Pension Schemes Bill

Wednesday 3rd December 2025 Commons Chamber

Consideration of Bill, as amended in the Public Bill Committee

New Clause 30

Funding of the Ombudsman for the Board of the Pension Protection Fund

“(1) In the Pension Schemes Act 1993, in section 175(1) (general levy)—

(a) omit the “or” at the end of paragraph (d);

(b) after that paragraph insert—

“(da) of the Secretary of State under section 209(6) of the Pensions Act 2004 (payments to PPF Ombudsman), or”

(2) In section 209 of the Pensions Act 2004 (ombudsman for the Board of the Pension Protection Fund), omit subsections (7) and (8).”—(Torsten Bell.)

This new clause (which is intended to be added after clause 112) enables the expenditure of the Ombudsman for the Board of the Pension Protection Fund to be paid from money raised by the general levy payable by occupational pension schemes, and removes the power to impose a separate levy to meet this expenditure.

Brought up, and read the First time.

14:19

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government new clause 31—Indexation of periodic compensation for pre-1997 service: Great Britain.

Government new clause 32—Indexation of periodic compensation for pre-1997 service: Northern Ireland.

Government new clause 33—Financial Assistance Scheme: indexation of payments for pre-1997 service.

Government new clause 34—Exemption from public procurement rules.

Government new clause 35—Funding of the Board of the Pension Protection Fund.

New clause 1—Independent review into pension losses incurred by former employees of AEA Technology—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act, commission an independent review into the pension losses incurred by former employees of AEA Technology who—

(a) transferred their accrued pension benefits out of the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) public service scheme to AEA Technology (AEAT) on privatisation in 1996, and

(b) suffered financial losses when AEA Technology went into administration in 2012 and the pension scheme entered the Pension Protection Fund (PPF).

(2) The review must examine—

(a) the extent and causes of pension losses incurred by affected individuals,

(b) the role of Government policy and representations in the transfer of pensions during the privatisation of AEA Technology,

(c) the findings of the Public Accounts Committee and the Work and Pensions Select Committee,

(d) the adequacy of safeguards provided at the time of privatisation,

(e) potential mechanisms for redress or compensation, and

(f) the estimated financial cost of any such mechanisms.

(3) The review must be—

(a) conducted by an independent panel appointed by the Secretary of State, with relevant expertise in pensions, public policy, and administrative justice, and

(b) transparent and consultative, including engagement with affected pensioners and their representatives.

(4) The panel must report its findings and recommendations to the Secretary of State and lay a copy of its final report before Parliament within 12 months of its establishment.

(5) The Secretary of State must, within 6 months of the publication of the report under subsection (4), lay before both Houses of Parliament a statement setting out the Secretary of State’s response to that outcome.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into the pension losses incurred by former employees of AEA Technology.

New clause 2—Transfer of British Coal Staff Superannuation Scheme investment reserve to members—

“(1) Within 3 months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for the transfer of the British Coal Staff Superannuation Scheme investment reserve to members of the scheme.

(2) Those regulations must include—

(a) a timetable for transferring the total of the investment reserve to members of the scheme, and

(b) plans for commissioning an independent review into how future surplus will be shared.

(3) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to set out in regulations a timetable for transferring the whole of the BCSSS investment reserve to members and committing to review how future surplus will be shared.

New clause 3—Terminal illness: means of demonstrating eligibility—

“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision about how a person may demonstrate that they are terminally ill for purposes relating to compensation or assistance from the Pension Protection Fund or Financial Assistance Scheme.

(2) In making regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must seek to minimise the administrative burden placed upon the person with a terminal illness.

(3) Regulations under this section must provide that, where the Department of Work and Pensions (“the Department”) holds a valid SR1 form in respect of a person seeking to demonstrate that they are terminally ill for purposes relating to compensation or assistance from the Pension Protection Fund or Financial Assistance Scheme, the Department must share that form with the Pension Protection Fund or the Financial Assistance Scheme.

(4) Regulations under this section must require the Pension Protection Fund and the Financial Assistance Scheme to make the appropriate payment or payments within a specified time of receipt of a valid application.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to provide, by regulations, for the use of a valid SR1 form to make it easier for a person to demonstrate that they are terminally ill for purposes related to compensation from the PPF or FAS.

New clause 4—Review into investment in defence companies—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, carry out a review into investment in defence companies within Local Government Pension Schemes.

(2) The review must consider how the investment in defence companies—

(a) impacts on, and

(b) aligns with,

the UK Government’s international obligations.

(3) The Secretary of State must prepare a report of the review and lay a copy of that report before Parliament.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to conduct a review into investment in defence companies within Local Government Pension Schemes and how that impacts and aligns with Government international obligations.

New clause 5—Review into defined benefit schemes’ social impact—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, carry out a review into the social impact of defined benefit schemes.

(2) The review must include an assessment of—

(a) the efficacy of investment strategies in delivering social good, and

(b) the potential impact of increasing investment in—

(i) social housing, and

(ii) green technology.

(3) For the purposes of this section—

“social good” means something which benefits society as a whole, and

“green technology” means the use of technology and science to create environmentally-friendly products and services.

(4) The Secretary of State must prepare a report of the review and lay a copy of that report before Parliament.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to review the efficacy of investment in terms of delivering social good and the benefits of directing more investment towards social housing and green technology.

New clause 6—Indexation of pre-1997 service—

“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for indexation on compensation in respect of pre-1997 rights for members of the Pension Protection Fund and the Financial Assistance Scheme.

(2) Those regulations must specify that—

(a) pension payments from the PPF and FAS are increased each year in line with Consumer Prices Index (CPI) inflation for pensionable service before and after 6 April 1997,

(b) where a PPF or FAS member has pensionable service prior to 6 April 1997 which has not increased each year in line with CPI inflation, but which their scheme provided for, the scheme manager must—

(i) determine the annual increase attributable to that service for each year since the date on which the annual payment was first payable, and

(ii) reimburse the member for the amount determined under paragraph (b)(i), and

(c) increased payments must also apply to transferee members, to ill health payments and to payments to surviving dependants.

(3) Regulations under this section—

(a) shall be made by statutory instrument, and

(b) may not be made unless a draft has been laid before and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to provide, through regulations, for indexation on PPF and FAS compensation in respect of pre-1997 rights.

New clause 7—Report on indexation of pre-1997 Pension Protection Fund and Financial Assistance Scheme benefits—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, publish a report on options for providing indexation to pension rights relating to pre-1997 service in the Pension Protection Fund (PPF) and the Financial Assistance Scheme (FAS).

(2) The report must consider—

(a) the current absence of indexation on pre-1997 accrued rights and the financial impact on affected pensioners;

(b) the number of pensioners affected and the mortality rates since the establishment of FAS and PPF, including evidence from the Pensions Action Group;

(c) the feasibility of introducing indexation, in full or in part, for pre-1997 rights;

(d) the potential use of scheme reserves, including residual funds from failed schemes transferred into the FAS, and the implications for taxpayers;

(e) the urgency of reform given the age profile of affected members and the social impact of frozen incomes;

(f) alternative funding mechanisms that could deliver indexation without undermining the sustainability of the PPF; and

(g) comparative approaches to legacy benefit indexation in other jurisdictions.

(3) In preparing the report, the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) the Pensions Regulator,

(b) the Pension Protection Fund,

(c) representatives of Financial Assistance Scheme members,

(d) the Pensions Action Group, and

(e) such other stakeholders as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

(4) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before both Houses of Parliament.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish a report examining options for addressing the lack of indexation on pre-1997 pensionable service in the PPF and FAS, with particular regard to evidence provided by the Pensions Action Group, mortality data, scheme reserves, and the urgency of the issue.

New clause 8—Universal Pension Advice Entitlement—

“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations establish a system to ensure that every individual has a right to receive free, impartial pension advice at prescribed times.

(2) Regulations under subsection (1) must provide for individuals to be offered advice—

(a) at or around the age of 40; and

(b) at a prescribed age, not more than six years before the individual's expected retirement age.

(3) The regulations must make provision about—

(a) the content and scope of the free, impartial pension advice, which may include, but is not limited to, guidance on—

(i) pension types (including both defined contribution and defined benefit schemes),

(ii) investment strategies,

(iii) charges,

(iv) consolidation of pension pots, and

(v) retirement income options;

(b) the qualifications, independence, and impartiality requirements for any person or body providing advice;

(c) the means by which individuals are notified of their entitlement to receive the advice and how they may access it;

(d) the roles and responsibilities of pension scheme trustees, managers, and providers in facilitating access to advice;

(e) the sharing member information with prescribed persons or bodies subject to appropriate data protection safeguards.

(4) Regulations under this section may—

(a) make different provision for different descriptions of pension schemes or different descriptions of individuals;

(b) confer functions in connection with the provision or oversight of the advice on—

(i) the Pensions Regulator,

(ii) the Financial Conduct Authority,

(iii) the Money and Pensions Service, or

(iv) other prescribed bodies;

(c) require the provision of funding for the advice service from prescribed sources.

(5) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”

This new clause makes provision by regulations for everyone to receive free, impartial pension advice at age 40 and again around five years before their expected retirement.

New clause 10—Independent review of forfeiture of survivor pensions in police pension schemes—

“(1) The Secretary of State must commission an independent review into the impact and fairness of provisions within police pension schemes that result in the forfeiture, reduction, or suspension of survivor pensions on the grounds of—

(a) remarriage or entry into a civil partnership by the surviving partner of a deceased scheme member; or

(b) cohabitation with another person as if married or in a civil partnership.

(2) The review must examine—

(a) the legal and policy basis for such provisions;

(b) the financial, social, and emotional impact on affected individuals and families;

(c) consistency with other public sector pension schemes, including schemes for—

(i) the Armed Forces,

(ii) the NHS, and

(iii) the civil service;

(d) potential options for reform, including retrospective reinstatement of pensions;

(e) any other matters the Secretary of State considers relevant.

(3) The Secretary of State must—

(a) appoint an independent person or panel with relevant legal, pensions, and public policy expertise to conduct the review; and

(b) publish the terms of reference no later than three months after this Act is passed.

(4) The person or panel appointed under subsection (3) must—

(a) consult with relevant stakeholders, including—

(i) the National Association of Retired Police Officers (NARPO),

(ii) survivor pension recipients,

(iii) police staff associations, and

(iv) pensions experts;

(b) consider written and oral evidence submitted by affected individuals; and

(c) publish a report of its findings and recommendations within 12 months of appointment.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into the impact and fairness of provisions within police pension schemes that result in the forfeiture, reduction, or suspension of survivor pensions.

New clause 11—Independent review into state deduction in defined benefit pension schemes—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act, commission an independent review into the application and impact of state deduction mechanisms in occupational defined benefit pension schemes.

(2) The review must consider—

(a) the origin, rationale and implementation of state deduction in the Midland Bank Staff Pension Scheme,

(b) the clarity and adequacy of member communications regarding state deduction from inception to present,

(c) the differential impact of state deduction on pensioners with varying salary histories, including an assessment of any disproportionate effects on—

(i) lower-paid staff, and

(ii) women,

(d) comparisons with other occupational pension schemes in the banking and public sectors, and

(e) the legal, administrative, and financial feasibility of modifying or removing state deduction provisions, including potential mechanisms for redress.

(3) The Secretary of State must ensure that the person or body appointed to conduct the review—

(a) is independent of HSBC Bank plc and its associated pension schemes;

(b) possesses relevant expertise in pensions law, occupational pension scheme administration, and equality and fairness in retirement income; and

(c) undertakes appropriate consultation with—

(i) affected scheme members,

(ii) employee representatives,

(iii) pension experts, and

(iv) stakeholder organisations.

(4) The person or body conducting the review must—

(a) submit a report on its findings to the Secretary of State within 12 months of the date the review is commissioned; and

(b) the Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before Parliament and publish the report in full.

(5) Within three months of laying the report before Parliament, the Secretary of State must publish a written response setting out the Government’s proposed actions, if any, in response to the report’s findings and recommendations.

(6) For the purposes of this section—

“state deduction” means any provision within a defined benefit occupational pension scheme that reduces pension entitlements by reference to the member reaching state pension age or by reference to any state pension entitlement;

“defined benefit pension scheme” has the meaning given in section 181 of the Pension Schemes Act 1993;

“Midland Bank Staff Pension Scheme” includes all associated legacy arrangements and any successor schemes administered by HSBC Bank Pension Trust (UK) Ltd.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into clawback provisions in occupational defined benefit pension schemes, in particular, the Midland Bank staff pension scheme.

New clause 12—Section 40 commencement—

“(1) The provisions in section 40 shall not come into force except in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of State.

(2) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (1) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”

This new clause would require that the provisions in clause 40 could only be enacted once agreed through secondary legislation.

New clause 13—Targeted Advice Access for Under-Saving Cohorts—

“(1) The Secretary of State must make regulations to provide enhanced access to pension advice or guidance for cohorts identified as under-saving for retirement.

(2) Regulations may make provision for—

(a) identifying under-saving groups, including but not limited to—

(i) women,

(ii) ethnic minority groups, and

(iii) others affected by long-term pay or pension gaps;

(b) mechanisms to fund and deliver targeted support;

(c) reporting and evaluation requirements to assess take-up and effectiveness.

(3) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”

This new clause allows for the creation of targeted pension advice or guidance interventions for groups at risk of under-saving for retirement.

New clause 14—Cap on cost of advice for pension holders—

“(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations introduce a cap on the cost recoverable for providing pension advice per pension holder under any scheme operating free or subsidised advice.

(2) The cap may vary depending on—

(a) the value of the pension pot;

(b) the type of pension scheme;

(c) the complexity of advice required.

(3) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”

This new clause enables the introduction of a cost ceiling for advice provision to members of pension schemes.

New clause 15—Independent review into the British Coal Staff Superannuation Scheme—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act, commission an independent review into the treatment of members of the British Coal Staff Superannuation Scheme (BCSSS).

(2) The review must consider—

(a) the origin and operation of the Government’s surplus-sharing arrangements with the BCSSS since 1994,

(b) the adequacy of communication to scheme members regarding the use of surpluses,

(c) the impact of the Government’s retention of scheme reserves on members’ retirement income,

(d) representations made by the Trustees of the BCSSS calling for reserves to be released to members, and

(e) options for reforming how any future surpluses in the BCSSS are shared between the Government and scheme members.

(3) The person or body appointed to conduct the review must—

(a) be independent of the Government and the BCSSS Trustees,

(b) possess relevant expertise in pensions law and scheme administration, and

(c) consult with affected members, Trustees, pension experts, and stakeholder organisations.

(4) The review must report to the Secretary of State within 12 months of being commissioned, and the Secretary of State must lay the report before Parliament and publish it in full.

(5) Within three months of publication, the Secretary of State must publish the Government’s response to the review’s findings.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into the treatment of members of the British Coal Staff Superannuation Scheme, including the handling of scheme reserves and future surplus-sharing arrangements.

New clause 16—Report on Pension Scheme Eligibility and Access—

“(1) The Secretary of State shall, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament a report into the operation of occupational pension schemes where certain categories of employees have been excluded on the basis of job classification or employment start date.

(2) The report must examine the case of employees and former employees of Fife Joinery Manufacturing (a subsidiary of Velux), including—

(a) whether affected workers were provided with opportunity to join existing pension schemes,

(b) the adequacy of record-keeping and employer accountability, and

(c) potential remedies to ensure equal access to workplace pensions.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to report on the Velux Pensions case.

New clause 17—Clarification of pension scheme investment duties—

“(1) The Pensions Act 1995 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 36 (Choosing investments), after subsection (9), insert—

“(10) Regulations under subsection (1) must provide—

(a) that when interpreting the best interest or sole interests of members and beneficiaries for the purposes of this section and the regulations, the trustees of a trust scheme may (amongst other matters) take the following into account—

(i) system-level considerations,

(ii) the reasonably foreseeable impacts over the appropriate time horizon of the assets or organisations in which the trust scheme invests upon prescribed matters, including upon members’ and beneficiaries’ standards of living, and

(iii) the views of members and beneficiaries;

(b) that investment powers or discretions must be exercised in a manner that considers and manages the matters specified in subsection (10)(a)(i) and (ii) where they are financially material; and

(c) a prescribed definition of the term “appropriate time horizon” for these purposes.

(11) For the purposes of this section, “system-level considerations” means, over the appropriate time horizon, risks and opportunities relevant to the scheme that—

(a) cannot be fully managed through diversification alone, and

(b) arise from circumstances at the level of one or more economic sectors, financial markets or economies, including but not limited to those relating to environmental or social matters.

(12) Regulations under subsection (1) must come into force no more than one year after the passing of the Pension Schemes Act 2025.

(13) In complying with requirements imposed by this section and regulations, a trustee or manager must have regard to guidance prepared from time to time by the Secretary of State.”

(3) The Financial Conduct Authority must make general rules with effects corresponding to the provisions of subsection (1) for providers of pension schemes to which Part 7A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (inserted by section 48 of this Act) applies.

(4) The Secretary of State must make regulations with effects corresponding to the provisions of subsection (1) for scheme managers of the Local Government Pension Scheme.

(5) The rules and regulations under subsections (3) and (4) must come into force no later than the date on which regulations pursuant to section 36(10) of the Pensions Act 1995 (as amended by this Act) come into force.”

This new clause gives the Secretary of State a duty to make regulations clarifying investment duties of occupational pension schemes, including system-level considerations and other matters including impacts of investee firms, beneficiaries’ standards of living and views. It also imposes duties on the FCA and the Secretary of State to make corresponding rules and regulations for workplace personal pension schemes and the Local Government Pension Scheme respectively.

New clause 18—Report on indexation of pre-1997 benefits—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 6 months of the passing of this Act, publish a report on whether the Pension Protection Fund and the Financial Assistance Scheme should provide indexation on compensation in respect of pre-1997 rights, where pension schemes provided for that.

(2) The report must consider—

(a) the potential benefits for affected pensioners;

(b) approaches of occupational pension schemes to indexation of pre-1997 benefits;

(c) the impact on compensation schemes’ surpluses and on public finances;

(d) international approaches to indexation of legacy pension benefits.

(3) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before both Houses of Parliament.”

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to report on whether the PPF and FAS should provide indexation on compensation in respect of pre-1997 rights, where scheme rules provided for that.

New clause 19—Fossil fuels and climate change risk—

“(1) The Pensions Act 1995 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 41A (Climate change risk), after subsection (6) insert—

“(6A) Regulations under subsection (1) must, within 1 year of the Pension Schemes Act 2025 receiving Royal Assent, prohibit the trustees or managers of schemes of a prescribed description from holding relevant assets.

(6B) The relevant assets in subsection (6A) are issuance by issuers which, in relation to thermal coal—

(a) derive 10% or more of annual revenue from its production, transport or combustion,

(b) produce annually 10 million tonnes or more, or

(c) have 5GW or more of power generation capacity.

(6C) Within 2 years of the Pensions Act 2025 receiving Royal Assent, and every 3 years thereafter, the Secretary of State must carry out and publish a review on whether the definition of relevant assets should be extended to include—

(a) issuance by issuers which, in relation to thermal coal, derive a smaller proportion of revenue, produce a smaller amount or have a smaller amount of power generation capacity than the proportion and amounts specified in (6B),

(b) some or all new issuance by issuers of a prescribed description deriving a prescribed proportion or amount of their revenue from the extraction, transport, trading or combustion of prescribed fossil fuels, or

(c) some or all new or existing issuance by issuers of a prescribed description investing a prescribed proportion or amount in exploring for, or expanding the extraction of, prescribed fossil fuels.

(6D) Regulations under subsection (1) may implement the conclusions of the review referred to in (6C).”

(3) In subsection (8), at end insert—

““thermal coal” means coal and lignite used in the generation of electricity and in providing heat for industrial or residential purposes;

“issuance” means all investable assets, including equity and debt.”

(4) The Financial Conduct Authority must make general rules with effects corresponding to the provisions of subsection (1) for providers of pension schemes to which Part 7A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (inserted by section 48 of this Act) applies.

(5) The Secretary of State must make regulations with effects corresponding to the provisions of subsection (1) for scheme managers of the Local Government Pension Scheme.

(6) The rules and regulations under subsections (4) and (5) must come into force no later than the date on which regulations pursuant to section 41A(6A) of the Pensions Act 1995 (as amended by this Act) come into force.”

This new clause would require Government and the FCA to make regulations and rules restricting exposure of some occupational and workplace personal schemes to thermal coal investments and to regularly review whether the restrictions should be extended to other fossil fuel investments.

New clause 20—Pensions and savings advice allowance—

“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for a tax-free pensions and savings advice allowance which individuals between the ages of 30 and 50 can withdraw from their pensions to access financial advice.

(2) Regulations must specify—

(a) the maximum amount for the pensions and savings advice allowance,

(b) the content and scope of the pensions and savings advice,

(c) the qualifications and independence requirements of any person or body providing pensions and savings advice,

(d) the means by which individuals are notified of their entitlement to the pensions and savings advice allowance and how they may access—

(i) the allowance, and

(ii) advisers who meet the requirements under subsection (2)(c),

(e) the roles and responsibilities of pension scheme trustees, managers, and providers in facilitating access to the pensions and savings advice allowance, and

(f) whether the pensions and savings advice allowance counts towards the Individual Lump Sum Allowance.

(3) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to introduce, by regulations, a pensions and savings advice allowance which individuals between the ages of 30 and 50 can withdraw from their pension savings tax-free to access appropriate financial advice.

New clause 21—Significant life event lump sum—

“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for a significant life event lump sum of up to £5,000 which a person is entitled to before they attain normal pension age.

(2) The regulations may prescribe circumstances in which, and conditions subject to which, a person may become entitled to a significant life event lump sum, including—

(a) purchasing a first home;

(b) getting married;

(c) unexpected loss of employment.

(3) The regulations must specify that the significant life event lump sum counts towards the Individual Lump Sum allowance.

(4) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to introduce, by regulations, a significant life event lump sum of up to £5,000 tax-free which individuals can take from their lump sum allowance prior to reaching pension age.

New clause 22—Indexation of pre-1997 pensions—

“(1) The Pensions Act 1995 is amended as follows.

(2) In Section 51 (Annual increase in rate of pension), omit subsections (1)(b) and (1)(c)(ii).

(3) In subsection (2), leave out from “pensionable service,” to “or”.

(4) In subsection (2), leave out from “commencement day]” to “—".

(5) In subsection (2)(b), leave out from “pensionable service” to “, so much of”.

(6) In subsection (4ZE), leave out from “pensionable service” to “in subsections (3) to (4ZD)”.

(7) In subsection (5)(a), leave out “6 April 1997 or”.

(8) In subsection (8)(a) and (b), leave out “at any time on or after 6 April 1997”.”

This new clause would remove references to 6 April 1997 from section 51 of the Pensions Act 1995 in order to require that annual increases to pension payments in line with CPI and RPI apply to pensionable service both before and after 6 April 1997.

New clause 23—Indexation of pre-1997 service—

“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for the use of Pension Protection Fund surplus/reserve funds for the indexation on compensation in respect of pre-1997 rights for members of the Pension Protection Fund and the Financial Assistance Scheme.

(2) Those regulations must specify that—

(a) pension payments from the PPF and FAS are increased each year in line with Retail Prices Index (RPI) inflation for pensionable service before and after 6 April 1997,

(b) the cap on the annual increase is raised to 7%,

(c) where a PPF or FAS member has pensionable service prior to 6 April 1997 which has not increased each year in line with RPI inflation, the scheme manager must—

(i) determine the annual increase attributable to that service for each year since the date on which the annual payment was first payable, and

(ii) reimburse the member for the amount determined under paragraph (c)(i), and

(d) payments made to reimburse members under paragraph (c)(ii) must be made from Pension Protection Fund surplus funds and future funds.

(3) Regulations under this section—

(a) shall be made by statutory instrument, and

(b) may not be made unless a draft has been laid before and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to provide, through regulations, for indexation on PPF and FAS compensation in respect of pre-1997 rights, for indexation to follow RPI inflation with a cap of 7%, and for retrospective payments to be funded from PFI surplus and/or reserve funds.

New clause 24—Indexation of pre-1997 pensions—

“(1) The Pensions Act 1995 is amended as follows.

(2) In Section 51 (Annual increase in rate of pension), omit subsections (1)(b) and (1)(c)(ii).

(3) In subsection (2), after “52” insert “52A”.

(4) In subsection (2), leave out from “pensionable service,” to “or,”.

(5) In subsection (2), leave out from “commencement day]” to “—”.

(6) In subsection (2)(b), leave out from “pensionable service” to “, so much of”.

(7) In subsection (4ZE), leave out from “pensionable service” to “in subsections (3) to (4ZD)”.

(8) In subsection (5)(a), leave out “6 April 1997 or”.

(9) In subsection (8)(a) and (b), leave out “at any time on or after 6 April 1997”.

(10) After Section 52 (Restriction on increase where member is under 55) insert—

“52A Restriction on increase where a pension scheme is not in surplus

No increase under section 51 in the annual rate of a pension shall not be paid or shall not be paid in full unless the pension scheme is in surplus.””

This new clause would remove references to 6 April 1997 from section 51 of the Pensions Act 1995 to require that annual increases to pension payments in line with CPI and RPI apply to pensionable service both before and after 6 April 1997, with the restriction that annual increases would only be paid if the pension scheme is in surplus.

New clause 25—Review of impact of this Act—

“(1) Within five years of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must carry out a review of the impact of the provisions of this Act on actual and projected retirement incomes.

(2) The review must consider—

(a) the impact of the provisions of this Act on actual and projected retirement incomes, and

(b) whether further measures are needed to ensure that pension scheme members receive an adequate income in retirement.

(3) The Secretary of State must prepare a report of the review and lay a copy of that report before Parliament.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to review the impact of this Act on retirement incomes and whether additional measures are needed to ensure the adequacy of retirement incomes.

New clause 26—Establishment of targeted investment vehicles for pension funds—

“(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for the establishment or facilitation of one or more investment vehicles through which pension schemes may invest for targeted social or economic benefit.

(2) Regulations under subsection (1) must specify the descriptions of targeted social or economic benefit to which the investment vehicles are to contribute, which may include, but are not limited to, investment in—

(a) projects that revitalise high street areas;

(b) initiatives demonstrating social benefit;

(c) affordable or social housing development;

(d) capital projects that meet essential public needs, such as care homes;

(e) clean, renewable energy projects.

(3) The regulations must make provision for—

(a) the types of pension schemes eligible to participate in such investment vehicles;

(b) the governance, oversight, and reporting requirements for the investment vehicles and participating pension schemes;

(c) the means by which the contribution of such investments to targeted social or economic benefit is measured and reported;

(d) the roles and responsibilities of statutory bodies, including the Pensions Regulator and the Financial Conduct Authority, in authorising, regulating, or supervising such investment vehicles and the participation of pension schemes within them.

(4) The regulations may—

(a) make different provision for different descriptions of pension schemes, investment vehicles, or targeted social or economic benefits;

(b) provide for the pooling of assets from multiple pension schemes within such vehicles;

(c) require pension scheme trustees or managers to have regard to the availability and suitability of investment vehicles when formulating investment strategies, where consistent with—

(i) their fiduciary duties, and

(ii) the long-term value for money for members.

(5) In this Chapter, "pension scheme" has the same meaning as in section 1(5) of the Pension Schemes Act 1993.”

This new clause would allow the Secretary of State to establish investment funds to encourage investment in areas such as high streets, social housing, care homes, clean renewable energy, and other investments with clear social benefits.

New clause 27—Review of proposed mandated investment powers and their impacts—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, before making any regulations under this Act relating to mandated investment requirements for pension schemes, lay before Parliament a report reviewing the potential impacts of such powers.

(2) The report under subsection (1) must include an assessment of—

(a) the extent to which any mandated investment requirements may conflict with the fiduciary duties of trustees and managers of occupational and personal pension schemes;

(b) the potential effects of such requirements on the long-term financial returns of scheme members, including—

(i) risks relating to illiquid or politically directed assets,

(ii) risks to diversification, and

(iii) any expected increase in costs borne by savers;

(c) the risk that mandated investment requirements could lead to politicisation of pension scheme decisions or undermine public confidence in the private pension system;

(d) the adequacy of parliamentary oversight and scrutiny of the exercise of powers to mandate investment allocations, including whether additional safeguards are required;

(e) the question of accountability in circumstances where mandated investments perform below expectations, including whether liability would rest with trustees, fund managers, or the Government;

(f) the potential for market distortion arising from requirements that schemes invest in specific UK-based assets, including the risk of asset inflation or the creation of investment bubbles; and

(g) alternative policy measures that could encourage pension scheme investment in the United Kingdom without the use of mandatory requirements, including the removal of regulatory barriers and the creation of suitable investment opportunities.

(3) The report must include a summary of views received from—

(a) industry bodies representing pension schemes, trustees, and fund managers;

(b) relevant financial regulators; and

(c) any other persons the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

(4) The Secretary of State must publish a response addressing the findings and any recommendations contained in the report.

