Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill
Monday 3rd February 2025
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberPublic Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
20:50 - The House divided: - Ayes: 343 / Noes: 87 - Question accordingly agreed to.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
The reasoned amendment has not been selected.
The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Liz Kendall)
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
This Bill will help deliver the biggest ever crackdown on fraud against the public purse, which has now reached an astonishing £55 billion a year. That includes fraud against our public services, such as by those who abuse the tax system; fraud by dishonest companies that use deception to win public contracts and manipulate invoices; and benefit fraud by criminal gangs and individuals, which now stands at a staggering £7.4 billion a year.
There have always been people who commit fraud against the state—tragically, this is not a new problem—but at a time when families across the country are working so hard to pay their bills and put food on the table, when more than 7 million people are stuck in pain and discomfort on NHS waiting lists, and when a shameful 4.3 million children in Britain are growing up poor, it is simply unforgiveable that the Conservatives allowed fraud to spiral out of control. During their 14 long years in government, they failed to put in place a proper plan to crack down on fraud, and there is no better symbol of this than their failure to update the powers of the Department for Work and Pensions to properly crack down on benefit fraud. Just let that sink in for a moment.
Over the last decade, fraudsters have become increasingly sophisticated in the techniques that they use to steal people’s money, using data, technology and all manner of scams. In response, banks and other companies have transformed their ability to spot and stop fraud, and to protect their customers’ money, but the last Government completely failed to do the same for taxpayers. In all their time in power, and with all the developments in technology and the ability to share data and information, they failed to update the DWP’s powers. The Conservatives will no doubt claim that they did introduce measures, but, in truth, they put forward one poorly thought-through measure that was tagged on to another Bill at the tail end of the last Parliament, without any of the proper safeguards or oversight in place. Today, all that changes with our new fraud Bill.
This Bill is tough and it is fair. It is tough on the large companies and dodgy businessmen who try to defraud our public services, it is tough on the criminal gangs and individuals who cheat the benefit system, and it is fair to claimants who make genuine mistakes, by helping us to spot and prevent errors earlier. Taxpayers deserve to know that every single pound of their hard-earned money is being spent wisely and that benefits are there only for those who need them, not fraudsters who take advantage.
Richard Burgon (Leeds East) (Ind)
The Secretary of State is absolutely correct to say that we need to pursue criminal gangs that are engaged in widespread organised theft. I put a written question to the Department for Work and Pensions to ask about the amount lost through personal independence payment fraud, and I was told that only 0.2% of such claims were fraudulent in 2022-23. Does the Secretary of State agree that as we pursue organised criminal gangs, it is really important that we make it clear that there cannot be a hostile approach to disabled people claiming PIP or disabled people more widely who are using the benefits system as they deserve to?
Liz Kendall
People who are genuinely entitled to claim benefits have nothing to worry about from this Bill, but we believe that the £7.4 billion wasted every year through benefit fraud must be cracked down on.
To the corrupt companies with their dodgy covid contracts, to the organised criminal gangs and to every single individual knowingly cheating the system, our message today is clear: we will find you, we will stop you and we will get our money back.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
No one denies that there are those who are blatantly cheating the system, as I referred to in my oral question to the Secretary of State earlier today. On her point about fair play, however, can she give an assurance to me and to the House? I am concerned that if officials in the Department seek out low-hanging fruit, people who have a genuine disability could be denied their rights. I am concerned about the anxiety, the depression and the physical effects that that might cause.
Liz Kendall
Actually, the Bill will do the precise opposite. Through the measures relating to the Public Sector Fraud Authority, we are saying to the large companies and corporations and to the individuals cheating, “We will treat you equally. We do not allow fraud against the public purse. We want to stop it and get our money back.”
Several hon. Members rose—
Liz Kendall
I will make a bit of progress.
I want to start by setting out the measures in the Bill that give the Public Sector Fraud Authority the powers that it needs—further to the point that the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) rightly raised—to fight modern fraud across the public sector on behalf of Government Departments and public bodies.
Liz Kendall
I will set this out first. The Bill will provide the authority with new powers to obtain search warrants, to enter premises and seize evidence as part of fraud investigations, to compel businesses and individuals to provide information where there is a suspicion of fraud, and to enable it to better detect and prevent payments made as a result of fraud or error. It will also bring in new debt recovery powers, so that we can get public money back for taxpayers, and new financial penalties that the PSFA can use as an alternative to often lengthy criminal prosecutions.
What happened during the pandemic was completely unacceptable, with billions of pounds squandered by the Conservatives on dodgy deals with their covid cronies. This Bill will help us to get that money back. It will double from six to 12 years the time limit for civil claims to be brought in alleged cases of covid fraud, giving the PSFA and our new covid counter-fraud commissioner more time to investigate complex cases relating to those who exploited a national emergency for personal profit.
Dame Meg Hillier (Hackney South and Shoreditch) (Lab/Co-op)
I have spent more than a decade studying fraud and error in the DWP. The Secretary of State is right that levels of fraud have been intransigently high, but my concern is about where there are errors. Quite often, they are made by the Department. My constituent received a £5,000 overpayment. Will the Secretary of State make it clear to the House that people in that situation will not have money taken out of their bank account, and that they will be treated properly if there is a small error on their side or a big error by the Department?
Liz Kendall
I will come on to that point in a moment, but I have the utmost respect for my hon. Friend. In fact, I think that the measures in the Bill will help us to spot such errors and prevent them from happening in the first place. People make genuine mistakes. We do not want them to build up errors and build up debt that they have to repay. I think that the Bill is part of solving that problem. I will say more about that in a moment.
I turn to fraud and error specifically in our welfare system. The Bill will modernise and extend the DWP’s anti-fraud powers, bringing it into line with other bodies such as His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, so that we can use technology and data to find and prevent fraud more quickly and effectively; so that our serious and organised counter-fraud investigators have the powers they need to search premises and seize evidence, including from criminal gangs, and bring offenders to justice; and so that we can ensure that when people owe us money and, crucially, when they can pay, we get that money back for taxpayers. That all comes with strong and new safeguards and with independent oversight on the face of the Bill, as I will set out in detail.
David Pinto-Duschinsky (Hendon) (Lab)
As my right hon. Friend mentioned, the Conservatives did not do much on this issue except tagging on a Bill at the very end of their tenure. The Information Commissioner’s Office was very critical of the approach taken in that fraud Bill. Can she reassure the House that she has addressed those concerns?
Liz Kendall
I can indeed reassure the House. The Information Commissioner was rightly critical of the last measure introduced by the Conservatives—the third-party data measure. He has written to us today, and we will make sure that his letter is published. He says that he has reviewed our proposals and is very clear that the current measure more tightly scopes the type of information that can and cannot be shared; specifies much more clearly those in the power’s scope; requires a statutory code of practice before measures are taken; and includes a requirement for the Secretary of State to appoint an independent person to carry out reviews of these functions. I am more than happy to publish that and share it with the House, because I think it shows the changes this Government are making.
We are serious about getting these measures through. We understand people’s concerns, and we have addressed them. The Information Commissioner’s letter should reassure the House.
Andy McDonald (Middlesbrough and Thornaby East) (Lab)
My right hon. Friend has the House’s wholehearted support in pursuing the recovery of funds taken by fraud and error. The National Audit Office estimates that, in the last financial year, £39 billion of tax revenue was not received due to fraud and error, compared with £7 billion in overpaid benefits classed as fraud, which we want to pursue. Can she reassure the House that an appropriate level of resources will be targeted at recovering this large sum of money, which will bring better dividends back to the Treasury?
Liz Kendall
My hon. Friend is right to raise this issue, which he knows the Chancellor and the Treasury team are looking at seriously. The clear message from this Government is, “If you are getting money to which you are not entitled or owe money to the taxpayer through either unpaid taxes or fraud, that is wrong.” We treat everything the same, large or small. We believe in our public services and our social security system, and we want people to know that every single penny of their money is wisely spent and goes to those in the greatest need.
Rachel Gilmour (Tiverton and Minehead) (LD)
As a Member of the party that introduced the state pension, I am behind the Government on this Bill because we all want to cut down on tax fraud and evasion. But I am concerned that pensioners are included under this blanket of Government scrutiny, and it seems that the only thing they have done to deserve it is to get a bit old.
Liz Kendall
One of the new measures introduced by the Bill, the eligibility verification measure, explicitly excludes the state pension. I reassure the hon. Lady on that point.
Shaun Davies (Telford) (Lab)
In places like Telford, it is a basic principle that people pay into the system and then take out of the system, or their neighbours do, when they are in need. The companies and individuals that are defrauding national benefits are often also defrauding local authority benefits and schemes. Will we extend these powers so that local government is able to work with national Government to pursue this fraud?
Liz Kendall
I reassure my hon. Friend that local authorities will be able to put examples to the Public Sector Fraud Authority for scrutiny. The new powers introduced by the Bill will enable the PSFA to crack down on precisely those issues.
Liz Kendall
I will crack on a little, and then I will be happy to take an intervention.
I will now spell out each of the Bill’s measures in turn. First, there are powers to investigate potential fraud. The Bill will mean that, for the first time, the DWP’s serious and organised crime investigators will be able to apply to a court for a warrant to enter and search the premises of suspected fraudsters and criminal gangs to seize items for evidence, such as computers and phones. At the moment, our investigators have to rely on the police to do this. The Bill will enable us to act much more quickly to gather evidence, to take control of and speed up investigations, while also freeing up police time. These powers will be used only when approved by the courts, and the police will continue to be responsible for arresting suspects.
Secondly, the Bill will update the DWP’s information-gathering powers for investigating fraud. At the moment, we have the power to require information from only a limited list of third parties. This does not include key organisations and sectors that could help to prove or disprove suspected fraud, such as airlines.
To add to that, there is limited ability to require responses to requests to be sent electronically. Instead, quite unbelievably, they have to be sent in writing or physically collected, which is time consuming and cumbersome, to say the least. That limitation on our powers completely underlines how the changes in the Bill are long overdue, and the lack of action by the previous Government. The Bill widens who the DWP can compel information from, and it will enable us to require the information to be provided digitally by default.
Thirdly, our new eligibility verification measure will enable us to require banks or other financial institutions to provide crucial data to help identify incorrect benefit payments people might be getting, including fraudulently, such as if someone has too much in savings, making them ineligible for a benefit, or if they are fraudulently claiming benefits abroad when they should be living in the UK. People should not be getting benefits they are not entitled to, and the alerts will make the process of identifying potential fraudsters much simpler, quicker and easier.
However, we know that people lead busy lives and sometimes genuine mistakes happen. The measure will help there too, by finding and putting errors right quickly, preventing people from building up large debts that they then need to repay. I am absolutely determined to reduce benefit mistakes by stopping them from happening in the first place and to avoid debts building up, with all the worry and distress that causes. That is why I have launched the independent investigation into the overpayment of carer’s allowance, in order to learn lessons about what went wrong and ensure that does not happen again.
I want to stress to the House that, under our eligibility verification measure, the DWP will not be able to access people’s bank accounts or look at what they are spending. We will not share any personal information with banks. Once an alert has been issued, any final decision about someone’s benefits will always be taken by a human being and the state pension will be excluded from the measure. There will also be independent oversight of the power on the face of the Bill, with the requirement to produce reports and lay them before Parliament, which I will say more about in a moment.
Sammy Wilson (East Antrim) (DUP)
The Minister is outlining the actions she intends to take to ensure that errors do not happen and that humans will conduct any reviews. However, once a decision has been made—whether the error was genuine or not, the person should not have received the money—the Bill sets out that the person is still subject to all the measures that would be imposed on people who have deliberately engaged in fraud. That is the real worry. Despite the Secretary of State’s assurances, errors will still be made. Judgments will have to be made about whether the money, given in error, is recoverable, and if it is recoverable, it will be treated as if that were fraud.
Liz Kendall
No, it will not be treated in the same way. There is much more we can do to use technology to prevent genuine mistakes and errors building up in the first place, but we also have to use all the technology and information-sharing abilities we have to crack down on fraudsters who will use anything they can to try to defraud the system. I will come to the wider safeguards in the Bill towards the end of my speech, but my hon. Friend the Minister for Transformation and I will be more than happy to talk to the right hon. Gentleman in more detail about any other concerns he may have.
Ben Maguire
I am interested to hear about the measures in the Bill relating to local authorities and public authorities. Has the Secretary of State considered expanding remit of the Public Sector Fraud Authority to investigate cases of serious mismanagement of funds by local authorities, such as the recent botched sale of Newquay airport by Conservative-controlled Cornwall council, which reportedly cost Cornish taxpayers over £1 million in consultancy fees and the like?
Liz Kendall
The hon. Gentleman has made his point simply and clearly. The Bill is about tackling fraud and people who have defrauded the public purse. I am sure his local newspaper will write his comments up very clearly.
The fourth chapter of part 2 of the Bill is about widening our ability to punish fraudsters using a financial penalty as an alternative to seeking prosecutions. At the moment, we can issue financial penalties only in cases of benefit fraud. The Bill extends our ability to use them in cases of fraud against any type of DWP payment—for example, if we had any future scheme like the kickstart employment scheme. That will ensure that more fraudsters committing a wider range of fraud can be dealt with swiftly without going to court.
Last but not least, the Bill gives the DWP more power to get back public money that someone owes in cases where they can repay it but repeatedly refuse to do so. This power does not cover people on benefits or in payrolled employment, because money can already be recovered through the social security or pay-as-you-earn systems, but for people who have moved off benefits and are not on PAYE—for example, because they are self-employed or now living off savings—the Bill will enable the DWP to request the bank statements of people we know owe us money but who have repeatedly refused to engage with us, to verify that they have sufficient funds to repay. We can then recover the money from their bank account through either a one-off lump sum or regular deductions. That will be done in a fair and manageable way, with time for the person to make any representations and the right to appeal.
As a last resort, if someone owes us more than £1,000 and continues to repeatedly refuse to engage with us and agree how they will pay the money back, we can go to court and get an order to disqualify that person from driving for up to two years. This is the same power that the Child Maintenance Service has been able to use for the last 25 years in cases where a parent repeatedly refuses to make payments to support their child. In considering a disqualification order, a court will always check whether the person needs a driving licence for work, because taking it away would be totally counterproductive if they do, and look at other reasons why a license may be essential, such as if the person is disabled or a carer. The measure is for people who have repeatedly refused to engage with the system. It is an important power that the DWP should have to bring people to the table for a discussion about how they will repay the money that they owe. We are clear that someone keeping public money to which they are not entitled is serious, and will result in serious consequences.
Ben Lake (Ceredigion Preseli) (PC)
I am grateful to the Secretary of State for outlining some of the Government’s thinking behind clause 91. Will she elaborate on whether the Government have considered the fact that such a disqualification would have a disproportionate impact on somebody living in a remote area, compared with those in more urban areas, where there is much greater access to public transport?
Liz Kendall
As I said, the court will always look at whether the person needs a car for their job, but we cannot say that people are allowed to get away with fraud in different parts of the country. This is about getting money back. The measure is for people who have repeatedly refused to engage with us, and who we know have the money to repay what they owe. We can bring them to the table and have a discussion about that repayment. I think that most members of the public would think that that is totally reasonable and fair, and that is the new power that we will have.
Let me turn to the strong new safeguarding measures in the Bill. First, as I have said, there will be independent oversight in the Bill for the eligibility verification measure, and new powers for the DWP and the Public Sector Fraud Authority to investigate fraud. I will appoint an independent person to oversee how the EVM is being used and its effectiveness. The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Queen’s Park and Maida Vale (Georgia Gould), will also appoint an independent person to review the use of the PSFA measures. Both will be required to provide reports to the Government, which will be published and laid before Parliament. His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services will oversee the investigation powers of the DWP and the Public Sector Fraud Authority. Any complaints about the use of the new search and seizure powers in the Bill will be referred to the Independent Office for Police Conduct.
Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)
This is a genuine question on the power to request information: will the DWP be able to request information from charitable organisations that are perhaps providing support to people, or from Members of Parliament, who may be providing support to constituents who come through our door?
Liz Kendall
The eligibility verification measure is for banks and financial institutions. It has been tightly defined, which is one of the reasons the Information Commissioner has written his response now. The last Conservative Government just referred to third-party data. That was not a serious proposal, narrowly defined with proper independent oversight. We want the legislation to pass and be used proportionately and effectively. That is why we have included the proposals as drafted.
The second important point is that there will be a statutory code of practice on how the powers can be applied, which we will consult on during the passage of the Bill, to clearly define the scope and limitations. Thirdly, there will always be vulnerability checks for each individual under the new debt recovery powers to ensure that people are not forced to pay back money that they cannot afford. Last, but by no means least, final decisions affecting benefit entitlement will always be made by a human being. Those decisions will sit alongside the right to reviews and appeals—no ifs, no buts. Put together, I believe that those new safeguards will provide the reassurance that the public and some Members of this House need that the Bill’s powers are proportionate, safe and fair.
The Bill delivers the biggest upgrade to the DWP’s anti-fraud powers in more than 14 years. It brings in new powers to tackle fraud right across the public sector by empowering the Public Sector Fraud Authority, and not before time. Our approach is tough but fair: tough on criminals who cheat the system and steal from taxpayers; tough on people who refuse to pay back money; fair on claimants, by spotting and stopping errors earlier, helping to avoid people getting into debt; fair on those who play by the rules and rely on the social security system; and fair on taxpayers, by ensuring that every pound is spent wisely, responsibly and effectively on those who need it. We were elected on a mandate for change, and that is what the Bill will deliver.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
I call the shadow Secretary of State.
Helen Whately (Faversham and Mid Kent) (Con)
A strongly held Conservative principle is that public money must not be wasted. We hold this view not because we are mean, but because the Government do not have money of their own. What they have, they raise through taxation from all of us. A tiny fraction of every penny that they spend is yours, mine and everyone else’s who pays in. Those who spend public money have a duty to spend it wisely, and ensure that it ends up only with those who should have it, for the purpose for which it was intended. In a big, complex system of government in a country of nearly 70 million people, from time to time that will not happen for a range of reasons—from a form that has been accidentally filled in with the wrong information, or a change of circumstance that someone forgot to notify the jobcentre about, to serious organised fraud—but however taxpayers have lost out, it is incumbent on the state to do all that it can to get their money back. That is what taxpayers rightly expect. It is part of the unwritten contract for collecting that money in the first place. Therefore, it will be no surprise to hear that, in principle, we support the Bill’s aim. In fact, much of the Bill continues work that we did in government, and legislation that was interrupted by the election.
It is important to put what we are discussing today in context. Before the pandemic, fraud and error across the DWP benefits and tax credit system was at a near record low, but then we had two national crises—first, the pandemic, then war in Ukraine—which piled huge cost of living pressures on families across the UK. During both, we acted rapidly. We set up never-seen-before systems of support in record time. We protected millions of people’s jobs. We paid half of everyone’s energy bills for a year. We got direct payments to the people who needed them the most. I am proud of what we did, and I think that history will look back kindly on how we supported people through those times, but the truth is that when we do something fast at a moment of crisis, that inevitably opens up new vulnerabilities in the system. Disappointingly, against a national spirit of getting through hard times together, some people saw it as a chance to make a quick buck, and we saw a material increase in the amount being lost to fraud within the system. Any and all of us could spell out better uses for that money. That is why, back in May 2022, we published our plan, “Fighting Fraud in the Welfare System”. We increased the number of frontline counter-fraud professionals in the DWP, created a new Public Sector Fraud Authority and started work on new legal powers to investigate and punish fraudsters. It was a good start. In 2022-23, fraud and error were cut by 10%. We saved £1 billion through the Department’s dedicated counter-fraud activities. The next year we upped that to £1.35 billion, exceeding the £1.3 billion target, yet we were still not satisfied.
In May last year, we published a second fraud plan to save £9 billion by 2027-28, which included hiring more staff to check claims for accuracy, modernising information-gathering powers, broadening the penalty system and investing £70 million in advanced data analytics. In April, we announced plans for a new fraud Bill to align DWP investigations with HMRC, treating benefit fraud like tax fraud and giving investigators new powers to make seizures and arrests. When the general election was called, the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill had already passed through the House of Commons. The Bill included the powers the Government are introducing today to require third parties, such as banks, to provide relevant information to the DWP. To the extent that this Bill continues that work, I do not envisage substantial disagreement—albeit we have questions on how the law will work in practice. I also have serious concerns about the powers that the Cabinet Office is giving itself.
Before I deal with those, let me say that I recognise the concerns that people have about the state getting too much information about their finances. Privacy should never be taken lightly. I do not want to live in a country where the Government can access our bank accounts and look at what we have been spending our money on, and I would not support a Bill that would allow the Government to do that, but I believe that it is right for the DWP to learn lessons from HMRC to recoup taxpayers’ money. The fact of the matter is that if someone receives money from the state, it is not unreasonable for the state to investigate if there are signs they are taking money that they should not be.
As I said, I have some questions about how the social security powers in the Bill will be put into practice, and I expect to probe those matters further as the Bill progresses. For instance, on the role of banks, how much testing has been done of the systems that they expect to use? The Horizon scandal is a recent reminder of how computer systems do not always get it right. What progress has been made on the code of conduct, and when will we see it? I also note that no impact assessment has been done on the cost to banks. Has the Minister met the sector and discussed what the changes mean for it? I know there are concerns within the sector about the lack of detail brought forward by the DWP. If the maximum level of scrutiny allowed under the Bill is demanded by the DWP, how would that work in practice for banks and what would it cost?
On the sanctions that can be meted out under the Bill, we support the Department for Work and Pensions being given further powers to pursue recovery outside of benefits and PAYE, but are the measures outlined in the Bill tough enough? Why is 40% the maximum amount of someone’s capital that can be reclaimed? Allowing for hardship, which the Bill does, why should someone potentially keep the majority of their ill-gotten gains?
It is not clear how the Bill intends to treat carer’s allowance overpayments, which I know from my time as Care Minister are complicated and often accidental, though unfortunately not always. None the less, they are a loss to the taxpayer that should be investigated. We would like to understand in more detail how the savings we are told to expect from the Bill will accrue. How many people does the Government think that will affect, and what proportion is it of the fraud currently being perpetrated? I was concerned the other day to see reports in the media of a number of artificial intelligence schemes being quietly shelved in the Department. It is noticeable that the plans rely heavily on human labour to root out fraud. While I know the Government have to create jobs somehow, I would be interested to hear what consideration has been given to automating some of the processes in future. That too will help ensure that taxpayers’ money does not go to waste.
I come to my main area of concern, which is the powers being given to Cabinet Office Ministers and the Public Sector Fraud Authority. I know what it is like to make legislation thinking that I, as a good person, would only use it wisely, but I also know what it is like to be wrongly investigated by a public authority on the grounds of a misleading newspaper article. Looking at the investigatory powers bestowed in chapter 2 of the Bill, how could one not be worried to see a Minister being given powers, with little oversight, to compel a person to release whatever information they wish, in any format demanded, within 10 days, along with the information of anyone connected to them, on any grounds that the Minister deems “reasonable”—and to disclose that information to whomever they think necessary, with the sole right of appeal being only to that Minister? It could be impossible for someone to comply within the timeframe given, yet the Bill includes fines set at £300 a day for missing the deadline.
Of course the Government should go after fraudsters, but I worry that some of that power could be abused and that, in its current form, it may breach laws on the state taking someone’s property without due process. I would be interested to hear if experts in the legal sector have been consulted on the legislation as drafted. Have Ministers engaged with the Law Society, the Bar Council or, for that matter, organisations like Liberty and Justice?
In the Department for Work and Pensions and the Cabinet Office, it is right to pursue fraudsters with the full might of the law, but the ends cannot justify all means and the process must always be fair, reasonable and proportionate. I look forward to further discussions on the detail of the Bill, and I am sure that colleagues in the other place will be preparing for that, too.
In the meantime, we must not let the Bill distract from the elephant in the room. For every penny the Bill will save—welcome though that is—it will do nothing about the billions of pounds that will be racked up in sickness benefits under this Labour Government. It is staggering that they did not come into office with a plan. They have done nothing to halt the tide in the seven months they have been in office, and I hear that they have shelved some of the work we handed over. We have heard not a murmur about what they will actually do, just briefing after briefing to the papers. Why not bring an actual plan to Parliament rather than talking to the papers? I suspect you, Madam Deputy Speaker, might agree with me on that point.
We had a plan—where is theirs? Every day the Government scramble about without a plan costs taxpayers millions. Fraud and error in the system is a problem, and I am pleased to pledge the Opposition’s support for tackling them, but let us not use this Bill as a distraction from the big issue. We all agree that the welfare system needs reform. Let us end the briefings and have some action.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
Before I call the next speaker, I just want to make it clear that after the hon. Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth (Debbie Abrahams), I will call the Liberal Democrat spokesman, the hon. Member for Torbay (Steve Darling).
Debbie Abrahams (Oldham East and Saddleworth) (Lab)
It is absolutely right that fraud against the taxpayer, whoever it is by, is detected, that money is recovered and that future fraud is prevented. We saw fraud during covid when, for example, the abuse of the bounce back loan scheme cost the taxpayer nearly £5.5 billion. There was also covid-related contract fraud, such as the purchasing of unusable personal protective equipment, which was outrageous.
As my right hon. Friend the Member for Leicester West (Liz Kendall) mentioned, the National Audit Office identified six areas of fraud risk against the public sector, estimated to cost the taxpayer between £55 billion and £85 billion. They are grant fraud, which is the misappropriation or misuse of grant money; service user fraud, which we have focused on today; procurement and commercial fraud; income evasion; internal fraud and corruption; and regulatory fraud.
In its 2023-24 annual report and accounts, the DWP estimated that it made overpayments—including fraud and error—of £9.7 billion out of the £269 billion that it spent. That is 6.7% of related expenditure. However, it also made underpayments of £4.2 billion—that is 1.6% of related expenditure—up from £3.5 billion the previous year, because of underpayments of disability living allowance. Within that, there were different levels of fraud for different benefit types. For universal credit, the level of overpayment for the same period is 13.2%. That is down from a peak of 21% in early 2020, during the covid pandemic, when some of the controls were suspended to speed up the application process. In fact, by value, two thirds of all overpayments are on universal credit—£6.5 billion out of £9.7 billion.
The DWP has tried to argue that the increase in fraud in the social security system reflects an increase in fraudulent behaviour in society. However, that does not explain why the overpayments are concentrated in universal credit accounts, or why, for example, there was a 10% reduction in fraud incidents reported in the crime survey for England and Wales between 2023 and 2024. The National Audit Office and Public Accounts Committee agree. In its recent report on the DWP’s annual accounts, the PAC said that it was not convinced by the DWP’s claims, adding that that was a “dangerous mindset”. The Committee also produced the following context, which we should all consider:
“It is concerning that DWP is not providing a decent service to all its customers, who include some of the most vulnerable in society and some of those with the most complex needs. In particular, claimants of disability benefits, including Personal Independence Payment (PIP) and Employment and Support Allowance (ESA), are receiving an unacceptably poor service including processing times compared with those receiving Universal Credit (UC) and State Pension.”
I worry that many of those disabled claimants, made vulnerable by their circumstances, are receiving less than the DWP estimates that they are entitled to. I believe that there is a genuine commitment from Ministers to change the DWP’s culture and build trust with its service users, but the Bill will be seen by many as more evidence not to trust the DWP and not to engage. I am not alone in that; in evidence to the Work and Pensions Committee inquiry on safeguarding vulnerable claimants, Citizens Advice raised concerns that the failure to engage is the second largest category that the DWP classes as fraud, and that when the enhanced review team identifies a household as having potentially made a fraudulent claim, payments may be immediately suspended. Citizens Advice recommended that the detriment caused by such a suspension should not take place while the fraud review process is ongoing. Disability Rights UK, UK Finance and others have raised concerns about the lack of systemic safeguards in the Bill. To their credit, Ministers have accepted that and will look at it as a whole.
However, Ministers—particularly those from the last Conservative Government—will remember the housing benefit fraud allegations, in which more than 200,000 people were wrongly accused of and investigated for housing benefit fraud and error last June. An AI algorithm—which the shadow Secretary of State, the hon. Member for Faversham and Mid Kent (Helen Whately), just said we should be using more of—incorrectly identified people as potentially behaving fraudulently, and they were investigated. That is really serious. What level of investigation of innocent people do Ministers consider acceptable?
Policy in Practice has also raised concerns about underclaiming, barriers to accessing support, the lack of value for money of the DWP’s fraud detection, prevention and recovery system, which addresses less than 5% of the debt owed, and how the focus on fraudulent claims is
“spoiling the system for the 97% of ‘genuine’ benefit claims”,
fuelling beliefs about benefit cheats, and detracting from
“the millions of households that are rightfully and legitimately supported by a social safety net designed to be there for all of us when we need it.”
I have questions for the Ministers, some of which I have raised with them before. What risk assessments of the Bill have been undertaken? I know that there is an impact assessment and a human rights assessment. What are the risks, what mitigations have been put in place, and will the Government publish them? How are safeguarding concerns, including the Caldicott principles and the responsibilities of the Caldicott guardian—which the DWP has, to its credit, now put in place—addressed in the Bill? This Bill is too important for us to mess it up and for innocent people to become the victims.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.
Steve Darling (Torbay) (LD)
I thank the hon. Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth (Debbie Abrahams) for laying out very concisely some of the challenges in ensuring that the Bill does the right thing without going too far and breaking the things that people want fixed.
Clearly, defrauding the benefits system is wrong. One need only reflect on the level of disinvestment in many of our public services by the previous Government to note how that can bleed the system dry. I reflect on my own Torbay constituency, where the hospital tower block has scaffolding around it not because it is under repair, but to prevent bits of concrete from falling and killing people. I reflect on the lack of investment in our schools; the challenges with reinforced autoclaved aerated concrete mean that the necessary capital programme will not happen for the next six years. I reflect on the lack of investment in our police services, which means that the number of sworn officers has massively reduced. Those are serious issues that affect us following the lack of investment under the previous Government.
The Conservative Government were asleep at the wheel during the covid pandemic, as the Secretary of State alluded to in clear terms. Businesspeople in Torbay told me that they felt Rishi Sunak was—
Madam Deputy Speaker
Order. I remind the hon. Gentleman that we refer to Members not by name but by constituency. I think he was referring to the right hon. Member for Richmond and Northallerton.
Steve Darling
My apologies, Madam Deputy Speaker. Those businesspeople felt that the then Chancellor of the Exchequer was filling carrier bags full of £50 notes and placing them around towns, expecting people just to pick them up, so low were the safeguards for a number of the covid support schemes.
I will move on to an item that has already been covered by a number of colleagues: the carers scandal. More than 136,000 people—equivalent to the population of West Bromwich—have been left with liabilities of £250 million that they are extremely worried about. The Government have quite rightly commissioned a review, but it is due to report not in the near future but next summer. I challenge the Minister: why not wait for that review’s findings before we push hard on these proposals, so that we can ensure that lessons are learned? We want fraud to be tackled, but we want it done in the right way. There have been just seven working days between this Bill’s First Reading and its Second Reading. Large tracts of the safeguards and the rails around it are out for consultation as we speak, which we need if we are to understand what safeguards there will be to protect our communities.
Colleagues have already mentioned AI, and they are right to have done so, because there are real concerns about a lack of transparency—[Interruption.] Sorry, Jennie is joining in; she is having a dream about rabbits. As Liberal Democrats have already highlighted, we do not know what safeguards there will be around the use of AI. How can we back the Bill until we know what safeguards will exist? I would like to reflect on how the Bill can contain those appropriate safeguards. Sadly, as the hon. Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth highlighted, the DWP is a broken Department.
Robin Swann (South Antrim) (UUP)
Bearing in mind the money that has been claimed back from unpaid carers and our concerns about the DWP, does the hon. Member agree that this legislation would see more unpaid carers or their like come under far harder and harsher penalties?
Steve Darling
I welcome the hon. Member’s intervention; he has highlighted a serious issue, and he is spot on. One has only to reflect on the significant backlog, with 90,000 people waiting for their pension to be reviewed as part of the winter fuel allowance issues—that is a massive backlog.
Access to Work, which is meant to support people with disabilities into work, is sadly another broken system. Quite often, those wishing to receive support find that job offers are withdrawn because their work package has not been pulled together in time. An academic survey has highlighted that over three years, sadly, almost 600 people committed suicide around the management of their support from the DWP. I suggest to the Secretary of State that, while one understands the aspirations of this Bill, it is far too much of a Big Brother Bill. It is far too much of a snoopers charter, and I suggest to the Government that they withdraw it.
Oliver Ryan (Burnley) (Lab/Co-op)
I thank the Secretary of State for introducing this important Bill. Fraud is a serious issue, and we simply cannot tolerate the level of fraud that the previous Government left us with. In the year 2023-24, we lost almost as much to fraud as we spent on defence.
We have all heard the stories of people fraudulently claiming covid support and benefits to which they were not entitled. People have been claiming from the safety net not for security in their time of need, but to feather their own nests on the backs of British taxpayers. I am glad that this Government are serious about protecting public money from fraudsters, and I have no time for the whataboutery of the Liberal Democrats.
This robust Bill closes loopholes, strengthens enforcement and prioritises financial accountability. It is a great step forward for the real change that we promised at the election. The message from me and my constituents is quite clear: those who defraud or attempt to defraud the British public in any way deserve to feel the full weight of the law. I believe in doing what is right to protect taxpayers and hard-working people in business, which is why I will not stand by while fraudsters take advantage of the system. The Bill says, “If you have defrauded the British taxpayer, we will come for you, and we will not mess about.” That is what people in Burnley, Padiham and Brierfield want.
Turning specifically to the strengthening of measures on covid fraud, I am proud that one of the first actions taken by this Government was to appoint the covid corruption commissioner, and that the Bill bolsters the commissioner’s powers and doubles the time limit in which civil claims can be brought, among other measures. A typical example of rampant covid corruption was the bounce back loans, which have already been referred to by other Members. Those loans saw millions of pounds of public money shovelled out of the doors of the Treasury without proper oversight. We have all read the stories and heard about some of the heinous outcomes—huge amounts of public money gone to fake companies as well as people using stolen identities or providing products that were either defective or just plain did not exist. Meanwhile, I have had to explain to my constituents why basic public services have gone to the wall.
To put it into perspective, all in, the previous Government handed the equivalent of £20,000 of taxpayers’ cash to fraudsters every minute of the last Parliament, and now Conservative Members moan that there is no money for anything. If this Bill had become law earlier, much of that fraud could have been prevented by allowing stronger eligibility verification procedures, faster detection of fraudulent transactions and faster financial recovery powers for quicker action against fraudsters.
Moving on to benefit fraud and the Department for Work and Pensions, the same principle applies: those who defraud the British public will feel the full weight of the law, and will have nowhere to hide. We have a moral duty to recover every penny of public money that has been defrauded, and I am glad that the Bill full-throatedly says so. Benefit fraud has tripled since 2019, and since then we have lost almost £10 billion overall to fraud and error. As the now Leader of the Opposition said while in government, fraudsters were let “off the hook” by the Tories. People who work hard to pay their taxes deserve to know that every pound stolen is a pound that cannot be spent on public services, and they deserve to have that money returned. It is simply unforgivable that the previous Government allowed fraud in the benefit system to get to this level.
By voting in favour of the Bill, we will allow this Government crucial investigatory and search and seizure powers that are essential if we really want to tackle fraud in this country. I know that there will be concern from some quarters, but I am reassured that the Secretary of State has taken into consideration the necessary safeguards that will balance the need for effective fraud prevention and recovery. Indeed, if during the passage of the Bill she finds a way to be tougher and go further, she should do it; I am not sure whether two years is enough for a driving ban.
The powers we are extending to the Public Sector Fraud Authority have already proven effective. They are used by the DWP and by HMRC, and by expanding them, we will recover more funds and bring more fraudsters to justice. This is the first update to those powers in 20 years, as the Secretary of State said. Of course, DWP investigators should be given warrant powers, to save police time if nothing else.
The safeguards are in the Bill to make sure we tackle fraud effectively and, as importantly, protect people’s rights, as the Secretary of State has also said. To address a point raised a second ago by the shadow Secretary of State, the hon. Member for Faversham and Mid Kent (Helen Whately), decisions will be made by a human being in the final stages, as with any decision that affects somebody’s benefits. I think that is right, and clearly it is something that the Secretary of State has tried to stipulate.
People in Burnley, Padiham and Brierfield expect their money to be used effectively, and they demand accountability, with fraudsters who exploit the system being held to account and locked up if necessary. As the Secretary of State said, the Bill is tough but fair, with measures designed to save an awful lot of money over the next five years. That is a promising step that I believe will restore public trust and tackle financial mismanagement. I am grateful to the Secretary of State for taking the issue so seriously—more power to her elbow.
Mr Peter Bedford (Mid Leicestershire) (Con)
I would like to echo many of the points raised by the shadow Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, my hon. Friend the Member for Faversham and Mid Kent (Helen Whately). Like her, I am a conditional supporter of the Bill. While I welcome its intent, I would like to raise a few questions regarding its implementation and its true impact on reducing fraud and error in the system.
Conservative Members understand three core principles: the importance of promoting personal responsibility, the importance of law and order, and of course, the importance of reducing the burden of an overreaching state and ensuring that taxpayers’ money is spent efficiently. I am therefore pleased that by introducing this legislation, the Secretary of State appears to have accepted the long-standing arguments made by Conservative Members. The Bill, much like the previous Government’s policy paper, is both necessary and overdue. It is a scandal that fraud and error in the DWP benefits system has reached such levels. Since the pandemic, the UK taxpayer has overpaid £8 billion due to a lack of proper provision for the DWP to thoroughly investigate cases of fraud and error.
This Bill maintains the focus of the previous Government’s policy paper on fighting fraud in the system. Under the previous Secretary of State, my right hon. Friend the Member for Central Devon (Mel Stride), the DWP saw a 10% drop in fraud and error in the system, which led to savings of over £2 billion between 2022 and 2024. That was achieved through the Department recruiting over 2,000 review agents and hiring 1,400 counter-fraud professionals. Unfortunately, due to time constraints at the end of the last parliamentary Session, my right hon. Friend was unable to carry out the modernisation of information-gathering powers or to broaden the scope of cases that could lead to civil penalties. I have no doubt that, had those Conservative policies been fully implemented, fraud and error levels would be lower than they are now.
Turning to the Bill, although I support its principles, I seek clarification from the Secretary of State on several key points. First, can the Secretary of State guarantee that this Bill will not distract her and the Department from much-needed reforms to benefit conditionality, including work on health assessments and increasing incentives for people to find work?
Lewis Cocking (Broxbourne) (Con)
My hon. Friend is making an excellent contribution and I support what he is saying. We must get benefit fraud down and I support some of the measures in the Bill. On the point he has just raised, does he agree that this is only one side of the coin in dealing with benefits in this country? Of course, we must do everything we can to get benefit fraud down, but the other side of the coin is encouraging people to go back to work, because the best form of welfare is having a well-paid job.
Mr Bedford
I absolutely agree with all the sentiments my hon. Friend has expressed. Getting a job is the best route out of poverty, and it is the best route to ensuring that we have a more socially mobile society.
Secondly, my instinctive belief in personal liberty means that I believe provisions allowing access to individual bank accounts must be handled with caution. Can the Secretary of State therefore confirm that such measures will be used only as a last resort, and that the independent person appointed by the Cabinet Office will be given full oversight and will report transparently on the use of these powers?
Thirdly, the Bill proposes the restriction of driving licences for those committing fraud against the DWP, but what alternative deterrents does the Secretary of State propose for those who do not drive? His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the Child Maintenance Service already have these powers. I would like to see the independent person assess whether these measures are as impactful at the DWP.
Fourthly, Gareth Davies, the Comptroller and Auditor General at the National Audit Office, wrote last year that the forecast
“shows that DWP no longer expects Universal Credit fraud and error to return to the levels seen before…the COVID-19 pandemic”.
In response, the DWP explained that this was because there has been an “increasing propensity” for deceit across British society. I do hope that the Secretary of State will push back against this defeatist culture in the DWP and that my constituents in Mid Leicestershire do not continue to foot an astronomical bill for people committing fraud in the Department.
Finally, to gauge the correct path when dealing with fraud and error in the system, will the independent person conduct a review to determine whether the provisions in this Bill are just as effective as the Conservative policies of the previous Government?
In conclusion, as a Conservative, I support the intent of this Bill. It is shocking that fraud and error are at current levels. However, I urge the Secretary of State to work collaboratively with Members across the House to ensure that individual freedoms are respected, that the Bill does not distract from wider welfare reforms and that its measures deliver a long-term reduction in the welfare bill.
Gill German (Clwyd North) (Lab)
This Bill is crucial for delivering on this Government’s manifesto commitment to safeguard taxpayers’ money. As the Secretary of State has rightly stated, we must be
“turning off the tap to criminals who cheat the system and steal law-abiding taxpayers’ money.”
In Wales alone, the national fraud initiative found £7.1 million of fraud and payment errors in 2022-23, up by £0.6 million since the previous year. Figures such as this show just how much a blight on the economy fraud and error continue to be. I have heard at first hand from constituents about instances of benefit fraud that they are well aware of, such as individuals using past addresses to make claims to which they are not entitled. They know that this is not right, and they expect us to take action. It is also essential that we crack down on organised crime gangs and streamline the process through which DWP investigators can act to bring these serious offenders to justice more swiftly.
I welcome this Government’s crackdown on fraud, because every £1 lost to fraudulent claims is £1 that could be spent on vital public services—services that my constituents in Clwyd North rely on to strengthen our communities and improve lives. However, it is crucial that we make a clear distinction between intentional fraud and accidental individual error. Errors leading to overpayments may be the result not of deliberate wrongdoing, but of the inherent complexity of the social security system itself. Many of my constituents have shared their struggles with the complexity of applying for benefits, and knowing what to apply for and how. This causes significant stress, and it exemplifies the risks of penalising individuals who may simply have been unable to navigate the system, further entrenching the fear of making a mistake. The Bill must therefore go hand in hand with reforms to make this navigation far more straightforward.
A YouGov survey for Turn2us in 2024 found that 77% of respondents believed they would struggle when they needed to claim benefits if their circumstances changed. This highlights the real challenges that people face in navigating a system that is often confusing and difficult to understand. The Government must ensure that their powers to recover overpayments differentiate between fraudulent criminal activity and genuine mistakes. Without this distinction, there is a risk of penalising individuals who have simply struggled to navigate the system, and those people may already be in vulnerable situations.
Getting this Bill right, however, will mean that £1.5 billion of taxpayers’ money over five years will be saved. That money can be invested in the services that people in my constituency and across the country rely on, from public transport to local infrastructure. With fraud and error costing nearly £10 billion a year, we must act decisively to drive down this fraud and error and protect public funds. At a time when families are struggling and public services are under pressure, ensuring that taxpayers’ money is spent where it is truly needed is not just responsible, but essential.
This Bill must tackle fraud and error in a way that is fair and proportionate and does not punish those who have made an honest mistake. I know that the Government have worked hard to include measures that will ensure that these critical distinctions are made as the Bill progresses. However, it is crucial that we do not shy away from coming down on this issue, and that we ensure constituents see their hard-earned contributions going directly to the services that strengthen our communities.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
This Bill is, at heart, Conservative legislation left over from the most dark corner of the last Administration, and I have no qualms about opposing it. I will speak against giving it a Second Reading and, alongside my fellow Green Members, will vote against it later.
One of the changes that people wanted to see when they voted out the last Government was a welfare system that treats people with dignity and respect. Sadly, this Bill is instead based on blame and suspicion of people in need of help. It has a focus on fraud when a far bigger issue is unclaimed and under-claimed benefits due to a lack of awareness, complexity in the system and stigma. The people losing out are not helped by this legislation. The Chair of the Select Committee, the hon. Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth (Debbie Abrahams), set out the risk of damaging trust in and engagement with the DWP. We also have the risk of reigniting damaging and unfair stereotypes from some people involved in wider debates on these issues on social media, in newspapers and in broadcast media.
All in all, this Bill is deeply concerning and disappointing, and I had hoped better of this Government on this issue. I sincerely hope that Ministers will go back to the drawing board and come up with a new, fair and humane policy for dealing with what is a very small proportion of fraud in our benefit system.
I have had so much correspondence on this from constituents who are very concerned about the Bill’s sweeping powers to invade their privacy and treat them as suspects, not citizens. I am talking about pensioners who need pension credit, people who are permanently disabled and whose entitlement to employment and support allowance is clear and settled, people who are precariously underemployed or unemployed who need universal credit, family carers, and people who are simply on low wages and cannot make ends meet. These are citizens, not suspects.
The clauses about what appear to be routine and regular Government access to information from bank accounts for eligibility verification—not linked to serious crime—most concern me. I am also opposed to the clauses that increase powers of search and access to homes for more serious matters, and those that would remove driving licences from people who are having difficulty paying back to the DWP overpaid money due to what may simply be human error at a difficult time in their lives, not fraud at all.
I therefore suggest that the Government come back to this House with the parts relating to covid fraud and to contractors and businesses, and maybe add something on the much bigger problem of tax fraud. On the rest, I suggest that they start again with a process of genuine listening and co-production, with those who claim social security, about appropriate, fair, respectful and secure ways of ensuring that people in need of support can receive what they are entitled to, and to protect in a proportionate way against those who may seek to defraud the Government or local authorities.
This process would fit together very well with the recent proposal from the charity Mind in response to other upcoming changes to benefit processes, which asks for a new approach to the benefits system and a commission led by disabled people to redesign benefit assessments. Mind says that this kind of process would help to rebuild trust between disabled people and the DWP. I agree, and my personal view is that this Bill will do the absolute opposite.
In summary, I believe that this Bill should go no further, and I and my Green colleagues will be voting accordingly today, to stand up for our constituents’ rights and dignity and for social security based not on intrusion and suspicion, but on support.
Jon Trickett (Normanton and Hemsworth) (Lab)
I wish to make a few points. First, it would have been impossible not to note the zeal of the Secretary of State when she was banging on the Dispatch Box and talking about fraud and loss to the taxpayer, and she is right to do that. We, on this side of the House at least, believe in public expenditure, and therefore there is a duty on us to ensure that every single penny is spent in an appropriate manner. So where it is wasted or stolen or fraud is going on, we should bear down on it.
However, although the Secretary of State started off with that zeal and passion in talking about the gangs and others, she talked most about benefit claimants. Although the Bill sets up powers for the fraud authority, it deals largely with the question of fraud in the benefit system. But the title of the Bill mentions both fraud and error, and not enough time has been spent in this debate on the nature of error, which is far bigger than can be easily acknowledged.
I looked at the figures for PIP. Between 2019 and 2024 some one in four cases for alleged fraud by PIP recipients were dropped before reaching appeal, indicating the decision had lapsed because the Department had decided in favour of the appellant. That indicates the scale of the error that this Bill also wants to address. I am going to refer to a couple of cases in a moment or two, but at the core of this Bill is the creation, effectively, of a partnership between the state and the private banks, and the Bill does not make clear what that partnership will look like. I hope that we get some clarity on that before the Bill reaches Committee.
The banks themselves have said that they are very worried about this Bill, because they have a statutory duty, imposed by this House, to make sure that they deal properly with vulnerable clients. The banks have said there is a contradiction between the contents of this Bill and the obligations that fall on them and their duty to treat people who are vulnerable in a proper way. I want to reflect on that briefly.
Let me give the House a case from my own constituency that is symptomatic of a wider problem. A couple were referred to my office. They both had learning difficulties, both were illiterate and innumerate, and they found it impossible on their own to fill in the dozens and dozens of questions which the forms require people to fill in to get access to the benefits. So they were helped to put the form together by people employed to look after such people. The DWP then decided, years later, that it had made an error and had overpaid the couple by a large amount. This error came to light as a result of a review of some kind in the Department. So here is a very poor and vulnerable couple who were unable to fill in the form on their own and who had been helped by professionals, and what did the state do? It sent them a bill for £20,000.
All Members will have a great deal of empathy—they would not be in this job otherwise—so we can imagine the state that couple were in when they received a bill from the state to repay £20,000. It was discovered after they came to my office that they had in fact filled in all the forms correctly; this was a computer error caused by someone failing to key in some of the information that had been provided to the DWP. Neither the council which was helping them nor their support workers spotted the fact they were being overpaid; nobody spotted it, so this went on for a number of years and the sum reached £20,000. A deeply vulnerable couple were left in that situation.
Eventually they encountered a local councillor in my constituency who referred them to me. We went through the whole thing and managed to make an appeal on their behalf. But this Bill gives people only 28 days once they have received an order to pay. It took us longer than 28 days to resolve this once it had got into my office. I just say to the Secretary of State that 28 days is not long enough in these complicated cases for people to produce the evidence to show they are a victim of error rather than they have committed a fraud. There was a presumption by the state that they had committed a fraud of £20,000, totally incorrectly, it turned out.
I worry that the Bill will put people like my constituents, and I imagine constituents of every Member in this House, in the same position. My constituents were fortunate to find an MP, but many people in that situation would not know how to find their way through the system.
That raises the question I have referred to about the banks. The banks have a statutory duty to protect vulnerable customers. How will they exercise that duty when they are being required to provide information to the DWP about the financial activities of various individuals banking with them?
On the subject of vulnerability, Disability Rights UK tells us that one third of all claimants of legacy benefits have mental health problems. I imagine that most of those people would be regarded as vulnerable by the banks and by every humane person in this House. One therefore wonders just exactly how we will reconcile the statutory duty on the banks with what they are required to do in relation to this Bill.
We are giving powers to this fraud authority. I personally am in favour of tackling fraud, as I have said—I am a Yorkshireman, and I do not like spending money. I do not like money being spent wastefully by the state either, and when I was the leader of Leeds city council, everyone knew I was strong on waste.
Finally on vulnerability, have the Government commissioned and received an equality impact assessment? If they have, can that be placed in the Commons Library, because the Bill will clearly have an impact on people who are extremely vulnerable? I think something somewhere in the Department will refer to that impact assessment.
I will make a couple of final points. It is suggested that the Bill will save £300 million a year by tackling benefit fraud. That is a large amount of money, but we can compare it with the £10 billion of fraud on personal protective equipment provided during covid, the £16 billion lost to the taxpayer in fraudulent covid schemes, the £5.5 billion a year of tax evasion, or the £6 billion of other illegal activities against HMRC. The £300 million is important, but it is not the largest amount of fraud that is taking place. The fraud authority is getting new powers and will be staffed up. How will it choose among the disproportionate amounts by which the state is being defrauded by various different agencies, by private individuals and, frankly, by some gangsters, too? Will the staffing be allocated according to the prejudices of politicians—whichever politicians are then in charge—or will it be allocated proportionately to the loss to the taxpayer incurred through different forms of fraud?
My final point is on the Information Commissioner. The Secretary of State suddenly announced that she received a letter today—it would be interesting to read it—but the Information Commissioner had been suggesting that the powers were disproportionate. We need to see the letter, and hopefully it will go into the Library or somewhere.
Clause 74, which empowers schedule 3 to the Bill, goes right to the kernel of the problems with this Bill, which could not be clearer. I am worried that it is not apparent how the intervention of banks will be invoked. Schedule 3 allows the banks to be invoked and then for action to take place. Will the bank account of every single citizen in the UK be looked at? That is the view of some campaign groups in society. If so, that is a massive incursion into the liberty that the British people hold dear. If not, how will the banks be asked to identify particular individuals? What process will be gone through? That is not clear, and the Bill does not explain it. I have read clause 74 two or three times, as have many other people.
Finally, can we be assured—not necessarily now, but as the Bill progresses through its various stages—exactly how that right of appeal will work? I have just referred to the 28-day cut-off, but will the Secretary of State look again at that? It seems to me that it is slightly too tight.
David Chadwick (Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe) (LD)
It is an honour to follow such an excellent speech from the hon. Member for Normanton and Hemsworth (Jon Trickett). As a Welsh Liberal Democrat, I find myself concerned with the civil liberties aspects of this Bill, particularly the influence and power it gives to the big banks. I spent seven years working in data privacy as a data protection consultant, and reading this Bill created more questions than it answered. I worked on datasets involving different businesses, Governments and organisations from across the world. In particular, I want to speak to the points around the banks, because as we speak, customers from Lloyds and Halifax cannot access their bank accounts because of an outage. We should be concerned about making banks the judge, juries and executioners of social policy, particularly with something as important as welfare policy.
The UK has strong data protection laws that have been carefully negotiated over time and inherited from the European Union, and this Bill threatens to erode some of those protections and implicates treaties that we have already signed, such as the data adequacy agreement we have with the European Union. If the EU was to turn around and say that it was unhappy with the Government’s decision to monitor their subjects and citizens in this way, that would create many more problems for organisations across the UK. Citizens should have the right to object to automated decision making, and I struggle to see how asking banks to scan their datasets for potential fraud could not be regarded as decision making. Let us give citizens the right to be able to object to these decisions being made about them. If we do not, we might be violating the data privacy agreements that are already in place.
What do the Government expect the process to look like, when they are asking the banks to provide this information? The Secretary of State said that the information would be provided in a digital format, but what will that actually look like in practice? What could go wrong if, as has been mentioned, the banks are having to relay huge datasets to the Government and to the DWP in particular? That could create honeypots of data that might be easy for hackers to intercept and interfere with.
In data protection, if there is not data integrity, availability and confidentiality, essentially all of the agreements that exist with the data subject and the data processor can be said not to be valid. I therefore wonder what the Government see as the perfect framework for this data to be provided. Does it mean that the banks will have to export the names of everyone who has more than £16,000 in savings and send that to the Government to see whether they are in receipt of welfare payments?
One of the core principles of a free society is the right to privacy, yet in its current form, this Bill represents an intrusion by the state into the privacy of individual citizens. Under the Bill, the Government would be granted sweeping powers to access and monitor the personal financial records of citizens, even without any evidence of suspicious activity to justify such actions.
Many people are in receipt of welfare payments through no fault of their own, and this Bill could result in the mass surveillance of private financial information, potentially affecting 9.4 million citizens. The presumption of innocence is a cornerstone of our justice system, yet the Bill would fundamentally alter that principle. Under the Bill, individuals could be presumed guilty until proven innocent, with their personal data shared, investigated and scrutinised without sufficient cause or due process. That sets a dangerous precedent, where the burden of proof falls on citizens, not the state. We have all seen the devastating impact of errors made by the Department for Work and Pensions on individuals. Such a system could lead to disastrous consequences, where it falsely flags someone as fraudulent due to simple administrative errors or unintentional mistakes. The hon. Member for Normanton and Hemsworth acknowledged that the banks had raised concerns about whether they are the right organisations to do this.
The Bill risks creating a two-tier society where certain groups are subjected to intrusive financial monitoring by the state while others are not, which would undermine the principles of equality and fairness that our society is built on. In the current climate where banks are closing branches left, right and centre—Lloyds bank has announced that it will close its branch in Pontardawe—the Government should not be asking banks to act as judge, jury and executioner in social welfare policy while granting themselves access to people’s bank accounts but not requiring those banks to ensure that citizens have access to their bank accounts. That does not sit well with the liberal society that I want to live in, and I do not believe that my citizens want to live in such a society, either. I call on the Government to rethink their proposals and to assure us that the Bill will not undermine our data protection adequacy agreement with the European Union.
David Pinto-Duschinsky (Hendon) (Lab)
We have heard lots of statistics and detailed policy questions, but I want to start by sharing two stories. The first is of Antonia Foods in Wood Green, north London. From the outside, it looked like a normal neighbourhood corner shop selling fruit, veg and groceries, but from its back room Galina Nikolova and Gyunesh Ali ran a vast fraud operation, making use of transnational networks to file hundreds of illegal UC claims. By the time they were caught, they had defrauded the DWP of over £50 million. When the police finally raided their addresses, they found cases stuffed with cash. Nikolova and Ali received prison sentences, as did many of their associates, but the reality is that most of the money they claimed had long since disappeared, likely spirited out of the country. They had successfully stolen from us all.
The second story is of Yvonne, a disabled woman who was paid thousands of pounds more in benefits than she was entitled to over a number of years as a result of an innocent mistake and is now struggling to make ends meet as the DWP deducts overpayments from her current entitlement. Both those stories illustrate why we so desperately need the Bill.
The extent to which fraud against the public purse spread under the last Government is breathtaking. The proportions are simply staggering. As my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State said, public sector losses amounted to £55 billion last year—as much as the defence budget, and three times what we spend on police in England and Wales. That loss costs every man, woman and child £800 a year and is the equivalent of a third of the entire national VAT take.
This is not a victimless crime or some technical infringement. It robs every family in Britain, erodes our public services and takes money that could be used to help those most in need, depriving the most vulnerable of support. My constituents in Hendon and people across the country rightly expect it to be tackled. This is a crime that feeds on the most disadvantaged and weakens not only public services but the public’s faith in those services and their fairness. I say gently to those who have criticised the Bill that there is nothing progressive and nothing compassionate about allowing fraud to fester. It is a scourge that must be tackled. It is a scourge that grew out of control and was professionalised under the last Government.
Perhaps no area illustrates the challenge that we face, how it evolved and the last Government’s catastrophic failure to kerb fraud better than benefits. The DWP’s net bill for fraud and error, even after deducting underpayments, is £8.6 billion. That is £272 a second, £16,300 a minute and almost £1 million an hour. In the time that it will take for us to have the debate, the DWP will have lost more than £3 million. The bill for fraud and error is roughly the same as the Department’s entire programme budget. The DWP loses as much to fraud and error as it spends on every active programme it has to help the unemployed, the long term-sick, those with disabilities and the elderly. The picture is shocking, and it got much worse under the Conservative party.
The headline figures for fraud and error excluding underpayment tripled in cash terms between 2010 and 2024 from £3.3 billion to £9.7 billion. As bad as those figures are, they actually understate how badly things deteriorated under the Conservatives. Claimant error rose only slightly in cash terms, while official error remained flat. In contrast, fraud rose a stunning sevenfold in cash terms and more than fourfold as a proportion of the total benefits budget. That was not some act of God; it was the result of serial failures by the Conservatives, who failed to understand that fraud was evolving and failed to modernise the DWP’s powers to allow it to keep up in the arms race with the fraudsters. They also made truly terrible policy and design choices that actively fuelled the fraud crisis.
That can be seen nowhere better than in how the Conservatives set up universal credit. Because of their failures in properly establishing and policing its gateway, it became a magnet for fraud. Universal credit accounts for just 22% of benefit spending but contributes over 76% of all benefits fraud. Almost £1 in every £9 claimed through UC in the Conservatives’ last year in power was claimed fraudulently, compared with just £1 in £25 for housing benefit, £1 in £300 for PIP and just £1 in £1,000 for pensions.
The reality is that the Conservatives failed to take the threat of fraud seriously and failed to understand how it was being professionalised and industrialised, as my earlier story showed. They left us all to pick up the bill. They say that they acted, but the truth is they did nothing for years. Even when they finally got their act together at the end of their term in office, it was too little, too late. Once again, we are having to step in to clear up their mess. They owe everyone in the House and everyone in the country an apology. It is striking that in all their bluster during the debate, we have not heard the only word that they should be uttering: sorry.
Fraud exploded on the Conservatives’ watch because of their failings, but the pattern of fraud also tells us much about why the powers outlined in the Bill are so desperately needed. The DWP’s own statistics show that of the £7.4 billion lost to fraud last year, about £1 billion was lost to people who held too much capital to be eligible, £1.3 billion was lost to those who had failed to report their self-employment earnings, and a further £1.3 billion was lost to those who had failed to provide sufficient evidence. A further £250 million was lost to those who were abroad. Those frauds could have been caught with better data and better investigatory powers. It would have been possible for banks to spot people with too much capital to claim, or those with considerable earnings, yet today, because of the last Government’s failure to update their legislation, the DWP cannot compel information digitally.
Virtually all banking is now done online, and yet while fraud is propagated through digital channels and moving at lightning speed, the DWP is still forced to rely on analogue tools. In other fields, we already integrate information and get institutions to work together to prevent fraud. Banks regularly scan patterns that indicate fraud; benefits should be no different. We need digital tools and access to digital data to fight fraud. As with tax, investigators should have the powers they need to recover funds from those who are no longer on benefits. That is why the powers that the Secretary of State is proposing to take are so important as they will allow us to better identify those committing fraud and take more effective recovery action to get taxpayers’ money back.
That brings me back to my second story. Along with the measures that the Chancellor brought forward in the Budget, these measures will help us protect legitimate claimants by helping to pick up overpayments earlier. Last year, 480,000 people had deductions averaging £500 taken from their universal credit payments because of overpayments. Underpayments can be a source of huge anxiety and hardship. Preventing them and catching them earlier will help protect the most vulnerable claimants. That will be possible only because of the better data and the better processes that the Bill will help support.
As we heard from the hon. Member for Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe (David Chadwick), some have voiced concerns about whether the powers proposed in the Bill will impinge on people’s rights. I am strongly reassured by the powerful raft of safeguards that the Secretary of State has included in the Bill. Those safeguards mean that new debt recovery powers will be focused not on those on benefits, but rather on those who are neither on benefits or PAYE, and the DWP will not have access to people’s bank accounts, contrary to what some have implied during the debate. Those safeguards will include independent oversight and options for appeal. I am pleased to hear that, on top of that, the ICO believes that the safeguards address the concerns that it had with the Conservative party’s proposals.
This is a fair and balanced package, which modernises our approach and gives us the digital tools to fight a digital scourge, and the enforcement powers to take on organised crime while protecting the vulnerable. This Government and this ministerial team are modernising our system to protect public money, help the vulnerable and, critically, get Britain working. I am proud to support the Bill.
Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)
I want to comment on a number of speeches that have been made. As the Scottish National party tabled a reasoned amendment, which unfortunately did not get selected, it will not surprise anyone that we have a number of significant problems with the Bill.
Part 1 of the Bill relates to recovering the covid moneys and the services and goods that the Government received that were substandard, for which organisations need to pay the Government back. Since its scope does not extend to Scotland, I will not add many comments, except to note that I have a long track record of bringing up covid fraud, particularly PPE frauds, in this Chamber. I will support the Government’s work to recoup the money that was fraudulently taken in Government contracts that did not deliver.
I oppose the DWP elements of the Bill, which are not what social security should be about. As my friend, the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion (Siân Berry), said, the social security system should be built on dignity and respect. Very few Members have said that we should have a social security system that works. Members have talked about tightening up eligibility criteria. Last week, people talked about the number of scroungers that there are—people not in work who are claiming social security benefits—and how desperately we must get them back to work. People should have opportunities, but it is also important that we have a social security system that catches people and supports them when they are not able to access those opportunities, because they are struggling with their physical or mental health or have learning difficulties. We need a social security system that works.
I have asked the Minister on a couple of occasions about co-production, which an hon. Member also mentioned. Co-production is needed when it comes to changes to disability benefits. If the Government are to reduce the amount of money being paid out for disability and sickness benefits, they must work hand in hand with disabled people. They must not just say, “We are going to reduce it by this amount.” They need to sit round the table with disabled people to have those conversations and to make clear what changes they want.
In Scotland, we have reformed the previous PIP system to create the adult disability payment and child disability payment. I used to get a number of emails and people walking through my door who were terrified about their upcoming PIP assessment—having to fill in those forms again, and sit and write a long list of the normal things that their child cannot do, on an annual basis. We have changed that in Scotland. We do not have regular assessments. If someone has a longer-term condition, they do not have to go through that awful situation on an annual basis. The Government need to focus on dignity, respect and co-production. That should be way ahead of conversations around fraud.
It is important that the social security system, the procurement system and the tax system do not propagate fraud. As has been mentioned a number of times by Members from across the Chamber, the tax system creates a huge amount more fraud and a huge amount more could be recouped from that than from the social security system.
I have major concerns about how the Government are approaching the issue. Why are they introducing this Bill before the child poverty strategy? Why is this more of a priority than cancelling the two-child cap and taking kids out of poverty? Why are the Government talking about nearly £10 billion a year owed to the DWP? Just to be clear, that is not what they intend to recoup. According to the impact assessment, at least 30% will be written off, so £10 billion is a misleading figure. It might be the total amount of fraud and error, but it is not what the Government expect to get back. It does not take into account that they will spend £420 million over the next few years just to increase the number of staff or the costs of the eligibility criteria. It is also not a net figure—it is just the headline figure right now. All the work being done on the legislation is to recoup a fairly insignificant amount of money, but it will put people through absolute hell.
As has been said, the Bill will treat people as guilty rather than begin from the point of view that they are innocent. Potentially, it will put every person applying for benefits through an eligibility check through their bank. It will put them under surveillance in a way that is not compatible with the human rights that we should all expect. Let us remember that we are talking about people who, in some cases, are incredibly vulnerable, and may have their driving licence taken away.
The hon. Member for Normanton and Hemsworth (Jon Trickett) talked about two of his constituents who found themselves in a difficult situation and who did not have a huge amount of literacy. It is possible that one of those people could have had a driving licence. For disabled people, a car can be an lifeline—the most important thing. For people with mental health problems, opening letters can be really difficult. People might not engage with the DWP through no fault of their own, but because they are not getting the mental health support that they need.
That £10 billion or however much will be recouped will not fix mental health services to ensure that everyone is capable of getting up in the morning, having their breakfast, having a shower and opening the letters in scary, big writing that have come through the door. It will not ensure that people can engage in that system. It will not teach them to read and write—they may not be capable of that. I share the concerns of other Members that, for some individuals, the powers of recouping and of revoking a driving licence are entirely inappropriate. We have not had enough reassurances on that.
My concerns about the Information Commissioner are still extant. The Secretary of State said that she has had a letter from the Information Commissioner. I understand that it is probably not her fault, but I am really disappointed that we have not seen that letter in advance of today—[Interruption.] I am being told that it is being published.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Andrew Western)
It is on the ICO website.
Kirsty Blackman
Unfortunately, I have not seen it because I was not aware of its publication until the Secretary of State stood on her feet. It would have been helpful for Members to have been given that information beforehand, so that we could have read the Information Commissioner’s comments in advance of Second Reading, given a number of us have mentioned the significant concerns of the Information Commissioner in relation to the previous Bill.
The Secretary of State said that the Bill is tough and fair. Another Member talked about tax and benefit fraud, and the issue with the DWP making overpayments. They suggested that this new system will ensure that overpayments are caught earlier. I suggest that that is a tad over-optimistic. The DWP makes mistakes and makes overpayments, and now we are giving it another place to make errors. The DWP can now see into people’s bank accounts and say, “You don’t meet the eligibility criteria, so you won’t be getting the social security payment.” Until we have built up much a higher level of trust, most people will assume that these powers will create more errors in the system, rather than reduce them.
Lastly, on a subject that I mentioned earlier, a massive number of disabled people have no trust in the social security system. They are massively concerned about the cuts coming down the line and concerned in particular that they will bear the brunt of those cuts, given the comments from so many politicians, using the word “scroungers” and talking about people fraudulently claiming benefits.
Despite the fact that the hon. Member for Hendon (David Pinto-Duschinsky) very helpfully laid out the figures on every pound claimed fraudulently, which I genuinely thought was very helpful, disabled people feel that they are being lumped in with the entire group of people claiming fraudulently—whether they can or cannot work, whether they are being paid universal credit or PIP to assist them with their work, and whether they have a helpful employer or have not been able to find one.
People feel they are being demonised by politicians simply for claiming social security, which they are entitled to. Until that trust is rebuilt, making the decision to look at their bank accounts, as in these measures, is the absolute wrong decision. The Government need to do what they can to put dignity and respect at the heart of the social security system and rebuild people’s trust in it before they introduce these sweeping, disproportionate powers.
The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion mentioned the fact that there are so many unclaimed benefits. Surely ensuring that people have the money they are entitled to, ensuring that they have enough to live on, reducing child poverty and ensuring that not one child grows up in poverty should be more of a priority for the Government than introducing eligibility criteria and demanding that banks provide financial information on social security claimants.
Zarah Sultana (Coventry South) (Ind)
I will focus on the powers in the Bill that force banks to trawl through our private financial data, scanning for indicators of fraud and error—indicators that are not publicly disclosed —and flag those individuals to the Government. These powers will allow the Department for Work and Pensions to seize money directly from bank accounts without due process, suspend driving licences and even search properties and personal devices. They are not the hallmarks of a free and democratic society but the tools of an Orwellian surveillance state.
Let me be clear: we all agree that genuine fraudsters should be held to account, especially multimillionaire tax avoiders, organised criminal gangs and the dodgy companies that exploited covid funding. However, the Bill goes far beyond that. It will subject millions of innocent people—disabled individuals, carers, jobseekers, pensioners and parents—to unwarranted financial surveillance, treating them as suspects by default, simply because they receive state support. It is deeply unjust. The Government already have extensive powers to investigate suspected fraud; under existing legislation, they can access bank accounts where there is reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. However, the Bill removes the need for suspicion altogether. Put simply, this is mass surveillance.
There are significant risks. We have already seen the devastating consequences of automated decision making in the Post Office Horizon scandal, where faulty software led to hundreds of wrongful prosecutions. The Bill risks repeating that injustice on an unprecedented scale, and we should not have to wait for an ITV drama to expose it in the future. The DWP has already made mistakes in accusing benefit claimants of debt. Last July, The Big Issue reported that a disabled woman had her disability benefits stopped and was accused of owing the Government £28,000, which the DWP later admitted was its mistake, while a single mother was accused of a £12,000 debt when the DWP actually owed her money. Algorithm-driven financial surveillance will inevitably result in errors that will disproportionately affect the most vulnerable in our society: the elderly, the disabled and those already struggling to make ends meet. Even a 1% error rate in the AI system used by banks could lead to thousands of benefit recipients being wrongly flagged, unfairly investigated and forced into lengthy appeals.
Moreover, the Government’s own impact assessment suggests that these measures would recover just £146 million annually, which is less than 2% of the estimated annual loss to fraud and error. In contrast, £23 billion in benefits and support goes unclaimed each year, while £3 billion in claims is underpaid. Yet the Bill does absolutely nothing to address those injustices or to build a security system based on dignity and respect; instead, it targets those who can least afford to be wrongly flagged as fraudsters.
This legislation represents a rushed process with little scrutiny. At 116 pages long, the Bill was scheduled for Second Reading just seven working days after First Reading. It is an attempt to push through mass surveillance powers with minimal debate, bypassing the necessary checks and balances that should apply to any policy, especially one that affects millions of people’s fundamental rights. The powers are also legally questionable, with privacy experts warning they could breach article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
The Bill risks creating a two-tier justice system—one for the very wealthy, who will never face this kind of intrusion, and another for those on benefits, who will be subject to constant scrutiny, automated checks and the threat of their money being seized, perpetuating harmful stereotypes about so-called benefits cheats. It will therefore also distract attention away from the millions of households that are legitimately supported by a social security system that exists to support every single one of us when we need it.
Civil society groups including Amnesty International, Big Brother Watch, Disability Rights UK and Age UK have all condemned the powers, warning they will entrench discrimination against the poorest and the most vulnerable. We cannot allow that to happen. We cannot allow the Government to turn our banks into agents of the state, spying on their customers and reporting back to Whitehall; we cannot allow the presumption of innocence to be eroded by a culture of suspicion and surveillance; and we cannot stand idly by while the most vulnerable in our communities bear the brunt of this overreach. This is not the change people voted for. I therefore urge the Government to remove clause 74 and schedule 3 from the Bill.
Jim Allister (North Antrim) (TUV)
None of us, I hope, has any empathy with fraudsters. I trust that it is the united view of this House that fraud, wherever it occurs, should be pursued with rigour. However, that does not mean that a Bill that proclaims itself to have that purpose should be simply nodded through. The fine print of this Bill deserves as rigorous an examination as any other.
There are a number of areas in this Bill that I find concerning. I find the equivalence in investigative powers and the initiation of those powers between investigating fraud and investigating overpayment troubling. There is a huge difference between a person who enriches themselves through fraudulent activity and someone who is innocent, but is the recipient of an overpayment—not because of a mistake they have made, but because of a mistake the Department has made. That is a huge distinction morally, and in every other way. Yet it seems to me that the Bill makes an equivalence between the powers of investigation in that regard, which is something I find discomforting and unfair.
I also find some of the detail we find in the Bill surprising. As our law presently stands, a person can be regarded as and held to be a fraudster, in the eyes of the law, only if they have been convicted of fraud beyond all reasonable doubt. That is the hallowed and long-standing criminal standard that has to be reached before someone is convicted as a fraudster. But no longer is that the standard. Indeed, no longer is it for the courts to decide whether someone is a fraudster. Now, under clause 50, the Minister can decide whether someone is a fraudster, and not on the criminal standard but on the balance of probabilities. Clause 50 states:
“The Minister may impose a penalty on a person if satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the person has carried out, or conspired to carry out, fraud”.
The Minister—not our courts, but the Minister—will decide, on the balance of probabilities, whether someone is a fraudster. How could that be right? How could that be fair?
It gets worse, because when we read clause 50 with clause 52, we discover that the penalty is measured not by what the fraud was in every case, but by what the fraud might have been. So a person can be penalised on the balance of probabilities; not by a court, but by a Minister; and not for having obtained anything fraudulently, but for what they might have obtained had the fraud been perfected. I say to the House that is taking us far too far. That needs to be re-examined.
Then we come to clause 91. Under this astounding, disconnected provision, a person can be disqualified from driving if they have failed to pay back £1,000, whether they got it by fraud or, as I read it, they were overpaid it. They can lose their driving licence not because they have been convicted of fraud, but because clause 91(2) states that the schedule that will now be amended will make
“provision for a liable person to be disqualified”.
What is a “liable person”? We have to go to clause 11 to discover that a “liable person” is somebody on whom the Minister has served a recovery notice. If the Minister serves a recovery notice on you, that makes you a liable person under clause 91, and under clause 91, if you still have not paid back £1,000, you can lose your driving licence. Really? I do think that with this measure we have hugely run away with ourselves in terms of what is proportionate and appropriate.
There is much in this Bill in the way of overreach, which the Government need to re-examine. Yes, let us go after fraudsters. Yes, let us recover the money that they should never have had. But let us do it in a way that respects the traditions of our legal system and of the decency in our society, instead of the overreach of some aspects—not all—of the Bill.
The Bill does not apply to the area I come from, Northern Ireland, but inevitably, because parity controls the welfare payments that are made in Northern Ireland, there will eventually be some parallel, reflective legislation. That will be needed, but I want to say a word—I want the Minister to take it on board—about the Northern Ireland Executive. Welfare payments in Northern Ireland are demand-led. They are administered by the Department for Communities in the Northern Ireland Executive, but they are demand-led. Therefore, in that sense, they are not coming out of the Northern Ireland block grant.
It seems to me that there is a tendency within the Northern Ireland Executive to be less rigorous than they ought to be on fraud, because they are not recovering money that has been misused from the block grant; they are recovering money that has been misused from the Treasury. That, for some of them, shamefully, does seem to create a disincentive to pursuing fraud recovery with the vigour that they should. I say that on the basis of figures released in a number of Northern Ireland Assembly answers. They show that in the last five years there have been only between 200 to 300 fraud pursuit cases in Northern Ireland, touching on only £4.5 million. There is a lot more fraud in the benefits system in Northern Ireland than £4.5 million.
Yes, let us pursue fraud with vigour, but let the Secretary of State put some pressure on the Northern Ireland Executive to ensure that they are living up to their obligations to also save the Treasury the money that has been lost in fraud.
Sally Jameson (Doncaster Central) (Lab/Co-op)
The Bill sets out a clear agenda that this Government will be tough on fraud. It will ensure fairness for benefit claimants and offer confidence to the taxpayer. When it comes to taxpayers’ money, fraud and waste cannot and must not be tolerated. I am pleased that the Government are taking that approach, and I am proud to speak in favour of the Bill.
I was appalled, frankly, to learn that a total of £35 billion of taxpayers’ money has been lost to fraud and error since the pandemic. I think of my constituents in Doncaster Central, of how desperately our hospital needs refurbishing, of how many children live below the poverty line, and of how many of my constituents are stuck on NHS waiting lists. I am outraged at just how much money, which could have helped to solve those problems, was instead drained by fraudsters, sometimes on a large and organised scale, and by the careless errors of the previous Government. With these measures, this Government will protect claimants by preventing errors earlier, ensure that our benefits system works for those who claim benefits they so desperately need, and give taxpayers the right to see their hard-earned money spent well.
I welcome the fact that the Government are bringing the Department’s search and seizure powers in line with those of HMRC and the Child Maintenance Service, and I am pleased to see the Department’s commitment to ensuring strong safeguards on those powers, including the appointment of an independent body to conduct independent inspections of the Department’s investigations. We must ensure that the tough measures we introduce to recoup taxpayers’ money are met with equally tough scrutiny and safeguards. I hope that will remain a priority as the Bill passes through the stages of this House.
I have no doubt that some Opposition Members will claim that they introduced measures to crack down on benefit fraud. Indeed, they did—eventually. At the very tail end of the last Parliament, they tagged measures on to the end of another Bill, which never passed. It has fallen to us, as it has in many other areas, to take the necessary action. Whether it is benefit fraud or fraudulent covid contracts, these are not victimless crimes. It is public services and our constituents who lose out. We need to get on with this job. We cannot afford to lose more public money, which our constituents pay for with their taxes and should feel the benefit of.
Tough measures, tough sanctions and tough safeguards are the key to ensuring that our welfare system is fair for its genuine claimants and robust enough to ensure that taxpayer money goes where it is supposed to go: to the people and the services that need it most.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
Let me, at the outset, make it clear for the record that I think it is important that the Government pursue fraud. I asked the Secretary of State about that this afternoon during DWP questions. There is a story in the newspaper today, and it may even have been in yesterday’s Sunday paper, about a gentleman who defrauded the system of about £800,000 and skipped off to, I think, Romania. There was no treaty whereby we could pursue him, but obviously the Government wish to ensure that all those moneys are recoverable. The point I am making is that there are clearly those who set out to defraud the system, and it is important for the Government to respond positively. I think they are doing that, but I have some concerns.
When we speak to constituents on the doorstep, none of them have an issue with people who need help from the state—who are ill, or out of work for other genuine reasons—but there is a definite feeling that people should not claim and work on the side, and I agree that we need to clamp down on those who are “doing the double”. That terminology may not be used very often, but its meaning is clear. The statistics suggest that there may well be an issue, although the scale referred to in Government documentation varies greatly. The National Audit Office puts the amount across the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in 2023-24 in the range between £5 billion and £30 billion. It is clear that we need to do something effective. Those who work hard and are barely making ends meet are crying out for fairness. However, I fear that we may open up powers that cannot be removed and that would turn us into a nanny state.
In my earlier intervention on the Secretary of State, I expressed concern about those who make genuine and honest mistakes. The hon. and learned Member for North Antrim (Jim Allister) referred to that, in his polished and qualified way. People fill in forms and think they are doing it correctly, but perhaps they make a mistake and tick the wrong box. It happens all the time. I asked my right hon. Friend the Member for East Antrim (Sammy Wilson) whether he had dealt with many such cases over the years. I have dealt with about 30, perhaps 40, every one of them involving a genuine mistake when someone unfortunately ticked the wrong box and had to repay the money. I am concerned about those who are disabled, those who are anxious, those who are depressed, those who have emotional or mental issues. I do not want them to become the “low-hanging fruit” for Ministers and the Department to pursue, rather than pursuing those who are guilty of claiming benefits only just this side of £1 million, like the person I mentioned.
A girl in my office, a member of my staff, works full time on benefits, five days a week. Her diary is full from 9 am until 5 pm every day of the week. Disabled people come to my office, and they are the people whose cases are genuine. They are the people who have applied for benefits and are anxious and worried about the whole thing. I always say to them, and the girls in the office say it as well, “If you are going to get the benefit—and it is right that you do—put the facts on your application form, and the Department will make a decision.” Those are the people I fear for. They are the people I worry for. They are the people about whom I myself feel anxious on their behalf, worrying about what could happen to them.
When people apply for benefits genuinely, the DWP does sometimes make mistakes. Every one of the 30-odd people I mentioned earlier with whom I have been involved over the years was successful because there had been a genuine mistake. I have to say, “Guys, I respect this greatly, because I understand the principle of what you are trying to do, so you should never be in doubt about where I am coming from”—I apologise, Madam Deputy Speaker; I should have referred to “hon. Members” rather than “guys.”
