National Security and Investment Bill
Tuesday 17th November 2020
(4 years ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Alok Sharma)
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
Our country has always been a beacon for inward investment and a champion of free trade. We recognise and celebrate the positive impact of these twin policies in delivering prosperity and opportunities across the United Kingdom. Over the past 10 years, the UK has attracted around three quarters of a trillion dollars of foreign direct investment, which in turn has helped to create 600,000 new jobs in our country.
In 2019-20 alone, more than 39,000 jobs were created in England thanks to foreign direct investment projects, with more than 26,000 of those jobs created outside London. Almost 3,000 jobs were created in Scotland, and more than 2,500 in Wales and 2,000 in Northern Ireland respectively. That is why we will continue to work relentlessly to ensure that the UK remains a great place to do business and invest. That approach is more important than ever as we look to business to create jobs in our recovery from covid-19.
The UK is very much open for business, but being open for business does not mean that we are open to exploitation. An open approach to international investment must also include appropriate safeguards to protect our national security. Those are not conflicting approaches; prosperity and security go hand in hand. Otherwise, we leave the United Kingdom open to the risk of being targeted and compromised by potential hostile actors who are looking to disrupt our economic and wider security.
Ms Nusrat Ghani (Wealden) (Con)
From the moment that this Bill was started to now, we have learnt a lot more about security and infrastructure. Does my right hon. Friend share my concerns that the Chinese national intelligence law requires Chinese firms to assist with state intelligence work? This was brought to light for me when TikTok gave evidence to the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee. I am incredibly anxious about the data that it could potentially be harvesting and sharing back with its parent company, ByteDance.
Alok Sharma
I know that my hon. Friend cares very deeply about this issue and, indeed, she and I have had discussions about it. I would say to her that the Bill is agnostic as to the domicile of an acquirer. I think that that is right and proper, but it is also right and proper that we look at every single transaction on a case-by-case basis. Let me assure her that if there are security concerns with any transaction, of course we will act.
Bob Seely (Isle of Wight) (Con)
There is a lot in the Bill that I am sure we all support, but does my right hon. Friend accept that without a public interest test, a character test, an anti-slavery test and a human rights test, the definition of national security being offered here is extraordinarily narrow and problematic to the broader age that we live in? Does he accept that there will be debate around that point—about what constitutes national security in this age?
Alok Sharma
My hon. Friend raises a point that I know he has raised with my fellow Ministers, and other colleagues will raise a similar point. He talks about modern slavery. He knows that the Government passed the Modern Slavery Act 2015. The Home Office is looking to update and strengthen that. I note the points that he has raised, but the whole point of the Bill is for it to be narrow on national security grounds, and that is the way that it was constituted when it was first discussed in the Green Paper in 2017 and in the White Paper in 2018. However, I will try to address some of the points that he raised as I go on.
Those who seek to do us harm have found novel ways to bypass our current regime by either structuring a deal in such a manner that it is difficult to identify the ultimate owner of the investment, or by funnelling investment through a UK or ally investment fund, or indeed, by buying or licensing certain intellectual property rather than acquiring the company. Be in no doubt that the UK and our allies are facing a resurgence of threats. That is why we are updating our powers to screen investments into the UK. Our current powers date back to the Enterprise Act 2002. Technological, economic and geopolitical changes across the globe over the past 20 years mean that the reforms to the Government’s powers to scrutinise transactions on national security grounds are now required.
Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)
I welcome a lot of the proposals in the Bill, including on the issue of land and the removal of the thresholds in terms of ownership. One way that people have been able not only to get influence in this country but to launder money has been through the purchase of large amounts of property in the UK, which were highlighted in the Intelligence and Security Committee’s report on Russia. Does the Secretary of State see the Bill addressing that issue?
Alok Sharma
I will go on to the detail of that particular issue, but as the right hon. Gentleman identified, the Bill looks at assets and intellectual property. On the point that he raised about the size of transactions, as he knows, under the 2002 Act, apart from some limited exceptions, businesses being acquired must have a UK turnover of over £70 million or, indeed, the merger must meet a minimum 25% market threshold. This means that acquisitions of smaller but technologically sensitive companies are not covered.
The Government have been clear for a number of years about our intention to introduce new powers. Many of our international allies, including our Five Eyes partners, have also acted to update their legal frameworks to address national security risks. We, in turn, are seeking to update our legislation in a proportionate manner to ensure that we have more security for British businesses and people from hostile actors targeting our country; more certainty for businesses and quicker, slicker screening processes as we remain open to trade and recover from covid-19; and a regime that is in line with our allies, meaning that investors will be familiar with this approach.
Let me turn to some of the specifics of the Bill. Part 1, chapter 1 introduces a call-in power that the Government may use in relation to a trigger event across the economy that they reasonably suspect has given rise to or may give rise to a risk to national security. Trigger events include acquisitions of certain shares or voting rights in a qualifying entity, and the acquisition of material influence over such an entity. As the right hon. Gentleman pointed out, it will be possible for the first time to call in the acquisition of a right or interest in a qualifying asset, including intellectual property, where such an acquisition would enable the acquirer to use the asset or control or direct how it is used. That is similar to the US and other countries’ regimes.
The call-in approach is consistent with the 2002 Act, but importantly there are no minimum thresholds for the size of the business or asset to be acquired. That means that sensitive businesses and assets that may previously have slipped under the minimum size threshold will no longer do so. That will close the back door into the United Kingdom that hostile actors could exploit.
However, it is important to reassure the investment community that the Government expect to use these powers sparingly. We estimate that less than 1% of transactions in any given year will be subject to call-in. For transactions that fall outside the mandatory requirement of the regime, the Government will be able to call in a transaction within a period of five years of a trigger event having taken place where they have not been notified. When the Government become aware of a trigger event having taken place, they will have six months to issue the call-in notice. That five-year period is, again, consistent with regimes in Germany and France. The Bill requires that the Government publish a statement of policy intent explaining how they expect to use the power to issue a call-in notice.
Should the Bill become an Act, the Government’s call-in powers will apply from the date of introduction and will cover transactions that complete during its passage. That will ensure that hostile actors do not rush through the completion of transactions between the introduction of the Bill and Royal Assent as a means to avoid scrutiny under this legislation. My Department has already set up an investment security unit to field enquiries from businesses and investors about transactions under the new regime.
Under the National Security and Investment Bill, there will be no requirement to publish call-ins. That is of course in contrast to the public interest intervention notices under the 2002 Act.
Aaron Bell (Newcastle-under-Lyme) (Con)
I welcome what the Secretary of State just said about the call-in power. Will he confirm that, as a result of the measures in the Bill, most transactions can take place within 30 days, which means that the UK will remain a venue, and be an even better one, for foreign direct investment as we seek to rebuild our economy following coronavirus?
Alok Sharma
My hon. Friend makes a very important point. We are giving certainty, and we expect that most call-in decisions will be decided upon within 30 days. I said that we expect that less than 1% of all transactions in any given year will be called in, and only about 10% of those will then face detailed scrutiny.
Mark Pritchard (The Wrekin) (Con)
Will the Secretary of the State provide clarity to the House about the jurisdiction of the Bill? For example, if a German technological company was listed in Germany but the IP and research and development was based in the UK, what powers would the Government have to act?
Alok Sharma
This Bill applies to any transaction that relates to an asset or entity in the United Kingdom. If that were the case, of course it would apply.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)
I am interested in that point. If a malign actor made an investment in another country with a lower-standard test, which then invested in the UK, putting intellectual property rights at risk, where do the UK Government go on that? Do they give themselves the scope, which I do not see in the Bill, to act on the basis of the original investment?
Alok Sharma
I thank my right hon. Friend for his question. He has taken a great deal of interest in this legislation, and we have spoken about such matters. As I said earlier, the whole point of the Bill is that we will be able to scrutinise the precise details of a transaction and of who the ultimate beneficial owner of a particular acquiring entity may be. I would therefore hope that the Bill will indeed cover the particular set of circumstances he outlines.
Going back to the point about providing assurances, businesses and investors can be reassured that the Government will treat potential national security risks with the discretion they deserve.
Turning to the mandatory notification elements of the Bill, investors in 17 prescribed sectors of the economy will be mandated by law to notify the Government of acquisitions of entities above a certain threshold of shareholding or voting. That mandatory notification process is similar to the approach taken in the United States, Germany and France. The Government have, alongside the introduction of the Bill, published an eight-week consultation to refine the definitions of those 17 sectors. The discussions that I and other Ministers in the Department have had with the investment community suggest that that has been extremely welcome.
Many sectors, of course, are well defined, and the purpose of the consultation is to refine them further so that the definitions are clear and narrowly focused on specific parts of sectors in which risks are most likely to arise and will allow parties to self-assess whether they need to notify. The House will appreciate that we could not have published the consultation before we introduced the Bill, with its call-in powers, or we would have risked hostile actors completing transactions in the particularly sensitive sectors.
Richard Fuller (North East Bedfordshire) (Con)
My right hon. Friend is quite rightly focusing on precisely defining the sectors. Was he as concerned as I was to hear the Opposition spokesman say today that he would prefer a strategy that did not have that definition, relying instead on the whimsy of a particular Secretary of State at the time? That situation could, like it does in France, lead to a yoghurt company or water bottle business being defined as a national strategic asset.
Alok Sharma
My hon. Friend speaks with a great deal of interest and experience in investments. This Bill focuses on national security, and we have been clear that we will define the sectors where mandatory notification is required, which is right and proper. The whole point of the Bill is that we are taking a proportionate approach. We do not want some kind of chilling effect on investment coming into the UK. We have been a beacon for inward investment over many years with, as I said earlier, three quarters of a trillion dollars coming into our country over the past 10 years. We would not want that to change.
Transactions covered by mandatory notification that take place without clearance will be legally void. Again, that is in line with the French, German and Italian regimes. Parties to an acquisition may, of course, voluntarily inform the Secretary of State about their acquisitions to seek swift clearance to proceed. We have also streamlined the information required for notification from 36 pages, as required under the Enterprise Act 2002 for competition modifications, to a third of that.
The use of digital processes will make interaction with the Government much simpler, more transparent and slicker, and Government will aim to provide clearance for most transactions within 30 working days of notification, as my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Aaron Bell) raised earlier. Having spoken to the investment community over the past week, I know that that timely approach to the clearing of transactions is welcomed.
Moving on to the assessment of called-in transactions, part 2 of the Bill provides powers to assess transactions should the Government call one in. Where the specific legal test is met, the Government may impose conditions or, in extremis, block or unwind transactions. I stress once again that the Government will use those powers sparingly and proportionately.
The Government will take the necessary powers in the Bill to gather information about any transaction. However, such information will be strictly safeguarded against inappropriate disclosure. That includes, of course, information from parties, regulators and others to make informed decisions on transactions. If no remedies are imposed, a final notification will be provided at the end of a national security assessment. Alternatively, the Government may choose to prescribe remedies.
Any notification decision under the Bill will be subject to legal challenge from the potential acquirer entity by way of judicial review or appeal, and the Government will be able to apply to the court for a closed material procedure to protect commercially sensitive and national security matters in such proceedings. The investment security unit will ensure that the entire process is streamlined and supported by robust digital structures and governance to ensure swift decision-making on assessments.
It is worth noting that the new regime will be underpinned by both civil and criminal sanctions, creating effective deterrents for non-compliance with statutory obligations. Again, that is in line with sanctions in the French and German regimes.
Mark Pritchard
Is it not the case that a call-in itself could be commercially sensitive, particularly to a listed company? In that regard, a default of self-referral to the Government would probably be a better way for industry to ensure that share prices are not unfortunately affected by what might be a legitimate call-in.
Alok Sharma
My hon. Friend raises an incredibly important point. Of course, self-referral, as he refers to it, is possible. In fact, if any company has particular concerns as to transactions that they may be undertaking or part of, they will get a swift assessment from the Government.
I make the point, though, that we will not be effectively publicising call-ins when they take place. Clearly, at the end of a transaction, if there was a particular remedy, that would be made public. It is also worth pointing out that the Government will publish an annual report, not on individual transactions, but on the scope of the transactions and sectors that have been looked at. I hope that that will give future investors an opportunity to consider the type of transactions in which the Government have a particular interest.
The final measure that I want to detail relates to the overseas disclosure of information relating to a merger investigation. Under section 243 of the 2002 Act, there is a restriction on the ability of UK public authorities to disclose merger information to overseas authorities unless the consent of the entity has been given. Clause 59 of the Bill removes that restriction. That will strengthen the Competition and Markets Authority’s ability to protect UK markets and consumers as it takes a more active role internationally, allowing the UK to set up comprehensive competition agreements with our international partners.
In conclusion, I hope that right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House see that the Bill updates our national security powers in a proportionate, pro-trade and pro-business manner.
Alok Sharma
My hon. Friend raises an important point. As he will know, and I am sure appreciate, I am not going to be able to set out every single test that we will apply when it comes to a national security assessment. The application of the tests will, of course, be based on information that we garner from across Government. He can be certain that in using the powers, the Government will act in a quasi-judicial fashion, we will have regard to the statement of policy that has been published, and we will act, again, in accordance with public law principles of necessity and proportionality. I also made the point earlier that any decision can, of course, be challenged by an affected entity.
Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)
Before the Secretary of State moves on, will he give way?
Alok Sharma
I will move on, if that is all right with the hon. Gentleman.
These powers are narrowly defined and will be exclusively used on national security grounds. The Government will not be able to use these powers to intervene in business transactions for broader economic or public interest reasons, and we will not seek to interfere in deals on political grounds. They will not and cannot be used for wider economic tests. The Government already have proportionate powers in statute for intervention on the grounds of competition, financial stability, media plurality and combating a public health emergency. Going further than that would risk chilling and destabilising investment in the United Kingdom and reducing growth opportunities and jobs.
The UK has the lowest corporation tax rate in the G20. We are rated one of the most innovative countries in the world, ranking fourth in the 2020 global innovation index. We are one of the top 10 countries in the world for ease of doing business. We have a world-leading research and development environment, and the stability of our institutions, tax system and legal framework are respected globally. It is because of our pro-market approach that the United Kingdom has become one of the premier places to invest in the world, and I certainly would not want to do anything to change that. The powers we seek in the Bill support and enhance our pro-business environment, supporting economic growth, prosperity and jobs across the United Kingdom, while enhancing security for our country. I commend the Bill to the House.
Edward Miliband (Doncaster North) (Lab)
I will start with the vital context to the Bill. At the heart of it is the first duty of any Government: to protect our national security, while meeting the shared desire across the House for our businesses to succeed and create wealth and jobs. The Bill must be seen against the changing geopolitical and economic landscape; the evolving nature of the threats to our national security in an age of rapid changes in technology; the lessons of covid about the critical nature of unexpected threats, including pandemics, which has thrown into sharp relief the critical need for advanced domestic capabilities in manufacturing and logistics and across supply chains; a shared sense across the House that we as a country have at times been too relaxed about some overseas interests investing in our country, with damaging national security implications; and an understanding that the existing legislation supported across parties two decades ago does not provide the basis for the kind of active industrial strategy that we need to build a safe and successful economic future. Those factors together demand legislation, and that is the context in which we view the Bill, so we support it and the fact that the Government are taking the necessary legislative steps to protect our vital national security interests. It is the right thing to do for our country.
Our main argument with the scope of the Bill is not so much about what it seeks to do on national security but what it omits on wider issues of industrial strategy. It is notable that the Bill brings us into line with other major economies on the security questions we face but fails to do so on broader issues of public interest and takeovers going beyond national security, despite the clear lessons that have been shown over the last decade. I will return to that point later in my speech, but first let me focus on the specific provisions in the Bill.
We should be candid that, in drafting the Bill, the Government face the very difficult challenge of keeping our economy open as much as possible to foreign direct investment, which is part of the lifeblood of business and jobs, and protecting our security. Navigating that challenge is hard, which is why getting the specific provisions of the Bill right is so important. This is obviously reinforced by the fact that the Bill goes significantly further in a number of respects than the 2018 White Paper envisaged—notably, the mandatory notification obligation that will apply in 17 sectors and the question of five-year retrospective application.
I want to raise a number of issues about the Bill in the interests of the constructive scrutiny that is the role of this House. These questions are about the scope of the Bill, the issue of retrospection, the capacity of the Government to make this regime work and the scrutiny of its effectiveness.
First, on the scope of the Bill, we do not take issue with the 17 key sectors identified by the Government. In quantum technologies, engineering, biology, space and a range of other emerging technologies, there are serious potential issues around national security. For example, the acquisition by a firm owned or funded by a foreign power of a company that designs graphic processes, networking routers or microchips could potentially risk national security, especially if the products are used by the UK Government. That is why the legislation is necessary.
However, as the Secretary of State acknowledged, the Bill goes well beyond those sectors. The call-in ability stretches to any entity or asset in the UK, irrespective of sector. While that was true in the old regime, this power will be viewed in the context of a much more activist, interventionist Government approach. We do not say that is wrong, or indeed out of line with some other countries, but there is a danger of a potential deterrent effect on investment.
To be fair to the Secretary of State, in his statement of policy intent accompanying the Bill he says that in those non-mandatory areas,
“transactions are only expected to be called in on an exceptional basis.”
The central question for businesses and investors in the non-mandatory sectors will be to decide whether or not to notify. The central challenge for the country is to make sure that investors are not put off from investing in the UK.
I would say to the Secretary of State that there is not yet clear, targeted guidance for market participants on how and when they should notify in those non-mandatory sectors; further detail on that will be crucial in due course. The Secretary of State will be aware of the example of the suspicious activity reports from financial institutions to the National Crime Agency where the system has, according to the Law Commission, been “swamped”. As with suspicious activity reports, there is a risk that the voluntary notification system sees businesses err on the side of over-reporting; the impact assessment already estimates that at least 1,000 notifications will be made each year. I hope that, during the passage of the Bill, Ministers can offer reassurance on that point.
Secondly, I want to raise is retrospection. The Government consulted on a six-month retrospective power to call in transactions for review, and certain respondents expressed the view that that was too long. The Government have chosen to go much further—for five-year retrospection. I appreciate that that is similar to France, Germany and Italy, and we have no inherent objection to it if the case can be made, but I have read carefully the Government’s response to the consultation, and I do say to the Secretary of State that Ministers need to do a better job of explaining the change in thinking to such a lengthy period.
In particular, I wonder whether Ministers would explain what the experience has been in those countries that have five-year retrospection—whether they have looked at its effects. As well as the possible deterrent effect on investors, there is obviously a massive challenge in unwinding a transaction that has taken place at five years’ remove. It would help if Ministers explained that, because there could be a subsequent series of transactions, so that unwinding from that would be very complex. There is also the issue that has been raised about the voiding, which is that a notifiable acquisition completed without the Secretary of State’s approval is void—not unwound by the Secretary of State, but automatically void without any decision required on his part. That is an unusual concept, and Ministers need to explain how it will work.
Thirdly—this is really important for practical purposes—I want to focus on how Government can guarantee an effective regime for the new powers. The Government have proposed a new investment security unit in BEIS. It is hard to overestimate the extent of the challenge for the new unit. It will have to respond to a large volume of mandatory, and potentially voluntary, notifications within a tight timeline set out in the Bill. The start of a new regime will always be turbulent.
The unit will have to track the development of fast-moving, highly complex technologies and monitor each of those markets, and the Secretary of State will have to take decisions on the advice of the unit, which can be challenged in court in the context of highly sensitive information and wide-ranging powers. And the unit will need to develop policy, practice and precedent to provide certainty to a wide swath of the economy. These are, as I am sure the Secretary of State knows, significant challenges, and it is no exaggeration to say that the success of the regime and the effective functioning of an important part of the economy rest on the new unit operating swiftly and effectively. If I may put it this way, the Secretary of State will be aware that his reputation and that of future Business Secretaries—not to be presumptuous —will depend on the resourcing and functioning of the unit.
I want to raise in particular the issue of small and medium-sized enterprises, which may well find the notification process most burdensome. Take the example of a small tech start-up founded by recent university graduates, who might incur much more debilitating costs in navigating the process than a large global corporation. It is essential that the Government find ways to mitigate this risk.
In any case, my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah) and I are seeking from Ministers assurances that the unit will be adequately resourced, with access to the right technical capabilities; and crucially, there must be a clear flow of information and shared priorities between the unit, protecting our national security, and the Department of International Trade’s new office for investment, whose job is to get inward investment into the UK.
Mr Kevan Jones
Does my right hon. Friend agree that what is also going to be needed is some very close relationships and working with the security services, because the information that it could rely on in these cases will mostly not be accessible straightaway by this new unit?
Edward Miliband
My right hon. Friend speaks with great knowledge on this issue, and he is completely correct. Indeed, I do not want to answer for the Secretary of State, but one of the issues that was raised was the definition of national security. These things are hard to define, for a whole range of reasons that we can understand, but for the reasons that my right hon. Friend set out, it is absolutely crucial that there is a close relationship with the security services.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
Does the right hon. Member agree that the definition of national security provided in spheres such as the United States and Australia would actually help clarify for companies an idea of whether they are likely to fall within it? Without that, they are not quite sure what the judgment will be behind closed doors.
Edward Miliband
The right hon. Gentleman has taken a huge interest in these issues and, again, speaks with great expertise, and he may well be right that it is possible to do more on the definition. I am sure that is something the Secretary of State will consider. I can see there are definitely challenges, but I would agree with the right hon. Gentleman that the more guidance there can be for business about this, the better, because the more we will avoid a mountain of notifications that are not necessary and the more clarity there will be and the greater protection for our economy.
Fourthly, I want to talk about the role of this House in scrutinising the effects of this legislation. A large number of areas are left to delegated legislation in this Bill. Notably, the Bill enables Ministers to add new sectors to those subject to mandatory notification. I understand some of the reasons for this, but I do hope there can be proper scrutiny, if that is the case, in this House and, indeed, interaction with business. Given the sensitive nature of the issues involved in this Bill, I do think there needs to be a way—an annual report is envisaged, I believe, by the Secretary of State—for this House to monitor how this is working in practice.
I do not speak for it, but we have a special Committee of the House—the Intelligence and Security Committee—that can look at these issues. I would like to raise the question with the Secretary of State whether it could play a role in scrutinising the working of the regime and some of the decisions being made, because there are real restrictions on the kind of transparency there can be on these issues for the reasons raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones). The ISC is in a sense purpose-built for some of these issues.
Again, this is one of a range of issues we will seek to raise during the passage of the Bill, because I think that it is really important. We see our role as a constructive Opposition to get this right. There is a shared understanding across this House that we need to update our legislation. There does need to be proper scrutiny, and I hope that there can be good scrutiny in Committee and an openness on the Government side to the points that are made across the House in relation to improving the legislation and a proper way to look at its operation, which is vital to our businesses.
Bob Seely
Is the shadow Secretary of State aware that some people on this side of the House, as part of this process and as part of the scrutiny, have been calling for an annual statement on strategic trade dependency to give ourselves an overview and an understanding of the strategic direction of some of our industries, including specific examples?
Edward Miliband
It sounds like a good idea to me, and I would welcome that. Actually, that is a convenient segue to the wider points that I want to make on this Bill.
Our view is that this is only one part of the change we need, because I believe that the existing legislation has been found wanting. That legislation was passed by a Labour Government—I checked—and I think it was more or less agreed across parties; certainly, the then Opposition did not vote against it. It has been found wanting not just on national security but on wider issues such as the public interest test for takeovers on economic grounds.
I just want to raise a very specific issue, because it illustrates the point. We are in the midst of a threatened takeover in the tech sector: the Nvidia-ARM deal. We know that ARM is the crown jewel of the British tech sector. We know that Nvidia competes with companies to which ARM supplies. There is a widespread view across the tech sector and across this House that this takeover could be a risk to the future prosperity and success of the sector in the UK, but looking at the Secretary of State’s statement of intent, I do not think that it falls in this list. The list of trigger risks are: disruptive or destructive actions; espionage; or inappropriate leverage. Those are not the issues with Nvidia. The issue is our wider economic interests, which speaks to the point that the hon. Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely) made.
In the two months since the takeover was announced, we have heard little from Ministers. It is true that there could be a referral on competition grounds—I am sure that the Secretary of State is a bit constrained in what he can say about this, but let us hear it if there is. But we are deeply worried about the future of ARM. We are worried about the strength of the legal assurances on its headquarters and other matters. It would be good if Ministers could tell us what they think about this issue. These are deeply serious issues about our industrial strategy and our economic base, and they go beyond national security and, on my understanding, the tests that are set out in the Bill.
Andrew Griffith (Arundel and South Downs) (Con)
The right hon. Gentleman speaks very lucidly about the deterrent effect, which he talked about earlier, as well as some of the challenges in establishing this new unit. Surely he must understand that the answer to this is to make sure that the scope of this Bill is absolutely as narrowly drawn as it can be. With respect, he has fallen into the trap of immediately hanging Christmas-tree-like baubles of employment policy and other areas of his industrial policy in what would otherwise be a very narrowly drawn and constructive Bill.
Edward Miliband
I really appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s point. These are not Christmas tree baubles that I have suddenly raised now. In 2010, there was the issue of the Kraft takeover of Cadbury. In 2014, there was the threatened takeover by Pfizer of AstraZeneca that had deep implications for our science base. I have felt for a decade that our legislation is not fit for purpose—and I acknowledge completely that this legislation was put in place by the Labour Government. These are deeply serious questions about the future of our industrial strategy and industrial base.
I do not pretend that these issues are easy to resolve. Of course there are dangers on both sides of the ledger, and we have to strike a balance between those two dangers, but we have enough experience with Kraft-Cadbury and with Pfizer and AstraZeneca— which did not happen, but not because of any powers of Government—to be anxious about Nvidia-ARM. If, as I believe, the whole basis of this legislation is to say that other countries are taking this action when it comes to national security and so should we, the logic applies here as well. It is not straightforward, it is not simple, and I completely acknowledge that to the hon. Gentleman, but I see the case for change.
Richard Fuller (North East Bedfordshire) (Con)
The right hon. Gentleman used the phrase “I feel” and then talked about confectionary, then about how he felt about pharmaceuticals and about semiconductor chips that are used in mobile telephony. That is the problem, is it not, Mr Deputy Speaker? His feelings are not an appropriate way to interfere in the development assets of private capital. What could he provide to those businesses to protect their development from the vagaries of his feelings from time to time?
Edward Miliband
It is interesting; I believe the hon. Gentleman supports this Bill—I may be wrong—but on national security, the Government will apply some tests and we could apply some tests when it comes to our industrial base. Let me make this point to him: it is not just France, but Germany, Australia, Japan and the United States. It is all of the other major industrial economies that say, “Well, no, we do have a strategic interest in certain industries.” Of course, if we decided to go down that route, we would have a debate in this House about the specific areas in which we wanted to be able to intervene. We would have to look at exactly the criteria, and it is not just about whim, but the question is: is the status quo adequate?
I say to the hon. Gentleman that the status quo is not adequate, and we do not just have 10 years or more of experience to suggest that the status quo is not adequate; we also have a real situation now with Nvidia and ARM. If anyone in the House wants to get up and say, “We think it is fine. We think this should just go ahead. We are not concerned about what that means for our tech sector”, then fine, but everybody I speak to in the tech sector who knows about this issue, including my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central, says that there is a real worry. Why have we not developed enough of these world-leading companies in this country? Why do we want to see ARM taken over?
Andrew Griffith
The right hon. Gentleman is probably aware that on the journey to build the fabulous enterprise that is ARM, which is still employing thousands of British people and will continue to employ many more in the Cambridge artificial intelligence hub, that business made 22 acquisitions to equip itself to be where it is today. Had each and every one of those been subject to the jeopardy and the predations that he talks about, we may not have great British businesses like ARM in the future.
Edward Miliband
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely entitled to his view; we just have a difference of view on this. When it comes to our industrial base, I believe that the current legislation is inadequate, and there have been a series of events that illustrate that point. Indeed, I would make this point as well, which is that the Government say that the crisis of coronavirus makes parts of our corporate sector more vulnerable, and I think that only strengthens the case for action.
The overall point I would make is this: I welcome the Bill and think it is the right thing to do, but there is a broader picture here about what a modern industrial strategy looks like, and I do not think we can ignore these vital issues around our economic and industrial base.
Several hon. Members rose—
Edward Miliband
I have such an array of options. I think the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Aaron Bell) was first.
Aaron Bell
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for giving way. He is perhaps proposing an industrial strategy Bill, rather than a national security Bill, but on innovation and science and technology, does he not worry about the chilling effect of what he is proposing? Individuals who may be setting up a scientific or technology company might prefer now to do that in the United States, where they have every option of going to California and setting up the company in the first place, rather than setting up in the UK, because they might fear that he, as a potential future Secretary of State, as he indicated earlier, might prevent them from cashing in on what they have done?
Edward Miliband
The hon. Gentleman makes the point that the United States has exactly the regime that I am talking about and does indeed have those wide powers of intervention, so the notion that people are going to set up in the United States rather than Britain, when they have much stronger powers than us, does not hold water.
Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)
The right hon. Gentleman is of course right that there is a difference between the United States and the United Kingdom. One of the differences is that there are 350 million people in the United States. It is a continental power, a position that the UK sadly does not share. It does mean that our investment regime and our investment protocols have to recognise that we are having foreign direct investment of a very different nature.
I appreciate that this is a matter for debate, and I also appreciate that this is something where we will probably not agree. In fact, interestingly, the right hon. Gentleman seems to align much more closely with the former Prime Minister’s special adviser Mr Dominic Cummings than he does with me. Apart from that, it is actually a matter for a separate Bill. I may actually have some views where I sympathise more with him, but this Bill is quite clearly about national security. There are issues about how much further it should go, but what he says is not the scope of this Bill.
Edward Miliband
I can say to the hon. Gentleman that this is the first time I have been called a Cummings-ite. I have been called many things in my time, but a Cummings-ite after Cummings is really unusual.
The final point I will make before I conclude, because many hon. and right hon. Members want to speak in this debate, is that when I listen to Government Members, I feel that they accept the logic that we have to move away from the old view—the two decades ago view best embodied perhaps by the Enterprise Act 2002—when it comes to national security. They say, “We are worried about the investment effects, but national security matters.” Of course it does, and I agree with that. But then, when it comes to our industrial base, suddenly they have a completely different view, which is, “No, no, no. We can’t go back. We can’t change our view.” I think there is a degree, dare I say it, of inconsistency on that.
Mr Kevan Jones
Is there not a direct national security issue around telecoms? When BT was privatised, the old General Post Office was advanced in both mobile technology and fibre optics. It was because the Thatcher Government decided to throw it open to the open market that the advantage we had in this country was lost. That is why we now find ourselves at mercy of Huawei and other companies.
Edward Miliband
My right hon. Friend makes a very important point. Indeed, my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and I were discussing this very issue last night—that these issues can interact.
I will just say this and then I will conclude, Mr Deputy Speaker, I promise. I think the public are in a different place from some of the Government Members who have spoken. I think the public really recognise this issue. We have many great companies, but some of them have been subject to takeover, and the public do not really understand why and they do not really understand why the Government have not played more of a role. I can see some hon. Members nodding.
Updating legislation to protect national security is long overdue, and we welcome it. We will support the Government as they seek to protect national security and defend our country. We will push them to go further on industrial strategy and the takeover regime. We think this is the moment to be bold and develop the industrial strategy that 21st century Britain needs, but we want to see this Bill pass through the House. We will engage on it constructively, and I know from the Secretary of State and the way he operates that he will do the same.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)
As Members will notice, the call list is quite extensive and it is top heavy on the Government side, so please be mindful, particularly on the Government side, of the length of your contributions.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)
It is always a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Doncaster North (Edward Miliband), not only because he followed me into leadership and discovered just exactly how pointless that really was. On that we can immediately agree, and he may well have stumbled into another point of agreement; he should know, now that he is a Cummings-ite, that I once employed him and then let him go, so maybe it is time for the right hon. Gentleman to do the same. Anyway, beyond that, I want to congratulate him, because there were things on which I did agree with him, as well as, obviously, things that would need further discussion.
I thank my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for his deliberations on the Bill, which I will support tonight. It is long overdue. The debates around the Huawei stuff at the beginning of the year really exposed the fact that the UK had lost its way in this area in terms of threats and so on. We were behind the others—Australia, the United States; some of our big Five Eyes compatriots—but at least my right hon. Friend has grasped the nettle and brought this Bill forward, which is laudable. I also thank him for his courtesy in the course of this, in the sense that he spoke to me and, I know, to others. I particularly commend the courtesy of his Minister, the Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, my hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Nadhim Zahawi), who is a very good friend. He went out of his way to talk this through with colleagues on both sides of the House.
This debate is in that context. This is right. I particularly like clauses 32 to 39 and onwards, which deal with penalties, fines and incarcerations, the scope of which is up to five years. These are strong recommendations—slightly stronger than I expected, to be quite frank, but they are well worth it. There are many other good things about the Bill. I will not run through them all, because the Secretary of State did that, and I want to tease out a few points that I think are relevant and need inquiry.
The Bill gives the Secretary of State great powers for industrial strategy—powers to screen these investments that we have been discussing and to address the national security risk that they involve. It also gives him the power to call in investments. We have been through those already. However, I want to pick up on the things that I think are missing from the Bill and that I hope the Secretary of State will look at again in the course of its passage.
First, we have to accept that parked across this space are two very big threats: Russia and, of course, China. In fact, I think China is now the single biggest threat and problem posed to the United Kingdom and the free world. The way it is going—its problems, its difficulties, and the way it is focusing on internal suppression, external expansion and trashing both World Trade Organisation rules and laws—means that we will have to deal with that, and I suspect that this Bill will progressively be right in the middle of that. In dealing with that, I want to raise a couple of issues. In dealing with that, I want to raise a couple of issues.
Without this definition of national security, the Government are giving a stick to beat themselves with at the moment. Having such a definition is important for two reasons. First, it helps to improve clarity—a couple of my hon. Friends wanted clarity. I have looked at some of the definitions out there, including the American definition, which may not be perfect but it does cover some of the wider areas that I will talk about soon under transnational crimes and goes into things such as threats from drug trafficking. It is important for the Government to think carefully about this because it will help to define the Bill.
Bob Seely
On what the shadow Secretary of State said, there is obviously a genuine and good debate to be had on the elements of the Bill. This is not necessarily about industrial policy—I say with great respect to those on the Benches opposite—which is part and parcel of another debate. It is about the modern definition of national security and whether we see it as narrow or broad, and there is a strong argument today for having a broader definition of national security.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
I agree with my hon. Friend and I agree that this is not the Bill to discuss industrial strategy. The right hon. Member for Doncaster North made wider points which I think are worthy of discussion, but I am not sure that that discussion should take place in relation to this Bill and I want to keep this narrow.
First, in China something very special is taking place: the idea of civil-military fusion, which is now infecting every single enterprise and company in China. The Chinese military, as we have already heard, uses this concept and strategy to acquire intellectual property, technologies and research for civilian use and for military use. An external investment screening body, therefore, should be set up under this legislation, to establish and investigate cases where this may now affect UK investments. This is very important, because the rules are very strictly applied in China: you co-operate with the intelligence services or you are out of business. You may be out of not just your livelihood but your freedoms.
Ms Ghani
Is it not even more dangerous in that, under the national security law in China, not only do people have to hand over data, but if asked by a foreign state they have to deny they are handing over data? If that is the case, should we not have a bigger debate about social media companies based in this country harvesting our data and our children’s data and where that data might end up down the line?
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
I of course completely agree with my hon. Friend and I was just going to come on to the data harvesting point, because it is caught in this. She is right that China’s national intelligence law requires all Chinese firms to assist with state intelligence work and to deny that if they are asked. Let us say the Secretary of State wants to investigate and says he has strong penalties for non-compliance. By law in China they are not allowed to comply with that process at all, so there is already a national conflict in this. TikTok is owned by ByteDance, which is a very dodgy company set up in China that has huge links with the Chinese Communist Government. So we need to be very careful about where we go with this because UK nationals might get caught up and get punished for what is essentially a refusal by the Chinese Government to allow others to do this.
I am also slightly concerned about some of the things that happened in the past not being caught by the Bill. The Henry Jackson Society has today announced that, having looked through the Bill, only 23 of the 117 Chinese acquisitions over the last decade would have actually been caught. The areas that are outside of this include pharmaceuticals. The Chinese takeover of Bio Products Laboratory, which has a very significant technology with regard to blood products, would not have been caught. In education, 10 universities have many thousands of obligations to Chinese investors, where they get a trade-off on technology, some linked to defence firms. That would not have been caught. Interestingly, Thames Water and Veolia Water have significant share ownership from Chinese firms, but that certainly would not have been called into question.
Richard Fuller
My right hon. Friend is referring a lot to China, and I am sure he will not be alone in that this afternoon. Is his perspective that we should be looking in the Bill to restrict all Chinese investments in the UK, or investment in particular sectors, and what is the differentiation if the origins of that is the Chinese state, in this fusion of the state with business?
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
My view is that the Bill should help us to identify exactly which of these are genuinely private and not located in China under Chinese law. That will be a big issue. I have to tell my hon. Friend that, on that question he is right, because I believe we are now facing a very significant threat from China. So we now need to use the Bill to figure out how we deal with that threat on a wider basis, not just on individual takeovers. The Government need to look at that. Huawei was a very good example of Government policy having to be reversed on that basis. It is a growing problem and he is right to raise it.
Richard Graham (Gloucester) (Con)
Does my right hon. Friend agree that it is incredibly important that we recognise that the Bill is not aimed at one particular country or any particular identified sovereign threat? It is a more general Bill about the importance and value of national security assets in this country. Does he also agree that referring to China as communist—although, of course, it is ruled by the Communist party—is a misnomer in the context of a successful model of authoritarian state capitalism with which we will have to deal and the world will have to deal? We will have to separate those companies that offer attractive investment opportunities from those that are genuine threats.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. I know he has been a big champion of that relationship. We do not agree with each other on this matter because I think that China, with its dictatorial Government, poses a very significant threat. But I did speak about other countries—I did say that Russia also poses a threat—so I recognise his defence.
I want to move on to the national interest test. This year, the Australian Government invoked the national interest in looking at tests and they used it in similar legislation to block the acquisition of a minor stake—this might deal with the issue that my hon. Friend was talking about—in AVZ Minerals by a Chinese firm. They needed to intervene because the asset, given what has happened with covid and so on, had lowered in value unusually and unnecessarily, and that had opened it up to a takeover which they felt would have been very unhelpful. The other point I want to raise in passing is that we need to look at things like the Confucius Institute, which is here investing in universities with offers but is actually acting on behalf of the Chinese Government to follow lots of Chinese students around.
Other Members wish to speak, so I will finish my remarks. My main point is that without that national security test the Bill will lack clarity and definition, and fail to understand sometimes where it is actually looking. It could be open to pressures to turn this more into an industrial policy statement, rather than a national security issue.
The Bill also falls short of similar legislation by Five Eyes partners. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State is absolutely right to say that they have looked across the scope of what others have done, but other Five Eyes partners have gone further on this. They are competitor countries to us, so it is not as though they have any kind of dictatorial regimes. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States and the Australian Foreign Investment Review Board are external bodies.
This is the point that I wanted to make to my right hon. Friend. I just wonder whether he might want to reflect on the nature of the pressure on somebody such as him, who, under the Bill, will have to sum up and make final decisions on the advice peculiarly to him. The other two organisations, in Australia and in the United States, have the ability to say that everybody on the panel makes a group decision on the evidence. I know he will argue that that process takes longer—yes, he may be right about that—but I feel that the pressure is on him.
I was in government for six years and I know what Downing Street does. It gives you a call and says, “I don’t think you have to go very far with this sort of stuff, do you? After all, this is worth a lot of money to us. Come on.” Others will say that and the Secretary of State will be sitting there thinking, “This is a balanced judgment. Where do I go on this?” I just wonder whether that pressure is fair on the Secretary of State. He would be questioned later on why certain decisions were made. If I was the Secretary of State, I would want to release myself from that situation. I would not want to be dragged to the courts to be accused of being biased in that decision and making a decision that was not agreeable. So I would look for more external bodies to be able to make that judgment.
I also say to the Government that human rights are vital nowadays. We cannot walk away from it; it is part of what makes us. The reality for us is that far too many companies have allowed themselves to quietly get sucked into the use of slave labour and other labour. We know about that, in Xinjiang province and in other areas too. My right hon. Friend does need to think about that very carefully. I do not want to make the Bill a Christmas tree, but elements of that are involved.
I congratulate the Government on bringing forward the Bill. It is the right legislation to bring forward. It is overdue, no question. However, the balance still needs to be widened somewhat. I hope that in the course of the Committee and Report stages the Secretary of State will accept that good amendments may come forward from brilliant people—not just me—who may well be able to help him in his adventures.
Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)
I start with my ISC hat on because it was the ISC that first investigated UK Government powers and processes for scrutinising foreign investment in sensitive areas of UK industry, found them lacking and called for more powers. In its 2013 report, “Foreign involvement in the critical national infrastructure”, the Committee looked into the issue of
“foreign investment in the Critical National Infrastructure (CNI)”
and concluded:
“The difficulty of balancing economic competitiveness and national security seems to have resulted in stalemate.”
That is not a criticism and it is not meant to be contentious. This issue has arisen over the past few years and most, if not all, advanced economies are now grappling with it. I therefore welcome the Bill, in principle, or certainly a measure like it.
While on the subject of the ISC, I offer the apologies of its Chair, the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), who is self-isolating having been contacted by the English version of Trace and Protect, and is sadly missing this debate.
The Bill is designed to bring additional scrutiny of foreign investment that may have an impact on national security. I say from the outset that not only is there nothing wrong with having a national security eye on investments in critical areas—it is in fact absolutely vital.
Currently, as we have heard, the ability of the Government to scrutinise investments on national security grounds contained within part 3 of the Enterprise Act—that is, the mergers provisions—is rather limited. In practice, it means that the UK Government are unable to scrutinise on the grounds of national security without the investment first meeting competition concerns or, in very limited circumstances, a public interest test. We know this concern and similar concerns are shared globally. A number of other countries have been tightening up their investment security regimes in response to changing national security-related threats, enabling technology, the loss of intellectual property and the increasing crossover between sectors, which I may touch on later. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States is largely seen as setting the standard. We have also seen tightening in Japan, Canada, Sweden, Germany and France at least, with the Japanese regime extraordinarily strict, in some cases limiting ownership to barely 1% of active management or, more accurately, to barely 1% of a company in certain circumstances.
In the UK Government’s proposals, if both the trigger and the threshold are met, the individual investment can be called in by the Secretary of State for approval. The powers can be retrospective; it can be called in after it has occurred. However, the time to conduct the national security assessment—30 days, with potentially an extra 45—might be deemed to be a little short, given how shrewd, or clever, certain institutions, organisations and individuals are at hiding genuine beneficial ownership. One thinks how long it took to find where beneficial ownership existed for some entities in the UK. Were it not for the Panama papers, we would probably still never know. I therefore question whether that maximum of 75 days is actually sufficient.
The Bill adds a mandatory notification scheme whereby investment interests in certain sectors and asset types—which I do not demur with—must be pre-emptively or retrospectively declared, but it removes notification of call-ins from the competition authority to a direct serve from the involved parties. In the interests of transparency, I seek clarity from the Government on the reasons why notification via the CMA is being removed.
The Bill also introduces new powers to increase screening in respect of health and preventing hostile acquisition through strategic buying of health supplies, for example. I welcome that, but the scope of activities that might be caught is very wide. There may be a good reason for that, but it is worth exploring. The statement of policy intent describes the core areas as including things such as advanced technology, which is perfectly reasonable, but it also contains a much wider definition of national infrastructure. The impact assessment for the Bill estimates that the new regime would result in between 1,000 and 1,830 transactions being notified per year. That is very specific and it is also an eye-watering number, given that only 12 transactions were reviewed on national security grounds since the current regime was introduced 17 years ago. The necessary resources, as the right hon. Member for Doncaster North (Edward Miliband) said, and access to intelligence agency assessments, as the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) said, must be available in the proper manner in order to carry out the work.
Mr Kevan Jones
Does the hon. Gentleman share my concern that the Bill sets out a voluntary reporting and a notification system, but it is not clear how the security services enact any concerns they may come across into this system? I shall be making the point that I do not think this should sit within the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. Does he have concerns on that issue?
Stewart Hosie
I absolutely agree that these services should not sit within another Department. I am not sure whether it would be appropriate for them to be able to request call-ins directly, not least because where the information came from would then become abundantly clear, but there must be a mechanism whereby information that an agency comes across can be fed in to the proper people in order for this call-in to happen.
It is also self-evident that Members considering this legislation need to have far more information to understand the reasons for the Bill and the changing nature of the threat it is designed to counter. We also need carefully to assess the impact the Bill will have on sectors and infrastructure, not just in the UK as a whole, but in the devolved Administrations and in the English regions, in the light of the future economic opportunities they see and the plans they are already putting in place. It is far too soon to seek assurances, but I hope the Minister will wish to take a little time just to convince himself that there are no unintended consequences, either for the UK or for the Scottish Government’s inward investment plans, when Government agencies of all sorts are out actively seeking investment in some of the areas that may be deemed to be critical national infrastructure. As an example, let me cite the whole of Scotland’s tech sector, but that of Dundee in particular. It now has a digital ecosystem that spreads out across academia and through gaming, software design and development, and data centres. Many of the component parts of that have cross-sectoral application, some of which, depending on who owns them and who wishes to use them, could certainly raise a national security concern, depending on how bits of tech are deployed. How do we ensure collectively that the Bill does not impede growth or investment in such areas?
I also briefly wish to raise, at this early stage, some issues about implementation. The Bill is set to radically overhaul the UK’s approach to foreign investment, at a time of significant economic uncertainty. On leaving the EU, the UK Government cannot afford to get their global Britain approach wrong and suffer what has been described as the “chilling effect” on investment if this appears heavy-handed. So let me turn briefly to some of the possible implications and costs of these measures.
First, the impact assessment suggests a net cost to business of £43 million. Can the Government confirm whether that is the direct cost, or whether the figure includes the cost of lost investment? I suspect that it is the former because the latter is incalculable, but if the Government get this wrong, the true figure in lost investment, and the concomitant loss of output and productivity, could be substantial.
Secondly, the impact assessment suggests that microbusinesses are in scope. As the Secretary of State will know, some of those businesses develop high-tech, cutting-edge intellectual property, and their business models include selling tranches of shares to raise cash throughout the development and life of the business. What assessment has been made of how these measures might stifle that investment and growth?
The third point is specifically on universities and academia. Throughout the whole UK, universities all have incubators, start-ups, spin-outs and commercialisable research. What assessment has been made of their ability to continue to thrive if the measures in the Bill inhibit investment by proposed sales being called in—because word will get out—or even investment being put off because of the potential additional risk of those sales being called in? We do not yet quite know what the impact on academia would be. There are some wider concerns about the possible impact on essential investment in energy, particularly renewable energy, and the possibility of retaliatory action against UK investors overseas, but I think they can be explored later in the Bill’s progress.
Let me return to one particular issue. I said earlier that the impact assessment suggested notifications of up to 1,800 transactions a year. In clause 7(4)(c), the Bill describes a qualifying asset as
“ideas, information or techniques which have industrial, commercial or other economic value.”
I know that this is not the Government’s intention, but wielding a hammer or welding a pipe are techniques that have economic value, and my concern is that companies erring on the side of caution will refer or notify themselves when they need not.
I have three brief questions that were sent to me by the Photonics Leadership Group. I intend to ask these questions now because they will be typical of what many industrial and new tech sectors are asking. First, there will be a huge number of research groups and businesses for which this Bill is relevant. Has the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy considered the number involved, and is it ready for the volume of submissions? Secondly, the information that has been sent out to relevant groups includes a flow chart, which suggests that businesses currently engaged in relevant business have from 12 November until this Bill is passed to register. This would suggest that the process is live already, but there appears not to be a template to allow businesses to contact BEIS and ask the question. Thirdly, since many in the sector cannot rely on foreign investment, how are the Government planning to replace this should there be the chill on investment that some fear?
I am pleased the Secretary of State said that the assessments would be based on information gathered from around and throughout Government, because I think we need to make our own geopolitical assessments. But the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) quoted the Henry Jackson Society. It would be unfortunate if we found that our assessments of which investments may or may not be aligned were being driven, pushed or prodded by someone else’s geopolitical assessment. I say gently to the Secretary of State that we need to guard against that to ensure that national security is protected, but that we do not have the chill on investment that is possible if we get it wrong.
Greg Clark (Tunbridge Wells) (Con)
It is a pleasure to follow the thoughtful speech of the hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie). May I join my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) in paying tribute to the Front-Bench team for their courtesy in being open about the development of the Bill and for their communication with all parties in the House?
This is an important Bill at an important time. In recent years, we have seen a tendency on the part of some countries to move towards national measures that seek to protect their domestic economics from the open conditions of international trade, not only in goods and services but in ownership and intellectual property, and we of all nations should be a voice against that. Few nations have prospered through pursuing a policy of national self-sufficiency. Over time, they have become deprived of innovation, competition and investment, although the exposure and experience of international trade and investment can be disruptive and uncomfortable. In the end, workers become less productive than in other countries, consumers pay more and those countries use technology that is behind what other more open economies allow. In other words, they become less prosperous.
The importance of this Bill pivots on its title. Is it exclusively about national security, or is “and Investment” a doorway to a more restrictive view of overseas investment more generally? I am pleased that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State made it absolutely clear that the Government have decided that it is the former, rather than the latter, although there are some dangers that I want to touch on.
Do we need a statutory framework to ensure our national security when it comes to commercial investments? Yes, of course we do. There are commercial activities conducted in this country that are essential to our national security—defence contractors are an obvious example. Public policy has always recognised that, whether through the use of export controls on their products or, in the case of ownership, through golden shares and the intervention powers of the Enterprise Act 2002 for national security, which have been referred to.
Does the framework need to be kept up to date? Yes, of course it does. As the Secretary of State made clear, technologies that are now pivotal to our national security had not been dreamed of 18 years ago when the Enterprise Act passed through this House. The nature of some of those technologies is such that their financial value may not be reflected in the ownership of the company concerned, so they may be pivotal but not trigger the turnover test. The turnover and the value of the transaction may not be a dependable guide to their importance to national security. The control of those technologies may not be confined any more to takeover bids for public companies; it may include ownership outside the stock market of intellectual property or other assets.
Most nations on earth have a framework for overseeing the national security consequences of investments. It is important that we have one and that ours is up to date. The Government are right not to expand the Bill beyond national security or to introduce, as the right hon. Member for Doncaster North (Edward Miliband) said, a wider public interest or industrial strategy test. I say that as the author of our current industrial strategy, of which an essential pillar is our business environment. That strategy says that we need to continue to be
“an open, liberal free-trading economy in which new businesses can be created easily”
and
“existing businesses can attract investment”.
It is obvious that if a British company has succeeded and has made an international impact, we want it to continue to succeed and prosper in this country, and to do so with its headquarters and operations here. That goes without saying. The most important thing is that the company is founded and prospers in the UK in the first place, as my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Aaron Bell) said. Especially in fields such as the tech sector, if we tell the founders of new businesses that, should they succeed, they will be excluded from the possibility that they can receive overseas investment, or at the very least that it will be heavily questioned if they should cede control of the business, and that the more their business succeeds, the more draconian the restrictions are likely to be—although Silicon Valley continues to be a major source of international capital investment—the consequence, no doubt unintended, may be that those firms will not be founded here in the first place but will go to places where there is no risk of there being stranded assets.
Bob Seely
My right hon. Friend is making an important point, and there is clearly friction on this side over what we see as the crux, but does he accept that the United States and Australia—two free-market nations—will have significantly tighter restrictions after this Bill than we will, and does that concern him?
Greg Clark
Of course we should look at the example of other countries; I am sure we will do so during the course of the Bill. However, I would say to my hon. Friend that those two countries are very different in their markets and the size of their economies. The pool of capital that is available to start-up companies in the US is vastly greater than it is in the UK at the moment, although I hope that will change, for reasons that I will go on to discuss. Australia, conversely, is a much smaller economy, which does not have the network of policy regulatory innovation that we have.
We have been a leader; that is our international reputation, and one reason that transactions are conducted in this country is the confidence in our rule of law. We should emphasise and champion that, rather than feeling compelled to follow what other countries are doing in their entirety. Our policy—our industrial strategy—must be to make Britain an even more attractive place for innovative companies to be founded and to stay—not because they are compelled to do so, but because the environment that we provide, in terms of scientific research, educated and trained people, the availability of capital at every stage in their development and the public policy environment make it an attractive place for them to want to be.
Neither must our regime establish, in my view, a list of countries that cannot invest at all in the UK. The test must genuinely be about national security. That is very appropriate. China has been mentioned already in these discussions, and of course it is right and proper that the national security concerns that the House has about China should be reflected through this regime, and these powers are important for that. However, when I was sitting in my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State’s place, I fought hard to save, for example, British Steel in Scunthorpe, Skinningrove and Teesside. The Chinese steelmaker that bought the company, Jingye Group, is essential to the employment of many tens of thousands of people across the north and the east of England, and more in the supply chain. From my recollection, there was no intellectual property vulnerability in terms of its operations. Indeed, the retention of that substantial steelmaking capacity has enhanced our economic resilience, whereas losing it would have seen us relying on imports. I might say the same for Geely, the owner of the London Electric Vehicle Company, which my hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Nadhim Zahawi), being a west midlands MP, will be familiar with, and which gives valuable jobs to many people.
Richard Graham
My right hon. Friend is making a very good case for why it is important to look at each investment in its own right. Geely, which bought the London Taxi Company, produced electric vehicles and now exports them to the Netherlands and France while continuing to manufacture in Coventry, is a good example of why that is so important. Does he agree that it is simply not good enough for this country to say, “China is Communist and we will not accept Communist investment, and therefore we will not accept Chinese investment.”? We must be a great deal more sophisticated and open than that.
Greg Clark
I would say to my hon. Friend that the Bill’s focus on national security is absolutely right. We should have a beady eye on national security, with substantial powers, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) said, to enforce that. I think the Bill has it right in its focus on national security.
The Committee that examines the Bill will need to consider in detail some of the provisions of the Bill as it is presented on Second Reading. It is essential to provide investors and UK firms with a sense of predictability and confidence, but that can be undermined if the law has administrative consequences that are unintended and not provided for. For example, there are strong reasons to think that there may be a deluge of notifications, as the hon. Member for Dundee East said, when the new unit in the Department is set up, and it must be geared up to handle that right from the outset.
The prospect of five years’ imprisonment for directors and fines of 5% of turnover, as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State commends, for failure to notify under a mandatory regime within sectors defined as broadly as communications and transport is, in my view, likely to lead to many small transactions being notified under the voluntary regime for peace of mind regarding those very strong sanctions against an inadvertent breach. It is an enormous challenge for the Department to set up a new unit, especially since the current regime—or the previous one, since the powers are live—has dealt with a very small number of transactions each year.
As Secretary of State, I reduced the turnover threshold for review from £70 million to £1 million only two years ago. This Bill contains no de minimis threshold, and I will be interested to see during the passage of the Bill evidence of why a zero de minimis threshold is necessary, especially when the definition of technology assets extends to “ideas, information or techniques”, which is very broad. This could result in a very large number of very small transactions being notified defensively.
Even if businesses are confident that they will not be covered by the mandatory notification requirement, the advantages of voluntary notification and clearance, with its exemption from the five-year look-back, may prove to be very attractive and very important in baking in the approval of a transaction against reversal more than five years in the future. It is clearly the ambition of the right hon. Member for Doncaster North to add further public interest tests. As we approach the general election, it may well be attractive, as a defence against the action of future Governments, for companies to notify even when they do not have to. It is very important that the Department is geared up for that.
Much of the Science and Technology Committee’s work in recent months has been concerned with the nation’s response to the coronavirus. If we can learn one lesson from that—for example, from problems with the test and trace system—it is that, to have public confidence, we need to properly anticipate demand and to set up to meet it from the outset. If that demand is not supplied, public confidence, which is crucial for investment, will be undermined.
Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)
Does not the coronavirus provide us with another lesson, which is that Government historically have not been terribly good at assessing risk and modelling the response to it? I say that as a former Minister, like my right hon. Friend. I was always surprised, in all the Departments I served in, at how little time is spent on modelling outcomes of the kind we are now enduring.
Greg Clark
My right hon. Friend is right. To look ahead, we need to develop the capabilities to do that, and for a unit in the Department that previously did not have that responsibility—it was with the CMA, advised by others—that is a steep learning curve.
The foundational feature of the UK’s commercial reputation in the world is a place where people and businesses all around the world can be confident in investing. That derives in no small part from a public policy regime that is rational, stable and rigorously and efficiently administered. We should continue to aspire to take a global position of leadership in this area, so I welcome the focus of the Bill and its ambition to bring our arrangements up to date. I look forward to helping ensure that we can be proud of the Bill and see it as a contribution to our continued reputation for having the highest standards of corporate government and investment security in the world.
Darren Jones (Bristol North West) (Lab)
Before I begin my remarks, I should declare my interests as chair of the all-party parliamentary group on technology and national security and the parliamentary internet, communications and technology forum APPG, whose members will no doubt have interest in the Bill; as the chair of a global network of legislators interested in artificial intelligence regulation called the Institute of Artificial Intelligence; and lastly, in my capacity as Chair of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, I have had discussions with the management of ARM, its founder Hermann Hauser and the CEO of Nvidia about the proposed takeover.
I support the Bill and thank the Secretary of State for briefing me on its contents last week. The ability to scrutinise foreign investment and to intervene when there are national security interests is not only a critical function of the state but an increasingly important one, given the impact of technology and data on every part of our economy and our infrastructure, and the use of that avenue to cause harm to Britain’s interests. It is on that basis that we should have a robust scrutiny function, but it should also be finely balanced with the transparent, clear and pro-investment framework brought forward under this Bill. I agree with other colleagues around the House that, by international standards, Britain has been a bit of a laggard in recent years in bringing forward a robust foreign investment regime, and that is why we support the Bill, but I have a few questions today, which I hope the Minister might try to answer in summing up.
First, on the definition of sectors, the 17 sectors identified include some dual-use functions such as quantum computing, which at this point in its development seems obvious and indeed is in line with the recommendations of the Science and Technology Committee inquiry into quantum computing in the last Parliament, when I was a member of that Committee. However, as has been noted, other sectors are identified merely as “artificial intelligence” or “energy”. Artificial intelligence, for example, is a general purpose technology that will increasingly apply to every aspect of our economy, so how we ensure robust and clear definitions will clearly be important.
It has been noted that there is a risk under the Bill of over-reporting as an insurance policy. I wonder whether lessons could be learned from other regulators—for example, by introducing regulatory sandboxes within the units in the Department where interested individuals might be able to come to set forward in advance the transaction and get some initial advice on whether it falls within the definitions. If it does not, I think there will be a risk of over-reporting, but also of court cases that dispute the definitions, which, in their own right, can be fairly limited in statutory instruments and will probably not apply to every circumstance. I reaffirm the comment from the Opposition Front Bench on engaging with Parliament on the sector definitions under the statutory instruments—and not just with Parliament as a whole but with the relevant Select Committees, including my own. I also note the interest of my hon. and right hon. Friends from the Science and Technology Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Defence Committee in this matter.
Secondly, on the definition of national security, there has been some debate in advance of the publication of the Bill on whether the Government were intending to go beyond national security and to look at broader economic or jobs-related issues. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Doncaster North (Edward Miliband), the shadow Business Secretary, said from the Dispatch Box, we think that there is some legitimacy to Ministers having a right to intervene when, for example, a major employer or a sector that is strategically crucial to the British economy is under threat from a legitimate overseas acquisition that could have an impact on British jobs or British industrial capacity. I welcome the comment that this is a broader industrial strategy conversation and note the Department’s intention to rewrite that, as previously advised before Christmas, although it will presumably now take longer. I look forward to that broader debate, but I agree with colleagues on a cross-party basis that at least some legal structure around the definition of national security would be helpful, for reasons I will come on to later.
Thirdly, this is not just about mergers and acquisitions; as the Government’s Project Defend assessment has shown, there are very long supply chains relating to critical national infrastructure, through which components are sourced from companies in jurisdictions about which Ministers might legitimately have national security concerns. I would be interested to hear whether Ministers plan to expand the scope of the Bill or bring forward other legislation in future to deal with supply chain intervention, in addition to or alongside merger and acquisition issues.
I also note that while clause 7 of the Bill covers all the corporate vehicles such as limited liability partnerships, trusts and limited companies, it excludes individuals. This is probably very limited, because individuals would not want to take on the liabilities of buying big companies, but I am sure there are potential cases where individuals will buy intellectual property or assets in their own individual right, whether it is a licence to intellectual property or actual property, as my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) mentioned, and they would fall out of the scope of this Bill. I would be interested in the Minister’s view on that.
Fourthly, the application of the Bill applies from the date of presentation, not from the date the Bill becomes law. It would be useful, given that this is now the regime in the UK, for the Department to set out what current takeovers will be subject to it. Colleagues have mentioned the ARM-Nvidia takeover, which of course is important to the British economy. I understand from press reports that the Department has not felt able to confirm whether that will be subject to this legislation, but I think it would be in Ministers’ interests to be quite clear about that.
Equally, I would stress again the comments from the Opposition Dispatch Box about the length of retrospectivity. Five years seems a very long time, and I would be interested to understand why a period of five years has been adopted by the Government. One of the attractive natures of the British economy is our policy stability and the way in which the rule of law functions, and I share the concern that five years is a long time. There could be a change of Government, a change of Ministers, a change in leadership in the unit in the Department or a change in the view on national security that could start to unwind a transaction many years after it had gone through. Ministers need to consider that carefully.
Fifthly, we are still waiting for confirmation of the Government’s intentions for our post-Brexit competition and state aid policy regime. Ministers have been quick to table statutory instruments to say that the European regime will not apply from 1 January but have not yet set out what will. The Bill is implicated in that process. It is the start of a post-Brexit state aid and competition policy. If the Minister feels able to give us a bit of a glimmer in his closing remarks about when the details of our post-Brexit competition and state aid policy might be published, I would be grateful.
Lastly, I am not entirely clear what the assessment process is under the Bill. In previous examples, such as the hostile takeover of GKN by Melrose, in which I declare a constituency interest, the national security assessments were undertaken by the Secretary of State for Defence and, perhaps for fair reasons, were done without much oversight or transparency. Given that all those sectors will now be subject to national security assessments, will it be the Ministry of Defence, the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, the intelligence services or another body that undertakes them? It would be useful to have some transparency about who is making the assessment and how the Secretary of State will ultimately balance very difficult decisions.
In sum, I will support the progress of the Bill. I share some concerns about the speed and why it has been brought forward so quickly, and I reiterate my point about the statutory instruments, therefore, being an important part of parliamentary scrutiny when they are introduced. I hope that Ministers will engage fully in the consultation process with stakeholders to ensure that the new framework is not only fit for purpose but gets the crucial balance right between national security concerns and maintaining Britain’s leadership as a pro-investment economy that fits with our broader regulatory position post Brexit.
Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)
I start, as many other hon. Members rightly have, by paying tribute to the ministerial team and the team of civil servants for their consultation on the Bill with not just Members of this House, but the wider business community. It is a hugely important Bill. When, no doubt, some of it becomes an Act, we will all be living with the consequences, which are difficult to imagine in a fast-changing world in which technology is evolving.
I welcome enormously not just the consultation that the Secretary of State has already contributed to, and which he has welcomed, but that which he has also invited, because that is a really important part of the next few weeks and months. It shows wisdom and extreme judgment to make sure that the Bill survives contact with the enemy.
I welcome the fact that the Bill has been crafted to recognise the competition that we are seeing increasingly between states. The Minister in his place, my hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Nadhim Zahawi), as a former member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, knows only too well what we are seeing around the world and has regularly spoken with me about the various natures of competition that he, too, envisions. I welcome that he sees the Bill as being about the UK’s response and ensuring the prosperity and happiness of the British people around the world.
Power is not just about state power; it is also about the economics of strategic challenge through business. As the sadly likely recession following the covid pandemic rises, the reality is that state capitalism will pose a greater problem. As the wells of private sector investment dry up, companies able to draw on national reserves may do better.
Other countries have already seen that and reacted early. In March, in response to similar pressures that the Secretary of State responded to earlier, the Australian foreign investment review board reduced the threshold to zero for calling in acquisitions. In August, France reduced the shareholding required to trigger an inquiry from 25% to 10% for similar reasons. The United States has not followed suit on that basis, but the CFIUS regime, as we all know, is one of the most mature in the world. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States has, in some ways, led the way, so the need to adapt to changing circumstances is not so immediate.
For our Government to introduce the Bill now is a welcome demonstration that the UK sees the changing circumstances and recognises that state-owned enterprises pose a different threat from five, 10 or 20 years ago. The Bill also recognises, in the 17 sectors that other hon. Members have spoken about, the rapid pace of technological change that we are seeing and the urgency of making sure that we realise what we are looking at. As assets are being developed that are essential to our continued prosperity and security, they now emerge much more quickly than we ever imagined.
Indeed, I would argue that two of the biggest strategic losses for the United Kingdom in recent years were the 2014 sale of DeepMind to Google and the 2016 sale of ARM to SoftBank, but they have been completed. What those two firms have both enabled, however, is quite phenomenal. Deep Mind, which one can pretty safely say is the world’s premier AI company, is an extraordinary asset. When it started in 2010, it was seen as a sideline, but today in 2020 it is seen very much as the main event.
The UK is not directly comparable with some of the other countries that we have spoken about. Some people have mentioned France, Germany or Australia, but the UK has about double the foreign direct investment of France or Germany, and our international co-operation—our links abroad—are quite different.
Here I declare that my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests shows that I, too, invest in businesses across the UK, and the reason why is that I think, as a Conservative, that if someone believes in business, they should put their money where their mouth is. I am proud to support some young people who have come up with some ideas, some of which may succeed and one of which may even make me as rich as the Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, my hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon—[Laughter.]
This Bill looks at the challenge that such businesses are starting up with, and here I pay tribute to my constituency neighbour and right hon. Friend the Member for Tunbridge Wells (Greg Clark) who spoke about the de minimis clause—the minimum amount that should be called in. Of course, it is absolutely right that companies can evolve. Technology can adapt very quickly, and ideas that one thought were insignificant can become very significant.
However, the reality is that that rarely happens overnight and, with the nature of British capitalism being as it is, the value of a company will be appreciated in the market a long time before the technology is appreciated by the Government. Therefore, although I understand why the minimum number is set at zero, there is an argument—I would welcome the Government’s thoughts on this—for setting it even as low as £1 million, which is actually a very small sum these days for many of the venture capital enterprises in our country.
I welcome the fact that this Bill makes the important distinction between national interest and national security. I see the hon. Member for Aberavon (Stephen Kinnock) in his place, and I know well that if this Bill were about national interest, he would be making one of the strong speeches about the steel industry that I have heard him make over the past five years, but this Bill is not about that. This Bill is fundamentally about the threats to the UK people and to our national security, not just our immediate interests.
It is important to make that distinction in the long term because, of course, to change that would be to fundamentally open a different question. It may be one that Opposition Members or, indeed, some Government Members, would wish to engage with, but it would be a big change to the investment environment of the United Kingdom. It would change our employment structures considerably and challenge many of the services that are built on the UK economy, from law and accountancy to finance and investment. It is a rather larger question, and I am glad that it is not included in the scope of this Bill.
The Government recognise that more consideration is needed, and they could do a little more, if I may say so, just to advertise the consideration that they are looking for in the 17 sectors. Having spoken to many lawyers in recent days—a confusion of lawyers, in fact—and to several businesses, it is quite clear that, although the consultation is welcomed, not all are as aware of what is required as would be beneficial.
If I may, I am going to start claiming some credit for some of this, because the Minister will know that the Foreign Affairs Committee has long pressed for tougher measures to protect our vital national security interests against growing threats. In our May 2018 report entitled “Moscow’s Gold”, we highlighted the corrupt investments associated with the Kremlin, but not unique to that Mafia-style regime, that have direct implications for the UK’s national security. The sanctions regime we rejected is a welcome addition to the state’s arsenal against those who seek to damage our national security. In 2019, we went further: in our report, “A cautious embrace: defending democracy in an age of autocracies”, we recommended that the Government establish a power to block listings on the UK markets on national security grounds as a matter of urgency. The Government have now announced their intention to do so to stop companies with questionable ownership from taking advantage of UK listings.
The fact that the Bill builds on both those reports is enormously welcome. They also led us to ask some pretty important questions about how the Government could achieve their aim, because there are various elements in which those questions exposed gaps or failures in the British structure that would allow the Government to be properly informed of where to get the information. That is why I will ask a few initial questions, before the Foreign Affairs Committee spends a few weeks hearing evidence and listening to commentators on the Bill and investors, practitioners and lawyers about its application. Indeed, we may even suggest amendments.
To turn to my first question, the Government have been clear that state-owned entities and sovereign wealth funds are not inherently more likely to pose a national security risk, especially if they have operational independence in economic investment strategies. This is of course important for many countries around the world, including Norway and many others, who operate very large sovereign wealth or national pension programmes. However, regimes such as that of the Chinese Communist party use opaque ownership structures to hide state interference. Will the Minister tell us what structures will be created and legal powers given to ensure that we can draw on the expertise and knowledge of those Departments and agencies across Government, including the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, to shape decisions accurately? It is clear to all of us that UK missions around the world will need to be actively involved to ensure that the information required to take decisions is provided in a timely manner.
My second question is about the fact that this Bill provides gateways for disclosure of information to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and disclosure by him to a public or overseas authority. What we really need to know as well is not just how much he is able to exchange, but how much he is able to draw on other intelligence agencies and other partners and particularly, perhaps, on those in democratic and law-abiding countries, including the European Union, as we will no longer be part of the investment screening regulation and we have never been part of the different agencies or regulators in the United States, Australia and many other countries. Who are the likely partners with whom he is intending to share and how will we support each other?
Thirdly, the best estimate of the impact assessment suggests that the new notification regime will cost about £49 million a year and about £425 million over 10 years. Those numbers are, of course, uncertain. The new regime is expected to result in up to 1,800 notifications a year, which is a vast increase compared with the approximately 60 notifications a year that the Competition and Markets Authority currently deals with. The Bill introduces an investment security unit that will be staffed by 100 officials. May I seek assurance that this unit will have the capacity and necessary competencies to effectively screen this high volume of transactions and to expand if notifications are more than expected? The Minister will have heard from many people that there is the possibility that voluntary notification will result in a much higher level of disclosure than anyone is currently expecting, and therefore, the 100 officials could rapidly become overwhelmed and the timelines that he has very sensibly set out, of 30 and 45 days, could become impossible.
Mr Kevan Jones
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that this unit or some of the individuals in it will need a high classification of security clearance? Without that, they will not be able to make informed judgments on some of these applications.
Tom Tugendhat
I agree entirely with the right hon. Member that what we are looking at here is a multi-agency taskforce, not a BEIS departmental body. The reason, of course, why it has to be a multi-agency taskforce is that, as he says quite correctly, the need to have access to high-level intelligence is clear, but so is the need to be able to understand the changing nature of the technology and, indeed, the changing nature of some of the individuals and groups that may be affected. It is, after all, entirely possible that a company owned one day by one individual abroad is likely to be, or is in the direction of being, controlled by a rather less salubrious individual only a few days later, and the need for such multi-agency taskforce access is clear.
Insufficient resources would of course cost delays and have a serious impact on the UK economy. Indeed, it could lead to the various obstacles that I know the Minister has been incredibly careful about avoiding, which is why he has made the scope of the Bill so narrow. I am sure that he will be able to help me in assuring me that this group will have the resources it needs. Fourthly, given the sensitivity of the cases—my mistake: I was going to repeat exactly what the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) said, so I shall skip it. I was going to ask for exactly the same.
As this Bill makes its way through the House, the Foreign Affairs Committee will be following it closely. As I have said, we will be conducting various hearings with various people along the way in the next few weeks, and we will, I hope, be making welcome suggestions that the Minister will be able to consider. Properly implemented and with due consultation and consideration, this new investment regime should provide certainty and transparency for UK businesses and investors in this country. It is an important and valuable change to our laws to ensure that our businesses are able to prosper in the safe knowledge that the information they develop and the innovations they provide allow the happiness and prosperity of these people, our friends and our allies.
Mark Logan (Bolton North East) (Con)
It is a great privilege to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat). I especially agree with him that the Minister and his team have been exceptionally good at communicating this over the past weeks, so long may that continue.
With the right clarifications, I stand to support the Second Reading of the Bill. It is incumbent on all of us here to think in terms of the contribution we can make to our collective livelihoods—a contribution of security, a contribution of transparency and a contribution of prosperity. On prosperity, the Minister and other colleagues have been working hard to assuage some of my concerns. I gravitate towards this side of the House because I believe in opportunity—the opportunity that overseas investors see in the UK to grow market share, reach new customers and develop cutting-edge technology, thanks to access to the brightest brains on the planet, and a confidence that a penny put into Britain today can become a pound tomorrow. We do not want the Bill to herald in uber-protectionism by stealth; otherwise I would have great difficulty in subscribing to it.
Foreign direct investment is a powerful contributor to the UK. Indeed, conservative estimates show that FDI has created over two Boltons-worth of jobs. That is 600,000-plus jobs, as the Minister actually told me last night, so I hope that is correct. Over 57,000 new jobs were created as a result of FDI in 2018-19 alone. The “World Investment Report 2019” showed that the total value of the UK’s inward investment stock was $1.89 trillion—the third highest in the world, and worth more than the figures for Germany and France combined. Indeed, the northern powerhouse has been one of the top winners from FDI. Manchester has been recognised as Europe’s fifth best large city for business, ranking ahead of places such as Rotterdam. Bolton is a significant recipient of FDI through, for example, the £250 million redevelopment of the Crompton Place shopping centre, and this is central to our town’s rebirth. We need to be on the ball, as the value of the UK’s inward FDI has been falling. In 2016, the value of inward FDI was equal to 10% of GDP, which fell to 2% in 2018. I welcome the new Office for Investment, as we must not lose out to friendly competitors on our own doorstep. FDI contributes so much to our economy and society.
Moving on to security and transparency, the Bill seeks to contribute by putting the UK on a similar footing to other major economies, such as the US, France and Germany. Indeed, the CFIUS regime in the US reviews certain foreign investments in businesses to determine whether such transactions threaten to impair US national security. That is a sound premise and one that every nation state should embody: protecting one’s core sovereign interest. Indeed, the Bill aims to offer more security for British businesses and people and protection from actors or, indeed, actresses harbouring malign intent.
I appeal to the Minister to ensure that the Government will only use their brand- spanking-new powers exclusively on national security grounds and not for broader economic or political measures. Mission creeping may lead to capital seeping. I encourage the Minister to articulate how to safeguard against spurious applications of the new powers. Some analogous screening systems are viewed as not transparent, such as those that do not give parties the opportunity to debate the conclusions. I understand the intention of our own UK version is to allow a quicker, slicker investment process for investors.
I also understand that a new digital portal will be made available to investors, and the Government have committed to a 30-working-day service timeline. Along with mandatory notification of investments in key sectors, that provides much-needed transparency for firms, while providing proportionate defence against those targeting sensitive UK assets.
