Baroness Kramer
Main Page: Baroness Kramer (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Anderson. In the eyes of this Committee, coming here today on her honeymoon to lead on the Bill demonstrates that she is a true romantic.
The amendments in this group, both of which are in my name, are probing amendments, and they are designed to create a whistleblowing channel in the PSFA. Amendment 3 is more general, but Amendment 66 would specifically set up an office of the whistleblower. Expanding the role of the Public Sector Fraud Authority without creating an appropriate whistleblowing channel seems an opportunity seriously missed. The Cabinet Office, with its wide reach, is exactly the right place to put an office of the whistleblower to tackle public sector fraud.
At Second Reading I spoke of the change in attitude towards whistleblowers by both regulators and enforcement agencies. Many now see whistleblowers as crucial to their effectiveness. I will not repeat a Second Reading speech; I ask the Minister not to take my word for this but to speak directly to the Serious Fraud Office, to HMRC’s tax office and to the Covid commissioner. I hope the Government will respect what these organisations have learned out in the field about tackling fraud, and that will lead her to see the significance of creating an appropriate whistleblowing channel.
However, I want to address what seemed to be some misapprehensions from the Minister’s speech at Second Reading. She seemed to be of the view that the national benefit fraud hotline is a sufficient whistleblowing channel. As far as I can tell, it funnels information, usually anonymous, to DWP, but there is little or no follow-up with the individual who has reported. Whistleblowing is a process. Initial reports lead to further exchanges and often to the gathering of information and evidence. That is why it is so valuable. The hotline today simply is not sufficient, and that is one of the reasons why fraud is so prevalent.
The Minister also said that only 6% of benefit fraud is linked to organised crime, and I find that impossible to believe. The Police Foundation recently did a major piece of research and concluded that 30% to 45% of fraud is linked to organised crime. That is way above the levels previously estimated anywhere across the piece before that report came out. It is now regarded, in a sense, as the masterpiece of research in this area.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Maude of Horsham, and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger of Leckie, for rowing in on this issue of real significance. I also thank the Minister, who is clearly taking these issues on board, thinking them through and looking for a way to progress. I would love the opportunity to meet her to explore where I can be helpful.
I want to challenge a couple of issues raised by the noble Viscount. The cost is often raised when we talk about creating a specific office of the whistleblower. But in the United States there are offices of whistleblowing in the Securities and Exchange Commission, the CFTC and the Department of Transportation, for example. Every single one of them is now regarded by the US Department of the Treasury as a profit centre, not a cost centre. Their effectiveness in bringing people to trial and achieving fines is so significant that they not only pay for themselves but flow money up into the Department of the Treasury. HMRC has very similar experience. It is now proposing significant financial incentives for whistleblowers on the grounds that this will allow the recovery of lost tax to a degree that will more than pay for the process. There is a real set of questions there.
I fully accept that there are many ways in which to do this but I am feeling heartened by the broader receptivity around this issue. I do not think that there is one template that works for all, but there certainly can be a template that would work well within the context of the work that the PSFA will do. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, this has been a very useful debate, and I hope to be able to give some clarity on some of the issues that have been raised. It would be remiss of me, and I should have done it earlier, not to thank the noble Lord, Lord Maude, for starting the process of where we have ended up today. He and the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, started a great deal of this under the previous Government. We are now seeking to ensure that the PSFA has the appropriate powers to deliver what they started.
Before I move on to the substance of this group, I think it would be helpful to respond to a question that was touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, about what a public authority means with regard to the Bill and what we are actually talking about. Public authority is defined in Clause 70 “Interpretation”. The definition is:
“‘public authority’ means a person with functions of a public nature so far as acting in the exercise of those functions”.
It would include, for example, other government departments, arm’s-length bodies and local authorities. This is a broad definition that takes in a wide range of organisations and delivery mechanisms for public functions to ensure that fraud against the public sector in its widest sense can be tackled.
Whether a body comes into the definition of public authority will be tested before a case is adopted, but let us be clear that, especially when we are talking about fraud, it would be surprising if someone was targeting the public sector and they stopped at the remit of one government department just because we define it as one government department. We all know, and noble Lords who have served in government are even more aware, that MHCLG, the Cabinet Office, the DfE and the Department of Health will have multiple users that may touch on different levels of fraud, which is why it is important that we have the breadth of definition.
On the substance of this group, Amendment 4 would remove error from the scope of the amounts that the Minister can recover. This would significantly change and restrict the scope of the PSFA’s recovery function. It would mean that, if the PSFA investigates a case and does not find fraud but does find that a person has had money that they were not entitled to, it would not be able to take action to recover it, including using the debt powers in the Bill. The PSFA would have to refer the matter back to the public authority concerned to take whatever error recovery actions it is willing and able to take.