The hon. and learned Member for North Antrim mentioned people having their driving licences removed if they have not repaid £1,000 when it is money that, perhaps, they should not be in receipt of. However, if their driving licences are taken away when they have simply made a mistake, and they are penalised and deemed to be guilty, they cannot go to their jobs because they have no cars, and cannot do the work that would enable to pay the money back, that is overkill.
I also want to say something about bank accounts. Everything I do in this House comes from Strangford, and it will not surprise anyone that the examples I will give are Strangford-based. I say that to help all the other Members here. I was contacted by a constituent whose brother has been diagnosed with paranoid psychosis and was living in a tent when she realised that he had been turned out of his apartment and his benefits had fallen by the wayside. She took control, got him on benefits and found him a private rented apartment. Because he does not trust banks, which is part of his health issue, all that is done through her accounts. Without her, he would be unable to pay rent or do anything, as he does not trust Government and she handles it all. Will her bank accounts be open to Government scrutiny? Will she hand over care to the social worker who ceased contact because her brother would not engage, and signed him off as too difficult to work with? That is all part of the paranoid psychosis—the health problems, the disabilities, the emotional and mental issues that such people face. I think of these people. I will always speak up for the wee man and the wee woman who are penalised through a system that tries hard to achieve the goals that it sets itself, but unfortunately—again—falls by the wayside.
Who will take care of the situation if this man’s sister objects to Government rifling through her accounts when she works hard and pays more than her share in tax? One hon. Gentleman—I cannot remember who it was—said that HMRC should be pursuing other moneys with the same zeal that they are showing in this case. What security will my constituent have to ensure that her privacy is not sacrificed because she is helping her brother? More importantly, how many others like her —friends and families of those suffering from mental ill health—will pull back because of that?
I ask the Minister for an assurance about such cases, and I think it important for each and every one of us who has a conscience—I am not saying that no one else has a conscience; perhaps I should say, those of us who have concerns on behalf of our constituents—to bear them in mind. A Government overreach for those who are caring for the mentally ill, and who already lead a life of stress owing to their caring duties, without recompense from the Government because they already work—could lead to more pressure from the state to fill the breach. I must respectfully say that I do not see how we have the capacity for this.
I never want to see a scenario in which genuinely disabled people are so concerned about the scope of Government regulation in respect of their moneys that they do not claim what they are entitled to. That would be terrible. The Government set a system—whether it is the personal independence payment, universal credit, disabled living allowance, pension credit or attendance allowance—and all those benefits are there for a purpose. When people come to me, I always say, “The Government have set this aside for you. It is yours if you qualify and the criteria are there.” I think of people who save for a holiday, or perhaps their partners work and take them on a holiday tailored to their needs; perhaps they will go to the hotel in Portrush, not far away, or perhaps they will take a plane to Jersey, with a wheelchair and an assistant to get them on and off the plane. I do not want such people penalised when their disability is such that they can only do that if there is someone with them. They may be afraid to go on that holiday because they fear being labelled a benefit cheat, while those who are doing the double, as it used to be known, should be unable to continue that life at the expense of the taxpayer. My question to the Minister is this: how do the Government intend to find the balance?
It is critical for us to get that balance right. I understand the urge to do this, and it is right to do it, but I do not want those who are justified in receiving a benefit to be penalised. I note that the Government believe they could reclaim some £54 million in 10 years. If that figure is right, this is worth pursuing, but how much will it cost to run over that period? How much will it cost the Government to chase all these moneys? How do we send a message to those who are concerned about their loss of freedom to a Government who can look into family bank accounts that this is a measure worth taking?
My final words to the Government are these: “Do. the job that you have set yourself, but make sure you do not chase the wee man and the wee woman”—the people whom I represent, the people whom the hon. Member for Blyth and Ashington (Ian Lavery) represents, the people whom we all represent on both sides of the House.” Those are the people I am speaking up for tonight, and I want to make sure that they are protected.
John McDonnell (Hayes and Harlington) (Ind)
I do not want to repeat what has been said by others, but I will share my perspective on the Bill. It is in two parts, and there is almost unanimity about the first part, which deals with how we tackle fraud carried out through contracts and so on. I thank the hon. and learned Member for North Antrim (Jim Allister) for pointing out some of the elements of real concern in that part of the Bill, which, to be frank, I missed. The Bill has been published for only a week, and it has been difficult to go through it. I have been somewhat distracted by the Government trying to concrete over a quarter of my constituency with a third runway at Heathrow, and elements of the Bill need further examination. To be frank, I think it will face legal challenge in some form.
I cannot welcome the first half of the Bill enough, which deals with tackling overall fraud. I was the first MP to raise with the then Chancellor the corruption that was taking place with covid bounce back loans. I raised it a number of times in the House, and I wrote to him twice. I received a standard letter that was almost identical to the response I got from the banks, which said they were going through their usual investigatory process, and then we eventually discovered that fraudulent claims for bounce back loans amounted to at least £5 billion. I welcome the first half of the Bill, because we need to be ruthless on the corruption and fraud that takes place.
However, the second part of the Bill, particularly clause 74 and schedule 3, is where we are straining, to be frank. Some hon. Members have mentioned the context already. There is real fear out there among people who claim welfare benefits, particularly disabled people. It is a result of their being targeted, and of careless language in this place and elsewhere. That is then exaggerated even further by the media, and benefit claimants become targets.
I echo what the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) said, because I have the same problem in my constituency. Sometimes it is about telling people to claim what they are entitled to, because they are terrified of the stigma around claiming benefits at the moment, particularly older people. The atmosphere that we now have is a climate of fear, and I am worried that this debate will add to that climate of fear.
The Secretary of State said that any proposal has to be proportionate, safe and fair, but there are real concerns about the proportionality of this Bill. As other Members have said, it is a mass surveillance exercise. The road to hell is paved with good intentions, and I fear that once we start down the path of surveillance in this way, others will come back with proposals for where we can go further. As Members have said time and again, there is an issue with safety. How many lessons do we have to learn about the way that computer systems and the use of algorithms have destroyed people’s lives? My hon. Friend the Member for Normanton and Hemsworth (Jon Trickett) said that the banks are gearing up, but they have expressed concern that the Bill is almost an exercise beyond their abilities. As a result, there will be errors, which will reinforce the climate of fear around benefits.
Jim Shannon
I apologise for omitting this issue from my speech. Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that the Government have decided to penalise those who have been charged with alleged fraud? Does he feel that there should be a system in place so that they can appeal?
John McDonnell
That is why the code of practice is going to be interesting. The code of practice needs to be published as rapidly as possible to see what mechanisms will be available for us to protect our constituents.
I have one area of experience with regard to the flagging up of sums of money that raise concerns: in the debates that we had on tax avoidance, we talked about suspicious activity reports. There is a record of real faults and a high number of errors in that process. As a result, people have been not just penalised, but penalised unfairly and exposed unfairly. It is not that I am in any way a defender of tax avoidance or anything like that, but if we are to introduce a system, we need to make sure that it is secure and effective, and does not penalise people unfairly.
The Bill is supposed to be proportionate, safe and fair. The reason why people will feel that it is unfair is that it specifically targets people who are often in desperate need. If there was a group of people whose accounts we would want to monitor because there has been a history of fraud, and who have had to pay money back—some have gone to prison—it would be MPs. I was here during the expenses scandal. Following that experience, are we really not monitoring our accounts for undue payments and so on? Why is it always the poor who we target in this way?
As I said, I am really worried about the climate of fear, particularly among people with disabilities, which the hon. Member for Torbay (Steve Darling) mentioned. We know about 600 suicides that are related to DWP activity. We circulated John Pring’s book “The Department”, which looks at the DWP’s role in those deaths, to all MPs, and it was starkly obvious that it had made a significant contribution, if not caused them. I remember a case in Scotland in which a poet in Leith committed suicide but did not leave a suicide note; he just left a letter from the DWP beside him.
My view is that whatever steps we take in exercising the powers in the Bill, we have to be extremely careful. One of the things I want to raise—if I can crowbar it into this legislation through an amendment, I will—is that a number of us, on the basis of the work of Mo Stewart, who does research on poverty and welfare benefits, have said that we must give people assurances that they will be protected and that we will do everything we can to cause no harm, and certainly not cause any further suicides, but we must also learn the lessons of what has happened in the past.
One of Mo Stewart’s proposals is for an independent advisory panel for DWP-related deaths. We have exactly that system in place for deaths in custody. We have an advisory system at the moment for the DWP but, to be frank, it is not working. The minutes of the panel’s meetings are cursory, and it does not do detailed reports in the same way as the deaths in custody panel. If we are to reassure people out there that we really are looking after their interests, that is one small step that we could include in this legislation. I am not sure that we will be able to crowbar it into the title of the Bill, but I will do my best and would welcome other Members’ creative drafting to help me. Such a measure would send out the right message. The Secretary of State has tried to do that tonight with her assurances about the processes, but I am not sure whether that will be enough, given the climate of fear that we now have.
What are the next steps? I hope that there will be sufficient time in Committee for us all to get our head around the detail of the Bill. I hope that there will be more consultation; it would be better to delay Report to enable that. I also wish to raise the same issue as the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion (Siân Berry): we were given assurances that the proposals would be implemented by co-production rather than announced from above.
It would be an example of good governance if there were a process of proper consultation. After the Ellen Clifford case, in which the High Court ruled against the previous Government on their consultation, the spirit of the Government’s response was that there would then be proper consultation, hopefully on the principle of “Nothing about us without us”. Consultation on the detail of the Bill throughout its passage would be the best example that this Government could give of that process working productively so that we get it right and we do not endanger any more people, as unfortunately has happened in the past.
John Milne (Horsham) (LD)
I am sure that I speak for all hon. Members when I say that putting a stop to fraud of any kind is welcome, especially at a time when public money is scarce. However, many of my Horsham constituents have contacted me to say that the powers outlined in the Bill are very far-reaching and, if abused, could have hugely detrimental effects on benefit claimants through no fault of their own.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay (Steve Darling) said, the carer’s allowance repayment scandal shows exactly what can go wrong when the state has high-level powers over debt recovery. Due to departmental error, not the claimants’ error, there were more than 250,000 cases of overpayment to carers in the last five years of the Conservative Government. That is an enormous number. What would have happened to those carers, who are paid very little for the huge service to society that they provide, if the powers in the Bill had been in place during those five years? They would probably have faced forced withdrawals from their bank account, the possible removal of their driving licence or even forced entry to their home by the DWP.
The Bill will give increased powers to access private bank accounts. This requires careful consideration from a civil liberties perspective. However, the DWP already has the power to compel third parties to share data where criminal activity is suspected. The new powers appear to reduce the need for prior evidence and simply grant access at will. Given that access to banking information is estimated to recover just 1.4% of the Government’s annual loss to fraud and error, do these powers of forced withdrawal represent a proportionate action? Before introducing new powers, it might make more sense for the Government to increase the efficacy of existing requirements on third parties to report suspicious activity, and for HMRC to share banking data on an annual basis.
The Government have asserted that the Bill will save the public purse £1.5 billion, but in the absence of an impact statement, how do we know? If the DWP is to have the power to take people’s money, suspend driving licences and enter homes, we should at least be very confident that it is worth it. In particular, we need to be sure that the savings predicted do not come from the blameless victims of departmental error, as happened with the carer’s allowance overpayment scandal. It is of huge importance that fraud be reduced, but until we are sure that we have learned the lessons of the past, we run the risk of damaging people’s lives for insufficient benefit. We are at risk of making the same mistakes again, but with fewer checks and balances.
The sentiment of the Bill is welcome, but there are risks attached. I am concerned that it builds a narrative that assumes that the claimant is the guilty party, when it could be the Department that is at fault. I therefore call on the Government to apply all possible care before launching new regulations that, at present, would amount to a matter of trial and error.
Paula Barker (Liverpool Wavertree) (Lab)
I recognise that fraud exists across the public sector and that it is wholly right for any Government to track down the fraudsters, the criminal gangs and those who cheat the system at the bottom as well as the top—we have heard about the VIP fast lane—but I hold deep reservations about the unintended consequences of the Bill in its present form.
We have heard some very constructive contributions this evening from Members across the House. I thank my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, who is always accessible and has been willing to listen to my concerns and those of my many constituents who have got in touch to express their views. Although she has allayed some of my fears, I did let her know that I would raise my concerns in the Chamber today.
First, the Bill needs to make a greater distinction between fraud and error. We cannot accept a situation in which our constituents are being accused of fraud on the back of genuine personal errors. I know at first hand from my experience as a constituency MP that the Department is more than capable of making glaring errors of its own, and people suffer greatly as a result. The welfare system is not an easy one to navigate; people should be supported when problems arise, rather than there being a natural presumption towards guilt. Many organisations that have been in touch with hon. Members share this fear, so it is essential that the Government address the point head on.
Other aspects of the Bill sit very uneasy with me. The Government already have the powers, under existing legislation, to investigate those who are suspected of fraud. That raises the question why the Bill is needed. It feels like a hammer to crack a nut.
After the second world war, the Attlee Government set about establishing a welfare state as a safety net for those who were genuinely in need. The Attlee Government took responsibility for looking after the wellbeing of all their citizens from the cradle to the grave. Worryingly, there now seems to be a determination to transform the British welfare state into a system of mass surveillance.
I will be grateful if the Minister responds to the following points. First, although I acknowledge that the Secretary of State spoke about this at the Dispatch Box, what provisions are being made in respect of proper oversight of these proposed new powers? How would any financial institution navigate data protection conflicts between the Government and its customers? How would data security risks be mitigated?
During an iteration of the Bill introduced by the last Government, the Equality and Human Rights Commission called for it to be scrapped. A legal opinion from Dan Squires KC and Aidan Wills found that the powers in the previous iteration were likely to breach UK article 8 privacy rights protected in the Human Rights Act. Can the Minister tell us what legal advice the Government have received on the proposals in the Bill?
I have serious concerns that assertions and decisions on individual cases, if automated, could lead to Horizon-style injustices if the necessary steps are not taken to put the right safeguards in place, alongside measures to guarantee some level of transparency and accountability when mistakes arise. We are looking at a hugely significant change to our welfare system, at a time when the Department is responsible for record underpayments. Surely that should be a Government priority, rather than further upheaval of a system that threatens to further stigmatise those who legitimately rely on the welfare state.
There are low levels of fraud in the benefits system. The latest Government figures put it at 2.8% of total benefit expenditure, which translates to overpayments due to fraud recorded at 3.7% in the financial year 2023-24. Although it is right and proper to look at ways to reduce that figure, politicians in this place have a responsibility to make it clear at every opportunity that any such move, especially one as far-reaching as this, is intended to target a small minority of criminals. The constituents I support often tell me that the services they interact with, and by extension the Department, tend to view them with suspicion and lack of empathy. The Bill must not be used to entrench such attitudes.
For the British public, whether they are in work or out of work, life is getting harder. Rampant inequality has broken our economic model, while the 1% continue to squeeze the rest. I very much hope that the Bill will not end up punishing the wrong people, making those inequalities even worse. I look forward to Government Front Benchers engaging with those who express legitimate concerns today and during the Bill’s parliamentary journey. I will not oppose its Second Reading, but I will work constructively with colleagues across the House to table amendments in Committee that alleviate my concerns and those of right hon. and hon. Members.
Jo White (Bassetlaw) (Lab)
In Bassetlaw, most people work hard all their lives, pay their dues and want to live comfortably. They keep themselves to themselves, whether in Worksop, Harworth, Retford or the villages, but what unites them in anger is the known benefit fraudster who lives down the street. I have lost count of the number of times I have heard the rage, the sense of injustice and grievance that benefit fraud is happening on their doorstep, and that nothing seems to be done about it.
With billions of pounds of public money lost last year, we welcome this Bill in Bassetlaw. At long last, it is the start of real action against the fraudsters and those milking the system, whether they are workshy or feeding the coffers of organised crime. This legislation will give the DWP new anti-fraud powers, for the first time since the Tony Blair years, bringing it into the digital age.
I welcome the new search and seizure powers, bringing the DWP into line with HMRC’s investigative powers—seizing luxury goods, bags of cash and mobile phones to use as evidence of fraud, and taking active control of investigations into the criminal gangs that are defrauding the taxpayer. If that means raids, let it crack on.
I welcome the new, stronger powers to pursue those who receive money that they are not entitled to. Where they refuse outright to repay, it is right that their driving licence should be removed. Banks and building societies flagging fraud, such as long-term trips abroad or wages going into an account while benefits are also being claimed, is also welcome.
Although the Government will at last be tough on fraud, the new powers will include strong safeguards to ensure that they are used appropriately, protecting the vulnerable and the sick. The message from today is that if you are living off the wages of fraud, we are coming to get you. If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear.
That is why I back the Bill’s additional measure to pursue those who ripped us off during covid, including the previous Government’s greedy friends who grabbed the PPE contracts and the fake company owners who took the business loans. We will not allow time limitations to act as a barrier. We want our money back and the thieves jailed, and we want anyone who lined the pockets of their mates to feel the long arm of the law.
I cannot abide the thought of my constituents’ hard-earned money funding the luxury lifestyles of the fraudsters. Labour is the party of working people, and this Bill puts our values into action. This Bill is all about fraud. It is the start, not the end, of stamping out corruption, insider dealing and the defrauding of those who strive and save by working hard. This is the start of resetting broken Britain.
Mr Luke Charters (York Outer) (Lab)
Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. Last, but I hope not least.
Before entering this place, I spent a lot of my career tackling fraud. One key trend in fraud is its increasing sophistication. Rather than the art of a local chancer, fraud is increasingly conducted by organised crime groups using elaborate mechanisms, deeply advanced technology and rapidly shifting modus operandi. That includes benefit fraud gangs. I am sorry to say this, but fraud in the benefit system has reached an industrial scale. Frankly, it is time the Government got a grip, which is why I welcome their swift action in introducing this Bill.
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State wrote an excellent op-ed today highlighting this exact point. This is the money of many hard-working Brits, and it has been stolen from right under their noses. The Tories presided over a system that allowed criminals to line their pockets at taxpayers’ expense.
Paula Barker
My hon. Friend is making a passionate speech, and he talks about benefit fraud on an industrial scale. Does he really believe that just over 2.5% is an industrial scale?
Mr Charters
As I will come to, it is about the advanced techniques that these fraud gangs are using. It is industrial-level criminal activity.
Last year, £7 billion was cheated out of taxpayers’ pockets, and we have been left to clean it up. If we had that cash, we could have funded extra police officers or vital repairs to some of our hospitals. Frankly, it would also have made it easier to fill the £22 billion black hole left by the Conservative party, wherever its Members are.
I now turn to a few concrete examples of why this Bill matters. First, on the economics, the Bill is expected to save £1.5 billion over the next few years. These are not insignificant sums of money. It is important to stress that the public purse is not an endless pot, and the contributions of millions of working people across the country, including many of my constituents in York Outer, help to fund it. They want to see taxpayers’ money being spent wisely. Stealing benefits is not just fraud; it is a slap in the face to the hard-working taxpayers who fund our public services. This Bill changes that.
The Bill is not just about keeping more taxpayers’ cash in the Treasury. As Brits, we embody the values of kindness, decency and fairness. Although we are rightly outraged about criminals circumventing our system, we all want a reliable welfare state for the people who truly need it. Every £1 stolen by benefit fraud gangs is £1 less for a low-income single parent looking for a job on universal credit, £1 less for a disabled person on the higher rate of PIP, and £1 less for someone on carer’s allowance. In many cases, these payments are a lifeline for people getting back to work. At the moment, this cash is going to criminals rather than carers.
I now turn to a few recent cases of organised benefit fraud to elucidate the scale of the challenge we face. All have been settled and are now in the public domain following prosecutions.
In May 2024, we saw the largest benefit fraud case in history. The operation saw five Bulgarian nationals forge thousands of documents to make thousands of fraudulent universal credit claims to the value of £50 million.
In October 2023, seven people were sentenced for falsely claiming employment support allowance. They used advanced techniques to hijack identities, resulting in the crime group stealing hundreds of thousands of pounds.
An investigation by City of London police in 2020 saw enforcement against a benefit fraud ring to the tune of hundreds of thousands of pounds. I take a brief moment to praise the excellent work of our law enforcement agencies, including City of London police, who I have met, for their collaboration. That is exactly how the last fraud ring was closed. This example shows the benefit of public-private partnerships, which this Bill seeks to catalyse, in tackling benefit fraud,
What do these cases have in common? The benefit fraud was actually a predicate to other illicit activities. They demonstrate the need to upgrade our response, and this Bill represents additional lines of defence in our rising to the challenges we need to fix. Some of the measures in this Bill will do exactly that: supporting covid-era fraud investigations; strengthening the PSFA by establishing it as a separate entity; giving the PSFA powers to compel evidence and enter premises with a warrant; extending the time limit to bring action against historical fraud to 12 years; and granting extra powers for recovering money.
I recently visited the national economic crime centre at the National Crime Agency, and I know the scale of the challenges we face when it comes to tackling fraudsters. I have no doubt that, with this Bill, the Government will smash the benefit fraud gangs, but we must also acknowledge that this Bill represents a significant shift for the financial industry. It is a step into a new dawn for those in the banks who work on tackling economic crime, as they will be spending more time tackling benefit fraud.
It is right that the Government are pursuing a growth-first strategy, which has to be carefully balanced with the economic crime plan. The Financial Conduct Authority’s new consumer duty was an important stride forward for the industry, and I was proud to play a small role in that, but, as scrutiny of the Bill continues, I warmly invite Ministers to engage with the FCA and report back to the House on how the new powers will carefully balance consumer vulnerability with the need to drive down benefit fraud.
Finally, there is an important scenario that must be considered more carefully as the Bill progresses in this place. A victim of domestic abuse—let us call her “Jane”—is quietly saving money to escape, but then an account information notice is issued. Based on three months of bank statements, a debt recovery notice follows. Jane has 28 days to appeal, but no access to legal advice. Worse still, her abuser intercepts the letter and her savings, which are her lifeline to escape, are seized. Her escape plan is exposed, putting her at risk. We must ensure that financial processes do not accidentally or invertedly work against victims of domestic abuse in those scenarios, as I am sure Ministers are aware.
To close, the Prime Minister said in a speech at a recent Labour party conference:
“If we want to maintain support for the welfare state, then we will legislate to stop benefit fraud”.
When it comes to tackling organised crime groups, not only is he right, but the Bill is proof he is delivering on his promise. The Bill is about smashing the benefit fraud gangs, treating taxpayers’ money fairly and ensuring we have a safety net left for the genuinely vulnerable people who need it. I refer time and again to a point I made in my maiden speech that rings as true today as it ever has done. I said:
“I want to ensure that there is no safe harbour for fraudsters, no compromise in our pursuit of their schemes and no escape from justice.”—[Official Report, 17 July 2024; Vol. 752, c. 124.]
Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)
It is a pleasure to wind up this important debate on behalf of the official Opposition. It has been a really interesting debate, with some strong views expressed by Members from all parties, and the disagreements did not necessarily come from where we might have been expected. In fact, it seems the official Opposition and the Government are more in agreement than anybody else.
The hon. Members for Oldham East and Saddleworth (Debbie Abrahams), for Torbay (Steve Darling), for Clwyd North (Gill German), for Doncaster Central (Sally Jameson) and for Strangford (Jim Shannon) all spoke. My hon. Friend the Member for Mid Leicestershire (Mr Bedford) made some very valid points. At the end of the debate, the hon. Member for York Outer (Mr Charters) made an interesting point about the connection between the Bill and violence against women and girls, which will be important to consider in Committee. Passionate views were raised by the hon. Members for Brighton Pavilion (Siân Berry) and for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman), and the hon. and learned Member for North Antrim (Jim Allister). It has been an interesting debate all round.
Before I start, I want to reflect on some of the comments made about covid. As has been made clear, the Bill is in two parts: one part is about the Cabinet Office and the increasing powers, and the other is about the benefit fraud challenges facing the DWP. The previous Government, particularly when my right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond and Northallerton (Rishi Sunak) was Chancellor, saved a huge number of businesses through the bounce back loans and jobs through the furlough scheme, and provided initiatives like the kickstart programme. Without those, even more people would have needed to claim from the DWP. The National Audit Office has said that there is no evidence of ministerial involvement in improper procurement or contract decisions, so it is important to make that point for the record.
As we have heard, the measures in the Bill are a continuation of much that the previous Conservative Government were implementing before the election was called, but it also contains some concerning extensions to the powers of the new Government. A pattern is emerging: the Government pick up our previous work, quietly remove some of the more sensible plans, and add some ill thought out plans of their own. My hon. Friend the Member for Faversham and Mid Kent (Helen Whately) highlighted our record in government of tackling fraud in the welfare system and fighting public sector fraud. Members on the Government Benches seem to have forgotten that record but, in good faith, I will assume that is error rather than fraud on their part. It has been a few hours since my hon. Friend shared that record, so allow me to recap.
Before the pandemic, we worked hard to secure near record low levels of fraud and error across the DWP welfare and tax credit systems. We knew the stress and anxiety experienced by those who had been overpaid, we were hunting down those who were deliberately misappropriating the system, and our actions were making a difference. However, given the amount of Government support provided during the pandemic, it is not surprising that individuals and groups sought to exploit the emergency situation we all faced.
In response to that, we published our “Fighting fraud in the welfare system” paper in May 2022. That crackdown led to a 10% reduction in fraud and error, and £1 billion saved through dedicated counter-fraud activities. In addition, an estimated further £1.35 billion was saved between 2023 and 2024. Our ambition did not end there. Last May, we published a further paper, “Fighting fraud in the welfare system: going further”, which set out plans to save an additional £9 billion by 2027-28 by cracking down on benefit cheats. During the debate, we heard about the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill, which was the precursor to part 2 of the Bill before us. Furthermore, our proposed fraud Bill would have aligned the Department for Work and Pensions with HMRC, enabling us to treat benefit fraud in the same way as tax fraud, giving investigators new powers to make seizures and arrests.
All that is before we look at our record of tackling public sector fraud, as additionally included in this new Bill. Our taxpayer protection taskforce secured about £1.2 billion, which was either blocked from being paid out or recovered through our compliance work. We set up the Public Sector Fraud Authority, whose powers are being extended in the Bill, to work across Government to reduce fraud against the public sector. Its first-year target was £180 million, which was smashed with savings of £311 million.
Our risk, threat and prevention service was the first in-house fraud squad of its kind in the world when set up in 2023. Working across Government, it set out to ensure the public purse was protected at key points, as new spending programmes or policies were announced. Why was that important? We know that between 2023 and 2024 alone, the Public Accounts Committee has found that nearly £1 in every £15 was either error or fraud. That is an eye-watering amount of taxpayer money, as the vast majority of Members would agree. The ambition of the Bill for a more powerful Public Sector Fraud Authority could lead to about £54 billion being recovered from public sector fraud in 10 years, which is a welcome figure.
However, the Government could be doing more. We have heard how the taxpayer simply cannot afford the Government to stop here—more action is essential. The new Government’s inaction to date in reforming health and sickness benefits is estimated to have cost the taxpayer approximately £1.8 billion since July 2024, which is around £266 million every month. Instead, the new Government have gone after pensioners, employers and farmers, actions they were ready and waiting to take without delay. Yet here we are, seven months into a new Parliament, with not a peep on how they will reform the benefit system, other than repeating that they will come up with a plan soon. Indeed, they had 14 years to come up with that plan. Every day Labour ducks the tough questions, the benefits bill continues to grow.
However, taking a step back, it is important to remember why we have a benefits or welfare system in the first place. I am sure that across the House we are agreed that it is morally right for the state to provide for the most vulnerable—those who, through no fault of their own, need financial support to provide for themselves or their family. In debating the Bill, it is easy to forget that, in the majority of cases, beneficiaries of additional support from the state claim it simply to get on with their lives, and they are not a cause for concern. However, as the title of the Bill suggests, there is a need to recover public money that has been claimed either in error or because of fraud—as a result of an innocent mistake or with deliberate intent. This is, after all, as we have heard multiple times, taxpayers’ money that has ended up in the wrong bank account. That needs rectifying, which is why, as we have already made clear, we support the Bill in principle.
My hon. Friend the Member for Faversham and Mid Kent set out a number of questions, which I hope the Minister will address shortly in his summing up. Unsurprisingly, we remain concerned about the final details of the legislation and the huge absence of a plan to tackle the rapidly rising benefits bill. However, we look forward to debating the details of the Bill further in Committee shortly, and working cross-party to ensure that further progress is made. First and foremost, we must see money from the public purse fairly and squarely in the hands of those it is intended for, and not in the hands of the fraudsters working to line their own pockets.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Andrew Western)
I hope that the House will bear with me; I have binned my original closing speech, given the number of contributions that we have heard, and some of the legitimate questions and concerns that colleagues have set out. I thank those colleagues who rightly highlighted the scale of the challenge, and why the Government must act to tackle fraud against the public sector. My hon. Friends the Members for Burnley (Oliver Ryan), for Clwyd North (Gill German), for Hendon (David Pinto-Duschinsky), for Doncaster Central (Sally Jameson), for Bassetlaw (Jo White) and for York Outer (Mr Charters) all set out the scale of the challenge, and the views of their constituents on this issue, in very robust terms.
I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for York Outer about the risk of unintended consequences, particularly on the issue of violence against women and girls. We are looking at that closely and will continue to do so. A number of Members referred to the alleged lack of an impact assessment, or the publication of one. An impact assessment has been published, alongside the view of the Regulatory Policy Committee, and is available for colleagues to view.
Let me turn to specific concerns about the Bill, starting with those of the shadow Secretary of State, the hon. Member for Faversham and Mid Kent (Helen Whately). I welcome the tone of the Conservatives, and their broad support for a number of the principles in the Bill. She is correct that it is incumbent on the state to get its money back. It is part of the unwritten contract that she referred to. I felt there was a slightly tenuous justification for the escalation in benefit fraud that we have seen in recent years: the war in Ukraine. I know that we are happy to blame Putin for many things, but that was a new one on me. She rightly pointed to an escalation in benefit fraud and error as a result of covid, but that does not explain why the level of fraud and error in the Department for Work and Pensions was higher in 2023-24 than in any of the years from 2021-22 onwards—£9.7 billion last year, a record level. The issue is getting worse, not better, and that happened on the Conservatives’ watch.
The shadow Secretary of State suggested that the contents of the Conservatives’ fraud plan would have solved all these problems, and that we are copying much of what was in it. It is fair to say that the Conservative party legislated only on the third-party data measure in that plan. The Conservatives never mentioned debt recovery powers, and made no efforts to get a grip on public sector fraud with the new powers that we are introducing by putting the PSFA on a statutory footing. Overall, their appalling record hardly comes as a surprise.
The shadow Secretary of State went on to say that she was concerned about the amount of information being shared by banks. Just to be clear, we will not be sharing any information with banks. The information that will come back to us will have very strict criteria, and we are taking a specific power to fine banks for oversharing information that is out of scope. She asked what testing has been done on this; two trials have been undertaken, so we know that the proposal will work, as it pertains to the eligibility verification measure.
The shadow Secretary of State went on, with some audacity, in my view, to challenge whether the debt recovery powers go far enough—powers that the Conservative party refused to take, and never put forward when they were in government. She mentioned the number of AI schemes that have been set aside. Test and learn is perfectly normal in the AI space. I remind her that some of the schemes that had not been taken forward are now moving through under different names. She mentioned the PSFA, and raised concerns about the right to compel information. The powers have independent oversight to ensure that their use is proportionate, so although no organisations are exempt, all actions are considered within a robust legal framework.
We then heard from the Conservatives, astonishingly, that there is nothing in the Bill to get a grip on the benefits bill. What cheek, when the benefits bill spiralled by some £20 billion on their watch! As for their so-called plan, I remind the shadow Secretary of State that they made a hash of it and that we lost a judicial review on their failed plan just a few weeks ago, so we will take our time to bring forward the proposals and will consult on them, and we will get this right.
I am grateful for the support of the Conservatives, but I hope that it will manifest itself in the voting Lobby later because, with the exception of the hon. Member for Mid Leicestershire (Mr Bedford), who I believe is the Parliamentary Private Secretary, we have not had a full speech from a single Conservative Member—just one intervention. If that does not show the lack of seriousness with which they take this issue, the appalling record and position we have inherited should do just that.
I want to spend a little time on the comments of the Chair of the Select Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth (Debbie Abrahams), who is a champion for vulnerable people. I particularly want to speak to the measures we are taking to assure ourselves of the appropriate support for vulnerable people, both within the scope of the Bill and more generally, because that is important and relates to a number of comments from Members. It is always the Department’s priority to set repayment plans that are affordable and sustainable; that we make use of the debt respite service, Breathing Space, which allows for a temporary protection from creditors; and that we provide additional support to help customers manage their money. We work with the Money and Pensions Service under its brand name “Moneyhelper”, which offers free, independent and impartial money and debt advice. Indebted customers are routinely offered a referral, with the majority who meet the criteria taking up that offer.
In addition, a DWP debt management vulnerability framework has recently been introduced to provide guidance for advisers on how to support customers at risk of becoming vulnerable, including signposting to specialist support. That is embedded across debt management, and part of that involves advisers undertaking annual refresher training on identifying and supporting customers experiencing vulnerability. Within the scope of the Bill, it is important to recognise that the power of debt recovery will not be used on benefit claimants. It extends only to those who receive their income through means other than benefits or through payrolled employment.
There are also important safeguards in the Bill that govern the process of debt recovery and the new enforcement powers. There will be repeated efforts at contact before any enforcement action is taken, and there will be affordability checks before any deductions are taken from bank accounts. There will be limits on the size of those deductions, a right to require deduction orders and a right to appeal deduction orders beyond that. Also, the DWP can vary or suspend the deduction order following a change in circumstances.
Kirsty Blackman
I appreciate that the Government have made changes around affordability, but they still do not assess either benefit clawbacks or the deductions on the basis of whether they are actually affordable for the people having to pay them back. Are the Government planning to put that in place at some point in future?
Andrew Western
The hon. Lady will forgive me if I have not understood her correctly, but there is specific provision in the Bill on the debt recovery powers to limit the amount that can be clawed back to 40% of anybody’s capital, but if I have misunderstood that, I am happy to have a conversation with her afterwards. I hope that I have set out some of the steps we are taking in the Bill and more broadly to ensure support for vulnerable people.
The Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Torbay (Steve Darling), was right to highlight the scale of covid fraud and the lack of safeguards in place to protect the public purse. He highlighted the carer’s allowance review, which will report this summer, not next, but we are already learning the lessons of that. Much like the proposals in the Bill, data is key, so we have secured funding to extend the verify earnings and pensions service system of alerts from HMRC to 100% of claims. We will ensure in this Bill that the eligibility verification measure information is processed quickly to reduce large overpayments, and to avoid a repeat of what happened on the last Government’s watch with carer’s allowance.
The hon. Member for Torbay raised the use of AI, as did my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth. There will always be a human decision maker on each of these powers, so where decisions are made, a human—not AI—will make that call. For EVM, a flag would be passed to a human to establish benefit eligibility. For debt recovery, it would be passed to a human to assess vulnerability and the ability to pay. For information gathering, it would be passed to a human for investigation where there is a suspicion of fraud. For search and seizure, a warrant would be granted by a judge. At all times, a human is making those decisions, as is right and proper, given the powers that we are talking about.
According to the hon. Member for Mid Leicestershire, there is no doubt that had the Conservatives had longer, their policies would have driven fraud down further and faster than our proposals will. Thankfully, we do not have the opportunity to test that theory. Given their appalling record—with fraud and error escalating every year since the pandemic and standing at £9.7 billion last year—I dread to think what they would have done when they turned their attention to these matters.
The hon. Member for Mid Leicestershire went on to ask whether the independent person would report on the use of powers. Yes, and those reports—on both the PSFA side and the DWP side—will be placed before Parliament annually. He asked about non-drivers and the point of suspending licences when not everybody drives. Well, short of taking the power to prevent somebody from walking, I fail to see how much further we could have gone in that regard. However, I recognise—as I hope he does—that that is only one of a suite of measures that we are considering to move us forward in the powers available to us.
Of course, it is important to recognise that the introduction of an independent person was not considered necessary by the Conservative Government in the third-party data measures that they proposed under their Data Protection and Digital Information Bill. We are introducing that measure not just for the PSFA powers or the eligibility verification measures, but for information-gathering powers and powers of search and seizure.
I understand that the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion (Siân Berry) is concerned, but I fundamentally disagree with the idea that it is conservative to want to tackle benefit fraud, and that we should ignore the £7.4 billion-worth of welfare fraud last year. I certainly do not think that it is conservative to go after public sector fraud; in fact, if it were slightly more conservative, we might not be in the terrible position we are in now.
My hon. Friend the Member for Normanton and Hemsworth (Jon Trickett) raised a number of important questions. Time prevents me from running through them all now, but I would be delighted to meet him to discuss them further. I was especially concerned by the case that he raised. One potential benefit of the eligibility verification measure is that it will allow us to detect overpayments earlier, but clearly we want to ensure that the DWP is handling such issues correctly first time. The ICO was mentioned by a number of Members, including my hon. Friend. Just to clear that up, it was not a letter received into the Department; the ICO published on its website today its findings and thoughts on the Bill at this stage. It recognises the steps that we have taken on proportionality, and I welcome those comments.
The hon. Member for Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe (David Chadwick) has concerns about banks and the potential erosion of data protection powers—that is not my view. The Bill will involve very limited data sharing. The Department for Work and Pensions is not monitoring accounts, and we will fine banks if they overshare in that space.
The hon. Member for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman) made an important contribution. To clarify, the Bill is not predicated on saving £10 billion in welfare fraud; it sets out to save £1.5 billion over five years, but it is part of overall measures to save £8.6 billion over that period, because we do not accept the level of fraud in the system at present.
The hon. Member for Coventry South (Zarah Sultana) suggested that the Bill subjects millions of people to unwarranted financial surveillance. To give Members absolute clarity, we will not receive transactional information from banks, we will not look in bank accounts directly, and we will not ask banks to take decisions on whether somebody has committed fraud.
The hon. and learned Member for North Antrim (Jim Allister) raised the question of clause 50 on the PSFA side of the Bill and asked what constitutes fraud. For clarity, it is standard for powers to be taken by the Secretary of State—or a Minister in this case—but in practice, qualified and experienced decision makers will consider cases as authorised officers.
The hon. and learned Gentleman went on to raise clause 91 and the removal of driving licences. I would gently say to him that this is an existing power held by the Child Maintenance Service. The question of liable persons and whether removal is proportionate would be a matter for a judge; it would only happen after repeated attempts to secure repayment, and before any disqualification occurs, an individual will always be given the opportunity to agree a repayment plan. This is a power of last resort, but I assure the hon. and learned Gentleman that if he has specific concerns about the pursuit of fraud in Northern Ireland, I am happy to follow them up.
As always, the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) spoke from the heart about the plight of his constituents and the challenges they face. I want to assure him that this is not a Bill that is intended to focus on the low-hanging fruit of vulnerable people; that is why it includes some of the protections I set out earlier, and it is why we are putting in place independent oversight for the debt recovery and eligibility verification measures. He asked about the right of appeal, and I can confirm that the rights of review and of appeal against a ruling in the debt recovery space are written into the Bill.
The important question of appointees is one that I want to address directly, given the point that the hon. Gentleman raised about his constituent’s sister. To be very clear, that is something we had significant concerns about after the previous introduction of the third-party data measure, and the system will remove appointees. There may be circumstances in which those bank accounts need to be checked if the appointee receives benefits themselves, but if they do not, they will be screened out.
Kirsty Blackman
The individuals who are going to do the independent assessment will be appointed by the Secretary of State. Would it not be better for Parliament to agree the appointment of those individuals, so that we can be assured that they are actually independent?
Andrew Western
Clearly, we will inform Parliament as to who that will be, but we will go through a proper recruitment process. If the hon. Lady is talking about the independent person to be appointed for the eligibility verification measures, we will go through a thorough recruitment process to ensure they have the expertise needed. They will report every year to Parliament, and it is right and appropriate that they do so.
I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) for his support for part 1 of the Bill, but I understand his concerns about the powers as they pertain to the Department for Work and Pensions. One of his principal concerns was about banks perhaps being unable to exercise those powers appropriately; what we are proposing is not intended as a decision-making action, but as a data push. Banks will not make decisions—a human within the DWP will carry out that investigation. He has raised concerns about potential errors in the system, and to be clear, we acknowledge that this is a new power. We intend to scale it up in a “test and learn” phase, doing so gradually so that we can get it right, but we simply cannot ignore the problem and not look to take these powers when we had a £7.4 billion problem with fraud in the DWP last year.
Turning to the hon. Member for Horsham (John Milne), I think I have already dealt with the issue of carer’s allowance overpayments and how we are starting to put that right. To clarify again, we are not accessing bank accounts; banks will be doing that for us, but they will not be taking decisions as to somebody’s benefit eligibility. The hon. Gentleman said that we should look at the efficacy of existing powers to request information. We are doing that through the updating of information-gathering powers and the right to compel information digitally. We will be moving to a list of excluded organisations, rather than a list of organisations from which we are able to compel information.
My hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Wavertree (Paula Barker) raised a series of concerns, which I know come from a good place. I am very happy to meet her to discuss some of these powers—it is important that we get this right—but on the particular question of the legal advice and article 8, although she is correct that Big Brother Watch did commission some legal opinion, we are confident that the powers in the Bill are compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. They are different powers, distinct from the third-party data powers put forward as part of the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill, and we do think that they are compatible with the ECHR, including the right to a private life under article 8. That is specifically because the third-party data elements are now narrower, and because we have included the safeguards that I have set out. We think the measures are justified in accordance with the law and are proportionate.
The final speech was from the Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for South West Devon (Rebecca Smith). Again, I felt it was constructive, if slightly fantastical at points, and I may disagree about the extent to which the Conservatives had more sensible plans that have since been abandoned by this Government. On the question of public sector fraud, I note that she pointed to action to be taken to try to claw back public money. Can I suggest to her that they seek to put that in a press release? If they are not enough of a laughing stock because of their previous behaviour, they would be after seeking to claim that they had a positive story to tell in that space.
I will finish by reiterating the comments of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State: whoever you are—big businesses, covid fraudsters, organised criminal gangs seeking to defraud the system or individuals knowingly cheating on their benefits—it is not acceptable. We have a major problem, and we are taking the powers needed to act.
Question put, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Programme)
Monday 3rd February 2025
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberPublic Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text
Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Money)
Monday 3rd February 2025
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberPublic Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text
Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (First sitting)
Tuesday 25th February 2025
(3 weeks, 2 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesPublic Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 25 February 2025 - (25 Feb 2025)
The Chair
We are now in public session and proceedings are being broadcast. Before I begin, I remind Members to switch their electronic devices off or to silent. Tea and coffee are forbidden. Date Time Witness Tuesday 25 February Until no later than 10.10 am Professor Mark Button, University of Portsmouth; Dr Rasha Kassem, Aston University; Professor Michael Levi, Cardiff University Tuesday 25 February Until no later than 10.30 am Cifas Tuesday 25 February Until no later than 11.00 am Kristin Jones; NHS Counter Fraud Authority Tuesday 25 February Until no later than 11.25 am Money and Pensions Service Tuesday 25 February Until no later than 2.30 pm National Audit Office; HM Revenue & Customs Tuesday 25 February Until no later than 2.50 pm John Smart Tuesday 25 February Until no later than 3.10 pm UK Finance Tuesday 25 February Until no later than 3.30 pm JUSTICE Tuesday 25 February Until no later than 3.50 pm Public Sector Fraud Authority Tuesday 25 February Until no later than 4.10 pm Big Brother Watch Tuesday 25 February Until no later than 4.40 pm Campaign for Disability Justice; Greater Manchester Coalition of Disabled People Tuesday 25 February Until no later than 5.00 pm Department for Work and Pensions; Cabinet Office
We have three motions to consider: the programme motion on the amendment paper; a motion to enable the reporting of written evidence for publication; and a motion to allow us to deliberate in private. In view of the tight timetable, hon. Members may wish to take those motions formally, without debate.
The Minister will move the programme motion standing in his name, which was discussed by the Programming Sub-Committee yesterday.
Ordered,
That—
1. the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 9.25 am on Tuesday 25 February) meet—
(a) at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 25 February;
(b) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 27 February;
(c) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 4 March;
(d) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 6 March;
(e) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 11 March;
(f) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 13 March;
(g) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 18 March;
(h) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 20 March;
2. the Committee shall hear oral evidence in accordance with the following Table:
3. proceedings on consideration of the Bill in Committee shall be taken in the following order: Clauses 1 to 7; Schedule 1; Clauses 8 to 69; Schedule 2; Clauses 70 to 74; Schedule 3; Clauses 75 to 77; Schedule 4; Clauses 78 to 90; Schedule 5; Clause 91; Schedule 6; Clauses 92 to 98; new Clauses; new Schedules; Clauses 99 to 104; remaining proceedings on the Bill;
4. the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Thursday 20 March.—(Andrew Western.)
Resolved,
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Andrew Western.)
Resolved,
That, at this and any subsequent meeting at which oral evidence is to be heard, the Committee shall sit in private until the witnesses are admitted.—(Andrew Western.)
The Chair
We are now in public session and proceedings are being broadcast. Before we hear from the witnesses, do any hon. Members wish to declare interests that are pertinent to the Bill?
Michael Payne (Gedling) (Lab)
I would like to declare an interest as a member of both Nottinghamshire county council and Gedling borough council, which are both responsible for administering benefits.
Michelle Welsh (Sherwood Forest) (Lab)
Mine is exactly the same: I am a member of Gedling borough council and Nottinghamshire county council, which have responsibility for administering benefits.
Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)
In the same vein, I am a member of Plymouth city council.
Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)
I am a trustee/director of Southwark Charities, which provides accommodation for some older people who may be affected by the provisions of the Bill—a cursory reference, really.
Examination of Witnesses
Professor Mark Button, Dr Rasha Kassem and Professor Michael Levi gave evidence.
The Chair
Q
Professor Button: Good morning, everybody. My name is Professor Mark Button. I am co-director of the Centre for Cybercrime and Economic Crime at the University of Portsmouth and I have been researching fraud-related issues for nearly 20 years.
Dr Kassem: Good morning, everyone. I am Dr Rasha Kassem, senior lecturer and leader of the fraud research group at Aston University. Like Mark, but probably for fewer years, I have been researching all aspects of fraud.
Professor Levi: I am Michael Levi. I am professor of criminology at Cardiff University and I have been researching fraud for 53 years, so I think I win on that score, although that may mean I am very out of date.
Mike Wood (Kingswinford and South Staffordshire) (Con)
Q
I will start by asking the panel a reasonably general question. What, in your experience, are the main limiting factors in investigating public sector fraud?
Professor Button: There is a number of factors. Obviously, the first challenge with dealing with social security fraud and a lot of the rest of public sector fraud is that you have no choice but to deal with those people. It is not like a bank or a private company, which have the opportunity to decide whether to do business with that particular person. In the case of someone making a claim for a benefit, the public sector body has to deal with that person.
You are obviously dealing with increasingly highly organised fraudsters that often operate across borders. That poses significant challenges, particularly for many public sector fraud agencies, particularly when the police themselves have very limited resources. Fewer than 2,000 officers are dedicated to economic crime. They simply do not have the time to help public sector bodies deal with these things. When you look at those particular challenges, having professional capacity within government to investigate fraud with the appropriate powers is a sound basis for dealing with these problems.
Dr Kassem: The capabilities and skills of public authority staff would be a main challenge for me. Do they have the same understanding about what fraud means, its impact, the methodologies and typologies of fraud and the limitations of each type? I ask that because when you talk about fraud, you are talking about fraud committed against the public sector by individuals as well as organisations. The procedures cannot be the same in each case, and the motivations and the resources will not be the same in each case, so they have to have this understanding.
Equally, there has to be an understanding about the differentiation between fraud and error; the element of intent to deceive is the main differentiating factor. Do we have criteria that tell staff in the public sector how to differentiate between fraud and error? Is that agreed upon criteria to ensure that errors are not happening? Are they trained and do they have the proper skills to enable them to investigate without accusing, for example, innocent people and impacting adversely vulnerable individuals? That would be the main challenge, in my view.
Professor Levi: I have one final, quick point, because I know that there are a lot of questions. At one extreme, there is the point that Mark made about organised crime groups and so on, but it is a question of identifying when something is an organised crime activity, which you can only do easily either by getting intelligence or by correlating claimants’ data to build up a pattern, as in covid-19 fraud schemes. At the other extreme, there is what is probably the majority—failure to notify a change in circumstance. This has always been the most common part of the area covered by the Department for Work and Pensions. As far as the Public Sector Fraud Authority goes, I think it is a question of identifying a lot of internal cases from people that you would not ordinarily suspect.
Mike Wood
Q
Professor Button: One of the key things is always resources. If you look at the size of the PSFA at the moment, in terms of the scale of fraud, and look at some of its estimates, you see that this is substantially more than the estimates of fraud in the DWP, so having a relatively small unit, as proposed, is, I think, a limitation. For me, the key thing is having the appropriate resources within that unit to have a real impact on fraud. That question, “Is there enough there at the moment?”, is a key one.
Dr Kassem: Although I believe that this is a very positive step and definitely will enhance accountability, several things need to be considered. To start with, the definition of fraud can be a bit limiting in the current Bill, because, first, it assumes that fraud is happening for financial reasons when that is not necessarily the case. There are non-financial motives. Let us consider insider fraud—fraud committed by insiders, people working for the public authorities—which is one of the most common threats not just in the public sector, but across other sectors. A disgruntled employee can be as dangerous as someone with a financial motive. So I would stick with the Fraud Act 2006 definition of fraud, because it mentions personal gain full stop. It can be financial and it can be non-financial. That has to be clarified.
There is also the difference between fraud and error. I know that intent is mentioned—rightly so—as the main differentiating factor between fraud and error. Again, however, we have to be very clear about the criteria that would enable public sector staff to differentiate between fraud and error, because you do not want them to make mistakes and accuse innocent individuals of committing fraud, just like what happened in the Post aOffice scandal. That would cause further reputational damage to the Public Sector Fraud Authority and the public sector in general, so they have to be very careful about the criteria, which have to be agreed upon.
This is the second area that I want to talk about: because there is a difference between fraud and error, the recovery and the procedures, in terms of perpetrators committing fraud versus those committing an error, need to be clarified in the Bill. I do not think that that is clear enough at the moment.
The third point is about understanding the very nature of fraud—the fact that fraud can be committed by individuals and organisations. The policies and procedures that will be followed when you deal with fraud committed by individuals should not be the same as those that are followed when you deal with organisations. For example, if you were to take preventive measures, the procedures would be different for organisations versus individuals. With organisations, you are talking about controls, compliance measures and so on. That has to be clarified in the Bill—how fraud committed by organisations will be dealt with versus fraud committed by individuals.
Lastly, I would like to raise the possibility of abuse of power. Again, although the PSFA has greater intentions of preventing fraud, you want it to appear to the public that there is less risk of abuse of position. The oversight board will be very important there as an independent body, and perhaps it could be a board independent from the PSFA staff who oversee the work. For this to work, there have to be proper governance structures, including independent board members who have proper fraud expertise and understand the limitations and the mission of the public authorities. It will be very important for public authorities to report on their operational performance to enable that independent board to oversee properly.
Professor Levi: I do not quite agree with all those comments. Some of those measures do not need to be in the Bill, but they obviously need to be part of the structure. The Bill will hopefully last for a long time, and I am sure that you are all familiar with changes.
I think the point about the resource is important, but you also need to allow time for bedding in. There is the issue of where they will recruit staff from, and how experienced they are in actually dealing with stuff. I remember the Assets Recovery Agency, which was a stand-alone body. It was closed down because it did not recover as much as it cost at that time, as there were so many appeals. This is not quite analogous with that agency, but one needs to remember that it takes years to develop skills in actually handling cases. I do not think that is so much a question of the limitations of the Bill but a warning about not expecting too rapid results. Obviously, the practitioners and policymakers may offer a different view from mine, but I think it takes quite a long time. When I reviewed the Serious Fraud Office for the royal commission in 1992, I saw that gaining expertise in actually dealing with stuff takes quite a while, and some would argue that it has not yet done that.
Mike Wood
Q
Professor Button: With any kind of initiative like this, you will always get a degree of displacement. The clever fraudsters will find new means to get around the rules. Obviously, a lot of these measures are directed at the more opportunistic individuals who are not as well organised and probably do not invest as much time in looking for means to get around some of those measures. For that client group of offenders, the Bill will be quite effective. However, for the more organised offenders, particularly the more organised crime elements, they will find ways to get around some of these measures.
Professor Levi: I am not clear about the provisions for international linkages in the Bill. Perhaps that is something that just needs to be sorted out afterwards, but people need to be able to chase money overseas. The question about who does that, and what they need to do before they are able to do that, is pretty important. This is not so much in covid-19 frauds, because that has already happened, but a lot of these things are time critical. The asset-freezing orders that were granted to the police in 2017 have proven very effective, so we need to think about what processes there are for dealing with stuff rapidly.
Dr Kassem: I have one final point. I raised the issue of differentiating between fraud committed by individuals and by organisations. I think that needs to be sorted in the Bill, not afterwards. For example, from a governance perspective, the Bill says that you can access banks accounts and freeze assets, but whose? Are you going to take the assets from the organisation, the directors running the organisation or the fraud perpetrators inside the organisation? This has to be sorted, because you will face another issue, at least in courts, about who is the controlling mind in the organisation. The organisation has a mind of its own legally, and therefore cannot be treated in the same way as when you deal directly with individuals. If that is sorted, there will hopefully be a higher probability of recovery and fewer loopholes in the Bill.
Professor Levi: There is also the question of legal aid for those suspected or accused who have to take some measures to appeal. I was not clear about that, although it may be my fault.
Neil Coyle
Q
Professor Levi: I am not sure that it needs to be in the Bill. Definitions of what we mean by “organised” are typically vague. An act committed by three or more people for the pursuit of profit is a very low bar for organised crime. A fraud by one person can be perfectly well organised, but they are not part of an organised crime group. In policing, we talk about organised crime activity and people normally think about organised crime groups. That is a definitional problem that may be too much for the Bill in its present form, and indeed for Governments. They certainly need to think about what conditions apply to which people, and I am sure they have. I am not sure whether that constraint needs to be in the Bill, but Dr Rasha may have a different view.
Dr Kassem: For me, when I talk about fraud committed by organisations, it does not have to be organised crime. It could be a legitimate organisation defrauding the public sector. Again, the Bill mentions things around recovery, such as accessing bank accounts and seizing assets—how would they apply in cases of organisation versus individual? That needs to be thought about carefully in the Bill. Again, when you think about the nature of fraud and who is committing it, you are talking about different powers and different motives for individuals versus organisations. There are different assets and different ways of recovery. They are not the same, and therefore that has to be clarified in the Bill.
Neil Coyle
Q
Dr Kassem: It depends on whether they have knowingly done that, because the differentiating factor between fraud and error is the intent.
Neil Coyle
Q
Dr Kassem: Yes, in terms of the intent, because errors could happen. The differentiating factor between fraud and error is the intent to deceive. The example you mentioned could be error or fraud, depending on the intent to deceive. There must be clear criteria in the Bill to at least guide staff in the public sector to differentiate between fraud and error.
Neil Coyle
Q
Dr Kassem: It could be, yes.
Professor Levi: I agree.
Neil Coyle
So does that distinction need to be in there—that there needs to be the flexibility to treat this on an individual basis?
Professor Button: I was just going to say that my son recently reached 18 and went to university, and my wife received a letter saying something like, “Unless you have these circumstances, you have to positively say that they are staying on in further education.”, so there would be a clear misrepresentation there, I think. There would not be any opportunity for an error in that particular example, based on my experience with my son.
Neil Coyle
But what if the 18-year-old went into work? The point is that the onus is on the individual to make clear the change in circumstances to the Department, but the Department also has the opportunity to question. In your case, you are showing that the Department has done that.
Professor Button: They sent a letter, and you had to fill in a form to say that your son was staying on in further education in order to continue receiving payments.
Professor Levi: Yes, to reduce the fudge. It is sometimes difficult to see how there can be a legitimate explanation in the case that you are rightly using, but there must be a possibility of arguing. I am not sure myself that that needs to be in the Bill—that is a matter of criminal law, which the Bill does not seek to change in this case—but, in most departmental behaviour, they will adjust. Mark’s son’s case is a perfect example; the Department has clarified so that, if the family had continued claiming under those circumstances, it would be clear that they had committed an offence.
Neil Coyle
Q
Professor Levi: I am enthusiastic about the extension of the 12-year limitations; I think that is very sensible, particularly in view of the length of time that has elapsed since covid-19. But I am not sure how you would insert something in the Bill that would enable it to be varied. Presumably Parliament would like to see those proposals before they are approved, but there is an issue about parliamentary time—or it could be done through supplemental issues.
But I think it is right. Very few people can envisage the future. Look at the impact of technologies in our time. People will find ways of getting around things that you have not thought of yet, so that is pretty normal.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Andrew Western)
Q
Dr Kassem: There are lots of definitions talking about fraud, including lies, cheating and misrepresentation for personal gain, but my point is that personal gain can be financial or non-financial. The Bill specifically mentions financial gain, but what would you do if you had a staff member working for a public authority who, for example, allowed unauthorised access or shared information out of revenge? There is no financial gain in that case. Would you treat that as fraud?
Andrew Western
Q
Dr Kassem: Yes, I have seen that in the literature, but not in practice yet. I think the way to go forward with that is by education and raising awareness about fraud and its impact, because those individuals committing fraud do not see the harm there. They see the Government as having lots of money in a rich country. They see themselves as entitled as well—more than others—and they take their fair share, or they might do it out of revenge, ideology or coercion, perhaps. There are lots of motivations for them to do that. Educating them about why this is wrong and what would be the consequences of committing fraud can help to reduce fraud over the long term and raise awareness about it. Equally important is training staff in public authorities about fraud, what it means and how to detect it. Prevention is better than a cure. Again, those have to go hand in hand. Yes, there has to be an investigation and a deterrent to discourage people from doing it, and this Bill is an excellent step in doing so.
However, if you produce the Bill, with untrained staff members who are not able to identify fraud criminals individually or organisationally, it will not really work. Preventing fraud requires a holistic approach. You cannot focus on prevention alone or on enhancing accountability alone, or on deterrence or investigation. Everything needs to work together, and education plays an important part internally in public sectors and externally across the public.
Professor Button: I have recently done some research where we replicated a study from 10 years ago. We sought a representative sample of the population and their attitudes to various deviant behaviours, including benefits fraud, and we found there was a significant decline in honesty. I think there are changes that are particularly pronounced among younger people. It has been driven by a whole range of factors, not least it is much easier to be dishonest now. If you go back 20 or 30 years, if you wanted to apply for a loan or a credit card you had to go to a bank. Now you just do it online on a computer. It is much easier to engage in dishonest behaviours in those types of ways.
The other thing is that social media and different types of forums provide opportunities for people to discuss how to engage in dishonest behaviour. I am doing some research at the moment about online refund fraud. We have been going into forums where a wide range of individuals discuss how to defraud retailers and get refunds for stuff that they have bought online. I strongly suspect that that kind of thing is probably also going on for benefits fraud. All of those factors are making it much easier, so I think there is a much more significant challenge for not just the public sector, but private sector organisations in dealing with fraud because of that.
Professor Levi: There is a lot of scope for unchallenged behaviour. Who gets challenged by people? If you do not have face-to-face relationships, the opportunities for moral education are much fewer. Personally, I think there needs to be a lot more in schools, but there is a lack of capacity in the schools curriculum for that kind of thing. Also, there should be more about how to avoid being a victim and discussions about money muling and so on. There is a broader spectrum of behaviours where people can get involved in fraud that we need to look at collectively.
The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Georgia Gould)
Q
Professor Button: If you look at this in the broader context of hybrid policing bodies, which is one of my areas of study—non-police bodies that engage in a whole range of enforcement functions—what is being proposed in terms of the accountability of this body compared with, say, the Health and Safety Executive, the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority and some of the many other different types of enforcement bodies is certainly on a par with, if not better, than some of those organisations, with the inspection, the complaints body that people have access to and the additional measures in place.
One of the crucial areas is obviously when you get to prosecutions. With the Post Office scandal, we have seen the challenges if you have too much control over prosecution as well. The Department for Work and Pensions does use the Crown Prosecution Service, but with the lesser sanctions, it might be an issue to have more accountability, where you have that situation, to avoid excessive use of those penalties in a very negative way. That is possibly the only area where I would see an issue. Otherwise, the accountability measures are very similar to the many other hybrid enforcement bodies that central Government have.
Georgia Gould
Q
Professor Button: Yes, I think that does. That is fine.
Professor Levi: His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services has been pretty tough on fraud policing by the police, so I am personally encouraged by the proposal for accountability and review by them. It is reasonably rigorous and scientific, and there is the National Audit Office as well. Following on from Professor Button’s comments, sampling behaviours at all levels is a good methodology for testing. The question that Dr Kassem was raising earlier about the internal stuff and the supervision of that is a more complex example.
Dr Kassem: My suggestion was more about having an independent oversight board—independent from the PSFA—to review the work and also perhaps to support an independent audit of the operation and see whether the Bill is actually working in terms of recovery and of transparency and fairness. Someone might say, “Okay, we need someone from the PSFA on the board to feed back about operational tasks and challenges and so on.” That is fair enough, but that could slightly reduce the independence that we are talking about. It can still produce a report to describe the work, the performance and the challenges that it met, and a completely independent board can then oversee the work and challenge and scrutinise it if needed.
Georgia Gould
Q
Dr Kassem: Yes.
Georgia Gould
It is really reassuring to hear that because oversight is incredibly important to us. I have one more question, but I am happy to give way to others.
Andrew Western
Q
Dr Kassem: Personally, I would recommend a board rather than an individual, because how sustainable could that be, and who is going to audit the individual? You want an unbiased point of view. That happens when you have independent experts discussing the matter and sharing their points of view. You do not want that to be dictated by an individual, who might also take longer to look at the process. The operation is going to be slower. We do not want that from a governance perspective—if you want to oversee things in an effective way, a board would be a much better idea.
Professor Button: The only thing I would add on the DWP is that it is likely to be much more resource-intensive. There are likely to be a lot more cases. Having an appropriate capacity is important for that.
Professor Levi: I agree with that. Historically, in relation to asset forfeiture, say, the problem has been one of excessive caution rather than too much activity. A lot of legal challenges remain. I was on the Cabinet Office Committee that set that up, and there can be too much governance of that, so there is a tension between having a lot of governance in place and saying, “Look, can we get on with it?”
Rebecca Smith
Q
Professor Button: It is important to tackle those areas. I am not sure whether it is something that needs to go in the Bill. I think it is more an issue of giving the body the capacity to go after those types of individuals and to work with other relevant policing agencies— I suspect that that would need to be the case—to deal with it, rather than saying such things in law. We have the Online Safety Act 2023, which covers a lot of areas. Is that useful enough? Are the Fraud Act 2006 and the historical offence of conspiracy to engage in fraud appropriate, or do we need to create a new, specific offence of, say, promoting social security fraud online? I would not like to comment on that; it is probably something that needs more thought. The key thing is more enforcement, and disrupting forums where that kind of discussion is taking place.
Professor Levi: There is also the issue of signalling to people where the boundaries lie. This is an issue not so much for the Bill, but for enforcement practice across the board. We need some condign activities that communicate to people via social media, as well as in the old media that we may read, what is acceptable, and what is and is not legal. The National Crime Agency has been pretty good about that in the cyber-crime area, in trying to educate people and to divert them away from crime. There are some good lessons across that. It is also a question of resource and how many such things people can deal with.
Georgia Gould
Q
Professor Levi: The Americans used to be better at this than may have been the case in the past few weeks. The General Accounting Office and some of the inspectorates general in the US have been pretty active, but the US still had a huge amount of covid-19 fraud. Australia is getting better. Clearly, the head of the Public Sector Fraud Authority is part of this group of people trying to improve things, but I would say we are starting at a pretty modest level, in terms of numbers of people. In terms of the DWP, it is a struggle for everyone. We have to look at it in relation to general welfare. I remember going to a meeting and talking to some French delegates who said to me that it was about—
The Chair
Order. That brings us to the end of the allotted time for this panel. I thank the witnesses very much for their evidence. We will move to the next panel.
Examination of Witness
Helena Wood gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear evidence from Helena Wood, director of public policy and strategic engagement at Cifas and a fellow of the Royal United Services Institute.
Mike Wood
Q
Helena Wood: I find it quite difficult to comment on that, given that we are yet to see the code of practice. A lot of burden has been placed on that code of practice as it stands to build in some of that proportionality. I know the Government have committed to consulting on that code of practice forthwith, but without seeing that, a lot hinges on how those powers will be used in practice. Without that being known to me at present, I would quite like to see something pulled up on to the face of the Bill to build in proportionality by design.
Both on the PSFA side and the DWP eligibility verification powers, the Bill is a very blunt instrument, as it stands, and I think the law would do well to pull up those proportionality measures on to the face of the Bill. We have to look at this Bill in its broader context: very much unintentionally, it stands at that ideological debate between the rights of the individual to privacy and the rights of society as a whole to benefit from the funds that are available to fund essential public services. We have to deal with both of those arguments with due caution and due respect. As it stands, the Bill tends to be quite blunt in the way things are proposed on its face, and I would like to see a lot more from that code of practice and how it will be built in.
Beyond that, I would like to see a lot more about the people who will be using these powers. Again, we trust the police to use their coercive and intrusive powers based on their skills, experience and training. At the moment, there is a reasonably low bar set in the legislation, which is merely to be a higher executive officer or senior executive officer—a very entry-grade civil service officer. Other coercive powers that we can see across areas I have studied over the course of a 20-year career, particularly the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, require some professional skills: where one is not a police officer, one must be a trained financial investigator. It is a trained and accredited role that is overseen by statute. Here, the competence of the individuals using that power, and the trust we can thus place in them to use those powers proportionately, is quite limited.
Mike Wood
Q
Helena Wood: It depends which part of the Bill we are talking about. This is a game of two halves: some of the PSFA powers, for example, mirror powers that are used almost as standard across the landscape of counter-financial crime, and I think we can be more comfortable about the use of those powers. The power I have more concerns about is something that is very new and incredibly intrusive, and without limitation to it being a civil or criminal investigation: the DWP eligibility verification powers. There, we need to proceed with more caution about how they are used, given that this is very much at risk of being a blanket, phishing-style power without any recourse to the limitations and the bars that others have to reach to use other powers that would be either a civil or criminal investigation. I think that part of the Bill requires a little more thought and proportionality pulling up front, unless the Government can bring forward that code of practice to allow those of you around the room judging this Bill to see what will be in the code to limit the use of those powers to the highest risk of high-end investigations, rather than making it a blanket power.
Mike Wood
Q
Helena Wood: Absolutely. The concerns I have around those powers are about collateral intrusion. We can all agree that the quality of data both on the DWP side and on the part of financial institutions is not always as good as it could be. I completely agree with the need to minimise the level of information that those institutions give back to the DWP, to caution against unnecessary intrusions upon privacy, but I would like to see a minimum standard of data match that would be required to take action on that data. If the banks are only giving a minimum amount of information back into the DWP, how do we know that that is an absolute specific match on the individuals they have on their system? Without seeing information about how that will be acted upon in the code of practice, I am slightly cautious. We need to see that detail earlier rather than later, for you to be able to make that judgment about the risk of unintended consequences of this legislation.
Let us again look at this in its broader context. This is a very intrusive power, but it sits in a suite of other measures and powers available to investigators across the system. What we do not want to do with this power is to bring those other powers into disrepute. We have to apply it with due caution, making sure that a match is a match. I would like to see which specific data points will be available to the DWP investigator to ensure this is a match and to minimise the risk of collateral intrusion.
Andrew Western
Q
Helena Wood: That is a very good question. It goes back to the balance between individual rights to privacy and society’s rights as a whole. Only you can make the decision about where that balance falls. Going back to the previous question, I would like to see built into the oversight of the use of the power a specific requirement for the independent reviewer to look at instances of collateral intrusion and where mistakes have been made, and to report on those to Parliament. If we can build that into the code of practice—forgive me for keeping on going back to that code, but I think a lot of the use of this power hinges on how it will be used in practice and by whom. We need to build some significant guardrails against that.
The second point I would make is that to my knowledge, this is an unprecedented power internationally, so how can we be sure it is going to be effective in practice? We know, for example, that individuals rarely have one bank account in one institution any more. In fact, numerous pieces of research—forgive me; I do not have the figures in my head, but I can refer those back to the Committee—show that individuals now have masses of bank accounts across five, six, seven and up to 10 or 20 institutions. By targeting one institution, are you really going to get a full picture anyway? If this is to be proportionate, we have to be clear that intrusion is proportionate and is going to be effective in practice. I am yet to see the evidence that it is, if it is used in a scattergun way. That is why it would be great to build into the code of practice something much more targeted around risk. For example, high-risk postcodes coming through in intelligence around organised crime attacks on the benefits system might be one way to look at this.
Andrew Western
Q
My concern is about broadening the scope. We have taken significant steps, when set against previous proposals in this area, to narrow the scope of the Bill. For instance, we are initially looking only at the three benefits where we see the highest levels of fraud and error. Universal credit is obviously principal among those.
Does the work that we have done to narrow the scope reassure you at all when you look at the Bill—for example, the removal of the state pension and the restriction to only one financial institution? Clearly, without that, we would have to look at every single bank account in the country in detail and investigate why every single person in the country has £16,000, if we are unable to see across the full range of bank accounts that they have.
Helena Wood: Absolutely, and I will answer that question in two parts. If we compare this Bill with the predecessor Bill that was put forward by the previous Government, the concerns have been listened to. There is much more significant oversight and much more limited scope. If we look at that in comparison with the predecessor Bill, that is absolutely true.
On the second part of your question, you make a very good point that this is not always organised crime. I would build on the point made by my predecessors in giving evidence that this is absolutely what we would refer to as a first-party fraud-driven approach. At Cifas, we run a fraud behaviours survey every year, questioning individuals about their general attitudes to fraud—individual-level fraud—and we see those numbers ticking up year on year about what individuals deem acceptable. Your point is well made and fully made about the rising levels of first-party fraud. We do have to look at it as both a first-party fraud and an organised fraud response.
Andrew Western
Q
Helena Wood: A really good point was made, and others who follow me in this Committee’s evidence sessions will make it as well: fraudsters rarely simply defraud the public sector or the private sector. It is often the case that those with a propensity towards fraud will look at any channel through which they can gain financial benefits.
This is very much a narrow-facing Bill, but we have to look at it in its broader context. I would question whether DWP could be doing more to share information with the private sector, using existing powers to do so. There are plenty of voluntary information and data-sharing schemes available to which DWP is not plugged in. It would complement this particular power to be able to layer the data picture and the intelligence picture, and not just look at this single piece of information in isolation. There will be a number of data points across the private sector that you could gain through voluntary data-sharing schemes that DWP is currently not engaging with.
Rebecca Smith
Q
Helena Wood: Absolutely; the point was well made in previous evidence that the police simply do not have the resources to look at fraud against consumers, never mind to support DWP, so I think it is entirely necessary to extend those powers of search and seizure to DWP as well. Again, I keep coming back to the broader context: there are other powers. We should not assume that this Bill is the sole answer. It has taken a very civil lens, quite necessarily, on what is a huge-volume crime, which cannot be dealt with simply through a criminal justice response alone. We have to save that criminal justice response for use in a surgical way, for the really high-end cases, particularly in an organised crime sense. We should not be seeing it as an either/or.
What I would not like to see from this is the replacement of the necessary deterrent of a criminal investigation and prosecution with pure use of civil measures. We need to use that full suite of powers beyond this Bill, including those in existing legislation, such as the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, and standard issue fraud criminal prosecutions. Something that I would like to see from the independent oversight is that we do not lose that criminal thread. We have to keep prosecuting where necessary, and providing that necessary deterrent through all the available means, not just the ones available in this Bill.
Georgia Gould
Q
Helena Wood: This is a really necessary approach. However, I would caution that we are holding off from establishing the PSFA as a statutory body for now, and I completely understand the reasons for that: we are in a very tight fiscal environment, the cost of setting up a new agency is substantial, and we need to test the competence of the PSFA in doing so. However, I think in due course we need a more fixed timeline to move the PSFA off into a statutory body, to at least remove any perception—if not actual political interference—in investigations. That is really important—we need a stronger timetable. I know that will happen when the time is right, but I would like to see a stronger timetable towards it. I think there will be at least a perceived risk of Executive overreach if the PSFA does not move in that direction more quickly.
Georgia Gould
Q
Helena Wood: There is a question of “Who guards the guards?” in some respect. This Bill has significantly built in oversight; I think at every step we see that. However, it depends who the independent chair is, and a question would be whether that individual could be subject to a parliamentary approval process, as other oversight positions are—particularly if we look at the National Audit Office model, for example. It might be good to build in a parliamentary approval process for the individual who will take that role.
Georgia Gould
Q
Helena Wood: That is a really good question, which deserves more considered thought. These are people who have not gone through the police training process, for example.
I wonder if it is worth considering whether we make use of the powers contingent on being a financial investigator, as accredited under the Proceeds of Crime Act. However, I make that suggestion with some caution, knowing that in a practical sense there is a national shortage of financial investigators across the country. We are haemorrhaging these individuals; we train them up in the public sector and they go straight out to be poached by the financial sector, and probably to respond to some of these measures set out in the Bill. I say this with some caution, however, as that is a properly accredited and overseen process of skills. We need to look carefully about who exercises those powers and whether they need to do an analogous police training programme. I think there is some consideration of the professionalising investigations programme, although they cannot be officially credited over time—they will not be using the powers as frequently as that process would require.
Those are the parts of the Bill I would like to see strengthened in some way. It is perhaps incumbent on the Government to look at what the other routes are beyond a financial investigator to ensure the right level of competence in using what are very intrusive powers.
Andrew Western
Briefly, on the question of efficacy and scale, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs has powers at the moment to request information from banks en masse. Given the experience we have within Government of doing that, and from what I can see, the lack of problem with it, I wonder whether you feel—
The Chair
Order. Alas, that brings us to the end of the allotted time for the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank Helena Wood for her evidence. We will move on to the next panel.
Examination of Witnesses
Kristin Jones and Alex Rothwell gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear evidence from Kristin Jones, formerly of the Serious Fraud Office and the Crown Prosecution Service, and from Alex Rothwell, chief executive of the NHS Counter Fraud Authority. For this panel, we have until 11 o’clock.
Mike Wood
Q
Kristin Jones: I am sure I have the same answer as Helena. Until we see the codes of practice and the operational guidance, it is difficult to tell. Obviously, I have operated in very regulated situations where there has been accountability, but without that extra information, I cannot really say at the moment. But I think it is important that when you interfere with the rights of the individual, decisions are taken at a sufficiently high level by people with sufficient experience.
Mike Wood
Is that your view as well, Alex?
Alex Rothwell: I would echo Kristin’s thoughts. I suppose there is not necessarily anything novel in the Bill. Those powers exist elsewhere, so we have seen them in operation. The ability to test and learn, which is baked into the proposals, is very helpful. Importantly, it addresses a need.
Mike Wood
Q
Kristin Jones: Not on the face of the legislation necessarily, but I would perhaps expect certain commitments in debate that the code of practice will cover certain areas.
Mike Wood
Q
Kristin Jones: I do have some reservations about dealing with corporate organisations, as was expressed earlier, because a corporate cannot speak itself; it can speak only through its officers. The Bill only talks about notices; it does not talk about answering questions. It is quite difficult if you are not able to ask an officer of a corporate questions and you have just written answers through notices. I wonder whether there are sufficient powers for dealing with the more serious, top end of public sector fraud.
Mike Wood
Q
Alex Rothwell: Perhaps a good example is that although we believe we are losing something in the region of £1.3 billion a year to fraud, the amount of fraud that is actually identified is relatively low, because a lot of the value we get is from future prevention. For example, in 2023-24, the figure was something like £5.2 million, but we only recovered 12% of that figure. There is a lot more value to be had. The Bill will be incredibly helpful for us to recover more money from people who have been suspected of fraud. When it comes to pursuing criminal justice outcomes in relatively low value cases—perhaps individuals who have taken £5,000 or £10,000, who have been exited through human resources processes or who have simply left the organisation—the Bill gives us an incredible opportunity to recover more funds, and I think we would use it extensively.
Mike Wood
Q
Kristin Jones: My career has been dealing with fraud in the public and private sector, and I think it is important that when fraud is investigated and you discover something that is not in your scope, you are able to communicate it so that fraudsters are tackled, whether that is in the private or public sector. That is my only concern.
Alex Rothwell: The Bill seems pretty comprehensive in terms of our requirements. There are things that I have concerns around, including training—not just of individuals who are exercising the powers, but of those who manage them and set the culture and tone of an organisation and how it is built in. I echo Kristin’s comments about private sector providers. For example, we are increasingly seeing private sector providers providing NHS services, so how would that be exercised? From my point of view it is more about the exercise of the powers than the extent of the powers.
Kristin Jones: The other thing I think is missing compared to when other organisations have been established is that we only talk about investigators. I am a great believer in a multidisciplinary team, with early legal advice, accountancy advice as necessary and financial investigators, but we have an organisation at the moment in which we only define the role of the investigators.
Andrew Western
Q
Alex Rothwell: I certainly echo your thoughts in terms of attitude. We have seen that expressed in a number of different ways through surveys and transparency—the international transparency index, for example. In terms of statistics, we have seen our fraud prevalence rate remain fairly steady over the last five to seven years, but it is a complex picture because I think that we have been increasing our fraud protection measures as well. What we have seen across the board are bitter pay disputes and a sense that contracts do not pay enough. We have extensive provider assurance programmes that are recovering funds through what we classify as error. I do not see any change in that climate necessarily. Opportunities to strengthen prevention, for us, are the most important factor to influence people’s decision making before they commit fraud. So it is a huge concern to me, but not necessarily in terms of statistics.
Kristin Jones: During my career, I have seen sentences for fraud increase dramatically and that sends a clear message but, over my career, instead of only a few people being exposed to fraud, when you answer your telephone, there is a good chance you have a scammer at the other end; it could happen once a week, if not several times a day. If you are being targeted, it could be every mealtime, with the scammer hoping that while you are distracted you will fall for some con. The worry is that the public are exposed so much to fraud that its seriousness gets watered down in their mind. You have these forums where you can recommend how to claim various things from the Government and how to hit sweet spots to get that benefit or grant. So it has changed and perhaps people are not as shocked by fraud as they used to be.
Andrew Western
Q
Alex Rothwell: Data sharing is critical to our ability to prevent fraud. We have a particular challenge in the NHS in that medical records are in a particular category, so we are exempt from the Digital Economy Act 2017. Perhaps I would focus in the first instance on the rich data sets that the Government actually hold and our ability to communicate inter-Department. Those data sets are critical, yet it is still challenging to obtain data. In many ways, the data protection legislation already provides the ability to share information, particularly where fraud is concerned, although the application of it is often quite risk averse. I wish it had been called the Data Sharing Act and not the Data Protection Act, quite frankly.
Kristin Jones: I come from a slightly different angle on this. Having prosecuted for many years and had to deal with the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 and the responsibility to gather material and go through it, I think it is important, if you have data, to decide what you are going to do with it. In preparing for this Committee, I looked at the National Audit Office report on carer’s allowance. There you have a lot of data being gathered, passed and, if it is not addressed, discarded. For me it is important, if you gather data, to do something with it. There has been a lot of discussion about error. It is important for the public that, when they apply for something that they may not be entitled to, if that information is held, they can rely on that. If you apply for a passport and you fill the form in wrongly, you do not get your passport. It should be the same in other parts of government. You should be able to rely on the information the state already holds on you. This relates to the point about child benefit.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
Q
Alex Rothwell: In terms of search warrants and physical access?
Siân Berry
Yes. The other powers that you mentioned already exist and are being transferred to a new place where things are conducted. Eligibility verification in the form that it is written is quite novel.
Alex Rothwell: Does His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs not have the ability to conduct those inquiries?
Siân Berry
As inquiries, but the difference is that we are talking about routine use.