(5) No regulations requiring pension schemes to meet mandated investment allocations may be made under this Act until the report under subsection (1) has been laid before Parliament and the response under subsection (4) has been published.”

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to review the potential effects of mandated investment powers including on risks to returns, fiduciary duties, market distortion, and accountability before any powers can be exercised.

New clause 28—Pension Protection Fund: members who have not attained normal pension age at assessment date—

“(1) Schedule 7 of the Pensions Act 2004 is amended in accordance with subsections (2) to (7).

(2) In sub-paragraph 3(3), for “the appropriate percentage” substitute “100%”.

(3) Omit sub-paragraph 3(4).

(4) In sub-paragraph 11(3), for “90%” substitute “100%”.

(5) In sub-paragraph 14(3), for “90%” substitute “100%”.

(6) In sub-paragraph 15(3), for “90%” substitute “100%”.

(7) In sub-paragraph 19(3), for “90%” substitute “100%”.

(8) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for the retrospective payment of compensation to PPF members, as if the amendments made by this section to Schedule 7 of the Pensions Act 2004 had had effect on the day on which that Schedule came into force.”

This new clause would provide that pension scheme members who have not reached Normal Pension Age by the Pension Protection Fund assessment date receive compensation at a rate of 100% instead of 90%, and provides for retrospective application.

New clause 29—Pension Protection Fund: estimate of cost of increasing compensation for surviving spouses or partners of members—

“(1) The Pension Protection Fund (PPF) must prepare and publish an annual estimate of the cost of increasing the value of compensation paid to surviving spouses or partners of PPF members to a sum equivalent to the value of any payments to which they would have been entitled had the scheme not entered the PPF.

(2) The first assessment under this section must be published before the end of the 2025/26 financial year.”

This new clause would require the Pension Protection fund (PPF) to publish annually an assessment of the costs of increasing compensation to the spouses or partners of PPF members to equal the amount they would have received if the pension scheme had not entered the PPF.

New clause 36—Local Government Pension Scheme: expenses and duties of administering authorities—

“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for—

(a) a cap on the management expenses that can be claimed by administering authorities, such that they do not exceed ten basis points of the asset base of the pension fund,

(b) a cap on the investment management expenses that can be claimed by administering authorities, such that they do not exceed five basis points of the asset base of the pension fund,

(c) a cap on the general administrative expenses that can be claimed by administering authorities, such that they do not exceed five basis points of the asset base of the pension fund.

(2) Regulations under this section must also require administering bodies to provide to the Local Government Pension Scheme Advisory Board—

(a) evidence that they have considered and acted on any guidance issued by the Local Government Pension Scheme Advisory Board, and

(b) evidence of the steps that they have taken to comply with their fiduciary duties in respect of pension scheme members and Scheme employers.

(3) In making regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must consult the Local Government Pension Scheme Advisory Board.

(4) In this section—

“administering authorities” has the meaning given by Schedule 1 to the Local Government Pension Scheme Regulations 2013, and

“Scheme employer” has the meaning given by Schedule 1 to the Local Government Pension Scheme Regulations 2013.”

Amendment 1, in clause 1, page 3, line 7, at end insert “, or

(b) secure employee representation on the company’s board.”

This amendment would add employee representation on boards as a requirement on asset pool companies for Local Government Pension Schemes within the scheme regulations under clause 1.

Government amendments 20 and 21.

Amendment 2, in clause 2, page 4, line 7, at end insert—

“(ba) the funds or other assets for which a scheme manager is responsible (other than money needed for making payments under the scheme from the pension fund maintained by that scheme manager) should be invested in a way that is compliant with the UK’s duty not to aid or assist serious breaches of international law, including genocide and other atrocity crimes, and illegal military occupation.”

This amendment would require that investments of the local government pension scheme should be compliant with the UK’s duty not to aid or assist serious breaches of international law.

Amendment 3, page 4, line 7, at end insert—

“(ba) the funds or other assets for which a scheme manager is responsible (other than money needed for making payments under the scheme from the pension fund maintained by that scheme manager) must be divested from any oil and gas companies within 5 years of the passing of this Act.”

This amendment would require that local government pension schemes divest from oil and gas companies within 5 years.

Government amendments 22 and 23.

Amendment 17, in clause 9, page 9, line 25, leave out from “does” to the end of line 25 and insert

“apply to a scheme that is being wound up unless the trustees determine by resolution that it shall not apply.”

This amendment would ensure that the principles for surplus extraction shall also apply to surplus release after further wind-up, so that employers are not incentivised to wind-up funds rather than release surplus to pensioners.

Amendment 18, in clause 10, page 10, line 21, after “notified” insert “and consulted”

This amendment would ensure that members of pension funds have to be consulted on surplus extraction.

Amendment 4, page 10, line 36, at end insert—

“(e) about the proportion of any surplus that may be allocated, or the manner in which it may be determined, for the purpose of contributing to the provision of free, impartial pension advice and guidance services for scheme members.”

This amendment enables a proportion of surplus funds to be used to fund free pension advice.

Amendment 19, page 10, line 36, at end insert—

“(e) that the trustees are satisfied that it is in the interests of the members that the power to pay surplus is exercised in the manner proposed;

(f) that the trustees have taken full account of—

(i) the extent to which members’ pensions have kept up with the cost of living and inflation (as defined in the relevant rules and deeds), and

(ii) any previously rejected requests for discretionary pension increases.”

This amendment would reinstate the current requirement that ensures trustees consent to the paying of surplus as proposed, and creates an obligation on trustees to take account of any erosion in members’ standards of living.

Amendment 5, in clause 11, page 11, line 38, at end insert—

“(aa) make, publish and keep under review the consistency of—

(i) regulated VFM schemes, or

(ii) regulated VFM arrangements,

with the goals of the Paris Agreement on climate change and clean energy;”

This amendment would require pension funds and managers to show whether their portfolio investments are consistent with the Paris Agreement.

Amendment 6, page 11, line 38, at end insert—

“(aa) make, publish and keep under review the compliance of—

(i) regulated VFM schemes, or

(ii) regulated VFM arrangements,

with statutory and regulatory targets for reducing sewage discharges by water and sewerage undertakers,”

This amendment would require pension funds and managers to monitor and report on the compliance of water and sewerage companies they invest in with targets for reducing sewage discharges.

Amendment 7, page 12, line 10, at end insert—

“(d) publish or share with prescribed persons, for the purpose of enabling VFM assessments to be made, prescribed categories of information (referred to as “climate alignment metric data”) regarding the scheme’s exposure to climate-related financial risks and the alignment of its investments with the goals of the Paris Agreement on climate change and clean energy.”

This amendment, with Amendment 5 would require pension funds and managers to show whether their portfolio investments are consistent with the Paris Agreement.

Amendment 8, page 12, line 10, at end insert—

“(d) publish or share with prescribed persons, for the purpose of enabling VFM assessments to be made, prescribed categories of information (referred to as “sewage discharge compliance data”) regarding the scheme’s exposure to, and investment in, companies holding permits to discharge sewage, including those companies’ performance against statutory and regulatory targets for reducing sewage discharges.”

This amendment, with Amendment 6, would require pension funds and managers to monitor and report on the compliance of water and sewerage companies they invest in with targets for reducing sewage discharges.

Amendment 9, page 12, line 41, leave out “that provides money purchase benefits”

This amendment, together with Amendment 10, would ensure that the value for money provisions introduced by this Bill apply to all occupational pension schemes.

Amendment 10, page 13, line 5, at end insert—

“(14) Value for money regulations may make different provision for different descriptions of relevant pension schemes and must make provision for the application of the value for money assessment with a VFM rating to defined benefit occupational pension schemes.”

This amendment, together with Amendment 9, would ensure that the value for money provisions introduced by this Bill apply to all occupational pension schemes.

Amendment 11, in clause 13, page 14, line 13, at end insert—

“(iv) the consistency of the investment portfolio with the goals of the Paris Agreement on climate change and clean energy, including metrics for assessing climate-related financial risks and opportunities;”

This amendment would require pension funds and managers to show whether their portfolio investments are consistent with the Paris Agreement.

Amendment 12, page 14, line 13, at end insert—

“(iv) the compliance of the investment portfolio with statutory and regulatory targets for reducing sewage discharges by water and sewerage undertakers, including metrics for assessing related environmental and financial risks and opportunities;”

This amendment would require pension funds and managers to monitor and report on the performance of water and sewerage companies they invest in against targets for reducing sewage discharges.

Government amendments 24 to 49.

Amendment 16, in clause 40, page 43, line 38, leave out from beginning to end of line 27 on page 46.

This amendment would remove the ability of the Government to set mandatory asset allocation targets for certain pension schemes, specifically requiring investments in UK productive assets such as private equity, private debt, and real estate.

Amendment 15, page 46, line 9, leave out from “Before” to the end of the subsection and insert

“implementing the first set of regulations under subsection (1) the Secretary of State must—

(a) prepare and publish a report regarding—

(i) what barriers pension funds, based in the United Kingdom, are facing that are preventing them from investing back into the United Kingdom due to—

(A) legislation introduced after The Pensions Act 1995;

(B) regulations introduced by the Financial Conduct Authority, Prudential Regulation Authority, HM Treasury, or Bank of England;

(C) cultural and market behaviours;

(ii) how financial interests of members of relevant Master Trusts and group personal pension schemes would be affected by the proposed regulations;

(iii) what effects the proposed measures could be expected to have on economic growth in the United Kingdom;

(iv) any other matters the Secretary of State considers appropriate; and

(b) respond to any recommendations or issues raised in the report.”

This amendment prevents use of the reserved mandation powers in this Bill until the Government produces a report on the reasons why the powers are needed and the effects of the use of the powers and resolves any issues raised in the report.

Amendment 14, page 48, line 15, leave out paragraphs (a) to (c) and insert—

“(a) The scheme in question demonstrates strong potential for growth and an ability to innovate, and”

This amendment would revert the text of section 28F(2) on the eligibility conditions for new entrant pathway relief to its form in the Bill as introduced.

Government amendments 50 to 85.

Amendment 13, in clause 117, page 120, line 19, leave out “2035” and insert “this Parliament”

This amendment provides that if section 40 is not commenced before the end of the current Parliament in respect of the insertion of certain provisions, then the insertion of those provisions would be automatically repealed at that time.

Government amendments 86 to 89.

[Torsten Bell]

I start by thanking all hon. Members for their valuable contributions during the Bill’s passage to date. In particular, I thank members of the Public Bill Committee who offered line-by-line scrutiny. They have challenged the Government, but always constructively—that includes the shadow Economic Secretary to the Treasury, the hon. Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier), who is not with us today. That reflects the broad consensus across the House that the Pension Schemes Bill is an important piece of legislation, and it is a consensus for which I am very grateful. The same consensus underpinned the introduction of automatic enrolment under the previous Government.

It is exactly because we as legislators have more than gently nudged people into pension savings that the Bill’s most fundamental job is to drive up returns on those savings. The case for this focus is clear: those retiring in 2050 are currently set to do so with lower private pension income than those retiring today. The Bill also recognises that, with the second largest pension system in the world, pensions matter not just to deliver an income in retirement but for the whole economy as the largest source of domestic capital. With those goals in mind, this Bill builds a solid foundation on which we can build, not least via the Pensions Commission over the next year, exactly as several hon. Members called for on Second Reading.

The vast majority of the amendments tabled by the Government are minor technical amendments, and there are two substantial areas on which I would like to dwell. The first is on pre-1997 indexation within the Pension Protection Fund and the financial assistance scheme.

The PPF is one of the most important legacies of the last Labour Government, but we have all heard about the challenges caused by the lack of indexation of compensation related to pre-1997 pensions. I am grateful for the time that affected pensioners have given me in discussing their experiences directly. I have listened carefully to them and to hon. Members who have kept attention on this issue.

I particularly acknowledge the contribution of my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth (Debbie Abrahams) and her Work and Pensions Committee, as well as my hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Luke Murphy) and the hon. Member for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman) who raised this matter in Committee. I am also grateful to the hon. Members for Didcot and Wantage (Olly Glover), for Caerfyrddin (Ann Davies), for Torbay (Steve Darling) and for Belfast South and Mid Down (Claire Hanna), and my hon. Friend the Member for Poole (Neil Duncan-Jordan), for their proposed new clauses and amendments related to this matter.

[Olly Glover (Didcot and Wantage) (LD)]

I welcome that the Government have tabled these amendments to strengthen the Pension Protection Fund arrangements. However, that will be of little use to those such as the AEA Technology pension campaigners, about whom I have met the Minister. Despite many Select Committee reports and National Audit Office findings, they were badly advised by past Governments and have not been given a route to redress. I invite the Minister to reconsider his past decision and consider new clause 1.

[Torsten Bell]

I do not agree with the premise of the hon. Gentleman’s question, because I think that members of the scheme he mentions will benefit from the improvement in pre-1997 indexation within the PPF, albeit I am sure they would rather not be within the PPF, which applies to most people who have fallen into it. All I would gently say is that the change we are introducing was refused by Liberal Democrat Pension Ministers during the coalition Government, so this is a big step forward and will make a difference to others.

[Sean Woodcock (Banbury) (Lab)]

I am delighted by the Chancellor’s announcement in last week’s Budget, having had decades of Tory Governments dithering and delaying while pensioners lost out. It is a great sign of what this Labour Government are delivering on pensions. Could the Minister confirm how much, or by what amounts, those affected are likely to benefit from the changes he has incorporated into this Bill?

[Torsten Bell]

My hon. Friend has been a powerful campaigner on this issue in the run-up to the Budget, and he brings me on to my next point. We are not just listening; we are acting. We have tabled new clauses 31 to 33 and Government amendment 87 to introduce prospective indexation of Pension Protection Fund and financial assistance scheme payments that relate to pensions built up before 6 April 1997. And directly to his question, these will be consumer prices index linked, capped at 2.5% and apply to members whose former schemes provided for such increases. I thank the Pension Protection Fund for its support on this measure and its implementation, which rests with the PPF.

[Dr Al Pinkerton (Surrey Heath) (LD)]

I have been contacted by many Surrey Heath constituents who often worked for very large American companies such as Atos. These companies are refusing to offer the pre-1997 uplift, and from what I understand, the pensions fall outside both the PPF and the FAS. Can the Minister offer any reassurance to those pensioners today and explain how they can continue to survive on such diminishing returns from the pensions they paid into?

[Torsten Bell]

The hon. Gentleman asks an important question, and I shall come to exactly that issue when I finish discussing the changes within the PPF, because as he rightly notes there are wider indexation questions for solvent pension schemes.

On the PPF itself, this issue has been long running and many campaigners have long campaigned on it. Our changes aim to bring the matter to a conclusion. It is a step change that will make a meaningful difference to over 250,000 members. Over five years, the average PPF compensation will be boosted by £400 a year. Of course, I recognise that this does not go as far as some affected members would have wanted, but this change is real progress and rightly balances the interests of eligible members, levy payers, taxpayers and the Pension Protection Fund’s ability to manage future risk. I hope all hon. Members will support this step forward, and on that basis, that those with related amendments will feel content not to press them today.

New clauses 22 and 24 and amendment 19 concern that issue of discretionary increases or pre-1997 indexation in solvent defined-benefit pension schemes more generally. I put on record that we all recognise the impact of the high inflation in recent years on the value of some pensioners’ retirement income in exactly the way that has just been set out.

I want to be straightforward with the House that we do not support retrospectively changing scheme rules. Neither did previous Conservative or Liberal Democrat Governments, given that contribution levels were set on the basis of the scheme rules at the time they applied. As I have said before, and as I discussed recently with my hon. Friends the Members for Llanelli (Dame Nia Griffith) and for Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock (Elaine Stewart), wider changes in the Pension Schemes Bill relating to surplus release will put trustees in the lead in a way that will help on this issue.

[Dame Nia Griffith (Llanelli) (Lab)]

The Minister will understand just how sceptical pensioners are because, quite frankly, they have seen their trustees try to make the companies do the right thing time and again. Will he agree to meet me and trustees from companies such as 3M and Hewlett Packard Enterprise to explain what mechanism he thinks will be available to them that will actually force the companies to give a decent, index-linked rise to their pensioners?

[Torsten Bell]

Absolutely, is the short answer. I am always very happy to meet my hon. Friend and near constituency neighbour. I will explain how the change may help in that situation, but I am very happy to take that meeting.

The changes give those trustees overseeing schemes without pre-’97 indexation greater leverage in discussions with employers on discretionary increases, should those trustees see fit. I would encourage them to do so.

The other substantial amendments are on the Pension Protection Fund administration levy paid by DB schemes, allowing the Secretary of State to recover the PPF’s administration costs. It also covers the costs of administering the Fraud Compensation Fund. The levy was initially introduced to allow transparency when these administration costs were significant relative to the PPF’s reserves, but this is no longer the case, with the levy standing at around £18.5 million while the PPF manages over £10 billion-worth of reserves. The PPF is now more than able to cover its administration costs, and transparency can be achieved in the normal way through annual reports and accounts. These amendments therefore abolish the levy, simplifying the pension levy landscape.

I will now briefly cover some minor amendments, starting with those on the local government pension scheme. Amendment 22 exempts the Environment Agency, as a national body, from the requirement on other administering authorities to co-operate with strategic authorities on local investment opportunities.

New clause 34 introduces new wording to clause 4, with amendment 23 deleting the existing wording. Rather than stating in this Bill how procurement law affects the LGPS, new clause 34 will instead move the LGPS exemption directly into schedule 2 to the Procurement Act 2023, future-proofing the exemption from future changes to that Act.

Amendment 28 is the central amendment on small pots. It introduces the concept of a destination proposer. This allows for either a single entity or multiple entities to be designated as the proposer of pot transfers. This reflects recent work by the DWP and Pensions UK to consider a federated model as a potential alternative to a centralised data platform for delivering the small pots policy. I want to add that there is no change to the desired policy intent; this is about the mechanism by which we deliver it. We are committed to exploring both models in full.

Amendments 37 to 53, on the scale clauses, are minor in nature. They include clarifying the circumstances in which schemes may count assets held in other schemes towards the scale condition—the requirement to have at least £25 billion-worth of assets under management by 2030—and clarifying when the transition pathway relief will end. On guided retirements, amendment 54 simply removes a redundant interpretation provision. Government amendments 55 to 86 relate to clauses 100 and 107 of the Bill, on the validity of certain alterations to salary-related contracted-out pension schemes—more often referred to as the Virgin Media case.

14:30

Most importantly, Government amendment 59 clarifies the meaning of “qualifying legal proceedings”, specifying that the proceedings have to be before a UK court, concern a dispute about scheme rules, and involve trustees or managers and one or more members or beneficiaries of the scheme or their representatives. I ask hon. Members to support those amendments, all of which go with the grain of the discussion we had in Committee.

Hon. Members have tabled a range of wider amendments. We had the chance to debate many of them in Committee, and I will respond further to them at the end of the debate. However, I thank the hon. Members for Torbay and for Caerfyrddin for new clause 2 and new clause 15 on the British Coal staff superannuation scheme, both of which would require the Government to commission an independent review of the sharing of surplus funds with members. Upon reflection, we do not believe in waiting that long, or that more reviews are necessary. Instead, we are acting now.

The Budget last week confirmed the transfer of the full £2.5 billion-worth of reserves. Implementation is a matter for trustees, but we understand that they have put processes in place so that the first payments will be made on 23 December—just a matter of weeks. The change is the result of the powerful advocacy of so many of my hon. Friends on the Labour Benches, not least my hon. Friend the Member for Blaenau Gwent and Rhymney (Nick Smith).

While I am on the subject of powerful advocacy, I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Hodge Hill and Solihull North (Liam Byrne) for tabling new clause 17, which seeks to clarify the scope of trustees’ investment duties, which are sometimes referred to as fiduciary duties. This is a long-running debate, and almost everyone involved in it agrees on one fundamental principle: a trustee’s primary duty is to act in the interests of scheme members. Nothing should change or undermine that. His new clause highlights that different trustees continue to take different approaches to interpreting those duties, and in particular in how they take into account structural factors such as climate risk and members’ standards of living when they are making investment decisions. That matter is raised again in a number of the amendments tabled, and we discussed it at some length in Committee.

Having discussed this matter with my right hon. Friend, I agree that more clarity about the ability of trustees to take into account such factors would help. But rather than hardwiring that into primary legislation, there are advantages to consulting more fully and retaining an ability to be responsive to future developments. I can therefore announce today that I intend to bring forward legislation that will allow the Government to develop statutory guidance for the trust-based private pensions sector. The guidance will encapsulate those wider factors set out in his new clause, with the goal being to provide practical support to trustees about how to comply with their existing duties in considering these factors, including what we mean by systemic risks and standards of living. There is good support in the industry for providing that clarity, giving added confidence to trustees that they can invest in the long-term interests of their members and our society. We will set out more details on our guidance plans in due course.

[Steve Darling (Torbay) (LD)]

Would the Minister be kind enough to share the timescale he is working to for these proposals?

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the hon. Member, who was one of the contributors to our debates on this matter in Committee. I hope to bring forward clarity on the next steps in a matter of months.

[Peter Swallow (Bracknell) (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for making this important announcement about a consultation on the role of trustees. As part of that consultation, will he keep in mind the important issue of pre-1997 indexation so that we can ensure that trustees are acting in the best interests of their pensioners?

[Torsten Bell]

My hon. Friend has discussed this challenge with me many times and is a powerful campaigner for his affected constituents. I give him absolutely that assurance, and I extend to him the same offer I have given to other hon. Friends: I will be happy to meet him and affected constituents, or trustees who have been affected by this issue.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

The Minister has indeed been most accessible, and I am extremely grateful to him for the meeting he held with members of the ExxonMobil pensioners group. I am still being lobbied very hard by ExxonMobil pensioners who are concerned that whereas changes introduced in the Budget will benefit members of the FAS and PPF schemes, private defined-benefit scheme members will not benefit. He knows far more about the subject than I do, but can he not see that there is a feeling that they are being discriminated against? Is there nothing he can offer to make them feel somewhat more included in the beneficial steps being taken for members of other schemes?

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that and for our conversations on this matter in recent months. Although I think it is completely reasonable that people would feel like that—so would many of us if we had seen the high inflation of recent years eat into our non-index-linked pension payments—let me explain the consistency of the Government’s position. We are providing pre-’97 indexation on compensation relating to pensions now held within the PPF to those who were in schemes that did provide for indexation. There is no question of retrospectively changing the entitlement within the schemes; we are simply requiring that the compensation within the PPF and the FAS recognises that the schemes that people were in did previously recognise the need for indexation.

Other schemes within PPF and outside the PPF, including the one that the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) mentioned, did not provide for indexation in their scheme rules. He is right to say that, on those matters, the changes that I have outlined today on the PPF do not provide relief. I have gone on to say that because of the changes we are bringing forward in the surplus rules, I think the trustees—as was discussed with some of his trustees—do have more ability and more leverage with which to ask for those discretionary increases, but I completely appreciate that that is different in form from the compensation indexation that we are providing within the PPF.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

The problem, as the Minister knows from our meeting, is that the trustees are rather hemmed in by not having the leverage or the freedom to act if the company itself—particularly if it is headquartered abroad—is disinclined to pass on any surpluses that it might have available.

[Torsten Bell]

I recognise the right hon. Member’s point. I think the level of pessimism may be overstated. My view is that our changes on surplus, which put trustees clearly in the driving seat, provide for more ability for trustees to seek to change that balance of power within their relationship. I do not want to prejudge the individual discussions between all trustees and their employers—those will be different in different circumstances—but trustees are in a stronger position given the changes on surplus release that we are introducing through this Bill. But I am not pretending for a second that that solves overnight the points that the right hon. Member is making.

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

To take us back to the consultation and action to provide guidance for trustees, we all think that is a good thing, as trustees have a difficult job to do and providing them with more guidance is incredibly helpful. On the timeline for the consultation and the legislation arising from it, it would be incredibly helpful if the Minister could, as soon as possible, provide us with a road map for what that will look like when it returns to the House and, in particular, set out whether it will involve primary or secondary legislation.

[Torsten Bell]

The hon. Member brings me back to the part of my speech I was coming to. The direct, quick answer to her question is that I would envisage taking powers in primary legislation and then consulting on the statutory guidance relating to the powers provided to the Government. That is the order in which I would think about it, but, exactly as she has asked for, I will endeavour to provide more clarity on the timeline.

As I said, I think there is good support for such a change across the industry—actually, I heard calls for it long before I became Pensions Minister—and it is time that we get on with setting out more details and providing that clarity to trustees so that, rather than debating whether trustees have the ability to invest with these longer-term structural or systemic factors in mind, they can get on with doing so, if they so wish. I should say that this is about giving trustees that ability and not specifying that they must do so.

I hope I have usefully set the scene for the debate. Let me close my opening remarks by reiterating my thanks to everyone who has engaged with the Bill so far. I look forward to hearing hon. Members’ further contributions this afternoon.

[James Wild (North West Norfolk) (Con)]

Before speaking to new clauses 24 and 25 and amendments 14, 15 and 16, I shall begin by reiterating the position adopted by my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier), the shadow Economic Secretary to the Treasury—he is not here today, as the Minister acknowledged—which is that we support many of the planned changes in the Bill because, fundamentally, we all want a pensions system that is more accessible to the average person and gives all our constituents dignity in retirement. We want to see a Bill that helps make the system work better, and some of its measures will undoubtedly do that.

Equally, the higher-tax Budget, of which the Minister was a controlling mind, is relevant. We know from media reports that he feels passionately about the Budget—he used industrial language that is perhaps more expected from industry than from a think-tanker, and it is certainly not for the Chamber. We also know that, because of the briefings that appeared in the press, hundreds of thousands of people drew down their pensions prematurely, damaging their savings income as a result. The Budget also increases taxes on pension contributions. Taxing people’s incomes, savings and pensions more is the wrong political choice.

There is much in the Bill that we agree with, but some fundamental issues remain. Arguably the most pressing issue is the fact that the Bill does not address pensions adequacy. Research from Pensions UK shows that over 50% of savers will fail to meet the retirement incomes set by the Pensions Commission. The simple, uncomfortable truth is that this will affect millions of people, and that is despite the introduction of auto-enrolment and the triple lock introduced under the last Conservative Government.

The Bill was an opportunity to do more, but it does not currently do so. We are therefore giving the Government another chance through new clause 25, which would require the Secretary of State to conduct a review within five years and to recommend further measures. We recognise that the second phase of the pension review is ongoing, and we have faith in Baroness Drake to lead that review, but we have concerns that it will not report until 2027. We maintain that this part of the pensions review should be fast-tracked, so could the Minister at least clarify in which quarter of 2027 we can expect that report to be published?

Amendment 14 would change the wording on the eligibility conditions for new entrant pathway relief back to the form it was in when the Bill was first introduced. This means that schemes would qualify for relief if they simply demonstrated strong growth potential and an ability to innovate. All of us on these Benches understand the economies of scale and agree on the need for them, but we have concerns about the changes to the eligibility requirements. The benefit of the existing market is that its diversity provides choice, creates competition and incentivises innovation. As it stands, though, the Bill will disadvantage niche or boutique funds. Specifically, if the amendment made in Committee is enacted, existing companies that previously qualified for the pathway will now be excluded.

An example is Penfold, whose workplace pension was launched in 2022 and has grown quickly to over £1 billion of assets under management, tripling the rate since the start of 2024. Even with this trajectory, the timing of the scale test gives insufficient time to reach the £10 billion threshold for the transition pathway. We therefore agree with the chief executive officer of Penfold when he said:

“The original drafting created the scale that everyone agrees is vital, while still leaving room for challengers to innovate without the threat of a hard scale deadline that deters private investment”.

He is right. These are exactly the type of businesses that the Government should be supporting.

I shall turn now to the issue of indexation to pre-1997 pensionable service. We all want pensioners to have dignity in retirement, but when people have done the right thing by putting money in their pension and it is not followed through, that does not give pensioners the dignity they deserve. The issue around the pre-1997 indexation is also time-sensitive, like the infected blood scandal, and the longer the can is kicked down the road, the smaller the problem will become, sadly. We therefore broadly welcome the Minister’s commitment to taking primary powers through Government new clauses 31, 32 and 33. Our new clause 24 was seeking to achieve a similar outcome.

We pay tribute to the lobbying from groups including the Pensions Action Group and the Deprived Pensioners Association. Also, my hon. Friend the shadow Economic Secretary to the Treasury wanted to acknowledge our right hon. Friend the Member for Herne Bay and Sandwich (Sir Roger Gale) for his continued representations on this issue. The Minister has already been pressed by a number of Members about the concerns of organisations, such as the Esso Pensioners Working Group, that want to understand further how the Government will ensure that these groups are not forgotten.