Finally, my humble contribution to today’s debate will imminently fly towards the Minister, like a not quite national security-protected Airbus paper plane. Alas, I have penned a mnemonic. According to Hansard, the word “mnemonic” has only been used once in this House, and without actually producing one. This could be an epic fail, so the House should brace itself. I will give way to the Minister if he would like to intervene straight away or, indeed, anyone else in the Chamber who can rhyme off the 17 industries that may feature in this final legislation. If not, forever hold your peace. Silence—great. It goes like this, and it does not roll off the tongue. It is CQC—which we are all very familiar with—CASCADED MS TEAM. C is for communications. Q is for quantum technologies. C is for computing hardware. I could go on, but I will simply repeat again: CQC CASCADED MS TEAM. That, hon. Ladies and Gentlemen, along with the Bill’s contribution to security, transparency and prosperity, is how I would like to personally contribute to today’s debate.
Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)
I was going to say it is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Bolton North East (Mark Logan), but I am not sure that it is. I welcome any measure that aims to protect or increase our national security. We live in an interconnected world now—a global world—in which capital is no respecter of national boundaries. We also live in a world in which nation states are using strategic investment as a way to pursue their own national interests, and there was mention earlier of the Chinese belt and road initiative.
We also live in a world in which nations or individuals use investments to launder money or to buy influence or protection, as was highlighted in the Intelligence and Security Committee’s Russia report. So the measures in the Bill are to be welcomed but, as the hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie) said, the issues that it addresses were raised seven years ago in the ISC report on Huawei. None the less, I wish to mention a few areas where the Bill is still deficient.
The right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) mentioned the Secretary of State’s role. A call-in will be triggered on whether a transaction creates a risk to national security. Notification takes place in one of two ways—a transaction is notifiable either under four criteria or under a voluntary system. I believe the voluntary system is fraught with administrative difficulties and needs to change. However, I want to focus on how the assessment is then made and the role that the Secretary of State plays in deciding whether a case goes forward. I do so by reference to a recent case—that of the Cobham company.
The Bill would not have prevented the £4 billion sale of Cobham to a US company, even though the Ministry of Defence had huge issues around the sale, partly because it would allow unauthorised persons to understand either the details of the MOD capacity and activities, or give them a more strategic picture of the capabilities and activities that had been built up. The MOD said that the transaction posed a risk to the existing MOD programmes if the merger entity took decisions to exit from an investment or to move offshore the associated capabilities.
At the time, Lady Cobham’s concern was that Cobham would be split into various entities and sold off—and, lo and behold, that it is exactly what is happening. It has gone from four divisions to nine, and the risks to national security were clearly evident at the time. I see nothing in the Bill that would have stopped that, because it comes back to the decision of the Business Secretary.
I am not anti-business in any way, but I am not sure that BEIS takes a view in terms of security issues, which would be perhaps more evident in the Ministry of Defence and so on. So there is an issue about who takes the final decision on such bids’ going forward. I would prefer that to be a decision of the national security committee or a sub-committee of that, so that we may have in-depth intelligence reasoning—and I accept that such decisions should be taken on national security grounds only. If we look at the United States model, we see that some very dubious decisions are taken there on national security grounds, which, frankly, are more to do with protectionism rather than anything else.
Tom Tugendhat
Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that there is a real role for Committees of this House in such processes and that the ability to subpoena both witnesses and papers would add not only depth to the Government’s investigation but protection to the Business Secretary who was forced to take the decision?
Mr Jones
I agree. There is an issue, in some of these cases, around national security. A point was raised earlier in the debate about whether the ISC should look at such decisions. Certainly there is an argument for an annual report, which I would welcome.
I said earlier that I had a fundamental problem with one individual’s taking such decisions, and I am sorry, but I do not think that the new investment security unit is the vehicle. The hon. Gentleman has referred to it as a taskforce, but unless it has national security at its heart, the push for business to get things moved on will take over, rather than what we should be looking at—national security. So decisions should not be left with the Business Secretary.
The other issue I raise is with supply chains. We all know that supply chains are now very complicated, long and diverse, from small companies right down to SMEs. I asked who will map those supply chains. We might say that small companies will self-notify, but would we miss things? There is a key role here for our security services in terms of flagging up things about particular companies, and I do not see that in this process. A small company very low down the supply chain, which may have only a very small element of either a nuclear project or a defence project, might lead to a security risk. I do not think that the new investment security unit will be able to deal with this. That is a role for our security services, which should be at the heart of this, rather than just being a member of the taskforce.
The other area I wish to focus on is in relation to the core areas. Listing them in the way that they have been listed is not helpful. For example, the term “military dual use” brings in a whole host of issues. Is a vehicle that is used for military purposes “dual use” even if it has a civilian use? Trying to define things in a list is actually very unhelpful. I would sooner come at it from the point of view of security and intelligence-driven information, which would inform the decisions that are taken. I am also a bit reluctant for things to be added to that core list by secondary legislation.
Then we come to an area that has already been touched on, which is the role of universities. The Bill mentions
“moveable property, ideas, information or techniques which have industrial, commercial or other economic value.”
When does an idea become a commercial value? I personally think that we need to be looking carefully at this. There is some perfectly legitimate and important foreign investment in our universities, and I do not want to stifle it, but if we have, for example, a Chinese or Russian company investing in a university, particularly in a research programme, is that covered by this Bill? At the initial stage, the investment goes in, but there is no actual product as such. A separate look at that needs to be part of our overall assessment, and, again, that can only be done not from a broad brush stroke approach, but from letting our security services look at some of these areas.
The other point I want to make is to do with land, which is referred to in the Bill, but, again, what is strategic? Would it be allowable, for example, for a Chinese or Russian company, or any company, to start buying up real estate with Government offices on it? The other thing that the Bill does not really cover—the Minister might say that there are measures to cover this—is the issue relating to the well-trailed arguments about the way in which Russian and former eastern European countries have used the property market in the UK, not only to launder money but to build up huge assets in terms of power and influence.
I have just two final points. One is referred to in the appeal system as closed hearings. Members may be aware of what closed hearings are. This is where intelligence, which is an informed decision, goes before a court within a closed hearing. These hearings are mainly used in terrorism-related activities or other national security cases. I would be interested to hear from the Minister in his summing up exactly how he envisages that working in relation to this Bill and how he will manage closed cases, because they are very controversial. At the moment, for example, there are a lot of legal challenges to cases when intelligence goes before the court and then it is ruled that it cannot be heard in open hearings. I just wondered what the Minister has to say on that.
My final concern is around the time limit, which I do not quite understand. It is six months from the date that it comes available to the Secretary of State. I am very opposed to anything that is retrospective, because, as has already been argued, to try to unpick these things will be very difficult. I just want to understand from the Minister the reason behind the five-year retrospection.
Yes, I welcome this Bill, but what it should have at the heart of it is security and intelligence. At the moment, there is too much emphasis on business. I am not arguing for one minute that we should get security and intelligence looking at every single investment decision. I am pro-investment, but the balance here is possibly wrong if we are trying to stop what we all want to stop, which is malign activity in our economy.
John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)
I have declared my business interests in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.
I support the idea of Ministers having powers to prevent foreign acquisitions where security matters are of concern. I trust that Ministers will want to ensure that all the other transactions that do not pose those security issues will go through smoothly, easily and quickly for obvious economic reasons.
There is a wider concern. As Ministers have rightly said, this is not the debate to deal with all the other worries we might have about unsuitable foreign investors, but there is concern out there in the public that we do not want asset-strippers, we do not want large companies that come here in order to gradually close down the UK capacity to take out a competitor, and we do not want them to come in under cover of sustaining jobs in Britain only to take away the intellectual property and then later to discover that they are not so keen on the British business after all.
We do need those protections, but where Ministers are checking their defences on competition grounds as well as on security grounds, they need to ask themselves this fundamental question: why are so many of our assets sold to foreigners? There is, of course, one very simple reason: throughout this century, under all three types of Government we have had so far, we have run a massive balance of trade deficit with the EU on trade account, so we need to raise the foreign currency to pay the bills so we can afford to buy the tomatoes, the vegetables and the German cars and all the other things that we have been importing, not matched by an equal volume of exports to pay those foreign currency bills.
We see that it is having a bigger impact now on our long-term balance of payments situation. Before we ran this long series of huge deficits, we had net assets abroad, which meant that there was a big positive line in our balance of payments, which said that as a country we earned a lot more in interest and dividends from our investments overseas than foreigners earned on the investments they had in the UK. That has now been reversed, and every year now we have a very big deficit on the interest and dividends, because there are so many more foreign claims on us than we have claims on foreign assets.
This is a matter of concern. Ministers need to work on a series of economic revival policies that put much more emphasis on British people investing in Britain, so that we recreate more of that wealth in our own national hands and do not have the vulnerability, that need for foreign currency, which has been brought about by the current twin deficits—the trade deficit and now the deficit on investment income account.
I was very pleased to hear Ministers saying, rightly, that there are many great investment opportunities in the United Kingdom, so we need to deal with this paradox: why is it that foreigners can see them and are piling in with all their money to buy our best ideas, our best companies and our best properties, and why are more British people and British companies not able to do just that? The Government need to work with the British investors, British companies and British entrepreneurs to make it an even better climate for them to do the investing, as well as taking advantage of the foreign investors coming in and giving employment opportunities.
We need that entrepreneurial Britain, which grasps this opportunity and understands that we have a huge opportunity here to take out imports—to grow more of our own food, and to produce more of our own cars and more of our own products generally—so that we chip away at the very big balance of trade deficit, and in turn then generate cash that can be reinvested in the United Kingdom.
This Second Reading debate presents an opportunity to make the wider plea to Ministers that, as we recover from covid and the damage, we remember that £100 billion deficit that we were running in 2019 before covid-19 disrupted world trade and say that that is unacceptable: that means too big an increase in claims by foreigners on our country year after year. That is why we need policies to get the investment in, chipping away at the £20 billion deficit in food with the EU and at the fishing deficit and the car deficit, so that we are generating those jobs on British capital, and starting to reverse that net liability position that now disfigures our accounts.
Charlotte Nichols (Warrington North) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Wokingham (John Redwood), who is my dad’s Member of Parliament. Considering the number of Conservative MPs who are self-isolating, I am glad to see Minister in his place. May I take this opportunity to wish good health to the hon. Member for Warrington South (Andy Carter), who is also self-isolating?
I welcome this Bill and I am glad that the Government are at last addressing the important issue of protecting important assets when foreign acquisitions threaten national security. However, I fear that they have dragged their feet on this matter and that that has led to paralysis rather than strategic planning in several sectors, most notably civil nuclear power.
In 2016, the then Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May), delayed approval of Hinkley Point C because of fears of the potential for a controlling influence by the Chinese state firm China General Nuclear Power Group. While approval was subsequently granted, that illustrates the governmental hesitation that has beset this vital industry—an industry that depends on long-term certainties—for years now.
It has taken more than four years for the Government to bring forward the proposals in the Bill to allay those fears. In that time, the nuclear sector, which offers both reliable low-carbon energy and high-skilled, well-paid, unionised jobs, has suffered paralysis. Our fleet of nuclear power stations is ageing and needs renewing. The Government promised an energy White Paper in summer 2019, which has been delayed and delayed ever since. In that time, we have seen Hitachi withdraw from its planned investment in a nuclear plant at Wylfa because of the Government’s hesitation in agreeing a funding agreement. The whole sector, and thousands of people in quality jobs, including almost 4,500 civil nuclear workers in my constituency, are still waiting to hear a clear plan and direction from the Government. We must not lose those jobs, and the planet cannot afford stalling over this green energy sector.
We know that part of the reason for the delay has been fear of foreign influence in our strategic assets. Dozens of Conservative MPs have even formed an internal lobbying faction called the China Research Group to focus on the threats that they perceive from China. That led to the banning of Huawei from our 5G network back in July. That makes it all the more extraordinary that it has taken so long for the Bill to be brought forward. Labour has called consistently for tougher powers on takeovers since 2012. I hope that now this legislation is finally here, the Government will have no more excuses not to act to give the assurances and firm grounding that nuclear firms reasonably request.
Alongside the Bill, I look forward to early publication of an energy White Paper that lays out the groundwork for nuclear energy that is environmentally and economically secure, and where the UK’s national interest and national security are protected.
Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)
My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. Does she agree that the fact that 57 items of our critical national infrastructure—including, of course, nuclear, but also other energy and airports—are reliant on Chinese supply chains demonstrates the abject failure of this Government to bring forward a proper industrial strategy?
Charlotte Nichols
I agree that, given the national security risks posed by actions being taken by the Chinese state, including what our military refers to as sub-threshold activity, we should, as a nation, make sure that we have a Bill that ensures that our national security is protected from the Chinese state and anyone else, anywhere in the world, who seeks to damage our national security.
Developing a robust takeover regime is essential if we want firms in our key sectors to grow and provide good jobs here in the UK, and this Bill is a key part of that. I worry, though, that it misses the opportunity to go much further in strengthening powers that prevent damage to the UK’s national economic interest, as well as our national security, as in the case I have outlined. I therefore hope that the Government will consider amendments in Committee to widen the scope of what constitutes national security.
Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)
This Bill is welcome, necessary, important and, it has to be said, overdue. In making a few remarks about it, I draw the Minister’s attention to the fact that the Chairman of the ISC, the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), is not able to be with us and sends his apology. I will make a number of points from the Committee on his behalf and that of other Committee members.
The first is that this Bill is stimulated, at least in part, by the ISC report from 2013. That report, “Foreign involvement in the Critical National Infrastructure”, made the case that new legislation was required. The hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie) has already made that point emphatically, but the Minister does need to explain what might have happened differently had this legislation been in place seven years earlier, because some of these powers are clearly retrospective but they do not stretch back into the mists of time.
The Bill is important, not least because the Government have acknowledged that the UK faces continued and broad-ranging hostile activity from foreign intelligence agencies, hostile state actors and others. Novel means of undermining UK national security include investments that can be structured to obscure the real actors behind them. This is not a straightforward matter of takeovers that are directly linked to defence or critical national infrastructure; it is subtler than that, as the Bill acknowledges and as the Government have said. I want to dig a little further into that during my extensive, but not tediously so, contribution.
The Bill’s importance is also reflected in the dynamism of the threat that we face, which is metamorphosing, as I implied a moment ago. Those who seek to undermine our national security are becoming increasingly clever at doing so and the Bill will need to exercise all the flexibility that its provisions permit. But it may be that, as well as that, we need to return to these matters time and again. In a recent debate, I emphasised that traditionally legislation coming before this House pertaining to security has been spasmodic—it has been periodic. Legislation has stood the test of time but, as the increasing dynamism of the threats we face obliges Government to think again about means of countering them, it may be that we see more legislation than we have hitherto in this area. I happily give way to my hon. Friend, a fellow member of the ISC
Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)
I thank my very good friend for giving way. It seems to me that, if we define national security closely, we will not keep up with the speed at which it changes. So I am against the idea of having a definition of what national security is. Does my right hon. Friend agree?
Sir John Hayes
I do, but the challenge in a democratic polity is ensuring sufficient accountability while maintaining that degree of flexibility. It is all much easier in less democratic countries—I use that term as gingerly and modestly as I can—which are not obliged to legitimise or justify what their Governments do. We are—rightly—so the Government are properly scrutinised and held to account. It is right, as my hon. Friend says, that we maintain enough flexibility to respond to the dynamism that I described. But of course, we need mechanisms in place to ensure that that flexibility does not allow the Government too much scope. That is why—this point was made by my hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat) and I emphasise it on behalf of the ISC—Committees in this place missioned to do just that need to play an important role. I know that the Government recognise that, and that my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (John Redwood) recognises it.
John Redwood
Indeed. This issue—where does security end—is very difficult. If we look at the great wars of the last century, which we do not want to repeat, food supply was absolutely critical and was a great strategic vulnerability of our country.
Sir John Hayes
That is true. Vulnerability, of course, is also dynamic. That is why I emphasised, in intervening on my right hon. Friend the Member for Tunbridge Wells (Greg Clark), that the Government need to get better at assessing risk and modelling the response to it. This is what the Bill begins to do. It has been a long time in the making, but I emphasise that it is welcome because it begins to look at appropriate mechanisms for doing that. So it is certainly necessary.
Mr Kevan Jones
Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that security and intelligence need to be at the heart of the Bill and that they should drive how we take decisions? That is why being located in BEIS might be a mistake.
Sir John Hayes
The right hon. Gentleman made that point in his contribution earlier and it seems to me to be a profound one. In establishing the new processes and the new governance associated with this legislation, it is vital that the interaction with the intelligence services, and all the skills available to the Government to assess risk, is built in to their considerations but also to the process. I am not absolutely convinced that the Bill does that. It may be that there is sufficient flexibility, to take up a point raised in an earlier intervention, to allow the Government to do so, but I hope the Minister, when he sums up the debate, will provide reassurance that the connection between intelligence and risk assessment is as sure as it needs to be. I am grateful to the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) for making that point.
Greg Clark
When the decision maker is a Minister in the Government, they benefit from the advice of the security services, including the National Security Adviser. That was certainly my experience as Secretary of State. All these decisions draw extensively on the advice of the national security apparatus. I do not think—my hon. Friend the Minister will clarify it when he winds up—there is any intended change to that.
Sir John Hayes
Yes, the Minister needs to explain how the Government’s arrangements for the new investment security remit interface and interact with the national security structures that already exist, such as the investment security group. There needs to be clarity about the process, as I described it a few moments ago.
Stewart Hosie
Of course, it is not just about the formal structures, because of the fast-changing nature of the threat and the way in which technology emerges and develops. Perhaps we should have an annual debate in here, where we can think out loud about emerging technologies that may become a threat and, on the other side, those technologies that have become so redundant they are no longer a threat, to avoid them being pre-emptively given to the Government and clogging up the system.
Sir John Hayes
That is an excellent suggestion from another member of the Intelligence and Security Committee. My goodness, we are here in force and working as a team, as you can see, Madam Deputy Speaker. It is important that the House considers these matters, as well as the Committees I mentioned which have a particular responsibility for dealing with these things and holding the Government to account.
The point was made earlier that the national interest and national security are not identical. But they are coincidental—they do overlap—as there is a point at which national resilience, or its absence, compromises national security. The Government acknowledge that in the scope of the Bill. They talk about critical national infrastructure, as well as technology sectors of various kinds. By the way, I first looked at this issue, Madam Deputy Speaker—this is not a widely known fact, but I am happy to share it in the privacy of this intimate gathering—as a Cabinet Office Minister, with the former Member for West Dorset, Sir Oliver Letwin. We looked particularly at the threats posed to core infrastructure, such as the energy sector. By the way, that threat is posed not only by hostile state actors, but other players who might choose to disrupt core activities, with extraordinarily damaging consequences for our citizens. The Government do look at those things, but historically I do not think they have done so systematically enough. I know my right hon. Friend the Member for Tunbridge Wells, who has a distinguished record in this area, will have had similar experiences to me when we, in turn, looked at energy as part of our ministerial responsibilities.
China has been mentioned. I do not want to speak about it at great length, but clearly the ISC is currently looking at China and will be considering these very subjects in relation to that inquiry. That will come as no surprise to the House or the Minister.
I said this Bill was necessary, but necessity requires a degree of precision and I have some specific questions that I hope the Minister will deal with, either in summing up or by writing to the ISC if he does not have time to address them today. In looking at a specific case, will the investment security unit be able to consider the cumulative effect of a particular business transaction? In other words, will it take into account whether past acquisitions in that sector, when combined with the case currently under consideration, will result in a cumulative threat to national security? Moreover, will the unit consider acquisitions that might result in an indirect threat, for example, through supply chains or managed service providers? This may well involve very small businesses; sometimes a single expert or a small group of experts will play a vital role, as component parts, in either a technology or an industry that is vital to our national security.
Bob Seely
My right hon. Friend is making an excellent point in an excellent speech. He is highlighting the need to understand national security not only as individual events and individual companies, big or small, but as a series of cumulative processes. Those gradual processes, over time, are as important to understand.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
Order. Just before the right hon. Gentleman replies, let me give a gentle reminder that we have a lot of speakers still to go and I know the Minister wants to give a full reply at the end.
Sir John Hayes
I am terribly grateful, Madam Deputy Speaker. I do not know whether it was the persuasiveness of the case I was making or its imperfection that has encouraged 1,001 people to intervene on me. Perhaps it was the latter, but I will give way no more and move to the concluding part of my oration.
There are questions to be asked about the proposals before us. I touch on one more before I reach my exciting summary. The Bill provides for the Government to apply to use closed material proceedings. My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely) and the right hon. Member for North Durham made the point about connections to other expertise, both within Government and beyond it, so how will that be impacted, given the closed material proceedings? How will closed hearings be managed effectively? I think the House will want to know the answer to that.
I said that the Bill is welcome, and it is certainly is, because it provides the means by which, for the first time, Government will consider matters of profound concern very much in line with the recommendations of the 2013 report. That report identified:
“The difficulty of balancing economic competitiveness and national security”
and suggested that it had reached a “stalemate”. With this Bill, we have moved on from that stalemate. Given the scrutiny the Bill will enjoy, in the spirit that this kind of legislation normally does, as the whole House will want to get this right, and given the Government’s willingness to listen and to take on board some of the points that have been made today and that will be made in further scrutiny, I have every confidence that we may end up with a very good piece of legislation that is fit for purpose. Edmund Burke said:
“Early and provident fear is the mother of safety.”
Sometimes it is important to be a little fearful in order to be provoked to take necessary action. In taking that action, the Minister will know that the Government have no greater responsibility than to secure the safety of the country they serve and its people.
Layla Moran (Oxford West and Abingdon) (LD)
It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes). I can assure the House that I will not be speaking for quite as long, although I aim to speak as eloquently. I thank the Minister for the time that he spent with the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China yesterday, going through some of the issues in the Bill. We operate on a cross-party basis, and I will be mentioning some of the concerns raised in that call so that they are made public.
The Liberal Democrats absolutely support the premise of the Bill. It is the right thing to be doing. My objection, however, lies in the Bill’s scope, which I genuinely believe should be wider. I appreciate that it has been constructed narrowly, presumably so that it can be put through Parliament quickly, but this is a great opportunity that should not be missed. The point that I made to the Minister yesterday was that if we are not going to amend this Bill to include some very important changes that are needed in our legislation, when are the Bills that will be necessary to fill in the cracks going to be brought to the House? I am hearing that that is what Members across the House want to know. If not now, when?
I will focus on two specific matters. The first, which has been mentioned by other Members, is the definition of national security. I found the speech of the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings very interesting, because there are arguments for defining and not defining. I believe that we should be defining, so that this House can properly scrutinise whether the definition encompasses everything that we would consider a national security concern and whether those concerns will be captured in the Bill.
Anthony Mangnall (Totnes) (Con)
Rather than being about not not defining national security, I wonder whether this is about broadening the definition so that it can include the many other issues with which we are all concerned.
Layla Moran
Yes, indeed; I agree. We should be broadening it, in fact, to underline the values of our country that should be enshrined in the Bill. I hope that Members would agree that there is no way that anyone could describe human rights as baubles. Human rights are not baubles off of which we are hanging a Bill. Human rights are the trunk of the tree off of which we hang the legislation and everything that we do in this place. When I suggest that we widen the scope of the Bill to include more human rights amendments, it is in that spirit.
We should not be singling out China particularly—although I am about to—but it is right that this Bill is looking at the enterprise in itself; it is not China or any Chinese investment per se that concerns Members of the House. That distinction is very important. It is equally important, especially during the time of a pandemic, that we attract business, that this country is open for business and that businesses want to invest in it. That is all correct, but I have grave concerns, particularly about companies such as TikTok, which is an example of the kind of thing that we very much hope is captured in the Bill. It is a shame that we do not know—I certainly do not—whether TikTok will fall within the scope of the regime put forward by the Minister and the Secretary of State. That is a genuine question. If it will not, let me make the case for why it should.
As has been said, this is not just about national security and infrastructure as things that we can touch. As we well know, the way in which hostile states are now operating is more to do with data flows and what they do with them. We also know that China does not think within the scope of two, three or four years; it is thinking ahead to the 20, 30, 40 and 50 year marks. What is it doing with TikTok? It is harvesting data, and primarily the data of young people—not just here, but across the world. Some 41% of TikTok’s users are aged between 16 and 24. Our young people’s data is being harvested now. Why? Competitive advantage, perhaps, but also we know that the way that the modern Chinese state is operating is to slowly build dependency. It is incredibly important to recognise the point around dependency and national security now, because it is getting a slow underground hold on our country. If we are not careful and we just focus on the parts that we can see, like the mycelium of a fungus—is it edible or not?—we forget that the majority of what is happening is underground and longer-lasting than we might imagine. Will data flows be considered specifically? Will the movement of the global HQ of TikTok to this country come under the scope of the Bill? If not, I will seek support across the House for amendments at the next stage so that that can happen.
Now is the time to fully address human rights. That is why it is important to talk about China, because yes, on the one hand, there are data flows, but on the other, there is what it has done in Hong Kong. The issues with TikTok arise from 2017, but the more recent issues in June of this year, and what it has done in Hong Kong, suggest a direction of movement for the Chinese state that is deeply concerning. Linking that to what is happening in Xinjiang with the Uyghurs, we have, almost through not paying attention, tacitly said to that state, “We think what you are doing might be okay. We are not going to challenge it directly.” Magnitsky sanctions are mentioned as the current way that the Government are dealing with this. We welcome that and think they should go further. However, it is also time that we had amendments to a Bill that specifically deal with genocide, slave labour and supply chains. This is not just about sanctioning individuals. We know that the state has a hold on its enterprises, and that needs to be addressed too.
At this stage, I have no intention of throwing any Lib Dem strops and opposing Bills, or whatever. However, I hope that the Minister knows that at the next stage some movement needs to be made on these two very important issues.
Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)
I want to concentrate on what is essentially the core of this Bill—our national security. Today our country continues to face a broad-ranging hostile attack from foreign intelligence agencies. A few of our critical industries and technologies may already have been purchased, at least in part, by foreign investors, some of whom may not have a particularly benign approach to British national security.
This Bill comes not before time, considering that the Intelligence and Security Committee ruled on the matter and suggested changes in 2013. Unless the UK curbs the right of foreign firms and investors to obtain technologies through the means of mergers and acquisitions, and similar, our advanced technologies could easily find their way into the weapons systems of foreign and potentially hostile states. This would definitely harm the UK either directly or indirectly. The Bill gives the Secretary of State the power to screen investments that might just pose a national security risk, and that is what we are talking about today.
Obviously the Bill very much reflects the views of the ISC, of which most Members, apart from the Chairman, are present. [Interruption.] I didn’t use the word “you”, did I, Madam Deputy Speaker? [Interruption.] Oh good—you were looking at me with horror.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
I only pointed out that I was once a member of the ISC as well.
Bob Stewart
I am always a culprit on the word “you”. I have now lost my place, thanks to your intervention, Madam Deputy Speaker!
The report produced by the ISC in 2013 contained a requirement for legislation, and we are now getting that legislation seven years later, which is rather a long delay. I am delighted that the Bill protects British industry and puts safeguards on it, but it puts particular safeguards on our national security. In future, investors will have no choice but to notify the Government if the ownership of certain businesses is to change hands—thank goodness for that. However, I note that the Secretary of State will also have the power to call in other businesses if he or she has concerns about national security. That is why I am slightly against a narrow definition of national security; I would prefer it to be a bit more fluid.
The decision to call in an investment will be based on three factors: the nature of the target of acquisition; the type and level of control being acquired and how that could be used in practice; and the extent to which the acquirer raises national security concerns. The list of sectors to be covered is under consultation. I will not use a mnemonic, which until today I thought was some sort of drill, but that list includes advanced robotics, artificial intelligence, cryptographic authentication, whatever that is, quantum technologies—I do know what that is—and satellite and space technologies, in which we are world leaders. It is very important that those sectors are guarded against being infiltrated, because that is what it is—infiltration to take away intellectual property.
At the moment, the UK is almost unique among major western economies in not having stand-alone foreign investment legislation, and this Bill will sort that out. It will give Ministers the power to look at transactions overall and to review them. The Government’s impact assessment estimates that it will result in well over 1,000 transactions a year—possibly up to 1,800, as some Members have suggested. That is a lot, and it means a lot of work for a specific department of BEIS. There will only be 100 people to do that work, which is slightly worrying.
I will finish, because I was told to be short—and I have been, in six minutes—and because I had your naughty finger pointed at me, Madam Deputy Speaker.
Bob Stewart
I am getting on with it! I am trying to finish. This is a good Bill. I hope the House will support it. I will not finish my last paragraph, because my hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton) has stolen my thunder. This is a good Bill, and we need it.
Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)
It is such a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart), and I genuinely hope that your naughty finger will not be pointing towards me at any point in my remarks, Madam Deputy Speaker.
We on the Opposition Benches will not oppose the Bill, because it is a step in the right direction. It is good to see the Government finally recognising the need to put national security at the heart of how we deal with foreign investment. However, the Bill fails to address the broader issue of how takeovers and acquisitions should be regulated to promote our broader national and economic interests and, indeed, the interests of British workers and their families across the length and breadth of our country. In that sense, it draws a false distinction between national security and economic security, because it is absolutely clear that the two are intrinsically linked.
In order to properly reflect on the effectiveness of this legislation, we therefore need to go back to first principles and ask ourselves this single basic question: what is the economy actually for? It is only by reaching consensus on that fundamental point that we shall be in a position to assess the extent to which the Bill will make a positive contribution to the lives and livelihoods of our constituents.
The British economy is unbalanced, it is unstable and it is therefore profoundly lacking in resilience. It is too reliant on the financial services sector at the expense of manufacturing—our manufacturing sector has collapsed since the 1970s from 30% of GDP then to just 9% now. It is too London-centric, thus failing to harness the talents of so many people from other areas of our country; it is too inward-looking, with persistent trade deficits; it is too unequal, pushing the proceeds of growth to the wealthiest 1%, and it is too short-sighted, constantly aiming for the fast buck rather than long-term, sustainable prosperity driven by patient capital.
Every piece of legislation that is brought forward by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy should be relentlessly focused on fixing those faulty foundations of our economy—those fundamental weaknesses—and every step that the Business Secretary takes should be a step towards an active industrial strategy that is designed to drive a modern manufacturing renaissance. He should be focused on home-grown industry, home-grown investment and home-grown technology. Those critical steps will help to build that sense of purpose and resilience into the UK economy that we are so desperately missing.
The culture of the UK’s corporations is also in urgent need of change. The prevailing business strategies are driven by short-termism, with the delivery of fast buck profits to shareholders taking precedence over all other considerations. Addressing that will require a new deal between shareholders, companies and their workforces, and between the public and private sectors. Far too many of the corporations listed in the FTSE 500 are characterised by a transactional, rootless form of ownership, which militates against the investment in R&D, innovation, skills development, new technology, plant and machinery that is desperately needed if we are to put our economy on to a more balanced and sustainable footing.
The Government’s laissez-faire approach makes a major contribution to this short-termist culture, because it opens the door to acquisitions by foreign companies, resulting in the UK’s having by far the highest number of successful hostile takeover bids of any advanced economy in the world. Time after time since 2010 we have seen our strategic national assets being flogged off to the highest bidder. Let us just look at the case of Arm, a jewel in the crown of the British tech industry, which is in the process of being sold to Nvidia, or Cadbury’s, an iconic British brand, sold to Kraft without any proper consideration of what that would mean for the long-term sustainability of the business.
Moreover, our sovereign capability is profoundly undermined by the fact that much of our critical infrastructure is not in our own hands. In fact, 57 of our critical national infrastructure supply chains depend on China, from our energy suppliers to our airports, our pharmaceuticals and our personal protective equipment. The repercussions of that overexposure have been felt during the pandemic. Our lack of capacity to produce PPE has cost the UK taxpayer an eye-watering amount of money; a breaking story today shows that a Spanish businessman has pocketed £21 million of British taxpayers’ money simply for acting as a broker between the Government and overseas suppliers—a potent symbol of systemic failure.
Let me be clear that many of these so-called private takeovers and infrastructure investments are carried out by companies and investment vehicles that are a front for authoritarian state actors who have wider political and national security agendas and whose values are at odds with our commitment to democracy, liberty and the rule of law.
The crucial point here is that our values should not be for sale.
The most obvious and pressing case, of course, is the Chinese Government, who are relentlessly expanding their influence economically, politically and militarily. We need only recall the case of Imagination Technologies, which was recently the target of a hostile takeover attempt by an investment vehicle with direct links to the Chinese state. Of course, there are also substantial Chinese stakes in Hinkley Point and other sizeable chunks of our critical national infrastructure.
Successive Conservative Governments since 2010 have been naive and complacent in their approach to China, exemplified by David Cameron and George Osborne’s disastrous “golden era” strategy. It is time for this Government, this House and, indeed, the entire country to wake up to the reality of these matters and to come to the realisation that, while we must always seek constructive engagement with China, we must take a clear-sighted, hard-headed approach to defending our national interest and our sovereign capability.
I also take this opportunity to raise another more specific way in which the Government’s lethargic tendencies have proved costly to British business and weakened the economy as a result. The Government have been naive about the deliberate attempts to weaken UK businesses through market distortion by the undermining of competition laws. The most obvious example of that is the deliberate over-production of steel way beyond global demand and the subsequent illegal dumping of that steel on European markets.
The result of those illegal uncompetitive practices combined with Conservative inertia has been the weakening of UK steel companies and the opportunity for foreign investors, many of whom come from countries that are the origin of the dumping in the first place, to buy up our strategically and nationally important asset. Some 80% of China’s steel industry is state owned, and the key point is that the illegal dumping of products from those state-owned industries into European markets is an example of the practices that are undermining the international rules-based order.
That in turn has a damaging and direct impact on our industrial base and on our communities and their families—the workforces that are directly impacted. It is a perfect example of how the global is truly local. We need a level playing field, and this legislation should be about—this is everything that the BEIS Department should be about—developing that level playing field so that our workforce is not competing with one hand tied behind its back against a system that is rigged against it from the word go.
This Bill is a big missed opportunity to strengthen the UK’s wider industrial strategy and for the Government to show that they are committed to building an economy of purpose and resilience. Moreover, it fails to reflect the impact of coronavirus on UK businesses and the increased vulnerability in the face of vulture capitalists and state-backed actors that are waiting to pounce. This legislation only really seeks to protect the UK’s national security and appears to do little to support the UK’s wider national interest, such as the need to protect jobs and support communities in this time of national emergency.
Focusing on the all-too-narrow scope of the Bill, I also have genuine concerns about the process for arriving at a decision on whether to block a takeover. Currently, the plan is that the process sits firmly within BEIS. That is an issue, first, because such a decision would have huge cross-departmental impact, so it would surely be better to create a multi-agency taskforce to rule on key decisions. Such a taskforce would include the Treasury, the Home Office, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the intelligence and security services, and the Ministry of Defence. It could follow a similar model to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. All the signs were that BEIS was a cheerleader for the Huawei deal, when it was clearly against our national interest to go ahead with that deal. That does not augur well for its ability to police the effective implementation of the Bill.
Secondly, handing all the decision-making power to the Business Secretary could lead to problems further down the line, should a future incumbent—I am in no way implying that such a fate would befall the current Business Secretary—be influenced by political or commercial interests in this country or overseas.
Sir John Hayes
I had not intended to intervene again in the debate, except that I want to emphasise, and perhaps amplify, the point that the hon. Gentleman has just made. The legislation brings us into line with other Five Eyes players—the intelligence community with which we work directly—but he is right to say that the mechanisms that they use are different, in some cases, from the ones employed in the Bill in exactly the way he describes. Will the Minister look at those mechanisms and see what more we can learn from them as the Bill is improved during its passage through the House?
Stephen Kinnock
The right hon. Member has pointed to the fact that it is such a broad, cross-departmental issue that it requires more than just one pair of eyes—if he will excuse the pun—to look at it.
Time and again, we have seen that the takeover regime is not fit for purpose. It is welcome that we are finally coming into line with other countries on national security, but we are still behind on takeovers that would harm the national interest more broadly. Protecting our national security is only one element of protecting, nurturing and developing the vital sectors of the future that we know are crucial for our economy.
Given the economic dislocation and potential corporate vulnerability caused by coronavirus, the case for action is stronger than ever. I will support the Bill, but we need to see improvements and further regulation to protect British business and the broader national interest.
Mark Pritchard (The Wrekin) (Con)
It is always a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Aberavon (Stephen Kinnock). Although I did not agree with everything in his speech, I have fond memories of being in his constituency playing rugby as scrum half, fishing, and go-karting on rickety self-made go-karts that often fell apart. I also went to my first rock concert at Aberavon leisure centre—The Who; I think they were at Madison Square Garden some years earlier, I hasten to add.
I welcome the Bill. As has already been stated, it is perhaps a little long overdue, given that my predecessors on the Intelligence and Security Committee suggested in 2013 that such a Bill was required urgently. I also put on record my thanks to my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely), who has been calling for such a Bill for many years. I am sure he is, at least in part, happy to see the Bill before the House. I also commend the Secretary of State, the Minister and, indeed, the whole ministerial team for bringing the Bill forward so early in this Parliament.
It is, of course, right that the Secretary of State has new powers to scrutinise strategic and sensitive investments in sectors that might pose a national security risk to the United Kingdom. The Bill should also act as a legislative assurance, or reassurance, for would-be investors and businesses. They can now avoid, hopefully, being targeted and potentially exploited by the hostile states and entities hidden behind the respectable veil of supposedly legitimate mergers and acquisitions that take place in the City every day—strategic partnerships, joint ventures and major investments.
The Bill also rightly responds to the huge advances in technology, as we have heard from other hon. Members today, which in itself further widens the potential scope of the Government’s national security concerns—and, indeed, remit—particularly around intellectual property, patents and copyright. Although this might prove problematic for the Government, particularly around dual technology, it is absolutely right that it should be addressed. We heard from the hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie) earlier on the use of dual technologies. However, the Bill should not mean compromising growth or prosperity, and I was glad to hear the Minister underscore that. Got right, there is no need for it to compromise or conflict with national security and national prosperity. It is more than manageable, certainly with this excellent ministerial team, for the Government to balance national security and economic competitiveness, and to give the Government greater powers to assess and scrutinise investments that could reasonably be viewed as posing a potential risk to the UK’s national security. The Bill rightly empowers the Secretary of State, where necessary, proportionately to impose remedies up to and including blocking the transaction, using full through to lower-level measures. If the risk to national security is extreme, clearly those fuller measures should be deployed.
Of course, the Bill protects businesses that are small. We have heard from hon. Members on that as well, and I think the Government need to be careful that investors are not put off by the potential for many months of bureaucracy and hurdles to entry to market, particularly at the start-up stage or the second or third capital raising stage for entrepreneurial SMEs. The Bill will, of course, look at small businesses, and many of these small businesses have a global reach although their turnover might not be particularly large. They might—by definition, as small businesses—have fewer than 30 employees, but that does not necessarily mean that their technology and intellectual property are not of interest to some of the UK’s adversaries.
In welcoming the Bill, I would like to take the opportunity to thank my hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat) and his Committee for their work. He has raised this issue over many years, and I would like to put on record my thanks to him. My hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) has rightly mentioned computing hardware, quantum technologies and satellite and space technologies. There is a list of 17, and I will not go into them now, but it is absolutely right that these very sensitive areas fall under the remit and the scrutiny of this new legislation. Madam Deputy Speaker, you will know as a previous distinguished member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, that the Committee is currently considering the threat of this whole area in its current inquiry into the national security threat that China may or may not pose. In my view, it poses a significant threat in a lot of areas. Will the Minister give an undertaking to the House that there will be a timely publication of those mandated reporting sectors?
If I may, I would like to ask a few questions, through you, Madam Deputy Speaker, of the Government. Can the Minister explain the Government’s arrangements for the new investment security unit? How will it interact with the national security apparatus and structures that already exist, including the investment security group? Will the investment security unit consider acquisitions that might result in an indirect threat—for example, through supply chains or managed service providers? What safeguards will there be in the Bill to prevent non-UK Governments from pressuring the UK Government to call in certain mergers and acquisitions that those Governments might find offensive or inappropriate even though the UK might take a different view? Also, on the issue of competitors, what safeguards will there be to prevent vexatious and spurious calls for the Government to intervene by competitors who feel they are going to lose out as a result?
This Bill is long overdue, but it is right to give credit where credit is due. I thank the Government for bringing it forward and I hope that they will work with the ISC and the whole House as it goes through to Report stage. I commend the Bill and thank the Minister for all he is doing.
Andrew Griffith (Arundel and South Downs) (Con)
It is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for The Wrekin (Mark Pritchard), who was a very successful businessman before he entered the House. I am also looking forward to hearing from my hon. Friend the Minister when he sums up later.
Foreign investment in the UK is an unalloyed good thing, and we would all be much the poorer without it. Inward investment stimulates our economic growth across the entirety of the UK. In 2019 alone, as the Secretary of State told us, almost 40,000 jobs were created thanks to foreign direct investment, with most of those outside London, despite its global reach.
Foreign investors in the UK create more exports and spend more on research and development than our domestic businesses, giving the lie to some of the things that we have heard from Opposition Members this afternoon. Let us remember that every doctor, nurse and careworker who has looked after us during the pandemic is paid for directly from the product of the economic growth that results from being one of the most open economies in the world. That is one reason why I congratulate the Government on recently establishing the new Office for Investment, with my noble Friend Lord Grimstone and No. 10 working together to bring high-value opportunities to the UK, such as on net zero, as well as investment in infrastructure and advancing research and development.
I approach this Bill with a degree of trepidation, much as one may occasionally have to approach a golden goose and suggest moving it to a slightly different, newer nest next door. There are many positive aspects of the Bill that I welcome, such as the clear statement of intent about enthusiastically championing free trade—we heard that from the Secretary of State today. I think it is very important that the Minister restates that at each stage of the proceedings. In many respects, this will be a more modern and slicker framework, providing more certainty and clarity for those we seek to attract here to invest. Timelines for assessments will be set out in law, and, as somebody who was previously a practitioner of acquisitions, I know how capricious the current status quo is, so I welcome anything that can make that more predictable. I also agree that aspects such as the turnover test or share of supply are backward-looking in an era when a business can become successful or strategically important while barely out of the incubator.
I hope that the Minister will not mind if I mention some areas for those on the Government Benches to focus on, from the perspective of a colleague who wants the Bill to succeed in its stated objectives. It is really important that it remains narrowly drawn around the risk to national security, and it will be good to hear the Minister again restate that very clearly. To govern is to choose, and it is important to be as clear about what the Bill is not as we are about what it is.
Andrew Griffith
I will not, because I know that so many colleagues want to get in. The Bill is not about the impact of a particular locality or even the domicile of a particular acquirer, and it must not become another fit and proper test by the back door because we do not like the identity of an acquirer or their political views on that day of the week. Investment is all about taking risk and pricing that risk, but political risk is the very hardest to price. In a globally competitive world, where every word that we say in this House will be pored over for meaning, we all have a responsibility to ensure that we provide clarity to those who are poised to invest here.
Much is hung on the speed of this regime—I think, Minister, that 30 days must mean 30 days, and I can already see some ambiguity. The Bill talks about acceptance, not just receipt. A subjective view about what constitutes acceptance cannot be a back-door way of stopping the clock. That is a notorious practice in current European competition filings. There is also talk of the Secretary of State being able to have a further 45-day extension. I think there should be a clear presumption that if this is not done within 30 days, the transaction can proceed. In truth, if we apply that logic to a pavement licence during a pandemic, I do not see any reason why we should not apply it to keep our capital markets and our lifeblood of the economy functioning. Those timeframes should be symmetrical. The state should not load the dice in its own favour, because if we look at the Bill, we see that, when it comes to appealing the decision by the Secretary of State under judicial review, the claim must be brought within only 28 days.
I thought it was very helpful of the Secretary of State to provide the context that he expects less than 1% of all M and A asset transactions to result in notification, but with respect, I want the telephone number of his lawyer, because I do not know where we are going to find the risk-averse legal advisers in transactions that do not distort that by notifying just in case, particularly given the presence of criminal liability. I agree with other colleagues that I would like the Minister to commit, if possible, to publish annual statistics on the number of notifications and the outcomes.
Finally, as ever when we pass new legislation, it is wise to think of it as an opportunity to retire some elsewhere. Media plurality has ill served the media sector, much of which now lies in foreign hands. As we look to rebuild our industrial strategy in the future, post covid, and as we strike out post Brexit, a new lighter touch approach from the Competition and Markets Authority would give many of our British businesses the scale to compete internationally.
Bob Seely (Isle of Wight) (Con)
Naturally, Madam Deputy Speaker, I hope to speak for no more than six minutes. It is a pleasure—genuinely a pleasure—to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Arundel and South Downs (Andrew Griffith). In the spirit of constructive debate, I am going to disagree with some of his points, but it was undoubtedly the most eloquent argument in favour of a highly free-market approach, though I will ask some questions on it, if I may. I am going to talk a little about national security, and make some supportive suggestions for the Minister and some general points about the nature of national security in the modern world with China.
There is much to support in this Bill, and we can all agree that most of it is very necessary and very good. I would also like to thank the Minister, who is obviously held in very high regard by those on the Government Benches, for his engagement; it is always good to talk to him. I have actually rather enjoyed listening to the debate, because clearly a lot of constructive suggestions are being made, and I thank my hon. Friend the Member for The Wrekin (Mark Pritchard) for his kind remarks.
I am going to suggest some amendments and then explain why I think they are necessary. For me, there is an issue about national security and our definition of it. That has not been offered so far in the debate, but it sounds like the Government’s definition is too narrow in this age. That does not mean that we are talking about industrial policy. I was very interested to listen to many of the speeches by Opposition Members, including the hon. Member for Aberavon (Stephen Kinnock), who made some very good points. This is not the space for industrial policy, but it is a question of how we interpret national security.
The amendments I think we should be tabling are on a character test and a public interest test, if not specifically a human rights test. Nobody has ever accused me of being a bleeding heart liberal, but I think that, in this day and age, to have no human rights test, even one wrapped up in a public interest test or a character test, is genuinely confusing, especially because countries that are in many ways more free marketeer than us do have them. Australia has such a character test and a public interest test based on national security, competition, tax revenue, the impact on the country and what it describes as a common sense test. Forgive me if I am wrong, but I thought that we had rather invented common sense, but we do not necessarily have a common sense test or a character test.
While my hon. Friend the Member for Arundel and South Downs said that he is—I hope I am not misquoting him—ambivalent about the identity of people moving in, I am not. There is an issue about Huawei and there is an issue about ZTE because they are fronts for an authoritarian state. As well as a moral question over what authoritarian states do in their own countries—and, yes, we do tend to wag our fingers at people too much—there is a justified question to be asked, because how foreign authoritarian states treat their own people is very often, given half a chance, how they would treat us, so there is an issue for me here.
The next amendment relates to CFIUS, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. That is a more transparent process and, if I understand it correctly, more people have to sign up to agree, so it is not just sitting within their version of the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. Defence, the Secretary of State and other players get to sign off on funding for companies. In many ways, CFIUS has a higher threshold than we will have in this country. I do not think anyone is accusing the United States of being less free marketeer than we are, but in this area, they are more conservative. I am not saying they are right or wrong, but I think that it is an important point to note.
My right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes) and the hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie) spoke about the cumulative threat. It is not about a single company or a single issue, but the way an industry changes over time. Indeed, the hon. Member for Aberavon made that point about the slow collapse of the British steel industry. Also, the point has been made that a lot of foreign direct investment is good, but there is clearly a balance.
Finally on the amendments, I would be keen to see something more stated, more obvious or more explicit on critical national infrastructure. Where would we be with Chinese investment in our nuclear industry, for example, if this Bill was already law? That is a matter for genuine debate.
I will move on to one or two other specific points. We are forever telling people how we prioritise human rights and how we lead the world, yet there is nothing about human rights in the Bill. As I have said, I think that lacks consistency, and we need a public interest test.
Next, we are talking about national security without a definition. I was saying to my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton North East (Mark Logan) that we need a definition. He is very much a Sino expert: he lived in China and speaks Chinese, which is rather more than I do. He said that it is a very Confucian thing to say that, to have a debate, we need to understand the definition and know what we are debating. It is a genuine Confucian point: where is our definition of national security to have a debate with? We need that. In this day and age, we need a wider definition of national security. It is not just nuts and bolts on tanks—I am not saying that the Minister is saying that—but much wider than that.
The former leader of our party, my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) talked about civil and military fusion in China. I am somebody who lived in the Soviet Union. I have travelled in China a bit, and I have worked in sort of authoritarian states. The purest free market position here is dated. I am not saying we need an industrial policy approach, but we need an understanding that sees strategic interests—national security and the national interest—in big data, artificial intelligence, facial and gait recognition and all these technologies that Moscow and Beijing want to use to control their own people. I am surprised that the technology being developed by universities potentially does not fall under the Bill, and I believe it needs to.
My hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester (Richard Graham) made the point, as he ever does, about the importance of Chinese foreign direct investment, and I agree. The point was also made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Tunbridge Wells (Greg Clark). Chinese FDI clearly has an important role. It enriches our country, but there is a cost as well.
Finally, we need an amendment on strategic trade dependency. I would like to see an annual statement from the Government on the nature of our strategic trade dependency. If I had stood up a year ago and said, “Personal protective equipment is a strategic issue for this country,” everyone would have laughed and Front Benchers would have been swapping amused WhatsApps at the foolishness of a Back Bencher. Who now denies that PPE is a strategic issue, given the amount of money it has cost us and the delays because we did not have our own industry? Over time, that industry had faded away, and now that has caught us out. There is a wider strategic debate.
There is also the nature of dynamic risk, as my hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings said. Everything that we know about the last year, with the changing nature of authoritarian states, such as China and Russia, the fusion of the civil and military and the entirely different approach to power in those countries, makes me realise that the national security definition that needs to be offered in the Bill, but currently is not, should be, if not broad, then at least have a greater understanding of the modern world we live in than is currently the case in the Bill or this debate. I very much hope there will be movement on that from Ministers.
Tim Loughton (East Worthing and Shoreham) (Con)
It is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely), who has great experience in these matters. As he said, this has been a very thoughtful debate. I welcome the Bill, which, as many hon. Members have said, is long overdue. Much of our law on industrial security and business transactions is governed by the Enterprise Act 2002 and our very narrow and often inadequate competition and markets laws.
A lot has happened in the past 20 years. Major global corporations have exercised huge powers in mining data, monitoring and tracking populations and controlling technology in every aspect of our everyday lives. In most cases, they have done so without the need for a close physical presence. Of course, the huge issue of cyber-security and cyber-crime has become the weaponry of the 21st century. It is therefore right that we bring our laws into the 21st technological century, which would also bring us into line with some of our major allies.
This is also an investment Bill. As a global free-trading nation, we need to get the balance right and ensure that UK plc is open for business in the eyes of the international investment community and international markets. My constituency neighbour and hon. Friend the Member for Arundel and South Downs (Andrew Griffith), mentioned the great inflow of investment and jobs that that has created. The Bill needs to be targeted and proportionate so that we continue to attract safe investment, while deterring unsafe and questionable investment.
I am pleased to welcome the new systems and procedures in the Bill, including the transparent call-in notices based on trigger events, a clear and swift timetable to make decisions on call-ins, clear timelines, a single point of decision in BEIS, the interaction with the Competition and Markets Authority and the sanctions and legal challenge process. It is good to bring that in line with our Five Eyes allies. As the Minister said, it is estimated that the Bill will affect less than 1% of all mergers and acquisitions and asset transactions in this country.
My concern, like that of other right hon. and hon. Members, is whether the Bill goes far enough. Does it cover enough sectors and appropriate interests? How should the Government define national security, which is absent from the Bill? Should there not be a greater independent and external screening mechanism? Is not too much power still concentrated in a Secretary of State who, as was indicated by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), can still be swayed by political considerations that sometimes—just sometimes—might trump national interests?
Where is the parliamentary scrutiny role in all this? Where is the appeal mechanism if no call-in is triggered? This is a point that not many other Members have mentioned, but does the Bill leave too many of our early-phase innovation companies exposed to being gobbled up by foreign super-giants that can take advantage of almost unlimited capital and currency swings in their favour? I remember the old days in the City when the Government had golden shares in companies such as Cable & Wireless, British Aerospace and Plessey. People had to make a foreign ownership declaration to own shares in Peninsular and Oriental, and they were only able to own deferred stock. The Government still have special shares in British Airways and Rolls-Royce, for example, but it is hard to think of the last time the UK Government blocked a takeover or major asset acquisition of a company in which they held a golden share. Are they actually that golden?
The Minister stated that he is nation agnostic and that there will be no white list of nations, but we all know—this debate has brought this out very clearly again—that China remains the biggest threat and the single most important reason why such legislation is required. I have been a lone voice on China’s human rights abuses in Tibet for many years, as chair of the all-party parliamentary group for Tibet, and it is good at last to be in company, partly sparked by the outrage that is going on against the Uyghurs, what has been going on in Hong Kong and the suppression of the indigenous Mongolian population. However, it is what we do not see that is so much more dangerous, and the row over Huawei and 5G earlier this year brought that to light.
The ownership of Huawei is quite clear: it is 99% owned by the Huawei Investment & Holding Company trade union committee. Under Chinese law, trade union committees are ultimately administered by and answerable to the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, which is according to its constitution under the control of the Chinese Communist party. It is a very clear ownership: Huawei is under state control.
Huawei is involved with at least 11 United Kingdom universities as well as six London colleges, and I have great concerns—I have raised them on many occasions in this House—about the influence of the Confucius institutes on our campuses around the country. The US has raised concerns as well. The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission last year said:
“China is using broad research relations with universities and other entities to try to fill in any technological gaps they have as well as in certain areas to try to advance Chinese standards so that Huawei and other Chinese-produced equipment will be the equipment of choice as networks get built out.”
That is a threat to national security, and we need to take account of it.
We have heard a warning just today about Scotland and Scottish universities: Scotland has the highest number of Confucius institutes per capita of any country in the world.
We all know that ultimately the CCP has a claim on any data held by Chinese companies, where it does not need to go to the inconvenience of hacking into a foreign company’s database, as happens all too often. That includes TikTok, as we have heard from many hon. Members—in particular, my hon. Friend the Member for Wealden (Ms Ghani), who has made a specialisation of this. The spread of social media is a hugely powerful tool in extending control over populations, particularly young populations. China’s national intelligence law requires all Chinese firms, not just Huawei, to assist in state intelligence work, and Huawei’s equipment is used in monitoring the population in Xinjiang province. And of course it has great form in stealing IP from countries around the world.
All the contributions in this debate so far have focused on technology and communications, but why is pharmaceuticals and biotechnology not on the list in the Bill? It has been included on the list of the equivalent legislation in France. We know from Wuhan the global reach that biotechnology can have when it goes wrong. What checks are there on Chinese laboratories operating on UK soil in dangerous materials that could compromise our security? China, as we have heard, has been taking over pharmaceutical firms, including human blood plasma firm Bio Products, originally part of the NHS and taken over in 2016 by the Creat Group. That company would not have been covered by the mandatory notification under the proposals in the Bill.
There are many other areas of Chinese ownership that cause concern, too. The China General Nuclear Power Group holds a third of Hinkley Point nuclear plant and 20% of Sizewell C, and Beijing-controlled companies control about 25% of nuclear and wind energy demand in the United Kingdom. As my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes) mentioned, it is the cumulative effect of their influence and their ownership that we need to be aware of. The largest operator in the North sea is the China National Offshore Oil Corporation, accounting for 25% of UK oil production and 10% of the country’s energy needs—helped by billions of pounds-worth of tax breaks from this Government and previous Governments, it should be noted. The chairman of the CNOOC, Wang Yilin, declared in 2012:
“Large-scale deep-water rigs are our mobile national territory and a strategic weapon.”
The China Huaneng Group is building Europe’s largest battery storage project in Wiltshire, and the Hong Kong company MTR owns a 30% stake in South Western Railway and has the Crossrail franchise. I could go on and on, and the Henry Jackson Society has estimated that only 23 out of 117 Chinese acquisitions of UK corporations in the past decade would have been subject to the mandatory notification in this proposed legislation.
These are all strategic areas—energy, infrastructure, transport interests—which could have a massive impact on our security and prosperity if controlled by a malign party, and on top of that there is the monopoly China is building up in the supply of lithium and cobalt, essential components of batteries and the battery technology that we need to develop globally for environmental reasons as well.
What would the impact of the Bill be on all of those operations? What are the reciprocal rights for UK companies taking a stake—a controlling one or otherwise —in equivalent companies in China? I bet they are not equivalent. Surely there needs to be some sort of equivalence test in this legislation to ensure that we have access to assets overseas that is equal to that we are allowing overseas corporations and Governments to have in this country.
I have not mentioned human rights, which has come up many times. I have not mentioned the malign influence of Russia and heavily disguised asset purchases from those close to the Putin regime. What does the Bill do for clearer declarations of ultimate beneficial ownership and the role of Companies House? We have done much in that area on tax avoidance, but what about for the purposes of the national interest? We need far greater transparency. Surely the Bill is a way of helping to achieve that. Surely there should be a wider national interest test.
We must also mention the role and influence of friendly foreign powers, particularly the concerns about US and Japanese multinational companies that have been gobbling up UK high-tech start-ups and defence companies in recent years. The hon. Member for Aberavon (Stephen Kinnock) mentioned ARM, which was taken over by the Japanese—SoftBank—in 2016 and then by the Americans this year. It makes silicon chips for virtually all our mobile phones. There are numerous examples of high-tech start-ups in silicon fen at Cambridge. Public money has gone into universities, resulting in commercial spin-offs, and then founding shareholders have been lured by pound or dollar signs to silicon valley, US high-tech giants and social media companies. That is why we have no equivalents of Facebook, Google or TikTok in this country. We have very few tech stocks; in the FTSE, the weighting of infotech is just 1.37%.
In conclusion, Madam Deputy Speaker—before some naughty extremity of your body casts itself in my direction —surely we should be using a national interest test to grow our own in the United Kingdom. Certainly there should be a reciprocity test if national interest protection laws overseas prevent UK companies from making equivalent acquisitions or taking strategic stakes. I support the Bill, but there are many questions still to be answered, and measures certainly need to be beefed up.
Anthony Mangnall (Totnes) (Con)
Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker, for calling me in such an important debate. May I start by thanking the Secretary of State and the Minister for the time that they have given me, members of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China and others to discuss the contents of the Bill and what it does?
As I understand it—I hope I get this explanation right—the Bill gives the Government the power to screen and call in acquisitions of assets deemed to pose a threat to national security. Those assets might include land, physical property or intellectual property. As a result, the Secretary of State will be given retrospective powers to consider investments made over the past five years.
I welcome the cross-party consensus on the Bill. It seems to me, as a new intake Member of Parliament, that this is one of those rare moments when there is consensus in the House to produce a truly remarkable piece of legislation. I hope that the Government will listen carefully to the comments that have been made already.
I welcome the sentiments of the Bill, and I hope that passing it into law will be our first step in attempting to match Australia’s Foreign Investment Reform (Protecting Australia’s National Security) Bill and America’s Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernisation Act of 2018. But—and there is a sizeable “but”—we have, as other Members have made clear, a long way to go before this legislation reflects the comprehensive laws that many of our Five Eyes nation colleagues have in place.
The UK seeks to be a competitive, free and fair economy. I believe that that is sacrosanct and that we must do everything we can to ensure that businesses and people around the world look at our country as an attractive destination for investment. A stable democracy, a highly skilled workforce, league table topping universities, the rule of law and world-class industries such as photonics and FinTech all make the UK an attractive place to invest that benefits investors and British citizens alike.
Our laws are balanced as a result, encouraging foreign investment and adherence to UK laws and national interests. That balance has become all the more challenging with rapid technological change, internationalist agendas and our own failure, if I may say so, to hold a strategic dependency review. In short, the threats to our national security are numerous, real and present, and they come in a multitude of forms.
The narrow scope of the Bill limits its impact. It fails to address the threats that the UK is currently facing, and it holds the potential to see us become complicit with businesses and organisations that violate human rights. The national security that the Secretary of State spoke of remains ill-defined, to the detriment of the objectives of the Bill. Added to that, under the screening mechanism outlined in the Bill, a number of sectors are not addressed, such as education—a core part of the UK’s economy and an attraction to thousands of foreign students across the globe, with institutions that undertake research and development programmes in myriad areas, including defence, development and foreign affairs. A recent study found that 10 UK university laboratories are now dependent on significant investment from Chinese defence firms, yet our universities have not been specified in the scope of the Government’s consultation on sectors to which mandatory notification applies. How can that not be considered a national security risk?
The pharmaceutical sector is a global success story, with many companies basing their operations here in the UK, but there is nothing in the Bill that would have stopped or reviewed the Chinese takeover of Bio Products Laboratory. At a time when we face greater and graver challenges around the health of mankind, the Government must rethink what needs to be included in the scope of their consultation.
I have touched on two sectors but said nothing about the UK’s nuclear sector or water industry. Both need to be given the cover to protect our national security. Our core infrastructure, which is intimately connected to our national security, is routinely being placed in the hands of foreign owners. That should be a cause of great concern to the whole House. My hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton) mentioned the 23 out of 117 Chinese acquisitions of UK firms—if less than 20% of Chinese acquisitions are being scrutinised under this legislation, we need to rethink parts of the Bill and strengthen it where possible.
Richard Fuller
I think it would be helpful for us to decide whether we are talking about foreign ownership of assets or Chinese ownership of assets. Obviously there is a gradation between them, but I am hearing from some of the contributions that we just do not like foreigner ownership of assets, which I am sure is not what my hon. Friend means at all.
Anthony Mangnall
It is important to recognise that China has a poor track record in this case, which has not been addressed, but of course we are not against foreign ownership. We want to ensure that the structure is in place to scrutinise these acquisitions in the correct way that protects opportunity in this country. I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention.
A few months ago, I broke cover early on to vote against the Government over the proposals to see our 5G network built by Huawei—and I have not lived it down yet! I did so because our core infrastructure should never be compromised by foreign investment, and that was a severe threat to our national security. I welcome the fact that the Government have moved so significantly and plan to phase out Huawei by 2027.
I also did so because of the reports of human rights violations by Huawei. The success of my right hon. Friend the Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May) in passing the Modern Slavery Act 2015 is a proud moment for the UK, but it is worthless unless we use this Bill to stop dealing with companies that are reported to be using slave labour and looking to invest in the United Kingdom. Nothing in the Bill prevents companies that are complicit in gross human rights violations from investing in the United Kingdom, and that is a huge oversight. It would be an injustice and morally wrong for the UK ever to look the other way as money created from slave labour was invested in this country.
We have been told that this is not the right Bill for such provisions, but with all due respect, that is the same excuse used by the Whips on every single occasion that I have raised concerns about a piece of legislation. If we are going to bring forward the correct pieces of legislation, let us bring them forward. If not, the Government should not be surprised if we try to tack on amendments to address the issues that so many Members across the House feel strongly about.
Bob Seely
My hon. Friend is making such a brilliant speech that I do not want to interrupt him, but I will do so briefly. Does he agree that all these concerns could be wrapped up in a public interest amendment—including, for example, a human rights element—which would give Ministers some leeway and scope to address them?
Anthony Mangnall
My hon. Friend is absolutely correct. I hope that the Minister is listening, that we might expect such an amendment to arrive before us in due course, and that, with the consent of the House, we might see it implemented.
As I was saying, the line between state and civil actor has been blurred. The civil/military fusion requires legislation, and the Bill is in need of development to counter it. I therefore ask the Government very quickly to consider the following few proposals.
First, I would suggest the introduction of a committee on foreign investment. Our colleagues in America have introduced such a system. That would alleviate the pressure for any decisions to be made from political expediency. I believe, as my hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham was saying, that that would promote parliamentary scrutiny and transparency and ensure that there was an understanding of the entire system.
Secondly, I would suggest that the definition of national security be expanded to include human rights. We do more often than not, in this country and in this place, develop policy around moral obligations. This should be one of those cases.
Thirdly, I suggest that we increase the Bill’s scope and use it to tackle organised crime. That has not been mentioned. The UK very successfully closed the domestic trade in ivory. There was a trade across the globe—a domestic trade in ivory that was linked to al-Shabab. There is a way to track organised crime down to terrorist organisations. There is scope within the Bill to do so.
Fourthly, a recent study found that at least 929 UK shell companies used in 89 corruption and money laundering cases accounted for £137 billion. Those companies are registered through Companies House. The Bill should be used to alleviate the burdens and ensure that there are fewer implications for the UK.
We can attract investment and tackle malign activities. I hope the Government will engage, in the same constructive manner in which they have introduced the Bill, and I will be supporting them tonight. I am sorry for going on for so long.
James Wild (North West Norfolk) (Con)
It is a pleasure to be called to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Totnes (Anthony Mangnall) and make a contribution reflecting my time as an adviser in the Ministry of Defence, as well as in the Cabinet Office, where I was involved in national security issues and the investment regime.
In three years advising the Defence Secretary, there were issues with an increasing number of transactions that, typically, related to small firms involved in sensitive parts of the defence supply chain or in emerging technologies. The regime at that time, because of the threshold limit, did not allow the Government to impose formal remedies, let alone block transactions. Instead, we had to rely on a quiet word with those seeking to sell firms, to discourage them from such action. In more than one case, a suspicion was that a hostile actor, a state actor, was seeking to use a transaction to acquire key intellectual property to support their offensive military capabilities.
Persuasion did ensure that none of those transactions came to fruition, but the risk was clearly there. It is not acceptable to leave that gap in our powers. In the Cabinet Office I worked on measures to improve the Government’s ability to take a more strategic view of risks, and to understand the cumulative impact that my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes) and others have talked about, as well as bringing in the regulations to lower the threshold for military dual-use goods and advanced technologies. That dealt with some of the problems, but the case for comprehensive reform to strengthen the current legal framework is compelling.
In legislating, our role here today is to judge how best to protect national security while encouraging investment and maintaining the UK’s hard-fought reputation as one of the best places to do business. In my view, that is best done by having a regime that is targeted, predictable, transparent and efficient, so I welcome the Bill, which improves on the proposals set out in the White Paper. It gives more clarity on the sectors where the greatest risks to national security exist, and for which a mandatory approach will therefore rightly apply, subject to consultation.
However, investors must be assured that the regime is about national security; it is not a power to block transactions that Ministers do not like, or a back door to protectionism. There also needs to be an efficient screening system. It is crucial that the structures and resources are put in place to ensure that the timetables for review and assessment in the Bill are actually met. I know that the proposed investment security unit will sit within BEIS. Others have mentioned that issue. I should be grateful if the Minister would explain how the unit will work—for example, with the National Security Secretariat within the Cabinet Office—and whether there will be joint staffing, given the need for people with sufficient experience and vetting to provide the advice, because the success of the regime depends on being able to deal with the number of notifications coming forward. Will there also be additional resourcing for the agencies and other parts of Government that will provide those assessments?
The Bill represents a proportionate approach to provide the powers to screen transactions on national security grounds and ensures that the UK remains open for business—but not at any cost.
Nickie Aiken (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)
First, I note that I am the only woman on the Government Benches speaking in the debate today. That is not because many of my colleagues do not wish to. For example, my hon. Friends the Members for South Ribble (Katherine Fletcher) and for Rutland and Melton (Alicia Kearns) cannot speak today because they are self-isolating or shielding and our virtual Parliament does not allow them to take part in these debates. The sooner we allow Members who are having to self-isolate and shield to take part in debates, the better.
I welcome the Bill and the work it will do not only to protect British business and our national security, but to provide more safety and comfort to companies and individuals from abroad investing in the United Kingdom. There is a clear need for the Bill to secure new investment as we transition into a genuinely independent trading nation for the simple reason that legislation in this area was last written at the beginning of this century, and it has not kept up with business and advances in technology since then.
I regularly speak to financial and professional services based in my constituency of the Cities of London and Westminster, and the legislation technology lag is often a key concern. I am glad that the Government are taking action to prevent the lag from growing any greater. As we recover from covid-19, it is essential, for the economy to recover, that we remain a vibrant and attractive destination for global investment. The actions taken under the Bill to make interactions with the Government simpler, more transparent and swifter than the current regime have to be welcomed for the benefits to both domestic business seeking international capital and those investing from abroad alike.
The Bill, as I understand it, will also create an investment screening regime in line with those that already exist in other nations around the world—many have been mentioned today—meaning that investors will be familiar with the processes that they will likely have to undertake. I am pleased that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State is keenly aware that we must strike a balance between preserving national security and enshrining the UK’s world-leading position as an investment location. Of course, we are aware that it is only a small minority of rogue players who might pose a risk to our national security, so we must welcome legitimate investment as openly as possible. I hope the Government will continue to work with businesses as the Bill progresses to ensure that that balance is maintained.
Having said that, I understand that the Government predict, in their impact assessments, that less than 1% of all mergers and acquisitions and asset transactions will result in voluntary notification to Government. Some of the magic circle law firms based in my constituency believe that the Government may have underestimated those figures and, indeed, even if they are correct, it will none the less result in a much greater number of transactions being reviewed than is currently the case. They are concerned that the increased administrative burden of more reviews might deter investors. I would welcome a response from the Minister on that point.
I am pleased that the Bill’s focus is on national security concerns and that it will not enable the Government to intervene for wider economic reasons. This appears to remove the potential for any political interference when reviewing mergers and acquisitions. I would welcome assurances from my hon. Friend the Minister that it is the Government’s intention to take the politics out of that as much as possible. Furthermore, I am reassured that the new investment security unit will be within the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, rather than across Government—although I take the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for North West Norfolk (James Wild)—meaning greater consistency and potential speed in decision making. It is about that speed. As has been said already today, 30 days should really mean 30 days if we are to ensure that we do not block investment.
Finally, the Bill is to be welcomed in the broader context of other legislation before the House. I spoke last week in the Second Reading debate on the Financial Services Bill, brought forward by Her Majesty’s Treasury. Taken together, I believe the Bills represent a clear indicator that across Government, this Administration understand the priority and impact the financial and professional services, many based in the City of London, have on UK plc and the wider global economy. They will lead the recapitalisation of the economy post covid-19 and they will finance the Government’s levelling up agenda. It is right that we do what we can to ensure that they can operate safely and securely as technology advances in the financial marketplace.
I hope that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and ministerial colleagues will continue to consult business as the Bill progresses through the House. Should I be able to act as a conduit to the business community in my constituency, I would be delighted to help. I commend the Bill to the House.
Richard Fuller (North East Bedfordshire) (Con)
It is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Nickie Aiken), who represents a constituency where many businesses will have to wrestle with some of the implications of the Bill as it passes through and becomes law. I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and the Minister on their preparation of this Bill. A lot of good time has been put in over the past couple of years and good evidence has been presented to prepare the Bill for debate today, and it will be my pleasure to support it.
It is both easier and right to look at this as a national security measure and not so much as an investment measure; we have to deal with the investment implications, but it is important that we get the national security measures right. There has been lots of conversation today about the requirements of the Bill, but I have to say that the evidence of historical examples has not been quite as strong as some of the measures in it. In many cases, this is a precautionary Bill, rather than one driven by the evidence historically. I do not think we want to be too critical of what we have been doing over the past 10 or 15 years. As many Members have said, this Bill is bringing something up to date so that we can deal with the things we think might be coming in the next 10 or 20 years.
I can now see why the Minister has had to thread a needle to try to land this precisely. Many voices, on all sides, have been asking him to extend the Bill. Indeed, the Bill has the potential to be an expansive octopus, given the pressures that might be put on the Government to extend it. I have heard about having a wider national interest test and including more sectors than the 17 we already have. We have talked about a definition of the national interest, which has been portrayed to the Minister as something that might restrict, but, as he well knows, the more precise a definition, the broader it can be in terms of how it is interpreted for others.
There have been many cautionary comments from others about the extension of the Bill into a national industry strategy for the country—that is not the purpose of the Bill. The right hon. Member for Doncaster North (Edward Miliband), the Opposition spokesman, who is no longer in his place, misjudged the Bill in saying that that is something we need to adorn it with. That would be completely inappropriate and it would take away from some of the scrutiny I hope Members will give the Bill as it goes through Committee.
I ask the Minister to be aware of and listen to people on the potential for unintended consequences. We have heard a lot about the decision in respect of Huawei, but he will be aware of the potential for retaliatory measures by us. Please look at the unintended consequences in respect of innovation in some of the sectors that may be affected. In that regard, I just point Members to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests as an adviser to a technology company.
May we also feed something in from the Government Benches about a pattern we are seeing? As we are bringing forward more regulatory measures and as we take back regulatory powers from the EU, parliamentarians are constantly raising the question of what parliamentary oversight of those regulatory powers there is. It would be useful if Ministers would look at that. I congratulate the Minister on presenting the Bill and I am grateful for the opportunity to make some comments today.
David Johnston (Wantage) (Con)
It is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for North East Bedfordshire (Richard Fuller), who always brings a lot of expertise to debates about business matters in this House. I welcome the Bill, and I say that as a supporter of open trade and investment, not as a supporter of protectionism, not least because I want to see companies and products from the UK in every country in the world.
The Government’s No. 1 job is our national security, as is any Government’s. The regime for assessing that through an investment lens was designed in 2002. We can all pick something from 2002 that indicates just how long ago that was, but I have opted for the fact that it was in 2002 that President George W. Bush declared Iran, Iraq and North Korea as being the “axis of evil”. Whether or not we think he was right to do that and that those were the right countries, it illustrates just how much geopolitics has changed in that time and shows that we were not thinking about the threats we now face, at least in the same way, in 2002. It is therefore right that the Government now update the regime that we use to assess these matters. It is also right to have a system of mandatory notifications in the 17 areas that have been defined. In 2002, we did not even understand how artificial intelligence or advanced robotics might improve our lives, never mind the ways in which they might be used by hostile states to endanger our national security.
It is right that the Secretary of State will have a five-year period in which to call in trigger events after they have happened. That will enable him or her to perceive a threat that may not have been immediately obvious at the time of the trigger event. The Government rightly say that this Bill is not about one country or one threat—we should not be looking through the lens of 2002 for the current regime; we should make legislation now based on which countries we think are the threats in 2020. But I was one of the people concerned about the position we had got into with Huawei, which is, in many ways, a good example of why we need that retrospective power. Difficult though it may be to unwind some decisions, there are times when we have to do so. It is also right that there is no turnover threshold. If it relates to national security, it relates to national security. Turnover simply should not be a factor.
Unusually, I found that a lot of criticisms of the Bill that I looked at before this debate were actually in its favour, although a number of Members have actually made great contributions today about the ways in which we might further strengthen the legislation. The fact that we might, by the Government’s estimate, see between 1,000 and 1,830 notifications made says to me not that the new regime is too strong, but that our old regime has not been strong enough. Maybe it will end up at that number and maybe it will not, but having only had 12 assessments done in the period since 2002 suggests to me that we are not dealing with a strong enough set of tools to assess these situations. The fact that 100 instances might have to go through a full national security assessment and that we might seek to impose remedies on 50—again, by the Government’s assessment—just underlines why this legislation is important and why we need a much stronger regime.