Alex Rothwell: More extensive use.
Siân Berry
Yes. Would you care to comment on the eligibility-verification powers more specifically?
Alex Rothwell: I can see why there is concern. People have complex lives—perhaps it is not as straightforward as how much capital is in a bank account at a particular time. I think the powers need to be exercised very carefully. I am reassured by the opportunity to test and learn from the process through oversight, but I do recognise the concerns.
Kristin Jones: I used to be in charge of international assistance when I was at the Serious Fraud Office. One of the difficulties is that whereas other countries have a central bank register or building where you can tackle that and find out all the accounts and individual holes, here we do not. It is more tricky to try to verify financial information because there is no central register.
Alex Rothwell: We were speaking before about whether it is flexible enough to cover future events. The way that we use cash or funds is changing in terms of digital currencies and so on, and the way that people hold value is changing.
Siân Berry
Q
Alex Rothwell: Yes.
Michael Payne
Q
“It is very unlikely that most of the losses due to fraud and corruption”
during the pandemic
“will ever be recovered.”
How far do you agree with that statement? Do you think the new powers for the Public Sector Fraud Authority change the prospects?
Alex Rothwell: I absolutely do think they change those prospects. I was still in law enforcement when covid-19 was happening, and there was an extensive discussion about the police’s ability to support investigations. Frankly, policing had significant challenges with fraud, and still does, in terms of the volume of attacks against individuals and businesses, which made supporting the public sector almost an impossible ask, so I certainly welcome the ability to strengthen the public sector fraud response.
On whether the money will be recovered, there are significant challenges, as I am sure you are aware. It is right to apply a cost-benefit approach as well; although there is a moral imperative, we increasingly look at things in a commercial sense and at whether there is financial value in recovering funds.
Kristin Jones: It is very difficult to get money back from fraudsters, especially where it is organised, because the money disappears into different accounts in different names, and overseas through lots of corporate bodies, so it will be a big challenge. The important thing about this piece of legislation is whether we are future-proofing it so that, looking forward, we can learn from what has happened in the past and not repeat the mistakes.
Rebecca Smith
Q
Alex Rothwell: If we take the view that fraud has already happened—I have spoken about prevention, but once a fraud has happened and we have discovered it—there are increasingly limited opportunities to pursue criminal investigations. Although we maintain a strong investigative capability that deals with more serious types of criminality, we know about the challenges in the criminal justice system—the disclosure burden is high, it is incredibly expensive to run criminal investigations, and often they take eight years or longer to reach fruition—so we are increasingly looking at how else we can deal with fraud when it is presented to us.
In many ways, it is the low-value, high-volume cases that we see that are more challenging, where we are perhaps seeking to recover funds from someone who has taken £5,000, as I mentioned earlier. This is where I have the most interest in the Bill, because I think we would seek to use those powers extensively, and of course every penny that we recover is money that will be well spent in the NHS. I do not necessarily see any gaps in this particular legislation. There are elements of the work that we do in the national health service where we would benefit from some more powers, but the focus here is obviously on the Bill, rather than on our own ability. A lot of that would apply to how we access medical records, for example.
Georgia Gould
Q
Alex Rothwell: If we look across other international jurisdictions, we see that law enforcement agencies often have quite distinctive public sector fraud or crime functions—for example, the FBI has an extensive healthcare fraud capacity. The way policing has evolved over the last 20 or 30 years, particularly with an emphasis on drug supply, knife crime and firearms, has meant there is little capacity in policing to tackle public sector fraud, and of course there is an ever-present terrorism threat, which is changing rapidly. There is also safeguarding, with the National Crime Agency having quoted publicly the figures in terms of people who are a risk to children, for example.
One of the challenges is that even if you invest more in fraud capability, when a crisis happens, whether that is because of public order or some other form of crisis, policing has to flex more than other investigations. Inevitably, crimes like fraud are perhaps easier to put on hold for a time. Certainly since 2018 we have seen a gradual professionalisation and an increasing capability in the public sector, which I endorse. We could invest more in the police, but my concern is that there will continue to be crises that affect policing that will impact the ability of policing to support the public sector in the way that is required.
Kristin Jones: I agree with everything that Alex just said. The same applies to prosecution: if you have specialist prosecutors, where the resource is ringfenced, they do not get dragged away, but if you have them in with other prosecutors, it depends on what the pressure is at any particular time as to what resource is going to be given to fraud prosecutions.
Gill German (Clwyd North) (Lab)
Q
Alex Rothwell: One thing that we have always struggled to do is put a value on deterrence, because it is quite hard to say categorically that someone has not done something because of a change in approach to something. However, it is my view that, once it is known that there are increased powers in this space and that individuals will be pursued for funds, we will see some behaviour change. We could potentially quantify that, but the challenge is directly relating it to the Bill, particularly if you introduce other measures at the same time. I think there will be a powerful deterrent effect if it is exercised correctly and at scale and the public can see the benefits.
Kristin Jones: I agree. If people know there is an increased likelihood that they will be detected, that will have an effect. It is also important to use similar means to get the right narrative across about what you should and should not be doing.
Georgia Gould
Q
Kristin Jones: We have to plan for emergencies—they will, inevitably, occur—and the work on that should be kept up to date so that you can refer back to one you prepared earlier. That is so important because when there is an emergency, everybody is doing their best to get through it as fast as they can, and that is not the time for slow consideration, whereas having been through that experience, now is the time to reflect and document what we are going to do in future.
Alex Rothwell: Fundamentally it is about the loosening of controls, our understanding of the impact of the loosening of controls, and the friction that is or is not introduced when you are addressing an emergency. We also now have a much better understanding of how that can manifest itself. But I am confident that the Bill would enable an effective response.
Georgia Gould
Q
Alex Rothwell: From my perspective it is the digital footprint that is left and our ability to analyse that at scale. Very few transactions, if any, take place that do not have a digital or electronic footprint of some kind. The data sharing and our capability to analyse that data is the most important factor. The Bill goes some way to addressing that, but obviously elements of the Bill are about responding to fraud once it has happened. That, for me, is the biggest challenge. But on top of that are the safeguards that we put in place to ensure that our interpretation of that analysis is also correct.
Georgia Gould
So the other half—the prevention side—has to accompany this.
Alex Rothwell: Absolutely.
Georgia Gould
I very much agree.
Kristin Jones: Increasingly in society today knowing what the truth is, with the amount of data and false information out there, can be the problem.
Andrew Western
Q
Alex Rothwell: Data analysis has been particularly effective, as has getting better at recording and reporting—for example, we now have a ubiquitous case recording system that exists across the national health service. The greatest value we have seen so far has been in improved data analysis on large datasets that exist on, for example, national contracting. That is where the value lies in future.
Georgia Gould
Q
Alex Rothwell: Yes, it is. As I mentioned, the professionalisation of fraud specialists has made huge inroads in terms of the acceptability of fraud professionals, particularly in a finance environment—we deal with audit committees and so on—and there is also the recognition that the Government are taking fraud seriously. That is not just this Government but the previous one as well. The direction we have had from the Cabinet Office—
The Chair
Order. That brings us to the end of the allotted time for the Committee to ask questions. I thank the witnesses for their evidence. We will move on to the next panel.
Examination of Witnesses
Anna Hall and Christy McAleese gave evidence.
The Chair
For our final session this morning we will hear oral evidence from Anna Hall, corporate director of debt, and Christy McAleese, debt advice strategy and policy lead, both at the Money and Pensions Service.
Rebecca Smith
Q
Anna Hall: A lot of the operational detail of how the powers will work needs to be worked through, and the code of conduct will clearly be extremely important. Already existing in government are the debt management vulnerability toolkit and the public sector economic abuse toolkit, both of which have been set up by the cross-Government and cross-debt advice sector fairness group. We would like to see those existing systems tailored for the Bill and the recovery powers, to make sure that the code is implemented fairly.
There is lots of detail in the debt management vulnerability toolkit. It is about making sure that every individual is treated fairly, no matter how the debt has arisen. Once a debt is owed to Government, we are interested in how someone is able to set up a sustainable repayment plan. How are they able to access free debt advice and get the support they need? Regardless of how the debt has arisen, there is their ongoing expenses, their family, the need to make sure that there are no unintended consequences for wider society and their family, and how that debt is recovered.
Christy McAleese: I agree with Anna. There are possibly also opportunities in the code of conduct to build on some of the good work that the Department for Work and Pensions has already been doing on its ways of working with the debt sector. That includes good and consistent signposting and referrals through to free debt advice if, as seems reasonable, someone who has perhaps been contacted by the Department seeks advice from the sector. There are also some things around the acceptability of the debt sector—the advice worker being able to act on behalf of the person, so third-party forms of authority—and we could look at that. That would streamline the process for the person in debt and make it much easier for the debt sector to work with the Department. There are probably other things in that area.
Rebecca Smith
Q
Anna Hall: We can talk about who should be consulted. Debt advice organisations and consumer groups are important, because they will be the ones that interact with and support individuals in how they set up repayment plans and interact with the debt they owe to Government. At the Money and Pensions Service, we have an adviser panel, whereby we convene the debt advice sector, creditors and everyone who interacts in the ecosystem of debt advice. We can certainly support with that.
We are pleased with how DWP officials have engaged with us so far. They are clearly prioritising the people who are likely to be vulnerable. We work with them on an ongoing basis and expect to continue that through the development of the code of conduct.
Christy McAleese: To add to that briefly, we have a track record of doing consultation exercises in this area, and we have been sharing some of those learnings with colleagues at the DWP. In particular, as Anna mentioned, our debt adviser panel, which is made up of frontline advice workers from right across the sector, has been a valuable forum for us to understand how particular aspects of work that we are doing, and wider Government work, impact on the sector, and particularly on people in debt. Colleagues at DWP have been discussing how they can interact with that panel as part of the process as well, which we would really welcome.
Rebecca Smith
Q
Anna Hall: One thing that we know quite a lot about at the Money and Pensions Service is how people in debt behave. They do not always behave in a particularly rational manner, or in the way that you might expect people to behave, as with all people interacting with systems.
It can be incredibly overwhelming to have multiple debts. If you draw an analogy to other types of debts that people might owe—say, mortgage arrears or rent arrears—the fact that you might lose your home if you do not pay it is obviously an effective deterrent. For some people, those kinds of consequences are an effective deterrent. But we see day in, day out in the services we fund that people leave it right to the last minute before they seek help, and some people do not seek help at all. There can be all kinds of reasons for that. It could be something to do with them—they may struggle with literacy; they may have really overwhelming mental health issues; or it could be that they just do not know what to do. It could also be that they do not know where to seek help from. So I am sure it will be a deterrent for some people, but for other people, deterrents are not really the reason that they do not engage with the system.
We think it is really important that the systems that are set up once a debt has arisen are encouraging and supportive and help people to engage with the Department, so that they can set up an affordable and sustainable repayment plan. That will minimise the number of people who get to that point. We have experience of working with the finance sector and with other Government Departments that are trying to recover debt. If you really focus on being supportive, encouraging and creating the environment where frontline staff are people that you would want to disclose information to, set up income and expenditure, get a signpost to debt advice from and those kinds of things—if that is inherent in the system—you will not need the deterrent very often. There are huge numbers of people who are very vulnerable who have multiple debts, and deterrents are not really the thing that will impact on their ability to engage.
Andrew Western
Q
Anna Hall: We work with the Department in a number of ways. One of the most recent initiatives is working with Jobcentre Plus colleagues to embed the Money Adviser Network referral system into that. That means that where people present at Jobcentre Plus for a variety of reasons and are identified as having some kind of debt or money difficulty, they can either be referred to the MoneyHelper website—that is the Money and Pensions Service website—which has a variety of information on money, debt and pensions, or they can get a referral through the Money Adviser Network to one of our funded debt-advice providers. It is as seamless as possible and it really enables someone who presents perhaps not realising that there is help out there. When someone interacts with a system that they have to interact with, it is great if we can offer a real range of support that allows them to get to debt advice as quickly as possible.
I probably would say this, wouldn’t I, but debt advice can be absolutely life-changing for people? Its impact is huge. One thing we know is that people often do not know that debt advice exists. A huge number of people would benefit from debt advice. They do not know where to look or how to find it and think that is maybe is not for them, and they do not know what will happen when they get debt advice. If you have someone reassuring at the jobcentre saying, “This is a really independent, trusted service and it can help you sort out your financial affairs, and here is a seamless transfer through to that debt advice service,” that can be incredibly effective.
We are working with the Department, in Jobcentre Plus and across the board, on where people are particularly vulnerable and where they really need that support before they can even start to think about finding work or engaging with other things. If you are worried about whether you have food, whether you have money coming in and what you are going to do about the bailiff who is coming to knock on your door, you really need to deal with that before you can look at your long-term future.
The Department and all the officials we have been working with have been prioritising that. Being an arm’s length body of the Department for Work and Pensions is really helpful to make those connections, and embedding debt advice into all those systems has been really welcomed by the Department.
Andrew Western
Q
Can you reflect on the way that we have structured the process for people to engage with the Department when they are notified that they owe us a debt? We have done everything that we can to structure that as a power of last resort. Do you think that that is as robust as it can be with the multiple points of contact, the attempt to agree a sustainable and affordable repayment plan, and the ability, even after we have agreed a deduction, for somebody to come back to the table and negotiate that with us? Is there anything else that you would like to see in that space, or do you think that that is robust in reassuring ourselves that it is a power of last resort?
Anna Hall: It certainly looks that way from the detail in the Bill. As others have said, the code of conduct will be the critical thing. One of the things is that if frontline staff are not picking up vulnerabilities, or they are not trained in how to sort out affordability, in empathic listening or in all the protocols about how to have different types of conversations with people in different types of vulnerable situations—if those things are not in place—some of the processes in the Bill will not be as effective. It comes down to the training for frontline staff, and the capacity and processes to then follow up on what has actually been disclosed, that will enable those repayment plans to be put in place before those later processes. If those are not in place, that could cause some real issues. How successful this Bill is will come down to the code of conduct, as many have said.
Christy McAleese: I agree with what Anna has said. There are probably parallels with what has happened in the financial services sector and changes due to consumer duty and other requirements there. They have found that it is about embedding that culture in frontline staff and recovery staff, and making sure that they are trained effectively. The process on paper needs to be brought to life. We have been assured by the colleagues we have been speaking to at DWP so far that that is in their thinking. They have really demonstrated a willingness with us to learn what they can from how this is approached in the debt advice sector as well. We are reassured on that.
Andrew Western
Q
Anna Hall: We understand the DWP’s intent to ensure that debts can be recovered across all the different groups of people who might owe money. We are really focused on what happens when that debt arises and how people are treated in that situation. It is probably slightly outside our remit to comment on some of what you just outlined, but once the debt has arisen, we would look at how people are treated fairly in that situation across the board.
Christy McAleese: I have nothing to add.
The Chair
There being no further questions, I thank the witnesses for their evidence.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Gerald Jones.)
Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting)
Tuesday 25th February 2025
(3 weeks, 2 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesPublic Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 25 February 2025 - (25 Feb 2025)
The Chair
We will now hear evidence from Joshua Reddaway from the National Audit Office, and Richard Las from His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. We have until 2.30 pm.
Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)
Q
Joshua Reddaway: I guess I am agnostic as to what is done, but the benefits would be an opportunity for governance and an opportunity for accountability, clarity and transparency. I am sure that we would be absolutely delighted to audit the accounts for the PSFA and help to provide some of that transparency. Of course it is currently incorporated with the Cabinet Office, so it is about a clear line of sight. You have to offset that against the fact that there is an administrative burden for producing things like sets of accounts, and having governance and so on. The bigger question, and the one for the Committee, is whether it will enable better oversight of the powers in the Bill.
Rebecca Smith
Having a separate organisation?
Joshua Reddaway: Having a separate body.
Rebecca Smith
Q
Joshua Reddaway: I do not have a major opinion. I would ask whether you are comfortable with the oversight arrangements. One thing to point out is that this will be the closest thing to an anti-corruption unit that the Government have, with search powers. Are you happy with that being constitutionally in the Cabinet Office or not? I am also interested in what the criteria are. The explanatory notes have set out that there will be an efficiency assessment for the powers in the impact assessment. I am not sure the Cabinet Office is clear on exactly what that means. It is interesting to think about what would actually trigger it to exercise that power under the Bill to create it as a separate body.
Rebecca Smith
Q
Joshua Reddaway: In short, yes. Would you like a longer answer?
Rebecca Smith
That would be great.
Joshua Reddaway: First, we should be clear: with most fraud, once the payment has gone, you are not going to get it back. I have a professional next to me who can talk to you about the challenges and the pursuit, but if you ask how much fraud is out there, the answer is a lot. If you add up all the official estimates from the different schemes during covid, it is £10.5 billion-worth of fraud. The Government have so far recovered £1 billion of that, mostly from HMRC and less from others. Of course, HMRC stopped collecting it because it knew that its resources would have a higher return of investment if they were re-diverted back to tax rather than fraud recovery. I am afraid you are always on to a losing game if you enter the recovery phase, but every million counts. It is always nice to get something back.
The covid counter-fraud commissioner has only just been appointed. Their role is to review these schemes and see whether there is a way to get the money back. My understanding is that the six-year time limit under the Fraud Act 2006 will be expiring next spring so, with that timetable alone, if the fraud commissioner is going to bring forward anything that has a chance of working, it makes a lot of sense to give them a bit more time. Like I say, we are really sceptical that it is possible to get the majority of that £10.5 billion back. Some of it will come back from the bounce back loans anyway, but the vast majority of it has gone. But every million counts.
The Chair
Do you want to add anything, Mr Las?
Richard Las: On the covid side of things, we have not stopped our efforts, but we have recognised that we are not going to pursue it as a lead subject. However, we are conducting other inquiries and looking to other taxes. We will be looking at whether there was fraud under the covid schemes, and we will still be pursuing that. I still have a large number of cases going through the courts or heading towards prosecution in relation to the scheme. A bit like Joshua, I am certainly not giving up on it—we will keep pursuing it—but, in a decision on how we deploy our resources, we are saying, “We’ll look to what we think are the higher risks, and we will pick up the covid risks as and when we come across them at the same time.”
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Andrew Western)
Q
Joshua Reddaway: Specifically, do you mean the EVM—eligibility verification measure—stuff?
Andrew Western
All the powers pertaining to the DWP—the five principal areas in the DWP’s proposals—so information gathering, debt recovery, penalties reform, powers of search and seizure, and EVM.
Joshua Reddaway: Okay. To step back, we have been looking at a general trend of rising levels of benefit fraud for a few years. Actually, it has come down a little since covid, because there was a blip then, but if we take covid out, the levels were rising anyway. Currently, it is more than £10 billion, if you include the bit of benefits that HMRC pays—obviously, that is coming down with universal credit.
I do not think that what is in the Bill will solve that; what is in the Bill will support tackling it. This is about adding a few tools to the DWP toolkit. The key thing is that prevention is better than recovery. DWP is really good—one of the best in the world, as far as we can see—at knowing how much fraud is occurring; I am afraid it is not very good at saying why it occurs. In particular, DWP is not great at saying what it is about the way in which it administers benefits that enables fraud to occur or error to happen.
For some time, we have been advocating for DWP to get a much more granular view of its control environment. I think that, given how I interpret the capital rules here—it is an EVM exercise—it is doing that. This is one of the places where DWP said, “Actually, our control over capital at the moment is, frankly, to ask people how much capital they have,” which left it fairly exposed to the risk that people did not tell them the truth. Several times, the Public Accounts Committee asked DWP if it had the powers it needed, and several times has said, “The one area we need to explore is capital.” The challenge for this Committee is to work out whether that proposal is reasonable and includes enough oversight, given the privacy issues. In terms of there being a real problem behind it, however, I can confirm that there is a control-level issue that DWP is trying to resolve.
The other issues that the Bill tries to deal with on enforcement are similar. If we look at the impact assessment, the EVM was £500 million a year when fully rolled out and operational—that is a significant dent, but only a dent, in the £10 billion. I want to be clear: yes, I do think that there will be an impact. Is it sufficient? No. Is it meant to be sufficient? I doubt it. I think that DWP knows that, and that it has a very hard slog ahead of it. I will try to hold it to account—I am afraid it is your Department—on that hard slog of understanding where fraud is coming in and where error is happening, and put in controls step by step to improve it. There are no shortcuts in that.
Richard Las: My reflection is that fraud is inherently difficult to identify and potentially more difficult to investigate at times. How do you identify fraud? If I think about HMRC, you need information and to be able to triangulate information to understand the risks in front of you so that you can identify the highest risk. Sometimes you will not know what that risk is, or whether it is fraud or error, but it will point you in a direction. I feel that as an agency, if you have fraud, you need a good bedrock of information to understand the environment and to identify risk. A lot of that information can be information you gather from your customer—in our case, a taxpayer—or third party information. It is information that we can use to triangulate and verify. We do that regularly with lots of different information sets.
Once you come to investigate and deal with fraud, it is obvious to everybody, but people do not always co-operate, so you need powers that allow you to compel people to co-operate or powers that allow you to secure information and evidence in a way that you otherwise would not be able to do, because people would not do that. On the general framework, we are always looking to improve our basis for powers and our ability to use them. Certainly I feel that much of what is included in the Bill is powers that HMRC already has in many respects. We use those powers, we would argue, in a proportionate and necessary way, and there are controls and safeguards about how we do that. It is a difficult business with fraud. If you do not have some of those tools at your disposal, you are working with one arm behind your back.
Andrew Western
Q
Joshua Reddaway: Is there an alternative? I am aware that DWP is thinking about open banking as an alternative, but that, of course, would have wider implications and at the moment is on a voluntary basis. You have got that.
I honestly think that it fundamentally comes down to this: if you want to be able to detect, and if Parliament has set an eligibility criterion of capital as part of universal credit and some other benefits, DWP can either use that as a kind of symbolic deterrent so that you can opt out by owning up that you have that capital—that has a use—or if you want it to actually be enforced, you have to provide DWP with a tool that goes a bit further than just asking. There are various ways that you can get data matching from various different partners. This is the one that the Government have come up with.
Andrew Western
Q
Richard Las: It is the Finance Act 2011 that you refer to, which allows us bulk data gathering powers on information that we believe will support our functions. I guess it is not just the banks, but we do get the information on interest-bearing accounts. It is an annual exercise, not a real-time exercise. It is clearly timed in such a way that it helps us understand whether the right amount of tax has been paid on interest that has been accrued. We are talking about large accounts because in most cases people’s interest is quite small, but there will be some people who get a lot of it. We have a huge amount of controls over how we manage that information and how we use it and protect it; they are our normal requirements as with any other taxpayer data.
We gather other information from third parties. We have information from merchant acquirers on transactions that businesses might make, for example. We also have information that we get from online platforms in terms of sales and things like that. It is all part of bringing that information together. HMRC very much respects taxpayer confidentiality and manages that data responsibly. I guess those safeguards can exist in other organisations.
Andrew Western
Q
Richard Las: I do not know, if I am honest, whether there is. I can look that up for you.
The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Georgia Gould)
Q
Joshua Reddaway: I think you are referring to the report we did in March 2023, after the PSFA had just been established. We very much wanted it to be a baseline for the challenges it was trying to deal with. We basically said that there needed to be a cultural change across all of Government, that 84% of the resources were in DWP and HMRC, and that covid really exposed that the Government did not have the capability in other Departments. I have to say that, from our point of view, we saw fraud as essentially a welfare and tax issue for many years, so it was a bit of a surprise to start bringing it out to the other Departments a bit more.
I would interpret the Bill as being about giving the powers, particularly on the enforcement side, and in the meantime, the PSFA has been doing quite a lot on the prevention side. The prevention side is primarily where I would be focused because that is where the biggest gains are to be had in dealing with the cultural changes that are needed across all of Government. Mind you, I do not read the Bill as being against that; I see it as supplementary.
We would be very disappointed if the PSFA became exclusively an investigation and enforcement-type agency. The impact assessment thinks it can get roughly £50 million over 10 years from enforcement. Like I say, every million counts, but that is very tiny compared with the challenge that the PSFA is trying to meet. Is that the sort of thing you are interested in?
Georgia Gould
Q
Joshua Reddaway: It is not rare to find what we call audited bodies, Government organisations, that have found a fraud, have taken it as far as they can through their internal services, and have tried to hand it over to the police to make an arrest—this is the point where it is outside audit—but have not been able to find anyone who will pick up that file, which has been fairly developed. The point that we raised in the 2023 report and that the PSFA was trying to deal with was: how can you get an organisation that fills the gap to help defend the Government when they get attacked? The police are basically going to say that Government are big enough and ugly enough to look after themselves on this.
When we looked at fraud more widely across society in a report that we did later in 2023, we found that at that time it was 40% of all crime and 1% of police resources. That is what you are trying to tackle here. You are trying to have an organisation that fills the gap on enforcement. How important is that? I think it is about having a deterrent, and if you get it right it should also be about root cause analysis. By that I mean, if you have an investigation and you are able to fully investigate it, it is not just about prosecuting that person, but about properly understanding why that happened in the first place, and improving it. So if you are an organisation that is outsourcing an investigation to another party, I always wonder a bit whether they will do that bit of the loop. I am hopeful that the PSFA will develop the capability to do that.
Georgia Gould
That is a very helpful challenge.
Joshua Reddaway: That is my understanding of this. Our one concern is, please don’t let this be the tail that’s wagging the dog.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
Q
Joshua Reddaway: Interesting. The reason we always talk about error and fraud together is because it is often really difficult to differentiate between them when you are doing prevention. So, in my job, I am more interested in fraud and error together because I am more interested in how to correct that and stop the money going out. If you are in Richard’s job, as I am sure he will tell you in a second, he is going to be more interested in the one that you can prosecute—to an extent.
Richard Las: I am happy to jump in from an HMRC perspective. It is important to understand what the driver is—I think that is absolutely right—and to be able to distinguish between fraud and error. We have estimates for fraud and error in terms of the tax system, which we publish every year. We generate those estimates for a lot of different activity, but partly they are the result of our own inquiries, so we are analysing what we do and what we see. We make a judgment—is it fraud, is it error?—and we work out what is going on. Absolutely, you have to look at the underlying reasons, so if there is an error, a repeated error, you ask what is going on there—what is the cause of it? Certainly, as we develop our business in HMRC—especially with people filing online—we are very much looking to prompt people so that they can get the right answer. Those of you who do self-assessment hopefully will see that yourself—“Are you sure? Is this information correct?” That really does help in reducing errors—the simple errors that people might make, because it is complicated.
Siân Berry
Q
Richard Las: Potentially. But it goes both ways, often. Sometimes people overpay as well.
Joshua Reddaway: If you are looking at a particular case, normally the first thing you detect is that it is wrong—the transaction is not correct. You then have to take it to a certain level before you can work out, on the balance of probabilities, what it is. In tax world, is it evasion or avoidance? Then you go down a different route, depending on how you are dealing with it. Obviously, if you want to go for a prosecution, you have to have much more evidence and you have to be beyond reasonable doubt to go there.
I think the reason why PSFA often deals with both is that it is at that earlier stage of dealing with prevention, and it is not always clear which one you are dealing with; besides which, we want to stop error as well. My job is to definitely try to stop both, through audit and accountability. I think where it does not make sense for PSFA to get involved is where that fundamental responsibility for correcting the control environment belongs with the Departments. So if you see that as a, “They have done that triaging; they now think that it’s fraud,” you need an enforcement capability and you go down that route, but I would be very disappointed if that meant in that triage process that an error was not being dealt with. Does that explain?
Siân Berry
Q
Joshua Reddaway: I am saying I do not think this Bill is about that issue.
Siân Berry
Okay. Even with that title?
Joshua Reddaway: Even with that title.
Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)
Q
Joshua Reddaway: On how much fraud is created?
Neil Coyle
Q
Joshua Reddaway: Is this the behavioural effect?
Neil Coyle
Q
Joshua Reddaway: I have not done anything that adds to the information that is already in the impact assessment. I have not audited it, so I would just point to the numbers in there. I know there is an issue around whether people will split their money between multiple bank accounts. Is that also part of what you are referring to?
Neil Coyle
Yes.
Joshua Reddaway: I have spoken to DWP and the OBR about that. My understanding is that frankly it is an area of uncertainty, and that they wanted to make an adjustment because they knew there would be an effect but they do not know what that will be. We will have to come back and see what that is.
For me, the more fundamental point is that this power will not stop all fraud. It is designed to stop some. Will there be behavioural effects that will limit that? Yes. Does that in itself mean you should not try? No.
Neil Coyle
Q
Joshua Reddaway: My first instinct is that I would ask DWP how it was going to do that, because that is how the wonderful world of audit works.
Neil Coyle
Of course.
Joshua Reddaway: Secondly, I would suggest to them that they can establish a baseline, because this is pretty transparent within their published statistics. You have got a breakdown there of how much fraud is caused by people mis-stating their capital. The reason DWP is able to do that is because when you apply for a benefit, you do not have to provide your bank statements, but when you are subject to an inquiry that informs the statistics, you do have to provide your bank statements. The statistic is generated by the difference between those two processes. That will continue to be the case after this power is enacted.
Andrew Western
Q
Joshua Reddaway: I think that is a fair comment, given that I said it does not really deal with error. I was really referring to the enforcement powers under PSFA. I think PSFA do other stuff that is in the error space, but the enforcement stuff is not. The enforcement stuff for DWP also will not really be in the error space. However, you are quite right that any data matching is an opportunity to detect error, and DWP are used to that. For example, when they are doing targeted case reviews, that will be detecting error as well as fraud. What we know from the statistics is that DWP believes there is more fraud than error in that space, but I entirely accept the premise of your question, and I should have made that part clear.
Andrew Western
Q
Richard Las: Ultimately, it allows us to operate immediately and with real clarity. We would be under the same kind of governance and restrictions as the police would be, in terms of having to go to a court to get those warrants, but, in terms of our ability to—
The Chair
Order. We have come to the end of the allotted time. I thank the witnesses for their evidence, and we will move on to the next panel.
Examination of Witness
John Smart gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from John Smart, formerly partner for forensics at Ernst & Young, who now sits on the Public Sector Fraud Authority’s advisory panel. We have until 2.50 pm.
Mike Wood (Kingswinford and South Staffordshire) (Con)
Q
John Smart: I think being fully independent would probably be helpful, although I suspect that the realistic impact of that will be more theoretical rather than practical in the short term. Maybe, in the longer term, a fully independent, stand-alone organisation would be much more helpful.
Mike Wood
Q
John Smart: That needs to be determined in terms of the overall governance structure of the organisation, as and when it is set up, because it would clearly need to have an independent board, and some of the oversight powers proposed in the Bill would need to be independent of the management of that business. I think it would require quite a lot of thought around the overall governance structure, the way it operates and the way that the day-to-day management of the business is independent of the oversight powers.
Mike Wood
Q
John Smart: As you say, the nature of the investigations that will be carried out by the PSFA will be quite different from those being carried out by the DWP. Certainly, the proposal in the Bill is that investigations that require some form of search warrant will be carried out with a police officer present, and therefore the powers that are being given to DWP in relation to this Bill will already sit with the police that will accompany any investigators that are doing work on behalf of the PSFA. That is my understanding.
Mike Wood
Based on your experience with the PSFA so far, is that consistent with the length of time that, in most cases, it takes such organisations to reply to requests for information?
John Smart: The consistency question is an interesting one. I think a lot of those powers are likely to be applied specifically in relation to banks and telecoms companies. They already have procedures in place to respond to requests for information, and therefore, in the majority of cases, my suspicion is that those short timeframes will be consistent with what they normally deal with, so there will not be a big onus on them to change the way they normally operate.
Mike Wood
Q
John Smart: They are not, no. I do not know which institutions are likely to be required to provide information. There will be individuals and institutions. Other institutions might find it more difficult, but there is an appeals process, which they can apply to use, in relation to provision of information. If it is unreasonably onerous, I suspect it will mean that the timescale will be varied.
Mike Wood
Q
John Smart: That is true. I have spent 35 years investigating fraud, and the challenge is that there is a need to be reasonably speedy in doing those investigations because, as we heard earlier, any recoveries are going to be much reduced if there is a significant delay in carrying out the investigation and applying for either criminal or civil proceedings to take place. Therefore, speed is important in any investigation. Otherwise, you are spending a lot of time and effort without getting the result you need.
Mike Wood
Q
John Smart: I think weeks is reasonable. A small number of weeks is a reasonable number to look for, rather than days or months. Months is far too long, and days is probably a little too short in relation to the ability of organisations to respond.
Andrew Western
Q
John Smart: At the risk of echoing what has been said before, I think it is critical that we modernise the approach to fraud, and the Bill is a good step towards that modernisation. The critical part of a lot of investigations now—and of identifying, preventing and detecting fraud—is the use of data. Getting that data and information quickly and effectively is critical. I think the Bill will go a long way towards speeding up and broadening the available information that can be used to prevent, detect and prosecute fraud. That is a really valuable thing that we should be pushing for, because relying on pieces of paper to seek information from organisations is crazy in this day and age, when you can do it electronically and get an answer relatively quickly. If you are turning up with a piece of paper, it can take weeks or months.
Rebecca Smith
Q
John Smart: Having worried about this for a number of years, I think there are a lot of steps that the Government—the PSFA—can take over time, but we are on a ladder to get to a position that is constantly moving because the fraudsters are developing all the time. One critical thing that I have been concerned about for a number of years is the use and sharing of data across Government. Government have so much data available to them, and third parties have a lot of data available to them. There is clearly a privacy question that rapidly comes into play, but from my perspective, if the data is available to Government, they should use it. They should use it proportionately: they should not exploit those powers to use that data on some sort of phishing trip, but if there is evidence that fraud is being or has been committed, getting that evidence in the hands of investigators quickly is critical to preventing the fraud from continuing and to identifying and recovering any money that has been lost. To my mind, there is quite a lot of work still to be done on data sharing across Government.
Rebecca Smith
Q
John Smart: Absolutely. There are two points to make. The first is that that frauds that are already happening would be identified if the data was shared more effectively and quickly. Secondly, by joining up data that is sitting in Companies House, the licensing authority, or wherever, you can find evidence that a fraud is being carried out and prevent frauds from happening in the first place.
Rebecca Smith
Q
John Smart: An obvious example is the United States; there is an interesting case in point at the moment, which I have dealt with quite a lot. The US has whistleblower reward legislation in place, which is very effective at flushing out issues affecting payments made by Government. Their qui tam legislation, as it is called, flushes out frauds by incentivising whistleblowers to blow the whistle. It creates a lot of work for various organisations, but it encourages people to think about whether fraud is being committed against the Government in the US. That is an obvious piece of legislation that might be worth considering in this country.
Georgia Gould
Q
John Smart: That is a big question. I have been involved with the Cabinet Office for over 12 years, so the inception of the PSFA came about while I was working there. In the 18 months since it was formed, the PSFA has gone a long way to reach a better understanding of where the issues sit across Government. Clearly, it plays best outside the DWP and HMRC. My passion has been identifying where fraud is taking place, which I have worked on for the past 10 years, and trying to quantify the fraud occurring within Government. As you all know, that is very hard to quantify because it is hidden and therefore unknown. The PSFA has gone a long way and is continuing to flush out where resources should be committed to preventing, investigating and deterring fraud across Government outside HMRC and the DWP. That is critical. When I first started asking Departments where frauds were within the Departments, they replied, “There’s nothing to see here.” At least now, particularly because of the work the PSFA has been doing, there is recognition that there is a real issue to be addressed, and that it is not just expenses fraud, or whatever they used to think it was.
Georgia Gould
Q
John Smart: As we said earlier, the larger organisations will be geared up to provide the information within the timeframe required. Some of the smaller organisations might struggle to meet that 10-day requirement, but I still think it is a reasonable starting point. If you do not start with a reasonable starting point, for the larger organisations you end up deferring decision making and action being taken. I think 10 days is reasonable.
Georgia Gould
Q
John Smart: Exactly. That is the reason for the starting point.
The Chair
If there are no further questions, I thank John Smart for his evidence, and we will move on to the next panel.
Examination of Witnesses
Eric Leenders and Daniel Cichocki gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from Eric Leenders and Daniel Cichocki, both from UK Finance. We have until 3.10 pm.
Mike Wood
Q
Daniel Cichocki: A number of conversations with the industry have taken place since the measure was announced. We have been very clear since the announcement was made that we are supportive of the efforts to tackle fraud and error in the public sector. We recognise the scale of the challenge that the Government face, and as a private sector we see clearly the damage fraud does to both the public and the private sectors. We are very supportive of the objectives of the Bill. As you say, the key thing for us as a sector that is heavily regulated, both from a vulnerable customer treatment stance—my colleague Eric Leenders is best placed to talk about that—and a financial crime compliance perspective, is that more detail on the specifics of how the measure will work is still to emerge through the code of practice, but extensive conversations about that are under way.
From the banking industry perspective, we are keen to ensure that the compliance requirements for banks are clear in terms of what information is required. We hope to see in the code of practice, as soon as is practical, details of the specific criteria against which the Government will mandate banks to perform checks under the measure.
Mike Wood
Q
Daniel Cichocki: We are awaiting more detail. We have high-level indicators that the Government are likely to use the measure to require banks to perform checks against, which gives us some sense of the scale. Our initial assessment is that it is likely to be significant, but the key thing for us is to have more details of the criteria that the Government will require us to check against under the measure.
Mike Wood
Q
Daniel Cichocki: It is quite difficult at this stage to perform that level of assessment, partly because so much detail of the measure will be set out in the code of practice. We are obviously very keen to ensure that the expectations of the industry in complying with the new requirement are proportionate, but that is difficult to assess in detail before we have seen the detail of the code of practice. Much will depend on the mechanism through which banks will be required to share the information, the frequency of the information notices, whether the criteria we are required to run the checks against change over time and other factors that will influence how much capacity is required from the banking sector. As I say, at this stage it is challenging to do a detailed assessment.
Mike Wood
Q
Daniel Cichocki: Certainly. The banks share very significant amounts of information with Government Departments and law enforcement to ensure compliance with measures to tackle economic crime. We take that very seriously. We also continue to share extensive information with the Director of Public Prosecutions where there is suspicion of fraud. There is certainly an existing set-up to respond to information requests.
There is a difference with this particular measure, though, and we are keen for it be considered. This request is for information to tackle both fraud and error. A lot of the information sharing that we as an industry currently do with elements of law enforcement is very much focused on suspected fraud, economic crime and serious and organised crime. This is a slightly broader measure, so we are keen to see in the code of practice a very clear set of requirements for banks to comply with. The infrastructure is certainly there.
Mike Wood
Q
Daniel Cichocki: A variety of powers exist to date. Some have time measures built in for compliance with them and some are voluntary. I think you have to ensure that this particular power is balanced against all the information sharing that the industry is currently required to do with both Government and law enforcement. For example, it must be balanced against the voluntary sharing that the industry is doing, particularly with law enforcement. Certainly, those of us working in economic crime are primarily focused on how we can work with Government and law enforcement to tackle serious and organised crime. Striking the balance between the additional requirements under this power and that effort is an area of focus on which we have also been engaged with the Government.
Mike Wood
Q
Daniel Cichocki: Given that the eligibility verification measure is one of the more extensive powers in the Bill, we think that it may be appropriate to require the Minister to attest that its use is proportionate, as is required with the other measures in the Bill. That is just because of that particular power’s scale in requiring banks to share information on both potential fraud and potential error. As it includes the sharing of information of customers who may not be suspected of any crime whatsoever, we think that it would be helpful if the Government were to articulate that their use of the measure is proportionate, as is the case with the others.
It would also be helpful if the Bill were to replicate the very effective Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 exemption, which exists within the eligibility verification measure, in the other measures across parts 1 and 2 of the Bill. That is simply because we do not think that it is necessarily proportionate or helpful for banks to be considering, in complying with legislation, whether they should also be undertaking a suspicious activity report for the authorities. One of the constructive conversations that we have been having with Government is how we delineate our responsibilities to comply with this legislation and our responsibilities to comply with financial crime measures. We will be writing on this in more detail, but we suggest that the exemption under the eligibility verification measure, which is very helpful, should be replicated in other elements of the Bill.
Andrew Western
Q
Daniel Cichocki: We are making this suggestion because under the Bill banks responding to an information request or a direct deduction order, would have to consider whether there is some indication of financial crime that under POCA requires them to make a suspicious activity report. We think it is simpler to remove that requirement, not least because where there is a requirement to make a suspicious activity report there is a requirement to notify the authorities; clearly, there is already a notification to the authorities when complying with the measure. Removing that requirement would avoid the risk that banks must consider not only how to respond to the measure but whether they are required to treat that individual account as potentially fraudulent. We are trying to manage risk out of the system more broadly with financial crime compliance, so we think it is much more proportionate and effective to simply apply the same exemption across all the measures in the Bill.
Andrew Western
Q
You briefly mentioned direct deduction orders. I know you have some concerns about the debt recovery power, and this is an opportunity for you to set them out. Is there anything you want to elaborate on beyond what you have just said about that element of the powers we are proposing?
Eric Leenders: There are two or three key areas for us. First is the affordability assessment. I think you have heard previously that the use of the standard financial statement would be helpful in outlining essential monthly expenditure. I will come back to that point.
Secondly, I believe the caps differ between the PSFA and the DWP. We think that they should be aligned, with the PFSA’s 40/20 split also applied to the DWP. It is also quite important that there is some form of de minimis, so that individuals do not find themselves without any funds whatsoever. Our thinking is something aligned to the £1,000 threshold that there is in Scotland. HMRC has a threshold of about £5,000, or £2,000 for partners paying child maintenance. We think there should be a floor, but more essential is consideration of one month’s essential expenditure. That would allow the individual to readjust their expenditure in the period when they need to consider making the payments under the deduction order, or indeed the period in which the balances are withdrawn.
Andrew Western
Q
Eric Leenders: We would like to consider a specific de minimis. There are probably two approaches: an absolute amount or a relative amount, dependent on the individual’s essential expenditure—not their lifestyle expenditure. That is why we feel that the standard financial statement would be a useful tool.
Siân Berry
Q
Going back to Daniel’s earlier comment, can you clarify that you do not yet have a clue regarding the volume of requests? Have you been given some sort of estimate by the Government?
Daniel Cichocki: Let me take that first. The Government set out two broad criteria pertaining to the eligibility verification measure: the capital check and the check against abroad fraud, through assessment of transactions abroad. It is difficult at this stage, because the industry has not undertaken any detailed collective analysis of the criteria against the current book of customers. That work has not yet been done. We anticipate it being done through the development of the code of practice, but key for us is understanding exactly what criteria we will be required to run, and then banks can start to build an assessment of how that looks against their current book. That detailed work has not yet taken place.
Siân Berry
Q
Daniel Cichocki: I do not think we take a view on the scope of individual benefits for which this is applied. The key principle for us is that where there are changes to the eligibility criteria, we are required to check that there is proper public consultation around those changes and an appropriate implementation period for any of those changes, and that those changes are not too frequent. As an industry, we have to build a system to run these checks every time, and every change will have to be built and tested. For us, it is more about the principle of the frequency and appropriateness of the changes. The broader debate around what is in scope is not one we have taken a view on.
Siân Berry
Q
Eric Leenders: Certainly. I will just build on Dan’s point regarding change requirements, to give a picture of the timespan involved. Typically, a change would involve the build—IT systems change and training, which is policy and procedures. We would also need to think about communications, including potentially into terms and conditions for the legals that sit around that. We would want to build monitoring systems to ensure that we have conformance and some form of review process. We have a three-line defence model, where the business runs the business, the second line checks the business, and the third line checks the checkers, so to speak. We then repeat that cycle. Putting that in place takes some time, which rather illustrates Dan’s desire for fewer changes and additions, because all of that would need to be considered.
The point on vulnerability is very well made. There is a slight health warning in my comments, because the Financial Conduct Authority is due to publish findings from a thematic review imminently, as I understand—within the next couple of months. The broad drivers we adhere to that they identify are around financial resilience—we touched on that point a little earlier—and physical and mental strain. There are potentially some mental strains for individuals who feel they may be under suspicion, particularly where those prove not to be founded. Life events are critical now—key in affordability, typically the driver for financial difficulty, and also capability. There are various measures, but as an industry we typically would work to a reading age of nine to ensure that the UK population understands the communications that they receive. In building out the guidance, it would be very helpful for a period of consultation so that we can get into the detail and forensics around those points.
Siân Berry
Q
Eric Leenders: It would always be within the gift of a consumer to open a separate account. They can then ask for the benefit to be paid into that account. There might be a risk, from a wider perspective, that potentially attorneys and landlords might no longer want to receive benefits directly because of the potential admin burdens through this Bill. I flag that as a consideration. I do not think it is necessarily a show-stopper but certainly it is something that I think from a vulnerability perspective we need to be alive to, because that might be an additional responsibility on a vulnerable person, for example, to pay the rent.
Georgia Gould
Q
Daniel Cichocki: The key thing for us now, as I said in relation to the DWP measures, is to start to look at the detail of the draft regulations and the code of practice that sit behind the powers, which we look forward to engaging on. Our broader observations are more on the DWP side. Across both elements of the Bill we welcome very strongly the independent review processes that have been built into the powers. We think the scope of those reviews could just consider some of the other factors that we know have been raised as questions around these powers. For instance, could there be more direct scope for that independent reviewer to consider the impact of some of the unintended consequences on vulnerable customers and the cost of compliance? Those are just some broader points on the independent review, but I think the principle of having one across both elements of the Bill is important.
Rebecca Smith
Q
Daniel Cichocki: In terms of broad principles, obviously wherever there is additional legislation and regulation on the sector, we would hope that that is proportionate. We anticipate doing further work with the Government to help to support the impact assessment as a result of the more detailed work when we see the draft code of practice, when we are better able to understand the methods through which this information will be shared, the practicalities of how it works, and the scale at which the powers will be used. We therefore anticipate more work being done around the impact assessment.
We would hope and anticipate that the Government would recognise that the impact on the private sector needs to be proportionate. As well as the cost implications around resource, this is also around prioritisation. To my earlier point, many of the teams that will be complying with this legislation will currently be complying with the broader legislation and regulation that we have in place, sharing information with the Government and law enforcement, and ensuring proportionality of how that resource is deployed. Certainly from an industry perspective, as a broad principle, we would see it as appropriate and desirable for much of that resource to be focused on serious and organised crime in the round.
Eric Leenders: I have a couple of brief points. First, one consideration is congestion. There is quite a crowded mandatory change stack, as we call it. There is a sequence of changes in train that firms are already implementing. Secondly, to your specific point about the cost-benefit analysis, we recognise the challenge that the cost will be direct, as in the build costs that we have just summarised. The benefits—reducing and deterring criminality generally, and perhaps even preventing it—are perhaps more indirect. I suppose that leads to another point: the extent to which we need to be thoughtful about circumvention and how to ensure that the legislation is suitably agile, so that bad actors cannot game the system no sooner than it has been introduced.
The Chair
There being no further questions, I thank our witnesses for their evidence. We will move on to the next panel.
Examination of Witness
Ellen Lefley gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear from Ellen Lefley, senior lawyer at Justice. We have until half-past 3 o’clock.
Rebecca Smith
Q
Ellen Lefley: It is right that the bank power, which is the eligibility verification measure, is separated out in terms of proportionality because, just to clarify, it is important that the other powers of information, search, entry and seizure, which are extended by the Bill to the PSFA and to DWP, all contain that threshold form of words of needing “reasonable grounds” of suspicion or belief. That threshold for the exercise of state power requires reasonableness and objectivity—for there to be something there. That rule-of-law barrier prevents fishing expeditions and state intervention in people’s lives when there is simply nothing to it.
Any such form of words, however, is missing from the eligibility verification measure, which is why the privacy concerns and the concerns about the proportionality of the measure have been so concentrated. Justice is concerned about the proportionality of the measure precisely because it does not have that threshold of reasonable suspicion and because of the vast numbers that could be subject to it, albeit that the state pension has been taken out of scope—it was in scope before, under the almost-equivalent measure in the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill last year.
The concern is with the broadness of that power, the lack of a threshold and the fact that the fundamental right to privacy is involved. We all have a right to privacy, and we all have a right to enjoy our privacy in a non-discriminatory way, and that is the further issue that I would raise. I am sure that others will raise this today, too: the almost inevitable disproportionate impact that those financial surveillance powers will have on people who are disabled. There has been no equality impact assessment for this Bill, but there was for the previous one—not that it was released, I think, but it was the subject of a freedom of information request and I had sight of it. It revealed that, even though about 23% of the population at large are disabled, that figure is about 50% for the benefits-receiving population. There is that prima facie disparity. The financial privacy that is enjoyed by citizens of this country and people who reside here is less protected for disabled people than for others. That very much needs to be proportionate and justifiable, given the fundamental rights that are engaged.
Rebecca Smith
Q
Ellen Lefley: Reassurance cannot be the word, unfortunately, given the moment we are in, which is one of increasing automation and increasing investment in data analytics and machine learning across government. Last month, I think, we had a Government statement about mainlining AI into the veins of the nation—that includes the public sector. Knowing that that is coming and having a clear focus on how the functions in the Bill will be operationalised need to be a key concern.
The preservation of human intervention in decision making might have been a statement that has been made, but it is not on the face of the Bill. Indeed, we need to remember that the Data (Use and Access) Bill, which is also before Parliament, is removing the prohibition on fully automated decision making and profiling. That is happening concurrently with these powers. In addition, over the years, there have been numerous Horizon-like scandals that have happened in the benefits area. One, quite close to home in the Netherlands, was a childcare benefit scandal, which Committee members will know of. In that scandal, recipients of childcare benefit allowance in the Netherlands were subject to machine-learning algorithms that learnt to flag a fraud risk simply because of their dual nationality. So there is a problem here. Even with the powers that are subject to reasonable grounds, we need to have a wider discussion as to what reasonable means and what it definitely does not mean when we talk about reasonable grounds of suspicion, when suspicion is an exercise that is informed in a tech-assisted and technosocial decision-making environment.
Justice has some suggestions as to how reasonable grounds can be better glossed in the Bill in relation to generalisations and stereotypes that a certain type of person, simply because of their characteristics, is more likely to commit fraud than others. Perhaps it could be recorded in the Bill that that definitely is not reasonable.
Some useful wording from the Police and Criminal Evidence Act code of practice A is not in the Bill because it relates to the power to stop and search, which is not being given to DWP officers, probably rightly and proportionately, but some explicit paragraphs in the code of practice for stop and search for police officers say that they cannot stop and search someone based on their protected characteristics. Under the Equality Act 2010, they cannot exercise their discretion to stop and search someone due to generalisations and stereotypes about a certain type of person’s propensity to commit criminal activity. Amendments like those could strengthen the Bill against unreasonable, but perhaps not always detectable suspicions being imbued by machine-learning algorithms. Of course, if there will always be a human intervention in the decision-making process, perhaps that could be explicitly recorded in the Bill as well.
Andrew Western
Q
Ellen Lefley: They make up a larger number of the cohort, so we would analyse a prima facie indirect discrimination potential risk there, which would then need to be justified as being necessary and proportionate. The proportionality assessment of course is for Parliament, but we consider that a significant amount of scrutiny is required not only because of the privacy impacts, but because there is that clear indirect discrimination aspect. I am not alleging direct—
Andrew Western
Q
Ellen Lefley: Raising the risk of indirect discrimination when you have cohorts of the population that are disproportionately reflected in any subcommunity of the population that will be exposed to any power is a relevant consideration, so yes in that respect. When it comes to the eligibility-verification measures, the proportionality analysis is, in our view, strained because there is not that threshold of reasonable suspicion. The mere fact that benefits recipients are in receipt of public funds makes them subject to this power. Of course, that could go further; all the public servants and MPs in this room are in receipt of public funds. If that is the threshold that we as a society are happy with, some real scrutiny of its proportionality is required, because it is a power that can require private financial information.
Andrew Western
Q
Ellen Lefley: When I speak about proportionality, the degree of loss is relevant, but there is no question but that the economic wellbeing of the country is a legitimate aim. On whether measures are proportionate to achieving that aim, we must consider not only whether there is any reasonable suspicion, but the degree of external oversight. The Bill includes that consideration, and there are various ways in which some of the powers are subject to independent review.
We have some suggestions as to how those independent review mechanisms can be a stronger safeguard and therefore make the measures more proportionate. For example, the independent review mechanisms seem to have the ability to access information but no power to demand it. That raises a query as to transparency and the full ability of the independent reviewer in different circumstances to meet their objectives. Also, when an independent reviewer lays their report before Parliament with recommendations and those recommendations are not going to be adopted, it might be helpful for there to be an obligation on the Department to provide reasons why not. That would be a more transparent way of ensuring that the oversight measure is as effective as intended.
Sally Jameson (Doncaster Central) (Lab/Co-op)
Q
Ellen Lefley: On the £35 billion figure, I think the benefits fraud and error figure was around £10 billion, and I think £7 billion can be shown to be fraud. I am sorry if I have got that wrong.
Andrew Western
Q
Ellen Lefley: I am grateful. It is a difficult one. For example, we could have almost zero crime in this country if everyone’s house had 24/7 surveillance installed. There will always be a way of decreasing privacy to increase state surveillance and therefore reduce unwanted behaviour, but the balance needs to be struck. Justice’s view is that when the state is getting new powers to investigate people’s private affairs, the balance is struck by having that reasonable suspicion threshold, which requires reasonable grounds for believing that a crime has been committed. That ensures that the powers given to the state in any primary legislation are not open to abuse or arbitrariness. Of course, the laws in the statute book must be written narrowly so that they protect rights on the face of it, rather than being written broadly and relying on the self-restraint of future Administrations to exercise them proportionately.
Charlie Dewhirst (Bridlington and The Wolds) (Con)
Q
Ellen Lefley: We continue to have concerns, acknowledging that there are two key oversight mechanisms in the Bill that were not in the previous one: this independent reviewer role and the code of practice. It would be far easier for Justice, but more importantly for Parliament, to be assured of the proportionality of any human rights infringement if that code of practice were before us.
Paragraph 79 of the human rights memorandum to the Bill notes that the code of practice will significantly impact whether the EVN measures are proportionate and prevent arbitrary interference with people’s privacy. It would therefore be very helpful to see that detail in order for Parliament to be confident about the content of that code of practice and how these powers will actually be used.
Mike Wood
Q
Ellen Lefley: I will try to give a very brief summary of the wider legislative framework that operates with respect to artificial intelligence in general. There are, of course, human rights obligations on any public authority or any authority exercising public functions, as well as equality obligations against direct and indirect discrimination. There is the data protection framework, which of course relates to personal data. Then there are different obligations on artificial intelligence use within different sectoral areas.
Mike Wood
Q
Ellen Lefley: That is where it gets quite tricky, because of course the first barrier would be even knowing that you have been subject to any kind of algorithmic decision making or algorithmic-assisted decision making. If you have been subject to a completely automated decision, the new data Bill that is coming through will enable you to make representations and to request human intervention after the fact. But if algorithms are assisting a human decision-making process, there is no right to be notified, let alone to complain.
The position of someone who has been subject to one of these decision-making processes also needs to be considered in a very realistic way. The motivation, empowerment, means and brain space to complain in such circumstances cannot always be relied on. Justice is clear that while access to redress is always important, preventing unfair and discriminatory decision making always needs to be the priority.
The Chair
There being no further questions, I thank the witness for her evidence. We will now move on to the next panel.
Examination of Witness
Mark Cheeseman OBE gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear evidence from Mark Cheeseman OBE, chief executive of the Public Sector Fraud Authority. We have until 3.50 pm.
Mike Wood
Q
Mark Cheeseman: The practical benefit to consider is that the place from where these powers are operated will have some degree of independence and separation from Ministers. That is a practice you would see in other circumstances as well, so it may give Parliament some assurance. That is balanced up against the cost.
Mike Wood
Q
Mark Cheeseman: In the Bill, the Minister passes the powers to authorised officers. The authorised officers could be in that statutory body, and the authorised officers would be the ones who use the powers to do that. Those authorised officers would be people who have experience working in fraud and are part of the Government counter-fraud profession.
Mike Wood
Q
Mark Cheeseman: The Bill currently lays it to the authorised officers. One of the transformations that has been going on in Government is the professionalisation of counter-fraud work. We now have a counter-fraud profession. There are now professional standards where, a while back, there were not, for a lot of investigations in the public sector. There are professional standards and practices, and a code of ethics for people who work in the sector. That sets a standard for the knowledge, skills and experience that the authorised officers exercising the powers would have. As to what level they are, that aligns with current practice and what you would see across the public sector.
Mike Wood
Q
Mark Cheeseman: The Public Sector Fraud Authority has been created by bringing together people from other spaces. These powers are designed by His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. We heard from Richard Las earlier about the powers that HMRC uses to take action on suspected fraud where it has reasonable cause to do so. It is some of those experts who have come and developed these powers. I feel that that capability will come into the organisation, through which the organisation will be able to use the powers.
Mike Wood
Q
Mark Cheeseman: Absolutely. The code of practice will be developed alongside the legislation, as is standard practice.
Mike Wood
We saw this in other legislation under the previous Government. It is not uncommon for Ministers to give an undertaking that at least a draft code might be published before legislation returns to Parliament for final decisions to be made. I know this is, perhaps, a question to ask of Ministers in a future session, but what are your thoughts on developing a draft code that parliamentarians might be able to look at whilst making those decisions, given that the legislation is now well under way? Is that something that you feel is a long way away, or would it be possible to have at least an outline of a draft code in a reasonably short period of time? I accept that there will be developments as we learn with experience.
Mark Cheeseman: I will leave Ministers to answer that question later, but we are developing the codes of practice now. The reason I talked about who has come into the Public Sector Fraud Authority to think about this is because it is not from scratch; we are basing it off current practice elsewhere. We are now developing those and they are under way, but I will leave it for Ministers to respond on the timescale.
Mike Wood
Q
Mark Cheeseman: It is important to remember that the 10 days in the legislation is a minimum. It is the lowest that would be used. It is not saying that it will always be 10 days. One of the witnesses earlier highlighted that some of the organisations will have standard practices where they could respond in that time—they will be set up to do so. The time that is given will be dependent on the organisation you are interacting with, the individual you are interacting with and what is reasonable. Our fraud investigators are trying to balance the expediency of doing the investigation with making sure that people can respond, and that it is a fair and reasonable time to respond. The balance is there, and we should remember that that timescale is a minimum.
Mike Wood
Q
Mark Cheeseman: It is slightly different—it goes back within the structure, but the review of that decision is done by a separate authorised officer from the original authorised officer who did it.
Mike Wood
Q
Mark Cheeseman: The process as set out in the legislation is within the organisation, but there is an extra safeguard of an independent chair who will review the decisions taken by authorised officers. One would expect that that would be on a sampling basis, but we will be reviewing those decisions. If there are practices where those timescales look unreasonable, the independent chair could pick up on that and ask for action to be taken on it.
Mike Wood
Q
Mark Cheeseman: There will be case-by-case review, but you are right; it will be more, “Here is an issue that should be dealt with, and here’s how”.
Andrew Western
Q
Mark Cheeseman: My view is that the Bill does strike that balance, and it tries to strike the balance. It is difficult, because you need to balance the ability to take action against someone who has committed fraud against the state with having fair and reasonable processes for looking at someone who has not. The purpose of an investigation is not to find fraud; it is to find fact. That is why we have professionals who are trained and have a code of ethics around objectivity; their role is to find fact, not fraud. The Bill tries to strike that balance both by having authorised officers and by having the oversight that is in place. The Government structure, in having the counter-fraud profession, provides some of that as well. My view of the Bill is that there is a fair amount of independent oversight—that is a good thing—to increase how well things are done.
Michael Payne (Gedling) (Lab)
Q
Mark Cheeseman: Of course. When we estimate fraud, we estimate fraud and error, as the NAO has done. The NAO used the methodology that we have used previously. We have not repeated that yet, because it has gone ahead of us in the cycle. I have no reason to indicate that its estimate is incorrect, but that is its estimate, and Joshua was here earlier.
We estimate fraud and error as a whole, rather than fraud separately, but what we have seen in the fraud data is that detected fraud in the public sector has risen over the past few years. We have published that. Some was due to covid, but some is in other spaces. Earlier witnesses indicated that the threat has risen and that there are some changes in the perception of fraud and of how people may approach it.
My perspective is that the level of fraud and error in the system is high. There is waste there, and Parliament itself has challenged the Government on what more they can do to deal with it. The threat is rising, and therefore in my position, I think that the powers will help to take action on that. There is more to do to drive down waste and to reduce fraud in the system.
Michael Payne
Q
Mark Cheeseman: I will come back to what I said about the counter-fraud profession. We are one of the only countries in the world with professional standards published. Those are used by the police, the Serious Fraud Office and HMRC. They use these types of powers successfully on a regular basis. We would have exactly the same standard of investigator—both by bringing them in and by training them up to those standards—who would use these powers if and when they are in place.
Georgia Gould
Q
Mark Cheeseman: Yes. Apologies—that was a slip when I answered earlier. Yes, the powers of the Minister—it is written as “the Minister” in the Bill—are delegated to authorised officers, who sit in the PSFA. They would be qualified to the standards of the profession, and they would be taking the decision. What I was referring to earlier is that any review decision, if someone asked for a review, would be taken by a separate authorised officer. There are a number of provisions in the Bill to enable people within the process to make an information-gathering request or to ask for something else to be reviewed.
Georgia Gould
Q
Mark Cheeseman: Absolutely. That decision is made by the authorised officers, based on their experience of weighing up both proportionality and how they can engage with the organisation or individual they are asking for that information, and that individual or organisation can request a review of that request.
Georgia Gould
Q
Mark Cheeseman: Absolutely. First, the PSFA has been brought together from experts across the system. We have brought in experts not just from within the public sector, but from other sectors, and we also work with other countries to understand what they do on this. We have been consulting very widely with the public sector, and a number of the people who have come to look at this have looked at it from the point of view of what they could not achieve in their own public bodies and therefore how they could take more action and what that power would look like. We have also brought together other investigators and asked them what they think the optimal powers are and what the proportionality aspect and the safeguards should be, and considered that. We have done quite broad consultation within the public sector, but we have also asked local authorities what their views are on other aspects such as that.
Georgia Gould
Q
Mark Cheeseman: The Public Sector Fraud Authority has two elements to it. One is overseeing Government and how individual Departments are doing in dealing with fraud and what they are doing on it; the Bill itself says that Departments would refer cases to the PSFA and ask for them to be dealt with under it. The second is providing some of the services that support Departments around taking action on fraud where it happens.
The biggest difference we will make, alongside that, is through prevention. We heard from witnesses earlier about the use of data and analytics. We have a data and analytics service that works with public bodies to use that to find and prevent fraud up-front. We also have a risk service that works with other parts of the public sector to understand the risks they face, in order again to prevent those risks by putting in controls.
While there will always be that balance, there will also always be some element of fraud that is still committed. We will not be able to design a system where there is no fraud risk or design out fraud. There will always be cause for an efficient, effective and proportionate part of the machine to take action on those instances of fraud and to investigate them thoroughly and properly.
Rebecca Smith
Q
Mark Cheeseman: Again, I do not know whether it would need to be in the Bill; that would be for you to debate. As it gets past the authorised officer, there is a structure: there are senior leaders with deep experience in investigating fraud who are overseeing them. We have structures of senior investigation officers overseeing your investigators and the individual authorised officers. While it may feel like a big jump, there is a structure to ensure quality, to ensure the right practices, and so on. That directly compares with what happens elsewhere.
I am pretty comfortable that “authorised officers” is a term used elsewhere. I recognise what you say about the seniority of grade; I had to have a wry smile, because it took me a while to get to HEO and SEO—higher executive officer and senior executive officer—but those are still senior, experienced roles. They are experienced administrators with a high level of skillset and expertise doing those roles. Part of the reason for creating the counter-fraud profession is to show the expertise and capability that those experienced counter-fraud experts have in taking action on fraud.
The Chair
There being no further questions, I thank the witness for his evidence and we will move on to the next panel.
Examination of Witness
Jasleen Chaggar gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear evidence from Jasleen Chaggar, the legal and policy officer at Big Brother Watch. We have until 4.10 pm.
Rebecca Smith
Q
Jasleen Chaggar: We recognise that the Bill is different from the previous Conservative Government’s Bill and some changes have been made. However, we are still concerned that the purported safeguards in the Bill are really insufficient. One of the major safeguards that is pointed to as a reassurance is the fact that financial transaction information and special category data will not be handed over to the DWP from the banks. However, it is a circular safeguard in reality, because once the account number and name of the individual has been passed on to the DWP, it can very easily go back to the bank and request that granular financial information. That is incredibly privacy invasive, as you will know, so we are still concerned about the safeguards in the Bill.
A similar safeguard is the provision for an independent person, but there are no safeguards about what qualifications that person should have. They are expected to provide an annual report to Parliament, but we are concerned that their oversight role is more to do with enforcement than accountability. There are provisions about the efficiency of the measures but no provisions about how they impact equality or the adverse consequences on benefits recipients, so we are not reassured by these safeguards.
Rebecca Smith
Q
Jasleen Chaggar: Is that in relation to—
Rebecca Smith
Particularly in relation to bank account details and information on spending, and that sort of thing, which you just used as an example.
Jasleen Chaggar: On the eligibility verification measures—what we are calling the bank spying powers—we are recommending that they be removed in their entirety. They really are unprecedented financial surveillance powers. There are no other laws like this in this country. The powers would permit generalised mass surveillance of everybody’s bank accounts. It is not just benefits claimants who will be targeted; it is everyone’s accounts, including yours and mine. They will be scanned using algorithmic software to make sure that the eligibility indicators are not met. Even if you are a benefits recipient, you can appoint an individual—a parent, a guardian, an appointed person or your landlord—to receive the benefit on your behalf, so those people will also be pulled into the net of surveillance. We do not really see a way in which these measures could ever be proportionate.
Andrew Western
Q
Jasleen Chaggar: What is really important about the Bill is the conflation of fraud and error. It is not just people suspected of serious crime, or even low-level crime, who are pulled into the net of surveillance. It is also people who, while navigating the complexities of the benefits system, may have found themselves on the wrong side of making a benefits claim and made a mistake. It also involves DWP’s own errors, which make up one in 10 errors. What is critical when we are thinking about the Bill is that it is suspicionless surveillance that applies to everyone.
Andrew Western
Q
Jasleen Chaggar: There is another difference between HMRC recovering money and the DWP recovering money. When you think about the types of individuals these powers will be recovering money from, they are among some of the most vulnerable in our society. There are people living on the breadline, disabled people, elderly people and carers, who will all be dragged into this surveillance. The risk of errors caused by the automated system that is proposed will, therefore, have a dispro- portionate effect on those groups of people. There is a difference, if that is the case, between the powers being used by HMRC and the DWP.
Andrew Western
Q
Jasleen Chaggar: I am not aware of powers that are similar to eligibility verification notices that are exercised by the DWP. I am aware that they have similar powers in relation to direct deduction orders, and maybe that is the distinction that the witnesses earlier were making.
Andrew Western
Q
You talk about the inclusion of error, as well as fraud, in what we are attempting to do here. Do you accept that there is the potential, through the effective use of the eligibility verification measure, to detect overpayments through error sooner, thereby reducing any overpayment because it would come to light earlier?
Jasleen Chaggar: Yes, and to stop people getting into debt is an incredibly laudable aim. The question is whether we are willing to infringe the privacy rights of the entirety of the population to do that. Perhaps a more proportionate solution would be to make it easier for those benefits claimants who are making mistakes to navigate the system in the first place.
Coming back to your previous point, if you were happy to send me information about those powers, I would be happy to get back to you with our position on those.
Andrew Western
Q
Jasleen Chaggar: I accept that the Government are purporting that this is a sufficient safeguard, but I propose that it is not, because of that circularity.
Andrew Western
Q
Jasleen Chaggar: Absolutely. We believe as much as anyone that fraud and error need to be tackled in this country. Our position is that the best way to do that is through intelligence-led policing, where there is suspicion of fraud and not just of error, that is well resourced. In relation to error, as I have said, we think that making the benefits system easier to navigate in the first place, and the DWP getting its own house in order to avoid its own errors, are far better, more proportionate and privacy-preserving solutions than the ones proposed in the Bill.
Andrew Western
Q
Jasleen Chaggar: I think that it is important that suspicion has already arisen before those policing powers can be enacted. The police already have powers to request that granular financial information where there is suspicion of fraud.
Andrew Western
Q
Jasleen Chaggar: I think that there are ways to address this. We are a civil liberties organisation, and our job is to be a watchdog and to ensure that privacy rights are preserved. I do not have a solution for how the police should find out whether someone is suspicious, but we should not sacrifice the privacy rights of us all just to find out whether we should be suspicious of someone when no suspicion exists. As I said, it is a disproportionate power.
Siân Berry
Q
Jasleen Chaggar: Our view is that the powers will only ever be proportionate if they uphold the presumption of innocence, due process and judicial oversight, and any privacy infringements are set out in law and are necessary and proportionate. We feel that a code of conduct would be insufficient, because it would just defer those legal protections to some other time. Also, if an individual has a problem as a result of the use of the powers, they are unable to enforce their rights through a code of conduct. Setting out the protections in legislation would create a far more rights-preserving framework, with which we would definitely feel more comfortable.
Siân Berry
Q
Jasleen Chaggar: We are really concerned about the unintended consequences of the Bill. We appreciate that there has been an effort to tackle fraud and error, which is a serious problem, but we also have to consider the adverse and unintended consequences. One of those is the algorithmic error that can occur when automated systems are used on a population-wide scale. If the algorithms are scanning the bank accounts of 10 million people, an error rate of just 1% will result in 100,000 cases where innocent people are wrongfully investigated.
We are also really concerned about the human backstop element. The DWP has assured us that there will be human involvement in any investigations on the back of receiving this data, but when you receive such a deluge of information from the banks, that calls into question whether the human involvement will be meaningful. The impact assessment acknowledges that by saying that we might have to slow down the rate at which we receive all this data from banks. We are very concerned about the false positives, and about the devastating effects that they would have on the lives of the individuals who are wrongfully investigated.
Benefits recipients, who are already subjected to burdens in terms of documentation requirements, will find themselves subjected to an investigation by the DWP. We have heard from dozens of disability rights and elderly rights groups about the anxiety and stress that this will cause. Also, when benefits recipients are under investigation, they can find that their benefits are suspended, meaning that they will not have the money to pay for food, medical bills or heating bills. So the equality impact also has to be considered, and we have not actually seen an equalities impact assessment for the Bill either, which is a concern.
The Chair
There being no further questions, I thank the witness for her evidence. We will move on to the next panel.
Jasleen Chaggar: Thank you for having me.
Examination of Witnesses
Geoff Fimister and Rick Burgess gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from Geoff Fimister, of the Campaign for Disability Justice, and Rick Burgess, from the Greater Manchester Disabled People’s Panel, who joins us via video link. For this panel, we have until 4.40 pm. I have introduced the witnesses already, so we will go straight to Rebecca Smith.
Rebecca Smith
Q
Geoff Fimister: I should say, first of all, that the Campaign for Disability Justice was launched relatively recently—a few months ago—by Inclusion Barnet. We now have a substantial number of individuals—several hundred—supporting us, as well as a substantial number of organisations, ranging from large charities to grassroots disabled people’s organisations, so we get quite a lot of feedback.
I suppose our concern with the Bill include a broad aspect, but also a very specific aspect as to how it may impact disabled people. The broad aspect is that, because it focuses very much on means-tested benefits, it will, by definition, disproportionately affect people on low incomes, and disproportionately affect disabled people, because they are more likely to be on low incomes than others.
The practical issue, which I think has attracted the most concern, from the conversations I have had, is false positives, as the previous witness, Jasleen Chaggar, mentioned. We are all familiar with a world in which we have problems with malfunctioning technology. Every few months, my internet provider locks my inbox because of “suspicious activities”, which have included sending an email to an MP’s researcher or one to Mencap. Every now and then, my bank freezes my wife’s and my bank accounts because of “suspicious activity”, such as, on one occasion, purchasing a sandwich from a Marks and Spencer in Deptford.
That might sound entertaining, but it is a serious business; this tech goes wrong, and I think the previous witness made the point that, if large numbers of people are embraced by this kind of trawl, it will go wrong for a percentage of them. We do not know whether that will be a large or a small percentage, but even a small percentage of a big number is a lot of people. People being left without any income if technology triggers the cessation of their benefit is a serious business. Not having any income can cause hardship, debt and stress. In extreme cases, there can be serious health and safety issues. Disabled people are concerned about that kind of eventuality.
As to what we can do about it, I understand the thrust of the Bill and where it is coming from. In parliamentary terms, it has widespread backing, although a number of reservations have been expressed. We would like to see some sort of safeguard whereby benefits could not be stopped unless and until it was established that there was an overpayment—not that the DWP thinks that there might have been because the tech spotted something. We do not want to see a “shoot first and ask questions” later approach. If we could have some protection along those lines, that would be helpful.
Rick Burgess: I stress that I am from the Greater Manchester Coalition of Disabled People. The panel is something we do, but I am not speaking in that role today.
There are particular worries about how this affects people living with mental distress, particularly those with diagnoses of paranoia, schizophrenia, depression or anxiety. This adds to the feeling of being monitored, followed and surveilled, because you literally are being surveilled by your bank on behalf of the Government. So it will necessarily reduce the wellbeing of disabled people who are claiming benefits that are monitored by the system. There is no getting away from that.
On the potential risks, when you enter a trawling operation, you are not targeting it in any way; you are simply looking at everyone. So the error rate becomes extremely important. We do not know exactly what the technology is. We have not seen the equality impact assessment, but even if it had a failure rate of 0.1%, which would be a quite respectable systemic failure rate—it is pretty acceptable in a lot of these areas—that is still 1,000 people per million scanned. If you are talking about even the means-tested benefits, that is going to run to thousands of people getting false positives. If you think about the entire DWP caseload, which is 22.6 million people, that is over 22,000 people. Bearing in mind that the Post Office scandal involved fewer than 1,000 people, you are at the inception stage of something that could be the greatest miscarriage of justice in British history, if you go ahead with this with untested technology that has not had proper impact assessments.
I stress, though, that we are against this measure in its totality because it treats disabled people as a separate population who should have lower privacy rights than the general population. In that respect, given that the United Nations has condemned the UK twice in a row for grave and systemic human rights abuses, this is going further in the wrong direction and failing to address the failures identified by the UN. It is further marking disabled people for additional state oppression and surveillance, which, as I said, will necessarily be harmful to a great many of the people under the surveillance regime.
Andrew Western
Q
Rick Burgess: Because we are over-represented in those classes. If you choose to target it at those cohorts, you are accepting an additional level of targeting towards disabled people, which is discriminatory.
Andrew Western
Q
Rick Burgess: I think it does edge into that. There is certainly established thinking and case law that begins to establish that. The Equality and Human Rights Commission need to be brought into this urgently. There need to be public and transparent equality impact assessments, because I do not see how this does not breach a right to privacy and represent discrimination against groups who are over-represented in these cohorts.
Andrew Western
Q
Rick Burgess: It is about where that measure is one of a number of additional enforcement measures, rules or laws that would have negative consequences. The key to this is the trawling nature of the technology; it is not targeted, beyond being aimed at everyone on UC, everyone on ESA and so on. When you trawl, you do not target, and then you have a huge cohort. If, in that cohort, you have over-representation, without even thinking about it, you have then enacted a level of discrimination, because of the trawling nature of this approach.
If this approach applied to everybody on benefits, that would also be slightly questionable, because you are applying a different level of privacy to people who get an award from the DWP versus people who do not. If it applied to the whole country, I suppose that would be fairer in one respect, but it would also be a breach of everyone’s privacy, which goes to another question.
In terms of this measure being important for Government revenue, the amount lost to the tax gap is more than four times more—we are talking about £9.1 billion, but the tax gap is over £39 billion. You would recover more money if you subjected the whole country to this measure, but I would suggest that the reason you do not subject the whole country to it is that there would be outrage, because people would find their rights to privacy being completely abused.
Applying this measure in these targeted ways suggests a level of, “Well, these are people who perhaps have less rights to privacy than the general population.” If you are happy to have your bank account monitored in this way, fine, but you have not suggested that this should apply to the general population. You have suggested that it should apply to a population who receive benefits, and within that population there is an over-representation of disabled people, who are already exhaustively monitored, reviewed and tested and having to provide proof, whether that is for a blue badge, personal independence payment, ESA, universal credit or a concessionary pass on public transport.
The life of a disabled person is to be constantly tested and examined and having to produce proof, and this is another step in that. That is why this is germane to the United Nations report on the convention on the rights of persons with disabilities. We have continued down the road of removing rights, not respecting them, and of subjecting disabled people to greater scrutiny, greater surveillance and greater tests of their basic rights to be a citizen of this country. It is really quite distressing for disabled people to be in this position.
Not only have we had two really damning reports from the United Nations, but the new Government is actually adopting old policies of the previous Government and continuing on that road. The level of anger and distress in the disabled community is absolutely enormous. It is really difficult to explain to people that this is not an obvious attack, or one motivated by ableist assumptions about how disabled people run their lives or whether they are more or less honest, or more or less genuine, than people who are not disabled. It is really hard going for us—I have to tell you that. Disabled people in Britain have had a decade and a half of being the scapegoat of this country, and it has to stop. This measure is actually making it worse, as opposed to stopping that scapegoating.
Geoff Fimister: I just want to add something to a point that Rick made. We both made the point that the discriminatory aspect relating to disabled people arises, in the immediate sense, from the fact that these means-tested benefits are primarily in scope at the moment, and disabled people are disproportionately likely to be on low incomes. It is worth adding that if this measure were to be extended at a future stage to a wider range of benefits, potentially bringing disability benefits into scope, that would be even more sharp discrimination against disabled people.
They are not theoretical points that Rick has been making—there is a really raw feeling among disabled people that they are being targeted. In the context of quite a lot of negative media publicity around the interface between employment and unemployment among disabled people, there is an unpleasant atmosphere for disabled people. That is certainly the feedback that we are getting.
Andrew Western
I will not ask any more questions, but I just say to Rick that I think it might be helpful for a follow-up conversation to take place. Without wishing to get into a protracted argument, there were some things that I did not recognise as part of the Bill, but clearly that is how people are feeling and how the people you represent are feeling. I am very happy to ask officials to pick up a conversation to go through the detail.
The Chair
There being no further questions, I thank the panel for their evidence, which was robustly delivered.
Examination of Witnesses
Andrew Western and Georgia Gould gave evidence.
The Chair
For the final session, we have the Ministers in charge of the Bill. We have until 5 pm. You have been participating actively in the proceedings already, but could both of you please introduce yourselves for the record?
Andrew Western: I am Andrew Western, Minister for Transformation at the DWP.
Georgia Gould: I am Georgia Gould, the Minister for public sector reform at the Cabinet Office, with responsibility for fraud against the public sector.
Mike Wood
Q
Andrew Western: For the DWP part of the Bill, there will be three individual codes of practice: one for the eligibility verification measure, one for the debt recovery measure and one for the information gathering measure. As for exactly how they will work, you will appreciate that we are able to talk only in general terms at the moment, because that will depend on what the final version of the Bill looks like. That is why we do not currently have a code of practice that we can share.
Perhaps it will be helpful if I say a bit about how we intend to engage both Houses on the content of the codes of practice. For the Bill Committee, I will provide an outline of what will be covered by the draft codes of practice as we come to each of the relevant clauses, allowing the Committee to provide feedback on what they feel should be in there.
Beyond that, we intend—there are ongoing engagements, as you heard earlier from, for instance, UK Finance—to publish a draft version of the codes of practice as they pertain to the DWP in time for the House of Lords Committee stage, so it will also have the opportunity to play into the conversation on that. Ultimately, there will be a final statutory public consultation on the content of the codes of practice. It is difficult to say with any sort of exactness or precision what the codes of practice will look like at this stage, without knowing what amendments, if any, will be made to the Bill. But I know that Georgia has a code of practice on her side as well.
Georgia Gould: I do, and the same applies. As we go through the clauses, I will share with the Committee where we are on the codes of practice in relation to those clauses. We are working on the same timeline set out by the Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, my hon. Friend the Member for Stretford and Urmston. For the PSFA, within the Bill, it requires a code of practice that is particularly focused on penalties, in clause 60. Beyond that mandatory content, the intention is that the code of practice will also include information on safeguards and vulnerability assessments when it applies to the PSFA powers for investigating individuals, and more detailed information on the various reviews and appeals.
