in Committee. I hope so.

However, I must express my concerns and ultimately oppose Amendment 79 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, on the grounds that it risks undermining the effectiveness of the very system that we are seeking to strengthen—although I note the example given, the sad story of Ms Green, highlighted by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. The amendment would require that a copy of every information notice issued under Clause 72 be sent to all parties affected by that notice, including, crucially, the individual who is the subject of the investigation.

Fraud investigations, particularly in the social security context covered by Clause 72, often rely on timely access to accurate information before the subject of the investigation is made aware. This is not a matter of secrecy for secrecy’s sake; it is a matter of preserving the integrity of the evidence and preventing interference with the process. If a person suspected of fraud is notified that they are under investigation or even that information about them is being requested from a third party, there is a very real risk that they may destroy or tamper with evidence, close accounts, alter records or otherwise act to frustrate the inquiry before it has a chance to develop properly. This is not speculative; it is a well-established principle in law enforcement and regulatory practice. It is not clear when this notice would be sent, but there is an assumption in the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, that it would be sent immediately—perhaps he could clarify that when he winds up—in which case, I rest my case.

There is a reason why investigators, whether in HMRC, the police or other regulatory bodies, are often permitted to conduct inquiries without giving advance notice to those under scrutiny. To do otherwise, as I said, would be to tip off the very individuals whose conduct is in question and, in doing so, jeopardise the ability of investigators to properly undertake their duties. Investigators would be hampered at the outset, fraudsters would have an early warning and those operating within the system in good faith, including civil servants, local authorities and partner organisations, would find it significantly harder to detect and prevent abuse. This is particularly true in cases of organised or sophisticated fraud, where timely access to third-party data may be the only way to build a case before the trail goes cold. It is also true in cases where vulnerable individuals, perhaps manipulated by others, may be at risk of harm if alerted prematurely. I will return to that theme later today.

Of course, we must always strive for fairness and accountability, but there is a distinction between eventual transparency and instant notification. There are appropriate points in the process when the subject is made aware of action against them and can engage in a process of review, but to mandate notification at the earliest investigative stage before facts are even established would, I believe, give potential wrongdoers an unearned advantage. Therefore, I respectfully suggest that the practical consequences of this amendment would be counterproductive and potentially damaging to the very goals of the Bill. We need a fraud enforcement system that is lawful, proportionate and fair but also capable of operating effectively in the face of growing and increasingly complex threats to public finances. That is why I cannot support this amendment.

To conclude, a balance must always be struck between individual rights and the broader public interest. In this case, that balance lies in ensuring that information requests are reasonable, that liability is clear and that powers are used with restraint and purpose but not in mandating disclosures that could derail legitimate investigations. I therefore welcome Amendments 76 to 78, but I am afraid that I urge caution about and ultimately oppose Amendment 79.

[The Minister of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Sherlock) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this short debate and I welcome the Committee to Part 2 of the PAFER Bill. We are on to the DWP and it will be a joy to travel in this ship together with my happy fellow travellers. Before answering the specifics of the amendment, I want to reflect on some of the comments made by my noble friend Lord Sikka, because he helpfully highlighted a couple of the confusions that have permeated some of the discussion around the Bill.

The Bill contains a number of different measures and, in most cases, they apply to different people. In his speech, my noble friend spoke as though these information-gathering powers applied to all those people to whom, for example, an eligibility verification notice will be sent. In fact, that is not the case at all. A number of the amendments coming up next are about the eligibility verification measure, so I will return to any comments about it then. These information-gathering powers are quite different. They are specifically aimed at people of whom there is a reasonable suspicion of fraud by a named individual. This is a particular category of person.

Clause 72 makes provision for expanded information-gathering powers. There are existing powers in the Social Security Administration Act 1992, but they enable DWP to compel information only from a set list of organisations. That approach is restrictive and can delay or prevent the gathering of information that is relevant to proving or disproving a criminal benefit fraud investigation. So new Section 109BZB, inserted into the 1992 Act by this Bill, will update those powers to enable DWP to obtain relevant information from any information holder in respect of a DWP criminal investigation. That kind of information can be vital in proving or disproving an allegation of fraud.

Amendments 76 and 78, tabled by my noble friend Lord Sikka, concern liability for incorrect or incomplete information provided by an information holder in response to an information notice. The Bill is clear that information providers must comply with the information notice and should also be aware of their own data protection obligations in doing so. Information about those obligations will be included in the code of practice, and the information notice must specify the potential consequences for failing to comply.

Section 111 of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 sets out offences for intentionally failing to provide required information, as well as delaying or obstructing an authorised officer. In those circumstances, DWP can take action. So introducing a separate statutory liability for all errors is not necessary and would, in my view, actually place an unfair burden on information holders, particularly when mistakes are unintentional or minor.

Amendment 77, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, would insert “reasonably” into subsection (1)(b) of new Section 109BZB. I hope to persuade the noble Lord that we in fact have a very good case here. I think that it will be easier to write. There may be some disagreement about his comments about JOYS—this will be another theme, I think; I suspect that “Ode to Joy” jokes and other joy jokes will abound. But I will write, because I want to talk specifically about the amendment that he has tabled today and how that affects the DWP parts of the Bill.

The current drafting of subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) of new Section 109BZB in Clause 72 sets out that, prior to issuing an information notice, an authorised officer must have “reasonable grounds to suspect” that a DWP offence has been committed and must consider it “necessary and proportionate” to require the information. Both those steps have to happen, so I would argue that the drafting already captures the intent of the amendment. We have been doing this for some time. The department already has these information-gathering powers, with well-established training and guidance in place to ensure that they are used appropriately and in line with the existing law.

Authorised officers are trained and accredited before they can use those powers and they have to adhere to the code of practice. The existing guidance makes it clear that they have to consider all the facts, justify their decisions and record their reasoning. That will apply in the same way to the new expanded powers as it does to the current powers. For those reasons, we are confident that the principle of reasonableness is clear in the drafting of Clause 72 and we further support it. I can see that the noble Lord is itching to get to his feet.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I understand the noble Baroness’s point. It was because it said “reasonable grounds” in the first half that the fact that it was missing in the second half—paragraph (b)—stuck out: you have to have reasonable grounds, but then you just have to consider. But my point is more than that. Let us imagine the worst-case scenario, where a future Government decide to go for an all-out DOGE approach to whatever. I have no doubt, as I said, that the noble Baroness and the department at the moment will follow the guidance, et cetera, that she laid out, but that is just guidance and it can be torn up on a whim. If a new Government decide to go all out, there is no reasonableness safeguard; they can just say, “We consider it necessary”, and there does not need to be any reasonableness attached to that. That is the concern. It is not about now; it is about where we might be in a year or five years’ time that worries me.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I see where the noble Lord is going with this and I am happy to pick up the conversation outside. I do not think that the distinction is big enough for it to be a problem, because the reality is that a reasonable suspicion is not just a hunch: it has to be based on an objective test, it requires up-to-date and accurate information and it must be something that an ordinary reasonable person would consider a legitimate cause for suspicion given the same information. So, for information gathering to be legal and justified, the intrusion into a person’s privacy must be necessary, proportionate and in accordance with the legislation. We think that that is belt and braces, but I am happy to pick that up with the noble Lord because I think that we want the same thing. The only question is: do we need any more ways of saying it?

Finally, Amendment 79, in the name of my noble friend Lord Sikka, would require DWP to copy the information notice to all parties, including the subject of the information request. The noble Viscount, Lord Younger, has explained the obvious reason why this is the case: since these powers apply only to named individuals about whom there is a reasonable suspicion of fraud, telling somebody at the outset could clearly prejudice the investigation and potentially enable them to conceal or destroy evidence.

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[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

Obviously, I am not going to comment on individual cases. As the noble Baroness will be aware, there is an inquiry going on into the carer’s allowance on which we hope to report in the near future, so we will learn more from that.

Let me be clear here: this is the question of whether somebody should be told in good time that they are being investigated. Clearly, that would be a problem. There is a reason why that precise problem is recognised in data protection legislation, which sets out the circumstances in which the DWP and other government departments can process data for law enforcement purposes without notifying the relevant data subject.

To pick up the noble Baroness’s point, it is not as though somebody would never know because, if a fraud investigation uncovered reasonable suspicion of fraud, at some point, for a case to go anywhere, there would have to be an interview under caution with the person suspected of it. The conversation about what had happened would take place at that point, so it is not as though they are never going to know about it; they would have to know about it. We are talking about how they are told, including in what way and at what time. Although I understand where my noble friend Lord Sikka is coming from, the reality is that his proposal would make it impossible to investigate fraud effectively and would allow those who wish to avoid appropriate action on their problems the opportunity to get away with it.

The final comment from the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, was about oversight. As with the review of investigations, the oversight of these measures will be carried out by His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services. I hope that that reassures him.

I hope that all that has helped to assure the noble Lords and that, on that basis, they will withdraw or not press their amendments.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

I am very grateful to everyone for their contributions to this debate. I want to come back on a couple of issues.