It is right that national security is not defined in this legislation, as that will enable the Government—and, importantly, our security services—to interpret it as broadly as they can, and to perceive threats that they may not have perceived before. It is also right that the Secretary of State makes the decisions. I have seen some pooh-poohing of the role of politicians in this process, with the idea that they might use it for political gain or domestic considerations that are not really about national security, but we elect politicians to make judgments about national security. They are the ones who are truly accountable, rather than officials. It is right that that role should sit with the Secretary of State.
I welcome the way in which we have borrowed from international examples: mandatory notifications such as those in the US and Japan, and a retrospective period such as that in France and Germany. This suggests that we have looked at examples around the world, and borrowed from them all to try to get the best system for us. Of course, it also underlines the fact that we are behind a number of our partners—both the Five Eyes and our western European partners—and therefore the importance of passing this legislation quickly.
I will continue to welcome foreign investment and foreign trade, but I will never do so with any risk to national security. Given the actions that we see from hostile states through their investment decisions on a weekly basis, the passage of this Bill cannot come quickly enough.
Alexander Stafford (Rother Valley) (Con)
It is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Wantage (David Johnston) and also to recall the axis of evil. He mentions that things have moved on, but I challenge that and say that those countries that were part of that axis of evil are still threats today. Some of us were warning about the likes of China and Russia back in 2000, so I believe that the world is becoming a far more dangerous place. We have an increased number of threats rather than fewer, which is why this Bill is so fundamentally important. We need to have national security as our watchword. I know that this Government understand that perfectly well, so, as well as encouraging new investment into Britain, we need to increase the security and safety of British interests from hostile actors.
The Bill will give the Government new powers to block mergers and acquisitions when they are national security risks. It will also introduce an extension of screening powers to include assets and intellectual property as well as companies.
Why is this Bill so necessary? There is no doubt that foreign direct investment is vital to the UK economy. In the past 10 years, over 600,000 new jobs have been created from more than 16,000 FDI projects and $750 billion have flowed into the UK as a result of FDI. Foreign direct investment is overwhelmingly a good thing. As a Conservative, I am greatly anticipating throwing open our doors to global inward investment as we exit the Brexit transition period. I support unrestricted international trade and, for me, attracting investment into Britain is one of the most exciting things about leaving the European Union. Let me make this clear: leaving the European Union allows us to increase investment in this country, and it will be better economically for all of us.
However, we cannot be naive about the threat that certain regimes pose for the United Kingdom. They exert their influence by taking over companies in strategic areas and increasing our dependency on their products and services, limiting our independence and stifling our dissent in the process. We cannot overthrow the shackles of the European Union only for hostile powers to come over and take over the jewels in the British crown. That is not acceptable.
Members will know well that one of my political interests is the combating of the malign influence of the People’s Republic of China. The Government demonstrated strong leadership earlier this year by banning Huawei from Britain’s 5G infrastructure. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Totnes (Anthony Mangnall), who is no longer in his place, who helped the Government to come to the realisation of these malign influences. However, despite Huawei’s weak protestations of independence from the Chinese Communist party, western politicians and companies know the price of conducting business in the PRC. A mainland Chinese telecom company, founded by a former People’s Liberation Army officer, has no chance of avoiding Beijing’s meddling, especially when the company in question is playing a central role in critical western infrastructure.
The same can be said of TikTok, a Chinese-owed app, which has enjoyed explosive growth in the west among teenagers. It is not all fun and games though, with the company being accused of having close links with the Chinese regime and of gathering data on our young people. Indeed, we heard from representatives of TikTok on the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee a couple of weeks ago, and we heard their protestations saying that they had no connection almost and that they were not passing over data. However, how can that be true when TikTok is owned by China—a state that is naturally hostile to human rights and many other aspects?
There are very real fears that the Chinese state is using its economic influence to weaken our Government, sow discord in our societies and extend its surveillance network in our lives. Let us be honest, it is not just in Britain that we see China act in such a way. We have seen it act across the middle east and into Africa as well. We are not the only country over which China is trying to extend its influence and it is great that this Bill will go some way to stop that influence and protect our national infrastructure. I am pleased that the Bill takes such a strong stance.
Huawei and TikTok should act as a cautionary tale to us for the future. The PRC’s unforgivable actions in Hong Kong, an autonomous territory, against the Uyghurs, a distinct and proud people, and against the Christians in China show us that Beijing cannot play by the rules and we cannot rely on them to look after our best interests.
However, the PRC is not the only regime about which we must worry. I do not need to remind Members of the threat posed by Russia and Iran and other despotic dictatorships. My priority is the protection of the British national interest and the safety of UK citizens. As the UK’s current powers to oversee foreign investment date from legislation in 2002, new primary legislation is needed to bring the UK Government’s powers up to date. As my hon. Friend the Member for Wantage said, much has changed over the past 20 years and therefore these new powers must take into account new threats and technological, economic and geopolitical changes. The Government must have powers to intervene effectively and efficiently to protect the UK. Furthermore, to be an effective and trustworthy ally to our friends and partners around the world, we must bring our powers into line with theirs. Australia, Japan and the United States have already taken action in this area, and we must not be left behind, because if we are, our businesses and our infrastructure will be ripe for the picking for these malign regimes.
This Bill means that we can continue to work on bringing investment to our shores, boosting GDP and creating jobs as we recover from the coronavirus while defending ourselves against those who threaten the safety of the British people and the UK’s sensitive assets. I expect Members in all parts of the House to support this crucial piece of legislation, which will ensure that we are prepared for the challenges and the threats of the future, because the world is not a safe place and there are many countries and regimes that want to do us down. We will always stand with the British people and with British business to protect our interests.
Aaron Bell (Newcastle-under-Lyme) (Con)
It is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Rother Valley (Alexander Stafford), and indeed colleagues around the House, as the last Back-Bench speaker in this debate.
This has been a very thoughtful debate with lots of interesting suggestions for the Minister from all sides. I thank the Secretary of State for his opening remarks and the Minister for his engagement with these issues. He met the Science and Technology Committee last week to talk through the Bill. It was obviously time well spent, because three of my colleagues from the Committee have already spoken, and now he has me as well—so well done to the Minister.
It is tempting, from a science and technology perspective, to seek to widen the scope of the Bill to attempt, for example, to protect start-ups in these fields, which are very innovative. Ultimately, however, I come down in the same place as the Chairman of the Committee, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tunbridge Wells (Greg Clark). Countries that try to legislate themselves into self-sufficiency instead end up self-satisfied, and that would then strangle the very innovation that we all seek and want to see in our businesses in the spheres of science and technology. I am therefore pleased that the Bill is drawn narrowly.
The Bill sits at the nexus of our domestic economy and our international relations. If we were to widen its scope beyond the fairly narrow way it has been drawn, that could have unintended consequences for both those things. We heard the excellent and witty speech from the former Leader of the Opposition, the right hon. Member for Doncaster North (Edward Miliband), who clearly has lots of ambitions in the area of industrial strategy. I look forward to him putting that into the next Labour manifesto, perhaps, and that is where we can discuss these things, but this Bill is not the place to try to detail all the elements, whether it is about confectionery companies, union control or any of those sorts of things. This needs to be a narrow Bill so that we do not move into too many unintended consequences.
On international relations, as my hon. Friend the Member for Wantage (David Johnston) said, we need to move with the times and in response to events. The exact nature of the threats we face evolves and changes over time. I trust my right hon. Friends the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister, and we need to give them the leeway to make judgments about national security in the face of what the international situation is at the time. This Bill is not just for the next five years. It is not just for the threat that we clearly face from the expansionist tendencies of Russia and China. It needs to stand the test of time, and by drawing it narrowly, we give it a better chance of doing that.
I support the Bill as it is, although many colleagues around the Chamber have made thoughtful suggestions for amendments, and I know the Minister will speak to those when he winds up. First, it gives us more security. Others in this place are far more expert on national security than I am, but it is clear that the developments we have seen over the past decade have meant that we have had to re-evaluate our relations with potentially hostile actors, such as China. My right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) spoke very firmly about that. This Bill gives us a proportionate defence against hostile actors who are targeting sensitive UK assets, and in ever more novel and complex ways that we could not have imagined in 2002 when the Enterprise Act on which our current defences rest was passed. It is time to update those powers, and I hope we can do so in a way that will stand the test of time. It is also right that we update those powers with a turnover requirement, because, again to echo my hon. Friend the Member for Wantage, national security is no respecter of the size of a company or where it is in terms of growth. Sometimes very nascent companies could have a significant impact on our national security in future.
The Bill provides more certainty for businesses and a regime that prioritises swift resolution of referrals and call-ins. That is absolutely, fundamentally important. My hon. Friend the Member for Arundel and South Downs (Andrew Griffith) was very much to the point on this. Businesses deserve certainty. If the answer is no on national security grounds, that is fair enough, but we cannot leave things in limbo. One might think that the five-year period does leave businesses in limbo to some extent. I acknowledge my hon. Friend’s point that most lawyers will probably suggest that they notify the Minister, and so, as he said, publishing statistics on notifications would be welcome. We need to maintain the UK as a premier foreign direct investment destination, because it is so important to our future, to our recovery from covid, to meeting our net zero targets—I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Arundel and South Downs on his appointment on that—and to levelling up. It is particularly relevant to me, in Newcastle-under-Lyme in north Staffordshire, that we continue to attract foreign direct investment so that we can continue to regrow our national economy and our local economies in areas that have not had much investment in the past couple of decades.
To sum up, this Bill will give us a regime in line with some of our strongest allies in the world. It will protect our national security and ensure that Britain remains fully open for business, and for all those reasons, I will be supporting it on Second Reading.
Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)
As my right hon. Friend the Member for Doncaster North (Edward Miliband) set out very well in opening the debate, we support the Bill. Inward investment is crucial for businesses across the UK and our economy, but it is also crucial that the UK has the powers in place to scrutinise and intervene in business transactions that could have implications for our national security.
In fact, we would have welcomed this Bill a long time ago. It is clear that the Government have failed to keep pace with other countries, including the United States, France and Germany, that have already taken steps to update the legislation in line with evolving security threats. From serious questions about Huawei’s dominant role in the UK’s 5G network, as raised many times by the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), to the takeover of Imagination Technologies by Canyon Bridge, it is inarguable that the Government have been slow off the mark on foreign acquisitions and the possible implications for national security.
Right hon. and hon. Members from all sides agreed on that, including, I think, the Chairs of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, the Science and Technology Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee, and all five—I think it was five—members of the Intelligence and Security Committee who spoke. I thank colleagues from across the House for their contributions and apologise in advance if I cannot do justice to all of them.
This has been an excellent debate, one that I think showed the House at its best; we heard informed and considered speeches and, where there was disagreement, it was reasoned and open. There is strong agreement across the House that new legislation is necessary to combat changing security threats and to balance those considerations against the ambition to ensure that the UK remains an attractive country in which to invest.
Companies in fast-developing fields, from quantum computing to telecommunications to artificial intelligence to cryptography, are no longer just companies; they are strategic assets that are fundamental to our nation’s security. Until now, Ministers have failed to modernise the takeover regime to keep up with this changing landscape, the pace of technological development and what that means for security. Instead, they have continued to operate within a legal framework that, as we have heard, was created almost two decades ago, before Facebook or Twitter were even invented. My hon. Friend the Member for Warrington North (Charlotte Nichols) explained the impact of that uncertainty on the nuclear industry and investment in her constituency.
That is why we strongly welcome the Bill now and agree that it is necessary. It is essential that we get the specific provisions of the Bill right, in order not to deter foreign direct investment while also balancing the need to protect our national security. First, there is the definition of national security, which was raised by many, particularly the hon. Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely). The right hon. Member for South Holland and The Depths (Sir John Hayes)—[Interruption.] The Deepings, sorry.
Chi Onwurah
The right hon. Gentleman is always very deep in his responses. He suggested it was deliberately left undefined in the Bill. The sectors that will be subject to mandatory notification are also not defined in the Bill and, we are told, will be set out in secondary legislation. I thank the hon. Member for Bolton North East (Mark Logan) for his provisional mnemonic and wish him well in updating it.
Definitions, and the lack of them, are important because the proposed powers are not limited by size of turnover or share of supply threshold. They could apply to almost every business transaction within the sectors, and the definition of national security therefore must be set out to help provide clarity for businesses and investors, but it is unclear—perhaps the Minister could provide some of that clarity—whether the takeover of the UK artificial intelligence company DeepMind by Google would have been called in on national security grounds under the scope of this Bill.
In Committee, Labour will seek further details on how the retrospective powers to render acquisitions void would be applied and whether an assessment has been made of the economic and legal consequences for businesses and their employees of acquisitions being rendered void after the fact. The hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie) highlighted the Government’s capacity, or lack of it, to process the sheer volume of estimated notifications that the Bill will provoke. We need also to look at how businesses, small businesses in particular, will be supported to cope with the new regulations, which may prove difficult to navigate. We will ask also whether an assessment has been made by Government of the impact the changes could have on investment in small businesses—a chilling effect—including university start-ups, particularly those in the 17 key sectors, which was a point made by the hon. Member for The Wrekin (Mark Pritchard).
Labour will also seek assurances about transparency and oversight and how the powers are applied—a worry of the hon. Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart)—including calling on the Government to explore giving the Intelligence and Security Committee a role in scrutinising the use of powers under this legislation. My right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) was right to emphasise the importance of the involvement of and access for the intelligence services.
We hope to work with the Government to ensure that we establish a robust, transparent and fair regime that protects national security, while allowing the UK to continue to enjoy the opportunities that overseas investment affords businesses across our country and economy, but the Bill is also a missed opportunity. It is a missed opportunity to demonstrate what the Government mean by “industrial strategy” and to show that it is more than a slogan. It is a missed opportunity to help UK businesses in key sectors to flourish and grow here in the UK, sustaining and creating jobs—a point on which my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon (Stephen Kinnock) was particularly eloquent.
Time and again, we see vibrant, growing UK companies sadly lost overseas. While we recognise that foreign acquisition can breathe new life into a company, supporting jobs and growth in the UK, far too often we see UK companies pawned off or stripped for parts. Far too often we see UK companies bought out and wound down to eliminate the competition, with the consequent loss of high-skilled jobs. Nowhere is that more evident than in the technology sector, which must be a key part of any 21st century industrial strategy.
We have lost far too many businesses to Silicon Valley, weakening our technological sovereignty. The takeover of leading UK technological company Arm by the US company Nvidia was announced recently, and while Ministers claim to have scrutinised the deal, they have not been forthcoming with the details. When Arm was previously taken over by SoftBank, legal assurances were extracted about the future of the company’s Cambridge headquarters and the UK workforce. Have Ministers extracted the same legal assurances at this time? Will the Minister come clean today?
The Business Secretary said himself that the UK should be open for business but not for exploitation. However, key companies have been cherry picked by companies in San Jose, with the UK consequently losing out. It is therefore not clear that the current takeover regime is fit for purpose.
The weaknesses in the current regime are about not just national security but industrial strategy. Under the current regime, the Secretary of State has the power to intervene in qualifying businesses on four public interest grounds: media plurality, national security, stability of the UK finance system, and the capability to combat and mitigate the effect on public health emergencies.
Sir John Hayes
The coincidence, as I described it, between national interests and national security is profound and is proven. When a company is taken over and technology transfer takes place, it is possible for a nation that is hostile to our interests to gain a sufficient understanding to develop systems that endanger this country, including, in some cases, weapons systems.
Chi Onwurah
The right hon. Member is talking to a chartered engineer who strongly believes that our capability in engineering and the kind of key technologies of which he talks is a basis for our national security, and that national security, without some degree of important technological sovereignty, is difficult to wholly achieve. I look forward to debating that in Committee.
It is worth pointing out that the Government’s powers have been used only sporadically in previous interventions, and they are seemingly not underpinned by any real strategy. The hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton) made a similar point.
Many Conservative Members are vehemently opposed to extending the remit of the Bill to cover industrial strategy, including, but not limited to, the hon. Members for Totnes (Anthony Mangnall), for North West Norfolk (James Wild), for Cities of London and Westminster (Nickie Aiken), for North East Bedfordshire (Richard Fuller), for Wantage (David Johnston), for Rother Valley (Alexander Stafford), for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Aaron Bell) and for South Dorset (Richard Drax). Labour believes, however, that the Government should be able to intervene in the takeover of a critical business on industrial strategy grounds. That power should be paired with defined criteria and transaction thresholds to give businesses and foreign investors clarity and confidence, and to truly make it clear that we are open for business and not exploitation—to coin a phrase.
Why did the Government not bring forward legislation to ensure that technology firms remain in the UK and to end the current ad hoc approach to industrial strategy being pursued by Ministers? That has seen binding commitments often negotiated at the last minute, companies lost, and no clarity as to the rhyme or reason why the Government choose to intervene or not. I urge the Secretary of State and the Minister to continue to approach the Bill in the spirit of collaboration, to address the undefined areas and issues that we have raised, and to shed some light on their long-term industrial strategy, including their plans to keep high-growth technological companies flourishing in the UK.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Nadhim Zahawi)
It is a pleasure, as ever, to follow the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah). I thank all hon. Members who have spoken in this important debate. We have had upwards of 25 speeches, all of which were thoughtfully delivered. I also thank the shadow Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Doncaster North (Edward Miliband), for his constructive approach to this important piece of legislation. I will aim to respond to as many points made by hon. Members as possible, but I will, of course, write in response to individual questions as well.
I begin by responding to the points of the right hon. Member for Doncaster North and the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central, who both raised the grounds for intervention when it comes to the legislation. The legal texts in the Bill are explicit in their reference to national security rather than public interest or wider economic considerations. The hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central mentioned the particular deal with DeepMind and Google. If it is deemed that the asset is so important to national security—it does not matter who the acquirer is—the Bill would allow us to intervene and block that acquisition.
I have to be clear to the House today that any action the Secretary of State takes under the proposed regime would be to protect national security and not for wider economic or industrial reasons. I am sure that the right hon. Member for Doncaster North will look forward to the industrial strategy refresh that the Secretary of State is committed to publishing in the first quarter of 2021.
To address the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton), we already have a proportionate public interest power on the statute book, and most recently we have legislated to allow intervention for mitigating the effects of public health emergencies. The right hon. Member for Doncaster North and the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central also asked about the engagement with Government. The investment security unit will ensure that clear guidance is available to support all businesses engaging with investment screening from the outset. We have made it clear to the investment community that we are committed to effective engagement with businesses on the regime itself, and to ensuring that they are able to access a dedicated, simple online portal to notify us of any potential transaction. Of course, we note the importance of a full Government approach to investment screening. While the unit will be based in BEIS—this point was made by the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) when he talked about the ISC—it will work closely with the security agencies and other Departments with real sector expertise. The chief executive of Make UK, Stephen Phipson has recognised this point, saying: “Technology development moves at fast pace and this Bill will modernise the UK’s approach in a proportionate way, given the Government’s commitment to a quick and streamlined process of evaluation.”
More widely, I am happy to meet any hon. and right hon. Member who has today expressed an interest in the workings of the investment security unit. The right hon. Member for Doncaster North also raised the role of the Intelligence and Security Committee, as many other colleagues have done today, and we will of course work constructively with its members and, indeed, with other Committees across the House. I wish the Chair of the Committee, the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), well, and I would like to thank the other members of the Committee who spoke today. The contributions from the hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie), the right hon. Member for North Durham, my hon. Friend the Member for The Wrekin (Mark Pritchard), my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes) and my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) were typically excellent and well-informed.
The right hon. Member for Doncaster, North, along with the hon. Member for Bristol North West (Darren Jones), also raised the issue of the five-year period for retrospection. We have come to that view because six months would simply be too short, and we have looked at what other countries have done. It would be relatively easy for hostile parties to keep a trigger event quiet for six months and time us out, but that will be substantially more difficult in a five-year period.
Sir John Hayes
I am extremely are grateful to the Minister for his comments about the members of the ISC who have contributed to the debate. Given the range of questions posed to him by ISC members, will he commit to write to the Committee formally to pick up those points, so that the Committee has a clear set of answers to the series of questions posed? It would not be fair to expect him to deal with all of them now.
Nadhim Zahawi
I can certainly give my right hon. Friend that commitment; I will do that.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely) and the hon. Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Layla Moran), who is not in her place, probed on the definition of national security. A number of hon. Members have argued that the definition of national security is too narrow. I would gently point out that the Bill does not seek to define it at all, as some other Members have quite rightly argued, including, very wisely, my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham. I think that is a real strength of the Bill, not a weakness. It means that the Government have the flexibility to act as risks change over time. The statement of policy that was published last week refers to espionage, disruption and destruction and inappropriate leverage. Those are examples of national security, not the exhaustive content of it. We need to maintain a degree of flexibility in our approach, as my hon. Friends the Members for Wantage (David Johnston) and for Beckenham recognised. I appreciate that these are quite important powers, and of course they are fully justiciable under the Bill. Hon. Members can feel secure knowing that their use, including the application of national security, can be fully tested in closed courts if necessary.
The Chair of the Science and Technology Committee, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tunbridge Wells (Greg Clark), and my hon. Friend the Member for The Wrekin expressed concerns that these reforms will somehow threaten investment in small tech firms. I again remind the House that we estimate that the vast majority of transactions across the economy will not be affected by this legislation, and we do not expect to take action in relation to most of the small number that are notifiable. We will make any interactions with the Government simpler, quicker and slicker by providing clearance to most transactions within 30 days, and often quicker. Notifiable investments will be submitted through a new digital portal. At the spring Budget, the Government committed to increase public spending on R&D to £22 billion, which I think is music to the ears of many innovators in our country.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Tunbridge Wells and my hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat) made the important point that the Bill does not set out a minimum size of business affected by the regime. As the Secretary of State set out, the threats we face today do not correlate to the size of the parties concerned, as they perhaps once did. This is unfortunately the world we live in. I am glad that we live in a country in which small and medium-sized businesses thrive so mightily and are often at the vanguard of cutting-edge technologies, but it is only right that the Government have flexible powers to intervene when the acquisition of such businesses may pose a risk to our national security.
My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight, the hon. Member for Bristol North West (Darren Jones) and the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) raised the issue of supply chains. The covid pandemic has demonstrated the importance of resilience in supply chains to ensure the continued flow of essential items to keep global trade moving. We have focused on ensuring supply chains for goods such as PPE. When we entered the pandemic, only 1% was manufactured in the UK; it is now about 70%. That is why we are looking at what other steps we can take to ensure that we have diverse supply chains in place. We will consider all our global supply chains to avoid shortages in the event of future crises.
My hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling, my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings and the hon. Member for Dundee East also probed the assessment process. We will make any interaction with the Government much simpler, quicker and slicker, and I am very happy to share how we are doing that.
The Chair of the BEIS Committee, the hon. Member for Bristol North West, probed our approach to sectors. It is important for the regime to reflect technological change and keep up with the investment landscape. We welcome views from across the business community on our sector consultation, and officials from across Government are already engaging with the sectors’ experts to ensure that those definitions are tight.
In the time that I have left, I want to tackle the issue of human rights. My hon. Friends the Members for Isle of Wight and for Totnes (Anthony Mangnall), and the hon. Member for Oxford West and Abingdon raised the issue of human rights, particularly in relation to Xinjiang and the Uyghur people. We take our responsibility incredibly seriously and are concerned about gross violations of human rights being perpetrated against the Uyghur Muslims and other minorities in Xinjiang. We have played a leading international role in holding China to account on these abuses and we will continue to do so through the UN and other opportunities that we have. In respect of the risk of UK business complicity in human rights violations, including forced labour, we have urged all UK businesses to conduct due diligence on their supply chains and are taking steps to strengthen supply chain transparency.
In conclusion, we have had an excellent debate today and I again thank right hon. and hon. Members for their contributions. I look forward to further probing the Bill and getting it right together in Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read a Second time.
National Security and Investment Bill (Programme)
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),
That the following provisions shall apply to the National Security and Investment Bill:
Committal
(1) The Bill shall be committed to a Public Bill Committee.
Proceedings in Public Bill Committee
(2) Proceedings in the Public Bill Committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion on Tuesday 15 December 2020.
(3) The Public Bill Committee shall have leave to sit twice on the first day on which it meets.
Proceedings on Consideration and up to and including Third Reading
(4) Proceedings on Consideration and any proceedings in legislative grand committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which proceedings on Consideration are commenced.
(5) Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day.
(6) Standing Order No.83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings on Consideration and up to and including Third Reading.
Other proceedings
(7) Any other proceedings on the Bill may be programmed.—(David Duguid.)
Question agreed to.
National Security and Investment Bill (Money)
Queen’s recommendation signified.
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 52(1)(a)),
That, for the purposes of any Act arising from the National Security and Investment Bill, it is expedient to authorise:
(1) the payment of sums out of money provided by Parliament of any expenditure incurred under or by virtue of the Act by the Secretary of State, and
(2) the payment of sums into the Consolidated Fund.—(David Duguid.)
Question agreed to.
National Security and Investment Bill (First sitting)
Tuesday 24th November 2020
(3 years, 12 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 24 November 2020 - (24 Nov 2020)
The Chair
Before we begin, I have a few preliminary points to make. Please switch electronic devices to silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings. Members can sit in any seat marked with a “please sit here” sign. That includes the side tables and the Public Gallery, although Hansard colleagues have priority on the side tables. Members sitting in the Public Gallery should stand by the microphone to my right.
We will first consider the programme motion on the amendment paper. We will then consider a motion to enable the reporting of written evidence for publication, and then a motion to allow us to deliberate in private on our questions, before the oral evidence sessions. In view of the limited time available, I hope we can take these matters without too much debate. I call the Minister to move the programme motion agreed to yesterday by the Programming Sub-Committee.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Nadhim Zahawi)
I beg to move, Date Time Witness Tuesday 24 November Until no later than 10.30 am The Royal United Services Institute Tuesday 24 November Until no later than 11.25 am Sir Richard Dearlove KCMG OBE Tuesday 24 November Until no later than 2.45 pm The Centre for International Studies, London School of Economics Tuesday 24 November Until no later than 3.30 pm Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP Tuesday 24 November Until no later than 4.15 pm The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales Tuesday 24 November Until no later than 5 pm The Investment Association Thursday 26 November Until no later than 12.15 pm Slaughter and May Thursday 26 November Until no later than 1 pm Professor Ciaran Martin, the Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford Thursday 26 November Until no later than 2.30 pm Herbert Smith Freehills Thursday 26 November Until no later than 3.15 pm Simons Muirhead and Burton Thursday 26 November Until no later than 4 pm Chatham House Thursday 26 November Until no later than 4.30 pm PricewaterhouseCoopers
That—
(1) the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 9.25am on Tuesday 24 November) meet—
(a) at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 24 November;
(b) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 26 November;
(c) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 1 December;
(d) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 3 December;
(e) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 8 December;
(f) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 10 December;
(g) at 9.25 am on Tuesday 15 December;
(2) the Committee shall hear oral evidence in accordance with the following Table:
TABLE
(3) proceedings on consideration of the Bill in Committee shall be taken in the following order: Clauses 1 to 10; Schedule 1; Clauses 11 to 58; Schedule 2; Clauses 59 to 66; new Clauses; new Schedules; remaining proceedings on the Bill;
(4) the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 11.25 am on Tuesday 15 December.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg, and to serve with colleagues on this important Bill Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That, at this and any subsequent meeting at which oral evidence is to be heard, the Committee shall sit in private until the witnesses are admitted.—(Nadhim Zahawi.)
Resolved,
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Nadhim Zahawi.)
The Chair
Copies of the written evidence that the Committee receives will be made available in the Committee Room. We will now sit in private to discuss lines of questioning.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from the Royal United Services Institute. Before calling the first Member to ask a question, I remind all Members that questions should be limited to matters within the scope of the Bill and that we must stick to the timings in the programme motion. The Committee has agreed that for this sitting we have until 10.30 am. Will the witness introduce themselves for the record? [Interruption.] I am going to suspend the sitting for a few moments to see whether we can sort out the technical problems that we are having. This is not the first time; even the Prime Minister had problems yesterday.
The Chair
Q
Charles Parton: Thank you for inviting me. I am Charles Parton. I was, for 38 years, a diplomat, mostly with the UK, but for five years with the European delegation until the end of 2017. My area of work has largely been on China and, in the last decade, on the politics of China and the Communist party. I was an adviser to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons on two of its recent China reports. I continue, since leaving diplomacy, to study what the Communist party is doing and the relevance of that to our UK policy.
Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)
Q
Charles Parton: I would not profess to be an expert on individual cases, but I would like to make some general response to your excellent question. The first point to make is that the Government have not really been attending to the problem with the attention that they should, given the nature of the threat, particularly from the Chinese, although others may be relevant too. I do not think that there is the structure for actually assessing the degree of the threats; I think that 12 cases since 2002 is very few indeed, when you look worldwide at the Chinese programme for technology acquisition, both under and over the table. That in itself shows that there has been insufficient attention paid to the issue.
The delay in the Bill is also regrettable, because the threat has been fairly clear for some time. I would urge the Government, first, to research the question, which is the one you asked, of to what degree in the past have the Chinese in particular bought up technology companies, the acquisition of which was greatly against our interests? That work could and should be done.
I am an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, which has a team that has been looking through technology at a number of questions, but it could quite easily divert that team to look at this question, which needs China expertise and the ability to search through a lot of open data, which it has. I am not a member of the Government, but I am not aware that the Government have done that sort of research to establish the full degree of the problem.
From the point of view of the threat—if you will excuse me, as this is the first question, for putting a little bit of context to it in terms of the China thing—it is undoubted that there is nothing wrong with investment. In fact, that is extremely good. We want as much investment and good relations with China as with everyone else, but we need to recognise that there is a values war going on. I have written an article about that, which came out in the Conservatives’ China Research Group report a week or so ago.
This is not a cold war, because China is very important to us for trade, investment and many global goods, and it is a science and technology power, but we should not underestimate the degree to which Xi Jinping and the Communist party intend, as Xi said to the first politburo meeting, to get the upper hand against western democracies. He talks about us being hostile forces and about a big struggle all the time. When you add that to his policy of civil-military fusion—using civil in the military context—and the fact that he has set up a party organisation specifically to push that forward, and the change in investment policy away from things such as property, football clubs and other things, very much towards benefitting China and its technology, we have to be a lot more careful than we have been in the past.
The first step for that is to do the research. I am not aware of a really good assessment of just how much technology has been bought, the targets and so on. Maybe the Government have one—I don’t know—but I do not think that they do.
Chi Onwurah
Q
I was particularly interested in the civil-military fusion, if you like, of China’s technology ambitions. Could you say a little more about how the Chinese see nascent technologies that are indirectly critical to downstream industries that supply our national security? I am trying to understand how, if you like, we differentiate between industrial strategy and technology to ensure that we have leading defence and national security capabilities. Is there a distinction that we can make there? Do we need to do further research, as you suggest? Do the Chinese make that kind of distinction? Do we need to address some elements of our industrial capability when we consider national security?
Charles Parton: We should widen this not only to companies, but to academia, if I could come back to your question from this angle. We have the phenomenon at the moment of Chinese companies, one might say, hiring our academics, in one way or other, to do scientific research on their behalf. Some of that is probably something that our defence establishment and security establishment would be pretty upset about if they were aware of it.
It is quite difficult to distinguish some of these and to know about them all, but a few weeks ago The Daily Telegraph did a story on, I think, Oxford University and Huawei’s commissioning of research. I think there were 17 projects. I looked at those, and I am not a technologist by any means, but some of them rang certain alarm bells. If you are researching, on behalf of the Chinese, drone technology, cryptography, gaits— Gait is very important for gait recognition. We have facial recognition and voice recognition, but in circumstances where people are wearing masks or there is bad weather, gait is an absolute identifier. Again, are these bad technologies? Well, there are perfectly good civilian uses for them, no doubt, but there also military and surveillance uses. I think we need to be very clear on what our academics, as well as our companies, are doing.
To give you another example, if you go on the website of one of the top Oxford mathematician professors, he has now retired and set up a company with a base in Shenzhen. He is an absolutely top mathematician and does the most abstruse things in cryptography. Should one of our top mathematicians be helping the Chinese in cryptography? Well, there are perfectly good and innocent uses of cryptography, I presume, for things such as banking and e-commerce, and there are perfectly not good uses of it, in military and surveillance and other things. I have no idea whether that is something we should be concerned about. On the face of it, it strikes me that we should be.
I think we need to broaden the scope—forgive me if this is outside the Committee’s scope; you are only looking at the Bill—because the whole question of defence of technology needs to be looked at, in terms of whether we are strengthening a hostile foreign power, but also let us not forget the reputation of British companies and universities. If you look at what is going on in Xinjiang, for instance, with the concentration camps there—activities that quite definitely meet the definition of crimes against humanity under article 7 of the International Criminal Court’s Rome statute, or article 2 of the UN genocide convention—should our companies and universities be helping with technologies that can be used to strengthen that surveillance and that repressive regime? What is the difference between that and South African apartheid or some of the other things that we have seen in the past? Increasingly, the excuse of, “Well, we didn’t really know what was going on,” has gone, and companies and academia will have to be much more careful of their reputation. I have slightly moved away from the nub of your question. Perhaps you could just push the tiller a bit and put but me back to the centre of it again.
Chi Onwurah
Q
Charles Parton: That is sort of way outside my technical expertise, but I would certainly say that one major criticism I have of the Bill is that you have to set up the right structure to be able to do that. I am not sure that the Bill’s putting everything in the hands of the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and its Secretary of State is the right answer.
Let us take Huawei and the debate we had over the last couple of years, as well as the various flip-flops that have gone on. One might add flaps, as well as flip-flops, actually. There has been a big a division between the so-called economic and security Ministries. It is right that both have a say in the decision. Economic interests are very much at stake, but so are security interests. If you put everything into the hands of BEIS, which probably does not have the expertise on China—certainly not in the defence, security and surveillance realms, although not unnaturally, since its job is to encourage investment—you will perhaps find that the security and repression elements are not given sufficient weight, and more to the point, the perception will be that they are not given sufficient weight. We might therefore go back to this sort of business with Huawei, where there is a fight back and another fight back and so on.
What we actually need is an organisation that is made up of people on all sides of the debate and that has some real experts who actually understand what the technology means. One specific example I came across a year or so ago was a very interesting computer game. Fine. What is wrong with that? Well, I understand that it was then bought up by the Chinese and used to train fighter pilots. You cannot defend against everything, but you at least need some unbiased experts—a sort of, if I can use the words, Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies—who would be there to advise, and then decisions would actually be accepted by all sides, not questioned.
On occasion, I am sure that questions would be put up to the National Security Council and the Prime Minister for decision if they were really important. However, the issue is often about very small companies with some very interesting technologies that have not been established. The Chinese are extremely efficient at hoovering around, finding them and buying them up early. I am not convinced that the structure and decision making of the whole process are right.
Nadhim Zahawi
Q
Charles Parton: I think what covid has done is expose the nature of the Chinese Communist party, in answer to your question. I hope that it has brought home to people the nature of the beast. Looking at what happened, China did not do so well to start with, and its people were pretty upset with it. China then used its external propaganda machine to right its domestic problem, pushing forward the line, “Look how badly the foreigners have done, and look how well we are helping the foreigners out of the mess,” while hiding the fact that it had allowed the virus to propagate so fast in the first place. To many people in democracies, that brought home the fact that the Communist party of China is prepared to use that against us.
Where the Chinese Communist party was unhappy with how countries were acting, it started to put them under pressure and made threats about the delivery of personal protective equipment or whatever. Australia is really taking it in the neck at the moment because it had the temerity to ask—perfectly reasonably—for an investigation of the origins of the virus, which is essential for scientific and preventive purposes. Look at the political pressure on Australia. There is absolutely no doubt that where the Communist party sees an opportunity to use whatever is going on at the moment, it will do so.
The question that I have continuously asked is this: to what degree is investment threatened by a country such as the UK, Australia or Canada standing up for its own interest? We are not actually attacking China, but we are saying, “Sorry, but we have our own interests and our own security. You wouldn’t allow the equivalent in your country, possibly rightly, and we are not allowing it here because we are defending our security, in this case.” To what degree is the tool of depriving someone of investment a real threat? I have urged in a number of papers that the Government look at that in dispassionate terms. The China-Britain Business Council recently put out a paper, but I would not describe it as dispassionate. That is for the Government to do. My own feeling is that the likely conclusion is that, on the whole, the threats are pretty hollow. Chinese investment is not done for charitable reasons.
Since 2017—the high point was 2016—China has cut back on investment. Beijing was getting pretty annoyed at the way money was seeping out not in line with its policies, but investment is now more tightly controlled and aimed at the acquisition of science and technology. To what degree are we vulnerable? This is not charity. Money is very cheap at the moment; it can be got at negative interest rates. It is not as though China is the sole source of money. It invests because it wants technology. Surely we have to look at that carefully and ask where is the mutual benefit. If it is mutually beneficial, fantastic, let us go ahead. Let us not be too brow-beaten by this thing—that if you do not do x or y, or if you do not take Huawei, we will hit your investment. I think, in practice, if you look at that and then look at some of the other threats that China has made over the years, including to your exports, all those have grown for all countries, although they had been in the diplomatic doghouse historically—certainly in the past; we will see about the future—but I think it is greatly exaggerated.
Nadhim Zahawi
I am grateful to you, Mr Parton. I do not want to hog the floor, as I am sure many colleagues want to ask questions. Thank you very much.
Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)
Q
Going back to your point about resourcing the investment security unit, can you give a bit more detail about what would be an ideal outcome from your point of view? Would it be that we need specificity in the Bill that key representatives and experts of the intelligence services, of the Ministry of Defence, of the diplomatic corps and of other agencies be formally named in the legislation, so we would have that reassurance that the body doing the screening had all the necessary breadth across the spectrum of both the economy and national security?
Charles Parton: That is a good question; it is not necessarily for me and I do not necessarily have the experience to lay down precisely how it works. For me, I think, first, that all those organisations you have mentioned—although others also on the economic side, such as the Treasury and BEIS—perhaps should be there to set the parameters of what needs to be referred. I think that, as a sort of preliminary filter, one would hope that there was an ability for most companies, and most universities as well, very quickly to put forward the deals or the pieces of work that they felt might be coming up against the parameters set by such a Government body.
For a quick decision, is the topic one that is suitable, or does it need a little more investigation? Should we be working with this organisation, or in some cases this particular Chinese academic or company, which may have links to the military or to the repressive regime? The experts, as it were, which means the SAGE-type committee, surely should be very quickly—companies and academics need to move quite quickly—making a preliminary estimation of whether this needs to be referred upwards to a Government Committee that wants to look at it in more detail.
I do agree with you that the range of interests needs to be representative if the decision is to be perceived by all sides as acceptable when it is eventually made.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
In the Japanese and German cases, they refer to national security including concepts of public order. I refer in particular to your comments about organisations out there in the marketplace, whether they are universities or businesses, needing to have clarity to know what needs to be referred and what does not. They need to know where the amber or red light is flashing, and where it is clearly a green light and not an issue. Would that be aided and facilitated if the Bill contained a definition of national security?
Charles Parton: It is a bit like defining terrorism. It is really quite difficult to be all encompassing. Sometimes, I am in sympathy with the Chinese legislation that adds at the bottom “and other offences” or “and other things”. I think it is quite difficult, even if people are convinced that they can effectively define that. It is not only national security; there is a question whether you are aiding crimes against humanity or the genocide that is going on in Xinjiang. I am using loaded terms there, but I think they are justified. There must be some mechanism for ensuring that those, too, are brought to bear, but I am not expert enough in legislation to be able to say, “Yes, we need a watertight definition of ‘national security’.”
Certainly, the Bill must convey to companies and academics the need to clear a range of topics. That will not be specific, but, at best, they must be encouraged to consult almost as a default, so that they are not caught out. The other question is, what happens if they don’t? What sort of sanctions are they under if they do not consult, when it is clearly something they should consult on, for reasons either of security or of repression and crimes against humanity?
Andrew Griffith (Arundel and South Downs) (Con)
Q
As a Committee considering this Bill, we will hear from a constituency that could sometimes trip over into Sinophobia, being against any form of engagement or trade with China. Looking at the economic development of that market and the opportunities that it presents, could you talk a bit about the non-risk-based categories, such as inert goods and household manufactured goods, which the Committee should draw a clear line around, and those categories that you have talked about, which are covered in the Bill and speak to a real national threat?
Charles Parton: Let me make the general point that I am sometimes accused of being anti-Chinese. I greatly resent that. I am anti-party, as anybody should be if they saw what it does in places like Xinjiang or Hong Kong. I am not anti-Chinese. I think the Chinese Communist party itself deliberately muddies the waters on that one and says, “You are anti-China,” when, actually, you are opposing the policies of the Chinese Communist party. That said, I began the session saying that we want investment from China, trade with China and good relations with China. China is a major player. This must not be a cold war. If America or China decides to pursue that, we must try to avoid it.
I always talk about the holy trinity of national security, UK interests and UK values. We should establish those with the Chinese and say, “Sorry, those are non-negotiable. Just as you sometimes come and say, ‘These are our core interests and we are not negotiating them,’ we have the right to do that too.” But beyond that, we want open trading relations and open investment relations. What is wrong with China buying London Taxis International? Nothing. If it wants to invest and that is mutually beneficial, great.
We want an open China as much as possible. We certainly want a much more level playing field than there is at the moment. China runs a series of negative lists and there is much on them, particularly in the area of services, which we would want opened up. We must press for that in conjunction with the Americans, the EU, Australia and all the other democracies that wish to trade with China. In many ways, that is in China’s interest. It is certainly in the interests of its people. A closed market, with China just relying on its own consumption—it is a big market—is not going to be good for China any more than it is good for us. I fully go along with that. I do not think we should be anti-China in any circumstances. That is, in a sense, racist. We should be anti-Communist party, or certain against its policies, but with the Chinese people, and in trading, we should maintain a perfectly normal relationship.
Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)
Q
Charles Parton: On the first question about academics, I am not sure whether this is about investment. I think that academics are in some ways a separate question, unless universities are setting up, as they do, companies, and are moving that way.
Matt Western
Q
Charles Parton: Where academia sets up a company, and that involves itself with China, yes, that should be under the purview of the Bill. There is a separate question about when Chinese companies hire or fund—whichever you like to say—UK academics to carry out a specific piece of research for them. Universities are working on that, and that is a very urgent question. Again, I think that a much stricter regime should be put in place to stop the seeping out of technologies that could be used in the military field or the repressive one. I am not convinced that that is there at the moment; I am sure it is not. That might be a separate question. It may or may not be one that requires parliamentary legislation—people who are experts on that can make up their mind—but some form of consultation with the Government, or perhaps a sanctions regime, needs to be put in place so that that does not happen.
On the question of intellectual property rights, China has a very rigorous campaign to get hold of our IP. Some of it is stolen through cyber, and I am sure our intelligence services and others are doing their best to combat that. I am not sure about the degree to which this Bill can act as a defence against Chinese abuse. It can certainly try to encourage companies to raise their own defences, but the UK has an organisation—the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure—that aims to put out that advice and help. I do not know whether it is strong enough in its actions and shield; that is outside my area of expertise. It is certainly there, but perhaps it, too, needs strengthening.
Nickie Aiken (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)
Q
Charles Parton: I suspect that there is a limit as to how far down the line one can go, but where activity is still going on in the UK—that is to say, where UK individuals are still running that company in the UK on behalf of a friendly foreign country, and the company is later bought up—that should be covered by this Bill. Otherwise, you are absolutely right: you may find a company in Liechtenstein buying it; then the company gets bought by the Chinese, and the technology gets siphoned out. There has to be a defence against that.
If a company is bought by a friendly country and the technology is exported, and nothing is happening in the UK, then I cannot see how extraterritoriality would be applicable.
Simon Baynes (Clwyd South) (Con)
Q
I want to explore the extent to which the world—if I can describe it as one world—of academic consultants and private sector companies, to which you have referred, would agree with what you are saying. You refer to having a SAGE-like committee; is there a danger that, if you did have such a committee, it would actually have very divergent views?
I fully respect where you are coming from, but you made some quite hard-hitting comments earlier about crimes against humanity in the concentration camps, and questioning whether companies and academia should be involving themselves in aspects of China. You also referred to a top mathematician, who was formerly at Oxford University, helping China with cryptography.
I want to get a feel for the extent to which you think that your views are shared by academics, consultants and the private sector, and then feed that back into whether, if you did put together a SAGE-like committee—and I can see the sense in doing that—you might find it quite difficult to come to a consensus.
Finally, it must be quite difficult to judge exactly whether what is being developed—whether it be from an academic idea or from a corporate idea—will be helpful to the Chinese in a way that is detrimental to Britain, or is actually a perfectly sensible piece of research and development that could be of benefit to both countries.
Charles Parton: Can I take those three questions almost backwards, or certainly not in the order in which you have presented them? In terms of expertise within a SAGE-type community, those experts would not be making the political decision. They would be making the technical decision: “To what degree can these technologies be used in a military, as well as a civilian, context?” That is the advice that would be going up. It would then be for the Ministers on a committee to say, “Well, we judge that risk to be acceptable,” or “We do not.”
Of course, nothing is black and white in technology because, as the distinction between civil and military is increasingly eroded, it is quite difficult to know; there are many shades of grey here. A judgement has to be made on any particular technology—either “Sorry, we will have to rule that one out,” or “On this one, yes, there are some risks, and maybe we will come to regret it, but on balance, we will let that one through.”
On whether consultants, academics and others agree with my views on China and the nature of the regime, I think that depends, if you will excuse my saying so, on the degree to which they have studied China and looked at the issues. It is noticeable that those who read what the Chinese communist party says about itself tend very much to agree with what I say, or with the sort of views that I put out. Those who have other interests do not. Of course, there are some who I would say are captured, quite frankly, by the degrees of interference and other aspects that the Chinese United Front Work Department pushes.
There is a variety of opinion there, but I think that those who understand China and read what the party says—the party says an awful lot, actually, if you bother to read what it says; it is not a black box—are inclined very much to my views. Those views are: be careful, because it is not coming from the same angle as us, and has some very distinct and not very nice aspects to it. At the same time, it is a major economic power, a major science and technology power, and a major influence on the goods in the world, whether for health, development, peacekeeping or whatever, and we must get on with the country to the best of our ability. I don’t know if that answers your question fully; do come back.
Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP)
Q
Mr Parton, the Bill looks primarily at direct investment by potentially hostile operators. Does it give sufficient protection against indirect control? For example, a company may be reliant on its bankers, who may or may not be based in a hostile territory, and who may rely on technology through a company such as Huawei; or a company’s ultimate owners and controlling party could be registered in an offshore tax haven, and it could be that nobody has any idea who actually owns that company. Does the Bill give sufficient protection against those kinds of threats through indirect influence and control?
Charles Parton: I am not a legal expert, but the Committee stage of the Bill needs to look deeply at that question. If there is any doubt as to who the ultimate owners are, that should be taken into account by whatever organisation makes the recommendation on whether a particular investment is acceptable. If we cannot follow through relatively easily back to the ultimate beneficial owners and users, that is a factor that needs to be weighed very heavily in the decision on allowing a particular, possibly sensitive, investment to go ahead.
Peter Grant
Q
Charles Parton: I have to say that that is outside my expertise, but I do think it is an extremely good and important question that could be researched relatively easily. Forgive me if I am pushing RUSI here, but I suspect that RUSI has the capability in one of its teams to do some data mining on that, and come up with an answer. It is a very important question, but I am not aware of any research, though there may be some, that goes deeply into that question. It is certainly one that should be followed up.
Andrew Bowie (West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine) (Con)
Q
Charles Parton: Again, I am not a legal expert, but it seems to set out the legal framework. It all very much depends on the structures and mechanisms, and the resourcing of them, that are set up to ensure whether the judgments about a particular company or a piece of academic research and the technology from them should be blocked or allowed through. I put it back to the Committee: if its detailed research, and the measures that go into the Bill, show that whatever organisation is set up is sufficient unto the job, and that the channels are there to ensure that all these small and sometimes obscure technologies are at least passed by it, that is a really important piece of work.
Andrew Bowie
Q
Charles Parton: I have not done comparative research on that, or done a paper on it. That is something that needs to be done by the Government. Perhaps they have done that. The impression that I get from discussions of this sort of question in the various fora that I mix in suggests that the Americans and Australians have taken a much more hard-hitting approach than we have. Again, it depends on what structure is set up by the British Government, and how it functions in line with the Bill. Forgive me for not giving you a full answer, but that is the sort of research that needs to be commissioned by the Government in order to make decisions on how to deal with that question.
James Wild (North West Norfolk) (Con)
Q
Charles Parton: The question of elite capture is very important and very topical. First, I have called for this in various papers that I have written. The Cobra committee that makes decisions on employment after political or civil service careers definitely needs strengthening. I am not sure of the degree to which work on that is going on; in fact, I do not think much is. Certainly neither the provisions, nor the exercise of those provisions, have been sufficiently rigorous. It is very much a question of lengthening the amount of time between leaving a particular post and taking up a job where, in some cases, you are laundering the reputations of some of these companies. If that period is too small and the criteria are too weak, there is a great risk of people, while still in office or still in post, saying to themselves, “I’d better not be too harsh on this, because in a couple of years’ time, I might be approaching these people, or they might approach me for a job.” That is pretty crude, I know, but it is perhaps easier to see in the case of a defence company. If you were in the MOD, say, and you had to make a decision, one hopes you would make it entirely in the national interest, rather than with a view to possible employment by whichever company might be bidding for a contract, but that is one area that needs strengthening.
The other area in all influence problems, of course, is that sunlight and transparency is the one weapon we have, but if a Minister, an ex-Minister or a top civil servant is running a consultancy company, and let us say Huawei is employing that company—I choose this example by sheer chance—that should be known. That should be declared, because if such people—who are still influential with their old colleagues, whether parliamentary, ministerial or civil service—are urging a certain line, as I have heard some urge, it may not be disinterested; in fact, it certainly is not in some cases. That needs to be made clear. Sorry, could you just repeat the second part of your question?
James Wild
Q
Charles Parton: Yes, but I think you have to be very happy and convinced that the Minister in charge is one whose future does not incline him or her to make a decision that is somewhat biased. It is not without precedent in the world, anyway, that some ex-Ministers have been under the influence of the Chinese Communist party for one reason or another, so you have to be quite careful about that, and it is a really important decision. That is why I would be more inclined to make sure it is very clear that it is not just within the purview of BEIS, because BEIS’s job is to push investment. That is perfectly fair, but there may be occasions—not now, but in the future—where people’s backgrounds, inclinations or futures incline them to be less than even in their judgment.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
Charles Parton: That is a very good question.
Chi Onwurah
Could I just add to that? That is an excellent point, but could you also say a little bit on how China responds to proposed takeovers that might implicate its national security, if those takeovers are allowed? How does it respond to that investment into its companies?
Charles Parton: Those are both good points. First of all, divide it into the state-owned sector and the private sector. In terms of the state-owned sector, the top executives of the big state-owned companies are appointed by the central organisation department of the party. That is the organisation that is, as Mr Kinnock has said, in charge of the nomenklatura: the top 3,000 to 4,000 party officials. Of course, a lot of state-owned companies are also owned at the provincial and lower levels, and there, too, the top executives are party members and beholden to the party. Let us not forget that most foreign investment by the Chinese is state owned, so it is not just a fair bet but a fair certainty that any state-owned enterprise investing is fully politically controlled.
When it comes to the private sector, Huawei has spent a large amount of its time insisting that it is a private company—I really do not care. And I do not really care that the national security law says that any individual or organisation must help the party or security organs when called upon. The brute fact is that, in the way the system is run in China, if the party tells you to do something, the only response from private business to an order is to say, “Certainly, Sir. How high do you want me to jump?” so this debate is entirely irrelevant. The party is now pushing committees into all private enterprises—foreign and local—and it would be a very unwise head of a private company who said, “No, Mr Xi Jinping. I don’t think so.” If nothing else has been shown by what has happened with Jack Ma, China’s second-richest person, and the Ant Group finance company in the last few weeks—there are, of course, financial risk reasons they might want to control Jack Ma’s Ant Group—it is, “Sorry, you are beholden to the Communist party.” That was a very fierce reminder of it.
In terms of this debate, I do not think we should be under any illusion that if a party says to a company about its technology or whatever, “Well okay, it’s all very well that you’ve got that, but we want it fed into our People’s Liberation Army organisations and science and technology system,” no company is going to say, “Oh no, that’s not right. We won’t do that.” For instance, when Huawei says, “If we were asked to do something against our commitments, in terms of what we do abroad, that would threaten security, we would not do that,” it is rubbish. They know that.
The Chair
I am afraid that brings us to the end of this part of the session. Mr Parton, I thank you on behalf of the Committee for your evidence and the clear, concise answers you gave. We must now move on to the next session. If Members want to take a comfort break for a couple of minutes, I am happy to do that.
The Chair
Q
Sir Richard Dearlove: I am Sir Richard Dearlove. I was in MI6 for 38 years. I was chief of the service from 1999 to 2004. Before that I was head of operations, and before that I was head of all the admin and personnel. In fact, I completed the building of the new headquarters and the move of the whole service into that. I retired in 2004 and became the Master of Pembroke College, Cambridge, where I was for 11 years. I am now chair of the board of trustees of the University of London and hold a number of other directorships and advisory roles. I still remain pretty heavily involved as a talking head on geopolitics and intelligence issues, and I have founded a small think tank, which is actually an educational charity in Cambridge called the Cambridge Security Initiative. That gives you in essence my colourful past.
Chi Onwurah
Q
Sir Richard Dearlove: Wow. That is a massive question. Bear in mind that a large part of my career related to the cold war. In that period, our main concern was the Soviet Union and the members of the Warsaw Pact. It was characteristic of that period that there were heavy controls, mainly exercised through NATO structures, to prevent strategic material from leaching, as it were, into the economies of the Warsaw pact. I will not go into all the mechanisms. Historically, one does not need to worry about those now, but it was very much an issue that was at the forefront of people’s minds during that period of the cold war. Bear in mind also—I think this is important in looking at the broader context of what you are interested in—that the Soviet Union had hugely sophisticated what’s called S and T operations: science and technology. A whole line of Soviet intelligence of the KGB was devoted to obtaining strategic material that would help the Soviet economy, particularly in the military industrial complex.
This is now in the public domain: in the mid-1980s, there was a major intelligence success, which, interestingly, was conducted by the French, but in which the UK had an important role. We completely dismantled, or learned, exactly what the Soviet Union and its allies were up to on a global basis. We knew before, but we did not know the detail to that extent, and what we learned was pretty shocking. That case has not been greatly publicised, but it was probably one of the most important intelligence cases of the cold war.
With the break-up of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Soviet empire, particularly the economic structures that bound the Warsaw pact countries together, in the West our attitudes towards those issues changed very significantly. There was a much more laissez-faire situation and, as countries broke away from the Soviet empire, an enthusiasm to trade with them without the same degree of control.
During that period, you had the emergence of China, which was still very much a regional power but with aspirations to become a global power. To short cut, we have now transferred to China the concerns we had about the Soviet Union and its allies, but the problem with China in some respects is much more serious than the problem with the Soviet Union, although that was bad enough. Charlie Parton, who was talking to you before, is an expert on China specifically. I am not, and my view is maybe more strategic, although I had a lot to do with China when I was head of MI6.
If you look back at the emergence of China as a regional power, from the very start—when Mao was still alive and was then succeeded by Deng Xiaoping—its intelligence community focused on China’s economic growth. It was not particularly interested in what we would see as strategic or political intelligence. There is a famous passage in Kissinger’s book on China in which he is talking to Mao and Mao says to him, “We’re not interested in your politics because we have our own ideological view of the world, and I don’t really care what our intelligence service reports about what’s going on in the west.” What he did not say, but what was quite clear because it became evident subsequently, particularly under Deng Xiaoping, was that the primary purpose of the Chinese intelligence machine outside China was to contribute to the economic rebuilding of China.
We in the West have been, over a longish period of time, pretty naive and had forgotten the fundamental dangers of having a close relationship with China. I am not anti-Chinese or a cold warrior. I understand—and this is the complexity that lies at the heart of this legislation—that our economies in the West are tied to China’s. They are intertwined in a manner that did not exist during the cold war between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. Of course there were economic links with the Soviets but essentially the relationship was one of separation. But that is not the case any longer. We are intimately engaged with the Chinese economy. Our enthusiasm––I am using “our” in the broadest sense of the West’s enthusiasm––to trade with China and to have a close relationship and to build that relationship is thoroughly understandable, but in the process we have let down our guard and we have been extremely laissez-faire, as it were, in our attitude towards the commercial threat from China.
I remember very well on one of my visits to the far east, when I was coming out of China through Hong Kong, talking to a British lawyer who had been head of a legal office in Shanghai for a long time. He said, “Richard, you have got to understand one thing about the Chinese attitude to us: they don’t understand win-win. All they understand is ‘We win, you lose.’” However intimate and successful your relations with China may be economically, if you are too successful, you can absolutely guarantee that the Chinese will transfer that success to themselves in their own economic structures, having allowed you to run successfully for a period of time.
What we now know and understand is that the Chinese are highly organised and strategic in their attitude towards the West and towards us. For example, some of the thousands of Chinese students who are being educated in Western universities, particularly in the UK and the United States, are unquestionably organised and targeted in terms of subjects––I am thinking more about graduates, PhDs and post-docs––looking at areas of strategic interest to the Chinese economy, and they are organised by Chinese intelligence.
We need to conduct our relationship with China with much more wisdom and care. The Chinese understand us incredibly well. They have put their leadership through our universities for 20 or 30 years. We in comparison hardly know anything about China because we just do not have that depth of knowledge and experience. You have people such as Charlie Parton and many wonderful Chinese scholars who understand intimately, in particular, the workings of the Chinese state, but they are rare individuals who are now massively in demand in trying to educate people about the problem that we have on our hands.
I am not one who is saying that we have to hold China at arm’s length. It is impossible to do that because they are so intimately involved in our economy, but we have to understand where we restrict their access, where we control their access and where we do not allow them to build strategic positions at our expense and literally take us for a ride. If you go back a little way, we were incredibly naive about this, which accounts for the position we got into with Huawei. It was completely ridiculous that we should even have been considering Huawei to build our 5G. That is probably why you called me. I was heavily involved in lobbying MPs through these various structures. I am delighted that the Government have now taken a grip on this issue.
The Chair
Thank you. I have no leeway to go past 11.25 am, so please can we keep questions as succinct as possible.
Sir Richard Dearlove: Sorry. That was a long answer, but it is precisely the question one should be considering.
Chi Onwurah
Q
You have talked about the relationship between the military-industrial complex, in the case of Russia, and economic development, specifically in the case of China. We have essential industries that are critical to our economy and there has been concern that BEIS is going to be overseeing the security implications. Where we have industries and technologies that are critical for national security, they are also critical for our economic security, so our national and economic security end up being linked. You have talked about some of those links in the case of Russia and China. How can we reflect those links effectively in the Bill? Do we need structures within BEIS, or outside BEIS, to identify and reflect the overlap between economic and national security?
Sir Richard Dearlove: This is a really difficult question. I am expressing the problem, not the solutions. You have to bear in mind that I spent my life as a poacher, not a gamekeeper, so my view of these problems is mirror imaging. I was an offensive intelligence officer, not a defensive one. I spent my life trying to penetrate Chinese intelligence, if you see what I mean.
The problem is much bigger than just national security; that is one of the difficulties. It leaches into the whole future of our economic competition with China. I do not like to talk about it, but some people use the phrase “a new cold war”. I do not subscribe to that. We have to find some other way of talking about this. They are very serious competitors who are beginning to edge along the path of enmity in the way they treat us on some issues—witness Hong Kong at the moment—so you have to have some sort of flexible scrutiny arrangement.
The reason this is so difficult to comprehend is that areas like climate change and energy policy, which are national security issues but not right on the frontline, are so big that, I think, China has a pretty disturbing agenda for us. They will encourage us to follow policies that they think are disadvantageous to our economy.
If you take their statements on things like climate change, which is relevant to what we are talking about, China is going to go on increasing its carbon emissions up until 2030, if we look at the figures and understand its policies. China is going to completely miss out renewables. When it has generated enough wealth and success in its economy, it is going to jump from carbon energy straight to nuclear and hydrogen. It will have the wealth and the means to do that. Renewables for the Chinese are going to be rather peripheral, because they will not generate the energy intensity that the Chinese economy requires. China has a road map in its head that is really rather different from ours and there is no question but that, competitively, our green agenda is going to put us at an even greater disadvantage to China, if you take a 30-year view of that.
There are some very worrying aspects of this. That means that if we are gaily allowing the Chinese to walk off with all sorts of bits of our economy, we are going to pay possibly a pretty high price for that over a long period. We need to take a strategic view of this. China certainly has a strategy, and at the moment we do not really have a strategy. We are beginning to realise that we have to have one, and maybe this Bill is a healthy first step in that direction.
You will need sub-committees of some sort, with flexible thinking and experts to advise on where these problems lie. The difficulty is also that we do not want to ruin our economic relationship completely with China. We still need to partner with it in areas that are advantageous to us and our economy as well.
Nadhim Zahawi
Q
Sir Richard Dearlove: My view would be that the annual report has as much transparency as possible, but you are probably going to require a secret annexe from time to time. It is a bit like the reports of the Intelligence and Security Committee, which I dealt with frequently as chief. They and we were keen that they should publish their reports, but there comes a point where it is not in our national interest that some of this stuff is put in the public domain. I would be pretty clear cut on that.
The Chair
I call Peter Grant, who will be behind you, Sir Richard, because of the social distancing rules we have in Committees.
Peter Grant
Q
Sir Richard Dearlove: Obviously, the threat scenarios shift and change. I think I accept that. Clearly, at the moment, what is driving our considerations is mainly China, but you are right. It applies to others—Iran, North Korea—and there may be other states.
A good example in the past, not a current one, is Pakistan. The Pakistani bomb built by A. Q. Khan—the Khan Research Laboratories—was created by sending 600 Pakistani PhD students to do separate bits of research in different universities around the world. That is the origin of our thinking on counter-proliferation, and it is another very clear example of where you have to have control from the security services. Now, I believe, we register PhDs in relation to the nationalities studying in certain areas.
The Bill should be able to accommodate a changing set of scenarios, and you are right to say that non-governmental organisations can become problematic. The proliferation issue, whereby Khan was trying to sell his technology to other countries, happened around the time of my retirement and the disarmament of Libya. That was all based on Pakistani technology, but there was a commercial network run by a family of Swiss engineers called the Tinners. This is an example of how dangerous things can be. The Tinner network had several semi-clandestine factories dotted around the world that were all making different parts for nuclear centrifuges. Okay, that network was eventually dismantled by the UK and the Americans, but the problem of national security goes into some pretty odd areas, and you are right to identify those as not necessarily just being China or, in the past, Russia. There are still aspirations on the part of certain powers to break the non-prefoliation treaty and become nuclear weapons states.
Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)
Q
I am interested in your view on how the department that is proposed to be set up within BEIS to scrutinise this cuts across the Export Control Joint Unit, which is obviously a combination involving four Government Departments. Is that complementing it or contradicting it? Can they cut across each other? How do you see those two departments working together? They ultimately have the same aim, although they come from slightly different objectives.
Sir Richard Dearlove: I cannot give you a detailed answer to that question. From my experience, I would say that on some of these issues the co-ordination of Government Departments is one of the really big challenges, particularly when they ultimately have different objectives. The sophistication of our co-ordination mechanisms in the UK has not been highly developed, so we have run into problems in the past. My suggestion would be that this be given forethought rather than afterthought—that there is some arrangement to avoid those clashes of departmental interest.
Mark Garnier
Q
Sir Richard Dearlove: Yes, because they could be pulling in different directions. You have to have some degree of co-ordination. It is always better if these things are anticipated and something is put in place in advance, rather than scrabbling around to sort it out afterwards. I have seen that happen a lot.
The Chair
We are back to facing the front now, Sir Richard. Most members of the Committee wish to speak and I want to get everyone in, but I will have to cut them off at 11.25. Keep questions as succinct as possible.
Matt Western
Q
I am thinking of the consideration of investments from China in our nuclear power stations and other infrastructure networks. Something as simple as road traffic signals or rail infrastructure might break down if someone decided they wanted that to happen. Do you think the Bill does enough to recognise the unexpected areas of investment that a malign state might want to attack?
Sir Richard Dearlove: Probably not is the answer. The Bill should take account of the complexity of modern technology and the difficulties that we could run into in the future if we allow foreign entities to have a strategic piece of our critical infrastructure. Relationships can change over time and you can cause huge difficulties by throwing a switch and engaging a piece of software that is deeply embedded in something somewhere and causing a huge problem.
I do not want to be too alarmist, but Chinese engagement and involvement in nuclear power is another area of terrific concern and worry. It is not something that we should take at face value. We need to think very carefully about some of these issues. I would much rather have a French company building a nuclear power station than a Chinese company.
James Wild
Q
Sir Richard Dearlove: No, I was not. The first Huawei contracts were signed by BT in 2003 and, because BT was the primary provider, the relationship between BT and the intelligence community was, let us say, important; I will not go any further than that. BT was a successor to the General Post Office and, essentially, that was how the relationship came about.
At the time, people like myself were deeply concerned and shocked that we were signing deals with a Chinese company that looked to us to have strategic implications. Basically, as chief, I was not consulted. Basically, when I raised some questions, I was largely told, “It is nothing to do with you. These are issues we can control.” The relationship with Huawei took off without real consideration at the time that it would have a bearing on national security. I think that was extremely misplaced. I have written or said somewhere before that those of us who raised objections in 2003 were just disregarded.
James Wild
Q
Sir Richard Dearlove: I knew about the contract and said I thought it was completely inappropriate.
James Wild
Q
Also, do you think that although we need to look at the Bill as to what it does, we should also recognise that it does not solve all the problems and threats from hostile states—that the intelligence activity and other things we do to raise the cost of theft of IP need to be seen holistically across the piece, and that the Bill cannot solve all the problems?
Sir Richard Dearlove: The Bill is a step in the right direction. What is important about the Bill is that it raises parliamentary and public awareness of the issue. Everybody takes a big step forward in being sensitised to the problems in the future.
To be honest, I do not have any suggestions right now to add to the list, but I might look at that and see whether there are certain areas. For me, the Bill is almost a symbolic move—one that is long overdue and signals a change in attitude at Westminster and on the part of this and future Governments. It is a very healthy, pleasing and important development.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
“certain ‘critical’ elements of infrastructure, the loss or compromise of which would have a major, detrimental impact on the availability or integrity of essential services, leading to severe economic or social consequences or to loss of life.”
Would the Bill benefit from having that definition of critical national infrastructure embedded in the middle? Linked to that definition, should special measures be taken to raise our guard even higher when it comes to any kind of investment in our critical national infrastructure?
Sir Richard Dearlove: I would certainly see that as advantageous, because it defines a clear area where you start and from which you can make judgments about the involvement of foreign firms being given space or activity in those areas. That is not a bad idea at all, actually.
Simon Baynes
Q
Sir Richard Dearlove: I think we were over-enthusiastic about becoming a favoured trading partner with China. I am not going to name names, although I think I have done in one or two instances where, let us say, certain Ministers were incredibly enthusiastic and uncritical about building a commercial relationship with China. Part of that was driven politically, in that if we are going to not be a member of the EU, we need alternative relationships. I am not sure I would see it quite like that.
There has been a big emphasis on building a privileged position with China, which has led to people such as myself shouting from the sidelines and being pretty unpopular. For example, the 48 Group Club that the Chinese set up in the UK is extraordinary. They recruited a whole group of leading British business and political figures into that group who were designated cheerleaders for a burgeoning relationship with China. Huawei was an important part of that. The composition—the British membership of the Huawei board—was a very impressive line-up of people who were there to persuade us to drop our guard.
Anyway, I am glad that that is now largely history. A lot of the people who were involved are very keen to jump ship and be disentangled from those involvements. I am sure that, in time, the economic rewards that they were offered to go on to those boards and things were pretty significant. So the Chinese knew how to play us and that is why we got ourselves into this very difficult position on 5G.
Sorry, what was the second part of your question?
Simon Baynes
Q
Sir Richard Dearlove: On artificial intelligence, given that the UK is a leader in its own field, there are all sorts of aspects of AI and we would not want to allow the Chinese to buy those companies or take over the technology. There is no question but that the China dream that Xi Jinping has expressed is based on—let me put it like this—authoritarian technological supremacy and having a capability that dominates the global market in those areas. Huawei was definitely a step in that direction.
The critical areas are largely about the speed of technological advance and AI-related companies. We are very sophisticated in those areas, and the Chinese do not have a good record themselves of developing that sector without pinching it from the west—not to put too fine a point on it. The embargo placed on chip manufacturing by the Americans is a serious problem for China, because at the moment they cannot replicate that. I am sure that they will solve the problem themselves in due course. Of course, we have a certain dependence on them for certain things such as rare earth elements, so the quicker we can develop alternative sources, the better.
I am Cornish—I was born and brought up in Cornwall—and I see that one area where you might, using new technology, get rare earth out of the ground is Cornwall. I am devoted to the development of the Cornish economy, and I would love to see us making a real effort to develop Cornwall, for example, as a source of those elements, which is technically possible. It would be more expensive than buying them from China, but would be of huge benefit to our domestic economy. That is a good example of a sensitive area.
Andrew Bowie
Q
I was going to ask you a question I put to Mr Parton, although it is probably more relevant to you. How does what the Bill proposes compare with what is being done in other, comparable countries, such as our Five Eyes partners? Does it go as far as the Australians and the Americans, or are we still some way short of where we should be?
Sir Richard Dearlove: No, I think we will catch up. A very good example for us is Australia. They are hyper-dependent economically on their relationship with China, but the current Australian Government had the resolve to take a tough line on strategic issues, and they have suffered as a consequence. But their relationship with China will come back into balance, so the idea that you cannot be hard with the Chinese on these issues because it will prejudice a good trading relationship is rubbish.
The Chinese will probably respect you more if they know you mean business, they want a clear-cut relationship, and they see you have the legal means to impose that domestically, so they cannot just buy a high-tech company and walk off with the intellectual property, thank you very much. In the past, we have been so laissez-faire, it is ridiculous.
Chinese involvement in the oil industry is an interesting example too—I mean, look what they are doing now. They are doing deals with Iran and with Saudi Arabia on carbon fuel, exactly in the way I explained earlier. They are not going to cut their fuel emissions until they are ready to go for a nuclear-hydrogen economy, which they will have the means to do. We are sitting by and watching it happen, in a manner of speaking, and not worrying about the consequences for us.
One of my friends, who is a Chinese scholar, drew my attention—you will enjoy this, I think—to the 36 stratagems from the era of the warring states, which is 481 to 221 BC. I will mention three of the stratagems, because I think they are appropriate to the thinking of this Committee. Kill with a borrowed sword—that is, get what you can. Loot a burning house—bear that in mind in terms of taking advantage of the current pandemic. The third one is hide a knife behind a smile.
Sam Tarry (Ilford South) (Lab)
Q
Sir Richard Dearlove: You are talking about allied countries?
Sam Tarry
Obviously, if you are involved in global universities, for example, there will be some countries that we want to keep a much better relationship with, and whose students our intelligence services will have to monitor less.
Sir Richard Dearlove: There is definitely a graded difference in, let us say, our burgeoning relationship with India, but India can also raise some strategic security concerns for us. It has not always been entirely friendly, and bear in mind that it has quite a sophisticated weapons programme of its own. However, it would be wrong to treat India in the same way as you treat China; I agree that there is a gradation of treatment.
The Chair
That brings us to the end of the time allotted for the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank our witness very much for his time.
Before we finish, I want to read a message out to Members. I would appreciate it if Members did their best to arrive in the room a few minutes before this afternoon’s sitting starts at 2 pm, to ensure we can be seated in a socially distanced manner so that everybody remains safe.
National Security and Investment Bill (Second sitting)
Tuesday 24th November 2020
(3 years, 12 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 24 November 2020 - (24 Nov 2020)
The Chair
Q
We will now hear oral evidence from Dr Ashley Lenihan from the Centre for International Studies at the London School of Economics. Thank you for joining us today. Can you hear me now?
Dr Lenihan: I can hear you now.
The Chair
Q
Dr Lenihan: First, let me thank the Committee for including me in today’s evidence-gathering session. My name is Dr Ashley Lenihan and I am a fellow at the Centre for International Studies at the London School of Economics, as well as an associate at LSE IDEAS. My research for almost 20 years now has focused on foreign direct investment and national security.
Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)
Q
Dr Lenihan: That is an excellent question. To answer it, I will first step back for a second and say that the Bill is a very important step in the UK’s alignment with its closest allies on this issue, and especially the Five Eyes, because there is clear evidence that states are trying to use the market and companies over which they have control and influence to gain economic, technological and even military power in foreign investment. During times of economic downturn and crisis when asset prices are low, the opportunities for that type of behaviour increase. Hence, we have seen these modifications to regimes not only in the West, but outside the West as well.
I think one of the most important elements of regimes as they have evolved—especially among the Five Eyes, but among our NATO allies and even in Russia and China—is the move to ensure that review mechanisms have the institutional capacity and resources that they really need behind them. Part of this institutional capacity usually involves a multi-agency review body of some type.
There is always a lead organisation, and in the West—especially in the US, Germany and France—these tend to be in Treasury or in business or trade Ministries, and that lead body, like the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy in the Bill, receives the information and handles the day-to-day activity. However, in the US with the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, the idea behind having a multi-agency review body with multiple agencies and Departments across vast areas of Government is that you have the ability for regularised monitoring and feed-in from these agencies across the spectrum of possible threats, and you have dedicated staff within those agencies who have the necessary security clearances, training and specialised knowledge over time to keep an eye on potentially risky transactions and bring them to the awareness of the lead agency.
One of the key elements of CFIUS that has been very positive is that, as it has evolved, it has brought in more agencies, not less, so you have multiple opinions on the same potential transaction being brought to light and discussed before any decision needs to be taken by a Secretary or Head of State, depending on the question. In CFIUS, that responsibility ultimately lies with the President, but the idea is that you have had a multiplicity of views and, under the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernisation Act—the most recent update of US legislation—you have an ensured national security risk assessment made by the head of intelligence on detailed investigations of certain transactions.
The idea behind this is that—hopefully—any decision made will be viewed by the public as one that is truly based on national security concerns because of the debate that had to take place behind the scenes. That lowers the risk of politicisation and intervention, and again heightens the possibility of actually catching risky transactions in a way that otherwise can be difficult.
One of the great examples of transactions in the US caught not originally in the regularised monitoring process, but by a CFIUS employee in one of the agencies, was the unwinding in 2011 of Huawei’s purchase of 3Leaf, which was a US-based cloud computing technology company that had gone bankrupt. The assets, employees and patents had been purchased by Huawei—bankruptcy assets were not consistently monitored by the regime at that time. The purchase was caught by a Government staffer who happened to notice on his LinkedIn account that somebody whom he knew, who had partially run 3Leaf, was now listed as a consultant for Huawei. That transaction had to be reviewed and retroactively unwound. At that point, of course, one must assume that the bulk of the damage had been done, but it goes to show the importance of having not just one agency looking at these cases and being responsible; a multiplicity is needed across the piece. If I have any concerns with the Bill, my primary concern would be that the institutional capacity and resources behind the review regime are not made clear.