Mike Wood
Q
Andrew Western: That is the route we are taking. Obviously, Members have an opportunity to suggest what they would like to see in the code. The code is primarily an operational document rather than one on the general principles in the Bill and what we are trying to achieve through it. I absolutely understand that Members will want to see that, but we are simply not able to bring forward a final code of practice. It would not be possible to do that without knowing what is in the Bill. We can commit to sharing a draft as soon as we are able, but even that would be subject to change. It is not unusual, as I understand it, for this to be the case.
Mike Wood
Q
Andrew Western: All I would say is that that is the timeline we are proposing to follow. We will share the draft code of practice as soon as we are able to do so for all the measures that have them.
Mike Wood
Q
Andrew Western: I am happy to confirm precisely—because it may be that Members, as we go through the Committee stage, make it very clear what their expectations would be—what the current proposal is before we go into line-by-line scrutiny on Thursday.
Mike Wood
Yes.
Andrew Western: Because they are iterative documents that will change as we go through the test-and-learn phase. In particular, we are looking to introduce the eligibility verification measure in quite a cautious manner initially to check that it works, and to check that we do not have the sort of overreach that some witnesses have suggested may be the case. We want to be certain that the false positives that we have talked about and that witnesses have raised are minimised as best as possible. It is to enable flexibility so that we have the maximum potential to make any changes that we require, but obviously we would update the House as and when we were to do that.
Mike Wood
Q
Andrew Western: I would be very happy to have that conversation, should you want to table any amendments in that regard.
Mike Wood
Q
Andrew Western: I would not accept that and I do not think that that is the case. I would say that we require that flexibility. Even with the six weeks, if there are problems in the process, we would potentially need to act more swiftly than that, based on feedback from stakeholders. As I said, colleagues are very welcome to table amendments if they want to secure any changes in that regard.
Neil Coyle
Q
The Chair
That is a matter for debate. I think it is probably a question for the Library. Let us carry on with the questioning.
Mike Wood
Q
“Where it is proposed to introduce a code of practice in a way or for a purpose which departs from the guidance below, Ministers should be aware that this is likely to be controversial, particularly in the House of Lords.”
Have officials brought that to your attention?
Andrew Western: As I said earlier, we hope to have a draft code of practice by the time we reach the House of Lords Committee Stage. Clearly, alongside consideration of that guidance, as I said—and it was reiterated by Mr Coyle—this has not been unusual practice in recent years, as I understand it.
Mike Wood
Q
“the drafting of the code ought to begin early enough to enable a decision as to whether statutory provision is required”.
Has that drafting been done early enough?
Andrew Western: As I said, we will debate this in more detail as we come to the relevant stages. I think that we have done this in sufficient time to enable us to consult, as we are required to do, on the statutory code of practice and to ensure that both Houses can see it as it makes its way through the process.
Mike Wood
Q
“if Parliament is to be asked to enact statutory provisions relating to a code,”
which appears to be the case in this instance,
“a draft of the proposed code should if at all possible be made available so that the appropriateness of the statutory provisions can be properly considered.”
Obviously, that is part of the legislative process. Should we not have that information? Why should only the House of Lords be provided with that?
Andrew Western: I suspect that at that point you are asking a procedural question, so I am not best placed to answer it.
Michelle Welsh (Sherwood Forest) (Lab)
Q
Andrew Western: In the DWP space, we estimate that the amount would be £1.5 billion over the forecast period. That roughly equates to around £950 million on the eligibility verification measure, with the overwhelming majority of the rest—in fact, almost all of it—coming from the debt recovery power. There are also potentially significant savings over time that my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office may want to outline with regard to the PSFA powers. I realise that they are scalable; they start off small-scale. Minister Gould, would you like to come in on the potential?
Georgia Gould: They are more modest in the first instance. We are estimating just under £60 million-worth of savings. We are testing the new models. If the model is successful, there is potential to scale that up. We think that this is the first time we are introducing powers to take on fraud in the wider public sector outside tax and welfare. A huge amount of fraud has gone uninvestigated. We think the deterrent impact of this will be substantial.
Gill German (Clwyd North) (Lab)
Q
Andrew Western: As I have highlighted in my questions to witnesses throughout the day, there is the potential, through the eligibility verification measure, for a number of overpayments to be detected earlier than they would have been otherwise, thereby avoiding the large numbers that we have seen people rack up in overpayments through, for instance, the carer’s allowance challenges that we have seen in recent years.
The breadth of the conversation we are looking to have with people who are in debt with the Department is significant. We heard about the MoneyHelper service, on which the Money and Pensions Service works with us. That is just one of a range of organisations and packages that we utilise to support people who are in debt. We know that, whatever the reason—whether it is fraud or error, but particularly, as you say, if it is error—it is an incredibly stressful time for people.
In debt recovery terms, the power that we are taking is intended to be a power of last resort. What we always want to do, having been through all the things that you would expect us to do—the vulnerability management framework that was referenced earlier and the assessment that we make of people’s ability to pay—is to agree an affordable repayment plan. By the time we reach the point where we are looking for a direct deduction order, we would have looked to engage somebody on multiple occasions, contacting them several times and trying to agree that plan. This is for people we have no other means of engaging. It is as much a lever to try to bring them to the table and have the sorts of conversations you referenced as anything else.
This is also about addressing the existing fundamental unfairness. We can directly deduct from somebody in receipt of benefits, by deducting from that benefit entitlement, and we can do the same for someone in pay-as-you-earn employment, but we do not have that opportunity for people in receipt of income through other means—most obviously, but not exclusively, self-employed people. There is a fundamental point about addressing that inequity in the system. Having made those financial assessments, we know that these are people who can afford to pay. We have tried to reach out with the wraparound support that you suggested, and ultimately, they continue to refuse to engage.
Michael Payne
Q
Andrew Western: As it relates to the DWP—I do not know whether you want to say anything about the PFSA powers later, Georgia—it is worth reflecting that the proposed eligibility verification power is in effect a data-push power. The banks will not make any decisions as to someone’s culpability, on what penalty they might receive, or on whether the overpayment flagged on the account is legitimate; all the banks will do is send back a marker against an account to suggest that someone is in breach of their eligibility requirements.
For example, that might include someone who has more than £16,000 in their account, but is in receipt of universal credit. It is important to say that the flag is then passed to a human investigator to analyse the information and look at what the reasons may be, because there can be very legitimate reasons why someone has more than £16,000 in their account and is still entitled to benefits, such as someone who has received a compensation payment that is out of scope of what would be considered capital for benefit-eligibility reasons.
In all the five principal measures on the DWP side of the Bill, a human is involved in the decision making: on eligibility verification, it is passed to an investigator; on information gathering, when we receive information, it is passed to an investigator to consider the next steps in a fraud investigation; on debt recovery, an individual—a person—would make a decision as to someone’s ability to repay a debt; and on penalties reform as proposed, a human will determine what actions will be taken against a person who received a penalty for fraud against a DWP grant scheme. That is entirely the way that it works with any other penalty that can already be applied. Finally, on the powers of search and seizure, as we would expect, a human judge will take a decision on whether to issue a warrant. At every stage, a human decision maker is baked in before any final decision on sanction or otherwise.
Rebecca Smith
Q
Andrew Western: A draft code of practice will not be available at that stage, so I will speak in general terms about what we intend to include, but there will not be a written document at that stage.
Rebecca Smith
Q
Now the question that I was coming to, if I may. The state pension has been explicitly excluded from the eligibility verification measure, and the three means-tested benefits are the initial focus. I wonder why the Government have left it open to include other non-means-tested benefits in future, and what data would the Government ask for in those cases?
Andrew Western: The state pension is excluded—because of the particular nature of the eligibility criteria for state pension and the consequently incredibly small amount of fraud that we see on it—considering the number of people we would have to bring into scope of the measure to go after what is a tiny amount of fraud. It is not considered proportionate to do that, as far as I am concerned.
The determination that we have made as to the three benefits that should initially be in scope is entirely predicated on current levels of fraud and error. We want to retain the ability, if necessary, to bring other benefits into scope, should there be a surge in fraud in those benefit areas. We do not anticipate this, but we want to future-proof the Bill as best as we can, should there be any material changes in the level of fraud in those areas. For instance, if we consider the tiny amount of fraud in the state pension versus the £1 in every £8 currently spent in universal credit that turns out to be fraud or error, it is clearly right to distinguish between benefits and consequently to have some in scope and others not.
Sally Jameson
Q
Andrew Western: I answered this slightly in response to Mr Payne, but the flag in of itself does not mean that someone has been found guilty of fraud. A bank indicating to us that someone has above a certain amount of capital in their account does not mean, “Job done, box ticked”, or that person receives news that they have been found to have committed fraud, or that we then go through the penalty process with that individual. It would be referred to the most appropriate team for investigation—in the case of capital fraud, the team that looks at that particular type of fraud.
The principal other type of fraud that we think would be in scope is people who have been out of the country for longer than they are allowed to be as a condition of their benefit. Again, it is really important that we do not automatically penalise somebody for having done that, because it could be on grounds of a health emergency abroad. I had somebody in my advice surgery recently whose flights had been cancelled due to an environmental issue in the country that he was seeking to return from. It is really important that this is triaged to a human investigator to look into what the nature of the flag is, what the benefit eligibility criterion that we suspect may not have been satisfied is, and then take the appropriate steps needed to establish whether there is any legitimate reason for that.
Siân Berry
Q
Andrew Western: We would need, at that point, to take advice—legal advice, primarily—if there was that level of concern around any human rights impact. I would not want to second-guess, but certainly, in the instance where those views have been put forward and the legal advice suggested that they were valid, then clearly we would need to take appropriate action to ensure that the Bill is legal and satisfactory.
Siân Berry
Q
Anthony Western: When I talk about reducing over-payments, I mean reducing the value of overpayments rather than the number. Obviously, for a bank account to be flagged, there would have to be something in there to cause that flag. This would not reduce the overall number of overpayments necessarily, but it would reduce the amount of debt that someone might have accrued, were the eligibility verification measure to identify that at an earlier stage. We have seen some horrendous cases, through the carer’s allowance issues that have come to light, involving really significant numbers, because it has gone on for several years. That is the sort of thing we would be able to stop as a result of this—I am really sorry, Siân, but I cannot remember the rest of your question.
Siân Berry
Q
Andrew Western: I am not sure that I fully understood the question, so please come back in if needed. It is clearly the case that if somebody has been receiving benefits that they are not entitled to, for whatever reason, they could end up in a worse financial position as a consequence. That is necessarily the case for two principal reasons. One is that in universal credit all overpayments are reclaimed regardless of the circumstances behind them. That was the policy enacted by the previous Government. The other reason is that they may no longer receive benefits that they previously believed themselves to be entitled to. For instance, if it comes to light that you have £18,000 in your account and there is no mitigating circumstance for that, it would be the case that you would be worse off in overall terms because you would no longer receive that benefit.
Siân Berry
Q
Andrew Western: I am not prepared to put a percentage on it. We would have to see what came out. We have done two previous trials on this and we are fairly confident in the mechanisms that are in place. That has underpinned some of the assumptions we have made. We are committing through this process to a test and learn phase so that we can keep errors as minimal as possible. Ideally, I would not want to see any errors at all, but ultimately we have structured this so that, were something to come back as a false positive, as it were, it would not lead to an immediate decision, because it would be passed to a human investigator for further investigation.
Neil Coyle
Q
Andrew Western: I think it is fundamental, given both the lack of previous action that you identify and a general modernisation of powers. The world is changing. The nature of fraud is changing, and the behaviours exhibited by fraudsters are different from those of 10 or 15 years ago. The previous Government tried to bring forward the third-party data measure, now likened to the eligibility verification measure, but it did not have the oversight and safeguards in place that we have now.
There are a number of totally new proposals in the Bill that are crucial. To your point about the capacity of the police, the powers of search and seizure will be particularly helpful in speeding up investigations into serious and organised crime, because we can crack on with that, as it were, and enter premises without the need to wait for co-ordinated action from the police.
The other totally new power that is really important here, and which I personally think is a fairness argument, is the ability to directly deduct from people who receive their income through means other than benefits or PAYE employment. Overall, it is a fundamental change to the way that we do it, and it is part of a broader package. As I said earlier, this saves £1.5 billion over the forecast period, but it is part of a broader suite of measures that amount to the largest ever intervention to tackle fraud of £8.6 billion over that period. Unfortunately, like many of these things, that number is so high because the level of fraud we have is so high.
Georgia Gould: I add that the PSFA measures are entirely new. There have previously been no powers to investigate and recover fraud from the wider public sector, outside of tax and welfare. This is some of the highest-value fraud, through procurement or businesses falsely applying for Government grants, which is currently going un-investigated because of the resource pressures that you talked about. These are landmark new powers to investigate fraud across the wider public sector that have not previously been considered.
Neil Coyle
Q
Andrew Western: Yes. We are always looking at ways that we can build stronger relationships and build trust. On specific interventions, I would argue that—although it runs contrary to the evidence that we heard from the witnesses—there is the potential, through the eligibility verification measure, to build trust not just with disabled people but with all people in receipt of benefits, because we will be able to check that they are entitled to what they have. The capture of overpayments at an earlier stage and the ability to know that people who are genuine claimants are receiving the right amount of benefit will help to build that trust.
What really erodes trust is someone being captured in a position where they think that they have, for several years, been receiving benefits to which they are entitled but then end up with, for instance, a £35,000 debt to the Department. There is a suite of activity ongoing with stakeholders. The Minister for Social Security and Disability is doing a tremendous amount of work to reach out to repair relationships where that needs to happen. That work must continue because people make a fair point when they tell us that they are fearful of the DWP. I speak to people who do not want to apply for current benefits; they want to stay on legacy benefits because they fear they will lose entitlement through the application process. That is something that we need to constantly keep under review. We need to look at what we can do to improve those relationships.
Charlie Dewhirst
Q
Andrew Western: That is an important question, on which I have sought to reassure myself. We have already been through a spending review process in which we secured additional funding for further targeted case review officers and officers in the fraud space. I actually think that the number of fraud staff in the Department is slightly concerning not because of a lack but because the number of people suggests the scale of the problem. Because of the spiralling nature of fraud, we have had no option but to significantly scale up the number of people working on both prevention and detection of it. I hope that by embracing new technology, and through data sharing and other mechanisms, we can gradually reduce that number over time. It is a damning indictment of the state that we are in with fraud and error that we have that number of people.
To answer the question, I am assured and we have secured funding for the people that we need.
The Chair
There being no further questions, I thank the Ministers, and all the witnesses, for their participation.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Gerald Jones.)
Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Third sitting)
Thursday 27th February 2025
(3 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesPublic Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 27 February 2025 - (27 Feb 2025)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
Before we begin, I have a few quick preliminary announcements. Members should send their speaking notes by email to hansardnotes@parliament.uk. Please, everyone, switch mobile phones and electronic devices to silent. No matter how much we want tea or coffee, they are not allowed during our sittings.
Today, we will begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection and grouping list for today’s sitting is available in the room. It shows how the clauses and selected amendments have been grouped together for debate. Amendments grouped together are generally on a similar issue. Please note that decisions on amendments do not take place in the order in which they are debated, but in the order in which they appear on the amendment paper. The selection and grouping list shows the order of debates. Decisions on each amendment, and on whether each clause should stand part of the Bill, are taken when we come to the relevant clause.
A Member who has put their name to the lead amendment in a group is called to speak first. Other Members are then free to catch my eye to speak to all or any of the amendments within that group. A Member may speak more than once in a single debate. At the end of a debate on a group of amendments, I shall call the Member who moved the lead amendment again. Before they sit down, they will need to indicate whether they wish to withdraw the amendment or seek a decision. If any Member wishes to press any other amendment in a group to a vote, they should let me know in advance.
Clause 1
Core functions of the Minister for the Cabinet Office
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Georgia Gould)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Lewell-Buck. I look forward to constructive dialogue with the Committee throughout the day.
As the Committee is well aware, fraud against the public sector takes money away from vital public services, enriches those who seek to attack the Government, damages the integrity of the state and erodes public trust. The Bill makes provision for the prevention of fraud against public authorities by the recovery of money paid by public authorities as a result of fraud or error, and for connected purposes. Under part 1, the Bill authorises powers that will be used by the Public Sector Fraud Authority, part of the Cabinet Office, and under part 2, by the Department for Work and Pensions, on which the other Minister in Committee, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, will lead.
I will now consider clauses 1 and 2 together. Clause 1 gives new core functions to the Minister for the Cabinet Office and sets out what can be recovered by the use of the powers under part 1 of the Bill. It describes what the Government want to achieve with part 1: to investigate more public sector fraud; to get back funds lost to the public purse through that fraud; to take enforcement action against fraudsters, whether through civil or criminal routes; and to support public authorities to prevent and address fraud against them.
The functions of the powers under part 1 will be used to deliver. As such, it is necessary that this clause stands part of the Bill. The functions are given to the Minister for the Cabinet Office, but it is important to stress that that is drafting convention, and the Minister will not use the powers personally; instead, in line with the Carltona principles, later clauses set out that the decisions may be taken and powers utilised by authorised officers and authorised investigators appointed by the Minister. Those officials will sit within the Public Sector Fraud Authority and will be experienced investigative professionals trained to Government counter-fraud profession expectations, sitting in a structure led by senior counter-fraud experts. As we heard from the witnesses, that will sit within a system of oversight, to be discussed later in the Bill.
The clause also sets out what “recoverable amounts” are. First, that means payments made as a result of fraud or error that have been identified during the course of a fraud investigation to be either fraudulent or erroneous, and which the affected public authority is entitled to recover. Later clauses cover how that entitlement is established. Error as well as fraud is included here, because if an investigation discovers that there has not been fraud, but none the less that a person has received money that they should not have, the debt powers in the Bill can, if necessary, be used to recover it. That is in line with the approach taken by others, including His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the DWP, but it is important to stress that the core function of the powers is to investigate and recover losses from fraud. Recovery in that way will normally be when alternative voluntary routes have been exhausted, or a person or business can repay but is refusing to do so. All attempts will be made to engage.
Secondly, “recoverable amounts” covers any other amount that a public authority is entitled to recover in respect of that fraud. That covers frauds where no payment has been made, but the fraudster has benefited in some other way—for example, fraudulently not paying what they owe—and the value of that can be determined. Finally, it also includes any interests which would be collectable in those circumstances.
Clause 2 sets out how the Minister for the Cabinet Office can carry out the functions in clause 1. The clause excludes HMRC and the DWP from the list of bodies that the PSFA will be able to take this action for as they both have significant resources and expertise in this area, as well as their own powers. Again, we will discuss that later.
Importantly, the clause does not remove or supersede responsibilities and functions that other public authorities may have in respect of fraud and the recovery of money. The powers in this part allow the Government to fill a gap and complement what already exists. The intention is that, in exercising these functions, the Minister, and the authorised officers and investigators who will use the powers on behalf of the Minister, are not simply moving investigations and recoveries that would happen anyway into the Cabinet Office. Instead, they will primarily use them in a way that is additive, to take on investigations, recover money and take enforcement action that would otherwise not have been done.
Subsection (3) says that the Minister may charge “a fee”. The PSFA does not currently charge for its investigative services, but that gives it authority to do so in the future, consistent with the cost-recovery approach set out in HM Treasury’s “Managing Public Money” guidance. “Public authority” has a broad definition set out in clause 70 and would include, for example, other Government Departments, arm’s length bodies and local authorities.
Clause 2(4) says that the Minister is included in the definition of public authority in clause 70 as far as that concerns fraud or suspected fraud against the Minister, or recovery of money for the Minister. That is to ensure that frauds against the wider Cabinet Office and its agencies and bodies can still be investigated by the PSFA. However, to ensure that there is no conflict of interest, it will be set out in guidance that the PSFA will not investigate alleged frauds within the PSFA or allegations against the Minister personally but will refer those to another agency as deemed appropriate on a case-by-case basis. That will help to ensure the integrity of PSFA investigations by keeping responsibility for investigating fraud in the PSFA, or by the Minister, external to that function, to preserve appropriate independence.
Finally, subsection (5) ensures that, in giving Ministers these functions, this part does not affect a public body’s entitlement to recover an amount or any functions it has in respect of fraud or recovery. That means existing functions and powers are not taken away from public authorities or superseded by the Ministers’ functions.
Mike Wood (Kingswinford and South Staffordshire) (Con)
His Majesty’s Opposition agree with the Bill’s principles and support the Government in what they are seeking to do, but we will be using our best efforts to try to help them do it better where we can. As the Minister said, clause 1 sets out the functions. Those functions seem perfectly sensible and reasonable, as does the way in which the Minister for the Cabinet Office is to interact with other public authorities as set out in clause 2. One of the themes that runs throughout almost all clauses of the Bill is the issue raised by multiple witnesses on Tuesday about how the functions to be allocated to the Minister or their representatives are to be exercised within the various codes of practice provided for in the Bill.
On Tuesday, the Minister seemed to indicate that the Government intend for those codes of practice to be made available for the House of Lords to scrutinise, but not for the House of Commons. That obviously makes it much more difficult for the Committee to consider the appropriateness of those functions and the various powers in the Bill. I urge the Government again to reconsider and look at how the House of Commons can be given those chances before our House completes its consideration. We recognise that that will not be possible in Committee.
In August 2022, the previous Conservative Government established the Public Sector Fraud Authority within the Cabinet Office. We welcome the Bill taking that work forward by establishing the PSFA as a separate body from the Cabinet Office, to which the Cabinet Office is able to transfer functions. We entirely support the Government’s efforts to tackle fraud and error.
The National Audit Office puts the amount lost by fraud and error in the range of £5 billion to £30 billion in 2023-24, so ensuring that the Bill works to tackle both error and fraud is crucial within the functions set out in clause 1, and we will come on to that with some of our amendments to later clauses. Equally, we wish to ensure that the functions assigned to the Minister for the Cabinet Office are proportionate and capable of independent review and oversight. We will return to these important issues with our amendments later on.
I would like to ask the Minister some questions on clauses 1 and 2, the first of which is about the definitions. The Bill does not provide definitions of “fraud against a public authority” or “error”. As we heard in evidence on Tuesday, Dr Kassem from Aston University stated that
“the definition of fraud can be a bit limiting in the current Bill, because, first, it assumes that fraud is happening for financial reasons when that is not necessarily the case. There are non-financial motives. Let us consider insider fraud—fraud committed by insiders, people working for the public authorities—which is one of the most common threats not just in the public sector, but across other sectors. A disgruntled employee can be as dangerous as someone with a financial motive. So I would stick with the Fraud Act 2006 definition of fraud, because it mentions personal gain full stop. It can be financial and it can be non-financial. That has to be clarified.”––[Official Report, Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Public Bill Committee, 25 February 2025; c. 6, Q3.]
Really, it must be clarified within the functions set out for the Minister for the Cabinet Office. Why should that not be the case, and how does the Minister define these things for the Bill, if it is not in line with the Fraud Act 2006? Clause 2(3) also states:
“The Minister may charge another public authority a fee in relation to the exercise of functions under this Part on behalf of, or in relation to, the public authority.”
Can the Minister clarify what we would expect that fee to be? Is it arbitrary or a set amount? Does the Minister decide or is there a particular process?
I would also like to ask the Minister about the amounts that the Government expect to recover under the Bill. According to its impact assessment, the powers in part 1 are estimated to lead to around £54 million—the best estimate for net present benefits—being recovered from public sector fraud over 10 years. Can the Minister reassure the Committee how robust that estimate is, what it is based on and how confident the Government are that the full amount of money will be recovered?
The reason I ask that is because, for the Government across the 10 years, the best estimate for fraud recovered minus costs is £23 million. Different numbers of cases could mean a loss or a slightly higher return, which could be between minus £1.5 million and £24 million. How will the Government ensure that the Bill recovers more money than is paid out in costs in administering its functions? As clauses 1 and 2 are the foundation for establishing the PSFA, the Opposition are content for them to stand part of the Bill.
Steve Darling (Torbay) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Lewell-Buck. I am pleased that you already see that we will become the official Opposition by the next general election, as long as the right hon. Member for North West Essex (Mrs Badenoch) continues.
The Liberal Democrats would like to state clearly that fraud is wrong and, as the Minister rightly stated, it robs the state of the ability to support people and drive the change in our communities that we all thirst for. Our concern is that this legislation is being rushed through Parliament at breakneck speed, and rushed legislation can result in dangerous consequences for those who get caught up in it eventually. I share this concern with the Minister: we legislate at haste and repent at leisure when things go wrong.
Georgia Gould
I thank both hon. Members for their constructive comments. This dialogue will be really important in scrutinising the Bill. I also welcome the support for action on fraud, and the acknowledgment that it is a significant issue.
On timing, I reassure the hon. Member for Torbay that the powers in the Bill that the PSFA is asking for are all powers that exist elsewhere in government. They have been used and tested; they are just being brought into a new context. At the moment, there are few powers to investigate or recover fraud that happens to the wider public sector, but this part of the Bill seeks to rectify that. There has been a great deal of consultation led by me, the Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions and our teams to get us to this point, but we will engage constructively with scrutiny as we move forward.
On the cost-benefit analysis, the overwhelming message from witnesses was that these new powers are necessary because there is a gap in investigating and recovering fraud against the wider public sector, and that the Bill will make a difference.
On the question of the £54 million and whether that is robust, that is a modest amount given we know that at least £3 billion of fraud happens against the wider public sector. It has come about through a great deal of work from the PSFA in modelling forward the current size of the enforcement team and how the powers are used elsewhere. We can therefore be confident in that figure, but if the powers work well we could grow the capacity and potentially recover more fraud.
At the moment, we know that there is fraud going on that the Government cannot investigate. A big part of this will be the deterrent and making it clear that if there is fraud in procurement or grants, there will be real powers to investigate and recover that money. That is really important both for the concrete recovery of money and for trust in how public funds are spent.
On the wider points about the importance of oversight, including of the Bill, that has been incredibly important to the Government. We thought deeply about the measures in the Bill and we will discuss that as we go through it. As for the development of the codes of practice, as I hope the Committee will see today, I will refer to the measures that are to be put in the code of practice as we go through the clauses, so that we can have some discussion about that.
I reassure the Committee that the definition of fraud in clause 70 is as it is defined in the Fraud Act 2006. That includes the main fraud offences, which are false representation, fraud by failure to disclose information when there is a legal duty to do so, and fraud by abuse of position. Hopefully that provides reassurance on that question, and I look forward to answering any other questions.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3
Information notices
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 10, in clause 3, page 2, line 36, at end insert—
“(1A) The Minister has reasonable grounds to suspect a person has committed fraud against a public authority if—
(a) there is an objective basis for the Minister’s suspicion based on facts, verifiable information or intelligence, and
(b) a reasonable person would be entitled to reach same conclusion based on the same facts, information or intelligence.
(1B) The Minister does not have reasonable grounds to suspect a person has committed fraud against a public authority if the Minister’s suspicion—
(a) is based in any way on—
(i) the person’s physical appearance,
(ii) any protected characteristic under the Equality Act 2010 that a person may have or appear to the Minister to have, or
(b) is based solely on any generalisation or stereotype giving rise to a belief that certain groups or categories of people are more likely to be involved in criminal activity.”
Amendment 14, in clause 3, page 3, line 10, delete “10” and insert “28”.
Amendment 9, in clause 3, page 3, line 30, at end insert—
“‘reasonable’ means the Minister must have formed a genuine suspicion in their own mind, and the suspicion that fraudulent activity has taken place must be reasonable. This means that there must be an objective basis for that suspicion based on facts, verifiable information and or intelligence which indicate that fraudulent activity will be found, so that a reasonable person would be entitled to reach the same conclusion based on the same facts and information, and or intelligence.”
Mike Wood
Clause 3 would give the PSFA the power to issue information notices to a third party, compelling them to provide information within a deadline. The amendments set out the circumstances in which that would be done and set what we think is a perfectly reasonable test of reasonableness, as well as exploring the time provided for the recipients of notices to respond. Our amendments are designed to probe some areas of this process. The powers given to the Minister for the Cabinet Office in clause 3 are wide-ranging, so we wish to ensure that these are used reasonably and proportionately, and solely in connection with the explicit purpose of the Bill. We have tabled amendments 11, 10, 14, and 9 to that end.
We have to remember that the powers can be used against individuals and small businesses. While we might expect most of the notices to be issued against multinational companies, particularly financial institutions, we also need to consider those who do not have the capacity of larger organisations. The powers must be used reasonably and effectively in all circumstances.
Amendment 11 sets a reasonableness test relating to whether the information being requested is likely to relate to the fraud in question—for example, in private text messages—and therefore whether it is reasonable to ask for that information, and whether the cost involved in recovering the required information is likely to be reasonable and proportionate. The Minister referred to equivalent powers that are available in other forms of investigation that the Government and their agencies and bodies carry out. We see the reasonableness test as equivalent to that which HMRC must meet in its notices.
We also wish to ensure that the powers are not misused, and amendments 9 and 10 are directed towards that purpose. Although clause 3 states that the Minister can use the powers only against someone
“whom the Minister has reasonable grounds to suspect has committed fraud against a public authority”
the Bill provides no definition of “reasonable”, so amendments 9 and 10 are designed to fill some of that gap.
Amendment 10 specifies that the Minister for the Cabinet Office
“has reasonable grounds to suspect a person has committed fraud against a public authority if…there is an objective basis for the Minister’s suspicion based on facts, verifiable information or intelligence, and…a reasonable person would be entitled to reach same conclusion based on the same facts, information or intelligence.”
We want to be clear about what we do not think are reasonable grounds. These would include, for example, if the Minister’s suspicions were based in any way on a person’s physical appearance—protected characteristics under the Equality Act 2010 that the person may have, or appear to the Minister to have—or were based solely on any generalisation or stereotype giving rise to a belief that certain groups or categories of people are more likely to be involved in criminal activity. We want to ensure that the powers are exercised responsibly and appropriately.
Amendment 9 gives the definition of “reasonable” as meaning that
“the Minister must have formed a genuine suspicion in their own mind, and the suspicion that fraudulent activity has taken place must be reasonable. This means that there must be an objective basis for that suspicion based on facts, verifiable information and or intelligence which indicate that fraudulent activity will be found, so that a reasonable person would be entitled to reach the same conclusion based on the same facts and information, and or intelligence.”
Amendments 9 and 10 are based on the reasonable grounds for suspicion that are contained in the PACE—the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984—code A.
Bearing in mind that these powers will be exercised against individuals, some of whom might struggle to provide information, we want to probe the choice of 10 days as the timeframe in which to provide information. Amendment 14 increases the minimum notice period from 10 working days to 28, which is similar to the standard minimum time that people would expect to be given to respond to written requests for information from HMRC. Given the scope of the information that might be requested, appropriate time must be given to organisations and individuals to comply. External circumstances should also be taken into account when considering the time periods. If an individual is on annual leave or off sick for a few days, they may have less than a week to provide the information or they will face significant fines. That does not seem reasonable.
We are not necessarily saying that 28 days is a better time period than seven, but I would be grateful if the Minister explained why the Government set the minimum time that they did. That is particularly pertinent, as failure to provide the information required would carry a civil penalty of £300 a day, which, for an individual, can amount to a considerable sum of money very quickly.
In its current form, without being more specific about what it means to be “reasonable” or expanding the timeframes, we are a little concerned that the powers that clause 3 gives the Minister may not include the necessary checks and balances, so I would appreciate her reassurances on that point.
Steve Darling
Perhaps the word that the shadow Minister used most was “reasonableness”. In our strange political world in recent months, the question of what is reasonable in our society has changed significantly following the change of President in the United States. What normal society would expect is “reasonable” of an elected official, both here and in America, gives me, as a Liberal Democrat, cause for concern in relation to how we can make sure that a Bill like this, which gives very significant powers to the state, sets safeguards in stone to protect our communities. We will come to that later, but I would welcome reassurance from the Minister. Although I am sure that we are all reasonable people in this room, others who are unreasonable might take power at a later stage of our lives. With this legislation, how can we put safeguards in place? I hope that we will cover that later, but the Minister’s early thoughts would be welcome.
Georgia Gould
I welcome those probing amendments, because they give me an opportunity to provide some clarity and reassurance on those important points. I will respond to them in a second, but on the question of safeguards, as I said in my introduction, we have thought very deeply about them and we are really mindful of the responsibility of these powers, so a broad range of safeguards has been built into both sides of the Bill.
On the PSFA measures, all the use of powers will be overseen by a separate team that will be accountable to an independent chair who will transparently report their findings annually to Parliament. The use of the wider powers will be overseen and reviewed by His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services, which has a lot of experience in this. There are various routes of appeal and review built into the powers, as well as times when applications to court are needed, and we will deal with those in some depth as we go through the clauses. Oversight is absolutely critical, and that is why we have put such a robust oversight system in place.
On clause 3, currently any information needed from first parties or connected third parties can be asked for only if they refuse to provide it, and there is no way for the PSFA to compel the information to be produced without having to go through the civil court. The clause enables authorised officers in the PSFA to compel information to be produced that is not excluded, where it is necessary, proportionate and in line with the data protection legislation, from individuals and businesses as part of a civil fraud investigation. As we discussed on Tuesday, those authorised officers will all be highly trained and subject to professional standards and a code of conduct.
In particular, clause 3 extends the Minister’s powers to include taking copies of information and requiring the individuals to provide information in a specified form. The power includes imposing duties on an individual to retain information that they already hold for longer than they would normally be required to. For example, that might apply where the PSFA requests contractual notes as part of an investigation that a person may retain for only three years. Where the request is made just before the end of that period, the information notice would also explain that any failure to supply the specified information might result in a civil penalty being imposed.
The clause details the requirements of the information notice, including the format, the timeline for compliance and the location for submission. A similar approach is used by HMRC. In practice, authorised officers would engage, where possible, on a voluntary basis before issuing an information notice. The clause also ensures that there are restrictions on the information notice from demanding “excluded material” or “special procedure material”, as defined under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act.
I will turn to the amendments, and as I said, I am very grateful for the opportunity to explain how this clause works, which I hope will provide some reassurance. Clause 3(1)(a) and (b) set out a test for issuing an information notice. An authorised officer will have the power to compel information only when it is necessary and proportionate to do so, and only when the information being requested relates to a person whom the authorised officer has reasonable grounds to suspect has committed fraud. On that basis, PSFA authorised officers will request the information only when there are reasonable grounds to do so.
The question that amendment 10 raises is, “What is meant by ‘reasonable grounds’?” It must be objectively reasonable for them to suspect fraud, given the information available to them. An authorised officer must genuinely suspect that the fraud has been carried out by the individual, and that belief will be based on facts, information and/or intelligence. Reasonable grounds cannot be supported on the basis of personal factors such as those listed in the amendment, or a hunch. It is critical to set out that authorised officers will be using those facts and will be bound by the public sector equality duty and the Equality Act.
The reasonable grounds test is a standard, widely accepted test used by various organisations, including the DWP, the Serious Fraud Office and the police. Further to that, to ensure that the reasonableness test is applied properly in practice, the PSFA will have built in place safeguards. For example, authorised officers must consider all the facts of a case known to them at that time when they decide what is reasonable. Authorised officers must ensure that each decision made relating to the use of the powers is documented and available for checking. Management checks will ensure that those procedures are followed correctly. Information holders can also request a review of a decision to issue an information notice if they feel that there were no reasonable grounds.
As I said, there will also be independent oversight of the use of powers by an independent body such as HMICFRS or the new independent chair. I am setting out this detail on the record now, but we will also be transparent about this for those who do not leaf through Hansard. The code of practice envisioned by this legislation for the PSFA elements of the Bill relates to civil penalties. As civil penalties are the mechanism for ensuring compliance with the information gathering powers, we will also set out in the code of practice, and in further published guidance if necessary, how the information gathering powers will be used in practice, as I am doing today. We will also fulfil the commitment that we made on Tuesday to talk about what will be in the codes of practice as we reach the relevant parts of the Bill.
Let me turn to the period of compliance. Our approach in the Bill accommodates the variation in size and type of fraud investigations that the PSFA is likely to take on. As such, the Bill allows information providers a minimum, critically, of 10 working days to comply. However, in practice, the information notices will be tailored on a case-by-case basis, with each being judged on its merits and with the time period applied appropriately. Similar approaches are used in HMRC. That, in turn, protects the information holder from being asked to produce information in an unreasonable timescale.
On Tuesday, we heard from John Smart, who said:
“Some of the smaller organisations might struggle to meet that 10-day requirement”.
That is why we will be tailoring the requirement. But, he also said,
“I still think it is a reasonable starting point. If you do not start with a reasonable starting point, for the larger organisations you end up deferring decision making and action being taken. I think 10 days is reasonable.”––[Official Report, Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Public Bill Committee, 25 February 2025; c. 46, Q81.]
As I said before, that is the minimum.
Again, we will set out the commitment to tailoring to ensure that we are proportionate and reflect the different types of organisations and individuals who might be asked for information in the code of practice or published guidance. Alongside the time period for compliance, an information provider will have the opportunity to request a review, which would include the ability to vary the time period for compliance if it was considered that a longer timeframe was needed. The current drafting outlines a five-layered process for information holders to request a review of an information notice that they have received. I can go through that detail if Committee members want me to, but I hope that that provides some reassurance on hon. Members’ points.
Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)
I thank the Minister for those points, but I seek a bit more clarification. There are references to “the Minister” in clause 3, and I want to be clear about this, because we talked a lot about the code of practice during the evidence session on Tuesday. Is the Minister saying that the code of practice will have reference to the authorised officers? So, for Hansard, where clause 3 refers to “the Minister”, it is actually more likely, through the code of practice, to be referring to the day-to-day operation of those investigators. The Minister also mentioned that the definition of reasonableness is as per other departmental records and is widely available. Just to clarify, will that also be in the code of practice so that it is easily accessible for anybody in the public to look at what that might include? I seek more clarification on those two points.
Georgia Gould
Yes, the code of practice will be much more operational guidance that will be targeted at the authorised officers and their day-to-day operational practice. It will include the information that I have set out.
The Chair
Does the shadow Minister wish to press amendments 10, 14 or 9, which were just debated, to a vote?
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 16, in clause 4, page 3, line 36, leave out “Minister” and insert “First Tier Tribunal”.
Amendment 17, in clause 4, page 3, line 38, leave out “Minister” and insert “First Tier Tribunal”.
Amendment 18, in clause 4, page 4, line 3, leave out “Minister” and insert “First Tier Tribunal”.
Mike Wood
The amendments are all about ensuring that there is not just independent oversight but an effective independent channel of appeal against information notices that does not just go back to the same organisation that issued the original notice. Clause 4 will allow for the person to whom the information notice is given to appeal the notice up to seven days after it is issued, but that appeal will go back to the Minister for the Cabinet Office—or, in practice, the PSFA—to review it and decide whether to revoke, amend or uphold the notice. As drafted, it gives the Minister significant power, as really the only responsible person who can review the decision to give the notice.
There therefore appears to be a significant lack of independent oversight. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain why there is no ability to have an independent appeal of the kind that would generally take place against HMRC decisions and notices, through the first-tier tribunal. That is why we tabled amendments 15, 16, 17 and 18: to change the appeal body from the Minister for the Cabinet Office to the first-tier tribunal. We are concerned that, given it is the Minister who has been given the power to investigate fraud, it is then a case of allowing the Minister to mark their own homework if they—or the people acting on their behalf—review the decisions themselves.
I would like to understand the Minister’s view on whether that is an effective use of ministerial time and capacity. Does she envisage that any such appeal decisions would be delegated? In the amendments, we propose to replace the Minister with the first-tier tribunal in that process, which would be equivalent to the processes that would be expected when a decision of HMRC is reviewed. Our amendments would ensure that an independent third party is involved with the review process.
I would be grateful if the Minister could explain why there should be no ability for such an appeal to be made, whether it is made immediately against the notice for information or perhaps as a second appeal stage. We need to be satisfied that there is a good reason why people who are the subject of those notices, which may be quite onerous, particularly for individuals and smaller organisations, should not have the ability to appeal to an independent body. Normally, natural justice would assume that to be the case.
Steve Darling
I concur about the safeguarding of individuals. While there may be an independent reviewer or chair, the challenge, for me, is who appoints them. If it ends up being the Minister who appoints the chair, how independent will they be? Given what we are seeing elsewhere in the world, how do we ensure that we build a structure of independence into the Bill that we may not previously have thought was needed? I am somewhat supportive of the proposals from colleagues, but equally, I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say on the challenge.
Georgia Gould
Some points of clarity: the hon. Member for Kingswinford and South Staffordshire asked who would do the reviewing. A more senior officer from within the PSFA would complete that review, not the Minister themselves. The entire process would be overseen by a separate team who are accountable to an independent chair, and critically, who will report into Parliament to provide that level of independence.
The other important context is that the Bill also—we will come to this later—provides for the PSFA to become a statutory body, fully independent from the Minister. In the meantime, it is incredibly important that we have this process of oversight and the independent chair, as we discussed. All these issues are important for balance. We have to avoid giving fraudsters the ability to abuse the review process and frustrate investigations. As John Smart told the Committee on Tuesday, months is far too long, and adding a further route to appeal to the tribunal at that very early stage would add months, if not years, to our investigations into suspected frauds. We have tried to balance this very carefully to ensure that there are appropriate routes to review that sit within a system that is independently overseen.
I believe that we have found the right balance in the Bill, and I have explained those layers of review. They include internal review, which is the appropriate route that strikes the right balance between fairness and avoiding fraudsters frustrating the process. As I said, the internal reviewer will be a separate authorised officer, who will be—this is a requirement in clause 66—an authorised officer of a higher grade than the original decision maker. The way that these reviews are performed will be subject to oversight/ We will talk later in more detail about the oversight in the Bill, but it will include the inspections by HMICFRS and the day-to-day oversight by an independent chair, which could include live cases.
I explained in the previous debate—I did not go through the detail, but I can do so—the stages of an information notice going through if someone still does not agree that they should provide the information. Ultimately, it is really important that if a penalty is issued for non-compliance, the information provider can appeal to the relevant court against that penalty, so there is a formal appeal to a court at the end of the information-gathering process if it gets to that place. However, the intention of the powers—as I said, this will be written into the code of practice—is very much to work alongside those organisations that are gathering information, and to be proportionate to their size and the requests put forward, so I believe we have found the right balance.
Mike Wood
I thank the Minister for those responses, but I think that the first-tier tribunal is perfectly capable of dismissing applications that are without merit, without significantly extending the time. Given the importance of an independent appeal mechanism, I wish to push the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Mike Wood (Kingswinford and South Staffordshire) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 12, in clause 4, page 3, line 33, at end insert—
“or of the duration of the period mentioned in section 3(4)(a)”.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 13, in clause 4, page 4, line 2, at end insert—
“, including by extending the duration of the period mentioned in section 3(4)(a) where satisfied that the person is reasonably unable to comply with the requirement to provide the information within the time required by the notice”.
Mike Wood
Amendments 12 and 13 are in a similar vein to amendment 14 —they allow the individual or organisation issued with an information notice to apply to the independent body or board for an extension to the 10 working days within which they are currently required to provide information requested in the notice, if they are reasonably unable to comply. Sorry, have I skipped ahead a section?
Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)
Feel free to skip ahead to the conclusion.
Mike Wood
Sorry, it has been a while since I have been on a Bill Committee.
The amendments would allow the individual or organisation to apply for an extension to the 10 working days within which they are currently required to provide information requested in an information notice, if they are reasonably unable to comply. This is a common sense approach to support people who are engaging with the process and prevent them from being hit with penalties, which was never the intention of the legislation. This is also important because we do not know precisely what information the Minister will be able to ask individuals to provide, other than that an information notice cannot require the giving of particularly sensitive—such as excluded or special procedure—material, as defined in sections 11 to 14 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. This includes confidential business records or journalistic material. Otherwise, the Minister for the Cabinet Office has a very open-ended power to require different types of information. It would be helpful if the Minister could explain whether the Government would consider allowing those issued with information notices to apply specifically for an extension if they cannot reasonably provide the information within the time period requested.
Steve Darling
I can add very little to what the shadow Minister said. Again, I am broadly sympathetic on the need to have these safeguards in the legislation, and on not knowing what the practice notes are. We are very much in the dark, so that does give us cause for concern.
Georgia Gould
The critical thing to note here is that we have been very clear in the Bill that 10 days is a minimum. As we heard in evidence, some organisations will find it very easy to provide the information within 10 days; others will find it harder. As I have already set out, we will ensure that responding to different kinds of organisations proportionately is referenced in the code of practice.
I previously explained why we believe that the time limits in the Bill for information requests are appropriate, and why we believe that internal review strikes the right balance in preventing fraudsters from frustrating the process. The current drafting includes powers for authorised officers to vary the duration of an information notice in clause 4. The clause allows an information notice to be varied subject to the outcome of an internal review. A variation of a notice can include amending the timeframe to comply with a request if it is found that a longer timeframe is required.
We have discussed how the Bill allows information-providers a minimum of 10 working days to comply, which in practice will be tailored on a case-by-case basis, with each case judged on its own merits and the time period applied appropriately. This is a similar approach to that taken by HMRC, for example: an authorised officer would take account of the nature of the information or documents required and how easy it will be for the person to provide or produce them. That, in turn, protects the information-holder from not being asked to produce information within an unreasonable timescale. In response to the amendment, I ran through what the reasonable grounds test will be and the kinds of thinking that authorised officers will have to go through to determine what information they will gather. That includes writing it down so that their thought processes in requiring information can be reviewed.
Steve Darling
I welcome that reassurance from the Minister, which we will take onboard.
Mike Wood
I thank the Minister for her response, which offered some moderate reassurance. We would be comfortable if either it was included in the Bill or we at least had sight of the code of practice, which will actually define that decision-making process. A fundamental flaw of this Bill Committee is that we are being asked to make decisions on something that may be produced in the future, of which we have no advanced sight. For now, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Georgia Gould
Clause 3 introduces a civil power that allows authorised officers to compel information from first and third parties, similar to that used by HMRC. Clause 4 introduces a right to request a review of a decision to issue an information notice within seven days of a notice being issued. The policy intention is that this provides adequate time for an individual or business to request a review of a decision to issue an information notice, and sets a time limit for a review that will balance any attempts that might be made to aggravate the information collection process by slowing down the fraud investigation unnecessarily. During the review process, authorised officers will work with information-holders to give them every opportunity to comply.
Steve Darling
The Minister referred to a review process; it would be really helpful if the Committee could be aware of how long that process is likely to take.
Mike Wood
Clause 4 gives the Minister a considerable amount of power to compel individuals, as well as organisations, to provide an unspecified range of information within what could be very tight timescales, on pain of a fine of £300 a day if they fail to comply. The only route to appeal these powers is going back to the person or organisation that is exercising them, and we are concerned about the natural justice of this approach.
The legislation, as drafted, involves no impartial third party in the review process on a case-by-case basis, so it leaves individuals with nowhere else to go if they disagree with what is being asked for, or cannot practically comply with the request in the specified timeframe. Our amendments aim to balance these powers, and I am naturally disappointed that the Minister was unable to consider accepting at least some of them.
Georgia Gould
First, it is important to set out that these powers will be used by authorised officers who sit within a professional standard. They are highly trained and have a code of ethics that they apply. It is a deliberately limited group of people to ensure that we have full oversight. The kind of decisions that they make will have to be written down, so they can be overseen by the team within the Cabinet Office, which is answerable to the independent chair and to another independent body, and that is likely to be HMICFRS. I think I have already set out, and it is in the Bill, that the reviews on a case-by-case basis will have to be done by another authorised officer who is of a higher grade than the one who made the decision. There will be no set time, but we will set out a range within the wider guidance.
The intention of the Bill is to ensure that we prevent and recover fraud against the public sector. We want to be reasonable and proportionate, and as I have said, we will set out further information about the size and scale of organisations and timeframes within the code of practice. What we really need to avoid is organisations that have committed fraud using appeals to frustrate the process and keep this going for ages, so that money is moved and we lose the ability to recover critical public funds. We think that a huge amount of oversight has been put into this overarching package, but we have to ensure that we allow authorised officers to get the information they need and recover fraud. Finally, it is important to remember that, if we go through a process where somebody does not provide that information, and a fine is levied, they are able to apply to the courts at that point. There is that fundamental backstop to the system.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Gerald Jones.)
Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Fourth sitting)
Thursday 27th February 2025
(3 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesPublic Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 27 February 2025 - (27 Feb 2025)
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Andrew Western)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Lewell-Buck. Clause 5 is an explanation of the principles related to information sharing that pertain to the Public Sector Fraud Authority and the Cabinet Office. It sets out how the disclosure of information would work for the purpose of facilitating the Minister’s exercise of the core functions. It refers to how the Minister may use information disclosed under subsection (1); the specific purposes for which it may be disclosed; and what the Minister may not use information for. Information must not be used for any purpose other than the purpose for which it was disclosed and may not be disclosed to any other person without the consent of the Minister. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Mike Wood (Kingswinford and South Staffordshire) (Con)
Clause 5 will give the Minister enormous powers to request and share information for the purpose of facilitating the Minister’s exercise of the core functions under the Bill. Given that the Minister’s core functions are to decide whether to investigate and take enforcement action, we are concerned that almost any information could be shared to facilitate the making of those decisions.
Likewise, the Minister may share information onward. If they give consent, the information may go further yet. Again, this is a case of the Minister marking their own homework. They get to decide who knows what and whether it gets shared onwards, without any external oversight from an impartial third party. I would be grateful if the Minister explained what sort of information the Government envisage being requested, under what circumstances, and what safeguards will apply to the sharing of that information.
Andrew Western
I thank the shadow Minister for his question. I would not want to second-guess the specifics of what may be required in the sharing of information on a case-by-case basis; clearly that sort of speculation may restrict us unnecessarily. What I would say, however, is that the independent oversight powers laid out for the execution of the PSFA’s work would be in place to ensure that if anybody, up to and including the Minister, were considered to have overstretched their powers, it would be able to comment and investigate as necessary.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 6
Amendment of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016
Andrew Western
I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 6, page 4, line 28, in column 1, after “Office” insert
“, so far as relating to the Public Sector Fraud Authority”.
This amendment limits the designation of the Cabinet Office as a relevant public authority for the purposes of Part 3 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 so that it is designated only so far as relating to the Public Sector Fraud Authority.
Andrew Western
I am sure that colleagues will agree that the amendment is straightforward. It will limit the designation of the Cabinet Office as a relevant public authority for the purposes of part 3 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, so that it is designated only in so far as it relates to the Public Sector Fraud Authority.
Clause 6 sets out the purposes of the amendment to the 2016 Act and is straightforward in its terms. It will make a small tweak before the entry for the Common Services Agency for the Scottish Health Service to insert “Cabinet Office” and the relevant provision.
Mike Wood
As the Minister says, the clause will add the Cabinet Office to the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. The Act governs the powers available to the state to obtain communications and communication data, provides statutory safeguards and clarifies what powers different public authorities can use and for what purpose. This legislation will give the Cabinet Office further and greater investigatory powers.
Government amendment 1 seeks to clarify that this applies not to the whole of the Cabinet Office, but to the Public Sector Fraud Authority only. I am glad that the amendment will rectify that fairly major drafting error. Obviously, the Opposition support the amendment.
The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Georgia Gould)
I am sorry to have arrived late. Clause 6 will provide essential powers to obtain communications data from telecommunications providers, as and when necessary, as part of an investigation into fraud against the public sector. As a result of the clause, the PSFA will be listed under column 1 of schedule 4 to the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 and will thereby be granted the power to request communications data—the how, where, what and when, as opposed to the content, of communications—for the purposes of investigating suspected fraud against the public sector. The clause will not give the PSFA surveillance and covert human intelligence powers.
The precise listing of the PSFA in schedule 4 will not permit self-authorisation to use the relevant powers; a request for communications data in the course of a criminal investigation must be approved by the independent Office for Communications Data Authorisations. The powers also come with extra oversight from the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office, which will inspect the designated communications data single point of contact that facilitates the lawful acquisition of communications data and effective co-operation between the IPCO and public authorities that have these powers.
I welcome the Opposition’s support for Government amendment 1, which is necessary to align us with the Home Office’s new approach to restrict powers to specific teams in other Departments within the same schedule. The amendment will change the way the Department appears in schedule 4 to the Investigatory Powers Act, as it will restrict the use of the powers to the Public Sector Fraud Authority only, not the Cabinet Office as a whole. The amendment will ensure that the use of the powers is properly restricted and that there are no unintended consequences for other parts of the Cabinet Office.
I commend clause 6, as amended by Government amendment 1, to the Committee.
Amendment 1 agreed to.
Clause 6, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 7
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 etc powers
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Schedule 1.
Clauses 8 and 9 stand part.
Georgia Gould
Clause 7 and schedule 1 cover the investigative powers in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Clause 8 will give the PSFA a legal route to apply to a court for an audit in relation to property that has come into its possession in the course of a fraud investigation. Clause 9 will bring the PSFA under the oversight of the Independent Office for Police Conduct for serious complaints about its use of PACE powers.
Clause 7 will designate authorised investigators with the necessary authority to use limited provisions from PACE within the remit of public sector fraud investigations. These include powers to apply to the courts for a warrant to enter and search premises and to seize evidence, and special provisions to apply to the courts to gain access to certain types of material that are regarded as excluded material or special procedure material.
These are criminal investigation powers and will only be used in criminal investigations to enable all reasonable lines of inquiry to be followed and all relevant evidence to be collected. PSFA staff must be specifically authorised by the Minister before they can use the powers in the clause. Authorised investigators will be able to access and process evidence under the same conditions applicable to the police, ensuring that robust investigative protocols are followed. PACE has its own code of practice, and authorised investigators will adhere to the provisions that apply to the PSFA’s PACE powers, in particular PACE code B, which deals with the exercise of powers of entry, search and seizure.
Clause 7 is fundamental in reinforcing the Bill’s objective of combating public sector fraud effectively by equipping investigators with powerful investigative tools, governed by long-standing safeguards. The provision of such powers is essential and reflects our commitment to holding to account those who defraud public resources, maintaining the integrity of public administration.
Schedule 1 will modify the provisions of PACE adopted in clause 7 so that they apply to authorised investigators within the PSFA when they are conducting criminal investigations into fraud offences committed against the public sector. Clause 7 will enable these modifications to have effect; they include equating authorised investigators with constables for the relevant sections of PACE, clearly defining the range of their responsibility and authority. An amendment to replace “articles or persons” with “material” in schedule 1 is specifically intended to clarify the scope of investigations conducted by the PSFA. By defining the term more narrowly with reference to “material”, it reflects the fact that the PSFA will not be conducting searches of individuals.
While detailed stipulations regarding the retention and handling of seized material are set out in PACE, schedule 1 will provide the essential adaptations necessary for the authorised investigators to carry out their roles effectively while adhering to established legal safeguards. Overall, schedule 1 is necessary to equip authorised investigators with precise, tailored powers from PACE so that they can enforce the legislative aim of combating fraud within the public sector.
Clause 8 will give the PSFA a legal route to apply to a court for an order in relation to property that has come into its possession in the course of a fraud investigation. The order will determine who the property should be returned to and whether changes need to be made to the property before it is returned or, if appropriate, destroyed, subject to suitable safeguards.
The PSFA will not routinely need to use this power. It will use it only in three specific situations: first, when there is conflicting evidence as to who the property should be returned to; secondly, when it is not possible to return property to its owner, and the PSFA is otherwise liable to retain it indefinitely; or, thirdly, when it has been identified that the property could be used in the commission of an offence. Clause 8 will protect the PSFA in situations in which it could otherwise face having to retain property indefinitely, at ongoing cost to the taxpayer, and where it cannot return the property to its owner. It will ensure effective management and disposal of items, helping to prevent misuse while reducing the administrative burden.
The use of a magistrates court to determine the appropriate course of action is a critical safeguard. This external judicial oversight ensures transparent and lawful disposal decisions. A mandatory six-month waiting period is built into the process before property can be disposed of or destroyed. This period will allow any interested parties to make claims on the property. However, if a magistrates court orders that the property be returned to its owner, there is no waiting period for that return. Further application to court can be made if initial orders do not resolve ownership or disposal issues, ensuring ongoing flexibility and fairness in property management. Equipping the PSFA with these powers is vital for appropriately concluding fraud investigations and reflects similar practices in other Government Departments.
I turn to clause 9. The PSFA’s use of PACE powers will be subject to robust internal and external scrutiny. Elsewhere in the Bill, clauses 64 and 65 set out provisions under which His Majesty's inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services will work with the PSFA. Clause 9 amends the Police Reform Act 2002 to extend the functions of the director general of the Independent Office for Police Conduct to include oversight of public sector fraud investigators and enables them specifically to consider the PSFA’s use of PACE powers and associated investigations. In doing so, this clause enables the IOPC to be engaged where necessary to investigate death, serious injury, accusations of staff corruption or serious complaints against the PSFA’s use of PACE powers, although we hope that none of those will come to be.
The amendments made by clause 9 also include allowing the Minister to issue regulations conferring functions on the director general in relation to these investigations. In practice, this enables the Minister to detail in due course the specific remit of the IOPC in relation to the PSFA. This clause represents a typical approach to engaging the IOPC in legislation, similar to that of other law enforcement agencies.
The clause will also enable the sharing of information between the director general, the Minister and those who act on their behalf. Additionally, it will enable the sharing of information with the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration to facilitate potential collaborative investigations with the IOPC. The clause will ensure that any information sharing complies with existing data protection and investigatory powers legislation. Incidents and complaints will be either self-referred from the PSFA or referred to the IOPC via a third party. Any potential cases of serious injury or death that occur in the exercise of the PSFA’s PACE powers would be automatically referred to the IOPC for review.
The use of the independent complaints function offered by the IOPC is a key element of the oversight landscape, ensuring that the PSFA is held accountable to the highest standards in the exercise of PACE powers, and providing confidence to the public that the Government take their responsibilities in using the powers seriously. I went through a lot of detail there, but I know that the Committee is concerned about the proper oversight of powers, as it should be.
Mike Wood
Clauses 7 to 9 give authorised investigators the powers to enter and search premises and execute search warrants, and powers for the seizure, retention and disposal of property. Those are obviously extensive powers with potentially significant consequences. While strengthening powers to tackle fraud is welcome, we have some concerns. For example, clause 7(3) states:
“An authorised investigator is an individual who is authorised by the Minister to exercise the powers conferred by this section.”
The clause would extend some PACE powers to authorised investigators at the PSFA to investigate offences of fraud against a public authority.
An authorised investigator is defined as a Cabinet Office civil servant of at least higher executive officer grade. What training will those investigators have in order to carry out their functions appropriately? In evidence earlier this week about public sector investigators, Dr Kassem said:
“Are they trained and do they have the proper skills to enable them to investigate without accusing, for example, innocent people and impacting adversely vulnerable individuals? That would be the main challenge, in my view.”––[Official Report, Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Public Bill Committee, 25 February 2025; c. 6, Q2.]
Paragraph 3(2)(b) of schedule 1 states that an authorised investigator may be “a higher executive officer”, which is adding to the positions specified in PACE. The comparable position in the police appears to be specified as
“a police officer of at least the rank of inspector”.
Is the Minister satisfied that a higher executive officer is of equivalent rank and experience to a police inspector? Salary bands would suggest that they are not. A quick search suggests that the starting salary of a higher executive officer may be as little as £38,000, whereas a police inspector in London would typically be on at least £61,000. That suggests that there will be some disparity in the level of seniority that one might expect between the two positions. Is she satisfied that a higher executive officer has the seniority for the very far-reaching powers that the Bill would give them?
Turning to clause 8, it is welcome that there is a role for the magistrates court—we finally have some external oversight—where a Minister must apply to make a decision about an individual’s property.
Clause 9 amends the Police Reform Act 2002 so that an individual may go to the director general with complaints or misconduct allegations in relation to the Public Sector Fraud Authority. However, it appears that there remains discretion for the Minister, who only “may” make regulations conferring functions on the director general in relation to public sector fraud investigators and “may” disclose information to the director general. Does the Minister intend to make those regulations? What may they contain? If regulations are made under those provisions, what parliamentary procedure will they be subject to?
Georgia Gould
I thank the shadow Minister for those questions. As he said, these are important powers, and it is critical that the right training is in place. I reassure him that all these authorised officers will have relevant training to the standard that police officers have for the use of the PACE powers. As he set out in his remarks, an application for search warrants must be made to a magistrate, so there is already an external body ensuring that they will be used correctly.
Another critical component of the PSFA’s use of the powers is that if an authorised officer is visiting a property, they will be accompanied by a police officer and will not go their own, so we have not included powers of arrest because of the nature of the PSFA investigations as separate to the Department for Work and Pensions. The powers sit within a range of safeguards, some of which have been mentioned. To remind Members, His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services will also oversee the use of all these powers, as it has experience of doing that. The powers will be overseen in any serious circumstances by the Independent Office for Police Conduct.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 1 agreed to.
Clauses 8 and 9 ordered stand part of the Bill.
Clause 10
Acting for another public authority
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Georgia Gould
As I have set out, the Bill provides the key powers to investigate suspected fraud against the public sector. However, to be able to deliver a holistic counter-fraud service and recover vital funds lost to fraud and error, powers are needed to act on behalf of other public authorities for recovery action. That is what clause 10 outlines. The PSFA will already have conducted investigations before the recovery phase and will know the background to the case and the people and businesses involved. It will be able to leverage that information and those relationships to secure recovery, prioritising voluntary repayments first. It will then be able to utilise the proposed recovery powers already used across Government to get back fraudulent funds where people can afford to repay their illicit gains but are refusing to engage with us.
The recovery of fraudulent funds is complex, as is fraud itself. In 2021-22, the Government’s fraud landscape report found that only 23% of fraud losses were recovered. That is not good enough. Having a central recovery function within the PSFA will allow it to develop the expertise and capability required to drive effective recovery action on behalf of other public bodies. Providing the option to keep some of the recovered funds, subject to agreements with the public bodies concerned, helps to fund the development of that recovery expertise and provides value for money for the Government and taxpayer.
Clause 11 outlines the requirement to issue a recovery notice before proceedings can be brought to a court or tribunal. The notice must outline what the Government believe is owed and why. It must also provide information as to how the amount can be voluntarily repaid. Once issued, the liable person has a minimum of 28 days to respond. The recovery notice will effectively signal the end of the PSFA investigation.
During an investigation, a suspected liable person will already have had the opportunity to make their case and provide evidence to support their position. This provides the liable person with further opportunities to positively engage on the matter, either through voluntary repayment or by providing additional evidence. It also provides them with ample opportunity to prepare for a potential future court or tribunal proceeding. The issuing of a recovery notice is therefore an important step that promotes fairness and transparency in proceedings by providing a liable person with an overview of the position.
Clause 12 provides a key safeguard for the use of the recovery powers. During an investigation, the PSFA will collect and assess evidence to determine whether a liable person or business received payments made as a result of fraud or error. It will outline its reasonings in the recovery notice. However, it will be able to use the proposed recovery powers only if a liable person agrees and a court or tribunal has made a final determination of what is owed.
We will not be making unilateral decisions as to what is owed. Instead, this process firmly embeds independent judicial decision making. If a liable person disagrees with the determinations, they can present their case in a court or tribunal. If a liable person agrees, we do not need to seek confirmation from a judge, making important judicial time and cost savings and ensuring that we do not further overburden the judicial system.
Those are all important steps in commencing our recovery action. The positive impact of the Bill is predicated on being able to effectively recover funds identified as being lost to fraud or error. We have already agreed that recovery is a vital new core function of my Department, and it is one that we should strive to ensure can operate effectively to return money lost to fraud and error to the public purse.
Mike Wood
Clause 10 allows the Minister for the Cabinet Office to act on behalf of another public authority to recover a recoverable amount, including bringing court or tribunal proceedings, and recovered money will be returned to the other public authority unless it is agreed that the Minister can retain some or all of it. We have some questions about what has to be agreed ahead of time. Can the Minister just act, or do they need prior approval from the public authority beforehand, so that there is clarity about the basis on which the Minister for the Cabinet Office is acting and any division of recovered funds?
Clause 11 sets out the recovery notice that the Minister must give before proceedings can be brought to court or a tribunal, and what is included in it. How is it decided how much can be recovered? What assets are taken into account, and what is the process before the legal system becomes involved?
Clause 12 sets out that the recovery methods can be used only to cover the amount where the liable person agrees or a court or tribunal has determined the amount is recoverable. Where the liable person does not engage, what mechanisms exist to encourage them to do so? Are there penalties if a court or tribunal is involved, and how long is the legal process typically expected to take, given current capacity? What does capacity look like at the moment? We feel that, in principle, the powers could be proportionate, but that depends on how they are to be exercised. I would be very grateful if the Minister clarified some of those points.
Georgia Gould
The first point to clarify is that before any investigation and any debt recovery are started, there would be a vulnerability test on that individual, and that would be part of the basis for the decision making. As for whether there was a voluntary agreement about the recovery of debt, a conversation would happen with the individual, but there is a limit to the amount that would be recovered—up to 40% of their assets in their bank account for fraud and 20% for error. In terms of whether people would try to frustrate the process by unnecessarily reviewing it, one of the features of the Bill is that it can include interest on the money that is paid, so that is a disincentive to continue to drag out the process, and the matter can be resolved as quickly as possible—and voluntarily.
On the initial phase of the PSFA’s investigatory and debt recovery work, if there is a limited number of officers, we do not expect a high burden on the court system—we expect less than double digits to be taken through initially—and we believe that the provision around interest is a key disincentive against frustrating the process.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 11 and 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Gerald Jones.)
Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Fifth sitting)
Tuesday 4th March 2025
(2 weeks, 2 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesPublic Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 4 March 2025 - (4 Mar 2025)
The Chair
I remind Members to send their speaking notes by email to hansardnotes@parliament.uk and to switch all electronic devices to silent, and that tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings. Should any Member want to speak to any clause or amendment, please bob in the usual way as you would in the Chamber and try to catch my eye.
Clause 13
Penalties etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Georgia Gould (Queen’s Park and Maida Vale) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Lewell-Buck.
Clause 13 allows the Government to use the proposed recovery powers to recover late penalty payments and associated interest deriving from the civil penalty regime that is introduced in chapter 5 and any additional relevant costs, either awarded by a court or tribunal or incurred in exercising the recovery powers. In all of these cases, money will be owed to the public purse. Once it has been recovered, it can be used for public good. If these sums were to remain unrecovered, it would not have this positive impact.
We are building strong safeguards and appeal routes into all our measures, including on the application of penalties. Decisions to impose a penalty will be taken by authorised officers, and we have discussed the training that they will have. It is also intended that the debt recovery powers will be overseen by the independent oversight mechanisms, which we will turn to later in the session. Where we are justified in using the proposed recovery powers to seek payments directly from bank accounts and pay-as-you-earn earnings, we want to be able to use them. The penalties and costs will all derive from the fraud investigations that the Public Sector Fraud Authority will carry out.
Clause 14 restricts when chapter 4 recovery powers can be used to recover penalties. They can only be used when the timeframe for appealing a penalty has passed without any appeal being bought or any appeal against the penalty has been finally determined by a tribunal. Penalties are issued for important reasons to encourage compliance and to help make the whole Bill work effectively, and to help make the PSFA effective in its efforts to tackle fraud against the public sector.
Penalties are not something that can be put into the back of a drawer and forgotten about. Fraud is an expensive business for Government. It costs us money when people defraud us. It costs us money to investigate, to take proceedings through courts and to pursue recovery. It is not fair that these costs are shouldered by law-abiding citizens. It is right that those who do not follow correct procedures are penalised and have to pay.
Clauses 13 and 14 enable us to hold debtors to account, driving up recovery of what is owed by letting us use the recovery powers in a wider but proportionate manner and with the appropriate safeguards and appeal routes in place. However, this has to be done with respect of due and proper process, which is exactly what this clause mandates. These clauses are important safeguards that rightly prioritise the liable person’s right to appeal a penalty decision over the recovery of the penalty. It provides us with operational flexibility to recover a range of debts, driving up the value for money of our operations. I commend clauses 13 and 14 to the Committee.
Mike Wood (Kingswinford and South Staffordshire) (Con)
Clause 13 sets out that the Minister can use powers to recover amounts from a penalty, such as late payment, but also relevant costs to be awarded by a court or tribunal. Relevant costs rightly also include costs that are reasonably incurred by the Minister in exercising the powers in chapter 4.
Can the Minister share details on what this measure might include? What is reasonable and what are the expected amounts that might be recovered in this way? Does this also cover legal costs—for example, court fees and legal representation? Will it include investigatory costs, such as the use of forensic accountants or data analysts? Does it extend to administrative costs, such as the work of civil servants processing cases? How is reasonableness to be determined within these clauses? What criteria or guidelines will be used to assess whether a cost is reasonable and will there be an independent review process to prevent excessive or disproportionate costs from being been claimed? Will the affected individuals or entities have the right to challenge, at an appropriately early stage, costs that they deem to be unreasonable?
On the expected scale of the costs, do the Government have an estimate of the average cost that could be incurred and recovered under these provisions, and will there be caps or limits on the amount that can be recovered from an individual or organisation? Does the Minister expect those to vary? How will cost recovery be monitored and reported to ensure transparency?
Given the potential financial impact on those subject to enforcement proceedings, it is crucial that clear safeguards, transparency and accountability mechanisms are in place to ensure that costs remain proportionate and fair. I would appreciate further detail from the Minister about how these costs will be defined, managed and reviewed.
Clause 14 provides that the Minister can recover an amount due in respect of a penalty only when the time for appealing has passed without an appeal, or any appeal has been finally determined. We think that that is perfectly sensible and will support the clause.
Steve Darling (Torbay) (LD)
In the oral evidence, Professor Levi highlighted some powers regarding asset freezing that the police have had since 2017. I would welcome the Minister’s reflections on whether these powers could have a significant impact in this area of the law—in particular, whether they would apply to international organisations, and the impact on individuals. I think that would be helpful to the Committee.
Georgia Gould
I welcome the support for the clause. To clarify, the operational costs of running PSFA operations and investigations will not be included in reasonable costs. There is work being done through the test and learn period by the enforcement unit to inform those costs, and guidance will be published in due course. As I have set out previously, there will be independent oversight of the full use of these powers, by a team that will answer to an independent chair. They will report to Parliament and will look at all aspects of the use of these powers, including the cost. If it is not established by agreement, we will have to apply to a court or tribunal to determine what the debt is, so there will be that added aspect of independence.
For asset seizing, we can apply for orders through the courts. In evidence we heard from the financial industry, there were questions about how the powers will work together, and there is work going on to respond to some of those questions. Our teams are working very closely with those financial bodies.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 14 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 15
Payable amounts
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Georgia Gould
Before I go into the detail of the clauses, I want to take a minute, as we are entering a new chapter, to make some opening remarks about the wider powers.
Chapter 4 of part 1 introduces debt recovery powers. In 2021-22, detected fraud and error outside of tax and welfare was £823 million, of which only £190 million—23%—was recovered. Alex Rothwell, from the NHS Counter Fraud Authority, told us in his evidence that the Department recovered only 12% of fraud and error. There is a long way to go in this space, which is why the powers are so important.
We know that recovery of fraud-related debt can be challenging. Debt recovery powers are limited to a small number of organisations and are therefore not available across the public sector. The Public Accounts Committee, Home Affairs Committee and National Audit Office have all strongly challenged the Government to do more across the public sector to take action on fraud loss. As part of the Bill, we are bringing debt recovery powers into the PSFA to enable the Government to better recover fraud debt outside of tax and welfare. We heard from Alex Rothwell that these powers will be incredibly helpful for us to recover more money.
The powers are not new to Government—HMRC and the Child Maintenance Service already have the power to recover debt from bank accounts, and DWP and the Child Maintenance Service can recover debt from earnings. We will utilise best practice from those organisations in operating the powers. Although we initially expect to use them in just a small number of cases, we hope that this will grow as and when the PSFA enforcement unit expands.
We have consulted widely with a range of fraud and debt stakeholders, including public bodies, academics and non-public sector groups. Banks, charities and civil liberty groups have been engaged so that we can incorporate lessons learnt from the experience of debt recovery processes in Government. We know that those in debt can be in challenging situations, which is why the use of the powers will follow best practice across Government, including the Government debt management function standards, and guidance such as the debt management vulnerability toolkit.
Importantly, the powers will only be used once efforts to engage and secure voluntary repayment have been unsuccessful. The only people and companies who will face the powers are those who have the means to repay, but who refuse to do so. Those affected by the powers will have the right to make representations, apply to vary orders, request an internal review, and finally, appeal to the tribunal. The powers will be used by trained authorised officers who will be subject to independent oversight. The debt recovery powers in the Bill balance the need to recover public money efficiently, while ensuring that recovery is fair and proportionate, with robust safeguards to protect those in vulnerable situations.
Clause 15 refers back to clauses 1 and 13 to define a payable amount as: a payment made as a result of fraud or error, as discovered by an investigation into suspected fraud; a penalty under the civil penalty regime established by chapter 5; and, finally, relevant costs. This creates a limitation as to the debts that the Government will be able to use the chapter 4 recovery powers on, specifically, those determined by and during an investigation into suspected fraud, including from associated penalties.
We seek these recovery powers purely to further the counter-fraud activity that we will carry out to tackle fraud against the public sector. We do not intend to become a general debt recovery agency for the Government, and clause 15 confirms that. It reflects the operational context and purpose of the PSFA and its focus on tackling fraud and error.
Further to that, clause 16 confirms that we will be able to seek alternative recovery action through the civil courts. Although the Bill will provide the powers to seek recovery directly through bank accounts and PAYE earnings, these might not always be the most appropriate or effective recovery route. For instance, the liable person might hold significant other property assets or keep assets or money abroad. In those cases, it would be unfair for us not to seek recovery.
We therefore wish to work through established legal procedures to ensure that we can seek to pursue recovery through the most appropriate and effective mechanisms—for example, liability orders. The importance of clause 16 is that it confirms that the Bill does not limit existing powers. I commend clauses 15 and 16 to the Committee.
Mike Wood
As the Minister said, clause 15 establishes that a payable amount is a recoverable amount as defined in previous provisions of the legislation, while clause 16 further grants the Minister the power to apply to the county court for a recovery order. That ensures that a recoverable amount is treated as an enforceable payment under section 85 of the County Courts Act 1984, or as if it was directly ordered by the court.
While the mechanism for recovery is now clear, there are important practical questions about its implementation. First, we would like further reassurance about the impact on the county court system. What projection have the Government made regarding the number of cases that they expect to be brought under these provisions? Given the existing backlog in county courts, what assessment has been made of the additional burden that these measures will place on the system? Has the Minister engaged with her colleagues at the Ministry of Justice and His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service to ensure that county courts have the capacity and resources to handle these cases efficiently and in a timely manner?
To develop further the issue of efficiency and speed of resolution, what is the expected timeframe for these cases to be resolved once an application is made? Do the Government anticipate delays due to a high caseload in county courts, and if so, what mitigations are they putting in place to help to deal with those delays? Will the Government publish guidance or at least a framework on the expected process and timeline for obtaining a recovery order?
It is essential that these powers do not result in undue delays, excessive court burdens, or legal uncertainty for those subject to a recovery order. Further clarification from the Minister would help to ensure that this system functions fairly and efficiently—balancing the need for enforcement and fairness to the taxpayer to recover sums that are owed, with the available judicial capacity.
Georgia Gould
We have published an impact assessment. That says that with the current size of the enforcement unit, we expect there to be about eight cases, so a small number, but of course if the powers work well and we expand the unit, that will increase. As the hon. Member would expect, we have engaged heavily across Government on all these questions. The critical thing is that there is significant deterrence to having to go through a court process—in terms of the interest that is going to grow on the debt, and the fees that would be accompanied by the legal costs and other costs associated with that process. Our hope is that the majority of people will go through a voluntary process—that will be both easier and less expensive for them—and that these powers will be used primarily as a deterrent.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 15 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 17
Direct deduction orders
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause 18 stand part.
Clauses 20 and 21 stand part.
Georgia Gould
Clause 17 introduces direct deduction orders as a method to recover public funds lost to fraud and error from a liable person’s bank account. Direct deduction orders are a vital mechanism to recover funds from a liable person who can afford to repay their debt but refuses to do so. This debt recovery mechanism is not new to Government; the Bill seeks to bring powers that are used elsewhere into the PSFA, not to create brand-new powers for the PSFA. That provides assurance of their effective and proportionate use, and we are doing the same here. The introduction of direct deduction orders is essential to bolster the Government’s ability to recover public funds, ensuring that taxpayer money lost to fraud and error is reclaimed and redirected towards essential public services and the common good.
To safeguard the use of these powers, direct deduction orders will be used after an investigation by the Public Sector Fraud Authority into suspected fraud against a public authority. The decision to make a direct deduction order will be made by trained and authorised officers in the PSFA who will work to the standards of the Government counter-fraud profession. The investigation must determine, to the civil standard of proof, that money is owed to the public sector as a result of fraud or error. As I have said, we will seek voluntary engagement and repayment, and only after those efforts have been unsuccessful will direct deduction orders be used. As outlined in clauses 12 and 14, there are clear restrictions as to when these powers become available, ensuring that their use is not unfettered.
Mike Wood
Clause 17 establishes that when a payable amount is recoverable, the Minister can issue an order for direct deductions from a liable person’s bank account, either through regular deductions or a lump sum payment, as she said. Clause 18 further clarifies that those deductions can be taken from any account in which the liable person has a beneficial interest. That is extremely important, given the difficulty in establishing the different networks of bank accounts that may be held, particularly in cases of serious and organised fraud. We welcome the flexibility the clause introduces.
Although the provisions aim to improve efficiency in recovering public funds, there are still questions regarding fairness, proportionality and the safeguards that are in place, starting with the definition of beneficial interest in clause 18. Clause 18(1) allows the Minister to make an order on an account that is held by the liable person and contains an amount that the Minister considers the liable person has a beneficial interest in. What criteria or evidence does the Minister expect the PSFA to use in determining a person’s beneficial interest in an account, given the complex ownership and title structures that may be in place? On the flip side of that, how will the rights of third parties be protected, particularly if funds belong to someone other than the liable person that might be held in a shared account?
That brings us to the question of joint accounts. Clause 20 assumes that a joint account is split equally between account holders unless the Minister has reason to believe otherwise. What types of evidence would be accepted to demonstrate that the liable person’s beneficial interest is different from an equal split? The Minister referred to bank statements, but would those investigating also look at legal documents or perhaps third-party testimony? Would that be appropriate in some circumstances? Will additional checks be carried out to ensure that joint account holders are not unfairly penalised for debts that might not be theirs? It is not uncommon for people in marriages or long-term partnerships to have a domestic joint account. It might well be that one of the partners in the relationship is, in practical terms, paying more into an account, but also using the account more than the other partner, despite the two names being equally on the face of the account.
Clause 21, on the notice and the right to respond, sets out the process of notifying banks and liable persons before deductions are made, and includes provision allowing them to make representations within 28 days. The clause allows the Minister to notify the bank first before informing the liable person, to prevent account closure, asset withdrawal or other measures being taken to deprive the taxpayer of the recovery of sums that might rightfully be recoverable. Can the Minister point to a precedent for that approach in other areas of law? How does that align with best practices in financial enforcement?
Although clause 21 allows the liable person to make representations to the Minister, there is not an explicit provision for an independent appeal mechanism. Is there a reason why the Bill does not provide for such a process? Would the Government consider an independent review mechanism, beyond the systematic review that is in place for the Bill, to ensure that decisions are fair and transparent and do not disproportionately affect people in individual cases?
To go back to the potential risks of financial and domestic abuse that I touched on earlier, deducting money from joint accounts could create serious risks for individuals in financially abusive relationships. What safeguards will be put in place to prevent financial hardship, particularly for vulnerable individuals who might not actually be responsible for the debts that the PSFA seeks to recover? What specialist training will staff receive to identify and mitigate the risk of financial or domestic abuse? The effectiveness of the measures will depend on strong safeguards, clear guidance and robust oversight mechanisms to ensure fairness and proportionality. I would appreciate further clarification from the Minister on those points.