I fully understand the arguments made against Amendment 79, but at the moment the individual becomes aware that something is afoot only much later in the day. Individuals rarely have time to seek legal advice. They often cannot afford legal advice. Early notification that they are subject to scrutiny, especially when they have never committed a crime and are just under suspicion, would mean that they may be able to save the DWP some time, effort and money on needless investigations. They may even be able to go to the local citizens advice bureau or somewhere else to get some advice. Leaving it until a much later stage inevitably means that there will be a lot of psychological stress for people. They will probably throw in the towel, a bit like the sub-postmasters, and think, “I’ve got to get off this merry-go-round. I will plead guilty even though I am not, because I cannot really contest anything with the Government”. So, I understand the arguments made, but I think that the current position of not telling the benefit claimants much earlier on really will lead to problems.

The Minister referred to the information provider’s duty for data protection and so on, but I have a concern, given that the DWP will make errors. It has a history of making thousands of them. Given that banks make errors in providing information, once DWP officials have received the information from the bank, they have to interpret that information and make sense of it. There will be misinterpretations, which will have serious consequences for the people affected.

The question to which I still have not heard an effective answer is: who will be liable? Who will pay the compensation? Will it be the public purse? Will it be the banks? The DWP will have a statutory relationship with the bank and hence can demand information, but banks are normally required to preserve confidentiality or financial information, and a bank will not ask anything from the individual concerned. It cannot at that point be said to owe a duty of care to somebody with whom it does not actually communicate, especially when that duty of care is eroded by the Bill. So the question remains: who will foot the bill, which could run into billions of pounds, if we end up with a similar situation to the one in Australia? I hope that the Minister can clarify that situation about who will foot the bill.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

Before the noble Lord sits down, I want to raise something, which is more of a question to the Minister and the team behind her. When I was in post, I became perhaps infamous, particularly when I did not understand something, for asking for a flow chart, and I wonder whether this is such a case where a flow chart would be extremely helpful. By that I mean that, when a process starts, what happens? One answers yes or no to questions and then it follows through with the safeguards included. I would find that incredibly helpful, and I suspect the team has one already. If there is one, I would find it helpful to see how the system works and where the safeguards are.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I have never seen a flow chart, but some of these powers are not necessarily part of the same process, so they would not necessarily appear on the same piece of paper. But if I have any other way of explaining it, I would be very happy to do that.

Since I am on my feet, I reiterate that if the DWP is asking for information about an individual and it gathers information, it will most likely be doing so from a number of sources. An authorised officer will then review the information, and if there is felt to be a case for fraud, they will then interview the suspect under caution, who will be given the opportunity to get appropriate advice. There will be a process of engaging and discussion, but even before it gets to that stage, it is entirely possible that somebody will have reached out to find out the reason why an overpayment has been made. So, there are plenty of opportunities, and this specific amendment relates specifically to the extension of an existing power, which is used only when there is reasonable suspicion of fraud by a named individual. So, I do not think this amendment would help achieve the kind of things that have been discussed, and I urge the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

I am very grateful to the Minister for that reply, which gives us plenty to think about—and perhaps a flow chart would be helpful in due course. For the time being, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to this group of amendments, beginning with the Clause 74 stand part notice in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, which was moved by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. In our view, Clause 74 is not only necessary but foundational. It establishes the power to issue eligibility verification notices, which enable authorised officers to request information relevant to verifying a person’s entitlement to public funds or services. This is not an ancillary function; it is a mechanism that enables the Bill to work.

We broadly support Amendment 79B, which proposes the addition of a reasonableness test to the Secretary of State’s power to issue eligibility verification notices under Schedule 3. Throughout this Committee stage, we on these Benches have consistently returned to a set of core principles that should underpin the powers granted by this Bill: proportionality, accountability and clarity in the exercise of discretion. This amendment is very much in keeping with those principles. It would not constrain the function of the powers in question; instead, it would help to ensure that they are used lawfully, wisely and in a way that retains the confidence of both the public and those institutions asked to assist in their implementation.

Specifically, this amendment would require that the Secretary of State be “reasonably satisfied” that issuing an eligibility verification notice is both necessary and proportionate to the objective of identifying incorrect benefit payments. That is, by definition, not an unreasonable bar. It is not designed to frustrate the aims of the Bill or delay the work of the Government. On the contrary, it would simply formalise the expectation that the powers conferred under Schedule 3 should be exercised with care and justification.

This point is particularly relevant when we consider the position of banks and other financial institutions, which may be required under this provision to provide customer information. For those institutions, it is critical that the system is seen to be operating within a clear and lawful framework. They are being asked to co-operate in a sensitive and complex process. Ensuring that the Secretary of State is “reasonably satisfied”, and that this standard is explicitly in the Bill, would help to provide clarity, legitimacy and protection for all parties involved. As the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, made clear on the previous group of amendments, legislation needs to be made for the future and, as such, reasonableness safeguards must be on the face of the Bill.

Moreover, this amendment would reinforce public confidence in the system. When members of the public know that strong powers, such as those that allow government access to eligibility-related data, are being exercised only after a specific, documented and reasonable assessment of necessity and proportionality, they are far more likely to view those powers as legitimate. Trust, as we know, is a critical currency in any enforcement regime.

This amendment would not obstruct the use of eligibility verification notices. It would simply require that they be issued on the basis of reasonable grounds, with a clear and proportionate purpose. It would bring consistency to the Bill, reassurance to the institutions involved and greater credibility to the broader anti-fraud effort that we all wish to support.

We oppose Amendment 80, which would substantially limit the exercise of eligibility verification notices under Schedule 3 to the Bill by requiring that they may be issued only where the welfare recipient is already suspected of committing a DWP offence. I suggest that this amendment risks undermining the core function of eligibility verification and, in so doing, would weaken the entire framework that the Government are proposing to put in place to detect and prevent fraud. Let us be clear about the purpose of the eligibility verification power: it is not primarily an enforcement power but rather a tool of assurance and risk management, designed to help to identify cases where payments are being made incorrectly.

The core problem with this amendment is that it conflates suspicion with verification. It assumes that an authorised officer must already suspect a DWP offence before reviewing financial data. In practice, however, it is often the financial data itself—the information provided in an account—that gives rise to that suspicion in the first place.

I turn to Amendment 89. We support the principle behind this amendment, which seeks to ensure that the powers contained in this Bill—substantial powers, we must all acknowledge—are exercised only in relation to the specific benefits explicitly listed in the Bill. This is not a wrecking amendment, nor one that seeks to undermine the Government’s legitimate goal of strengthening our response to fraud and error. Rather, it is about ensuring that when we legislate new powers, they are accompanied by a clear, democratic mandate and appropriate parliamentary scrutiny. The provision that this amendment seeks to remove would grant Ministers the ability, by regulation, to extend the application of these powers to further benefits beyond those originally listed. I submit that such an extension should not be done by regulation alone but rather with the explicit consent of Parliament through primary legislation or a tightly scrutinised process.

The powers outlined in Schedule 3, including access to personal financial information, the issuance of eligibility verification notices and the ability to act on suspicion of fraud, are not minor administrative tools. They represent a significant expansion of state capacity to inquire into private affairs in the name of public interest. That may well be justified in many cases, but it is only right that Parliament retains control over when and how these powers are extended to new areas of social security.

Supporting this amendment means drawing a line in the sand that the list of benefits to which these powers apply is not open-ended and that any extension should come back before Parliament for proper consideration. If, in future, a compelling case is made to include additional benefits, let that case be made here, in public, with scrutiny and accountability. That is how we ensure confidence in the law, in enforcement and in our broader welfare system.

This is not about resisting action on fraud but about ensuring that the tools we use to combat fraud are clearly grounded in public consent, which gives the system legitimacy. It is about protecting the balance of power between executive action and legislative oversight.

We have made the argument throughout Committee that clarity, transparency and accountability must be woven into the fabric of the Bill. This amendment speaks directly to those principles. It ensures that the powers in this legislation are not allowed to expand by stealth but only by clear, deliberate parliamentary decision.

I hope that the Minister will see this not as a restriction but as an opportunity: to reinforce the legitimacy of the powers the Government seek and to show that we are committed not only to effective fraud prevention but to the principled governance of that process. For that reason, we support this amendment.

Finally, in addressing the stand-part notice of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, on Schedule 3, we understand that this is an area of concern for many noble Lords across the Committee, but we do not feel that removing the schedule from the Bill is necessarily the most constructive way to go about this in Committee.

I appreciate that this is probing, and we therefore hope that the Government will use this opportunity, in responding to the stand-part notice of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, to address the concerns that we and many other noble Lords have raised in Committee, even if we do not support the noble Baroness’s stand-part notice.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who spoke on this. I promise not to speak for long on this but, since it is the first time we have discussed the eligibility verification measure, I will, for the record, try to explain how it works, and, I hope, help the noble Baroness, Lady Fox—I apologise for my failure to explain it to her hitherto. I will have a go at doing that, and I will talk to the amendments as we go.