Finally, I want to turn to the part of the Bill with which we have our most fundamental disagreement: namely, the part that deals with mandation. Amendment 15 would prevent the use of the reserve mandation powers until the Government produced a report on the reasons why the powers were needed and the effects of the use of such powers, and resolved any issues raised in that report. It simply asks the Government to undertake an analysis of the barriers that pension funds are facing, rather than rushing to use mandation as perfectly reasonable. Amendment 16 would remove the power altogether.

14:46

Let us be in no doubt: this is a bad policy. First, it goes against the fiduciary duty of trustees to act in the best interests of savers. As the Minister has said many times, the most important thing is better returns for members. We agree, so how does forcing pension funds to invest in what the Government want them to invest in guarantee the best return for those members? Governments—particularly, but not uniquely, this one—do not always know best, and they certainly do not know better than the professionals.

Secondly, trustees and fund managers currently bear a legal responsibility to protect and grow these savings. If mandated investments failed, who would be accountable for the losses? Thirdly, this measure risks politicising the process. The role of trustees is to secure the best return for members, not to follow political whims. This is taxpayers’ hard-earned savings, not the Government’s money. The Government have already secured a commitment from industry to invest more into the UK through the Mansion House accord, which we support. We have only to look at comments from the Association of British Insurers, the Pensions Management Institute, Aviva, the Society of Pension Professionals and many others to see that they oppose this mandation power. The industry does not agree with the Government’s approach and neither do we, which is why we voted against these powers in Committee and why we intend to press our amendments to a vote today.

To conclude, there is much agreement on the Bill, but there are important issues still to be addressed, especially around the reserve mandation power. It is fundamentally wrong, and I urge the Minister to listen to the industry and to back our amendments.

[Dame Nia Griffith]

I rise to speak to my new clause 22. There is a group of pensioners who have worked hard for very prestigious companies, and those companies have grown rich and successful on the back of the work that those pensioners have done. These are companies with good reputations. People think of them as being honourable and successful. Many of us will have a computer with “HP” on it. Companies such as Hewlett Packard Enterprise, 3M and a number of others that have already been mentioned have treated their pensioners very shabbily indeed, because they are refusing to index-link the pensions of former employees that were accrued before 1997. In other words, people who worked hard to help build up the success of those companies have had no increase for as long as 23 years. Just imagine how much less they can buy with that pension now compared with 23 years ago. The cost of living crisis over the past few years has exacerbated their problems, eroding their pensions at a frightening rate. What is absolutely terrifying for many of those pensioners is how on earth they are going to manage in the next few years.

Through new clause 22, we are asking for the index-linking to take place from now on, not retrospectively for all the years when there have been no increases, nice though that would be. This is not about some form of compensation for the past. It is about going forward and trying to future-proof these pensions so that they at least they maintain the value they have now. It would not be a retrospective measure; it is about how we want the companies to behave from now on in respect of their pension funds, just as any other legislation would apply from now on.

When the employees were recruited to these companies, they would have thought, “Oh, this is a good job. It’s a good company and it’s got a pension scheme.” They would have assumed that any pension scheme worth its salt, particularly from a reputable company, would be index-linked. Sadly, however, these companies have found a loophole in the Pensions Act 1995, because it refers to 1997 as the start date for its provisions. In other words, the companies have been able to say that, according to the letter of the law, they do not have to index-link pensions accrued pre-1997, even though it would be in the spirit of the Act to do so. New clause 22 would amend the Pensions Act 1995 by removing references to 6 April 1997 from section 51 of that Act, thereby requiring annual increases to pension payments in line with CPI and RPI to apply to pensionable service both before and after that date.

Why do we need to legislate? We need to do so because efforts by trustees over many years have failed. We have had instances of unanimous votes by trustees for inflation-based rises being rejected by companies. We have had trustees appointed by companies. Essentially, the power structure is such that the company has the final word, no matter how healthy the pension funds are.

A recent newsletter for 3M pensioners said,

“Given that the Scheme’s financial position is very positive, and the funding level exceeds the regulatory expectations for solvency levels… we had hoped that the Company would permit some discretionary increases to affected members. Sadly, the Company did not agree to this and has not changed its position on the matter.”

Time and again, pensioners have been given that type of answer to a very reasonable, rational request.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

May I applaud the hon. Lady’s speech? That is exactly what has happened to so many ExxonMobil pensioners in my constituency and beyond.

[Dame Nia Griffith]

Indeed, the right hon. Member mentions yet another world-renowned, multinational, household name.

Our Labour Government have just announced that we will change the law to enable the payment of inflation increases on the pre-1997 pensions to Pension Protection Fund and financial assistance scheme members. That is an important principle. If we are doing it for pensioners whose companies have gone bust, we should ensure that successful multinationals like Hewlett Packard Enterprise and 3M pay up for former employees.

[Alan Gemmell (Central Ayrshire) (Lab)]

Will my hon. Friend allow me to put on the record my thanks to my constituent Patricia Kennedy and the pre-1997 pensions justice campaign for asking for exactly what she suggests? The Minister has taken a brave decision on the Pension Protection Fund pensions, and we should try to do that now for those pre-1997 pensioners.

[Dame Nia Griffith]

Indeed. I thank my hon. Friend for mentioning Patricia Kennedy, who has been incredibly hard-working and has really tried to put the facts and figures together.

Let me give the House an example now that I had intended to quote later. The number of companies that have reneged on giving out index-linked pensions is extraordinary. Listen to this list, citing the number of years for which companies have not indexed pensions: Goldman Sachs—10 years; KPMG—15 years; Lloyd’s Register—nine years; Johnson & Johnson—11 years; NCR (Scotland)—11 years; Chevron—13 years, 3M—16 years; Pfizer—16 years; AIG—18 years; American Express—20 years, Atos/Sema—20 years; STMicroelectronics—21 years; Hewlett Packard Enterprise—22 years; and Wood Group—23 years. Given that, we can imagine the loss in value of those pensions now.

[Dr Pinkerton]

The hon. Lady mentioned Atos. I have several constituents who worked for that company who find themselves in precisely the situation she describes. I thank her for the speech she is making and, on behalf of my constituents, I hope that those on the Front Bench are listening to her suggestions.

[Dame Nia Griffith]

As I said, it is an important principle on the PPF; if we are doing it for those pensioners for the companies that have gone bust, we really should be doing it for the successful companies, too.

[Peter Swallow]

My hon. Friend is being extremely generous in giving way. Effectively—not legally—the Government act as the trustee for the PPF, which is why they have been able to take this decision. Does she agree that if the Government see fit to use their role to increase PPF pensions, trustees of these companies should act just as the Government have done to address this injustice?

[Dame Nia Griffith]

The problem is that many of the trustees are trying to get these increases, but the difficulty they are encountering is that the power structure is such that the company has the last word. Sometimes trustees are actually appointed by the company; sometimes it is a unanimous decision that is then rejected by the company, as I mentioned with the 3M trustees. We see time and again the efforts of trustees totally decimated.

I was interested in what the Minister said in his opening speech about the new powers. What we really want from the Front Bench is some support to help these trustees to use the legislation to which the Minister refers—that is, part of this Bill—and to try to make it work.

[Torsten Bell]

Just reflecting on the excellent speech that my hon. Friend is making, I should add that the Pensions Regulator will be bringing forward guidance to provide exactly that kind of clarity to trustees.

[Dame Nia Griffith]

I thank the Minister for that, but it is a matter of action and ensuring that it really happens. We are too used to regulators not having the powers they are supposed to have or not being effective in using them. We need some action, and hopefully the Minister will help us to see how it could be done.

There is a bitter irony that the Pension Protection Fund is funded by a levy on the very same companies that are refusing to index-link their own pensioners’ pensions. We know from lots of evidence that the only way the companies will listen is through legislation. These companies are multinationals, and in countries where there is legislation, they pay up—so they do respond if there is a law.

As I was saying, saying that the trustees have the powers is sadly very far removed from the reality. Trustees of various countries have asked repeatedly for indexation, and before handing over any surplus to the companies, they will be very wary because they do not trust them at all. They will want cast-iron guarantees on indexation.

Let us look at the scale of the problem. Seventy-five per cent of UK defined-benefit schemes already provide pre-1997 indexation. The remaining 25% represents approximately 1.5 million members, including some 734,000 pensioners, with 80% of all pensioners concentrated within just 200 large schemes with strong employers. As we have seen, employer discretion has failed in practice, and many pensioners have had years of zero increases.

New clause 22 would set the statutory principle that there should be indexation. The Government can then design proportionate safeguards—for example, phasing in, exemptions and triggers—in order to protect genuinely weak schemes and to ensure, as the Society of Pension Professionals says, that schemes are not pushed into having to be picked up by the Pension Protection Fund.

We want action on this. We are talking about a small, manageable number of schemes, but we want the trustees really to be given the powers to force those companies to make that indexation. If the Minister is not minded to put this provision into the legislation, as we want, we want to see some concerted action and a genuine way forward. If that proves not to work, there needs to be an opportunity to come back and put this into secondary legislation instead.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

[Steve Darling]

For people who are lucky in the lottery of life, their pension can be one of their biggest assets, but, sadly, we know that 12 million people across the United Kingdom are not saving enough. That is around the population of Belgium. Talking more broadly, there is much about the legislation to be welcomed. I am sure the Minister had his best birthday ever by spending it in the Bill Committee. I am sure that as a 14-year-old, he dreamed of that day, on Committee corridor—sadly I am not joking.

[Torsten Bell]

indicated assent.

[Helen Whately (Faversham and Mid Kent) (Con)]

The Minister is nodding!

[Steve Darling]

Thank you for the audio description!

There is much to be welcomed in the Bill, and the way that we rattled through it in Committee demonstrated that there is lots of good within it. However, as a constructive Opposition and a critical friend, I will spend most of my time reflecting on where there could be improvement.

We Liberal Democrats still feel that there are chances to ensure a mid-life MOT on investment opportunities, including five years before retirement. We think that that could be strengthened significantly. I come from an area of sadness in respect of my father, who saw the poverty of his father, a lorry driver, and threw significant amounts of his income into his personal pension just before the 1998 stock market crash. He saw the value of his investment halved. Nobody would expect a lorry driver to understand the full ins and outs of investing in the appropriate manner. It is important to reflect the fact that people live their lives without really understanding financial markets, and further strengthening that part of the Bill would be welcome.

15:01

People are keen to see that their investments are doing good, whether by tackling climate change or cleaning up our waterways. We have tabled amendments to address that. The Liberal Democrats welcome the Minister’s announcement of a consultation to drive that forward.

We also welcome the British Coal staff superannuation scheme carve-out announced in the Budget last week. I suggest that the Minister ought to listen to my hon. Friend the Member for Didcot and Wantage (Olly Glover) and other colleagues. My hon. Friend’s new clause 1 relates to the AEA Technology. There is a strong case for that, as the National Audit Office has confirmed. I ask the Minister, with all due respect, to reflect on that and see it as an opportunity for another carve-out. Politics is about remedying such injustices.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

I applaud what the hon. Gentleman has said about the AEAT pensioners’ difficulties. It is quite shocking that, despite the fact that a previous Conservative pensions Minister, Paul Maynard, said that he would instruct his civil servants to work on a redress scheme, changes of Minister and Government have meant that the machine has carried on as before, even though a parliamentary Committee did an investigation, found in favour of the pensioners and said that they should get redress.

[Steve Darling]

The right hon. Member makes a powerful point. I am sure that the Minister will take note and reflect on it further.

I would like to reflect on the proposals to enhance pre-1997 pensions by up to 2.5%, which the Chancellor announced last week. Amendments providing for those measures have now been tabled. We know that there is significant surplus in the Pension Protection Fund. We question whether it is right for the Government to balance their financial books on the backs of that pension pot. I understand that their argument is that, because those billions are taken into account as far as Government finances are concerned, it is not possible to release as much as could be released from that pot to support pensioners with the cost of living crisis, but I urge Ministers to reflect on that.

Colleagues have also highlighted new clause 22 and pensioners who worked at American Express, Esso and Hewlett Packard. Those companies—strangely enough, it seems to be overseas companies—have left pensioners out in the cold. I hope that that consultation is able to pick up on that and give clear guidance to trustees on how they ought to support those members.

Surplus funds is another area that the Bill addresses. It is about getting the balance right. In winding up, will the Minister reflect on how surplus funds could support members and oil the wheels of the economy? That is important. Pensions should be about driving the economy. They are a big beast that should be an engine for change. In fact, the last area that I will touch on is how pensions should be the engine for change. As colleagues have alluded to, mandation feels a bit like the cold hand of Big Brother on the economy. I trust the Minister implicitly in respect of mandation, when he says, “Honestly, guv, it’s not really something I want to do,” but who knows who will walk in his footsteps? We need only look to the other side of the Atlantic, and at the gentleman in the Oval Office, to see the extraordinary things happening there.

[Sarah Olney (Richmond Park) (LD)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that, although it is certainly advantageous to encourage pension funds to invest in the UK, mandation creates the risk of reducing returns on investments? Would it not be better to incentivise pension funds to invest more productively—in housing and social care—through the creation of appropriate investment vehicles, and to encourage investment in British start-ups to allow them to scale up and create an attractive environment for investment?

[Steve Darling]

It is almost as if my hon. Friend had just seen the next section of my speech. We see such investment as an opportunity to drive social rented housing, our high streets and other investment in our communities. We need to ensure that UK institutions are the first, second and third investors in opportunities in the UK so that overseas investors see that we are backing ourselves and then pile in after us. That is essential.

We will vote against mandation. There is much to welcome in the Bill, but the devil is in the detail.

[Cameron Thomas (Tewkesbury) (LD)]

My hon. Friend speaks well about what is good in the Bill, but there is room for improvement. A number of my Gloucestershire constituents were employees of Gulf Oil before its merger with Chevron. Following the merger, they were moved on to the Chevron pension scheme. Between them, they have hundreds of years of service, but they are not protected against inflation, and over years of inflation, the value of their pensions has been eroded significantly. Does my hon. Friend agree that his new clause 7 is a genuine opportunity for pension justice—one that we hope the Labour Government support?

[Steve Darling]

I wholeheartedly agree with my hon. Friend. I am sure that the Pensions Minister is listening. Politics is all about calling out injustice, and my hon. Friend does a good job of that for his constituents.

[Neil Duncan-Jordan (Poole) (Lab)]

I will speak to a number of amendments tabled in my name. I thank the Pensions Minister for discussing them with me yesterday. I look forward to his comments later in the debate.

I spent a number of years as a regional trade union official with responsibility for the local government pension scheme, and I think it is important that we see pensions as a force for social good. My amendments aim therefore to make our occupational pensions more progressive. We should remember that such funds represent the deferred wages of millions of workers, and directing pension funds toward socially beneficial projects is one way in which the Government can rewire our economic model, so that it delivers for ordinary people.

In my view, workers’ money should be invested in sectors such as green technology and social housing—stable, reliable sectors that build a better future for the very people whose contributions fund them. Whether this is done through an expanded National Wealth Fund, which could direct investment into socially useful projects, or some other mechanism, it would clearly boost much-needed growth and GDP. What could be more progressive than using workers’ pension funds to build the council houses we so desperately need? That would be a tremendous step forward which not only ensured a solid investment for the funds, but provided decent homes at affordable rents. I designed new clause 5 to address this issue, and I hope the Minister will do more to encourage schemes to redirect their investments in that way.

Likewise, amendment 3 recognises that the voluntary approach to disinvestment in fossil fuels has not worked. The LGPS currently invests over £16 billion in fossil fuels, while 85% of all pension schemes lack a credible climate action plan. The environmental crisis is the great challenge facing us all. Workers’ wages should not be fuelling the climate catastrophe. Fundamentally, there is no retirement without our environment, and I hope the Government will emphasise that position to trustees more forcefully. We need a commitment from all LGPS schemes and pools to having a five-year plan to end their relationship with these harmful investments.

The overwhelming majority of the public would also be horrified to learn that their savings were invested in illegal wars abroad, such as the genocide in Gaza. We know that over £12 billion of LGPS funds are invested in companies that support the illegal settlements in some way, or produce arms or fuel for fighter jets used in the war. We must ensure that pension funds are not complicit in war crimes and human rights violation, whether in Gaza or elsewhere in the world.

The Minister will have noticed the strong cross-party support for my amendment 2, and I urge him to give a statement in the strongest possible terms that the LGPS should not be involved in funding breaches of international law in any form. I understand that many of the pools have money in tracker funds that are connected to arms companies, but that needs to be challenged. If that means disinvesting from arms manufacturers implicated in these breaches, so be it.

That brings me to the important matter of worker representation. Having a seat at the table is one way in which we can influence how money is invested. That is why it is important that we ensure trade unions have a voice on all future pension boards and committees, as outlined in my amendment 1. There is currently no requirement for worker representation on the boards of LGPS pools; the Government reducing the number of pools to six gives us an ideal opportunity in law to guarantee proper worker representation. Fundamentally, it is vital that the workers who pay into the funds have a fair voice in decisions on how their money is invested. I hope the Minister will begin talks with local government trade unions to see how we can bring that about.

Last week’s budget announcement on the pre-1997 pension indexation was welcome, and many have already quoted that this afternoon, but only those whose schemes were eligible for indexation and are members of the Pension Protection Fund and financial assistance scheme will see the benefit. Hundreds of thousands of retired workers whose pension funds were taken over by other companies, such as Hewlett Packard in the case of some of my constituents, and are still in operation will not be protected as was intended in the Budget for that other group; and the money they put into their company pensions before 1997 will continue to be frozen. I know the Minister recognises that over this period their pensions have become virtually worthless. That is why the Government must put pressure on trustees of all schemes to pay some of their surplus funds and ensure that their former staff get the pensions they deserve.

The Pension Schemes Bill offers a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to help the environment and society more generally by the way we invest. The £3 trillion in UK pension funds could be used to address the historical transfer of wealth away from ordinary working people toward the wealthiest individuals and corporations in our society. Given that pensions account for 40% of wealth in this country, change must include consideration of how this vast pool can be used to improve the lives of those whose payslips created it. The call to use our money and make pensions more progressive is therefore overwhelming. I look forward to hearing the Minister set out in the strongest possible terms the commitments the Government are making to bring that about.

15:15

[Sir Roger Gale (Herne Bay and Sandwich) (Con)]

There is clearly a great deal of good in the Pension Schemes Bill; that is why it went through Committee relatively easily. I do not wish to be a dog in the manger about that, but instead to recognise the good in the Bill. I shall focus on the issues raised in new clauses 22 and 24.

I do not pretend to be expert in these matters, but I do know injustice when I see it. As you know, Madam Deputy Speaker, I fought for many years for the uprating of frozen pensions for ex-pat citizens overseas. That is a shame from which the reputation of this country will take a long time to recover, and I fear that we are about to endorse yet another such shame.

There is absolutely no doubt in most people’s minds that the Pensions Act 1995 was flawed. This issue is an unintended consequence that was not foreseen. That it has taken this long to get to grips with it is wrong, but we now have the opportunity to set things right. The hon. Member for Llanelli (Dame Nia Griffith), in an excellent speech, set out the stall very clearly indeed. I have huge sympathy with her new clause. Were it to be called, I would vote for it without any question.

The right hon. Lady made it very plain—it is indeed very plain—that there is no suggestion that any redress should be retrospective; there is no question of any vast back payments to those whose pensions have been affected. I listened carefully to what the Minister said about retrospection—by the way, I agree that retrospective legislation normally ends in tears—but the proposed measure is not retrospective in that sense.

We come to how to get this right. It seems to me that the Government’s proposals are hugely complicated—unnecessarily so—and do not actually do the job. New clause 24, tabled by Opposition Front Benchers, who I know have put a lot of effort into trying to get this right, gives a get-out in the form of a lack of surplus, which I believe would enable those companies that have neglected their duties until now to carry on neglecting their duties. For that reason, my personal preference is for new clause 22.

I represent the remains of the Pfizer empire in Sandwich. Not entirely surprisingly, I have therefore a significant number—one is a significant number, by the way—of constituents who were affected by the pre-1997 section in the 1995 Act. I find it quite appalling that companies of size and international importance that have been named today—including Pfizer in my own constituency, which is a good employer—should have put themselves in the position that they are in when in some cases, for up to 25 years, pensioners have not been rewarded in the manner to which I believe them to be entitled. As I say, for my money, Pfizer is an excellent company. It does good work and is a good employer, but somewhere along the line, in the back office—probably in the United States—a decision was taken not to uprate pensions. That is quite simply wrong.

While I understand that the Minister comes to this issue with a reasonably open mind and a good heart, I do not think that his proposal does the job and I am not certain that the Opposition Front-Bench amendment does the job. I believe that new clause 22, in the name of the hon. Member for Llanelli, would do the job. I hope that further and very serious consideration will be given to adopting that resolution.

[Debbie Abrahams (Oldham East and Saddleworth) (Lab)]

I rise in support of the Government’s new clauses, particularly those that relate to the pre-1997 pensionable service indexation where scheme rules allow. That will mean that pensioners whose pension schemes became insolvent through no fault of their own and that have failed to keep pace with inflation will have that rectified. As I mentioned yesterday in my speech on the Budget, that will benefit more than 250,000 Pension Protection Fund and financial assistance scheme members.

I pay particular credit to the Pension Action Group, the PAG. It was formed in 2003 following the collapse of the Allied Steel and Wire pension scheme, which left thousands of workers without employment or their promised occupational pension. They are not covered by the Pension Protection Fund, which was introduced by the Pensions Act 2004 for members of defined benefit schemes whose employer went bust after 6 April 2005. The Pensions Action Group campaigned first for the financial assistance scheme to be set up for members of schemes that went bust, then for improvements to FAS benefits to bring them into line with those of PPF members.

In the last Parliament, members of the Pensions Action Group gave evidence to the Work and Pensions Committee on the hardship experienced due to the policy of not indexing pre-1997 benefits. As a relatively new Select Committee Chair, I remember hearing from them at a separate meeting, and it was so moving. Within weeks, unfortunately, different members were dying because of their age. Benefits were not going to their families, and they were not going to have the benefits that we see rightly being given to this group.

FAS members did most of their service before 1997, and most were in schemes that provided for indexation on all members’ pensionable service. Non-indexation of FAS compensation meant that the average award—about £2,700—was progressively lower than the amount expected from the original pension schemes. Terry Monk told the Committee that

“people should get what they paid for—end of story.”

Richard Nicholl said that

“people paid extra effectively, for full indexation…it is only fair that it goes to those who have paid for it.”

I pay credit to the Deprived Pensioners Association, which gave evidence to the Committee about the impact of the non-indexation of pre-1997 on PPF members. Having heard their evidence, the Committee recommended that the Government legislate to allow both compensation schemes, FAS and PPF, to provide indexation on pre-1997 benefits where scheme rules allowed.

I am incredibly grateful to the Pensions Minister for listening and to the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, who came to the Committee a couple of weeks ago and listened to concerns from members, including the hon. Member for Torbay (Steve Darling). What has happened is right, and I reiterate my thanks.

[Manuela Perteghella (Stratford-on-Avon) (LD)]

I rise to speak to two new clauses that stand in my name. The first is new clause 3, which concerns the use of the special rules for end of life form to ease the burden on people with a terminal illness seeking support from the Pension Protection Fund or the financial assistance scheme; the second is new clause 19, which deals with fossil fuels and climate risk. Those issues are very different in nature, but they share a common thread: both seek to improve the governance, fairness and long-term resilience of our pension system. I will also speak in support of new clause 11, as it seeks to remedy HSBC’s unjust clawback policy that the Midland Clawback Campaign has been fighting against.

New clause 3 concerns terminal illness and the use of the special rules for end of life form, or SR1. This amendment was born out of the experience of one of my constituents, Nigel. Nigel was diagnosed with incurable stage 4 pancreatic cancer. He told me about the issues he faced in providing several forms, applications and other bits of paper to providers just to demonstrate eligibility and his terminal illness. He told me his story and about the hurdles he encountered following his diagnosis, at what was a very stressful time.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

I have been contacted by some Members of the Northern Ireland Assembly about this issue—the thresholds in cases where a death occurs unexpectedly or suddenly, or when an illness comes on very quickly. When the Minister sums up at the end, I hope he will address that issue, for the sake of those Northern Ireland Assembly Members who asked me to raise that very question today. The hon. Lady is right; well done to her for highlighting this issue.

[Manuela Perteghella]

I thank the hon. Member for his intervention. When people get terminal illnesses, it is a time full of grief and stress, so new clause 3 aims to address the bureaucratic barriers those people face in accessing compensation or assistance from the Pension Protection Fund or the financial assistance scheme. At a moment when time is precious and stress is already immense, too many people are forced to navigate repeated administrative hurdles simply to demonstrate what another arm of the state has already accepted.

The new clause would require the Secretary of State to set out a clear, fair and straightforward process for demonstrating terminal illness—one that places the least possible administrative burden on the individual. Critically, where the Department for Work and Pensions already holds a valid SR1 form confirming a terminal diagnosis, that form must be shared with the PPF or the FAS; the person should not have to start again from scratch and provide several forms or applications again. Once the necessary information has been received, the PPF and the FAS should be required to make payments within a defined timeframe.

These are not abstract procedural improvements: they would materially affect the quality of the precious time a terminally ill person has left. New clause 3 reflects the explanatory statement’s intent to allow a valid SR1 form to serve as sufficient proof of terminal illness for these purposes, reducing duplication and speeding up support. It is a modest, humane and pragmatic change, and I hope the Minister will consider it in his concluding remarks.

I turn now to new clause 19, which deals with fossil fuels and climate risk. The new clause would require the Secretary of State to make regulations that would require specific schemes to exit investments in firms that are significantly exposed to thermal coal, and thereafter to review whether that restriction should extend to oil and gas expansion. This is a financial risk measure as much as it is a climate one. Despite the welcome climate reporting requirements in the Pension Schemes Act 2021, schemes remain heavily invested in the most damaging fossil fuels. These investments are doubly harmful. They risk becoming stranded as technology and policy move on, and they depress returns across the rest of the portfolio by contributing to climate damage that ultimately, as we have already heard, drags down the entire global economy.

15:33

The amendment would provide a measured, proportionate and financially rational way to divest. It does not force an immediate blanket divestment from all fossil fuels. It allows for staged action following consultation, subject to parliamentary approval and grounded firmly in the fiduciary duty set out in the 2021 Act to secure effective governance of climate-related risks.

[Edward Morello (West Dorset) (LD)]

I thank my hon. Friend for speaking to this important new clause, which relates to the fundamental fact that pensions are about planning for the future, and climate change is about making sure that we have a future for all. Having pension funds supporting anything that undermines the outlook for future generations should be prevented in any which way we can. I just wanted to lend my support to her wonderful amendment.

[Manuela Perteghella]

I thank my hon. Friend for his important intervention. New clause 19 would not create a precedent for ministerial direction of investments more broadly, if that is an issue. In fact, it would be much narrower than the Government’s own proposed reserve power. Existing measures cannot substitute for action now. Large schemes remain invested in the most dangerous fossil fuels, and the Government have not yet even consulted on transition plan requirements for pension schemes, meaning that enforcement is unlikely before the end of this decade.

I urge the Minister to acknowledge that transition plans alone are too little, too late, and we must address pension fund climate risks this decade. New clause 19 would provide a route to do so responsibly and effectively. Taken together, these two new clauses—one addressing long-term systemic financial risk and the other addressing immediate human need—would make our pension system more responsible, more resilient and more compassionate. I hope the Minister will consider them both in that spirit.

Finally, I will speak in support of new clause 11, which would introduce an independent review into state deduction in defined benefit pension schemes. That is necessary because Midland bank’s—now HSBC—outdated clawback policy has misled 51,000 former employees and deprived them of the pensions they were promised. This policy, which was abandoned by most organisations in the 1980s, allows HSBC still to deduct the value of an employee’s state pension using a 77-year-old formula, with payslips disguising it as “state deduction”. It hits the lowest-paid staff hardest and disproportionately affects women. For the same reason of long-standing injustice, I also support all the new clauses and amendments in relation to the indexation of pre-1997 benefits. In conclusion, this Bill is a chance to make pensions fairer, greener and more ethical and to put some of this historic injustice right.

[Liam Byrne (Birmingham Hodge Hill and Solihull North) (Lab)]

I begin by congratulating the Minister on bringing the Bill forward to this stage. He has been one of the country’s practical idealists since I first began working with him in 2008, and he is demonstrating those credentials once again in stewarding this Bill through the House today with such expertise and intelligence. He, like me, has long been concerned not only by the endemically low investment rates in this country—now languishing at the lowest in the G7—but that we should build up a system of universal basic capital, so that the wealth we create in this country is more fairly shared.

I rise to speak to clause 17, which is in my name, and I give enormous thanks to the 33 Members from all parts of the House who have added their names to it. That depth of cross-party support tells us something important: that here in this House is broad and deep support for the principles enshrined in the new clause. There is a shared belief across this House that working people should be able to use their savings to build a richer and stronger country in which to retire.