Steve Darling
I rise to speak about clause 20 in particular. Liberal Democrats are heartened by clause 18, which clearly says that if there is another account the money could be drawn from, that will be utilised. However, we are particularly concerned about coercive and controlling relationships.
In my 30 years serving the people of Torbay as a councillor, I found on a number of occasions that people who are happy to conduct fraud against other parties, whether the state or other organisations, are often very happy to financially abuse their partners as well. That leaves their partners in a very vulnerable situation. I found that often the individuals affected are very trusting people who have vulnerabilities elsewhere in their lives, which would be recognised by the Department for Work and Pensions if it were supporting them.
I really want to hear from the Minister how the DWP is going to support people and be alive to the risk. It is about making sure that there is a culture of knowledge of the issue among the investigators. Although it is essential that we get the money from fraud in, we do not want collateral damage on people who have been abused.
Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)
I have some queries about clause 17 and the provisions on recovery from bank accounts. My comments apply to clause 38 as well, but I will speak specifically to clause 17.
Earlier, the Minister mentioned that some of the powers for direct deductions and deductions from earnings are used more widely across the DWP, particularly in the CMS for recouping costs for parents. Have the Government thought more broadly than simply direct deductions and deductions from earnings? My understanding is that the CMS has quite strong powers beyond that and has used them in the past.
Given the nature of fraud against public authorities—these are ultimately quite serious offences—what more has been done to consider whether direct deductions and deductions from earnings are enough and will be all that is required? At some stage, do we need to think about putting in tougher and more stringent powers to claw back the money owed to the Government?
John Milne (Horsham) (LD)
As the Minister described, the powers in the Bill are already used by other parts of Government. Can she provide us with any evidence of their success? Are they doing the job they were made for? Have they led to a change in behaviour in the way potential fraudsters set up accounts or attempt to disguise beneficiary interests?
Georgia Gould
I really appreciate the focus on vulnerability and oversight, because with these powers comes a huge amount of responsibility. The questions that have been raised today are really important.
First, the joint account holder will be able to make their own representations for review. The starting point will be the equal split, as was set out, but they will be able to make representations and ask to have their rights reviewed as part of the investigative process.
On the wider point about vulnerability, which was well made, there is a huge amount of established practice in Government, and the PSFA will seek to learn from that. The Government debt management vulnerability toolkit will be utilised. All the authorised officers will have training in vulnerability and economic abuse. Vulnerability assessments will take place in every single instance of debt recovery and vulnerability will be kept under review. A range of training and safeguards is in place around our approach.
On clause 21, I reassure the shadow Minister that there is precedent in HMRC. There can be both an internal review and an appeal, which is set out in clauses 34 and 31.
A wider point was made about whether we have looked at different and wider powers. The thing to remember about the powers is that in the majority of cases, but not all cases, we expect them to be used to recover funds from organisations rather than individuals, which is why we have focused on the financial side of debt recovery and penalties. Other powers are used by other Departments. I said earlier that we want to continue to be able to use other legal procedures to pursue recovery, including liability orders, and the Bill will not stop us doing so. We have a range of options in front of us.
Rebecca Smith
I thank the Minister for that reassurance and for outlining that there are further abilities to recover funds. Particularly in recoveries from organisations, does that include the seizure of assets should that be necessary? A lot of organisations might be asset rich but cash poor. If we seek to retrieve money on behalf of the Government, is the ability to seize assets, if required, within the framework the Minister alluded to?
Georgia Gould
Among the powers in the Bill there is only the power to recover debt through the ways that I have set out.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 19
Requirement for banks to provide information
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Georgia Gould
The clause outlines the information notices that can be given to a bank, how the bank must comply, the information it must provide and how the information can be used.
To determine whether to make a direct deduction order, an account information notice or a general information notice may be given. This is crucial in ensuring that sufficient financial information is gathered to facilitate informed debt recovery decisions, thereby enabling the effective recovery of public funds. The information provided by the banks is necessary and proportionate to ensure that the liable person’s financial situation is considered before a direct deduction order is made. This approach is already used by HMRC for its comparable direct recovery of debt, and it is also requested by the DWP in part 2 of the Bill.
The information gathered will protect vulnerable people, prevent hardship and safeguard non-liable joint account holders, while acknowledging the vital need to recover public funds lost to fraud and error. Banks must comply with a notice under the clause, and may be liable to a penalty for failure to comply without a reasonable excuse—this will ensure that the measures are adhered to. Furthermore, banks are prohibited from notifying account holders that they have received a notice under clause 19, to avoid tipping off debtors and thereby prevent money from being moved from the account. Overall, the clause is necessary in furthering the effective recovery of public funds. Having outlined the key provisions in clause 19, I commend it to the Committee.
Mike Wood
Clause 19 grants the Minister significant powers to obtain financial information from banks before making a direct deduction order, including the ability to request three months of bank statements, or perhaps statements covering a longer period where specified. The power to issue an account information notice requires banks to provide statements to determine what deduction should be made, and the power to issue a general information notice requires banks to disclose an individual’s account details, balances and correspondence addresses.
Clearly, in many investigations there will be good reason why some or all of that information is necessary, appropriate and justified. Of course, some of the information will be extremely sensitive, so we need necessary safeguards and appropriate oversight to ensure that sensitive information is requested and subsequently shared only where it is directly necessary to the investigation, and where the Minister or PSFA has justifiable grounds to think either that an error is costing the public sector significant amounts of money or that there has been a case of deliberate fraud. As I said about the previous grouping, a prohibition on banks informing the liable person that an information notice has been issued is a sensible measure to prevent that person from taking action to frustrate attempts to recover money that ought to be recovered—they could, for example, empty their account before deductions could take place. In principle, we support powers designed to ensure effective debt recovery under the right circumstances and when used in the right way, but there are several concerns regarding proportionality and oversight when it comes to protecting legitimate privacy rights.
First, on the unlimited timeframe for bank statements, clause 19 states that the Minister must obtain at least three months’ worth of statements, but can request a longer period if specified in the notice. What criteria will determine whether more than three months of statements is needed? Is there a reason why no upper limit is specified within the clause on how far back those requests can go? Clearly, the further back that requests are made for a bank statement, the greater the risk that they could lead to overly intrusive requests that may not be entirely necessary for the debt recovery.
On the broad information-gathering powers, the general information notice allows the Minister to demand a full list of all accounts held by the liable person, their details and their addresses. Presumably, that is for the specific financial institution that the notice refers to. Are there any safeguards to prevent excessive or disproportionate use of those notices? Must there be a reasonable suspicion or at least a threshold to be met before those powers can be exercised? The Bill states that the Minister can only request information to exercise their core functions, but that is obviously a very broad measure so could be interpreted very broadly.
Banks would be prohibited from informing the liable person that an information notice had been issued. Although that prevents individuals from evading deductions, it means that they may be unaware of a Government investigation into their finances even after the event. Are there any circumstances in which the liable person might be informed that their financial data has been accessed—perhaps after an investigation has been closed? Does the Minister envisage any independent oversight to ensure that those powers are used proportionately?
On the burden on banks and financial institutions, on which my hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon and I have tabled amendments to be debated later in the proceedings, these powers will require banks to process and respond to Government information notices, likely adding costs and administrative burdens to those institutions. Have the Government consulted with financial institutions to assess how proportionate the kinds of requests envisaged under the Bill are, the ease or the difficulty of compliance, and the estimated cost to banks and the financial sector? During evidence last week, some financial institutions did not seem to have any idea of what scale of burden that would be putting on their members. Again, a large part of this came back to the lack of visibility of draft codes of practice.
On privacy and data protection concerns, although the Bill states that the Minister can only request relevant information, that can be interpreted broadly. What legal protections exist to ensure that financial data is accessed and used appropriately for the very narrow purposes for which these clauses are intended? Will there be an independent review mechanism to assess whether those powers are used lawfully and proportionately?
Finally, given the wide-ranging implication of the powers, further clarity and safeguards are needed to balance effective debt recovery against individual privacy rights. I would welcome further details from the Minister on those critical issues, so that we can be comfortable going forward that the wide-ranging powers that we would be granting to the Minister and the PSFA cannot be misused and that individual privacy rights will be protected and respected.
Steve Darling
I ask the Minister to reflect on how speedily the Bill is going through Parliament. As we heard from the hon. Member for Kingswinford and South Staffordshire, financial institutions are not clear about the impact on or the cost to them. When we legislate in haste, challenges will often come out of the woodwork in the longer term. In this particular area, again, the issue is about the safeguards. We assume that we are dealing with reasonable people, but we do not have to look far in international news to see what can go wrong when unreasonable people gain power.
Where are the safeguards? When holding a Minister to account, it is often assumed that the Minister will be a reasonable person. Sadly, however, in the future the Minister may not be a reasonable person, so where are the safeguards for individuals? Also, as alluded to earlier in the debate, it would be helpful to have some assurance on the banks and the impact on them.
Georgia Gould
Let me go through those points in turn. The first question was about why someone might need information before three months. There are two critical reasons why: one is to ascertain potential vulnerability and affordability plans—we have talked about safeguarding joint account holders so as to have more information—and the other is to prevent people from evading paying: if more information were needed to ensure that the assets had not been moved. Throughout, we have tried to balance ensuring fairness for the taxpayer and protecting vulnerability. I hope it will give some reassurance that such powers are used effectively elsewhere in Government. We have learned from best practice.
I talked through the process of the first notice, and that will be where the individual is informed that that information has been requested. As we have discussed, a number of safeguards are built into the process, and the intention when recovering debt will be to work with the individual and to make it collaborative. If people refuse to pay, only at that point would we apply to the courts or a tribunal, where safeguards are of course in place.
To the wider question of what safeguards hold the system to account, as I have outlined and as we will discuss in more detail later, a team answerable to an independent chair will oversee every part of the process, including the ability to look at live cases and at the patterns, to ensure proportionate use of the powers. That individual will report to Parliament. Separately, a fully independent body will review the full use of the powers. We expect that to be His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services. The Bill also includes a provision to make the PSFA a statutory body, and so fully independent of the Minister. While it remains in this smaller phase, where we are testing the powers, the independent safeguards are built in.
On the point about the consultation with the finance bodies, I hope the Committee heard in the evidence that UK Finance was clear that we have been having a constructive dialogue on all of the issues. The PSFA has published an impact assessment, which suggests that, in the first instance, banks will need to look at a very small number of cases. We have committed to testing and learning alongside the process as the PSFA grows. There will be established practice for working closely with the banks. We expect the burden on banks for the application of the PSFA powers to be limited. I hope that gives some reassurance on oversight.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part and clause 23 stand part.
Mike Wood
Clause 22 outlines how much can be directly deducted from a liable person’s bank account, while clause 23 specifies the information that must be included in direct deduction orders. These provisions are central to the enforcement mechanism and yet there are many questions that remain about their practical implementation and fairness.
As we have said many times in Committee, it is very difficult to assess how the system will work without seeing a draft code of practice. As Anna Hall from the Money and Pensions Service said when giving evidence last Tuesday,
“the code of conduct will be the critical thing. One of the things is that if frontline staff are not picking up vulnerabilities, or they are not trained in how to sort out affordability, in empathic listening or in all the protocols about how to have different types of conversations with people in different types of vulnerable situations—if those things are not in place—some of the processes in the Bill will not be as effective. It comes down to the training for frontline staff, and the capacity and processes to then follow up on what has actually been disclosed, that will enable those repayment plans to be put in place before those later processes. If those are not in place, that could cause some real issues. How successful this Bill is will come down to the code of conduct, as many have said.”––[Official Report, Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Public Bill Committee, 25 February 2025; c. 30, Q49.]
The Minister kindly promised during earlier sessions that:
“As for the development of the codes of practice, as I hope the Committee will see today, I will refer to the measures that are to be put in the code of practice as we go through the clauses, so that we can have some discussion about that.”––[Official Report, Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Public Bill Committee, 27 February 2025; c. 92.]
This is another occasion where it would be helpful, as the Minister suggested, to know a bit more about the code of practice, to enable us to scrutinise the provisions better. As witnesses have said, the code of practice is key to how effective the provisions will be. The effectiveness of the Bill will depend on matters such as the training for frontline staff on assessing affordability and vulnerabilities, the processes to evaluate hardship and to create fair payment plans, and the protocols to identify and support people in vulnerable situations.
Can the Minister provide further information about the code of practice, when it will be available for scrutiny and how it will relate to those elements of these clauses? How will the direct deduction system work in practice? As I say, this is a question about staff training and decision making; it will be an operational matter rather than something that can necessarily be directed from Westminster or Whitehall, so how will staff determine a suitable recovery amount and timeline? What principles will guide repayment plans, and how will assessments be made to ensure that affordability and prevent hardship?
Without knowing those matters, it is difficult to judge the appropriateness of some parts of these clauses, because there obviously will be some vulnerable individuals who might be subject to some of the measures in these clauses. What safeguards will be in place for those who require additional support? Will special provisions exist for individuals facing mental health issues, financial abuse or crisis situations?
I turn to the limits on deduction amounts. This is an area where we think the Government are possibly not going far enough: they are setting a maximum deduction limit even when sufficient funds exist and even when the Minister is satisfied that there has been deliberate fraud and an intention to deprive the taxpayer of money that should rightfully be being spent on public purposes.
Obviously, there are some safeguards in the clauses relating to hardship and essential living costs. The legislation states that deductions must not
“cause…hardship in meeting essential living expenses,”
but just how is that hardship to be assessed? Would someone who fraudulently obtained money be allowed to retain it if they successfully argued that they would suffer hardship from repaying it, even if they were never entitled to the money in the first place? And where does that line fall? Presumably, we would not expect them to be able to retain money to allow them to lead a certain quality of life that they may be used to, but that is obviously very different to being able to pay essential bills.
Under the Bill, in cases of fraud, only 40% of credited amounts can be deducted in the relevant period. We are not sure why that cap is in place when the individual was never entitled to the money. If a person has sufficient funds and there has been a conscious—perhaps even organised—attempt to defraud the public sector, why limit recovery rather than allowing full repayment?
That brings me to amendment 19, which stands in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon. It proposes removing the 40% cap to ensure full recovery under this legislation where possible and subject, obviously, to the safeguards to which I have referred—the hardship test and the independent oversight that is contained within the clauses.
Mrs Lewell-Buck, if you had defrauded the taxpayer out of £100,000—I am not for a moment suggesting that you would—and £100,000 happened to be visible within your bank account, and the Minister was satisfied that that was the result of a conscious course of action on your part to defraud the taxpayer and that there was no reason to imagine that losing it was going to cause you obvious hardship, why should you be allowed to keep £60,000 of that £100,000 in your bank account, even though the money was simply not yours? In that hypothetical situation—I ought to repeat that—it would be stolen money. It does not seem right that the legislation appears to protect 60% of defrauded money and prevents recovery through these mechanisms, so I intend to push amendment 19 to a Division. Who is subject to the safeguards in the clause? If the Government are confident that those safeguards are robust enough to apply to the first 40%, it seems that they ought to be robust enough to apply to the remaining 60% as well.
Returning to clause 22, what happens if too much is deducted? The Bill states that the Minister must not deduct more than the payable amount, which is a sensible and logical bar to set. However, what mechanisms exist to correct over-deductions? What recourse does a liable person have if an error is made and they suffer loss as a result of an over-deduction?
Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)
Is the shadow Minister suggesting a level of deductions that is acceptable? The amount that the Department for Work and Pensions can claim back has fluctuated in recent years. Are the Opposition proposing a level at which that threshold should be set?
Neil Coyle
I am not talking about the amount for those who have committed fraud but for the second group that the shadow Minister mentioned, where there perhaps has been a mistake.
Mike Wood
In the case of non-fraudulent claims, where the Minister is not satisfied that there has been fraud on the part of the liable person, I would be inclined to go with the Government’s figure of 20%. That is reasonable in the case of errors, and it obviously allows for longer-term recovery where a genuine mistake has been made. Where there is deemed to have been fraudulent activity, it does not make sense to give those responsible the protection of protecting 60% of the money that they have stolen.
Neil Coyle
Is the shadow Minister’s other concern, with those who have committed fraud, that he thinks the payment should be faster? The Bill allows for 100% of this falsely claimed sum to be recouped, but he seems to be suggesting that he would like to see that done faster. Is that the nature of the amendment?
Mike Wood
Obviously, the Bill allows for sums to be recouped through regular earnings. Where money is in a bank account, we have established that the money is there from the information notices and other measures in the Bill. If the full amount that has been defrauded is available within the account, it seems to make little sense not to be able recover that sum from the account, rather than relying on a deduction of earnings order.
Clause 23(5) requires banks to comply with direct deduction orders. Have the financial institutions been consulted on those obligations and are they content with them? As was said earlier, the evidence that we heard last Tuesday suggested that many financial institutions did not seem to have a grasp of what those obligations and burdens might look like, as well as the costs that would arise.
To conclude, the effectiveness of these provisions will depend heavily on the codes of practice on staff training and on fair procedures. Further clarification is needed to ensure deductions are proportionate, transparent and do not cause undue hardship, particularly in cases of fraud and financial vulnerability. But where there has been demonstrable fraud, the Opposition see no reason to protect 60% of credit in a bank account where it may be linked to conscious efforts to defraud the taxpayer. I would welcome the Minister’s response to those concerns.
Steve Darling
The Liberal Democrats support this Conservative amendment. I will not go over the arguments again, as they have been well put. Some clauses talk about safeguards. It is about the culture of the organisation, making sure that individuals have professional curiosity and how to foster that within the organisation. Professional curiosity can bear significant fruit for a number of Government organisations when they conduct activities, but broadly we are supportive.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
It is a pleasure to serve under you today, Mrs Lewell-Buck. I do not support the Conservative amendment. A lot of the discussion in Committee has been about reducing the risk of harm to potentially vulnerable people and people caught up in these frauds, who might not deserve to be punished in any way. I would not support taking out a measure that is there presumably to reduce the consequences of making an error. Therefore, I will not support the amendment.
Georgia Gould
I welcome the opportunity to respond to the amendment and to clarify an error that I made in a previous discussion that might have contributed to some confusion. When I talked about the recovery of debt and a limit to the amount that will be recovered, I mentioned up to 40% of assets when I meant to say credited amounts. To be clear, in the instance that the shadow Minister mentioned—say the Member for Kingswinford and South Staffordshire defrauded the Government, they had £200,000 in their account and it was a lump sum, the powers would enable the PSFA to recover that money, with the safeguards of not leaving that person in financial destitution. The 40% is related to ongoing repayments and the speed of repayment. I hope that that gives some reassurance to the hon. Member.
To the points that Opposition Members have made about vulnerability and training, the PSFA authorised officers will be highly trained. They are subject to professional training and a code of ethics within that. That includes the kind of professional curiosity that the hon. Member for Torbay talked about. On debt recovery, they will work to establish debt practice, including the debt management vulnerability toolkit, which is publicly available. I would be pleased to send him those documents so he can understand the vulnerability assessments that will be made and scrutinise them.
To go through the detail of the clauses, specifically for a regular direct deduction order, the total deductions in a 28-day period must not exceed either 40% or 20% of the amount credited to the account in the relevant period: for fraud, 40% is the maximum; for error, the maximum is 20%. Throughout the Bill, we have sought to bring powers that are used elsewhere into the PSFA, not to create brand new powers for the PSFA. This provides assurance of their effective and proportionate use, and we are doing the same here. The 40% maximum limit is in line with existing legislation, such as the DWP’s existing direct earnings attachment powers and the Child Maintenance Service deduction from earnings order powers.
Mike Wood
I thank the Minister for giving us some clarification on that, but the direct deduction is different from an earning attachment where there is likely to be another similar amount coming in the following month. The Minister suggested I might have £200,000 in my account, which I think would raise a few eyebrows all around. But if all £200,000 had been the result of fraud from the public sector, and I chose to put that regular direct deduction order in place, my understanding of clause 22(3) is that in the first month the maximum that could be deducted would be 40% of £200,000—which is £80,000.
Georgia Gould
First, I want to make absolutely clear that I was not accusing the hon. Member of any fraud, but just using a hypothetical. In that instance, the PSFA would use the lump sum direct deduction orders, so they would be able to take the full amount. They would not need to use the direct earnings attachment. It would be a lump sum direct deduction order that would recover that money. As I said, there are no limits to that, except that it does not cause hardship in meeting essential living expenses. I hope that provides some reassurance.
The 40% maximum limit is in line with existing legislation. The amendment seeks to remove the 40% cap for fraud, allowing a higher percentage of regular deductions to be made. To be absolutely clear, for lump sum direct deduction orders, there is no maximum limit on the total amount of deductions. However, the lump sum deduction must still adhere to the core principles, in meeting essential living expenses and be otherwise fair. That ensures that where a higher proportion of the payable amount is present in the account, we can recover the debt more efficiently while maintaining those key safeguards.
We are also able to issue a lump sum direct deduction order and then establish a regular direct deduction order. That allows us to take an initial higher amount of deduction, with regular payments thereafter where appropriate. This is a better route than allowing for a higher level of deductions. It builds on established practice, is proportionate while still being impactful, and it limits the disincentive to earn that an unlimited regular deduction would create. A too-high regular deduction would disincentivise earnings so strongly that it would result in slower, not faster, recovery of funds for our public services.
I turn to clause 22, which sets out the amount of deductions that there may be under an order. We have ensured that the amount of debt we collect at any given time is fair. That is why we established maximum limits based on whether debt was accrued due to fraud or error. We have discussed the safeguards and precedent at length, and the powers here build on precedent across Government. A key consideration throughout the creation of the debt measures was to robustly prevent hardship, learning from best practice. The challenge was to balance that with the need to send a strong deterrent message to those who have the means to pay their fraud and error-related debt to Government, but refuse to do so.
Clause 22 caters for that by ensuring that the terms of the order will not cause the liable person, any other account holder, or a person living with or financially dependent on the liable person or any other account holder, hardship in meeting essential living expenses. To ensure we include other considerations outside of this list, the terms of the order are also required to be otherwise fair in all circumstances.
Clause 23 provides the contents and effect of direct deduction orders. Regular and lump sum direct deduction orders must specify the amount, or a method for calculating the amounts, to be deducted and when. A regular deduction may specify different amounts or different methods to be deducted at different times. For example, the first deducted amount may be higher than the following payments to recover the debt in the most efficient way possible. Deductions may not be made until 28 days after an order has been made. That provides a safeguard for the liable person, allowing them the requisite time and opportunity to request a review under clause 45. Banks must comply with the direct deduction order, whether regular or lump sum, to ensure adherence to these measures. A penalty may be imposed for failure to comply under clause 53.
Clauses 22 and 23 send a strong message to those with fraud and error-related debt to the Government, while preventing hardship and protecting those who are vulnerable. They play an essential role in the operation of a direct deduction order and align with the core principle of seeking the effective recovery of public funds.
I have set out the powers that are available under the Bill, but as I said earlier, they do not prevent the Government also being able to use powers that are already available, such as applying to the courts to seize assets. Having outlined the key provisions in clause 22 and 23, I commend both to the Committee.
Mike Wood
Given the Minister’s reassurances, I will not press amendment 19 to a Division now, but we may wish to come back to the matter on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clauses 22 and 23 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 24
Bank’s administrative costs
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 6—Report on cost implications for banks—
“The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act, publish a report on the expected cost implications of the provisions of this Act for banks.”
Amendment 23, in clause 103, page 63, line 35, at end insert—
“(3A) Before bringing into force any of the provisions of Part 1 of this Act, the Secretary of State must consult with banks as to the costs which will be incurred by banks upon application of the provisions of Part 1.
(3B) Where consultation finds that the expected costs to banks are at a disproportionate level, the Secretary of State may not bring into force the provisions which are expected to result in such disproportionate costs.”
Georgia Gould
Clause 24 enables a bank to deduct administrative costs that it has reasonably incurred when complying with a direct deduction order from the liable person’s account. This provision is essential to ensure that banks are adequately compensated for the administrative efforts required to comply with the orders, thereby facilitating the efficient operation of debt recovery processes while protecting account holders from undue financial strain. A direct deduction order will then specify how the bank can deduct its administrative costs while complying with the maximum amount of total deductions as specified in the clause 22.
Clause 37 contains a power to make further provision through regulations as to the administrative charges which can be imposed by the banks. That power will be used to introduce a cap on the charges which can be imposed under this clause and which can be adjusted in line with inflation and to ensure that the charges remain reasonable at all times. The amount may be deducted by the bank immediately prior to the direct deduction order. To safeguard against that causing unintended hardship, the question of deducting the bank’s administrative costs for the liable person must be taken into account when complying with the hardship considerations outlined in clause 22. That will ensure that the direct deduction order and deduction of the bank’s administrative costs do not cause the liable person, other account holders, those living with the liable person or joint account holder or those financially dependent on the liable person or joint account holder hardship in meeting essential living expenses and that the deductions are otherwise fair in all circumstances.
Regarding the burdens on the financial services sector, the Government are extremely mindful of the burdens that the Bill places on industry, including financial institutions. We want to ensure that banks are not subjected to disproportionate burdens or costs in complying with these measures. As I have outlined, that is why we met with key representatives of the finance industry, including UK Finance, individual banks, building societies and the Financial Conduct Authority, to ensure that there is close and sustained engagement on this Bill. We heard directly from UK Finance in evidence last Tuesday. The finance sector has supported the Bill’s objectives and there are constructive conversations already taking place. The direct deduction order powers in this Bill align with those existing powers and we will continue working with the DWP to align direct deduction order processes across both Departments where possible to simplify implementation.
Mike Wood
As the Minister said, the clause allows for deductions from a liable person’s account to include reasonable costs incurred by the bank in processing the deduction order. While the clause will ensure that banks can recoup legitimate administrative expenses, several important questions arise about fairness, oversight and overall financial impact.
Steve Darling
I echo many of the concerns raised by the shadow Minister. There are serious issues with giving a blank cheque to banks to undertake certain activities. How are they planning to calculate what their cost is? Is it purely the direct cost of that activity, or are they able to ladle into that some of their central costs? Clearly, if they did not exist as a bank, they would not be able to undertake these activities. There is uncertainty, and we wish to see fairness and transparency. Some feedback from the Minister on this matter would be extremely welcome, because although it is fair that people pay for the activity to be undertaken by banks, so that the burden does not fall on either the banks or the taxpayer, it is important that it is equitable. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Georgia Gould
I referred in my opening remarks to the positive and ongoing conversations that we are having with banks and the UK finance industry, and that was reflected in the evidence we heard. A UK Finance representative said that a number of conversations with industry have taken place since the measures were announced, and referred to “constructive conversations”.
Concerns were raised about safeguards for the charges that banks could put in place under the PSFA measures, and I have already outlined some of the safeguards in place. The deduction of a bank’s administrative costs should not cause the liable person, other account holders, those living with the liable person or joint account holder, or those financially dependent on the liable person or joint account holder hardship in meeting essential living expenses, and they should be fair.
There are further protections in the Bill. Clause 37 contains the powers to make further provisions through regulations on the administrative charges that can be imposed by the bank. The powers will be used to introduce a cap on the charges that can be imposed under the clause and adjusted in line with inflation. To give further reassurance to the Committee, this is in line with the powers that HMRC has through the Enforcement by Deduction from Accounts (Imposition of Charges by Deposit-takers) Regulations 2016. For HMRC, the regulations specify that the amount should be
“the lesser of…the amount of those administrative costs reasonably incurred by the”
bank “and £55.” So there is precedent, and the necessary regulations will be made in due course.
In my view, new clause 6 is not required. We have already published the Bill’s impact assessment, which sets out the minimal expected cost to businesses of its measures, where it has been possible to do so, including to banks. The impact assessment has been green-rated by the Regulatory Policy Committee. DWP has also committed to providing estimates in a subsequent impact assessment of the business costs for DWP’s eligibility verification measure, within three months of Royal Assent. So DWP has already come forward to commit to bringing forward that information as part of the package. I am confident that that will provide the necessary transparency that the shadow Minister seeks, and I hope that our commitment again today to provide those costs reassures hon. Members.
Equally, we believe that the purpose of amendment 23 is already provided for through the regulation-making powers under clause 37. As I stated, we have consulted and will continue to consult the banks to implement the measures in part 1 of the Bill, as set out in the published impact assessment. In part 1, the costs to banks are expected to be minimal and offset by the ability of banks to recover administrative costs from the liable person.
Clause 24 enables the banks to recover administrative costs from the liable person, and clause 37 provides for regulations to be made in relation to the costs that a bank may recover by virtue of clause 24. We intend the regulations to be reasonable for those paying and for the banks. Before introducing such regulations, a consultation must occur with those representing the interests of banks. We are committed to continuing engagement and consultation with the financial services sector through the passage of the Bill and its implementation —indeed, that has been ongoing since evidence was given last week.
It is important to put the cost to banks in the context of the amount that will be recovered under the Bill, which we estimate to be £940 million—money that is vital to delivering public services. It is right that every part of the system plays its part in recovering money that was lost to fraud. Having outlined the key provisions in the clause, I urge the Committee to agree that it should stand part of the Bill.
I have just received a message: I thought I said that DWP would produce an impact assessment in 12 months, but I said three months. I assure everyone that it is 12 months.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 24 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 25
Insufficient funds
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Georgia Gould
The clause sets out the action to be taken if the amount in the account is lower than the amount specified in the direct deduction order. Should that situation arise in relation to a lump sum direct deduction order, no deduction is to be made by the bank, and the bank must notify us as soon as possible. If it occurs in relation to a regular deduction order, the order is to be read as requiring the deduction to be made on the same day the following week. If the amount in the account still remains lower, no deduction is to be made and the bank must notify us as soon as possible. That approach ensures that individuals are not unduly penalised or driven into financial hardship because of insufficient funds, while maintaining the integrity of the debt recovery process through prompt communication and reassessment. Having outlined the key provisions of the clause, I commend it to the Committee.
Mike Wood
The clause outlines the procedure when a bank account does not contain sufficient funds to fulfil a direct deduction order. The key provisions are as follows. For lump sum deduction, if the full amount is not available, no deduction is made and the Minister is notified. For regular deductions, if the necessary funds are not available, an attempt is to be made again on the same day the following week. If funds remain insufficient, no deduction is made and the Minister is notified.
I have some key questions and concerns as to what happens next. Once the Minister is notified, what are the next steps? Does the notification trigger further action to recover the money through other means? Is there a set timeframe in which the Minister must decide on further steps? Does the Minister have discretion to determine the best course of action, or are there prescribed steps that must follow? If funds are unavailable in the specified account, is there a process to check whether the liable person has other accounts in their name with other financial institutions that may have sufficient funds? Would the Minister have the power to issue a further general information notice to a bank in order to identify other accounts that could be used for recovery?
Georgia Gould
I am grateful for the shadow Minister’s questions. This clause and his questions really highlight the balance between safeguarding vulnerability—ensuring that people are not left without money to be able to support themselves and dependants—and recovering all the money owed to the Government.
Hopefully, the shadow Minister will be reassured that alternative recovery methods will be available, including using other powers in the Bill to gather information on, or recover money from, other accounts held by that liable person. If an individual continues to try to frustrate the process, as the shadow Minister has described, there are civil penalties through deduction orders of £300. If all the powers in the Bill are frustrated, the authorised officers will be able to apply to the courts to seize assets and to use other powers available. There are a number of options to ensure the full recovery of defrauded money to the state.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 25 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 26
Restrictions on accounts: banks
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Georgia Gould
Direct deduction orders will be an effective tool in recovering money owed to the public sector. However, it is important that we include measures in the Bill to make clear the obligations of banks and account holders with regard to the orders.
Clause 26 introduces restrictions on accounts from the perspective of banks. The bank must ensure that the account is not closed at the request of the account holder. If the notices relates to a lump sum direct deduction order, the bank must also secure that no transactions occur that would reduce the balance below the amount specified on the order, or the bank may transfer the specified amount, or the amount in the account if it is lower, into a hold account created by the bank to protect it. The bank must ensure that no transaction occurs that would result in the hold account’s balance falling below the amount transferred into it. When a bank transfers an amount into a hold account, it must ensure that in doing so, it does not cause any disadvantage to the liable person or any account holder. These provisions are essential and are a key safeguard to ensure that funds required for recovery are preserved while also protecting account holders from any disadvantage, thereby maintaining trust and fairness in the enforcement process.
Clause 27 imposes restrictions on account holders to prevent them from taking any action that may frustrate the effect of the first notice or direct deduction order, which the shadow Minister raised concerns about. To clarify, frustrating the effect of the first order in this context means frustrating the effect of the proposed direct deduction order, the terms of which are set out in the first notice. Frustrating the effect of the first notice or the final direct deduction order might include a liable person creating a new bank account in order to redirect the payment of their salary, or the liable person falsifying the extent of their protected essential living expenses.
These restrictions are vital to ensure that funds necessary for debt recovery are not deliberately concealed or moved, thereby upholding the fairness and integrity of the public fund recovery system. They are also balanced within the wider direct deduction order measure, which includes review and appeal rights that are also intended to be subject to independent oversight, to be discussed later. Should a person frustrate the effect of the first order or direct deduction notice, a trained authorised officer may decide to impose a penalty under clause 53.
Mike Wood
Clause 26 places significant responsibilities on banks once a direct deduction order has been issued. The bank must ensure that the account is not closed while a deduction order is active, prevent transactions that would reduce the balance below the required deduction amount—for example, the transfer of funds—and ensure that these actions do not cause disadvantage to the liable person.
I have a few questions about those responsibilities. How are banks expected to assess disadvantage or hardship, based on what is likely to be very limited information available to them about their account holders? What guidance or criteria will be provided to banks to determine what constitutes a disadvantage to the liable person? How can banks assess the potential immediate impact of blocking transactions, including preventing spending on essentials—for example, food or utility bills—and any consequences that might arise from that? How will they consider longer-term financial obligations, such as rent or mortgage payments, disruption to which could cause significant hardship?
The lack of a code of practice makes it difficult to properly scrutinise these measures. The code of practice is expected to provide crucial details on how banks should balance enforcement with protecting individuals from undue harm, but we will have to wait until after we have made decisions in Committee and in the Bill’s remaining stages to see it. It would be helpful if the Minister could clarify how these concerns will be addressed in the code of practice and provide as much specificity as possible.
Clause 27 states that account holders must not take actions that frustrate the direct deduction process, such as closing the account, moving funds elsewhere to evade the deduction or engaging in other actions that undermine the effectiveness of the recovery process. The matter of penalties for non-compliance needs to be looked at carefully. What penalties will be imposed if an account holder deliberately frustrates the deduction order? Would non-compliance be treated as a civil offence, or could it lead to criminal penalties in cases of deliberate obstruction? If the financial institution failed to prevent it, would that be a civil offence, or would it be seen as a regulatory issue?
Is there an appeal mechanism if an account holder can prove that a transaction was necessary and not an attempt to evade the deduction? For example, what would happen if someone urgently needed to pay rent or buy medicine and did not realise it would interfere with the deduction order? Would there be any flexibility in cases of financial difficulty, and how would that be assessed?
Given the significant responsibilities placed on banks and the potential impact on individuals, further clarity is needed on how banks will be guided in assessing disadvantage and hardship, how the code of practice will address these concerns and ensure practical implementation, what penalties will apply if an account holder frustrates the deduction process or if a financial institution fails to prevent such frustration, and what appeals or exceptions exist for necessary transactions that unintentionally interfere with the deduction order. Those clarifications are essential for ensuring that the system is both effective and fair.
Georgia Gould
It is important to set out again that these powers will be used in the last instance and, in many cases we hope they will be a deterrent. In the majority of cases, we expect people to engage with the authorised officers and come to a voluntary agreement. If people do not agree, the powers will be used only after an application to a court to determine the ability to recover that debt. In the first instance, we expect these powers to be used in a very limited fashion; the impact assessment talks about fewer than 10 cases a year. There is ample time to work through with banks how these powers are used and ensure that it is proportionate.
The shadow Minister raised concerns that the powers are too harsh in some cases and that they will leave people vulnerable in others, which shows the balance involved. The measures have been carefully thought through, and they include safeguards for vulnerability but also the ability to step in if people are deliberately frustrating the process.
We will issue guidance to banks on how the three months of bank statements will be determined, and authorised officers will work with banks to ensure that this works effectively. The shadow Minister asked about the penalty. It will be a £300 fixed penalty notice for failing to comply. As with every part of this, people will be able to request a review and, ultimately, to appeal.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 26 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 27 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Gerald Jones.)
Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Seventh sitting)
Thursday 6th March 2025
(2 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesPublic Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 6 March 2025 - (6 Mar 2025)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
I remind members to email their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk. Members should not imbibe tea or coffee in the room, and electronic devices should be switched to silent.
Clause 56
Procedural rights
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Georgia Gould)
It is a pleasure to continue to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond.
A priority when designing the Bill was that its powers be sufficiently balanced by strong oversight and transparent safeguards to protect the vulnerable and guard against human error. Rightly, a large number of the questions from the Committee have probed that. Clause 56 is a key part of that design. It ensures that certain steps must be taken and assured before a penalty may be issued; these steps cannot be rushed, skipped or subverted. As I have confirmed, the application of these powers will be strictly limited to specifically authorised officers within the Public Sector Fraud Authority, as set out in clause 66. To exercise the powers, these officials will be required to comply with the relevant training and qualifications, as set out in the relevant codes. They will be subject to both internal and external oversight, including scrutiny of training.
Further safeguards are embedded throughout the legislation for civil penalties. These include the right to make representations in clause 56, the ability to request an internal review in clause 57, and the ability to request an appeal to an appropriate court in clause 60. Additional details of the safeguards will be set out in a code of practice published before the first use of the civil penalty powers. I will give some detail of what will be in that code of practice when we discuss the later clauses. Clause 56 is essential because it holds the PSFA and this Government accountable, ensuring that the safeguards are not only explained to the public but maintained and reviewed by independent oversight.
Clause 57 ensures that a penalty decision notice must be issued before a penalty is imposed, and provides an essential safeguard by giving individuals access to a review and sufficient time for it to be carried out. Powers of review will be available only to authorised officers within the PSFA who are appropriately trained. Penalties are a key part of the deterrent message that this Government wish to send by delivering the Bill. Fraud will not be tolerated, but it is not enough to simply recover money lost to fraud and error. A clear message must be sent that fraudulent actions have consequences.
Clause 58 is essential to ensure that the PSFA enforcement unit acts with transparency and is held accountable for its decisions. It is also an essential safeguard for the individuals and businesses that it will deal with, as it provides a right of review and a chance for decisions to be challenged. As part of the process, the penalised person will have the opportunity to request a review of the penalty and state why it should not be imposed; a person may contest the level of the penalty. During review, a penalty will not be imposed, per clause 57(3). If a person is not satisfied with the result of a review, they will have the opportunity to appeal the outcome to an appropriate court, per clause 60. Reviews will be carried out by an authorised officer of higher grade than the authorising officer who made the original penalty decision, as stated in clause 66(3). This is yet another safeguard that ensures a fair review of the penalty.
Mike Wood (Kingswinford and South Staffordshire) (Con)
The clauses outline the steps and safeguards before the Minister may impose a penalty. Getting these provisions right, ensuring that due process is followed, affected individuals and businesses have a right to respond and penalties are not imposed arbitrarily, is crucial.
Clause 56 sets out the procedural rights of a person facing a penalty. It ensures that penalties are not imposed without the affected party first being allowed an opportunity to respond. Subsection (2) requires that a notice of intent be given to any person facing a penalty, inviting them to make representations before a final decision is made. Under subsection (3), the notice of intent must include the amount of the proposed penalty, the reasons for imposing a penalty of that amount, and the means by which representations may be made, as well as the timescale for doing so.
As we are approaching the end of part 1, I know that the Government will be disappointed if I do not have a long list of questions on these provisions for the Minister. A theme from Tuesday’s sessions was the time limit on representations. The Bill states that individuals and businesses must be given a minimum of 28 days to make representations. There is a little more flexibility in the provisions we debated on Tuesday, but do the Government intend to set a maximum limit, whether in the legislation or perhaps the code of practice, on the number of days that would be available for such representations? If not, how will it be ensured that the process does not become excessively prolonged, as the Minister spoke about on Tuesday? As well as causing delay for the public authority seeking to recover funds, it might cause uncertainty for businesses and individuals. We are also interested to hear about guidance that might be issued on when it would be appropriate to vary the 28 days and allow a longer period for representation in order to strike a balance.
On the issue of authorised officers, and assuming that the decisions are being delegated, the Minister has previously referred to the Carltona principle whereby Ministers can delegate decision-making and executive powers to appropriate officials. In the light of the Government’s intention to repeal the Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act 2023, I am interested to know whether they have assessed the impact that might have on the operation of the Carltona principle in these circumstances. The principle is derived from pre-second world war case law, but it was significantly weakened in the Gerry Adams challenge. It was one of the things the previous Government were seeking to change, as a response to amendments in the House of Lords to re-establish the principle. In the absence of the 2023 Act, will the principle still be legally robust enough to allow the delegation that the Government intend under this Bill?
We assume that the decision on whether to maintain, reduce or cancel a proposed penalty will be made by an authorised officer rather than the Minister for the Cabinet Office, so will the Minister set out the level of seniority of the authorised officers within the PSFA and how that decision was reached? What training will those officers be required to undergo for this specific function, and what steps is the PSFA expected to put in place to ensure consistency in decision making across different cases?
Clause 57 outlines the process for issuing a penalty decision notice once a final decision has been made. Again, the requirements in the clause appear to be sensible and necessary if we are to ensure that individuals and organisations are fully informed of their liability and have an opportunity to challenge decisions that they believe to be incorrect or unfair, so we support the clause standing part of the Bill.
Clause 58 deals with reviews of penalty decisions. I have a few questions about who in the PSFA or Government will conduct the review. Who will ensure that they are properly separate from the individual decision-making process and if the reviews are to be conducted by officials, what will be the level of seniority required?
The clauses set out important procedural safeguards that seem to be appropriate to ensure penalties are not imposed unfairly. If we are given clarification regarding the degree of discretion available, the seniority, and training in decision making and the safeguards that ensure fairness, we will be content for the clauses to stand part of the Bill.
Steve Darling (Torbay) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. The Liberal Democrats broadly welcome the proposals in the clauses. Safeguarding people is an essential part of the Bill. I suspect we will go into that in greater depth as we embark on part 2.
Georgia Gould
I would indeed have been disappointed if the shadow Minister had not had lots of detailed questions for me on the operation of the powers. I agree wholeheartedly about the importance of safeguards.
To take the questions in turn, we are confident of the legal robustness of the Carltona principle. It is how Government routinely works, and we are confident that the powers can be exercised by highly trained authorised officers. As the shadow Minister says, 28 days is a minimum. There are no plans at the moment to introduce a maximum, but the intention is for the team to work as quickly as possible to recoup public money. As we have discussed, there might be exceptional circumstances where people need more time, and the authorised officers will be able to provide that time on a case-by-case basis, always bearing in mind the need to return money that is owed because of fraud.
We will talk shortly about the oversight and review process, but we want a separate team outside the PSFA that is answerable to an independent reviewer. It could look at the wide range of cases and ensure there is consistency and that powers are used proportionately. It could report to Parliament, so there would be ongoing scrutiny of the exercise of the powers. It is important to remember what will have taken place by the time we get to a penalty. In order to establish the recovery of a debt, if the individual did not agree, the matter will have gone to court. An authorised officer will have reviewed the case and submitted to a senior member of the team the rationale for a penalty to be imposed.
There are a number of routes of review. The first is a review by another authorised officer of a higher grade in the PSFA team. If the individual is not satisfied with that, they will, as the shadow Minister set out, have the ability to apply to a court or a tribunal to have that reviewed. There are robust safeguards built in within the PSFA and outside the PSFA.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 56 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 57 to 59 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 60
Appeals
Georgia Gould
This legislation is underpinned by robust oversight and layers of protection for individuals and businesses. Safeguards have been put in place to ensure that there are sufficient opportunities for individuals and businesses to make representations, request internal reviews of decisions and appeal to the relevant courts. Every opportunity will be provided to ensure that no one is penalised unfairly or in error.
Clause 60 is an important final safeguard that ensures that everyone has the right to appeal to an independent court or tribunal should they disagree with the PSFA’s final determination. Per clause 14(b), once an appeal is made, recovery measures may not be exercised until after the appeal is heard and completed.
The clause includes a delegated power that allows the Minister, by regulation, to make further provisions about appeals. The regulations are subject to the negative procedure. Crucially, the Minister is not given the power to remove the right of appeal; instead, the Minister may amend the clause simply to make the appeal process more efficient—for example, by allowing an appeal against a penalty or debt to be heard at the same time.
Mike Wood
We support the provision that a person can appeal against a penalty to the appropriate court. This is an appropriate level of oversight for these civil penalties, and it is appropriate that the court can uphold, revoke or amend the penalty notice and make the final decision on whether an individual should be penalised for fraud. Obviously the Minister’s judgment that the behaviour was fraudulent and caused the loss to the public authority will form a part of that decision. It is clearly right that there is a role for the legal system in the appeal process. It is also sensible to have the decision by the appropriate court marked as the final decision, to prevent ongoing appeals that could frustrate the proper recovery of funds that are properly payable.
The clause also allows the Minister to make further regulation via the negative procedure regarding appeals against a penalty notice. Will she explain why the negative procedure was judged appropriate in these circumstances, rather than one that would allow Parliament automatically to have its say on any proposed regulations? What further provisions does she envisage being introduced at a later date? I understand that part of the purpose of the clause is to accommodate unforeseeable changes in circumstances, so it is not always possible to see the detail, but some clarity on the kind of area or circumstances in which regulations may be needed would help the Committee to form a judgment on the clause. If no further provisions are expected and there is no reason to imagine that they may be necessary, that clearly renders that part redundant.
That is a rather shorter list of questions to this clause—I am drawing to a close. I would appreciate if the Minister could provide that clarification.
Georgia Gould
I am pleased to provide that clarification. As I said, the critical point is that this provision is very limited in its scope, and the right to appeal set out in the Bill cannot be removed. In my initial remarks, I gave an example of making the appeal process more efficient, such as by allowing an appeal against a penalty or debt to be heard at the same time. The provision is limited to how appeals are operationalised, and does not affect the right to have an appeal.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 60 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 61 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 62
Code of practice
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Georgia Gould
The clause is an important part of the Bill because the code of practice will set out how and why civil penalties will be calculated and imposed. This will help to ensure that those powers are used transparently and reasonably. I made a commitment as we went through the previous clauses to go into detail about what will be in the code of practice, which I plan to do now.
The code of practice will set clear guidance and standards for authorised officers when using the powers. It will also help the general public to understand how those powers are exercised. To encourage co-operation with our investigations, allowing the PSFA to recover more from fraudsters in the most efficient way possible, it may be appropriate to offer discounted penalties to those who co-operate.
We will consult on the code of practice and publish it ahead of the first use of the civil penalty powers to ensure sufficient time for Members to familiarise themselves with the measures. In the spirit of being helpful to the Committee, I want to give as much detail as I can on what the code of practice will contain so that the House has the opportunity to understand it, as well as the other place in due course. This will of course be subject to change if either House amends the Bill.
The code of practice will set out the statutory obligation under which it is published, who the intended audience is, and how it should be used. It will set out the rights of anyone who is penalised, which will include appointing legal advisers or other representatives, and how to access legal aid, if entitled to do so. It will set out how the civil penalty system will be overseen by senior officials and set out the roles of the oversight function and the “independent person” under clauses 64 and 65.
The code will explain the scope of the power and how individuals, companies and other organisations will be treated. It will also set out the various kinds of penalties in the Bill, and that penalties may be applied to fraud that occurred before the Bill is enacted. It will cover the training that authorised officers will have undertaken before being authorised to issue civil penalties and the standards used by the Government’s counter-fraud profession.
The code will inform the public about the investigative process in enough detail to give a fair understanding of how cases will be proven to the civil standard, without giving so much information that it would enable a fraudster to game the system. This will include how cases are referred to the PSFA, how authorised officers will be trained to assess individual vulnerability and how that will be assessed during the initial case assessment.
The code will explain how the information powers in the Bill work, how they will be used, the safeguards for their use and how reviews may be requested. It will include how authorised officers will establish a claim, including in court, and how authorised officers will assess whether a case meets the civil burden of proof required to issue a fraud penalty. It will also test that assessment with others, including subject matter experts, specialists and legal advisers. It will explain the decision-making process, including who will make the decision about penalty calculation and imposition.
The code will also set out the circumstances in which the PSFA will not apply a penalty, such as where there has been an error rather than fraud. Importantly, it will also make it clear that civil penalties will not be applied as an alternative to criminal prosecution but as a separate response to fraud.
The code will set out how fraud penalty levels will be calculated. Penalties will be bespoke to the case they relate to, based on the individual facts. Penalties imposed will be reasonable and proportionate, and the code will set out what that means in practice. Penalty levels will be decided by reference to a variety of factors, based on the circumstances of each case. Those include, but are not limited to: the financial loss to the public authority; the time period and frequency of the offence, whether it is a one-off or a sustained fraud; the harm done to a public authority; the impact of the offence; the offender’s behaviour; whether the offender has acted alone or as part of a group; whether a position of trust held by those committing fraud has been abused.
Separately, the code will set out how the penalties in the Bill for non-compliance will work, along with information powers and debt recovery powers, and the safeguards that will be in place. It will set out the criteria by which the PSFA may offer to discount a penalty for fully co-operating and disclosing fraud. It is beneficial to the Government to seek early resolution to investigation and enforcement action, and that kind of discount is used elsewhere to incentivise that. However, the code will also explain that there can be no discount without full co-operation.
The code will set out the practical steps of issuing a penalty in accordance with the clauses in the Bill. That will include the issuing of notices of intent; how a person can access their right to make representations on any relevant matters; how penalty decision notices will be issued; and how to access the rights of internal review and of appeal to the tribunals. On that last point, the code will also help a person to understand what a tribunal is and how to appeal. It will not replicate the existing published guidance on the tribunals, which it will instead signpost people to.
The code will set out when a penalty becomes payable, how to pay it and what will happen if it is not paid. That will include setting out how the debt recovery powers in the Bill will work, if their use is required, and other potential routes of debt recovery action. Finally, the code will make it clear how the PSFA will process, hold and share data, as set out in the Bill and with reference to the Data Protection Act 2018.
The content of the code of practice, as I have set out, will give anyone affected by these powers a clear understanding of what will happen and why, their rights and responsibilities, and how the PSFA will act throughout the process. Having explained that, I commend clause 62 to the Committee.
Mike Wood
I thank the Minister for that explanation. Obviously, it is helpful for us to have what are, essentially, the chapter headings of the code of practice—the areas that it will cover. That clearly provides some degree of transparency, but it is no substitution for the detail of what will actually appear within those chapters.
We heard from a range of witnesses last week who, in response to many of our questions, were unable to say whether the powers and provisions in the Bill are appropriate and proportionate because of the absence of detail about the code of practice. It would be helpful and courteous to this House, therefore, if as much detail as possible about what will appear—the actual provisions for how the code of practice will operate, rather than just the chapter headings—could be made available at an early enough stage for it to be considered during the Bill’s passage through this House.
Can the Minister give more information about the input that will go into deciding what the details are within the code of practice? Which stakeholders does she expect will be engaged with? Are there any parallel equivalent codes of practice in other areas that might be expected to be a model for this code, or are we effectively starting with a blank sheet?
Again, although the Minister’s explanation is extremely welcome, we continue to be disappointed that the actual detail is currently scheduled to be made available only for Members of the House of Lords to consider before legislating, rather than elected Members of Parliament. We appreciate the recognition of the importance of transparency, which we are obviously seeking to maintain throughout the Bill, but we hope that the Government will accelerate their plans to provide more information for Members of Parliament so that informed decisions can be made about this important legislation.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Sir Desmond. I want to reiterate the points made by the Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for Kingswinford and South Staffordshire. It is not good enough to be able to refer only to the official record of the long list that the Minister just read out of what is likely to appear in the code of practice. At this stage of the legislation, we ought to be scrutinising at least a draft.
The clause does not include any consultation on a draft code of practice and there are no scrutiny safeguards built into the legislation, so it is wrong to not be looking at the details. In previous debates, I have set out my concerns that although there have been reassurances that this part of the Bill is about major fraud, and that it excludes the Department for Work and Pensions, it is easy to envisage that there may be a scheme of fraud against other Departments that involves defrauding grants that are available to support people claiming certain benefits. That might bring people who are poorer and more vulnerable into a scheme where, according to previous clauses, these penalties may be applied. We need to look at the code of practice in draft form at this stage of the legislation or as soon as possible.
Steve Darling
Legislation that is rushed is often legislation that is dangerous, and I fear that that is where we are today. The hon. Member for Kingswinford and South Staffordshire was very polite in putting his challenges to the Minister, but I would like to be a little more robust and say that I believe it is extremely unreasonable that we do not have the code before us. “The devil is in the detail” is a hackneyed phrase, but that is the fact of the matter. I say to the Minister that it would be extremely helpful if the code could be published before the legislation passes throughout Parliament, so that there is at least the opportunity to scrutinise it at a later date. I look forward to receiving a satisfactory response from her.
Georgia Gould
I am grateful for those questions. As I set out, the code of practice provides additional guidance and operational detail, but the important thing is that the key safeguards we have discussed are covered in a great deal of detail in the Bill. We have gone through the right to appeal and the level of the authorised officer who will be looking at every part of the process, whether that is the initial decision or the review. We have discussed the timeframes, all the appeal routes that are built into the legislation, and the oversight. The key safeguards to the operationalisation of these powers are in the Bill in a great deal of detail.
It is right that I went through the kind of operational detail that the code of practice will cover. To hopefully offer some reassurance on the questions of consultation and precedent, in developing the code of practice, we are building on a great deal of precedent within Government—from the DWP, the Home Office and His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs—on the use of these powers and what has worked well. There is already a huge amount of consultation, at ministerial and official level, on developing the code. There will be a public consultation on it as well, and, as we have already committed, we will bring forward the code of practice within the parliamentary process.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 62 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 63 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 64
Independent review
Steve Darling
I beg to move amendment 31, in clause 64, page 34, line 23, at end insert—
“(1A) Prior to appointing an independent person, the Minister must consult the relevant committee of the House of Commons.
(1B) For the purposes of subsection (1A), ‘the relevant committee’ means a committee determined by the Speaker of the House of Commons.”
This amendment would ensure Parliamentary oversight of the appointment of the “Independent person”.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
Clause 65 stand part.
Steve Darling
The amendment is about ensuring transparency around the Bill. I have already explored transparency, and other hon. Members have talked about reasonableness. The Bill gives the Minister the ability to appoint their own independent person. Although I am sure that those in power for the foreseeable future are very reasonable individuals who will genuinely appoint independent persons, we can read in our newspapers about people not very far away who are effectively appointing yes-people around them, so I fear that we need to future-proof the Bill to ensure that the people appointed are genuinely independent.
Constitutions elsewhere in the world have checks and balances heavily built into governance. The amendment, which proposes to delegate to the Speaker the decision about how the appropriate Committee of Parliament can be involved and consulted about the appointment of the independent individual, would be a good way of ensuring genuine independence and reasonableness. I hope that the Government seriously consider it; we will be pressing it to a vote.
Georgia Gould
I will start by talking about clauses 64 and 65, and then I will address the amendment.
It is absolutely necessary that there is appropriate independent oversight to ensure the powers in the Bill are used appropriately, and we welcome debate on that. That is why we have introduced the power to appoint an independent person, which might be one person—an independent reviewer—or an organisation such as His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services. They will augment the existing oversight structures laid out elsewhere in the Bill, such as the role of the Independent Office for Police Conduct, set out in clause 9, which will investigate the most serious complaints into the PSFA’s use of entry, search and seizure powers.
Clause 64 mandates that an independent person appointed by the Minister undertakes reviews of the use of powers in the Bill. The independent reviewer will conduct reviews to consider whether the exercise of the powers is in keeping with the legislation, codes of practice and relevant guidance. They will produce a report of their findings for the Minister, including any recommendations they deem appropriate. The Minister is then required to publish the report and lay it before Parliament. That ensures there is both public and parliamentary accountability in the role of the independent person outlined in the Bill.
As we state in the explanatory notes, we intend to make the duty imposed by the clause in two ways. First, the Government will commission His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services to inspect the PSFA’s use of the new investigative powers, which can include the end-to-end investigative process and decision making. HMICFRS has a long-standing history, going back to 1856, and it independently assesses and reports on the performance of police and fire and rescue services in the UK, as well as other public bodies with investigatory powers, such as His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. HMICFRS reports are already made available publicly, and are an efficient way to hold bodies accountable for their investigative practices.
Secondly, the Government are creating a new position for an independent reviewer to whom the PSFA’s oversight team will report. The independent reviewer will assess how the PSFA exercises the powers given to it in the Bill. The independent reviewer will carry out reviews and report on whether the use of the powers is in keeping with the legislation, codes of practice and relevant guidance, as well as considering areas where HMICFRS or other oversight bodies have not already reported. The independent reviewer could, for instance, consider live case reviews or conduct supplementary reviews between those undertaken by other bodies, or look specifically at how the PSFA has taken forward recommendations from past reviews. The independent chair will have discretion in determining where to focus their resources.
We do not believe it is necessary to legislate in the manner proposed by the amendment to ensure parliamentary scrutiny. Parliament will scrutinise the independent person’s report, which the Minister is obliged to lay in Parliament. There is also an established process for agreeing posts that should be subject to pre-appointment scrutiny by Select Committees without the need for legislative provision. That process is to reach agreement on posts suitable for pre-appointment scrutiny between my Department and the Chair of the relevant Select Committee. We will be following that process for the appointment of the independent chair. We hope that offers assurance to the hon. Member for Torbay. The appointment of the independent reviewer will also fully comply with the governance code on public appointments which is overseen by the Commissioner of Public Appointments.
Mike Wood
Clause 64 sets out that the independent person has responsibilities to prepare and submit a report on the review. We welcome that element of transparency, but are conscious that we need to balance those publications against the privacy of individuals. It is covered within the legislation, but could the Minister further detail the measures that are being taken to ensure that the independent person’s reviews do protect the privacy of individuals involved, especially where there may not have been a legal process in which someone has been found guilty of an offence?
What sort of person is considered an independent person for these purposes? Is the provision intended to create a team of civil servants in the Department who do these reviews, or will it be an individual? What oversight will there be of the independent reviewers, and what resources will they have? Will they have any other responsibilities beyond the report that they produce at the end of the period that the Minister sets out?
Clause 65 allows the Minister to give direction
“as to the period to be covered”
by the review, and provides that the Minister
“may disclose information to the independent person, or to a person acting on behalf of the independent person”.
Even if the Minister is only able to set timeframes for reviews, I would still like clarity as to how independent that person is intended to be from the PSFA, the Cabinet Office and the Minister. We understand why information will need to be shared between the Minister and the independent person if they are to carry out that function, but what protections are in place to maintain privacy and protect against the sharing of unnecessary personal information that goes beyond what the independent person will require?
We have some sympathy for amendment 31, tabled by the Liberal Democrats. There is clearly a need to ensure a proper and open appointment process, as choosing the right person will shape the effectiveness of many of the review mechanisms. It is therefore vital that that decision is right. The involvement of Parliament does seem to be one way of achieving that oversight, in the absence of any better proposal in the legislation. While we recognise that this role may be rather different from the others that are set out in annex D of the Cabinet Office guidance on pre-appointment scrutiny, we would be more comfortable knowing that there is going to be that scrutiny rather than relying, at some point after the legislation is passed, on conversations between whoever happens to be in the Cabinet Office at the time or whoever happens to be Chairing whichever Committee the Speaker feels is most appropriate to be conducting any such hearings.
Georgia Gould
Let me address those questions. The first thing to say on personal or sensitive information is that the teams will of course remain subject to data protection legislation and fulfil all their obligations under the law. Only information that is pertinent and necessary to the review or inspection process will be shared with external bodies, and that will be done in accordance with information handling rules.
The team in the Cabinet Office will be a small, separate team that does not undertake day-to-day investigations; the team will be created to exercise the reviewing powers in the Bill. Its members will take direction from, and report to, the independent chair. They are intended to carry out the day-to-day oversight work as well as to support the functioning of the independent chair, both administratively and in conducting their formal reviews. A similar approach is taken by other independent persons who have a duty to conduct independent reviews or monitoring, and who require support from a Department —for instance, the independent Prevent commissioner for the Home Office. There is provision within the Bill for the PSFA to become a statutory body that will further separate out these functions. I reiterate the point that I made in response to the amendment: we do expect, as is normal process, that there will be a parliamentary role in the appointment of the chair, but we will continue to stay open to all suggestions as the Bill progresses.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Georgia Gould
The powers in the Bill are conferred on the Minister, but they will be exercised by officials specifically authorised by the Minister and termed “authorised officers”. The clause is an essential element of the legislation. It sets out the decisions that, if not made by the Minister personally, may be undertaken by an authorised officer only: deciding to give an information notice; deciding to give a recovery notice; deciding to make or vary a direct deduction order; deciding to make or vary a deduction from earnings; deciding to give a notice of intent to impose a civil penalty; and imposing a civil penalty.
Furthermore, the clause details some fundamental safeguards on the use of the powers. First, to be appointed as an authorised officer, the individual must be employed in the civil service within the Cabinet Office. That is to ensure strict control over who may use the powers. The clause also defines who may conduct internal reviews, a protection offered widely in the Bill. Any internal reviews must be undertaken by an authorised officer at least one grade senior to the officer involved in the initial decision, or by the Minister. That ensures that officers cannot review their own decisions when challenged for an internal review.
Authorised officers form the backbone of the Government’s approach to taking the powers. The officers will need to complete a rigorous bespoke training programme, which will cover all aspects of investigative practice, including the relevant powers under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 for authorised investigators. That will be to the same standard as for other public bodies using the same powers. Only after the training conditions have been met will an individual be put forward to the Minister for authorisation to act as an authorised officer and then may use the powers. Their use of the powers must follow strict processes, guidance and codes of practice. They will be subject to internal and external independent oversight of their use of the powers.
The clause is essential, as it provides a statutory gateway for PSFA officials to use the powers under the Bill. Without the clause, the Government’s intention to improve counter-fraud enforcement would either be impractical, or the powers would be given to more individuals than is absolutely required. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Mike Wood
As the Minister says, the clause sets out those decisions that can be taken by an individual authorised by the Minister on their behalf. It specifies that the authorised officer must be a civil servant in her Department. Where there is a review, it must be taken by an authorised officer of a higher grade than the one who took the original decision. As we said when debating earlier clauses, the level of the original officer seems to be set at a rather lower level than in the equivalent decision-making processes in the police and other similar organisations. The measures set out in the clause appear to be sensible, but we have one or two questions about their practical aspects.
In particular, how many of the decisions referred to in the clause does the Minister expect an officer to be likely to make on a weekly basis? When we were debating civil penalty notices, the Minister suggested that it might only be a few a year. This clause covers a rather wider range of notices, so some idea of the workload to be expected of authorised officers will help us to form a better picture of the detail of what we expect authorised officers to be considering. Similarly, does the Minister have any expectation at this stage of how many authorised officers across the different grades will be fulfilling these functions?
Georgia Gould
I thank the hon. Gentleman for those questions. Critically, we have been clear that the team will be small. However, as I have said, if the practical use of these powers goes well—we expect it to, because they are widely used in government—there is the opportunity to grow the team. Importantly, these will be highly trained officers who are specialists in this work. They will have that breadth of experience. In the first instance, we expect around 40 cases a year, but as I said, that is subject to change as time goes on.
The team will be higher executive officers or above in the PSFA. Authorised investigators must also be higher executive officers or above. That means that they will receive further training on PACE powers. Where PACE stipulates that a decision must be made by an officer with a rank of inspector or above, schedule 1 states that it will be taken by an authorised investigator of senior executive officer grade or above. That is proportionate. These are highly trained officers. We specifically ask that the powers not be given out widely, but to a group of people who will have a huge amount of training and oversight to be able to exercise them proportionately, and in a way that recovers fraud but also safeguards those being investigated.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 66 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 67
Disclosure of information etc: interaction with external constraints
Georgia Gould
I beg to move amendment 3, in clause 67, page 36, line 10, leave out “disclosure, obtaining or use” and insert “processing”.
This amendment clarifies that clause 67(3) applies in relation to all processing of information and makes it consistent with clause 67(1) and (2)).
Georgia Gould
The clause is essential in protecting specific information, preventing potential harm to individuals and upholding ethical standards in situations where unauthorised sharing could cause damage. The clause ensures that the powers adhere to current data protection legislation by safeguarding data from misuse, damage and unauthorised access. It also ensures that a person’s legal professional privilege rights are protected. The clause safeguards an individual’s rights and prevents them from being forced to provide information that could incriminate them.
Amendment 3 is necessary to clarify that this power applies to all processing of information, and to provide consistency with clauses 67(1) and (2). It would replace “disclosure, obtaining or use” of information with “processing”. It would create no additional effect and ensures clear comprehension that clause 67(3) applies in relation to all processing of information.
Mike Wood
The clause sets out how the provisions relate to data protection legislation. It is clearly an important provision to reinforce the data protection framework, given the number of concerns raised, particularly by Opposition Members, about the protections for individual privacy. The clause sets out some protection, albeit at a baseline of the existing legal provisions, to prevent breaches of any obligation of confidence owed by the people making disclosure, or of other restrictions including legal privilege. It seems eminently sensible, but will the Minister detail further the oversight mechanisms that will ensure that the safeguards are followed? What processes and avenues are available if someone believes that the requirements set out in the clause have not been followed? How should that be pursued?
As the Minister said, Government amendment 3 is a technical amendment. We have no objection to it.
Georgia Gould
As I set out previously, the PSFA will collect personal data necessary only for the relevant purposes and will ensure that it is not excessive. Any data not relevant to the stated purposes will be erased in line with the data retention policy, which specifies that data connected to a suspected fraud is held for up to five years following resolution. Data that is not connected is held for up to two years. The use of the powers will be governed by the Data Protection Act 2018 and other data protection legislation.
Amendment 3 agreed to.
Clause 67, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 68
Crown etc application
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Georgia Gould
Clause 68 sets out how the powers in part 1 of the Bill variously apply or do not apply to the Crown, to Parliament and to the King and his estates, and in circumstances of grounds of national security. The clause sets important boundaries on the scope of part 1. As such, it is essential that it stands part of the Bill.
The clause ensures that the Crown is bound by specific powers and provisions in the Bill. It applies in relation to premises used or held on behalf of the Crown —for example, a building owned by a Government Department—in the same way as any other premises. For instance, an authorised investigator could, if necessary, apply to a court for a warrant to enter, search and seize evidence from Crown premises. However, it does not bind the Crown in respect of some powers, specifically those in clauses 16 to 37, relating to recovery orders and recovery from bank accounts, and chapter 5, relating to civil penalties. If it did, the effect would be the Crown recovering money from itself or imposing a penalty on itself that it would pay to itself, simply moving money within its own accounts.
Subsection (4) creates a power for the Minister to certify that it appears appropriate in the interests of national security that the powers of entry conferred by this part should not be exercised on Crown premises specified in the certificate. Authorised investigators could not seek a warrant to enter those premises to search for evidence. This carve-out exists because there are certain Crown premises where searching may compromise national security. It is important that this is respected. In that event, the PSFA would discuss with the relevant Department or agency what alternative approach may be possible.
Finally, the clause states that the power of entry conferred by this part cannot be exercised on His Majesty’s private estates or premises occupied for the purposes of either House of Parliament. The King’s private estates are those held by His Majesty as a private person. This does not mean the Crown Estate—the sovereign’s public estates, which are managed by the Crown Estate commissioners on behalf of the Crown. In the incredibly unlikely event that evidence suggested that it was necessary to search the King’s private estates or either House of Parliament, the PSFA would request to be invited by the appropriate authority, which would be the Speaker or the Lord Speaker in the case of this House and the other place, respecting the privileges of Parliament.
Clause 70 is the interpretation clause, which sets out the meaning of terms used in part 1. I do not propose to run through the whole list of terms. Many of them are straightforward and refer back to previous clauses we have debated, but some are important to understand the scope of this part or are used in a novel way. I will say a few words about them so that the Committee can understand them in the correct context.
The first term is “authorised officer”, which we covered in clause 66. In this part, authorised officer has the meaning given in clause 66, which as we have already seen says that they must be employed in the civil service in the Minister’s Department. This means that other types of public sector workers, such as consultants or contractors, cannot be authorised officers, which is a safeguard on the use of the powers.
The clause defines “fraud” as including
“the offences in sections 1 and 11 of the Fraud Act 2006…and…the offence at common law of conspiracy to defraud.”
The Committee will recall that we discussed this in the debate on clauses 1 and 2, and I can repeat the assurances that I gave then. The definition sets the scope of fraud in relation to the core functions of a Minister in clause 1, and it covers the three main fraud offences: fraud by false representation, fraud by failing to disclose information and fraud by abuse of position. It also covers the common-law offence of conspiracy, which requires that two or more individuals dishonestly conspire to commit a fraud against a victim. Together, these give the scope needed to tackle the key forms of public sector fraud.
The clause defines “public authority” as
“a person with functions of a public nature so far as acting in the exercise of those functions”.
This sets out the scope of the Departments, bodies and agencies that the PSFA would be able to work with and on behalf of. The definition is deliberately wide to enable the PSFA to tackle public sector fraud wherever it may arise. It will allow the use of powers to investigate fraud against all central Government Departments and agencies—except HMRC and the DWP, because they already have existing powers—as well as local government and any arm’s length delivery mechanisms that deliver functions of a public nature.
The clause defines “suspected fraud” as
“conduct which the Minister has reasonable grounds to suspect may constitute fraud”.
We discussed this definition in the debate on clause 3. Reasonable grounds to suspect is an objective test meaning a belief based on specific evidence that a reasonable person would hold. It is not just based on the investigator’s own subjective opinion. It is a reasonable test that asks, “Would an ordinary, reasonable person”—like you or me, Sir Desmond—“being in possession of the same facts as the investigator, agree that it was reasonable to suspect that fraud had occurred?” This is a common standard to initiate an investigation.
Finally, beyond the definitions, the clause clarifies references to
“giving a notice or other document”
and sets out how court proceedings are considered to be finally determined. The clause is essential to ensure the correct understanding and interpretation of key terms used throughout part 1 of the Bill.
Clause 71 states that all regulations under this part should be made using statutory instruments. This ensures a structured approach to the regulatory framework. The clause allows for the creation of different types of provisions, such as consequential, supplementary, incidental, transitional or saving measures. This flexibility helps to adapt regulations to various circumstances.
The affirmative procedure requires that the regulations be approved by both Houses of Parliament, which ensures that there is oversight and accountability. The negative procedure allows regulations to be implemented promptly, but they can still be annulled by either House of Parliament if necessary. The option to convert regulations from the negative to the affirmative procedure ensures flexibility in response to the significance of particular regulatory provisions.
Clause 71 is essential for establishing a coherent and responsive regulatory framework in the legislation. By mandating the use of statutory instruments, it promotes a structured process that enhances accountability and keeps the regulatory system transparent.
Mike Wood
We fully support the measures in clause 68 on Crown premises and the Houses of Parliament—they seem perfectly sensible. As the Minister said, clause 70 specifies a whole string of definitions. Given the time, Members may be relieved to know that I do not have a specific response for each of them; there is very little in the definitions to quibble with.
Clause 71 sets out the regulations under this part. The Minister drew attention to subsection (5), which allows for the regulations specified in the Bill to be subject to either the negative or affirmative procedure. As we said earlier in Committee, many of the cases that have been outlined will be require regulations that have potentially far-reaching consequences, both for individuals and organisations. Such consequences would strongly justify the active participation of Parliament, rather than simply relying on the negative resolution, which lacks any guarantee of a debate on an attempt to pray against.
Regulations can be very difficult for Parliament to object to. We encourage the use of the affirmative procedure and hope the Government will detail their intentions on when it will be used for provisions that would otherwise be subject to the negative procedure. Beyond that, we have no objections to the clauses.
Georgia Gould
When I previously went through the different regulatory areas, I also went through which would be subject to the negative and affirmative procedures. I absolutely hear the point; the critical point for me is that the key provisions sit in the Bill. We do not expect changes made by regulation to change the key areas of oversight and the safeguards but, as the shadow Minister says, the provision for changes is there if necessary.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 68 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 69
The Public Sector Fraud Authority
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Georgia Gould
The clause creates potential for the Public Sector Fraud Authority to be established as an arm’s length statutory body, as defined in schedule 2. It contains provision for the establishment, constitution and operational framework of a new statutory body called the Public Sector Fraud Authority. It enables the transfer of the functions conferred on the Minister by the Bill to the new PSFA, and other practicalities.
The policy intention is not to commence the provisions for the independent PSFA immediately, but at a later date once a review of the effectiveness of the use of the powers has been undertaken. Providing the ability to establish the PSFA as a statutory body allows for future flexibility in how the Government conduct their counter-fraud activities. However, the decision to establish the PSFA as a new arm’s length body should not be taken lightly, nor should any decision to create a new statutory body. The Government have assessed the case for doing so immediately and decided that it would be disproportionate at this time to do so, but that will be kept under review.
The PSFA is running a pilot enforcement function. There are a relatively small number of staff and cases, so we judge that turning the PSFA’s limited enforcement function into an arm’s length body would be disproportionate at this time, given the significant cost and administrative burden involved in the short term. The Government intend to focus instead on ensuring that the powers conveyed in the Bill are bedded in effectively and the oversight is strong, so that the PSFA’s valuable work can benefit immediately from the additional investigative tools and debt recovery powers the Bill enables.
The Government will review the position on the PSFA as a statutory body once a suitable amount of time has passed to fully understand the required scope and scale of such a body. Schedule 2 ensures that, at the appropriate juncture, the Government will have the tools needed to create that body. It provides precise detail on constitution, make-up and remuneration of a board. It enables the PSFA to appoint staff. Remuneration, pensions and other payments shall be determined subject to the approval of the Minister.
Furthermore, the schedule imparts a duty on the PSFA to exercise its functions effectively, efficiently and economically. It allows for the PSFA to authorise a member of the PSFA, their staff authorised for that purpose, or a committee or sub-committee to exercise its functions. The independent PSFA must prepare a report on the exercise of its functions for the financial year, to be sent to the Minister. The Minister must lay the reports before Parliament and publish them. The Minister may create appropriate transfer schemes for assets and liabilities to enable the independent PSFA to exercise its functions. The schedule also provides a regulation-making power to transfer the powers conferred by the Bill to the new body.
The schedule allows the Minister to amend part 1 of the Bill and other existing enactments amended by part 1. This is to ensure that part 1 of what will be the Act is fit for purpose when the PSFA is established as a statutory body. The Minister may make regulations that enable the Minister to give the PSFA general or specific directions regarding the exercise of its functions. This would allow the Minister to guide the PSFA’s strategic priorities to align with Government priorities, or to direct the PSFA’s future structural changes, for example.
Mike Wood
The clause contains provisions on setting up the Public Sector Fraud Authority on a statutory basis. As I said at the beginning of Committee stage, we support the Government’s work to strengthen the PSFA’s role. The form in which it has been operating since it was established under the previous Government offers an opportunity to see how its functions can be exercised more effectively to recover a greater amount of public money that has been lost either to fraud or to error.
Although we have a range of concerns, which we have discussed, about the exercise of some of the functions and, in particular, about the oversight of some of them, we think the decision to have a Public Sector Fraud Authority is the right one, and agree that there may be future circumstances in which those functions could be performed more effectively were the authority placed on a statutory basis, so we do not oppose schedule 2.
As we have reached the end of part 1 of the Bill, and so probably the end my exchanges with the Minister, I thank her for the answers she has given. We will seek to follow up on some of those answers during the passage of the Bill, but for now we are happy for clause 69 and schedule 2 to be part of the Bill.
Siân Berry
In general, I very much support the move to make the PSFA an independent body, and the constitution in schedule 2 seems like a good start. However, looking through it I cannot see anywhere how the people appointed as the chair and executive of the PSFA will be subject to a code of conduct; to rules on transparency and registering interests; to requirements relating to compliance with the Nolan principles; and to the oversight of the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments relating to subsequent work after they leave the PSFA. The Minister, who is currently named in the Bill, is subject to all those requirements.
There is clear potential for conflicts of interests in the various roles, so it is important that they are put under that regime. Will the Minister be clear about how that will come about and whether that could be added to the constitution if it is not already there?
Georgia Gould
I echo the shadow Minister and thank him for his constructive line of questioning. It has been helpful to look into this part of the Bill in such detail. As he set out, I hope we will continue to have conversations about a number of areas, not least some of the commitments I made to look at the provision on 28 days in parts of the Bill. I appreciate the support for the provisions in this area.
On the process of establishing a statutory body, there is Cabinet Office guidance on the establishment of a public body that looks at a whole range of issues, and protections in the ministerial code require Ministers to maintain high standards of behaviour and to behave in a way that upholds the highest standards of propriety.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 69 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2 agreed to.
Clauses 70 and 71 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Gerald Jones.)
Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Eighth sitting)
Thursday 6th March 2025
(2 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesPublic Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 6 March 2025 - (6 Mar 2025)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 13 / Noes: 3 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 13 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 13 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 13 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Andrew Western)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Jeremy. In commencing debate on clause 72, my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office, passes the baton to me, to discuss part 2 and the elements of the Bill that pertain to the Department for Work and Pensions. This part sets out reforms of the Department’s approach to five key areas: information gathering, the eligibility verification measure, debt recovery, search and seizure, and penalties reform,
Clause 72 inserts proposed new section 109BZA into the Social Security Administration Act 1992. The new section grants DWP authorised officers powers to issue information notices to any information holder as part of a DWP criminal fraud investigation. When I say “authorised officers”, I mean DWP staff who have been authorised by the Secretary of State on completion of training and receiving accreditation, and can therefore issue notices. “Information holders” may include businesses or employers; a useful illustration of the sort of organisation from which we may request information is a travel agency. This kind of information can be vital in proving or disproving fraud.
The DWP already has powers to compel information in the Social Security Administration Act 1992. The Act sets out a list of information holders from which the DWP can request information, but that list is restrictive. New section 109BZA will update the powers to enable the DWP to obtain relevant information from any information holder in respect of all payments and investigations made by the Department; it also includes the ability to compel it electronically, which is a vital updating mechanism. These updates enable the DWP to take an approach similar to the one already adopted by the Scottish Government for their own criminal investigations into social security fraud.
The DWP takes its responsibilities in handling personal information very seriously. That is why new section 109BZA is constructed with a number of safeguards to ensure the appropriate use of the powers. First, per subsections (1) and (2), the power may be used only by an authorised officer where there are reasonable grounds to expect that a person has committed fraud. Reasonable grounds are established by an objective review of available facts, intelligence and evidence. This is the same principle on which the police also determine reasonable suspicion. Reasonable grounds cannot be supported by personal factors or a hunch. In addition, subsection (1)(b) stipulates that all the information requested must be “necessary and proportionate” for the purposes of investigating the fraud allegation. This determination will be made on a case-by-case basis. Mandatory training in the use of this power will be undertaken by all authorised officers.
New section 109BZA will make it easier for information holders to understand and respond to requests for information. It requires that the information notice must identify the individual concerned, and set out how the information should be returned and by when; it must also set out the consequences of non-compliance.
The clause will help to make the DWP’s fraud investigations more effective in both proving and disproving fraud. I understand that the Opposition will be interested in the code of practice, but I urge them to hold their comments until we consider clause 73, in which the code of practice is discussed at length. Having outlined the main provisions in the clause, I commend it to the Committee.
Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Jeremy. As it was to the Minister, the baton has been passed to me from our Cabinet Office spokesperson, my hon. Friend the Member for Kingswinford and South Staffordshire, as part 2 sets specifically how the Bill applies to the DWP.
We recognise that there is a huge amount of work to be done, given the increasing levels of fraud and error against the Department for Work and Pensions in recent years. We broadly support the details of part 2, but unsurprisingly, we will have some questions in the coming sessions, and we are tabling a number of amendments too.