Clause 74 introduces new Section 121DB and Schedule 3B to the 1992 Act. They contain the provisions for the eligibility verification measure, which enables the Secretary of State to issue a bank or other financial institution with an eligibility verification notice, or EVN, which will help the DWP identify incorrect payments in the social security system. Ensuring that the right person is paid the right amount at the right time will help prevent both fraud and genuine errors, meaning that people do not accidentally build up debts, with all the concern that that causes.

As I set out at Second Reading, this is a data-requiring measure. It will enable the DWP to ask for data from banks to help identify incorrect payments and verify eligibility for specific benefits. It is about requiring banks to look within their own data and provide limited, relevant information on the accounts they have identified that match the eligibility indicators provided by the DWP. Just to clarify, we will ask the banks to look at accounts into which we make benefit payments, and we will give them the criteria, which clearly can only be things related to eligibility for the benefits under question.

That limited information will help the DWP to identify where claimants do not meet eligibility criteria for the benefits they are receiving. Getting access to information is key to addressing the whole fraud and error challenge. But if your Lordships think about other areas, we have seen how the DWP getting access to data such as earnings information from HMRC has massively reduced income-related overpayments. In fact, if you look at people on PAYE and universal credit, earnings-related fraud and error have pretty much been wiped out by getting access to earnings data directly from HMRC.

I will speak to Schedule 3 in a few moments. Let me look first at Amendment 79B from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, which seeks to ensure that an EVN may be issued only when the Secretary of State is satisfied that it is necessary and proportionate to do so to achieve the aim of identifying incorrect benefit payments. This is the nub of it. Clearly, I agree that the power must be proportionate and necessary before we use it. We are bringing forward the legislation because we believe it is necessary, and we have already taken enormous steps to ensure that it will be used proportionately.

The reason it is necessary is that taxpayers deserve to know that every pound of their money is being spent wisely, and that benefits are being paid to those who need them and are legally entitled to them. This measure will improve the DWP’s access to important data to help verify entitlements, to ensure payments are correct, and to stop overpayments building up and debt accruing.

The National Audit Office made a telling point in the Commons at the evidence stage, basically saying, “If you want to enforce the eligibility criteria that Parliament has set, such as capital limits, you have to provide the DWP with a tool that goes a bit further than just asking people”. We do not know of other ways to get the necessary information to be able to pursue the kind of overpayments and fraud that are out there. However, I just remind the Committee that the measure has been designed with hugely strict safeguards, most of which are in the Bill, and they are supported with further detail in the code of practice, of which noble Lords have seen a draft, to ensure that the power is being used fairly and proportionately. The legislation sets out the benefits in scope, of which more later, and the type of information that can and cannot be shared under the power, and includes provisions to bar financial institutions from sharing transaction information or special category data.

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[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, the Minister made a powerful point about the position of the current Opposition. As she identified, the old-age pension being covered in the former iteration of the Bill caused an enormous amount of concern. Obviously, all the groups we are talking about are potentially vulnerable, but old-age pensioners are particularly vulnerable and prone to be stressed and worried about this situation. Can the Minister assure me that the Government will not put the old-age state pension underneath the Bill?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving me the opportunity to recover my voice and to say that not only will we not do it but the Bill says explicitly that the measure cannot be used on the state pension, so there is no question of it being used for that.

The case load is really straightforward. Fraud in the state pension is so low that it is the one area where the NAO does not qualify the accounts. We have to have a rationale. The reason we have chosen these three benefits initially is specifically because they are the areas where fraud is significant, and we know the information is out there that could make a difference. I can absolutely reassure the noble Baroness on that point: without amending primary legislation, this measure cannot be used on the state pension, and the Government will not do that. Any subsequent Government would have to change the law to be able to do it. I am grateful to the noble Baroness.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I intervene briefly to add a little history on the reason we included pensions. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, may know, there is some fraud in the pensions area, to the tune of £100 million. This, I admit, is not as much as the £9.5 billion in welfare fraud that the Minister cited, but I just wanted to put the record straight; there was a reason for including pensions.

Secondly, you can have it one way or the other. We thought it would be good to put all benefits in scope in primary legislation, but I accept that another way of doing it is to limit it to the three benefits, as this Government have done, with a view to having secondary legislation for including others. I understand that.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I am grateful. The noble Viscount is quite right: there is some fraud in the state pension. It was a judgment about proportion, having compared the size and value of the case load. It is very small. The fact that the affirmative procedure is used means that there will have to be a debate. The Government cannot simply on their own start investigating new benefits without anyone knowing about it, so that makes a difference.

The Bill is clear that, to help make this measure proportionate, only the minimum amount of information necessary is shared with DWP by the banks. That can include only details about the account, such as an account number and sort code; details to identify the individuals, such as names and dates of birth; and details about how the individuals appear to be breaching the eligibility criteria for their benefit. But still at that point, no one is suspected of having done anything wrong; the presumption of innocence remains, because further inquiries are needed to establish whether a benefit has been incorrectly paid.

Some people may have disregards in place that mean they are allowed to have more money than is normally used in the benefit rules. For example, normally you are allowed to have only £16,000 maximum in capital to be entitled to universal credit, but there are reasons why you might have more than that. Some forms of compensation payments are disregarded, for example. There may be a perfectly good reason, which will be investigated at that point—and that will be that. Others may have made a genuine mistake that has led to an overpayment of benefits, which it is important to correct as quickly as possible for the individual and the organisation.

However, there will be some cases, especially in the early stages, that ultimately lead to fraud being identified; that conclusion will never be drawn from these data alone. As is the case now, any claim where a suspicion of fraud arises is referred to our specialist investigation team, which has to undertake a thorough investigation, following all reasonable lines of inquiry before any determination can be drawn.

Just to reassure my noble friend, whether he accepts it or not, in fraud and error cases, decisions on entitlement will be made by a DWP staff member.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

It is clear that we are talking about two different stages here. The first intervention into the bank accounts of individuals will be done algorithmically. The DWP will provide the banks or whoever with the set of criteria that they should apply, and the banks will run it through their computers and that will throw up cases. No individual will be involved at that stage. Cases that are highlighted then referred to the DWP are the ones where human intervention will start. But there are the two stages, and the human intervention is at the second stage, not the first.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I think that we are going to repeat ourselves at each other. This is essentially a data-requiring measure—it is a data push. The data is coming across to DWP, and that data will be used with other data, and where there is an indication that there may be an overpayment, it will be dealt with either by reaching out to the individual or, if there is a possibility that it is fraud, it will be referred for a fraud investigation. Any decision on benefit entitlement and fraud and error is made by a DWP staff member.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I hope that the Minister will forgive me for making the point, but it is crucial. The bank will send a data file with cases that it has flagged. Will cases from that data file be identified by humans or by the DWP algorithmically?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I think that we are talking at cross-purposes here. The information will be sent across to DWP, and DWP will take information on an individual and, if there is a signal that an individual may have a breach in eligibility criteria and may have more money in their bank account than is permitted, that information will be looked at and taken together with other information and a DWP staff member will make a judgment about what to do about that. I do not think that I can be any clearer than that.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

I am standing up to be helpful to the Minister. For fear of being rather like a long-playing record, I think that a flow chart would be incredibly helpful—so I am pressing my case for a flow chart. That is all that I shall say.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am not a flow chart gal, but if anyone is capable of turning this into a useful flow chart, I shall have a look into it.

I fully accept, being an observant person, that not everybody in the Committee agrees with these measures. It is clear that they can make a difference to tackling fraud and error. We think that they are proportionate, but I accept that some Members do not think that, and that is obviously completely legitimate. We simply take a different view.

In the next few groups of amendments, we get to look at different aspects of how that would work, but it is the Government’s view that the scale of fraud is such that it needs to be tackled. If there were other, simpler ways in which to do it, we would have used them by now. This is a source of data that will help us to tackle fraud and error in overpayments, which we do not have at the moment. We do not see any other suitable ways in which to do it, so we think that it is proportionate. We have wrapped it around in safeguards as much as possible.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

The Minister has been very helpful. There are obviously disagreements philosophically, but what is confusing is that the financial service representatives have suggested that this is a trawling exercise—the quote given was of a “fishing exercise”. The Minister has stressed, “Don’t worry: when we go to the banks and ask for this information, it is suspicionless. We are not treating people as though they have done anything wrong; we are simply finding out”. That is a huge admission that the state—the Government—is going to the banks and demanding that they provide information for no other reason than that these people are on benefits.

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I will jump in quickly before the Minister continues. She has been very helpful in explaining how this is going to work. I should say, as I have before, that I think this is infinitely better than it was when we saw it a year or so ago—I just put that on the record again. However, there are two questions about how it works on which I would like clarification.

First, I think the Minister indicated that the banks would not have to trawl all bank accounts, but I do not think that that is right. The logic must be that the DWP provides the criteria that it wants to look at, which is whether someone is in receipt of benefits and, secondly, whether there is a flag. In order to identify whether they are on benefits, the banks will have to trawl through all the accounts to find that out. That seems a necessary step—they have to spot the indicators in the accounts.