Chi Onwurah
Q
In terms of your work on investments, and the investment regime, is there not a risk that it ends up capturing a host of investment transactions? I am particularly thinking of the burden and impact on our innovative tech start-ups. The likely definitions of the sectors to be involved include artificial intelligence and data infrastructure. Based on your experience of other countries’ introduction of new investment screening rules, have you found patterns in how similar changes have affected foreign direct investment, and potential trade deals, which is a topical subject? Do you have any thoughts on ways to mitigate the burden and impact, particularly on start-ups?
Dr Lenihan: The Bill is arguably broader in scope on call-in powers than some other foreign direct investment regimes—I would argue that these perhaps even include the US regime—because it does leave wide latitude for call-in powers. The Bill also covers trigger events that are initiated by all investors, both domestic and foreign, and that is truly rare among Western FDI review regimes that are focused on national security. Usually, the concern is to focus the regime on investments from foreign-owned, controlled or influenced entities. Domestic entities and acquirers that have, for example, ultimate foreign ownership or influence in some ways should be able to be caught by any well-institutionalised and resourced regime. I am not sure why it is that we do not actually see the word “foreign” in the Bill, even though it is supposed to be based on foreign direct investment. Perhaps that is a concern about potential domestic threats down the road, but either way, it will lead to a much larger volume of mandatory notifications than most other national security FDI regimes—the US, Germany, Australia and other countries. Almost 17 have made changes in the past couple of years, and these have increased and been modified since the covid pandemic.
I understand that the legislation may be written as it is to include domestic investors, perhaps to avoid appearing to discriminate against foreign investors. I would suggest that that is probably too broad a formulation for focusing on and identifying real risk. The EU framework for FDI screening encourages its EU members to adopt mechanisms that do not discriminate between third-party countries, but that does not mean that it takes the word “foreign” out of its legislation to target foreign investments as opposed to domestic ones. Part of that is about the volume of transactions.
One thing I would highlight is that FIRRMA expanded the scope of covered transactions to include non-controlling investments of potential concern, as well as any other transaction or arrangement intended to circumvent CFIUS’s jurisdiction. But because it has had more cases to review on a detailed level in the past two or three years than in its history, since 1975, a major element of that Act is, again, around staffing and resources. There is a specific provision in FIRRMA, which is very clear that each of its agencies needs to hire under-secretaries in each agency just to be dedicated to this task.
There are two elements. An inter-agency review team is needed. You need enough staff to actually handle and catch all the risks. You the need the proper resources to do so—the right access to the databases, the right security clearances, the right training. On top of that, the volume of mandatory notifications will be increased by the fact that this is not just focused on foreign investment. I do not think there is much you can do about the foreign cases that you will get. There will be a high volume of those, and you need to be ready for them, but it is an important national security risk that needs to be dealt with.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Nadhim Zahawi)
Q
Dr Lenihan: Personally, I think they are fine. I know that might not be a popular answer with some. Germany, France and even parts of the EU framework set up this five-year retroactive for cases. I think that that is at minimum important. Other countries, such as China, Russia and the US, do not place any limit on retroactivity. I would have to check up on Australia and Canada, but there have been cases that have gone beyond a year there. Under the original Government White Paper, the idea of having only a six-month period, whether or not you have been notified, is quite dangerous, because there have been cases that were well known where they have been caught after that point.
Some of my examples are from the US. The reason for that is that it is one of the longest-standing and most institutionalised regimes. It is also one of the most transparent, from which we know most about the cases that have gone through it. I have looked at over 200 cases of this type of investment over a seven-year period in the US, UK, Europe, China and Russia. One case that stands out in the US is the 3Leaf acquisition by Huawei, which was caught almost at the year mark. Another good example that went over the one-year mark would be the review in 2005 retroactively of Smartmatic, which was a Venezuelan software company, and its purchase of Sequoia Voting Systems, which was a US voting machines firm. Smartmatic was believed to have ties to Chavez. However, that acquisition completed without knowledge of CFIUS and it was not actually able to be unwound until 2007. At that point, you worry about what has happened, but at least you do not have the ongoing concern.
You do need flexibility. With the volume of notifications and the learning curve that the investment security unit will have to undergo, or whatever the final regime truly looks like, it will take time to get the team in place and get the knowledge and systems down, to accurately catch even the most obvious investments that are of concern. Dealing with the kind of evolving and emerging threats we see in terms of novel investments from countries such as China, Russia and Venezuela needs the flexibility to look at retroactively and potentially unwind transactions that the Secretary of State and the investment security unit were not even aware of.
One thing is that for mergers and acquisitions transactions, which are historically what have been covered under these regimes, across Europe, Australia, Canada, Russia, China and the US, all the systems that have been used—the M and A databases: Thomson ONE, Zephyr, Orbis—take training, but they only cover certain types of transaction. They do not cover asset transactions; they do not cover real estate transactions, which are of increasing concern, especially for espionage purposes.
It is going to take time, and I believe that flexibility really needs to be there. It can always be reviewed in the future, but I do not think that so far foreign investment has been deterred in any way in countries that have that retroactive capability. To limit the UK’s capacity to protect itself for some kind of strange feeling that we need to be perceived as being even more open than everybody else when under threat is not really wise at this time.
Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)
Q
Dr Lenihan: I do think the US system is the most institutionalised that we have, and the best at the moment. That being said, Germany’s system is very good; it has caught quite a bit. The German system has also been very good about regularly updating, changing and adapting its regulations as it sees new emerging threats to itself. They seem to have good feed-in across Government and they are exceptionally good at co-ordinating with other states in terms of information of concern.
In terms of national security review, Canadian and Australian systems are quite good. The problem with those systems is that they tend to do national interest reviews at the same time or in tandem with their national security reviews. Over the long term, including national interest in the regime has had an impact on how they are perceived in terms of their openness to foreign direct investment abroad. In the OECD’s FDI restrictedness index, Canada and Australia rank far lower than the US, the UK, Germany and France, and I think this is because of their inclusion of national interest concerns. Similarly, on the World Economic Forum’s global competitiveness index, they rank far lower. That does not provide investors with the type of clarity that they need. In general, we see that investors tend not to be dissuaded from investing just because there is a new foreign direct investment regime, as long as that regime is seen to have clear regulatory guidance, is transparent, and is applied consistently over time.
France sometimes gets quite a bad reputation for economic nationalism, but its review mechanism is also quite good at catching potential threats to national security. Japan is an interesting case. It has been so restrictive for so long that it is a little harder to compare with the other western countries. Its system has been tied in again to an overarching inward investment regime that has been restrictive towards foreign investment for other means beyond national security, so I find that country to be less of a comparator for these purposes. I hope that answers the question.
Simon Baynes (Clwyd South) (Con)
Q
I have found your comments particularly interesting, Dr Lenihan. My own background is in the financial world, where I was involved in cross-border M and A and quoted equity transactions. I fully accept the premise of the Bill, which I think is important and has to be put into effect, and I draw encouragement from what you are saying about other regimes, but I am still left wondering a little bit whether, in practice, it will be really quite difficult for us to put into effect. Your point about the necessity of expertise among staff is crucial. Having sat at the centre of the process, I recognise that the point you make about a huge amount of information flowing across, especially in respect of unquoted companies, is very important; often, there is not much established information in the public domain. That first point is very important. The second point is that there is a very complex mechanism of market sensitivity as well. I do not quite know how this system intervenes with that. Also, within the UK itself there is a culture of openness, which has been touched on before, and in some respects we are a very different country from the others, particularly given the strength of the City of London. We therefore have the ability to transact in a way that some other countries do not, and a different culture.
The other point I wanted to raise and to hear your comments on is that there is a danger of political interference. I know that that is not the intention, but it must be a hazard in this process. What happens if the Government get it wrong about a company? Could not that be interpreted as political interference rather than seeking to establish a security risk?
Dr Lenihan: I started my career in mergers and acquisitions in aerospace and defence M and A, in London. I think you make an important point: the UK has historically been the most open country to foreign direct investment on most indices and indicators. That perception is strong, and I do not think that that culture of open investment will or should change with the introduction of the regime. To the contrary, it actually gives you one of the best starting points that any country has to do this.
As I said, on the whole, in the Bill as written, and in the statement of policy intent behind it, it is very clear that the powers for review and intervention should be used only for an identified risk of national security, and not on the grounds of national interest. Regimes that are based only on national security, like that in the US but also Germany and France—even with a very different culture in many ways—have not seen a lowering of levels of foreign direct investment over time, because they have introduced, modified or kept these regimes up to date. It is because, on the one hand, the stable environment that they provide and that the UK will definitely provide for foreign investors, is far more attractive than any uptick in cost from having to get up to speed on a new regime; also, they are able to retain these global perceptions of openness to foreign investment and ease of doing business because of the way in which the rules are applied. As long as the rules are applied consistently, and with clear reasons behind their use, and applied consistently and transparently over time, it should be okay.
The Bill provides for a lot of regulatory guidance, which needs to come forward in a clear and very easily comprehensible and understandable manner. As long as that happens, it should be okay. Global Britain should still be the proponent of liberal economic values that it always will be, while also being able to demonstrate to itself and to its allies that it is able to protect itself from this type of investment.
Going forward, Britain’s relationship with many of its Five Eyes allies is going to depend on having a comprehensive regime of this nature that is used well. Under FIRRMA, under US law, for example, the UK is an exempt foreign investor in certain categories—one of three with Canada and Australia. It has been stated that for that to continue––it is going to be reviewed––it needs to have a regime to protect itself. We can talk about this later, but part of that is about the potential concern about not just the ability to share intelligence on these issues, but about acquisition laundering, export controls and all these issues that tumble on behind that can affect investment, trade and intelligence-sharing relationships over time. That is important.
The research evidence shows that foreign investment is not deterred unless there is a problem in how this is applied. There has been politicisation of cases; demonstrated proportionality of response is also extremely important. There are many cases in which a threat to national security can be mitigated by agreements and undertakings without needing to block a deal. When you look at the modern history of foreign direct investment intervention across Europe and the US––even if you look at Russia and China and how they behave––the preference is, where possible, to mitigate national security concerns through comprehensive agreements, and that can be done in a host of ways. It can be that you have a board of directors that is only UK nationals, or that you require divestment of a certain black box technology company to another UK company or a friendly allied country. Whatever it may be, historically, there has been a preference for that type of action to be taken. Vetoes of cases are actually quite rare since world war one, when we first really saw this type of issue pop up.
The concern is if we see the UK blocking deals where it could mitigate because a deal has become a political hockey puck. In today’s world, where this is something that is constantly discussed in the Financial Times and The New York Times, whereas it was not 15 years ago, any case has the potential to be discussed widely in the political debate. The question is how it is treated by Government and how other countries perceive that treatment. I know that I have used US examples quite a bit, but if you look at US-China investment, China still invests a lot in the US, even though it complains every time a deal is blocked or mitigated. The reason behind that is because this is a sovereign right under customary international law, and China does the same thing when it has the same concerns. It is only if a case becomes truly politicised that there is an issue.
To give you an example, in 2005 in the US, the case of Dubai Ports World and P&O, which was a takeover of a UK company, became overly politicised in the US system. It is one of the only real examples where it has happened, and that was because there were a few US lawmakers who had a completely different view of the risk and relationship of the US vis-à-vis the United Arab Emirates than the Department of State or the Department of Defence. That is quite rare but what ended up happening was US lawmakers seeking to block a deal when most reasoned professionals in the industry and in various Government Departments thought that any risk could be mitigated simply in a host of other ways.
In the case of overuse, overbalancing, misuse, politicisation, whatever you want to call this tool of economic statecraft, there was a momentary blip in relations between the US and the UAE. There was a momentary stalling of trade talks, change in the currency basket and some uncomfortable months, but the relationship was strong enough to survive and it usually is. This is not really an aspect of going to war. I think the key is proportionality in response, how it is applied, and it is about consistency and transparency. The Bill is well written in many ways, but how it is used can go any number of ways, so it is about how the UK uses it going forward.
The Chair
Thank you, Dr Lenihan. There are lots of Members wanting to speak and we have limited time, so I will try to get through some quickly. I will call Stephen Flynn, Mark Garnier, then Stephen Kinnock.
Stephen Flynn (Aberdeen South) (SNP)
Thank you for your comprehensive and helpful answers, Dr Lenihan. I would like to divert back to some of the comments that were made about the Bill on Second Reading, particularly relating to definitions, or a lack thereof, in relation to national security. I would welcome your thoughts as to whether the Bill should or should not have a definition.
My second question relates to the scope of the Bill, which you mentioned earlier. In terms of the consultation going on, 17 sectors have been identified. The glaring omission seems to be social media, but I would appreciate your view on whether artificial intelligence would cover off social media to a level that you would be comfortable with.
Dr Lenihan: Those are both really good questions that I hoped would be asked. If national security is that which seeks to maintain the survival of the state and preserve its autonomy of action within the international system, unfortunately that means that you cannot necessarily define national security in law without binding yourself in an inflexible way. What we have seen is that most foreign direct investment regimes of this nature all refer to national security. I do not know of a single one that actually defines it or limits itself to a particular definition. I could be recalling incorrectly but I have looked at over 18 of them and I have never seen a particular definition.
What you do see in regulations is guidance as to how national security risk might be assessed or examples of what could be considered a threat to national security. US guidance is helpful on this, in terms of how they put their regulations together. Some have argued that it is too comprehensive—it is a lot to read and provides the lawyers with a lot to do—but it is useful and has meant that the process of knowing when you might be triggering concerns is easy to navigate. I really do not think that the UK wants to define it in the Bill.
There was a US Government Accountability Office report in 2008 examining the foreign direct investment restrictions in 11 countries at that time. Each was determined to have its own concept of national security but none of them actually defined it. In 2016 the OECD did a similar report after a new resurgence of changes in laws, and it looked at 17 countries including Lithuania, Korea, Mexico and Japan, and they came to the same conclusion. The OECD has quite good guidance in general on this and they have not recommended that their countries define national security risk, but they have recommended regulations to help increase transparency around what could be considered a risk.
Regarding the sectors for mandatory notification, I think that is a very good question and one that it is difficult to grapple with in many ways, because the threat is emerging and changing at the very same time that technology is emerging, changing and interacting with our society in various ways. Various countries have been trying to deal with this. In the US, a final rule was just put out in relation to non-controlling investments and situations where you have certain mandatory notifications. A pilot programme was initiated in 2018 to try to define—as your consultation will, in many ways—the proper sectors using North American industry classification system codes, instead of standard industrial classification codes as the UK regulation does.
Whatever codes you use, though, the US found that they had an incredibly high volume of mandatory notifications and were not necessarily getting to the issue that they wanted to. They have changed that under the final rule, and now mandatory notifications in that classification are going to be defined [Inaudible.] and would come under certain US export control regimes. The idea behind that is that the US is doing a review of export control regimes, which will try to get to what foundational technologies might be of concern. I think that applies to your question about social media.
Social media is of concern because of the data, and data retention, involved in most social media. As I understand it, the sectors in the Bill will be kept under constant review and can be changed and updated as needed. That is important, and it might be worth doing a pilot programme.
The Chair
Dr Lenihan, I was trying to squeeze two more questions in, but I think it will probably be just one.
Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)
Q
Secondly, it is worth bearing in mind that the Minister, Lord Grimstone, sits in both the DIT and BEIS. He is responsible for investment promotion. We are talking about more acquisitive types of investment, but do you see a potential conflict of interest between the ambitions of the Government to secure more investment into the UK and potentially having the wrong kind of investment?
The Chair
Sorry, Mark, but we have about 90 seconds for that to be answered. Please have a go, Dr Lenihan.
Dr Lenihan: I would suggest that the investment security unit and the unit that will handle the processing of this regime remain in BEIS. That is fine; however, it would be useful to set up in the Bill some sort of multi-departmental review body that contributes regularly, and that has staff in those Departments who monitor the risks in relation to this concern. As you say, the Department for International Trade will be able to monitor, find and catch risk that others—such as the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, GCHQ and its new cyber unit—cannot.
It would seem very strange to not have a feed-in from intelligence agencies and the Ministry of Defence on a regular basis. If you set that up in an institution that is clear, at least to the outside world, about its composition and makeup, as opposed to having ad hoc feed-in over time, it would help with the perception of openness from the outside. It would also help to counter any claims of an individual or place being politicised or used for some other purpose by a particular Minister, because then they could give a balanced opinion for the Secretary of State in charge to make a final decision.
The Chair
Thank you very much, Dr Lenihan. That brings us to the end of the time allotted to the Committee for asking you questions. We are grateful to you for your time. Where members of the Committee wanted to ask questions and were not able to, I will try to give them a bit of priority on the next panel—or in another, if that is helpful.
Examination of Witness
Michael Leiter gave evidence.
The Chair
We come to our fourth panel of witnesses. We will hear oral evidence from Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher and Flom LLP and Affiliates. For this panel we have until 3.30 pm. Mr Leiter, I welcome you, and ask you to introduce yourself for the record.
Michael Leiter: Good afternoon. My name is Michael Leiter, and I head the national security and Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States practice at Skadden Arps. It is a pleasure to be with you this afternoon.
Chi Onwurah
Q
Michael Leiter: Thank you for the question; it is quite a good one. It is one that the United States has struggled with, as have other countries and their regimes. We suggest a couple of approaches. First, one piece that I think the Bill does quite well—although there is a countervailing concern that has to be addressed—is not having a de minimis threshold, in terms of dollars. The Bill is quite strong in that regard, because as you note in your question, just because someone acquires a start-up company for a relatively modest amount—a few million pounds—it does not mean that that company and that technology does not have, or will not have, very significant national security implications.
The flipside of that is, of course, that without the de minimis threshold, it becomes a far more difficult regime to manage. The volume can be much higher. It can potentially poison venture capital innovation. This is best balanced by not having a threshold for dollars, as you do with the no de minimis threshold, but then making sure that regulators have the ability to review these matters extremely quickly. The pace of investment in emerging technologies requires a very short timeframe. It is not like a large public company transaction, which has extended timelines. As long as one implements a very rapid review process and has the officials in Government to keep up with that potential backlog, I think those two interests can be effectively balanced.
Chi Onwurah
Q
Michael Leiter: This is very important. I was rather taken aback by two things about the Bill. The first is the projection of over 1,000 matters, going from the very, very few that the UK has traditionally had; this is an explosive increase in matters. I am concerned that no Government are ready for that rate of change. Even in CFIUS under FIRRMA, although there is not an increase in the overall number of long-form notices, in the short-form declaration process, there was an increase. That was relatively modest, an increase of about one third, so the US now reviews approximately 240 full cases, and about another 100 short-form.
When you talk about going from a few dozen to 1,000, you have to be very sure that you have both the resources and the expertise to process that. I would be concerned by that. Another case where your Bill goes much farther than anything I have seen, and certainly much farther than anything in the United States, is in encompassing not just acquisition and investment in businesses but acquisition and investment in supplies, goods, trade secrets, databases, source code and algorithms, so it is tangible and intangible objects, rather than businesses. That scale is very difficult to predict, and if one is more in the mood for incremental change, so as to see how a Government can handle change, including those elements poses some real risk for management.
Nadhim Zahawi
Q
Michael Leiter: I am honoured to have worked with the UK Government for 20-plus years on security issues, and over the past 10 years on economic issues. I certainly think you have the potential to strike that balance. In the US, traditionally, the CFIUS structure was a balance between the security agencies, which tended to want to restrict investment, and the economic and commerce agencies, which tended to want to encourage that investment. Certainly, in the case of China, we have seen massive decline in direct investment because of both Chinese controls and US controls: a tenfold decrease from 2016 to 2018. But as you said, the scale and strength of the US economy mean that global investors look to the United States no matter what.
I do not mean to make less of the UK in any way but, from a UK perspective, one has to be a bit more careful, because you simply do not have the scale that inevitably will attract investment. The US could be a rather poor place to invest, with lots of regulation, but people would still come because of the scale of the market. You don’t have quite that luxury. That is not to say that the UK has not for generations been an incredibly attractive magnet for investment, but whereas the US can err on the side of security, from my perspective, admittedly an American one, the UK might want to be a bit more careful about restrictive measures, because the size of the market is not in and of itself so inherently attractive that companies and investors must be in it. We have a bit of an advantage over you on this one.
Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP)
Q
Michael Leiter: I was able to see part of Dr Lenihan’s excellent testimony, which was quite informative and good. First, to clarify, although the US does make distinctions for exempted countries—obviously those are the UK, Australia and Canada right now—that exemption is extremely narrow. It limits those countries only on mandatory filings, and only if investors from those countries fulfil a fairly rigorous set of requirements. So, although Canadian, UK and Australian investors were quite excited before CFIUS reform, when the regulations about excepted investors were promulgated, that has had a minimal effect on those countries. It is not a significant advantage. Those countries are still subject to CFIUS review in the vast majority of investments they make. Now, that gives only half the story, because clearly investments from those nations go through a much less rigorous review, and come out with much better results than those from countries where the US has a more strained security relationship.
On what I see in the Bill, I would say a couple of pieces about the excepted possibility. First, as I read the Bill right now, it covers investments from other UK investors—not even simply those outside the UK. If my reading is correct on that front, I have to say that is probably not wise. We have already talked about the significant increase you could have, based to some extent on mandatory transactions as well as some other factors, and I think trying to take a slightly smaller bite of the apple and not including current UK businesses in the scheme would be well advised.
To the extent one has open trade and security relationships with certain countries, lowering the bar for review to exempt them, or including things such as dollar limits and getting rid of the de minimis exemption, might well make sense. That is another way of making sure that the Secretary of State can focus on those areas you think are the most sensitive from a security perspective. Whether we like to do so or not, that can be aligned to some extent with the country of origin of the investor. It is not always perfect—one must often look below that, especially when dealing with limited partners and private equity—but it is a relatively easy way to reduce the load you may experience if all these measures were implemented.
Nickie Aiken (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)
Q
Michael Leiter: Right now, it is a very robust list. In fact, I would probably err on the side of going in the other direction. I think this is a good list of 17, but what is critical is that these sectors gain further definition about what this actually means. Let me give you a quick example: artificial intelligence. I invite you to go online and try to find more than 10 companies in the world right now who are doing well and do not advertise their use of artificial intelligence in one way or another. It is one of the most commonly used marketing terms there is: artificial intelligence and machine learning, all to serve you in your area of work. If one interprets artificial intelligence as encompassing all those businesses, there will be a flood of reviews. Now, if one focuses on those companies not using artificial intelligence but actually developing artificial intelligence, I think the definition of the mandatory sector will make much more sense. That is an area where I think the US is still finding its way. As Dr Lenihan noted, the US began with a set of listed sectors where transactions were more likely to be mandatory. They eliminated that and now focus purely on export controls, but again, it is not that a company uses export control technology; it is that it produces export control technology.
That may be too narrow for your liking, but if one mapped out your 17 sectors as currently described to their widest description, I think there would be very little left in the UK economy, except for some very basic manufacturing and some other services that would not be encompassed. This is a very broad list and, again, I think it will take some time to tune those definitions so they are not overly encompassing. Again, if you look at data infrastructure, communications, transportation —at their extreme, that is quite a broad set of industry descriptions.
Sam Tarry (Ilford South) (Lab)
Q
Michael Leiter: Thank you for your question. I will do my best to provide some advice. I do so with some hesitation, because I readily accept from my experience working with the US and the UK that although we are related, we have two very different systems. The scale of our Governments and the scale of our private sectors are different, so one should always be very careful of trying to learn lessons from any other single country.
First, I would try to take this incrementally. This is a very big step and in trying to predict second-order and third-order effects of this—both the security effects, which may be positive, and the economic effects, which may not be as positive—I would tread carefully. I would start narrowly, then open up the aperture as necessary, rather than opening up quite wide and then narrowing it down.
Secondly, I think it will take some time, and not only to develop the administrative capabilities to handle this volume within the Government. I think you would have a significant amount of learning to do within your private Bar as to how this works, but also how to manage those voluntary filings. You are talking about including voluntary notifications across the economy, which I think is quite a sensible approach, but that requires a degree of collaboration between the UK security sector and the Secretary of State and the UK private legal Bar and commercial sector to understand where those national security threats and risks may lie. This is something that has developed in the United States over the past 20 years, but does not, in my view, yet exist fully in the UK.
Next, I would say that it is very important to consider how this should be applied for limited partners in private equity. Private equity plays a massive role both in UK and US investment and having clear rules about limited partners and the rights that may or may not implicate non-British ownership in those private equity funds is a very important step to take and one that should be clarified up front. It should not be approached without further clarification.
Lastly, I think it is important to build into the scheme the ability to evolve as technology evolves. I heard some of the questions about social media during the previous panel and it would have been very difficult to understand the sensitivities that are implicated by social media 10 years ago, or perhaps even five years ago. The ability for the review and notification to evolve with changing technology, access to data and new national security threats is critically important. The regime should be a living one that will evolve with those changed political or technological circumstances, not one that keeps still.
Sam Tarry
Q
Michael Leiter: Having worked with some of them, I think you have some outstanding individuals in some of the relevant Departments who can look at this matter. I believe that they will have to increase their interaction with the security elements of Her Majesty’s Government in a way that does not perhaps yet fully exist. The departments and agencies that I worked with while I was in the US Government were generally fairly separate from these sorts of investment review, and it will be necessary for training among those agencies to ensure that there is an understanding of the nature of acquisitions and investments in the private sectors in a way that security agencies do not yet fully understand it. Teaching the economic agencies about those security concerns will also be necessary. I think that the Government will need an initiative to make sure that there is a degree of integration across Her Majesty’s Government based on an understanding of those cross-fertilisations, which will take some period to take hold.
Andrew Griffith (Arundel and South Downs) (Con)
Q
Thank you for joining us, Mr Leiter. It is invaluable to have a practitioner’s perspective as we make legislation; that is something I would like us to do more often. I wanted to ask about your practitioner experience with respect to two things: first, the inclusion in the Bill of personal criminal sanctions and, secondly, its behavioural impact, from the point of view of attorneys and lawyers advising clients, on the likelihood of notification.
Michael Leiter: Let me answer that with two points. First, there is clearly an educational process when such a new regime comes into place for bankers, attorneys and business people. This regime will take some time for them to understand as well, but I think that the UK, like the US—I have already drawn some distinctions about the risk of reducing investment in both countries—remains overall one of the most attractive places to invest in the world. One of the reasons it is so attractive is that it has a strong rule of law and courts system, and clear legislation. In that regard, those who would come and invest in the UK very much understand the need to comply with these regulations, and criminal and civil penalties.
What we have seen in the United States is an appreciation, even if there was some initial shock at the scope of the review and what might be considered a national security concern, and a very robust understanding that we at the Bar and our clients have developed about the importance of these reviews and compliance with the legal regime that applies. I do not see any likelihood of, or reason for, the same not taking hold in the UK. I find that my clients are quite appreciative of the counsel we give them, whether it is related to the US or a UK foreign investment. Overall, I think that the concern tends be less about personal criminal liability, although such concern undoubtedly inspires some, and more about the ability to continue to have good, strong, open relations with regulators in the country in which business is being done. That is critical.
The second piece I would commend you on, which is much better than the US system, is that the Bill provides for a very full and complete review by your courts. That is quite positive, especially with the change that will have to be implemented by the Government. The fact that there is an ability to turn to the courts for review is central and important. As you may know, that is not nearly equivalent in the United States. The ability to pursue remedies in the courts in the context of CFIUS is actually quite narrow. On behalf of my clients, and for improvement of the system, I am quite jealous of your approach on this front.
Stephen Flynn
Q
Michael Leiter: I will take those in reverse order. You are absolutely right: the timing is often central to much of what goes on in the world of mergers and acquisitions. With respect to the effective five-year look-back with six months of notification, that is not dissimilar to what we have in the United States. It serves a very useful purpose in that it certainly incentivises parties to file voluntarily.
To the extent that one includes a voluntary notification regime, I think that it is very important to have some period of look-back. I do not have a strong view whether that should be four or five years, but I do think that look-back is important in a voluntary regime. Of course, in CFIUS, there is no statute of limitations at all, but in reality, we rarely see CFIUS going back more than one year, at most two or three. Again, I think that if everything were mandatory, this would not be required, because to the extent that one has a voluntary regime, it is perfectly reasonable to give the Government an opportunity to look back. Doing so also provides an important incentive for parties, because they will often calculate the likelihood of the Government coming and knocking on their door one or two years down the line. I think that a general approach makes sense.
With respect to the specific timeline for the reviews, your Bill mirrors not perfectly, but closely, the CFIUS approach. In most cases, that timeline works relatively well, but there are a few exceptions. First, in public company mergers and acquisitions, this is no problem. The period between signing and closing tends to be quite long, so the idea of 75 days is not problematic. Similarly, whenever you have a matter where there is a competition review, which of course encompasses many things—on our side, Antitrust and Hart-Scott-Rodino, and in the UK and EU there are separate regimes—that 75 day-period seems to fit relatively well, provides sufficient time for the Government do their review, and will not be problematic.
The place where I think this is more problematic—I apologise that I cannot recall the Member who asked the question—is in smaller-scale, early-stage venture investments. That is where deals can go signed to close within hours or days, and having that longer period could be quite disruptive. In that sense, to the extent that one is concerned with early-stage technology investment, these timelines can be problematic, and finding a window to get through that quickly is quite important.
Finally, with respect to the timing of implementation and the time that it will take to get up to speed, I think it is important to have this effectively phased. I know I have said this several times, but I think this is a rather seismic shift in the UK’s approach to review of investment. I am not saying it is a bad shift. I think it is a shift that is consistent with the United States and other allies in Europe, and Australia. I think it is going in the right direction, but it is very significant, so having some opportunity to make sure that both the private sector and the public sector are ready for that and understand the rules—that the sectors are defined in a clear way and that parties understand, especially in the realm of having criminal penalties—I think it is particularly important to do that.
I think there are probably ways, to the extent you are worried about a risk during that interim period that things are not being reviewed, of addressing that as well, with the look-back provision, or initially implementing things in a narrower or separate sense, but I would be a bit careful about not having some transition period, which allows, again, both the public and private sectors to adjust to this very significant change.
Stephen Flynn
Q
I am sorry to flip back again, but on smaller-scale early-stage ventures, we said this could be an issue, and again, I am sorry to pin you down: could it, or will it, be an issue? Where would you lean in that regard? Will we find that investors seek to go elsewhere with this a little bit more, where the timing is a little easier?
Michael Leiter: I think it will be an issue unless you are confident that small-scale, early-stage investors can have their transactions quickly reviewed within roughly 30 to 45 days. If it is longer than that, that will make the investment climate, I think, worse than other competing markets. I think that could have an impact.
On your first point, let’s face it, business always likes predictability, so you always want certainty, but deal makers have to understand risk and understand some uncertainty. That is inherent. I will say, it is not that the US has done this remotely perfectly. The US announced almost two years ago now that it was going to further define foundational and emerging technology that would then be subject to different levels of review under CFIUS. Here we are, almost two years later, and we still do not have that. The fact is that there has been uncertainty, and there will be uncertainty on your side as well. Having those definitions clarified as quickly as possible is good.
Do I think that a lack of clarity for three, four or five months about these sectors will suddenly stop investment in the UK? No. I don’t want to exaggerate it to that degree. You can try to pin me down, but the fact is this is all a matter of balancing, and there is no clear answer about when people will stop or start investing. More clarity is better. The faster there is clarity, the better, and to some extent, a lack of clarity will push people to look at other markets.
Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)
Q
Michael Leiter: Thank you for the question. The answer is that many regimes do draw such a distinction, which is generally a good thing, but there is an exception to that as well. This is important on two points, one of which I have already raised so I will not belabour. Understanding the ownership structure of private equity to understand how the Bill will or will not handle limited partners who are managed by a general partner at a fund is very important. That is a significant amount of investment, and clarity on that point is critical.
In the United States, for example, foreign limited partners in US private equity are fundamentally, overall, not considered for CFIUS. For foreign private equity investing in the United States, foreign limited partners are considered. Again, that is broad brush, but that is fundamentally how it works. With respect to sovereign wealth funds or state-controlled investments, there is a perfectly good argument that yes, the standard of review might be a bit more rigorous. In the United States, the way that works is that if a foreign Government-controlled entity invests in what is known as a TID business—one that that deals with critical technology, critical infrastructure or sensitive data—in the United States, and if they own more than 25% equity, that is a mandatory filing. So, it is increasing the likelihood of a mandatory filing if you are controlled by a partner.
Using such a standard makes sense. Right now, I do not believe the Bill provides many opportunities for that. You are already saying that, in the 17 sectors, all will be mandatory and there is no de minimis threshold. From that perspective, whether you are a sovereign wealth fund or not, it will be mandatory in a large scale of matters. You could of course say, with a dollar threshold such as you have now, that in the voluntary sector, if it was a state-sponsored entity, that would also be mandatory. I think there is some sense to that, but I would move slowly on that because, as I have noted several times, you are going to have a relatively high number of mandatory filings in the first place.
There is a second important piece to this, though, about whether you actually want to change it for Government-controlled entities. That is, especially in the case of China, but other countries as well, the distinction between state controlled and not state controlled is becoming less and less. Again, in some western democracies, it is quite clear whether it is a state-controlled entity, but to the extent a foreign Government can influence a private sector actor, that distinction starts to fade away, at least partially. Under your regime, it is not clear to me, other than expanding some voluntary into mandatory, how that will apply, and I think, to some extent, the distinction is losing some of its fineness.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
Michael Leiter: That raises two excellent points. First, yes, I think private equity is quite methodical about thinking of those restrictions. Whenever I deal with private equity in the Unites States, whether it is US private equity, foreign private equity or sovereign wealth funds, there is always a consideration of the way in which the business in which they are investing may be subject to a national security review and whether or not they will, even if approved, lose access to critical information, technology or other management control of the business in a way that would make it a less attractive option. From a US Government perspective, I think that is entirely appropriate; it is the entire purpose of the national security reviews.
It could affect the choices of private equity in the UK, but one still has to identify what the national security risk would be—and not just what the national security risk might be, but the extent to which, if the investment was allowed, the Government could still put in place restrictions that would eliminate or mitigate that national security risk. That leads me to make two very quick points.
First, there has been much commentary about defining what national security means. I would not welcome to go down that path; frankly, I think it is a bit of a fool’s errand. The Government will define national security as they may. Certainly, they should not overreach in extreme ways, but this is not one that I think legislative language is well tuned to trying to capture. That is not to say that it should not be limited in practice, but trying to capture it in legislative language is, I think, exceedingly hard. Again, it changes over time, depending on technology, access to data and other factors. One can imagine certain things that, before covid, we never would have considered to be issues of national security, but that are today. Capturing language for that is quite challenging.
The second piece is making sure that you have a good regime. We have been talking so much about screening, punishment and what falls into the bucket of review. There has been much less discussion here, and there is much less discussion in the law, about what mitigation and rules and enforcement there will be. If you permit a foreign investor to invest in one of these sectors and you put in place certain protections to protect British national security, how will you actually make sure that that occurs? It is wonderful to have these rules, but unless you actually have the regime and follow these things and ensure that there is enforcement and monitoring of them, you will have spent an enormous amount of time and money but actually not protected national security, so I think we should not give short shrift—[Inaudible]—deal is closed and approved but still being monitored by the Government for the very national security risk we are trying to protect against.
The Chair
We have to end this session at half-past 3, so I think that this will be the last question and it will come from Simon Baynes.
Matt Western
Q
Michael Leiter: I think your Bill does cover it. CFIUS would cover it in two ways. First, to the extent that a non-benign actor was behind the first transaction, CFIUS looks at the ultimate parent and whether it has been structured to evade review, so I think there is robust authority there. Secondly, the follow-on transaction itself would of course also be subject to CFIUS review, so I think you could catch it in the first instance or the second instance.
I think your Bill covers that. I will say also that I think the Bill is quite expansive and potentially problematically so. The US regime looks to see if there is a US business that is being acquired or invested in. That is a broad definition, but it still requires, generally, some physical presence, some people or the like. Your Bill does not seem to contemplate that, and specifically it says, “If the business simply provides supplies and goods to the UK or from the UK”. That is a very broad definition. It fundamentally means that if someone in London is buying something from a US business and it sends that to London—well, I read that as being covered by the Bill. That would actually be more expansive than CFIUS. It might, in that sense, give you greater national security protection, but I think it also may implicate a far more significant scale of transactions.
The Chair
Thank you very much, Mr Leiter. We are grateful to you for giving of your time so generously to assist the Committee.
Examination of Witness
David Petrie gave evidence.
The Chair
We now move to the next session. David Petrie is from the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. Mr Petrie, would you be so kind as to enough introduce yourself for the record?
David Petrie: Good afternoon, Sir Graham, and thank you very much indeed for inviting me to give evidence to the Committee. My name is David Petrie, and I am head of corporate finance at the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. My background is in corporate finance and mergers and acquisitions, for 10 years or so now in my current role at the ICAEW and prior to that with PwC. My experience includes advising on transactions, principally in the mid-markets, including private equity buy-outs, company sales and some infrastructure transactions. Prior to that I had a career in industry as well, so I have seen all sides of the fence on this, I suppose.
The Chair
Thank you very much. Before I move on to taking questions, I remind everybody that this session has to close by a quarter past four.
Chi Onwurah
Q
David Petrie: The Government have been very clear that the purpose of this legislation is to focus on protection of national security. The guidance notes they have issued, which accompany the Bill and are intended for market participants, are very clear on that aspect. I would suggest that probably all the factors you listed in your question extend beyond a simple matter of national security—if national security can be a simple matter; no doubt that this Committee has heard this afternoon about the difficulties associated with defining national security. Many of the factors that you set out there, important elements though they are to all stakeholders in a company, are not necessarily matters of national security.
I would also say that that for some of the companies that you mentioned there, while certain of their activities might well be included within the scope of this new Bill, it would be very difficult in certain instances to suggest that they had a direct impact on our national security. Of course, that would be up to the new investment security unit to determine, based on a full representation of the facts. If that unit was at all concerned, a procedure is set out in the Bill whereby it would be able to call for as much evidence as it felt was necessary in order to be able to reach a balanced determination on whether investment by an overseas entity did indeed constitute a real threat to our national security. I think that is the point here.
Chi Onwurah
Q
David Petrie: I have read the impact assessment, which included that example. It is a difficult situation, as described in the example. In accordance with the way that this new legislation is drafted and the number and extent of the sectors that are regarded as mandatory—the sectors in scope such that their operating activities would require a notification of the unit—the example set out in the impact statement would indeed require screening by the investment security unit. The Government would likely have the opportunity to review a potential acquisition in that software company.
I was struck by that example, in that it suggested that service had failed, or a malign actor had decided not to provide the necessary services to the airport. I think a broader question here is what might happen in reality. Those services would be procured through a commercial contract, which in turn would, presumably, be backed by insurance. If it were an absolutely critical service, I would expect that the airport would have a back-up system, whether power supplies or a parallel running system, as they do for air traffic control. There are commercial protections for the actual operating activities of critical infrastructure, which should work. It is difficult to protect against the actions of malign actors, but critical infrastructure already has systems and processes, and invests heavily in capital equipment, to ensure that there is not an interruption of supply. The question would be the extent to which ownership of that asset physically gave the owners of the shares the ability to get in and interrupt supply. That almost implies mechanical breakdown or some deliberate and malign disconnection. Again, companies have cyber-security systems in place to ensure that critical infrastructure does not fail.
The point you made was about whether suppliers of that sort of service to our critical infrastructure and their ownership should be subject to review. As the Bill is set out and as the sectors in scope are drafted—of course, the Government will consult over the next month or so on those definitions and whether they should be adjusted or whether they are as wide-reaching as they should be—a business like that would be captured. The investment security unit and, presumably, the security services would have an opportunity to review whether or not to allow that to go ahead.
Nadhim Zahawi
Q
David Petrie: I think a quasi-judicial review is really important and a part of the process, and then, if necessary, there is judicial review. I think the question cuts back to how many times that is likely to happen. We have to step back a little bit and recognise that that would be a situation where the parties to the transaction are challenging the Secretary of State’s decision as to whether or not this is in the interests of national security.
I would assume that if the sellers are British companies, they will probably have received what they feel are adequate assurances that it is okay to sell to an overseas acquirer, but the Secretary of State takes a different view, presumably based on evidence provided by our national security services. Ultimately, if there is a compelling body of evidence to suggest that a transaction should be modified or adjusted or, in extremis, blocked, it would be quite an unreasonable group of shareholders to disagree with that if the if the Secretary of State was applying the test as set out in the Bill, and indeed in the guidance note, that intervention is to be limited only to matters where the national security of this country is at threat.
That is quite different from the national interest. It is tempting—or possible, rather—in this debate to get sucked into questions about what we should and should not be doing in this country. That is not what this is about. The Government have been very clear to the investment community, and to British business more generally, about the purpose of this legislation. That is why, although markets and investors recognise that it will take a certain amount of time and effort to comply with a mandatory regime—the Government have been very clear about their purpose in introducing that—the market is generally favourably disposed towards it. We can see that it is unfortunately necessary in these modern times.
Stephen Flynn
Q
David Petrie: Perhaps I could deal with the second part of your question first, if I may, on the potential number of notifications that the new legislation is going to necessitate. The first point I make about that is that this new investment security unit will need to be very well resourced. A thousand notifications a year is four a day; I am just testing it for reasonableness, as accountants are inclined to do. That is quite a lot of inquiries. I note from the paperwork that the budget allocated to the new unit is between £3.7 million and £10.4 million. I do not know and cannot comment yet as to whether that is likely to be adequate. What I can say is that the impact statement also suggests that of those 1,000 or so transactions which are going to be subject to mandatory notification, only 70 to 95—the numbers set out in the impact statement—are likely to be called in for further review by the Secretary of State, where a very detailed analysis of those businesses and the potential target is going to be necessary.
As, I hope, has been echoed by other witnesses, it is going to be extremely important that this new unit can engage in meaningful pre-consultation with market participants—with British companies, finance directors, and investors and their advisers—so that they can get a pretty clear steer at an early stage as to whether or not this is likely to be subject to further review. If the unit operates in a way where it can give unequivocal guidance to market participants at an early stage and is open to dialogue—I understand from discussions with the Minister that this is the way the unit is being asked to operate—that would be extremely helpful.
I would say that that is about process, certainly, but I think it is also about culture. It has to be a balance, which is well achieved by the Takeover Panel, for example, in this country. You do not tend to approach the Takeover Panel unless you are well-informed and have done your homework—"Don’t bother us with stuff you ought to know” is the unwritten rule. But at the right time and place, I think it is important that there is an opportunity for market participants to be able to engage in a dialogue. The guideline where we put this “Don’t bother us with stuff you ought to know” question is going to shift. At the moment, we really do not know a lot about the way the Government are going to look at certain transactions. We do know which sectors and operating activities are in scope, but, again, we are not quite sure at what stage it will be right to consult and try and get clear guidance. This process will evolve.
I note that the Bill includes provision for the new unit to issue an annual report as to the number of transactions called in and the sectors they are in. That will be extremely helpful for market participants. An issue here, I think, is potentially asymmetry of information. In order to resolve potential asymmetry of information amongst the investment and advisory community, it would be very helpful that the unit is well resourced and able to engage in meaningful pre-consultation, but, by way of a third recommendation, it would also be extremely useful if it was able to issue meaningful market guidance notes, similar to the notes that accompany the takeover code. That would again be extremely helpful so that we can understand. It would help the market to be better informed. If, for example, the unit is receiving a lot of notifications that are not correctly filled in or with important details as to ownership missing, then it would helpful to have guidance notes as to what we can do to make sure this process works with more certainty, speed, clarity and transparency—these are the things financial markets need to see—to help us with that, beyond what has already been issued, which is very helpful, I have to say. As the market evolves, that would be extremely helpful.
Mark Garnier
Q
David Petrie: That is a very difficult question. We will find out—that is the answer to that. I think businesses working in sectors where there is a real threat to national security know that. They know that they are involved in weapons design or designing software that could have a dual use. In advising companies over the years, I have found that no one knows better than the company directors about the value of their assets and their business, both from a market perspective and to competitors or others seeking to gain access to their technology.
The Bill has been in discussion for some years now, and the advisory community is well aware of its existence and of the Government’s desire to put this legislation on the statute book, so I do not think there will be many corporate finance advisers for whom the Bill emerging last week was a surprise. I am very sympathetic to the points made about small companies falling under the provisions of the Bill, but I hope that it will be possible for them to complete what, in the first instance, is a five-page questionnaire—when completed, it could run to 20 pages or more—at a relatively low cost.
To my earlier point, I hope they are able to engage in formal and meaningful dialogue with the unit at the earliest possible opportunity by saying, “This is what we do, and this is what we are worried about.” They have to say, “We’re concerned about this. These are the people from whom we are hoping to attract investment to take the business to the next stage. How do you feel about our business, and how do you feel about the people we are talking to? How does the Government feel about xyz corporation?” I think that kind of steer would help remove a great deal of uncertainty from the circumstances that you have set out.
Simon Baynes
Q
David Petrie: On the question of tangible assets, it really depends on what we are talking about. Again, it was trailed in the White Paper and the Green Paper that assets would also be within scope, so it is not going to be a surprise. It depends very much on the nature of those assets. In a relatively small country, the ability to acquire land or other buildings—strategic assets—immediately next to a sensitive military installation is, presumably, now included within scope because people who know about these things think it ought to be. I think the investment community will have a degree of sympathy there.
With intangible assets, that is a much more difficult question. It depends on the extent to which ownership of those assets is necessary in order for a malign actor to have the control or the information that they might need. It is possible to gain access to intellectual property through means other than ownership, so the question here is, how might those intangible assets be applied in ways that might prejudice our national security in some way? Again, that is something that the unit is going to have to assess on a case-by-case basis.
It makes sense to include assets that could be sold separately, without the sale of shares in a business. Companies often do that. They may well sell a parcel of patents, or parcel up a division and sell it on because it is no longer core to their operating activities. That is understandable. The investment community will understand that. In short, it is not a surprise, and we are going to have to find our way through this on a case-by-case basis.
Simon Baynes
Q
David Petrie: That would be the most obvious example. There are things like industrial designs, blueprints or chemical processes that may not be subject to patents. It is typically those aspects of production and design that it is necessary to ensure would be in the scope of this kind of legislation.
Much of the discussion that has led to the publication of the Bill has been around the ownership of shares or of the business—as to whether that is actually the bit that malign actors might want to get hold of. That may not be what really interests them with the business. It may well be intellectual property or these other assets, which it is necessary to separately define. If they are able to get hold of those without buying the company, then it seems to follow that it makes sense to include that within the scope of this Bill.
Simon Baynes
Q
David Petrie: Yes. I don’t think anyone is suggesting that the job of this new investment security unit is going to be straightforward. In fact, we are absolutely not suggesting that. It is going to be absolutely essential for Government Departments to work together and, going back to my original point, for this unit to be extremely well resourced, to be able to respond quickly and appropriately to what is put before it.
Peter Grant
Q
David Petrie: This is an issue that is well recognised by the investment and advisory community. I think that, as you say so rightly in your question, the warning flags, flares or whatever they might be will already be going off if this is a particularly sensitive military asset that is being considered for acquisition. I think that the unit will be able to look first at the nature of the asset, and it will be apparent very quickly as to whether this is a very sensitive issue. If the acquirer is not a British public limited company, a British private company or one invested in by private equity, if the ultimate ownership is structured in a way that is not conventional—many companies are held through offshore companies for entirely conventional, obvious and transparent reasons for the investment community—and if there is something strange about that ownership structure that makes it extremely difficult to trace the ultimate ownership, it feels to me as though that would be one of the 70 to 90 cases that the Secretary of State would want to review in a lot more detail. Then, due and diligent inquiries would be made to try and understand the ultimate ownership of those holding companies. There would be lots of complicated diagrams drawn, no doubt, showing who owns which bit of what and who are the key individuals and shareholders. The answer would be that, I am afraid, this unit is going to have to keep digging until they get to the bottom of who are the ultimate shareholders.
The Bill is drafted in such a way that you do not need to own much in the way of shares—or there are provisions included within it such that if an entity or individuals, or individuals reporting elsewhere, have control or influence over those holding companies, that in itself would be something we would be concerned about. The Bill includes provision for that because we know, and I believe the security services are well aware, that the equivalent of layering is used for acquisition of these sorts of businesses, or people have certainly tried to do that. So, it is going to be a matter of hard work and digging to get to the bottom of who really owns and controls those entities.
Peter Grant
Q
David Petrie: I suspect that would be the corollary of that, yes. We are probably dealing with a relatively unusual set of circumstances here. It rather assumes that the shareholders of the British company are absolutely determined to sell or take investment from an entity where its ultimate ownership is quite difficult to identify. We are dealing with quite an unusual situation—not unprecedented, certainly, but relatively unusual. I do not know what resources the new unit will have at its disposal, but given that this is relatively rare and is a question of national security, I would expect that the Secretary of State would ask it to use whatever resources are necessary to gain the information it needs.
I hope—again, we will see—that the closed doors process for the judicial review, should it come to that, would enable national security to be protected, so that if there were some other breaches as a result of the investigation, or if explaining how we found out what we know caused a breach in national security elsewhere, that problem could be resolved. I am comfortable—I think that would be the right expression—that those difficulties can be dealt with in circumstances in which the absolute preferred option for the company is to take investment, but I have to say that I think those circumstances would be relatively rare.
Sam Tarry
Q
David Petrie: Yes, I have. The Government have been very clear about the need to bring this legislation on to the statute book, and they have done so through the Green and White Papers. When consulting on the White Paper, they sought opinion from a very broad spectrum, including business groups, businesses, the investment community and so on. They have set that out in the response to the consultation.
The next consultation is the one on the sectors within the scope of the mandatory regime, and the next month or so is going to be a very important stage in this process. Defining those sectors in a way that market participants understand and that does not trigger manifestly unnecessary notifications is going to be very important, and we look forward to engaging in that process, as does the legal and investment profession and British business.
Sam Tarry
Q
David Petrie: Yes, that is an important consideration. I hope that if small businesses have limited resources, that is recognised by the new unit, and that smaller businesses are able to have an open dialogue with it, and can say, “This is what we do, and this is what we need the money for. We are going to need it quite quickly because we are running out of money.” If the unit is able to give unequivocal guidance very quickly, that would be very helpful.
I would also say that the new unit should not treat the 30-day turnaround for a mandatory notification as the target. The target should be to respond as quickly and efficiently as it can, and in such a way that does not cause difficulty or distress for small and medium-sized companies. A five-page form for a small or medium-sized company seeking investment for a UK or a relatively straightforward overseas entity is not a terribly burdensome obligation. I hope that it will be possible for them to find their way through that at relatively low cost.
The Chair
I do not think there are any more questions, so once again I thank you, Mr Petrie, for generously giving your time to assist the Committee.
David Petrie: Thank you.
Examination of Witness
Chris Cummings gave evidence.
The Chair
We welcome Chris Cummings, the chief executive of the Investment Association. Mr Cummings, would you be so kind as to introduce yourself for the record?
Chris Cummings: Thank you for the opportunity to appear in front of you. My name is Chris Cummings, and I am the chief executive of the Investment Association. We represent UK-based fund managers, an industry of some £8.5 trillion used by three quarters of UK households today. We own roughly a third of the FTSE.
Chi Onwurah
Q
Chris Cummings: Thank you; that is such a pertinent question. Before I address the substance of it, I want to try to describe the work of many of my members, which is broadly portfolio investments. They seek not to acquire a company but to invest, taking a very small stake—a fraction of a percent—of those companies. That provides an opportunity for those companies to receive the investment they are looking for, and enables us as investors to invest in a company, an industry or a whole sector in order to generate a return for the investors whose money we are managing. They tend to be pension funds and insurance companies—institutional investors.
Of that £8.5 trillion I mentioned that we manage, about 80% to 85% comes from institutional investors; the other 15% or so comes from retail: people on the high street saving in individual savings accounts and so on. Our view on the Bill is about how we can continue to do our work to help finance companies in the UK and internationally with the investment collateral that we can bring to bear. We do that in the two major parts of the market: listed companies and unlisted companies.
Perhaps I can address the point you made about small and medium-sized enterprises. We make investments in unlisted companies—of course, small and medium-sized enterprises are not listed organisations—by developing an understanding of sectors and industries. We look for individual institutions that we regard as high-performing—that is, high-performing over a long period of time, because we are patient investors, tending to take a long-term view, unlike colleagues in other parts of the industry, who are more high-frequency, or looking at a two to three-year earn-out period. To help us do that, we need two things. The first is legal certainty around the investment climate here in the UK, so that we understand the rules of the game, so to speak. This particular Bill is helpful in establishing greater clarity about the rules of the game; we do have one or two caveats, but it is helpful. The other is publicly available information, such as analysts’ reports—the type of thing that we as investors would look to receive and interrogate, and on the back of which we would then make an investment decision.
We are really looking for whether the Bill helps make the UK more attractive; whether it helps us funnel savings into productive investment that can help companies grow, create jobs and so on; and whether it is adding to the legal certainty of our investments. You are right to ask about SMEs; our members who invest in higher-growth companies are really keen to make sure that the process is as friction-free as possible, and that there are no surprises. Being very clear about a pre-notification regime is especially important to us, as is something like the five-year review period that could come after a deal has ended. Certainty about those 17 sectors is particularly important as well. That is why we have wanted to maintain a really close dialogue with the officials—the team that has sponsored this Bill—to make sure that no inadvertent barriers have been erected to us deploying that investment in the right way.
One of the suggestions we would like to commend to this Committee is something we have seen work particularly well in Japan, which considered a similar raft of legislation: a blanket exclusion for investment—not for takeovers, obviously, but for portfolio investment, where the investment industry wants to support unlisted or listed companies, and it is clear that there is not a desire to take them over, involve ourselves in the management of those firms, seek a position on the board or secure the intellectual property, but where we are just performing the role of long-term investor. That has been judged as being outside the scope of the legislation, but we commend that to the Committee as a practical step that takes forward the principles of the Bill and secures the “investability” of the UK’s investment landscape.
Chi Onwurah
Q
Chris Cummings: Forgive me: I noticed that I missed the point about mergers and acquisitions. We regard the pre-approval facility that officials have mentioned—I believe the last witness mentioned it, as well—which is a way in which the team responsible could be approached ahead of a deal being put together, as a very sensible, practical step forward, as long as confidentiality was absolutely rigorously maintained.
In terms of definitions, we find the Japanese definition quite attractive, and again we commend it to the Committee. It clearly differentiates out investors such as the ones we represent, who are looking to provide capital for a company and share in its success for the benefit of the investors whose money we manage, but are not seeking to take an active role in the management of those companies. We are not looking to put somebody on the board; we are not looking to intervene directly in day-to-day management decisions. Our relationship is with the board chairman and so on, in order to engage in a constructive and strategic discussion, but we stop short of securing assets or taking an active role in management. That is a system that works well.
Turning to our caveats, I mentioned the five-year review period. We undoubtedly recognise the spirit in which this legislation is drafted, but Governments change, as does public opinion. The strength of this Bill is that it is focused around national security. Perhaps a definition of national security may go a little further in helping investors as well, because we could not really strike upon a catchy, well-turned phrase that defined national security, and have a reluctance to move away from national security; we would hate to see the Bill being widened into more public interest ability.
A final point to note would be the interplay between this legislation and the Takeover Panel, which has a different and distinct role to play. The notification percentages are slightly different: it is 25% in the Bill, and 30% in the Takeover Panel, so ensuring that there was no accidental misalignment would be most useful.
Nadhim Zahawi
Q
Chris Cummings: When it comes to a clarification point around national security, this is similar policy-intent-driven legislation to what we have seen in other emerged markets, such as the US, Germany, France and so on. We do not find that it is out of step with other developed markets. In other jurisdictions—I will take the US as an example—the legislation has started small and then grown as people have become familiar with it. The UK, perhaps because we feel we are playing catch-up—that is not for me to say—has started on a larger scale first. That is why there are queries around scope and around the durations. We look forward to engaging with the definition of the 17 sectors to ensure it is as specific as possible, and to ensure that we understand the operation. We would like to hear from officials and colleagues in ministerial positions on how they see it working in practice, so that the investment community is really clear that the rules of the game have not changed, and that the UK really is as attractive as we want it to be for incoming investment.
As I mentioned, we represent UK-based investment managers, but of course, those organisations are headquartered not only across Europe, but in other parts of the world, particularly the US. We are managing pension scheme money not only for UK savers and pensioners, but from other parts of Europe and places as far-flung as Brazil. If we as investors were looking to make an investment in UK plc, we would need to be clear about where head office was, and where the money was coming from. All those things could be either pre-approved or ruled in court as quickly as possible to ensure that there is not a missed beat in attracting the investment that we all want to see.
Nickie Aiken
Q
Chris Cummings: As for particular strengths, we feel that the aspects that deal evidently with national security are strengthening a regime that needed some modernisation.
On the protection of intellectual property, one of the key areas—it is absolutely essential for us as investors—is knowing that if we are investing in a particular company, we are doing so because, depending on the market and sector it is in, we feel that the intellectual property is clear, maintained and protected by clear legal contracts, and that if something goes awry, we, as investors, have recourse to legal sanctions.
There is much in the Bill to be commended. In terms of areas of weakness—forgive me; I feel I have touched on these—it is about ensuring that, as investors, our position is clear and understood. In investing in a company, when doing that not to try to take it over or seize the reins, it is to provide more of a long-term investment to support the company’s development. We do not feel that quite comes through in the way the Bill has been written at the moment. It has been written, rightly, for takeovers. We do not want to be hit by ricochet —by accident—in wanting to continue to support UK plc and find that new barriers have been erected that prevent us doing that, simply because this part of the investment landscape had not been completely thought through. That is a caveat, rather than a point for deep consideration.
Nickie Aiken
Q
Chris Cummings: That is something we are looking forward to engaging with. When you first hear it, 17 sectors sounds like quite a lot, but having worked through the 17 sectors and looked at some of the draft definitions, I think that each one is justifiable.
We would be keen to point out a few things to the Government. First, the greater the specificity around the definitions, the better. Secondly, we should not rush to change the sectors by adding to them too quickly. Investment needs a degree of stability, and legislative stability most of all.
Thirdly, in consulting with industry and thinking about the operations and practice, I would ask to have industry expertise around the table. We found time and again working with officials—they are hugely valuable, talented individuals, but do not come from a commercial background, almost by definition, although some do—that having the commercial insight, we can play a role in nudging in the right area, to ensure that nothing is hard-coded that would prevent a deal because the nuance has not been appreciated. Having that industry insight would be a big step forward, if it could be accommodated.
Peter Grant
Q
Chris Cummings: With any new piece of legislation, and certainly one of this character and this far-reaching, investors will always want to understand the motivations that led to it being introduced, how it will work in practice and whether we can give case studies as quickly as possible to prove that it does work in this way.
The important thing—I cannot stress this enough—is how it gets spoken about by Ministers. That enduring political support for investment carries such weight with investors. More than the words on the page, what matters is how it is presented—how Ministers then talk about the desire to continue to attract investment and how they make themselves available to investors.
All major economies, because of the covid-19 crisis, are seeking new levels of investment, whether for individual corporates or infrastructure investment, let alone Government debt. We feel very strongly that the UK has a tremendous story to tell. Introducing new legislation such as this at a time when, bluntly, we are looking for more investment to come into the UK, will require a degree more explanation. The way it has been phrased so far, as national security and almost as a catch-up activity with other developed jurisdictions, is fine. However, if Ministers make themselves very much available to investors to explain how this will work, and make a bonus of the pre-authorisation facility, so that if investors are troubled that an investment they are considering could attract attention, there is an ability within 30 days —that is a really important point: within 30 days—to have it pre-approved and then stood by, that will go a long way in the investment community.
As you can tell, we will have to paddle a little bit harder, but that has the potential to be a short-term explanation for a long-term gain. Potentially, that is fine, but I say again that we hope Ministers will seize the opportunity to explain this to investors, the course will be set and we will not see further iterations or scope creep from national security to other sectors, which then becomes a little more worrisome.
Peter Grant
Q
Chris Cummings: Forgive me, but it is obviously not my role to advise future Ministers on attitudes they may take. I can simply say, from an investor’s point of view, that we prize stability, predictability and accountability beyond all things. Making sure that the rule of law applies and that there is no handbrake turn in policy direction matters hugely. Investment is being sought by every economy around the world, and it would be a very rash Minister indeed who decided to unpick something that is a great strength of the UK and one of our global competitive advantages: a system based on the rule of law and an approach to policy making that is entirely transparent and accountable to Parliament, which gives the investment community great confidence that the UK retains its position as being one of the safest places in the world to invest in.
From our perspective, that accounts for one of the reasons why our investment management industry here in the UK is globally pre-eminent. The UK is not only the largest investment centre in Europe; we are bigger than the next two or three added together. Only the US is a bigger market, and that is because of its substantial domestic scale. When it comes to international investment, the UK is streets ahead of its competitors. We would very strongly urge any parliamentarian, and certainly any Minister, to think twice before taking actions that would have a lasting consequence for our international reputation.
Simon Baynes
Q
Thirdly, to what extent do hedge funds represent members within your organisation? Obviously, they have greater capacity, or greater natural affinity, for investing in smaller companies—not always, but in certain cases. They might actually fall within the remit of the triggers, so I do not quite see how we could implement the blanket exclusion, if from time to time there are exceptions to the exclusion.
Chris Cummings: Thank you for asking me to clarify; I apologise that I was not as clear as I should have been. The hedge fund community has a representative organisation. It is a splendid one that can do a tremendous job in speaking for them, and I would not put myself in that position; I would not try to speak for them. We have members that invest substantially through private markets into smaller and unlisted companies. Again, it comes down to intention. The intention is not to invest in such a way as to take over the company and to seize the reins; the intention is to make an investment that is in the strategic direction of the company, to support its growth.
I am trying not the use the term “passive investment”, because we are anything other than passive when it comes to investing, but it is an approach that is designed to support the company, rather than to change dramatically the company’s ownership or direction, or to land one of our members on its board—in effect, they would then be part of the management and governance of that company. I hope it is more than a subtle definition; it is a distinction with a real difference. That is part of why we think it is an important distinction to make.
Other jurisdictions have been through similar experiences. The Japanese example is so relevant, because it is only a year or so ago that the Japanese Government were considering very similar legislation. As a result of consultation, they came up with the approach that we are suggesting: to exclude the activities of investors, insurance companies and so on, because it is around the intentionality—not wanting to take an active role in the management or to change the company’s direction, but to support through investment rather than to seek control.
The US has a similar modus operandi. It is not quite as framed in the legislation as it is in Japan—again, just through history. The approaches that we have seen in Germany and France also nudge in the direction that I am describing, so there are parallels. The Japanese experience is the closest match that I can offer the Committee, but we will continue to do further investigations and to feed in ideas through the Bill’s stages and through the consultation on individual sectors.
Simon Baynes
Q
Chris Cummings: Certainly, we are keen to see those smaller and medium-sized companies get access to as much growth capital and investment as they need. Part of our enthusiasm for this piece of legislation, and indeed others, is that it is an opportunity to re-excite the UK public about the opportunities for equity—for shareholder participation in fast-growing companies. That is partly why we are so keen to work with your Committee and others to communicate the message.
Perhaps a clearer distinction could be found for the difference between listed and unlisted companies. That is perhaps where we could focus our attention more, on explaining—I am not sure that “blanket exception” is quite the right language for me to use because that seems to be a one-and-done exercise and perhaps there would be more to it than that—but focusing the attention on the listed sector, where it is much more obvious that we as investment managers are investing for the long term rather than seeking control over the company. I hope that would allay some of the concerns that you rightly mention.
Matt Western
Q
Chris Cummings: You rightly raise the question of scale and resources. It is one of the things we have been consulting our members on, and having discussions with others, to try and get a better view of what the notification process would be, who would notify, who would then respond, the scale of the team in the Department that would be exercising due diligence in the applications and whether the system could cope. Bluntly, what would concern us deeply is having a 30-day notice or turnaround period that the Department regularly missed, because that would then create a shadow over this particular piece of legislation. It would gum up the works and, frankly, none of us would wish to see that.
Looking at how the regime works at the moment, with very few notifications, there seems to be a scale difference between where we are today and what the legislation proposes. We would like to hear more from Ministers on how they are going to address that and what the processes would be. There have been discussions about a portal, a very brief form of five pages or so that would be easy to complete, but I think a degree more of reassurance on that point would not go amiss—as would the confidentiality. There is so much around any investment process and the acquisition process that has to remain entirely confidential, that investors would require and would be looking for reassurance that these conversations could be held in the strictest of confidence and that nothing would appear until the right time. In terms of scale and resources, it is a point that we share your interest in.
I was making a note of the point you raised on transactions, but could you repeat that part of the question? Apologies.
Matt Western
Q
Chris Cummings: Thank you, and apologies again for omitting that. This is something that we, as the investor community, have been observing for the last few years at least, looking at the different requirements that Governments have tried to put on acquiring companies—Kraft Cadbury and so on, through to SoftBank—and seeing what has happened there, and the role that the takeover panel has been asked to play to police or report on those activities.
The intent behind the Bill at the moment seems to be for national security to preserve intellectual property in that R&D capacity here in the UK. If that is going to be seen through, transparent and accountable mechanisms need to be clarified in the Bill, on how that will work in practice, what resources will be in place to measure, monitor and report it, to whom it would report, and any sanctions that would be applicable afterwards. Those are definitely areas that we feel deserve further scrutiny.
From our point of view, as investors, the last thing we want is to invest in companies where we feel the IP is protected and the R&D facility is well known to us, but where within one, two or three years there has been either a change of management or further changes that mean that IP has been moved or duplicated elsewhere. That is a very legitimate concern.
The Chair
If there are no further questions, I thank you very much on behalf of the Committee for giving your time and assistance, Mr Cummings.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Michael Tomlinson.)
National Security and Investment Bill (Third sitting)
Thursday 26th November 2020
(3 years, 12 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 26 November 2020 - (26 Nov 2020)
The Chair
Q
I welcome the two witnesses from Slaughter and May. Can I ask you to introduce yourselves for the record, please?
Lisa Wright: Hi, my name is Lisa Wright and I am a partner in the competition group at Slaughter and May.
Christian Boney: Good morning. I am Christian Boney and I am a partner in the corporate mergers and acquisitions group at Slaughter and May.
Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)
Q
I am sure you are aware that many countries—the US and Canada are just two—give some sense of the factors that might be considered under a national security assessment. Do you think it would be helpful for market participants to have greater clarity about the types of factors that would be considered? How could we give that clarity while retaining the sensitivity and discretion that are needed on those matters?
Joined to that, there are cases such as Arm and DeepMind where economic security became national security over time. When considering what national security is, what links do you see between national security and economic security or sovereign capability? Can they better be reflected in the Bill?
Christian Boney: Lisa, shall I have a go at that first?
Lisa Wright: Yes, go for it.
Christian Boney: Starting with the need for factors to help inform market participants’ decisions about whether, for example, their potential transaction presents risks, yes—in short, the more guidance that can be given about the kinds of factors that the Government will consider in determining whether a transaction presents a national security concern, the better. The statement of policy intent is very helpful in framing that, but clearly the more detail that can be included, the better.
The other thing that will be important in giving people a sense of whether their transaction should be notified or whether it falls within a mandatory notification sector is the interaction that will take place through informal engagement through the investment security unit. It is very important that the process for getting informal guidance from that unit is as streamlined, interactive and responsive as it can be. That will go some way to giving practitioners realtime guidance on potential concerns.
Lisa Wright: Can I just add a point to the idea of the desire for more certainty around what national security means? I think it is worth recognising that that is particularly important if you look at where we have come from. With the existing regime under the Enterprise Act 2002, there have only ever been a dozen or so interventions on national security grounds. There is not a widespread understanding of what it means and the circumstances in which the Government would intervene. That is the historical position, but we all know that this is constantly evolving.
When you take that and add to it the fact that the prediction now is that there will be, as it says in the papers, between 70 and 90 call-ins a year, that is obviously a huge increase against the 12 since the Enterprise Act. Any greater clarity that can be given around the circumstances in which the Government would be looking to, for instance, exercise the call-in powers would be beneficial, particularly at the beginning of the regime when everybody is trying to learn the ropes.
Chi Onwurah
Q
Christian Boney: I think this question really divides into two. In terms of larger corporates, investment by, and in, larger corporates is very likely to be unimpacted in any meaningful way by this legislation, because large corporates and their advisers are very used to going through regulatory clearance processes. This will just be another thing that needs to be added to the list.
I think you make a very valid point in the context of start-up and early-stage companies. The concern I would have principally is with those companies that are in that phase of their corporate life and fall within the mandatory notification sectors. Given the kinds of companies that this country is trying to encourage to flourish—those that are active in areas like artificial intelligence, advanced robotics and quantum technologies—a reasonable number of start-ups, I would expect, would fall within those mandatory notification sectors. For them, this regime is going to make the process of getting investment more time-consuming and more complex.
Anything that can be done in the process of consulting on the mandatory sectors, and anything that can be done to pair back the regime to make it more workable for companies in that stage of life, the better. An example might be some form of de minimis threshold, which is included, such that really early-stage companies do not fall within the mandatory notification regime, but the Government can nevertheless rely on their call-in power down the track, should that early-stage company becomes successful and more strategically important within the UK. Those are my principal thoughts. Lisa, do you have anything to add?
Lisa Wright: Not on that point, no
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Nadhim Zahawi)
Q
Chi Onwurah
To clarify, my question was this: how would you distinguish between national and economic security?
Nadhim Zahawi
My question is more about your reflections on the Bill being narrow in its purpose to deal with national security versus the wider public interest.
Lisa Wright: It is already a very broad regime; it catches a lot of transactions, as we have just discussed. I therefore think it is important and right that it is limited, in terms of the substantive concerns that it is catching, to national security. That is already a necessarily, I think, uncertain or undefined concept. Corporates and investors can make it work as long as other aspects of the regime work efficiently. That may be subject to some of the points that Christian just made about the impact on start-ups.
I think that once you broaden the regime out from national security into other considerations, you do risk introducing quite a degree of unpredictability, which possibly would impact on people’s assessment of the investment climate in the UK. My understanding is that the existing intervention regime under the Enterprise Act is planned to remain in force, so the national security considerations will come out of that and will be dealt with under this new regime. But there will still be the ability for—[Inaudible.]
The Chair
Mr Boney, do you have any observations while we are waiting for the tech to work?
Christian Boney: I agree entirely with what Lisa has been saying. I think the scope of the Bill is already broad, so to my mind, broadening it further to take account of other areas is likely to introduce the uncertainty that Lisa was referring to and, as a consequence, have a potentially negative impact on the investment climate in the UK.
The Chair
Lisa, it looks like we have got you back now. Would you like to add anything?
Lisa Wright: I am not sure at what point you lost me, but I think I was saying—
Nadhim Zahawi
We lost you while you were talking about a “degree of unpredictability”, Lisa.
Lisa Wright: Okay. In my view, if you were to broaden the regime out from national security to take into account other considerations, that would introduce quite a degree of unpredictability and would, I think, potentially impact negatively on people’s assessment of the investment climate in the UK—I am sorry if I am repeating myself. However, my understanding is that the existing intervention regime will remain, so national security will come out of it, but the Government will still be able to intervene in transactions on other public interest grounds under the Enterprise Act. That regime has some limitations, but those powers will still be there.
Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)
Q
Christian Boney: I think the de minimis concept is potentially relevant and helpful in the context of thinking about what needs to be subject to mandatory notification. If you are not within the mandatory notification regime, that does not mean that the Government cannot exercise the call-in power so long as the relevant tests in the legislation are satisfied; it just means that the relevant company does not have to make a notification. There are elements of the mandatory sectors where some form of de minimis has already been included. Energy is a good example of that, and that makes sense in the context of energy.
I think it is worth exploring whether, within any of the other sectors, where we are more likely to see start-up, early-stage companies operating, there is benefit in introducing some form of de minimis regime solely in respect of the mandatory notification requirement. As I say, if a small-scale company operating in critical artificial intelligence is receiving investment from somebody who we view as a hostile actor, that transaction might escape mandatory notification, but that does not mean it escapes voluntary call-in by the Government at the point they become aware of it. That is something that might be worth exploring.
Stephen Kinnock
Thanks very much. Does Ms Wright want to add anything?
Lisa Wright: No.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
Christian Boney: If I am following the question correctly, I think it is the correct balance to strike to say that people pursuing significant M and A activity involving the UK’s critical national infrastructure should expect to go through a notification process and should expect their transaction to be at potential risk of examination and call-in. From my experience, corporates undertaking transactions in the spheres of national infrastructure and so on expect that. It is what they see in other countries and jurisdictions, so it is something they come to accept as part of doing deals in top-tier democratic nations.
Lisa Wright: I agree with all that. I guess I would also add that people are well aware that these considerations change over time. This year has shown that more than ever. People have an eye on what might not have been an issue yesterday; today, it might be different. We saw the amendments coming through to the Enterprise Act earlier in the autumn to bring in the power to allow the Government to intervene on public health grounds. People are very conscious of the fact that this changes, and they keep an eye on it from that perspective.
Simon Baynes (Clwyd South) (Con)
Q
I would have thought that there are two aspects to that. One is the nature of the acquirer, which is partly what you have already alluded to. The second part is that I would have thought that it is quite difficult to ascertain whether something at the cutting edge of technology is or is not a threat. I would have thought that that is a really difficult judgment to make in practice. Do you have any thoughts on that, and what experience do you have of other regimes trying to make that kind of judgment?
Lisa Wright: I think there are probably a number of ways to tackle that question. I guess that an answer is that it is ultimately a question for the Government. They are the ones who understand the threats and the intelligence. As advisers, we can look at the guidance and cases that have happened in the past, and we can speak to the unit, which, as we understand it, will be open for engagement and will welcome that. We can guide clients through the process, using the touch points and information that is available to us, but ultimately it is the Government that are in possession of the full set of facts and considerations that go into the decisions about whether that particular transaction is a problem or not. I guess what that speaks to is having the right people in the unit and getting them plugged into the right people elsewhere in Government to arm them with the ability to make these assessments.
Christian Boney: To pick up on that, I agree entirely with what Lisa said. It is not necessarily an easy thing for the advisory community or clients themselves to make a judgment about whether they are presenting risk to national security. That is why this concept of real-time, interactive engagement with the unit that is set up to police this regime is going to be so important.
In the world I operate in, one of the regulators we deal with is the Takeover Panel, which is fantastic at being responsive, with real-time engagement. It results in a dialogue and an interaction that helps advisers navigate their clients through a regime that is not straightforward at times. That is the kind of practice that could usefully be learned from in the context of the investment security unit, because that kind of real-time feedback and informal advice will be very helpful in helping companies make the judgment about which side of the line they fall.
Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP)
Q
There is a fair amount of information in the Bill and the documents published alongside it about the kinds of businesses being acquired or taken over that might give rise to concern. There are quite clear definitions of what constitutes a trigger event, whether it is a purchase of shares or whatever, but there is very little detail about how the Secretary of State will decide which potential acquirers pose a threat. There are clearly good reasons why that information cannot be made public in too much detail, but is the fact that there is so little on the face of the Bill about how that decision is arrived at a problem? Does it make it less certain and therefore more likely to result in legal challenge?