My new clause calls for something very simple. It calls for something that has been missing for far too long. As we know, pension fund trustees have fiduciary duties to the people they represent and the people they serve, but those duties need clarity, and for too long that clarity has been missing. What we have instead is confusion, and from that confusion comes a caution, and from that caution comes a world in which pension scheme providers are simply not investing what they could and what they should in the productive assets of our country.

The flight of British savings from investment here has long bedevilled the country. It is a sight to behold. We are not short of savings, but we are desperately short of investment. We have somehow magicked a situation in which we have £3 trillion-worth of long-term savings, but we have the lowest investment rate in the G7. I think the Bill will help to turn that around. I think it will help to break that curse. There is much in it that is welcome: the consolidation of funds, the consolidation of pots, the simplification of structures, and a stronger framework for long-term investment. For all its virtues, however, as it is drafted today we are still left with the core problem, and unless we solve that core problem, the Bill’s noble ambitions will be defeated by its notable omissions. We risk creating bigger and better-managed funds that still fail to invest in our country, and still fail to invest in our country’s future.

The Bill will fail to channel the investment that we need in affordable homes, in net-zero investments, in cleaner power systems, in affordable transport systems, in the social care that we all need for the future, in regeneration, and in the national infrastructure of growth. It will fail because it fails, as currently drafted, to clarify exactly what it is that pension fund trustees can consider. We want those trustees to have the freedom to invest in good things here, not out of some patriotic flourish but because it is plainly in members’ best interests. When national investment grows, our national productivity rises, and when pension pots get bigger, they will get bigger faster if we have a country that is more productive and growing faster than it is today. When a country grows, the returns that shape retirement grow with it.

Many scheme providers today simply do not feel that they have the permission to make those investments. They are unsure of the law. They fear litigation. They worry about the possibility that looking at system-level risks, from low productivity or high housing costs or climate stress, might fall outside their legal remit. This is where the problem lies. It is a paradox that I think we can no longer ignore. We ask trustees to act in members’ best interests, yet the law today is so unclear that many of them feel unable to invest in the very things that could secure the long-term interests of their members: growth, productivity, and the living standards on which those members will one day rely. Today’s rules were built to ensure prudence, but what they are doing is creating paralysis. A framework that was meant to safeguard the future is, in practice, preventing pension savers from shaping that future. Scheme providers want to do more, members expect them to do more and our country needs them to do more, but all that can only happen if Parliament now provides the clarity that the courts have not provided.

This is not an academic matter. At a recent conference, fewer than one in five practitioners said that fiduciary duty was “completely clear”. I believe that 31 industry leaders have now written to the Minister for Pensions to request that legal clarification, including a dozen chief executives. Publicly, the chief executive of Nest, the provider of the UK’s largest defined-contribution scheme, has said much the same.

Fiduciary duty dates back to case law that is centuries old, back to a 19th-century brick factory in Pontefract and, before that, the inheritance of a market lease at some point in 1726. I am afraid that these cases simply cannot answer the questions that trustees must answer today, and they cannot help with the challenges that trustees face today: globalised portfolios, system-wide risks, intergenerational impacts, and the real-world living standards of their members. That is why the spirit of new clause 17 is so important, modest though it is. It does not alter the statutory purpose of pension schemes, and it does not ask a single saver to accept lower returns. What it does is cut through the confusion and allow the Government to produce regulations and guidance that spell out clearly and consistently what trustees must consider, and what they may consider, when making investment decisions.

I warmly welcome the Minister’s commitment to introduce new legislation. I hope that if he gets his skates on, he can table an amendment in the other place once the Bill moves from our precious hands, but mere guidance is not enough, because sometimes it can be ignored. Guidance does not eliminate liability risk and does not give trustees a solid statutory floor, so I urge the Minister to ensure that the legislation he brings forward delivers guidance that is statutory in its bite. I urge him to go big, by pairing guidance with underpinning regulation that gives trustees legal clarity; to go broad, by ensuring that every single kind of scheme falls within the ambit of the legislation; and to be specific, by explaining precisely what those powers can be used for and the way in which they can be allowed to ensure productive investment. That clarity, if we get it right, could avoid the need to resort to the mandating powers that some Members of this House have objected to. It could unlock investment by giving schemes confidence to act, rather than making them fearful and hesitant.

We in this House have a profound duty to ensure that the maximum amount of pension savings in this country not only yield a return to give comfort to savers in their golden years, but do a double duty: they should help to provide the productive investment that we need to build a bigger and richer country. After all, a nation that invests is a nation that builds, and a nation that builds is a nation that will grow its pension pots to help ensure that pension savers enjoy their golden years in comfort.

The steps that we have heard from the Minister go some distance towards helping us deliver on the spirit of new clause 17. I am very grateful to him for his announcement today, which could unlock billions of pounds for affordable homes, clean energy and comfort in retirement for millions of the people we came to this House to serve.

[Ann Davies (Caerfyrddin) (PC)]

I thank the Minister for his opening remarks this afternoon. The Bill has provided an opportunity for the Labour UK Government to address long-standing pension injustices. Such injustices include the British Coal staff superannuation scheme scandal, whereby surplus sharing arrangements saw billions of pounds heading to the Treasury while former mineworkers’ pensions were eroded, and the lack of indexation for pre-1997 pension accruals under the financial assistance scheme and the Pension Protection Fund, which has caused hardship for pensioners. Addressing such scandals is exactly what my new clauses 2 and 6 set out to do.

New clause 2 would require the Secretary of State to set out a timetable for transferring the whole of the BCSSS investment reserve to members, and to commit to a review on how future surplus will be shared. The coal mining legacy of south Wales extends to my constituency of Caerfyrddin, with the Amman and Gwendraeth valleys bearing the scars of previous industry, so it is of no surprise that my constituents were among those whose funds had been withheld, causing immense hardship for pensioners who had paid into the system for decades. In fact, it affected over 180 residents in my constituency, 20 of whom came to a drop-in earlier this year to share their stories of how this long-running issue has affected their lives.

When the hon. Member for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman) kindly moved new clause 2 on my behalf in Committee, the Minister’s answer gave some hope for long-awaited action. I therefore welcome the recent confirmation that the UK Government have finally listened and have implemented the transfer of the full £2.3 billion reserve to trustees. I pay tribute to my constituents for their hard work, and to former mineworkers everywhere for their long-fought campaign to make this day a reality. On behalf of 180 of my constituents, I thank the Minister. 

Former Allied Steel and Wire workers have also campaigned tirelessly to receive their rightful dues in retirement. When the company went bust in 2002, ASW employees lost not only their livelihoods, but the pensions they had worked hard for, and which they were relying on for security later in life. The financial assistance scheme and the Pension Protection Fund were introduced to provide some relief to pensioners in such a situation, but pension contributions made before April 1997 were not inflation-proofed, leaving pensioners without the secure retirement that they were promised.

15:45

In Committee, I put forward two amendments to extend the indexation of compensation under FAS and the PPF to cover both pre-1997 and post-1997 service, and to reimburse members for the annual increases they should rightly have received. After the Minister for Pensions responded that the amendments could not work, I went back to the drawing board—we never give up in Wales, do we?—and sought advice to address his concerns. New clause 6, which is the result of that advice, would require the Secretary of State to make regulations to provide for that indexation.

I welcome the recently announced action by the UK Government to finally start addressing this injustice, but limiting pre-1997 indexation to a 2.5% cap for those whose schemes originally offered it simply does not go far enough. I would add that, as of earlier this afternoon, I have still not received an answer to my written question asking how many FAS and PPF members will not benefit from the Government’s measure because of this caveat. I would welcome a response, I hope within the next few days.

The UK Government should instead adopt my new clause 6, which provides no cap on inflation, includes reimbursements to make good losses and specifies its application to transferee members, ill health payments and payments to surviving dependants. Affected pensioners must be at the heart of action to address the pension injustices that they have faced for so long. I urge the UK Government to listen to the continued concerns and to make the necessary changes to deliver real justice. For former ASW workers, that means providing full pre and post-1997 indexation—and backdated, please.

[Dr Scott Arthur (Edinburgh South West) (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for introducing the debate. I want to speak in support of Government new clauses 31 to 33, and in the context of new clause 22. Before I do so, let me say that I think it is really good that today’s debate has brought people together after four days of debate on the Budget. There seems to be a lot of agreement today, which is good. In particular, we are agreeing on the pre-1997 measures that were announced in the Budget last week. Nobody mentioned them much in their speeches over the past few days, but today we are all talking about them, which I think is really good.

I warmly welcome the Government’s confirmation in the Budget that we will legislate to allow the Pension Protection Fund and the financial assistance scheme to provide some inflation protection for pre-1997 pensions. This is an issue I have campaigned on, alongside Members from across the House, and I am genuinely pleased to see concrete progress included in the new amendments to the Pension Schemes Bill before the House. I thank the Minister for meeting me in the Treasury in the week running up to the Budget, and for drawing the Chancellor into that discussion. We had our picture taken in the Chancellor’ office, and one of my constituents spotted that there was a mouse trap, which shows that the Treasury hangs on to even the crumbs, as well as to the pounds and pennies.

For years, more than a quarter of a million PPF and FAS members have seen a significant part of their pension frozen—left to lose value year after year—and last week’s announcement begins to right that wrong. It matters deeply for people in Scotland. More than 26,000 pensioners will be helped by this change, which is 26,000 former workers in manufacturing, retail, hospitality and countless other industries. Having spoken to many constituents in this position, I know that many of them have felt forgotten. This reform sends a message that they have not been forgotten, and also that they have been listened to, which I think is even more important.

This decision is important not only for what it delivers, but for what it signals. By acting, the Government have effectively acknowledged that the lack of pre-1997 indexation was an injustice. By recognising that injustice in the public system, I feel that the Government have established an expectation that the private sector must also look at this matter.

The private sector requires encouragement in this area, as a number of companies—primarily under US ownership, in my assessment—are not currently providing regular discretionary increases on pre-1997 pension payments. Many of my constituents, pensioners who used to work for the likes of ExxonMobil—it has been mentioned a few times—and Johnson & Johnson, have told me of sponsoring companies taking a 10-year funding holiday from pension payments into the fund, while simultaneously blocking the indexation in payments. I take the view that the money in the funds belongs to the pensioners and that the funds themselves have a responsibility to move that money from the funds into pensioners’ pockets—and hopefully into the tills of local businesses in my constituency.

The Pensions Regulator itself notes that 17% of pre-1997 pensioners receive no inflation protection, not because of actuarial need but because scheme rules enable companies to do so. For a long time this was an academic matter because inflation was so low, but over the past five years it has eaten some pensions alive, and affected pensioners in Edinburgh South West are now really feeling it. I hope very much that the private pension schemes that do not already provide significant indexation to pre-1997 pensions but have the financial capacity to do so—many do—will see the signal from the Government’s changes to the PPF and the FAS schemes and improve their own schemes for the benefit of those pensioners. I have some slight concerns about the Bill, in that it might not go far enough in forcing them to make those improvements, but I have great faith in the Minister’s negotiating powers.

It is hoped that the surplus release enabled by the Bill will help to underpin additional corporate investment in the UK, but there is a risk that in cases such as ExxonMobil it may simply enable such companies to move the money in those funds outside the UK and into the bank balances of shareholders in other countries. That money really does belong in pensioners’ bank accounts, but there is a credible argument for also using it to invest in the UK. It does not seem like a good outcome for that money to be lost to our economy.

That can be avoided by addressing the issues of trustee governance. Some trustees undoubtedly act in the interest of scheme beneficiaries, but scheme rules do not always allow it and contrary guidance from the Pensions Regulator may be non-binding. Additionally, trustee boards often lack independence, particularly when we see a majority or even all members have been appointed by the employer—perhaps a conflict of interest. Mindful of that, I commend the Minister for announcing that his Department will consult on trust-based pension scheme governance, strengthening the member voice and supporting lay trustees working closely with the Pensions Regulator to ensure that trustees act in the interests of all beneficiaries, and comply with the law and their scheme rules. Again, the money belongs to those beneficiaries.

I have high hopes for the review, as we need significant reform if we are to secure meaningful protection for these pensioners. The urgency is clear: many of these individuals and their spouses are of an advanced age—I hope none of them hears me say that and thinks it is an insult—and we need to act quickly if they are to benefit. Addressing this injustice requires not only technical improvements in governance and trusteeship, but the political will to act. I am proud that this Labour Government are stepping up to act and looking at this issue in detail. We saw progress last week in the Budget and there is a commitment to do more.

Before I end, I want to touch on two slightly aligned issues. First, we have spoken a lot, across the House, about people who have pre-1997 private pensions and we worry that those pensions are not enough to support them. Each week, in Oxgangs in my constituency, I go to a community meal where I meet people who do not have any private pension. They survive on the state pension, often in quite difficult circumstances. When we talk about poor pensioners, it is right that we think about pre-1997 and others with private pensions who are struggling, but we should never forget who is really feeling the cost of living crisis.

Secondly, I have to thank my union, the University and College Union, for the work it has done over many years to protect my pension. I know I will benefit from that. Hardly a month goes by without me getting an email from it saying that there is some risk to pensions in a university somewhere in the UK. I commend it for its work.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I appreciate the chance to speak in this debate, especially without time limits—it is lovely. I absolutely love a very technical debate in the Chamber, but unfortunately not enough Members do. It would have been nice to see huge numbers delighted to talk about the technical aspects of legislation, but being a veteran of previous Finance Bills, I am aware that there is not often a huge turnout for these debates.

I am thankful for—but have a few criticisms of—the Government’s position throughout the Bill. I will start with a couple of issues around timing. It is appreciated that the changes are being made. The hon. Member for Edinburgh South West (Dr Arthur) mentioned the Budget debates, and I mentioned in my speech then how delighted I was that the change had been made, and how great it was that pre-1997 indexation would be taking place.

However, when I made my speech last Thursday, we had not yet seen the Government amendments. I was aware that there would be Government amendments, because it had been announced, but we did not have the opportunity to properly scrutinise them, or to consider whether those amendments should be amended, because of the timeline of when the details were provided. I appreciate that the Minister tabled the amendments in advance of the deadline, which is great, but there are questions that I potentially would have asked, and I may have tabled some probing amendments, if I had seen those Government amendments in advance.

On the 1997 indexation, I apologise that on Thursday, when I was talking about this, I mentioned the FSA instead of the FAS—I apologise to the Food Standards Agency; I did not mean anything by it. If I do that again, I apologise. In terms of the PPF and the FAS, the PPF got in touch with me last week, and I had a good meeting with it about what the indexation will look like and how many members would potentially be impacted. It suggested that it was getting in touch with 165,000 members, which I thought was a very significant number, with an impressively fast turnaround in the time it was looking to reach out to them. Those are significant numbers, and I appreciate that.

However, I am concerned that the uplift does not involve a one-off payment in order to bring the pre-1997 contributions up to some sort of level. The contributions were made pre-1997, so the compound interest on that would be unbelievable—it would be very significant. If there is no one-off payment to be made, and no recognition of the fact that the indexation has not taken place, then we are looking at adding 2.5% a year on to a tenner—or whatever—instead of 2.5% every year up until now, which would be a significantly different sum.

I appreciate that the change has been made, and I also appreciate that the PPF levy is still going to have the potential to reduce to zero. The PPF’s plans are still intended to go ahead, and it is still able to meet its financial obligations, even with the changes that have been proposed by the Government. However, I would appreciate it if the Government considered the possibility of a small one-off addition to the pre-1997 accrual that members have, in order to bring them closer to what the pension should have been if they had had that indexation previously.

Older pensioners are the group affected, some of whom are very unwell. As was mentioned by the Chair of the Work and Pensions Committee, the hon. Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth (Debbie Abrahams), a number of them are no longer with us. The Chair also mentioned Terry Monk, who has been in regular contact with me via email, and I thank him and all of the members who have fought so hard for this change. They have achieved something, although I expect they will probably go on fighting for more. I can understand that and I will be happy to back them in the search for more justice.

On some of the other issues that have been brought up in this debate, around the fiduciary duties, the right hon. Member for Birmingham Hodge Hill and Solihull North (Liam Byrne) and I probably have a similar idea of what “best interests” looks like, what the words “best interests” mean, and what the interests of scheme members are. Some of the ideas that he was talking about around investments are ideas that I would fully align with.

However, we can all define best interests in different ways. The shadow spokesperson, the hon. Member for North West Norfolk (James Wild), talked about the fact that fiduciary duties mean having to get the best returns—he said something like that—but it is not the best returns, but the best interests. Some people may define best interests as best returns, but some people may not. Some might define best interests as better transport systems for the majority of the scheme beneficiaries who live in a certain area, for example; if there were a more efficient transport system, more housing and better schools and hospitals, that would significantly benefit those members in that area.

16:00

[Liam Byrne]

The hon. Lady is absolutely right. Many members would say that they wanted their investments to help to create a more equal country—a less unequal country—not least because we now know from the work of the OECD and the International Monetary Fund that more unequal countries grow more slowly.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Absolutely. Productivity and growth are real possibilities if there is better patient capital investment, not just in social housing and renewable energy projects, which I would dearly love to see and have spoken a lot about—in particular social housing—but in tech and appliances, so that companies can use capital investment that is invested for the long term. That could have a significant impact on productivity.

Turning back to the Minister’s announcement around fiduciary duties and that definition, although there will of course be political argument about what best interests mean and how we define best interests, trustees will at least have the benefit of the guidance and will not necessarily labour under the misapprehension that they have to get the best possible financial return.

I draw the Government’s attention to the Well-being of Future Generations Act 2015 in Wales, which I talk about a lot, and which is about making the best decisions for the future. It is not necessarily about chasing economic growth at any cost; it is not necessarily about building certain things. Instead, it is about ensuring that future generations are best provided for. Some of the lessons that could be learned from that could be put into the fiduciary duties consultation that is coming forward about what the term best interests actually means and how it could be defined.

We have largely covered the mandation powers and their direction in the discussion of fiduciary duties. I am pretty relaxed about there being some mandation and some requirement, not least because of the points the right hon. Member for Birmingham Hodge Hill and Solihull North made about the growth in the economy that is likely to occur should capital be invested more in things that will increase productivity. There probably is a balance to be struck between benefiting pensioners of today and the future; if there is a lower return for pensioners 30 years in the future, we might again be causing a level of generational unfairness that we need to think about. How does that balance up? Does that new hospital or that new social housing provide enough of a benefit for those younger people, who will become pensioners in 30 or 40 years? Does that stack up? I do not think that will be an easy decision to make.

However, generally I think we can look at mandation; I do not take an ideological position against it like some with Conservative beliefs. I am, though, happy to support the Conservatives in their amendment that would require a report on what those mandation powers look like, because the more transparency from the Government—the more transparency from everybody in this place, frankly—the better. I therefore think a report on that would be absolutely grand.

I will mention a couple of other things. New clause 3 about terminal illness is a really neat solution to a problem. My local authority has implemented a “Tell us once” policy, whereby if someone has had a bereavement in their family, for instance, they have only to tell their distressing story to the local authority once and everything will be changed—their council tax and benefits—and they will no longer get various charges. I therefore think the solution proposed in new clause 3 is neat.

The Minister might come up with some issues around potential data sharing between the PPF and the DWP. However, if he could come up with a solution so that people do not have to tell their distressing story numerous times—having to explain again to somebody else that they are terminally ill and having to provide a huge amount of paperwork to do that when they have already had to do that with the DWP—that would be hugely helpful.

My understanding from my conversation with the PPF on Friday is that it is pretty good at supporting members, and I felt that it would be willing to be flexible about this should it get direction from the Minister and should the data-sharing issues be sorted out, but I am just guessing—I am not putting words in the PPF’s mouth. I just feel that it is a very member-focused organisation and might be quite keen to support its members in that regard.

[Dr Arthur]

This is a very slight aside, but is it not interesting that, when it comes to claiming benefits, there are so many silos and barriers to organisations, councils, Government agencies and Departments talking to each other, but they suddenly start speaking to each other and the benefits are stopped overnight when someone passes away?

[Kirsty Blackman]

I would like to see much more conversation. Gateway benefits allow people eligibility for other things, and sometimes those do not work either. A person might be eligible for universal credit, but they do not necessarily get the follow-through to free school meals, for example. Anything we can do to make that path smoother, either in the cessation of benefits or in agreement on eligibility, would be really helpful. I agree with the hon. Gentleman; we have seen issues with carers, for example, being chased for overpayments that were not their fault.

Again, I support the Government’s move on the consolidation of small pots, which I think is incredibly sensible. I am famously a massive supporter of the pensions dashboard and have never been at all critical of its timelines, but when it comes online there will be a rush for consolidation anyway. This is all about consolidation for people who have not touched their small pots, and making sure they get a return from that is totally sensible.

Guided retirement and the mid-life MOT are mentioned in a number of amendments, and ensuring that people are given the correct advice at the correct time is incredibly important. When the Government do their sufficiency review—when we are looking at the adequacy of pensions and what people will get when they hit retirement—I would be very surprised if that and the consultation do not conclude that more people need more advice earlier. The more advice that people have on their pension, and the more money they put into their pension at the earliest time, the bigger their pension will be.

I have already mentioned compound interest: if we put £100 into our pension when we were 21, it will be significantly bigger by the time we retire than if we put £100 into our pension when we are 40. That is just a fact. The more advice that we can give people at various important life stages, but particularly significantly before retirement, would be really helpful. That is another thing that should be included.

Finally, the hon. Member for Boston and Skegness (Richard Tice) spoke at a press conference about the local government pension scheme and how terrible it is that it is spending so much money on fees. That was in September, after Second Reading, at which he did not speak about that. He did not table any amendments on it before the Committee stage, and he has not shown up to raise it on Report. It is almost as if Reform MPs are saying things in press conferences and not doing any actual work. [Interruption.] I told him I was going to mention him. It is almost as if they make statements in press conferences and do not do anything, just as they have not shown up today.

Should a Reform Member have been particularly keen to make changes to the LGPS—such as to cap the level of fees it can pay, which are probably not unreasonable, as the LGPS is phenomenally successful in its returns for members—they could have amended the Bill, but they would have had to show up to do so. I suggest that the media organisations who are happy to cover press conferences ask the Members giving those press conferences what they will actually do to get their policies implemented. If such Members have an opportunity, they should use it rather than just shouting from the sidelines.

As I think I have made clear, I am largely supportive of an awful lot of things in the Bill, the direction of travel and many of the technical measures, which are great fun to have a good look at. I have some concerns about pre-1997 indexation. I am delighted that it has happened, but more could have been done. I will be interested to follow the progress of the fiduciary duty statutory guidance and the sufficiency and adequacy review and whether there will be mandation powers.

Lastly, on new clause 3, can we please make it easier for members who are terminally ill to have that conversation? I would very much appreciate the Minister committing to taking that away and considering how the PPF and FAS can get that information more easily without requiring people to jump through significant hoops.

[Jayne Kirkham (Truro and Falmouth) (Lab/Co-op)]

I welcome the real progress made on the pre-1997 fund. I do not have as much specific technical knowledge as most hon. Members in the Chamber, and I was not on the Bill Committee, but I have looked at the amendments and would like to comment on them, as I was lucky enough to chair a local government pension scheme committee—I think it was very well run—and sit on a pool oversight board. I will use that experience as an example.

Our LGPS in Cornwall was a good example of responsible investment and good practice in the sector. The Bill will consolidate LGPS funds into six pools from eight on the basis that that will be effective in achieving scale and diversification of assets and cost savings. Brunel—the pool that Cornwall is in—is not to go forward. Forming Brunel was costly and, as I said on Second Reading, the Cornwall fund was due to break even following the forming of that pool only this year. The costs involved in moving to another fund are expected to be high, which concerns me, as that may impact members, though we hope those costs will be recouped by investment growth as a result of the consolidation.

Being in a bigger pool did enable funds to invest in local infrastructure such as housing, transport and clean energy. Cornwall was good at that: we used our £2.3 billion—not a huge fund when we think of the size of many of these pools—to invest in affordable rental housing near Camborne, where 67 new homes were built on a brownfield site. I am looking forward to seeing the infrastructure projects that further consolidation will make possible.

On Second Reading, I raised concerns that moving to larger funds may affect local links. Brunel is a strong south-west pool and, although it covers as far up as Oxford, we have managed within that pool to be effective on a local level.

The Environment Agency—I noted the amendment on that—was part of our pool, and it did have slightly different rules, which was tricky and somewhat impacted on our pool. I am pleased that the scheme managers will now have a duty to co-operate with strategic authorities, as the inability to do that often led to perhaps unintended consequences. In social housing, for example, we may have been looking at investments that were the same as the local authority’s. It would make sense to be able to talk about such investments so that we are not doing silly things like competing against each other.

In Cornwall, we had a strong responsible investment policy, and our carbon-neutral date was earlier than the rest of the pool by five years. We were able to maintain those policies and our environmental, social and governance focus by having a strong presence on the oversight board, which enabled us to influence the pool and be a bit different within it. I hope that will continue so that pools do not end up following the lowest common denominator when it comes to things like social impact, investment and ESG matters, but instead will be raised up to the highest level. In our local fund, we had employers and employees on our pension committee, and that worked well. The union reps and the employers gave some very valuable input, and I think that would be valuable for the larger pools as well.

Our local social impact fund was, in the end, 7.5% of our investments. We could channel our investment into rented housing and local renewables in Cornwall, as well as more widely around the UK, and I hope that local government pension schemes will still be able to set their own local investment targets in that way, even when working with local authorities.

16:16

I welcome the new guidance on fiduciary duties. The trustees need that confidence, because they can be uncertain about what they can and cannot invest in, and they are nervous about that. When I chaired the committee, we wanted to ensure that our local impact portfolio enabled us to combine our fiduciary responsibilities to our members with delivering positive social and environmental change in Cornwall, where we were and where our members lived and worked, but that uncertainty produced concern at times.

To conclude, I really support the Bill and its aims. The Cornwall pension fund benefited from its initial consolidation into the pool by being able to invest in local infrastructure, and we made responsible investment one of our top priorities; I believe that has continued since I stepped down as chair. There are issues to do with consolidation and growth that I would like the Minister to look at, and I look forward to hearing his response.

[Vikki Slade (Mid Dorset and North Poole) (LD)]

I welcome the overall thrust of the Bill. Measures such as the pension pot consolidations are long overdue and will make a real difference to savers, particularly small savers. Every new year, I try to tidy up the numerous tiny pensions from jobs I had in my 20s and 30s, but the pots are so small that the cost of a financial planner and the exit fees would wipe them out, so this reform is great news for consumers who have been on low incomes and have moved from job to job. I urge the Government to go further by lifting the threshold. After all, a pension pot of £10,000 will generate a payback of only around £50 a month, which is barely enough to cover a basic weekly shop. The Bill goes in the right direction, but it does not go far enough or move fast enough. I am concerned that it leaves groups of pensioners who did the right thing by saving for the future considerably out of pocket.

Like others in the Chamber, I welcome the long-overdue decision to provide some indexation for pre-1997 pensions in the PPF and FAS, but let us be clear: this is not full justice. These pensioners have endured decades without inflation protection, and a CPI increase capped at 2.5% starting in two years’ time, at a time when the cost of living has soared, is still going to leave people struggling. They expected fairness and parity with post-1997 benefits, but what they have received is a compromise that falls short of restoring their full dignity and security in retirement. I call on Ministers to support the calls of many people, including the hon. Member for Llanelli (Dame Nia Griffith), to ensure that pensioners outside the PPF and the FAS are fully supported.

The case of AEA Technology pensioners is a long-running injustice that I have been dealing with since my first days in this place. Employees, who were often nuclear scientists and safety engineers, were promised pensions “no less favourable” than the civil service scheme, and many worked at the Winfrith atomic energy establishment, just outside my constituency in Dorset. I have met and talked to a number of them, including Peter, Phil, Sally and Michael, as well as Jonathan, who wrote to me saying that

“nearly 20% of AEAT pensioners have died since the campaign started in 2012, including my colleague and campaigner Derek Whitmell. This has echoes of the Post Office and infected blood scandals. Delay by the Government is simply unacceptable…this is now in sharp focus for me with Derek’s passing”.

Those pensioners trusted the promise that the Government gave them at the time, yet after AEAT collapsed, their pensions were cut by almost half, with inflation protection stripped away. Today, the fund holds far in excess of what is needed to restore their pensions in full, yet thousands of them remain short-changed.

I recognise the changes in the pre-1997 pensions announced last week, but they are woefully inadequate. That is not just unfair; it is a breach of trust. New clause 1, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Didcot and Wantage (Olly Glover), calls for an independent review so that we can finally deliver justice for those pensioners, just as the Government have started to deliver justice on many other historical scandals, which I welcome. This is one of those scandals.

I turn to another. While the Government’s intention to allow surplus sharing of defined benefit schemes is welcome, the Bill as drafted leaves pensioners exposed. UK DB schemes hold an estimated £222 billion in surplus, yet 88% of those funds have failed to use those surpluses to restore pensions eroded by inflation. Companies such as BP transfer the assets to insurers in bulk annuity deals worth £50 billion annually, while pensioners see their living standards fall.