Clause 72 amends the Social Security Administration Act 1992 to provide powers to require information related to fraud. An authorised officer can give a written notice requiring information where they have reasonable grounds to suspect that the person has committed or intends to commit fraud, and where it is necessary and proportionate to do so. The Minister spoke about how this will enable organisations outside the DWP to be required to provide information. It would be useful to understand better the Social Security Administration Act and what it is currently used for, to make sure that we have covered specifically why it needs to be amended in addition to the provisions of this legislation. I recognise what the Minister is saying, but is there a problem now? Are we not able to take its provisions far enough, and so need these changes to be made? Why are existing information-gathering powers insufficient? This is quite a broadening of the current powers, so some clarification would be great.
I have another question on clause 72 and the changes proposed to the 1992 Act. When we talk about a “person”, is this just the person the information is being requested of—an estate agent or whoever it may be—or does the term also relate to the person being investigated? Are we talking about the person who is suspected of committing a fraud, a person in possession of information about that person under suspicion, or both? In effect, who is the written notice intended for? I am sure that is probably straightforward, but it would be useful to have it outlined clearly.
I note what the Minister said about the code of practice, which I was not planning to mention in this speech. I was saving my comments on that for clause 73—we are learning as we go in this. Can the Minister confirm whether there are any limits on the non-financial institutions that will have to provide information under the verification notices? Does this include institutions such as education institutions, insurance companies, water agencies and others that people receiving benefits might be paying bills to? Where do the limits lie around the types of organisations that will be contacted? I appreciate that is done in other legislation at the moment, but it is quite a big move. We may well cover this later, but are they subject to the same sort of time restrictions as other organisations? If a school that has never had to do this before is contacted, and they have no idea of what is expected of them, how are we going to ensure that they are not penalised? This could be the first time that anything like this has come in their direction.
Steve Darling (Torbay) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Sir Jeremy. Liberal Democrats believe, as do all members of the Committee, that fraud is bad. It clearly impacts on the ability of the state to support people and our communities. It is important to put that on the table. I will give a small overview as we start debate on part 2 of the Bill, but as a liberal, the idea of mass surveillance within this part of the Bill causes me grave concern on a number of levels. This will be unpacked over the next few sessions.
I would welcome the Minister commenting on why this piece of legislation is being rushed. The rush poses a danger to our communities. The fact that the Government commissioned a review into the carer’s allowance overpayments is to be welcomed. We Liberal Democrats called for that, but we are gravely concerned that the Government are bashing ahead with this legislation without being able to take into account any lessons that could be learned from the carer’s allowance debacle.
Although the vast majority of the challenges that we face are error and fraud, my and my colleagues’ concern is that the Government need to fix the Department for Work and Pensions, which is effectively broken. I could wax about that for England, but I will not. When the machine is not fit for purpose, we need to fix it before adding more bells and whistles; simply adding to a broken machine will not fix it. I would welcome some explanation of why we are dashing ahead when we do not have the findings from the carer’s allowance overpayments review. I would also welcome a deeper explanation of what reasonable grounds for suspecting fraud will be. Putting a bit more colour on the palette would be extremely helpful.
Andrew Western
I welcome the broad support from the Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for South West Devon, for the overall intent of the Bill. She asked a number of questions about the usage of the 1992 Act. It sets out the information-gathering options available to the Department where fraud is suspected. When we want to compel information for whatever reason—it may be a referral, or data or evidence may be suggesting that there has been fraudulent activity—there is the ability to request, as part of an ongoing investigation, any information that may be useful.
There are two principal reasons why we need changes. The first is modernisation, as I said in my opening comments. I am sure all Members can see how being able to request information via digital means will add speed and simplicity to the process. That is a basic modernisation. There is a more significant change in the shift towards an exclusion list rather than an inclusion list of organisations, which broadens the range of organisations that we can request information from.
The hon. Lady asked whether institutions such as schools or utilities companies may be in scope. In essence, anybody is in scope for this power—for a request for information—unless they are withholding exempted information. There is a range of things that would be specifically exempt. Legally privileged material is an obvious example, as is information that could lead to self-incrimination for recipients and their spouses or civil partners.
It is worth saying for clarity that organisations that provide no-cost advice and advocacy services will not be compelled to share personal data about their service users. That will maintain trust, which is an important principle of their work, and allow individuals to seek help without fear of their information being disclosed. There is also an exemption from providing excluded or special procedure material as defined under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. That includes personal records, including records relating to physical or mental health, human tissue and confidential journalistic materials. Those are the types of information that would be exempt. With the exception of the organisations providing advice and support, all organisations are essentially in scope if they hold other relevant information to help with an ongoing inquiry.
The person in receipt of the notice is the person or organisation we are compelling the information from, rather than the person about whom it is compelled. So the person receiving the notice is the one we are asking for detail from.
Andrew Western
With permission, before turning to clause 73, I will take the opportunity to make a few general points about the approach to codes of practice for this Bill more generally, as that has become a recurrent theme in the line-by-line scrutiny and was in the evidence-gathering sessions last week. The codes of practice issued under the Bill do not contain statutory provisions. That means that they do not have any particular legal effect; they will simply outline how the measures will be operationalised in more detail. The Bill, and particularly its associated schedules, set out a baseline for that operation. In my view, that gives us more than enough opportunity to understand how the Bill will work in practice.
As the codes of practice do not contain statutory provisions, the guidance, as previously referred to in the evidence sessions, does not say that we must provide them alongside the legislation. The guidance even goes so far as to say that it is “unnecessary” to make it a statutory requirement to provide these codes at all, but we have done so as we believe that is the right thing to do. It is the legislation itself, as I said, that should be considered and scrutinised. There is considerable detail within the Bill, and it clearly sets out the legal obligations that the Government are creating that Parliament must consider, as we are doing in Committee.
As I have said, however, we want to be more transparent with the House, because we recognise that these codes are of interest, even if they are not wholly relevant to the legal obligations that the Bill will create. As such, as my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary has done on part 1, I will provide an outline of what the codes will cover as the relevant clauses are debated. We have committed to provide drafts of the relevant codes as soon as they are available. That is not a requirement, but it recognises the interest of Members. We are going above and beyond what is required in the spirit of transparency.
The “Guide to Making Legislation”, which the hon. Member for Kingswinford and South Staffordshire may be interested to know was reissued this week—I assure him that it will be my bedtime reading this weekend—outlines that codes are not to be used as a substitute for legislation. That is why we have made a conscious effort to include lots of detail in the Bill about how the powers will work in practice.
The clause amends section 3 of the Social Security Fraud Act 2001 to require a new statutory code of practice for authorised officers accredited by the Secretary of State to exercise the information-gathering powers under the proposed new section 109BZA of the Social Security Administration Act 1992. Beyond the detail already included in clause 72 and other parts of the Bill, the code will set out more detail on the limitations of the powers and how they must operate, and clear conditions for their use. That includes detail on the meaning of a reasonable suspicion of fraud, as set out in clause 72.
The code will also include additional detail to help guide information providers. It will provide further detail on the timeframes for compliance and how an information request must be complied with—including how to comply with requirements under subsection (5), which includes the power for the DWP to request that information be provided in a specified form, and for the DWP to require an information holder to state where the information may be held if they do not have it and to explain why it cannot be provided.
The code will also include further details on the consequences of non-compliance. Under existing legislation, information providers who fail to comply with an information notice may be subject to prosecution, which can result in a fine of up to £1,000. If they continue to refuse to provide the requested information, they may be liable to a fine of up to £40 for every day that they fail to provide the requested information. That approach will apply to the new information-gathering provisions. There will also be further detail in the code about the consequences for information providers who repeatedly fail to comply with information requests, and about what may be considered a reasonable explanation for why the information provider is not able to comply with an information notice.
Before issuing the code of practice for the first time, we will carry out informal consultation with stakeholders on a draft code, to ensure that their views are reflected in the drafting. Once finalised, the code of practice will be laid before both Houses of Parliament and published.
Rebecca Smith
I thank the Minister for setting out that information. This is a short clause, so my comments will not be long. It amends section 3 of the Social Security Fraud Act 2001 to add a code of practice on the use of information powers exercised by an authorised officer.
As has been said, much has been made of the lack of a code of practice. We maintain our view, and I am sure other Opposition Members will agree. I have heard the reassurances of the Minister and, earlier today, of the Cabinet Office Minister, but the Minister’s indication of what will be in the code gives me an opportunity to ask a couple of questions.
I welcome that there will be a consultation on the code, although I appreciate that it could slow down the introduction of the legislation. Had the code of practice been developed in tandem with the Bill, or even beforehand, we could have implemented the Bill much more quickly after its passage to crack on with recouping some of the fraudulent costs and highlighting any errors being made. However, we are where we are and, even so, I welcome the consultation.
The Minister has reassured me that we will continue to hear about the code of practice, but my other question goes back to what I said on clause 72 about additional non-financial organisations that might be contacted, and to what the Minister has just said about the fines to be levied for non-compliance. A huge amount of responsibility is being placed on the people who receive these notices. This will be new to them as it is a new Government power, particularly as it pertains to the DWP.
What will be in the code of practice to ensure that we remember the people about whom we seek information are not necessarily the ones at fault? How do we communicate with them so that they want to co-operate, and so that they do not end up in a non-compliant position? This may not be within the scope of the Bill, but how do we communicate to the general public, in layman’s terms, what is expected of them? For example, if this lands on the desk of a primary school headteacher, how will the Department ensure that they understand what has been done and are not terrified by the process? How will it ensure that we achieve the process and outcomes we all seek?
Steve Darling
The Minister will not be surprised that I return to the fact that the Bill has been rushed. I respectfully remind him that we are a very refreshed House of Commons. This is fresh information for the vast majority of Members. Although Parliament may have a corporate memory, this Bill has moved at great pace since First Reading and we remain very concerned that this may result in errors.
The Minister has assured us that the code of conduct will be available in due course, but can he identify by what date or by when in the legislative programme? That would give us some comfort. Although positive words have been said about the code of conduct, it drives the culture of an organisation, and culture is extremely important. I look forward to some words of reassurance from the Minister.
Andrew Western
I am not sure that I agree with the assertion of the hon. Member for South West Devon that the time it takes to pass the code will significantly slow down the Bill. As she is aware, we are currently working with a range of organisations and stakeholders, and we are gathering information and ideas for a draft of the code.
To answer the hon. Member for Torbay, we hope to share the draft of the code before Committee in the House of Lords. I am happy to put that on the record, as it is an important point that applies to all codes of practice in the Bill, both for the Public Sector Fraud Authority and the DWP.
I am not sure I fully agree with the hon. Member for South West Devon that we could have saved time by having already drafted and consulted on the code. If there were any amendments to the Bill, the code would have to be rewritten, at least to some extent, to reflect them.
I was asked which organisations are anticipated to be called upon to provide information, as well as their willingness to do so and our ability to maintain a positive relationship. They want to engage with this, because tackling fraud is important and has a clear public benefit. We want to make the information notices as clear as possible. People will have at least 14 days to comply with an information request, and they will have the right to appeal should they have any particular issues. We would look to work with them wherever possible to ensure that they are able to provide the information needed. Clear communication is important, and we want to be certain that we achieve it.
I have dealt with the question about the code of practice, and I hope that is helpful to the hon. Member for Torbay. I struggle rather more with his suggestion that our being a new Parliament means the Bill has been rushed. A number of Bills have already made their way through the House since July. The machinery of government must be able to continue at the pace required to react to change, particularly for a Bill such as this where we are responding to evermore challenging and complex types of fraud. The Department for Work and Pensions alone lost £9.7 billion to fraud and error last year, which suggests to me that urgency is required. On that basis, I see no issues with the timings of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 73 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 74
Eligibility verification
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 30, in schedule 3, page 84, leave out line 12.
This amendment would remove pension credit from being a ‘relevant benefit’ for the purposes of the Act.
Amendment 25, in schedule 3, page 84, line 12, at end insert “(d) housing benefit”.
Amendment 29, in schedule 3, page 84, leave out lines 13 to 17.
This amendment would remove the provision for regulations to change the list of qualifying benefits.
Amendment 35, in schedule 3, page 84, line 13, leave out from “to” to end of line 17 and insert
“remove types of benefit from the definition of ‘relevant benefit’”.
This amendment would mean that benefits could not be added to the list of “relevant benefits” by regulations.
Amendment 24, in schedule 3, page 84, line 25, at end insert—
“or such an account which is held by a person appointed to receive benefits on behalf of another person.”
Schedule 3.
Andrew Western
Before I address this group, may I make a brief correction? I confused my information notices earlier: it is 10 days to comply, with no right of appeal, but we are happy to have conversations with those who, for whatever reason, are unable to provide the information that we require, and to work with them to ensure that they can.
I will speak to clause 74 and schedule 3, and then colleagues can speak to the various amendments. Clause 74 inserts proposed new section 121DB and proposed new schedule 3B, which is outlined in schedule 3 to the Bill, into the Social Security Administration Act 1992. The proposed new clause and schedule contain provision for the eligibility verification measure, and they must stand part of the Bill so the Secretary of State can issue a bank or other financial institution with an eligibility verification notice, which will help the DWP to identify incorrect payments in the social security system.
Ensuring that a person is eligible for the benefit they are receiving will help to prevent fraud and genuine errors so that people do not accidentally build up large debts, with all the worry and distress that causes. The measures before us are tough on fraud, but they are also about: fairness to those who play by the rules and rely on the social security system; fairness to those who make errors, by helping to identify potential errors sooner; and fairness to taxpayers, by ensuring that every pound is spent wisely, responsibly and effectively on those who need it and are legally entitled.
Fraud and error in the welfare system were responsible for the overpayment of almost £10 billion in 2023-24. Since the pandemic, £35 billion of taxpayers’ money has been incorrectly paid to those not entitled to that money. These measures alone will save £940 million over the next five years, up to 2029-30—a figure that has been certified by the independent Office for Budget Responsibility.
An eligibility verification notice issued under schedule 3B will require a bank or other financial institution to look within its own datasets and to provide data to help the DWP identify where someone might not meet the eligibility criteria for a particular benefit. To do that, the notice will contain defined criteria that the bank or other financial institution must use to detect accounts that might not meet the eligibility rules for a certain benefit—for instance, accounts that receive universal credit but have over £16,000 in capital, which is above the normal limit to remain eligible.
Only then, if there is an indication that an individual may not be eligible for the benefit they are receiving, will the bank or other financial institution share limited information about the account to allow the DWP to undertake further inquiries, as necessary. We know that a customer might hold money in more than one account, and not necessarily in the one that receives the benefit payment. For that reason, schedule 3B requires a bank or other financial institution to look at all the accounts it provides to the individual, and to compare them with the criteria set out in the notice.
The measures also contain important safeguards to protect benefit recipients and associated individuals, to protect their data, and to ensure that it is not unduly onerous for a bank or other financial institution to comply with an eligibility verification notice. Those safeguards, which are extensive, include clearly restricting who the DWP can collect information on, and for what purpose; clearly restricting how the DWP can use the information gathered under these powers; tightly limiting the accounts in scope, including the sharing of data on UK accounts; limiting the type of information that can and cannot be requested, with clear provisions that certain data, such as information on transactions, cannot be shared; and showing that a human will always be involved in decisions that affect benefit entitlement. A code of practice must be produced, providing guidance for financial institutions on their obligations under this legislation.
To protect the privacy of our customers and associated individuals, such as appointees, we must take steps to ensure that limited information is shared with the DWP—the minimum to enable further inquiries, where necessary. That is why part 2 of proposed new schedule 3B outlines provision for a comprehensive penalties regime to prohibit banks or other financial institutions from sharing information that is not permitted to be shared under the measure, as outlined in paragraphs 1(4) and (5). This can include information about individual transactions and special category data, such as data about an individual’s health, ethnic origin or political opinions.
If a financial institution wishes to dispute a notice, it has recourse under proposed new schedule 3B. Specifically, it will have access both to a process to ask the DWP to review the decision to issue a notice, as set out in part 3 of proposed new schedule 3B, and to an appeals process to formally dispute the requirements of a notice, as set out in part 4. Part 5 will mean that the Secretary of State must publish a code of practice to govern the use and operation of the measure, including data received under it.
I said I would spend a moment on codes of practice where appropriate, so I will now speak to this in more detail. The code of practice for EVM will provide further guidance for banks and other financial institutions on complying with notices, and information for those who may be affected by the measure. It will include detail on the eligibility of verification notice and its purpose, including how it will be sent, who should comply with it, and further details on the accounts in scope, such as linked accounts and appointees. It will specify further the type of information that the DWP will request from financial institutions, and the type of information that is prohibited, such as transaction and special category data. It will also set out how the DWP will use the data received in response to a notice, beyond what is in the Bill.
The code will also set out more detail on the safeguards to ensure that the measure is exercised in a proportionate and measured manner, along with the mechanisms embedded to ensure accountability. This includes safeguards for individuals, financial institutions and the data itself, as well as the independent oversight of the measure. It will explain how data must be handled and treated once received, along with the confidentiality and security requirements and compliance with rules and provisions set out in the Data Protection Act 2018 and the UK general data protection regulation. It will also set out clear avenues for compliance concerns to be raised.
The eligibility verification measure is projected to save £940 million over the next five years, and it is a vital part of a package of measures that will save up to £1.5 billion over the next five years.
The Chair
Before I call the shadow Minister, it would be immensely helpful if Members could say whether, at this stage at least, they intend to press their amendments to a vote. They will, of course, have a chance to change their mind if the Minister persuades them otherwise when he winds up.
Rebecca Smith
As we have just heard, clause 74 amends the Social Security Administration Act to give power to the Secretary of State to obtain information for the purposes of identifying incorrect payments of certain benefits. I think that is fairly self-explanatory, so I do not have any questions.
Schedule 3 provides further detail on eligibility verification measures, but what happens when people have an account with a bank or financial institution other than the one that DWP payments are made into? We talk a lot about linked bank accounts, but it is implied that one bank will be looking to see whether a person has multiple accounts. However, people have much more complicated lives.
How does the Minister intend to ensure that we not only look at the account into which the benefit is paid, so that the investigation is more thorough? Thinking specifically about National Savings & Investments—a Government account into which people save money—are we going to make sure that a person’s entire suite of bank accounts are included, or just the one into which the DWP pays money?
That leads me on to my amendments. As the official Opposition, we have tabled amendments 24 and 25 to schedule 3, relating to the scope of who may be subject to the legislation. I will also speak to the amendments tabled the hon. Members for Torbay and for Brighton Pavilion during my comments.
Amendment 24 would include within the scope of the Bill accounts held by a person appointed to receive benefits on behalf of another person. We have tabled that because it would mean that proxy accounts are not excluded and wider patterns of potential organised fraud could be monitored and prevented over time. Without that measure, we believe that it would be easy for fraudsters to deliberately evade monitoring.
Steve Darling
I am sure that many colleagues will be alive to the fact the proposals before us mean that one in eight will be affected by these quite significant powers of mass surveillance. Will the hon. Lady advise us on how many more people will be affected by including housing benefit in the proposals?
Rebecca Smith
If I may, I will come to that when I speak to amendment 25, which deals with housing benefit. I think it will be simpler if I deal with the amendments separately, but I thank the hon. Gentleman for that question.
We believe that we should look at the recipients of what are essentially proxy accounts because, without that measure, it would be easy, as I said, for fraudsters to evade monitoring deliberately, and therefore investigations and consequences. The Bill in its current form will be limited in how it can tackle welfare fraud, which is one of the main purposes of the legislation. Ultimately—maybe with the exception of error—where people are determined to commit fraud, there are numerous ways of doing it, and if the Government’s Bill is not enabling that significant investigation, we believe that it will fall at the first hurdle.
We also believe that the proposal has the value of increasing protection for vulnerable or older people who may otherwise be unwittingly targeted by those seeking to defraud the DWP. In effect, therefore, this amendment broadens the scope of fraud prevention, ensuring that any misuse of benefits by third parties is identified, and that includes those who are acting as a proxy. We argue that this is, in effect, a tidying-up amendment to enhance the measures in the Bill and to ensure that the legislation does not create loopholes before it has come into force.
We have also tabled amendment 25, as we believe that we should add housing benefit to the list of benefits that fall within scope. If we are serious about tackling fraud and error, we should want to expand the relevant benefits as far as we can, while ensuring that the cost-benefit analysis remains proportionate. Although housing benefit is in the process of being replaced as part of the roll-out of universal credit, as of November 2024, 2 million claimants of traditional housing benefit remain. New claims, as Members will know, can still be made for housing benefit by people who have reached state pension age or who live in supported, sheltered or temporary housing. Receipt of benefit is dependent on household income, including savings and capital, among other criteria.
Amendment 25 provides a focus in our debate on economic impact and cost effectiveness. The current accredited official statistics, published by DWP in its report, “Fraud and error in the benefit system”, show:
“The Housing Benefit overpayment rate was 6.3% (£980m) in FYE 2024, compared with 5.7% (£860m) in FYE 2023… Overpayments due to Fraud were 3.9% (£600m) in FYE 2024, compared with 3.5% (£530m) in FYE 2023.”
That represents £600 million of lost taxpayer money. The report continues:
“Under-declaration of financial assets (Capital) was the main reason for the changes across total Housing Benefit overpayments”—
I know that came up quite a lot during our evidence sessions. The report also states that at a total level, capital fraud
“increased to 2.2% in FYE 2024, compared with 1.3% in FYE 2023.”
We know that that is a significant problem. Indeed, as we heard in evidence from the Minister about capital fraud, the amount is eye-watering. Often this is about error, but equally, it does still mean that people fall out of scope for receiving benefits. That increase is statistically significant and highlights why we believe that housing benefit should be brought within the scope of the Bill, if the Government are truly serious about tackling welfare fraud and error.
Steve Darling
I reflect to the hon. Member for South West Devon that accusing somebody of being short-sighted when they have a guide dog with them is a bit of a juxtaposition, but it was taken well.
The Liberal Democrats and I have grave concerns about this Orwellian approach to mass surveillance, and that the proposals are overcooked. I go back to my concerns that the DWP is, sadly, not fit for purpose. One has to look only at the significant delays throughout the system and the challenges within that Department, and yet we are looking at granting it massive, extremely significant powers. The DWP already has the ability to intervene where it suspects fraud, and we welcome that where there is reasonable suspicion, but to actually subject people to this approach is outrageous. Some of the evidence I heard when I consulted people from disability groups is that people with mental health issues may be fearful. They may think, “Because the Government Minister is looking in my bank account, I can’t afford the nice cheesecake from Waitrose. I can only shop in discounted supermarkets because the Minister is going to be watching what I am doing.”
Turning to our amendments, we have grave concerns that the approach could be the thin end of the Government wedge. We have therefore tabled amendment 29 to put a clear restriction on the proposals, ensuring that what is before us is set in stone rather than allowing for mission creep.
On amendment 30, we know from the debacle around the winter fuel allowance that getting pensioners to step up to the mark and claim pension credit has been a real challenge. I also draw the Minister’s attention to the fact that pension credit is an area where there are significantly lower levels of fraud. There are already low levels of fraud generally throughout the benefits system, but the pension credit levels are extremely small.
Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)
I think the Conservative spokesperson just gave the figure of £500 million in pension credit fraud and error last year. Is the Lib Dem spokesperson saying that that is not very much?
Steve Darling
We need to make sure that there is a level of proportionality. On pension credit, proportionality suggests to me that pensioners are often extremely private people, and they will fear that the Minister will be looking through their shopping bills. Although there may be reassurances, this is still the presentation of what parts of our society may see as a Big Brother state. We have concerns about the impact, and by excluding pension credit specifically through amendment 30, we would serve some of the most vulnerable people in our society in the best way we can.
Siân Berry
It is a pleasure to serve under you again, Sir Jeremy. I rise to speak against clause 74 and schedule 3, and to support my amendment 35, which I intend to push to a vote. I also support the two Liberal Democrat amendments, and will vote for those if they are pressed.
In short, I am opposed to clause 74 and schedule 3 standing part of the Bill, and to the related powers that apply to the eligibility verification process. These powers do nothing less than bring in a system of disproportionate, mass financial surveillance of millions of people who have done nothing wrong and are not suspected of any wrongdoing. It is of profound concern that these powers are likely to be used at scale to monitor the private bank accounts of people who need the support of society and have done absolutely nothing to arouse suspicion.
One of the changes that people wanted to see when they voted out the last Government was a welfare system that treats people with dignity and respect. Sadly and disappointingly, these parts of the Bill are based instead on blame and suspicion of people in need of help, when the bigger issue is unclaimed and underclaimed benefits due to a lack of awareness, complexity in the system and stigma. I asked the Minister in the evidence session whether he would be using these new powers to also help alert people who are underclaiming benefits to what they may be due. The answer was not very clear, but I think it was no, because only the possibility of overpayments and reclaiming those was discussed.
I do not want to tweak these proposals—I want to prevent these two parts of the Bill becoming law at all, because they would allow the DWP to require banks and other financial institutions to provide information about claimants of universal credit, pension credit and employment support allowance in order to interrogate their claims of eligibility and entitlement. I assume that every claim would be examined over time. That means a huge new invasion of citizens’ privacy.
Currently, if someone is out on the street, the police can only use suspicion-less stop and search on them if they have a section 60 notice in place, which involves setting out a clear reason, identifying a small area and identifying a fixed time for which that would take place. The Bill effectively puts a section 60 notice around every single person who claims these benefits. These people include, disproportionately, people from protected groups—disabled people and older people. This is a real problem; it is discriminatory, unsettling and unfair.
On the numbers, around 7 million people receive universal credit, around 1.4 million pensioners receive pension credit, and around 1.5 million get help from employment support allowance. These powers will drag nearly 10 million people directly into a net of intrusive financial surveillance, as well as those appointed to receive benefits on their behalf, including parents, carers, appointed people and landlords. Given that several of these benefits have eligibility requirements based on household income, we are bringing in family members as well. Unsurprisingly, these measures are of huge concern to disability rights, poverty, pension and privacy groups, who are united in their opposition to them.
Ideally, I want to see everything struck out, but amendment 35 to schedule 3 would at least mean that more benefits could not be added to the list of relevant benefits by regulations. It would leave in place the ability for Ministers to remove benefits through regulations in future.
The hon. Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth (Debbie Abrahams), Chair of the Work and Pensions Committee, set out on Second Reading the risk of damaging trust in and engagement with the DWP for millions of people who might otherwise not claim benefits. I raise that problem because I believe that underclaiming is as much of a problem as fraud and error and should be getting as much attention.
On proportionality, it is incumbent on Ministers to come up with a new, more proportionate way to address fraud, where there is reasonable suspicion. I am not against the issue being looked at, but I add that administrative errors are 8% of the problem. They are caused by the DWP’s mistakes and should not result in a need to treat as suspects people who might make errors in their claims due to lack of clarity in or awareness of requirements.
It is absolutely right that fraudulent uses of public money are dealt with robustly. To that end, the Government already have significant powers to review the bank statements of welfare fraud suspects. Ministers did not hear me complaining at the new powers to require more information when there is a reasonable suspicion of somebody having committed fraud. This eligibility requirement goes way, way beyond.
There are automated decision-making powers coming through in another Bill, which impacts on this Bill and the assurances we have received from Ministers. They say that no automated decisions will be made based on the eligibility verification data alone and that, where potential fraud is identified against those eligibility indicators, cases will be referred to the DWP for further consideration and investigation. However, assurances by the DWP that a human will always be involved in the decision whether to investigate an individual are not set out in the legislation, and the scale and nature of any human input is very unclear, despite its having been promised.
Furthermore, as we heard in oral evidence, while assurances about human involvement are also provided for under current data protection law, the Data (Use and Access) Bill currently making its way through Parliament will remove any proper prohibitions on automated decision making. Those must be included in this legislation, in the code of practice or in the regulations. I believe it is for the Government to produce urgent amendments to solve the problem.
John Milne (Horsham) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Jeremy. It is important for us all in this place to remember that, although we make legislation with the best of intentions, it does not always play out perfectly in practice. As a member of the Work and Pensions Committee, I heard evidence a few days ago from a number of claimants who have had a very bad experience at the hands of the DWP. Their overall theme was one of antagonism and hostility from the service, and they described a number of serious problems.
That is the attitude that, unfortunately, many claimants and many people across the country have. They think that the objective of the DWP is to catch them out rather than to help them—rightly or wrongly, that is what they feel. In that context, the title of this Bill covers “fraud and error”, not “fraud and genuine human mistake”—which, frankly, is what goes on a lot of the time.
I say that particularly in the context of our amendment 30 relating to pension credit. As my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay has described, pension credit is an area of relatively low fraud. However, there are more elderly and vulnerable people who are more likely to make an error, particularly in the context of the removal of winter fuel payments. There is a little extra onus on pension credit, and we are trying to push greater take-up. About a third of eligible people do not claim pension credit. Part of the reason is that many of them feel intimidated by the process and the feeling that they are getting something that they should not have. It is fear that holds them back.
A few months ago, the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, the right hon. Member for Leicester West (Liz Kendall) said she would “move heaven and earth” to try to push that take-up higher, because we never seem to get past that 65% to 66% level. In that context, this feels like a retrograde measure, likely to depress rather than to encourage take-up.
Neil Coyle
Could the hon. Member give us the figures on the increase in pension credit take-up for the period during which a Lib Dem held the position of Minister for Pensions?
John Milne
That was before my time and I was not even in the country, so I am afraid I cannot answer that question.
It is very important that we should be pushing take-up, not sending it into reverse. For that reason, I ask the Minister to reconsider the need to include pension credit; that the upside—the amount of money that might be recovered from fraudulent claims—is relatively modest compared with the potential downside of putting more people off claiming.
Regarding amendment 29, tabled by the Liberal Democrats, we have heard from many witnesses, such as Big Brother Watch, about the risk of mission creep and these powers being extended in too many directions. It seems to me completely unnecessary to simply give the Minister of the day the power to add whatever benefits he or she feels like at that time. There is no need for it. Excluding that now does not affect the tax take or the potential benefit for the Government, and it seems an unnecessary and disproportionate power. I urge the Minister to reconsider the inclusion of that measure.
Damien Egan (Bristol North East) (Lab)
I want to make a few points, because I am worried that some Members are underestimating the level of fraud and the direction of travel, because it is only going up.
The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion is correct in a sense in saying that people voted for change and that fairness in the welfare system is one of the things they voted for, but part of that is about having confidence in the welfare system. People can see the level of fraud, and they want the Government to restore the balance so that it is less in favour of people committing fraud.
I encourage those Members who are apprehensive about these elements to visit their local jobcentre. I did two visits at my local jobcentre in Kingswood; I had to go back because the work coaches had so many stories to tell. Members of the Work and Pensions Committee will have heard me say this before, but I spoke to two women: one had been there for 45 years and the other 41 years. They said the level of fraud is something that they have never seen before. I wish they were here now, because everything that they said about how we deal with it was about getting information from banks and other agencies and sharing that information on eligibility and combating fraud. I wanted to make those points and I encourage Members to speak to them.
Siân Berry
Does the hon. Member recall me talking about clause 72 and not speaking up about speeding up the electronic getting of information from banks when people are under suspicion? Does he agree that there is a barrier at that point?
Damien Egan
I really appreciate the point, but I think if hon. Members were to spend time and speak to work coaches—as they may have done—they would find that work coaches want, and are asking for, more of that information to be shared. It is also about trying to prevent people from committing fraud.
Andrew Western
I will make a few general comments on the thrust of hon. Members’ contributions, beyond the comments that they made about their amendments, and then I will speak to the amendments as one at the end of my contribution.
The Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for South West Devon, talked about people who bank with more than one financial institution, and asked what happens if their benefit is paid into one institution and they have savings in another. She is right that we will not have full sight of somebody’s accounts if they bank with more than one institution. That is by design, specifically because of the concerns we heard from other Members about the scope of the Bill. Were we to take the power to check every single account in the country, there would understandably be significant outcry about proportionality; indeed, we have heard some of that with regard to what I would call the limited scope of what we are putting forward.
I would be especially concerned were we to attempt to narrow the scope by sharing the details of benefit recipients only. That would breach an important safeguard that we have built into the eligibility verification measure: namely, that we will not share data directly with banks. I do not think there would be a way to do that for somebody who banks with more than one institution without either checking every single bank account in the country—which would not only be a mammoth undertaking, but would lead even me to use words such as “mass surveillance”—or sharing data in the other direction, which I am incredibly keen to avoid.
This is a question of scope. We have gone a considerable way in narrowing the scope of this eligibility verification measure. It most obviously compares to the third-party data measure that the previous Government put forward in the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill. That did not make the same interventions to narrow scope—for instance, removing the state pension—nor would there have been independent oversight of the process.
The hon. Lady is correct that there is a question about what happens when somebody banks with more than one institution. I assure her—this is a really important point from a fiscal perspective—that the savings that we have earmarked against the Bill and the eligibility verification measure are based on the principle of checking only the institution into which the benefits are paid. That does not mean that we would check only that account, however, so if the person had more than one account—a current account, a savings account and so on—that would be in scope, albeit business and charity accounts are explicitly ruled out.
The hon. Lady also asked about the capacity to better protect older and vulnerable people. That is incredibly important. Clearly, there is already a range of safeguards across the Department to work with people who present to us as vulnerable. We have specialist staff who work with those people and a vulnerability management framework within the Department to ensure we work as best we can with people who need additional help and support. She is right that that may manifest more in cases involving pension credit, and we will do all we can to work with people in need of additional assistance.
That does not mean that we get everything right, but we have made strides in our day-to-day support for vulnerable people, both when they apply for benefits in the first place, and when they owe debt to the Department for whatever reason. When we come to the debt recovery powers in the Bill, I will say significantly more about the vulnerability protections that we have built into the Bill and have more generally across the Department.
That brings me to the general comments that the hon. Member for Torbay made. I will avoid some of the more hyperbolic language—“Orwellian”, “mass surveillance”—and go straight to one of my favourite things: a Waitrose cheesecake. I assure him that, as expressly set out on the face of the Bill, transactional data will not be shared with the Department for Work and Pensions under the eligibility verification measure. He says that people are saying that that should be of concern to benefit recipients; I suggest that those of us in this House have a particular responsibility not to peddle those sorts of myths.
I am compelled to address the overarching accusation that the DWP is not fit for purpose. We are not a perfect organisation and do not claim to be, but we support millions of people, week in and week out, pay out billions of pounds, week in and week out, and provide a vital safety net for people up and down this country. I am proud of the work that we do. That does not mean that we do not need to strive to make improvements or that we are in any way beyond reproach. But I have to say that the role we play in supporting the most vulnerable people in society is absolutely critical for this Government.
Siân Berry
I hope the Minister will not take this the wrong way, but I hope that he is able to understand that the stigma that people feel about applying for benefits is partly to do with the attitudes people have towards those who receive benefits. The idea of the Government applying a privacy invasion measure against that cohort of people as a whole feels like discrimination to them. It adds to the stigma; it speaks to the fact that they feel that they are not treated as well as other people in society. They are not believed when they say that they do not have £16,000. Those are all parts of the same package of discrimination, are they not?
Andrew Western
They would be, were the powers entirely unique. However, as we heard in the evidence of the representative from HMRC, there is a long-standing power—introduced, I believe, in the Finance Act 2011—for HMRC to routinely and regularly check all interest-bearing bank accounts in the country. I have not looked at the cohort of people who are fortunate enough to have interest-bearing bank accounts, nor have I ever been in such a position myself, so I plead ignorance here. However, I suspect that there is not the same over-representation of vulnerable groups.
The important point—this comes back to the broader point around automated decision making, AI and so on that the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion made—is that we are looking to better improve our access to data, not take decisions as a direct result of the information we have received. Indeed, we have built in human decision making at every stage of the five areas where we are taking new or updated powers on the DWP side of the Bill.
Steve Darling
I referred to the proposals as Orwellian, and my concern goes back to “Animal Farm” where the notice was amended to read:
“All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others”.
We have this perverse situation with the legislation where for some sections of society it is appropriate for the Government to use AI to go through their bank accounts, and for other sections of society it is not appropriate to use AI to go through people’s bank accounts. How does that lead to a society that is cogent and speaks together? Or is this just sowing division around our communities?
Andrew Western
It is incredibly important to reiterate for anybody who may be watching our proceedings that the Government will not be going through anybody’s bank accounts. We will be asking banks and financial institutions to do that, and to share information with us only where there is a potential breach of eligibility verification. The information that is shared with us will be specifically related to identifying the bank account and the potential breach of eligibility. It will not be, for instance, special category data or transactional data.
To return to my point about the use of AI and automated decision making, when a flag comes back on the eligibility verification measure, a potential breach of eligibility will immediately be passed to a human investigator to take that forward. It will not at any point trigger a penalty or a prosecution for fraud without a human intervening and, as they do at present, establishing that there is potentially fraudulent activity or, indeed, an error that warrants a reclamation of overpayment.
Amendment 30 seeks to stop the DWP from being able to use the eligibility verification power in respect of pension credit. We have had quite the debate about that already, and the hon. Member for South West Devon made many of the points that I would have made.
Mike Wood (Kingswinford and South Staffordshire) (Con)
According to the House of Commons Library, one of the biggest factors in that 10% of pension credit expenditure that is lost to fraud and error is payments to people who are abroad. How will the measures on eligibility verification help to identify people who do not actually live in the country so would not be eligible for pension credit?
Andrew Western
I am grateful beyond belief to the hon. Gentleman, because he highlights why this provision is so important. More than 50% of the fraud and error that we see in pension credit comes from two principle sources, which the eligibility verification measure specifically seeks to address. One is the issue of capital fraud, where there is a relatively easy indicator—for example, in respect of universal credit, was the individual in receipt of capital in their account of more than £16,000?
The provision also has the benefit of helping us to establish when somebody has been out of the country for longer than their benefit entitles them to be. For instance, it would provide a flag on an account when somebody’s bank account suggested they had been making purchases abroad and so on. We would not receive the transactional data or know specifically where the purchases were made—or, indeed, whether it was cheesecake or some other item—but it would give us specifically the date that somebody left the country, and thereby show whether they were in breach of the length of time they are allowed to be away. This is not, then, just a tool to deal with capital fraud, although that is the most straightforward example to articulate and, therefore, the one I use most readily; it will also be useful to identify people who have been abroad for longer than their eligibility suggests they should be allowed to be while continuing to receive benefits.
It is important to recognise—I touched on this when I set out the human safeguard that is in place—that a flag would not necessarily mean that someone has done anything wrong, or that they are no longer entitled to benefits. On capital fraud, it might be because someone has received, perfectly legitimately, a Government compensation payment, such as for infected blood, which would be out of scope. That is why a human would check that. The person would therefore not lose benefits or receive an overpayment.
On someone being out of the country for longer than they are entitled to be—if they have been taken ill, or if there has been an environmental catastrophe, humanitarian disaster or some such, that means they are unable to leave the country they are in—again, that would be investigated. The person would not face action as a result. I hope I have set out exactly how the eligibility verification measure is useful not only for capital fraud, but for allowing us to notice and receive indications about when someone has been out of the country for longer than they are entitled to be while still receiving benefits.
As I said, on amendment 30, the hon. Member for South West Devon touched on many of the comments that I would have made about why pension credit is included. The change would not explicitly exclude pension credit, as with the state pension, because the legislation still enables Ministers to lay regulations for its inclusion at a future date. My intention, however, is to use the power for pension credit payments from the outset, because unfortunately the rising trend in overpayments of pension credits demonstrates that pension-age benefits are not immune from fraud and error.
In 2023-24, £520 million in pension credit was overpaid, and pension credit has one of the highest rates of capital fraud and error, with £198 million lost in 2023-24 alone. The rate of fraud in pension credit increased by more than 50% in 2023-24, as against the previous year, so we have a clear problem. The under-declaration of financial assets and claimants staying abroad for a longer period than is allowed remain the two main causes of pension credit overpayments in ’23-24. As I said previously, they accounted for more than 50% of all overpayments.
Equally, it is important to ensure that people receive the right payments. The eligibility verification measure is not about removing pension credit payments from anyone; it is about confirming that claimants meet the conditions of entitlement. The measure also enables the Department to help to prevent individuals from unknowingly accruing overpayments, pension credits or any other benefit in scope, which could lead to financial stress if later they need to repay money they were not entitled to.
Overall, the measure and the inclusion of pension credit will help the DWP to ensure that public funds are used responsibly while maintaining confidence in the benefit system. On that basis, I will resist amendment 30.
Rebecca Smith
Before we move on from pensioners, throughout the debate there has been a valid concern about pensioners potentially being alarmed at or feeling vulnerable about what might happen. Will the Minister clarify something? Any pensioner who is not involved with pension credit is not likely to fall within scope of having their bank accounts checked, so only those people who are interacting with the Department in one shape or another are likely to have their bank accounts searched, and only in relation to those benefits. Every single pensioner out there will not have their bank accounts scrutinised; only someone of whatever age or bracket who is, or seeks to be, in receipt of benefits will fall within the scope of the Bill. Am I correct in believing that? That would at least reassure a proportion of pensioners—although not all—that they are not, as we said, going to get snooped on for buying a cheesecake. They will fall in scope only if they end up interacting with the Minister’s Department.
Andrew Western
I am happy to confirm that the situation is as the hon. Lady articulated. Only someone in receipt of one of the three benefits initially in scope would face use of the eligibility verification measure.
Steve Darling
Will the Minister confirm whether, once the Bill has passed, he could choose to increase the scope to include all pensioners?
Andrew Western
That brings me to amendment 25, which seeks to include housing benefit, and to later amendments on the affirmative procedure regulations that we propose for being able to bring other benefits in scope. We would need to do that to reflect the changing nature of fraud and the fact that fraudsters, unfortunately, change their behaviour and the benefits they target depending on the safeguards in place and the extent to which they are effective. Therefore the answer to the question is yes, and I will say more on that when we come to the specific amendments in that space.
Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Ninth sitting)
Tuesday 11th March 2025
(1 week, 2 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesPublic Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 11 March 2025 - (11 Mar 2025)
The Chair
I remind Members to send their speaking notes by email to hansardnotes@parliament.uk and to switch all electronic devices to silent. Tea and coffee are of course not allowed during sittings.
Clause 75
Eligibility verification: independent review
Steve Darling (Torbay) (LD)
I beg to move amendment 37, in clause 75, page 41, line 25, at end insert—
“(1A) Prior to appointing an independent person, the Minister must consult the relevant committee of the House of Commons.
(1B) For the purposes of subsection (1A), ‘the relevant committee’ means a committee determined by the Speaker of the House of Commons.”
This amendment would ensure further oversight into the appointment of the “Independent person”.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 38, in clause 75, page 41, line 29, leave out “person” and insert “board”.
This amendment would replace the “independent person” with an independent board.
Amendment 39, in clause 75, page 41, line 32, leave out “person” and insert “board”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 38.
Amendment 40, in clause 75, page 42, line 19, leave out subsection (7) and insert—
“The Secretary of State may by regulations appoint persons to, and confer functions upon, an independent board for the purposes of securing compliance with subsections (1) to (6).”
This amendment is related to Amendment 38.
Amendment 41, in clause 75, page 42, line 23, leave out first “person” and insert “board”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 38.
Amendment 42, in clause 75, page 42, line 24, leave out “person” and insert “board”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 38.
Clause stand part.
Steve Darling
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Western. We have touched previously on having an independent overview of the activities that will take place under the Bill, and this is another opportunity to have the checks and balances I have alluded to on a number of occasions. Of course, all Members in the room are reasonable people, but we see in world politics what happens when people are unreasonable. Given that the United Kingdom’s constitution is unwritten, beginning to build those checks and balances into legislation is important. Amendment 37 would hardwire them into the Bill, and I ask that the Minister give it serious consideration. I have heard hints that it may be taken into account in one way or the other when the Bill goes to the other place, but I would welcome some reassurance, if possible, that that is the case.
John Milne (Horsham) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Western. As my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay said, the amendment is about checks and balances. We appreciate that the Bill has been introduced in the context of the Government’s desire to cut the benefits bill, but the Treasury deeming something to be financially necessary does not necessarily make it right.
The percentage lost to fraud and error is relatively modest, but of course the sums are huge because the overall number is huge. We need to remember that these measures will not get anywhere near recovering all that money, so the question is: is the action proportionate, considering the sacrifice we are making in terms of civil liberties? It is vital that we get the best value from public money, but the amount expected to be recovered is just 2% of the estimated annual loss to fraud and error of £10 billion, and just a quarter of what is lost to official error at the Department for Work and Pensions.
As drafted, the clause empowers the Minister to appoint an independent person to carry out reviews of the Secretary of State’s function under schedule 3B to the Social Security Administration Act 1992. There is no external oversight, and that undermines the credibility of the role. Our amendment states:
“Prior to appointing an independent person, the Minister must consult the relevant committee of the House of Commons”,
which means
“a committee determined by the Speaker of the House of Commons.”
Without proper scrutiny, the role’s independence is undermined, potentially damaging trust in the process.
The Committee previously heard evidence from Dr Kassem of Aston University, who stated:
“I would recommend a board rather than an individual, because how sustainable could that be, and who is going to audit the individual? You want an unbiased point of view. That happens when you have independent experts discussing the matter and sharing their points of view. You do not want that to be dictated by an individual, who might also take longer to look at the process. The operation is going to be slower. We do not want that from a governance perspective—if you want to oversee things in an effective way, a board would be a much better idea.” ––[Official Report, Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Public Bill Committee, 25 February 2025; c. 13, Q15.]
A board would ensure that the appointment is truly independent and subject to parliamentary scrutiny. We therefore propose that the Minister must consult the relevant House of Commons Committee before making such an appointment. That simple steps would ensure genuine independence and parliamentary scrutiny, and would strengthen transparency and public confidence.
Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this morning, Mr Western. As we have just heard, Liberal Democrat amendments 37 to 42 would mean that, before appointing an independent person, the Minister had to consult a Committee of the House of Commons nominated by Mr Speaker. Amendments 38 to 42 seek to replace an independent person with an independent board, and therefore to allow the Secretary of State to appoint persons to, and confer functions upon, the board.
I have a couple of questions for the hon. Member for Torbay. What greater independence do the Liberal Democrats think will be gained by changing the requirement, given that both the independent board and the independent person would be appointed by the Secretary of State? What practical difference will the amendments make to improve the review process and ensure that it is high quality?
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Andrew Western)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Western. With your permission, I will speak to amendment 37 before speaking to amendments 38 to 42. I will then speak to why the unamended clause 75 should stand part of the Bill.
Before I begin, I will respond to a couple of the comments made by the hon. Member for Horsham on the relatively small amounts of fraud and error we see. With this particular measure, as he is aware, we are initially targeting the three benefits with the highest levels of fraud and error. To take universal credit as an example, it is £1 in every £8 spent, which is a tremendously high number and one we must do everything we can to bring down. However, it is worth recognising and explaining to colleagues that the measures in the Bill are part of a broader package to tackle fraud, which reached £8.6 billion across the relevant period. This is not the beginning and end of the Department’s work on fraud across that period, but it is the part of that overall package that requires legislation.
Returning to my substantive notes on the question of a “board” versus a “person”, I think there may be some misunderstanding of definitions here. Amendment 37 seeks to oblige the Secretary of State to consult a relevant Committee of the House of Commons before appointing the independent overseer of the eligibility verification measure. I believe that the amendment is unnecessary and I will be resisting it.
We recognise the importance of appointing the right person or body to oversee the use of the eligibility verification measure. That is why we have made it a requirement that the overseer report annually on the use of the power directly to the Secretary of State, who will then lay the report before Parliament. We have included that key safeguard to ensure the effective and proportionate use of this power and to introduce greater transparency in the use of it. The person or body will be appointed following a fair and public recruitment process, which will be carried out under the guidance of the Commissioner for Public Appointments.
I assure the Committee today that we will abide by the governance code on public appointments throughout the process. Whether this role is subject to pre-appointment scrutiny will be governed by the code, and we will follow its guidance at all times. The final decision on who will oversee this measure will, in all cases, be made by the Secretary of State. That is because the governance code on public appointments points out:
“The ultimate responsibility for appointments and thus the selection of those appointed rests with Ministers who are accountable to Parliament for their decisions and actions.”
We will keep the House informed about the process at all key stages, including when the process is set to begin and on the proposed final appointment.
Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)
Am I right in thinking that the Work and Pensions Committee will be entitled to call any witness, including whoever is appointed to this role, to give evidence to it and to be scrutinised by its members?
Andrew Western
My hon. Friend is entirely correct. The Select Committee always has that power, and were it to have any concerns whatever, it would look to exercise that power at the earliest opportunity.
I recognise that the amendment has been tabled with good intentions. However, because of our commitment to an open and transparent recruitment process, and because we will be abiding by the requirements of the governance code on public appointments, it is unnecessary and I will resist it.
I will now turn to amendments 38 to 42, which seek to remove the term “person” and insert the term “board” in reference to the appointment of an independent reviewer of the eligibility verification measure, as set out in clause 75. I recognise the intent behind the points raised, but the amendments are unnecessary and I will resist them. It is probably useful to clarify that, legally, the term “person”, as referred to in the clause, can refer to an individual person, a body of people or a board, as per the Interpretation Act 1978. I therefore reassure the Committee that any reference to “person” in the Bill includes a body of persons, corporate or incorporated, that is a natural person, a legal person or, for example, a partnership.
I reassure the Committee that the Secretary of State will appoint the most appropriate and suitable independent oversight for the measure. That might be an individual expert, which is consistent with the approach taken for oversight of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, or it might be a group of individuals who form a board or committee. As the Cabinet Office’s governance code on public appointments clearly sets out, Ministers
“should act solely in terms of the public interest”
when making appointments, and I can assure the Committee that we will do just that.
To offer further reassurance, I confirm that the appointment process for the independent person or body will be open, fair and transparent, adhering strictly to the governance code on public appointments, which ensures that all appointments are made based on merit, fairness and openness. The Government will of course notify the House of the appointment. I therefore resist these amendments.
I will now turn to clause 75. Independent oversight is one of several safeguards for the eligibility verification measure, and I remind the Committee of the others that we discussed on Thursday. First, we are initially pursuing the measure with just three benefits in scope. Others can be added by regulations, but not, in any circumstances, the state pension, which is specifically excluded from the Bill. Furthermore, limits on the data that can be collected are set out in the Bill. For instance, no transactional data or special category data can be shared. Finally, as we discussed at length on Thursday, a human decision maker will be in place to determine whether any fraud has been committed.
Clause 75 provides a vital safeguard for the eligibility verification power. By inserting proposed new sections 121DC and 121DD into the Social Security Administration Act 1992, it establishes a requirement for independent oversight of the power, to ensure accountability, compliance and effectiveness. We recognise the importance of safe and transparent delivery of the eligibility verification measure, which is why we are legislating to make it a requirement for the Secretary of State to appoint the independent person to carry out annual reviews.
As per proposed new section 121DC(2), the person must prepare a report and submit it to the Secretary of State. And as per new subsection (3), the Secretary of State must then publish the report and lay a copy before Parliament. New subsection (4) outlines that the first review must relate to the first 12 months after the measure comes into force, and new subsection (5) outlines that subsequent reviews must relate to each subsequent period of 12 months thereafter. Those annual reviews and reports will ensure transparency in the use of the measure and its effectiveness.
To ensure that the eligibility verification measure is exercised in a responsible and effective manner, in accordance with the legal framework, new section 121DC further details what each review must consider during the review period. That includes compliance with the legislation and the code of practice, and actions taken by banks and other financial institutions in complying with eligibility verification notices. The review must also cover whether the power has been effective in identifying, or assisting in identifying, incorrect payments of the benefits covered during the review period. In new subsection (7), there is provision for the Government to bring forward regulations to provide relevant functions to the independent reviewer to enable them to perform their duties under the clause.
In order to ensure that the independent reviewer is able to fulfil their duties, clause 75 also provides a legal gateway for the Secretary of State to disclose information to the independent reviewer, or a person acting on the reviewer’s behalf, for the purposes of carrying out the review. That can be found in new section 121DD, which is inserted by clause 75. Data protection provisions in new sections 121DD(2) to (4) make it clear that such sharing must comply with data protection legislation and other restrictions on the disclosure of information.
In conclusion, the clause represents a key safeguard in relation to the new power and confirms a previous commitment to Parliament to establish oversight over it and ensure its proportionate and effective use. On that basis, I propose that clause 75 stand part of the Bill.
Rebecca Smith
Apologies, Mr Western, because I probably should have spoken to clause 75 stand part when I made my earlier remarks—it was just 9.20 am. Thank you for letting me speak now.
As we have discussed, clause 75 amends the Social Security Administration Act 1992, adding provisions for a review of the powers given through clause 74, which we debated last week. The Secretary of State must appoint an independent person to carry out the reviews, and a report must be submitted, published and laid before Parliament. I am grateful to the Minister for his assurances that, by definition, a “person” could be a body, a board or a panel. That has precluded quite a lot of the notes I was going to read out this morning, but it is good to hear that that definition is included in the Interpretation Act 1978.
However, it is worth again putting on record some of the evidence that we heard, and the fact that that definition caught the attention of some of those who gave evidence during our initial sittings. Some experts were concerned to have the eligibility verification reviewed by, potentially, a panel to ensure that it was both sustainable and auditable and that an unbiased viewpoint could be presented. Dr Kassem said:
“Personally, I would recommend a board rather than an individual, because how sustainable could that be, and who is going to audit the individual? You want an unbiased point of view. That happens when you have independent experts discussing the matter and sharing their points of view. You do not want that to be dictated by an individual, who might also take longer to look at the process. The operation is going to be slower. We do not want that from a governance perspective—if you want to oversee things in an effective way, a board would be a much better idea.” ––[Official Report, Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Public Bill Committee, 25 February 2025; c. 13, Q15.]
Clearly, the Minister addressed that in his comments, but it does raise the question of what volume of work he envisages the independent person, panel or body having to assess. I appreciate that that could well be a “How long is a piece of string?” exercise at this point, but does it have any bearing on whether the Secretary of State will appoint one person or several people at the point at which this body is instituted? I ask that question to reflect the concerns about volume, speed and the ability to get the review produced in the right amount of time, and also to provide clarification to those who gave evidence.
Finally, we heard from Helena Wood that she had concerns that the Bill is a “very blunt instrument”, specifically in relation to its powers on eligibility verification. What consideration has the Minister given to those comments, especially about the proportionality and reasonableness of the measures in the Bill, to ensure that it does not get used as the blunt tool it appears to be? What more information about how the powers in the clause are to be exercised will be set out in the code of practice in due course?
Andrew Western
I acknowledge what the hon. Lady said about the evidence we heard and the preference for a board. If I am being absolutely transparent with the Committee—as I would be expected to be—I am entirely open-minded at this point about where we may end up. I do not have a person, body or group in mind. That is why I hope that the open and transparent process yields the best possible result in terms of the qualifications and specialisms of the individual or individuals who may ultimately be appointed. A range of skills would be of use to us—specialisms in data and human rights, and in welfare, obviously—so I am open-minded about where we end up in relation to who takes this work forward for us.
On the question as to the volume of work, the hon. Lady is correct that it is something of a “How long is a piece of string?” question. However, in terms of the bare essentials, the requirement is to produce an annual report to be laid before Parliament, so I would not expect the volume of work to be at the extreme end in terms of how onerous it would be.
Steve Darling
I am pleased to have had the debate. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 75 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 76
Entry, search and seizure in England and Wales
Andrew Western
I beg to move amendment 34, in clause 76, page 43, line 38, leave out from “the individual” to end of line 1 on page 44 and insert
“is an official of a government department and—”.
This amendment clarifies that to be an authorised investigator an individual must be an official of a government department and be of the specified grade.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
Clause 77 stand part.
Government amendments 4, 5 and 33.
Schedule 4.
Clause 78 stand part.
New clause 3—Application of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to investigations conducted by the Department for Work and Pensions—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, introduce regulations for the purpose of applying certain powers of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, subject to such modifications as the order may specify, to investigations of offences conducted by the Department for Work and Pensions.
(2) The powers to be applied must include—
(a) the power of arrest;
(b) any other such powers that the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
(3) Regulations made under this section shall be made by statutory instrument.”
Andrew Western
Clause 76 will insert a new section 109D to the Social Security Administration Act 1992 to make provision for specialist DWP staff to apply to the courts for a warrant to enter a premises for the purposes of search and seizure. That is one of the five overarching powers that we are looking at in the Bill. It is a new power for the Department, but not uncommon across Government more broadly. These actions may be exercised only by an authorised investigator—an individual who has received authorisation from the Secretary of State and completed industry standard training.
As drafted, subsection (6) of proposed new section 109D could be interpreted as requiring an authorised investigator to be either an official of a Government Department or of at least higher executive officer grade. Amendment 34 makes it explicit that an authorised investigator must be both an official of a Government Department and an HEO, for the purpose of these powers in England and Wales. That is an important clarification and is in line with our original policy intent. I trust that the amendment is welcome, as it ensures that there are clear criteria in place and that only those who hold the right office and grade may be authorised to exercise the powers in clause 76 and schedule 4.
I turn to clause 76 itself, and the substance of the powers of entry, search and seizure for the DWP. The clause will insert new section 109D and schedule 3ZC into the Social Security Administration Act 1992, which will provide DWP-authorised investigators with the power to apply for warrants, enter a premises, search it and seize items. It will also give authorised investigators power to apply for an order to gain access to certain types of materials that refer to business or personal records, defined in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 as “excluded material” under section 11 or “special procedure material” under section 14.
The ability to undertake this activity will play a crucial role in gathering and securing evidence to bring serious and organised benefit fraudsters to justice. Currently, DWP investigators must rely on the police to undertake all this activity—securing the warrant from the court and exercising it—on their behalf. The clause changes that. It means that DWP-authorised investigators will be able to apply directly to a court for a warrant to enable them to enter, search and seize items from premises, but only during a serious and organised criminal investigation.
I can assure the Committee that DWP-authorised investigators will be required to meet the same legal requirements when submitting an application as the police. That includes undertaking all activities in compliance with the Home Office code of practice on entry, search and seizure. In addition, independent inspections of the DWP’s use of the power may be conducted by His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services in England and Wales or by His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary in Scotland. That is addressed in clause 87, which we will consider later, and will be in addition to the internal safeguards, including clear processes for signing off warrants, that the DWP will have in place to ensure that the powers are used appropriately, safely and lawfully.
Clause 77 will insert new section 109E and new schedule 3ZD into the Social Security Administration Act 1992, and will provide equivalent entry, search and seizure powers for DWP-authorised investigators carrying out investigations of serious and organised fraud in Scotland. The powers enabling entry, search and seizure in England and Wales are primarily provided by PACE, and that is addressed in clause 76; however, there is no equivalent Act in Scottish law to provide the basis for these powers, so the powers in relation to Scotland are set out in this Bill. New schedule 3ZD to the 1992 Act —inserted by clause 77 and schedule 4 to the Bill—provides the basis for applying for a warrant for entry, search and seizure and exercising that warrant in Scotland. Those powers are similar to those set out in clause 76 and schedule 4 for England and Wales.
Clause 77 enables a DWP-authorised investigator to apply for and execute a warrant or a production order—a court-authorised directive requiring an individual to promptly disclose information relevant to a criminal investigation—in Scotland. It also provides for the DWP to search premises and seize items when that action is authorised by a sheriff in Scotland. The clause is intended to achieve parity between the nations, and I commend it to the Committee.
Government amendments 4 and 5 are minor and technical and aim to deliver the original policy intent of schedule 4, relating to entry, search and seizure for the DWP in Scotland. Their effect is to provide that where an authorised investigator who is exercising a search warrant identifies materials or items that have a bearing on any offence under investigation, they should seize them only if taking a copy or record, such as a photograph, is deemed to be not appropriate. That will ensure that items or materials are seized only where necessary, and will apply the same safeguard in Scotland as is currently the case in England and Wales.
As the Bill is drafted, the requirement to take a copy where possible, rather than seizing something, would apply only to an item and not to material. The amendments will deliver the original policy intent, which was not to differentiate. They will also ensure that no seizure, copies or records should be made where an item or material is subject to legal privilege or defined as “excluded” or “special procedure” material. I hope that my explanation assures Members that the amendments are minor and technical, and will ensure that schedule 4 works correctly and is in line with the existing approach taken by the police. I commend Government amendments 4 and 5 to the Committee.
Government amendment 33, which is very similar to Government amendment 34, makes it clear that an authorised investigator must be both an official of a Government Department and of HEO grade, but this time in relation to the use of these powers in Scotland, under schedule 3ZD, which is set out in schedule 4 to the Bill. I trust that the amendment will be welcomed like amendment 34.
Schedule 4 outlines modifications to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 for entry, search and seizure operations in England and Wales, and includes equivalent legislation for operations that take place in Scotland. The schedule sets out the essential modifications and practical details needed for DWP-authorised investigators to fully execute powers of entry, search and seizure. It outlines new schedule 3ZC to be inserted into the Social Security Administration Act 1992, to modify certain provisions in PACE to provide the relevant policing powers to DWP-authorised investigators in England and Wales.
The schedule sets out the minimum grade required to be an authorised investigator, which is the minimum civil service equivalent of a police constable. The DWP will require 250 authorised investigators to be trained to industry standards, and they will be subject to internal management checks. The schedule also restricts the use of the powers so that they are exercisable only for the purpose of investigating a DWP offence, as defined in clause 84 of the Bill. It permits others to accompany an authorised investigator on to the premises named in the warrant and limits a DWP-authorised investigator’s authority so that they can conduct searches only of “material” and not of people. The schedule also makes technical modifications to PACE, to allow the DWP to carry out entry, search and seizure activity in the same way as the police.
Schedule 4 also outlines new schedule 3ZD to the 1992 Act, which makes provision for entry, search and seizure in Scotland. As far as possible, this replicates the approach taken in England and Wales, except where an alternative approach is needed to account for the different legal system in Scotland. The primary differences between schedule 3ZC and 3ZD are the process that must be followed when executing a warrant in Scotland, which includes providing a copy of the warrant to persons on the premises; the process for issuing receipts for items seized; the legal requirements for making applications for Scottish production orders and Scottish warrants for special procedure material.
Clause 78 replicates the approach taken in legislation governing police actions in respect of the Crown and Crown premises. It sets out how the law applies in the unlikely event that the DWP needs to obtain a warrant to enter Crown premises. It provides for a DWP-authorised investigator to apply for a warrant to search the locker of a suspect who works in, for example, a Government Department, but it prohibits the use of these powers in the interests of national security once the Secretary of State has certified that this is the case, and with regard to any private estates belonging to His Majesty and the Houses of Parliament. The package of measures in the Bill will leave very few places for organised criminals and the gangs who attack the DWP to conceal the evidence of their crimes, but clause 78 keeps us in line with other similar legislation.
Rebecca Smith
The DWP has fewer powers than other organisations, such as His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority, which are tasked with investigating economic crime. We know that it does not have the power to arrest or to conduct search and seizure. Clause 76 will allows DWP-authorised investigators to apply for and execute a court warrant with or without police involvement in England and Wales. The aim is to help the DWP investigate and disrupt serious and organised fraud by giving investigators the power to make searches and seizures. That will allow them to deal with, for example, cases where universal credit claims are made using false identity documents.
We in the official Opposition want the Bill to work and the DWP to be able to successfully identify and tackle benefits fraud. DWP estimates of fraud and error in the welfare system exceeded £8 billion in each financial year from 2020-21 to 2023-24, with a combined total of £35 billion overpaid. For the financial year 2023-24, the DWP’s central estimate is that benefit overpayments totalled £9.7 billion, which is 3.7% of all benefit expenditure. Of that overpayment figure, £7.4 billion, or 76%, was due to fraud, £1.6 billion, or 16%, was due to claimant error, and £0.8 billion, or 8%, was due to official error, or 8%. It is clear that fraud costs the DWP the most, yet we worry that the Bill will be more effective at tackling error than fraud. We therefore support the powers in clause 76 to tackle fraud.
Steve Darling
The power to seize items, down in the weeds of an investigation, is essential to ensuring that we hold the right people to account. However, I am alive to the fact that seized items are often kept for a long time. Our mobile phones often contain our whole lives. Not that long ago, a resident in Torbay who was accused of a criminal offence and was under investigation had his mobile phone seized by Devon and Cornwall police for a very long time—a matter of months. What assurance can the Minister give that when the power of seizure is used—particularly when it is used to seize a mobile phone—items will be returned in a timely manner? What timescale does he plan to set for civil servants to return such items?
Andrew Western
Let me begin with some of the questions from the Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for South West Devon. Her comments setting out the challenge and her commitment to wanting the Bill to work are incredibly welcome. She is right to set out the scale of the challenge. That is why we are taking the powers that we are proposing.
On whether the requests and the use of the powers of search and seizure will be reserved to members of our staff working in serious and organised crime only, the answer is yes. On the level of seniority of team members executing those powers, it is HEO-grade officers that do that. In terms of salary equivalent, salary can be quite a crude comparison for a number of reasons. Police officers undertake shift work and an element of their salaries is higher as a result. Obviously, as members of the emergency services, there is a level of risk to their work. The National Crime Agency suggests that an HEO grade is the equivalent of a police sergeant, although in salary terms, it is probably more akin to a police constable.
On training, they will receive the industry standard training, equivalent to the training that police receive in this area. On safeguards more broadly, for the power in the Bill, a lot of the safeguards in place relate to the fact that a warrant is granted by a judge. There is always that specialist person making a determination in terms of appropriateness and proportionality. All warrant applications and all warrants would be exercised in compliance with the Home Office code of practice for entry, search and seizure. That is specifically limited to serious and organised crime only—that is multiple people working together to commit complex fraud, typically resulting in higher value overpayments.
As I said, everybody executing this power would be of HEO grade. They would have had the industry standard training. Investigations will also be subject to independent inspections, which will report on the DWP’s use of the powers, and any serious complaints can be reported to the Independent Office for Police Conduct. A range of safeguards is built into the proposals.
If I may, I will come later to the question from the hon. Member for Torbay about the return of information. There are specific provisions to enable us to keep items for as long as is needed, but there is a desire to return things as soon as possible. Elsewhere in the Bill, we speak to the specific powers that would be required were we wanting to go further and not return an item. There is a commitment to return, unless specific powers are required to prevent further criminality based on evidence found on phones. I cannot give a specific timeline—something would be kept for the length of time necessary for the purposes of the investigation—but I hear the point, particularly about mobile phones.
I stress again that this is about serious and organised crime. If I think of some of the cases I have seen—Operation Volcanic, for example—we are talking about going into buildings where there are several dozen, if not hundreds, of pay-as-you-go mobile phones set up expressly for the purposes of fraudulent activity and criminality. I would perhaps be less sympathetic to the swift return of those phones, and I hope the hon. Gentleman understands why.
I turn to new clause 3. I appreciate the explanation of the rationale from the hon. Member for South West Devon, but I do not share her view. I gave great consideration to the question of whether to take powers of arrest when first having discussions about the scope and shape of the Bill. The Bill enables trained DWP investigators to apply for a search warrant to enter a premises, search it and seize items or material that may have a bearing on the DWP case being investigated. Put bluntly, it gives us the right tools to do the job effectively.
Crucially, it enhances police efficiency by allowing the DWP to handle warrant applications and carry out search and seizure activity, freeing the police from those administrative and investigative tasks that they currently undertake for the DWP. No longer will DWP investigators always need to rely on the police for search warrants, take up police time briefing them on the specifics of the warrant applications or always be restricted to simply advising the police as to what items may be relevant during a search, only for them to then be seized by the police and later transferred to the DWP.
On efficiency, we are taking the powers we need to smarten up our processes. The current process is clearly imperfect. It is inefficient for both the DWP and the police, as well as burdensome in terms of resource, and the Bill resolves that situation. There is a clear rationale for the powers set out in the Bill, but the same cannot be said for the amendment.
To close, I will explain why it is not appropriate for the DWP to undertake arrests as well. I am concerned about the safety impacts; the police have expertise that equips them to carry out arrests. The policy intent is to facilitate more effective investigations and smoother administration, striking the right balance between activities undertaken by the DWP and the police. A power to arrest would require the DWP to take on roles that go beyond those that are administrative and evidence gathering in nature.
Not only that, but it is common for a serious organised DWP offence to involve other types of serious and organised crimes. As a result, a suspect is likely to be involved in wider criminality than just a DWP related offence, such as firearms, drugs or being involved in people trafficking. It makes sense that the police would conduct the arrest in such a situation and, after that, DWP investigators could focus their time on searching the scene for relevant evidence related to the DWP offence.
In addition, for the DWP to be able to operate independently of the police would require the DWP, for example, to have appropriate vehicles for transporting an arrested person and custody suites for detaining them. Currently that is not the case and, to be clear, we are not moving in that direction. We do not operate extensively in that area and allocating resources there is unlikely to be efficient or make sense.
The powers in the Bill promote effective collaboration between the DWP and the police, bring some genuine efficiencies and allow each team to focus on its strengths, which is the right approach. This amendment would not serve the same purpose and it would add a layer of complexity to the DWP’s work that we are not equipped to deal with, either in terms of the expertise of our team or the equipment that we have. For this reason, I must resist new clause 3.
Amendment 34 agreed to.
Clause 76, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 77 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 4
Social security fraud: search and seizure powers etc
Amendments made: 4, in schedule 4, page 91, line 28, after “item” insert “or material”.
This amendment clarifies that paragraph 2(3) of new Schedule 3ZD of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 (as inserted by Schedule 4 of the Bill) applies in relation to any item or material.
Amendment 5, in schedule 4, page 91, line 31, after “item” insert “or material”.
This amendment clarifies that paragraph 2(4) of new Schedule 3ZD of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 (as inserted by Schedule 4 of the Bill) applies in relation to any item or material.
Amendment 33, in schedule 4, page 93, line 32, leave out from “individual” to end of line 33 and insert
“is an official of a government department and—”.—(Andrew Western.)
This amendment clarifies that to be an authorised investigator an individual must be an official of a government department and be of the specified grade.
Schedule 4, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 78 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 79
Offence of delay, obstruction etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Western
I am sure colleagues will be pleased to know that this speech will be brief.
Cases of serious and organised fraud against the DWP can amount to millions of pounds being stolen from the taxpayer. Clause 79 provides for consequences when those suspected of serious and organised fraud intentionally attempt to delay or obstruct an investigation. A suspect can be prosecuted if they intentionally try to frustrate a DWP investigation, and if convicted, they can be fined up to £1,000. Without this important provision, DWP fraud investigations into serious and organised criminal attacks on the social security system could be wilfully manipulated by those suspected of carrying out the fraud, which would be an untenable situation.
Rebecca Smith
I am sure the Committee will be pleased to hear that I will also be brief.
It is an offence under section 111 of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 to intentionally delay or obstruct an authorised officer, and conviction for a failure to comply may result in a fine of up to £1,000. Clause 79 means that obstructing an authorised investigator will be treated in the same way as obstructing an authorised officer, which means that obstructing an authorised investigator will be a criminal offence carrying a fine of up to £1,000. We are happy for the clause to stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 79 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 80
Disposal of property
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Western
This clause gives the DWP a clear legal path to seek court approval to dispose of property that has come into its possession when executing a search warrant. In most cases, the seized items will be returned to their rightful owner as soon as they are no longer required by a criminal investigation. However, as I alluded to in responding to the hon. Member for Torbay, there are certain circumstances in which this may be either not possible or not desirable.
An order may be sought when a seized item does not belong to the suspect and where it is not possible to identify the rightful owner, where there is a high risk that returning the seized item means it could be used for the furtherance of crime or where information needs to be deleted before the item is returned to prevent a further offence. This will prevent the risk of, for instance, returning a seized smartphone that contains data relating to hijacked or stolen identities that may enable fraud and the distribution of information that could be used for criminal gain. With the increasing use of technology, it will be ever more critical to ensure this does not happen. This clause allows the DWP to act in the same way as the police.
To avoid the risk of incorrect disposal of seized items, applications for any action of this kind must be made to, and must be approved by, a court. In addition, there are restrictions on how quickly seized material can be disposed of. In all cases, six months must elapse from the approval of an application by a court before a seized item can be destroyed.
Finally, any person with an interest in an item can make an application to the court. This could be the DWP, the item’s rightful owner or the person from whom it was seized. The clause sets out specific criteria in relation to any challenges that may be brought and the procedures that apply. If an order has been given for the item to be destroyed, the order cannot be revoked. However, the timeframe for the item to be destroyed may be challenged.
This clause creates a legal and proportionate gateway for the DWP to deal with seized items appropriately. This ensures that the DWP can act in the same way as the police when concluding fraud investigations.
Rebecca Smith
Where DWP investigators seize items from a premises, they will generally be returned to the owner if they are no longer needed for an ongoing investigation. As we have heard, it may not be appropriate to return an item in certain cases, such as if the person from whom the item was taken is not the actual owner or if the owner cannot be traced. In some cases, there may be a risk that a seized item could be used for a criminal purpose if it were returned. We acknowledge that clause 80 gives the DWP a lawful basis for disposing of the items. Clause 80 stipulates that items cannot be destroyed until six months have passed from when the magistrate approved the application to destroy them. Why is six months the chosen timeframe, and what are the precedents for other evidence seized in criminal investigations?
We support the provision allowing someone with an interest in the item to request the court to alter an approved action in relation to the item. We believe that is sensible. Can the Minister give an example of the sort of scenario that might refer to, just for the benefit of the Committee? What will the timeframe be for such applications? Finally, how will interested parties be made aware of items they may wish to take court action over? I assume it will not be a police lost property office, but ultimately it is one of those questions of how someone will know that there is something in which they might have an interest.
Andrew Western
I will briefly answer those questions. The period of six months is the same as set out in the Police (Property) Act 1897. We want to ensure alignment where we can to make the process between the police and the DWP as seamless as possible, so that serious and organised fraudsters do not recognise any difference.
On the question of how someone will know if we were intending to destroy their items, the clause does not require the DWP to inform any relevant person of any intended action in relation to the seized item. That is commensurate with how the 1897 Act works for the police in similar circumstances, but anyone who has an interest in the seized goods will have the same access right as the Secretary of State to apply to a court for a particular course of action to be taken. That could include seeking an extension before the seized item is destroyed. In all cases, a notice to occupier information notice will be left at the property, which will provide information about the search, the items seized and relevant points of contact.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 80 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 81
Amendments to the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Western
Clause 81 applies only to Scotland and amends the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 to enable DWP-authorised investigators to seize an item from a premises and scrutinise it off site to determine its relevance to the investigation. This will apply in circumstances where it is challenging or even impossible to determine the relevance of an item to an investigation while on site. In some cases, large volumes of documents could be found that may comprise valuable evidence, but that will take a long time and need detailed scrutiny to assess. A locked electronic device may be found that could have evidence stored on it. This clause gives DWP-authorised investigators the ability to deal with those kinds of situations in the same way as the police by seizing items and taking them off site for sifting or further examination elsewhere. Without the authority granted by this clause, vital evidence could be missed, lost or even destroyed if left on site. In all instances, the DWP will seek to return seized items as soon as possible to the owner, where they are no longer needed or found to be irrelevant to an ongoing investigation. Those are the main provisions in clause 81, and I commend it to the Committee.
Rebecca Smith
Clause 81 amends the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 to deal with situations where authorised investigators cannot ascertain whether an item or material contains information relevant to that search, such as when dealing with large volumes of materials or files or electronic devices. That material therefore may need to be taken to be examined elsewhere, and we recognise that the clause allows for material to be seized and then sifted, rather than sifted and then seized. For that reason, we are happy for the clause to stand part of the Bill.
Steve Darling
I seek the Minister’s guidance as to how DWP officers, when they undertake these acts, will ensure that seize and sift will not be the standard modus operandi and that it is used only in appropriate cases. When will the Government publish a code of conduct? What guidance will be given? It might be tempting to undertake trawling operations for information rather than taking the spear-fishing approach that would garner the evidence more easily. I would welcome the Minister’s reassurance on that.
Andrew Western
I am grateful to the hon. Member for South West Devon for her support and to the hon. Member for Torbay for his questions. By way of reassurance, the DWP cannot just seize anything and everything from a place it has entered with a warrant; it can seize only items that are directly relevant to the investigation. Other oversight is built in, given the ability to make complaints to the IOPC and the oversight powers we are affording to HMICFRS, and people will be trained to the industry standard and so on, but fundamentally they must be able to demonstrate that a seizure is directly relevant to the investigation.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 81 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 82
Incidents etc in England and Wales
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Western
Clause 82 amends part 2 of the Police Reform Act 2002 and will insert proposed new section 26H, which provides for the IOPC to investigate any serious complaints or serious harm related to the use of the powers of entry, search and seizure. There are multiple safeguards—including industry-standard training for all authorised investigators—to minimise the risk of the Bill’s entry, search and seizure powers being used incorrectly. I assure Members that the likelihood of a serious complaint, particularly anything that involves death or serious harm, is extremely unlikely. However, an effective and independent complaints process is essential when it comes to powers of this nature.
Whenever a search warrant is executed, information will be provided setting out how to raise a complaint and what to do in the unlikely event that the complaint is serious or involves death or serious harm. The clause aligns the DWP’s approach to serious complaints and incidents relating to entry, search and seizure with that of other bodies with similar powers, including the police. That is why we have agreed with the Police Investigations and Review Commissioner that they will investigate serious incidents that occur in Scotland related to the use of the powers of entry, search and seizure by the DWP under clause 83.
If a complaint is not of a serious nature, as defined in IOPC guidelines, it can still be raised via the existing departmental complaint procedures. It will be investigated internally, and if an individual is not happy with the complaint response, they can ask for their complaint to be reviewed by a more senior manager. If an individual remains dissatisfied with the Department’s final response, they may escalate their concern to the independent case examiner.
Clause 83 amends articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 (Consequential Provisions and Modifications) Order 2013. It mirrors the provisions of clause 82, which applies to England and Wales, and provides for similar independent investigation arrangements for serious incidents in Scotland. I again reassure Members that robust safeguards will be in place, including investigators having comprehensive training, robust internal governance with clear processes for signing off warrants, and the external independent authorisation of all warrants by the courts.
In the very unlikely event that a fatality is associated with the DWP’s use of the powers, the Police Investigations and Review Commissioner can be directed to investigate by the Crown Office Procurator Fiscal Service, which is Scotland’s public prosecution service and death-investigation authority. We expect that, in almost all cases, incidents relating to the DWP’s use of the powers will fall outside of the scope of being serious in their nature. In such cases, the Department’s existing complaint procedures will be used, as I set have out.
It is crucial to build trust in the Department, especially when serious incidents happen. The public must know that their concerns will be handled with importance and impartiality. Clauses 82 and 83 provide that assurance by establishing a transparent and accountable investigation process that is independent of the Department. Having outlined their main provisions, I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Rebecca Smith
Clause 82 specifies that the Independent Office for Police Conduct—which oversees complaints, professional conduct matters and serious incidents involving the police and similar bodies in England and Wales—will handle serious complaints relating to the DWP’s use of the powers under proposed new section 109D in relation to DWP offences. That will be done through a regulation-making power, so will the Minister explain what modifications might be made to how the IOPC oversees complaints when its functions are extended to DWP investigators? How much additional funding does the Minister anticipate the IOPC will need to take on those functions?
Andrew Western
On the question of funding for the IOPC and the PIRC, we are in ongoing discussions with them about what the exact costs will be. We clearly do not expect the costs to be excessive because it is not a massive shift from the work they undertake already.
On the question of what modifications are required to the IOPC role, the regulations will set out how the functions will work for the DWP. It is important to remember that we envisage that the IOPC will look at cases only where there have been serious complaints and deaths, so we are not talking huge numbers.
There could be a range of ways in which people can refer. It may even be that we would self-refer if there has been a death. One of the principal reasons why I did not consider it prudent to take the power of arrest is that that minimises the likelihood of our finding ourselves in that position. Where arrests are undertaken, clearly the police will be on site with us and responsible for that.
I do not envisage the process for making the complaints to be set out explicitly in the code of practice, but clearly if someone contacted the Department and wanted to make a complaint of that nature about something very serious that was outside the scope of internal complaints—for instance, if there had been harm or death—we would immediately refer the person and the case to the IOPC. As I say, the costs are not expected to be excessive, but we would expect to meet them ourselves.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 82 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 83 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 84
DWP offence
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Western
The clause creates a new definition of “DWP offence”, expanding on the existing definition of “benefit offence” set out in the Social Security Administration Act 1992. The DWP must have the power to respond to the different types of fraud we find. We know that, for example, the misuse of national insurance numbers can be a gateway to wider fraud. If criminals steal the identities of honest people and misuse their details to make false benefit claims, that is unacceptable and we need the power to act.