Christian Boney: Acquirer risk is one of the points picked up in the statement of policy intent that is going to be looked at when determining the level of risk that a transaction presents. When looking at and explaining acquirer risk, I think that helpful additional guidance could be added to it to, for example, make clearer how the Government will consider acquirer risk in the context of things such as private equity funds and other funds that may be looking to invest in the UK. By that, I mean in particular whether the Government will be willing to disregard the identity of limited partners and other investors in funds that sit above the particular acquisition vehicle that is doing the relevant transaction. That is the kind of thing that I think there would be real benefit in trying to make clearer in the statement of policy intent.
Peter Grant
Q
The Companies Act 2006 has similar requirements for a company to notify Companies House if certain things happen that put someone in a position of significant influence. From a lay person’s point of view, such as my own, some of those provisions are almost word for word the same in the Companies Act and the Bill. Some appear to have the same effect but the wording is different, and therefore there will potentially be occasions when the definition is different. Would there be benefits in completely aligning both pieces of legislation so that a particular event either has to be notified or does not have to be notified? Otherwise, there is the possibility that some events will have to be notified under the Bill, and other events will have to be notified under the Companies Act but not the Bill.
Christian Boney: In short, I think there would be benefit in having as much alignment as there can be. Clearly, the two pieces of legislation are not necessarily designed with the same intent and focus in mind. Yes, I think there is merit in having as much alignment between the two as there can be.
If I may, there is just one point about the trigger events that is worth considering. One of the points in the statement of policy intent in the context of trigger events is the Government considering the risk of espionage. That seems to me to be something that is worth thinking about in the context of this regime. At the moment, the trigger events are focused, as you were saying, on the ability to influence a particular company, but there are certainly circumstances where, without acquiring a level of shareholding that enables a person to influence the company, the person can nevertheless gain very significant access to information—for example, through a board seat, which might come at a shareholding of lower than, for example, 15%. That would give that person considerable access to information within the company. If they were a hostile actor and they wanted to act in a nefarious manner, it would enable them to feed that information back to another hostile party. We have spoken about narrowing the scope of the regime, and I appreciate that that would be an amplification of it, but I think that is a point that is worth considering.
Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)
Q
The other thing is that a start-up company can raise money in other ways. The Bill tries to make sure that we are not losing intellectual property, but a business can raise finance by licensing the intellectual property that we are trying to protect—I am not sure that that would come within the scope of this Bill—or even sell the intellectual property and license it back again. There are various other ways in which a company can raise finance, over and above equity, where there is a huge amount of influence or it falls outside the Bill. Clearly, crucial national infrastructure is a very different thing, but intellectual property is something that is very difficult to grab hold of; it is like trying to grasp a handful of sand. Given the objectives, I wonder how the Bill tackles those other areas, which seem to allow malign investors a way through.
Christian Boney: I think an important aspect of the Bill—this is one of the reasons why Lisa and I have described it as a broad regime—is that it does allow policing of the acquisition and control of assets, including intellectual property. In my experience, at least, that is quite different from what you see in other international regimes. Clearly, the acquisition of control of assets does not fall within the mandatory notification regime; nevertheless, it is helpful that the Government have the power potentially to exercise a voluntary call-in in respect of, for example, an acquisition or a licence of intellectual property.
Mark Garnier
Q
Christian Boney: That is certainly fair. I think the level of influence and control that a debt provider will typically get in what I will call the ordinary courts means that it is less likely—I am certainly not saying it is impossible—to be at the level of getting such granular, sensitive, let us call it operational information, which is the kind of thing we would really be concerned about. It would more be focused on getting access to financial projections, financial performance and that kind of information, which, although it can still be sensitive, is probably less sensitive than operational data. A balance needs to be struck, it seems to me, in the context of this legislation. Not having debt providers obviously within scope does limit the legislation, but does it strike an acceptable balance? My personal view is that, on balance, it probably does.
Nickie Aiken (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)
Q
Lisa Wright: In many ways, the regime just brings the UK into line with major international peers. From that perspective, for people doing deals around the world who have already experienced those other regimes, it ought not to have any real negative impact at all, provided that BEIS can deliver on the aspiration set out of a slick and efficient regime, turning around notifications within sensible deal timeframes and providing the kind of informal advice and early engagement promised. That will be critical, particularly in the early stages of the regime. From that perspective, I do not think this should have a long-term negative impact on people wanting to do deals in the UK. As Christian was mentioning earlier, it may be a slightly different picture for the start-ups and the smaller companies where they are caught up in the mandatory sectors, but overall I think it is right that this can be viewed as the UK bringing itself into line with what else is going on around the world.
Christian Boney: I agree with that. That is the right assessment.
Sam Tarry (Ilford South) (Lab)
Q
Lisa Wright: It is certainly worth considering. I would imagine that those sorts of considerations will be going through the mind of the officials and the Secretary of State tasked with making these assessments and issuing the decisions. I can see there may be some sensitivities and a desire perhaps not to make that all transparent in terms of public documents. Perhaps they think they will deal with it over time through this engagement and, with advisers and parties coming to talk to them, you will get a sense of who is okay and who is not that. But I can see that perhaps they will not want to put that down in very great detail on a public piece of paper, not least because one might imagine it could change over time. I guess there needs to be a degree of flexibility to recognise that.
Christian Boney: I agree. I am certainly not a CFIUS expert, but my understanding of the exempt list of countries is that actually the practical impact is quite tightly drawn. I do agree with Lisa. I think we are likely to get the best sense of those countries that are viewed as more risky than others through the engagement process and as people’s experience of the regime develops.
The Chair
We are almost at the end of the time available for this session, so there will be no further questions for these witnesses, but thank you, Ms Wright and Mr Boney, for being so generous with your time and assisting the Committee so much. We will now move on to the next witness—either we will suspend the sitting briefly until everything is sorted out or we will move seamlessly on—but thank you both very much.
Examination of Witness
Professor Ciaran Martin gave evidence.
The Chair
Q
Professor Martin: Thank you. My name is Ciaran Martin. I am currently a professor of practice at the Blavatnik School of Government at the University of Oxford, but until August of this year I was the founding chief executive of the National Cyber Security Centre and a member of the executive board of GCHQ, within the Government. I should also declare for these purposes, although I am not sure it is relevant, that I serve on the advisory board of a US venture capital company called Paladin.
Chi Onwurah
Q
Professor Martin: Thank you for your comments, Ms Onwurah; it is nice to see you again. I speak as someone who thinks that the Government have broadly got this issue correct, in terms of their proposals in this Bill. That is not to underestimate the sheer complexity of dealing with the core, fundamental question that you rightly identify of balancing economic security and national security and of where one stops and the other begins. That is a very complicated and difficult thing to do. I think one starts with an attempt to define a core principle, which is essentially around the freedom to act. I think that if you look at something such as Arm—I would say this probably more in the case of Arm than DeepMind—and its potential ultimate sale to Nvidia, you see that the UK has less freedom of choice in a key strategic technology, which undermines its own ability.
I think there is an analogy with the little known but quite long-standing—for more than a century—work on sovereign cryptography. That is one of the areas that has long been covered by national sovereignty requirements. There are things in information security, as we used to call it, cyber-security, as we do call it, that have always needed to be fully sovereign, entirely British-made—they are not very many areas. The problem has been that as technology and communications have changed, it has been quite hard to keep up, and there are always pressures to expand that in a way that is economically harmful to competition and so on. So it needs a clever buyer within Government to identify what will be the strategic areas and what will not be.
In the area of sovereign cryptography, we end up trying to keep, depending on the era, around half a dozen or a dozen companies viable, because it is not a lucrative market. You can see the problem, but the key issue is whether there is enough, first, sovereign, but if not sovereign, friendly capability that allows us the freedom of choice to adopt key technologies. That means identifying the key technologies in the first place, evolving them over time and then having a very difficult to achieve but necessary intelligent function within Government that can evaluate the notifications that it gets. Of course, at the moment we do not have the power to do that, and that is what this Bill correctly seeks to remedy.
Chi Onwurah
Q
Moving on slightly, a comment made numerous times on Second Reading was about the role of the intelligence services. Indeed, my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) asked for more intelligence in the process. How can the Bill better ensure that the intelligence services, including the National Cyber Security Centre, have input and scrutiny and, indeed, provide their expertise as part of the process so that the appropriate decisions are taken?
Professor Martin: I think the essential, principal requirement is not the intelligence services’ involvement—although that is important and I will come to that in a minute—but the understanding of technology and technological developments within Government. These are fundamentally economic issues as well. Apart from anything else, if you look at some of the reasons why the Bill has come about, you will see that, in strategically important technologies, the Government have invested heavily in university-sponsored research and in private sector research, only to see the fruits of that research sold off. Even if that did not impact on national security, which in most cases it does, it is not a good return for the taxpayer in terms of long-term UK involvement if the intellectual property ends up being monetised elsewhere.
I have enormous respect for Mr Jones and I think he is on to something in terms of involving the national security and intelligence services, but I do not think this should be intelligence-led. In my experience—obviously, I cannot go into detail on this particular aspect of it—secret intelligence adds relatively little to your knowledge of intent. If we take Russia and China, the two big strategic threats to the UK, Russia does not have a strategy in this space. We have to worry about Russia and cyber-security because it attacks us, but it attacks us on the internet that the west has built.
China is very different. China has a technological, strategic dominance aim, but it is not a secret. It is published and has been translated into English in the Made in China 2025 strategy, as you know. Our knowledge about the precise, intricate details of how that is implemented gains relatively little from secret intelligence.
What secret intelligence does have, particularly in GCHQ and the NCSC within it, is a knowledge of how technology works in terms of the national security threat space. I think the UK has a head start on other countries, because the National Security Council innovations of the 2010s gave the intelligence services a much bigger voice at the table, and that is reflected in the structures that we have now. The UK should be well placed to be able to listen to the intelligence services, but I would encourage—not least to make sure that in this very delicate balance of trying to show that we still have an open economy and are not shutting the doors to investment—as much transparency as possible on the decision taking. It will not always be possible because GCHQ technologists will know about things—exploitations of particular bits of technology—that they cannot reveal. They will be able to tell that to secret forums within Government for consideration—I am quite confident about that: there will be a seat at the table for them.
My recommendation would be that, as far as can safely be done, the Government should be relatively open about why they make the judgements they make about strategic areas of technology and the interventions they will make once this Bill is passed—assuming that both Houses wish to pass it.
Nadhim Zahawi
Q
Professor Martin: I suppose the mantra, if I had one, would be, “Broad powers, sparingly used, with accountability mechanisms”. It is incredibly hard to be specific about this, for two reasons: one is that new areas of technology crop up, as they invariably do, and the other is that sweeping categorisations are needed on the face of legislation.
I am not a deep technical expert—although others are available from my former organisation—but if you take sweeping, umbrella titles like “quantum” or “artificial intelligence”, there are huge swathes of that where, actually, not a lot of these powers in the Bill will be used. There will be companies that will be doing very interesting things—10 interesting things—of which only one would be caught by this Bill.
If you take areas like specialist quantum computing and so forth, I think the community of interest and expertise is actually relatively small and has relatively good relations with Government—not least because, again, while it is not perfect, the whole system of research council funding and Government investment in funding technological research is pretty good, by international standards—so you end up knowing these people. One of the reasons that this sort of policy evolution came about, which has led to the publication of the Bill before you—I remember this from discussions within Government—is that people were volunteering to come to us. World-leading experts, people who had been funded by the Government—I will not go into individual cases because it is commercially sensitive and possibly security sensitive—would come to Government and say, “Look, we’ve had this inquiry from a Chinese behemoth,” or even, “We’ve had this inquiry from a US company,” and so forth: “What do you guys think about this?” and, invariably, we would have to have an informal influencing discussion.
I do not think that some of the businesses to which this will apply will be screaming that this is horrible Government regulation and intervention in areas where that should not be made. There was already a dialogue; there was just no legislative framework. Of course, that meant that companies that felt a loyalty to the UK and so forth but that also had to look after their commercial interests were sometimes in a real bind.
To try to answer your question, I think that the powers should be fairly broad. I think there should be accountability and transparency mechanisms, so that there is assurance that they are being fairly and sparingly applied.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
Professor Martin: I think there are broadly two or three areas in which China is very interested in doing that. I can make some comments on motivations, because I think they are very important, and then I will finish with how that manifests itself in UK casework.
Clearly, China has set out a stall, which it published in Made in China 2025, in which it said it wants to be the world’s pre-eminent leader in a number of key areas of technology. It mentioned artificial intelligence and quantum, and it is throwing vast sums of state money and long-term strategies at them, unencumbered by the need to seek re-election and popular consent, so it is a very powerful movement. That is the first thing: it is trying to build up its capability.
China is also trying to change, at least for itself—we will come to that in a minute—the way the internet works. It was reported earlier this year that Huawei and other major companies in these international standards bodies are looking at something called new IP protocols, among many other things. To give you a sense of what the motivations behind that are, at the minute when traffic flows around the internet, despite some popular impressions to the contrary, it is actually pretty hard to work out what is going through it. Therefore, it is relatively difficult to censor, although China has managed it in some ways. The new IP protocol will make it much easier to work out what sort of traffic is going through and being rerouted, so it makes it much easier to control. China is trying to dominate and essentially get a lead in the strategic technology, and also to change the character and culture of the technological age from one that started off fairly anarchic to one that is much easier to control. That is what it is trying to do.
Why is China trying to do that? A lot of this is about the assertion of its own power for itself—the regime, power, Chinese nationalism and so forth. I think it does intend to extend its sphere of influence, but I have never seen that as the primary motivation. One of the interesting things, post the pushback from the Trump Administration and the US sanctions on Huawei, is the extent to which China will now accelerate its desire for self-sufficiency, and the extent to which that leads to a separate pole of technological influence that may become less interested in countries such as the UK, European Union countries and North America.
To date, how has that manifested itself in cases in the UK? Ms Onwurah has already mentioned the Huawei controversy. If you take Huawei as a company, I think it shows the different ways in which this can manifest. The Huawei 5G controversy is going to be dealt with by a Bill that I believe is coming to the House next week, not this one. The 5G controversy was not about investment; it was about selling to British companies to build stuff. Obviously, that case has been very heavily analysed.
I think that the more interesting case in the last 10 years involving Huawei was its acquisition in 2012 of the Centre for Integrated Photonics—a world-leading British firm in a really key area of technology. That, in my view, was pretty strategically damaging. If we had our time over again, that is the sort of thing that the Bill might well notify. I know you have taken evidence from the likes of Charles Parton and people with huge China expertise. The fact that the acquisition of the Centre for Integrated Photonics did down Britain’s technological development was probably a by-product. The point is that Huawei could buy world-leading research, which China could then take and appropriate for itself very cheaply. That is what it will continue to do to build up its own capabilities.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
Professor Martin: One of the reasons that this is so difficult, as I said in my first answer to Ms Onwurah, is that I can think of at least three areas of expertise that the unit is going to need to draw on. Technological, yes, because of what technologies will matter. Geopolitical, yes, and I do not have a strong view on whether it needs Mandarin speakers because the UK has a strong and intelligent foreign service mission in country in China and all over the place that can provide input. But the third thing is actually quite a lot of commercial nous—patent laws and so forth.
This is where there is a distinction. This is not all about China. It is layered, and there will be things that we would not want to see going even to quite friendly countries. Arm is a case in point, with the concentration of power in a couple of US companies—particularly when one of them is derived from UK technology. That is not comparable as a strategic threat to Chinese dominance—I hope the Committee does not think I am saying that—but there are times when it would be a damaging foreclosure, if you like, of UK freedom of action and freedom of choice. We know that the US has a strong and sometimes aggressively used extraterritorial legal system in which it can use the power of US companies and block trading with US companies and so on, so we need people who understand those areas where we think, “We are not sure we would want that to leave the country at all” as well as people who understand Chinese. That involves a lot of expertise in things like patents, international law, US commercial law, sanctions and so on.
Andrew Bowie (West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine) (Con)
Q
Professor Martin: I do not vehemently disagree with that suggestion, but I am not persuaded by it. It is not a new issue. I remember cases—they have nothing to do with this—going back to the aftermath of the so-called global war on terror, with demands during inquiries for definitions of national security. I am not sure what that would achieve other than it would be heavily litigated. In terms of both definitions of national security and the categories of technology, a better answer is a drumbeat of reviewable activity, which is by definition transparent, about how the Government interpret the scope of the Bill, if it becomes an Act, and the sort of cases it applies to so that, over time, you build up a broadly accepted framework—of course, not everyone will accept it—that is seen to be fair and rational.
Peter Grant
Q
Professor Martin: I certainly would not be against things like that, if it could be done in a way that did not compromise the wider use of the Bill, because I do not think there is intent to interfere in the democratic process. I think the intelligence services take that pretty seriously. I remember in other contexts, when asked to co-operate on cyber-security with other countries, given that some cyber-security capabilities—by no means all—can be intrusive, that a lot of due diligence is always done on whether they could be turned by more authoritarian regimes against their own people. I would not object to that in principle. I do not know whether you have a case in mind when you say that might be necessary, but I have an open mind on that.
Peter Grant
Q
Professor Martin: In general terms—this is a personal view, for what it is worth—I do not think the location of most government functions matters a great deal. Perhaps I am just a bit of a contrarian on that point, and always have been. The Government is the Government. Institutions do have cultures. I do not know whether the Government or the intelligence services have offered a formal view, but personally I would be reluctant to put it within the national security estate, first, because it has to be economically literate, and secondly, because it has to justify its existence and use. A strong national security input is important, but I would not leave it in the national security community.
I am sorry to sound like a broken record on this point, but I think the more important force in function is some form of reviewable transparency requirement. If you set it up and let it go away, first, you take away pressure to perform well, and secondly, you take away pressure to justify the decisions that are made.
This is a really hard problem. When I was still in government and there were discussions around it, this was not the sort of Bill that most Ministers and politicians came into Government to want to pass. It is a necessity of a bunch of case work that we have become concerned about that has required us to do this. It is sort of the least bad option. The country wants to be open to investment—we are all mindful of the impression it may give that it is trying to deter investment—so it is probably the least bad option, as I say.
I do not think there is any arrogance in government or belief that a bunch of civil servants assembled in BEIS or another Department will make infallible judgments on individual cases, but what is the alternative way to stop the sort of things we have seen happening—world-class taxpayer-funded research in key strategic technologies that are going to be vital for national security being sold for a song to potentially hostile regimes?
Peter Grant
I will leave it there, Sir Graham. I may want to come back later, but I will let someone else in now.
Simon Baynes
Q
Professor Martin: I get that completely. I do not think 100% transparency will be possible in this case. Obviously, it will be judicially reviewable, but I am entirely unsurprised that there is an explicit provision for closed material procedures. It will be a minority, but there will be cases in which the reason why a particular aspect of a particular piece of technology is really sensitive—it will probably be highly specialised, and there might be a dozen people, of whom four serve in government, who actually understand why—cannot be published. Then, of course, there will be commercial sensitivities.
Having said all that, if you take, for example—these are real examples—the current debate around the potential use of offensive cyber, or the sort of allegations Edward Snowden made against Five Eyes countries in 2013, or some of the defences that the Government had to use in the 2000s about their role in the aftermath of 9/11 and Iraq and co-operating with US forces, in my view there is a clear distinction between being able to describe the operating environment and the sorts of thematic issues that you are dealing with, versus individual cases, which often contain extremely sensitive detail. National security organisations can say much more about the former than historically they have been willing to do.
In something like this, where we are talking about business confidence and how the country looks to potentially very friendly and helpful outside investors who like the UK, want to come here, want to put money here and like the high-quality research and the brilliant innovators and individuals, it should be possible to give them something that says, “In the course of the last year, we have looked at quantum resistant cryptography and here are the types of aspects of this that we are reserving and here are the bits that are more open” or that sort of thing, without disclosing anything sensitive. That is all you need to be able to say—these are the judgments. Let us say that the Bill becomes law in the middle of 2021, for sake of argument. By 2025 and the beginning of the next Parliament, the tech landscape will look very different. You will not want investors to be looking back at the debates you are having in the House now as a guide to the latest way in which the Government are applying this, or looking at drip feeds of information. You will want something official. It should be possible to do that.
Mark Garnier
Q
Professor Martin: I do not know the ECJU that well, but it is relevant. I remember, although it was some time ago, being asked for specific inputs into that sort of point. The important thing is that the unit achieves a prominence and reach across the Government, because bits of Government will have to be involved occasionally and there will be bits that will be embedded. It needs a home—in our system of government, every organisation needs a home with a responsible Minister and an accounting officer and all that. However, I do think this needs to be broadly based and multidisciplinary. Export controls are one of the few areas where we have had to do that consistently for a number of years, so I agree that it is well worth a look.
Mark Garnier
Q
Professor Martin: I think it should be formal. The Government are not new to this. There should be some sort of review board to make sure that it has the right resources, the right performance, the right skillset and so forth. I would encourage ministerial interest. It may be something that the National Security Council wants to periodically review. In my time in national security, there were standing issues that the Government would come back to twice a year, whether there was anything interesting happening on them or not, just to take stock. That might be an issue. In answer to the previous question about transparency, there may be a case for a formal presentation, secret detail and all, to the National Security Council every year, which would include all the potentially covert and sensitive stuff. It really needs to work with the grain of ministerial thinking as well. That will need to be done collectively, at some point, so there may be a role for the NSC.
Peter Grant
Q
Professor Martin: There is a reasonable case for a more frequently reviewable point. There is also a cultural point about the way in which the political processes work. There are aspects of government about which questions are not routinely asked in Parliament, because they seem to be too secret. Again, it is a point about casework versus framework.
To my mind, there is no reason why the Secretary of State for BEIS could not be asked from time to time to update on this or why questions in the House should not be asked. I do not think technology changes fast enough that the whole framework of categories of regulated activity and so forth have to be updated more than every five years, but there will be a possibility of more frequent updates on working, approving listings and that sort of thing.
Peter Grant
To be fair, there is nothing to stop MPs from asking questions about international security, but the chances of us ever getting an answer may be somewhat less.
Chi Onwurah
Q
Professor Martin: I am not sure if the Bill will get in the way or help, one way or the other. I think Government technological nous across the civil service needs to be invested in properly. There is a deep, fairly sizeable reservoir in GCHQ. Again, without going into too much detail, more and more people are being transferred and seconded from there into other areas. That is a good thing, and we should welcome that rather than cast aspersions on this being all secret state stuff. It should be permeating normal Government activity.
There will be issues about how to pay for some of the specialists that are needed. I do not think we will ever compete with the big tech companies, but there may be scope for paying some specialists a bit more and bringing them in here. There is something about creating a career path for technologists in Government. There are big issues for the heads of the civil service and the permanent secretaries. If I were heading it, I would want an immediate infusion of seconded talent and private sector buy-ins relatively quickly. Government can do that quite well some- times, and sometimes not so well. There also needs to be a long-term strategy for technologists in Government.
The Chair
I will now thank you very much, Professor Martin, for giving your time so generously and being of such assistance to the Committee. Given that the next witness is not due to give evidence until 2 pm, I invite the Government Whip to propose the adjournment.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Michael Tomlinson.)
National Security and Investment Bill (Fourth sitting)
Thursday 26th November 2020
(3 years, 12 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 26 November 2020 - (26 Nov 2020)
The Chair
We now come to our third panel. We will hear oral evidence from Mr James Palmer, senior partner from Herbert Smith Freehills. This will last until 2.30 pm. Mr Palmer, welcome; thank you for joining us. Would you be so kind as to introduce yourself for the record?
James Palmer: Thank you very much, Chair. I am James Palmer, a corporate mergers and acquisitions, and investments, partner at Herbert Smith Freehills. I have been doing that work for 34 years. I have worked with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy on business regulation for over 25 years. I also chair our global board; we are an international firm.
Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)
Q
James Palmer: I was advising the takeover panel and the regulator, not one of the parties, so our thoughts were more about their role in ensuring appropriate regulation of that takeover—not from a foreign investment perspective, obviously, but there was a foreign investment angle to it. I am not a technical expert. My read of that—nothing to do with the work I did, but obviously I followed it and all the other transactions that have been looked at—is that it was more about economic security and positioning than necessarily about national security per se, but I am not the expert on it.
I think the point that you are drawing out—I heard your question earlier today—is a really fundamental one, which is that there is a spectrum of things that can be regarded as matters of national security. Indeed, the Bill papers draw this out. On the one hand, you have things that are clearly national security, like the risk of infiltration of systems that the country’s security depends on or that the country’s systems depend on—critical infrastructure being an example—but I do think that there are aspects of the Bill that are touching on things that stray more into economic influence and stability.
Again, I am not the expert on this, but I think we all know that in the debate about what is a matter of national security, there is a question of economic dependence, supply chain dependence and so on. That is one of the most difficult areas for this legislation, because where you have a straight, obvious national security real risk of some cyber-infiltration or whatever, nobody is going to argue about that. The grey into issues of supply chain dependency and more economic security starts to raise some of the more difficult areas, which I am sure we can come to.
I do not think that there is a simple binary distinction, and I am not here to give you the answer as to what the right approach is for dependency on China for supply chains. All I would say, having worked out in Asia many years ago, is that the interconnectedness of the world is not going to reduce and we are going to need to find ways of navigating that.
Chi Onwurah
Q
Also, we have heard a number of times today that under the Bill—this will be reflected in your experience—we are going from 12 call-ins to a much bigger number: 90 or 100. And the impact assessment estimates that, I think, 1,870 notifications might come in under the new regime. Could you consider how best to reflect that or to put in place the skills and the resources for the Bill, and say a little about what impact you think it might have on the attractiveness of investing in UK companies and, in particular, small and medium-sized enterprises?
James Palmer: I have focused on the same numbers as you. I hope the Minister will excuse my saying so, because I think the team have genuinely done a superb job of looking at a lot of granularity on a swathe of issues, but there is one data point I did not agree with: the suggestion that there will be an 18% increase in the reviews; it was framed quite narrowly. In my maths, 12 reviews in nearly 20 years going to nearly 2,000 a year is well over a 10,000% increase. I think that that is a very important context in which to look at this—as the world outside looks at this, it is potentially looked at as pretty seismic change by the UK. Again, there is lots that we can go on to as to the ways in which the detailed thinking around this has tried to mitigate that, and I know the Department has worked very, very hard in trying to mitigate it, but I think that we just need to be realistic.
In terms of the skills, there is a fundamental question, which the Bill papers have started to try to set out, which is this: how do we focus the debate so that it is not all-encompassing? Again, the Minister is aware of my views on this. I am extremely pleased—I know that some may not share this view—that the Bill does not catch a broader public interest test. The reason for that is what happens every time we introduce a power for the Government, for very sensible reasons—these things are always about competing tensions with sensible reasons —to seek to interfere, review something and decide who should own it, or whether they want to impose conditions on that.
Let me give you an analogy. Let us say that I invite someone to come and invest in this country to build a house. At the moment, if I invite them to come to this country to build a house—or a business or a small technology business—they know they can build that house, live in it and sell it to whoever they want. If I invite them in and say, “Come and live in this country and build your house, but I reserve the right to decide who you sell it to and what conditions I impose on who you sell it to,” that is a very different prism—a new prism.
The Bill team have done a really good job of trying to narrow that so that everybody does not think, “Help! If I come to the UK, there is a Government discretion,” but there is an innate tension between, on one hand, the desire to have a broad power to interfere in circumstances that we have not all thought about to protect something as important as national security and, on the other hand, a desire to give investors certainty. My unhelpful view is that there is not a simple route through that, and I do worry about, in particular, small technology businesses.
Again, the team have done a good job of trying to narrow the sectors. This is a very different proposition, in terms of granularity, from what we saw in 2017 and 2018. But I think a lot of further work may be needed. The Government have been clear that they want to receive further feedback on how to narrow the remit. One example is the breadth of the communications sector, which has no de minimis. Artificial intelligence is not a thing done by four clever businesses anymore; it is a thing done by thousands of businesses. I think an awful lot of businesses are going to get caught that are not actually what the ministerial team are worried about.
The second bit is that, even outside the mandatory regime, other transactions may be judged with hindsight to be a matter of national security. Under the regime, a Minister—maybe not the current Minister, but whoever it is in the future—may decide that it is a matter of national security. As you have already highlighted, there is a spectrum of where economics becomes national security. People are going to worry about the predictability of investing in this country.
I am thinking particularly about smaller businesses. Obviously, there will be huge attractions to investing in the UK for technology. We have skills and expertise that can only be exploited here. The UK has had a very distinctive position as one of the few countries in the world where businesses without a particular nexus to a country have chosen to go as a destination of choice. Those businesses are the ones I am most worried about.
There is also the cost and risk for small businesses. If I was a European venture capitalist, how comfortable would I be in investing in a technology business in the UK that I will be able to sell it to an American or Danish buyer—not the Chinese—in five years’ time, or at least to do so simply? In terms of the call-in power, why would boards take a 1% risk that in five years’ time somebody will judge your transaction as being one that should have been notified? Why would I take even a 1% risk of my transaction being unravelled? I think that the Department has worked very hard—this is not just ritual politeness; I really think it has—to try to narrow it, but I do not think it has done so enough, because I think that there will be a lot more than 1,800 notifications.
Chi Onwurah
Q
James Palmer: My partner, Veronica Roberts, appeared before the Foreign Affairs Committee on Tuesday, and she and I will be submitting a list to this Committee. I am afraid we do not have time to go through it today, but I will draw out a couple. Some of the mandatory filing sectors are very broad, such as communications. Again, the Government have said that they welcome narrowing those. There are not de minimises in a number of those sectors. It is true that there are other jurisdictions that do not have de minimises, but they are not jurisdictions with as large a proportion of their GDP linked to trade, and they are not jurisdictions that are as much seen as international business headquarters as well as centres of international business; there is a difference.
There is a de minimis for transport, for example, and it is very focused on ports over a certain threshold and on airports over certain levels of traffic. That is excellent, because those are the kinds of business that it makes sense that you would want to catch. The same layering has not been applied elsewhere. In particular, I worry about catching the sale or the licensing of intellectual property in relation to any of the technology areas. I think that that will catch an awful lot of things that people have not thought about yet, and I think that it will create a big burden for those small businesses.
I can conceive that in one or two very narrow areas—in some of the material science and so on, I am told—there may be low-value things that need to be caught. I am personally very sceptical that low-value things need to be caught in many other areas, because how can they be that important to the economy if they have a value that is below £1 million?
One of our concerns is that, although we know that the Government are very committed to a free trade agenda here and trying to make this work, I have worked with new regulators as they have developed for a very long time, and—forgive my saying so—I have never seen a regulator whose remit was only at the level that was predicted when it was set up. All remits expand exponentially, and that is one of the fears we have.
I would certainly advocate ensuring that the factors that the Secretary of State has to have regard to include, for example, impact on trade. The cost-benefit analysis sets out a sensible attempt—again, it is a much more developed piece of work than the, frankly, not-that-great cost-benefit analysis done in 2017-18; this one is a good and credible attempt—to work out what the actual cash costs are. But it does not address, as the Regulatory Policy Committee drew out, the real economic costs. It may all be okay, but the risks there are not hundreds of millions, but absolutely billions, and the UK’s competitive positioning there.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Nadhim Zahawi)
Q
James Palmer: I will just explain why. I remember working when the public interest regime still applied. The move away from the public interest regime started in the 1980s. Pre the 1980s, this country was not an international investment destination; it really was not. We have earned that position. Whatever one’s politics—I am not party political—this is something that the UK has earned. We have done that by moving to being pretty open-minded in foreign investment. We have actually not worried that much about national security considerations being controlled through ownership, because again this debate has been—sorry, let me first come back to the Minister’s point.
I am very nervous that if you open it up to public interest, you vest that authority in a politician; forgive me, but that is what leads to lobbying, to short-termism, and to completely inconsistent decision taking. I am afraid that whatever Ministers at the time may say about these decisions, there is no external credibility on the predictability of those. It does not matter whether Ministers think they are doing it in good faith or on security grounds. It does not come over that way.
On broadening it to public interest, I completely agree. I am very grateful—because I know that there was a debate about this—that it has been rightly focused just on national security, albeit with a broad ability to intervene to protect the national interest.
Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)
Q
James Palmer: My own view is that I actually hope so, because I think that there is a debate here. We all identify a business that has been established in the UK, and we regard it with pride as a national asset. I completely understand that. I am not just interested in global M and A; I am interested in investment in the UK. My goal is not just M and A. It is the investment, which we will not get without M and A at the end, because investors want to know that they have the ability to realise.
My own judgment—I am not an economist, but most of the economic evidence that I have seen supports this—is that you do better by allowing people to come in, allowing them to sell, not necessarily completely untrammelled, but on a broadly liberal perspective, giving them the certainty and confidence to do that.
I think what we are debating here is about those things that are generated solely in the UK—for example, research, work and ideas that are funded by the UK Government. I can see why the UK Government might want to keep control over those things and link their funding to a level of control. If someone takes funding on that basis, I can see that. I do not know enough about the history of Arm, but it was acquired by a Japanese parent, not by a so-called hostile actor. If we are not going to allow Japanese businesses to buy into our technology businesses, I think we look like a less interesting technology investment and growth destination. We might hold on to a business for another five years, but what businesses are we losing for our children and grandchildren in 10, 20 and 30 years’ time? That is how I look at the question.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
James Palmer: Partly. I was involved in that as well—not entirely, actually. By the way, I think there is a misunderstanding about hostile versus agreed deals. Agreed deals, politically, are regarded as generally okay, and hostile deals as not. But it is about price normally. In occasional cases, there may be other factors, but I think that should not be the determinant of whether a deal is favoured or not.
On AstraZeneca-Pfizer, the challenge there is that AstraZeneca is not just a UK company; it is a global company. Most of its business is not in the UK; it is all around the world. It was built up by making acquisitions all around the world. If we say that it cannot be acquired by an American pharmaceuticals company, what message does that give to businesses that want to come and headquarter in the UK to then go and buy elsewhere? The UK has been a net acquirer globally, and I think that our openness is what has allowed us to do that.
I completely understand the concerns about jobs, and I completely understand the concerns about science and the preservation of skills, and I do not dismiss those, but I worry that by trying to hold on to what we have today, we lose the appeal in the long term, a bit at a time, to people coming in the future. It seems to me that if we are going to have research in the UK, which I think we will, it should flow from our research skills, not from holding on to things that want to leave.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
James Palmer: There is an interesting issue about compliance with law. You need to be careful, because clearly, the draft legislation envisages—as, by the way, I think, the current very broad discretion, which catches an awful lot of transactions, gives discretion to do—allowing quite a bit of leeway to exercise judgment as to what is a national security issue. If you have an investor that is clearly law-abiding and not about to try to put toxic software into your systems or whatever it might be, you are going to worry a lot less about them, so I do not want to limit the discretion.
Do I think that you need to draw out compliance with law in particular? I am nervous about doing so, because it could become a hobby horse for a company that has breached some law somewhere or other. If a big global company has 50,000 employees, people make mistakes; someone somewhere will do something that will transgress. So I worry about it missing the substance. I think there is a discretion to look more substantively, rather than being too much tied to whether they are law-abiding or not. Again, there is clearly a China focus here—I am neutral on that issue; that is for you—but you are not going to know whether a Chinese company is law-abiding outside China or in China, in particular if it has not invested outside China before.
The only other thing I would say on comparator regimes is that the whole debate on this has been framed, as it was in the 2017 paper, around the main rationale, which was, “Other countries are doing this, so we need to look at it.” A much better rationale, which has also been articulated by the Government, is, “We’re coming out of the EU. We’ve got EU-based legislation at the moment. It’s actually the right time to take stock, rather than necessarily that the old regime was hugely defective.” I do not think it was as defective as everybody is saying.
We keep talking about France, the US and Australia. My firm is the largest law firm, or one of the largest law firms, in Australia, and we are in all the markets—France, Germany, Italy and Spain—that keep being cited. Those countries are our very friendly trading partners, but none of them has the reputation for being as open and free trade-oriented as this country. I think we need to be careful about setting comparisons with the most controlling of our friends, not the least controlling, because there are a whole load of countries that have not been named in any of the discussions that are not doing any of this.
Take Ireland and technology. Maybe, under pressure from the EU, they will introduce something, but the Irish have been trying to grow technology; so have the Danes and the Swedes, and the Dutch as well. The Dutch will come out with some proposals in this area, but my expectation is that they will be much more limited. The Dutch are very internationally competitive. For new industries—for green tech, which we really want to be in—the Nordic countries are significant competitors, and I do not think they are going to have all this. I think that, for investors, that is a factor we just need to bear in mind as we try to find the right balance.
The Chair
We have less than five minutes left, so I suspect that this will be the last question. Mark Garnier.
Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)
Q
James Palmer: I have not done any analysis, and I have not read the economics—that is beyond my pay grade—but I have worked on hostile takeovers for a very long time, and I have been involved in loads of auctions of businesses, with debates about who the buyers are and so on. It is blindingly obvious, isn’t it, that if you have fewer buyers, it has a price impact? I think the question is, what is the appropriate, proportionate acceptance of that? I do not think we should kid ourselves; if we want to dial up focus on national security, there will be a level of impact. I think what the Government are trying to do—they have sent very strong signals that this is their goal, which I am supportive of—is to ensure that, yes, we do it, and, yes, there may be a little bit of consequence, but that we try to keep it in proportion.
I think the risk we have here is not with the 10 or so active interventions that the Minister and Lord Grimstone have talked about in briefings on this, which is a very positive signal and a big reduction from the 50 or so that were consulted on before—that gave us, frankly, very high levels of concern. The concerns are, first, will that be held without a really rigorous review mechanism that ensures there is accountability over that review? I would raise four-year, eight-year, 12-year, continual reviews, where you actually look at economic impact and there are evidence-based requirements. I would also bring in proportionality on those to the judgments, because if you ask a group of very intelligent civil servants to think about risk and say that their job is to protect national security, you can find national security risks in almost anything.
I think there will be market distortion impact. John Fingleton, the former chief executive of the Office of Fair Trading, has commented broadly on this. The Economist wrote in an August article about the negative economic impact on US GDP being significant from its equivalent step up of the CFIUS rules. I think it is about trying to thread the needle in a way that keeps that very narrow and limited.
Mark Garnier
Q
James Palmer: I heard the question that you raised this morning on that. I am not troubled by that. I think debt is a bit of a myth. The material influence test that the Government have picked is lower than a number of other EU countries have gone for but is at least consistent—it is levered off the test we already use, which I think is helpful—so I am personally a bit less worried about that than some others are. Finance does not worry me that much. If somebody seeks to foreclose and exercise, they are not going to be able to do so if they are going to be caught. I think we could get ourselves in a knot, and I think the London financing markets could be disastrously impacted if we were to start to try to regulate lending heavily on this.
The Chair
I am afraid that brings us pretty much to the end of the time available. Many thanks, Mr Palmer, for your time and your assistance to the Committee.
We will move seamlessly on to the next session and hear evidence from David Offenbach, a consultant at Simons Muirhead & Burton. While he is taking his seat, let me say to those members of the Committee who were not able to ask questions last time that I will try to make sure that you get an opportunity on this occasion or a future one.
Examination of Witness
David Offenbach gave evidence.
The Chair
Welcome, Mr Offenbach. May I ask you to introduce yourself for the record?
David Offenbach: Yes, thank you very much, Sir Graham. I am consultant solicitor with Simons Muirhead & Burton solicitors, a firm of some 32 partners, and I have been there 19 years. I am here in a personal capacity. Previously, I was a senior partner of the law firm founded by my late father, and I merged my practice with Simons Muirhead in 2001.
I have acted for small public and private companies, and for 15 years, I was a non-executive director of a fully listed plc. I have been involved professionally in takeovers, and I have written on the subject. Currently, I am updating a paper I wrote previously called—this may be of interest to you—“Takeovers and the Public Interest”.
I have recently ceased being a further education college governor and non-executive director, after 18 years’ service, and I was with a social housing company for 15 years. In fact, one that I finished a term of six years with was the subject of one of the largest takeovers in the social housing sector. It is now one of the biggest housing associations.
Briefly, I welcome this Bill very much; but the UK has changed fundamentally since 2017, when the Government started their consultation on this, so I think that it is good, but it could be better. If the United Kingdom is going to build back better, as the Chancellor said yesterday, after covid and after Brexit, whether there is a deal or not, then this legislation needs to be wider than it is now, and I have some suggestions on how it could be improved and some amendments that might be made to it. Excuse me; I’ve got a bit of a cough.
Chi Onwurah
Q
David Offenbach: Well, there are three categories. First, are the 17 subjects that are referred to in the paper sufficient? Sir John Redwood, in the debate last week, said that food should be included, because there is nothing more important than food security. Mr Tim Loughton said that pharma and biotechnology should be included. There is not really very much on energy in the 17 subject matters. So I would like to see those included.
The next is the definition. National security is not defined in the Bill, which I actually approve of, because once it becomes too closely indicated, then it is not easy to decide what should be in it, or what should not be in it. I would like to see a definition that includes what Lord Heseltine said when Melrose took over GKN, that research and development should be a subject of importance; it should be included.
The other thing I would like to see included, contrary to the last speaker, is a general definition of public interest. The reason for that is that when you look at recent examples, you see that it is very easy for things to slip through the net that actually might be both in the national interest and in the interests of national security as a specific point.
Some of these examples have already been mentioned: SoftBank’s purchase of Arm. Now, that was world-beating British technology. It is in every computer, it is in every telephone and it came from Cambridge. It is now the subject of a bid by an American company owned by a Japanese bank. Do we really want to try and hang on to the research and development—as someone said in the House of Commons debate last week, the Crown jewels, or as Harold Macmillan said many years ago, the family silver? At this economic time, is it not desirable that we try and hang on to these important assets that are homegrown? Is self-reliance something that we should bear in mind?
Similarly, in 2014, Google bought DeepMind—world-beating British technology in artificial intelligence. Should that have been the subject of consideration? Recently, Lady Cobham was bemoaning the fact that Cobham had been sold to private equity for £4 billion. She said she only wished that the Act had already been in existence, and then perhaps the nine divisions that have now been reduced to four and the sell-off that started would not have happened. Of course, one of the problems is that the post-offer undertakings that can now legally be provided by companies to the takeover panel are fairly feeble and do not really deal with the issues to protect the necessary research and development and public interest.
At Immarsat, as those of you who drive around Old Street roundabout in the middle of London’s tech city will know, there was a £4 billion takeover of world-beating satellite technology. It started as a United Nations organisation, then became private and was quoted on the London stock exchange and has now gone to private equity.
Nvidia is buying Arm. When they bought Icera in 2011 in Bristol, they closed it down, 300 people lost their jobs and the technology went abroad. One that might now cause a bit of embarrassment is the case of Huawei, which bought from the East of England Development Agency the Centre for Integrated Photonics in 2012. Another piece of world-beating technology owned by the British Government has now gone abroad.
Those are just some of the numerable examples of assets that, at this difficult time, we really ought to try and hang on to. I do not want to decry the argument that Britain is open for business and that we believe in free trade. We do. There is twice as much foreign direct investment into Britain as there is into France and Germany. Several hundred thousand French people live in London. It is the fourth largest French city for French citizens. Why? Ask anybody. It is much easier to do business in London that it is in Paris.
As for the other argument—that if we do not make the business climate easy, people will start up their businesses elsewhere—the answer is that they will not, because in the other places where they want to open their businesses the regimes are tougher than here, so that argument does not wash. France has just passed its recent new law. They use a slightly different test that is strategic. Their test is not quite as wide as public interest. Of course, a right to intervene on strategic grounds is what Mr Tim Loughton and Mr Bob Seely suggested in the House of Commons debate last week, and Mr Tugendhat was very sad about the fact that Google had bought DeepMind and that SoftBank had managed to acquire Arm. For all those reasons, I think we do need to add to the definitions. That is the position.
Chi Onwurah
Q
David Offenbach: It is very difficult to separate these. When you look at GKN, for example, 50,000 people—even now, after covid—are headquartered in Redditch, near the Minister’s constituency. It is one of the largest industrial companies worldwide, 250 years old, and a defence contractor to the Ministry of Defence, but the question is whether the amount of defence work it does, apart from its other engineering, is sufficient for it to be called in under the existing legislation. Clearly, the decision was made that it was not appropriate, and it is the same with Cobham. Cobham clearly had a national security element, but it was not sufficient for it to be called in and blocked by the Minister, so I think it is very difficult to separate the economic from the national interest, because these companies are multi-layered; they operate in different markets; some of their work is sensitive, and some of it is not sensitive.
That is why I think it is better to try and improve this Bill than deal with it under a separate Bill. The problem is that it has taken three years to get to where we are with this Bill. If we are just going to say, “Let’s deal with it another time”, it might take another three or four years before we get to consider that, so while it is here, while it is on the table, let’s try to improve it now and make it really work for Britain, so that we can build back better—to use a phrase—going forward.
Nadhim Zahawi
Q
David Offenbach: I am very pleased with it. It is much better than the previous regime, because now, rather than just having post-offer undertakings that are subject only to contempt of court criteria if they are breached, we have a proper statutory framework that will enable the Minister to impose orders so that for non-compliance, there is a breach of statutory duty, not merely a breach of an undertaking. Of course, one of the problems with the takeover code is that the object of a takeover code is to protect shareholders and to encourage fair dealing in takeovers. It is not there—and this has never been its job—to protect the public interest; it is there to protect the shareholders who are in receipt of an offer, so that they have been given fair treatment. For example, if you take SoftBank and Arm at the moment, we do not know whether or not they will have complied with their post-offer undertakings when the five years is up, because the price that is being paid now is more than was paid in 2016. There is no complaint. Public interest is irrelevant to the job of the takeover panel, which is why this new regime is a very welcome improvement on the old regime.
Sam Tarry (Ilford South) (Lab)
Q
For me, there is something really important we need to explore a little bit more when it comes to our approach, in terms of rushing to be the most open, the most liberal, the most pro-business country we can possibly be, and the exposure that is left—in this case—to China. Just thinking about that, are there particular areas of law that you think need to be tightened up and thought about alongside this, and that need to be looked at in tandem, perhaps around IP protection, licensing and that kind of thing?
David Offenbach: I think this actually does most of what is necessary. I do not think it needs to be improved in that regard. One thing that does slightly worry me is that the present regime, which is essentially a competition regime, has the Competition and Markets Authority as a statutory body, having lost national security to the new unit that will be set up inside BEIS. They only have financial stability, media plurality and public health, which was added this summer, but it is a proper organisation that deals with public interest in those areas. Public interest is the only area.
It is quite important for us to think that one of the reasons why one wants to extend the definition of national security to a public interest element is because there are many more areas of public interest, other than those three that are now left in the CMA. There is a little bit of an anomaly, because national security does not have its own separate statutory body to deal with these issues. It suggests that this is going to be put into a little hole somewhere in BEIS and that somehow competition is more important than national security, because it has a statutory body.
I wonder whether there should be a parallel statutory body, which could be called the national security investment commission, or something like that, that actually dealt with these things separately, outside BEIS. That would deal with some of the objections that people have and that a Minister is going to be lobbied about. It would be dealt with in more of a quasi-judicial way, in the same way that the CMA now deals with referrals to it. I wonder whether the Minister would like to consider that, as part of the amendments.
Sam Tarry
Q
David Offenbach: I listened to and read the Second Reading debate in the House of Commons last week. I know that a lot of Members were concerned to try not to let issues of industrial strategy stray into areas of national security. It is a subject that I do not really want to go into.
Some people have expressed anxiety about the activities of sovereign funds in other countries posing dangers to assets in this country. Is there more of a risk from investments in China? Somehow, people feel that those investments are connected with the Government and that they are not really independent. I think the necessary protections are in this new statute that will prevent that from being an issue.
So far as industrial strategy is concerned, people are worried about sovereign funds. I think Britain should have its own sovereign wealth fund, like Norway does and like we used to have with the Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation, and then with 3i. There are amazing investments that could be made and wonderful technological discoveries that Britain should be able to get the profits from, and that should not be going overseas. When I went on a trade visit to China a few years ago, I saw the China Investment Corporation. They said, “We are really pleased with our investment in Thames Water. We do nothing every year. The dividends come and it doesn’t cost us any money.” I thought, “Why shouldn’t Britain have the advantage of the dividends, rather than the China Investment Corporation?” Norway’s sovereign wealth fund is worth more than £26,000 for every citizen in Norway and is one of the most successful. That is something that really we ought to look at.
Simon Baynes (Clwyd South) (Con)
Q
David Offenbach: Yes, I am.
Simon Baynes
Q
David Offenbach: No, I do not—not in the slightest. I am thinking of clients of mine—French—who moved from Paris to London because it is easier to set up and promote business here. Why did they not stay in France? Because they know that the regime is more restrictive. Why did they not go to Australia? Because they are a similar regime. They are more restrictive. We are a very open environment to do business, in this country. You can come here and set up a company in 24 hours, and start trading. You cannot do that in France: it is much more difficult. In Germany, it is much more difficult, and in Australia. Those comparable regimes, if you like, are less favourable. That is why people come from the Baltic countries to set up business here. It is much easier to do business.
Simon Baynes
Q
David Offenbach: We have the issue that we do not know what difference being out of the European Union is going to make to future investment; but Ireland has been very attractive for many years, partially because of the tax regime—and for lots of other reasons—so will people choose Dublin rather than London if they want to do business? They might very well, but the fact that Britain is open to trade is an important part of the British economy. People will still come here and work here, open businesses and enjoy the infrastructure of the technology and the various businesses that are already here, and that they can feed off, so I am not worried about that in the medium term.
Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP)
Q
David Offenbach: It does not need to be any different at all. I was pleased that land was included. Certainly one knows from seeing property transactions and looking at title deeds, sometimes where the owners of these companies are or purport to be is very curious. The Bill covers that very adequately.
Peter Grant
Q
David Offenbach: I do not know. I am sure that officials in the Minister’s Department have thought about whether or not this is an issue for the devolved Administration, but I do not think it is a problem.
Peter Grant
Q
David Offenbach: Yes, it is. The first thing that will be looked at is where is the beneficial ownership. It is, first, follow the money and, secondly, follow the beneficial ownership.
Peter Grant
Q
David Offenbach: Then you block it.
Peter Grant
Q
David Offenbach: Yes, I am sure that is what the security unit will do. If it cannot be established where the beneficial ownership is, then they will block it, and so they should.
Peter Grant
Q
David Offenbach: Well, I remember there was an outcry years ago when Michael Portillo was a Defence Minister and they were going to sell the Ministry of Defence. There was an outcry and it was withdrawn. Should Admiralty Arch become a hotel or is that an asset? These are the sort of issues which, if they come up, will be dealt with at the time. I like to think that certain things are fairly sacrosanct. We would not sell Buckingham Palace or Windsor Castle to a foreign buyer if we did not know who they were—or at all, in fact.
Andrew Bowie (West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine) (Con)
Q
David Offenbach: The answer is that one is not quite sure. That is why I want to widen the definition. The reason why there are 17 different areas and categories in the Bill is that it is hard to know what national security is at any particular time and how it is reflected in the business that is actually being considered. The only way to make sure that something does not slip through the net is to have a slightly wider definition. There is no definition of national security itself in the Bill, which is perhaps why strategic, research and development, innovation or other issues should be brought in. Then one can be quite sure one has not accidentally lost an asset where there are national security issues.
Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)
Q
David Offenbach: Completely. It has also changed how the Government view it. In the summer, public health was added to the list of items on which a public interest intervention notice can be given. So it is clear that, in the face of the national emergency that, alas, we face—according to the Chancellor it is the greatest economic crisis for 300 years—we have to hang on to our assets. That is why the Bill is even more necessary than it was before. The pandemic gives added weight to the arguments that I was making even before we had covid. We need to have a wider test to protect our national assets.
Matt Western
Q
David Offenbach: I am not personally worried about state entities being said to pose more of a risk, because I think that the Bill is strong enough to make it possible to intervene where necessary. Although one is entitled to look at the asset being purchased, the acquirer and the person from whom it is acquired, I do not think that it will be a problem under the Bill as it is drafted.
Matt Western
Q
David Offenbach: I do not think that there is anything other than the 17 already mentioned and the ones that I mentioned, most of which came up in the debate last Tuesday. I think that telecoms might be mentioned as well, but the list really covers all the areas where national security is a significant risk.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
“Land is generally only expected to be an asset of national security interest where it is, or is proximate to, a sensitive site, examples of which include critical national infrastructure”.
Do you think that scope is too narrow? For example, we know that property in London is used to launder large amounts of money—nefarious organisations often own property in London and use it for nefarious purposes. London is sometimes referred to as a laundromat for dark money. Do you think that that is a national security risk and should be included in the scope of the Bill, and that the land definition in the statement of political intent should reflect the money laundering issue?
David Offenbach: I am not sure I quite agree with the statement of intent as part of the Bill papers. The drafting of that section of the Bill is wide enough to include the issues that you raise. It would be open to the Minister to intervene in the cases that you mention without any change to the drafting of the Bill being necessary.
The Chair
If there are no further questions at this point, I will say thank you very much, Mr Offenbach. The next witness is not due until 3.15 so we will have a 10-minute suspension.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from our fifth panel. We welcome Mr Creon Butler from Chatham House. We have until 4 o’clock for this session. Mr Butler, may I welcome you to the Committee? Please will you introduce yourself for the record?
Creon Butler: I am Creon Butler, the director of the global economy and finance programme at Chatham House. I am very pleased to have the opportunity to give evidence.
Chi Onwurah
Q
Creon Butler: You get right to the heart of the matter and, indeed, to one of the points I wanted to make. Yesterday I looked at how national security is defined, and the “Collins English Dictionary” defines it as preventing a country from being attacked by hostile powers. One very important thing in relation to this Bill is that, first, while there is a good justification for having a broad range of powers to intervene, given the breadth of those powers to intervene and collect information, it is important that the Government define more clearly than they have hitherto exactly what those powers will be used for and, in those terms, use them in relation to national security. Specifically, I mean investments that could lead a hostile power to have technology that would enable it to make better weapons to attack us or would enable it to intervene in our critical national infrastructure.
There are other aspects of economic security, such as having a major industry in AI, renewable energy or something of that kind, that could be relevant to broader security in the future. You may well want to have a strategic intervention to ensure that the UK has that kind of industry, but I do not think this is the Bill for doing that. I think there are other tools you would want to use, including competition policy, strategic investments, contracting, R&D and so forth. That is one of the points I wanted to make.
Chi Onwurah
Q
Creon Butler: On your first question, I do not think we have that yet as a country. Actually, with the previous Prime Minister we had a clear definition of a number of sectors that were felt to be very important, but it is a continuing story in terms of exactly how we are going to intervene to ensure that those sectors are strong. We have some powers, but there are a range of tools. I previously mentioned public contracting, where we do our research and development, and competition policy specifically to make it impossible for British companies to develop in those sectors, and so on. There is a broad range of policies for ensuring we have those sectors, and I think they are continuing to evolve.
Your second question is a really crucial one. I guess a key point is that this is not an absolute thing: you cannot protect the country from all possible national security risks through this route. The only way you could do that, potentially, is by having every single investment notified and examined. That would create an enormous bureaucratic monster, which would really not be what we want.
The further point is that when you are looking at the right cases, you want to be sure that the judgments that are made trade off with the national security risk, as I have defined it, but also with the potential economic benefit of having an investment in that area. To do that, you need expertise among the people who are making such judgments, which spans security expertise but also economic, investment and commercial expertise. It is very important, first, that there enough people to do the judgments properly, and secondly, that you have a breadth of expertise. Certainly in the past, we may have swung from one side to the other. Sometimes you have had what people would describe as a securocrat approach: “There is a possible risk here. Let’s go for it—let’s eliminate it, whatever the economic cost.” Sometimes, on the other hand, you have had the alternative situation: “Let’s encourage investment, whatever the risk might be.” I think it is important that we get a balance between those two.
Nadhim Zahawi
Q
Creon Butler: I think—I am sure many people have said this—it is very clear that the previous legislation needed updating and was not fit for purpose, given both the way in which the global economy as a whole has evolved and the way in which the threats have evolved. It is both necessary and urgent to update that, and the way the Bill has done that, in terms of this first phase of creating the powers both to collect information and to intervene, makes a lot of sense. We have to fine-tune it and make sure it works properly, but this is a good first step. As I said, though, it is really important, if you are going to have such broad powers, to define exactly how you will use them—and much more precisely than the Government has done hitherto.
The further point is that this piece of legislation does not do everything. Alongside it, we need to strengthen our ability to collect the information we need about those threats. There are a number of elements. One that I have some experience of and that is really important is the question of who actually owns and controls companies that are operating in the UK—the question of beneficial ownership transparency. If you do not know that a hostile power is influencing a company that might be registered in an overseas territory or something of that kind, you will not be able to take the steps that you need to take.
A further area—it is a step in the right direction, because it gives us the powers to engage with this issue —is through international co-operation. Looking forwards, we need to strengthen and enhance our international co-operation with like-minded partners by going beyond the Five Eyes and including other really key partners, such as Japan, the EU and so on. That will enable us to do two things. First, it will enable us to share information about the things that can happen, such as the techniques that hostile powers are using. You may see it come up first in one country, and if we can share that information, we know that we can be prepared for that. Even more importantly, you may have a hostile power that does a number of things in different parts of the world, and it is only when you see the entire picture that you can see what the threat is.
Having that kind of international co-operation to do that is really important. These powers are necessary to get us in the same place as some of our key allies, in terms of what we can do. I do not think we are ever going to be able to standardise the areas of intervention or the nature of powers, but we should push very hard to enhance the sharing of information in the way I described.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
“the National Security and Investment regime does not regard state-owned entities, sovereign wealth funds—or other entities affiliated with foreign states—as being inherently more likely to pose a national security risk.”
Do you agree with that assessment? Logic would seem to suggest that the closer an entity is to a foreign Government, the more likely it is to pose a risk to our national security.
Creon Butler: Clearly, some state-owned enterprises can be a significant risk, but some clearly are not. VW has a significant state element in it through North Rhine-Westphalia, but that does not make it a national security risk. At the same time—this goes back to the point I was making about who actually controls companies —you could well have a company that is registered in another country and, particularly if that country does not have very beneficial ownership transparency laws, as even some very close allies such as the US do not, the company emanating from it could have ill intent towards us.
For that reason, I think the Bill is right not to make a special regime for companies that are state owned, because that could go wrong in two ways: either you could be looking at only one set of companies when there are others that are potential threats, even though they come from close allies, or you may end up spending a lot of time looking at companies with state shareholdings that are really no threat at all. Clearly, when you come to do the analysis, whether there is a stake from a hostile state will be an important part of the analysis that you do in assessing that threat. I think the Bill gets it right in not creating a special regime, but that does not mean that this will not be an important part of the analysis that you do in assessing the threats.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
Creon Butler: I did not read it quite that way. I read it more as meaning that that is not a reason for having a special regime, but when it comes to doing the assessment, you look at whether there is a state element of ownership and from which country that state element of ownership comes. That would be a factor when you are examining the likelihood that that particular investor could pose a threat to us. I am not a lawyer; I just read it that way. If the way you are reading it is the correct way to read it, I do not think that is quite right.
James Wild (North West Norfolk) (Con)
Q
Creon Butler: It is a constantly evolving picture. The benefit that the NSS can bring is a strategic overview. When you want to put the element of national security protection in the context of broader economic security issues, it is really important that the NSS plays a key role. I do not know the precise detail of exactly what the linkages are between the new unit and the NSS. I would think, from the way I worked in the NSS, that they will be very close in term of people, exchanges, links and so on.
In terms of the respective roles, the strategic role is one that the NSS should play, looking at this element alongside all the other elements of national economic security. As I understand it, it is very important that this unit has a very strong operational focus and effectiveness, the skills that enable it to do this, and the space in which to do it. If I was in charge of designing the relationship, that is how I would design it.
James Wild
Q
Creon Butler: There is obviously a trade-off again. My sense was that the provisions that are there now are realistic and sensible, but we need to see how the thing evolves and fine tune it according to the experience that we have had. People have pointed out that this will lead to a lot more cases being looked at than before. I do not think that that is a criticism of what is happening; it is a reflection of the world that we are in. However, in the light of the experience of looking at a much broader range of cases, we should be ready to adjust the timeframes and so on, taking account of that experience.
Matt Western
Q
Creon Butler: In my view of economic security broadly, the biggest existential threat is climate change, frankly. We are going through a ghastly pandemic. Fortunately, it looks like we can see the way out of it, but I do not think that at any point we felt that this particular virus was an existential threat to mankind more generally. My view of climate change is that it is, and it is very close. In any broad assessment of national and economic security, I would put climate change as one of the most important issues. That is why the accelerating efforts both within Governments and in the private sector to deal with it are crucial.
In terms of other kinds of threats, we have had this particular pandemic, which as far as we can see is not an existential one; there could be other pandemics that are. That is why infectious diseases have been so high on our risk register in the past. Steps to ensure that we do not face future pandemics that are even more serious than this one in terms of the threat to human life, or the economy, are a very important priority. Those are two examples of broader threats beyond hostile powers that we should incorporate in our approach to national and economic security.
Peter Grant
Q
Creon Butler: It is a good question. It is something I worked on when I was in the Government. There is a pending proposal in relation to property, to ensure that no foreign company can invest in UK property without some means—whether their own register of beneficial ownership or a regime put in place in the UK—of ensuring that transparency. That is in relation to ownership of property. It did not go much broader than that, because it involves a major bureaucratic process and there is the issue of not interfering too much with the way the economy works. If we did do that, it would help in relation to one of the national security concerns we have, which was highlighted in the Bill, where a hostile power buys some property close to a very sensitive site.
I need to think about it a bit more, but I do not think it would make sense at this stage to require that we can identify the ownership of every single investment. For example, in the US they do not have consistently strong beneficial ownership rules. You might find a situation in which several US investments in the UK did not meet those transparency requirements. If they were in non-sensitive sectors and did not pose a threat to us at all, it would create a considerable burden.
Thinking it through on my feet, the logic would be to do something of that kind, where it related to sectors that we knew to be sensitive. Indeed, those are already covered by the mandatory notification case. Where you have the mandatory notification, it will presumably trigger information about who owns the company that is making that investment. If that is not clear now, that may be the route to make sure that this element is covered.
Peter Grant
Q
Creon Butler: Absolutely. We currently have a public register of beneficial ownership for all UK-registered companies. That was a major and important step. There are issues about whether we are doing enough to enforce those legal requirements. That area could be looked at helpfully in this context. When that regime was designed, the view was that market forces, external pressures and gathering information from NGOs and others would ensure that the information on the register was accurate. I am not sure that we can now be sure that is the case. We want to get that transparency for UK-registered companies, and we may need to do more in that direction, particularly through the enforcement process in Companies House.
Stephen Flynn (Aberdeen South) (SNP)
Q
Creon Butler: I think this comes again to the point about how we will tightly define national security in relation to these broad powers. I think you are thinking of a hostile power investing in a social media platform that can then be used to attack the UK—I guess that is what you have in mind. It is, again, something that I have not thought through. Probably, I would not see the nature of the threat as being so great that we would necessarily make it a mandatory notification, but by using other sources to collect information about threats, we might use the other powers in the Bill—the calling in and those kind of powers, and the voluntary notification —to make sure that we had covered the threat. I do not think I would put it in the mandatory category, but I would want to use other information and powers to collect information, and to call in a particular investment if I felt it was a threat.
The Chair
There are no further questions, so thank you, Mr Butler, for your time and your assistance to the Committee. We have our witness for the sixth and final panel in the witness in the room, so we can move on seamlessly and a little early.
Examination of Witness
Will Jackson-Moore gave evidence.
The Chair
We have until 4.30 pm at the latest for this session. Mr Jackson-Moore, will you introduce yourself for the record?
Will Jackson-Moore: I am a partner at PricewaterhouseCoopers. I am responsible for our relationships with private equity, infrastructure, real estate and sovereign funds on a global basis. I started working in our Sheffield office, predominantly with small and medium-sized industrial organisations, before moving into our deals practice, where I spent the majority of my career working with corporates and private equity houses, undertaking transactions here in the UK and abroad. I then relocated with my family, while still at PWC to the middle east, where I spent a number of years —I got quite a lot of exposure to the sovereign funds there—before moving back to the UK and into my current role.
My areas of expertise are flows of international capital and the deals market. I am not a specialist in national security matters.
Chi Onwurah
Thank you for sharing your expertise with us, Mr Jackson-Moore. What impact do you expect the measures in the Bill to have on the sovereign funds and others you represent—the investors and potential acquirers of UK assets? You said clearly that you were not an expert in national security—why should you be? —but how will you identify those acquirers who may be considered to pose a national security threat? What kind of engagement would you expect to have with the Department for Business in order to make that sort of call?
Will Jackson-Moore: That is a two-part question. On how the proposed Bill will impact the flow of capital into the UK, generally these are sophisticated investors who operate across the globe, investing in territories that already have equivalent legislation, so the actual legislation itself will not come as a surprise or a barrier. It is in the application of it that there will be concerns, in that, quite rightly, the definitions are drawn quite broadly and we believe that a significant number of transactions and inbound investments will be brought into this—in many cases, voluntarily, so people can get guidance. That will be an area of concern, in terms of whether it will create a barrier, either through publicity or with the timing of bringing capital into the UK. That is probably one of the main concerns right now.
In terms of sovereign funds, I am not in a position to say whether an individual investor or fund is a threat to national security. That is not something I would be looking to comment on.
Chi Onwurah
Q
Will Jackson-Moore: In terms of how we might engage with organisations on the applicability of the Bill, I think we would be asked questions about the industries that are covered, the definitions of an industry and what a business actually does. Whether an organisation is drawn into the legislation—whether it is considered a national security threat—is not something we would be involved in. I would be pointing organisations in the direction of their legal advisers on that.
As I said, there are something in the order of 6,000 investments into venture capital in the UK each year. There are approaching 10,000 mergers and acquisitions transactions a year in the UK, plus a number of infrastructure investments, and many of those will fall into the definitions within the Bill. I do not think it is entirely clear to buyers yet whether they would be caught. A traditional private equity house or a venture capitalist looking to invest in a start-up in the UK, may well be owned by Britons, with a management team who are British, but they may have structures that include overseas entities, and many of their investors will be overseas investors. I think that many of those organisations will be wanting guidance as to whether they will be considered an overseas acquirer, even though on the face of it they appear relatively British.
Chi Onwurah
Q
Will Jackson-Moore: No. The way traditional fundraising for a start-up or a transaction takes place is that a business is either put up for sale or seeks investment from a number of parties; the entrepreneur wants to raise finance and have a competitive situation in which the providers of capital are making the most attractive offers possible to reduce the cost of capital for the organisation. I think there would be an incentive for them to be able to say to potential investors, “We are not going to be considered as an asset that is important to national security”. The definitions are quite broad and many organisations will have technologies that right now appear relatively benign and are used for purely civilian purposes but are cutting-edge and on a trajectory whereby in two years’ time they may have military applications or other things that could be a threat to national security.
Chi Onwurah
Q
Will Jackson-Moore: Yes, in many cases it is a raising of finance for a partial stake. It is an entrepreneur looking to attract capital to expand their business, seeking to bring in an investor to provide maybe 25% of additional equity capital. They want to have a competitive situation where people are offering the most beneficial terms possible. Many of those investors will be overseas investors.
Nadhim Zahawi
Q
Will Jackson-Moore: For the vast majority of existing transactions, the existing legislation was not really a major factor; it only addressed a handful of transactions each year, whereas this is much more in the mainstream of the M and A market and therefore it will be much more on people’s agenda. We already have a number of organisations reaching out to us to understand the potential implications for ongoing transactions.
I do not think the timeframe in itself represents a barrier, since it is not that dissimilar to other jurisdictions, but again it is the application. If you look at Australia, for example, buyers have the ability to pre-clear themselves, and that type of amendment would be very helpful to ensure the free flowing of capital.
Stephen Flynn
Q
Will Jackson-Moore: Yes, it potentially could, because it will create an additional uncertainty. In order to attract capital, you need as much certainty as possible. An ability to say to investors that we do not believe we are in an area of investment that presents a national security threat is important.
Stephen Flynn
Q
Will Jackson-Moore: It is already having an effect, in that it is being discussed by organisations that are considering investments into the UK right now. People do not necessarily want to be seen as a guinea pig or have high-profile investments unless they really have to. It is not that it is stopping it; it is just another factor on the balanced scorecard as to whether you are going to make an investment. It is one factor to consider and it is a degree of uncertainty, which is never helpful.
Andrew Bowie
Q
Will Jackson-Moore: Not as the Bill stands in its own right. As you say, we are the largest inbound country for venture capital, for private equity and for infrastructure, and we have been seen as the gold standard for the location in Europe to invest into. Many other European territories have equivalent legislation, but again it is about the application of the legislation, in particular the process, the ability to pre-clear and the timelines actually being met. To understand some of these technologies is not going to be straightforward. These are emerging, cutting-edge technologies in some cases, and the talent required to assess that will not necessarily be easy to attract. Some consideration needs to be given to partnering with research institutes or academia in specific areas, so that there is a panel available to assess certain technologies, not only to understand its position right now but also its trajectory—where that technology may go in the next two or three years.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
Will Jackson-Moore: It is not something I have specifically considered. It certainly would not that be within what I considered to be a matter of national security under the auspices of the Bill. I do not think I am in a position to comment any further.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
Will Jackson-Moore: I am not in a position to talk about specific individual organisations. A number of sovereign funds in China are very well regarded in the international capital markets. However, in terms of their interaction with Chinese Government, that is not something that I have a perspective on.
Mark Garnier
Q
Will Jackson-Moore: As I mentioned earlier, the UK is the gold standard for a location to invest in, particularly within Europe. Investors like investing in the UK because of the fairness and transparency, UK law and UK courts, and as a place to be based and to live, so there is an inherent benefit to doing UK-based transactions. However, and as we sit here right now, on a scorecard-type approach, the UK is not as attractive a location as it has been historically. We have the uncertainties of Brexit and we have a number of other territories looking to recover and rethink their economies given the situation we are all in, so there will be more—
Mark Garnier
Competition?
Will Jackson-Moore: Yes, there will be more competition for international flows of capital. As I have said, I do not think this Bill in its own right fundamentally changes the attractiveness, but it does create another level of shorter-term uncertainty, just because people have not seen it operating in practice yet.
Mark Garnier
Q
Will Jackson-Moore: It is entirely appropriate to have legislation to protect matters of national security, so perhaps this puts us on a level playing field with other nations. But does it specifically enhance our position for the attraction of international capital? The answer is not specifically, but it sets a standard that the international capital markets expect us to put in place.
The Chair
We have no further questions from the Committee, so thank you very much, Mr Jackson-Moore, for your time and assistance. We are finishing slightly ahead of time, but I invite the Government Whip to propose to adjourn.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Michael Tomlinson.)
4 pm
Adjourned till Tuesday 1 December at twenty-five minutes past Nine o’clock.
National Security and Investment Bill (Fifth sitting)
Tuesday 1st December 2020
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 1 December 2020 - (1 Dec 2020)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
I have a few preliminary points to make. I ask Members to switch electronic devices to silent and remind them of the importance of social distancing—spaces are clearly marked. Members who are not able to fit into the body of the room—the Opposition Benches are full—will have to sit in the Public Gallery. I will suspend the sitting if I think that anyone is in breach of social distancing guidelines. Hansard will be grateful if Members e-mail electronic copies of speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk.
Today we begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list is available at the back of the room, showing how the selected amendments have been grouped for debate. Amendments grouped together are generally on the same or similar issues. Decisions on amendments are made not in the order in which they are debated, but in the order in which they appear on the amendment paper.
The selection and grouping list shows the order of debates. Decisions on each amendment are taken when we come to the clause that the amendment affects. I will use my discretion to decide whether to allow a separate stand part debate on schedules and clauses following debates on amendments.
Clause 1
Call-in notice for national security purposes
Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 3, in page 1, line 6, after “Secretary of State” insert “upon the assessment of a multi-agency review or recommendation of the Intelligence and Security Committee”.
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to assess a multi-agency review prior to issuing a call-in notice.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 4, in clause 4, page 3, line 21, at end insert—
“(aa) at least one week before the statement is made, consult with the Intelligence and Security Committee in respect of the contents of the statement; and
(ab) amend such legislation as may be necessary to allow such consultation to take place;”.
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to consult with the Intelligence and Security Committee before publishing a statement under section 3.
Amendment 5, in clause 6, page 5, line 3, at end insert—
“(10) Before making regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must—
(a) provide the Intelligence and Security Committee with one week’s advance notice of his/her intention to bring forward such regulations; and
(b) make any necessary amendments to legislation to allow the Intelligence and Security Committee to respond with recommendations.”.
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to notify the Intelligence and Security Committee before making regulations under this section, and would provide a mechanism for the Committee to respond with recommendations.
Chi Onwurah
May I begin by saying what a pleasure it is to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg, and what a pleasure and, indeed, honour it is to discuss this important Bill with the rest of the Committee?
This issue is important to Members on both sides of the Committee, and as we scrutinise the Bill line by line over the next two weeks I am sure we will get closer—or as close as social distancing allows. Labour Members look forward to a constructive and collegiate debate and recognise that Members on both sides of the Committee share the objective of making well-informed contributions. It was clear from speeches made last night on the Telecommunications (Security) Bill, the interests and ambitions of which overlap those of this Bill, that all Members share a belief in the critical importance of national security, and I am sure that will be reflected in our deliberations.
We agree on the importance of securing our national security, for which line-by-line scrutiny is vital. The Government’s impact assessment notes the need for change and says that national security is an area of “market failure” requiring some Government action. I found that statement somewhat shocking, and a marked difference between the views of Labour and Conservative Members. It is an astonishing claim, because national security is not a private concern first, and a Government after-thought second. There is no market in national security, which is the first duty of a Government and not a failed responsibility of the private sector. It ought to be the first priority of any Government to address it. It is not under-supplied by the market; it is outside the market altogether.
Although that claim is astonishing, it is unsurprising from this Government and the party that leads them. The impact assessment is a marker of a Government who have outsourced significant responsibility for national security; a Government who let Kraft take over Cadbury in 2012 because the market promised good behaviour by the acquirer, only for them to be embarrassed when the acquirer broke all its promises—national responsibility outsourced and British jobs and national interests handed over to the market.
James Wild (North West Norfolk) (Con)
Could the shadow Minister explain the national security issues with the Kraft takeover?
Chi Onwurah
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. I meant to say that national responsibility was outsourced—and British jobs—and the national interest handed over to the market. That was the concern with the Kraft takeover. If he wishes, I shall follow up with further examples, but the national interest and the responsibility of this Conservative Government for economic security have clearly been lacking. This is the Government who let the Centre for Integrated Photonics, a prized research and development centre, be taken over by Huawei in 2012—an event that our head of the National Cyber Security Centre said that in hindsight we would not wish to happen. National security was outsourced and the British interest again relinquished to the market.
Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)
My hon. Friend makes a point about the market failure that we have experienced over the past decade and its relevance to or inappropriateness for national security. The Government actively encouraged inward investment from China and let the market be totally open, without any control whatsoever, which is one of the driving factors in the challenges we face today, especially with Huawei, as outlined in last night’s debate.