More importantly, though, this is not a one-off exercise under the Bill. They do not just send it once and then go away. The Bill allows for these things to be periodic within 12 months, and they can then be extended. I am interested to understand what the Government intend by “periodic”. Under the way that it is currently written, they could be saying, “I want you send us this data every day—or indeed every hour or minute—for the next 12 months”, and they could then extend it. What is the plan in terms of the periodicity of this?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

Let me deal with the noble Lord first, because that will be quick and I am conscious of the time—I have already gone over the 20 minutes. The DWP will tell the banks, “We have a reference number and these are the accounts at your bank into which we pay benefits; please look only at those accounts, not those of anyone else”. I have been saying this all the way along the line, but I have clearly failed to get this across. The noble Lord may recall the previous discussions when we were asked why you could not look at every bank account, and the reason is—

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I am still not convinced that that is correct. I think that what happens is that there is an indicator that goes with the payment of the benefit, and we are then asking the banks, first, to identify all accounts where that indicator exists—so they have to look at all accounts to identify which those are—and, secondly, for those accounts, whether there are any with an eligibility indicator that is flagged. My reading is that it is in fact quite clear, and it is also clear in the code of conduct and the other stuff.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

In as much as we will say to the banks that we would like them to look at the accounts into which we pay benefits and will give them the reference numbers. Clearly, it is up to the banks how they identify those. I think it unlikely that they will take each bank account, look at it individually and make a decision, but it is up to them. We simply want them to look at those bank accounts and to tell us whether, within those bank accounts, they believe that the particular eligibility indicator that we have given them is correct.

Regarding frequency, we will negotiate that with the banks. The previous Government looked at an earlier iteration of this and ran two proofs of concept to establish that it would work and be effective. We now have to take the powers in order to be able to start doing this. So, we have agreed that we will work with a small number of banks and work out bit-by-bit how this works, bring over information as we can manage it, make sure that the system works, and build up as we go. We will determine from that how often we will need to do that and how it works. That has to be determined; we could not determine that in advance because we need the powers in the Bill to be able to start the process.

In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, it is a question of proportionality. Clearly, we already ask the Revenue to tell us how much people earn in order to determine whether or not they meet the earnings criteria for, for example, universal credit. We could simply allow people to tell us, but when we did that, some of them got it wrong; many of them made mistakes; sometimes it changed, and sometimes they deliberately did not tell us. So now, we simply get information directly from the Revenue.

We think that the power is proportionate. Whenever someone compares it to something that feels disproportionate, such as spying or putting bugs in everyone’s houses, I think that we can either claim that this is a mass surveillance power like China would use and then wonder why people are getting paranoid about it, or, while I do my best to be specific about what we are trying to do, we can all try to have a measured conversation about whether or not it is reasonable, while fully accepting that for some people the line will be in a different place than for others for reasons of both philosophy and proportionality. I fully accept that.

I have done the best I can in 25 minutes. On that basis, I urge noble Lords to agree that the clause stand part.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that tour de force. I am afraid the problem is that we all have different ideas about what is proportionate. From what I have heard, I do not think what the Government are suggesting is proportionate, and that is where the problem arises. I come from the feeling that there is a presumption of innocence, and this seems to me almost a presumption of guilt.

The Minister has not taken the point about the nervousness of banks. If a bank gets even a modest inquiry—anyone who has a bank account knows that this happens if there is a certain inquiry on your bank account—signs go up in the algorithm used by the bank saying, “We’ve got to look at this”. Anyone who is a Peer or an MP knows that their affairs can be looked at more closely just for that very reason. I hope that, on Report, we can deal in greater detail with how nervous the banks will be about what is proposed. I hope the Minister can come back and give us reassurance from real banks—joint-stock banks—that have said how they view this. I think they will view it wanting to be on the safe side.

However, at this stage, I will not press my noble friend Lady Kramer’s clause stand part notice.

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To conclude, clarity in law is not a luxury; it is a duty. If we are to demand co-operation from financial institutions and to ensure fairness for those caught up in fraud investigations, we must ensure that the legal framework we are creating does not give rise to unintended and disproportionate consequences. For all these reasons, I strongly support Amendment 89C and urge the Government to do the same.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken on this group of amendments.

Amendments 81 and 91 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, speak to the costs that banks may incur as a result of this measure and asks whether they are proportionate to the savings achieved. Let me say, first, that we acknowledge that, clearly, there will be new requirements on banks as a result of this proposed legislation. It is right that additional asks on banks are scrutinised, and I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving the Committee the opportunity to do that. I can assure the Committee, first, that we are bringing the legislation forward precisely because we believe that it is necessary; and, secondly, that we have taken steps to make it proportionate. We have already been through why we think that it is necessary, in our debate on the previous group, so I will not dwell on that again; let me just say that, given the scale of the savings and the lack of alternatives, we think that this legislation is necessary and that the safeguards make it proportionate.

Various noble Lords asked about the cost. We have estimated, based on initial consultation with industry sources, that the set-up cost will be around £40 million across the sector and that there will be some limited ongoing compliance costs for data holders; further information on that estimate can be found in the published impact assessment. We recognise that there is more work to do with industry to consider the costs further. That is why we committed to publishing a further, updated impact assessment within 12 months of Royal Assent: to update the estimate, taking into account the ongoing work with industry, and to ensure that there is transparency on the costs as we move forward. I assure the Committee that the Government take burdens on business seriously. We are committed to keeping requirements and costs proportionate and to a minimum; this has been a key aim at the forefront of our close and regular engagement with the finance sector.

We are not starting from scratch here. As we have discussed, the previous Government tested this approach through two proofs of concept. We know that it works. We continue to work closely with UK Finance and the finance sector on the delivery of a policy to minimise costs; I can reassure my noble friend Lord Davies both that there have been a number of meetings and Bill forums with UK Finance in recent weeks and that it will carry on working closely with us.

A few banks—a small group of them—are already working closely with us on the design and build of the digital solution that will be used to facilitate the transfer of information, in order to ensure that it is developed in a way that works for the sector. I just want to put on the record our appreciation to those banks for their valued input.

Let me say, however, that the Government can be held to account. The independent reviewer must consider whether the measure has been effective at helping to identify incorrect payments. The independent reviewer could also report on the burdens and costs that financial institutions might experience as part of that assessment. If financial institutions believe that Government are overreaching, they also have the right of review and appeal. Financial institutions can use the reviews and/or formal appeals processes to dispute an EVN, including if they determine that complying with an EVN would be unduly onerous. This is set out clearly in Parts 3 and 4 of new Schedule 3B, as inserted by the Bill. For those reasons, we believe that the amendment is not necessary.

Amendment 83 would require financial institutions, when asked to provide data to the DWP under this provision, not to provide it if they reasonably consider that doing so would conflict with their duty of care towards their customers. My concern is that this amendment assumes that we are asking banks and other financial institutions to look into the individual data that they provide to the DWP. That is absolutely not the policy intent. Let me again remind the Committee that information shared by financial institutions is done so without suspicion or presumption of any wrongdoing on the part of the claimant.

This type of data-sharing is not new to government. The Government already have similar powers to request data from financial institutions or third parties. Noble Lords will be aware, I am sure, that HMRC has the power to obtain data at scale from banks on interest-bearing accounts to support its work in gathering up taxes from all of us. For financial institutions, the duty of care owed to their customers includes obligations on a range of matters, including treating their customers fairly, taking reasonable steps to protect their customers against fraud and scams and providing fair-value services. There is nothing within the eligibility verification measure that would affect or impede these duties from being fulfilled.

This amendment would also have a practical impact: it would put greater burdens on financial institutions. The EVM is simply a data-requiring power; it does not ask financial institutions to make any assessments about the data shared. Asking them to do that would fundamentally change the basis of the policy and increase the burdens on them. I have already said that we have been working closely with the finance industry, and I can assure the Committee that we will carry on doing so.

I speak finally to Amendment 89C, which seeks to remove the risk that information that arises only as a result of complying with an EVN could by itself cause a bank to have to take specific reporting action against the account holder under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for raising this, and I hope to persuade him that the current provision already addresses this issue.

As I have said, the EVM is a data-requiring measure; it is not decision-making power. Information is shared by financial institutions without suspicion or presumption of any wrongdoing on the part of the claimant or account holder. EVM information will be used by the DWP to support our normal processes to help verify a claimant’s eligibility for the benefit that they are receiving. However, to give certainty on this point, we have already created an exemption in Schedule 3 that amends the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to make it clear that failure to disclose offences will not be committed if the information that the individual or institution has is only as a result of an EVN. To be clear: if the only reason that the institution has the information is as a result of an EVN, they will not be guilty of a failure to disclose offence under POCA. We have reflected this point in the EVM code of practice. This recognises that, while EVNs are not intended to indicate any wrongdoing, the DWP cannot legislate categorically for whether a person knows that there is other information a financial institution may be aware of.