In response to concerns raised by many noble Lords, including the noble Baroness, Lady Fox—I am pleased that I was able to make her happy at the beginning of Committee stage—it is very likely that the PSFA will encounter payments that could be classed as error. Fraud and error are difficult to separate. Indeed, the National Audit Office and the PSFA do not attempt to do so in their measurement methodology. This is because proving fraud requires evidence of intent, and it is often impractical or impossible to do so. One of the purposes of the Bill is to do more to evidence fraud and take the right action to tackle it, but I hope noble Lords will agree that when you have money that you are not entitled to, you should pay it back and it should be recoverable if it is not paid back. That has always been a principle that the Government have adopted.
Before I move on to wider detail, I want to touch on some comments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, on the loophole for public authorities. Public authorities are the victims, not the perpetrators. Even without powers, the PSFA enforcement unit is getting referrals. We do not foresee a shortage of cases coming our way. The PSFA must be able to triage and pursue the most impactful and value-for-money cases. This is a genuine question—which is why we are here in Committee—of culture and approach, and one that we should have a conversation about. The Government genuinely believe that a collaborative approach with other government departments will yield more co-operation in terms of investigations than a more aggressive approach. Being invited in will ensure that government departments actively engage with us, as has proven to be the case during our pilot so far.
I believe it will assist your Lordships’ Committee if I briefly set out the circumstances in which a public authority would recover an amount of money. Accounting officers of public authorities are required to follow the principles set out in the HM Treasury publication Managing Public Money in annexe 4.11, which is— apparently—readily available to noble Lords. The relevant section states:
“Most organisations responsible for making payments will sometimes discover that they have made overpayments in error. In principle public sector organisations should always pursue recovery of overpayments, irrespective of how they came to be made. In practice, however, there will be both practical and legal limits to how cases should be handled. So each case should be dealt with on its merits”.
Amendment 5 would remove the words:
“only at the request of that public authority”
from Clause 2(1). I believe the intention of this amendment is that PSFA should be able to simply decide to open a fraud investigation irrespective of the wishes of the target of fraud, in the same way that the police can open an investigation into other crimes. However, omitting the deleted words but not otherwise changing the clause would create an element of uncertainty over who is responsible, in the first instance, for dealing with fraud against a public authority. At the moment, it is clearly the public authority. If the intention of this amendment is that it should be for the Minister for the Cabinet Office to decide to investigate, whether or not the public authority wants the Minister to step in, this may conflict with the preservation of public authorities’ own fraud functions in Clause 2(5)(b).
Responsibility for managing fraud is, in the first instance, given to accounting officers of public authorities, as set out by Managing Public Money annexe 4.9—which I am sure all noble Lords have read. There may also be other unintended consequences by the adoption of this amendment, specifically whether the revised working of the clause might actually compel the Minister for the Cabinet Office to investigate all public sector fraud. That is something beyond the current capacity of the PSFA, which I am sure we will discuss in great detail later in Committee. If the PSFA finds fraud off its own bat, as it were, it might not then be clear on what legal basis, if any, it would be able to recover it, as it would not be acting on behalf of the public authority per se. The Government seek to maintain the status quo of acting at the request of public authorities as a matter of operational practice as set out in this Bill, in order to prevent any confusion.
The noble Lord, Lord Maude, raised a query about the Treasury not taking this seriously. The PSFA reports to the Cabinet Office and HMT. It works closely, advising HMT on fraud as part of the spending review process. I hope that that is somewhat reassuring, given where we are in the spending review process.
Amendment 6 would remove the restriction in Clause 2(2) on the PSFA undertaking cases at the request of the DWP and HMRC. This would be a significant change in policy intent. HMRC and DWP have 84% of the counterfraud resource across His Majesty’s Government, including thousands of people and their own designated powers. The PSFA role envisaged is supporting those departments which do not have well-developed fraud investigation, enforcement and recovery functions or powers, not seeking to subsume those with targeted powers that are already well established. For once, this is a government department not seeking to gather other people’s power and staff. Neither HMRC nor DWP need the further assistance of Part 1 of this Bill and there are many other public authorities which do.
If the Minister does not mind, can I pick up the issue that the noble Lord, Lord Maude, raised? Nobody knows how to manage government more closely than him; he is deeper steeped in this than any of us. How does the Minister anticipate dealing with the fragmentation of investigation? If HMRC is chasing down someone, you can almost be certain that it will be dealing with public procurement in a different way and that there will be other issues around that particular entity. Is there a mechanism she sees that will break down those siloed lines?