Fraud is not just contained to the most claimed benefits, like universal credit—as we saw with kickstart, grant payments intended to support people when they need extra help can also be abused—yet DWP investigative powers are limited when investigating other types of crime. By providing a new definition of a DWP offence, the clause ensures that fraudulent activity relating to grants, loans, national insurance numbers and other financial support issued by the DWP is explicitly captured in the law. It allows any offences linked to the payments to be met with firm action. The new definition works hand in hand with our enhanced investigation and entry, search and seizure powers in the Bill, thereby giving the DWP the ability to obtain critical evidence needed to prove or disprove allegations of fraud, in a fair and proportionate way.
The clause is about ensuring that every pound lost to fraud, and taken away from those who genuinely need support, is pursued with all the powers we have, whatever the nature of the payment may have been. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Rebecca Smith
I thank the Minister for outlining the plans around the clause, which would establish the definition of a “DWP offence” to allow any offence relating to a benefit payment, credit or grant that the DWP administers to be included under the new information-gathering powers. It would also include offences related to national insurance numbers.
We support the clause, which should hopefully allow DWP to gather information more holistically and lead to more successful prosecutions, but I have a couple of brief questions. What assessment has been made of the scale of prosecutions that could be made? What assessment has been made of the cost of exercising the new power?
Andrew Western
I thank the hon. Lady for her support and her questions. I would not want to put a specific number on the prosecutions—as I said, we have not had the powers to investigate these crimes in full before—but we think that by bringing these areas it into scope not only will we find significant offences that we need to clamp down on but there will be a deterrent effect. Having both levers together makes this an important tool to have in our arsenal.
On the costs, they would be broadly similar to those we already bear for investigating any other type of offence. They would not be materially different in terms of the implications for our budget.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 84 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 85
Disclosure of information etc: interaction with external constraints
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Western
The clause is an important safeguard for the DWP’s information-gathering powers. It sets out the kinds of information that a DWP-authorised officer cannot compel from an information holder. The exemptions are similar to those set out in the Social Security Assistance (Investigation of Offences) (Scotland) Regulations 2020. They are designed to prevent information from being obtained that is particularly sensitive, or if it would be inappropriate for the DWP to do so. For instance, as with the existing legislation, exemptions apply to legally privileged material and to information that could lead to the self-incrimination of the person or their spouse or civil partners.
In addition, the clause sets out exemptions for excluded material and certain special procedure material, as defined in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. This includes material such as medical records, records about counselling that an individual may have received, and journalistic material. The clause also prevents information notices from being issued for personal information about the use of organisations that provide free advice and advocacy services—including, for example, charities that provide refuge from abuse—thereby ensuring that vulnerable people can seek help without fear that their information will be disclosed.
Any use of the powers must be compliant with obligations set out in data protection legislation, which requires that personal data is kept secure and is not misused. The powers cannot be used to obtain communications data. If the DWP seeks communications data as part of its investigation, it must follow the authorisations and processes under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. Further detail on the safeguards will be in our code of practice, which will be consulted on before being laid before Parliament, and to which all authorised officers will be required to adhere. Having outlined the main provisions of clause 85, I commend it to the Committee.
Rebecca Smith
Clause 85 sets out that DWP’s actions under part 5 of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 must comply with existing laws relating to the use of data and with the existing protections to protect confidential data and data prohibited under the Investigatory Powers Act. I have a brief question before I move on to subsection (8). Does the Minister envisage that clause 85 will provide much practical constraint on how the DWP is able to share information?
Subsection (8) states:
“A person who provides services on a not for profit basis in relation to social security, housing (including the provision of temporary accommodation) or debt, may not be required under the provision to give personal data about the recipients of the services.”
I acknowledge what the Minister just said about the particularly vulnerable, who may be in refuges or places like that, but the provision feels quite broad, particularly in relation to debt recovery and support. Many organisations might have quite a lot of information that would be helpful to the DWP—I think particularly of, for example, Citizens Advice, which sees the records of quite of a lot of people. Why has that carve-out been included and what purpose does it serve, beyond protecting particularly vulnerable groups that we do not want to put in danger?
My other question is about whether the provision excludes local authorities, which often provide temporary accommodation, for example. Does the subsection mean that local authorities will not be part of the group that could be asked for information?
Andrew Western
First, I am not of the view that the protections overly constrain our ability to gather the information we need and execute fraud operations as effectively as possible. The provision significantly broadens the overarching information-gathering package, the number the organisations from which we can compel information and the nature of the information that we can receive, but it is important that we take the steps needed to rule out some of the obvious kinds of information that people would expect us to remove, such as medical records and journalistic material.
It will probably help if I clarify the matter of the special protection status for certain organisations—I apologise if I was not clear when I said this before. The clause does not exempt charities or any specific organisations; it exempts certain types of information, such as that from organisations that provide services free of charge in relation to social security, housing or debt. We can still ask them for information, but not in relation to the advice they have provided. The measure is therefore perhaps not as restrictive as it may seem. It is not that the organisations can never be asked for information; it is just that certain types of information, of the nature I outlined in my principal contribution, will be protected.
Local authorities are not exempt, and they will have a part to play in much of our investigatory work, as the hon. Member for South West Devon suggested.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 85 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 86
Giving notices etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Western
The information-gathering powers set out under clause 72 will be amended to ensure that information can be compelled from third parties digitally. That is an important step forward for us. The updated information-gathering powers create a single, clear legal gateway so that the DWP can compel information from third parties, it is more straightforward to respond, and that information can be provided digitally.
The Department must ensure that provisions are in place so that, in the event of a failure of digital systems, investigations are not impacted. Therefore, under such rare circumstances, the DWP will retain the power to compel information in writing, as set out in clause 86 —[Interruption.] I think Jennie likes this one. The clause also confirms that the DWP giving an administrative penalty notice by post is sufficient to effect service, and also applies to the eligibility verification measure, enabling the DWP to issue a notice to financial institutions by post, if necessary.
Rebecca Smith
Clause 86 inserts the provision for the DWP to retain the ability to issue an information notice and receive relevant documents by post. The Minister will be pleased to hear that he has answered my questions. The only thing I would ask is: how often does he expect information notices to be issued digitally? I suppose the flip question is: are you expecting the system to work perfectly and the post option to be used very rarely? For example, with vulnerable and older groups, might the post option need to be used more broadly than digital in certain cases?
Andrew Western
Clearly, in individual cases, if someone were to request contact by post, we would want to bear that in mind, but without wishing, as the Minister for transformation, to sound over-confident about the digital capability of some of our systems, in my view we would need to use these powers extremely rarely. It would be digital by default, except in the instance of, for example, system failure.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 86 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 87
Independent review
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Western
Clause 87 introduces an important safeguard by providing that all the criminal investigation powers in the Bill are independently inspected. As the Committee would expect, the DWP will make every effort to ensure that its criminal investigations are carried out to the letter of the law—through effective training, internal guidance and, for our entry, search and seizure powers, independent authorisation by the courts. However, it would not be right for the Department to simply mark its own homework. That is why the clause provides for an independent person to be commissioned by the Secretary of State to undertake inspections. This will ensure that there is a formal provision in place to establish that arrangement, and that it can be done in a way that is suitable for both the DWP and the independent person.
The independent person will be responsible for impartial inspection of the Department’s effectiveness, and compliance with relevant codes of practice and guidance in its criminal investigations. That aligns with other Government bodies such as His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority and the National Crime Agency, which also use investigatory powers at different levels and are also subject to independent inspections.
I am pleased to say that the independent person the DWP intends to commission is His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services for matters relating to investigations in England and Wales, and His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary in Scotland for investigations in Scotland. Those well-established bodies are experts in conducting such inspections and independently assessing the use of criminal investigation powers. Their reports will be published and laid before Parliament, including any recommendations for improvements.
The clause ensures that the Department’s criminal investigations will be conducted with transparency and accountability, demonstrating its commitment to fairness and transparency when exercising its criminal powers.
Rebecca Smith
Clause 87 provides for DWP investigation activity to be inspected and evaluated by an independent person or body. The Secretary of State will be able to appoint someone to inspect DWP criminal investigations, and to provide written reports and recommendations to the Secretary of State, which must be published and laid before Parliament. That review will also consider the DWP’s compliance with the codes of practice, which we have not yet seen, as was much discussed in earlier sittings.
We welcome the transparency that clause 87 will bring to how the DWP is using these powers; however, unlike clause 75, the clause does not state how often reviews would have to be conducted. Is there a reason for that? The Secretary of State would give “directions” as to the period to be covered by each review, having first consulted the independent person. Can the Minister confirm how frequently the Secretary of State will ask the DWP investigation activity to be reported on, and will the independent person or body be able to carry out reviews on their own initiative or will they have to wait until directed to do so by the Secretary of State?
The Minister has already given the Committee an indication of who may be appointed to lead those reviews, and I assume the layout of the police and fire authorities relates to that particular question, so I will not restate that for the record, but can I also ask the Minister how quickly reviews are expected to be concluded once they have been initiated—referring back to the wording of clause 75? For these reviews to be meaningful, there must be a way for the DWP to learn lessons and improve practice, so how can the Minister reassure the Committee that there will be a process in place for that to happen?
The Chair
I remind Members to bob if they wish to catch my eye to speak, and to refrain from using the word “you”, which refers to me as opposed to the Minister.
John Milne
My colleague has just partially asked my question. While we broadly welcome the clause, we are concerned by the absence of the code of practice. Could the Minister give any indication of the kind of guidance that it might contain? Also, at what stage of the parliamentary process will there be scrutiny of it, given that it will not be during this Committee?
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Western. I want to raise the comments made by the Information Commissioner in relation to the Bill and the updates to the previous Government’s proposals. I understood that they were more content with this Bill than the previous Bill. They were pleased that it brought data protection more tightly within the measures, and that it talked about data protection in a much more consistent way with the law. They said that the Bill more tightly scopes the types of information that can and cannot be shared. I understand that our debate on clause 85 covered some of those improvements.
However, at the end of their comments, the Information Commissioner talked about the review process, and said very clearly that they would like to explore with the Government the role that the Information Commissioner’s Office can play in assisting with the review process. This clause does not set out the different offices and people with whom the independent reviewer needs to liaise in preparing their report. I wondered whether Ministers could comment on their thoughts surrounding that process, and consider setting out in the code of practice or further guidance how the independent reviewer might engage properly with data protection in their review.
Andrew Western
There were a number of questions there—I was scribbling at pace—so if I miss anything, please intervene. In terms of when and how often investigations will happen, it is expected that the period for each review will be set and carried out in mutual agreement with each of the bodies. On whether they can ask to undertake a review, it would need to be in consultation with the Secretary of State, but it is fair to say we would be doing ourselves no favours by refusing to bear their request in mind. Likewise, on timescales, it is all in collaboration with the Secretary of State.
On when we can expect to see the codes of practice, for search and seizure the Home Office’s existing codes of practice will apply, but for information-gathering powers it will be the updated code of practice, which will be consulted on and laid in Parliament before being used. We anticipate that new codes of practice will be available before Committee stage in the House of Lords.
In relation to the response to inspections and how we would learn from them, once the independent body has produced its report the Secretary of State must publish it and lay it before Parliament. Although no legal obligation is placed on the Secretary of State to implement recommendations, we will respond to all recommendations promptly and, as a learning organisation, always look to make continuous improvements.
Rebecca Smith
I thank the Minister for answering those questions. The lack of stipulation on timeframe, frequency and so on begs the question of why this provision is in the Bill. Ultimately, what will trigger a review? That is the bit we probably have not touched on. Who will say to the Secretary of State, who no doubt is an incredibly busy woman, “This is what we need to be doing at this time”? I appreciate that it would be her officials, but this provision is buried in the middle of the Bill and there is no stipulation that a review has to happen after a 12-month period, every six months or whatever. How do we ensure that this transparency, which we welcome, will actually take place, and that the benefits of having a review come to pass?
Andrew Western
That is a reasonable question. Clearly, if there are incidents such as those that would bring into scope the IOPC powers, that would attract significant attention and it would be obvious and—dare I say it?—necessary for the Secretary of State to refer there. In relation to timescales and so on, much of that would depend on what has happened in a period. Were we to say that this was something that will be done every year or every other year and then something happened immediately, we would lack the flexibility to utilise the powers in the agile way we hope to do so. I appreciate that it may appear vague when compared with some powers that we have previously discussed, but that is so we can respond to events, rather than seek to dodge the use of the power.
Clearly, to an extent we will always work in collaboration. As I say, I would not intend at any point to resist a request from HMICFRS or any other body to look into work that we had undertaken, in particular in response to anything that may be considered controversial, not least because search and seizure powers are totally new for the DWP. We need to land them appropriately and build trust that we are able to execute the warrant powers properly.
The Information Commissioner’s comments related primarily to the eligibility verification measures, as they pertain to a direct comparison to the third-party data powers in the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill. Obviously, the Information Commissioner has fairly wide-ranging powers to involve himself in any investigations. It is not something that we would look to resist. I think the channels are already in place for him to engage wherever he feels that it is appropriate.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 87 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 88
Enforcement of non-benefit payments
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Western
Clause 88 sets out the details of how an overpayment of a non-benefit payment, such as under the kickstart scheme that was used after the pandemic, will be made recoverable. This is necessary if we are to use the administrative penalty in connection with such cases to enable us to improve fairness, allowing the Department to address fraud wherever it occurs in the welfare system. As the Bill specifically seeks to extend the use of the administrative penalty—a penalty that is considered only after a criminal investigation of a suspicion of fraud—we are specifically extending the recovery of overpayments to cases of fraud against a non-benefit payment.
This means that, before we can recover overpayments of non-benefit payments, the DWP will need to have completed a thorough criminal investigation into a suspicion of fraud and either an administrative penalty is accepted or there is a court conviction. Once that has happened, the process for recovery of non-benefit overpayments will be the same as the long-established processes for social security overpayments. As with social security overpayments, a notice must be sent to the person who received the non-benefit overpayment. The notice sets the right to challenge the overpayment decision.
The overpayment decision can be challenged first by requesting a review by the Secretary of State, and if the decision is maintained, they can appeal to the first-tier tribunal. Individuals have one month to apply for a review and one month after the notification of the outcome of the review to appeal, as outlined in proposed new subsections 71ZK(2) and 71ZK(6). These time limits are the same as those for challenging benefit overpayment decisions. If the decision is not disputed or is upheld following a review or appeal, the non-benefit overpayment becomes recoverable in the same way as social security overpayments.
Clause 88 is fundamental. It ensures that there is fairness in the DWP’s response to fraud, meaning our investigators and decision makers treat cases of fraud against any DWP payment in the same equitable way.
Rebecca Smith
Clause 88 sets out the mechanism for the recovery of non-benefit payments. This applies when a person misrepresents or fails to disclose a material fact, and as a consequence they or another person receives a non-benefit payment, or an amount of a non-benefit payment, that they would not otherwise have received. Subsection (2) provides a power to recover the overpayment.
Clause 88 also sets out what the Secretary of State must do before an overpayment can be recovered. This includes providing an overpayment notice, the detail that must be included in that notice, and that the person must have had the opportunity to challenge the overpayment. The Secretary of State can issue an overpayment notice only if the person has been convicted of an offence set out in the legislation, or if it appears possible to institute proceedings against a person for an offence. The only grounds to appeal a notice are if there has been no overpayment of a non-benefit payment or if the amount stated in the notice is not correct. Any appeal must be made before the end of the period of one month, beginning the day after the day on which a person was given the notice.
This question has probably been answered in an earlier debate, but I will ask it anyway to get it on the record: will the notices be sent in the post or electronically? That links back to our debate on clause 86; how the Government ensure that the notices get to the right people is going to be particularly important. Finally, why is there no ability to extend the one-month period, and on what basis was one month decided?
Steve Darling
I just want some assurance on how it was decided that one month was long enough. For my sins, I served the people of Torbay in elected of office for 30 years before getting elected to Parliament. I am alive to the fact that some people have chaotic lives. I am only too aware of how sometimes people turn up to the citizens advice bureau with a couple of carrier bags full of unopened envelopes because due to their mental health challenges the only way they are able to deal with their world is by putting their head in the sand, sadly.
I wanted an assurance on whether there was a level of flexibility. It appears from the clause that there is a drop-dead proposal here. What flexibility is proposed? I look forward to hearing the Minister speak about those people who are perhaps more vulnerable than the rest of us.
Rebecca Smith
I was hasty in putting down my notes and I realised I left out a bit, so thank you for humouring me, Mr Western. Clause 88 also sets out that there is a right of appeal to the first-tier tribunal against the notice, unless it has been revoked on review. We welcome the ability to appeal to the first-tier tribunal, but can I ask the Minister whether any amounts recoverable will be paused during the appeal process? Again, there is only one month to appeal to the first-tier tribunal, so can he explain on what benefit this timeframe was chosen?
Andrew Western
On whether notices will be sent in the post, it will be a mixture, as in the case for benefits rather than grants. The means of communication may be electronic or by post—there is always a blend. When we follow up in instances where debt recovery is required, we always use a range of mechanisms, such as telephone, digital and post, to attempt to get hold of somebody when we need to.
On the question from the hon. Members for South West Devon and for Torbay regarding how we came up with the one-month period either side of the appeal, that is the existing practice in the case of benefits, and we feel that it is therefore appropriate for non-benefit grants. To give some assurance on flexibility and vulnerability, the characteristics of claimants that might make them vulnerable, such as mental health difficulties, disabilities and other mitigating circumstances, will always be factored in by the decision maker when deciding whether to opt for an administrative penalty in the first place. At present, that happens in the case of benefits, and we would be extending that practice to grants and other non-benefit issues.
If the customer is suspected of being vulnerable at any stage of the investigation, the team leader or higher-investigations leader, in consultation with the investigator, will decide on the appropriate next steps. On the question of the timeliness of recovery, recovery will not start before an appeal was made. If there is an appeal, there will have been no recovery.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 88 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Gerald Jones.)
Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Tenth sitting)
Tuesday 11th March 2025
(1 week, 2 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesPublic Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 11 March 2025 - (11 Mar 2025)
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
I beg to move amendment 7, in clause 89, page 55, line 6, leave out from “unless” to the end of line 14 and insert—
“(a) the liable person agrees, or
(b) there has been a final determination by a court or tribunal that it is necessary and proportionate to exercise a power under Schedule 3ZA.”
This amendment would mean that the Secretary of State can only exercise powers to recover amounts from a person where the person agrees or where a court or tribunal has determined that such recovery is necessary and appropriate.
Siân Berry
It is a pleasure to have you back in the Chair this afternoon, Sir Jeremy. The amendment covers direct deduction orders relating to social security payment debt of individuals who are no longer on benefits and not employed within the pay-as-you-earn system, as well as the use of powers to disqualify debtors from driving—a power I oppose, and we will debate that when we come to schedule 6.
The clause introduces the power for the Department for Work and Pensions to recover funds directly from a person’s bank account without a court warrant. The Secretary of State may make a direct deduction order in respect of a recoverable amount, where the debtor is no longer on benefits and is not employed within the PAYE system. As I understand it, the powers apply to all benefits under sections 71 to 78 of the Social Security Administration Act 1992, including universal credit, and employment and support allowance. The powers apply to not only overpayments caused by deliberately fraudulent behaviour, but negligent oversight, incorrect statements and failure to disclose information. A DDO may be issued in relation to a joint account, if that is the only account that the debtor has.
The amendment would replace the conditions for such powers under proposed new section 80A(5) of the 1992 Act and would mean that the Secretary of State can only exercise powers to recover amounts from a person where the person agrees that the payment is due, or where a court or tribunal has determined that such recovery is necessary and appropriate. The language and wording almost exactly mirrors that in clause 12, on page 9 of the Bill, which provides that protection for debtors to public authorities. If the likes of potential covid fraudsters and corrupt company directors get the protection of a court or tribunal decision, it is difficult to understand why a benefit recipient should not get the same.
It is worth noting that we already have powers to address the scenario where a debtor is no longer on benefits and not in PAYE employment. In such cases, the DWP can recover overpayments through county court enforcement proceedings. I am aware that the DWP argues that the county court method of enforcement is slow and resource-intensive. However, that is not a good reason to jettison judicial oversight from a process that allows the Government to take money directly from individuals’ bank accounts.
My amendment 7 seeks to address the concern that those powers hand an extraordinary amount of discretion to the Secretary of State, as there is no threshold to determine what constitutes hardship or what would be fair in all the circumstances. Furthermore, as far as I can see, no floor is defined for the amount of money that must be left in the debtor’s bank account.
I understand that the DWP maintains that the power is like those used by His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the Child Maintenance Service, but that is not comparing like with like. Child maintenance is money owed—already defined to be affordable—by one parent to ensure provision for their dependant who does not live with them. That differs from an individual claiming money from the social security system who has been overpaid, potentially through no fault or a simple mistake of their own, where restitution may be extremely difficult to manage fairly and affordably.
Furthermore, I understand that HMRC powers have safeguards: before the powers are exercised, debtors must receive a face-to-face visit from an HMRC agent; and HMRC must retain at least £5,000 across the debtor’s accounts. By contrast, the Bill leaves those protections to the DWP’s discretion, based on the debtor’s representations and covertly obtained bank statements.
The amendment is also needed because the direct deduction powers as drafted would not be powers of last resort. For example, there is no requirement for the minimum number of times a liable person has failed to engage with the DWP before the powers can be exercised; there is no definition of whether someone has been given a reasonable opportunity to settle the debt; and there is no requirement for an in-person visit from the DWP. Such safeguards matter, because benefit recipients may not be engaging due to incapacity, illness, mental health problems or other genuine reasons. If those circumstances are ongoing, this will be an ineffective deterrent to force people to engage and repay their debts.
The amendment would mirror protections in part 1 of the Bill by limiting the availability of direct deduction order powers to cases where the debt is accepted, either by the debtor or by judicial determination. That would prevent the DWP from lowering the legal threshold at which funds can be removed directly from an individual’s bank account. I hope that we will come back to this issue at a later stage, as I really do want some action on it.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Andrew Western)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship again, Sir Jeremy. Amendment 7 would introduce a new requirement for the direct recovery from account power, restricting its use to cases where the debtor agrees or where a court or tribunal determines that the exercise of the power is necessary and appropriate. I am not clear whether the amendment would do exactly what the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion intends, which I believe is to place the restriction on all the new DWP recovery powers proposed in the Bill, but I will address the amendment as I think it was intended.
Although I share the view that there should be protections in place to ensure that the direct recovery power is used proportionately and appropriately, I do not agree that the amendment is necessary. In my view, the Bill already contains sufficient safeguards. The amendment would also introduce unnecessary burdens for courts and tribunals, create avoidable inefficiencies and, ultimately, reduce the amount of taxpayers’ money that the power would bring back into the public purse.
The Department has long-standing powers under sections 71 and 71ZB of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 to recover public money wrongly paid in excess of entitlement. Those provisions include a strong framework, including rights of reconsideration and appeal against the overpayment decision. The DWP already has powers to recover such overpayments through deduction from benefits and PAYE wages under sections 71, 71ZC and 71ZD of the 1992 Act.
The power in the clause is aimed at recovering taxpayers’ money owed by debtors who persistently evade repayment and refuse to engage with the DWP to agree affordable repayment terms, even though they have the means to do so. It is highly unlikely that those debtors, who, until this point in the debt recovery process, have ignored all reasonable requests by the DWP to work with it to agree repayment terms, would suddenly willingly agree to the DWP recovering the money they owe directly from their bank account. It is therefore highly likely that, under the amendment, the DWP would be required to seek a determination from the court or tribunal that a direct deduction order is necessary and appropriate.
The DWP can already seek lump sum recovery from a debtor’s bank account through the courts by applying for a third-party debt order. The very rationale for introducing this power is to recover more than £500 million of public money over the next five years without using court time unnecessarily. The amendment would create entirely avoidable inefficiencies.
The Bill already makes sufficient provision for a debtor to challenge a direct deduction order if they do not agree with it, first through the right to make representations concerning the terms of the order prior to any deductions being made and, following that, through a right of appeal to the tribunal. That is in addition to the debtor’s existing mandatory reconsideration and appeal rights concerning the decision that there is a recoverable overpayment that must be repaid.
In addition to those safeguards, the Bill includes sufficient provisions to ensure that the power is used appropriately and proportionately. Specifically, it provides that it is a last-resort power that can be used only if recovery is not reasonably possible by deductions from benefit or PAYE earnings. The debtor can avoid the power entirely at any point by working with the DWP to agree affordable and sustainable repayment terms.
Separately, the disqualification from driving power can be exercised only at the discretion of the court. Again, that provision includes necessity and proportionality considerations by requiring disqualification to be suspended provided that the debtor makes the payments ordered by the court, and ensuring that an order cannot be made if the court considers that the debtor has an essential need for a licence.
Lastly, the amendment would be likely to reduce the expected deterrent impact of the direct deduction power. Although the DWP will take the appropriate action, in line with legislation, to address debtors who persistently evade repayment of taxpayers’ money when they have the financial means to repay, the power is expected to encourage debtors to agree affordable and sustainable repayment with the DWP without the need to proceed with an order.
Making such an amendment would lessen the power’s effectiveness, meaning that the DWP would have to take this action more frequently than envisaged and potentially subject debtors to court proceedings where the DWP would not have as the Bill is currently drafted. I hope—but I suspect possibly not—that I have reassured the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion that the Bill contains sufficient provisions and safeguards.
Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)
Is it fair to say, for the reasons that the Minister outlined on the removal of the deterrent, that this amendment would not only assist some who seek to commit fraud but cost the DWP in its internal legal responsibilities and duties, as well in what it has to contribute to the court process to pay for what the amendment would require, in the sum of tens of millions of pounds?
Andrew Western
I would not put a specific value on it, but my hon. Friend may well be right with the sort of figures that he suggests. Yes, there would be additional costs from the preparation in advance of court appearances, as well as the administrative costs of applying to the court itself. I think we would bear a significant burden, were we to agree to this amendment. Having outlined my reasons, I will resist amendment 7.
Clause 89 inserts proposed new section 80A into the Social Security Administration Act 1992, and it sets out which debts can be recovered by the new DWP recovery powers introduced in part 2 of the Bill. The new recovery powers are, firstly, the power to recover from bank accounts via direct deduction orders and, secondly, the power to disqualify a person from holding a driving licence.
The introduction of this clause ensures that the DWP can apply the new recovery powers to relevant social security debts. The clause is crucial to ensure that the new recovery powers in clauses 90 and 91 are used proportionately, appropriately and as intended by making them a power of last resort. By that, I mean that the DWP can use the new powers only after a debtor has been given all reasonable opportunities to repay the money owed, and only where recovery by existing powers is not reasonably possible.
The DWP debt stock stands at over £9 billion. As set out in the impact assessment, there is approximately £1.7 billion of off-benefit debt where individuals are able to avoid repayment, as the DWP is currently unable to recover effectively and efficiently in these cases. The Department’s current recovery powers are limited to deductions from benefits or PAYE earnings, meaning that those with other income streams and capital can choose not to repay their debt. The powers are vital to tackle those who repeatedly and persistently evade repayment, bringing £565 million of taxpayers’ money back into the public purse over the next five years.
These powers are expected to have a deterrent effect and to encourage many debtors to agree to repay without the powers being used. Debtors will be notified of the powers and their potential to be used to recover the money owed, should the individual continue to evade repayment. Let me be clear: where someone keeps money to which they are not entitled and repeatedly refuses to repay, the DWP will recover that money through these new powers. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Sir Jeremy. Clause 89 sets out how money is to be recovered. It specifies that the Secretary of State cannot recoup the money from someone’s bank account or disqualify them from driving until they have given the liable person a reasonable opportunity to settle their liability, notified the liable person that the Secretary of State may exercise the power to recover the amount, if the liability is not settled, and the Secretary of State must also have given the liable person a summary of how the power would be exercised.
We support the recovery of money that has been fraudulently claimed, and I believe it is pretty clear that we need to do it. However, when the money has been given out in error, particularly to vulnerable claimants, as has been mentioned this afternoon, will the Minister explain how those vulnerable claimants will be communicated with? How will the DWP ensure that funds can be managed in a way that is sustainable for the individual who has to make those repayments? I hope that would also reassure the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion.
Green party amendment 7 would mean that the Secretary of State can exercise powers to recover amounts from a person only where the person agrees or where a court or tribunal has determined that such recovery is necessary and appropriate. We in the official Opposition question why the Secretary of State should be prevented from recovering amounts that have been fraudulently claimed, unless the person in question agrees. The amendment seems to us to entirely frustrate the purpose of clause 89, which may well be its intent.
Siân Berry
Would the hon. Member care to comment on the fact that in clause 12, actual fraudsters are given the option to either have a court agree, or for them to agree to repay the amount?
Rebecca Smith
In terms of the Cabinet Office powers that we debated under part 1 of the Bill, I think we are not comparing apples and apples; we are comparing apples and pears. I am not the Government, so it is not my Bill, but ultimately we have heard the figures—indeed, I have shared the significant amount of fraud we are talking about—and if I were in the Minister’s shoes, I would say that the number of cases is not comparable. I continue with my view that this is different from the first part of the Bill.
I would be interested to hear an explanation from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion about why she does not believe that money that has been fraudulently claimed from the DWP should be paid back. However, I have a question for the Minister off the back of amendment 7, which is similar to the question I asked him about clause 89. Regarding the concerns about the definition of hardship and vulnerability that the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion mentioned, what might those levels be? I appreciate that that is potentially difficult to include in the Bill, but it would be interesting to know what is defined as a level of hardship that would have an impact on repayment, and how that would be determined.
Andrew Western
I will spend a moment setting out the process around the establishment of communications prior to deduction from a bank account and the affordability considerations that we undertake.
A person who is not paid under PAYE, or is in receipt of benefits, is identified and referred to the DWP’s debt management team initially to recover the debt. The debt management team makes multiple attempts, by letter or phone, to contact the person over at least four weeks to agree a voluntary repayment plan. If no contact can be made at that point, the case is referred to the DWP debt enforcement team, who will make at least four further separate attempts at contact, by letter or phone. That will include, at a minimum, two written notifications setting out the debt amounts owed, how the DWP may enforce the recovery of the debt, and with signposting to debt support to ensure that support is offered to vulnerable people.
If there is still no contact made, the person has repeatedly refused to engage and agree a voluntary plan. At that point, the DWP will check that the person has not made a new claim for benefit or entered PAYE employment, to check the person is suitable for this sort of recovery action. The person’s bank can then be contacted by the DWP to provide three months of bank statements from their accounts to check the affordability for any deduction, and to help the DWP work out the right amount, and frequency, of any deduction. The deductions must be line with caps in legislation. For regular deductions, that must not exceed 40% of the amounts credited into an account over the period for which bank statements are obtained. This will ensure that no one is forced to repay more than they can afford, so no one is pushed into financial hardship due to the recovery of debt.
Once that affordability assessment is complete, the DWP must write to the person to outline the debt that is being recovered—in other words, what has been overpaid and what is owed—the amount and frequency of the deduction, and how the deduction will be made, which in this case is from their bank account. The letter must outline the opportunities for the person to make representations to the DWP about any circumstances that the Department should consider before making the deduction, and it must also outline their right for the deduction decision to be reviewed. The person has a month to make representations or request a review. The letter must also outline appeal rights, including that if a person has made representations or asked for a review and the deduction order has been upheld, they may appeal the decision to the first-tier tribunal.
If there is no contact, one month after notifying the person of the proposed deduction the DWP will instruct the bank to deduct money, and repayments will be made directly to the DWP from the person’s bank account until the debt is repaid. That shows that it is quite a rigorous process, with a number of attempts to make contact with the person and a number of safeguards in rights to object and rights to appeal. In addition, for particularly vulnerable people, we have the vulnerability framework; part of that process supports people through referrals to advice services. We work with the Money and Pensions Service in particular, and frequently refer people to its services frequently.
For specific vulnerabilities and in particular cases, there is discretion to consider waiving the debt. That is unusual, but it is clearly an important safeguard for extreme cases—for instance, where domestic violence or financial coercion is involved. That is applied very much on a case-by-case basis; it is not a power or a policy that we would expect to use regularly.
I hope I have given the Committee an indication of the support and process for vulnerable people, and the number of humps in the road, as it were, before we get to the point at which we make a deduction.
Siân Berry
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 89 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 90
Recovery from bank accounts etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Western
Clause 90 inserts proposed new section 80B into the Social Security Administration Act 1992, adding the direct deduction order power to recover public money owed to the DWP directly from a debtor’s bank account. Direct deduction orders are vital to recovering funds owed by debtors who have the means to repay a debt but refuse to do so. This is essential to bolster the DWP’s ability to recover more of the public money owed by those who persistently evade repayment, to minimise losses to the taxpayer and to redirect the funds recovered to essential public services.
The powers also make DWP debt recovery fairer. At present, the DWP can recover debt directly from people on benefits by making deductions from benefits; it can also recover debt directly from those on PAYE through a direct earning attachment, but for those who are neither on benefits nor on PAYE, the DWP has limited options for recovery if they refuse to pay. That cannot be fair. For those not on benefits or PAYE, where all attempts to agree an affordable and sustainable repayment plan have failed, the option available to the DWP is to seek a third-party debt order via the court. Such action is restricted to lump-sum recoveries and can lead to debtors facing challenges securing credit due to the court judgment. Introducing the new power will allow the DWP to return taxpayers’ money to the public purse more effectively through affordable and regular deductions, without using court time.
There are important safeguards. First, the powers are to be used only as the last resort; multiple attempts at contact must be made, and those must be of different types—for example by letter and telephone. Secondly, all direct deduction orders will be subject to an affordability assessment based on the three months’ bank statements obtained. Thirdly, before any recoveries are made, individuals must be notified of the proposed action; they will have the right to present information to the DWP about their circumstances and the proposed terms of the order, in response to which the DWP may vary or revoke the order. Fourthly, if an order is still upheld after a review or consideration of information presented, the individual has a right of appeal to the first-tier tribunal. These are important safeguards to ensure deductions do not cause undue hardship. In addition, the Department will always signpost to debt management advice. In the oral evidence session, we heard from the Money and Pensions Service about how well that partnership is operating.
Direct deduction orders are essential to increasing the amount of debt that the DWP can recover. They are balanced measures, with robust safeguards to protect those who are vulnerable or experiencing financial hardship. Having outlined the main provisions in clause 90, I commend it to the Committee.
Rebecca Smith
Clause 90 makes provision for recovery of social security debts directly from the liable person’s bank account. That power is broadly similar to powers contained in the Child Support Act 1991 and the Finance (No. 2) Act 2015, which enable deductions to be made directly from the liable person’s bank account without a court order. We support the inclusion of the power in the Bill, but further to our debates on part 1, I should be interested to know whether any other measures beyond bank account recovery and disqualification from driving were considered. Reference was made earlier to the ability to seize assets, particularly in relation to part 1 and the Public Sector Fraud Authority, but as that is not on the face of the Bill I would be grateful for further details about if and where that is allowed for within part 2.
John Milne (Horsham) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Sir Jeremy. I am again raising concerns about a serious power to make direct deductions from people’s bank accounts.
Life does not always come in neat paragraphs; it is messy. I have had a number of letters from constituents in Horsham setting out the kind of errors that can happen. A lady called Marianne, who is a universal credit recipient, received a small inheritance, which she tried to report by phone and email, but that still resulted in her wrongly losing her UC for a period. Another constituent, Hannah, said:
“I have zero hours contract and work between 9-11 hours a week at just over minimum wage. At times I have had a back dated pay rise which pushed me over the allowance limit (I wasn’t informed in advance this was happening). I’m also at the mercy of someone else submitting my hours, so if they aren’t submitted on time they roll over to the next pay period causing me to exceed the allowance limit.”
At no time did she ever come anywhere near the allowance limit in real earnings; nevertheless, she was caught up in the rules.
Does the Minister feel that we have sufficient safeguards to avoid that kind of inadvertent administrative error? Mistakes have happened in the past and will continue to happen, but this is a very strong power that could cause real distress.
Andrew Western
We have not considered the seizure of assets under this Bill; nor are we are looking at forcing the sale of a home. We want to ensure that the powers we take are proportionate. We are not seeking to cause further hardship, and clearly the loss of their home would likely move a person into that category. Those decisions would ultimately remain with the court were we to take particularly serious case through the courts.
The hon. Member for Horsham raised some examples from his casework of people in receipt of universal credit who found they were inadvertently in receipt of overpayments. If they are still in receipt of universal credit—I think they are, going by what the hon. Gentleman said—they would be out of scope for the debt recovery powers that we are considering, so this provision would not apply in those specific examples.
If someone tells us of a change of circumstances, we always seek to action that as swiftly as possible. In cases such as the second example that the hon. Gentleman cited, where the mistake was the employer’s, there is not a tremendous amount that the Department can do. I have sympathy with his constituent, but it does not sound like that case would fall under the umbrella of departmental error. I assure him, however, that as both his constituents were still in receipt of benefits, they would not face a deduction from their bank accounts. That does not mean that an overpayment would not be recovered through other means, but recovery would be out of scope of this power. The treatment of overpayments from universal credit as recoverable was determined by Parliament a long time ago—I believe in 2012.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 90 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill..
Schedule 5
Recovery from bank accounts etc
Siân Berry
I beg to move amendment 8, to schedule 5, page 98, line 10, leave out from beginning to end of line 24 on page 99.
This amendment would remove the requirement for banks to provide information to the Secretary of State for the purposes of making a direct deduction order.
My amendment 8 is related to our debate about direct deduction orders and safeguards for people with social security debts. The amendment would remove the requirement for banks to routinely provide information to the Secretary of State for the purposes of making a direct deduction order. It is important to note that before the Secretary of State can make a direct deduction order, they must submit an account information notice to the bank with which the debtor has an account requesting copies of the debtor’s bank statements covering a period of at least three months prior to the notice being issued.
I understand that the disclosure’s intended purpose is for the Secretary of State to consider whether the debtor can afford to have the funds deducted, but the schedule states that the bank must not inform the debtor or joint account holders if it receives an AIN. I am concerned that powers to request granular information from banks about their customers, without the customers’ knowledge, to decide whether an individual can afford to pay back an overpayment are intrusive and potentially authoritarian. Bank statements can reveal sensitive and private information about an individual’s movements, associations, political opinions, religious beliefs, sex life, sexual orientation and trade union membership. Since an AIN can also apply to joint accounts, individuals who are not themselves benefit recipients can have their private financial information disclosed to the DWP in a similar way.
The powers will affect individuals who have been overpaid because of mistakes and oversights. The Secretary of State should not be able to covertly demand a person’s financial records without suspicion that the person has committed any criminal offence. I sincerely hope that the Minister will consider amendment 8. It would remove the powers that require banks to hand over bank statements and account information, and thus it would prevent direct deduction orders being issued on the basis of covert financial surveillance. As with amendment 7, I hope we will come back to the issues raised by amendment 8 at a later stage, and that we will see some changes in this area.
Andrew Western
I will resist amendment 8. It is challenging to receive an amendment such as this after a conversation about what we are doing to protect vulnerable people. Having stressed the need to do that and to ensure that debts can be repaid in a way that is affordable, it would be wrong of me to agree an amendment that would entirely remove our ability to ascertain that.
The amendment seeks to remove the requirement for banks to provide information to the Department in response to an account information notice and a general information notice for the purpose of making a direct deduction order. That removes a critical safeguard on direct deduction orders.
Siân Berry
Will the Minister consider the covert aspect of the requirement? The information is not given voluntarily by the person concerned. That is the authoritarian surveillance aspect and that is what concerns me the most; it is not merely that the Secretary of State is seeking useful information.
Andrew Western
The challenge is that, by that time, we will have made repeated and sustained attempts to contact the person to ask them to engage with us to agree an affordable repayment plan, to assess their ability to agree that plan and to encourage them to pay back what has already been established as a recoverable debt. The requirement is part of a power of last resort. I am not convinced that we would be able to secure engagement from such a person, as the power applies in relation to someone we have repeatedly tried to contact. Without it, I fail to see how we could both have a conversation with someone whom we have not previously been able to contact and assure ourselves that we would not be putting somebody in a particularly challenging financial position.
Neil Coyle
Is it fair to say that the impact of this amendment, if made, would be to require the DWP to ask people that they suspect of committing fraud for their permission to investigate whether they are committing fraud? Is it not likely that the number of potential fraudsters willing to give that information would be the roundest of round numbers?
Andrew Western
Not quite. We would not be contacting banks to establish whether fraud had been committed under the amendment. We would already have established that a debt is owed, so that investigation would already have been completed. The debt, whether it was the result of fraud or error, has been established. However, I agree with my hon. Friend on the number of people who, having previously not engaged with us at all, will concur on the need to check bank statements to assess affordability. That may well be the roundest of round numbers.
Under the Bill, before any direct deduction order is actioned, the DWP must issue an account information notice to a bank to obtain bank statements. The AIN must contain the name of the debtor and identify the targeted account. This is a necessary and important safeguard so that the DWP can gather sufficient financial information to make informed decisions on fair and affordable debt recovery. Obtaining this information is also vital to the effectiveness of the direct deduction power, as the Bill is clear that a deduction cannot be made until this information has been acquired. Without the information from bank statements, the DWP will not understand a debtor's financial circumstances and will not be able to establish an affordable deduction rate and commence recovery.
I remind the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion that the reason the information is not known is the sustained lack of engagement by the debtor in efforts to agree a voluntary and affordable repayment plan, and that the power is aimed at recovering taxpayers’ money from debtors who persistently evade repayment and refuse to engage with the DWP. The information gathered will make it clear whether they have the means to do so. Finally, I remind the Committee that these powers will be used as a last resort, and that by working with the DWP to agree affordable and sustainable repayment terms, debtors can avoid the application of the powers altogether.
Siân Berry
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Rebecca Smith
I beg to move amendment 48, in schedule 5, page 101, line 17, leave out from “exceed” to the end of line 18 and insert—
“(a) in a case to which sub-paragraph (3A) applies, the amounts credited to the account in the relevant period, or
(b) in any other case, 20% of the amounts credited to the account in the relevant period.
(3A) This subsection applies in a case where the Minister is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the payable amount to which the regular direct deduction order related is recoverable from the liable person because the liable person committed fraud.”
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 22, in schedule 5, page 110, line 29, at end insert
“to which paragraph 6(3A) does not apply”.
Rebecca Smith
As hon. Members can see, amendment 48 would change the percentage of collections made, to bring them in line with what we have debated previously, so taking it down from 40% to 20%. It is fairly self-explanatory, but we felt that this decrease would make sense and tidy things up a bit. We are interested to know whether the Minister is in agreement.
Rebecca Smith
Amendment 22 is self-explanatory and I assume it is not something the Minister will be interested in, but we thought it was worth seeing what conversation could be had around it. Ultimately, it is as it is written and we are interested to hear the Minister’s response.
Andrew Western
Amendments 48 and 22 seek to limit the amount that can be deducted via a direct deduction order in any month to 20% of the amount credited to the account in the relevant period in non-fraud cases, and to set no limit in cases where the Department considers it more likely than not that the debt is the result of fraud.
The hon. Member for South West Devon will know I have sympathy with the idea of quickly collecting debts that arise due to fraud, but the measures in the Bill already allow the Department to collect higher amounts through a lump sum deduction order, rather than through a regular deduction order. This important flexibility in the application of these powers will allow us to seek a higher level of deductions. A lump sum deduction order can also be followed with a regular deduction order, if deemed appropriate.
The Bill currently states that, where recovery is made under a regular deduction order, the deduction must not exceed 40% of the amount credited into the account during the relevant period. Forty per cent is the maximum and is in line with other maximum rates for the DWP’s existing recovery powers, such as the direct earnings attachment power and the Child Maintenance Service’s deduction from earnings order power.
Mike Wood (Kingswinford and South Staffordshire) (Con)
Perhaps the Minister can correct me if I have misunderstood, as the drafting obviously relates to the parallel provisions we debated in clause 22. My understanding is that, as currently drafted, if the Minister or the Public Sector Fraud Authority is satisfied that a loss is the result of fraud, they can impose a lump sum deduction up to 100% of the credited amount in an account. However, if they were to use a regular deduction order, each sum can be only 40%. Is there any reason, in principle or for welfare, why it is okay to take 100% of someone’s account on day one but not okay to take 50% today and 50% the following month?
Andrew Western
Put simply, my understanding is that if an individual debtor has sufficient money in their account to pay 100% on day one without financial hardship, we will apply that power. Where that is not possible—for example, if a person’s debt exceeds their means to repay it in one go—we will look at a regular deduction order. It is on that basis that we came to the 40% figure, which is based on the income going into an account each month.
We have set the cap to ensure that ongoing living costs can still be met on a month-by-month basis. It may not be that the figure used is 40%. We are simply seeking to give ourselves flexibility up to that amount. We are not saying that we will never recover more than that. If someone has £10 million in a bank account and owes the Department £1 million, it is reasonable to assume it will not cause them undue hardship to recover all of it in one go through a lump sum deduction.
The two powers are complementary but separate—one deals with ongoing recovery from a person who does not have sufficient means for recovery in one go, and the other deals with people who have savings or means significant enough to do just that. I hope that answers the question. I am happy to take another intervention if not.
The Bill currently states that when a recovery is made under a regular deduction order, deductions must not exceed 40% of the amount credited into the account during the relevant period—month by month is the obvious example. Forty per cent is the maximum and is in line with other maximum rates for the DWP’s existing recovery powers. The Department intends to set lower rates for regular deductions in non-fraud cases, allowing those rates to remain in line with existing recovery powers. Paragraph 24 of proposed new schedule 3ZA to the Social Security Administration Act 1992 therefore makes provision for regulations to be brought forward to set a maximum percentage deduction that is less than 40% in these cases.
Andrew Western
My argument is that the amendment is not required. The intention is to align deduction rates with other recovery methods used by the Department, and therefore the maximum rate of deduction is expected to be limited to a maximum of 20% in non-fraud cases.
I stress that these are maximum regular deduction rates; the actual deduction rate will depend on the level of income and other affordability considerations, based on the Department’s experience when applying deduction caps using existing recovery guidance outlined in the benefit overpayment guide, which can be found on gov.uk. In non-fraud cases, the amount regularly deducted will likely range between 3% and 20%. Similarly, not all fraud debt will be recovered at 40%. Regular deductions in fraud cases will range between 5% and 40%, depending on the debtor’s circumstances.
How the new debt measures operate will be clearly set out in the forthcoming statutory code of practice. These powers will enable the Department to apply the most appropriate debt recovery method to ensure efficient recoveries are made. Having outlined why I feel amendments 48 and 22 are unnecessary, I will therefore resist them.
Rebecca Smith
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Andrew Western
I beg to move amendment 6, in schedule 5, page 107, line 2, leave out from “review” to end of line 7.
This amendment leaves out provision that is not needed; paragraph 13(5), (6) and (8) of new Schedule 3ZA of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 (as inserted by Schedule 5 of the Bill) makes the necessary provision.
Andrew Western
This amendment seeks to remove unnecessary repetition in the Bill, specifically removing part of paragraph 18 of proposed new schedule 3ZA to the Social Security Administration Act. This concerns the provision for the Secretary of State to notify the bank, the liable person and any other account holders, where appropriate, of the outcome of a review where a direct deduction order has been varied by the DWP.
This amendment does not change or remove that provision, as the DWP has a key obligation to ensure that all affected parties are notified of any changes to a direct deduction order following a review. This amendment simply removes a provision that is not needed; paragraphs 13(5), (6) and (8) of proposed new schedule 3ZA already makes the necessary provision. This amendment will simplify the Bill and prevent unintended confusion and duplication.
Schedule 5 introduces proposed new schedule 3ZA, which contains the substantive provisions of the new direct deduction orders, introduced in clause 90. The ability to recover directly from bank accounts is vital to recover public money owed to the DWP by those who have the means to repay but refuse to do so. As I outlined in my speech on clause 90, these powers will bring greater fairness to DWP debt recovery. At present, the DWP can recover debt directly from people on benefits only by making deductions from their benefits, and from those on PAYE through a direct earnings attachment.
For those who are on neither benefits nor PAYE, the DWP has limited options for recovery. Currently, there are an estimated 885,000 debtors off benefit who are not in repayment, with an estimated £1.74 billion not in recovery from this group. This schedule outlines powers to make lump sum and regular direct deductions from bank accounts through the use of a direct deduction order, as outlined in paragraph 1 of proposed new schedule 3ZA. Paragraph 3 outlines the information notices that the DWP can give to a bank, how the bank must comply, the information it must provide and how this information can be used.
To determine whether to make a direct deduction order, the DWP can give a bank an account information notice or a general information notice. An account information notice must be given to a bank, prior to any direct deduction order, to obtain bank statements. It must contain the name of the debtor and identify the targeted account. It is a necessary and important safeguard so that the DWP can gather sufficient financial information to make informed decisions on fair and affordable debt recoveries. A general information notice can be issued at any time for the purpose of determining whether to make a direct deduction order. It requires the bank to provide information on all the bank accounts held by the debtor, including any joint or unincorporated business accounts.
A bank must comply with an information notice, and may be liable to a penalty for failure to comply without a reasonable excuse. The information provided by the bank is necessary and proportionate to ensure that the DWP considers a debtor’s financial situation before making a direct deduction order. As set out in paragraph 4, the schedule also requires the DWP to presume that any moneys in a joint account belong equally to the debtor and the other account holder, unless there is evidence to the contrary. That ensures that only the portion of funds reasonably attributable to the debtor can be recovered from joint accounts, protecting the rights of other account holders.
Before seeking to recover debt, the DWP must give the debtor notice. The notice must identify the account to be subject to the proposed order, state the terms of the order and identify the recoverable amount to which the order relates. It must also invite the debtor to make representations. It must set the time for representations to be made, which must be at least one month. The Secretary of State must consider those representations and uphold, vary or revoke the order. Only after any representations have been considered can the direct deduction order be made. If no representations are received, the order can be made but the account holders are given a further month to request a review.
To ensure that funds necessary for debt recovery are not deliberately concealed or withdrawn, a bank may be required to take steps, in response to the notice, to ensure that the amount proposed to be deducted is not removed while the account holders are given time to make representations or request a review. That is vital to ensure that funds necessary for debt recovery are available in the debtor’s bank account so that the direct deduction order cannot be evaded.
If an order is made, it must be given to the bank and account holders. If the account holder is still dissatisfied, having made representations or sought a review, they can appeal to the first-tier tribunal, as I outlined previously. That allows disputes between the DWP and the debtor to be worked through quickly, while providing fair opportunities for the use of the power to be challenged.
When making a direct deduction, a DWP official will assess the bank information and determine the most appropriate deduction. As set out in paragraph 6, the schedule limits regular direct deductions to no more than 40% of the funds entering the account over the period in which the bank statements have been supplied. Regulations can lower, but not raise, the maximum percentage in some or all cases. That safeguards against excessive deductions and brings the powers in line with existing DWP recovery method legislation.
There is no legislative cap on lump sum deductions, as we expect to use them only where someone has large available savings. However, the DWP must be satisfied that neither lump sum nor regular deductions will cause the debtor, the other account holder or their dependants hardship in meeting essential living expenses. The Secretary of State may also vary direct deduction orders in the light of a change of circumstances—for example, if the debtor has a change of income or makes a new benefit claim.
In addition, paragraph 8 includes provision for a bank to deduct from the debtor’s account the administrative costs it has reasonably incurred by complying with a direct deduction order. That provision is essential to ensure that banks are compensated for the administrative efforts required to comply with the orders, thereby facilitating the efficient operation of debt recovery processes while protecting account holders from undue financial strain.
The schedule also contains provisions to ensure flexibility in direct deduction orders. Paragraphs 12, 13 and 16 allow the Secretary of State to vary, suspend or resume a regular direct deduction order. That provides the Secretary of State with the necessary flexibility to take appropriate action in relation to an order where a debtor’s circumstances change. Paragraph 9 requires that no deduction be made where the amount in the account is lower than the amount to be deducted. It is an important further safeguard to ensure that no one is pushed into hardship by a direct deduction order. Paragraph 17 makes provision to revoke a direct deduction order upon notification that the debtor has died.
Overall, the measure represents a significant part of the Bill, enabling the recovery of public money owed from those who persistently refuse to repay effectively, proportionately and fairly. Through this measure, the DWP estimates that it will realise benefits of £565 million in recovered debts over the forecast period.
Rebecca Smith
Schedule 5 makes provision regarding direct deduction orders from bank accounts. These can be regular or lump sum. The Secretary of State may make a direct deduction order in respect of a joint account only if the liable person does not hold a sole account in respect of which a direct deduction order may be made that would likely result in the recovery of the recoverable amount within a reasonable time. I would be grateful if the Minister explained what criteria will be used to decide whether a person has such an account. This came up last Thursday in relation to the main bank account of a claimant and the fact that the DWP will not be able to ascertain what other bank and savings accounts may be held. Is the same true here? Is this relevant only if the joint account is the account into which the benefits are paid? For the record, I am referring to column 238 of Hansard on 6 March.
The schedule will give the Secretary of State a power to request bank statements that is not time limited. It will also give the Secretary of State the power to request from banks details about the accounts that a person holds with that bank. The Secretary of State can set out how and when the bank must comply with the notice, and explain that the bank may be liable for a penalty under it if it fails to do so without a reasonable excuse. Can the Minister reassure the Committee about his planned engagement with banks—indeed, has he already had such engagement? Do banks think that this is a manageable requirement, and what will the costs of administering it be? Should that engagement with banks be due to happen, what might be done to reflect their views?
We have discussed that there is quite an onerous expectation on banks. The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office, the hon. Member for Queen’s Park and Maida Vale, made a comment, in terms of the Cabinet Office powers, that it was almost the banks’ civic duty to make sure that they do this. I am intrigued to know whether they agree with that. It would be interesting to know what engagement Ministers have had, and what they will do about it. Lastly, how long will banks have to comply with notices, and what level of penalty will be levied on them if they do not comply? I think those are fair questions.
John Milne
The hon. Member raises the issue of the burden on banks; there is also the potential burden on the claimant. Banks sometimes have very large administrative charges, well in excess of the actual costs of whatever it is they do. Can the Minister give any assurance that there is some upper safety limit on excessive charging by banks? For instance, will a bank be able to charge for its corporate cost centre—a contribution towards its head office or functions—as can be the case with other charges? Basically, I seek clarity on the balance of how the charges will be administered.
Rebecca Smith
That relates to what I was going to say on amendment 43, had we got to it. I entirely appreciate what the hon. Member says about dealing with the vulnerable and protecting them from undue expectations, but is it not right that, if someone’s bank account goes overdrawn, they pay those charges regardless of their financial situation? Are we potentially seeking to give claimants more rights than they would ordinarily have with their own bank account simply because it is the DWP that is trying to recoup the money, rather than their bank?
John Milne
I am simply concerned that there should be some control of, or protection against, excessive charging. In the past, institutions have inflicted disproportionate charges that bear no relation to the actual cost of servicing whatever action had to be remedied. I am therefore seeking confirmation from the Minister that there is some protection in that direction as well with regard to the costs on the banks, as we said earlier.
Andrew Western
On the question raised by both the Opposition spokesperson and, substantively, the hon. Member for Horsham on the amounts that banks will levy in administrative charges on customers who are subject to a deduction order, paragraph 8 of schedule 5 makes provision for banks to deduct sums from an individual’s account for the purpose of meeting reasonable costs. Paragraph 23 makes provision for the Secretary of State to make regulations to set and maintain a cap on the charges that the banks may deduct. That is in line with the approach taken by the Child Maintenance Service, which sets maximum rates that the debtor can be charged for lump-sum or regular deductions.
To give an indication of the maximum amounts, that is £55 for a lump-sum deduction and £10 that the bank may charge for each regular deduction. It is worth stating, for the benefit of Members, that banks do not necessarily charge that amount; it can be significantly lower, but that is the most that someone can expect to pay.
On banks more generally, the exact costs to banks of this are still being worked through, for obvious reasons, but they have the ability to claim back administrative costs, as we have just discussed. On engagement, I have met UK Finance and a number of banks on a number of occasions. I think that the overarching theme of those conversations is that they would not want anything too onerous placed on them, but that they welcome the thrust of what we are trying to achieve and want to be helpful in working with us to achieve that. Speaking of costs to banks is probably a natural point for me to mention the penalty that can be placed on banks for not complying, which is £500.
On the question of multiple accounts and the determination of which accounts to look into and so on, we would make multiple orders if we wanted to look at more than one bank account. We would send information notices to each of those. We can use those notices to see other accounts that are held and relevant. Were someone to have a number of accounts, they would not be able to evade this provision, as was the case perhaps when we were discussing the eligibility verification measure.
I think I have probably answered everything that I had noted. Please let me know if there is anything else. I was about to repeat myself—
The Chair
No need for that.
Amendment 6 agreed to.
Schedule 5, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 91
Disqualification from driving
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Western
The clause inserts proposed new section 80C into the Social Security Administration Act 1992 to enact the disqualification-from-driving power. The introduction of the clause will allow the DWP to apply to the court to disqualify temporarily a person from driving, if they persistently and deliberately fail to repay their debt. The power is vital to boost the DWP’s ability to recover public money.
In accordance with clause 89, the power will be used as a last resort in the most serious cases, where the outstanding debt is at least £1,000 and where the debtor has persistently and deliberately evaded repaying their debt, such as by moving their capital out of reach of a direct deduction order, introduced under schedule 5, despite having the financial means to repay.
Schedule 6 inserts proposed new schedule 3ZB into the 1992 Act and it contains the substantive provision of the disqualification-from-driving power introduced under clause 91. The schedule sets out when the power may be used and how it will operate, including rules on the operation of suspended and immediate disqualification orders, variation and revocation of orders, as well as the grounds on which an order may be appealed. Appeals may be made to the appropriate appellate court on points of law, including the terms of an order or the court’s decision to make, not make, vary or revoke an order.
Only when all attempts at recovery, including the new direct deduction power, have failed will the Department for Work and Pensions be able to apply to the court for a suspended DWP disqualification order. If the court agrees that the debtor had the means but did not repay without a reasonable excuse, it will order the debtor to make what it assesses to be affordable repayments. The debtor can avoid being disqualified by making those repayments; it is only if the debtor does not comply with the court’s repayment terms that the DWP can apply for an immediate DWP disqualification order. It is at that point—again, only if the court agrees—that the debtor can be disqualified from holding a licence for up to two years.
Before either a suspended or immediate order can be made, the debtor will have opportunity to be heard by the court. We recognise that stopping someone from driving is a serious step, so my Department has built in several safeguards to give debtors every opportunity to avoid that. For example, missing a single instalment will not result in an immediate disqualification order. Even when someone is disqualified, they can get back the right to drive when they start making the repayments and the court considers that repayments are likely to continue.
However, persistent evaders who have the means to pay their debts will no longer be able to evade paying; it is against them that we would utilise this power. It is important to note that the court cannot make either a suspended or immediate order if it considers that the debtor has an essential need for their licence, such as if they need to drive as part of their job or to care for a dependant. That important safeguard in schedule 6 ensures a balance between taking robust action against those who deliberately evade recovery and preventing undue hardship.
The powers are key to recovering funds from those who deliberately evade repayment of public money owed to the DWP. Having outlined the main provisions in clause 91 and schedule 6, I urge the Committee to support them.
Rebecca Smith
Clause 91 makes provision for a liable person to be disqualified from driving. Any disqualification from driving will always be suspended in the first instance, subject to the liable person complying with what the court has assessed to be affordable and reasonable payments. When disqualification does occur, it is temporary and the liable person can have the disqualification lifted by satisfying the court that they are now making and will continue to make repayments.
We support the clause in general, but I have a few questions for the Minister about the practicalities, which are worth debating. First, however, will he clarify whether the clause is for cases of fraud, error or both? From what he said, it feels as if it is for both, and it is worth getting that on the record. What safeguards will the Department put in place to ensure that someone is not disqualified unnecessarily? Again, it sounds as if there is a long process before getting to that point. Is there a right of appeal or can the process be stopped before the disqualification takes place?
A few additional questions came to mind as I listened to the Minister just now. What role are the DVLA and the police expected to play in the wider disqualification? Who is responsible for the enforcement of that disqualification? I certainly know of a neighbour of mine who was disqualified for two years but continued driving; it was frustrating when I knew what he had done. Who would be responsible for that enforcement? In that instance, I knew that I could ultimately go to the police, but the scenario could be different in this case.
Likewise, will the decisions to disqualify from driving be publicised as they are when someone is disqualified for speeding or drink-driving? Again, that is part of the punishment; it also enables other people to know when somebody is in breach and promotes enforcement. It is also worth querying what measures might be put in place when somebody cannot be disqualified. The Minister said that some people would not be disqualified because of their jobs or family situations. What would be the deterrent for those people?
Furthermore, what if the person were not a driver or in possession of a driving licence? Obviously, recovery will be attempted from bank accounts, but if losing a driving licence is the final stop point it will be in the interests of fraudsters to divest themselves of theirs. We need to make sure that whatever it is that we are trying to achieve in the Bill, there are no shortcuts or opportunities for people to evade the repayment that the Department seeks.
John Milne
I am uncomfortable with this proposal, because it seems unfair that one group of people should be liable to a punishment and not another. If someone cannot drive or they do not have a car, this punishment means nothing to them, whereas another group who do drive are affected—and some of them very deeply, depending on their lifestyle, such as living in the country or other necessary means. I am fundamentally uncomfortable with what seems to be a punishment that falls on only one group of people, when it should be levied equally.
Siân Berry
As we have been discussing, schedule 6 and clause 91 make provision that, where all other methods of debt recovery have failed, including the direct deduction order measures we have been discussing, the DWP may apply to a court to have the debtor disqualified from driving. Like the hon. Member for Horsham, I have real concerns about these new powers. I cannot see how this specific novel civil penalty of removing a driving licence is at all appropriate to the particular group of people we are discussing, nor do I see the equivalence to the people being enforced upon by HMRC and the Child Maintenance Service, which have similar powers.
Legitimate benefit claimants who are overpaid through error, make a mistake or for any other reason owe money to the DWP are, almost by definition, in need of help. They might often make mistakes or fail to disclose information through an oversight, and their failure to engage with the DWP to date might be due to genuine incapacity and health issues. I am therefore very concerned that there are ineffective safeguards in the court process for these powers.
Although the DWP must apply to the court for the disqualification order, the court does not have discretion to refuse unless the debtor needs a driving licence to earn a living or has another essential need for one. It is unclear the extent to which this will protect vulnerable benefit claimants who have not engaged with the DWP due to incapacity, illness or mental ill health, or for whom driving is not essential for their work, but may be essential for their wellbeing or family life. I am not sure that the proposed legislation is clear enough about what will be deemed essential or what will be reasonable for the court to object to.
I also have concerns, as outlined a moment ago, that these powers cannot be exercised unless the people concerned have tried every other method, from benefit deductions or deductions from earnings to the direct deductions from bank accounts—the measure we have just discussed, which is extraordinarily intrusive on people’s financial information and privacy. Given that these powers would only be used where it appears that those other powers cannot be, is it not true that they are basically only for when a debtor cannot physically pay back what they owe? In effect, this measure of removing the driving licence is a punishment. It is a poverty penalty for those who do not have the means, despite all the intrusion that Ministers have gone through to establish that, to return what they have been overpaid.
I cannot support this power. It is incredibly punitive. I do not think it will create the conditions in which debtors are encouraged to engage with the DWP, but it could create dire consequences for individuals who are already struggling and least able to afford repayments.
Andrew Western
I will attempt to answer those questions, and hon. Members are free to intervene if I have missed anything. The Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for South West Devon, asked whether this would be a power that is implemented in response to just fraud, or fraud and error. Because it is in response to a failure to repay a debt, it could be utilised for either. The criteria for its use is not how the overpayment came about, but whether the person has engaged to pay it back.
The safeguard around whether somebody is disqualified unnecessarily is all the various measures that we have attempted previously, plus the determination of the court. Responsibility for enforcement would lie with the Courts and Tribunals Service and the DVLA. However, if somebody was driving without a licence, that would clearly also be a legal issue. On the question whether we would advertise that somebody had had their licence suspended, we would not, because no crime has been committed; the suspension is just as a result of somebody failing to repay a debt. That is distinct from somebody who has had their licence removed because they have broken the law through drink-driving or some such crime.
John Milne
In the light of the Minister’s confirmation that this power does refer both to error and fraud, I am all the more concerned. Removing a driving licence can mean the removal of a means of income. It is almost like the old-fashioned debtors’ prison: someone is in debt, so they are put in prison, and then they cannot get out of their debt. It is a Catch-22 situation.
I understand that the power has been used regarding the Child Maintenance Service. I have a case in Horsham where a constituent feels that he is being unreasonably demanded of; he is in trouble because he will potentially lose his job because of just such an order. Therefore, this power could be applied inaccurately or incorrectly—it is inevitable that in a large organisation there will be mistakes—so I am concerned that the power seems both very extreme and, as I said before, not generally applied. It should be generally applied in order to be legitimate.
Andrew Western
On the point about a debtors’ prison, if somebody requires their vehicle for work, that is a criterion that a judge can consider in terms of whether a licence should be disqualified. It is also worth remembering that, in all cases, the initial move would be to suspend the suspension of the driving licence to give somebody the time to engage with us and start to pay. While, as I say, this is baked in as a last resort, we have put a number of break points in this process for people to engage. Indeed, even after we have suspended the licence, if somebody starts making repayments, they can have their licence reinstated. However, we have explicitly stated that caring responsibilities and the need for a car for employment purposes are criteria that would mean that we would not look to pursue that suspension.
Turning to the comments from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, I understand where she is coming from. She is consistent in her view of an erosion of civil liberties coming about as a result of many aspects of this Bill. However, I must say to her that the idea that we have exhausted everything, including deductions from benefits, fundamentally misses the point about the cohort of people who would be in scope for this power. Benefit claimants and people who are paid through PAYE would not be in scope of the driving licence power; it would be people who are no longer on benefits. Indeed, if they were on benefits, we would be able to deduct from those benefits directly, without needing recourse to such actions.
I therefore take a fundamentally different view from the hon. Lady on whether this amounts to a poverty penalty. Clearly, the poorest people would not be impacted by this power; it is for people who we know have the means to pay. Usually, we know they have the money, but they have moved it out of our reach, so we have ascertained their ability to pay, but it is not possible to lay our hands on those funds. This power—like wider mechanisms for people who do not drive, such as charging orders—is the initial lever to bring people to the table.
As I said in response to the hon. Member for Horsham, before we suspend a licence, we will ask people to engage with us. After agreeing the right to suspend that licence, we will give somebody a further opportunity to engage with us and to begin making regular repayments. After the licence has ultimately been suspended, there will again be the opportunity to commence regular payments and have the licence reinstated. All that is a power of last resort.
I will give the Child Maintenance Service statistics for context. The CMS utilised this power on seven occasions last year; six of those were suspensions of suspension and only one was an actual suspension of a driving licence. That tells us that this power is important as much as a deterrent as in practice. It is for that reason that it forms a part of this Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 91 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 6 agreed to.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Gerald Jones.)
Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Eleventh sitting)
Thursday 13th March 2025
(1 week ago)
Public Bill CommitteesPublic Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 13 March 2025 - (13 Mar 2025)
The Chair
I remind Members to send their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk, to switch off electronic devices and to abstain from tea and coffee. It is Lent, after all.
Ordered,
That the Order of the Committee of 25 February be amended as follows—
In paragraph (1)(f) delete the words “and 2.00pm”.—(Gerald Jones.)
Clause 92
Code of practice
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Andrew Western)
It is a pleasure to serve again under your chairship, Sir Desmond. After that remarkably collegiate agreement on the most controversial item of today’s business—I hope—I turn to clause 92.
The clause provides a vital safeguard for the new debt recovery measures. It inserts new section 80D into the Social Security Administration Act 1992, making provision for a code of practice. In the clause, we have made it a requirement that the code sets out how and when the Department for Work and Pensions will exercise its functions under direct deduction and driving disqualification powers, as well as its approach to penalties for non-compliance by banks, and how any information obtained will be used and processed. The code will also include further information on how safeguards and other provisions in the Bill will be applied, such as those on reasonable opportunity to settle the debt, and how those struggling with debt can be signposted to independent debt advice and money guidance.
We recognise the importance of transparency in the use of the new debt recovery measures. That is why, before issuing the DWP’s debt code of practice for the first time, as per our statutory obligations we will carry out a formal public consultation on a draft of the codes, to provide an opportunity for all interested parties to review them. Once finalised, all the relevant codes of practice will then be laid before both Houses of Parliament for 40 sitting days, before publication.
The clause is a key safeguard to ensure that the new DWP recovery powers are exercised proportionately, and it offers transparency for the public on their use. I commend it to the Committee.
Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)
The clause requires the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice about the giving of notices to banks requiring the provision of information, the processing of information, the circumstances in which penalties may be issued to banks, and the circumstances in which the Secretary of State expects to exercise functions to disqualify a liable person from driving.
As we have said several times in Committee, it has been extremely difficult to scrutinise the Bill without the code of practice. Will the Minister confirm when it will be published? I believe he just did, but we will get it on record again. He said that it will be before the Bill is finalised, but it would be useful to know what sight we will have of it beforehand. What can the Minister say about how the code of practice will regulate the giving of information notices to banks?
We clearly agree that the Secretary of State should consult on the draft code, and the Minister has just implied that it will be a public consultation. It would be useful to know what form that consultation will take, and how it will be publicised to ensure that it can be seen by as many people as possible. Will it include a consultation on the impact of bank costs and what those should be, and give banks an opportunity to feed back at that point in time?
The Secretary of State must consult before the first code of practice is issued, which is welcome, but there is no suggestion that further revisions will be subject to any scrutiny. Will the Minister confirm whether that is the case? What oversight mechanisms exist to ensure that the code of practice is not changed for the worse in the future, and to ensure that Parliament remains informed?
When does Minister envisage that the powers in the Bill will first be used, given the delay that the code of practice consultation will necessitate? What might trigger a revision and reissue of the code, and who might be able to alert the Secretary of State to the need for that? The clause implies that the Secretary of State could revise the code, but what would be the trigger and who might be involved? Will there be a non-statutory review after a certain period of time as an initial check and balance?
Steve Darling (Torbay) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I thank the Minister for his introduction to the clause and for his assurance that there will be a consultation; it would be helpful if he could explain the likely consultees. Also—Opposition Members have repeatedly raised this question—what are the key principles within that consultation and what areas is he keen to address with the code of practice? The Minister has alluded to that already, but a bit more flesh on the bones would be extremely helpful.
Often, people who commit fraud use other peoples’ accounts and abuse them, and are often financial abusers. Will the Minister flesh out how the code of practice will take that into account? Finally, I would be grateful if the Minister could expand on how the code of practice will take account of people with learning disabilities, covering both those who are able to operate the accounts themselves and those who may need a proxy to manage the account.
Andrew Western
Members have asked a number of questions, which I will do my best to cover. On the broader context and content of the code of practice, I outlined a range of areas such as a reasonable opportunity to settle debt, the exercise of functions under direct deduction, driver disqualification powers, penalties for noncompliance by banks, the use and processing of information and ensuring that that is compliant with the Data Protection Act 2018 and GDPR, as one would expect.
On the broader question of how we would work with people with vulnerabilities—the hon. Member for Torbay mentioned financial abuse and learning disabilities—there are a range of existing practices through which the Department supports people, as I set out in some detail on Tuesday afternoon. We have a vulnerability management framework and assessments of an individual’s vulnerabilities at all points throughout the process are built into our existing debt recovery practices, including a specialist team who work with customers who we know to be vulnerable. I think that the Department has sufficient infrastructure in place to deal with and support people who find themselves in those circumstances, either as victims of financial abuse or because of some of the disabilities that the hon. Gentleman mentioned.
The hon. Member for South West Devon asked about the issuing of notices. The code of practice will give guidance on when notices are given and further guidance on how banks should comply. On the subject of consultees, it is important to say that we are in ongoing dialogue with banks and organisations such as the Money and Pensions Service about support for people who find themselves in debt. The public consultation will invite those who are already closely engaged with the subject to correspond with us further. That will include some of the stakeholders I have just mentioned, but we will accept evidence from anybody who wants to feed into that process.
I would not want to second-guess the cause of any future revision, but were it to become apparent that there were issues that we needed to contend with, grapple with and get right—whether they came out in discussion with stakeholders or in the practical application of the code—I imagine that that would be a sensible stage at which to do so.
I was asked about delay and when the code would be in place. We are looking at laying it before both Houses of Parliament for 40 days, so I am confident that delay will not be a particular challenge for us in recovering some of the figures that are scored against this measure. We anticipate that the draft code of practice will be available to Members before Committee stage in the House of Lords.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 92 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 93
Rights of audience
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Western
The clause inserts proposed new section 80E into the Social Security Administration Act 1992. That provision gives DWP officials right of audience and allows them to conduct litigation in the magistrates, county and Crown courts in England and Wales. New section 80E has been introduced to enable lay DWP officials to oversee civil claims and applications and appear in related court hearings on behalf of the Secretary of State in debt recovery matters. That is similar to the rights already provided to other Government Departments, such as His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the Child Maintenance Service, as well as local authorities.
The disqualification from driving power in clause 91 and schedule 6 of the Bill will be exercised by the court only on application from DWP, and there are other civil recovery mechanisms already available to DWP involving the courts. Those are generally routine proceedings, but, without the clause, DWP is required to instruct a solicitor in every case. However, the clause does not prevent DWP from instructing a solicitor for debt recovery proceedings where it would be appropriate to do so. That ensures that DWP can recover public money in the most efficient and effective way from those who evade repayments, thereby reducing costs for the taxpayer.
Rebecca Smith
As the Minister has just set out, clause 93 grants rights of audience and rights to conduct litigation in the magistrates court, county court and Crown court in England and Wales for, or in connection with, debt recovery proceedings to designated officers of the Secretary of State. That will allow DWP officials to be able to pursue the enforcement of debts via the court without the need to instruct solicitors, thereby ensuring cost efficiency in the recovery of public funds.
This is not particularly complicated clause, so I have just a few questions. We would like confirmation of the level of seniority of the officials signing off the decisions to bring litigation, and will the DWP officials bringing the cases have appropriate training to do so? Where court appearances are required, does the Minister anticipate a slowing down of recovery proceedings? I know he has talked about cost efficiency, but will this mean that it will take slightly longer? Will costs increase as a result, either in terms of what is owed by the person that the action has being taken against or the costs that might be necessary through the courts?
Finally, what consultation has there been with the Ministry of Justice around these new provisions in terms of capacity, the costs and the court backlogs? Will this measure create a problematic situation, or is the Minister confident that it will be okay going forward?
Andrew Western
I may have missed a question about costs, so will the hon. Lady please ask me that again if needed? The team members taking forward cases for us in the court will be HEO, or higher executive officer, level. That is the existing process, and that is the required level of authorisation for those using similar powers. This is not particularly new for us; it is just new for us in this space. A specialised DWP team will receive training in conducting litigation and appearing in court in addition to training on the new recovery powers. We already have the right to conduct and appear in similar tribunal proceedings, so we will share best practice when developing that training.
On the question of MOJ consultation and court pressures, whether we use solicitors or take them forward ourselves, the pressure on the courts will be the same, so there will not be a material impact on the court backlog. Clearly, the MOJ is aware of our intentions in this regard, but this is more about our ability to do that while minimising costs.
Rebecca Smith
My final question was about whether court appearances, regardless of whether that is with a solicitor or through DWP officers, will effectively slow down recovery proceedings. As a result, will there be some knock-on costs either for the person who the action has been taken against, if interest is being charged or anything like that, or for the Department in terms of staff and that sort of thing? I assume it will be a last resort, but it would be interesting to have an answer.
Andrew Western
It is very much the case that the power is a last resort. Where there are additional costs, we will be able to recover them. It is important to recognise the steps, as I outlined on Tuesday afternoon, that will have been gone through before the point at which we reach this process. If we were to go through a more traditional route outside these powers, it would add considerable time to the process. I remind Members that by the point at which we take somebody to court, we have reached out to them multiple times through debt management and at least four further times through debt enforcement, and we have offered at every break in the process the opportunity to agree an affordable repayment plan. That would be the case right up until this stage, so I can reassure Members that it would be a power of last resort.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 93 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 94
Recovery of costs
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Western
Clause 94 inserts proposed new section 80F into the Social Security Administration Act 1992 and relates to the recovery of costs from debtors. The clause simplifies existing legislation to ensure that the costs of court enforcement that DWP is already entitled to reclaim from debtors can be effectively recovered from the debtor, together with any costs incurred by DWP under the new direct deduction and disqualification from driving powers. The clause enables DWP to recover these costs from the debtor using any of the available recovery methods, to make sure that, as debtors’ circumstances change, the money can still be recovered. The clause ensures that the taxpayer does not pick up the burden for costs associated with pursuing debtors who refuse to repay public money, and that DWP can recover these costs from the debtor in the most effective way.
Clause 95 inserts new section 80G into the Social Security Administration Act 1992, providing technical interpretative provisions for the new debt recovery powers contained in part 2 of the Bill. First, it confirms that debt recovery provisions should always be read in a way that is consistent with data protection legislation. This is a relatively standard provision that deals with any unintended and unforeseen ambiguity or apparent conflict with normal data protection principles. Secondly, it confirms that references to “giving notice” can include, among other methods, service by post, as defined in the Interpretation Act 1978. That avoids ambiguity about how, for example, proposed deduction orders can be given to account holders for their consideration, which is a key safeguard under the new direct deduction order power.
Rebecca Smith
Clause 94 states that any costs incurred by the Secretary of State in recovering an amount under clauses 71 to 80 or schedules 3ZA or 3ZB of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 may be recovered as though they were recoverable under the same methods as the debt itself. Will it be done separately, and what might the cost to the Department be in putting that forward? Is there any limit to the costs that the Secretary of State can recoup in this way?
Clause 95 clarifies that provision does not require or authorise processing of information that contravenes data protection legislation, or the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. The final line states,
“references to giving a notice or other document…include sending the notice or document by post.”
This also came up in the debate on Tuesday, so I would like to get it on the record. I assume I know the answer, but can the Minister clarify whether this includes electronic methods of communication also, such as email? If I may ask this, as I am intrigued, then why does sending by post need separate legislation? We have debated the subject twice now, and the answer is probably really straightforward, but as it is set out on its own line, it might be a nice idea to find out why it has to be legislated for. I ask that purely because I am nosy and would like to know.
John Milne (Horsham) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. Clause 84 states that costs incurred by the Secretary of State in taking recovery actions can be themselves recovered. Will the Minister clarify what happens in a case where the claimant is found to be not guilty? What happens to the costs then? Are they borne by the bank, the DWP or the claimant? Will he also clarify how the cost of the general trawl through all the accounts is apportioned?
Secondly, to go back to the issue of fraud versus error, and how they seem to be treated as pretty much the same throughout the Bill, will the Minister clarify whether, where it is the DWP’s error, a claimant would still end up paying the administrative charge? If that is the case, it seems quite unreasonable, so it would be great if the Minister could clarify those points.
Andrew Western
I am a little perplexed by the suggestion that somebody would be found not guilty or be charged. We are talking about debt recovery, so it is a slightly separate matter. It is not a criminal issue; it is a question of how, through civil powers, we can reclaim funding, so I am not sure that those questions arise. But if the hon. Member for Horsham wants to intervene on that, he is welcome to.
On the question of whether fraud and error are distinguishable in the reclamation of debt, the answer is no. They are treated in the same way, because this is about situations in which it has already been established that somebody owes us a recoverable amount and they have repeatedly refused to engage. I refer to my earlier comments about the number of times we would have reached out to somebody to get them to engage with the process. Parliament has previously resolved that overpayments of certain types of benefits are recoverable, and the Bill does not change that.
On the question about savings and so on, we would be able to recover all reasonable costs. There is no particular limit on what we can recover, and it is treated on the same terms as debt.
