Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Baroness Fox of Buckley Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 9th June 2025 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Baroness Fox of Buckley]

27: Clause 17, page 10, line 19, leave out “make” and insert “apply to the appropriate court for”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes the power of the Minister to make direct deduction orders and instead provides for direct deduction orders to be made only by a court following an application by the Minister to the court.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 27, I will speak also to Amendments 29, 62 and 75, which relate to debt recovery and concerns about the proportionality, even constitutionality, of the Bill’s use of direct deduction orders. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, for his support in this endeavour.

The purpose of these amendments, and those in the later group starting with Amendment 102, is to transfer the powers of the Minister in Part 1 and of the Secretary of State in Part 2 to make direct deduction orders and deduction from earnings orders to relevant courts, whether the county court in England and Wales or the sheriff court in Scotland.

Before I look at the substance of this issue, I note that Amendment 29 addresses Clause 19(2) and paragraph 3(2) of new Schedule 3ZA, inserted by Schedule 5 to the Bill, whereby the Minister or the Secretary of State are required only to believe that a person holds the bank account in question. Other provisions require such belief to be reasonable, so inserting the word “reasonably” before “believes” would impose a reasonableness test. Not having such a test removes the balance of proper scrutiny and any threshold for a belief. This needs to be addressed to prevent unscrupulous intrusion. Meanwhile, Amendment 62 probes the circumstances in which orders can be restarted where they have been suspended, because I am confused about why that is necessary.

To return to the fundamental principles at stake in Amendments 27 and 75 in particular, and the broad theme, for centuries the rule of law and the separation of powers have ensured that a person is innocent until proven guilty and cannot be punished by political diktat. The Executive cannot arbitrarily take action against a person, even a debtor, in the manner that the Bill gives the relevant Minister. The Bill allows the Minister to order a bank to supply sensitive information for the purposes of debt recovery, without either judicial oversight or individual knowledge.

On our first day in Committee, we heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, the shocking details of how Clause 7 allows relatively junior civil servants in the Cabinet Office to apply for a warrant to enter and search premises and seize anything they have reasonable grounds to believe has been obtained in the commission of fraud. If handing police powers to civil servants was not chilling enough, here are powers that facilitate the state raiding bank accounts.

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[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, a garnishee order is used to obtain money directly from a third party. That is not the process that we are undertaking; we are regaining money directly from an individual, as opposed to a third party. I am happy to write to the noble Lord with more guidance on that, but that is my understanding.

I move on to Amendment 29, which would necessitate a “reasonable belief”, rather than a “belief”, that a bank account is held by the liable person prior to the PSFA requesting bank statements from the bank to inform decisions on direct deduction orders. In practice, the PSFA will already be operating at this level as it will already, through the course of its fraud investigation, have developed an overview of the liable person’s financial information.

In addition, having thrilled the Committee with my recitations from Managing Public Money last Wednesday, I am excited to be able to quote from another government page turner, The Judge Over Your Shoulder. All “public law powers” must be exercised with

“reasonableness or rationality—following a proper reasoning process and so coming to a reasonable conclusion”.

Making a Minister’s belief a “reasonable” belief therefore has no effect, because they are already subject to it.

In addition, Clause 19 lets the PSFA issue a general information notice to banks, which provides confirmation of the accounts that a liable person holds. The amendment is therefore not adding anything new.

Amendment 62 seeks to remove the ability to restart a deduction from earnings order once it has been suspended. For some context, a deduction from earnings order is a mechanism by which public funds lost to fraud and error can be recovered directly from a liable person who is not in PAYE employment. Having listened to the debate, I have some sympathy with noble Lords; however, it is important that the PSFA remains able to issue, vary, suspend and restart, or revoke a deduction from earnings order, for very human reasons.

We need to be able to suspend and restart a deduction from earnings order due to a temporary change in the liable person’s circumstances; for example, if they were temporarily hospitalised. People’s lives, as we know, can be messy; it is important that we have the flexibility to recognise that. Where it is more appropriate to revoke the order altogether, this is provided for in Clause 47.

The purpose of the amendment therefore overlaps with existing provision which gives the necessary flexibility while maintaining clear communication with both employers and liable persons, maintaining a fair and transparent debt recovery process. If this provision was adopted, an unfortunate consequence would be the end of such flexibility and the reluctance of anyone to suspend payments due to having to restart the process.