I reassure your Lordships’ Committee, particularly the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, that the PSFA and HMRC or the DWP can and will do dual investigations and work closely together. They have their own powers. I think the case of HMRC is probably more relevant than the DWP, but they will work collaboratively and do joint operations while having their own separate remits. It is not that they will not work together; however, we anticipate that especially where there is evidence—as I said earlier, it is about breadth of government—we would expect the majority of the PSFA’s work to be outside of those government agencies or public authorities.
Amendment 7 is unnecessary because it straight- forwardly duplicates matters already dealt with elsewhere in the Bill. Clause 1(1)(a) states that the Minister is given the function of investigating “suspected fraud” against public authorities. Clause 70, the interpretation clause, defines “suspected fraud” as
“conduct which the Minister has reasonable grounds to suspect may constitute fraud”.
I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, is content that the issues she raises in this amendment are appropriately dealt with.
Finally, Amendment 8 would restrict the fees that the PSFA could charge a public authority for investigation, enforcement or recovery action to no more than the amount that is recovered. Cash recovery is the hardest part of enforcement. Many initiated investigations will close without reaching the recovery stage—for example, because no fraud is found, an alternative approach is taken or because recovery is not possible even if the investigation is successful. The amendment would mean that no fee could be charged in those cases, despite the PSFA having necessarily invested resources into the investigation with the agreement of the public authority to have taken the case and undertaken the actions in the first place. That does not represent good value for money and runs contrary to the guidance in Managing Public Money on cost recovery.
In the most serious cases, cash recovery may not be the main or even a major factor; it will be the disruption of criminal gangs and prosecution of serious offenders. Such cases may be long, complex and multi-agency, and costs will probably exceed any potential recovery quite quickly. In cases of organised crime, assets may be irretrievable, laundered beyond reach or overseas. The public interest in investigation is to punish the criminals. The adoption of this clause would also fail to acknowledge or promote the deterrent effect of the investigations. The PSFA cannot be restricted in the cases that it selects by how much of its costs it can recover; that is counterproductive and counterintuitive.
I have two other points to raise.
There is a balance here, because of the positives that go alongside this. There is a genuine issue that, if a criminal gang is actively targeting a public authority, the investigation and prosecution of those people in itself is something that the public authority would wish to see. There will always be costs involved in criminal activities, even if they cannot all be recovered. The police actively investigate criminal gangs, with the pragmatic understanding that not all costs can be recovered. There is also a deterrent effect in prosecuting people to ensure that everyone is aware that, if you defraud the state, you will be prosecuted. We will not always be able to get the money back, but we must be realistic about what is in front of us and what we can achieve.
I have not thought this through, but a no win, no fee approach seems quite useful. If the PSFA, which will have many successful prosecutions where it brings in fees that are well above its actual costs, it will have a resource that will surely allow it to pursue cases where there is not a successful recovery but where it is important for the case to go ahead. I am just wondering whether there is not a model that might work more effectively.
The noble Baroness makes an interesting point. That is why the Cabinet Office and the PSFA are adopting a test-and-learn approach to see what will and will not work. Having said that, we have to be realistic that we will not always be able to recover funds and someone has to pay for the cost of the investigation. The balance of what that looks like is something we will have to explore as cases progress.
My Lords, I will very quickly make a couple of comments on Amendments 9 and 10. First, on Amendment 9, I have an amendment later in Committee that inserts a reasonableness point in a similar way, so I support this. However, I wonder whether this amendment is actually in the wrong place; I suggest that it ought to be in the initial line—“the Minister should reasonably consider”—as opposed to “reasonably proportionate”, but that is a small issue. I support the concept of Amendment 9.
Amendment 10 is quite important. This issue has been raised by the banking industry, and there is a very real concern that the receipt of a notice might provide reasonable grounds for the financial services firm to know or suspect that the customer has defrauded the public sector. In that situation, the failure to take action, for example to close or restrict the account, might conflict with wider anti-money laundering obligations and, possibly—I am not sure this is right—the corporate criminal offence of failure to prevent fraud. That might include having to exit customer relationships and so on.
So there is a very real concern from the financial services industry here. I am sure that that is not the intention of the Government in this situation but it is something that we need to think about, as the receipt of a notice cannot be seen as reasonable grounds to suspect fraud, because that would set all sorts of hares running against people who might be entirely innocent.
My Lords, I will just pick up the issue that has been raised by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. We are dealing tomorrow with a statutory instrument that attempts to provide safeguards against banks and other organisations deciding to close people’s bank accounts or to deprive them of other financial services. It is often the people who are under the most financial pressure who find it difficult to get banked in the first place. They can get a basic bank account if they are lucky, but to get a bank account with any of the features that make financial life reasonable is exceedingly difficult. I therefore share the noble Lord’s concern that we do not start a hare running.