Chi Onwurah
I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. He is absolutely right. This is particularly relevant to amendment 3, as we shall see. This Government, and previous Conservative Governments of the past 10 years, have maintained an ideological position that bypasses the question of national security and leaves Government responsibility much curtailed and focused purely on our defence capabilities and requirements without considering the impact of our technology and R&D. As the debate on the telecoms Bill showed, the Government are not considering the impact of the telecoms sector on our short-term and long-term security.
On the specifics of amendment 3—these principles guide the reason for the amendment—the Secretary of State would have to draw up a multi-agency review or act on the recommendation of Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee prior to issuing a call-in notice.
The Bill marks the total transformation of the UK’s existing merger control process and the provisions of the Enterprise Act 2002. It would move us away from 12 reviews in 18 years to a potential 1,830 notifications a year. It would shift the locus of merger control from the experienced Competition and Markets Authority to a novel unit of the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. As we heard in our expert evidence, the world is looking at the UK and seeing a pretty seismic change. We recognise the need for such a change, but we do not accept that the skills and knowledge to implement and monitor such a change reside wholly in BEIS.
The Minister is a modest man, and he may not want to share with the Committee the fact that he has recently been made the tzar for vaccine acquisition and delivery across the nation, but that is one of the many responsibilities of his Department. I hope he will agree that is a considerable responsibility, but the responsibility of identifying and understanding the national security implications of 1,830 notifications a year is a particularly great challenge. As someone who champions the importance of trade and economic growth, he will agree that there is potentially a conflict of interest—we have seen this for many years, as my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington suggested—between the trading implications of foreign direct investment and access to finance and the national security implications. This is such a huge shift that we cannot rely on discretionary judgments made potentially to suit political ends alone. We cannot rely on BEIS alone because the Department may have a conflict of interest in its separate role of boosting UK investments.
This is a critical point, and I hope to hear from the Minister how he or the Secretary of State will prioritise the role of the Department in boosting investment in the UK and in scrutinising these 1,830 notifications. We need to ensure a robust contribution from across Government and the agencies in guiding these decisions.
Andrew Bowie (West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine) (Con)
Is not the entire purpose of calling in a decision to then instigate an investigation into whether that investment would be contrary to national security? It is after the Secretary of State has called it in that the agencies and Departments can look into the investment or takeover to see whether it is contrary to national security. That investigation does not take place before the call-in notice has been issued.
Chi Onwurah
The hon. Member makes an interesting point. We will examine the skills of those involved in the examination once a transaction has been called in. There was a clear contradiction in what he said, because if it is not called in those skills and expertise will not be brought to the table. There is obviously a need for the expertise before the call-in, or there would not be a call-in.
Andrew Bowie
If it is not the calling in by a Minister, what would trigger the multi-agency investigation into the investment or takeover that has caused the problem in the first place?
Chi Onwurah
The hon. Member makes an important point that goes to the heart of our concerns. I do not wish to detain the Committee for too long on this, but it is important to discuss the way in which the skills and resources of our national security services, who do so much to keep us safe and secure, will be used to work with the Department to identify potential triggers for a call-in. Some guidance will be given in the statement issued by the Secretary of State, and we will debate that shortly, but what was mentioned many times yesterday during the debate on the Telecommunications (Security) Bill was the capacity and the need for institutions such as our Intelligence and Security Committee to have a more concrete role. Not all of their expertise and knowledge can be in the public domain. As we heard yesterday, the Committee first issued concerns about Huawei back in 2013. If, back in 2013, the business Department had been able to benefit from that expertise, knowledge and insight the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport would be in a different position today.
Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)
As my hon. Friend rightly says, the fundamental purpose of our amendment is to ensure that the screening process takes place upstream so that the multi-agency and highly technical capability of intelligence agencies and the Ministry of Defence can be deployed in advance of the Secretary of State—who otherwise may be in a state of isolation—making an initial decision about whether there is a trigger event or whether action is required. The amendment would ensure that the screening process is done by multiple agencies that can then give the Secretary of State advice that is well informed and rooted in an understanding of the risk that we face.
Chi Onwurah
I thank my hon. Friend for putting it so clearly, and I hope that addresses the concerns of the hon. Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine. We want the screening process to benefit from the knowledge of our intelligence agencies and others before the Secretary of State calls it in. Our national security depends on having those robust contributions from across Government and the agencies in guiding decisions. In some cases, this may rely on the established sensitive channels of information and access and communications that have marked the work of the Intelligence and Security Committee. That is the best way to guard our national security, relying on our world-leading intelligence agencies, diplomatic service and our civil service expertise across Departments and not just on a single Secretary of State.
During the evidence sessions last week, we heard from an academic expert witness that institutional capacity in this area usually involves a multi-agency review body. We heard from the former head of MI6 that
“the co-ordination of Government Departments is one of the really big challenges”.––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 23, Q25.]
I am sure everyone who heard Sir Richard Dearlove’s evidence was struck that his years at MI6 had clearly taught him that this is a big challenge and that it is important to have co-ordinated and organised multi-agency input. We heard from the recent head of the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre that the new body
“needs to be broadly based and multidisciplinary.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 26 November 2020; c. 85, Q103.]
The consensus of academic and intelligence service experience is that we need an approach that includes different agencies upstream of the calling decision.
Matt Western
My hon. Friend is making incredibly important points. There are really two issues. One is the volume that will be coming through, as she articulated earlier, but there is also the multiplicity of the challenges and where they may come from. This is not simply about the most obvious security challenges or risks. It is not necessarily about defence contracts or telecoms; it could come from all sorts of areas. It is the soft areas that are perhaps the most vulnerable. That is where the expertise of the different Departments will come into play, and that is why a multi-agency approach is so important.
Chi Onwurah
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Perhaps I should have emphasised that point more.
When we look at the examples of Huawei or DeepMind, which was allowed to be sold to Google in 2014, we are looking backwards. We now recognise the security implications. Artificial intelligence is a key security capability, as I think the Minister will agree, given that it is one of the 17 sectors for which notification will be mandatory. At that time, it was difficult and I take it—perhaps the Minister will contradict this—that the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills did not recognise the security implications of the acquisition.
The key question is, what are the acquisitions now that will have security implications in five or 10 years’ time? That is what the Secretary of State needs to know in order to make the decisions we are discussing. It is no injustice to the Secretary of State and the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy to say that alone, they are not in a position to know that. Deciding from where in the world the great threats to our security may come is not purely technological, although it requires technological expertise, and it is not even purely geopolitical. Last night we heard a lot about China and Russia. In future, we may be looking at other emerging threats. This is an attempt to improve the Bill by ensuring that there is a multi-agency approach.
Simon Baynes (Clwyd South) (Con)
Could you list the agencies that you have in mind under the term “multi-agency”?
Chi Onwurah
I do not think it would be appropriate to be prescriptive at this point. Some of the agencies I have in mind are the Intelligence and Security Committee, the National Cyber Security Centre and our security services—MI5 and MI6. I am very happy to hear from the hon. Gentleman what agencies should be involved, but the key point is that we need multiple agencies.
Matt Western
If the University of Cambridge were approached by a Chinese academic institution with an offer of funding to collaborate on some project, for example, surely that would need the intervention of the Department for Education. It is obviously not just about the intelligence services; it would need the engagement of the DFE and not just BEIS.
Chi Onwurah
I thank my hon. Friend for that important point. I am reluctant to continuously mention China, because this is not an anti-China Bill per se, but we heard in oral evidence of the real concerns about Chinese influence in our higher education institutions. He is right that the Department for Education may have an important input to make about securing our future national security.
In defining the agencies that need to be involved in this multidisciplinary approach, we could look at the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, which has nine voting departments, two non-voting agencies and additional White House representation on its decision-making committee. I know that the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy has done some work on comparisons with other countries, in particular our Five Eyes allies. There are models to take.
Andrew Griffith (Arundel and South Downs) (Con)
In the same vein as my hon. Friend the Member for Clwyd South, to expand a little on what multi-agency would mean, would the hon. Lady rule out the Low Pay Commission, for example?
Chi Onwurah
I welcome this debate. If by that the hon. Member is asking whether I think human rights have a relationship to national security, that was very well debated yesterday in relation to the Telecommunications (Security) Bill. A number of his colleagues strongly made the point that there is a relationship between modern-day slavery and our national interest and national security. I do not have the expertise to identify what the agency should be. The Low Pay Commission is not an organisation that I had considered, but I am happy to take his advocacy for its being part of this multidisciplinary approach.
Stephen Kinnock
My hon. Friend is being incredibly generous. Not wishing to second-guess some of the scepticism that we may be picking up from the Government Benches—[Interruption.]
Stephen Kinnock
Thank you, Mr Twigg. As I was saying, not wishing to second-guess the scepticism that I may be picking up from Government Members, one reason I support the amendment is that I think it brings additional focus to the process. Without a clear definition of what national security is in the Bill, and a clear institutional capacity for the Secretary of State, the Secretary of State will be left with an open-ended process. By having a multi-agency, strong institutional capacity we will streamline the process. Our amendment is about cutting bureaucracy out of the process, and streamlining and focusing it. I hope that hon. Members will consider that when they take their sceptical approach.
Chi Onwurah
As always, I am immensely grateful to my hon. Friend, who does well to remind us that part of the underlying issue, which we will debate later, is the lack of any definition of national security. Rather than just considering the scepticism, let me focus on what we are trying to do. Given the lack of any definition of national security, is it not right that it should not be left to the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy to decide what the key issues are on national security? Fundamentally, I think that is the question that Committee members must consider.
The amendment seeks to fill the gap that expert advice and international precedence highlight. It enshrines credible decision making in law and, in doing so, protects our security and gives businesses confidence that the decision to call in has been grounded in evidence and expertise, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises, who will find certain provisions of the legislation most burdensome and who may have the most to lose from lengthy processes once the call-in procedure happens—the hon. Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine referred to those processes. It grounds a mechanism for effective accountability for the call-in decisions of the Secretary of State.
Amendment 4, which would amend clause 4, has a similar aim. It would require the Secretary of State to consult with the Intelligence and Security Committee before publishing a statement under section 3, which sets out the scope and nature of how the Secretary of State would exercise the call-in powers. That statement would include details of sectors that might especially pose risks, details of trigger events and details of factors that the Secretary of State would consider in deciding whether to act. It would also include details of the BEIS unit’s resourcing, if amendment 9 were agreed to.
The measures are a seismic shift in terms of the UK’s approach to mergers and acquisitions and it gives significant powers and discretion to the Secretary of State. It suggests that the Government may publish a statement setting out the scope of the call-in powers. As part of our discussion this morning, we have talked about the way in which security threats evolve over time in the light of technological change—for example, security threats that we did not recognise in the past led to the Huawei debacle—and also, importantly, in the light of political changes, so it is understandable that our understanding of some of those changes will be imperfect and will rely on sensitive information. However, the critical point is that the fact that there will be change and its sensitivity should not preclude the need for accountability.
In other areas of national security, the Intelligence and Security Committee holds Government to account through proper scrutiny and with access to sensitive information. I refer again to the debates on the Telecommunications (Security) Bill and the Second Reading of this Bill, where members of the Intelligence and Security Committee demonstrated their understanding of the key issues around national security and their ability to make a contribution—I think it is fair to say that they are very willing to make a contribution. It is only right that we bring the same level of scrutiny to measures in this Bill, on matters of critical national security. The amendment would bring the scrutiny of the Intelligence and Security Committee to changes in the Secretary of State’s call-in powers, ensuring that these major powers consistently act to protect our national security.
Scrutiny is especially needed in this area. We have had the Enterprise Act since 2002, but there have been only 12 national security cases under it. That speaks very clearly to the lack of experience and an acute need for scrutiny as we now move up to almost 2,000 annual cases. Several witnesses in our evidence sessions emphasised that we were going from effectively zero—a standing start—to Formula 1 performance levels, and that as such, we needed to ensure that we put in place the resources, the expertise and the support to enable that to be effective and not unnecessarily impede our business, our economy and our foreign investment.
Andrew Bowie
I am listening intently to what the hon. Lady is saying and I understand the point she is trying to make, but surely it is already within the power of the ISC to call in anything that it thinks is a threat to national security. Therefore, it can investigate anything that it thinks it will be detrimental to the national interest. If we read further down, clause 4(2) states:
“Either House of Parliament may at any time before the expiry of the 40-day period resolve not to approve the statement.”
There is already capacity in the Bill as it stands, and the procedures that we already have in Parliament, to ensure scrutiny of any procedures that the Secretary of State might decide to take forward.
Chi Onwurah
I recognise that at the point that the hon. Gentleman is trying to make, and I agreed with him until he said that there are already powers to “ensure scrutiny”. The powers that he describes might enable scrutiny, but I do not think they would ensure scrutiny. We are trying to ensure the scrutiny of the Intelligence and Security Committee by writing it into the Bill. I see him nodding, and I appreciate that we understand each other here.
Matt Western
This is about putting it on a different footing; it is as simple as that. As was said by Sir Richard Dearlove and others in the evidence sessions last week, with the sort of agenda that a Government of any political colour may have, we have seen particularly over the past decade an embrace of, say, China, and the investment in our nuclear power stations provision as well as in other areas. Now, that could have been Russia, and if it had been Russia, what would the advice have been? What would the agenda of the Government of the day have been? Would it have been as embracing? That is why it is really important to understand from the ISC what its views are and to put this in a different setting, as my hon. Friend has said.
Chi Onwurah
Another excellent contribution from my hon. Friend, who raises a delicate, nuanced, important point. Governments of all colours may have trade and geopolitical agendas that lead to, as my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) described it, a “hug a panda” approach, whereas the ISC, which we have seen mark its independence of thought both as a Committee and in its contributions in parliamentary debates, has a duty, a responsibility and an understanding to see beyond short or even medium-term political ambitions and to focus wholeheartedly on the security of our nation. That is where its support is invaluable.
I will finish my comments on the amendment by quoting some of our parliamentary colleagues with regard to the Intelligence and Security Committee. On Second Reading, the Chair of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, the hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), said that
“there is a real role for Committees of this House in such processes and that the ability to subpoena both witnesses and papers would add not only depth to the Government’s investigation but protection to the Business Secretary who was forced to take the decision”.—[Official Report, 17 November 2020; Vol. 684, c. 238.]
I think that is powerful advocacy for the amendment. A member of the ISC, the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes), said that
“we need mechanisms in place to ensure that that flexibility does not allow the Government too much scope. That is why—this point was made by my hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat) and I emphasise it on behalf of the ISC—Committees in this place missioned to do just that need to play an important role.”—[Official Report, 17 November 2020; Vol. 684, c. 244.]
We had support in the evidence sessions, support across the House and, most importantly, we have the support of the ISC itself, or at least its agreement that the amendment would be a constructive improvement to the Bill.
Finally, I will say a few words on amendment 5, which would require the Secretary of State to notify the Intelligence and Security Committee before making regulations under clause 6 and would provide a mechanism for the Committee to respond with recommendations. Regulations made under clause 6 would likely define the sectors that pose the greatest national security risk and would come under mandatory notification requirements. With the amendment, the ISC would be able would to provide both scrutiny and challenge to these sector definitions. The Committee will understand that the driving reasons behind the amendment are similar to those behind amendments 3 and 4, which is of course why the amendments have been grouped together, and would seek to improve the Bill through putting in place a requirement for parliamentary scrutiny specifically on the definitions.
As we have said, the Bill gives the Secretary of State major powers, and it demands mandatory notification of investments in large parts of the economy, with 17 proposed sector definitions already. I really cannot emphasise enough how broad those definitions currently seem. I know it is the intention that the definitions should be tightly drawn. However, I speak as a chartered engineer with many years’ experience in technology. Three or four decades ago, we might have talked about digital parts of the economy, but now the economy is digital. Similarly, in the future, parts of the economy not using artificial intelligence—from agriculture to leisure to retail to education—will be looking to use it.
Katherine Fletcher (South Ribble) (Con)
I am a scientist myself, so I share a passion from a technology perspective. I am listening to the hon. Lady’s view of the breadth of opportunities, but amendment 5 would bring the Intelligence and Security Committee into the process, and I wonder whether we would be creating a bottleneck. The hon. Lady talked earlier about breadth and said that time is critical for SMEs and larger companies that need a decision. I think she would accept that Government is perhaps not the most effective and efficient vehicle, so why does she seek to put additional steps into something that is time critical and based on national security?
Chi Onwurah
I welcome the hon. Lady’s intervention. It is great to have scientific knowledge in Committee and in the House. I welcome the contributions and scrutiny that a scientific background can bring. She is right that there is a tension. The technological environment is fantastic and innovative, with its start-up and enterprise culture. We have great centres of development and innovation, from Cambridge to Newcastle. I am sure hon. Members can mention other centres of great technological development that lead to lots of local start-ups in different areas. All or many of them may be caught by the provisions of the Bill, and that is a concern, but our amendments have been tabled to put in place parliamentary scrutiny.
Parliamentary scrutiny of the call-in process should be, as my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon said, upstream of the actual call-in notification. This is about the definitions of the sectors to ensure upstream scrutiny. Small businesses, particularly start-ups, seek finance, often foreign investment. There are enough barriers in their way and we do not want to create more unnecessarily, but our amendments are about clarifying and ensuring the robustness of the definitions before they hit the coalface of our small businesses and start-ups, whose interests I want to protect. The Opposition are champions of small businesses, are we not?
Stephen Kinnock
Indeed we are. My hon. Friend is absolutely right. I reiterate that what we propose is, through consultation, removing bottlenecks—the key word in the intervention from hon. Member for South Ribble. By improving consultation and ensuring that we have the best possible expertise, we will make the Secretary of State’s life easier, not more difficult. It is about removing bottlenecks, not adding them.
Chi Onwurah
I thank my hon. Friend for his eloquence. I reiterate that we are looking to make the Secretary of State’s life easier. We hope that, in the not-too-distant future, a Labour Member will be in that position. Our guiding principle is that we want every clause to be as effective as possible and our amendments are designed to make the Bill work as effectively as possible.
Andrew Bowie
I suggest that, in seeking to make the Secretary of State’s life easier, the Opposition are making the life of the Intelligence and Security Committee much more difficult. On current projections, there could be more than 1,000 call-in notices a year. That would make the ISC’s job almost impossible to do alongside all its other important work throughout the rest of the year.
Chi Onwurah
I think the hon. Member and I have the same aims, and we are looking to make the process work as effectively as possible. The Intelligence and Security Committee has clearly said that this is an area in which it can make an important contribution. Further, as my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon so eloquently said, this is about putting in additional security upstream. I do not envisage—I think I am right in saying this—that these measures would result in the Intelligence and Security Committee reviewing 1,800 call-in notifications; this is about putting in place the ISC’s expertise and scrutiny upstream.
Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)
I am listening, or trying to—perhaps it would be helpful if we turned the volume up a bit. The hon. Lady is asking Parliament to form part of the process of being the Government, when surely the purpose of Parliament is to scrutinise the Government’s work, rather than doing their work for them. That is why I am finding her arguments quite troubling. Will she explain why she thinks Parliament should be doing the work of the Government, not just scrutinising the Government?
Chi Onwurah
That is a really interesting point, and we could debate for some time the nature of the Government—the Executive—and the role of Parliament. So as not to exhaust your patience, Mr Twigg, I will just say that the role of Parliament is to scrutinise Government, but our proposal is actually about scrutinising decisions that the Government are taking—for example, the definition of the 17 sectors in the amendment that we are considering. I do not want to put words in the hon. Gentleman’s mouth, but I think his argument is that that parliamentary scrutiny should take place only after myriad companies have complained that the definitions are far too broad. We are trying constructively to find a balance on this important question, but I want to draw that balance in the interests of national security, small businesses and our business community who have to work with these definitions.
Mark Garnier
Some of the work of the International Trade Committee carries across to this argument. That Committee’s job is to scrutinise on behalf of Parliament the trade deals that are going through; we have just had the first example of that in the Japanese trade deal. The work of a Select Committee, which is what the hon. Lady is talking about, is to help to inform Parliament and to enable it to scrutinise the Government properly. I am worried that with this amendment, she is asking Parliament to be part of the process of the work of the Government. That is where the amendments become rather confusing. It is important that Parliament scrutinises thoroughly what is done, but it must be independent. What it must not do is to participate in the Government’s work by doing some of that work in its scrutiny.
Chi Onwurah
Perhaps I do not quite understand the point that the hon. Gentleman is making, because we propose that the Intelligence and Security Committee should provide that scrutiny. The scrutiny that the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee provides is necessarily limited to business. At the centre of this is the fact that we are putting in the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy a key issue of national security. Is it not right that those who have expertise and experience in security, as opposed to international trade or business, should be part of that?
Mark Garnier
The hon. Lady is being very kind in giving me a chance to come back on this. Surely we should not be putting a duty of Parliament in a Bill. It is up to parliamentarians to decide what we do on scrutiny, and we should not have that in a Bill or enact it in law; we should be doing it anyway.
Chi Onwurah
I am struggling to see how that would happen. How would Parliament, after the Bill becomes law, decide that the Intelligence and Security Committee, as opposed to or in addition to the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, should have a role. How would that happen in practice?
Stephen Kinnock
There are plenty of examples of Select Committees getting involved in the upstream work of Government—for example, giving feedback on White Papers. Parliament and its Select Committees consistently get involved in the work of Government in that context.
Mark Garnier
The point is that that is not on the face of legislation. All the Select Committees do this work incredibly well, but they do not have to be told on the face of a Bill to do it. Parliament does it anyway, so I wonder why the amendment is necessary.
Chi Onwurah
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention, because I think we are getting to the nub of it. The amendment is necessary because, as I outlined, there is an inherent conflict of interest within the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy with regard to foreign investment and national security. In addition, there is a need for security-cleared knowledge. I do not know the security clearance of the current members of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, but I doubt it is at the same level as the members of the Intelligence and Security Committee.
Katherine Fletcher
Sorry, I nearly put my hand in the air then—I am still new. Listening to the debate, I was reflecting on the efficiency of the process. We must make sure we do not put Parliament within an operational procedure. Does that not also apply to amendment 3 and the idea of a pre-emptory notification? Is the hon. Lady not seeking to put together some kind of ethereal multi-agency association, when all that is really needed is a phone call to a team of people who are security cleared within BEIS? Does she accept that point?
Chi Onwurah
The hon. Lady makes a good point, in that much would be solved by the appropriate phone call at the appropriate time. Had Sir Richard Dearlove been phoned by the right person when the Huawei acquisition was going through, that issue would have been solved. Whichever Government are in power, we are continuously looking for ways to ensure a more joined-up approach to government.
Given the importance of national security—I think we can all agree that national security is the first duty of Government—and given the reality of the conflicting pressures on Departments, I think these proposals to improve scrutiny by involving a multi-agency approach are necessary. I also point the hon. Lady to the approach of the US Government, who have found this to be necessary, as have others of our allies. With that, I will make some progress.
The Chair
Order. I think it is important that we stick to the amendments we are discussing.
Chi Onwurah
I will follow your guidance, Mr Twigg.
Under the amendments, the Government would have to publish notifiable acquisition regulations to define sectors and notification rules in greater detail. From time to time, those sectors and rules will need to change, with new regulations made to keep up with changing technological, security and geopolitical risks, as we have discussed. To guard our security, not all those risks should be discussed in public, but the need for change and for sensitivity does not preclude the need for accountability—a point I have made a number of times. In other areas of national security, the ISC holds the Government to account through proper scrutiny and with access to sensitive information. It is only right that we bring the same scrutiny to bear here, on matters of critical national security.
The amendment would bring ISC scrutiny to notifiable acquisition regulations specifically up-front of any decision to call in or notify, so ensuring that these major powers consistently act to protect our national security. Again, that is an important point. Significant powers are being given to the Secretary of State to protect our national security. It is right that we should have security input into the definition of these sectors.
In his oral evidence, Professor Martin, the former head of our National Cyber Security Centre, said:
“I think that the powers should be fairly broad”,
but
“there should be accountability and transparency mechanisms”.––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 26 November 2020; c. 81, Q96.]
We need to ensure that flexibility does not allow the Government too much scope, so flexibility must go hand in hand with accountability and transparency. The ISC, critically, has the skills, security clearance and expertise to provide that scrutiny and accountability.
The Chair
Before I open up the debate, I will say a couple of things. The Committee is just getting into its stride. The first hour has now gone. I suggest that Members keep interventions succinct. Also, a few people have used the word “you”. Members should refer to each other as “the hon. Member” or, better still, by their constituencies. I have given some leeway, as it was the first hour and the Committee is just getting into its stride. I call Stephen Flynn.
Stephen Flynn (Aberdeen South) (SNP)
Thank you, Mr Twigg; it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. I once again thank all the witnesses who gave evidence in previous sittings. They did a sterling job and answered numerous questions in a very insightful way.
As we have seen through the lengthy presentation of the amendments and the back and forth between Members across the Committee, this is an incredibly important matter. Perhaps the amendments strike to the core concern that many have regarding the Bill: its scope and how we balance the need for investment and the desire to continue to encourage inward investment—particularly given that there will be an extremely challenging economic event in just 30 day—against national security concerns without potentially overwhelming a Department and while allowing it to create structures that have sufficient capacity to deal with the potential number of call-ins.
As we heard on numerous occasions, in excess of 1,800 notifications or call-ins are expected annually. How do we marry all that together in a coherent platform, while ensuring that each and every call-in that is made is dealt with coherently on the basis of national security? The amendments are helpful in creating a wider dialogue about how to achieve that. The role of the Intelligence and Security Committee seems to be one that we would want to utilise. Its skills and expertise in this regard are unsurpassed.
On issues of national security, having the key experts in the room assisting the Government is clearly something that all Members would support. I am mindful that there seems to be a wider discussion of how that might work in terms of process, but that relates to the entire Bill, and it would be helpful if the Government would be clearer about why Bills are being discussed before consultation with sectors are complete, and how they intend Departments to deal with the raft of potential call-ins. I am sure that the Minister is incredibly capable, but he is also incredibly busy, and his life is about to get much busier; I will not be alone in hoping that he spends a lot more time getting the vaccines rolled out than he does sitting in rooms like this listening to some of our debates.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Nadhim Zahawi)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg, and to speak on this important Bill. I am grateful for the congratulations—or perhaps commiserations!—of the shadow Minister and all colleagues on my new role as the vaccines delivery Minister. I am obviously focused on the NSI Bill now, but I am also conscious of my responsibility for delivery, and I had a very good conversation with the devolved Administrations last night.
I hope that the Committee agrees that the Second Reading debate and the evidence sessions last week demonstrated the importance both of this legislation and of getting it right. I again place on record my thanks to the Opposition parties for the constructive way in which they have approached the Bill thus far, and I look forward to discussing the amendments that they have tabled to this part of the Bill.
Amendment 3 requires the Secretary of State to assess a multi-agency review or recommendation of the Intelligence and Security Committee before issuing a call-in notice. I remind hon. Members that it is vital for the Government to have the necessary powers fully to scrutinise acquisitions of control over entities and assets that may pose national security risks. To enable this, clause 1 gives the Secretary of State power to issue a call-in notice when he or she reasonably suspects that a trigger event has taken place, or is in progress or contemplation, and that that has given rise to, or may give rise to, a national security risk. It is entirely reasonable, as Committee Members have said, to want the Secretary of State to make full use of expertise across Government and Parliament to run the most effective and proportionate regime that he or she can. The amendment aims to recognise that.
To explain why the amendment would not achieve that noble aim, it would be helpful briefly to summarise the overall screening process. First, businesses and investors can notify the Secretary of State of trigger events of potential national security concern. In certain parts of some sectors, notification by the acquirer will be mandatory. Following a notification, the Secretary of State will have a maximum of 30 working days to decide whether to call in a trigger event to scrutinise it for national security concerns. For non-notified acquisitions, the Secretary of State may call in a completed trigger event within six months of becoming aware of it, both on a case-by-case basis and when developing his overall approach. The Secretary of State intends to draw on a wide variety of expertise from across, and potentially beyond, Government as is appropriate.
If the Secretary of State calls in a trigger event, there will be a detailed review. At the end of the review, the Secretary of State may impose any remedies that he reasonably considers necessary and proportionate to address any national security risk that has been identified. The Bill gives the Secretary of State 30 working days to conduct an assessment, but this may be extended for a further 45 working days if a legal test is met, and then for a further period or periods with the agreement of the acquirer. The purpose of the initial assessment of whether a trigger event should be called in is not to conduct a detailed review of the entire case, or to determine whether the trigger event in question gives rise, or would give rise, to a risk to national security. That comes later. It is simply a preliminary assessment of whether the trigger event warrants a full assessment. Prohibiting the Secretary of State from calling in a trigger event until a multi-agency review has taken place, or the Intelligence and Security Committee has provided a recommendation, could severely upset the process – as we heard eloquently from my hon. Friend the Member for South Ribble.
Chi Onwurah
I thank the Minister for giving way and again congratulate him on his new role. I also thank him for his constructive tone. I sense a contradiction in the point he is making. He is saying that the Business Secretary will call on a wide range of advice and expertise, but that if he is required to call on a wide range of advice and expertise, it will upset the process.
Nadhim Zahawi
What I am trying to get at is the point made so eloquently by my hon. Friend the Member for South Ribble—the bottleneck issue. It is unlikely that adding this review, or requirement for a recommendation at the stage where the Secretary of State is assessing whether to issue a call-in notice, would be feasible within the 30-day window following the notification.
I remind the Committee that the Government’s impact assessment estimates that there will be at least 1,000 notifications every year. As my hon. Friend the Member for South Ribble said, under this amendment, every single one would need a multi-agency review or an Intelligence and Security Committee recommendation, which would be a truly massive and, in my view, unfeasible undertaking.
Chi Onwurah
The review would be required before issuing a call-in notice. The impact assessment mentioned about 1,830 notifications, but only 90 call-in notices. It is not accurate to say that the amendment would require about 1,800 reviews. It is only for those that would lead to a call-in notice, which is a much lower number.
Nadhim Zahawi
We can debate the number, but the issue is one of delay and bottlenecks. It could mean that the Secretary of State was timed out of calling in potentially harmful acquisitions and of imposing any national security remedies. Alternatively, if the initial assessment period following a notification was extended beyond 30 working days, which is not currently possible under the Bill, that could reduce certainty for businesses, which I know the hon. Lady and the hon. Member for Aberavon were also concerned about. Any delay to remedies addressing national security risks would be a problem. However, I assure hon. Members that the Secretary of State will eagerly seek expertise and advice from a wide range of sources, and we will work together to safeguard our national security. Having a slick and efficient call-in process is vital to that.
Amendment 4 seeks to require the Secretary of State to consult the Intelligence and Security Committee prior to publishing a statement on the exercise of the call-in power, known as the statement of policy intent. Clause 4 requires the Secretary of State to carry out such a consultation on a draft of the statement as he thinks appropriate, and to take into account the response to any such consultation during the drafting process. That process could include engagement with interested parties across the House, and I am delighted to learn that such esteemed colleagues as members of the ISC might wish to discuss the statement in detail. Parliament has been provided with the first draft of the statement, and we would welcome its view on its content.
I draw attention to the fact that clause 4 requires the Secretary of State to lay the statement before Parliament, as my brilliant hon. Friend the Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine rightly pointed out. If either House resolves not to approve the statement within 40 sitting days, the Secretary of State must withdraw it. That provides Parliament, including members of the ISC, with plenty of opportunity to influence and scrutinise the contents of the statement, which I believe is the aim of the amendment and which I am therefore not able to accept.
Amendment 5 would require the Secretary of State to notify the Intelligence and Security Committee prior to making regulations under clause 6 and to enable the Committee to respond with recommendations. I welcome the contributions made by many members of the ISC on Second Reading, and I have since written to the Committee Chair, who unfortunately was unable to attend, to follow up on a number of the recommendations made by his colleagues.
Clause 6 defines the circumstances covered by mandatory notification. The Bill calls them “notifiable acquisitions” on the basis that they must be notified and cleared by the Secretary of State before they can take place.
Members are aware that any modern investment screening regime must provide sufficient flexibility for the Government to examine a broad range of circumstances, bearing in mind the increasingly novel way in which acquisitions are being constructed and hostile actors are pursuing their ends. The regime needs to be able to respond and adapt quickly. Regulations made under the clause will be subject to parliamentary approval through the draft affirmative procedure, giving Members ample opportunity to ensure that mandatory notification and clearance regimes work effectively.
The draft affirmative procedure means that regulations may not be made unless a draft has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House. I am pleased to advise esteemed members of the ISC that in developing the regulations the Secretary of State will take the greatest care, and will consult as widely as is judged appropriate, while ensuring he is able to act as quickly as needed. I see no need for a formal consultation mechanism. Indeed, such a mechanism between the Committee and the Secretary of State would be unprecedented.
For the reasons I have set out, I am not able to accept the amendments, and I hope that the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central will not press them.
Chi Onwurah
I thank the Minister for his response and the generally constructive tone with which he laid out the aims of the amendments and the reasons he did not feel able to accept them.
There is, however, as I suggested in an intervention, a sense of the Minister playing both sides at once. He says that the scrutiny proposed in the amendments, by the ISC and through the multi-agency approach, should take place, but that it would be wrong to require it because it will take place. The hon. Member for South Ribble said that the challenges and the need for input scrutiny could be addressed by the right phone call at the right time. That is true, but there are many reasons why that might not happen. For example, the Minister might be looking at vaccine delivery at the time the phone call was being made. We therefore propose the amendments to ensure that that input, scrutiny and expertise are in the Bill.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Nadhim Zahawi
It is vital that the Government have the powers necessary fully to scrutinise acquisitions and control over entities and assets that might pose national security risks. The Bill refers to such acquisitions as trigger events.
The clause therefore gives the Secretary of State the power to issue a call-in notice when he or she reasonably suspects that such a trigger event has taken place or is in progress or contemplation and it has given rise to, or may give rise to, a national security risk.
The parameters of the call-in powers will give the Secretary of State sufficient flexibility to examine potentially sensitive acquisitions connected to the United Kingdom while ensuring they may be used only for national security reasons. The Committee will note that in the acquisition of or control over businesses, unlike in the Enterprise Act, there are no minimum thresholds for market share or turnover.
Why is that necessary? It is necessary because acquisitions of small businesses at the start of their ascendancy can harm our national security, particularly if they involve the kind of cutting edge, world-leading technology for which this country is known. Although there is a broad range of scenarios in which the power may be used, of course, most trigger events will not be called in, as they will not raise national security concerns.
Examples of those that may be more likely to be called in include a person acquiring control over an entity that operates part of our critical national infrastructure; a person acquiring the right to use sensitive, cutting-edge intellectual property; and boardroom changes that mean that a person acquires material influence over the policy of a key Government supplier. Clauses 5 to 12 and schedule 1 set that out in detail.
Call-in notices may be issued in relation to trigger events that are in contemplation or in progress, as well as those that have already taken place. That will ensure that potential national security risks can be examined at any stage of the process rather than, for example, waiting until a transaction has taken place or is nearing completion, when it is more difficult for the parties involved to make any changes that may be required. It is envisaged that, in most circumstances, call-in notices will be issued after the Secretary of State has received a notification about a trigger event from an involved party, but it is also important that the Secretary of State retains the ability to call in trigger events where no such notification has been received. The limits for issuing a call-in notice are set out in clause 2.
The Government are committed to ensuring that businesses have as much clarity as possible when it comes to the use of this power. We heard in the evidence session about the need for real clarity for businesses, so the Bill is proportionate. The Secretary of State may not, therefore, exercise the power until he publishes a statement for the purposes of clause 3, setting out how he expects to use the power. The Secretary of State must have regard to the statement before giving a call-in notice. A draft of the statement was published when the Bill was introduced. I do not intend to anticipate our discussions in respect of the statement when we move on to clauses 3 and 4, but I am confident that it will provide reassurance that the Secretary of State intends to exercise the call-in powers in a measured and considered way.
Hon. Members will appreciate, though, that it would not be responsible, given that national security may be at stake, for the Secretary of State to be restricted to exercising the power only in the circumstances envisaged in the statement. The purpose of the statement is, after all, to set out how the Secretary of State expects to exercise the call-in power, not to give binding assurances. That is why clause 1 specifies that nothing in the statement limits the power of the Secretary of State to give a call-in notice, though I reiterate that I expect the vast majority of call-in notices to be issued in accordance with the expectations set out in the statement.
I hope that hon. Members will agree that clause 1, alongside clauses 2, 3 and 4, enables the Government to carry out a vital assessment of relevant trigger events in a measured and effective way.
Chi Onwurah
I thank the Minister for his remarks on clause 1 stand part and for setting out the Bill’s aims and ambitions. We largely agree with those aims and ambitions, and in that spirit I will give further clarity on the Opposition’s overall position. We stand in support of the need for the Bill, and indeed we sought it years ago. We support the need for the new powers to protect our national security, as set out by the Minister, and the need for those new powers in the context of changing technological, commercial and geopolitical realities. Our approach to the Bill is therefore one of constructive challenge and is guided by three principles, the first being the security of our citizens. We do not want narrow legal definitions. Our proposed amendment to clause 1 would have ensured broad input into the considerations, such that our national security was not threatened as a result of insufficient expert advice or by the pure, ministerial market ideology of recent record. Our group of amendments sought to bring legal powers, multi-agency expertise and proper decision making to bear in putting British security first.
There has already been significant discussion of the right national security powers, both on Second Reading and in the Committee evidence sessions. An essential part of that discussion has been focused on the merits of giving the Government powers to protect our national security by using a public interest test. There are understandable concerns that too broad a test might result in a drop in investment for the UK’s start-ups and businesses, and these concerns note an economic challenge in expanding our national security powers. At the same time, however, there is widespread agreement that national security and economic security are not entirely separate. They are deeply linked. A national security expert told us that a narrow focus on direct technologies of defence, for example, was mistaken, and that we should look at the defence of technologies that seem economically strategic today and might become more strategic in future.
Our concern is that we have a Government who are years behind our allies in even contemplating the new national security investment regime. We have seen only 12 national security screenings in 18 years, and not a single instance of the Government acting decisively to block a takeover and guard our national security. In the context of what other countries are doing and how rapidly technologies progress from being economically strategic to becoming security threats, we must not just consider a narrow national security test, but pursue a road to sovereign technological capability and much more ambitious and robust routes to protecting national security and strategic interests. The Opposition will therefore put the security of our citizens first. We will not shy away from regaining national sovereign capability, and we assure our citizens that Britain will have the technology and the capability to protect its national security.
In scrutinising the Bill and this clause, we will champion clarity and support for our prized SMEs and innovative start-ups—the engine of British jobs and British prosperity. We have already heard from market participants that the Government’s belated rush with this Bill has created huge uncertainty and concern over the ability of BEIS to operate the new investment screening regime that the Minister set out. The Government’s impact assessment notes that 80% of transactions in the scope of mandatory notification will be by SMEs. We heard from our expert witnesses that the impact assessment fails to account for the costs faced by the acquired companies, and for the overall impact on funding for our start-ups. The Opposition will not turn a blind eye to those costs for our small and medium-sized enterprises. At each step, the Opposition will plug gaps left by the Government in coherent policy making, to champion British creativity and innovation. It is the least our small and medium-sized enterprises deserve.
Finally, we will stand for effective scrutiny of the Government of the day. That is why we tabled the amendment, which has unfortunately not been accepted by the Committee. However, we will find proportionate, robust and democratically legitimate means of seeking accountable action to protect our national security. Our amendments will stand up for British security, and for competent and coherent decision making. Clearly, we regret the Committee’s decision on our amendment, but we will not oppose the clause standing part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 2
Further provision about call-in notices
Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 10, in clause 2, page 2, line 12, leave out subsection (1) and insert—
“(1) No more than one call-in notice may be given in relation to each trigger event, unless material new information becomes available within five years of the initial trigger event.”.
This amendment would enable the Secretary of State to issue multiple call-in notices if material new information becomes available.
Dr Whitehead
Rather late in the day, I will say what a pleasure it is to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg. I am sure you are aware that we share an anniversary: we are among the few surviving Members of the 1997 intake—those happy days when Labour used to win elections. We came to this House in 1997 and have been here ever since.
The reason I emphasise that fact, Mr Twigg, is to underline just how many Bills you and I have sat on, led for the Labour party or been involved in over the years. I am unable to tot up the exact number but it is a considerable, and it is a great pleasure to be sitting on this Bill Committee. I have served on a large number of Bill Committees of late, the most recent being the Environment Bill Committee, which has just finished its deliberations. I was unable to be present for this Bill Committee’s witness sessions because I was finishing off the Environment Bill—well, trying to strengthen it rather than finish it off. I am grateful to my colleagues for asking a series of pertinent questions in the evidence sessions. We are all grateful for that and, indeed, to the expert witnesses.
I want to cite the amendment in the context both of the various Bills that have come through the House and of the witness sessions, which I have assiduously read, even though I was not present for them. I hope the Minister will accept that the amendment is entirely in line with the constructive way in which I hope we have gone about our business in this Committee. The amendment, which I shall unpack in a moment, strengthens not only the Bill but the ability of Ministers to do their job properly as far as its provisions are concerned. That is its intention.
The amendment seeks to replace subsection (1), which is a bald sentence:
“No more than one call-in notice may be given in relation to each trigger event.”
My time with Bills has taught me to look carefully through all of the different clauses to find the qualification. In my experience, tucked away somewhere in most Bills is a qualification. Sometimes it is about when a clause is to be implemented, sometimes it is a definition of the wording, and sometimes it is an additional provision that mediates the clause to which our attention was first drawn.
This clause has no such qualification. It is an absolutely straightforward statement. We have discussed trigger events to some extent in our evidence sessions, and they are elucidated and qualified in further clauses, as are call-in notices, but the fact that we get only one call-in notice per trigger event seems to be the central essence of this subsection. Our amendment seeks to put a question mark against whether that bald statement about the fact that we get one go per trigger event is the wisest formulation to have in the Bill.
The amendment makes a modest change to the clause, stating:
“No more than one call-in notice may be given in relation to each trigger event,”
and adding,
“unless material new information becomes available within five years of the initial trigger event.”
James Wild
From his experience of many Bills, I wonder what the hon. Gentleman made of the provisions in clause 22 on false or misleading information that has been given to the Secretary of State, whereby if he has been given that information he can change a decision he has previously given and can therefore issue another call-in notice.
Dr Whitehead
Yes, indeed. The hon. Member is quite correct to draw attention to clause 22, which concerns false or misleading information. It relates to where someone has, at the time of the trigger event, concealed or misled or sought to deceive those concerned with the trigger event about the nature of the event. I would suggest that that is a different case from what we are trying to establish today. It is not that anyone has tried to deceive anybody or maliciously mislead anybody at the time of the trigger event, but new material may come to light or become available within five years of the initial trigger event that might cause a further call-in notice to be introduced. According to the definition set out in the Bill, that looks like it might not be possible.
Stephen Kinnock
I thank my hon. Friend for giving way, and he is being very generous in doing so. He rightly talks about new material or information, but what about the evolving nature of geopolitical threats? There may well be countries that are not considered to be hostile actors now, but political changes one, two or three years down the line could have a massive impact on whether we see that country as a threat to national security. It could become a hostile actor.
Dr Whitehead
My hon. Friend makes an important point, which was reflected in the evidence sessions on this Bill. I want to dwell on that briefly, because he makes a really important point. These matters are evolving. Not only that, but the nature of databases evolves. The nature of what we do and do not find out evolves. There are circumstances—my hon. Friend mentioned a particularly important one—where the Secretary of State could be excessively curtailed in the diligent pursuit of his role in terms of call-ins and trigger events if no amendment is made to this clause.
The expert evidence we received from Dr Ashley Lenihan of the Centre for International Studies at the London School of Economics gave rise to a couple of important considerations in terms of how evolving circumstances or new information might be important. Dr Lenihan made a very important point, similar to that made by my hon. Friend, when she stated:
“Dealing with the kind of evolving and emerging threats we see in terms of novel investments from countries such as China, Russia and Venezuela needs the flexibility to look at retroactively and potentially unwind transactions that the Secretary of State and the investment security unit were not even aware of.” ––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, Tuesday 24 November; c. 34, Q36.]
Speaking of existing databases, Dr Lenihan also stated:
“They do not cover asset transactions; they do not cover real estate transactions, which are of increasing concern, especially for espionage purposes.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, Tuesday 24 November; c. 35, Q36.]
I note that there has been a lot of concern in the United States more recently about real estate purchases in strategic locations, which may give rise to espionage or other national security concerns. As Dr Lenihan emphasises, existing databases do not cover such arrangements but might do in the future and might find it necessary to do so in the future. Under those circumstances, new information could well come to light.
Dr Lenihan also gave an interesting example—this is not strictly in line with our considerations today—of how information might come to light in a way not easily anticipated by those doing the initial call-in notice and trigger event. She referred to the purchase in the United States of a US cloud computing company, 3Leaf, which had gone bankrupt. Huawei—as it happened—quietly bought up the assets, employees and patents of that bankrupt company. That was not noticed at the time by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States regulators, because they did not pay attention to bankrupt companies, as opposed companies that continued to operate. That went quietly unnoticed, uncommented and unactioned until, Dr Lenihan informed us, a Government staffer happened to notice on his LinkedIn account that someone he thought had been partially running 3Leaf was listed as a consultant for 3Leaf for Huawei. He thought to himself, “How can this be?” Only through his attention and reporting back was that acquisition unravelled in the United States. No one was providing malicious information or seeking to mislead at the time. It was just that new information came to light, in that instance through surprising mechanisms. However, an important issue came before regulators and the security services. That emphasises that clause 22, important though it is, does not cover those sorts of circumstances and eventualities.
Nadhim Zahawi
I hope that the hon. Member for Southampton, Test and other hon. Members will permit me, in responding to the hon. Gentleman’s points, to begin by considering stand part and by laying out the Government’s broad rationale before turning to the substance of the amendment.
The clause contains further provisions about the use of the call-in power. It is vital that the Secretary of State is able to call in and scrutinise trigger events that have taken place. However, it is right that clear limits are placed on the call-in power to ensure that it is used in a proportionate manner—the whole point here is proportionality. The clause therefore prohibits a trigger event from being called in more than once. It also provides that the Secretary of State may issue a call-in notice only up to five years after a trigger event has taken place and no longer than six months after becoming aware of the trigger event.
The time limit of five years strikes the right balance between ensuring the Secretary of State has enough time to spot completed trigger events that may pose a risk to national security. The hon. Gentleman cited evidence from Dr Lenihan on 3Leaf, which speaks more to the screening operation than the amendment. Of course, the Secretary of State also has to make sure that the risks to national security are balanced against avoiding undue uncertainty for the parties involved, which we all want to make sure we look after, and we have heard from colleagues about the challenges that small businesses face in building or rebuilding their business
For trigger events that take place before commencement but after the introduction of the Bill, the five-year time limit starts at commencement rather than from when the trigger event takes place. If the Secretary of State becomes aware of that trigger event before commencement, the six-month time limit also starts at commencement. The ability to call in trigger events that take place before the commencement of the call-in power but after the introduction of the Bill will help to safeguard against hostile actors rushing through sensitive acquisitions to avoid the new regime, now that we have set out our main areas of interest.
The five-year time limit does not apply if the Secretary of State has been given false or misleading information, as my hon. Friend the Member for North West Norfolk (James Wild) reminded us, or in relation to notifiable acquisitions that have been completed without prior approval.
In all this, we will seek to provide as much transparency and predictability as possible. The Secretary of State may not, therefore, exercise the power until under, clause 3, a statement is published setting out how.
Stephen Kinnock
Could the Minister say a little more about what the problem is with not having the Minister’s or the Secretary of State’s hands tied? Our amendment simply says that if information comes to light that creates cause for concern, the Secretary of State may, if he or she so wishes, look into it again. It is not an obligation; it simply makes sure that the option is there.
Nadhim Zahawi
I was going to address that at the end of my remarks, but I will touch on it briefly and hopefully reiterate it at the end. It is about certainty and proportionality. Everything we are doing by legislating in this way has an impact on businesses and the certainty of attracting investment and growing, as the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central, reminded us in her opening speech.
As I was saying, a draft of the statement was published alongside the Bill. Following commencement, if parties involved in trigger events are concerned about them being called in, they will be able to remove any doubt about this by notifying the Secretary of State of their event. They will then be entitled to receive a quick and binding decision on whether the Secretary of State will call in the event.
I will turn briefly to amendment 10, which seeks to extend the Secretary of State’s power to issue a call-in notice in respect of a trigger event that has previously been called in when no new material information becomes available within five years of the trigger event. After a trigger event is called in, the Secretary of State has—
National Security and Investment Bill (Sixth sitting)
Tuesday 1st December 2020
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 1 December 2020 - (1 Dec 2020)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Nadhim Zahawi)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Graham. As I was saying, after a trigger event is called in, the Secretary of State has 30 working days in which to carry out a full national security assessment, although that may be extended in certain circumstances. During that period, the Secretary of State may use his information-gathering powers under the Bill to gather from relevant parties any further information he requires to make a final decision. I can reassure hon. Members that the Secretary of State will make full use of these powers to fully assess every aspect of an acquisition.
Where, at the end of an assessment, the Secretary of State imposes remedies in relation to a trigger event, the Bill provides a power for him to amend those where appropriate. Such an amendment is really relevant only in cases where a trigger event is called in for scrutiny but ultimately cleared by the Secretary of State outright, without any remedies being imposed. In cases where false or misleading information is provided that materially affects the Secretary of State’s decision to clear a trigger event outright, he may revoke his decision and give a further call-in notice up to six months after the false or misleading information is discovered.
Adding further opportunities to call in a trigger event each time new material information becomes available after the Secretary of State has already had the opportunity to carry out full scrutiny of the trigger event would be disproportionate and give rise to unjustified uncertainty for the parties involved. The Government have been clear that this regime must provide a slicker route to investment by providing clarity and predictability for investors. Sadly, the proposed amendment would create uncertainty for businesses, with them unable to assess if and when the Secretary of State might call in their trigger event again, up to five years after the trigger event has been completed. That is why I am unable to accept the amendment. I hope that the hon. Member for Southampton, Test will agree with me and withdraw it.
Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)
Our amendment was genuinely intended to be helpful, to try to ensure that what we see as a loophole is closed. The Minister has indicated that, in his view, that loophole would be closed at the expense of uncertainty in company land, as it were—uncertainty for those companies that might be subject to this procedure.
The circumstances that would see this amendment put into action—I have outlined some possible circumstances—would be very rare; only circumstances in which things had changed very substantially, in terms of global interest in particular areas of our economy, or circumstances in which information that could have been supplied was not supplied, and not because there was an intention to be malicious or misleading, but because people did not get to the bottom of something first time around. In those circumstances, companies would perhaps anticipate that that change might happen, and certainly if there were substantial global changes in who was interested in what, then companies would also anticipate that to a considerable extent. I do not share the Minister’s view that the amendment would place companies in general in a state of uncertainty.
The additional assistance that the amendment would provide to make the process watertight should be taken seriously. However, I hear what the Minister has said and appreciate that a balance has to be achieved between different arrangements so that they are satisfactory both for national security and for company wellbeing and development—I am sorry that he has perhaps come down slightly further on one side than on the other in his appraisal of amendment 10. However, I appreciate what he has said and therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3
Statement about exercise of call-in power
Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 3, page 3, line 1, leave out “may” and insert “shall”.
This amendment would make it obligatory for the Secretary of State to include certain matters in a statement about his/her exercise of the call-in power.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 2, in clause 3, page 3, line 9, at end insert—
“(d) the Secretary of State’s definition of the scope of what constitutes national security.”
This amendment provides that a statement from the Secretary of State about the exercise of a call-in power may include his/her definition of national security.
Amendment 9, in clause 3, page 3, line 9, at end insert—
“(d) details of the resource allocated annually to reviews of national security assessments guiding call-in decisions, including specific headcount, skillsets and review caseload figures.”
This amendment provides that a statement from the Secretary of State about the exercise of a call-in power may include details of the resources allocated to reviews of national security assessments within BEIS.
Chi Onwurah
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship once again, Sir Graham. Amendment 1 would make it obligatory for the Secretary of State to include certain matters in the statement about his or her exercise of the call-in power. As we have said on a number of occasions, the Bill gives major powers to the Secretary of State and marks a significant shift in the UK’s merger control process. It is worth emphasising that. It is important to make sure that that shift is done in a transparent and accountable way. The Bill is critical for our national economy and our national security. There is a great deal of uncertainty and there is no definition of national security, and I will come to that point later.
There is a great deal of latitude in the powers, but the Bill attempts to mitigate that by indicating that the Government may publish a statement setting out the scope of their call-in powers. That statement would include details of which sectors are especially under focus, details of trigger events, and details of factors that may be considered by the Secretary of State as part of an intervention. That transparency is welcome, as far as it goes, but we believe that it should go further. As Professor Martin said of the powers, in his expert evidence,
“there should be accountability and transparency mechanisms, so that there is assurance that they are being fairly and sparingly applied.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 26 November 2020; c. 81, Q96.]
The Government consultation responses list some detail on the scope of call-in powers but not on a clear final statement of scope. There is no detail on sectors, trigger events and, critically, factors considered under national security. The statutory statement of policy intent—in its current draft version—is woefully lacking in detail. Amendments 1 and 2 are designed to ensure that greater clarity is given about the Secretary of State’s intent. In particular, amendment 2 includes a definition of national security.
There was a good deal of debate during the evidence sessions—I see the Minister nodding—about defining national security. Certainly, I found it a very good and informative debate, hearing from a wide range of experts with different levels of experience in different aspects of national security, from Sir Richard Dearlove to academics, and their views on the importance of and the concerns with defining national security.
Sir Richard Dearlove said that he would certainly see a definition of national security as
“advantageous, because it defines a clear area where you start and from which you can make judgments about the involvement of foreign firms being given space or activity in those areas. That is not a bad idea at all, actually.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 25, Q31.]
David Offenbach said:
“National security is not defined in the Bill, which I actually approve of, because once it becomes too closely indicated, then it is not easy to decide what should be in it, or what should not be in it. I would like to see a definition that includes what Lord Heseltine said when Melrose took over GKN, that research and development should be a subject of importance; it should be included.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 26 November 2020; c. 99, Q106.]
He also said:
“The only way to make sure that something does not slip through the net is to have a slightly wider definition. There is no definition of national security itself in the Bill, which is perhaps why strategic, research and development, innovation or other issues should be brought in. Then one can be quite sure one has not accidentally lost an asset where there are national security issues.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 26 November 2020; c. 105, Q130.]
As I have referred to on a number of occasions, I think the loss of DeepMind to Google and of the Centre for Integrated Photonics to Huawei show that we can lose strategic assets through a lack of clarity about what might constitute a national security threat. Amendment 2
“provides that a statement from the Secretary of State about the exercise of a call-in power may”—
not “must”—
“include his/her definition of national security.”
We are trying very hard to reflect the advice from certain experts that too closely defining national security would limit the powers of the Secretary of State, would not allow it to evolve with the threats and would give indications that could in some respects be gamed, but at the same time we are trying to address the vacuum that no definition creates. That vacuum risks creating major uncertainty for businesses and arbitrary powers for politicians to intervene without appropriate scope for that intervention.
We discussed earlier the conflict of interests between the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy welcoming foreign investment and the national security interests perhaps saying that there should not be foreign investment. That is especially challenging in the light of the major increases in interventions expected—as we have heard, we expect to go from 12 interventions to 1,830.
We believe strongly that we owe our citizens and businesses clarity on what will guide this increased intervention, but it is also right for the Government to retain flexibility for action and not to have their hands tied with a precise, narrow definition of national security, as security risks change due to technological, economic and geopolitical changes. Indeed, that is why we have needed this legislation for some years now, and why Labour has been calling for it.
The amendment again seeks to make the Secretary of State’s life easier, by encouraging him—or her, in the future—to provide guidance on the factors that might form part of national security assessments. That would not tie the Government’s hands by ruling anything out; it simply asks them to guide businesses with clarity on the sort of factors that might matter, giving flexibility to the Government and clarity to our small and medium-sized enterprises in particular.
Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)
Just to add to the argument that my hon. Friend is making in her very eloquent manner, this is also about having a smart approach to regulation, whereby we do not take a one-size-fits-all approach but recognise that there is a hierarchy of risks. By pointing out in the definition of national security what key factors make up that definition, we will point both the business community and the Secretary of State to that hierarchy of risks and make sure that there is additional screening, monitoring and assessment of those risks where they are considered to be higher because they contain the factors in the definition.
Chi Onwurah
I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. As a past employee of a regulator, Ofcom, he really appeals to my sense of regulatory best practice in speaking as he does about the importance of smart regulation that is not tied to narrowly defined legalistic definitions of national security but allows, as he says, a hierarchy of assessment of the different interests. We all need to take responsibility for doing everything we can to ensure that kind of smart judgment can be made by small businesses. We encourage giving as much guidance as possible—I see the Minister nodding, so I hope that he will be receptive to the amendment.
Finally, amendment 9 would mandate Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy unit resourcing updates. I will speak briefly to amendment 9, because I know that other hon. Members wish to speak to it. This amendment provides that a statement from the Secretary of State about the exercise of call-in power may include details of the resources allocated to reviews of national security within BEIS.
The driving thought behind this, again, is to ensure that the Secretary of State’s life is made as easy as possible by consistently looking at the resources available to do this very complex and difficult job, particularly given that we are transitioning, as one witness put it, from a standing start to potentially thousands of notifications.
Sam Tarry (Ilford South) (Lab)
It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship so soon again, Sir Graham. Following on from the eloquent exposition of those last two amendments by my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central, I would like to focus on amendment 9. The amendment is simple. It tries to help the Government help themselves.
Amendment 9 provides that a statement from the Secretary of State about the exercise of a call-in power may include details of the resources allocated through reviews of national security within BEIS. We know that this is a significant and large change that the Department will have to absorb. For that to be effective—in whatever state the Bill ends up passing through Parliament—there will clearly be a need for proper resource allocation and for Parliament to scrutinise that process.
The Bill transforms the UK’s merger control processes. It locates the merger control processes away from the Competition and Markets Authority, which is a new development. The CMA had a history of experience of overseeing those sorts of processes. At the moment, there is no such expertise in BEIS.
While massively expanding the scope of the intervention, as my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central said, moving from only 12 national security interventions in 18 years to potentially over 1,800 is such a significant step change, so it will be important for Parliament to have the ability to monitor that. It is unprecedented. The Government have neither a precedent nor a plan—none has come forward with the notes to this Bill—to assure the House of how the shift will be managed. That is why we felt it was important to put forward this amendment.
I believe this amendment has support on both sides of the House. Crucially, hon. Members across the House have raised legitimate concerns about the capacity and capability that will be required to manage this major shift. My colleague from the Transport Committee, Greg Clark, said,
“It is an enormous challenge for the Department to set up a new unit, especially since the current regime…has dealt with a very small number of transactions each year.”—[Official Report, 17 November 2020; Vol. 684, c. 228.]
Similarly, James Wild said,
“It is crucial that the structures and resources are put in place to ensure that the timetables for review and assessment in the Bill are actually met.”—[Official Report, 17 November 2020; Vol. 684, c. 266.]
I think both of those points are extremely pertinent.
I do not see this as a controversial amendment. I think it is important to allow the Bill, once passed, to function effectively and with proper oversight. It also provides the appropriate scrutiny, ensuring that this critical part of our national and economic security functions effectively and efficiently. I am sure that in amendments to come we will debate where the balance should be between economic freedoms and our responsibility to safeguard our citizens. But clearly, on the simple idea put forward in this amendment, the Government will have to be transparent about the capability and capacity of BEIS on investment security, as many other countries around the world do.
Stephen Kinnock
My hon. Friend is setting out the case very well. To add to that argument, this is also about reassuring us as Members of Parliament. A Bill is all very well—it puts it all down on paper—but what really matters is putting it into practice. How does the implementation work? The investment security unit will be the key place for that. We need assurance that that crucial part of this process will have the capability to deliver. The amendment we are putting forward is also an assurance amendment—that when Parliament votes this Bill through, we can be assured that the implementation capability will be there.
Sam Tarry
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. As we have shaped our own Bill, we have been learning about regimes in other countries and comparing and contrasting provisions. For example, in the US—we have heard evidence on this from Michael Leiter earlier in the week—they look in detail at only around 240 cases, and then they look at 100 in a short form. We are saying that will have up to 1,800, and at the moment we do not have any guidance on what would be a more detailed and thorough investigation. Clearly, we need to have confidence about the amount of resources and about the fact that the Department has proper oversight of that and has been doing things properly.
This is not just about making our country the most attractive destination to do business; it is also about ensuring that we have the resources in place so that we do not slip up. We do not want another Huawei situation. We do not to be in a place where we do not have the resources, and where the former head of MI6 has to come to our evidence session and say that successive Governments have placed too much emphasis on building the economy at the expense of our security.
One of the evidence sessions last week touched on the idea of moving from just a few dozen cases to 1,000-plus being investigated. We do not know exactly when those cases will come. If there is suddenly a glut of cases at the same time, we need to make sure that the resources are there to deal with all of them. In that way, we will not have smaller companies, in particular, which are not getting the media coverage that some companies have had, falling through the net. As we know, very small, innovative technology companies sometimes develop some very radical forward-thinking technologies, and we might not even notice that they have been bought out or taken over by a state-owned business or by a business that is aligned closely with another state that may not share British values or interests.
I will leave it there, Sir Graham. This is about helping the Government to help themselves, allowing Parliament to have oversight and ensuring that the resources are in place, so that we get this right and do not have to revisit it after a calamity in a few years’ time.
The Chair
Before I call the next speaker, I did not interrupt the hon. Gentleman, because I am feeling benign this afternoon. However, it is timely to remind Members that other Members of the House should be referred to by their constituencies, not by their names.
Dr Whitehead
I did not mention what a pleasure it is to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Sir Graham.
Dr Whitehead
It is unfortunately force of habit, and it is a habit that I am loth to break.
Amendments 1, 2 and 9 are closely related. Clause 3 is about the Secretary of State putting forward a statement about the exercise of the call-in power and, within that, specifying—or it looks like they are specifying—what at least some of the contents of that statement are likely to be.
I will talk about the context in a moment, but amendment 1 draws attention to another problem that I have had to look at closely on several occasions in my examination of Bills over the years: the use of the word “may”, which appears at the beginning of clause 3 and in clause 3(3). In looking at Bills, whenever the word “may” appears, I have always concluded that there needs to be a silent “(or may not)” after it, although it is never there. That is what that phrase actually means in any piece of legislation.
Nadhim Zahawi
I am pleased to speak to this group of amendments, which relate to clause 3. This clause provides for a statement to be published by the Secretary of State, setting out how he expects to exercise the call-in power. Clause 1 requires that this statement is published before the power may be used. There are three amendments in this grouping—amendments 1, 2 and 9—and I will speak to each of them in turn.
I advise the Committee that we have interpreted amendment 1, including with regard to the Members’ explanatory statement, as seeking to amend clause 3(1) rather than 3(3). The effect of this amendment, as we believe it was intended, is to require the Secretary of State to publish the statement. As I set out on Second Reading, the Government are committed to providing as much clarity and predictability as possible for business when it comes to the use of the new investment screening regime that is provided for by this Bill. The proposed statement will provide valuable information to businesses and investors, and help them to determine whether they should submit a notification about their trigger event. Indeed, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament, publish and not withdraw the statement before the call-in power may be used. In effect, this means that the Secretary of State will need to have published a statement to use the call-in power, which is crucial to the regime.
Of course, as the security landscape changes over time, he may wish to publish an updated statement at a future point; this will need to go through the same consultation and parliamentary procedure as the original statement before it can take its place. I assure hon. Members that the Secretary of State has neither the intention nor the power to run this regime without having first published a statement.
I will now turn briefly to amendment 2, which would allow for the Secretary of State to include a definition of national security in the statement provided for by clause 3. The Secretary of State’s powers under the Bill are expressly predicated on investigating and addressing risks to national security. When exercising these powers, the Secretary of State is required to proceed on the basis that national security is strictly about the security of our nation. That is because what national security means is a question of law, which has already been answered by the highest courts of the land as being the security of our nation.
The Secretary of State will obviously need to comply with the law when exercising the powers in the Bill. There is therefore no need to define what national security means in the Bill. As Dr Ashley Lenihan—a fellow at the Centre for International Studies at the London School of Economics, who was quoted earlier by the shadow Minister—mentioned in last week’s evidence session:
“What we have seen is that most foreign direct investment regimes of this nature all refer to national security. I do not know of a single one that actually defines it or limits itself to a particular definition”.––[Official Report, National Security and Infrastructure Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 38, Q42.]
Furthermore, as national security is a term used in the Bill, it would in any event not be appropriate for the Secretary of State to define the scope of the term in the statement; the statement is not legislation and is not subject to approval by Parliament.
Wanting to understand the Government’s aims and expectations for these powers is entirely reasonable—there is no discussion about that. However, I refer the Committee to the comments of Michael Leiter, a partner at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher and Flom LLP, who told us that he would consider that
“it is a bit of a fool’s errand”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 49, Q55.]
to define national security. Instead, the statement will set out how the Secretary of State expects to use the call-in power, and we plan to include details of the types of national security risks in which the Secretary of State is especially interested.
Stephen Kinnock
I just want to come back on the point the Minister made about other regimes not using a definition of national security. The United States Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act provides a sense of congress on six factors: countries of special concern; critical infrastructure, energy assets and critical materials; history of compliance with US laws; control of US industries that affect US capability and capacity to meet national security requirements; involvement of personally identifiable information; and potential new cyber-security vulnerabilities. In his comments, the Minister said that no other regime includes a definition of national security, but that sounds like a definition of national security to me.
Nadhim Zahawi
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Aberavon for his comments. I was quoting from the evidence that Dr Ashley Lenihan provided. She said:
“I do not know of a single one that actually defines it or limits itself to a particular definition,”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 38 Q42.]
if that is what he was referring to.
Instead, what I am trying to share with the Committee is that the statement will set out how the Secretary of State expects to use the call-in power. Within that, we plan to include details of the types of national security risks in which the Secretary of State is especially interested. These include certain sectors of the economy and types of acquisitions relating to entities and assets that may raise concern. I think I have said enough on that.
Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)
I am not sure that the Minister has; it is always a pleasure to hear his dulcet tones. In all seriousness, is this not open to interpretation with a change of Secretary of State, in the way that we have seen in the US with a change of President, and how that President chooses to define what national security means?
Nadhim Zahawi
I am grateful for the hon. Member’s contribution. Of course, no Government can tie the hands of future Governments, if that is his argument.
Moving on, I commend hon. Members for their interest in the process and function of the regime, made clear through amendment 9, which provides for additions to the statement about the exercise of the call-in power. It aims to ensure that the regime created by the Bill is properly resourced with the right numbers of skilled staff. The hon. Member for Ilford South was thoughtful in his concern about that. However, I would say to him and other Members that the purpose of the statement is to set out how the Secretary of State expects to exercise the power to give a call-in notice. It will provide information on the types of scenarios where the Secretary of State may consider there to be a national security risk. It would not be appropriate to add details about how the regime will be staffed.
Furthermore, internal arrangements on resource and skills are a matter for the Secretary of State and, of course, the permanent secretary at BEIS. I reassure hon. Members, however, that the Bill compels—this is the lever for Parliament, in my view—the Secretary of State to publish an annual report, which will provide information on the number of mandatory notices accepted and rejected, the number of voluntary notifications accepted and rejected, and the number of call-in notices and final orders made. That review is incredibly important in measuring performance. The exact details and requirements for the annual report are set out in clause 61. I will not go through all of them.
For the reasons I have set out, I am unable to accept the amendments and hope that Opposition Members feel able to withdraw them.
Chi Onwurah
I thank the Minister for his response. I particularly thank my hon. Friends for the points that they have raised. My hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South set out the importance of reporting on resourcing. I am disappointed that the Minister could not accept that amendment. He said that it was not appropriate to include details of resourcing and staffing. I point him in the direction of the Government’s misinformation unit, which was set up to grand acclaim in order to address that important issue. As the Minister for vaccines, he will have a strong interest in the effectiveness of misinformation, which could harm our wellbeing and future return to normality.
That unit was set up. Written parliamentary questions that I tabled revealed that it had no full-time staff or full-time equivalents, and we see a resultant lack of action on misinformation. I make that point to counter the Minister’s assertion that it is not important to have details on resourcing reported. On the contrary, our experience in Parliament and the civil service suggests that it is what is resourced that will get done, with the appropriate skill and care. With such a great number of cases, and such a great change in the scope of takeover and acquisition legislation that the Bill represents, reporting on resourcing is very important.
I also thank my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South for such intriguing and at times amusing oratory on the importance of a single word in the right place.
Chi Onwurah
My hon. Friend intends to stay where he is. I thank him for his oratory on the importance of the single word “may”. Something has been lost in translation between ourselves and the Clerks, in that there was originally an intention to address the first “may” with regard to publishing the statement. The Minister says that we do not need that to become a “shall” because it will be published but rejects the notion of it becoming “shall” despite the fact that it will be published. I leave it to the Committee to decide on the holes in that logic.
I am sure that the Minister was not deliberately trying to misinterpret what we were saying, but we made it clear that we are not looking for a precise and narrow definition of national security; we are looking for broad indications or guidance. As my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon said in citing how the US does it, we are looking for a sense of what is taken into consideration with regard to national security. I would only plead with the Minister to recognise the circumstances of so many small businesses, start-ups and investors in trying to understand what the Secretary of State will take into account. This is intended not to define it narrowly, but to give a sense of what will be taken into account as we move into this new regime that is so vastly different. Because these amendments are important and significant, I intend to press them.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
We must now deal formally with amendments 2 and 9, which can either be pressed to a Division or withdrawn.
Chi Onwurah
I would like to press amendment 2 but withdraw amendment 9. I would like to hear the Committee specifically on national security.
Amendment proposed: 2, in clause 3, page 3, line 9, at end insert—
“(d) the Secretary of State’s definition of the scope of what constitutes national security.”—(Chi Onwurah.)
This amendment provides that a statement from the Secretary of State about the exercise of a call-in power may include his/her definition of national security.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Sam Tarry
I beg to move amendment 11, in clause 3, page 3, line 16, at end insert—
“(7) The Secretary of State must publish guidance for potential acquirers and other interested parties separate from the policy intent statement.
(8) Guidance under subsection (7) must cover—
(a) best practice for complying with the requirements on acquirers imposed by this Act and regulations;
(b) the enforcement of the requirements; and
(c) circumstances where the requirements do not apply.
(9) Guidance under subsection (7) must be published within six months of this Act receiving Royal Assent.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to provide clear guidance to potential acquirers and other interested parties.
Again, this is, in our view, a fairly simple amendment. It is important because it is about ensuring that we are an attractive destination for business. A number of witnesses were very clear that many businesses need an early warning. The amendment would require the Secretary of State to provide clear guidance to potential acquirers and other interested parties, so that people are not put off from investing or getting involved in the British economy because of red tape that they might fear being tied up in. The amendment is about providing that clear guidance to companies.
If the Government went even further and published guidance that created regulatory sandboxes and clear engagement guidelines for innovative small and medium-sized enterprises, which could benefit from efficient regulatory engagement to pursue investment transactions just as, for example, the Financial Conduct Authority has done for the UK’s world-leading FinTech sector, we could turn this into an opportunity to encourage the right types of companies from our allies around the world to invest in Britain.
One of the things we fear is the introduction of significant uncertainty. We know that hard work is going on to finalise a trade deal. Businesses have for so long felt that their big problem, in deciding about long and medium-term investment, is uncertainty. The amendment is about tackling straightaway any fears of uncertainty among businesses, particularly innovative SMEs, which will not have the resources to spend on figuring out the lengthy processes and, potentially, the accompanying guidance that could be put in place once the Bill passes. The amendment would require the Government to try to reduce that uncertainty.
Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)
I have a lot of sympathy for what the hon. Member says, because clearly the more clarity a potential investor has when investing in the UK, the better. The only problem is that if the Government are in a position to provide guidance in the first place, they are in a position to subsequently update it. Governments of different colours could change the guidance without necessarily having to refer back to Parliament. Does the amendment therefore not perversely create greater potential uncertainty, by enabling Governments to change their guidance willy-nilly, without scrutiny?
Sam Tarry
The hon. Gentleman makes a valid point, but it was not really borne out in the evidence that we heard from the witnesses. They were clear, even while having different approaches, that more guidance accompanying this, and providing it early, would provide that certainty. We heard a range of approaches and opinions, and that advice should clearly be listened to. Dr Lenihan said:
“The Bill provides for a lot of regulatory guidance, which needs to come forward in a clear and very easily comprehensible and understandable manner.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 38, Q42.]
Chi Onwurah
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South for moving the amendment. The Committee must support the aims of the amendment and the implementation of the requirement to publish guidance for potential acquirers and other interested parties separate from the policy intent statement. My hon. Friend set out the importance of avoiding uncertainty and of providing certainty for companies and businesses that might come into the scope of this Bill.
Now is perhaps the time to highlight a failing of the Bill and the impact statement, in that the focus is on the acquirers—those who will acquire companies or shares through transactions. The explanatory notes explain why that is the case: because a trigger event might take two or three separate transactions to complete, such as acquiring a 25% interest, so it has to be on the acquirers to make the notification. I understand that, but I think the impact statement dramatically underestimates—in fact, it does not make an estimate—the impact that will have on those being acquired.
By that, I think particularly of small start-ups—our small, innovative new ventures and new enterprises, perhaps spun out from universities or other institutions. As they seek finance to grow and to thrive and to make further discoveries and innovations, they will have to give a lot of consideration to the provisions in the Bill. To be frank, as all of us who have worked in small businesses know, time is at a premium, as is access to legal advice. Small start-ups need this kind of guidance easily and readily available. I fail to understand why the Minister would not want the Department to provide this guidance specifically to companies, separate from the policy intent statement. I support my hon. Friend’s amendment.
Nadhim Zahawi
Amendment 11 would require the Secretary of State to publish guidance in relation to the Bill and regulations made under it within six months of Royal Assent. The hon. Member for Ilford South raised an important issue and I welcome the opportunity to discuss the Government’s plan for communicating the application of the proposed new regime, including the requirements that would or might be imposed on persons. It is important that appropriate steps are taken to make such persons aware of the requirements that would or might be placed on them. I have used “persons” here deliberately as it is the correct term, but I wish to make it clear that that includes acquirers.
First, the Government have published factsheets on the digital platform .gov that make clear what the measures in the proposed legislation are and who they apply to. The factsheet “Process for Business” sets out step by step what steps persons must or may need to take to ensure compliance with the regime. Secondly, we have set up the email address investment.screening@beis.gov.uk specifically for the purpose of providing advice on what may be in scope of the NSI regime for persons to contact to ensure that they properly understand the proposed regime. Of course, the Government believe that the Bill does not require any adjustment but should adjustments happen as it passes the scrutiny of this House and the other place, then any adjustments that affect persons would be reflected in the factsheets.