We are not in a position to dictate to someone else whether they must or must not know or suspect something. This amendment seeks to prevent a person from knowing or suspecting that an offence is being committed if the information that leads them to that conclusion has arisen solely as a result of EVM. In other words, it seeks to legislate for a person’s state of mind—whether they know or suspect something—which we do not think is the way to do it. Our provision maintains the focus on the information available and aligns with the existing POCA exemption for information obtained, for example, as a result of carrying out specific immigration checks.

I always try to explain things in language that I would understand. My understanding is that, as currently drafted, the clause says that you cannot be guilty of a specific offence if you do not report somebody under SARS where the information comes only from an EVN. This amendment would fully exclude someone’s ability to suspect someone who may be acting suspiciously, and that cannot be possible. I hope that that makes sense to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. He may want to reflect on it and come back to me, but that is the reason why we think that this is not the way forward and why what have done is the right way. I therefore believe that the current exemption, as drafted, is sufficient and aligns with the DWP’s intent that data returned by financial institutions does not in itself suggest any suspicion of fraud.

I will address some of the other comments made, starting with those of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. I accept that there is a question about what is appropriate out there, but banks already have to do a range of things, including, as I said, HMRC having to report on interest-bearing accounts. We believe that the burdens are proportionate. After the set-up costs, we will see the details to be worked through with them, but once the systems are set up, we do not believe that this will be an extensive burden. Therefore, we hope that that will not be too much of a problem.

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[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I wish to speak broadly in support of Amendment 82 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. This amendment goes to the heart of something that we should all be able to agree on: that the public have a right to know the rules by which they may be judged and that those tasked with making assessments, such as banks, should not be left to act on unclear or unpublished guidance.

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish the eligibility indicators that banks are expected to use when checking their customers’ accounts under the new regime. In plain terms, it asks the Government to set out clearly, before these provisions are enforced, what criteria are being used to determine eligibility. This chimes with the opening remarks made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. It is difficult to see how a system of such potential consequence to individuals and to financial institutions alike can be implemented fairly, if the basis on which it operates is not published and understood in advance.

We have heard throughout the debates on this Bill about the need to balance effective fraud prevention with the protection of individual rights, proper due process, and clarity for institutions involved. Amendment 82 speaks directly to that balance. If banks are to play a front-line role in identifying accounts or individuals under suspicion, they must be given unambiguous and publicly available guidance to avoid the risk of overreach, error or unjustified intrusion. We cannot have a system where accounts are flagged or actions taken on the basis of indicators that are withheld from public view. That would be both untransparent and unjust.

We should not legislate for a regime that affects people’s access to their financial resources or that places duties on banks to act in quasi-investigative ways, without knowing exactly how those judgments are to be made. This is not a wrecking amendment—it does not oppose the broader framework of the Bill. It merely insists that, before new powers are exercised, the public and partners involved in delivery know the criteria. That is not too much to ask. In fact, it is the very least we should expect in a system rooted in fairness and good governance. Again, this echoes the remarks made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox.

To pick up on remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, there is a balance to be struck between not giving too much away in the interest of transparency so that fraudsters are given fuel to manipulate the system. Can the Minister say where that balance should be struck, as balance there must be?

Similarly, I speak in support of Amendment 88, also in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. I believe it represents a sensible and timely addition to the schedule. As we have discussed throughout the passage of this Bill, the use of data and automated decision-making, particularly through algorithms, is becoming an increasingly central feature of fraud detection and eligibility verification. That in itself is not a problem; it is a reflection of the complexity and scale of modern fraud threats. But it also means that we need clear and consistent standards for how these tools are developed, deployed and scrutinised. The cautionary tale from the Netherlands, highlighted by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, is very much noted. I am sure that the Committee has noted it.

This amendment goes to the heart of the need for standards. By requiring the code of practice to include mechanisms for the scrutiny of algorithms used by those in receipt of eligibility verification notices, typically banks, it creates a shared framework for oversight. This is particularly important when algorithms are applied across several discrete institutions, each of which may have slightly different internal systems, standards or even risk profiles. Without a common baseline, we risk inconsistency, a lack of accountability and potential harm to individuals through opaque or poorly calibrated processes.

Moreover, new sub-paragraph (g) proposed in this amendment rightly extends that principle of scrutiny to the powers themselves, and we must also be willing to assess whether they are effective and 100% secure in their specified and sole objective. We must also be willing to assess whether they are proportionate to the outcomes that they set out to deliver. In short, this is a practical amendment rooted in the principles of clarity, consistency and continuous improvement—perhaps part of the test and learn. It does not obstruct the Government’s goals; it helps to make them more credible and accountable, we believe.

I express my support for Amendment 89ZA in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, which I believe strikes a careful and important balance between transparency, accountability and the effective operation of the powers contained in this schedule. At its core, this amendment does something quite simple but significant: it ensures that individuals applying for or receiving relevant benefits are clearly informed—that is, in writing—that information relating to their bank accounts may, under certain circumstances, be shared with the Secretary of State. This is a matter of basic transparency and fairness. I note that this is being proposed at the time the benefit is applied for, and I might describe it—perhaps putting words into the mouth of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux—as part of an induction process when one applies for any benefit in scope. In other words, fair warning is given that a benefit that comes from the taxpayers’ pocket has responsibilities attached to it. Perhaps this should also be placed in the code of practice, and I ask that question of the Minister.

If we are to entrust public authorities with powers of this magnitude—which allow for sensitive financial data to be accessed without the individual’s active consent—surely it is right that we also commit to informing individuals of the possibility that those powers might be used. This is not about compromising investigations or alerting fraudsters in advance; it is about ensuring that people understand the system that they are entering and can act responsibly and lawfully within it. Providing this information up front reinforces personal responsibility. As I said earlier, it says clearly to the individual, “If you are claiming public money, there is a legitimate expectation that your eligibility may be subject to verification”. It allows claimants to know the rules of engagement in advance, and it ensures that they cannot claim later to have been caught unawares.

At the same time, I recognise, and I think the noble Lord does as well—I hope he does—that this amendment must not inadvertently encourage more sophisticated methods of deception. It is a fine line to walk, and this chimes with my earlier question to the Minister. We must not turn transparency into a user manual for fraud, but I believe that this amendment is framed carefully enough to avoid that risk. It does not disclose when, how or under what criteria information will be requested—only that it may be. That is, I believe, a proportionate step. Ultimately, this amendment supports the legitimacy of the wider regime, and I therefore support it and hope that the Government will see it as a constructive addition to the schedule.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all the noble Lords for their comments. Amendment 82, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, would require the Secretary of State to make public the eligibility indicators, as set out in EVNs. Although I understand the point that she is making, I am firmly of the view that making public the eligibility indicators will be counterproductive, for reasons alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. It is set out very clearly in the Bill that all eligibility indicators have to link to the eligibility criteria for those benefits that are within the scope of the EVN measure: universal credit, pension credit and ESA. Those eligibility criteria are widely available for anyone to see, including on the GOV.UK website. The DWP does its utmost to ensure that customers who claim benefits are clear on the relevant criteria, and they are reminded many times throughout their claim of the need to report changes of circumstances against these key criteria. This is important because there are people out there who are not fraudsters but who make genuine errors, and we do all we can to help people understand the eligibility rules and ensure that changes of circumstances are reported.

As the noble Viscount alluded to, there is a fine line between transparency and making things easier for fraudsters, but I do not want to publish the specific eligibility indicators that we will set out in an EVN, because to do so would actually help those who want to commit fraud to circumvent the measure. We know from all kinds of sources that there are people out there who study every single rule and piece of information we put out to try to work out how to get around them and get money to which they are not entitled. The Committee would obviously want us to do everything we can to avoid that. So, to protect the effectiveness of this measure and to help stop fraud, we do not think it appropriate that we publish the eligibility indicators.

Turning to Amendment 88, also from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox—

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

Before the Minister moves on to Amendment 88, I asked about the cross-comparison with datasets from different banks; this goes to the point that the Minister has just been making about it being easy to commit fraud. To what extent will data from bank A be amalgamated with data from bank B to discover whether, when combined, there is an eligibility indicator flag?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

An EVN can be used only in relation to the bank account into which the benefit is paid. Therefore, that would be a specific bank account in a specific bank. Of course, the DWP’s authorised investigators have and use a range of sources where they have a suspicion of fraud, and there is a range of mechanisms out there to look at what other information can be gathered in order to make that judgment. I can see that I have not hit on what the noble Lord was asking for.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

In the situation where there would be a suspicion of fraud, you have bank A—actually, I suppose it would not have provided the information, would it?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

Exactly.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I have just answered my own question.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

Related to that, as far as I understand it, some benefits can be paid into foreign bank accounts but they are totally beyond the scope of the Bill, so, presumably, if there is fraud there, it will never really be tackled. Secondly, is it permissible for a UK-resident benefit recipient to request that the benefit be paid into a bank account in the Cayman Islands, the Bahamas, Cyprus or somewhere else?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

Just to be clear, this measure is attacking both fraud and error. It looks at overpayments, whatever the source. It is simply one tool among many that is available to the DWP and which will help produce a source of information, which will help to identify incorrect overpayments. Having got that information, the DWP will use the full range of powers and the information available to it. If any fraudsters are sitting down on a quiet Monday afternoon and watching this Committee, they should be warned: the DWP has lots of sources of information; it will investigate them; and it successfully prosecutes many people for fraud. The DWP will use this and other powers to pursue what is there. However, this measure alone has been scored by the OBR to save up to £940 million over the next five years. No single measure will be foolproof alone; it will play its part alongside a range of measures and processes to help root out fraud.