My amendments 17, 18 and 19 seek to put fairness at the heart of the process. Amendment 17 would ensure that surplus sharing principles applied even when schemes were wound up. Amendment 18 would require consultation with members before the surplus was extracted, and amendment 19 would reinstate trustee consent and oblige trustees to consider whether pensions had kept pace with inflation and past requests for discretionary increases.

[Mr Alistair Carmichael (Orkney and Shetland) (LD)]

I have several BP pensioners, with BP obviously having operated the Sullom Voe terminal in Shetland for many years. The injustice they suffered, which left them with a pension worth about 11% less than it should have been because of the decisions of the trustee in 2021 and 2022, showed the inadequacy of the control and independence of the trustee in relation to the company. Does my hon. Friend agree that that requires urgent attention?

[Vikki Slade]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his intervention—he has stolen my next line.

John, who works at the BP depot at Wytch Farm, which is the largest onshore oil site in England in Poole harbour, told me that his pension has been eroded by 11%—he probably got the same letter as my right hon. Friend’s constituents. Even modest requests for discretionary increases made by the trustees have been refused by the parent company. Those discretionary increases were affordable; they would not have required any additional funds from the company. Another of my constituents, Suzie, who sits on the steering group, told me that the issue affects 56,000 pensioners from BP alone, but the change—a small one—would support pensioners from many other companies.

I will end by talking to new clause 3, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Manuela Perteghella). I do so in memory of my mum Lin Foster, who died before she could access her pensions, and in support of my constituent Judith, who came to see me about her sister Alison, who died after receiving a terminal brain tumour diagnosis. Alison found that the paperwork required to access her lump sum meant that she would have to articulate and confront her impending death—something that she simply could not do on top of everything else. It meant that, as a result, she missed out on funds that could have made her last few months more bearable, as well as on potentially accessing treatments that might have given her a bit more time with her family. This simple clause would have allowed her medical team to make that declaration on her behalf via an SR1 and to reduce the administration for all concerned.

The Bill goes a long way in improving the lives of pensioners, but for the pensioners who are missing out, small changes could make a huge difference. I urge Ministers to think about the impact they could have on lives by little tweaks that will not cost the Government anything, or very much, at all.

[Peter Swallow]

Can I say at the outset how much I have enjoyed the debate? I particularly want to highlight the contributions of my hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli (Dame Nia Griffith), who powerfully raised some of the issues that I will go on to address, and—purely because I enjoyed the fiscal geekery—the contribution from the hon. Member for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman), who rivals the Minister himself in her enthusiasm for financial issues. What a delight it was to experience that.

I welcome the opportunity to speak on this Bill, which touches on several issues close to my constituents in Bracknell Forest. It is also worth acknowledging the strong action that the Chancellor took in the Budget to support all pensioners by raising the state pension by up to £550. That is possible only thanks to Labour’s steadfast commitment to the triple lock on pensions. That is real action on pensioner poverty, at a time when the Conservatives and Reform have flirted with scrapping the triple lock.

Similarly, the Bill delivers real benefits to private pension savers across the country by simplifying and streamlining the system. The measures will increase their returns—around 3,300,000 workers on defined contribution schemes in the south-east alone stand to benefit by about £29,000 more for their retirement—while helping to unlock around £50 billion of investment in the UK economy. Hon. Members need only follow the Minister on Twitter to see why it is so important that we increase investment in the UK economy after many years of under-investment by the previous Government.

I thank the Minister for the work to get the Bill to this stage. I welcome in particular the measures providing for action on an issue close to the hearts of many in Bracknell Forest: the slow erosion of pre-1997 defined benefit pensions. It is for that reason that I will focus on new clause 22, which calls for the indexation of pre-1997 pensions. I sympathise deeply with the spirit of the new clause. The erosion of those pensions is an injustice—one that urgently needs addressing. It is important to say that not all pre-1997 schemes are in surplus. Although I agree that that is not the fault of their members, legislating to index would put entire schemes at risk, and I believe that that is not a risk that any sensible Government would take. However, it is vital that the Bill marks the beginning of further action to bring justice to those with pre-1997 defined benefit pensions whose schemes are now in generous surplus.

I was delighted when the Chancellor announced at the Budget statement that members of the Pension Protection Fund will have their accruals protected from inflation, ending years of degradation. That has been carried through in amendments before us. I welcome the recognition in principle that those with pre-1997 pensions are indeed facing an injustice, and that action must be taken to rectify it. I have met many constituents who were formerly employed by HP and later HPE, which used to be based in Bracknell. They are now members of the HPE pension scheme, and have seen their returns decimated. I have spoken with other pensioners in other schemes, too—many of which have been mentioned by others Members across the House. It is not right that people who have worked hard and paid into their pensions now face ever-diminishing life savings through no fault of their own, despite many schemes, including HPE, having significant reserves.

One of my constituents, Ed, began drawing from his pension nine years ago. In that time, his pension has increased only three times, by three separate percentage increments: 3%, 1%, and 1%. He says that, had his pension risen in line with inflation, he would have seen his pension increase by around 38% over the years to 2025. As a result—this is the real-life impact—he has seen a dramatic fall in his living standards. Ed is not alone. Constituents in Bracknell and across the country should not have to fight any more to make themselves heard and achieve justice.

This is an opportune moment to do what we can to put that right. In the Bill, the Government are reforming the use of surpluses, rightly strengthening the hands of trustees to act, as the Government themselves have done for the PPF scheme, for which they effectively act as the trustee—they are leading by example. I thank the Chancellor and the Pensions Minister for meeting me to discuss that before the Budget. The Minister has been clear on his expectations of trustees following the passage of the Bill, including in his contribution today, and I thank him for his comments, specifically on strengthening guidance for trustees.

Today must be the beginning, not the end, of the story. I have written to the trustees of the HPE scheme urging them to use the powers in this Bill to right the wrong.

I wanted to take this opportunity to call once more on the trustees of the HPE scheme, and other schemes similarly in surplus, to do everything in their power to ensure that pre-1997 pensions are protected from inflation, and I wanted to do so on the Floor of this House because I think it important that we are as clear as possible that trustees will be given the powers they need to act and should follow through with concrete action to protect pensions. That is the right thing to do, and with the powers the Government are granting in the Bill, it is now in their hands to do it.

16:30

[John Milne (Horsham) (LD)]

I shall speak to new clauses 8 and 13, which stand in my name, among others.

With its title, the Pensions Schemes Bill, this piece of legislation was probably never destined to grab headlines—sorry, Minister, but that is the case—which is a pity, because it contains some genuinely intelligent measures, developed over years with significant cross-party support, and could go some way to boosting UK plc, as we all want. Directing more of our pension fund savings into UK investments is a long-overdue mission; however, it is not just about what you do, but how you do it, and as I argued in Committee, I am not convinced the Government have struck the right balance with their plan to take sweeping powers of mandation. Yes, we should be concerned about very low pension fund investment into the UK, but the reason behind that is not some form of trustee treason; rather, it is a logical and predictable response to the UK’s regulatory framework and a market that over-emphasises costs, which discourages any kind of active management strategy.

Mandation is the wrong solution. There are other ways to reach the same outcome through partnership, building on the consensus achieved in the Mansion House accord. I strongly urge the Government to look again at creating more ready-made investment vehicles. The biggest risk in mandation is that it could force pension funds to make sub-optimal investments, because they are chasing the same limited supply of UK assets as everyone else.

In addition to more support for innovation and start-ups, like others who have spoken today, I see a fantastic opportunity for large-scale investment in social housing, care homes, high streets, environmental schemes and infrastructure. That would bring huge social rewards, as well as boosting growth, which is the Government’s mission. That will not happen, though, unless the Government help local and regional authorities to pump prime the system with a stream of investable products. To me, that seems like a small ask, and I hope the Government will reconsider.

I am pleased by Ministers’ positive response to some of the amendments we fought for in Committee. That does not always happen. The scandalous treatment of pre-1997 pension savings has been left unresolved for decades, so I welcome this Government being the first to act and their decision to link compensation payments from the PPF and FAS to CPI inflation. Of course, this is far from a complete solution, and indexation applies only going forward, but given that until now there had been no sign of compensation of any kind or of any group, I will take this as a partial win. I pay tribute to persistence of all my Horsham constituents who have raised pre-’97 indexation with me time and again.

Compensation by the PPF is certainly a solution, but we are in danger of missing a one-off opportunity to access pension surpluses. The Bill will give trustees increased access to surplus savings, which have built up in many funds in recent years, which is good, but without some sort of extra push from the Government, it seems to me likely that none or little of the money will go toward pre-1997 pension injustices. In the Work and Pensions Committee last week, I asked the Secretary of State whether he truly believed that the Bill as it stands would help people, and I got a “Yes, Minister” kind of answer:

“I am not going to call stumps on brand new legislation before it has had a chance to have an effect, so let’s see what effect it has.”

That is not good enough. The companies that have not been shamed into action in a quarter of a century are not miraculously going to discover altruism today. Some form of compulsion is required.

I hope that the pre-1997 section will be taken further in the Lords, where the balance of power gives the Liberal Democrats somewhat more leverage than we had in Committee. [Interruption.] It is a wonderful institution—so democratic, is it not? I also welcome the decision to abolish the Pension Protection Fund levy, which had become effectively redundant; that was the subject of another Lib Dem amendment. That move will reduce hidden fees for pension schemes and pass those savings directly to savers.

However, other things are still missing. As someone with a professional background in pensions communications, I argued in Committee for the Government to enable free universal pension guidance at the age of 40, among other stages, when there is still time to change outcomes, rather than waiting all the way to the moment of retirement itself. There is a ticking time bomb of pension inadequacy that must be addressed today, and pensions guidance is an incredibly low-cost way to improve outcomes. The Pension Wise service would be an excellent vehicle for that, and it is ready and waiting for us to use it. If the Government will not back new clause 8, will the Minister meet with me and members of industry to look at how an auto-enrolment trial could finally move this proposal forward?

That brings me to new clause 13, tabled by myself and my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay (Steve Darling), which seeks to strengthen the people-focused elements of the Bill by using pensions services to offer free, accessible guidance to the groups we know are under-saving. If we look at minority ethnic savers, we see that their pension pots average £52,000—less than half of the £115,000 that applies to white British savers. Let us also consider that women are on average set to retire on just £13,000 a year, compared with £19,000 for men—a third less. Disabled workers are approaching retirement with average pension savings of £47,980—just a third of the UK average. The Government rightly say that they want people to be independent, financially resilient and able to pay their own way, but that cannot happen if entire groups—women, ethnic minorities and disabled people—are destined to retire on a fraction of what others are provided with.

There is a lot to like in this Bill, but legislative opportunities come up only once in a blue moon, and a lot more could be done here. I ask the Government to support new clauses 8 and 13.

[Elaine Stewart (Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock) (Lab)]

I rise to speak to new clause 22. Let me begin by recognising the work of the Hewlett Packard Pension Association, particularly the work of Patricia Kennedy from Ayrshire—she hoped to be in the Gallery today, but she was too ill to travel. Patricia has been a driving force to keep this issue alive, but of course this is not about only one individual; it is about all pre-1997 pensioners.

Earlier this year, I was proud to host Patricia and many of her fellow campaigners in Parliament. That meeting made clear the human cost of inaction—pensioners seeing their incomes erode for decades, and families struggling because the system has failed them. That is why new clause 22 matters. At its heart, the new clause sets a simple principle: pensions earned before 1997 should not be left to wither away. It also follows a principle that the Government have already adopted.

I welcome the Minister’s commitment in his opening remarks to work with trustees to ensure that schemes in surplus, such as Hewlett Packard Enterprise, work to benefit pensioners. If good co-operation is not forthcoming, will the Government look to other legislative means to correct this course? Many of these schemes are backed by profitable multinationals, yet discretion has failed. It has failed with Wood Group, Hewlett Packard Enterprise, STMicroelectronics, Atos/Sema, American Express, AIG, Pfizer, 3M, Chevron, NCR Scotland, Lloyd’s Register, and Johnson & Johnson.

Some pensioners have gone for 10, 15 or 23 years without a single increase. That is not fairness. NC22 would correct that. I am sure all Labour Members agree that pensioners should not depend on the whims of employers, and we should be wary of accidentally creating an entrenched situation in which pensioners in failed schemes receive protection while those in solvent schemes remain unprotected—to me, that seems inconsistent. New clause 22 would address that inconsistency, ensuring that every pensioner has the security and dignity they deserve, regardless of when their service was accrued. I thank the Minister for meeting me to talk over my worries about this Bill.

[Susan Murray (Mid Dunbartonshire) (LD)]

I start by thanking my hon. Friends the Members for Torbay (Steve Darling) and for Mid Dorset and North Poole (Vikki Slade), who have clearly devoted a lot of time and care to scrutinising the Bill—along with others, of course—and tabling constructive amendments.

As we have heard, the UK pensions market is currently worth around £3 trillion—a staggering sum. The right hon. Member for Birmingham Hodge Hill and Solihull North (Liam Byrne) has already highlighted the opportunity for national investing, as well as to improve the quality of life for pension holders. For too many people, though, the rules and regulations that determine what they will receive in retirement are opaque—as anyone who has worked through the Bill will know—and often deeply confusing. That is why I welcome the Liberal Democrat proposals to introduce a simple traffic light system, which will help people to understand their scheme and how well their pension is performing.

However, understanding is only one part of the picture; people must also be confident that their pension is being managed legally and ethically. I therefore welcome the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Poole (Neil Duncan-Jordan), which would ensure that British pension funds are compliant with the UK’s duty not to aid or assist serious breaches of international law. After the horror we have witnessed in Gaza over the past two years, and judging by the strength of feeling expressed both by my constituents and by Members across this House, I believe that safeguard would be warmly welcomed.

Like other Members, I cannot speak in this debate without raising the topic of pre-1997 pensions.

[Peter Swallow]

I apologise for interrupting the hon. Lady just as she is getting on to a point that, as she knows, I care deeply about, but I wanted to tease out a point about ethical investment. What I am struggling with is that her Front-Bench spokesperson, the hon. Member for Torbay (Steve Darling), has spoken against mandation, but the hon. Lady has talked passionately about the need to ensure ethical investment. Will she address the fact that there is a conflict here? I am deeply sympathetic to both viewpoints and understand both of them, but I also recognise that there is a conflict. We either have a system in which pension schemes are given clear guidance about where they should invest and what they should invest in, or we do not; we cannot have both. Will the hon. Lady address that conflict and come down on one side of the fence or the other, not—if I may very gently say so—do the Lib Dem thing of sitting on that fence too much?

[Susan Murray]

I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s point, but the important thing is that there is clear guidance for pension funds to make sure we do not assist breaches of international law. I think that would make things very clear, and quite easy for pension funds to understand and implement.

My constituency of Mid Dunbartonshire has many pensioners who are reliant on schemes that do not provide annual indexation. That is why I was pleased to add my name to Liberal Democrat new clause 7, which takes a nuanced and responsible approach. It calls for an assessment of the position faced by pre-1997 pensioners, and of options to address the reality that their pensions have effectively been frozen for many years. As the hon. Member for Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock (Elaine Stewart) mentioned, when schemes that are in surplus are able to ensure that pension holders have a better quality of life, we should fully support as many of them as possible.

Ultimately, this is about fairness and openness in our system. Pension schemes hold an almost unimaginable amount of money and are among the most powerful financial actors in our economy, which could help to reduce the inequity in our communities. They are too large and too complex for any individual saver or campaign group to challenge alone, and it therefore falls to us in this House to ensure that schemes operate fairly, ethically and transparently, and that the people who contribute to them and rely on them can retire with dignity and confidence.

16:45

[Clive Jones (Wokingham) (LD)]

My constituent David worked for 3M for 31 years, 23 of them pre-1997. His pension payment for service prior to 1997 has not increased since 2008, since when it has lost 40% of its purchasing power. Other constituents have lost more. Another constituent worked for ExxonMobil, which he says gave him written documentation that he would receive annual increases at 80% of RPI. However, since legislation changed in 1995, that has not happened. Those are just two of the 40-plus constituents who have contacted me about the injustice experienced by pensioners whose pension schemes are failing to provide an inflation increase on their service prior to 1997. I know that many more across the country face the same injustice. Their stories are deeply troubling. Rather than enjoying a well-earned retirement, pensioners are left struggling to keep pace with the cost of living, often while their pension scheme is in surplus.

[Helen Maguire (Epsom and Ewell) (LD)]

I have a similar constituency case with a similar example of discretionary increases. Those were 80% of RPI, but in 2023 that was reduced to half. That has left my constituent, among others, unable to afford their bills and their home. Although I am pleased to see the pre-1997 pension indexation in the Budget for PPF and FAS members, I remain concerned for constituents such as mine. Does my hon. Friend agree that there needs to be a plan for those impacted by a sudden decrease in inflation payments?

[Clive Jones]

I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend. There needs to be some sort of plan, and sooner rather than later.

The Government appear to recognise the injustice and are proposing to use surplus funds in the PPF to provide inflation increases on some pre-1997 pensions. Why are we not seeking to resolve the same issue for company defined-benefit pension schemes? Many of these pension schemes have a funding surplus but choose not to use it to support their former employees, despite often being asked to do so by trustees who are ignored by foreign-based employers. Surely that cannot be right.

Research by the Pensions Regulator has revealed that even among schemes whose rules allow for discretionary benefits, less than a third had provided those benefits in the previous three years. Employer discretion has failed in practice and will continue to fail unless Parliament acts. The Pension Schemes Bill fails to address this issue.

Only by amending the original legislation can we ensure fairness for those with pre-1997 service. The Society of Pension Professionals argues that legislation on pre-1997 benefits is unnecessary, but the evidence is clear: discretion, more often than not, is exercised to the detriment of pensioners. As I have said, trustees lack the authority to act and pensioners are left behind. The problem appears to be concentrated in a small number of large companies. They were meant to provide long-term financial security for their employees. We must remember that all defined-benefit schemes paid levies into the PPF, creating a surplus that now funds indexation. If pensioners in the PPF deserve protection, so do those in live schemes who helped build the surplus in those schemes.

The Government have taken the first step by restoring indexation for some. They must now take the logical next step by extending inflation protection to all pre-1997 pensioners in live schemes. I believe that pre-1997 pension service should receive inflation protection on the same statutory basis as post-1997 service. This is about fairness, dignity and justice for those who worked hard, paid into schemes, were made promises, and now deserve security in retirement. Pensioners affected by this injustice live in every constituency, and they deserve the support of this House of Commons and the Government. Our constituents affected by these injustices simply ask for fairness, and hopefully the Minister will make sure that it happens soon.

[Ayoub Khan (Birmingham Perry Barr) (Ind)]

I hope to devote a large portion of my speech to new clause 36, which stands in my name, but let me first swiftly acknowledge the new clauses tabled by the hon. Member for Poole (Neil Duncan-Jordan), the right hon. Member for Birmingham Hodge Hill and Solihull North (Liam Byrne), the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Manuela Perteghella) and the hon. Member for Llanelli (Dame Nia Griffith).

While pension fund managers should no doubt ensure that they deliver sufficient returns to their clients, they must also reflect on the duties that they have not only to those who make contributions, but to society at large. That means not using public money to prop up industries that rail against our primary objectives, be they preventing violations of human rights, upholding our commitment to net zero or delivering unfettered justice for those who have been wronged, as in the case of those whose pension contributions made before 1997 have not risen with inflation. I wholeheartedly align myself with the hon. Member for Mid Dunbartonshire (Susan Murray) on the need for ethical parameters.

In tabling new clause 36, I hoped to bring a focus to the practices relating to pension funds that fall under the local government pension scheme—those that make provision for the employees of schools, universities, local authorities and police forces, to name just a few. Those pension fund managers preside over £390 billion in assets, under the management of members of the investment banking sector. Given that much, if not all, of the funding that flows from our schools, councils and the like comes from taxpayers’ money, we have a right to ensure that none of it is being put to waste. I regret to report, however, that these local government pension funds are heading for an absolute embarrassment of riches. While public money sits idle in a vault, lining the pockets of the investment bankers who manage the funds, we are experiencing deep funding crises in our schools, our universities and our local councils.

Year after year, since the moment when these pension funds were established, we have seen the same tactics deployed by those who preside over them. Councils, schools and others end up putting too much of their budgets towards employer contributions, leaving them with less money to spend on the things that matter, while obscene amounts of money are left to be used as a lucrative plaything for the investment banking sector.

When calculating the money that councils, schools and the like must pay into their employees’ pensions, the pension fund managers first estimate the annual rate of return that they expect to get from their assets. To do that, they enlist the work of an actuary firm—usually one of the “big four”—which takes into account market conditions and various risk factors in order to come up with a figure. The work of these actuaries is incredibly precise, yet every year they end up drastically underestimating the amount by which the local government pension funds will grow over the next year. Why? Because the local pension boards set the assumptions and parameters on the basis of which they make such calculations, often with the intention of overstating elements that may hit the fund’s assets, such as market volatility and uncertainty. From there, by default, they then skim a substantial percentage off the fund’s assets, usually about 0.5%. While that may not seem a lot, given that, for example, West Midlands Pension Fund holds £21.2 billion-worth of assets, it means that at least £1 billion is being scraped off the top every year.

When a highly conservative estimate for growth is combined with lofty management expenses, the result is one thing, and one thing only: our councils, schools and key institutions end up putting more than they need into the banking sector, under the guise of securing their employees a comfortable retirement. Then, once they get to the end of the year and have mysteriously exceeded their artificially conservative projections for growth, the pension fund managers are left with an even bigger pot of money, from which they take their mandatory percentage fee.

It is this repeated cycle of grossly inflating the contributions of our state institutions that is resulting in more and more taxpayer money being used not to fix our crumbling public services that benefit society as a whole, but for city bankers to make big bets on the market and make profits. It is the equivalent of pension funds setting the rules of the game, marking their own homework and keeping the proceeds for themselves, rather than refunding those who put into the system. It has got to the point that even the LGPS Scheme Advisory Board, which advises local pension boards, has said that they need to stop overcharging their clients and underestimating their growth. Unfortunately, however, all the power lies in the hands of the Secretary of State to make the changes that would put much-needed investment back into our schools, councils and the like.

I will give an example. Research by David Bailey, of the University of Birmingham, and John Clancy, of Birmingham City University, has shown that Birmingham city council has handed over £1.2 billion in employer contributions to the West Midlands Pension Fund in the past 10 years. By 2022 the council was being asked to pay an extra 37% on top of its standard bill, whereas the nine other core city councils in the UK were asked to pay an average of around 17%. Birmingham city council is calculated to have overpaid the West Midlands Pension Fund by roughly £547 million. In 2023 the council declared section 114 bankruptcy, and this year it has approved council tax rises of 21% and £300 million in cuts to vital services.

Hypothetically, had that payment never been made, Birmingham city council would have needed neither to declare bankruptcy, nor to approve budget cuts that reduced its offer to bare-bones skeleton services. The implications that clamping down on the excesses of local pension boards would have for local councils, schools and universities, and for the British taxpayer, are truly incomprehensible, yet as things stand we are shying away from rebalancing the books and from deploying as much of the Government’s investment into public services as we can.

That leads me to my new clause 36, which would put a cap on the investment expenses that can be claimed on LGPS pension funds. In the case of the West Midlands Pension Fund, the management expenses that are charged amount to an increase of four percentage points in employer contributions. Because the fund charges 60 basis points in management fees, Birmingham council tax payers are paying £13.4 million to the investment managers, which works out at £50 on every band D council tax payer’s bill. However, if new clause 36 were to be put in place, only £3.30 would be charged to every council tax payer’s bill. In the same period, the pension fund has consistently failed to report where the investment management expenses that it charges go, and whom they benefit.

As I say, my new clause 36 would implement a cap on the fees that investment bankers can take from pension funds. While that would certainly mark a great step forward in ensuring that excessive wealth gets put into the hands of the private sector, we must also do more to ensure that our schools and councils pay no more in employer contributions than they must, so that they can put more investment into things that really matter—whether that is local government funding for adult social care or for schoolchildren with special education needs, or being able to put more teaching staff in our classrooms.

[Torsten Bell]

With the leave of the House, I will respond to as many of the points raised as I can manage.

I thank hon. Members for their speeches today. They have shown not only the depth of knowledge in this House, but the breadth of pensions issues that matter to all of us and to our constituents. I start by thanking those who have welcomed some of the changes that we have introduced and set out today. My hon. Friends the Members for Oldham East and Saddleworth (Debbie Abrahams) and for Edinburgh South West (Dr Arthur) spoke about the PPF, and I appreciate their remarks. On the changes we have set out on the statutory guidance for trustees, the speech by my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Hodge Hill and Solihull North (Liam Byrne) is much appreciated, as is that from the hon. Member for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman).

[Claire Hanna (Belfast South and Mid Down) (SDLP)]

Like others, I was delighted to see in the Budget the pre-1997 indexing. The Minister will know that that softens but does not correct a wrong, and it leaves tens of thousands of former employees of Harland & Wolff and Visteon, including my constituents, without indexation. New clauses 28 and 29, in my name, would address that, and I hope the Minister might be able to incorporate them in the future.

[Torsten Bell]

I thank my hon. Friend for her intervention. I covered that extensively in my opening remarks.

I want to mention two points raised in the debate. The hon. Member for North West Norfolk (James Wild) asked about the timeline for the Pensions Commission. I can assure him that nothing is going slowly, so the final report will be delivered in early 2027, which is significantly quicker than the last one in the 2000s. I will update the House as soon as I have more to say on that front. The hon. Member for Caerfyrddin (Ann Davies) asked how many people will benefit from the change to the PPF indexation and how many will not benefit. The answer is that 250,000 members will benefit and 90,000 will not benefit, because their schemes did not provide for indexation in the scheme rules in the first place. I hope that answers the question she raised.

17:00

I will focus the remainder of my remarks on issues that I did not have a chance to touch on in my opening speech, although I would add that I have heard the powerful speeches of hon. Members—including those of my hon. Friends the Members for Bracknell (Peter Swallow) and for Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock (Elaine Stewart) and the hon. Member for Wokingham (Clive Jones)—that took us back to the issue of pre-1997 indexation. I hope trustees will have heard the powerful case they have all made.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Poole (Neil Duncan-Jordan) for his comments and amendments on the local government pension scheme. Amendment 1 rightly focuses us all on ensuring that members’ voices are heard as part of the LGPS governance arrangements. There are already well-established routes at the level of the administering authorities, and that continues to be important, because that is where the crucial investment strategies will be set. He raised pools, and I commit to discussing that further with the Minister for Local Government and Homelessness, and monitoring in more detail what is happening as those organisations go through a significant period of change.

Amendments 2 and 3 and new clause 4 relate to what the LGPS should or should not invest in. As hon. Members will all be aware, the Government’s general position is that investment strategies are set locally by each pension fund. Importantly, that includes decisions on how environmental, social and governance issues are to be taken into account. I encourage LGPS authorities to take such matters incredibly seriously, as my hon. Friend the Member for Truro and Falmouth (Jayne Kirkham) did from her own experience.

[Neil Duncan-Jordan]

I want to press the Minister slightly more on the need for UK pension funds not to invest in companies that could be guilty of war crimes and breaking international law. Would he like to reflect on that?

[Torsten Bell]

Specifically on the question of having regard to international law, I emphasise that compliance extends far beyond the LGPS, and it obviously reaches right across Government. That said, the LGPS, as a public sector scheme, has particularly high expectations on responsible investment, and I have heard the points my hon. Friend has made.

The hon. Members for Torbay (Steve Darling), for Horsham (John Milne) and for Stratford-on-Avon (Manuela Perteghella) broadened this debate beyond the LGPS, not least on questions of climate change and the wider social impact of investments. The Department for Work and Pensions is currently conducting a review of the task force on climate-related financial disclosures requirements, and we have also asked the Pensions Regulator to assess the practicalities of transition plans for pension schemes. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, we will also bring forward legislation to clarify that trustees can take systemic factors into account when making their investment decisions. I hope this provides hon. Members with significant reassurance on those points.

The hon. Members for North West Norfolk and for Torbay returned to the issue, which we discussed extensively in Committee and on Second Reading, on the limited reserve or backstop asset allocation power. As I have repeatedly made it clear to this House, we do not currently anticipate it will need to be used. That is precisely because of the industry’s commitment to the Mansion House accord and wider support from the pension industry for greater investment in private assets.

I welcome the recognition of the importance of the pipeline of projects by the hon. Member for Horsham, and I encourage him to make sure that no Liberal Democrat anywhere opposes construction projects—I have seen the leaflets—be they for energy, roads, housing or anything else.

A crucial point was raised in Committee about the importance of monitoring these commitments, and I can confirm that since then the ABI and Pensions UK have committed that they will work together to track progress. I hope that helps answer some of the questions raised in Committee.

The proposals to add to the matters on which the Government must report are, I believe, unnecessary, as any exercise of the power would be subject to a wide range of safeguards—not only the production of a report about the impacts on savers and growth, but a savers’ interest test.

The hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon spoke powerfully to her new clause 3, as did the hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole (Vikki Slade). I believe the PPF works hard to make sure that it can deal quickly with payments for people with terminal illness, and the Bill contains other measures that mean it can do that at an earlier point in someone’s prognosis. The SR1 form would already be sufficient for the PPF to provide the certainty that the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon is looking for. I have checked with the PPF to ensure that currently within the PPF and the FAS we do not currently have any outstanding requests for such payments where they have been unable to make them, for example for the reasons of not having sufficient evidence. That said, she has spoken powerfully on that point and I will speak to the PPF at my next meeting with the chief executive and the chair to see what more can be done. I thank her for raising those issues.

I also thank the hon. Member for Horsham for bringing us back to the question of advice and guidance. Most of us do need help in preparing for retirement. However, I take a slightly more positive view of the current provision of free guidance through the Money and Pensions Service. I also agree a bit more with the hon. Member for Mid Dunbartonshire (Susan Murray) that the task of Government is to reduce the complexity in our pensions system, rather than just hoping that ever more advice will help savers to navigate it. That is exactly why the parts of the Bill on guided retirement and small pots are so important as we move forward.

I would just like to cover some of the commitments I made in Committee. [Interruption.] I know this is going to be electric for all Members. That is the kind of enthusiasm I hope to see from more Members across the House. I will make a quick update on pensions dashboards, which at least one Member will appreciate. User testing on pensions dashboards has begun. I know that will thrill everybody in this House. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] That is the attitude we need! [Laughter.] It will ramp up over the course of the next year, with greater volumes and more focus on consumer behaviour. We will be conducting a full evaluation of pensions dashboards over the coming years as the service goes live. That will include the impact of dashboards on engagement with pensions. I commit to update the House on that work in due course.

Following on from other issues raised in Committee, I am pleased to report that following the findings of the curriculum and assessment review, the Government will make financial education compulsory in primary schools in England.

One issue raised in Committee was the Department’s monitoring and evaluation plans for the policy programme set out in the Bill, not least the guided retirement measures. Those comments have been taken on board; an updated impact assessment this week lays out how we intend to approach monitoring impact.

I have endeavoured to do justice to the very wide range of different issues raised during the debate today. I hope hon. Members will support Government amendments that build on policies that will make a real difference to all our constituents in the decades to come.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 30 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 31

Indexation of periodic compensation for pre-1997 service: Great Britain

“(1) Schedule 7 to the Pensions Act 2004 (pension compensation provisions) is amended in accordance with subsections (2) and (3).

(2) In paragraph 28—

(a) for sub-paragraph (2) substitute—

“(2) Where a person is entitled to periodic compensation under any of those paragraphs, the person is entitled, on the indexation date, to an increase under this paragraph of—

(a) where sub-paragraph (2A) applies, the aggregate of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2C) and the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2E);

(b) where sub-paragraph (2B) applies, the aggregate of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2D) and the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2E);

(c) in any other case, the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2E).

(2A) This sub-paragraph applies where, immediately before the assessment date—

(a) the admissible rules of the scheme included a requirement for all or any part of so much of the annual rate of a pension in payment under the scheme as is attributable to a person’s pre-1997 service to be increased annually,

(b) that requirement did not apply only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme, and

(c) that requirement applied in relation to pre-1997 service in respect of which the compensation is payable.

(2B) This sub-paragraph applies where—

(a) the scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period,

(b) that accrual was in relation to GMP indexed service in respect of which the compensation is payable, and

(c) immediately before the assessment date the admissible rules of the scheme—

(i) did not include a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), or

(ii) included such a requirement only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme.

(2C) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is—

(a) the appropriate percentage of the amount of the pre-1997 underlying rate immediately before the indexation date, or

(b) where the person first became entitled to the periodic compensation during the period of 12 months ending immediately before that date, 1/12th of that amount for each full month for which the person was so entitled.

(2D) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is—

(a) the appropriate percentage of the amount of the notional pre-1997 underlying rate immediately before the indexation date, or

(b) where the person first became entitled to the periodic compensation during the period of 12 months ending immediately before that date, 1/12th of that amount for each full month for which the person was so entitled.

(2E) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is—

(a) the appropriate percentage of the amount of the post-1997 underlying rate immediately before the indexation date, or

(b) where the person first became entitled to the periodic compensation during the period of 12 months ending immediately before that date, 1/12th of that amount for each full month for which the person was so entitled.

(2F) In any case where it is unclear to the Board whether, immediately before the assessment date, the admissible rules of the scheme included a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), this paragraph has effect as if the scheme included such a requirement.

(2G) In any case where it is unclear to the Board whether, immediately before the assessment date, a requirement of the scheme of a kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a) (including such a requirement included by virtue of sub-paragraph (2F)) applied in relation to particular pre-1997 service, this paragraph has effect as if the requirement applied in relation to such service.

(2H) In any case where it is unclear to the Board whether the scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period, this paragraph has effect as if the scheme so provided.

(2I) In any case where it is unclear to the Board whether the accrual of a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme (including by virtue of sub-paragraph (2H)) was in relation to particular GMP indexed service, this paragraph has effect as if the accrual was in relation to such service.”

(b) in sub-paragraph (3)—

(i) in the opening words for “sub-paragraph (2)” substitute “sub-paragraphs (2) to (2E)”;

(ii) for both definitions of “underlying rate” substitute—

““notional pre-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 3 or 22, the aggregate of—

(a) a prescribed percentage of so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service, and

(b) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amount within paragraph (a) of this definition immediately before the indexation date;

“notional pre-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 5, 8, 11 or 15, the aggregate of—

(a) a prescribed percentage of so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service,

(b) a prescribed percentage of so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(aa) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service, and

(c) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amounts within paragraphs (a) and (b) of this definition immediately before the indexation date;

“post-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 3 or 22, the aggregate of—

(a) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to post-1997 service, and

(b) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amount within paragraph (a) of this definition immediately before the indexation date;

“post-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 5, 8, 11 or 15, the aggregate of—

(a) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to post-1997 service,

(b) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(aa) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to post-1997 service, and

(c) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amounts within paragraphs (a) and (b) of this definition immediately before the indexation date;

“pre-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 3 or 22, the aggregate of—

(a) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service, and

(b) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amount within paragraph (a) of this definition immediately before the indexation date;

“pre-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 5, 8, 11 or 15, the aggregate of—

(a) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service,

(b) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(aa) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service, and

(c) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amounts within paragraphs (a) and (b) of this definition immediately before the indexation date.”;

(c) in sub-paragraph (5)—

(i) in paragraph (a), for “sub-paragraph (2), each definition of “underlying rate”” substitute “sub-paragraphs (2C) to (2E), each definition of “notional pre-1997 underlying rate”, “post-1997 underlying rate” and “pre-1997 underlying rate””;

(ii) in paragraph (c), for “sub-paragraph (2), the definition of “underlying rate”” substitute “sub-paragraphs (2C) to (2E), the definition of “notional pre-1997 underlying rate”, the definition of “post-1997 underlying rate” and the definition of “pre-1997 underlying rate””;

(d) in sub-paragraph (6), before the definition of “post-1997 service” insert—

““GMP indexation period” means the period beginning with 6 April 1988 and ending with 5 April 1997;

“GMP indexed service” means—

(a) pensionable service which is within paragraph 36(4)(a) and occurs during the GMP indexation period, or

(b) pensionable service which is within paragraph 36(4)(b) and meets such requirements as may be prescribed;

“guaranteed minimum pension” has the same meaning as in the Pension Schemes Act 1993 (see section 8(2) of that Act);”;

(e) in sub-paragraph (7), for “and “pre-1997 service”” substitute “, “pre-1997 service” and “GMP indexed service””.

(3) In paragraph 29, for sub-paragraph (2) substitute—

“(2) The Board may also determine the percentage that is to be—

(a) the appropriate percentage for the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2C) and (2D) of paragraph 28;

(b) the appropriate percentage for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2E) of that paragraph,

(and where it does so, the definition of “appropriate percentage” in paragraph 28(3) does not apply in relation to the sub-paragraph in question).”

(4) Schedule 5 to the Pensions Act 2008 (pension compensation payable on discharge of pension compensation credit) is amended in accordance with subsections (5) and (6).

(5) In paragraph 17—

(a) for sub-paragraph (2) substitute—

“(2) Subject to sub-paragraph (3), the transferee is entitled, on each indexation date, to an increase of—

(a) where sub-paragraph (2A) applies, the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2E);

(b) where sub-paragraph (2B) applies, the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2F);

(c) where sub-paragraph (2C) applies, the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2G);

(d) where sub-paragraph (2D) applies, the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2H).

(2A) This sub-paragraph applies where—

(a) the transferor's PPF compensation is payable in accordance with paragraph 3, 5, 8, 11, 15 or 22 of Schedule 7 to the Pensions Act 2004 (“the relevant Schedule 7 provisions”), and

(b) immediately before the assessment date—

(i) the admissible rules of the scheme in respect of which that compensation is payable included a requirement for all or any part of so much of the annual rate of a pension in payment under the scheme as is attributable to a person’s pre-1997 service to be increased annually,

(ii) that requirement did not apply only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme, and

(iii) that requirement applied in relation to pre-1997 service in respect of which that compensation is payable.

(2B) This sub-paragraph applies where—

(a) the transferor's PPF compensation is payable in accordance with the relevant Schedule 7 provisions,

(b) the scheme in respect of which that compensation is payable provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period,

(c) that accrual was in relation to GMP indexed service in respect of which that compensation is payable, and

(d) immediately before the assessment date the admissible rules of that scheme—

(i) did not include a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(b)(i), or

(ii) included such a requirement only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme.

(2C) This sub-paragraph applies where—

(a) the transferor's PPF compensation is payable in accordance with the relevant Schedule 7 provisions, and

(b) neither sub-paragraph (2A) nor sub-paragraph (2B) applies.

(2D) This sub-paragraph applies where the transferor's PPF compensation is payable otherwise than in accordance with the relevant Schedule 7 provisions.

(2E) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is the aggregate of the appropriate percentage of the pre-1997 underlying rate and the appropriate percentage of the post-1997 underlying rate.

(2F) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is the aggregate of the appropriate percentage of the notional pre-1997 underlying rate and the appropriate percentage of the post-1997 underlying rate.

(2G) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is the appropriate percentage of the post-1997 underlying rate.

(2H) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is the appropriate percentage of the general underlying rate.”

(b) in sub-paragraph (3), for “(2)” substitute “(2E), (2F), (2G) or (2H) (as the case may be)”;

(c) after sub-paragraph (3) insert—

“(3A) For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2A) to (2C)—

(a) in any case where it is unclear to the Board whether, immediately before the assessment date, the admissible rules of the scheme included a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(b)(i), those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme included such a requirement;

(b) in any case where it is unclear to the Board whether, immediately before the assessment date, a requirement of the scheme of a kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(b)(i) (including such a requirement included by virtue of paragraph (a)) applied in relation to particular pre-1997 service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the requirement applied in relation to such service;

(c) in any case where it is unclear to the Board whether the scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme so provided;

(d) in any case where it is unclear to the Board whether the accrual of a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme (including by virtue of paragraph (c)) was in relation to particular GMP indexed service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the accrual was in relation to such service.”

(d) in sub-paragraph (4)—

(i) in the opening words, for “sub-paragraph (2)” substitute “sub-paragraphs (2) to (2H)”;

(ii) for the definition of “the underlying rate” substitute—

““the general underlying rate” , as at an indexation date, is the aggregate of—

(a) the general indexed proportion of the aggregate of the initial annual rate of compensation and (in the case of compensation payable under paragraph 6), the revaluation amount,

(b) so much of any actuarial increase under paragraph 16A as relates to the amount in paragraph (a), and

(c) so much of any annual increase to which the transferee is entitled under this paragraph in respect of earlier indexation dates as relates to the amounts in paragraphs (a) and (b);

“the notional pre-1997 underlying rate” , as at an indexation date, is the aggregate of—

(a) the notional pre-1997 indexed proportion of the aggregate of the initial annual rate of compensation and (in the case of compensation payable under paragraph 6), the revaluation amount,

(b) so much of any actuarial increase under paragraph 16A as relates to the amount in paragraph (a), and

(c) so much of any annual increase to which the transferee is entitled under this paragraph in respect of earlier indexation dates as relates to the amounts in paragraphs (a) and (b);

“the post-1997 underlying rate” , as at an indexation date, is the aggregate of—

(a) the post-1997 indexed proportion of the aggregate of the initial annual rate of compensation and (in the case of compensation payable under paragraph 6), the revaluation amount,

(b) so much of any actuarial increase under paragraph 16A as relates to the amount in paragraph (a), and

(c) so much of any annual increase to which the transferee is entitled under this paragraph in respect of earlier indexation dates as relates to the amounts in paragraphs (a) and (b);

“the pre-1997 underlying rate” , as at an indexation date, is the aggregate of—

(a) the pre-1997 indexed proportion of the aggregate of the initial annual rate of compensation and (in the case of compensation payable under paragraph 6), the revaluation amount,

(b) so much of any actuarial increase under paragraph 16A as relates to the amount in paragraph (a), and

(c) so much of any annual increase to which the transferee is entitled under this paragraph in respect of earlier indexation dates as relates to the amounts in paragraphs (a) and (b).”;

(e) omit sub-paragraphs (5) and (6);

(f) before sub-paragraph (7) insert—

“(6A) For the purposes of paragraph (a) of the definition of “the general underlying rate”, “the general indexed proportion” is such proportion as is determined in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of State.

(6B) For the purposes of paragraph (a) of the definition of “the notional pre-1997 underlying rate”, “the notional pre-1997 indexed proportion” is such proportion of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph of Schedule 7 to the Pensions Act 2004 under which the transferor’s PPF compensation is payable that is attributable to pre-1997 service as may be prescribed.

(6C) For the purposes of paragraph (a) of the definition of “the post-1997 underlying rate”, “the post-1997 indexed proportion” is the proportion of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph of that Schedule under which the transferor’s PPF compensation is payable that is attributable to post-1997 service.

(6D) For the purposes of paragraph (a) of the definition of “the pre-1997 underlying rate”, “the pre-1997 indexed proportion” is the proportion of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph of that Schedule under which the transferor’s PPF compensation is payable that is attributable to pre-1997 service.”;

(g) in sub-paragraph (7), for ““the underlying rate”” substitute ““the general underlying rate”, the definition of “the notional pre-1997 underlying rate”, the definition of “the post-1997 underlying rate” and the definition of “the pre-1997 underlying rate””;

(h) in paragraph (9)—

(i) before the definition of “post-1997 service” insert—

““GMP indexation period” means the period beginning with 6 April 1988 and ending with 5 April 1997;

“guaranteed minimum pension” has the same meaning as in the Pension Schemes Act 1993 (see section 8(2) of that Act);”;

(ii) in the definition of “post-1997 service” for “has” substitute “, “pre-1997 service” and “GMP indexed service” have”;

(iii) after that definition insert—

““the assessment date” , in relation to a pension scheme, has the same meaning as in that Schedule (see paragraph 2 of that Schedule);”.

(6) In paragraph 20, in sub-paragraph (1)(b), for “for the purposes of paragraph 17(2)” substitute “—

(i) of the pre-1997 underlying rate and of the notional pre-1997 underlying rate for the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2E) and (2F) of paragraph 17;

(ii) of the post-1997 underlying rate for the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2E), (2F) and (2G) of that paragraph;

(iii) of the general underlying rate for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2H) of that paragraph.””—(Torsten Bell.)

This new clause makes provision for certain compensation paid by the Pension Protection Fund in respect of a person’s pre-1997 pensionable service under legislation extending to England and Wales and Scotland to be increased annually.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 32

Indexation of periodic compensation for pre-1997 service: Northern Ireland

“(1) Schedule 6 to the Pensions (Northern Ireland) Order 2005 (S.I. 2005/255 (N.I. 1)) (pension compensation provisions) is amended in accordance with subsections (2) and (3).

(2) In paragraph 28—

(a) for sub-paragraph (2) substitute—

“(2) Where a person is entitled to periodic compensation under any of those paragraphs, the person is entitled, on the indexation date, to an increase under this paragraph of—

(a) where sub-paragraph (2A) applies, the aggregate of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2C) and the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2E);

(b) where sub-paragraph (2B) applies, the aggregate of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2D) and the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2E);

(c) in any other case, the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2E).

(2A) This sub-paragraph applies where, immediately before the assessment date—

(a) the admissible rules of the scheme included a requirement for all or any part of so much of the annual rate of a pension in payment under the scheme as is attributable to a person’s pre-1997 service to be increased annually,

(b) that requirement did not apply only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme, and

(c) that requirement applied in relation to pre-1997 service in respect of which the compensation is payable.

(2B) This sub-paragraph applies where—

(a) the scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period,

(b) that accrual was in relation to GMP indexed service in respect of which the compensation is payable, and

(c) immediately before the assessment date the admissible rules of the scheme—

(i) did not include a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), or

(ii) included such a requirement only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme.

(2C) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is—

(a) the appropriate percentage of the amount of the pre-1997 underlying rate immediately before the indexation date, or

(b) where the person first became entitled to the periodic compensation during the period of 12 months ending immediately before that date, 1/12th of that amount for each full month for which the person was so entitled.

(2D) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is—

(a) the appropriate percentage of the amount of the notional pre-1997 underlying rate immediately before the indexation date, or

(b) where the person first became entitled to the periodic compensation during the period of 12 months ending immediately before that date, 1/12th of that amount for each full month for which the person was so entitled.

(2E) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is—

(a) the appropriate percentage of the amount of the post-1997 underlying rate immediately before the indexation date, or

(b) where the person first became entitled to the periodic compensation during the period of 12 months ending immediately before that date, 1/12th of that amount for each full month for which the person was so entitled.

(2F) In any case where it is unclear to the Board whether, immediately before the assessment date, the admissible rules of the scheme included a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), this paragraph has effect as if the scheme included such a requirement.

(2G) In any case where it is unclear to the Board whether, immediately before the assessment date, a requirement of the scheme of a kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a) (including such a requirement included by virtue of sub-paragraph (2F)) applied in relation to particular pre-1997 service, this paragraph has effect as if the requirement applied in relation to such service.

(2H) In any case where it is unclear to the Board whether the scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period, this paragraph has effect as if the scheme so provided.

(2I) In any case where it is unclear to the Board whether the accrual of a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme (including by virtue of sub-paragraph (2H)) was in relation to particular GMP indexed service, this paragraph has effect as if the accrual was in relation to such service.”

(b) in sub-paragraph (3)—

(i) in the opening words for “sub-paragraph (2)” substitute “sub-paragraphs (2) to (2E)”;

(ii) for both definitions of “underlying rate” substitute—

““notional pre-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 3 or 22, the aggregate of—

(a) a prescribed percentage of so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service, and

(b) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amount within paragraph (a) of this definition immediately before the indexation date;

“notional pre-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 5, 8, 11 or 15, the aggregate of—

(a) a prescribed percentage of so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service,

(b) a prescribed percentage of so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(aa) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service, and

(c) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amounts within paragraphs (a) and (b) of this definition immediately before the indexation date;

“post-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 3 or 22, the aggregate of—

(a) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to post-1997 service, and

(b) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amount within paragraph (a) of this definition immediately before the indexation date;

“post-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 5, 8, 11 or 15, the aggregate of—

(a) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to post-1997 service,

(b) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(aa) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to post-1997 service, and

(c) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amounts within paragraphs (a) and (b) of this definition immediately before the indexation date;

“pre-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 3 or 22, the aggregate of—

(a) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service, and

(b) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amount within paragraph (a) of this definition immediately before the indexation date;

“pre-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 5, 8, 11 or 15, the aggregate of—

(a) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service,

(b) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(aa) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service, and

(c) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amounts within paragraphs (a) and (b) of this definition immediately before the indexation date.”;

(c) in sub-paragraph (5)—

(i) in paragraph (a), for “sub-paragraph (2), each definition of “underlying rate”” substitute “sub-paragraphs (2C) to (2E), each definition of “notional pre-1997 underlying rate”, “post-1997 underlying rate” and “pre-1997 underlying rate””;

(ii) in paragraph (c), for “sub-paragraph (2), the definition of “underlying rate”” substitute “sub-paragraphs (2C) to (2E), the definition of “notional pre-1997 underlying rate”, the definition of “post-1997 underlying rate” and the definition of “pre-1997 underlying rate””;

(d) in sub-paragraph (6), before the definition of “post-1997 service” insert—

““GMP indexation period” means the period beginning with 6 April 1988 and ending with 5 April 1997;

“GMP indexed service” means—

(a) pensionable service which is within paragraph 36(4)(a) and occurs during the GMP indexation period, or

(b) pensionable service which is within paragraph 36(4)(b) and meets such requirements as may be prescribed;

“guaranteed minimum pension” has the same meaning as in the Pension Schemes Act (see section 4(2) of that Act);”;

(e) in sub-paragraph (7), for “and “pre-1997 service”” substitute “, “pre-1997 service” and “GMP indexed service””.

(3) In paragraph 29, for sub-paragraph (2) substitute—

“(2) The Board may also determine the percentage that is to be—

(a) the appropriate percentage for the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2C) and (2D) of paragraph 28;

(b) the appropriate percentage for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2E) of that paragraph,

(and where it does so, the definition of “appropriate percentage” in paragraph 28(3) does not apply in relation to the sub-paragraph in question).”

(4) Schedule 4 to the Pensions (No.2) Act (Northern Ireland) 2008 (pension compensation payable on discharge of pension compensation credit) is amended in accordance with subsections (5) and (6).

(5) In paragraph 17—

(a) for sub-paragraph (2) substitute—

“(2) Subject to sub-paragraph (3), the transferee is entitled, on each indexation date, to an increase of—

(a) where sub-paragraph (2A) applies, the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2E);

(b) where sub-paragraph (2B) applies, the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2F);

(c) where sub-paragraph (2C) applies, the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2G);

(d) where sub-paragraph (2D) applies, the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2H).

(2A) This sub-paragraph applies where—

(a) the transferor's PPF compensation is payable in accordance with paragraph 3, 5, 8, 11, 15 or 22 of Schedule 6 to the 2005 Order (“the relevant Schedule 6 provisions”), and

(b) immediately before the assessment date —

(i) the admissible rules of the scheme in respect of which that compensation is payable included a requirement for all or any part of so much of the annual rate of a pension in payment under the scheme as is attributable to a person’s pre-1997 service to be increased annually,

(ii) that requirement did not apply only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme, and

(iii) that requirement applied in relation to pre-1997 service in respect of which that compensation is payable.

(2B) This sub-paragraph applies where—

(a) the transferor's PPF compensation is payable in accordance with the relevant Schedule 6 provisions,

(b) the scheme in respect of which that compensation is payable provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period,

(c) that accrual was in relation to GMP indexed service in respect of which that compensation is payable, and

(d) immediately before the assessment date the admissible rules of that scheme—

(i) did not include a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(b)(i), or

(ii) included such a requirement only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme.

(2C) This sub-paragraph applies where—

(a) the transferor's PPF compensation is payable in accordance with the relevant Schedule 6 provisions, and

(b) neither sub-paragraph (2A) nor sub-paragraph (2B) applies.

(2D) This sub-paragraph applies where the transferor's PPF compensation is payable otherwise than in accordance with the relevant Schedule 6 provisions.

(2E) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is the aggregate of the appropriate percentage of the pre-1997 underlying rate and the appropriate percentage of the post-1997 underlying rate.

(2F) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is the aggregate of the appropriate percentage of the notional pre-1997 underlying rate and the appropriate percentage of the post-1997 underlying rate.

(2G) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is the appropriate percentage of the post-1997 underlying rate.

(2H) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is the appropriate percentage of the general underlying rate.”

(b) in sub-paragraph (3), for “(2)” substitute “(2E), (2F), (2G) or (2H) (as the case may be)”;

(c) after sub-paragraph (3) insert—

“(3A) For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2A) to (2C)—

(a) in any case where it is unclear to the Board whether, immediately before the assessment date, the admissible rules of the scheme included a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub- paragraph (2A)(b)(i), those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme included such a requirement;

(b) in any case where it is unclear to the Board whether, immediately before the assessment date, a requirement of the scheme of a kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(b)(i) (including such a requirement included by virtue of paragraph (a)) applied in relation to particular pre-1997 service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the requirement applied in relation to such service;

(c) in any case where it is unclear to the Board whether the scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme so provided;

(d) in any case where it is unclear to the Board whether the accrual of a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme (including by virtue of paragraph (c)) was in relation to particular GMP indexed service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the accrual was in relation to such service.”

(d) in sub-paragraph (4)—

(i) in the opening words, for “sub-paragraph (2)” substitute “sub-paragraphs (2) to (2H)”;

(ii) for the definition of “the underlying rate” substitute—

““the general underlying rate” , as at an indexation date, is the aggregate of—

(a) the general indexed proportion of the aggregate of the initial annual rate of compensation and (in the case of compensation payable under paragraph 6), the revaluation amount,

(b) so much of any actuarial increase under paragraph 16A as relates to the amount in paragraph (a), and

(c) so much of any annual increase to which the transferee is entitled under this paragraph in respect of earlier indexation dates as relates to the amounts in paragraphs (a) and (b);

“the notional pre-1997 underlying rate” , as at an indexation date, is the aggregate of—

(a) the notional pre-1997 indexed proportion of the aggregate of the initial annual rate of compensation and (in the case of compensation payable under paragraph 6), the revaluation amount,

(b) so much of any actuarial increase under paragraph 16A as relates to the amount in paragraph (a), and

(c) so much of any annual increase to which the transferee is entitled under this paragraph in respect of earlier indexation dates as relates to the amounts in paragraphs (a) and (b);

“the post-1997 underlying rate” , as at an indexation date, is the aggregate of—

(a) the post-1997 indexed proportion of the aggregate of the initial annual rate of compensation and (in the case of compensation payable under paragraph 6), the revaluation amount,

(b) so much of any actuarial increase under paragraph 16A as relates to the amount in paragraph (a), and

(c) so much of any annual increase to which the transferee is entitled under this paragraph in respect of earlier indexation dates as relates to the amounts in paragraphs (a) and (b);

“the pre-1997 underlying rate” , as at an indexation date, is the aggregate of—

(a) the pre-1997 indexed proportion of the aggregate of the initial annual rate of compensation and (in the case of compensation payable under paragraph 6), the revaluation amount,

(b) so much of any actuarial increase under paragraph 16A as relates to the amount in paragraph (a), and

(c) so much of any annual increase to which the transferee is entitled under this paragraph in respect of earlier indexation dates as relates to the amounts in paragraphs (a) and (b).”;

(e) omit sub-paragraphs (5) and (6);

(f) before sub-paragraph (7) insert—

“(6A) For the purposes of paragraph (a) of the definition of “the general underlying rate”, “the general indexed proportion” is such proportion as is determined in accordance with regulations made by the Department.

(6B) For the purposes of paragraph (a) of the definition of “the notional pre-1997 underlying rate”, “the notional pre-1997 indexed proportion” is such proportion of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph of Schedule 6 to the 2005 Order under which the transferor’s PPF compensation is payable that is attributable to pre-1997 service as may be prescribed.

(6C) For the purposes of paragraph (a) of the definition of “the post-1997 underlying rate”, “the post-1997 indexed proportion” is the proportion of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph of that Schedule under which the transferor’s PPF compensation is payable that is attributable to post-1997 service.

(6D) For the purposes of paragraph (a) of the definition of “the pre-1997 underlying rate”, “the pre-1997 indexed proportion” is the proportion of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph of that Schedule under which the transferor’s PPF compensation is payable that is attributable to pre-1997 service.”;

(g) in sub-paragraph (7), for ““the underlying rate”” substitute ““the general underlying rate”, the definition of “the notional pre-1997 underlying rate”, the definition of “the post-1997 underlying rate” and the definition of “the pre-1997 underlying rate””;

(h) for sub-paragraph 9 substitute—

“(9) In this paragraph—

“GMP indexation period” means the period beginning with 6 April 1988 and ending with 5 April 1997;

“guaranteed minimum pension” has the same meaning as in the Pension Schemes Act (see section 4(2) of that Act);

“post-1997 service” , “pre-1997 service” and “GMP indexed service” have the same meaning as in paragraph 28 of Schedule 6 to the 2005 Order (annual increase in periodic compensation);

“the assessment date” , in relation to a pension scheme, has the same meaning as in that Schedule (see paragraph 2 of that Schedule).”

(6) In paragraph 20, in sub-paragraph (1)(b), for “for the purposes of paragraph 17(2)” substitute “—

(i) of the pre-1997 underlying rate and of the notional pre-1997 underlying rate for the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2E) and (2F) of paragraph 17;

(ii) of the post-1997 underlying rate for the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2E), (2F) and (2G) of that paragraph;

(iii) of the general underlying rate for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2H) of that paragraph.””—(Torsten Bell.)