I hope that this explanation reassures noble Lords and that the noble Baroness will withdraw Amendment 27.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have a number of points. It was very interesting that the Minister concluded in relation to one of these amendments that “people’s lives can be messy”. It is precisely for that reason that in saying that DDOs will be issued only due to a lack of engagement, without any consideration of why that lack of engagement might happen, it might well be because people’s lives are very messy, to quote the Minister. So I am not convinced by that at all.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

To reassure the noble Baroness, efforts to engage with a liable person would not be just a one-off hit. There would be over a dozen attempts, under my understanding of the Act. So it is not just a one-time effort to engage with each liable person. By the time we got to the process of a direct deduction order, there would have been multiple efforts to engage with the liable person.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

It is quite feasible that I have missed the multiple efforts in the reading of the Bill. Maybe it is there—it might be another bit that I have missed. But I do not think that is clear, so maybe that could be clarified.

I am sure that this is the intention—the problem is the principle. We were given the explanation that I thought we would be given: we are doing this directly and not going for judicial authorisation because the courts just have too much work on. I always worry about an explanation that says that it will cause too much work for the courts. On this basis, we may as well cut out sending anyone to a court and put them into prison—because that court process is so darned long-winded for everything, is it not? But we do not say that, because the court system sets in place safeguards to ensure that people are not unfairly treated. We do not have a direct situation where a Government of the day simply decide that the courts are dispensable with. That is the principle that I was trying to raise here, so I do not think that is a satisfactory answer.

I was also unconvinced by the argument, which I will go through, that HMRC already has powers to deduct money directly from bank accounts under Schedule 8 to the Finance (No.2) Act 2015. Actually, there are statutory safeguards, including the requirement that HMRC retains £5,000 in the debtor’s accounts, and guidance about who HMRC should deem as at a particular disadvantage. That is not in this Bill. It is part of that Bill, which was cited as a reassurance to me.

The comparison with child maintenance is also a false comparison. Child maintenance is money owed by one parent to ensure provision for their dependant who does not live with them. That differs greatly from an individual claiming money from, for example, the social security system, who potentially has been overpaid—as I keep pointing out, through no fault of their own. I do not think those two things count as equivalences at all.

I was grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, for the amendment on stop-starting DDOs. I have some sympathy with her approach in terms of them being permanently never allowed to start again. My nervousness with it is that it feels so arbitrary. The explanation given was that people have messy lives, which is fine, but I do not want to be in a situation whereby I am nodding through a system that means that people could keep having their direct deduction orders stop and start because of the messiness of government. We are told that it is the messiness of people’s lives, but it is not clear that that would be the only reason why this would occur; it is not in the Bill.

Of course, I shall not press my amendments, but I imagine that I will return with some of them on Report.

Amendment 27 withdrawn.

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I have amendments in later groups on the EVM section of the Bill with a similar effect to these, looking at the costs to the banks. This is not just about the impact on the banks, however. As many of us know from the experience of being politically exposed persons, when you put onerous responsibilities and costs on the banks that relate to a particular class of customers, you can create a disincentive for the banks to provide services to them. Most of us have probably had the experience of being PEP-ed, and it is not terribly pleasant. Here, if we are putting a load of costs on the banks that relate to benefit recipients, we make it less likely that those vulnerable people will be able to access banking services. The Government need to think about this quite carefully.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I was going to make a very similar point. We have to consider the serious consequences of the Government, in effect, turning banks into de facto government inspectors, as well as the unintended consequences such as those for politically exposed persons. Goodness knows that that has not gone well. It has created all sorts of chaos. I am very anxious about private institutions, in effect, being asked to do the Government’s dirty work in many instances.

I want to query, though, banks being able to charge for the hard work they do via new paragraph 8 in Schedule 5, in which there is a provision for the bank to be able to deduct a fee from the debtor’s account to meet its reasonable costs in complying with the order, which is a ridiculous situation. It amounts to state-backed approval of funds being taken directly from the bank accounts of private customers to deal with administrative retrieval of overpayments. By the way, the maximum amount that banks could charge would be set by the Secretary of State via regulations, which is also not reassuring. Although I do not want the banks to be used, I also do not want them to be able to charge their own clients to do the job that the Government have demanded they do. I feel very queasy about all this.

On the discrimination point, if these measures identify a range of types of bank clients who are causing more trouble than they are worth, the obvious decision will be to debank. It makes perfect sense that they would think, just like every other private sector organisation, “Do I really want people on benefits living in my house?” We have seen this discrimination time and again. There is a serious danger of unintended consequences here that the Government have to take seriously.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I did not speak at Second Reading, but the Bill has attracted my interest for the reasons a number of noble Lords have pointed out about procedure and due process. I share the concern about the risk of debanking en masse a group of individuals whom banks will view as not particularly good customers in terms of the money they deposit and as they now come with greater risks. I would also like to know what the Government’s thinking is on that issue.