I will have to write to my noble friend Lord Sikka on the Cayman Islands. I do not have them at the back of my mind at the moment, I am afraid, but I will let him know if there is an issue over there.

I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that I fully accept that there is a line between giving all details in public and tackling fraud. We have given out a lot of information and a lot of protections here, and we have found ways of making sure that there is oversight. One reason for having oversight is that there are things that we will never be able to put out in public; it is important that somebody has scrutiny and can report to Parliament, independent of the department, on how these powers are being used. We would hope that that picks up the remaining areas of concern.

I turn to Amendment 88, also in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. I will address in turn the two points that it raises. The first is the requirement for the code of practice to include information about the ways in which scrutiny can be applied to the methods that a financial institution may use to identify relevant accounts, for the purposes of the eligibility verification measure. This is not a matter for a code of practice. The criteria that financial institutions must use to identify relevant accounts are described in paragraph 1(2)(b) of new Schedule 3B to the Social Security Administration Act 1992. Accounts must simply meet two tests in order for information to be shared by the financial institution with the DWP: first, the account must receive a relevant benefit payment or be linked to that account; and, secondly, the account in question must meet the criteria that the DWP sets out in the eligibility verification notice. Financial institutions operate in many ways. It must be for each individual financial institution to determine how it identifies relevant accounts.

The key point here is that the EVM asks banks to return specified data only where those two tests have been met. It is a data-requiring power; we are not asking banks to do anything more than that. Again, I remind the Committee that it is the DWP that will review all the information received and DWP staff who will make any decisions about entitlement where potential fraud or error is identified. No decisions will be taken using EVM data alone; decisions about entitlement will be made only once the DWP has made further inquiries.

On that point, the Bill does not introduce any new use of automated decision-making. The DWP will examine data received from banks under the new power, alongside other data received, to determine whether there has been an incorrect overpayment. As is set out in our personal information charter, which is publicly available, the DWP uses automated processing in some decision-making to help us deliver efficient services. The DWP will not make any decision that has significant effect based solely on automated processing unless the law allows this, and claimants will be informed if we make any such decision.

I turn to the second issue in this amendment. It would require the code of practice to contain information about measures that would enable scrutiny of the effectiveness of the EVM. This is, again, an important issue but not one for the code of practice. However, I completely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that we must assess how effective the EVM is; that is why, under Clause 75, the independent overseer of the measure must consider the extent to which the exercise of the power has been effective in helping to identify incorrect payments of relevant benefits.

Finally, I turn to Amendment 89ZA, which raises the issue of informing claimants that the EVM may be used to require the sharing of information about their relevant accounts with the DWP. Let me take a moment to update the Committee on the ways in which the DWP will inform claimants and relevant account holders about the measure; I hope that this will reassure the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. The DWP has a personal information charter that sets out how it uses and stores personal information. It is publicly available, and claimants are explicitly directed to it at all times when the DWP requests their personal data. We will update the DWP personal information charter to make it clear that the EVM may be used to require the sharing of their personal information; that commitment is made clear in the draft code of practice, which noble Lords have seen.

This amendment suggests that we should inform claimants either at the start of their claim or within three months of the EVM becoming operational. Our approach of updating the personal information charter means that customers are much more regularly informed about the EVM; this is because claimants are regularly directed to the document throughout their claim. For the benefit of the Committee, I can confirm that claimants are explicitly directed to it in all DWP claim forms; in change of circumstance and uprating letters; in recorded telephone messages; in DWP agents’ telephony scripts; on digital online services; and in other products where the DWP collects personal data. As noble Lords will know, the draft code of practice, which will be publicly consulted on, makes clear that all those who hold a personal account into which a relevant benefit is paid should be aware that information about them and their relevant accounts may be shared by a financial institution with the DWP if the eligibility indicators specified in an EVN are met.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

There is a big difference between pointing someone towards a data protection statement—let us be brutally honest: how many of us have ever read one?—and telling people that their bank account details can be provided to the DWP as a result of having this particular benefit. Nobody has ever read a data protection statement, and I do not suppose that they ever will.

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[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

To be clear, their bank details cannot be accessed by the DWP under this measure; their bank details can be accessed by the DWP under its other powers. I know that the noble Lord knows this but I want it to be clear for the record because there is a lot of misunderstanding out there; I hope that he will let me finish my sentence. The DWP cannot access people’s bank accounts using this measure or look at transaction data. It does not see what they spend their money on or any of that. It can simply ask banks to let it know whether a particular criterion is met. I take the noble Lord’s point; we think that this is adequate, but he does not, so I am afraid that we may just have to agree to disagree on this one.

Regarding the noble Lord’s other point, on how much data and how many different banks will be involved—and when—we had two choices in doing this: test and learn, which is the subject of much comment; or the alternative, which is a big bang involving all the banks going out together at once, getting their data, bringing it in and going through it. We decided not to do that, as we thought that it would be irresponsible. Test and learn means that, for the first 12 months of the rollout, we will initially work closely with a smaller number of banks and financial institutions, identifying any possible areas for concern, allowing them to be addressed and sorting out teething problems. The measure will then gradually be rolled out with all the relevant financial institutions. The impact assessment says that, in the first year—2026-27—we expect a rollout rate of around 2%, going up to 25% in 2027-28. The idea is that you start very small, make sure that it works, iron out the problems and then grow it as it goes on.

I think it was the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, who mentioned that the data could be slowed down. We do not want to bring in data that we cannot process; we want to bring in data that is appropriate. We will bring it in and manage it, as we are able and resourced to do. I hope that that reassures noble Lords; I encourage the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, to withdraw her amendment.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

I want a bit of clarity on test and learn. We have had two exercises, which have reached proof of concept. I am confused now because the Minister is, I think, indicating that there are test and learn exercises still to begin. How many are ongoing and how many are due to begin?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

Clearly, I am expressing this really badly, because I have said it about 17 times and still have not explained it clearly.

When the noble Viscount was a Minister—perhaps it was his predecessor—under the previous Government, they were working with banks to find out whether the proof of concept worked. The answer is that, yes, it does. Test and learn is about saying, “We’re now going to build this up and operate it at scale. How do we do it? What does it look like?” Bit by bit, we will work with a small number of banks; try it out; make sure that the processes, the data pushes and so on work properly; and work with a small number of people who also understand how the sector works as a whole. Then, when it is working, we will roll it out to a wider number.

I am sorry if I have not been explaining that clearly, but that is the difference. The proof of concept asks: can it be made to work? The answer is yes. The test and learn asks: what is the best way to set this up so that the systems will work and so that we get the right information at the right time—a time when we are able to work it properly? I hope that that has helped.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

I give many thanks to noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. In some ways, it has clarified quite a lot for me; in some ways, I am completely confused. I will go off and read the debate, reflect on it then work out how to bring this issue forward on Report.

I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Younger of Leckie, for his supportive remarks in general and the insights that he brought; they are much appreciated. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for drawing attention to my dilemmas around transparency. I want there to be more transparency but, as I said, I do not want to be associated with being an idiot—well, that ship might have sailed—in relation to giving the game away. Transparency is important in politics and in terms of trust in a new Bill that will bring about a huge change in the way the state is viewed, in terms of how it relates to citizens on benefits and so on. One of the reasons for this confusion and difficulty is that this Bill insists on treating fraud and error indistinguishably. That is one of the dangers with it. Fraud is one thing, but people who are inadvertently overpaid when errors are made are treated with the same piece of legislation. That is why it was helpful of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, to remind us earlier that there are people who will play the system—that is one thing—while there are other people who could inadvertently be treated like criminals.

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To conclude, this Bill rightly equips the state to recover public money and respond to fraud, but our job in this Committee is to ensure that those powers are not just powerful but proportionate; that they are not only swift but fair; and that those affected by them, especially the most vulnerable, can have confidence that decisions are made with care, with oversight and with due regard to context and consequence. That is what I believe these amendments seek to achieve, so I commend the noble Lord on bringing them forward and urge the Government to consider them very seriously. They would improve the Bill; uphold the principles that we have championed in Committee; and strengthen the legitimacy of the enforcement regime that this legislation clearly seeks to build.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I am grateful to all noble Lords. The noble Viscount just described these amendments as thoughtful and necessary. I think that they are characteristically thoughtful, but I hope now to persuade the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, that they are not in fact necessary. This is a good one, so I offer the noble Lord this.