Banks are eager to offload people who do not have a lot of exciting and interesting activity. If this notice gives them an excuse to do that, I can see that an awful lot of banks will seize that opportunity, so I raise this as an issue to be wary of. In fact, we have an SI going in the opposite direction tomorrow, so this is really for the Government to make sure that one hand knows what the other hand is doing.
My Lords, I apologise in advance, because I think we are about to have a vote—or not, if the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, does not press her Motion.
Some significant points have been touched on in this very short debate. I will respond to each amendment in turn. Amendment 9 looks to introduce a test of reasonableness to determine whether an authorised officer has appropriately considered that information sought is both necessary and proportionate. Clause 3(1)(a) and (b) already set out the test for issuing an information notice: an authorised officer will have the power to compel information only when it is necessary and proportionate to do so, and only when the information being requested relates to a person whom an authorised officer has reasonable grounds to suspect has committed fraud.
My Lords, our amendments in this group are based on a recognition of the fact that we are granting sweeping powers to investigators in the PSFA, to be exercised in the name of the Minister. This is, again, all about proportionality.
Amendment 17 would require the Minister to set out in statutory guidance the process through which authorised investigators are appointed. In combating fraud, we must protect against the creation of opaque but powerful bodies with inadequate oversight and accountability. Justice, a cross-party law reform and human rights organisation working to strengthen the UK justice system, recognises this amendment as an effective measure that would bring much-needed clarity to the process of appointment and the standards under consideration in that process.
Amendments 18, 19 and 20 relate to property. Amendment 18 seeks to probe the Government on the sort of changes they anticipate may be deemed necessary by the courts in relation to seized property. Before we vote to endorse this part of the Bill, I hope that the Government will take this opportunity to provide greater clarity on how they expect that the powers provided for under this part will be exercised, which is a particularly important point of clarification given that we are talking about property seized by the state.
Amendments 19 and 20 combined would prolong the period of time that must pass before an order to dispose of or destroy the seized property can be enacted. The seizure and destruction of personal property is a substantial power, and we must balance the practical consideration of holding seized property with a view to protect the rights of the individual to property which is theirs and which they have a right to recover. We believe that extending this period from six months to one year is a proportionate measure that would balance the practicalities of the process with the rights of the citizen.
Amendment 21 relates to oversight of the exercise of powers granted to the Cabinet Office under the provisions in this clause. If the Government deem it necessary to grant powers of this scale to the Cabinet Office in order to combat fraud, this must come with the acceptance that proper oversight and review of how those powers are used is a concurrent responsibility. This should not be left to the discretion of the Minister and ensuring that oversight is properly exercised from day one is a vital change.
Amendment 22 is an important measure designed, again, to ensure that sensitive information can be disclosed only to relevant persons. Although I am sure that this is simply an oversight in how the Government have drafted the Bill, clarifying the persons to whom information can be disclosed is an important safeguarding measure that would inspire confidence in investigations and ensure that confidence in the relationship between the IOPC and the PSFA is strong from day one. I hope that the Government and noble Lords will recognise this as a sensible improvement, which seeks to facilitate the role of the IOPC in the way that the Government have outlined.
The amendments in this group are rooted in a single, guiding principle: the exercise of significant powers by the state must always be matched by strong safeguards, transparency and oversight. We recognise the necessity of equipping investigators with the tools to combat fraud, but we must not do so at the expense of proportionality or the rights of the individual.
From the appointment of authorised investigators to the seizure and potential destruction of personal property, these powers touch on serious questions of liberty, accountability and trust in our institutions. Our amendments seek to ensure that powers are not only effective but clearly defined, properly scrutinised and subject to checks that protect both the public interest and individual rights. In strengthening the role of oversight, clarifying the limits on data sharing and demanding clear standards in the appointment and exercise of authority, these are far from wrecking amendments; they are constructive and measured. They reflect the careful, balanced approach we must take when legislating in areas where the state touches most directly on the lives and property of citizens. I hope the Government will engage seriously with these proposals and that noble Lords across the House will support them. I beg to move.
My Lords, I will be brief. The Minister will be aware that false bailiffs knocking at your door are a major scam, and the PSFA clearly would not intend or hope to be a source of opportunity for people pursuing a scam in claiming to be part of its activities.
Has the Minister had the opportunity to talk to people such as those from StepChange to try to get a feel for how to deal with people who are vulnerable from whom they need to collect property or recover items? Has that charity been involved in shaping the framework for this particular set of issues?