Looking at this from the point of view of the bank, I am a bit concerned about the relationship between Clause 19(4) and Clause 19(10). Clause 19(4) says:

“The Minister may give an account information notice relating to an account only for the purpose of determining whether to make a direct deduction order in respect of the account”.


If the bank receives such a request for an account information notice, but for some reason considers there may be a different purpose in that request, what is the bank supposed to do? Clause 19(8) says:

“The bank must comply with a notice given under this section”.


However, Clause 19(4) puts a clear limit in terms of the lawfulness of giving an account information notice. Who is to assess whether there is any doubt as to the purpose of that account information notice?

In Clause 19(10), it says:

“Information given to the Minister in response to a notice under this section may be used by the Minister for the purpose of exercising the core functions but not for any other purpose”.


Of course, the core functions are wider than the purpose identified in Clause 19(4), which says that you can give an account information notice only for the purposes of determining whether to make a direct deduction order. But then, in Clause 19(10), that information may be used for wider purposes than enabling the taking of that decision.

That puts the bank in a bit of difficult position. It is told that it must comply with a notice but also that the notice must be only for the purposes of determining whether to make a direct deduction order. If it has any doubt, presumably it owes a duty to its customers and will have to consider how to behave in that situation. Further, it is also told that the information it will be providing may be used for wider purposes than simply the making of a direct deduction order. I would like to hear from the Government how they see the relationship between these various provisions in Clause 19, and where that leaves the bank in that kind of scenario.

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[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, it would be inappropriate for me to speak on behalf of the banks, and I do not think that noble Lords would want me to do so. But as far as I am aware—having said I will not speak for them, I am now going to—the banks are supportive of the approach we are taking. In terms of fraud, we are working very closely with them. The banks, however, want us to be as similar to HMRC as possible, and we are trying to do that. Given that those are regulations they currently work with in day-in, day-out, that is what we are trying to emulate. I think that is as far as I can go. The noble Viscount should be reassured that we are engaging directly with UK Finance regularly, and he might want to reflect on the evidence that it gave in Committee stage in the other place about how comfortable it was with this section of the Bill.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

I think it is fair to say that UK Finance and the banks, in terms of all the evidence that I have read, are obviously happy to sit down with Ministers to try and negotiate their way through this Bill. I do not think that is entirely fairly or accurately described as them being happy with this. They are being asked to do things by coercion in this Bill. I am not saying that word to be offensive. I mean they have not chosen to do it—the Government have told them they have to do it. In many instances, banks are required to do what the Government tell them in relation to their own customers or face penalties if they do not. Consequently, they are trying to negotiate the best of a bad deal. That is not quite the same as an enthusiasm for the Bill. I think that is worth noting, as we would not want to mislead.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I remind the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that what I actually said was that I did not want to speak on behalf of the banks. However, I find the word “coercion” a complete exaggeration and unnecessary. Just to clarify as well, the banks will not face penalties at any point in the Bill, unless I am to be corrected—and if I am wrong, I will correct the record. This is a process of trying to recoup government funds—taxpayers’ funds—to make sure that we get the money back. That is what we are trying to do and that is why this legislation is in place. We are working with the sector to make sure we can get our money back.

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[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I welcome the spirit of this group of amendments. I am not clear that I understand entirely how the independent review process might work, but I do understand the importance of having an independent review process; the case for this was made convincingly by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn.

Despite the fact that we are whizzing through these amendments at great speed, I do not think that it would be right to underestimate the huge amount of power that this Bill gives the Cabinet Office. There appears to be an atmosphere of consensual camaraderie, which it is pleasant to be involved in—it may be an atmosphere I am less used to—but I emphasise the amount of concern outside this Committee about the implications of this Bill. The people who are concerned are not all hucksters or fraudsters: they are ordinary people who have genuine fears around the possibilities of the absolutely unintended consequences of the Bill if we do not have adequate safeguards. So I am keen on anything that strengthens safeguards.

I hope, therefore, that the Government will consider these amendments seriously. I think that they are very helpful. I am particularly keen, of course, on the idea that liable persons, as they are described, deserve to have somewhere they can go to make an appeal. They deserve to know, as was suggested, that, if they have legitimate concerns, they will be heard. So much of what appears to be in this Bill happens behind the backs of liable persons, which creates an atmosphere of fear, suspicion and nervousness.