On the question of why we need to make a distinction for email, this is one of those situations in which I am grateful that I can sometimes reach out for answers. It goes back to the Interpretation Act 1978; we did not have email back then, so we need to set out separately, on a legal and technical basis, that post is specifically allowed, given provisions elsewhere. Yes, digital is still permissible, but we need to state specifically that post is acceptable as well.
John Milne
I used the word guilt, but can we forget that? I am referring to a case in which a claimant was investigated, so costs were incurred, but they were found not to be at fault, rather than guilty.
Andrew Western
I think the hon. Gentleman is referring to situations in which the court determines that the debt is not recoverable. I imagine that at that point we would bear the cost ourselves; it would not be recoverable from the individual. There is clearly some risk for us in that, as is perfectly usual, but by the point at which we decided to take somebody to court we would be able to demonstrate that a significant amount of effort had gone into attempting, through other mechanisms, to make them pay back what they owed the Department, so I hope we would have a very high success rate in that regard.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 94 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 95 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 96
Offences: non-benefit payments
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Western
The clause amends sections 111A and 112 of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 to include non-benefit payments. This will enable the DWP to charge a person with an offence under either of those sections where it relates to a non-benefit payment. This is a key clause that, in conjunction with clause 97, will enable the Department to offer an administrative penalty where there are appropriate grounds to do so.
The Government take a fair and proportional approach to tackling fraud and error. We will always be tough on serious fraud, but for less serious first-time offences it is appropriate and fair that we have the opportunity to offer an alternative to prosecution. The person will always have the choice to accept or reject an administrative penalty, should they wish to do so. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Rebecca Smith
The clause makes it an offence for a person to fraudulently claim a non-benefit payment for themselves or another person by making false representations or providing false documentation. Generally, we support this provision.
A non-benefit payment is a prescribed payment that is not a relevant social security benefit and that is made by the Secretary of State to provide financial assistance. Will the Minister provide for the record some examples of the types of payment that would fall within scope of the Bill as a result of this measure? Will he reassure us that it will cover all payments, unlike the provisions on social security benefits, which apply only to the three benefits included in the legislation? The flip question is: does the Minister anticipate any exceptions that will not be covered? If any new non-benefit payments were introduced in the future, would they automatically fall within scope of this legislation? Earlier in Committee we had a similar debate about enabling new benefits to come into scope; would the same apply to new non-benefit payments?
Steve Darling
The Minister alluded to proportionality and not wanting to criminalise people in undertaking an administrative charge. As my hon. Friend the Member for Horsham alluded to, it would be helpful if the Minister unpacked a little more for the Committee where that proportionality kicks in.
Andrew Western
Where proportionality kicks in is already established in the Department. We have trained investigators who ascertain whether we are looking at deliberate fraud, its severity, and what is therefore the appropriate mechanism to seek recourse. We are talking about administrative penalties for situations in which we consider there to be a clear case of fraud, not error, so proportionality will not really be changed by the Bill. What will change is our ability to extend the existing processes to non-benefit payments.
The example of a non-benefit payment that we use most routinely is a payment from the kickstart scheme, which came about at the end of the pandemic and which I think it is fair to say was open to abuse. We saw some particularly egregious examples of that, so we want to make sure that any similar grant schemes—as opposed to benefit schemes—are within scope of these powers.
On the point that the hon. Member for South West Devon made about only three benefits being in scope of the Bill, that is only as it pertains to the eligibility verification measure. All benefits are in scope of the Bill more broadly.
Andrew Western
The clause amends the Social Security Administration Act 1992 to expand the types of overpayments that can be considered for an administrative penalty under sections 115A and 115B to include non-benefit payments, such as the grants that were paid through the kickstart scheme. Currently, the option to offer an administrative penalty as an alternative to prosecution is not available for non-benefit payments, so the DWP is required to refer all such cases for prosecution. Extending the scope to include non-benefit payments will enable the DWP to offer those who receive a non-benefit payment an administrative penalty as an alternative to prosecution, in appropriate circumstances.
The measure gives individuals or colluding employers the choice to accept the administrative penalty or have the evidence reviewed before the courts. The change is really about fairness. It will bring equity and parity to the way the Department tackles and addresses fraud and it will offer first-time offenders or those who commit low-value fraud an alternative to prosecution. It will provide the individual or colluding employer with a choice, allow the courts to focus on the most serious crimes, and enable the Department to resolve cases more quickly where appropriate.
Rebecca Smith
The clause makes provision to allow for a penalty to be issued, instead of prosecution, if an overpayment notice has been issued in relation to a non-benefit payment. This can occur only after the review period has passed and, if a review was sought, after a decision has been made and any subsequent appeals have concluded.
We support efforts to be tough on those who have taken advantage through fraudulent methods and gained from benefits they were not entitled to receive. Will the Minister explain in what circumstances a penalty would be deemed more appropriate than prosecution, and why? That said, we also do not want to unfairly hit those who have made a genuine error, so in what circumstances would a penalty be seen as appropriate, assuming the claimant engages with the process?
Has any consideration been given to the likely timescales for the repayment of moneys obtained following erroneous claims? How long does the person have? Would a repayment be allowed before a penalty was applied? From what the Minister just outlined, the answer is likely to be yes, because an entire process would have taken place first; I seek clarification on the timetable or the process involved, particularly for those who have made a genuine error, and on how they will be able to stop the train and settle what they need to without any penalties.
Andrew Western
On when a penalty will be considered more appropriate, there are clearly thresholds for our investigators’ interpretation of when somebody has committed fraud and at what level we consider that fraud to be.
On the hon. Lady’s point about genuine error, the clause is for situations where we consider that somebody has committed fraud, not error. The administrative penalty does not arise in cases of what we consider to be error. It may be that it is a first-time offence. It would certainly need to be a low-value offence, because an administrative penalty is capped at £5,000. It is worked out as 50% of the value of the overpayment, so the amount would always need to be below £10,000. For anything beyond that we would be looking at prosecution. How long a person has to pay back will depend on a range of factors. It is clearly dependent on their ability to pay the money back, and what their means of production is and so on. That would always be considered on a case-by- case basis.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 97 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 98
Amendments to the Social Security Fraud Act 2001: loss of benefits following penalty
Andrew Western
I beg to move amendment 36, in clause 98, page 61, line 21, leave out from “(a)” to end of line and insert “—
(i) omit the words from ‘section 115A’ to ‘or’, and
(ii) for the words ‘the corresponding provision for Northern Ireland’ substitute ‘penalty as alternative to prosecution in Northern Ireland’, and”.
This amendment updates a parenthetical description in section 6B(2)(a) of the Social Security Fraud Act 2001.
Andrew Western
This straightforward amendment is a minor and technical change that looks to update section 6B of the Social Security Fraud Act 2001 by removing the phrase “the corresponding provision”, which will no longer be needed once clause 98 is agreed, and substituting in appropriate wording.
Section 6B, as enacted, references two Acts in which a penalty is defined in legislation and which would attract the loss-of-benefit penalty. The first is the Social Security Administration Act and the second is the equivalent legislation for Northern Ireland. Clause 98 will remove reference to one of those Acts—the Social Security Administration Act 1992—to ensure that the loss-of-benefit sanction is no longer applied if an administrative penalty has been offered by the DWP and accepted by a benefit claimant. Doing so will mean there will no longer be corresponding legislation in section 6B(2)(a) of the Social Security Fraud Act 2001, as it will reference only Northern Ireland legislation. I assure the Committee that the amendment is minor and technical and will have no operational impact on the remaining provisions in the 2001 Act.
Clause 98 removes the loss-of-benefit provisions in cases where an administrative penalty has been offered and accepted as an alternative to prosecution. As it stands, the acceptance of an administrative penalty is compounded by a further four-week suspension of certain benefit payments. The suspension of benefits is made in addition to the acceptance of the administrative penalty and alongside the obligation to repay the overpayment. By removing the four-week loss of benefit in these cases, the clause allows for a more proportionate approach to less serious, lower-value fraud and to first-time offenders.
However, the loss-of-benefit penalty is not being removed in its entirety: it will still apply in cases that are convicted in court, with a potential loss of benefit of up to three years. Limiting the loss-of-benefit penalty to convicted cases will ensure that only the most serious cases of fraud face the harshest consequences, without imposing unnecessarily harsh sanctions on lower-level offenders. On that basis, I commend the clause to the Committee.
Rebecca Smith
The clause amends the Social Security Fraud Act so that if an administration penalty is accepted instead of prosecution, the individual does not lose their benefit provisions. From what the Minister said, it sounds like different scenarios are affected.
I appreciate what the Minister said about the different situations—for example, for a lower-level or first-time offence, someone might not lose their benefits—but the challenge is that this perhaps seems like a soft touch, depending on the situation. Does there not need to be a bit more discretion than just a threshold depending on each case being dealt with? What are the expected values of the penalties, and how do they compare with the typical benefits? Although we need to ensure that safeguards on affordability remain in place and that claimants can meet their essential living costs—that goes without saying —it is not clear why a penalty should automatically prevent the loss of benefits. Ultimately in these situations, there has to be a deterrent in addition to the penalty.
Government amendment 36 will update the Social Security Fraud Act 2001 to allow a penalty to be an alternative to prosecution in Northern Ireland. Our questions on that are the same as those for clause 98. I have nothing further to add.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
It is a pleasure to speak to this minor amendment. I just wanted to point something out about the wording of amendment 36. In clause 98(2) there are two instances of the letter (a). I know which (a) the Government intend the amendment to refer to, but I wondered whether the wording could be clarified.
Andrew Western
I thank the hon. Lady for pointing that out. I will take advice on whether a further amendment may be required but, as she says, it does appear obvious what I mean when I refer to that measure.
On the comments from the hon. Member for South West Devon, we want to make a change so that only the most serious cases fall foul of the loss-of-benefit penalty. That increases hardship for people but, when it comes to our ability to reclaim money, in practical terms it means we would have to wait four weeks before we could start deducting from a person’s benefits.
To to give some reassurance about thresholds, were we to consider that somebody’s fraud, even in a lower-value case, was particularly outrageous—of course, that is a judgment for our investigators based on the sorts of things they see each and every day—we do retain the ability to go straight to prosecution, particularly if we think the fraud is part of something more serious or organised.
The value of the penalty is £65, but if someone loses four weeks’ benefit, as at the moment, the impact is clearly more significant. I accept that, but I think there is a strong question of proportionality here, and of the need to prevent somebody from falling into further poverty —and potentially as a consequence of that being pushed into wider activity that may be, shall we say, unhelpful.
Amendment 36 agreed to.
Clause 98, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered,
That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Gerald Jones.)
Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Twelfth sitting)
Tuesday 18th March 2025
(2 days, 2 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesPublic Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill 2024-26 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 18 March 2025 - (18 Mar 2025)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
I remind Members to send their speaking notes by email to hansardnotes@parliament.uk, and to ensure that all electronic devices are switched to silent. I also remind Members that tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings. It is going to be a busy morning. Please speak through the Chair, as usual, and refrain from using “you” unless you wish to speak to me.
New Clause 1
Overpayments made as a result of official error
“(1) Section 71ZB of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1), for ‘The’ substitute ‘Subject to subsection (1A), the’.
(3) After subsection (1) insert—
‘(1A) The amount referred to in subsection (1) shall not include any overpayment that arose in consequence of an official error where the claimant or a person acting on the claimant’s behalf or any other person to whom the payment is made could not, at the time of receipt of the payment or of any notice relating to that payment, reasonably have been expected to realise that it was an overpayment.’”—(Siân Berry.)
This new clause would provide that, where universal credit overpayments have been caused by official error, they can only be recovered where the claimant could reasonably have been expected to realise that there was an overpayment.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
It is a pleasure speak under your chairship again, Mr Western. I tabled the new clause as a probing amendment. In short, it would bring the test for the recovery of universal credit overpayments caused by official error into line with regulation 100(2) of the Housing Benefit Regulations 2006, meaning that they could be recovered only where the claimant could have reasonably been expected to realise that there was an overpayment.
Let me provide some background on why the new clause is needed. According to Department for Work and Pensions data, in 2023-24 the best part of 700,000 of the new universal credit official error overpayment debts entered into the DWP’s debt management system were caused not by fraud or claimant error but by Government mistakes. Unlike for many other benefits, the DWP can recover official error universal credit overpayments from claimants. This power was introduced through the Welfare Reform Act 2012, and represented a significant change to the position that previously applied to most legacy benefits.
When concerns were raised at the time, assurances were provided by the then Employment Minister that the DWP did
“not have to recover money from people where official error has been made”
and that
“we do not intend, in many cases, to recover money where official error has been made.”––[Official Report, Welfare Reform Public Bill Committee, 19 May 2011; c. 1019.]
However, Public Law Project research shows that the DWP’s default approach is to recover all official error overpayments. Relief is dependent on individuals navigating a difficult and inaccessible process to request a waiver. In 2022, only 26 waiver requests were granted.
DWP mistakes matter. The financial and psychological impacts of overpayment debt recovery on individual claimants can be severe. The research I have mentioned found that the recovery of debts, including official error overpayments, by deductions from universal credit led to a third of survey respondents becoming destitute. The risk of harm is particularly acute for official error overpayments, which individuals have no way of anticipating, so they can lead to sudden, unexpected reductions in income that impact existing fixed commitments and carefully planned budgets.
The recovery of official error overpayments brought an added sense of injustice, with individuals finding themselves in debt due to a DWP error over which they had no control. For example, one claimant was overpaid universal credit because the DWP had failed to consider income from her widow’s pension. She had informed the DWP that she received it and was assured that it would not affect her claim. She relied on that assurance and spent the money on daily living expenses. Four years later, the DWP told her that it would be recovering the resulting overpayment of £7,258.08. Aside from the significant financial impact, the stress associated with recovery impacted her mental health. She found herself constantly thinking about the overpayment and how she would pay it back, which in turn impacted on her physical health. She was left anxious that mistakes would be made again, leading to her incurring debt that she had no power to avoid.
Recovery often puts individuals who have relied on payments in good faith in financially precarious situations, forcing them to make difficult choices about sacrificing essentials. Research by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation has found that the current standard universal credit allowance is not sufficient to cover the cost of essentials. In this already difficult context, households that are repaying overpayment debt can lose up to 25% of their standard allowance each month.
People often base key life decisions and financial planning on information provided by DWP officials about their entitlement to universal credit. An official error universal credit overpayment can also have a knock-on effect on people’s entitlement to other support, such as council tax reduction. I am sure the DWP does not want to be responsible for pushing someone into further financial hardship. We can prevent this harm from occurring in the first place with my new clause, which would mean that overpayments can be recovered only where the claimant could reasonably have been expected to realise that they had been overpaid.
The new clause is equivalent to an amendment proposed by Labour Front Benchers during the passage of the Welfare Reform Act. Under the new clause, DWP officials would themselves consider the fairness of recovering an official error overpayment before any recovery was initiated. Increasing protections against the recovery of overpayments would also create a strong incentive to reduce the rate of DWP errors in the first instance, thereby contributing to a more accurate and better functioning welfare system from the outset.
The Bill provides the Government with an opportunity to proactively address a harmful and unfair process that affects hundreds of thousands of claimants each year, easing the financial burden of debt on claimants who have done nothing wrong and encouraging the DWP to get payments right first time. I hope that the Minister will respond to my points on new clause 1, and I sincerely hope that we will make progress on the issue as the Bill progresses.
Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Western. This is the first time that I have spoken to a new clause in Committee. New clause 1, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, would amend the Bill so that, where universal credit overpayments have been caused by official error, they can be recovered only where the claimant could reasonably have been expected to realise that there was an overpayment.
I am interested to know how the claimant could reasonably be expected to realise that the amount that they had received was an overpayment, as that would be the test for whether that person becomes liable for repaying the amount. If payments are made to an appointee’s bank account, do they become liable for spotting the overpayment under this new clause? Would the amount have to be repaid only if both the person eligible for the payment and their appointee realised the overpayment?
Are there figures on how much money is lost and recovered due to error? Do we therefore know how much the new clause would cost the DWP? Underpayments in taxes are recovered by His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs in the following months or years even where the individual is not at fault, and it is not clear why universal credit claimants should be any different. It would help if the Minister could explain to the Committee how, in the case of overpayments, a repayment plan will be put in place that is manageable for the person making the payments, and how that will be assessed.
We would be better off focusing on minimising official errors in the first place. What work is the DWP doing to better guard against overpayments, given that the overpayment rate for universal credit was 12.4% or £6.46 billion in the financial year ending 2024, compared with 12.7% or £5.5 billion in the financial year ending 2023? I argue that we need to focus on ensuring that overpayments are not being made, but once the error has been made, particularly because it is so costly to the taxpayer, we should try to ensure that the money is recouped.
Steve Darling (Torbay) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Western. I support the new clause tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. On several occasions over recent weeks, Ministers have gone on the record to describe the DWP and the benefits system as a “broken” system. It is extremely helpful that the hon. Member highlighted the impact that that can have on people who often have chaotic lives and are on the edge.
I have served the people of Torbay in elected office for 30 years. Over that time, I am saddened that, particularly with the recent cost of living crisis, the levels of destitution have become worse, as I hear from people who provide food banks and other support for the people in need in Torbay. Whether it is Scope or the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, many of those good organisations highlight to policy developers that the levels of benefits are really tough and the levels of destitution in our communities are higher than they have been for many years. Therefore, I would welcome some thoughts from the Minister about this proposal, because sadly, recovery will often drive people into destitution and, as highlighted by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, into severe ill health.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Andrew Western)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship once again, Mr Western. Before I come to my general comments on the new clause from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, I will attempt to respond to some of the questions that we have heard.
On how we can assure ourselves that people could reasonably have known, this assessment is made by our specialist investigation teams, who do this day in, day out. There is a balance of probabilities that they would apply to instances such as that. It is a process that has been in place for years. On whether an appointee would be liable for an overpayment, yes, they would. How much is official error? It is approximately 0.3% of all benefit payments. About £800 million is the most recently available annual figure.
On how a repayment plan is agreed—this goes to the point that the hon. Member for Torbay made also—we again have a specialist team who calculate this. We have a vulnerability framework should that be required. All repayment requests are done on an affordable basis. As we heard last week, the specifics around the new debt recovery power make attempts, throughout the process, to agree an affordable repayment plan. The limits that the Bill would put in place would be not more than 40% in the case of an ongoing deduction and 20% in cases of error. On the point about recovery causing destitution, which the hon. Gentleman also made, he will have noted that towards the end of last year, the Department announced its new fair repayment rates, reducing the amount of deduction that can be made from benefits down to 15%. As I have just outlined, further provision is made where we are looking to take these new powers to deduct directly from bank accounts.
To return to the point that the hon. Member for South West Devon made about prevention of overpayments, the eligibility verification measure is intended to help us to identify fraud, particularly in relation to capital, and people who have been abroad longer than they should be, in terms of aligning that with their eligibility for benefits, and we think that it will enable us to identify error overpayments sooner as well. Of course, people are regularly reminded to update their circumstances also. A range of mechanisms are in place already to assist with the identification of overpayments. We are not complacent. We know that there are too many overpayments through official and claimant error, just as there is far too much fraud in the Department. That is why we are taking many of the steps identified and outlined in this Bill.
Before I turn to my comments about new clause 1 specifically, let me just make a correction to something that I told the Committee last week. I said that the minimum administrative penalty that can be offered, which receives a four-week loss of benefit, is £65. I misspoke and I would like to take this opportunity to correct the record and state that the amount is £350.
New clause 1 seeks to amend existing recovery legislation, to limit when overpayments of universal credit and new-style benefits caused by official error could be recovered. Specifically, those official error overpayments would be recoverable only where the claimant could have been reasonably expected to realise they were not entitled to the overpayments in question at the time they received them. This Government are committed to protecting taxpayers’ money and ensuring that we can recover in a fair and affordable way money owed. The debt recovery powers in the Bill apply to all debt that Parliament has determined can be pursued. Section 71ZB of the Social Security Administration Act 1992, introduced in the Welfare Reform Act 2012 under the coalition Government, made any overpayment of universal credit, new style jobseeker’s allowance and employment and support allowance in excess of entitlement recoverable. That includes overpayments arising as a result of official error.
Official error can arise for a number of different reasons. Some errors, for example, occur as a result of the flexibility of the universal credit system. Unlike the tax credit system it replaces, UC works on a monthly cycle of assessment periods. It is to be expected that on occasion, corrections or changes take place over assessment periods. The system quickly rectifies these “errors” in the next assessment period and it is vital that this functionality is maintained. In these instances, the customer is not worse off as, over the course of subsequent assessment periods, they receive the correct amount on average. It is also helpful to explain that under existing departmental processes, customers have the right to request a mandatory reconsideration of their benefit entitlement as well as the amount and period of any subsequent overpayment. Following that, they can appeal to the first-tier tribunal, should they still disagree with the Department’s decision.
We recognise that overpayments, however they arise, cause anxiety for our customers. The Department’s policy is therefore to recover debts as quickly and cost effectively as possible without causing undue financial hardship to customers. DWP’s overall approach to recovery balances the need to protect public funds by maintaining recovery levels, while providing a compassionate service to all customers regardless of their circumstances. The Department’s policy is therefore to agree affordable and sustainable repayment plans. The debt recovery measures in the Bill, however, are last-resort powers for debtors who are no longer on benefits or in pay-as-you-earn employment and are persistently evading debt recovery. These powers apply across all types of debt.
All our communications to our customers signpost to independent debt advice and money guidance, and we heard from the Money and Pensions Service in our evidence sessions about how strong the partnership working between the Department and debt sector is. DWP is committed to working with anyone who is struggling to repay their debt and customers are never made to pay more than they can afford. Where a customer feels they cannot afford the proposed rate of recovery, they are encouraged to contact the Department to discuss their repayment terms. The rate of repayment can be reduced or recovery suspended for an agreed period, and the Department may also consider refunding the higher deduction that has been made. The Department’s overpayment notifications have been updated to make sure customers are aware they can request a reduction in their repayment terms. In exceptional circumstances, the Department has the discretion to waive recovery of the debt, in line with the Treasury’s “managing public money” guidance. In doing so a range of factors are considered including the circumstances in which the overpayment arose.
Finally, I have listened to and take seriously the concerns from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. As the Committee is aware, the Minister for Social Security and Disability is looking at the policy design of universal credit to ensure outcomes that tackle poverty and help people to manage their money better. I will pass the concerns raised by the hon. Lady on to him, but having outlined the reasons against it, I will resist new clause 1.
Siân Berry
I thank the Minister for taking seriously the concerns I raised. I will not press the new clause further today, but I hope that it will be looked at seriously in the next stages of the Bill, and that we can discuss this further in the House. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 2
Offence of fraud against a public authority
“(1) A person who—
(a) commits,
(b) assists or conspires in the committal of, or
(c) encourages the committal of
fraud against a public authority commits an offence.
(2) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 7 years.”—(Rebecca Smith.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 15—Offence of encouraging or assisting others to commit fraud—
“(1) The Social Security Administration Act 1992 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 111A (Dishonest representation for obtaining benefit etc), after subsection (1G) insert—
‘(1H) A person commits an offence if they—
(a) encourage or assist another person to commit an offence under this section, or
(b) provide guidance on how to commit an offence under this section.’
(3) In section 112 (False representations for obtaining benefit etc), after subsection (1F) insert—
‘(1G) A person commits an offence if they—
(a) encourage or assist another person to commit an offence under this section, or
(b) provide guidance on how to commit an offence under this section.’”.
Rebecca Smith
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 2 seeks to make it a specific offence to commit, assist or encourage others to commit fraud against a public authority. Someone who commits such an offence would be liable to imprisonment or a fine, or both.
The offence of fraud against a public authority in the Bill is a civil offence. The Government argue that civil penalties offer an alternative to prosecution and help to mitigate the burden on the criminal justice system by offering alternative routes for the public sector to manage fraud cases. The Bill introduces a framework of civil penalties for fraud that the Minister can impose, including on behalf of other Government Departments, serving as an important deterrent against fraud in the public sector. We think it is an anomaly for public sector fraud to be a civil offence while benefits fraud is a criminal offence. Will the Minister explain why one type of fraud is seen as less serious than the other?
The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Georgia Gould)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Western. I appreciate the intention of the hon. Member for South West Devon in tabling the new clause—that is, to take fraud against the public sector seriously—but the Government plan to resist it, because we believe that the proposals are already covered and that it could lead to unintended consequences that do the opposite of what she wants.
As the hon. Member said, new clause 2 would create a new offence of fraud against a public authority. We believe that that could have a detrimental effect and is unnecessary, because fraud is already an offence, and this is clearly defined in clause 70 as offences under the Fraud Act 2006 and the common law offence of conspiracy to defraud. The Bill uses those offences—they do not need to be written into it to have effect—and we have given assurances on that during a previous debate.
Consequently, there does not need to be a specific fraud offence for public authorities. Assisting and encouraging fraud against a public authority, as is mentioned in the new clause, is already an offence. The offences of “encouraging or assisting”, as set out in sections 44 to 46 of the Serious Crime Act 2007, apply to fraud offences as they do to other crimes. Again, that does not need to be written into the Bill to have effect.
The Public Sector Fraud Authority will be able to investigate cases in which it appears that someone has encouraged someone else to commit fraud. If we discover encouragement, that would likely form part of the PSFA’s investigation into a fraud case, and the Crown Prosecution Service could pursue that offence using the evidence collected. Whether action can be taken will depend on the facts of the case, the evidence available and whether the necessary standard of proof can be met.
Crucially, new clause 2 would reduce the maximum sentence available for Fraud Act and conspiracy offences from 10 years to seven years, for fraud against public authorities only.
Mike Wood (Kingswinford and South Staffordshire) (Con)
I thank the Minister for her response, but why does she feel that benefit fraud ought to be a specific offence, with maximum sentences under the Social Security Administration Act 1992, but that it is not appropriate for a specific offence to apply to people who deliberately defraud other public authorities?
Georgia Gould
As I set out, these measures are already covered, and the proposals would potentially reduce sentences from 10 years to seven years. I am sure that the hon. Member does not want those who defraud the public sector to get lower sentences than those who would defraud the private sector.
Mike Wood
The Minister is being generous in giving way. Prosecutors have a choice as to which charge to bring. They can still bring a charge under the common law offence, which as the Minister says, has a high maximum sentence—but one that is very rarely imposed—or, as with benefit fraud, they could bring it under a specific offence, as proposed in new clause 2. The Sentencing Council would then develop the guidelines that apply to deliberately defrauding public authorities. Although the Minister is right that the maximum sentence under the new clause is lower than the theoretical maximum for the common law offence, in practice, it is likely to see rather more substantial sentences imposed on conviction.
Georgia Gould
We already have effective fraud legislation. The issue that the Bill seeks to address is that we do not currently have the resources or the powers to properly investigate that or to recover money. We believe that the suggestions that are being made would have the unintended consequences of reducing the seriousness of the offence, in the way that I have set out. The proposals also omit the option available in the Fraud Act offences and the common law conspiracy offence for the Crown court to impose an unlimited fine instead of, or as well as, a term of imprisonment. Again, that weakens the response. That is contrary to the Government’s intention with the Bill that strong action should be taken against public sector fraud.
New clause 15 seeks to introduce an offence of encouraging or assisting others to commit fraud by adding new subsections to sections 111A and 112 of the Social Security Administration Act 1992. Sections 111A and 112 set out two specific offences related to benefit fraud. Although the intention behind the new clause is commendable, I believe that it is not needed for several reasons, which are similar to those I have set out on new clause 2.
First, the existing legal framework already provides sufficient measures to tackle fraud of this nature. The Fraud Act 2006 and the Serious Crime Act 2007 make it a criminal offence to encourage or assist any other offence, including when it relates to fraud. There are also existing laws that serve a similar purpose for Scotland. Those existing laws are robust and comprehensive, ensuring that individuals who provide guidance on how to commit fraud, or encourage others to do so, can be prosecuted effectively. Introducing additional subsections to the 1992 Act would therefore be redundant and unnecessary.
Secondly, the new clause could potentially complicate the legal landscape. Adding new subsections to the 1992 Act risks creating overlapping and conflicting provisions that could lead to confusion and inefficiency in enforcement. It is essential to maintain clarity and coherence in our legal system to ensure that justice is served effectively. Moreover, the new clause would mean that those convicted of a new offence would face a less punitive sentence than they would under existing laws. For example, under new clause 15, a conviction related to section 112 would carry a maximum period of custody of three months, compared with a maximum of 10 years under the existing Fraud Act. As a result, and this is similar to what I set out on new clause 2, rather than strengthening our position to respond to such types of fraud, new clause 15 could result in a weakened response.
Although new clauses 2 and 15 are well intended, neither new clause is needed as the existing legal framework already provides sufficient measures to address this issue, and introducing additional subsections would only complicate the legal landscape. However, I very much heard the points about the research being done by the hon. Member for South West Devon and the importance of tackling those who set up sites to try to defraud the public sector. I am more than happy to have a further meeting about how we can take action on that. We believe that we can do that using the existing powers, but we would welcome further discussion. The PSFA and DWP will be concentrating on the provisions in the Bill that are intended to effectively address and combat fraud through them. I therefore ask the hon. Member for South West Devon to withdraw the motion.
Rebecca Smith
I have heard everything that the Minister has said. However, we will still press new clauses 2 and 15 to a vote.
Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)
On a point of order, Mr Western. It is a pleasure to serve under you in the Chair; can I ask you a procedure question before we go any further? We have had the presentation of the new clauses, but we have not had any declarations of interest. Given that there are some notable Conservative party donors facing potential fraud charges under covid issues, I just wonder whether that should have been declared before we got to the change in how people in those situations might be punished.
The Chair
I understand, although I was not present at the time, that all the declarations were made at the time of evidence being presented to the Committee. I thank the hon. Member for his point of order.
Andrew Western
I would like to understand how the Opposition Front-Bench team consider new clause 15 to make any provision that is not already in the Fraud Act 2006 or the Serious Crime Act 2007, which already make it an offence to encourage or assist an offence including fraud. I stress that because I am particularly concerned about sickfluencers, to whom the hon. Lady referred, but I fail to see how new clause 15 offers any provision not contained in that legislation already. It does not mention at any point that it would extend powers to what happens online, presumably because—or I can say actually because—online sickfluencers would already be covered by that legislation. I understand the intent. We have a problem with sickfluencers that we need to deal with, but I would be incredibly appreciative to understand how the new clause offers anything that is not already in that legislation.
Rebecca Smith
I thank the Minister for his comments. I have obviously heard what both Ministers have said in response. We are still keen from a principle perspective to push the new clause to a vote because we think more needs to be done to outline specifically what we are doing to tackle the online aspect. I hear what the Minister is saying but, in this particular instance, we would like to take it further.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Rebecca Smith
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
We have tabled the new clause to require the Secretary of State to publish the results of any pilot schemes run with banks to test the provisions of chapter 1 of part 2 of the Bill. We have already discussed how banks will be required to undertake ongoing monitoring work to collect the relevant information as part of eligibility verification. The impact assessment states that two proofs of concept have taken place, including one in 2017, with short summaries provided of each. Given the scale of what is being asked of the banks, however, as well as how technology has moved on in the past eight years, it is reasonable to assume that pilots will also be undertaken to ensure that the system works properly before it is fully rolled out. Can the Minister confirm that this will be the case?
In the interest of transparency, we also need to see the results of the pilots, which is why we have tabled the new clause to ensure that they are published within three months of the Act coming into force. It is regrettable that we needed to table the new clause but, as we have said several times throughout the Bill’s passage, and as we heard from witnesses before the Committee, it is extremely difficult to judge how the legislation will work in practice without seeing the code of practice and understanding what will be required of the banks. As UK Finance said in oral evidence:
“Much will depend on the mechanism through which banks will be required to share the information, the frequency of the information notices, whether the criteria we are required to run the checks against change over time and other factors that will influence how much capacity is required from the banking sector. As I say, at this stage it is challenging to do a detailed assessment.”––[Official Report, Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Public Bill Committee, 25 February 2025; c. 48, Q85.]
The practical implications of how to implement the Bill are not currently clear to the banks.
We also discussed the consequences of getting this wrong. As UK Finance also said in evidence,
“under the Bill banks responding to an information request or a direct deduction order, would have to consider whether there is some indication of financial crime that under POCA requires them to make a suspicious activity report. We think it is simpler to remove that requirement, not least because where there is a requirement to make a suspicious activity report there is a requirement to notify the authorities; clearly, there is already a notification to the authorities when complying with the measure. Removing that requirement would avoid the risk that banks must consider not only how to respond to the measure but whether they are required to treat that individual account as potentially fraudulent.”––[Official Report, Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Public Bill Committee, 25 February 2025; c. 49, Q89.]
The banks are well versed in dealing with fraud, but not so much with error. We need reassurance that there are clear expectations of the banks in delivering their duties under the Bill, that those are compatible with existing obligations regarding financial crime, and that the banks can resource them.
Andrew Western
In my view, the new clause is simply not needed. As the hon. Lady said, to demonstrate the feasibility and potential of the eligibility verification measure, the DWP conducted two proofs of concept, in 2017 and 2022, and the results have been published in the impact assessment for the Bill. Further information on the effectiveness of the measure will, of course, be available following the independent overseer’s annual review and report. No pilot schemes have or will be conducted on information notices specifically, as they are an extension of existing powers. On that basis, I resist new clause 5.
Rebecca Smith
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 7
Annual reporting of amounts recovered
“(1) The Secretary of State must publish an annual report detailing the amount of money which has been recovered under the provisions of this Act.
(2) A first report must be published no later than 12 months after the passing of this Act with subsequent reports published at intervals of no more than 12 months.”—(Rebecca Smith.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Rebecca Smith
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish an annual report detailing the amount of money recovered under the provisions of the Bill, with the first report to be published within 12 months of its passage. The main purpose of the Bill is to crack down on error and fraud, and we support that aim. It is reasonable to ask for transparency to understand exactly how much money has been recovered thanks to the measures in the Bill, and to ensure that it is working as hoped. If it is not, further action will be needed, but at least we would know, and a discussion could be had instead of the issue being brushed under the carpet.
An annual report allows the Department enough time to produce it without being an administrative burden, while ensuring that it remains relevant and up to date. Given the large amount of money lost to fraud and error, it is important that we are all able to hold the Government to account for how effectively they are recovering it.
Andrew Western
I share and appreciate the hon. Member’s concern and interest in delivering the proposed benefits of the Bill, including the effective recovery of debt. The Bill delivers on our manifesto commitment that this Government will safeguard taxpayers’ money and not tolerate fraud or waste anywhere in public services.
Turning first to part 2 of the Bill, I do not think the new clause is necessary, given the existing routes for external scrutiny and reporting on the DWP’s fraud and error activities, including the new debt recovery powers. The Office for Budget Responsibility provides independent scrutiny of the Government’s costings of welfare measures. The Department estimates that, over the next five years, the EVM will save £940 million and the debt recovery measure £565 million. Those estimates have been certified by the OBR. In total, the Bill is estimated to deliver benefits of £1.5 billion over the next five years. In the published impact assessment, the DWP committed to monitoring and evaluation on part 2 of the Bill, including the new powers to recover debt and the EVM.
Although I understand that the hon. Member is particularly interested in scrutiny of the money recovered under the Bill, I remind the Committee that the Government have committed to the biggest welfare fraud and error package in recent history. The total DWP fraud, error and debt package, with savings from the Bill and other Budget measures, is worth £8.6 billion over the next five years.
In its annual report and accounts, the DWP already reports on the savings made from its fraud and error activities, including savings made from “detect” activity across our counter-fraud and targeted case review teams. In addition, we report on our debt recovery totals and debt stock. I think the annual report and accounts, in particular, will give the hon. Member the information in which she is interested. The Department also publishes annual statistics on the monetary value of fraud and error, including various breakdowns by benefit and type. That is another mechanism by which we can see trends over time and ensure transparency for the public.
Turning to part 1 of the Bill, the PSFA already has a published commitment in its mandate to produce an annual report that makes transparent the levels of fraud in Government and the latest fraud and error evidence base, and an annual report on its performance. Recoveries will be published in the annual report. Paragraph 12 of schedule 2 to the Bill also requires:
“As soon as reasonably practicable after the end of each financial year the PSFA,”
when set up as a statutory body,
“must prepare a report on the exercise of its functions during that financial year.”
Recoveries will be published as part of that.
For the reasons I have outlined, I resist the new clause.
Rebecca Smith
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 8
Publication of an Anti-Fraud and Error Technology Strategy
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, publish an Anti-Fraud and Error Technology Strategy.
(2) An Anti-Fraud and Error Technology Strategy published under this section must set out—
(a) how the Government intends to use automated technologies or artificial intelligence to tackle fraud against public authorities and the making of erroneous payments by public authorities, and
(b) a series of safeguards to provide for human oversight of decision making that meet the aims set out in subsection (3);
(c) how rights of appeal will be protected;
(d) a framework for privacy and data sharing.
(3) The aims of the safeguards in subsection (2)(b) are—
(a) to ensure that grounds for decision making can only be reasonable if they are the result of a process in which there has been meaningful human involvement by a human of adequate expertise to scrutinise any insights or recommendations made by automated systems,
(b) to make clear that grounds cannot be reasonable if they are the result of an entirely automated process, and
(c) to ensure that any information notice issued is accompanied by a statement—
(i) setting out the reasonable grounds for suspicion that have been relied on, and
(ii) confirming that the conclusion has been formed on the basis of human involvement.”—(Rebecca Smith.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Rebecca Smith
I beg to move, that the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish an anti-fraud and error technology strategy within six months of the Act’s passage. That must include: how the Government intend to use automated technologies and AI to tackle fraud, subsection (2)(a); safeguards to ensure human oversight of decision making, subsection (2)(b); protection of rights of appeal, subsection (2)(c); and a framework for privacy and data sharing, subsection (2)(d).
Members might be asking themselves why we tabled the new clause. In part, it is based on the evidence we received. In written evidence, the Public Law Project expressed concern that, although the impact assessment, the human rights memorandum and the statements from the Secretary of State and the Minister for transformation, the hon. Member for Stretford and Urmston, on Second Reading state that a final decision on benefit eligibility will always involve a human agent, this is not reflected in the Bill itself. In response to the Public Law Project’s concerns, the new clause would provide an audit of technology systems used to tackle fraud, ensuring accountability while addressing the risks posed by automation in decision making.
A report published by the Treasury in 2023, “Tackling fraud and corruption against government”, said:
“Public bodies can better protect themselves…by sharing data and intelligence with other public bodies and working together.”
We therefore believe the technology strategy clause recognises that sharing data is beneficial to stopping and recovering fraud, but includes additional provisions that audit its use.
The strategy must include: how the Government intend to use automated technologies or artificial intelligence to tackle fraud and error against public bodies; what safeguards exist for human oversight of decision making; how rights of appeal will be protected; and a framework for privacy and data sharing.
The safeguards must ensure that grounds for decision making are reasonable only if they are the result of a process in which there has been meaningful involvement by a human of adequate expertise to scrutinise any insights or recommendations made by automated systems. They must also make it clear that grounds cannot be reasonable if they are the result of an entirely automated process. To ensure this, any information notice issued must be accompanied by a statement setting out the reasonable grounds for suspicion that have been relied on, and confirming that the conclusion has been formed on the basis of human involvement.
We know that AI and other technologies have huge potential to improve efficiency and productivity, and they should be used where appropriate, but we cannot rely on it yet to the exclusion of people and human judgment. The strategy we propose would ensure that those points were adequately considered by the Department, ensuring that the taxpayer receives value for money while safeguarding claimants through the decision-making process.
Andrew Western
I thank the hon. Member for tabling the new clause. The Government recognise the opportunities that AI and machine learning can provide, while also understanding the need to ensure they are used safely and effectively. In January 2025, the Government outlined their response to the AI opportunities action plan led by Matt Clifford, which was commissioned by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology. The plan outlined 50 recommendations for how the Government can leverage AI, including recommendations to improve access to data, to make better use of digital infrastructure and to ensure the safe use of AI.
Under the leadership of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, we have endorsed this plan, and the Government are taking forward those recommendations. As the Government work to implement the action plan’s recommendations, I do not believe that the separate anti-fraud and error technology strategy proposed by the new clause is necessary. I believe the new clause would cut across the work being taken forward under the action plan, so I reject the amendment.
As technology advances, the use of AI and machine learning will play a crucial role in detecting and preventing fraudulent activities. The Government want to make use of technology and data to tackle fraud, as the Department has a responsibility to ensure that fraud is minimised so that the right payments are made to the right people. The Government remain committed to building our AI capability, and at DWP we will take advantage of the opportunities offered by AI while ensuring it is used appropriately and safely.
Rebecca Smith
Sorry, I should have said this earlier. The new clause would make the Government’s AI strategy a statutory requirement, instead of a manifesto commitment not written into law. That is important to us because, in the case of fraud and particularly benefit fraud, we are dealing with individual people. We want to make sure that we do not inadvertently penalise the wrong people or apply something that is disproportionate. A lot has been said about ensuring proportionality and reasonableness.
I am interested in the Minister’s reflections on where else in the strategy something is applied as personally to potentially vulnerable groups of people, thereby suggesting that we do not need this protection to ensure that people are not inadvertently penalised when we use this legislation to tackle the fraud they are committing.
Andrew Western
That is a reasonable question, and clearly the AI framework is not specific to vulnerable groups in the way that the hon. Lady sets out. Decisions regarding benefit entitlement or payments within the Department are made by DWP colleagues who always look at the available information before making a decision. I would not want to make an amendment to restrict that to only the activity within this Bill; I would want it to be Departmental wide.
As I have set out a number of times at every stage and in every area of this Bill, a human is involved in decision making. There is no plan to change that. I can understand the hon. Lady’s anxiousness to see that set out in legislation, but I think it would create an anomaly between the practices within this Bill and in the Department more broadly. For instance, it is outside the scope of this Bill for a human to complete the vulnerability framework when looking at somebody in financial need who has an overpayment. I would not want to make a distinction between these powers and the rest of the Department's activities. If we were to have a broader debate, I would be happy to engage with the hon. Lady on that basis, but I would not want to create a “two-tier”, for want of a better word, description within the Department.
At every stage of model development, as we bring forward the AI opportunities action plan and our work in the AI and tech space, we ensure that checks, balances and strong safeguards are in place. I am proud of our commitment to use AI and machine learning in a safe and effective way.
To provide further assurances to Parliament and the public about our processes, we intend to develop fairness analysis assessments, which will be published alongside our annual report and accounts. These will set out the rationale for why we judge our models to be reasonable and proportionate. This reporting commitment on our fairness analysis assessment further negates the need for the new clause.
Finally, the hon. Lady mentioned the new clause’s role in ensuring reasonable grounds of suspicion when investigating fraud. I remind the Committee that, under the information gathering powers, the DWP may request information only where an authorised officer considers that there are reasonable grounds to suspect a DWP offence and that it is necessary and proportionate to obtain that information. Again, a human is fully baked into the process.
The changes made by the Bill will be reflected in the new code of practice. Updated mandatory training will be provided for staff, who will be accredited to use these new powers. Of course, with the eligibility verification measure in particular, but running throughout the Bill, the principle of independent oversight is very much in place. I hope that will provide the hon. Lady with the necessary information to show that the Government will use the information gathering powers only where there is a reasonable suspicion of fraud, and that this will have considerable human involvement. I agree that there is perhaps a broader conversation to be had about this at an appropriate time.
Rebecca Smith
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 9
Impact of Act on vulnerable customers
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament an assessment of the expected impact of the Act on vulnerable customers.
(2) For the purposes of this section, “vulnerable customers” means someone who, due to their personal circumstances, is especially susceptible to harm, particularly when a firm is not acting with appropriate levels of care.”—(Rebecca Smith.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss
New clause 12—Impact of Act on people facing financial exclusion—
“(1) The independent person appointed under section 64(1) of this Act must carry out an assessment of the impact of this Act on the number of people facing financial exclusion.
(2) The independent person must, after 12 months of the passing of the Act—
(a) prepare a report on the review, and
(b) submit the report to the Minister.
(3) On receiving a report the Minister must—
(a) publish it, and
(b) lay a copy before Parliament.”
This new clause would look into the impact of the Act on people facing financial exclusion.
Rebecca Smith
New clause 9 would require the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament, within six months of the Act’s passage, an assessment of its expected impact on vulnerable customers.
Concern has been expressed in written evidence about the Bill’s impact on disabled people. It is important to ensure that vulnerable people are not inadvertently harmed by the Bill. There was a discussion about vulnerable customers in oral evidence, with Daniel Cichocki and Eric Leenders both supporting the notion of an impact assessment while being concerned about the mental strain of being under suspicion. They said that the FCA is due to publish a thematic review on this imminently. We suggest that this strengthens the case for a comprehensive assessment by the Secretary of State.
We define “vulnerable customers” as those who due to their personal circumstances are especially susceptible to harm, particularly when a firm is not acting with appropriate levels of care, per the definition used by the Financial Conduct Authority, with which the sector is familiar. New clause 9 is necessary because some of the people impacted by the Bill will be vulnerable, and some will be repaying money they acquired not through fraud but through overpayments resulting from DWP error. As we heard from UK Finance, banks have duties when they suspect that financial crime is taking place, and although such errors are obviously not financial crime committed by the person who holds the account into which the payments have been made, there is a risk that the Bill does not sit well with those existing duties on banks.
We need to ensure that communication with vulnerable bank customers is of a sufficient standard, particularly where the DWP is recovering funds in cases where customer is not at fault, because the group of people we are talking about is likely to have high levels of vulnerability. If the Minister will not accept the new clause, I would be grateful for an explanation of the reasons why and, importantly, how the Government intend to undertake monitoring, which we believe is important.
The Liberal Democrats’ new clause 12 would require an independent assessment of the impact of the Bill on people facing financial exclusion. I am interested in whether the Liberal Democrats have a particular individual or organisation in mind which they think would be appropriate to undertake such an assessment, but we do not have a difficulty with the principle of the new clause.
Steve Darling
New clause 12 is about financial exclusion, as the hon. Member for South West Devon said. The Liberal Democrats’ concern is that, as this morning goes on, a number of safeguards are looking to be—for want of a better phrase—baked into the system by legislation, yet according to the Minister the only thing baked into the system is the involvement of human beings. That causes me, and I am sure other colleagues, concerns.
If an annual review were to take place of the Bill’s impact on people facing financial exclusion, conducted by the independent person appointed with the Minister publishing and sharing that with Parliament, we could ensure a level of transparency. While many of us would acknowledge that the Ministers in place at the moment are well-meaning individuals, who knows where we will be in 10 years’ time? This legislation needs to stand the test of time, so baking in these safeguards would be a positive way forward. I hope that the Minister will welcome that. I look forward to his comments.
Siân Berry
I have a lot of sympathy with both new clauses. It is really important that we look closely, as we are mandated to do, at the impact of the Bill on the people whose examples have been raised throughout the debate. The Minister should answer the questions asked by hon. Members, and if the Government will not do what is proposed in the new clauses, he should say what the Government will do instead.
Andrew Western
I begin with new clause 9, tabled by the hon. Member for South West Devon. I share her view that where the powers in the Bill are exercised, there should be a consideration of the vulnerabilities that customers may have, whether they be the customers of data holders such as banks or customers of Government —for example, DWP customers. However, I do not think that the new clause is necessary given the existing safeguards, oversight and reporting provisions in the Bill.
The Bill includes a number of protections for vulnerable people, including affordability considerations and protections for persons experiencing hardship, rights of review and appeal, and independent oversight. Those provisions have already been debated and considered by the Committee, so I will not labour the point, but I will comment on the provisions in the Bill for independent oversight, as they will play an important role here.
Rebecca Smith
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 10
Recovery of overpayments of Carer’s Allowance
“The Secretary of State may not exercise any of the powers of recovery under this Act in relation to a person who has received an overpayment of Carer’s Allowance until such time as—
(a) the Secretary of State has commissioned an independent review of the overpayment of Carer’s Allowance;
(b) the review has concluded its inquiry and submitted a report containing recommendations to the Secretary of State;
(c) the Secretary of State has laid the report of the independent review before Parliament; and
(d) the Secretary of State has implemented the recommendations of the independent review.” — (Steve Darling.)
This new clause would delay any payments being taken from people who the Government may think owe repayments on Carer’s Allowance until the independent review into Carer’s Allowance overpayments has been published and fully implemented.
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 11—Audit of algorithmic systems used in relation to Carer’s Allowance overpayments—
“(1) An independent audit of algorithmic systems used in the assessment, detection or recovery of Carer’s Allowance overpayments must be conducted at least once every six months.
(2) Any audit under subsection (1) must be conducted by persons with relevant expertise in data science, ethics and social policy who have no direct affiliation with—
(a) the Department for Work and Pensions, or
(b) any person or body involved in the development or operation of the algorithmic systems under review.
(3) An audit conducted under this section must consider—
(a) the accuracy of the algorithmic systems in identifying overpayments, and
(b) the fairness of the systems’ design, application and operation, including any disproportionate impact on particular groups.
(4) After every audit a report on its findings must be—
(a) published;
(b) laid before both Houses of Parliament within 14 days of publication; and
(c) made publicly available in an accessible format.
(5) If any audit identifies significant inaccuracies, unfairness or biases in any algorithmic systems, the Secretary of State must, within 30 days of the publication of the report outlining these findings, present an action plan to Parliament which outlines the steps which the Government intends to take to address the identified issues.”
This new clause would provide for an audit of algorithmic systems used in relation to Carer’s Allowance overpayments.
Amendment 32, in clause 103, page 63, line 26, leave out from start to “following” in line 29 and insert—
“Subject to subsections (1A) and (2), this Act comes into force on such day as the Secretary of State or the Minister for the Cabinet Office may by regulations appoint.
(1A) No part of this Act may come into force until the recommendations of a report commissioned under section [Recovery of overpayments of Carer’s Allowance] have been implemented.
(2) Subject to subsection (1A), the”.
Steve Darling
I encourage colleagues to support these proposals about the carer’s allowance. Carers are the backbone of many households across the United Kingdom, and I hope the Minister will support the amendment.
John Milne (Horsham) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Western.
The DWP is making extensive and growing use of algorithms for investigation purposes. Without proper oversight, these systems threaten error, unfairness and bias, which could lead to wrongful debt collection. Our amendment therefore calls for an independent audit of these systems at least every six months, to ensure accuracy and fairness. The audit must be conducted by experts in data science, ethics and social policy with no ties to the DWP or system developers. True independence is key.
The audit look at issues such as accuracy, so whether the algorithms are correctly identifying overpayments; fairness, so whether they unfairly target certain groups or operate with bias; and, above all, transparency and accountability. After each audit, we suggest that a full report must be published, presented to Parliament within 14 days, and made publicly accessible. If serious flaws are found, the Secretary of State must respond within 30 days with a clear action plan to fix these issues. Overall, Liberal Democrats are positive about benefiting from new technology, but we do need to consider whether it offers help, not harm.
In the wider context, what work is the use of AI generating? There are already chronic staff shortages at the DWP, with 20% vacancy rates becoming routine. Disability Rights UK has commented that operational failures now permeate every layer of welfare administration. Fraud investigation teams therefore already lack capacity to address the annual £6.4 billion of overpayments. There are only four fraud advisers per regional office to handle cases flagged by frontline staff, which has created a bottleneck, so that very often 90% of suspected fraud cases go uninvestigated. In other words, one could suggest there is already plenty of fraud to investigate without trawling for more. This amendment ensures regular scrutiny, transparency and fairness. I urge the Minister to consider it.
Andrew Western
It is important that I begin by paying tribute to the millions of unpaid carers across this country. The Government recognise and value the vital contribution made by carers every day in providing significant care and continuity of support to family and friends, including pensioners and those with disabilities. The 2021 census indicates that around 5 million people in England and Wales may be undertaking some unpaid care, and many of us take on a caring role at some point in our lives. Like other hon. Members, through my postbag and at events across my constituency, I see much of the work carers do. Carers are fortunate to have some wonderful advocates, not only their MPs but organisations such as Carers UK, Carers Trust and the Learning and Work Institute, to name but three.
We inherited a system in which busy carers already struggling under a huge weight of responsibility had been left having to repay large sums of overpaid carer’s allowance, sometimes worth thousands of pounds. We needed to understand exactly what had gone wrong so we could set out our plan to put things right. This is why we launched an independent review of earnings-related overpayment of carer’s allowance. We were delighted that Liz Sayce OBE agreed to lead this review, which is now well under way; we anticipate receiving its conclusions this summer.
The review will investigate how overpayments of carers allowance have occurred, what can be done to best support those who have accrued them, and how to reduce the risk of these problems occurring in future, but we are not sitting back and just waiting for the outcome of the independent review. Right now, we want to make it as easy as possible for carers to tell us when something has changed in their life that could affect their carer’s allowance, so we will continue to review and improve communications. From this April, the weekly carer’s allowance earnings limit will pegged to 16 hours’ work at national living wage levels, so in future it will increase when the national living wage increases. The earnings limit will be £196 a week net earnings, up from £151 today. As a result, over 60,000 more people will be able to receive carer’s allowance between 2025-26 and 2029-30. That is the largest increase in the earnings limit since carer’s allowance was introduced in 1976.
As the Chancellor said at the Budget, we need to look at the current cliff edge earnings rules. A taper could further incentivise unpaid carers to do some work and reduce the risk of significant overpayments, but introducing a taper to carer’s allowance is not without challenges. It could significantly complicate the benefit, and significant rebuilding of the carer’s allowance system would be required. The DWP has begun scoping work to see whether an earnings taper might be a feasible option in the longer term, but any taper is several years away.
New clause 10 sets out four points. As I have mentioned, an independent review has been commissioned, its terms of reference have been published and it is well under way. It is anticipated that it will report its conclusions in the summer. Both the report from the independent review and the Government’s response will be published, and we will report to the House.
I disagree with the hon. Member for Torbay on two issues. It would not be responsible of us to commit in advance to implementing all and any recommendations from such a review, sight unseen. We need to consider them carefully. In addition, the proposed new clause, as I understand it, would not have the effect he desires. We would still be able to recover overpayments of carer’s allowance from benefits under the powers in the Social Security Administration Act 1992.
The new clause would prevent our recovering debts directly from bank accounts of those not on benefits or PAYE, which is one of the additional powers given in this Bill. Even if the new clause operated as intended, it would be disproportionate to suspend all recovery of carer’s allowance overpayments until after the review is concluded, as those with overpayments are already covered by the usual safeguards of appeal rights, affordable deductions and, in exceptional circumstances, waiver. Given the discrepancy this would create between those on PAYE and benefits and those with other forms of income, I hope the hon. Gentleman acknowledges the need to withdraw the new clause rather than create further unfairness in the system.
Regarding new clause 11, I re-emphasise that we will not speculate on the findings or any potential outcomes of the independent review. All recommendations will be considered when the independent review concludes. It would not be appropriate of the Department to commit to this new auditing requirement until that has happened, when we can take a holistic view of carer’s allowance and how DWP uses data. Nevertheless, it is helpful to set out how DWP currently uses data to verify eligibility for carer’s allowance. Verification of earnings and pensions alerts were introduced to carer’s allowance in October 2018 as part of a wider strategy to identify data sources, to verify information provided by the claimant, or to identify if information has not been provided by the claimant. Like all data we use for that, it is not intended to replace the legal requirement of a claimant to provide information that may change their entitlement to social security.
VEP alerts arise from HMRC payroll data. The alert service provides a notification of new earnings or pensions as they come into payment, or if amounts change during the life of the claim. The Department uses business rules to prioritise those alerts, based on data provided by the real-time earnings system. Since 2019, we have actioned around 50% of the alerts received in the Department as part of our focus on reducing the risk and level of overpayments. Having secured additional funding in the one-year spending review, we will be deploying additional resource in 2025-26,to action the alerts received from HMRC as quickly as possible. The Department is also testing an approach of using text messages to remind customers of the need to report changes in their circumstances.
Finally, I emphasise that the use of VEP alerts does not replace human decision making. If the Department processes an alert that highlights a change in earnings and a customer has not reported the change, DWP officials will contact the customer to confirm details have changed. If any overpayment is identified, it will be referred to debt-recovery teams. DWP remains committed to working with anyone who is struggling with their repayment terms, and will always look to negotiate sustainable and affordable repayment plans.
In the light of the information I have set out, and the ongoing work of the carer’s allowance independent review, I urge the hon. Member for Torbay to withdraw the proposed new clause.
Rebecca Smith
Liberal Democrat new clause 10 would delay any payments being taken from people who the Government think owe repayments on carer’s allowance until the independent review into carer’s allowance overpayments has been published and fully implemented. Liberal Democrat new clause 11 would provide for an audit of algorithmic systems used in relation to carer’s allowance overpayments. It would require that, if any audit identified significant inaccuracies, unfairness or biases in any algorithmic system, the Secretary of State must, within 30 days of the publication of the report outlining these findings, present an action plan to Parliament that outlines the steps the Government intend to take to discuss the identified issues. I am interested to know why the Liberal Democrats are singling out carer’s allowance for this treatment—namely, the review of the algorithmic systems—rather than any other allowance or benefits. Is there a reason for that?
Liberal Democrat amendment 32 is a commencement block. It specifies that no part of the Bill may come into force until the recommendations of a report commissioned under the clause “Recovery of overpayments of Carer’s Allowance” have been implemented. We would suggest that there is more holistic information that should be made public before the Bill can be commenced, and that the focus on carer’s allowance is in danger of missing the bigger picture. For example, we need to see the codes of practice, and we need to know precisely how the banks will deliver their responsibilities under the Bill. I would suggest that those things, which are sadly not yet available to the Committee as we scrutinise the legislation, and that has greatly hindered us, would provide a much more holistic assessment of whether the Government are ready to implement the Bill than the report on recovering overpayments of carer’s allowance. Would the Liberal Democrats consider an amendment at a later stage that goes wider than that?
Andrew Western
I contend that amendment 32 is simply disproportionate given the wide range of benefits that the Bill is expected to deliver to address fraud and error, not just in the social security system but in the public sector more widely. It is essential that all of Government have access to the capabilities and tools required to stop fraudsters stealing from the taxpayer. Tens of billions of pounds are being lost to public sector fraud. These losses are unacceptable, and waste enormous sums of public money, which could be put to good use. Delaying the Bill coming into force will risk £1.5 billion of savings over the next five years. These have been certified by the Office for Budget Responsibility. The Government made a manifesto commitment that we would safeguard taxpayers’ money and not tolerate fraud or waste anywhere in public services. The Bill delivers on that commitment, and delaying its delivery is unfair on taxpayers, who deserve to have confidence that money spent by Government is reaching those who need it, and not those who exploit the system.
Secondly—we have already discussed this point at length—I remind Members that the Bill introduces new, important safeguards, including provisions for independent oversight and reporting mechanisms, to ensure the proportionate and effective use of the powers. New codes of practice will be consulted on and published to govern how new measures will be exercised in more detail. That will include details of further protections. There will be new rights of review and appeal in both parts of the Bill to ensure that there are opportunities to challenge the Government’s approach. A human being will always be involved in decisions about further investigation or the recovery of any debt.
Finally, I return to my earlier point: data and information sharing are crucial when we look at fraud and error. For example, the eligibility verification measure, while it will not be applied to carer’s allowance itself, will improve the DWP’s access to important data to help to verify entitlements, ensure that payments are correct, and prevent the build-up of overpayments. That will enable the DWP to be tough on those who cheat the benefits system and fair to claimants who make genuine mistakes. It is vital that the DWP is equipped with the right tools, and delaying this Bill will only delay these benefits. In the light of that, I hope that Members will not press the amendment.
Steve Darling
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 13
Liability orders
“(1) Where—
(a) a person has been found guilty of an offence under section 1 or section 11 of the Fraud Act 2006, or the offence at common law of conspiracy to defraud,
(b) that offence relates to fraud committed against a public authority, and
(c) the person has not paid the required penalties or not made the required repayments,
the Secretary of State may apply to a magistrates’ court or, in Scotland, to the sheriff, for an order (“a liability order”) against the liable person.
(2) Where the Secretary of State applies for a liability order, the magistrates’ court or (as the case may be) sheriff shall make the order if satisfied that the payments in question have become payable by the liable person and have not been paid.
(3) The Secretary of State may make regulations in relation to England and Wales—
(a) prescribing the procedure to be followed in dealing with an application by the Secretary of State for a liability order;
(b) prescribing the form and contents of a liability order; and
(c) providing that where a magistrates’ court has made a liability order, the person against whom it is made shall, during such time as the amount in respect of which the order was made remains wholly or partly unpaid, be under a duty to supply relevant information to the Secretary of State.
(4) Where a liability order has been made against a person (“the liable person”), the Secretary of State may use the procedure in Schedule 12 to the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (taking control of goods) to recover the amount in respect of which the order was made, to the extent that it remains unpaid.”—(Rebecca Smith.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Rebecca Smith
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Our new clause would provide that, where someone has been found guilty of fraud or conspiracy to defraud and not made the required payments, the Secretary of State can apply for a liability order. It further provides that, where a liability order has been made against a person, the Secretary of State may use the procedure in schedule 12 to the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, on taking control of goods, to recover the amount in respect of which the order was made, to the extent that it remains unpaid.
The new clause is intended to give the DWP powers to apply to the courts to seize assets where fraud is probable, with the same burden of proof as for cash seizures. It would bring the DWP into line with the Child Maintenance Service. I know that we have had some debate on the matter, so this is probably more of a probing or tidying-up amendment than anything else, but it would be useful to have that said explicitly. It goes without saying that, if the Minister does not intend to support the new clause, I will be interested to know why. If the DWP is serious about recovering money lost to fraud and the person liable is not making the required repayments, why should the DWP not be able to apply to seize their assets?
Georgia Gould
This is similar to the previous new clause we discussed. We have a lot of sympathy with the points set out. We want to ensure that we recover money, whether it is fraud against the public sector more widely or fraud against the DWP, but we believe that that is already covered in the Bill and I will run through why.
Clause 16 clarifies that the PSFA is able to seek alternative civil recovery through the civil courts, in addition to the direct deduction orders and deduction from earnings orders in the Bill. It confirms that the PSFA will be able to apply to the county court for a recovery order. That is an order providing that the payable amount is recoverable
“under section 85 of the County Courts Act 1984, or…otherwise as if it were payable under an order of the court.”
Section 85 of the County Courts Act also refers to the use of the procedure in schedule 12 to the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 to recover the money. That would enable the PSFA to seek enforcement of a debt by applying for a warrant of control in the county court, enabling a court enforcement officer to seize and sell goods to satisfy the debt. That ensures that the PSFA is able to pursue recovery through the most appropriate and effective mechanisms. New clause 13 is therefore already provided through the Bill for the PSFA and through existing legislation for the DWP—section 71 and section 71ZE of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 to be specific—allowing them operational flexibility to recover money in the most effective and efficient way to return money to the public purse. An amendment is not required to do that.
Rebecca Smith
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 14
Inclusion of systems within the Algorithmic Transparency Reporting Standard
“(1) For the purposes of this section, ‘system’ means—
(a) algorithms, algorithmic tools, and systems; and
(b) artificial intelligence, including machine learning
provided that they are used in fulfilling the purposes of this Act.
(2) Where at any time after the passage of this Act, the use of any system is—
(a) commenced;
(b) amended; or
(c) discontinued
the Minister must, as soon as reasonably practicable, accordingly include information about the system in the Algorithmic Transparency Reporting Standard.” —(John Milne.)
This new clause would require the use of algorithms, algorithmic tools, and systems, and artificial intelligence, including machine learning, to be included within the Algorithmic Transparency Reporting Standard.
Brought up, and read the First time.
John Milne
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause would require that the use of algorithms, algorithmic tools and systems, and artificial intelligence, including machine learning, should be included within the algorithmic transparency reporting standard. That standard, established by the Government, is supposed to be mandatory for all Government Departments. However, last November, The Guardian reported that not a single Whitehall Department has registered the use of AI systems since it was made mandatory.
Throughout debate on this issue, the Government have consistently downplayed the risk of using AI to trawl for suspect claimants, but if it really is that simple, why have so many organisations come out with concerns and opposition? That includes Age UK, ATD—All Together in Dignity—Fourth World, Amnesty International, Campaign for Disability Justice, Child Poverty Action Group, Defend Digital Me and Difference North East. I could go on: I have half a page, which I will spare the Committee from, listing organisations that have expressed concern. It is quite a roll call.
Governments can and will get things wrong. History tells us that if it tells us anything. In June 2024, a Guardian investigation revealed that a DWP algorithm had wrongly flagged 200,000 people for possible fraud and error; it found that two thirds of housing benefit claims marked as high risk in the previous three years were in fact legitimate, but thousands of UK households every month had their housing benefit claims wrongly investigated. Overall, about £4.4 million was wasted on officials carrying out checks that did not save any money. We know that more mistakes will happen, no matter how hard we try to avoid them. I therefore ask the Minister to support the insertion of new clause 14 as a small measure of defence against future institutional failings.
Rebecca Smith
As we have heard, Liberal Democrat new clause 14 would require the use of algorithms, algorithmic tools, and systems, and artificial intelligence, including machine learning, to be included in the algorithmic transparency reporting standard. I have obviously just heard the comments of the hon. Member for Horsham, but I would be interested to know precisely what the Liberal Democrats are aiming to achieve with this new clause and how such reporting would better enable the Government to crack down on fraud and error. Is that the intention behind the new clause?
Andrew Western
I share the support expressed by the hon. Member for Horsham for the algorithmic transparency recording standard as a framework for capturing information about algorithmic tools, including AI systems, and ensuring that public sector bodies openly publish information about the algorithmic tools used in decision-making processes that affect members of the public. However, I do not think the new clause is a necessary addition to the Bill, and I will explain why.
First, all central Government Departments, including the DWP and the Cabinet Office, are already required to comply with the standard as appropriate. We are committed to ensuring that there is appropriate public scrutiny of algorithmic tools that have a significant influence on a decision-making process with public effect, or that directly interact with the public. We have followed and will continue to follow the guidance published by the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology on this to ensure the necessary transparency and scrutiny.
Secondly, I remind the Committee that although the DWP and PSFA are improving their access to relevant data through the Bill, we are not introducing any new use of machine learning or automated decision making in the Bill measures. I can continue to assure the House that, as is the case now, a human will always be involved in decisions that affect benefit entitlement.
Thirdly, although I do not wish to labour the point yet again, I remind the Committee that the Bill introduces new and important safeguards, including reporting mechanisms and independent oversight in the Bill, demonstrating our commitment to transparency and ensuring that the powers will be used proportionately and effectively. The DWP takes data protection very seriously and will always comply with data protection law. Any information obtained will be kept confidential and secure, in line with GDPR.
John Milne
I am content to beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 15
Offence of encouraging or assisting others to commit fraud
“(1) The Social Security Administration Act 1992 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 111A (Dishonest representation for obtaining benefit etc), after subsection (1G) insert—
‘(1H) A person commits an offence if they—
(a) encourage or assist another person to commit an offence under this section, or
(b) provide guidance on how to commit an offence under this section.’
(3) In section 112 (False representations for obtaining benefit etc), after subsection (1F) insert—
‘(1G) A person commits an offence if they—
(a) encourage or assist another person to commit an offence under this section, or
(b) provide guidance on how to commit an offence under this section.’”—(Rebecca Smith.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Rebecca Smith
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 16 would require the Secretary of State to conduct a review of whistleblowing processes in relation to fraud in the public sector within one year of the Bill passing. The Opposition would like the review to include the appropriateness and efficacy of existing whistleblowing processes, the barriers to reporting fraud, the reasons for the under-reporting of fraud, and recommendations for change.
The Committee has previously discussed the 2023 National Audit Office report that highlighted the difficulties with whistleblowing within the public sector, particularly in respect of whistleblowing on senior colleagues. The NAO also highlighted that of the public sector whistleblowing disclosures it received in 2023-24, 12% related to fraud. I did not get a particularly clear answer from the Minister about the safeguards that have been put in place to ensure that junior civil servants are able to raise concerns about more senior members of staff, so I am interested to see if there is more to be said.
It is a serious issue. One of the reasons I was interested in tabling this new clause is that, as a junior member of staff at a local authority, I saw this happen. I was in a situation where two colleagues were defrauding the local housing authority, and at that stage as a 21-year-old I did not feel able to do anything about it. That is one of the biggest regrets of my life. Having worked significantly in housing since, the fact that I was not able to call them out for essentially purchasing a council house that they were no longer living in, makes me feel that this safeguard —ensuring that Government Departments’ houses are in order as the legislation goes forward—is particularly vital.
John Smart, who sits on the PSFA’s advisory panel, raised the example of the US, which has whistleblower reward legislation in place that is effective at flushing out issues affecting payments made by the Government. The legislation flushes out fraud by incentivising whistleblowers to blow the whistle, so to speak. He recommended that the Government consider such legislation, so could the Minister inform the Committee whether the Government have looked into that option? Would it be possible for us to learn from that legislation? Could the Government consider such legislation in the future, and if not, why not?
Georgia Gould
I thank the hon. Lady for raising the critical issue of whistleblowing. I assure her of how seriously the Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions—my hon. Friend the Member for Stretford and Urmston—myself, and both Secretaries of State take the issue of whistleblowing. I hope, as I set out our responses to the NAO report and our wider work, to offer the reassurance that the Opposition are looking for.
When it comes to internal and external fraud against the public sector, Government Departments are responsible for their own whistleblowing arrangements and for overseeing arrangements in their arm’s length bodies. For example, the Department for Business and Trade publishes and regularly updates its guidance, “Whistleblowing: list of prescribed people and bodies”, which details who individuals can raise a concern with. The list comprises bodies and individuals to whom making a disclosure qualifies the individual who makes the disclosure for legal protections under the Employment Rights Act 1996—for instance, protection against being dismissed by their employer for the disclosure.
Whistleblowers can report concerns about public sector fraud to bodies such as the NAO’s Comptroller and Auditor General, the director of the Serious Fraud Office, the Auditors General for Wales and for Scotland, the NHS Counter Fraud Authority and various other bodies listed on gov.uk. The NAO report that the hon. Lady referred to set out that between 2019 and 2022 fraud one of the most common concerns raised—I think it accounted for 40% of concerns.
On the review of the existing processes, the key findings of the recent NAO publication related to the need to increase awareness of the channels for whistleblowing, to improve the experience of whistleblowers and to ensure that lessons are learned, as the hon. Lady set out. In the light of the NAO report, and with the intention of opening up as many avenues as possible for the reporting of public sector fraud, the PSFA will explore with the Department for Business and Trade whether it would be appropriate to add the PSFA to the list of prescribed organisations. That would go alongside the existing ability to raise fraud within a public sector body or Department. We will also use the findings of the report, as well as the NAO’s good practice guide to whistleblowing in the civil service, to inform our approach.
The DWP has established processes by which members of the public and staff can report suspected benefit fraud. Members of the public can report fraud online at gov.uk, by phone or by post, while DWP staff follow clear internal guidance and processes. Given the intent to maintain the focus of this legislation, the recent work by the National Audit Office, the existing DWP processes and the steps the PSFA is taking to continue to improve the whistleblowing offer for public sector fraud, I will resist new clause 16.
Rebecca Smith
I appreciate the Minister’s response. We will withdraw the new clause, but I urge her to go back and look at what more can be done. I appreciate that the PSFA might come in as a prescribed organisation, but I am particularly concerned about how we bridge the gap and enable more junior civil servants to blow the whistle in relation to senior colleagues. Ultimately, that was the focus of the NAO report. If there is a way to look at that ahead of Report stage, I would be grateful. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 17
Duty to consider domestic abuse risk to holders of joint accounts
“(1) Before any direct deduction order under Schedule 5 is made, the Secretary of State has a duty to consider its effect on any person (‘P’) who—
(a) is a victim of domestic abuse, or
(b) the Secretary of State reasonably believes to be at risk of domestic abuse,
where P shares a joint account with a liable person believed to be the perpetrator or potential perpetrator of domestic abuse.
(2) In this section ‘domestic abuse’ has the meaning given by section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021.”—(Steve Darling.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Steve Darling
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I start by acknowledging the hard work of Surviving Economic Abuse in this policy area. I thank that charity for its briefing, which I am sure it has shared with all Committee members. The charity and the Liberal Democrats are keen to make sure that domestic abuse, particularly where it plays out in relation to joint accounts, is on the face of the Bill, so that it is taken very seriously.
I can almost hear the Minister’s voice saying that DWP officers are well trained to deal with vulnerable claimants, but it is extremely important to put domestic abuse on the face of the Bill. Domestic abuse is a very wicked issue in my Torbay constituency, and I am sad to say that Torbay is not alone in it being a serious challenge in people’s households. I hope the Government will take this seriously and support the new clause, so we would like to press it to a vote in due course.
Rebecca Smith
The Conservatives—the official Opposition—share the Liberal Democrats’ view that it is vital that we use different Departments across Government to tackle domestic abuse and domestic violence. We have a really strong track record of doing that in government.
In principle, the new clause seems like a good idea. I am conscious that we need to ensure that the Bill does not exacerbate or create problems for victims and put them even more at risk. I have done a lot of work on violence against women and girls away from this place, and I am conscious of how tricky it can be to prove some of these things. I wonder whether there might be other ways to achieve the same outcome. I assume that is why the Government are not able to support the new clause.
The new clause includes language such as “potential” and “believed to be”. My gentle challenge is about whether it could be worded differently, as we go forward to other stages, to make it more achievable and deliverable, and something that would have a place in the Bill. As it stands, I am not sure that would be the case, but I am interested to see this issue debated further, because the official Opposition share the commitment to tackling domestic abuse and domestic violence.
Andrew Western
We have reached the stage in Committee at which the hon. Member for Torbay can second-guess my comments. He will be as pleased as I am that this is the last of the new clauses for debate, but it is a very serious one.
New clause 17 seeks to place a duty on Secretary of State to consider the impact of a proposed direct deduction order where a person is a victim of domestic abuse, or officials reasonably believe they are at risk of domestic abuse, and they share an account with a perpetrator of that abuse. I share the hon. Member for Torbay’s view that, where the new recovery powers are exercised, there should be a consideration of whether there is evidence of domestic abuse. However, I do not believe the new clause reflects the right approach. The DWP understands the importance of supporting victims and survivors of domestic abuse, and has existing guidance, processes and operational best practice for supporting them.
The new clause would apply to both debtors and non-debtors, and would not require the DWP to take any steps to identify possible victims. Subsection (1)(a) would place a duty on officials to consider the impact any time a person was a victim, even when the DWP did not and could not have known that that was the case. Subsection (1)(b) would imply a duty to assess whether there was reason to believe the person was at risk of domestic abuse but, as the hon. Member for South West Devon suggested, in many cases the DWP will not be in a position to make that assessment. That would put officials in a difficult, if not impossible, position.
As the direct deduction powers will be used as a last resort where multiple attempts to engage with the debtor to arrange a voluntary, affordable and sustainable repayment plan have failed, we anticipate that the DWP will know very little about the debtor’s current circumstances, unless it had been made aware previously or there were clear identifiable risk factors. We are working closely with charities, some of which the hon. Member for Torbay will have heard from, to help to identify those risks, as I will outline.
Where a joint account holder could be at risk of domestic abuse but is not the debtor, we are unlikely to have ever had direct dealings with them prior to the power being used. Unless we were directly notified, it is unlikely we would have the information necessary to form the reasonable belief that they were at risk, and much less likely that we could identify all the cases where the person was experiencing abuse. I do not, therefore, agree that a placing a legal duty on officials in this way is the right approach.
We are committed to continuing to support victims of domestic abuse whenever they interact with the Department, which is why we are working with charities such as Surviving Economic Abuse, which is dedicated to advocating for women whose partner has controlled their ability to acquire, use and maintain economic resources. SEA is supporting the drafting of the code of practice to ensure that robust safeguards are in place and to encourage engagement specifically from those who are vulnerable, including victims of domestic abuse. Although SEA works with women, the principles will apply to all victims and survivors of domestic abuse.
Frontline debt management staff already receive training for their role, including on assessing affordability, discussing hardship, and identifying and dealing with vulnerable customers. As we have heard, a specialist debt enforcement team will exercise the new recovery powers, and it will be governed by a code of practice. As explained, we will consult on the draft code of practice, and I welcome further views as part of the wider public consultation.
Finally, I note that paragraph 6(1)(b) of schedule 5 already imposes a broad duty on the Secretary of State to ensure that the amount of any deduction is
“fair in all the circumstances.”
That would include consideration of the impact on a victim of domestic abuse, as the hon. Member for Torbay seeks in the new clause, where the relevant context and circumstances are known to the Department. I hope that reassures the hon. Member that his concerns are already addressed in the Bill, and that the DWP takes domestic abuse seriously and will continue to do so when exercising the new recovery powers.
Steve Darling
I would like to press the new clause to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Georgia Gould
This is the final group of clauses that the Committee will consider. I give massive thanks to the Committee for our constructive dialogue, which I am sure will continue—I look forward to a long afternoon and Thursday discussing these final clauses.
Clause 99 covers how the Bill will be applied and limited by setting out the retrospective effect of the new powers, and makes some technical amendments to the Limitation Act 1980. There is a significant policy change in the clause, which is the extension of the existing six-year limit for civil claims relating to covid frauds. I think the Committee will agree that is critical. Although the application and limitation of the clause covers the whole Bill, and the powers can be used on existing cases, retrospective effect does not apply for clauses 96 and 97, which relate to non-benefit payment administrative penalties.
Subsection (3) of clause 99 sets out that the time-limit change applies to amounts that an England and Wales public authority is entitled to claim from a person as a result of a fraud the person carried out. Subsection (5) clarifies what is meant by an England and Wales public authority, and explains that Scottish and Welsh devolved authorities are not included. Subsection (7) makes technical amendments to section 38(11) of the Limitation Act 1980.
Clause 100 enables the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions and the Minister for the Cabinet Office to ensure that the Bill works alongside all existing legislation. As is usual for Bills that may have provisions consequential for other Acts of Parliament, the power allows the Secretary of State and the Minister to amend other legislation to ensure that the Bill works effectively with existing Acts of Parliament.
Clause 101 recognises that the Bill requires a money resolution, primarily because it confers new functions on the Minister for the Cabinet Office and the Department for Work and Pensions.
Clause 102 sets out the Bill’s territorial extent, while annex A in the accompanying explanatory notes provides a full breakdown of the territorial extent and application of its measures. The provisions in part 1 apply to England and Wales. Legislative consent is required for Wales for some parts of the part 1 provisions. The provisions in part 2 apply to England, Wales and Scotland in relation to reserved matters.
As the Committee is aware, the UK Government do not generally legislate on devolved matters without the consent of the relevant devolved Governments. We have written to our counterparts in Scotland and Wales, and engagement with both remains ongoing, to seek legislative consent from Wales on the part 1 provisions that interact with Welsh competence and from Scotland on the part 2 provisions that interact with Scottish competence.
Clause 103 is required to enable the provisions in the Bill to be implemented. It sets out how the Bill’s provisions will be commenced.
Finally, clause 104 is straightforward and confirms that the short title of the Act will be the Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Act 2025, to summarise the intent of the Bill captured in the long title. Having outlined the main provisions in clauses 99 to 104, I commend them to the Committee.
Rebecca Smith
The good news is that the Minister has answered some of my questions, particularly in respect of clause 99 and the extension of the retrospective time limits. Clause 100 is a standard Henry VIII power to make consequential provision as a result of the legislation; does the Minister envisage that the power will need to be used frequently? Clauses 101 to 104 are standard provisions and we do not have any substantive comments to make on them.
Georgia Gould
The Henry VIII power is to ensure that any other legislation is in line with this legislation. We do not expect it to be used on lots of occasions, but it will be used on some. We welcome the Opposition’s support for the extension to the limit for investigating covid fraud. I thank the Committee again for its work on the Bill, which will ensure that we take action against fraud wherever it occurs.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 99 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 100 to 104 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Question proposed, That the Chair do report the Bill, as amended, to the House.
Andrew Western
I place on the record my thanks to you, Mr Western, and all the other Chairs who have supported and guided us through the Bill. I thank the Clerks and officials from the Cabinet Office and DWP for their support. I also thank my co-pilot, the Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Queen’s Park and Maida Vale; the Opposition spokespersons; and all Committee members for their input. I commend the Bill to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill, as amended, accordingly to be reported.