Thirdly, the Government have published and will continue to publish guidance alongside key documents in the Bill. Hon. Members will, for example, be able to review the information likely to be required for notifications online, as well as draft guidance. It is our intention to complete similar such guidance wherever it would be beneficial to parties. I hope that that provides sufficient reassurance for the hon. Member for Ilford, South and the shadow Minister that the Government are thinking carefully, and will continue to think carefully, about how to ensure that all parties who need to understand the measure are able to. For the reasons that I have set out, I cannot accept the amendment and I hope that the hon. Member for Ilford, South will withdraw it.
Nadhim Zahawi
I hope that hon. Members will recognise that the Government are committed to providing as much clarity and predictability as possible for business on the use of the new investment screening regime provided for in the Bill. Clause 3 is the third clause related to the call-in power, and concerns the statement of policy intent. Colleagues will remember that clause 1 requires that, prior to the use of the call-in power provided for in that clause, the Secretary of State must publish and not withdraw a statement that sets out how they expect to use the call-in power.
The Secretary of State was pleased to publish a draft of that statement alongside the Bill to enable hon. Members, businesses and, indeed, the general public to review the approach he expects to take. As hon. Members will no doubt have seen, the draft statement contains details of what the Secretary of State is likely to be interested in when it comes to national security risks. It includes certain sectors of the economy and the types of entities, assets and acquisitions that may raise concerns.
Although it is crucial for investors to have confidence that there is as much transparency in the regime as possible, there is self-evidently a limit to how much the Government can disclose in that regard given that the regime deals explicitly with national security matters. Nevertheless, the draft statement goes into some detail about the factors that the Secretary of State expects to take into account when making a decision on whether to call in a trigger event. The statement will also be required to be reviewed at least every five years to reflect the changing national security landscape, although in practice it may be reviewed and updated more frequently.
Taken together, I hope that hon. Members will agree that the requirement for the Secretary of State to publish a statement of policy intent prior to use of the call-in power and the requirement to review it regularly provide a good level of transparency and guidance to businesses, while not disclosing our national security vulnerabilities, which of course hostile actors would be grateful to receive. The statement will provide valuable information for businesses and investors and help them, we believe, to determine whether they should submit a notification about their trigger event. I hope that hon. Members feel that I have sufficiently explained and justified the clause and its place in the Bill.
Chi Onwurah
Clause 3 is critical, as it sets out the context in which the Secretary of State will exercise the important power to call in transactions. We have sought in our amendments to improve it. I accept the Minister’s response to and rejection of our amendments, and his belief that the clause provides for the guidance and clarity that businesses need. I would just say to him that it was the clear conclusion of just about every witness in the evidence sessions that greater clarity and understanding were required, and that to make this change was an immense mountain to climb.
In some respects, the Government could not give too much support and guidance, within the bounds of national security, to the many companies and persons who will be caught up in the measures. Having said that, given that it is an essential part of the Bill, which we support, we accept that the clause stand part.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 4
Consultation and parliamentary procedure
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Nadhim Zahawi
As I turn to clause 4, I will begin with a reference to clause 3. The statement provided for in clause 3 sets out how the Secretary of State expects to exercise the call-in powers that we have just been discussing. It is the Government’s view that this statement is important in ensuring that businesses have as much clarity and predictability as possible regarding the potential use of the call-in powers, including the areas of the economy where national security risks are likely to arise. Likewise, clause 3 also sets out that the Secretary of State is required to review the statement at least every five years.
It is right that there are mechanisms to ensure that the Secretary of State seeks external input, where appropriate, on the proposed contents of the statement and that Parliament can scrutinise the final version. Clause 4 therefore requires the Secretary of State to carry out such consultation on a draft of the statement as he thinks appropriate and to take into account the responses to any such consultation during the drafting process. Those requirements also apply when the Secretary of State seeks to amend or replace a published statement.
Our plan is to launch a public consultation shortly after the passage of the Bill to make sure that affected parties can provide comments to us in good time. Before the final statement may be published, clause 4 also requires the Secretary of State to lay it before Parliament, following which the statement will be subject to a procedure akin to the negative resolution procedure. If either House resolves not to approve the statement within 40 sitting days, the Secretary of State must withdraw the statement. I can assure the House and hon. Members that the Government are committed to ensuring that this new regime works for those most affected by it. Investor and business confidence is imperative to the recovery from the covid pandemic. That is why the Government propose to put in place these requirements before the Secretary of State is able to publish the statement and exercise the call-in power.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5
Meaning of “trigger event” and “acquirer”
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss:
Clause 10 stand part.
That schedule 1 be the First schedule to the Bill.
Nadhim Zahawi
I turn now to clauses 5 and 10, alongside schedule 1, which set out much of the detail on the circumstances covered by the Bill. Clause 5 begins to set the scope of what may be called in by the Secretary of State by providing the overarching definitions of “trigger event” and “acquirer”. The Government are clear that these new powers should be sufficiently broad to cover potential risks to national security. Clause 5 sets out that the new regime is focused on the acquisition of control over both qualifying entities and assets. These acquisitions are collectively known as trigger events. I do not intend now to explore what does and does not qualify as an asset or entity. Instead, I would direct hon. Members to clause 7, which provides such definitions.
Following on logically, the person gaining such control is the acquirer, and to address a query raised on Second Reading by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), I should make clear that “person” includes both a body and an individual. Subsequent clauses explain the specific ways that control can be acquired for the purpose of the Bill, but this is a necessary clause to set the broad parameters of the regime. The trigger events within scope of the call-in power are defined in clauses 8 and 9 as acquisitions of control over qualifying entities and assets, but the Government consider that the Bill must supplement that by providing for interests or rights to be treated as held or acquired, and therefore for control to be acquired in certain circumstances, such as acquisitions involving indirect holdings or connected persons.
That is why clause 10, in combination with schedule 1, sets out various ways in which rights or interests are to be treated for the purposes of the Bill as being held or acquired, including, for example, joint arrangements with other parties. These edge cases are critical to ensuring that determined hostile actors cannot deliberately structure acquisitions in certain ways to avoid being covered by the regime. While many trigger events may be straightforward, direct acquisitions by a party without any connection to other persons involved in the target entity or asset, there may be broader factors that need to be taken into account when considering how control over an entity or asset may be held.
It may be that the ability to control the entity or asset is acquired, for example, as a result of arrangements between the acquirer and other shareholders or their relationship to other shareholders. The approach taken in schedule 1 broadly mirrors the concept of holding an interest in a company, already familiar in UK company law through the persons with significant control register, introduced in 2016.
Taking each in turn, paragraph 1 of schedule 1 defines joint interests, whereby two or more people holding an interest or right jointly are each treated as holding it. That means that any joint holdings of the acquirer will be taken into account when assessing whether control has been acquired over a qualifying entity or asset.
Paragraph 2 defines joint arrangements so that parties who arrange to exercise their rights jointly in a predetermined way—for example, to always vote together in a particular way—are each treated as holding the combined rights and interests of all the parties involved in such an arrangement. That is important to prevent hostile actors from being able to co-ordinate the acquisition and exercise of rights that might otherwise fall below the threshold of a trigger event.
Paragraph 3 defines indirect holdings, whereby a person holds an interest or right indirectly through a chain of entities, where each entity in the chain has a majority stake in the entity below it, the last of which holds the interest or right. We know that determined hostile actors are likely to seek to obscure their acquisitions through complex corporate structures, so it is vital that the Secretary of State can intervene in such circumstances.
Paragraph 4 simply stipulates that interests held by nominees for another are to be treated as held by the other, rather than the nominee. Paragraph 5 defines the circumstances in which rights are to be treated as held by a person who controls their exercise; this would cover, for example, instances where a person acquired a stake in an entity, but it was evident that they had an arrangement with a third party about how to exercise the rights that came with that stake.
Paragraphs 6 and 7 provide for the circumstances in which rights that are exercisable only in certain circumstances and rights attached to shares held by way of security are respectively to be treated as held, and mirror corresponding provisions in schedule 1A to the Companies Act 2006.
Paragraphs 8 to 10 define connected persons; as set out, connected persons are each to be treated as holding the combined rights or interests of both or all of them. That would cover, for example, shares in a company separately by a husband and wife or a brother and sister. Finally, paragraph 11 sets out that two or more persons sharing a common purpose are to be treated as holding the combined interests or rights for both or all. That would include two or more persons who co-ordinate their influence in relation to an entity or an asset, similar to joint arrangements. This will ensure that the Secretary of State is able to assess the impact of co-ordinated acquisitions.
Taken together, the concepts detailed in schedule 1 are a crucial part of ensuring that the new regime is flexible enough to deal with the complex reality of some acquisitions of control over entities and assets. Without these provisions, hostile actors could seek to take advantage of the gaps by structuring acquisitions in a way that would be out of scope of the regime, despite the very real risks that that might present. I trust that colleagues on both sides of the Committee want to ensure that the regime covers such cases suitably.
Chi Onwurah
I thank the Minister for his comments on clauses 5 and 10 and schedule 1, which are quite technical provisions designed to allow for the different ways in which control may be acquired over a qualifying entity or asset or a trigger event may occur. I shall not repeat what the Minister so ably set out, but simply say that we recognise the need to set out ways to mitigate the impact of hostile actors, as he put it, going to complex lengths to hide their interest in a qualifying asset or entity. However, having the powers and these definitions is not the same as actually using them. There have been several instances in which hostile actors have behaved in entirely transparent ways that we have not identified and prevented. While these provisions are necessary, we need to see the ways in which the Secretary of State will actively identify evolving risks even as they hide behind complex financial organisations.
Dr Whitehead
Will the Minister expand on some of the provisions in schedule 1, particularly as they relate to what might be a UK version of the case that I mentioned earlier concerning the US company that Dr Lenihan mentioned in his evidence? A company that had gone bankrupt had its assets, patents and employees bought up by what might have been conceived to be a hostile company in the US, in this case Huawei. If we imagine that happening in the UK, some questions arise about how schedule 1 is worded.
That sort of action might happen in a number of ways. It could be that a potentially hostile company buys up a failed, bankrupt company with the intention of making that company work again but so that it has control of its activities thereafter. Alternatively, the hostile company or organisation might want to buy up elements of the company not to make it work but to make off with the things that it wanted and then push the company further into liquidation. The company would not work but its assets and intellectual property would have passed into the hands of the other organisation.
Mark Garnier
I think the answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question under insolvency law is that the rights belong ultimately to the creditors and shareholders of the company that has been wound up, which is pretty bog standard insolvency law.
Dr Whitehead
Yes, indeed, that is right, but what seems to be the case under the schedule is that the creditors and shareholders of that company would expect their rights and their ownership the remaining assets of the company to be protected and acted on by the administrators of the company, who, according to the schedule, do not have access to and ownership of those rights. Even though what the hon. Member says is absolutely right in terms of the ultimate interests of the shareholders and creditors, what agency do those shareholders and creditors have to do anything relating to rights under the Bill? Should those shareholders and creditors, for example, be held liable under the Bill for reporting what those rights are?
Mark Garnier
The administrators are employed to work on behalf of the creditors and shareholders, so they are serving their interests. It strikes me as relatively obvious that the rights over that intellectual property and those things that are relevant in this schedule still, either directly or indirectly through the administrators, lie with the creditors and shareholders.
Dr Whitehead
But if the IP, the patents and various other things have been made off with by another company, and the administrators have presumably agreed to that, although they never hold the rights, where are the shareholders and creditors’ duties and rights at that point? Indeed, what is the remedy as far as the Government are concerned in those circumstances?
I can honestly say I am fairly confused about this, so I do not have the full answer to the hon. Member’s concerns. I am raising this more because I am not sure whether the wording in the schedule is fully adequate for those circumstances. I would be grateful if the Minister gave me some assurance, took some of the clouds from my mind about this, or alternatively said, “Well, we’re going to have a look at this to see whether there is a bit of a problem that we might have to fix.”
Nadhim Zahawi
My hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest addressed the issue of the administrator’s acting on behalf of the creditors. The important point to focus on—I will happily write to the hon. Member for Southampton, Test after the sitting—is that ultimately, it is the acquirer. If a malign actor were come to acquire those assets, and it is notifiable as part of the 17 sectors, then the transaction is made void. That is the remedy, effectively, because the acquirer would have to come forward and make representations to the investment unit about why they are acquiring and get clearance.
Chi Onwurah
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test for the points that he is making. I wish to put to him, and effectively the Minister as well, an example which was raised yesterday in debate on the Telecommunications (Security) Bill, with which I am intimately familiar as the collaboration is between Nortel, an equipment vendor for whom I worked in the past, and Huawei, on a project to develop new technology. When two entities come together and collaborate, which I do not think will meet any of the trigger events described here, but instead create something which has IP in it which is of value, how does that come under the provisions of the clauses and the schedule?
The Chair
I have let everyone speak. I do not know whether there are any more answers that the Minister wants to offer.
Nadhim Zahawi
Let us take the example given by the hon. Member of Nortel collaborating with Huawei or any other entity. They have to satisfy themselves that if they wish to acquire something else in future, they will effectively have to go through the same process of national security clearance. Collaboration between entities or in academia are covered under the separate guidance, including from the agencies, on who they collaborate with, but I think that is a different issue. Once an asset is created that has a national security implication for the United Kingdom, the Bill comes into play.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 5 accordingly agreed to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 6
Notifiable acquisitions
Stephen Kinnock
I beg to move amendment 6, in clause 6, page 4, line 27, at end insert—
‘(4A) The Secretary of State must have regard to the protection of critical national infrastructure when making regulations under this section.’
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to have regard to the protection of critical national infrastructure when making notifiable acquisition regulations.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Graham. I congratulate the Minister on his recent appointment as the vaccine tsar. I must say, he is taking multi-tasking to a whole new level, and we wish him well.
I rise to speak in favour of amendment 6, which is closely related to amendments 7 and 8. Sir Graham, should I speak to amendments 7 and 8 as well now, or to amendment 6 alone?
Stephen Kinnock
Thank you, Sir Graham.
Before we go down into the weeds of it, it is worth taking a step back and thinking about the fundamental purpose of the Bill. The amendments are informed by that fundamental purpose, because we wish to be constructive and to support the Bill, but also to improve it. We feel that if our amendments are not accepted, it will be a real missed opportunity to achieve something even better. We can take this Bill from good to great—an objective I am sure the Minister would support.
The aim needs to be around national security, yes, but also about economic resilience, because underlying economic resilience is actually what is required for our national security. The two are fundamentally intertwined. To build that resilience, we need sovereign capability. We need, as a country, to have a business culture based on purpose, rather than on fast bucks and short termism. We need resilience so that we are a country with a healthy and viable manufacturing sector that enables us to export more, because we would argue that the persistent trade deficit we face as a country has an impact on our national security. We also need to develop that sovereign capability. As the covid crisis has demonstrated, we have ended up being far too exposed to highly extended supply chains, many of which go through countries that are not our natural allies. That has left us lacking in resilience. The Bill is about managing risk, and our risk levels are far too high because of the economic model we have fallen into.
Simon Baynes (Clwyd South) (Con)
I understand what you are saying, but I think what you are suggesting really changes the whole Bill, because, as we were discussing with the witnesses, it is almost more about national interest. This is about national security, not national infrastructure. What you are proposing is a fundamental change or add-on to the nature of the Bill, which would have ramifications throughout the whole Bill process. I think it is important to make that point at this stage.
Stephen Kinnock
I thank the hon. Member for Clwyd South for his intervention. I take that point absolutely, but I think it is important sometimes to go back to the mindset we have around this legislation. The Opposition feel that there are opportunities to strengthen the Bill. Every single Bill that the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy puts forward should be informed by that need to strengthen our sovereign capability and make us less reliant on risky supply chains, and to be somewhat more realistic about the way that the world and globalisation work. It really was just contextual, but I do take the hon. Member’s point that we should remain within those parameters. I think the mindset is really important.
On the issue of exposure to highly extended supply chains and the way in which we have had the floodgates open for hostile foreign takeovers, this country has the highest number of hostile foreign takeovers in the entire OECD. That really speaks volumes about our economic model.
In terms of relations with China, the Bill is not an anti-China Bill as such, but we all know that the key economic development of the last few decades has been the rise of China. The reality is that we have been naïve and complacent in the way we have dealt with China. Previous Prime Ministers announced a so-called golden era, whereby we were going to open our markets to China, the Chinese were going to do the same, and they would gradually align with the international rules-based order, its norms and even its values, some thought.
That has been an unmitigated disaster. None of that has happened. In fact, what we have seen is that the benefits of the golden era have flowed almost exclusively from west to east. We are still running a £19 billion trade deficit with China and we are still seeing extremely hostile political acts, not least what is happening in Hong Kong and the persecution of the Uyghur people in Xinjiang. Both economically and politically, the strategy has failed.
Chi Onwurah
My hon. Friend is making an excellent point. In addition to the critical issue of the state of many small businesses after covid, there is Brexit. The low value of the pound means that our distressed assets will be cheaper on the global market.
Stephen Kinnock
My hon. Friend makes a crucial point. As we have constantly said, this is about risk and the hierarchy of risks we face. Risk is always sensitive to what is happening in terms of the global economic outlook. As she rightly points out, Brexit and leaving the transition period will be a seismic event for our country. It will have a massive impact on our currency and the strength of the pound. Combining that with the covid situation means that we have to be careful. We have to be vigilant and ensure that we defend our national interest. That is why it is important that our mindset involves taking a holistic view of our national interest, particularly in the turbulent times in which we find ourselves. This is fundamentally about saying that our national security is not for sale. Our national security does not have a price tag, and it has to be the primary consideration.
With those contextual comments in mind, I move on to amendment 6, which considers a particular aspect of our economy. It focuses on the asset side of the ledger in terms of this Bill—namely, critical national infrastructure. Our amendment would require the Secretary of State to have regard to the protection of critical national infrastructure when making notifiable acquisition regulations. Going back to China, it is remarkable how much of our critical national infrastructure is in the hands of Chinese enterprises or state-backed investment vehicles. This is happening now, right under our noses, and needs to be taken into account in discussing this amendment.
In essence, our amendment offers a way to ensure that critical national infrastructure is given particular and extra consideration in the national security and investment assessments within the regime. Given that the Bill fails to define national security, it does not, by definition, reference critical national infrastructure.
To drill down further, the Government’s consultation on the Bill lists the 17 sectors that might come under the regime’s mandatory notification process, but it does not explicitly list the UK’s critical national infrastructure. In fact, there is not a direct overlap. Five sectors are not included in the 17 that are in the consultation, but they are in our critical national infrastructure. The 17 range from advanced materials, advanced robotics, artificial intelligence, civil nuclear, communications, computing hardware, critical suppliers to Government, critical suppliers to the emergency services, cryptographic authentication, data infrastructure, data infrastructure, defence, energy, engineering biology, military and dual use, quantum technology, satellite and space technologies, to transport. However, the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure defines 13 areas as critical national infrastructure, including several sectors that are not included in the 17: food, Government more broadly––not just critical suppliers––health, space and water.
If we look at the impact of the pandemic and think about what critical national infrastructure means, we see that the 17 sectors are already out of date. Given our experience with covid and the concerns about food supply, that is clearly an issue we need to examine closely. Water is crucial to our wellbeing as a nation, yet it is not included in the 17. Our amendment argues that critical national infrastructure should be taken as an asset class. If defined as an asset class, the landscape moves and the definitions of sectors move, but there is clarity about critical national infrastructure always being within the scope of the Bill.
Matt Western
As always, my hon. Friend makes important points. To amplify those, if we had been sitting down and writing this Bill 10 years ago, which would have been a pretty good thing to have done, with hindsight––
Matt Western
I think I chose my time horizon pretty well. Had we been doing so, we may not have been considering these 17 categories, traffic light systems, underground systems, public transport or railway infrastructure in a way that we have to nowadays because we understand just how interconnected things are. We understand what the threats and risks are from these sorts of investments from possibly rogue organisations, states or businesses.
Stephen Kinnock
I thank my hon. Friend. This is genuinely not an attempt to make a party political point. There is no doubt that we should have seen the impact of the rise of China long before 2010. This is something that has been going on for a long time. President Xi Jinping was appointed in 2013 and there has been a qualitative shift in China’s outlook and the way in which it is engaging with the world. There is an increasingly aggressive and assertive set of economic policies. One of the experts said that the objective is to dominate the global technology scene. That is an explicit objective in the Made in China 2025 vision that the President and the Chinese Communist party adhere to. While we are not trying to make party political points here, a lot has changed in the last seven years.
Dr Whitehead
Does my hon. Friend consider that had these provisions, as amended, been in place in, say, 2015, the Government would not have signed the Secretary of State’s investment agreement with the Chinese state nuclear corporation, giving it control of a nuclear power plant and the right to build its own reactor, staff it with its own staff and run it entirely according to its own interest? Does he think that it was perhaps naive to do that? Might greater protection have been afforded for future deals under this sort of arrangement?
Stephen Kinnock
I thank my hon. Friend. His intervention is telling because it points to a fundamental failing at the heart of Government in terms of being joined up and credible. We cannot condemn aspects of China’s activity and its increasingly assertive behaviour —potential military threats to Taiwan, and sabre-rattling in the South China sea—while opening up our nuclear energy capability to that same hostile foreign actor. Security is about our credibility, resilience and ability to stand strong and united, because we know that the Chinese Communist party will exploit weakness and division. Consistency is vital—consistency and security are two sides of the same coin.
To answer my hon. Friend’s question, I profoundly and sincerely hope that the investment to which he refers would not have passed this test. Frankly, if it had passed this test, the Bill would end up not being worth the paper it is written on. This is about the implementation of the Bill and the Government’s capability to stand up for our national security and critical national infrastructure, which is at the heart of the amendment.
It is worth pointing out that the Intelligence and Security Committee defines our critical national infra- structure as
“certain ‘critical’ elements of infrastructure, the loss or comprise of which would have a major detrimental impact on the availability or integrity of essential services, leading to severe economic or social consequences or to loss of life.”
I am convinced that no Member present would argue with that definition or against putting those considerations at the heart of what Parliament and the Government stand for.
We must include critical national infrastructure. It would follow best practice—our allies the United States and Canada both include critical national infrastructure in their list of key factors to assess as part of national security, so we would not be reinventing the wheel but simply following best practice. In the expert witness sessions, I asked Sir Richard Dearlove specifically whether he thought that a definition of critical national infrastructure should be included in the Bill. He said:
“I would certainly see that as advantageous, because it defines a clear area where you start and from which you can make judgments”.––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 24, Q31.]
As I said the start of my comments, sovereign capability is what this is really about, and our sovereign capability is profoundly undermined by the fact that so much of our critical national infrastructure is not in our own hands. Supply chains are over-extended and often depend on actors that perhaps 10 years ago we did not see as we do now, which has to be taken into account. I urge hon. Members to consider the amendment seriously, because it goes to the heart of what Parliament and Government should be about.
Nadhim Zahawi
Amendment 6 would require the Secretary of State to have regard to the protection of critical national infrastructure when making notifiable acquisition regulations. I welcome the intention of the hon. Member for Aberavon to ensure that the protection of critical national infrastructure is considered by the Secretary of State. Indeed, I take it as a ringing endorsement of the approach the Government have taken in clause 6 to define the specific sectors and activities subject to mandatory notification clearance.
As the hon. Gentleman will know, we intend to introduce regulations under the clause once the Bill has received Royal Assent, and we are currently consulting on the sector definitions, which cover much of the critical national infrastructure that he quite rightly shared with the Committee, including energy, civil, nuclear, transport, communications and defence. We are publicly consulting, in particular with sector experts, the legal profession, business and investment communities, to ensure that those definitions provide clarity and certainty, and are focused on the specific parts of sectors and activities that can pose risks to our national security. I can assure the hon. Gentleman that, in developing any notifiable acquisition regulations, the Secretary of State will always take into account the national security needs of the country within the critical national infrastructure sectors, the advanced technology sectors and the wider economy.
Stephen Kinnock
I thank the Minister for giving way; he is being very generous. Does he not see the advantage of including this point on the face of the Bill? It makes an important statement—it is a political statement, really—about the need to ensure that, whatever the regulations say, critical national infrastructure is embedded in the Bill.
Nadhim Zahawi
I hear what the hon. Gentleman says. The word that slightly worries businesses is “political” statement. I think that that is a concern. I think his intention is right, and the reason why we have taken the route of mandatory notification for the 17 sectors is precisely the point he makes. I assure him that the Secretary of State will always take into account the national security needs of the country within the critical national infrastructure sectors. Indeed, the hon. Gentleman will recall that the Government introduced a statutory instrument to include health in the Enterprise Act 2002 when the covid pandemic hit.
Dr Whitehead
I wonder whether I can tempt the Minister to confirm that the 2015 Secretary of State’s investment agreement concerning Chinese control of the nuclear power station and reactor was a naive act by the Government and did not take national security properly into consideration, and that the Secretary of State who signed that agreement in the Minister’s Department clearly did not do so. Will the Minister both reflect on the naivety of that deal and give an indication that such a deal would never be contemplated by this Department in future?
Nadhim Zahawi
If the hon. Gentleman is referring to the Hinkley Point deal with EDF, the operator and junior partner in that is CGN.
Dr Whitehead
I was not quite; I was referring to the investment agreement on the Hinkley deal that enabled the Chinese state nuclear corporation to develop one third of that series of reactors entirely within its own resources. That was signed into the agreement by the then Secretary of State so that they would be junior partners in Hinkley, equal partners in Sizewell and 100% owners, operators and organisers of Bradwell. That is what I was referring to. The Minister ought to say a few words on the likely actions of the Department in future under the terms of the Bill.
The Chair
Crucially, Minister, interesting though this topic may be, those last few words should be firmly in your mind in any response you give.
Nadhim Zahawi
I am grateful to you, Sir Graham, for refocusing our attention on the amendment. Suffice it to say that national security is always taken into account when it comes to nuclear or energy, as it was at the time of those agreements. The point I am trying to make is that we must be flexible to ensure that the new regime can adapt to the threats of tomorrow. That is the right approach to ensure that we can keep this country safe. Of course, any such regulations will be subject to parliamentary approval through the draft affirmative procedure, giving Members of this House and the other place the opportunity to ensure that the mandatory notification and clearance regime works effectively. As such, I cannot accept the amendment and I hope that the hon. Member for Aberavon will seek leave to withdraw it.
Stephen Kinnock
I thank the Minister, but I am afraid that we will have to push the amendment to a Division, because it is so fundamental to how we see the purpose of the Bill. We have heard lots of assurances today along the lines of, “Trust us. We are on the right track. We get it.” I hope the Minister will forgive us, but we prefer the “trust but verify” model. Therefore, we think that this provision should be in the Bill, and I will have to press the amendment to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Stephen Flynn (Aberdeen South) (SNP)
I beg to move amendment 13, in clause 6, page 5, line 3, at end insert—
“(10) Notifiable acquisition regulations must be reviewed one year after they are made, and at least once every five years thereafter.”
This amendment would require notifiable acquisition regulations (including which sectors are covered) to be reviewed one year after they are made, and once every five years thereafter.
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair once again, Sir Graham. As things stand, I think it is probably a fair assessment, based on what we have heard, that perhaps if the Government had their time again they might have been able to bring forward a consultation in relation to which sectors will be linked to the Bill once it is on the statute book.
I think that a disappointing approach has been taken. It could have been done in a much more constructive manner. The purpose of the amendment is to try to highlight that the issue is a real one, and to highlight the scale and scope of the sectors. As we talked about, there is perhaps concern about whether a specific sector goes far enough. For instance, does artificial intelligence look properly at the role of social media? Does the infrastructure tie into social media in any way, shape or form? There are other examples of that too. Having the review after a year would perhaps allow the Government to be a little more certain about where their priorities lie, and to provide additional certainty to businesses in what is an ever-moving landscape. National security is, of course, an ever-evolving issue, as we have heard passionately from a number of Members.
I will keep my remarks succinct. The amendment is about tightening things up and removing the difficulties that are being caused by the lag between the Bill and the consultation, and doing so in a constructive fashion to try to assist the Government.
Nadhim Zahawi
To discuss this amendment, I believe it would be helpful to revisit briefly the role of notifiable acquisition regulations under the regime. A key part of the Bill is the ability it affords the Secretary of State to make acquisitions of certain shares or voting rights in certain entities—notifiable acquisitions, meaning they must be notified and cleared by the Secretary of State before they can take place. Those types of entity are to be specified in regulations by the Secretary of State and the Government have published a consultation on the definitions of those types of entity, which fall within 17 key sensitive sectors of the economy that we propose to initially be covered by the mandatory notifiable regime.
The regulation-making powers in the clause are the best and most proportionate way to enable the Secretary of State to change over time what does and does not constitute a notifiable acquisition. That is crucial for two main reasons. First, it would not be the right approach to set the types of entity covered by mandatory notification and their definitions in stone, forever, in 2020. We all know how difficult this year is. The Secretary of State must be able to update them, in some cases rapidly, as the threats we face evolve and to keep pace with technological development.
Secondly, the Secretary of State must be able to react to the operation of this regime in practice. While the Bill does not include a white list that exempts specific acquirers from the mandatory regime, we have been clear that we will monitor closely the volumes and patterns of the notifications made to the Secretary of State. It may emerge over time, for example, that acquisitions by institutional investors and pension funds are routinely being notified but very rarely remedied or even called in. Such evidence could build the case for using the powers in this clause to make exemptions to the definition of a notifiable acquisition, on the basis of the characteristics of the acquirer.
The Chair
Order. I do not know who the person who has just walked in is, but only Members are allowed in the room. Please leave immediately.
Nadhim Zahawi
It is therefore right that the Secretary of State keeps a constant watch on the regulations. Indeed, it is vital that he has the flexibility to re-assess and, if needed, seek to update the regulations as soon as is needed, while taking a proportionate approach that gives as much stability to business and investors as possible. Ensuring this vital timeliness and balance means it would not be appropriate to impose particular requirements on when and how frequently the Secretary of State should review the powers, so I cannot accept the amendment. However, I agree wholeheartedly with the hon. Member for Aberdeen South that keeping the regulations up to date and proportionate is of the utmost importance, and I can assure him that that is what the Secretary of State will do.
Stephen Flynn
I will certainly take that assurance from the Minister in the spirit in which it is given, but that is probably as far as that will go. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Nadhim Zahawi
Clause 6 defines the circumstances covered by mandatory notification. The Bill calls them notifiable acquisitions, on the basis that they must be notified and cleared by the Secretary of State before they can take place. The Government have looked carefully at investment screening regimes around the world, in particular those of our Five Eyes allies and other security partners. Common among them all is the inclusion of a mandatory notification component to ensure that the most sensitive transactions must be actively considered and receive clearance by the relevant authority before they can take place. We have concluded that that is the right step for the United Kingdom to take as well. That reflects our developed view that the Government must have greater assurance that certain acquisitions in the most sensitive sectors, including both the national infrastructure sectors and certain advanced technology sectors, are safe to proceed.
Chi Onwurah
I will be brief because I know that we have to make progress, but I will say a few words on clause 6, which is in some ways the heart of the Bill, defining as it does what a “notifiable acquisition” is.
I regret that despite the Minister’s repeated assurances, I am not entirely convinced that he has come to the Committee ready to make changes in response to our very constructive proposals. He has repeated on a number of occasions that the Bill is the best and most proportionate means, despite our constructive suggestions to the contrary. I remind him that—as we see in this clause in particular—the Bill gives significant powers to the Secretary of State, and particularly significant additional powers on delegated legislation. It is possible that not every clause is as perfect as it could be or as he seems to think it is. In particular, the amendment set out by my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon was a really important contribution to bringing critical national infrastructure directly and clearly into the remit of the Bill. If the Minister is so opposed to including them directly, what elements of critical national infrastructure does he think do not form part of our national security?
My hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test made an excellent point with the example of our nuclear capability. Only five years ago, the then Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer were happy to hand not only the financing but the technological development, innovation and reputational consequences to China. Does the Minister agree that if we had had this Bill 10 years ago, as we wished, having critical national infrastructure in it would have made that impossible?
There is also the case of Huawei. When that was debated last night, it was clear that if we had been writing this Bill five or 10 years ago, I doubt whether the then Government would have included telecommunications, given their lack of interest in many acquisitions and procurements in that area. We now see the impact of having a high-risk vendor in our 5G and fibre network on our national security. We will not oppose clause stand part but we hope to encourage the Minister to accept our most constructive and supportive amendments.
The Chair
Before I put the question formally, for the benefit of Members––particularly new Members who have not been able to be here as much in the last year as would otherwise have been the case––let me say that a good way of thinking of the rules of order in Committee is to think of them as being pretty much the same as in the Chamber. Similarly, above and below the bar applies in Committee as well as in the Chamber.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 7
Qualifying entities and assets
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Nadhim Zahawi
Clause 7 provides the definitions of “qualifying entities” and “qualifying assets” within the scope of the Bill, where, if they are subject to an acquisition of control that raises national security risks, the Secretary of State may take action. The Government have deliberately adopted a broad definition of “qualifying entities” to ensure that we can protect national security, regardless of the form of the legal structure of an entity that is being acquired in a trigger event.
Entities can be established or restructured in different forms including, for example, companies, limited liability partnerships and unincorporated associations. The clause includes an indicative, and non-exhaustive, list of the entities in scope. However, “individuals” are explicitly excluded. We expect most trigger events to concern companies, but we must also ensure that hostile actors cannot undermine or bypass the new regime through an entity being structured in such a way as to avoid scrutiny. It is therefore right that the clause provides for a broad definition of an “entity”.
Equally, from time to time, there may be cases that concern the acquisition of control over non-business entities such as trade bodies or industry groups that the Government none the less need to be able to scrutinise. The clause also permits the Secretary of State to scrutinise acquisitions relating to non-UK entities, if the entity carries on activities in the UK or provides goods or services to persons in the UK. As I am sure hon. Members will acknowledge, the cross-border nature of trade and supply chains in today’s world means that conduct abroad may impact national security here. For instance, goods that are critical to the defence of the realm may be supplied from abroad. If those goods were to be interfered with, that could harm our national security.
Stephen Kinnock
I beg to move amendment 7, in clause 8, page 6, line 38, at end insert—
“(10) The fifth case is where the acquisition involves state-owned entities or investors originating in a country of risk to UK national security and creates any change of influence.”
This amendment would mean that any acquisition involving state-owned entities or investors originating in a country of risk to UK national security and creating a change of influence would count as a person gaining control of a qualifying entity.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 8, in clause 8, page 6, line 38, at end insert—
“(10) The fifth case is where the acquisition involves changes to material influence in industries critical to the UK’s capability and capacity to maintain national security, including economic security.”
This amendment would mean that any acquisition which involves changes to material influence in industries critical to national security would count as a person gaining control of a qualifying entity.
Stephen Kinnock
I am very happy to have the opportunity to set out what we are trying to achieve with this amendment. While the previous amendment was very much about protecting our assets, this one focuses on the characteristics of the acquirer. It is absolutely clear that any successful screening regime has to be based on a solid understanding of both aspects—both the asset and the acquirer—and that both are equally vital to the successful implementation of the regime.
Harking back to the debate we had about an earlier amendment, the objective here has to be smart regulation. What do we mean by that? If we try to catch everything, we end up catching nothing. We have to prioritise. We have to have a screening system that has a smart, nuanced and well-informed understanding of risk, both in terms of the prioritisation of our assets and the prioritisation of understanding the characteristics of the acquirer. It is on that basis that we prioritise action, and when our investment security unit needs to intervene.
The amendment is focused very much on the characteristics of the acquirer. It is about ensuring that we guard ourselves against the influence of foreign powers that wish to do harm to our country—those that have an agenda. The Minister said earlier that companies get a bit worried when we use the term “political”, but national security is a fundamentally political consideration, because it is about our political analysis of the threat from hostile foreign actors and our understanding of what the national interest is in a holistic sense. We have to give that political leadership. We cannot expect the business community to take that decision for us; we have to give a lead on understanding where the investment is coming from and what the characteristics of the company or investment vehicle are. Fundamentally, going by the old adage that he who pays the piper chooses the tune, where there are state-owned and state-backed entities, it is absolutely clear who is paying the piper and who is choosing to the tune.
The amendment we have tabled would mean that any acquisition involving state-owned entities or investors originating in a country of risk to UK national security—a fundamentally political calculation—and creating a change of influence would count as a person gaining control of a qualifying entity. By including state-owned enterprises explicitly on the face of the Bill, we would be ensuring particular regard to the issue even where shareholding levels are low.
We understand the thresholds for trigger events, but what we are saying is that when the characteristics of the acquirer ring particular alarm bells, that should apply regardless of the shareholding level that is being considered by the acquirer. We know the threat from state-owned enterprises is disproportionate; that is why we are recommending a kind of disproportionate action in this amendment, to address the reality of the characteristics and to ensure that we are carefully guarding against potentially malign actors.
Again, this is not a new concept. Other countries use it in their regimes, and we are simply proposing that we follow suit and have a smarter strategy and approach to regulation at the moment. The clarity that we need, of course, is from understanding that where allied states are involved and the transactions are efficiently screened for approval there is little cause for concern, but with this amendment, even small and discrete investments from hostile states and from state-backed entities within those states would be fully captured.
Let us turn to the expert evidence that we received, particularly from Michael Leiter, the legal expert and lawyer, who said:
“With respect to sovereign wealth funds or state-controlled investments, there is a perfectly good argument that yes, the standard of review might be…more rigorous.”—[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 48, Q54.]
Let us be absolutely clear: we do sometimes see so-called private takeovers, where often the state-backed entity is rather obscured within the ownership structure. They are carried out by companies and investment vehicles that are in fact a front for authoritarian state actors, who have wider political, national security and geopolitical agendas and whose values are frequently at odds with ours.
A recent obvious example is the attempt by an investment vehicle backed by the Chinese state to take over Imagination Technologies. The company was the target of a hostile foreign takeover attempt, and that investment vehicle had direct links to the Chinese state. Then there are even more obvious examples, to which my hon. Friends the Members for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and for Southampton, Test have referred, particularly around Hinkley and Bradwell, where there is a clear ownership structure coming directly from the Chinese state.
We must also recognise the broader agenda with things such as China’s belt and road initiative, which is about creating debt-trap diplomacy. It is about building influence by entering other economies in such a major way that those economies effectively become dependent on the Chinese state. Of course, that comes with lots of strings attached, and it is part of the deal that those countries are not able or permitted to speak out when the Chinese state behaves in ways that we would not find acceptable. I hope that the Government and the Minister will seriously consider the amendment, because the characteristics of the acquirer must be taken into account if we are to have a smart regulation system that prioritises and does what the Bill sets out to do.
Nadhim Zahawi
This group of amendments would provide for certain cases to count as a person gaining control of a qualifying entity. The amendments are to clause 8, which defines the circumstances in which a person gains control of a qualifying entity for the purpose of the Bill.
Amendment 7 would ensure, as the hon. Member for Aberavon mentioned, that any acquisition involving state-owned entities or investors originating in a country of risk to UK national security and creating a change of influence would count as a person gaining control of a qualifying entity for the purposes of the Bill. I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s intention to ensure that national security is comprehensively protected. I reassure him that the Bill provides no carve-out or special treatment for state-owned entities or overseas investors where they acquire control of a qualifying entity or asset. They will be subject to the mandatory notification requirements in the same way as any other acquirer, and the Secretary of State will have the power to scrutinise any acquisition of control by such parties where the legal test for call-in is met. That includes the acquisition of material influence over the policy of the entity.
However, the Government have been clear that the regime is nationally agnostic, and that each acquisition will be considered on a case-by-case basis. The draft statement of policy published alongside the Bill simply states that the regime will not
“regard state-owned entities, sovereign wealth funds—or other entities affiliated with foreign states—as being inherently more likely to pose a national security risk.”
I strongly believe that this is the right approach. We must recognise that many such organisations have full operational independence in pursuing long-term investment strategies with the objective of economic return, raising no national security risks.
Moreover, the clause already sets out the circumstances that constitute control of an entity based on levels of shareholding and voting rights and material influence. Amendments such as this could, for example, capture increases of equity stakes at any level, even though many could not realistically be expected to give rise to a national security risk. Developing a list of countries of risk would likely be a moving feast that would quickly become out of date in response to changing geopolitics and would most likely harm Britain’s diplomatic relations and place in the world, giving rise to a chilling effect on investment in these shores.
Amendment 8 would create a new case of a person gaining control of a qualifying entity for “changes to material influence” in industries critical to the UK’s capability and capacity to maintain national security, including economic security. Once more, I welcome the emerging cross-party consensus that the Bill must capture more subjective acquisitions of control, rather than solely levels of shares and voting rights. I reassure the hon. Gentleman that acquisitions of material influence over the policy of an entity are very much in the scope of the Bill. That applies within the 17 sectors but also to the wider economy. Parties can notify the Secretary of State of a trigger event concerning the acquisition of a material influence, and he will have the power to proactively call in such a case if the legal test is met.
I should clarify that material influence is not a scale. It is the lowest level of control that can be acquired over a qualifying entity, which captures acquisitions of smaller stakes or other rights or interests in entities, such as board representation rights. As such, it is not immediately clear to me what circumstances such an amendment would bring into the scope of the Bill, given that it would capture changes to material influence. None the less, I admire the ingenuity of the hon. Gentleman’s seeking, at least in part, to define national security through the amendment and its explicit reference to economic security. As he will know, the Bill does not define national security, and, as I said on Second Reading, I think that is a real strength, not a weakness.
Chi Onwurah
The Minister says that this Bill is not country specific. I know he does not want to define national security in the Bill, but does he think that our national security can be country specific?
Nadhim Zahawi
I think that the Bill is proportionate and I think that national security is not dependent on a particular country. Malignant actors come from different nationalities. The Committee heard from a number of experts last week the reasons for not defining national security, not least because it might limit the Secretary of State from being able to respond to new and emerging threats that did not fall within the definitions set out in statute. For these reasons I cannot accept these amendments, and I would gently encourage the hon. Member for Aberavon to withdraw them.
Nadhim Zahawi
Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the amendment in his intervention.
Stephen Kinnock
I thank the Minister for giving way—sort of. One of the key sentences in the Government’s statement of policy intent is in the section on acquirers, which says:
“Clearly, national security risks are most likely to arise when acquirers are hostile to the UK’s national security, or when they owe allegiance to hostile states or organisations.”
I recognise that the statement of policy intent is a draft, but clearly somebody in government thought it a good idea to put that sentence in there, and I absolutely agree with it. It is therefore very difficult to understand the disconnect that appears to exist between the Bill, which is agnostic on different national actors, and the statement of policy intent, which explicitly talks about when acquirers
“owe allegiance to hostile states or organisations.”
On that basis, the amendment touches on a crucial issue and we shall be pushing it to a Division.
Nadhim Zahawi
I do not wish to keep repeating myself, but I have set out the reasons why I cannot accept these amendments. I would again gently encourage the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment, but I suspect we will be heading to a Division.
Stephen Kinnock
We are moving back and forth here. As I set out, the issues around the characteristics of the acquirer are so important to ensuring that we have a smart approach and the sentence within the statement of policy intent is so absolutely spot on that we will push the amendment to a Division to show our support for that section of the statement.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Sam Tarry
I beg to move amendment 12, in clause 8, page 6, line 38, at end insert—
“(10) The fifth case is where a person becomes a major debt holder and therefore gains influence over the entity’s operation and policy decisions.
(11) For the purposes of subsection (8A), a major debt holder is a person who holds at least 25% of the entity’s total debt.”
This amendment would mean that a person becoming a major debt holder would count as a person gaining control of a qualifying entity.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 14, in clause 8, page 6, line 38, at end insert—
“(10) The fifth case is where a person becomes a major debt holder and therefore gains influence over the entity’s operations and policy decisions.
(11) For the purposes of subsection (8A), a major debt holder is a person who holds at least 25% of the entity’s total debt.
(12) The sixth case is where a person becomes one of the entity’s top three suppliers of goods, services, infrastructure or resources and therefore gains influence over its operations and policy decisions.”
This amendment would mean that a person becoming a major debt holder or a major supplier would count as a person gaining control of a qualifying entity.
Sam Tarry
Amendment 12 is about where a person becoming a major debt holder would count as a person gaining control of the qualifying entity. I know there is some debate about the technicalities of this, but Admiral Mike Mullen, former chair of the US joint chiefs of staff, famously said of the US:
“The single greatest threat to our national security is our debt.”
This is an important point, because there is a substantial body of evidence to show that the debt holding of bondholders can indeed exert influence over companies. A particular feature of our current economic circumstances is extremely low, or zero, interest rates, so companies have drawn heavily on debt, not just equity, to fund themselves. In that context, it would be a major loophole for this Bill not to put debt investments under scrutiny in protecting our national security. This amendment would simply change that by bringing it into scope.
The amendment would ensure that an entity holding more than a quarter of a company’s debt became a qualifying entity, bringing transactions into the scope of the national security screen. We think this is really important, because we would want that level of scrutiny. We also know that a number of states use this kind of leverage in some of the companies that they are taking over or, indeed, taking the debt from. Without it, hostile actors can be expected to exert explicit influence by buying up UK companies’ debt, and that is something that should worry us all of us. Indeed, the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards talked about the importance of how debt can be used to exert influence. It said that,
“while a bank remains solvent, the formal powers of other creditors, such as bondholders, are much more limited.”
However,
“The terms of some bond issuances may have provisions in situations when the security of the bond may be affected”,
secured against
“creditors, such as securitised or covered bond holders”.
So in practice, the scale of the funding provided by bank creditors means they simply have more influence over companies. If debt was bought in that way, we could indeed have a situation where a loophole was used to bring in hopefully benign, but potentially troubling influence within a company which could impact our national security.
There is considerable research showing that, in some companies, there is a strategy of using a negative relationship between debt investments in research and development that has actually stopped innovation, so we want to tackle all those things, but most importantly simply focus on closing the loophole that is here. There may be some pushback from the Government side of the Committee to say that, legally, debt holders have no operational control over a company. Of course, technically that is correct, but in practice companies’ executives pay huge attention to bondholders and are materially influenced by them in substantive practice. There are a number of examples of that. From our point of view, we would like to push forward this amendment so that we bring into scope something that is otherwise a major loophole.
Stephen Flynn
I will be brief, as our amendment 14 is incredibly similar to the amendment moved by the hon. Member for Ilford South—not the hon. Member for Southampton, Test; I know that much. In any case, it is indeed very similar; I would just add that we must be clear about the fact that power does not just lie in ownership and investment, but also in debt and, indeed, in suppliers too. If we are standing blind to that, then I am not quite sure where we are at, particularly in terms of national security. Surely, it is an issue that we should be giving cognisance to, and the amendment certainly seems like a constructive proposal for the Minister to take forward.
I also have a fear that, as we approach anything to do with national security and investment, the bad guys, as they are often portrayed—and rightly so—will look for ways to get around things. If there is potentially a way to get around things, particularly by buying up debt or buying up the supply chain into an organisation, then I have absolutely no doubt they will do that. As we know, they will seek to exploit every opportunity available to them to wreak the damage they want to cause. We need to be mindful of that.
Mark Garnier
I am very sympathetic to the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Ilford South. He refers to the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, on which I sat. There is no question whatever that the bondholders of banks have a huge amount of influence on a bank—more so than the equity holders. I am worried about a couple of things with the amendment. The first is that it is very difficult to define what level of debt ownership constitutes control, because technically there is no control in law. It is possible to have an influence, but we cannot define what control is.
The second point is that tradeable debt, as in bond market debt, is something that is usually stuck to quite a sophisticated company. Most companies will have bank debt. Of course, if we start talking about bank debt, we introduce the tricky concept of where the bank is domiciled. For example, someone can borrow money from Barclays Bank, or they can go to a Russian, Chinese or Hong Kong-based bank. The sentiment behind the amendment is really important, because there is a lot of control by debt owners, be they banks or bond holders. However, it is too complicated to support at this level, because it needs much more debate and scrutiny, and we would need a much more cleverly worded amendment to support this. I do think it is a very important point, and I support the principle behind it.
Nadhim Zahawi
These amendments would ensure that a person becoming a major debt holder would count as a person in control of a qualifying entity. Amendment 14 would go further and ensure that a person becoming a top 3 supplier to an entity also counted as a person gaining control of a qualifying entity. I acknowledge that the hon. Members for Ilford South and for Aberdeen South are right to highlight that there are, in a small number of cases, national security risks that can be posed through debt.
Access to finance is crucial for so many businesses. In order to grow and succeed, they will often take out loans that are secured against the businesses and assets that they have fought so hard to build. That is why the Bill allows the Secretary of State to scrutinise acquisitions of control that take place where lenders exercise rights over such collateral, which goes to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest. Such an approach will prevent hostile actors from artificially structuring acquisitions in the form of loans, which, following a swift and convenient default, might otherwise allow them to evade scrutiny.
I can provide further reassurance to the Committee that the acquisition of any right or interest that enabled a person to exercise material influence over the policy of a qualifying entity, including by creditors through debt arrangements, would be in scope of the Bill. It was noted by Christian Boney, partner of Slaughter and May, that the Bill strikes an acceptable balance by not having debt providers specified as a separate case. Depending on the facts of the individual case, that might capture the acquisition of rights by the lender to appoint members of the entity’s board. That is a common approach by lenders when striking an agreement to provide significant amounts of finance, particularly for big infrastructure projects, in order to safeguard their funds. The Bill would cover a scenario where that provided material influence over the policy of the entity, but the amendments would go further still and stipulate that any person becoming the holder of 25% or more of an entity’s debt was a trigger event in itself.
The Government do not believe that the provision of loans and finance is automatically a national security issue—indeed, it is part of a healthy business ecosystem that enables businesses to flourish in this country. I fear that such an approach would likely create a chilling effect on the appetite of lenders to support otherwise attractive and viable projects. Lenders need confidence that they can see a return on ordinary debt arrangements in order to provide that service. I believe that such a chilling effect would have a detrimental impact on the range and extent of finance that is available to UK businesses, particularly SMEs, and their future prospects would suffer as a result. That is the very opposite of the Government’s intention. We must support our innovators and entrepreneurs as we seek to build back better from covid, rather than limit their opportunities to succeed.
Amendment 14 would create an additional case for any person who became a top 3 supplier to an entity. In effect, it would be a new trigger event. I share the desire of the hon. Member for Aberdeen South to ensure that business within our most sensitive supply chains can be protected. I believe the Bill does that already by allowing the Secretary of State to call in trigger events across the economy, when he reasonably suspects they may give rise to national security risks. That includes key suppliers.
Sam Tarry
I thank the hon. Members for Wyre Forest and for Aberdeen South for their contributions. It is my fear that, in some of the Minister’s answers, there was perhaps an admission from Government colleagues that there is a correct driver, in terms of what we are trying to push at with this amendment. It would be more ideal if we were able to bring back an amended amendment that would win the support of the Government side, given that there clearly is recognition from experienced Members of the House that this is a problem and it could continue to be a problem. That could be a risk. For that reason, we will press for a Division.
Nadhim Zahawi
Clause 8 sets out for the purpose of the Bill the circumstances in which a person gains control of a qualifying entity as defined in clause 7. More specifically, the clause sets out the four ways in which control can be gained.
The first two cases are where certain shareholdings or voting rights are acquired. The clause stipulates that acquisitions increasing a person’s holding in a qualifying entity above 25%, 50%, 75% or more all constitute trigger events. The thresholds have been chosen because of their significance under UK company law.
Under the Companies Act 2006, a number of key decisions relating to shareholders’ rights in relation to the decision making of a company require a special resolution. Special resolutions require a majority of 75% of votes to be passed. This means that a holding of more than 25% allows one person to, by themselves, block a special resolution. Similarly, a holding of 75% or more allows one person to, by themselves, pass a special resolution.
Under the Companies Act, ordinary resolutions, which apply to more routine shareholder decisions, require a simple majority. This means that a holding of more than 50% allows one person to, by themselves, make decisions affecting the governance of a company.
The Government believe these thresholds represent reasonable proxies for various levels of control over entities. The clause deliberately includes references to both shares and votes to prevent the artificial construction of acquisitions to avoid meeting one of these thresholds—for example, a 40% stake with 51% of voting rights. In most cases, ordinary shares carry the equivalent amount of voting rights: one vote per share.
Recognising that the regime also concerns entities other than companies established under the Companies Act, the third case explicitly extends the same principles on voting rights enabling the passage of a resolution to other entities. That means that any acquisition of voting rights that allows a person to secure or prevent the passage of any resolution governing the affairs of the entity is a trigger event. This is important because other types of entities are not subject to the Companies Act and may have different thresholds for the passing of resolutions.
Finally, the fourth case that constitutes control of an entity is the acquisition of material influence over its policy. This reflects that no single shares or votes threshold is appropriate in every case.
Material influence is an existing concept under the Enterprise Act 2002, which denotes the lowest level of control that might give rise to a relevant merger situation that may be considered for competition or public interest reasons. Material influence captures acquisitions of smaller stakes or other rights or interests in entities, such as board representation and rights, which nonetheless enable a person materially to influence the policy of the entity.
Other factors, such as the status and expertise of the acquirer or a relationship of financial dependence, may be relevant. Clearly, determining whether material influence has been or is to be acquired will require an assessment of all the circumstances of the case by the Secretary of State. It is not possible, therefore, to provide any hard and fast rules that will be applicable in all cases.
The Competition and Markets Authority has published guidance about what it considers to constitute a material influence. The Secretary of State intends to apply that in so far as is possible in the context of this new regime, for the purposes of determining whether control has been or is to be gained over a qualifying entity.
For the avoidance of doubt, the Government have no plans to publish their own separate guidance on material influence. Collectively, these four cases represent the ways in which control of entities can be acquired for the purpose of the Bill. It is vital that they stand part of the Bill so that the Secretary of State may scrutinise acquisitions of control over entities in whatever form that takes. I hope that hon. Members will agree that this approach has been carefully considered to reflect the complexity of the make-up of modern entities.
Chi Onwurah
As we are over time, I shall not detain the Committee long, but I want to say a few words on this important clause. Our debate has again highlighted the Minister’s apparent determination and conviction that the Bill cannot be improved on, even as we all acknowledge––and as the Telecommunications (Security) Bill makes absolutely clear––that the Government’s record on national security in this context can very much be improved on. I noted his celebration of the innovators and entrepreneurs, and his concerns about the chilling effect on them of bringing debt holders into the Bill’s remit as proposed in the amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South.
The entrepreneurs and innovators seeking investment, particularly foreign investment, are unfortunately to have no such protection from the Minister. We want a consistent and robust approach, given the breadth of powers that the Bill gives to the Secretary of State. I was concerned that, even with the wise intervention of the hon. Member for Wyre Forest, the Minister did not make a proposal to take these constructive amendments away to consider and perhaps return with Government amendments that reflect them later in the Bill’s passage. We will not oppose stand part, but I hope that the Minister will continue to consider our suggestions for the improvement of this and other clauses.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 9
Control of assets
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Nadhim Zahawi
Clause 9 sets out, for the purposes of the Bill, the circumstances in which a person gains control of a qualifying asset, as defined in clause 7. A person gains control of a qualifying asset where they acquire a right or interest in, or in relation to, the asset, and as a result they can do at least one of the following.
First, they can use the asset or use it to a greater extent than prior to the acquisition. This would allow the Secretary of State to intervene, for instance, when an individual purchases a sensitive site and can therefore access and use the site. Secondly, they can direct or control how the asset is used, or direct or control its use to a greater extent than prior to the acquisition. This second mechanism by which a person can gain control over a qualifying asset is particularly important as it brings into the scope of the regime those who may not have complete control over the asset, but who can nevertheless still direct or control its operation. Without that, there would be a control loophole that hostile actors may seek to exploit.
It is worth noting the relationship between this clause and clause 11, which provides an exception for control of assets in circumstances where the acquisition is made for purposes wholly or mainly outside the individual’s trade, business or craft. That is intended to put acquisitions such as consumer purchases firmly out of scope of this regime. I reassure hon. Members that the Secretary of State does not routinely expect to call in trigger events relating to assets. However, I hope that the Committee will agree that it is nevertheless important for the Secretary of State to retain this power to guard against hostile actors who seek to acquire control over sensitive assets as an alternative to acquiring the business which owns them.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 1 agreed to.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. ––(Michael Tomlinson.)
National Security and Investment Bill (Seventh sitting)
Thursday 3rd December 2020
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 3 December 2020 - (3 Dec 2020)
The Chair
Good morning, everyone. Before we begin, I have a few preliminary points. As usual, please switch your electronic devices to silent; I just remembered to do mine. The Hansard reporters would be grateful if Members could email any electronic copies of their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk.
Clause 11
Exceptions relating to control of assets
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Nadhim Zahawi)
Clause 11 is intended to provide an exemption for certain asset acquisitions, which would otherwise be trigger events. The power to call in acquisitions of control over qualifying assets, as defined in clauses 7 and 9, will significantly expand the Government’s ability to protect our national security.
The clause ensures that these new powers will not extend to certain acquisitions made by individuals for purposes that are wholly or mainly outside the individual’s trade, business or craft. The Government do not believe, for example, that it would be right for the Secretary of State to be able to intervene in consumer purchases. Given their nature, such acquisitions cannot reasonably be expected to give rise to national security risks.
Moreover, a regime which could apply to such circumstances would quickly become impractical and could result in significant numbers of additional notifications for no national security gain whatsoever. As such, this clause explicitly limits the types of assets that the Secretary of State may scrutinise in line with the Government’s intention that the regime will primarily concern control of entities and only extend to assets as a precautionary backstop.
It would mean, for example, that sales of software products to consumers by a software company would not be caught by the regime, but—this is important—it would not prevent a transaction involving the software company selling the underlying code base supporting that software to a buyer acting in a professional capacity from the possibility of call-in under the regime, where that might give rise to a national security risk.
The Government have also carefully considered whether certain types of assets should remain outside this exemption clause. We have concluded that all assets that are either land or subject to export controls, as my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest regularly reminds us, should not fall within the exemption. This approach, I believe, reflected in the clause, recognises the unique nature of the risks posed by land acquisitions and proximity risk to certain UK sites, as well as the particularly sensitive nature of items on the export control lists. The Government consider that this approach is proportionate and appropriately exempts acquisitions that do not give rise to national security risks, while ensuring flexibility exists to scrutinise hostile actors directly targeting the acquisition of sensitive assets.
Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP)
I note that subsection (2) lists some exceptions, many of which are framed in terms of regulations of the European Parliament and the European Council. Let me ask the Minister two things. First, why is that the case, given that we will be completely out of the European Union in a matter of days? Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, if the European Parliament and the European Council were to amend those regulations, do the Government intend to amend this legislation to keep in step with what is happening in the rest of the European Union?
Nadhim Zahawi
I am happy to write to the hon. Gentleman on that detail.
Question put and agree to.
Clause 11 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12
TRIGGER EVENTS: SUPPLEMENTARY
Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 16, in clause 12, page 8, line 4, leave out from “does” to end of line 11 and insert
“establishes that arrangements are in progress or contemplation which, if carried into effect, would result in a trigger event taking place.”
This amendment would expand the scope of events to be considered trigger events.
Chi Onwurah
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Twigg, and to see the Committee reconvened to debate this important Bill. On Tuesday, we had a lively, informative and generally collegiate debate in which we learned a significant amount about the Bill and each other. We learned, for example, that the hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs has an interest in low pay, the hon. Member for South Ribble is a scientist, the hon. Member for Wyre Forest has a great interest in defending business investment, and my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test knows well the difference between “may” and “shall”, and entered Parliament at the same time as yourself, Mr Twigg. We learnt that my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South has a great interest in defending our national security through supply chains. We learnt that I have a tendency to mispronounce and misplace my hon. colleagues’ constituencies—something that I am working on. We also learnt that the Minister feels this Bill is perfect in every way, clause and subsection, such was his reluctance to accept the most constructive and helpful amendments—I would say—put forward by the Opposition. As we look at our amendments today, I gently point out to the Minister that that is not a view held by everyone across the House, even by Government Members. I note the letter sent yesterday by the Intelligence and Security Committee pointing out several aspects that we have raised, requiring clarification and significantly indicating its intention—or desire—to be a greater part of both the scrutiny of this Bill and its implementation. I hope that in today’s deliberations we will meet with more support from the Minister.
We had lively debates on Tuesday and some votes, which as I have indicated that we did not win. Amendment 16, in my name and those of my hon. Friends, is a probing amendment. We seek to understand that the Minister fully understands the provisions of his Bill. That is an absolutely appropriate thing to do, as hundreds of thousands of business and individuals will be impacted by it and will have to seek to understand it. It is appropriate that we test the impact of the Bill now, particularly as the Minister has many competing duties, and, as we understand, is taking on more onerous ones.
Clause 12 contains supplementary provisions in relation to determining when a trigger event that takes place over more than one day is to be treated as taking place, and determining whether a trigger event is in progress or contemplation in circumstances where a person has entered into an agreement or arrangement that enables them to do something in the future that would result in a trigger event taking place. The amendment, as we have framed it, would considerably expand the scope of events that could be considered trigger events. In effect, it would give the Secretary of State power to call in events under contemplation, by leaving out from “does” to the end of line 11 and inserting:
“establishes that arrangements are in progress or contemplation which, if carried into effect, would result in a trigger event taking place”.
As we have discussed, the Bill gives significant powers to the Secretary of State and the amendment would significantly expand notification volumes. There are many minor transactions where parties agree that someone might have the right to buy more shares in the future, and, in themselves, these transactions do not create direct influence and are unlikely to create a threat to national security. We recognise that the amendment would require all such minor transactions to be notified; it would seek to reflect the potential intention that these minor transactions may be part of a greater contemplation of something which would lead to a trigger event.
We recognise that Government would already have the power to intervene, through notification, once a trigger event takes place, so this amendment brings all possible future trigger events into scope, not just actual, or likely, future events.
Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg. On the point on these disguised elements, does my hon. Friend agree that the issue is about not simply shareholding, but, as we heard in the evidence sessions, membership of boards, and how voting rights might not necessarily be in line with shareholding percentages, and that they can be distorted at a future date?
Chi Onwurah
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that intervention. He makes a good point, which reflects why we are proposing this amendment to test the Bill. As he says, influence can be exercised in a wide range of ways.
I will elaborate on this later, but we must recognise that hostile parties will not sit back and see the Bill, then say “Oh well, that’s fine; we won’t try anything against the United Kingdom’s security,” as a consequence. They will seek ways to game and effect an influence regardless. Changes to the relationships between voting rights and shareholdings, for example, might be one way where they could seek to bypass the Bill.
I recognise that this is a wide-ranging amendment, but I seek to understand how the Minister feels that the Bill, as it stands, can address the kinds of concerns that my hon. Friend has just raised. This also reflects—I emphasise this again—the approach that we are taking, as the Opposition, on the Bill. The first priority and central plank of that approach is to put our national security first, and to do everything that we can to secure the strategic and economic resources on which our security relies; that focus on putting national security first motivates this probing amendment.
As my hon. Friend indicated, there can be a number of contingent investment transactions where parties agree to future events that transfer controls or influence. For example, a buyer might buy a low share of a company today, but might acquire with it the right to influence its shareholding in the future to levels of material influence.
I think the Minister will agree that we must watch out for these disguised transactions. They can start with innocuous levels of shareholdings, but set the ground for harder-to-notice increases in influence. At the moment, the Bill leaves out these transactions from the scope of notification, so the Government could not intervene. The amendment is therefore intended to probe the Government’s approach.
Nadhim Zahawi
I thank the hon. Lady and share her reflections on the collegiate way the Committee has worked. I also thank her for her comments on the quality of the Bill. It is testament to the quality of the team that has worked on it—I place on record my thanks to the excellent civil servants who have worked on the Bill—and the level of consultation. We heard from the hon. Member for Aberavon, who is not in his place, that this has been a long time coming. There was the Green Paper in 2017, the White Paper in 2018 and then the consultation. There was, of course, deep consultation before the laying of the Bill as well.
Chi Onwurah
I thank the Minister for his comments. I want to make it clear that we are not in any way indicating any criticism of the civil servants who have worked hard, in extremely difficult conditions in the midst of a pandemic, to bring the Bill before us. I think we can all agree—we had some discussion on Tuesday about the nature of parliamentary scrutiny—that the objective of the process is that the Bill benefits.
Nadhim Zahawi
Hear, hear—I agree with every word.
For the benefit of the Committee, I will begin with clause stand part, before turning to the amendment. The Secretary of State’s power to call in trigger events that have taken place is limited to a maximum of five years after the trigger event takes place and six months after the Secretary of State becomes aware of the trigger event. It is important to bear that in mind when discussing the amendment. That means that the issue of timing as to when a trigger event actually takes place is incredibly important. Many trigger events will have a self-evident completion date, as supported by contractual or other legal agreements. However, some trigger events may be less clearcut. There could be terms agreed formally by the parties, followed by further documentation, leading to a formal completion, all spread out over a period of time.
The clause ensures that where a trigger event takes place over a period of more than one day, or if it is unclear when during a period of more than one day the event has taken place, the last day of that period is treated as the date the trigger event takes place. In addition, the clause seeks to provide clarity about when a trigger event may be considered to be in progress or contemplation, where a person enters into an agreement or arrangement enabling them to do something in the future that would result in a trigger event taking place. It makes clear that entering into such agreements or arrangements, including contingent ones, does not necessarily mean that a trigger event is in progress or contemplation at the time the agreement or arrangement is entered into.
Amendment 16 would ensure that a person entering into any agreement or arrangement that enables the person, contingently or not, to do something in the future that would result in a trigger event taking place would be deemed a trigger event in progress or contemplation for the purposes of the Bill. I welcome the intention to ensure that the Secretary of State can be notified about acquisitions before they take place and I understand the motivation behind that. That is very much the Government’s policy. Indeed, the inclusion of mandatory notification and clear requirements within the proposed 17 sectors illustrates that approach in the most sensitive parts of the economy.
The timing of any notification is clearly very important. It must contain sufficient information for the Secretary of State to decide whether to give a call-in notice. That means that a proposed acquisition must be at an advanced enough stage that all the key details are known: for example, the names of all the parties involved, the size of any equity stake in the entity or asset, and the specifics of any other rights—such as any board appointment rights, which the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington cited in his intervention—being provided to the acquirer.
In some cases, however, such details may be known, but the likelihood of a trigger event actually taking place may still be low because the acquisition is conditional. For example, the striking of a futures contract or an options agreement may stipulate conditions that must be met before the acquirer is required to, or has the right to, acquire a holding in an entity or an asset. Such arrangements are common in the marketplace where, for example, a company’s future share price might be the basis of a conditional acquisition. Equally, lenders provide finance to many UK businesses on the basis of conditional agreements, often with collateral put up by the business as security in return for the loan. Those terms may, subject to certain conditions being met, allow the lender to seize collateral if repayments are not made as agreed.
Peter Grant
Can the Minister explain, first of all, why subsections (3) and (4) are included here as part of a supplementary clause when they clearly affect definitions, and as such go to the very heart of the Bill? The main clause is about defining the date on which something has happened for the purposes of calculating when later stages have to take place, but subsections (3) and (4) not only apply to those timings; they apply to everything in the Bill. I wonder whether the Minister could explain why those subsections are not included in one of the earlier clauses.
Secondly, I understand the Minister’s argument, but would it not be more prudent to work on the assumption that if somebody insists on some kind of contingent future rights being built into an agreement, they think there is a possibility that they will have to exercise them? Would it not therefore be prudent for the Government to work on the assumption that they are likely to be exercised? If not, is the Minister not concerned that we could have a situation where a whole series of small events, none of which looks particularly significant by itself, adds up to something that does become significant when taken in sequence, but there might never have been a stage during that process where the Bill, or the Act, allowed the Government to intervene?
Nadhim Zahawi
I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s intervention. I am just getting to the crux of the resistance to this amendment on the Government Benches, so if he will allow me, I will do that. As far as subsections (3) and (4) are concerned, we think they are exactly where they should be in the Bill.
In the loan scenario, obviously loans are routinely paid back by businesses as planned, so lenders do not have the option of enforcing any rights towards collateral. Indeed, even where businesses default on payments, lenders will often look for an alternative way to recoup their funds, such as restructuring the repayment amounts or repayment period. That is why the Secretary of State generally only expects to be notified about and, if the legal test is met, to call in acquisitions when they are genuinely in progress or contemplation, not just when they are optional or might take place in the future, as the amendment would effectively do. That could include where an option holder had resolved to exercise their option, or where a lender had decided to enforce their collateral.
None the less, the clause as drafted does provide the Secretary of State with the ability to call in at the time agreements or arrangements are entered into. That would be determined on a case-by-case basis and would, as per subsection (4), take into account how likely it is in practice that the person will do the thing that would result in a trigger event taking place. The amendment put forward by the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central—she is right to probe on this—would mean that entry into any agreement or arrangement under which a trigger event could take place in future would be treated as a trigger event currently in progress or contemplation, allowing it to be notified and called in by the Secretary of State. We believe that this would—unintentionally, I am sure—have two significant negative implications.
Chi Onwurah
I thank the Minister for his response. I listened carefully to what he laid out. I have some considerations, which I do not feel he fully addressed.
In broad terms, he raised many points that I have raised about why the amendment is broad in scope and could lead to a huge increase in the number of potential trigger events. However, I think he said that hundreds of thousands of actions or contemplations would be considered trigger events. I think it is truer to say that they could be considered trigger events and that the power to consider them as trigger events or not, as in the wording of our amendment, would lie with the Secretary of State. It is a broadening of the Secretary of State’s powers to consider the contemplation of future acts as a trigger event. That is the aim, rather than necessarily bringing them all into scope.
I will not debate with the Minister whether we can trust the Secretary of State to exercise those powers in a proportionate way, but I think he is effectively saying that the concern is that the Secretary of State would not have the resources to do that. I still did not hear him address the gaming point—the idea that transactions would be deliberately set up in a way that escapes the remit of the Bill. The increased powers for the Secretary of State would address that.
I was also concerned that the Minister said that if an event was called in at this stage, it could not be called in again, even if there was material new information. Surely if a trigger event occurred in future, such as shareholding going above 25%, it could be called in, regardless of whether it had been called in earlier under the amendment. Would he like to respond to that question, particularly as to how this increases the powers of the Secretary of State, rather than necessarily significantly increasing the number of trigger events?
The Chair
Order. To be clear, you are asking the Minister to intervene, because he cannot come back afterwards.
Chi Onwurah
I am disappointed that the Minister chose not to address the genuine concern about the provisions in the Bill being gamed by hostile actors.
I share his concerns about increasing the powers of the Secretary of State at a time when, as we understand, there are many more calls on the Department’s responsibilities and it may not have the resources. We have already noted the conflict of interest that can occur between national security and the Department’s focus on increased investment.
As I said, this is a probing amendment, so I will not press it to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 13
Approval of notifiable acquisition
Chi Onwurah
I beg to move amendment 17, in clause 13, page 8, line 22, at end insert—
“(4) The Secretary of State must publish guidance that covers—
(a) consideration of the impact of a notifiable acquisition being deemed void under subsections (1) and (3), with particular regard to the impact on consequential obligations, liabilities and rights in completed events;
(b) who constitutes a “materially affected” person under Clause 16(1); and
(c) the informational and evidential standards that would underpin the requirement for completion “in accordance with the final order” at subsection (3).
(5) Guidance as set out under subsection (4) must be published within 3 months of this Bill becoming an Act and the Secretary of State shall review the guidance once every 12 months thereafter.”
This amendment would mandate the Secretary of State to publish guidance on the approval process of notifiable acquisitions.
Chi Onwurah
Amendment 17 addresses the unwinding of void transactions. Clause 13, which is the start of chapter 3 of the Bill, is concerned with the approval of notifiable acquisitions. It provides that:
“A notifiable acquisition that is completed without the approval of the Secretary of State is void.”
It is a short clause with only three subsections, of which that is the first. Subsection (2) says that the Secretary of State may approve a notifiable acquisition by giving a notification, making a final order, or giving a final notification under various clauses. Subsection (3) says:
“A notifiable acquisition, in relation to which a final order has been made, that is completed otherwise than in accordance with the final order, is void.”
I want to emphasise the consequences and impact of such a short clause. Our amendment adds a new subsection that says that the Secretary of State must publish guidance that covers
“consideration of the impact of a notifiable acquisition being deemed void…with particular regard to…consequential obligations, liabilities and rights in completed events;…who constitutes a ‘materially affected’ person…and…the informational and evidential standards that would underpin the requirement for completion ‘in accordance with the final order’ at subsection (3).”
The amendment effectively mandates the Secretary of State to publish guidance on how the mechanism of deeming non-compliant transactions void would work in practice. Once again, we tabled it genuinely in the spirit of improving the Bill, because this issue is potentially a hugely significant part of it. The two words “is void” have a huge impact, which needs to be unpacked. This is a constructive amendment; we want to ensure that there is clarity for small and medium-sized enterprises, and accountability to Parliament, on how the new powers will be exercised.
I know that the Minister rejected further new powers in the last amendment, but even without them these new powers are significant. We welcome the expanded powers to tackle national security concerns, but we need to ensure that they come with accountability and guidance. The ability for transactions to be deemed legally void where they have not been approved by the Secretary of State, or where they have not complied with the Secretary of State’s final order, has potentially huge repercussions. Again, it marks a radical shift from today’s regime under the Enterprise Act 2002 and from the Government’s White Paper.
Under the “legally void” provision, transactions that took place three to five years ago could now be immediately deemed void. If the first transaction in a chain were deemed void, that would leave the legal rights and entitlements of all subsequent transaction parties in total uncertainty. That is not just a theoretical concern that we are raising to test or probe the Bill, but a truly practical one. A number of investment transactions involve a change of shareholder parties over a three to five-year period. The automatic default of non-compliant transactions becoming void would mean an impossible series of rights, entitlements and changes having to be unwound. It may well be practically unworkable and legally uncertain.
Katherine Fletcher (South Ribble) (Con)
I appreciate the point that the hon. Lady is making, in that transactions over a period of three to five years could become complex, but surely if something is called in and deemed void in the overriding interest of national security there will be an extremely good reason for it. Although the complexity of downstream transactions is regrettable, we would be acting in the British interest if we had to trigger these powers.
Chi Onwurah
I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention, which by and large I agree with. That is why we are not seeking to remove the power, but to ensure that the Government and the Secretary of State explain how it would work in practice. She is right that if a bad or hostile actor has deliberately gone behind our national security framework, or the legislation as set out in the Bill, to undertake a transaction, the consequences will be on their head. However, there might be a series of other transactions as a consequence that were not made by bad or hostile actors—I will give some examples—and the impact on them should be set out, as far as possible, to give some clarity, because this is a huge area of uncertainty.
As has been stated on a number of occasions, we attract more foreign investment than any European Union country, and one reason why the UK is such an attractive location for foreign investment is that we have a robust legal framework that is trusted globally, but by giving rise to uncertainty the clause might impact that. We are not seeking to remove this power, but to have it properly explained, as far as possible.
Nadhim Zahawi
I thank the hon. Lady for her constructive engagement with the whole Bill, and especially with clause 13. She referred to the Intelligence and Security Committee, and this Committee will know that I have written to the Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee.
However, in answer to one of the questions raised in the letter that has been circulated to the Committee, which the hon. Lady referred to, it would clearly not be appropriate for me to speculate on individual cases, not least because decisions on past interventions have been taken by previous Ministers or Governments, who made their decisions based on the facts as they were known at the time. The Enterprise Act 2002 has provided a robust basis for nearly two decades to intervene on mergers that might have raised concern. However, it is also right that we modernise our powers, and that is exactly what this Bill will do.