I do not think that people are just being paranoid here. Consider—this has been mentioned before and will no doubt come up again—the Horizon scandal. There is nothing more frustrating than feeling as though you have been treated badly somehow but you do not know where to go. You have nowhere to appeal to. It may be that you have a perfectly legitimate explanation for something. What we saw in Horizon was “computer says no”. What we could have here is the Cabinet Office, which has just imposed something on you, not taking any notice if you should go and complain. That is a very important part of this: people deserve to know that their concerns can be heard, and so on.

There is a danger in this discussion sometimes. I fear that, if one raises concerns about this Bill, there will be an inference that one is not taking fraud seriously. That is absolutely not the case. I have constantly made the point, for example, that I worry about the conflation of error and fraud. This does not mean to say, though, that, where there is genuine fraud, we should not want to clamp down on it as hard as we can.

But it is also fair enough that we need to have a system in which there is public confidence. To clamp down on fraudulent activity, we need a watertight, safeguarded Bill that targets fraud and does not pick up any number of non-fraudulent issues, which will undermine public confidence. The intention of these amendments is to help enhance public confidence that there is a mechanism through which an independent body can review a process that could be corrupted inadvertently by a department having the capacity to mark its own homework, and, in that instance, not always see the wood for the trees when people raise concerns.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I, too, have a few comments to make on these amendments. I very much support the intention behind them. I would like to understand a bit more about Clause 34 and how it will operate. Paragraph 219 of the Explanatory Notes says:

“This clause introduces a process for review of deduction orders by an authorised officer of a higher grade than the original decision maker upon application by relevant parties”.


As far as I can see, there is no mention in the legislative text of the authorised officer who conducts the review being of a higher grade. Perhaps I have missed it, and it is somewhere else; if so, I would be grateful to know where. If it is not somewhere else, it may be that the Explanatory Notes made that point on the basis of general principles of administrative law. Either way, it would be useful to know where that comes from.

My second point concerns the grounds for review, which are very narrow. Clause 34(4) says:

“An application for a review under this section may not be made on, or include, any ground relating to the existence or amount of a payable amount (unless the amount is said to be incorrectly stated in the order)”.


The grounds for appeal in the following clause are equally narrow. Is my understanding correct that the reason these grounds are so narrowly drawn is that there has already been a final determination of the payable amount by a court or tribunal—which was the reference to Clause 12 that we were given earlier on? Can the Minister give us some examples of grounds for review, given how narrowly drawn that provision is in Clause 34(4)?

Finally, I note that there is no time limit imposed on the Minister for carrying out the review. The applicant would have to put in an application within 28 days, but they might just sit and wait for the outcome of that review for an indefinite period. Would it not be a good idea to include a clear time limit on the reviewer—ideally the independent reviewer—or the authorised officer for that review to be concluded?

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With regard to the appointment of an independent—

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

Maybe I should just clarify. I am not suggesting that the Cabinet Office is full of malign people out to behave badly, and I was not suggesting that they all need to be punished. I was more suggesting that the reason why it would be useful to have an independent review body was for exactly the reasons that fellow noble Lords have pointed out—that if people wish to challenge decisions that are made, it is very important they feel they can go to a body where they will not necessarily be working directly with the people who made the original decision, as has been described. No one is suggesting that there is an evil, scheming group there.

The comparison with the Horizon scandal that I was trying to make was about the sense of intimidation and fear when someone feels that they have been wrongly treated, then when they appeal or try and go to a body to sort it out and it ends up being the same people who punished them in the first place. Maybe I misspoke before, but it is this that I am concerned about—so I would like this independent review body to exist so that those who are liable have somewhere independent to appeal to, straightforwardly.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, in response to the noble Baroness, I state that there is the First-tier Tribunal opportunity, in terms of there being an independent process to go to. That is why we have put in place the additional safeguards with regard to the independent person who will be appointed to review all cases at their discretion, not at that of the Cabinet Office, as well as HMICFRS—so there is someone who has oversight. That is also why we are making ourselves subject to the IOPC for matters of complaints, as outlined in the Bill.

The noble Baroness raises a very important point about Horizon. I assure noble Lords that the Horizon scandal and how we ensure that it is not repeated has been central to this Government’s thinking on safeguarding. In light of the seriousness of events, the Government wish to proactively ensure the highest levels of oversight in new legislation, and that is why they exist in this Bill.

With regard to one of the points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, on the appointment of the independent person subject to a parliamentary pre-appointment hearing, the Government cannot commit to this at this stage. Cabinet Office guidance states that it should be discussed between the relevant Secretary of State and the chair of the relevant Select Committee. The Government want to make sure that the independent person is demonstrably independent and are exploring all available routes to achieve that. I hope that we will be able to discuss that further in due course, but with these explanations I hope that I have reassured noble Lords and that therefore they will not press their amendments.