First, to be clear, Amendment 84 would require an authorised person to need more evidence than just that provided through the EVM before carrying out an investigation under new Section 109BZB, which is to be inserted into the Social Security Administration Act 1992 by this Bill. I agree that the fact that an account meets an eligibility indicator set out in an EVN does not on its own constitute reasonable grounds for suspicion and cannot on its own be used as grounds for exercising fraud investigation powers under new Section 109BZB of the Act. The meeting of an eligibility indicator does not mean that a benefit has necessarily being overpaid. As I have made clear before, the EVM information does not come with a tag of suspicion attached.

The fact that an account meets an eligibility indicator does not mean that there are any grounds for suspicion of fraud or other offences; it does not even mean that a benefit has necessarily been overpaid. Paragraph 3(1) of the EVM legislation makes it clear that eligibility indicators indicate only that a benefit may have been, or may be, incorrectly paid. Whenever the DWP reviews a claim following the receipt of EVM information, it will initially look into its own systems to cross-reference between the data received via the EVM and the information that the customer has previously provided to the department. The DWP’s existing powers under Section 109 of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 can be used only where there is a reasonable suspicion of fraud, and only DWP-authorised officers will be able to request information under new Section 109BZB.

The requirement for reasonable suspicion before exercising powers under new Section 109BZB is set out in that section. This means that, before a case is referred to an authorised officer for a criminal investigation and these information-gathering powers are used, certain criteria must be considered: there must always be a reasonable suspicion of fraud, and all information requested must be necessary and proportionate for the investigation.

Amendment 85 would require information received following an EVN to be reviewed by an appropriately senior person before a person’s benefits can be amended or suspended, or before further investigatory powers can be used. Again, I hope to persuade the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, that this is not necessary. First, as I said, the eligibility verification measure is a data-requiring power, not a decision-making power. We have been clear that the limited data shared by financial institutions does not suggest any wrongdoing on its own. Data will be used, if appropriate, by DWP officials to make further inquiry and to ensure that the benefits being received are correct in line with the claimant’s circumstances and the relevant benefit eligibility criteria.

Obviously, the noble Lord does not specify what “an appropriately senior person” is. Let me assure him that these DWP officials are already trained to make these decisions, and they do so every day as part of the DWP’s business-as-usual activity. Decisions on claims and applications are made by trained officials on the Secretary of State’s behalf every day. This applies across many of the DWP’s processes with claims and applications; those decision-makers are usually administrative or executive officer grade.

When fraud is suspected and DWP wishes to use the power under new Section 109BZB of the Social Security Administration Act 1992, this can be used only by a DWP authorised officer of executive officer grade who has been trained and accredited. Only these authorised officers are able to request information under these powers, and they must always have reasonable grounds to suspect a DWP offence and consider it necessary and proportionate to require the specified information.

In all cases, before any decision is made, officials will look at any indications of fraud and error comprehensively. For example, DWP will look within its own systems to check for any inconsistencies between the data received via EVM and the information the customer has provided to DWP. There could, for example, be a disregard in place, which means that a claimant can have more money than normally allowed under the benefit rules. Alternatively, a DWP staff member may reach out to the claimant to request further information. In such cases, an appropriately trained and skilled staff member will make any decisions that affect benefit entitlement or changes to a claim. The suspension of a claim would be used only as a last resort and only after repeated attempts to contact the claimant and checking for any known vulnerabilities. I hope that, in the light of that, the noble Lord is reassured and will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

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Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

86: Schedule 3, page 85, line 27, leave out from “(1)” to end of line 33 and insert “may not be brought after the end of—
(a) the period of 14 days beginning with—(i) the day on which the eligibility verification notice was given, or(ii) if the person seeks a review of the notice under paragraph 13, the day on which the person is notified of the outcome of the review, or(b) such longer period (if any) as the Tribunal considers reasonable in all the circumstances.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment means that the tribunal can extend the time limit for appealing against an eligibility verification notice.

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[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak briefly to this group. For once I shall be helpful to the Government, as I rise to speak in opposition to Amendments 89A and 89B in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka.

These amendments would limit the scope of Department for Work and Pensions eligibility verification powers, as we see it, so that they apply only to bank accounts held solely in the name of the benefit recipient, including joint accounts from scrutiny. I recognise the intention behind this proposal, which is to protect privacy and the financial autonomy of those sharing bank accounts with benefit claimants—the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, very eloquently set out his stall—but I respectfully argue that the amendments would create a significant and problematic loophole in the integrity of the fraud and error detection system.

Let us be clear: if these amendments were adopted, a person under investigation for suspected misrepresentation of assets or income could very easily shield those resources simply by transferring them into a joint account, potentially with a spouse, relative, or even a third party. Under the proposed wording, such an account would then fall outside the reach of the DWP’s verification powers, regardless of whether the claimant retained full control over the funds or continued to benefit from them. Perhaps the Minister can help me and the Committee in understanding how the DWP test-and-learn mechanism might have highlighted such an issue, and how it might have provided such a solution.

This is not a theoretical risk. We know from operational experience that individuals engaged in fraudulent activity will often use exactly such mechanisms to conceal income or capital. The ability to move money to a joint account is a clear weakness that could be exploited by those who—we must remember—are believed to have stolen money from the taxpayer.

Under the current drafting of the Bill, the Government rightly allow verification of accounts held by or accessible to the claimant, including joint accounts. This does not mean that third parties will have their data or finances indiscriminately accessed. There are safeguards in place. The department will not be able to view or interfere with every joint account at will, only those, as the Minister indicated earlier, where eligibility indicators suggest a relevant connection, and only where necessary to verify benefit entitlement. These powers are proportionate and targeted.

The amendments, however, would tie the hands of investigators, even where there is a clear and compelling reason to examine whether the claimant has access to or control over funds that affect their entitlement. In so doing, they would introduce a gaping loophole in the very process that is meant to protect taxpayer money and ensure fairness across the system. Let us not forget the public interest at stake here. We are talking about a welfare system that supports millions of people, but also one that must command public confidence and demonstrate that it is both compassionate and resilient to abuse. Creating a known and easily exploited blind spot, as these amendments would, risks undermining that confidence and inviting avoidable losses to fraud or error.

Moreover, this is not a question of criminalising or persecuting people who live with others or hold joint accounts for legitimate reasons. It is about ensuring that where state funds are being claimed on the basis of need, the system has a fair and proportionate—to use that word again—ability to verify the facts, including the assets and income to which the claimant may have access.

No one benefits from a system where loopholes are left open, least of all the people whom the welfare state exists to support. These amendments may be well intentioned, as I said earlier, but they would weaken the ability of the department to carry out its responsibilities effectively, and in doing so would undermine both the fairness and sustainability of the benefits system. I therefore urge noble Lords not to support these amendments. Let us uphold the principle that verification powers should be robust, proportionate and resistant to manipulation—and not inadvertently create a rule that the dishonest can use to their advantage.

Finally, I feel that I might have written a speech for the Minister, but I am sure that she will tell me that I am completely wrong and, perhaps, rebut some of my points.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords, especially the noble Viscount, for doing some of my work for me; I am very grateful. I cannot support my noble friend’s amendments, but I am grateful to him because he has raised a point that people need to understand, and this Committee is exactly the right place to understand the issue.

It might be worth taking a step back. There will be two ways of getting information. We could either go to banks and say, “Here is Mr John Smith, please give us everything you know about him”, but then we would have to give personal information about the individual to the banks, which they do not have. Or we could do what we have decided to do, which is to say: “This is the account into which we pay the money. Please give us the information from that account according to these criteria”. We have gone with the second, because we will not be giving out personal information to financial institutions. However, that does have some consequences, which I will go through one at a time.

First, DWP benefits can be—indeed, are—paid into joint accounts held by one or more individuals. It is therefore essential for financial institutions to share information about joint accounts and any linked accounts that include a relevant benefit payment. Perhaps the most critical reason why we need joint accounts to be in scope of the EVM is that both pension credit and universal credit are household benefits; by that, I mean that eligibility for these benefits will depend on the circumstances of those in the household, including incomes and savings held by both account holders, not just by one individual. It is therefore vital to receive information on joint accounts.

In cases where the relevant benefit is paid into a joint account, information about both account holders and other linked accounts may be shared by the financial institution with the DWP. Again, I have explained why: it is because we cannot give out personal information about them. Once the information is shared, the DWP will then identify the benefit claimant and delete any information that is not relevant to the claim. That is made clear in the code of practice, which noble Lords have had a chance to see; this will be relevant in a moment to the points that the noble Lord made about landlords.

It is worth pausing here. Unlike previous iterations—it may be that the noble Lord is thinking back to some of those—this measure specifically excludes certain accounts from its scope: business accounts, credit card accounts, mortgage accounts, and a lot of other accounts that were previously in scope but are not anymore.