This new clause makes provision for certain compensation paid by the Pension Protection Fund in respect of a person’s pre-1997 pensionable service under legislation extending to Northern Ireland to be increased annually.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 33

Financial Assistance Scheme: indexation of payments for pre-1997 service

“(1) The Financial Assistance Scheme Regulations 2005 (S.I. 2005/1986) are amended as follows.

(2) In paragraph 7(1)(b) of Schedule 2 (determination of annual and initial payments), after “(b)(i)” insert “, (ia) and (ib)”.

(3) Paragraph 9 of that Schedule is amended in accordance with subsections (4) to (6).

(4) In sub-paragraph (2)—

(a) in paragraph (a) of the definition of “underlying rate”, after sub-paragraph (i) insert—

“(ia) where sub-paragraph (2A) applies, the product of X multiplied by so much of the expected pension as is attributable to pre-1997 service;

(ib) where sub-paragraph (2B) applies, the product of X multiplied by the relevant percentage of so much of the expected pension as is attributable to pre-1997 service;”;

(b) in paragraph (b) of the definition of “underlying rate”—

(i) omit the “and” at the end of sub-paragraph (i);

(ii) after that sub-paragraph insert—

“(ia) where sub-paragraph (2A) applies, so much of the expected pension as is, proportionally, attributable to pre-1997 service;

(ib) where sub-paragraph (2B) applies, the relevant percentage of so much of the expected pension as is, proportionally, attributable to pre-1997 service; and”;

(c) after the definition of “post-1997 service” insert—

““pre-1997 service” means—

(a) pensionable service (whether actual or notional) which occurs before 6th April 1997; or

(b) where the annual payment is payable to, or in respect of, a qualifying member who is, or was, a pension credit member of the scheme, pension credit rights deriving from rights attributable to service (whether actual or notional) which occurred before 6th April 1997;

“relevant percentage” means such percentage as may be determined by the Secretary of State;”.

(5) After sub-paragraph (2) insert—

“(2A) This sub-paragraph applies where, immediately before the qualifying pension scheme began to wind up—

(a) the scheme rules included a requirement for all or any part of so much of the annual rate of a pension in payment under the scheme as is attributable to a person’s pre-1997 service to be increased annually,

(b) that requirement did not apply only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme, and

(c) that requirement applied in relation to pre-1997 service in respect of which the annual payment is payable.

(2B) This sub-paragraph applies where—

(a) the qualifying pension scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period,

(b) that accrual was in relation to GMP indexed service in respect of which the annual payment is payable, and

(c) immediately before the scheme began to wind up the scheme rules—

(i) did not include a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), or

(ii) included such a requirement only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme.

(2C) For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2A) and (2B)—

(a) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether, immediately before the scheme began to wind up, the scheme rules included a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme included such a requirement;

(b) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether, immediately before the scheme began to wind up, a requirement of the scheme of a kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a) (including such a requirement included by virtue of paragraph (a)) applied in relation to particular pre-1997 service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the requirement applied in relation to such service;

(c) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether the scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme so provided;

(d) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether the accrual of a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme (including by virtue of paragraph (c)) was in relation to particular GMP indexed service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the accrual was in relation to such service.

(2D) In sub-paragraphs (2B) and (2C)—

“GMP indexation period” means the period beginning with 6 April 1988 and ending with 5 April 1997;

“GMP indexed service” means—

(a) pensionable service (whether actual or notional) which occurs during the GMP indexation period; or

(b) where the annual payment is payable to, or in respect of, a qualifying member who is, or was, a pension credit member of the scheme, pension credit rights deriving from rights attributable to service (whether actual or notional) which occurred during the GMP indexation period.”

(6) In sub-paragraph (3)—

(a) after “attributable to” insert “pre-1997 service or”;

(b) for “that amount” substitute “the amount in question”.

(7) In paragraph 7(1)(b) of Schedule 2A (determination of ill health and interim ill health payments), after “(b)(i)” insert “, (ia) and (ib)”.

(8) Paragraph 9 of that Schedule is amended in accordance with subsections (9) to (11).

(9) In sub-paragraph (2)—

(a) after the definition of “E” insert—

““EA” means so much of the expected pension as is attributable to pre-1997 service;

“EB” means the relevant percentage of so much of the expected pension as is attributable to pre-1997 service;”;

(b) after the definition of “post-1997 service” insert—

““pre-1997 service” means—

(a) pensionable service (whether actual or notional) which occurs before 6th April 1997; or

(b) where the ill health payment is payable to, or in respect of, a qualifying member who is, or was, a pension credit member of the scheme, pension credit rights deriving from rights attributable to service (whether actual or notional) which occurred before 6th April 1997;

“relevant percentage” means such percentage as may be determined by the Secretary of State;”;

(c) in paragraph (a) of the definition of “underlying rate”, after sub-paragraph (i) insert—

“(ia) where sub-paragraph (2A) applies, the product of X multiplied by (C x EA);

(ib) where sub-paragraph (2B) applies, the product of X multiplied by (C x EB);”;

(d) in paragraph (b) of the definition of “underlying rate”—

(i) omit the “and” at the end of sub-paragraph (i);

(ii) after that sub-paragraph insert—

“(ia) where sub-paragraph (2A) applies, so much of the amount “A” for the purposes of paragraph 2 as is, proportionately, attributable to pre-1997 service;

(ib) where sub-paragraph (2B) applies, the relevant percentage of so much of the amount “A” for the purposes of paragraph 2 as is, proportionately, attributable to pre-1997 service; and”;

(10) After sub-paragraph (2) insert—

“(2A) This sub-paragraph applies where immediately before the qualifying pension scheme began to wind up—

(a) the scheme rules included a requirement for all or any part of so much of the annual rate of a pension in payment under the scheme as is attributable to a person’s pre-1997 service to be increased annually,

(b) that requirement did not apply only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme, and

(c) that requirement applied in relation to pre-1997 service in respect of which the ill health payment is payable.

(2B) This sub-paragraph applies where—

(a) the qualifying pension scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period,

(b) that accrual was in relation to GMP indexed service in respect of which the ill health payment is payable, and

(c) immediately before the scheme began to wind up the scheme rules—

(i) did not include a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), or

(ii) included such a requirement only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme

(2C) For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2A) and (2B)—

(a) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether, immediately before the scheme began to wind up, the scheme rules included a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme included such a requirement;

(b) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether, immediately before the scheme began to wind up, a requirement of the scheme of a kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a) (including such a requirement included by virtue of paragraph (a)) applied in relation to particular pre-1997 service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the requirement applied in relation to such service;

(c) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether the scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme so provided;

(d) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether the accrual of a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme (including by virtue of paragraph (c)) was in relation to particular GMP indexed service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the accrual was in relation to such service.

(2D) In sub-paragraphs (2A) to (2C)—

“GMP indexation period” means the period beginning with 6 April 1988 and ending with 5 April 1997;

“GMP indexed service” means—

(a) pensionable service (whether actual or notional) which occurs during the GMP indexation period; or

(b) where the ill health payment is payable to, or in respect of, a qualifying member who is, or was, a pension credit member of the scheme, pension credit rights deriving from rights attributable to service (whether actual or notional) which occurred during the GMP indexation period;

“guaranteed minimum pension” has the meaning given in section 8(2) of the 1993 Act.”

(11) In sub-paragraph (3)—

(a) after “attributable to” insert “pre-1997 service or”;

(b) for “that amount” substitute “the amount in question”.

(12) In paragraph 6 of Schedule 3 (determination of certain annual payments)—

(a) in sub-paragraph (2)—

(i) in the definition of “underlying rate”, after paragraph (a) insert—

“(aa) where sub-paragraph (2A) applies, the product of X multiplied by—

(i) where the beneficiary is a qualifying member or a survivor or surviving dependant of a qualifying member who died on or after the calculation date—

(aa) where the qualifying member is not a qualifying member to whom regulation 17D applied, so much of the revalued notional pension as is attributable to pre-1997 service; or

(bb) where the qualifying member is a qualifying member to whom regulation 17D applied, so much of the sum of R-A as is attributable to pre-1997 service; and

(ii) where the beneficiary is a survivor or surviving dependant in respect of whom a survivor notional pension has been determined, so much of the survivor notional pension as is attributable to the qualifying member’s pre-1997 service;

(ab) where sub-paragraph (2B) applies, the product of X multiplied by—

(i) where the beneficiary is a qualifying member or a survivor or surviving dependant of a qualifying member who died on or after the calculation date—

(aa) where the qualifying member is not a qualifying member to whom regulation 17D applied, the relevant percentage of so much of the revalued notional pension as is attributable to pre-1997 service; or

(bb) where the qualifying member is a qualifying member to whom regulation 17D applied, the relevant percentage of so much of the sum of R-A as is attributable to pre-1997 service; and

(ii) where the beneficiary is a survivor or surviving dependant in respect of whom a survivor notional pension has been determined, the relevant percentage of so much of the survivor notional pension as is attributable to the qualifying member’s pre-1997 service;”;

(iii) after the definition of “post-1997 service” insert—

““pre-1997 service” means—

(a) pensionable service (either actual or notional) which occurred before 6th April 1997; or

(b) where the pension was payable to, or in respect of, a qualifying member who is, or was, a pension credit member of the scheme, pension credit rights deriving from rights attributable to service (whether actual or notional) which occurred before 6th April 1997;

“relevant percentage” means such percentage as may be determined by the Secretary of State;”;

(b) after sub-paragraph (2) insert—

“(2A) This sub-paragraph applies where immediately before the qualifying pension scheme began to wind up—

(a) the scheme rules included a requirement for all or any part of so much of the annual rate of a pension in payment under the scheme as is attributable to a person’s pre-1997 service to be increased annually,

(b) that requirement did not apply only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme, and

(c) that requirement applied in relation to pre-1997 service in respect of which the annual payment is payable.

(2B) This sub-paragraph applies where—

(a) the qualifying pension scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period,

(b) that accrual was in relation to GMP indexed service in respect of which the annual payment is payable, and

(c) immediately before the scheme began to wind up the scheme rules—

(i) did not include a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), or

(ii) included such a requirement only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme.

(2C) For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2A) and (2B)—

(a) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether, immediately before the scheme began to wind up, the scheme rules included a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme included such a requirement;

(b) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether, immediately before the scheme began to wind up, a requirement of the scheme of a kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a) (including such a requirement included by virtue of paragraph (a)) applied in relation to particular pre-1997 service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the requirement applied in relation to such service;

(c) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether the scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme so provided;

(d) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether the accrual of a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme (including by virtue of paragraph (c)) was in relation to particular GMP indexed service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the accrual was in relation to such service.

(2D) In sub-paragraphs (2A) to (2C)—

“GMP indexation period” means the period beginning with 6 April 1988 and ending with 5 April 1997;

“GMP indexed service” means—

(a) pensionable service (whether actual or notional) which occurs during the GMP indexation period; or

(b) where the pension was payable to, or in respect of, a qualifying member who is, or was, a pension credit member of the scheme, pension credit rights deriving from rights attributable to service (whether actual or notional) which occurred during the GMP indexation period;

“guaranteed minimum pension” has the meaning given in section 8(2) of the 1993 Act.”;

(c) in sub-paragraph (3), after “attributable to” insert “pre-1997 service and”.

(13) In paragraph 6 of Schedule 5 (determination of certain ill health payments)—

(a) in sub-paragraph (2)—

(i) in the definition of “underlying rate”, after paragraph (a) insert—

“(aa) where sub-paragraph (2A) applies, the product of X multiplied by (C x VA);

(ab) where sub-paragraph (2B) applies, the product of X multiplied by (C x VB);”;

(ii) after the definition of “post-1997 service” insert—

““pre-1997 service” means—

(a) pensionable service (either actual or notional) which occurred before 6th April 1997; or

(b) where the pension was payable to, or in respect of, a qualifying member who is, or was, a pension credit member of the scheme, pension credit rights deriving from rights attributable to service (whether actual or notional) which occurred before 6th April 1997;

“relevant percentage” means such percentage as may be determined by the Secretary of State;”;

(iii) after the definition of “V” insert—

““VA” means—

(a) where the beneficiary is a qualifying member or a survivor or surviving dependant of a qualifying member who died on or after the calculation date—

(i) where the qualifying member is not a qualifying member to whom regulation 17D applied, so much of the revalued notional pension as is attributable to pre-1997 service; or

(ii) where the qualifying member is a qualifying member to whom regulation 17D applied, so much of the sum of R-A as is attributable to pre-1997 service; and

(b) where the beneficiary is a survivor or surviving dependant in respect of whom a survivor notional pension has been determined, so much of the survivor notional pension as is attributable to the qualifying member’s pre-1997 service;

“VB” means—

(a) where the beneficiary is a qualifying member or a survivor or surviving dependant of a qualifying member who died on or after the calculation date—

(i) where the qualifying member is not a qualifying member to whom regulation 17D applied, the relevant percentage of so much of the revalued notional pension as is attributable to pre-1997 service; or

(ii) where the qualifying member is a qualifying member to whom regulation 17D applied, the relevant percentage of so much of the sum of R-A as is attributable to pre-1997 service; and

(b) where the beneficiary is a survivor or surviving dependant in respect of whom a survivor notional pension has been determined, the relevant percentage of so much of the survivor notional pension as is attributable to the qualifying member’s pre-1997 service;”;

(b) after sub-paragraph (2) insert—

“(2A) This sub-paragraph applies where immediately before the qualifying pension scheme began to wind up—

(a) the scheme rules included a requirement for all or any part of so much of the annual rate of a pension in payment under the scheme as is attributable to a person’s pre-1997 service to be increased annually,

(b) that requirement did not apply only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme, and

(c) that requirement applied in relation to pre-1997 service in respect of which the ill health payment is payable.

(2B) This sub-paragraph applies where—

(a) the qualifying pension scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period,

(b) that accrual was in relation to GMP indexed service in respect of which the ill health payment is payable, and

(c) immediately before the scheme began to wind up the scheme rules—

(i) did not include a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), or

(ii) included such a requirement only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme.

(2C) For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2A) and (2B)—

(a) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether, immediately before the scheme began to wind up, the scheme rules included a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme included such a requirement;

(b) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether, immediately before the scheme began to wind up, a requirement of the scheme of a kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a) (including such a requirement included by virtue of paragraph (a)) applied in relation to particular pre-1997 service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the requirement applied in relation to such service;

(c) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether the scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme so provided;

(d) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether the accrual of a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme (including by virtue of paragraph (c)) was in relation to particular GMP indexed service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the accrual was in relation to such service.

(2D) In sub-paragraphs (2A) to (2C)—

“GMP indexation period” means the period beginning with 6 April 1988 and ending with 5 April 1997;

“GMP indexed service” means—

(a) pensionable service (whether actual or notional) which occurs during the GMP indexation period; or

(b) where the pension was payable to, or in respect of, a qualifying member who is, or was, a pension credit member of the scheme, pension credit rights deriving from rights attributable to service (whether actual or notional) which occurred during the GMP indexation period;

“guaranteed minimum pension” has the meaning given in section 8(2) of the 1993 Act.”;

(c) in sub-paragraph (3), after “attributable to” insert “pre-1997 service and”.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This new clause makes provision for certain assistance paid under the Financial Assistance Scheme Regulations 2005 in respect of a person’s pre-1997 pensionable service to be increased annually.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 34

Exemption from public procurement rules

“(1) After paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 to the Procurement Act 2023 (general vertical arrangements exemption from public procurement rules) insert—

2A “(1) A contract between a local government pension scheme manager and an asset pool company providing for the company—

(a) to manage the funds and other assets for which the scheme manager is responsible,

(b) to make and manage investments on behalf of the scheme manager, and

(c) if the contract so provides, to carry out other investment management activities for or on behalf of the scheme manager,

if each of the conditions set out in sub-paragraph (2) is met.

(2) The conditions are—

(a) that more than 80% of the activities of the company are investment management activities carried out for or on behalf of local government pension scheme managers;

(b) that no person exercises a decisive influence on the activities of the company (either directly or indirectly) other than—

(i) the participating scheme managers in the company, acting in their capacity as local government pension scheme managers, and

(ii) where the only shareholder in the company is another company (see section 1(9)(a) of the Pension Schemes Act 2025), that other company;

(c) that the company does not carry out any activities that are contrary to the interests of—

(i) the participating scheme managers in the company, in their capacity as local government pension scheme managers, or

(ii) where the only shareholder in the company is another company, that other company.

(3) The contracts covered by this paragraph include a contract where the local government pension scheme manager concerned is already a participating scheme manager in the company (as well as one where the scheme manager concerned will become a participating scheme manager in the company as a result of entering into it).

(4) An appropriate authority may by regulations make provision about how a calculation as to the percentage of activities carried out by an asset pool company is to be made for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2)(a).

(5) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (2)(b), a person does not exercise a decisive influence on the activities of the asset pool company only by reason of—

(a) being a director, officer or manager of the company, acting in that capacity, or

(b) where the only shareholder in the company is another company, being a director, officer or manager of that other company.

(6) In this paragraph—

“asset pool company” has the meaning given by section 1(7)(a) of the Pension Schemes Act 2025;

“investment management activities” means activities involved in or connected with the management of funds or other assets for which a scheme manager is responsible (including making and managing investments on behalf of the scheme manager);

“local government pension scheme manager” means a person who is, by virtue of section 4(5) of the Public Service Pensions Act 2013, a scheme manager for a pension scheme for local government workers in England and Wales;

“participating scheme manager” , in relation to an asset pool company, means a local government pension scheme manager who participates in the company within the meaning of section 1(9)(b) of the Pension Schemes Act 2025.””—(Torsten Bell.)

This new clause amends the Procurement Act 2023 to create a new category of exempted contract covering certain investment management contracts between a local government scheme manager and the asset pool company. This is intended to replace Clause 4 in the current print of the Bill.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 35

Funding of the Board of the Pension Protection Fund

“(1) The Pensions Act 2004 is amended in accordance with subsections (2) to (5).

(2) Omit section 116 (power of Secretary of State to pay grants to Board of Pension Protection Fund).

(3) Omit section 117 (power of Secretary of State to impose administration levy on pension schemes).

(4) In section 173 (Pension Protection Fund), in subsection (3), before paragraph (a) insert—

“(za) any sums required to meet expenditure of the Board that is attributable to the operation or administration of the Pension Protection Fund,”

(5) In section 188 (fraud compensation fund), in subsection (3), before paragraph (a) insert—

“(za) any sums required to meet expenditure of the Board that is attributable to the operation or administration of the Fraud Compensation Fund,”

(6) No amount is payable to the Secretary of State by virtue of section 117 of the Pensions Act 2004 (administration levy) in respect of the financial years beginning with 1 April 2023 and 1 April 2024.

(7) In the Pensions Act 2008, in Schedule 10 (interest on late payment of levies), omit paragraph 3 (which makes an amendment about interest for late payment of the administration levy that has not been brought into force).”—(Torsten Bell.)

This new clause (which is intended to be added after clause 112) enables administrative expenses of the Board of the Pension Protection Fund to be paid out of the Pension Protection Fund and the Fraud Compensation Fund, and removes the existing administration levy mechanism; it also clarifies that no administration levy is payable for 2023/24 or 2024/25.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 3

Terminal illness: means of demonstrating eligibility

“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision about how a person may demonstrate that they are terminally ill for purposes relating to compensation or assistance from the Pension Protection Fund or Financial Assistance Scheme.

(2) In making regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must seek to minimise the administrative burden placed upon the person with a terminal illness.

(3) Regulations under this section must provide that, where the Department of Work and Pensions (“the Department”) holds a valid SR1 form in respect of a person seeking to demonstrate that they are terminally ill for purposes relating to compensation or assistance from the Pension Protection Fund or Financial Assistance Scheme, the Department must share that form with the Pension Protection Fund or the Financial Assistance Scheme.

(4) Regulations under this section must require the Pension Protection Fund and the Financial Assistance Scheme to make the appropriate payment or payments within a specified time of receipt of a valid application.”—(Manuela Perteghella.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to provide, by regulations, for the use of a valid SR1 form to make it easier for a person to demonstrate that they are terminally ill for purposes related to compensation from the PPF or FAS.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

17:11

Division 377

Ayes: 87

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Liberal Democrat: 59
Scottish National Party: 5
Reform UK: 4
Independent: 4
Plaid Cymru: 4
Conservative: 3
Green Party: 2
Democratic Unionist Party: 2
Social Democratic & Labour Party: 1
Your Party: 1
Ulster Unionist Party: 1

Noes: 299

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Labour: 294
Conservative: 2
Independent: 2

New Clause 26

Establishment of targeted investment vehicles for pension funds

‘(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for the establishment or facilitation of one or more investment vehicles through which pension schemes may invest for targeted social or economic benefit.

(2) Regulations under subsection (1) must specify the descriptions of targeted social or economic benefit to which the investment vehicles are to contribute, which may include, but are not limited to, investment in—

(a) projects that revitalise high street areas;

(b) initiatives demonstrating social benefit;

(c) affordable or social housing development;

(d) capital projects that meet essential public needs, such as care homes;

(e) clean, renewable energy projects.

(3) The regulations must make provision for—

(a) the types of pension schemes eligible to participate in such investment vehicles;

(b) the governance, oversight, and reporting requirements for the investment vehicles and participating pension schemes;

(c) the means by which the contribution of such investments to targeted social or economic benefit is measured and reported;

(d) the roles and responsibilities of statutory bodies, including the Pensions Regulator and the Financial Conduct Authority, in authorising, regulating, or supervising such investment vehicles and the participation of pension schemes within them.

(4) The regulations may—

(a) make different provision for different descriptions of pension schemes, investment vehicles, or targeted social or economic benefits;

(b) provide for the pooling of assets from multiple pension schemes within such vehicles;

(c) require pension scheme trustees or managers to have regard to the availability and suitability of investment vehicles when formulating investment strategies, where consistent with—

(i) their fiduciary duties, and

(ii) the long-term value for money for members.

(5) In this Chapter, "pension scheme" has the same meaning as in section 1(5) of the Pension Schemes Act 1993.’—(Steve Darling.)

This new clause would allow the Secretary of State to establish investment funds to encourage investment in areas such as high streets, social housing, care homes, clean renewable energy, and other investments with clear social benefits.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:—

17:24

Division 378

Ayes: 77

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Liberal Democrat: 59
Scottish National Party: 5
Independent: 4
Plaid Cymru: 4
Green Party: 2
Social Democratic & Labour Party: 1
Your Party: 1

Noes: 298

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Labour: 291
Independent: 2
Democratic Unionist Party: 2
Ulster Unionist Party: 1

Clause 1

Asset pool companies

Amendments made: 20, page 3, line 24, leave out from “whose” to “, and” and insert

“shares are all held by scheme managers only or by another company limited by shares and registered in the United Kingdom whose shares are all held by scheme managers only”.

The amendment ensures that a company can be an asset pool company either if its shareholders consist only of scheme managers or if it only has one shareholder, being a company whose shareholders consist only of scheme managers.

Amendment 21, page 3, line 26, after “company” insert—

“( ) being a shareholder in another company which is the only shareholder of the company,”—(Torsten Bell.)

The amendment is consequential on amendment 20, which allows scheme managers to arrange for a company wholly owned by scheme managers to hold the shares in an asset pool company.

Clause 2

Asset management

Amendments made: 22, page 4, line 9, leave out from “Wales” to end of line and insert

“each scheme manager (other than the Environment Agency) co-operates with an appropriate strategic authority”.—(Torsten Bell.)

The amendment refines the duty under clause 2(2)(c) for scheme regulations to require scheme managers to co-operate with strategic authorities. The new wording reflects a policy intention for the regulations to require each authority to co-operate (in relation to developing local investment opportunities) with the strategic authority whose area covers the area of the scheme manager. The Environment Agency’s area is the whole of England and so it is excluded by the amendment because the intended policy approach does not work for it.

Clause 4

Exemption from public procurement rules

Amendment made: 23, page 5, line 35, leave out clause 4. —(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment is consequential on NC34 which inserts a new clause intended to supersede the current Clause 4.

Clause 22

Small pots regulations

Amendment made: 24, page 23, line 25, leave out “specify” and insert “prescribe”—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 25.

Clause 23

Small pots data platform

Amendments made: 25, page 23, line 32, leave out

“person specified in the regulations”

and insert “prescribed person”.

This amendment makes use of the defined term “prescribed” to clarify how the regulations may identify a person who is to make proposals as to the destination of small pots.

Amendment 26, page 24, leave out line 1.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 28.

Amendment 27, page 24, line 16, leave out “The” and insert “A”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 28.

Amendment 28, page 24, line 18, leave out subsection (5) and insert—

“(5) Small pots regulations may, in compliance with subsection (1)—

(a) prescribe one person to make all of the proposals required to be made under that subsection, or

(b) prescribe two or more persons in relation to different descriptions of those proposals.

(6) Small pots regulations must require a proposal made by virtue of subsection (1) to be notified to the trustees or managers of the auto-enrolment scheme that holds the pension pot to which the proposal relates unless those trustees or managers are themselves the destination proposer).

(7) A person prescribed under subsection (1) is referred to in this Chapter as a ‘destination proposer’.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment ensures that the task of proposing destinations for small dormant pots may be undertaken by different persons, and defines such persons as “destination proposers”.

Clause 28

Timing of transfers

Amendment made: 29, page 27, line 23, leave out

“by the small pots data platform operator under”

and insert “by virtue of”—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 28.

Clause 29

Authorisation of consolidator schemes etc by the Pensions Regulator

Amendment made: 30, page 28, line 1, leave out

“the small pots data platform operator”

and insert “a destination proposer”—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 28.

Clause 31

Further provision about contents of small pots regulations

Amendments made: 31, page 29, line 28, leave out paragraph (h) and insert—

“(h) require a destination proposer, the trustees or managers of a relevant pension scheme, or the Secretary of State, to pay compensation to an individual who has suffered a loss as a result of a breach of the regulations;”.

This amendment makes a change consequential on Amendment 28; it also adds the Secretary of State to the list of persons who can be required to pay compensation for mistakes made operating the small pots regime.

Amendment 32, page 30, line 14, leave out

“the small pots data platform operator”

and insert “a destination proposer”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 28.

Amendment 33, page 30, line 22, leave out

“the small pots data platform operator”

and insert “a destination proposer”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 28.

Amendment 34, page 30, line 24, leave out

“the small pots data platform operator”

and insert—

“(i) a destination proposer, or (ii) the Secretary of State by virtue of section 31(1)(h) (compensation).”—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 28.

Clause 36

Interpretation of Chapter

Amendments made: 35, page 32, line 29, at end insert—

“‘destination proposer’ has the meaning given by section 23(7);”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 28.

Amendment 36, page 33, leave out lines 19 and 20.—(Torsten Bell.)

Clause 40

Certain schemes providing money purchase benefits: scale and asset allocation

Amendments made: 37, page 39, line 17, after “Trust” insert “(“the RMT”)”.

This amendment introduces a defined term which is used in text added to the inserted section 28A by Amendment 42 and other amendments.

Amendment 38, page 39, line 20, leave out “relevant master trust” and insert “RMT”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 37.

Amendment 39, page 39, line 23, leave out “A relevant Master Trust” and insert “The RMT”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 37.

Amendment 40, page 39, line 25, leave out “and” and insert “to”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 42.

Amendment 41, page 39, line 29, leave out “relevant master trust” and insert “RMT”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 37.

Amendment 42, page 39, line 33, at end insert—

“(aa) if one or more relevant Master Trusts are connected with the RMT, the total value of assets of those schemes that—

(i) represent accrued rights of members of those schemes,

(ii) are held subject to the main scale default arrangement, and

(iii) are managed under the investment strategy mentioned in paragraph (a)(iii);”.

This amendment ensures that, when determining whether a relevant Master Trust has sufficient assets to be approved under the new section 28A of the Pensions Act 2008, the assets of connected relevant Master Trusts are included.

Amendment 43, page 39, leave out lines 34 and 35 and insert—

“(b) if one or more group personal pension schemes are connected with the RMT, the total value of assets of those schemes that—”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 44.

Amendment 44, page 40, line 1, leave out subsection (5) and insert—

“(5) A reference in subsection (4) to a relevant Master Trust or a group personal pension scheme being ‘connected’ with the RMT is to a relevant Master Trust or a group personal pension scheme having a prescribed connection with the RMT.

(5A) Regulations under subsection (5) may, for example, provide—

(a) that a relevant Master Trust is connected with the RMT only if it has the same scheme funder or scheme strategist as the RMT, or

(b) that a group personal pension scheme is connected with the RMT only if its provider is also the scheme funder or scheme strategist of the RMT.”

This amendment would mean that regulations would set out the relationship that must exist between the RMT and other relevant Master Trusts, or group personal pension schemes, for their assets to be pooled for the purposes of gaining approval under the new section 28A of the Pensions Act 2008.

Amendment 45, page 40, line 31, leave out “the” and insert “a”.

This amendment clarifies that the reference is not to a particular relevant Master Trust.

Amendment 46, page 40, line 37, leave out “Regulator” and insert “Authority”.

This amendment ensures consistent use of the defined term “the Authority”.

Amendment 47, page 42, leave out lines 1 and 2 and insert—

“(b) if one or more group personal pension schemes are connected with the GPP, the total value of assets of those schemes that—”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 49.

Amendment 48, page 42, leave out lines 8 and 9 and insert—

“(c) if one or more relevant Master Trusts are connected with the GPP, the total value of assets of those schemes that—”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 49.

Amendment 49, page 42, line 27, leave out subsection (8) and insert—

“(8) A reference in subsection (4) to a group personal pension scheme or a relevant Master Trust being “connected” with the GPP is to a group personal pension scheme or a relevant Master Trust having a prescribed connection with the GPP.

(8A) Regulations under subsection (8) may, for example, provide—

(a) that a group personal pension scheme is connected with the GPP only if it has the same provider as the GPP, or

(b) that a relevant Master Trust is connected with the GPP only if its scheme funder or scheme strategist is also the provider of the GPP.—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment would mean that regulations would set out the relationship that must exist between the GPP and other group personal pension schemes, or relevant Master Trusts, for their assets to be pooled for the purposes of gaining approval under the new section 28B of the Pensions Act 2008.

Amendment proposed: 16, page 43, line 38, leave out from beginning to end of line 27 on page 46.—(James Wild.)

This amendment would remove the ability of the Government to set mandatory asset allocation targets for certain pension schemes, specifically requiring investments in UK productive assets such as private equity, private debt, and real estate.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

17:36

Division 379

Ayes: 143

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Conservative: 74
Liberal Democrat: 61
Reform UK: 3
Democratic Unionist Party: 2
Independent: 1
Ulster Unionist Party: 1

Noes: 304

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Labour: 295
Independent: 6

Amendment proposed: 15, page 46, line 9, leave out from “Before” to the end of the subsection and insert

“implementing the first set of regulations under subsection (1) the Secretary of State must—

(a) prepare and publish a report regarding—

(i) what barriers pension funds, based in the United Kingdom, are facing that are preventing them from investing back into the United Kingdom due to—

(A) legislation introduced after The Pensions Act 1995;

(B) regulations introduced by the Financial Conduct Authority, Prudential Regulation Authority, HM Treasury, or Bank of England;

(C) cultural and market behaviours;

(ii) how financial interests of members of relevant Master Trusts and group personal pension schemes would be affected by the proposed regulations;

(iii) what effects the proposed measures could be expected to have on economic growth in the United Kingdom;

(iv) any other matters the Secretary of State considers appropriate; and

(b) respond to any recommendations or issues raised in the report.”—(James Wild.)

This amendment prevents use of the reserved mandation powers in this Bill until the Government produces a report on the reasons why the powers are needed and the effects of the use of the powers and resolves any issues raised in the report.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

17:38

Division 380

Ayes: 154

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Conservative: 75
Liberal Democrat: 60
Scottish National Party: 5
Reform UK: 4
Plaid Cymru: 4
Independent: 2
Democratic Unionist Party: 2
Ulster Unionist Party: 1

Noes: 303

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Labour: 296
Independent: 5

Amendments made: 50, page 48, line 17, after “28A” insert “or 28B”.

This amendment adds a missing cross reference.

Amendment 51, page 51, line 22, leave out “Regulator” and insert “Regulatory Authority”.

This amendment clarifies that the reference in the new section 28J(2)(a) of the Pensions Act 2008 is to the Regulatory Authority (as defined by regulations under the new section 99(2) of that Act).

Amendment 52, page 52, line 31, leave out “they” and insert

“the provisions mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b)”.—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment clarifies that transition pathway relief will be repealed five years after the relief first becomes available.

Clause 41

Amendments related to section 40

Amendment made: 53, page 53, line 33, after “the” insert “Pensions”.—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment clarifies that the reference to the Regulator is to the Pensions Regulator.

Clause 53

Pension benefits strategy

Amendment made: 54, page 72, line 35, leave out subsection (6).—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment removes a redundant interpretation provision.

Clause 100

Sections 101 to 103: interpretation and scope

Amendments made: 55, page 105, line 7, after “a” insert “GB”.

This is a drafting correction to clarify that clause 100(3) is only about GB pension schemes.

Amendment 56, page 105, line 18, at end of line insert—

“( ) References to non-compliance with the requirements of paragraph (2)(a) and (b) of regulation 42 include non-compliance with the requirement in either paragraph (2)(a) or (2)(b) (as well as with both requirements).”

The amendment confirms that the phrase “non-compliance with the requirements of paragraph (2)(a) and (b) of regulation 42” covers failure to comply with either or both of those requirements. This deals with the possibility that the scheme actuary for a GB scheme was notified of a proposed alteration to the rules (so that paragraph 42(2)(a) was complied with)) without the confirmation required by paragraph 42(2)(b) being given.

Amendment 57, page 105, line 33, leave out “a” and insert “the”.

This is a drafting correction to secure consistency in the way subsection (7) refers back to things mentioned in subsection (6). It should refer to “the alteration”(as well as “the scheme”) because subsection (7) is explaining what counts as “positive action” in relation to the alteration mentioned in subsection (6)(c).

Amendment 58, page 105, line 40, leave out from beginning of line to “which” in line 42 and insert—

“(b) notifying any members of the scheme in writing (in consequence of the trustees or managers being of the view mentioned in subsection (6)(c)) to the effect that the trustees or managers are taking (or have taken) any other step in relation to the administration of the scheme”.

The amendment applies where the trustees or managers of a GB scheme, after deciding that an alteration is void for non-compliance with regulation 42(2)(a) and (b), take any step in the administration of the scheme that has (or will have) the effect of altering payments to beneficiaries. Under the amended subsection (7)(b) such a step will only be “positive action” (for the purposes of subsection (6)(c)) if they notify beneficiaries that they are taking or have taken the step. If that happens the alteration in question is not a potentially remediable alteration and so is ineligible for retrospective validation under clause 101 or 102.

Amendment 59, page 106, leave out lines 5 to 13 and insert—

“(a) has, before this section comes into force, been determined by the court in qualifying legal proceedings,

(b) was in issue on or before 5 June 2025 in qualifying legal proceedings, but has been settled by agreement between the parties at any time before this section comes into force, or

(c) was in issue on or before 5 June 2025 in qualifying legal proceedings and remains in issue in those proceedings when this section comes into force.

(9) In subsection (8) “legal proceedings” means proceedings for the determination of a dispute that have been brought before a court in the United Kingdom; and such proceedings are “qualifying legal proceedings” if —

(a) they will determine a dispute as to the rules of the scheme, and

(b) the parties are (or include)—

(i) the trustees or managers of the scheme, and

(ii) one or more members or other beneficiaries of the scheme (or a person acting on behalf of one or more members or other beneficiaries).”—(Torsten Bell.)

Under clause 100(8) a purported alteration of a GB scheme is outside the scope of remediation under clauses 101 and 102 if its validity is or has been in issue in legal proceedings in circumstances specified in any of paragraphs (a) to (c). The new subsection (9) clarifies the proceedings which are to count for this purpose: proceedings before a UK court the parties to which are or include both the trustees or managers of the scheme in question and beneficiaries or their representative. The terms used in subsection (9) are intended to have their usual meaning in the law of England and Wales, or Scotland so that, for example, proceedings before a tribunal or proceedings on a complaint to an ombudsman would not count.

Clause 101

Validity of certain alterations to GB salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes

Amendments made: 60, page 106, line 17, leave out “scheme other than one” and insert

“GB scheme other than a potentially remediable alteration”.

This is a drafting amendment. It clarifies that the clause is only about GB pension schemes and corrects a potentially ambiguous reference in clause 101(1). The word “one” was intended to refer to a potentially remediable alteration, rather than to a GB scheme.

Amendment 61, page 106, line 37, leave out “under” and insert “as mentioned in”.

This is a drafting amendment for consistency with the language of subsection (5) of clause 101. It is not necessary for the actuary receiving a request to consider whether it was made “under” subsection (3), especially if received before subsection (3) is in force. Subsection (4) already makes clear that a request of the kind mentioned in subsection (3) can be made (and if made can be dealt with) before clause 101 is in force.

Amendment 62, page 106, line 39, that paragraph (a) of subsection (4) be transferred to the end of line 3 on page 107.

The amendment would transpose the two paragraphs of clause 101(4) to reflect the fact that consideration of the information available should happen first. If the actuary thinks there is missing information they can address that before going on to consider whether to give the confirmation mentioned in subsection (3)(b).

Amendment 63, page 107, line 18, at end insert—

“(8) This section has effect, in relation to a potentially remediable alteration purportedly made to a public service scheme, as if the references in subsections (3) and (7) to the trustees or managers of the scheme were references to the responsible authority.

(9) In subsection (8)—

“public service scheme” means—

(a) a pension scheme established under section 1 of the Public Service Pensions Act 2013, or

(b) a statutory pension scheme which is connected with a scheme referred to in paragraph (a) (and for this purpose “statutory pension scheme” and “connected” have the meanings given in that Act);

“responsible authority” , in relation to a public service scheme, means the authority that is the responsible authority for the scheme by virtue of section 2 of, and Schedule 2 to, that Act.”—(Torsten Bell.)

The amendment ensures that in the case of a public service pension scheme, things falling to be done by or to the trustees or managers of the scheme under clause 101(3) or (7) are to be done by or to the responsible authority for the scheme. The responsible authorities for public service schemes in Great Britain are identified in Schedule 2 to the Public Service Pensions Act 2013.

Clause 102

Validity of certain alterations to GB salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: wound up schemes and other special cases

Amendments made: 64, page 107, line 23, leave out “scheme” and insert

“GB scheme, or a part of a GB scheme,”.

It is possible in certain circumstances for a part of a GB scheme to be wound up on its own. This would include a case where the part in question is a section of a segregated pension scheme. The amendment would secure that clause 102 applies to a potentially remediable alteration to a part of a GB scheme (as well as a GB scheme as a whole) that has been wound up before the clause comes into force.

Amendment 65, page 107, line 25, leave out “scheme” and insert

“GB scheme, or a part of a GB scheme,”

The amendment would ensure that clause 102 applies where the Board of the Pension Protection Fund has become responsible for part only of a GB pension scheme.

Amendment 66, page 107, line 29, after “a” insert “GB”. —(Torsten Bell.)

This is a drafting amendment to clarify that the provision refers only to a GB pension scheme.

Clause 104

Sections 105 to 107: interpretation and scope

Amendments made: 67, page 108, line 36, at end insert—

“(5A) References to non-compliance with the requirements of paragraph (2)(a) and (b) of regulation 42 include non-compliance with the requirement in either paragraph (2)(a) or (2)(b) (as well as with both requirements).”

The amendment confirms that the phrase “non-compliance with the requirements of paragraph (2)(a) and (b) of regulation 42” covers failure to comply with either or both of those requirements. This deals with the possibility that the scheme actuary for an NI scheme was notified of a proposed alteration to the rules (so paragraph 42(2)(a) was complied with)) without the confirmation required by paragraph 42(2)(b) being given.

Amendment 68, page 109, line 13, leave out “a” and insert “the”.

This is a drafting correction to secure consistency in the way subsection (7) refers back to things mentioned in subsection (6). It should refer to “the alteration” (as well as “the scheme”) because subsection (7) is explaining what counts as “positive action” in relation to the alteration mentioned in subsection (6)(c).

Amendment 69, page 109, line 20, leave out from beginning of line to “which” in line 22 and insert—

“(b) notifying any members of the scheme in writing (in consequence of the trustees or managers being of the view mentioned in subsection (6)(c)) to the effect that the trustees or managers are taking (or have taken) any other step in relation to the administration of the scheme”.

The amendment applies where the trustees of managers of an NI scheme, after deciding that an alteration is void for non-compliance with regulation 42(2)(a) and (b), take any step in relation to the administration of the scheme that has (or will have) the effect of altering payments to beneficiaries. The amendment secures that such a step will only be “positive action” (for the purposes of subsection (6)(c)) if they notify beneficiaries that they are taking or have taken the step. Where that happens, the alteration in question is not a potentially remediable alteration and so is ineligible for retrospective validation under clause 101 or 102.

Amendment 70, page 109, leave out lines 28 to 36 and insert—

“(a) has, before this section comes into force, been determined by the court in qualifying legal proceedings,

(b) was in issue on or before 5 June 2025 in qualifying legal proceedings, but has been settled by agreement between the parties at any time before this section comes into force, or

(c) was in issue on or before 5 June 2025 in qualifying legal proceedings and remains in issue in those proceedings when this section comes into force.

(9) In subsection (8) “legal proceedings” means proceedings for the determination of a dispute that have been brought before a court in the United Kingdom; and such proceedings are “qualifying legal proceedings” if—

(a) they will determine a dispute as to the rules of the scheme, and

(b) the parties are (or include)—

(i) the trustees or managers of the scheme, and

(ii) one or more members or other beneficiaries of the scheme (or a person acting on behalf of one or more members or other beneficiaries).”—(Torsten Bell.)

Clause 104(8) secures that a purported alteration of an NI scheme is outside the scope of remediation under clauses 105 and 106 if its validity is or has been in issue in legal proceedings in circumstances specified in any of paragraphs (a) to (c). The amendment is intended to clarify which legal proceedings are to count for this purpose, namely proceedings for the determination of a dispute before a court in the United Kingdom, the parties to which are or include both the trustees or managers of the scheme in question and beneficiaries under the scheme or a person representing beneficiaries. The terms used in the new subsection (9) are intended to have their usual meaning in the law of Northern Ireland domestic law, so that proceedings before a tribunal or on a complaint to an ombudsman would not count as “legal proceedings”.

Clause 105

Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes

Amendments made: 71, page 109, line 40, leave out “one” and insert “a potentially remediable alteration”.

This is a drafting amendment which would correct a potentially ambiguous reference in clause 105((1). The word “one” was intended to refer to a potentially remediable alteration rather than to an NI scheme.

Amendment 72, page 110, line 18, leave out “under” and insert “as mentioned in”.

This is a drafting amendment for consistency with the language of subsection (5) of clause 105. It is not necessary for the actuary receiving a request to consider whether it was made “under” subsection (3), especially if received before subsection (3) is in force. Subsection (4) already makes clear that a request of the kind mentioned in subsection (3) can be made (and if made can be dealt with) before clause 101 is in force.

Amendment 73, page 110, line 20, that paragraph (a) of subsection (4) be transferred to the end of line 25.

The amendment would transpose the two paragraphs of clause 105(4) to reflect the fact that consideration of the information available should happen first. If the actuary thinks there is missing information they can address that before going on to consider whether to give the confirmation mentioned in subsection (3)(b).

Amendment 74, page 110, line 28, leave out “a” and insert “an NI”.

This is a drafting amendment to clarify that the provision refers only to an NI pension scheme.

Amendment 75, page 110, line 30, leave out “Chapter 3 of”.

The amendment make a drafting correction. The term “assessment period” is defined by Article 116 of the Pensions (Northern Ireland) Order 2005 for the purposes of Part 3 of the Order, and not just for Chapter 3 of that Part.

Amendment 76, page 110, line 42, at end insert—

“(8) This section has effect, in relation to a potentially remediable alteration purportedly made to a public service scheme, as if the references in subsections (3) and (7) to the trustees or managers of the scheme were references to the responsible authority.

(9) In subsection (8)—

“public service scheme” means—

(a) a pension scheme established under section 1 of the Public Service Pensions (Northern Ireland) Act 2014 (2014 c. 2), or

(b) a statutory pension scheme which is connected with a scheme referred to in paragraph (a) (and for this purpose “statutory pension scheme” and “connected” have the meanings given in that Act);

“responsible authority”, in relation to a public service scheme, means the authority that is the responsible authority for the scheme by virtue of section 2 of and Schedule 2 to that Act.”—(Torsten Bell.)

The amendment ensures that in the case of a public service pension scheme, things falling to be done by or to the trustees or managers of the scheme under clause 105(3) or (7) are to be done by or to the responsible authority for the scheme. The responsible authorities for public service schemes in Northern Ireland are identified in Schedule 2 to the Public Service Pensions (Northern Ireland) Act 2014.

Clause 106

Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: wound up schemes and other special cases

Amendments made: 77, page 111, line 5, leave out “a scheme” and insert

“an NI scheme, or a part of an NI scheme,”.

It is possible in certain circumstances for a part of an NI pension scheme to be wound up on its own. This would include a case where the part in question is a section of a segregated pension scheme. The amendment would secure that clause 106 applies to a potentially remediable alteration to a part of an NI scheme (as well as an NI scheme as a whole) that has been wound up before the clause comes into force.

Amendment 78, page 111, line 7, leave out “a scheme” and insert

“an NI scheme, or a part of an NI scheme,”.

The amendment clarifies that clause 106(1)(b) applies only to an NI pension scheme. It would also ensure that clause 106 applies where the Board of the Pension Protection Fund has become responsible for part only of an NI pension scheme.

Amendment 79, page 111, line 11, leave out “a” and insert “an NI”.—(Torsten Bell.)

This is a drafting amendment to clarify that the provision refers only to an NI pension scheme.

Clause 107

Powers to amend Chapter 1 etc: Northern Ireland

Amendments made: 80, page 111, line 20, leave out “A Northern Ireland Department” and insert

“The Department for Communities in Northern Ireland”.

The amendment identifies the Northern Ireland department which is to exercise the powers conferred by subsection (1) of clause 107.

Amendment 81, page 111, line 27, at end insert—

“( ) Regulations under subsection (1) are subject to negative resolution.”

The amendment makes provision corresponding to clause 103(3) for Northern Ireland. Provision corresponding to clause 103(6) is proposed by Amendment 83 in place of the current clause 107(4) which applied to both the regulation-making powers in clause 107.

Amendment 82, page 111, line 28, leave out “A Northern Ireland Department” and insert

“The Department for Communities in Northern Ireland”.

The amendment identifies the Northern Ireland department which is to exercise the powers conferred by subsection (3) of clause 107.

Amendment 83, page 111, line 31, leave out subsection (4) and insert—

“(4) Regulations under subsection (3) may amend Northern Ireland legislation, or an Act of Parliament, passed or made before or in the same Session as this Act.

(4A) Regulations under subsection (3) which contain provision made under

subsection (4)—

(a) must be laid before the Northern Ireland Assembly after being made,

(b) take effect on such date as may be specified in the regulations, and

(c) cease to have effect on the expiry of the period of six months beginning with the day on which they take effect, unless the regulations have been approved during that period by resolution of the Assembly.

Paragraph (c) is without prejudice to the validity of anything done under the regulations or to the making of new regulations.

(4B) Regulations under subsection (3) which do not contain provision made under subsection (4) are subject to negative resolution.

(4C) In this section “subject to negative resolution” has the meaning given by section 41(6) of the Interpretation Act (Northern Ireland) 1954.”

The amendment secures that regulations under clause 107(3) can amend primary legislation. Regulations which include provision doing that will need to be approved by resolution of the Northern Ireland Assembly within six months from being made. Otherwise, the regulations will expire at the end of that period.

Amendment 84, page 111, line 34, leave out “A Northern Ireland Department” and insert

“the Department for Communities in Northern Ireland”.—(Torsten Bell.)

The amendment is consequential on amendments 80 and 82.

Clause 116

Extent

Amendment made: 85, page 119, line 24, leave out “105” and insert “104”.—(Torsten Bell.)

The amendment corrects an error in subsection (2) of clause 116 as inserted in Public Bill Committee. Clause 104 should extend only to Northern Ireland, in addition to clauses 105 to 107.

Clause 117

Commencement

Amendments made: 86, page 120, line 29, leave out from “force” to “the” in line 30 and insert “on”.

The amendment would alter the commencement date for Chapter 1 of Part 4 (Validity of certain alterations to salary-related contracted-out pension schemes) to the date of Royal Assent to the Bill.

Amendment 87, page 120, line 30, at end insert—

“(8A) Chapter 1A of Part 4 comes into force on such day as the Secretary of State may by regulations appoint.”

This amendment provides that the new clauses inserted by NC31, NC32 and NC33 (which are intended to form a new Chapter in Part 4 of the Bill) come into force on such day as the Secretary of State may by regulations appoint.

Amendment 88, page 120, line 37, at end insert—

“(d) section (Funding of the Board of the Pension Protection Fund)—

(i) comes into force on 1 April 2026, or,

(ii) if this Act is passed after that date, is treated as having come into force on that date;”.

This amendment provides that the funding change for the Board of the Pension Protection Fund introduced by NC35 has effect from 1 April 2026.

Amendment 89, page 120, line 37, at end insert—

“(e) section (Funding of the Ombudsman for the Board of the Pension Protection Fund) is treated as having come into force on 1 April 2007.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment provides that the funding change for the Ombudsman for the Board of the Pension Protection Fund introduced by NC30, which has in practice been in operation since 1 April 2007, is treated as having had effect since that date.

Third Reading

King’s consent signified.

18:00

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

Pensions matter. They are the means by which we deliver on some of the biggest promises we have made to the public: that the prospect of a comfortable retirement, with the option of leisure—hon. Members may choose not to take it—in later life, is there for the many, not just the few. We need not only to encourage people to save, but to ensure that those savings work as hard as possible for them to deliver that comfortable retirement. That is ultimately what this occasionally technical Bill is all about. Better returns mean better retirements, and there are few things more important than that.

The Bill adds wind to the sails of some of the major changes already under way in our pension landscape. Most importantly, it pushes ahead with the shift towards larger, better-governed schemes, better able to access and deliver returns for savers and to invest in a wider range of assets. It introduces a new value for money framework, so that schemes are judged on performance and service, not just cost. It removes one of the big barriers to people engaging with their pensions by consolidating small, inactive pension pots. It delivers reforms to ensure people are building up a pension, not just a savings pot, with simple default pensions that do not require each of us to become a financial expert as we approach retirement.

For defined benefit schemes, the Bill strengthens the local government pension scheme, puts more trustees in the driving seat for managing scheme surpluses, and addresses the lack of pre-1997 indexation within the PPF and the FAS. Those are real improvements shaped by constructive debate and detailed scrutiny in this place and across the pension industry.

I again thank Members from all parts of the House for their contributions and I thank the Clerks for taking us through Committee. I also thank the Bill team—Jo, Amanda, Mike, James, Sagar, Saadia and Steve—and the many officials across DWP and the Treasury who have worked behind the scenes to support the Government in bringing forward this important legislation. I appreciate that it is not a short Bill. The PPF, the Financial Conduct Authority and the Pensions Regulator have also played important roles for which I am grateful. I commend all of them, and this Bill, to the House.

18:02

[Helen Whately (Faversham and Mid Kent) (Con)]

As this Bill nears the end of its journey through our House, I take a moment to acknowledge some of the people who have played their part, whether that is former Pensions Ministers, including my right hon. Friend the Member for Sevenoaks (Laura Trott), the former hon. Member for Hexham, my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier), who cannot be with us today, or my hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon (Rebecca Smith), who also cannot be here today. My hon. Friend the Member for North West Norfolk (James Wild) did such a brilliant job speaking earlier this afternoon. I also thank the hard-working members of the Bill Committee, including my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Leicestershire (Mr Bedford). Many civil servants will have worked on this Bill and pensions experts will have contributed, and I thank them all for their hard work and expertise. May I also finally offer congratulations to the current Pensions Minister, the lucky one who gets to be here to see this Bill off to the other place?

We on the Conservative Benches do not agree with all of the Bill, but there is a lot in it that we do welcome, particularly the parts that the Minister inherited from us, including the consolidation of fragmented pension pots, the introduction of the value for money framework and the pensions dashboard. Those will help people to manage their pension savings and get better returns. We also welcome the Government’s amendment of the Bill, reflecting our new clause, to index pre-1997 pensions, for which there was significant consensus across the House. That will provide some dignity for pensioners who have seen their pensions eroded over the years, and we hope that the Government continue to work with campaign groups to see that through. I also thank my right hon. Friends the Members for Herne Bay and Sandwich (Sir Roger Gale) and for Hereford and South Herefordshire (Jesse Norman) for their representations on that.

The Bill also has some serious flaws. Nestled within the sensible reforms that the Government inherited is a power that no Government should wield: the power to mandate how pension funds invest. Today, the job of a pension fund manager is to make the best possible decisions for their fund members about where to invest. Their sole objective is the interests of those members. That is their legal duty, and mandation would change that, because mandation means the Government will be able to tell pension funds how to invest their assets. We should not for a minute underestimate the significance of that. Ministers have insisted it is merely a backstop and a tool they hope never to use, but a threat made just in case is still a threat, and pension trustees know it. I say to the Pensions Minister that a Minister should always consider the worst thing that someone else might do in their position—in essence, “I am not a bad man, but what might a bad man do?” He might be confident that he would not abuse the power, but what if someone else had it?

Those in the pensions sector do not support this plan. Earlier in the year the Minister told them to “chillax”. He may be intensely relaxed, but I must say to him that he is also intensely wrong. Trustees are the custodians of people’s life savings. They are not there to carry out manifesto pledges or pet projects, and the Minister should not put himself or any future pensions Minister in a position to tell them to do so.

Instead of forcing pension funds to invest in the UK, Ministers should ask why they have not been investing and then do something about that. Our amendment 15 gave them the opportunity to diagnose these problems and resolve them, but, as we have just seen, they voted it down. In any event, they should stop making Britain a worse place in which to do business, ramping up taxes on employment, slapping on red tape, and briefing out bad Budget news for months in advance to kill confidence in every sector of the economy.

As my hon. Friend the Member for North West Norfolk (James Wild) said earlier, our other concern with the Bill is the relationship between scale and innovation. We agree with the need for scale, but the Government should avoid blocking the emergence of new entrants and the scaling up of existing smaller players.

Finally, there is the question of pension adequacy. While the Bill should help people to manage their pension savings and boost their returns, it falls short when it comes to tackling the serious problem of people under-saving for later life. Millions of people simply are not saving enough for old age. The Government should be acting now in this regard, rather than delaying the next phase of the pensions review and attacking pension savings at every turn. First they came for pensioners’ winter fuel payments, then they came for self-invested personal pensions, and last week they came for salary sacrifice—and that was not a small tweak. The cap on salary sacrifice will net the Treasury nearly £5 billion of extra tax revenue in 2029-30—money that would otherwise have gone into people’s pensions.

We have made our points, argued our position and put amendments to a vote, so we will not be voting against the Bill on Third Reading. However, I urge the Government to listen to the wise and the many expert words that will be spoken when it is debated in the other place, and to use that opportunity to fix it.

18:06

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

I figured that, as I had only about 17 minutes in which to speak on Report, the House deserved to hear from me again on Third Reading, but I shall be very brief in expressing my views and those of my hon. Friends.

Members spoke earlier about people’s understanding of pensions, and I continue to have concerns about people’s understanding of defined contribution schemes. People who are given a figure for how much money is in their defined contribution scheme are often confused about what that will actually mean when they hit retirement. Those schemes are very different from defined benefit schemes, and, given the massive increase in the number of people investing in defined contribution schemes rather than defined benefit schemes, those issues will continue unless an incredible amount of education is provided so that people can understand what they might receive in their pensions, rather than just the amount in the total pot.

The Minister has made a number of changes to the Bill that I appreciate, not least the pre-1997 indexation for the Pension Protection Fund. The fiduciary duty announcement that he made today is, I think, extremely helpful in clarifying for trustees what their objectives are. He also mentioned that the Association of British Insurers had come up with an agreement. In my experience of serving on a significant number of Bill Committees, it is very unusual for so many changes to be made. I appreciate the fact that the Committee members were listened to, and that some of the concerns raised by Members in all parts of the Committee have been tackled during the Bill’s progress. I have already raised concerns about the short notice that we had for some of the amendments and new clauses and the fact that we were not properly able to scrutinise the Government changes, both in Committee on Report.

Finally, let me thank Matt and Fergus, who helped me with some of this. We rarely see pension Bills presented, and I would love to see another—shortly, probably. Given that the Minister has made commitments in relation to fiduciary duty, and given that he said he expected such a measure to appear in primary legislation with guidance to follow, I assume that a Bill will follow those commitments. I also think that the adequacy review may—hopefully—kick up some requirements for legislation.

This House should get used to talking about pensions. As the generations shift, the state pension will become a smaller percentage of what people rely on in retirement, and auto-enrolment and defined contribution schemes mean that significantly more people will rely on private pensions. Ensuring that they have the best possible outcomes for retirement is something that all Members of the House can support, and we need to have a legislative framework that keeps pace with how people are actually investing for the future, rather than one that reflects how people invested 20 or 30 years ago.

As the Minister will be aware, I would be delighted to debate more pensions Bills as they come forward. We will do our best to provide cross-party support wherever we can.

Bill read the Third time and passed.