On landlords, if a benefit is paid into a landlord’s account then, yes, that will come back, but, basically, the test will then be: is the account or person a benefit claimant? If not, the information will be discarded and destroyed. Although it is possible, for the reasons I have explained, that a landlord’s account could be identified by a bank if it matches the eligibility indicators and is not a business account, the DWP can easily identify landlords having a housing benefit paid directly to them once we have received the data from a bank. The DWP will screen out these cases and disregard their data. I hope that that assures the noble Lord and that he can in turn assure those who were concerned.

The question of appointees is something that I raised under a previous iteration of this; I simply have not been able to find a way around it. Corporate appointees and businesses are excluded, but, for personal appointees, we simply have not been able to do that. Of course, the appointee’s account will have the benefit paid into it, if the benefit is relevant. The only thing you could do is exclude anyone you knew was an appointee, but then many appointees are claimants in their own right, so you simply could not do that either.

All I can say is that, by receiving from institutions, we will filter out any information that is not relevant; I hope that that will reassure the noble Lord. We are interested only in information on benefits paid by the DWP to benefit claimants; that is for them. If the appointee is holding the benefit for that individual, that is in scope—of course it is—but not if it is for other purposes; likewise goes for landlords. Those with powers of attorney will be treated in the same way as appointees. Again, if the money is for the benefit claimant and it is about that, we can look at it; if it is not, we cannot. I hope that that will reassure my noble friend and that he can withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

I thank the Minister and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, for their illumination of, and contribution to, this issue. I am not really that convinced by their replies, to be honest. The reason is that a landlord can simply say, “I just won’t rent a property to anyone on benefits”. That way, the whole bank account—into which not just the benefit claimant’s benefit but other things go—is outside the scope of any DWP inquiry.

In time, we would notice that the amount of accommodation, especially for disabled people, had shrunk because of this piece of legislation. I think that many people would be dissuaded from becoming joint bank account holders with somebody who receives benefits for the same reason: they value financial privacy. We have to remember that this Bill is removing financial privacy only from people who are generally old, sick, disabled or unfortunate—everybody else can enjoy financial privacy. That would be the response.

So, in due course, there would be very heavy and negative social consequences. As I said earlier, the Minister can alleviate some of these by ordering banks or by creating legislation that says that the banks cannot refuse anyone a bank account. That way, many more people can have a bank account and the landlords, family members and friends may well be less likely to be subject to surveillance. This is something I will mull over for the next stage, but, for the time being, I beg leave to withdraw this amendment.

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[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Sikka’s Amendment 90 would require the independent oversight of the EVM to be carried out by a panel of people, at least half of whom would be elected by recipients of benefits in the scope of the measure.

First, I can clarify for the benefit of the Committee that the independent person in the Bill could be an individual, a group of persons or a panel. However, in appointing the person, we want to be clear that the Government will follow the direction of the Governance Code on Public Appointments throughout the process. In accordance with that code, it is for the Secretary of State to appoint an appropriate person or persons to the role of independent overseer, as set out in Clause 75, because, as the code says:

“The ultimate responsibility for appointments and thus the selection of those appointed rests with Ministers who are accountable to Parliament for their decisions and actions”.


However, the process will be overseen by the Commissioner for Public Appointments to ensure that it is robust and fair; this is in line with precedent.

My noble friend accused us of allowing some forms of politics to invade these decisions. I must say that the Secretary of State has a track record of appointing well-respected and experienced people to review the DWP’s work, even when that kind of oversight is not required. For example, in December she appointed Liz Sayce, the former chief executive of Disability Rights UK and formerly chair of the Social Security Advisory Committee, to lead the independent review into overpayment of the carer’s allowance; she also wanted Charlie Mayfield to lead a joint DWP and Department for Business and Trade review into the factors behind the growing levels of inactivity. I can assure the Committee that we will similarly look for relevant and independent expertise in this area. Clearly, the independent reviewer will have the discretion to engage with not only benefit claimants but any other key stakeholders whom they may consider appropriate, and we do not need to legislate for them to exercise that discretion.

The review must consider the extent to which the Secretary of State has complied with the legislation and the code of practice. The independent overseer will then consider the extent to which the Government have complied with the many safeguards outlined in the legislation and the code. So, the independent review is in the interests of all those who receive a payment for a relevant benefit and will help ensure that their rights are protected.

Amendment 91A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, would require the independent reviewer to include in their annual report any impact that the EVM may have on vulnerable persons. Although I obviously agree that the DWP needs to consider carefully the vulnerabilities that our customers may have, I do not think that this amendment is necessary given the nature of the measure and the existing safeguards, including the oversight and reporting provisions. Again, I remind the Committee that this measure will actually help some of our customers, including those who are vulnerable. We know that people make genuine mistakes; access to this important data will help us find those mistakes sooner and enable us to correct them. Detecting overpayments earlier will help prevent claimants accruing large debts to the department in cases where an overpayment is recoverable.

The key issue is that this is just a data-requiring power. It will simply require a bank to share limited information where benefit-receiving accounts meet the eligibility criteria specified in a DWP notice. The process of a bank sharing data through this measure will have no direct impact on the person’s claim of vulnerabilities. The measure is not about targeting anyone; it is about ensuring that claimants are paid the correct amount of benefit. It is only then that, under the DWP’s long-standing business-as-usual processes, people may experience changes to their benefit award—for example, where, following further inquiries, it is determined that the payment is not correct or that they do not meet the eligibility rules for the payment.

A major aspect underpinning the issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, is a broader question as to how the DWP supports vulnerable people in those processes. Layers of support already exist in the DWP to ensure that customers who are vulnerable or have complex needs have the right support put in place. DWP staff regularly conduct vulnerability checks and are proactive on this; when we do identify vulnerable individuals, we ensure that they receive the necessary support and adjustment. We have specially trained staff to support our most vulnerable customers, and they have access to a wide range of guidance to support them. Across our various benefits and services, colleagues record any support needs provided by the customer to ensure that, whenever a claimant speaks to the DWP, it is aware of how best to help them. As I have already set out, in cases of fraud and error, a DWP staff member will be the one making decisions affecting benefit entitlement.

Finally, I remind the Committee that the independent reviewer will report annually on how the powers have been exercised in line with the legislation and how effective they have been at identifying incorrect payments. They will be able to cover any issues they deem relevant, including the impacts the measure is having and what that means for DWP customers. Asking the independent reviewer to assess impacts on vulnerability would, by necessity, take the scope of the review far broader than the EVM, as it would need to focus on wider parts of DWP business. To accept this amendment would therefore fundamentally change the scope of the annual review.

Lastly, I understand what the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, is trying to achieve with Amendment 91B, but I do not believe it is necessary. The legislation already allows the Secretary of State to disclose information to the independent reviewer for the purpose of the reviews under new Section 121DD, and I assure the noble Lord that the DWP will of course work openly and collaboratively with the independent reviewer. We will provide them with the information requested and work with them to help identify the information they need to complete their review, sharing this under the existing provisions.

Should any incentive be needed, if the independent reviewer did not consider that they had received all the information they needed, the report they published and laid before Parliament would no doubt reflect this. It would be clear for Parliament to see and scrutinise it and hold the Government to account on it. However, I am confident that that situation will not arise because our deterrent will be quite enough. Nevertheless, to provide further assurance to the Committee that the Secretary of State will provide everything relevant, I am happy to commit to make this clear in the code of practice for the measure, but I would rather not legislate unnecessarily.

To close, I know that the noble Lord knows that the inclusion of this oversight matters to the whole Committee; it matters to me as much as it matters to him. The Government have not resisted calls for transparency and have a strong track record of working openly with independent reviewers, such as the independent review of carer’s allowance overpayments.

Since the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, mentioned that Amendment 91B is his final amendment, I want to say that I very much take his amendments in the constructive spirit in which they are intended. This is what the House of Lords Committee is for—to make sure that we pursue the aims of the Bill and that we do so in the most constructive and appropriate way possible. I look forward to carrying on engaging with him. For now, I hope that my noble friend Lord Sikka, whom I am sure I will see in future, will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, for their contributions. The argument that something is costly and timely has been made for centuries against universal suffrage, but somehow we overcome that objection and recognise that people can be elected on to all sorts of bodies. In the rest of Europe, workers are elected on to company boards; nobody said that is costly and time-consuming. Perhaps we are yet to catch up with that kind of democratic revolution.

Regarding the cost, I understand the point made, but what has not been asked is: what is the cost of not doing it? There is also a cost associated with not doing something—in this case, not bringing the direct experience of those impacted by this legislation: those whose lives may be ruined, who may be named and shamed in the neighbourhood, who may perhaps end up losing somewhere to live or who cannot buy food or anything. There is a huge social cost that is basically being ignored. The cost of not doing it is more injustice and more exclusion.

Of course, if the Government want to reach a halfway solution, they could bring the NGOs and civil society organisations representing the disabled, poor, old and sick into this review, but that is not what I think I heard from the Minister—although I hope that, in time, that will be thought through again. Nevertheless, I wanted to fly the flag for democracy and public accountability. For the time being, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.