The Bill provides—we had a similar discussion about that at Second Reading—that if an asset or company is deemed very valuable to the United Kingdom, it does not matter who the acquirer is, even if they are from a friendly nation, and an intervention can still be made by the Secretary State.
Clause 13 sets out the mechanisms by which the Secretary of State may approve a notifiable acquisition. After I have set out the rationale for the clause, I will speak to the amendment itself. As I have set out previously, notifiable acquisitions are acquisitions of certain shares or voting rights in specified qualifying entities active within 17 sensitive sectors of the economy. These acquisitions must be notified to, and require approval from, the Secretary of State before they may take place.
That approval can be given in three ways. First, when a mandatory notice is submitted by the acquirer, the Secretary of State may decide not to exercise the call-in power—for example, because he does not reasonably suspect that a national security risk may arise. In those circumstances, he is required to notify each relevant person, following the review period of up to 30 working days, that no further action will be taken under the Bill in relation to the proposed notifiable acquisition.
Secondly, when the Secretary of State exercises the call-in power in relation to the notifiable acquisition, he may make a final order at the end of the assessment process, which, in effect, gives approval to the notifiable acquisition, subject to conditions. Again, in that instance the notifiable acquisition is clear to proceed.
Thirdly, as an alternative to the previous scenarios, at the end of the full assessment process the Secretary of State may ultimately conclude that no remedies are required. In those circumstances, he is required to give a final notification that confirms that no further action will be taken under the Bill in relation to the call-in notice. Once more, that means that the acquisition is cleared to take place.
Chi Onwurah
I thank the Minister for eloquently setting out the clause. I have to suggest that he not place words into my mouth—certainly as we have such excellent reporting. Although I did not say that I thought it was an excellent deterrent, I did indicate that it could be an effective deterrent, were it considered workable.
Nadhim Zahawi
I am grateful for that clarification. I wrote down the hon. Lady’s words. She did say that it is an excellent deterrent, and went on to make her argument for the amendment.
To return to the substance, the provision means that the acquisition has no legal effect if it is void. It is not recognised by the law as having taken place. Clearly, voiding is a situation that it is in the interests of all parties to avoid, which should act as a powerful compliance incentive, if I can describe it as such. The Government’s view is that voiding is the logical result of a regime based on mandatory notification and clearance for acquisitions in the most sensitive sectors before they take place.
Although the Secretary of State, or the courts, may be in a position to punish non-compliance with criminal or civil sanctions, voiding is necessary to limit or prevent risks to national security that may otherwise arise where such acquisitions take place without approval. For example, there may be day one risks whereby hostile actors acquire control of an entity and seek to extract its intellectual property and other assets immediately. This is a reasonable and proportionate approach, and in arriving at this position we have carefully considered the precedent of other investment screening regimes. For example, France, Germany and Italy all have voiding provisions.
Amendment 17 would require the Secretary of State to publish guidance within three months of Royal Assent and then review it annually in relation to the approval process for notifiable acquisitions. I have listened carefully to the hon. Lady’s case for the amendment, and I hope that I can begin on common ground by saying that clearly voiding an acquisition is something that it is in the interests of all parties to avoid. That is why we are consulting on the sector definitions covered by mandatory notification and clearance, rather than simply presenting them to Parliament and external stakeholders like a fait accompli in the Bill.
That approach will allow experts from the sectors and the legal profession, and businesses and investors, to help us to refine the final definitions and tighten them up to ensure that the regime is targeted and provides legal certainty. Equally, mandatory notification applies only to the clearest acquisitions, focused on objective thresholds of shares and voting rights. Together, that will help acquirers to determine whether their acquisitions are in scope of mandatory notification, and therefore allow them to comply with their statutory obligation and avoid any voiding scenarios altogether.
Peter Grant
I agree that the sensible starting point is that, if a major transaction has not complied with legal requirements, it did not happen. As the shadow Minister outlined in her comments, however, it is easy to imagine situations in which the fact of a transaction such as this becoming void could have significant impacts on people who are completely innocent of any failure to comply with the law. Is the Minister comfortable with the fact that the Bill has almost literally nothing to say about those people and that there is not provision for any kind of redress? There is no statement as to what happens to people who may quite innocently find themselves facing significant detriment through the actions and failures of others.
Nadhim Zahawi
I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s intervention. As I was laying out, there is precedent from other screening legislation in Germany, France and elsewhere. Of course, the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central is concerned about the hundreds of thousands of people who may be shareholders in a company. If the acquisition was a notifiable acquisition and completed without approval, it is void, regardless of the number of shareholders.
I return to the point I was making before the hon. Gentleman’s intervention. Together, this will help the acquirers determine whether their acquisitions are in scope of mandatory notification. None the less, the Bill sets out the various ways in which an acquisition may be retrospectively validated, both proactively by the Secretary of State and in response to a validation application, where non-compliance occurs. I believe the guidance that the amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish is well meaning but fraught with difficulties.
There are a number of reasons why the Government must reject the suggested approach. First, the amendment is an invitation to the Secretary of State to, in effect, legislate through guidance to set out the legal implications of acquisitions being voided pursuant to clause 13. In our view, it would not be appropriate for the Secretary of State to do so, as it is for Parliament to legislate, but ultimately for the courts to interpret and apply that legislation.
The hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central will be aware of the much-quoted report from the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, which has emphasised the importance of avoiding guidance being used as a substitute for legislation. We have no intention to do so in respect of voiding.
Chi Onwurah
I confess that I am somewhat surprised by the Minister’s comments. Does he feel that all guidance is an invitation to the Secretary of State to effectively legislate through guidance? Is that something that the Minister feels is the case for all guidance? If that is the case, we will not be getting very much guidance for businesses at all. Does he not feel that, in terms of regulatory clarity, there should be effective help and guidance that is not legislation? He is right to say that it is for the legal system to interpret, but it is also right that we have clear laws to be interpreted. As the hon. Member for Glenrothes said, there is currently nothing in the Bill about what “voiding” means and what it could mean.
Nadhim Zahawi
Of course, not all guidance is guidance that the Lords Constitution Committee would have effectively considered to be a substitute for legislation. I will make some more headway, as I am conscious of the time.
Furthermore, the legal implications of voiding will depend on the particular facts of each case. It will ultimately be for the courts, as I said earlier, to resolve any disputes between parties.
Secondly, and for the same reasons, it would not be appropriate for the Secretary of State to publish guidance on who constitutes a “materially affected” person under clause 16(1). If it will assist the Committee, I will say that we consider these to be ordinary words of the English language and that whether a person has been materially affected by voiding will depend on the particular facts of each case. Ultimately, it will be for the courts to interpret this provision and to resolve any disputes between parties.
Thirdly, we do not consider guidance under paragraph (c) in the amendment to be necessary or appropriate. Final orders issued by the Secretary of State will need to be clear, and it is expected that in most instances they will follow extensive discussions with the parties so that all understand the conditions being imposed on the trigger event. That is equally true in relation to voided acquisitions scrutinised by the Secretary of State retrospectively. Where remedies imposed by the Secretary of State include restrictions on completion, it will be an objective question of fact, dependent on the circumstances of each case, whether the acquisition proceeds contrary to those conditions. This does not involve any determination by the Secretary of State, and it would ultimately be for the courts to resolve any disputes between parties, so it would not be appropriate for the Secretary of State to issue guidance setting out the “informational and evidential standards” that would apply. More generally, the value of any guidance would be limited, given that it would necessarily reflect the fact that retrospective validation will be dependent on the facts of an individual case.
The new regime understandably covers a broader range of acquisitions than is the case now. That is absolutely correct, as the hon. Lady stated. The combination of that fact with the reality that some voided acquisitions will come to light months or years after they take place and any number of events, involving numerous parties, may have occurred since then means that the Secretary of State must consider any validation application on a case-by-case basis. That is the right approach to keep this country safe, and this takes us back to the central issue that voiding is the logical result of a regime based on mandatory notification and clearance for acquisitions in the most sensitive sectors before they take place.
Chi Onwurah
I sense that the Minister’s speech is coming to a close. He makes the point that voiding is the logical consequence of the new regime, based on mandatory notification. I have said that we recognise that, but, further to the intervention by the hon. Member for Glenrothes, if it is the necessary consequence, why is it not included in the impact assessment?
Nadhim Zahawi
I thank the hon. Lady and the hon. Member for Glenrothes for their questions. It would be nigh on impossible to have an impact assessment as to what happened to a deal that should have been notified under the 17 sectors and then was voided. I believe that is something the Opposition should understand, in terms of the proportionality of the new regime, and I hope that it is something the hon. Lady and her colleagues can support. I hope that she will withdraw her amendment.
Chi Onwurah
I thank the Minister for his remarks. As I set out, we recognise the importance of this power. We were not seeking to remove the power to void—for transactions to be deemed void. But as I also set out, the two words “is void” have a huge impact, and it is of concern that neither the Bill nor the impact assessment addresses that. The Minister said that it would be impossible to assess the impact of voiding, but the impact assessment, where it looks at the number of affected businesses, estimates the number of investment decisions, notifications, security assessments and remedies. It makes estimates of all those, but has nothing to say on the number of potential voidings. That is a significant gap in the Bill and the impact assessment and, as a consequence, in the level of certainty and understanding about the Bill.
I have said a number of times that we are going from a standing start of 12 notifications in 18 years under the Enterprise Act 2002, which the Minister cited as having robust powers, to the almost 2,000 that we are expecting. Given his response, however, on which we see no likelihood of him moving, and given that we acknowledge the importance of the powers, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 13 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 14
Mandatory notification procedure
Sam Tarry (Ilford South) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 18, in clause 14, page 8, line 36, leave out “may” and insert “shall”.
This amendment seeks to make the Secretary of State’s prescription of regulation of the form and content of a mandatory notice mandatory.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 19, in clause 18, page 11, line 28, leave out “may” and insert “shall”.
This amendment seeks to make the Secretary of State’s prescription of regulation of the form and content of a voluntary notice mandatory.
Clause stand part.
Sam Tarry
It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg. These two amendments are simply about giving more direction. One issue that we have debated on every day of the Committee’s scrutiny so far is how the Bill will radically transform the merger control process and create an entirely new centre for that process within BEIS.
Small and medium-sized enterprises across the country will look at these changes with great interest and understanding that national security is important and imperative, but also with uncertainty as they consider the need to seek investment to grow and create jobs. We owe those businesses clarity, confidence and certainty in the new regime, which is why the amendment simply seeks to make the Secretary of State’s prescription of regulation of the form and content of a mandatory notice mandatory by deleting “may” and inserting “shall”.
The Bill gives some clarity on the assessment period and the review period under the new regime, but there is still major uncertainty about the first stage of the regime. It is unclear how long the Secretary of State can take to decide on rejecting a mandatory or voluntary notice. The Government’s consultation suggested that it would be as soon as reasonably practicable, but unfortunately that is of no assurance. For a new unit with major resourcing challenges, as soon as reasonably practicable could be far from soon.
My hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test spoke earlier in the week about his experience and the bad practice that could occur if the Secretary of State was left with so much discretion, rather than a little more compulsion. There are a number of examples, including the Energy Act 2013, where having “may” rather than “shall” meant that, in real terms, what was determined by the Bill never came into being.
Clause 66 of the Bill says that some clauses will immediately come into force, but it later says “may”. The Secretary of State could—hopefully he would not—wait for years or not do it at all. In both clauses referred to by the amendments, the regulations must be laid by the Secretary of State, and the term “may” creates some degree of uncertainty. It would be far better to take a more direct approach by inserting “shall”.
It is also unclear what specific form of content and information could be required in the mandatory or voluntary notices that firms and investors would have to provide. We could end that uncertainty. It is already an incredibly challenging time for firms to engage with a major new control process in the midst of a pandemic and, of course, while waiting to hear what our new relationship with the European Union will be.
Chi Onwurah
I thank my hon. Friend for the excellent remarks he is making. Is his experience of small and medium enterprises in Ilford South the same as mine in Newcastle, in that they generally do not have the time to fill out the multiple forms required to receive grants or to apply for support? To expect them not only to respond, but to design the form and decide what should go into it is really taking our small and medium enterprises for granted.
Sam Tarry
I agree. It is Small Business Saturday this weekend, and I imagine that many SMEs will be telling us when we are back in our constituencies about exactly these kinds of issues: the uncertainty, and the decisions they want to take about investment in staff, in technology and, of course, in equipment.
With this amendment we are trying to focus on ensuring that businesses have as much clarity as possible, so that they can begin to plan. If that uncertainty is ended, as we come out of the covid crisis and move forward from the debacle of Brexit, it will be better for businesses to have clarity, so that they can begin to take the positive decisions that will hopefully create jobs.
It is already challenging for firms to engage in such a tricky process. Remember that small and medium enterprises will not have the vast resources that are perhaps available to the multinationals or mergers-and-acquisitions-type companies from which we heard evidence. It will be far more frightening for SMEs to face such things given everything else they are dealing with at the moment.
The amendment would go a long way towards ending uncertainty for SMEs and ensuring that the Government act with clarity and, of course, with competence. It would require the Government to publish guidance on the form and content of the notices that firms will have to fill out. There will always be a degree of paperwork for businesses, but this is about ensuring that it can be filled in as quickly as possible. The recommendation is that guidance should create efficient forms and content requirements, and that it contains some indication of how long the Government will take to accept or reject a mandatory or voluntary notice,
Matt Western
My hon. Friend is making some important points. The issue here, as he is illustrating, is simply that the pressures that SMEs face in particular are about cash-flow and attracting inward investment. They do not have the resources or the capacity to cope with those sorts of approaches and will be under huge pressure. That is why the amendment is so important.
Sam Tarry
My hon. Friend makes a good point. Businesses are feeling huge pressure. SMEs will often experience a degree of fear at the moment about potentially having to grapple with a whole series of new regulations—not just under this important Bill, but under the spin-outs that come out of our ongoing negotiations with the European Union. Many businesses are, I think, holding back on investment and investment decisions—even inward investment into their own company—simply because of the uncertainty. It is incredibly important to remove those barriers and to get people back investing in both staff and technology and feeling that they have the ability to see forward far enough to keep staff on the books through such a difficult crisis.
Chi Onwurah
My hon. Friend is making an excellent point about Brexit, but I will not test the Committee’s patience on that. As for the changing forms and the requirements on SMEs, does my hon. Friend understand why the Minister is putting the onus for deciding what information is required on to small businesses, rather than on to his Department and the civil service, which could do that?
Sam Tarry
One of the things that we have probed a number of times, when taking evidence from witnesses and in our debates in Committee, is the idea that we need to give businesses clarity, because many are feeling uncertain. If they cannot make decisions about forward planning, clearly that will be detrimental as we move through the crisis.
Perhaps I should refer to some of the expert evidence we heard last week. Michael Leiter, who represents a very large, global limited liability partnership, told us:
“I think this is a rather seismic shift in the UK’s approach to review of investment… having some opportunity to make sure that both the private sector and the public sector are ready for that and understand the rules…is particularly important”.––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 46, Q52.]
That was in our discussion about resourcing, and one of the questions that I and colleagues on both sides of the Committee raised was on the resourcing of BEIS. As my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central suggested, rather than the burden falling on small and medium-sized enterprises, there should be a fully resourced and expanding new unit within BEIS. Given that the number of call-ins could rise from 12 to 1,800, as we have heard, we need a huge scaling up of BEIS’s ability to look at these, and obviously it does not have the same experience that the Competition and Markets Authority had previously.
I humbly point out that the Minister assured the House on Second Reading that:
“The investment security unit will ensure that clear guidance is available to support all businesses engaging with investment screening”.—[Official Report, 17 November 2020; Vol. 684, c. 277.]
The amendment is intended to secure that assurance in substance; not to tie the hands of the Secretary of State, but to give clarity to businesses by shifting from something that may happen to something that shall happen.
Peter Grant
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg. I know that there was quite a bit of discussion in an earlier sitting, which I was unable to attend, about the different between “may” and “must”. In relation to clause 14—my comments apply also to clause 18—if we try to imagine the circumstances in which the Secretary of State would choose not to make those regulations, we realise that there are none. If no regulations have been made, most of subsection (6), which clearly is the meat of the clause, just does not make sense.
Subsection (6) states that the Secretary of State may reject the mandatory notice if
“it does not meet the requirements of this section”.
But the clause does not place any requirements on the notice. A letter that says, “Dear Secretary of State, this is a notice under section 14” would meet all the requirements of that subsection, so it cannot be rejected on those grounds. Clearly, it cannot be rejected on the grounds that
“it does not meet the requirements prescribed by the regulations”,
unless the Secretary of State has made the regulations. It can be rejected if
“it does not contain sufficient information to allow the Secretary of State to”
make a decision. How can it possibly be fair for a business to have a notice rejected on the grounds that it does not contain sufficient information to allow a decision to be made by somebody who has chosen not to state what information needs to be provided?
Therefore, two of the grounds on which the Secretary of State can reject the notice are meaningless. The third one has meaning, but it is surely not a reasonable way to treat any business. If there is information that the Secretary of State feels will be necessary to allow her or him to come to a decision on the notice, surely that information should be set out in regulations so that there can be no doubt.
It is perfectly in order for the statutory form of notice to require additional information that cannot be specified in advance. Clearly, the Bill will cover a wide range of transactions, and there will always be information that is needed for one transaction but maybe not for others, but surely we will need to know the name of the acquirer, the identity of the asset and the timing of the intent to acquire. It will be impossible to process any notice without those kinds of things, so surely the Secretary of State will at the very least make regulations requiring that information to be provided. If the Minister can persuade me that there are realistic circumstances in which the Secretary of State can choose not to make any regulations at all, perhaps I would not support the amendment, but the clause will simply not work if the regulations have not been made. For that reason, it should require the Secretary of State to make those regulations.
The Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty’s Treasury (Michael Tomlinson)
On a point of order, Mr Twigg. I beg to move—
Michael Tomlinson
I apologise to the hon. Member for Glenrothes; I will wait.
Peter Grant
It is easy to see that there will be circumstances where “as soon as reasonably practicable” becomes a very open-ended time limit—or non-time limit—indeed.
Given that so much of the rest of the Bill puts time limits on the Secretary of State to ensure that potentially beneficial transactions cannot be held up forever simply due to delays in the Department, the combination of the words “as soon as reasonably practicable” in subsection (5), right at the start of the process, and the massive uncertainty in the minds of businesses if the Secretary of State does not make regulations persuades me that the Bill should not allow the Secretary of State to make those regulations but should require the Secretary of State to make them, because the clause simply does not work or make sense if they are not made.
Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Michael Tomlinson.)
National Security and Investment Bill (Eighth sitting)
Thursday 3rd December 2020
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 3 December 2020 - (3 Dec 2020)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
Order. I remind the Committee that interventions should be short. If Members wish to make wider points, they have an opportunity to make a speech, so they should seek to catch my eye while the lead amendment is being moved.
Clause 14
Mandatory notification procedure
Amendment proposed (this day): 18, in clause 14, page 8, line 36, leave out “may” and insert “shall”.—(Sam Tarry.)
This amendment seeks to make the Secretary of State’s prescription of regulation of the form and content of a mandatory notice mandatory.
Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Amendment 19, in clause 18, page 11, line 28, leave out “may” and insert “shall”.
This amendment seeks to make the Secretary of State’s prescription of regulation of the form and content of a voluntary notice mandatory.
Clause stand part.
Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)
I will not take up too much of the Committee’s time, but I wish to say a few words about the excellent contribution that my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South has made to our continuing discussions about “may” and “must”. It is a particularly egregious case that he has highlighted. If we look at the number of “musts” that appear in clause 14—this point has been made by other Members—we see that the subsequent “musts” would fall immediately if the Secretary of State may not prescribe by regulation the form and content of a mandatory notice—so the “must” in subsection (5) is relevant only if the Secretary of State does that in the first place, as are the “musts” in subsections (7) and (8), as my hon. Friend pointed out earlier.
There is also an interesting “must” at the beginning of the clause, which relates to the mandatory notification procedure itself. Subsection (1) states that
“a person must give notice to the Secretary of State before the person, pursuant to a notifiable acquisition…gains control in circumstances”
and so on. So subsection (1) appears to stand whether or not, in subsection (4), the Secretary of State decides to prescribe by regulation the form and content of a mandatory notice. That means that a person must provide a mandatory notice, even if the Secretary of State has not prescribed any form or content of that notice. The person may therefore have no idea what is to be in that mandatory notice, because the Secretary of State has not put it in regulations, but still they must give notice because this subsection says “must”.
That does not seem to be particularly proportionate. It appears to be constructed in such a way that, regardless of whether the concept is completely unknown to the person giving the notice, it is entirely up to the Secretary of State whether he or she makes the mandatory notice in any way comprehensible. I think that is quite an odd juxtaposition in this instance of “mays” and “musts”.
The “may” in subsection (6) is perfectly acceptable, in as much as its states that:
“The Secretary of State may reject the mandatory notice on one or more of the following grounds”.
That “may” is absolutely appropriate. However, the positioning of “must” right at the beginning of the clause, and the positioning of “may” in subsection (4), does not look reasonable to me. That could easily be solved by using the word “shall”, so that the situation is proportionate between those circumstances. That is the essence of the amendment 18, as my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South outlined earlier.
I accept that there have been a number of occasions when, although I have not particularly liked “may” going into a Bill, it has had some justification. However, the particular juxtaposition that we see here causes me to think that it is a rather important issue, as far as “may” and “shall” are concerned. I am interested to hear whether the Minister thinks that the wording could give rise to the sorts of problems that I have suggested, in the event that another Minister—not himself, of course—might be tempted not to produce such regulations when defining the form and content, because I think that could cause potential problems for reasonableness, as far as this clause is concerned.
Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)
I rise to give some thoughts on clause 14 stand part, but will also refer to the amendment proposed by my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South. Clause 14 is a critical part of this process, because it sets out the mandatory notification procedure. In some respects, it is the mandatory notification which places the greatest burden on those falling, or who might consider themselves to fall, within its remit. This is because it requires the person who is to make a notifiable acquisition to give a mandatory notice to the Secretary of State prior to the acquisition taking place.
The clause goes on to give the Secretary of State the option to set out the form and content of the mandatory notice. I shall come back to that. It then sets out the process by which the Secretary of State “must” decide whether to reject or accept that notice. If a mandatory notice is rejected, the Secretary of State must provide reasons in writing for that decision to be made. It also sets out the timescale elements and the persons to be notified. We recognise that mandatory notifications are an important part of making the Bill have the desired impact on our national security. It is absolutely right that in key areas the onus should be on those who will be aware that the transaction is taking place to notify the Secretary of State.
However, the amendment set out by hon. Friend is all about protecting and supporting the interests of small businesses. I am concerned that the Minister does not seem to be as vigilant about reducing the burden on and setting out the guidance for small businesses as we would like. All our constituencies have small businesses—it is often said that they are the lifeblood of the economy—yet in the Bill, and particularly in the clause, the Minister is not setting out the minimum support that they might require.
My hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test got to the nub of the matter in one of his very informative discussions about the difference between “must” and “may”. He observed that the “must” falls on the person who has to do the notifying. For example, it could be a small artificial intelligence start-up with a few members of staff, none of whom is a lawyer—remember that there are no de minimis provisions in the Bill for the size of the acquisition that must be notified—that is seeking investment from a foreign party. That start-up would be asked to indicate whether that investment would involve making a notification. Not only that, it must decide itself the form that the notification should take.
I really cannot understand why the Bill apparently seeks to give discretion to the Secretary of State to lighten his load, but not to our fantastic small businesses or to business generally. As my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South said, why should a small business, the notifier, also have to set out the format in which its notification takes place? Given that the clause sets out,
“The Secretary of State may by regulations prescribe the form”,
why can we not simply turn that into “shall by regulation prescribe the form and content of a mandatory notice”?
Equally, when voluntary notices are considered, I hope the Minister has some ideas about what should be in the notification. If he does, is it not simple and desirable for him to share his ideas with our business community, which in less than a month’s time is facing a huge change in how it trades and does business with the European Union, our largest trading partner by value? That involves countless new forms to be filled out, as we have discussed in the Chamber, some of which are not yet designed. At the same time that that is happening, to require that they should decide for themselves what is involved in a notification seems wholly unacceptable.
On that basis, I ask the Minister to set out whether he intends to accept the amendment. If not, will he tell us what work has gone on in the Department to look at the kind of information might be required? How will the impact assessment assess the likely level of familiarisation required for this legislation—there is a phrase that says that there is not expected to be a huge amount of familiarisation required in it—while at the same time there is no guidance, assessment or inkling about the kind of information that will be required to be included in that notification?
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Nadhim Zahawi)
I am grateful to the hon. Members for Ilford South, for Southampton, Test, and for Glenrothes, as well as to the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central, for their contributions on this set of amendments and clause 14. With the agreement of the Committee, I will begin with clause 14 stand part and then turn to the amendments.
Clause 14 provides a mechanism for proposed acquirers to notify the Secretary of State of notifiable acquisitions, which are those circumstances covered by clause 6. Contrary to what the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central said, we on this side of the House really do care about small business; indeed, we will be celebrating Small Business Saturday by highlighting the great small businesses that are trying to recover from covid-19. To avoid duplication or unnecessary burden for businesses and investors, if the Secretary of State has already given a call-in notice in relation to the proposed notifiable acquisition, no notification is required. Otherwise the proposed acquirer must submit a mandatory notice containing the necessary information for the Secretary of State to make a decision about whether to exercise the call-in power.
The Government carefully considered which parties should be legally responsible for this notification. In many cases we expect this to be a collaborative process between parties that have an aligned aim for the acquisition to take place. However, there may be instances where an acquirer who is purchasing shares from a number of individual sellers is the only party aware that, in totality, they are carrying out a notifiable acquisition. For example, if an acquirer buys 10% equity in an entity specified under the mandatory regime from two separate sellers—20% in total—each seller may be operating under the assumption their transaction does not meet the threshold of a notifiable acquisition. Equally, the entity itself may be unaware of these acquisitions until after they have taken place. As such, only the acquirer can reasonably be expected to know that their activities constitute a notifiable acquisition and the responsibility to notify therefore rests with them.
The precise information that will be required and the form of the mandatory notice will be set out in regulations by the Secretary of State in accordance with subsection (4). For the convenience of the House, the Government have recently published a draft of the information that is likely to be required in a mandatory notice. As hon. Members might expect, this is likely to include all the pertinent details about the acquisition, including the target entity, the nature of its business, the assets it owns, the parties involved, the details of the equity stake and any other rights that form part of the acquisition—for example, any board appointment rights.
Following acceptance of a satisfactory notification—for example, conforming to the format and content prescribed —the Secretary of State then has up to 30 working days to decide whether to exercise the call-in power, or to take no further action under the Bill. The Secretary of State will be entitled to reject a mandatory notice where it does not meet the specified requirements, or where it does not contain sufficient information for him to decide whether to give a call-in notice.
The nature of the information required should mean that such instances are rare, but it is crucial that the requirements of the notice are met in order for the 30-working-day clock to start only at the point the Secretary of State is in a position to make an informed decision. By the end of the 30-working-days review period, the Secretary of State must either give a call-in notice or notify each relevant person that no further action will be taken under the Bill. In effect, the latter clears the acquisitions to take place unconditionally.
The power to specify in regulations the content and form of the mandatory notice is an important one, as the Secretary of State may need to change this over time in response to the operation of the regime in practice, and in response to the volume and quality of such notices given and rejected. I certainly believe that this approach ensures that Parliament can scrutinise any such changes. This clause is a procedural necessity to give effect to the mandatory notification regime once notifiable acquisition regulations have been made, and I trust that it will be supported by both sides of the Committee.
Amendments 18 and 19 are designed to require the Secretary of State to make regulations specifying the form and content of a mandatory or voluntary notice, ensuring that the parties have clarity on what information they need to provide in order to have properly notified. That is undeniably important—I share the focus of the hon. Member for Ilford South on that point—so this is an entirely sensible proposition. I suggest, however, that the amendments are unnecessary because the Bill as drafted already achieves that aim.
In practice, in order for the notification regime to operate, the Secretary of State will first need to make regulations specifying the form and content of a notification, regardless of whether clauses 14 and 18 say that he “may” or “shall”. I pay homage to the hon. Member for Southampton, Test for introducing that experience to the Committee. Regardless of whether clauses 14 and 18 say that the Secretary of State “may” or “shall” make such regulations, the notification regimes cannot operate without the notification forms being prescribed in the regulations.
Chi Onwurah
I am somewhat confused. The Minister is saying that clause 14(4) in its entirety is unnecessary, because those things are already prescribed. Will he set out in more detail where they are already prescribed? He argues that they are already prescribed, but where are they prescribed?
Nadhim Zahawi
Let me make clear to the hon. Lady what I actually said, which was that whether clauses 14 and 18 say that the Secretary of State “may” or “shall” make such regulations, the notification regimes cannot operate without the notification forms being prescribed in regulations. My point is that whether the clauses say “may” or “shall”, it makes no difference. I therefore hope that the hon. Member for Ilford South will withdraw the amendment.
Sam Tarry (Ilford South) (Lab)
I have listened carefully to the Minister, and I feel that several issues have not been fully explored. The whole point of the amendment is to compel the Secretary of State to be clear that those regulations will be forthcoming in a timely manner, along with the reassurances that small and medium-sized enterprises seek. The amendment would mean that it was not the Secretary of State’s choice when or whether that happened. The use of the word “shall” would allow us to move forward more directly, because the Secretary of State would be compelled to do that as quickly as possible. On that basis, I will press the amendment to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Nadhim Zahawi
Clause 15 places a duty on the Secretary of State to consider whether to retrospectively validate a notifiable acquisition that was not approved by him before it took place. As I made clear in reference to clause 13, a notifiable acquisition that is completed without the approval of the Secretary of State is void. It is in the interests of all parties to avoid that situation, and voiding should act as a powerful incentive for compliance.
None the less, there may be instances where a notifiable acquisition takes place without approval and is therefore void, but the outcome is not a permanent necessity. This clause places a duty on the Secretary of State, following the point at which he becomes aware of the acquisition, to either exercise the call-in power in relation to the acquisition within six months or else issue a validation notice. A validation notice provided for by this Bill has the effect of treating the acquisition as having been completed without the approval of the Secretary of State, as though it were never void.
There are a number of circumstances in which the Secretary of State may decide not to issue a call-in notice in relation to a void acquisition. For example, as the Secretary of State may only call in trigger events, he may decide that the acquisition does not give rise to a trigger event—for instance, the acquisition of a 15% equity stake in a specified entity is a notifiable acquisition, but is not in and of itself a trigger event. A 15% stake may or may not, depending on the facts of the case, amount to or form part of a trigger event, namely the acquisition of material influence over the policy of the entity.
Alternatively, the Secretary of State may reasonably suspect that a trigger event has taken place but not reasonably suspect that it has given rise to, or may give rise to, a national security risk. In those situations, this clause requires the Secretary of State to give a validation notice in relation to the notifiable acquisition, which in effect provides the retrospective approval for the acquisition and means that it is no longer void. I should be clear that retrospective validation does not change the fact that the acquirer may have committed an offence by completing the acquisition without first obtaining approval. If an offence has been committed, criminal and civil sanctions will be available and may be used to punish that non-compliance.
As provided for by subsection (2)(a), where the Secretary of State decides, following consideration of a void acquisition, to exercise the call-in power in relation to it, he must give a call-in notice to the acquirer and such other persons as he considers appropriate. For the purposes of considering whether a trigger event has taken place under the Bill, including when deciding whether to exercise the call-in power, clause 1(2) provides that the effect of any voiding must be ignored, meaning that a notifiable acquisition that has been completed without approval can still amount to, or form part of, a trigger event even though it is of no legal effect.
This approach has been taken because a legally void acquisition may still result in a de facto exercise of the rights purportedly acquired and, consequently, a risk to national security. Where the call-in power is exercised in relation to a void acquisition, the case follows the conventional assessment process and is subject to the same statutory timelines and information-gathering powers. At the end of this process, the Secretary of State may decide to unconditionally clear the acquisition, resulting in a validation notice being issued and the acquisition no longer being void. Alternatively, he may impose remedies in a final order.
Dr Whitehead
I have a brief inquiry, following the Minister’s recent letter to me on a previous point raised in Committee, for which I thank him for his prompt attention. If a hostile company takes over another company, effectively puts it into liquidation and walks off with the intellectual property, patents and various other things, and those are out of the door by then, will it be necessary to provide a validation for the transaction, if it has not been previously notified or noticed, and to then pursue the consequences of that validation by subsequent means, given that the company was presumably in existence at the time of the validation, if not thereafter? Would that perhaps not be a cumbersome procedure?
Nadhim Zahawi
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that question; I will write to him on that point, rather than attempting to go through our thinking on this. He raises an important point on what happens after the effect.
Where the final order has the effect of clearing the acquisition outright, subject to conditions, the Bill provides that the acquisition is no longer void. Where the final order has the effect of blocking all or part of the acquisition, the Bill provides that the acquisition remains void to that extent. Further provision on this particular situation is made in clause 17. The deadline of six months for giving either a validation notice or a call-in notice was chosen by the Government to align closely with the Secretary of State’s other requirements to act within certain timescales under the Bill.
Chi Onwurah
I thank the Minister for his promise to write to my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test. The Minister mentioned on a number of occasions that a transaction is no longer void when a validation notice has been given. However, the transaction was void when completed, because it was completed without approval, so there will have been a period when it was void. What are the legal implications of that period?
Nadhim Zahawi
Is the hon. Lady is talking about a period when the Secretary of State was not aware of the transaction being void? If he is unaware of it, he is unable to act. It is only once he becomes aware, through a screening process or notification—
Chi Onwurah
I want to explain myself better. The question is not about what the Secretary of State can do, because I clearly understand that he cannot act on what he is not aware of. The fact of the transaction being deemed legally void for a period, which it will have been, may have some legal implications for the owners or the customers or whoever.
Nadhim Zahawi
Again, I am happy to write to the hon. Lady on that. Clearly, only when the Secretary of State is aware that a transaction is clearly in breach of the Bill is it then void. I am not clear as to what she is saying. Is she asking about before he is able to act?
Chi Onwurah
Let me clarify. Clause 13(1) states:
“A notifiable acquisition that is completed without the approval of the Secretary of State is void.”
It is void at the time it is completed, not at the time the Secretary of State becomes aware of it. Sometime later, the Secretary of State becomes aware of it and gives a retrospective clearing of it, but there will regardless have been a period where that transaction was void. What are the legal implications for the owners? It seems to me that having a transaction being void for a period would have some legal implications, regardless of whether the Secretary of State has cleared it.
Nadhim Zahawi
Again, I am happy to write to the hon. Lady on that point. Maybe I am being thick here, but the transaction only becomes void once the information is available to the Secretary of State. Is she talking about before that period?
Chi Onwurah
My understanding is that it becomes void at the point when the transaction is completed. At some point after that, the Secretary of State gives a retrospective validation, but there is nevertheless a period of one year, or however long it takes, when the transaction was void. Does that not have legal implications?
Nadhim Zahawi
I am happy to write to the hon. Lady on that point. What I think she is talking about is about the gap between the Secretary of State being aware and when the transaction actually took place, because the date where it is void is the date of the closing of that transaction, but I am very happy to write to her about that.
It is not in the interests of either the Government or the parties for the Secretary of State to have an unfettered ability to issue a call-in notice, perhaps long after he becomes aware of the notifiable acquisition. This approach provides a sensible mechanism for resolving the effects of automatic voiding arising from failures to receive clearance. I reassert my view that such situations should be rare, but it is only proper that the Bill provides such a mechanism for the Secretary of State to resolve them satisfactorily, should they arise. I hope hon. Members agree with that position.
Chi Onwurah
I thank all the hon. Members for their contributions, and the Minister for his remarks and his good humoured response to the interrogation on certain parts of this important clause. I recognise the importance of the clause and the importance of considering retrospective validations without application giving the all-consuming power through the voiding of notifiable acquisition without the approval of the Secretary of State. This debate has illustrated the need for greater clarity.
In the absence of the additional guidance that we were looking for in our earlier amendment, this has the possibility of becoming a legal goldmine for lawyers who are requested to give advice on what would or would not constitute a void transaction at what time. I raise that in the context of the requests of my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test and myself for greater clarity about the period, which may represent some sort of legal limbo, between when a transaction takes place but before it is given retrospective approval. However, we do not oppose the clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 15 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 16
Application for retrospective validation of notifiable acquisition
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Nadhim Zahawi
Clause 16 provides a mechanism for any person materially affected by a notifiable acquisition being void to make an application to the Secretary of State to retrospectively validate the acquisition. Although there is a duty in clause 15 for the Secretary of State to give a validation notice or a call-in notice within six months of becoming aware of the acquisition, we recognise that in practice that is often likely to be a process driven by the parties themselves. It may be, for example, that a party realises that their transaction was a notifiable acquisition only after the event, and wishes to take proactive steps to resolve the situation. The clause allows them to make a formal application for retrospective validation, following a similar process to the conventional mandatory notification route.
Subsection (3) enables the Secretary of State to make regulations prescribing the form and the content of a validation application. It is likely that that will closely resemble the mandatory notification form, given all of that information remains pertinent to the Secretary of State’s decision on whether to give a call-in notice. The Secretary of State will be entitled to reject the application where it does not meet the specified requirements, or contain sufficient information for him to decide whether to give a call-in notice.
If the validation application is accepted, all relevant parties must be notified and a 30 working-day review period begins. By the end of the review period, the Secretary of State must issue either a call-in notice or a validation notice. Once again, if a validation notice is issued, the acquisition is no longer void and the Secretary of State must confirm that no further action under the Bill will be taken in relation to that acquisition. As is the case with clause 15, retrospective validation through that route does not provide immunity against criminal or civil sanctions being pursued.
Validation does not change the fact that a notifiable acquisition did not have the Secretary of State’s approval prior to taking place. This is simply about how the acquisition itself should be treated, following the screening of all pertinent details relating to the acquisition. I hope that hon. Members will be supportive of parties being able to apply to the Secretary of State for a validation notice, and that they will see clause 16 as part of our business-friendly approach to the investment screening regime.
Dr Whitehead
This is more of a slightly extended intervention than a speech. The Minister has set out very clearly what the clause means and how it is to be operated, but I am not sure that he completely covered what the opinion of the Secretary of State may consist of. I am looking at subsection (8), which refers to the Secretary of State’s opinion that
“there has been no material change in circumstances since a previous validation application in relation to the acquisition was made.”
My concern is that the words “material change” are potentially subjective. That may be overridden by the fact that it is
“in the opinion of the Secretary of State”,
but there is no definition of what a material change might be considered to be, and what the boundaries of a material change consist of.
The provision does not say “no change”; it says “no material change”. Does the Minister consider that that is safe enough, in terms of the Secretary of State’s opinion overriding the material change, or does he consider that the subjectivity of a material change is potentially actionable if the Secretary of State were to say that there has been no material change, but somebody decided that the Secretary of State’s opinion was not reasonable or proportionate in the context of what has happened to a particular company?
Nadhim Zahawi
I think the hon. Gentleman has answered his own question. Obviously, I do consider that the Secretary of State’s ability on the opinion is safe.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 16 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 17
Retrospective validation of notifiable acquisition following call-in
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Nadhim Zahawi
Clause 17 provides for the retrospective validation of notifiable acquisitions that have been completed without approval, following the giving of a call-in notice in either of the situations covered by clauses 15 and 16. The previous two clauses detail how the Secretary of State may give a call-in notice in relation to a notifiable acquisition that has been completed without approval and is therefore void, either on his own initiative after he becomes aware of the acquisition or following a validation application.
Following call-in, there is a national security assessment process. The Secretary of State has a period of 30 working days to either make a final order imposing remedies or give a final notification confirming that no further action will be taken under the Bill in relation to the call-in notice. The Secretary of State may extend the assessment period by an additional period of 45 working days where the legal test is met. If a further legal test is met, the Secretary of State may agree a further extension or extensions with the acquirer.
Where the Secretary of State gives a final notification, in effect giving unconditional clearance to the acquisition, subsection (2) requires him to also issue a validation notice, which means that the acquisition is no longer void. That is because voiding cannot be maintained if there is no national security justification for it. Copies of that validation notice must be given to each person who receives a copy of the final notification, any person who made a validation application and anyone else the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
Alternatively, where, following the assessment process, the Secretary of State makes a final order imposing remedies, subsections (4) and (5) provide for so much of the void acquisition as is compatible with the final order to be validated. It may be helpful if I explain what that means, with some specific examples.
Where a final order has the effect of clearing the acquisition outright, subject to conditions, it means that the entire acquisition is no longer void. Where a final order has the effect of blocking all or part of the acquisition, the acquisition remains void to that extent. That means, for example, that where the Secretary of State decides that it is necessary and proportionate, for the purpose of safeguarding national security, to block 51% of a void 100% acquisition of an entity through a final order, 49% of the acquisition will be validated and the remaining 51% will remain void.
The Bill does not seek to prescribe how such a decision is delivered by the various parties in all circumstances. The Government recognise that some acquisitions may involve a range of sellers and the Secretary of State may not wish to stipulate in every case which constituent parts of the notifiable acquisition should remain void and which should be validated. Rather, we expect the Secretary of State to set out the end state that the acquirer must arrive at and to consider proposals from them to meet these obligations as part of the assessment process before a final order is made.
Any dispute between the parties arising out of how the void or validated elements are chosen will be a private matter for the parties. The Bill does not attempt to limit or cut across any restitutive action taken by the parties against one another if they deem it necessary as a result of the notifiable acquisition, or a proportion of it, remaining void.
This overall approach absolutely fits with our desire for the regime to be as reasonable and proportionate as possible. We have incorporated requirements for notifiable acquisitions to be retrospectively validated where the call-in power is not exercised in relation to them: where they do not pose a risk to national security, for example, or where the call-in power is exercised but ultimately no further action is taken in relation to them after the assessment process. We have developed a tailored approach through this clause, which provides for so much of a void acquisition as is compatible with a final order, and therefore with national security, to be validated automatically.
This is the legislation of a Government seeking to balance the country’s national security and prosperity interests. I hope colleagues on both sides of the Committee will support that approach in the clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 18
Voluntary notification procedure
Amendment proposed: 19, in clause 18, page 11, line 28, leave out “may” and insert “shall”.—(Sam Tarry.)
This amendment seeks to make the Secretary of State’s prescription of regulation of the form and content of a voluntary notice mandatory.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Nadhim Zahawi
The Government are committed to providing as much certainty as possible for business. The clause therefore provides parties with a mechanism to require the Secretary of State to decide whether a trigger event outside the mandatory notification regime will be called in. If parties wish, they may notify the Secretary of State of such a trigger event when it is in progress or contemplation or, alternatively, after it has taken place. Any early notification will allow businesses to plan for, and mitigate, any issues that may subsequently arise.
Following the acceptance of a satisfactory notification—one that conforms to the prescribed format and content, for example—the Secretary of State has up to 30 working days to decide whether to exercise the call-in power or to take no further action under the Bill. Businesses can rest assured that where the Secretary of State decides to take no further action following assessment of a notification, that decision may not be revisited further down the line. The only exception is if the Secretary of State has been given false or misleading information in relation to the decision not to issue a call-in notice, but I expect such instances to be few and far between. On those rare occasions where the notified trigger event does require further action, early notification means that parties can also factor in a security assessment following a formal call-in early on in their commercial timelines.
I hope that the Committee will agree that that is a pragmatic approach that provides the Secretary of State with the time he requires to properly screen trigger events, while giving businesses as much certainty as possible about when they can expect decisions. I would go further and say that the Government would welcome informal discussions with parties before the notification stage begins. That would allow parties to prepare for a potential assessment, while also allowing the Secretary of State to better understand the trigger event.
This is part of our commitment to working with investors and businesses in as transparent a manner as possible while protecting national security. However, I stress that a formal notification procedure is still required to enable the Secretary of State to make an informed assessment of the trigger event based on a full suite of information. I hope that hon. Members recognise the length the Government are going to to put in place a robust regime that both protects national security and retains business and investor confidence. The voluntary notification procedure, alongside the mandatory notification part of the regime, helps to strike that balance and will, I believe, work in the interests of all parties.
Chi Onwurah
I thank the Minister for his remarks. He is aware of the Opposition’s concerns about the voluntary notification procedure. I shall not repeat what he has said, and we recognise the importance of the clause and of having such a procedure. As with the mandatory notification procedure, the Minister has rejected our request for a requirement to set out the form of that notification. I would like to press him on this and to ask whether he would perhaps write to me to set out formally where it is that the pre-existing requirement that he said exists says that the Secretary of State “must”, rather than “may”, set out the form for the voluntary notification. I am also not clear whether the voluntary notification form format and information requirements are the same as those for the mandatory notification, given the difference in one being voluntary and one mandatory. Clarification on that would be helpful.
We agree considerably that we want to minimise the burden on businesses and the chilling effect on investment, while securing national security. The clause is an important part of that, so we will not oppose it.
Nadhim Zahawi
I am very happy to write to the hon. Lady; I thought that I had touched on that in my earlier remarks. The forms should be very similar, because ultimately the decision-making process of the Secretary of State, whether the notification is voluntary or mandatory, will pretty much be the same thing. I am happy to clarify that in writing.
Chi Onwurah
I thank the Minister for that intervention, and we will not oppose clause stand part.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 19
Power to require information
Dr Whitehead
I beg to move amendment 20, in clause 19, page 12, leave out lines 24 to 27.
This amendment seeks to broaden the Secretary of State’s powers to require information.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 21, in clause 20, page 13, leave out lines 17 to 20.
This amendment seeks to broaden the information gathering powers of the Secretary of State, in specific regard to witness attendance.
Dr Whitehead
I ought to explain to the Committee that the Opposition are under some multi-tasking pressures this afternoon, Mr Twigg. I should have been in the previous debate in the main Chamber on the future of coal, in my role as energy Front-Bench spokesperson for Labour. I managed to factor that job out to somebody else in order to be here in the Committee this afternoon, and I am sure that the Committee is delighted to hear that. Unfortunately, there was no such luck for the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central.
Katherine Fletcher (South Ribble) (Con)
I thank the hon. Gentleman for highlighting that our time is precious in the House. I, too, was hoping to be in the future of coal debate, to highlight the importance of the West Lancashire light railway. I thank him for bringing it to the attention of the Committee.
Dr Whitehead
I just wanted to explain the musical chairs that have gone on this afternoon, Mr Twigg.
Dr Whitehead
The amendments relate to clauses 19 and 20. Amendment 20 might be regarded as slightly unusual, as it seeks to remove a number of sentences in the Bill: to be precise, lines 24 to 27 on page 12—it would remove clause 19(2), while amendment 21 would remove clause 20(2). The Minister might be saying to himself that Oppositions usually try to restrict Ministers’ powers, yet here we are trying to extend their powers through these amendments. I want to explain why we think that is important.
We want to hear from the Minister why he thinks those particular paragraphs should remain in the Bill, and how the restriction that they place on the Secretary of State’s activity is advantageous to the Bill’s main purpose. The paragraphs that the amendments would take out relate to the power to require information and the power to require the attendance of witnesses and seek evidence. I am sure that hon. Members can read clause 19 for themselves, but I will point out the key part:
“The Secretary of State is not to require the provision of information under this section except where the requirement to provide information is proportionate to the use to which the information is to be put in the carrying out of the Secretary of State’s functions under this Act.”
That is to say that unless it can be, or is, established that the requirement to provide information is proportionate to what the Secretary of State wants to do under the Act, the Secretary of State is not able to require the provision of information. That is effectively what the clause states.
We have already heard during evidence to the Committee that there may well be a complex web when it comes to getting information and working out what is and is not relevant, particularly if a hostile power or body is seeking to take over a company or gain access to its information and IP. The information may well not consist of what it appears to consist of, or there may be a number of paths by which that information can be obtained.
From our expert witnesses we heard some interesting examples of things they thought looked rather far from the central activity of information provision. For example, on academic projects, in his expert evidence, Charlie Parton from the Royal United Services Institute told us:
“It is quite difficult to distinguish some of these and to know about them all, but a few weeks ago The Daily Telegraph did a story on, I think, Oxford University and Huawei’s commissioning of research. I think there were 17 projects. I looked at those, and I am not a technologist by any means, but some of them rang certain alarm bells.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 6.]
He was suggesting that, of a number of those postgraduate and PhD projects, there were some that he might have put a question mark against and others not, but he was not sure which were which. Nevertheless he seemed to think that some of those research projects—although they were cited within the ordinary parameters of whatever the research project might be, and who might be collaborating with whom, and who might get what information out of that—might ring alarm bells. That was in terms of who was collaborating, how the information might be used and where it might be going.
Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP)
I think I understand what the amendment is intended to achieve, but is not the hon. Gentleman concerned about the danger of almost explicitly building in a recognition that the powers in the Bill do not have to be used proportionately?
Dr Whitehead
The hon. Gentleman raises an important point. I will come to the word “proportionate” in a moment, because that is an important part of this clause. I hope I can satisfy him about my concerns about the word “proportionate”. He may want to come back when we have that discussion.
We heard from Sir Richard Dearlove, who said that,
“the Chinese are highly organised and strategic in their attitude towards the West and towards us. For example, some of the thousands of Chinese students who are being educated in Western universities, particularly in the UK and the United States, are unquestionably organised and targeted in terms of subjects”.––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 19.]
Before we go any further, perhaps I should say that I have nothing against Chinese students coming to the UK. On the contrary, I think that in general, Chinese students in UK universities is a very positive thing, and spreads a very good element of international learning into the process. I also think we might be reasonably confident that those Chinese students are getting as much from us, in terms of our way of life and our way of organising things, as we are from them. I do not think Sir Richard Dearlove’s point was partial towards Chinese students, but he made the point that he thought that some of those students may have targeted, or have been targeted towards, particular subjects and areas in the UK and the United States. Again, that is extremely difficult to find out and go forward on.
I am citing those particular expert witnesses in the context of this area of information, particularly concerning somebody—a company, an organisation, or indeed a state actor—that has hostile, malevolent intent towards the information that they have. It is not very likely that they will simply present that information in a ring binder with coloured markers, specifying where the various bits are; it is a very different process indeed. The clause therefore appears to very much limit the extent to which the requirement to provide information can be carried out, and it does so by requiring the provision of information to be proportionate to the use to which the information is to be put.
The word “proportionate” is very important here, and is potentially a real problem in terms of ensuring that the search for information that may be necessary by diverse means can be carried out properly. On the surface, looking at the ordinary language, one might say that the use of the word “proportionate” is a thoroughly good idea. If we apply the ordinary language test—what is the opposite of proportionate?—the opposite would be unproportionate; we would not want the Secretary of State to go about this in an unproportionate way. However, in legal terms, the word “proportionate” has rather a different context,
Proportionality as a legal term is a relative newcomer to the legal lexicon. It entered the legal arena—I am not saying that it had not been used before, but it was put forward as a concept around which a lot of other matters might turn—with the civil litigation reforms introduced in April 2013, known as the Jackson reforms. They covered the concept of proportionality in legal terms as it relates to costs in legal cases, but the question of proportionality was discussed in a wider context. The concept of proportionality, which had not been a particular issue in legal matters before, stuck itself firmly into the legal lexicon. Since then, there have been a number of debates about whether ways of apportioning legal costs were proportionate, even if they might otherwise be seen as reasonable.
Up until that point, the guidance on the issue of proportionality came from Lord Woolf in the Court of Appeal in—I am sure hon. Members will remember the case well—Lownds v. Home Office, where he concluded that if the legal steps that had been taken had been reasonable and necessary, the other party could not object to the cost of these steps on the grounds of proportionality. The test of reasonability and necessity overrode the question of the grounds of proportionality.
That is what changed in 2013 with the civil litigation reforms. An interesting commentary was made in an article published on 12 March 2014 in The Law Society Gazette, entitled “Proportionality and legal costs”—I am saying all this because I am not sure I will get the article to Hansard easily.
The author had this to say about the meaning of proportionality:
“However, the meaning of proportionality is not straightforward and the new rules do not provide clear guidance on how proportionality should be applied. The suggestion seems to be that a body of law will develop on a case-by-case basis until gradually the meaning will become clear. Until that happens, litigants, legal advisers and judges will have to guess at what costs will be considered proportionate in particular circumstances.”
Dr Whitehead
Yes, it is. Only one Member has left the room, so we are still in good order.
Peter Grant
I fear that the hon. Gentleman is taking the definition of proportionality into a context very different from what is mentioned here in the Bill, because this is not about whether the costs of civil proceedings are justified by the likely outcome, or even how those costs should be divided among the parties.
My reading is that subsection (2) is there to prevent a future Secretary of State—obviously, no one in the present Government would ever do this—from imposing extremely onerous requirements on a business, when it was perfectly possible for the Secretary of State to do due diligence and do the checks he needed to do without that information’s being provided.
I have not heard anything from the hon. Gentleman that would explain why he wants that protection to be taken out. He has said a lot about Chinese students, who may or may not collectively be working against our national interest, but this clause does not protect against that. What does the hon. Gentleman have against the idea that the Secretary of State is not allowed to put unreasonable and onerous demands on businesses when there is no clear benefit to national security of those demands’ being made?
Dr Whitehead
I hope that the hon. Gentleman will bear with me a few moments longer. Having unpacked “proportionality” in legal rather than colloquial terms, I want to put it back into the clause and see how it works, as far as the concerns of the Secretary of State go.
Indeed, the hon. Member for Glenrothes has questioned what we want to do on this clause in terms of the colloquial understanding of “proportionality”. I have mentioned how “proportionality” has come into the legal arena, specifically in terms of costs. Nevertheless, “proportionality” is now loose in the legal arena, so there is an interesting area of debate about it in general in the legal arena. That is not necessarily solely attached to the question of costs and civil litigation.
The problem is that there is virtually nothing to define that wider issue of proportionality in case law at the moment. Placing that word back into this particular clause suggests to us that the Secretary of State is restricted considerably on how that information may be gathered. The hon. Member for Glenrothes talked about research projects and various other things listed to us by our expert witnesses. I emphasise that I do not want to undermine those research projects or the presence of Chinese students. All I want to underline from that is that, on occasions, the process of getting hold of information and requiring people to give evidence can be convoluted. Indeed, it may require seeking information by going down paths that are not immediately apparent. As I say, it is not a question of someone turning up with a ring binder of things that can be perused.
In this clause, it appears that the Secretary of State may well have denied him or herself the ability to get hold of information, because it states that it has to be
“proportionate to the use to which the information is to be put in the carrying out of the Secretary of State’s functions under this Act.”
But he or she will not know about that information until it has been obtained. If there are difficulties in getting hold of the information, he or she will never know whether it is useful for carrying out his or her functions, because there is already a limit on getting the information in the first place.
I have brought the rather wobbly legal status of proportionality into the debate because it is potentially actionable through an obfuscation or refusal to put information forward by those actors. An actor who was required to give information could say, “It appears to me, your honour, that this request for information is not proportionate.” Of course, the Secretary of State may have a different point of view about what is proportionate from the person who is required to give the information.
There is also a vagueness in the application of the term “proportionate”. Although we think we know what it means in common language, that is not the case in the courts. That could be an additional issue that affects the Secretary of State’s ability to get the required information to make a judgment, over and above the fact that he or she may not know that until the information has been collected. So there are two procedural problems in the clause.
The hon. Member for Glenrothes said to me, to put it bluntly, “What exactly are you driving at? Perhaps it is not a good idea to appear to enable the Secretary of State to act disproportionately.” Of course, that is not what we are saying. We know that the Bill is more or less a giant amendment to the Enterprise Act 2002. Indeed, if hon. Members look at the back of the Bill, they will see that that is the only Act amended by it. Several amendments are made to the 2002 Act, but that is it—it is still sited within that Act. That Act was drawn up before the civil litigation changes to proportionality were put in place. The test set out in that Act, which is not amended by the Bill, is one of reasonableness, which is well understood, widely commented on and pretty clear.
If hon. Members consult the 2002 Act, they will see in clause 55 that the Secretary of State, in terms of enforcement, shall take such action
“as he considers to be reasonable and practicable to remedy”.
Therefore, we are not saying that the Secretary of State by acting disproportionately should act unreasonably. We are suggesting that the test that should be carried out is one of reasonableness, and should be in this particular clause. As the Enterprise Act already does, that would indeed prevent the Secretary of State going on fishing expeditions and undertaking actions that are wholly disproportionate because they would be unreasonable in terms of the definition of the Act. Our suggestion is to stick by that definition, which would be good enough to restrict the Secretary of State under the different circumstance that we are in today, in terms of seeking information. At the same time, it would give the Secretary of State the ability to take a path—I have said it is often a convoluted one—to obtain information that can be judged and used for the purpose of this Bill. I hope that the Minister will be favourably inclined towards that slight, but constrained, addition to his powers under this legislation.
Nadhim Zahawi
I am very pleased to be able to respond to the hon. Member for Southampton, Test on these well-intentioned amendments. I assure him that the Government and the Secretary of State will not be relying on a ring binder with highlighted paragraphs, because we have some of the best security and intelligence agencies in the world that would input into that process. It is an absolute joy to see Her Majesty’s Opposition play such a constructive role in the scrutiny of legislation, and to hear such a thoughtful speech.
Amendment 20 would remove subsection (2) of clause 19, through which the Secretary of State will be able to request information only through an information notice, where such requirements to provide information are proportionate. I agree with the hon. Member for Glenrothes on the issue. We have debated the fact that it is actually up to the courts to interpret if a particular acquirer feels somehow hard done by as a result of the process, and that there is a process to go through. The requirement to provide information is proportionate to the use to which the information is to be put in carrying out the Secretary of State’s functions under the Bill.
Amendment 21 seeks to remove subsection (2) of clause 20. Clause 20 enables the Secretary to require the attendance of witnesses and the giving of evidence. Therefore, clause 20 is complementary to clause 19, as it provides, for example, for the Secretary of State to receive expert explanation in person from those involved in a trigger event where the information previously provided does not give sufficient clarity. Clause 20(2) has a similar effect to clause 19(2). It means that the Secretary of State will be able to request information only through an attendance notice where requirement to give evidence is proportionate to the use to which the evidence is to be put in the carrying out of his functions under the Bill.
In response to both amendments, and mindful of the time, I can say that it is our view that any power of the Secretary of State to require the provision of information under clause 19, or to require the attendance of witnesses under clause 20, must be proportionate—indeed, the information-gathering powers are already significant. The Secretary of State may require information from any person in relation to the exercise of his functions under the Bill, which includes various stages of the procedure both before and after the call-in power is exercised. This may include requiring the provision of personal and commercially sensitive information about the parties in relation to a trigger event. There is good reason to include the restriction that any information required by the Secretary of State is proportionate to the use to which it is to be put in carrying out his functions. It is important that there are the safeguards for business. I have to say that I did not expect to be in the position of arguing against greater powers for the Executive from the legislature. It is clear to me, though, that business confidence and our reputation for being open for investment require it.
I hope that I have provided sufficient points of reassurance on these matters, and encourage the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.
Dr Whitehead
I appreciate what the Minister has had to say. He is clearly confident that the fine print of this clause is not going to be a problem. I slightly beg to differ: I think it may be. I also wonder whether the Minister has considered the extent to which what is already there—or, should I say, what I think is already there—in the Enterprise Act 2002 effectively restricts the Minister in his actions, in much the same way as this clause does, except that the restriction is much clearer from a legal point of view. That is to say, by relying on the restrictions that are already in the Enterprise Act, the Minister would probably not act any differently from how he would under this particular clause, but by relying on that element of the 2002 Act, his actions would be far less potentially actionable.
Before the Minister gets carried away by the idea that the legislature, or in this instance the Opposition, is clamouring for the Secretary of State to have far more powers, that is not our case. Our case is that it would be rather wiser to restrict what the Secretary of State may do through clearer legal definitions, which are already there, than through the rather woolly definition that is in the Bill. Before the Minister goes home thinking, “I have free rein to do whatever I like now”, that is not so: it is not so according to the Enterprise Act 2002, and it is something we want to stand strongly by. We do not want to underscore the idea that the Minister can act unreasonably, especially since the phrase “acting unreasonably” has a long pedigree, both in terms of civil action and administrative law over a long period of time.
I am sorry that the Minister does not accept our case, with all the caveats on it, although it may be that he is less inclined to accept the case now that we have highlighted the fact that there are caveats on what the Minister can do. I do not think we want to press this amendment to a Division, but we do so rather more in sorrow than in anger, because we think this could have been a prudent way to proceed with this Bill.
Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)
As always, my hon. Friend is making important points. I was surprised to see the letter from the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, which dates back to its 2013 report. Does my hon. Friend agree that if that Committee had been involved and consulted before this legislation was drawn up, some of the issues he is raising could have been brought out into the open and addressed better?
Dr Whitehead
My hon. Friend is right. I think that, because things have changed so substantially over the past decade or so, we tend to see things in a way that we may not have easily seen them just a few years ago. Indeed, the expert witnesses who were before us made considerable points on the question of how naive we had been on some previous occasions; we had not really taken into account some of the implications of what we were doing, because we did not have a clear picture of the consequences of those actions.
My hon. Friend is right—I suppose this is to some extent wisdom of the stairs—that if we could have considered things at that particular point the way we see them now, we would have expressed ourselves in much firmer and more watertight ways. However, I do not think the fact that we did not do so then is any particular excuse for continuing not to do so now. The idea that we may miss out on the ability to get proper information that can point us in the direction we want to go, albeit possibly by very roundabout means, and that we deny ourselves that particular possibility because we have written something in the legislation that stops us doing it does not seem to me to be fully learning the lessons that we might have done from 2013 onwards.
However, far be it from me to lecture the Minister or otherwise on the wisdom of these things; I am sure he is able to decide that subsequently for himself, just as I have challenged him about the wisdom of the Secretary of State’s investment agreements a little while ago concerning Bradwell. I am sure he knows in his heart that that is an appallingly naive thing to have done in those circumstances, and we might have thought differently had that taken place even today. That is the spirit in which we are moving this amendment. As I say, we do not wish to press it to a vote, but I hope the Minister will be able to consider those points and think about how this section might best be applied in the circumstances we have before us today. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Nadhim Zahawi
Clause 19 gives the Secretary of State the power to require the provision of information in relation to the exercise of his functions under the Bill. The Bill provides for an investment screening regime for national security purposes—a purpose that we all agree merits appropriate tools. As such, it is essential that the Secretary of State is able to gain access to information to arrive at decisions that are fully informed. This clause provides for an information notice that the Secretary of State may issue to require any person to provide information that is proportionate to assisting the Secretary of State in carrying out his functions.
Any information notice may specify a time limit for providing the information and the manner in which the information must be provided. An information notice must specify the information sought, the purpose for which it is sought and the possible consequences of not complying with the notice. There is a range of scenarios in which the Secretary of State will need to require the provision of information, and I will provide some examples to illustrate them.
The first scenario is when the Secretary of State has reason to suspect that a trigger event that may give rise to a risk to national security is in progress or contemplation. That could be where an acquisition has not been notified but the Secretary of State becomes aware of it through market monitoring. In that situation, this clause enables the Secretary of State to require the provision of further information to inform a judgment on whether to call the acquisition in.
Secondly, when a party has submitted a voluntary or mandatory notification to the Secretary of State and that notification has been accepted, the Secretary of State may require additional information from the parties to decide whether to call in the trigger event. Thirdly, when a trigger event has been called in, the Secretary of State may need to require that parties provide further information to help to inform decision making. Information notices will allow the Secretary of State to gather evidence to support accurate and timely decision making. Hon. Members will agree that it is entirely proportionate for the Secretary of State to have recourse to this power as part of the investment screening process provided for in the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 19 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 20
Attendance of witnesses
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Nadhim Zahawi
The clause provides the Secretary of State with the power to require the attendance of witnesses.
The Government are acutely aware that many of the acquisitions considered by this regime will be complex and highly technical. In addition to clause 19, which enables the Secretary of State to require the provision of information, most likely in written form, this clause enables the Secretary of State to require the giving of evidence. A notice requiring a person to attend under this clause is called an “attendance notice”. The clause is complementary to clause 19, discussed previously, as it provides, for example, for the Secretary of State to be able to receive expert explanation, in person, from those involved in a trigger event, where the information previously provided does not provide sufficient clarity.
In responding to an attendance notice and providing evidence, a person is not required to give any evidence that they could not be compelled to give in civil proceedings before the court. That protects privileged information. In addition, the Secretary of State will only be able to request information through an attendance notice that is proportionate in assisting him in carrying out his functions under the regime.
We envisage a range of scenarios where the Secretary of State may require the attendance of a witness in order to gather further evidence to make an informed decision on the case. I will provide a few to illustrate. First, I expect that a number of cases will involve complex acquisitions, either because of the advanced nature of the technology in question, or due to their financial structuring. In those cases, the Secretary of State may require those who hold expert knowledge to provide him with an explanation. There may also be cases where it seems that parties are being deliberately non-compliant, or only partly compliant with information-gathering requests. I expect those to be rare but, again, it is only right that the Secretary of State has the power to require the attendance of those parties to provide further information.
The attendance of witnesses may also be a more efficient way to secure additional information in some circumstances, and limit the risk that further time will be needed to consider additional information. There will be criminal and civil sanctions available to punish non-compliance with the notices and the provision of false or misleading information. The attendance notice is provided under threat of such sanction as it is important that the Secretary of State receives the information he needs and can count on to come to a decision.
Peter Grant
A brief question: is it the Government’s intention to allow for witnesses to attend virtually, if it is unreasonable for them to attend physically at the Department, or the Minister’s office?
Nadhim Zahawi
I suspect that the Government will accommodate whichever way is secure and provides the evidence.
I am sure that hon. Members will agree that the clause is crucial in allowing the Secretary of State to consider the fullest range of information in order to make informed decisions under this regime.
Dr Whitehead
The Minister has given a good exposition of what the clause is about: the attendance of witnesses. I note that, as he said, the witnesses are required to give evidence on the equivalent level of civil proceedings before the court—as the clause states:
“A person is not required under this section to give any evidence which that person could not be compelled to give in civil proceedings before the court.”
Dr Whitehead
I wonder if the Minister might intervene briefly, just to put my mind at rest.
Nadhim Zahawi
I think I have made very clear how these notices will work. The judicial procedure is open to any party that feels hard done by in any way by this Bill.
Dr Whitehead
I thank the Minister for confirming what I thought, which is that this can be challenged post hoc but not at the point of giving evidence. That is what I understand the Minister to have just said—but hey, I could be wrong. That is the clarification we wanted. On the issue of witness attendance, it is important that the Secretary of State is able to specify a time and that the evidence is undertaken at a level commensurate with civil proceedings. We do not oppose the clause standing part of the Bill, given the Minister’s clarification on proceedings involving witnesses.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 21
Information notices and attendance notices: persons outside the UK
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Nadhim Zahawi
Clause 21 makes provision in respect of the persons on whom the Secretary of State may serve an information notice or an attendance notice outside the United Kingdom. The clause applies in relation to the two earlier clauses. Clause 19 provides the power for the Secretary of State to obtain information either before or after the call-in power is exercised. Clause 20 gives the Secretary of State the power to require the attendance of witnesses to assist him in carrying out his function under the Bill.
Those outside the United Kingdom to whom an information notice or attendance notice may be given are clearly set out in clause 21, which is technical in nature. The purpose is to ensure that certain categories of persons with a connection to the United Kingdom are caught by the information-gathering powers, even if they are outside the UK. These categories of persons are UK nationals, individuals ordinarily resident in the UK, bodies such as companies incorporated or constituted in the UK, and persons carrying on business in the UK. Perhaps more importantly, notices may also be served on persons outside the UK who have acquired, or who are in the process of or are contemplating acquiring, qualifying UK entities or qualifying assets that are either located in the UK or otherwise connected to the UK. In practice, this means that notices may be served on most parties from whom the Secretary of State may wish to require information or evidence.
Peter Grant
I certainly would not seek to oppose this clause, but will the Minister go into a bit more detail about how it works in practice? What if a notice is served on somebody who is not in the United Kingdom, who is not a UK citizen or UK national, who has never set foot in the United Kingdom and quite possibly never intends to, as might happen if a big multinational is seeking to acquire a business intertest in the United Kingdom? Is the intention to create an offence that can be committed by somebody with otherwise no connection with the United Kingdom under UK law? That would mean that the person had committed the offence in a different sovereign territory, not even by something they did, but by something they did not do—not responding to a notice and not attending when required.
I understand why the requirement has to apply to everybody, and I understand that there is no point in serving a statutory notice if there are no consequences to refusing to comply with it; I am just not sure about the practicalities. Has the Minister considered alternative sanctions in those circumstances? For example, the person could be disqualified from being a director or a shareholder in significant UK undertakings. That would potentially have the same effect.
It seems to me that, generally speaking, we would create a criminal offence for the conduct of somebody in a different sovereign territory only in specific circumstances. If somebody is serving with the UK armed forces, for example, they might be covered by UK law even when they are serving abroad. The other circumstance is if the crimes are so heinous as to be regarded as crimes against international law—crimes against humanity and war crimes, for example. I understand that the Education Secretary thinks that Britain is just the best country in the word and nobody else can touch us, but I doubt even he would think that failing to respond to a notice from the UK Secretary of State constitutes a crime against international law.
Is the Minister concerned about setting a precedent whereby we attempt to apply domestic law to the actions or non-actions of people who, in normal circumstances, are covered by the laws of the country they are in and not the criminal law of the United Kingdom? Given that this might create a difficult precedent, is he satisfied that the Government have looked at every possible alternative sanction? This could create a precedent, and other countries could start legislating to say that what UK citizens do in the United Kingdom is contrary to their laws, which would therefore make any of us subject to arrest and prosecution by the authorities of another country. I am a bit concerned about the reaction that might be provoked from Governments elsewhere if we get this part wrong.
Nadhim Zahawi
I think the hon. Gentleman is referring to parties that are abroad and have a business in the UK—what if notice is served on them and they are non-compliant? Obviously, under UK law that would be a problem for them. I certainly think that, if an information notice is served, the timeline for the Secretary of State’s assessment of a trigger event is paused until the information is provided from the individual in whatever jurisdiction they or the entity happen to be at the end of the time period provided for compliance in the information notice.
If a party does not comply during the assessment process, that may lead to more onerous and stricter remedies being imposed by the Secretary of State than would otherwise be the case, including the acquisition being blocked or unwound where appropriate. It will therefore plainly be in the interest of those involved directly in the trigger event to provide information in a timely manner to the Secretary of State in order that a speedy decision can be taken. That is where the leverage lies.
Peter Grant
I am grateful to the Minister for that clarification. As I say, I fully understand what the Government are attempting to achieve. I would expect that, in those circumstances, the Minister would block the acquisition if there was a serious failure to comply by anybody who was in practice beyond the reach of UK criminal prosecution. I would certainly hope that in those circumstances the Secretary of State would use the other powers to ensure that they could not become a controlling influence on any strategically important UK undertaking.
As I said, I do not want to divide the Committee. I did not even feel it was appropriate to table an amendment, partly because I could not think of a way of amending it that would make it any better. Having made those points, I am grateful for the Minister’s clarification, and we will leave it to future Secretaries of State to implement it as best they can.
Matt Western
I will pick up on one issue, which concerns subsection (3)(a). I would like some clarification from the Minister. I am trying to get my head around what is meant by
“a qualifying entity which is formed or recognised”.
Could he give an illustration of what is meant by “recognised”? I assume that this is about some takeover, merger or acquisition. Could it be some sort of shell company or some other form? Perhaps the Minister could clarify what is meant by recognition under the law.
Dr Whitehead
Briefly, we fully understand the purpose of the clause. It is obviously necessary to ensure that witnesses, wherever they are, if they have a relevant interest in these matters, should be made available to give evidence. I share some of the concerns of the hon. Member for Glenrothes about how workable it might be. I particularly wonder whether subsection (2) includes UK overseas nationals. That is particularly relevant to some of our discussions earlier today. I see in the previous clause that if someone is a UK citizen and domiciled in the UK, they get their bus fare paid if they live more than 10 miles away.
Dr Whitehead
But apparently there are no international flight payments as far as overseas witnesses are concerned. I do not know whether the Minister has that in mind, but I note a big difference between the two clauses. If such witnesses could get some payment towards their attendance in the UK, that might resolve some of the problems that the hon. Member for Glenrothes suggested—provided it is economy class, obviously.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Michael Tomlinson.)
National Security and Investment Bill (Ninth sitting)
Tuesday 8th December 2020
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 8 December 2020 - (8 Dec 2020)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
Before we begin, I remind colleagues of the importance of social distancing. Please switch electronic devices to silent. The Hansard reporters would be very grateful if Members could email any electronic copies of their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk.
Clause 22
False or misleading information
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Nadhim Zahawi)
Clause 22 makes provision for circumstances in which false or misleading information is provided to the Secretary of State. Hon. Members will agree that a regime that protects our national security must take appropriate account of those who would wish to mislead us. It is not often that hostile actors offer up honest answers to difficult questions. In addition to the penalties that are provided for in clause 40 and elsewhere, the clause ensures that any decision that is taken on the basis of false or misleading information, and which is materially affected by the false or misleading information, may be reconsidered by the Secretary of State. Following reconsideration, the Secretary of State is then free to affirm, vary or revoke any such decision.
That may, for example, involve calling in a trigger event after an initial decision not to do so, if, for instance, it is discovered that false or misleading information was provided in the notification form. That might ultimately lead to remedies being imposed on the trigger event, including blocking or unwinding it where that is necessary and proportionate for the purpose of safeguarding national security. The Secretary of State is required under subsection (5) to give any call-in notice within six months of discovering that the information was false or misleading.
Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)
I thank the Minister for his comments on clause 22. This possibly shows a lack of understanding on my part, but could he say a little about how the Secretary of State will ascertain, decide or judge that information has been false or misleading?
Nadhim Zahawi
I am grateful for the hon. Lady’s question. The Secretary of State has a number of tools available to him, including our security and intelligence services. Of course, if the information is deemed to be false or misleading, he will be able to take appropriate action.
There is otherwise no time limit to revising a decision. The time limits under subsections (2) and (4) of clause 2 for calling in trigger events that have already taken place do not apply. We judge that this is an important signal to send. If people provide us with false or misleading information in relation to a trigger event, the Secretary of State may still call in the event for consideration whenever the false or misleading information comes to light, even if the event has long since completed. If truthful information is provided, the time limits in subsections (2) and (4) of clause 2 apply. If people provide us with the right information, they will have certainty. If they provide us with false or misleading information, we may revisit the trigger event whenever the false or misleading information comes to light.
Without the clause, parties could, in theory, deliberately provide false information to ease the passage of their trigger event. The Secretary of State would then be powerless to reopen the investigation into the event and impose national security remedies on it. I stress that I expect cases involving the provision of false or misleading information to be few and far between, but the Government must take steps to mitigate such risks.
Hon. Members may have some concern that the Secretary of State’s ability to reconsider previous decisions chips away at businesses’ confidence to invest. To those hon. Members, I say that the provision applies only to materially false or misleading information, and even if such information is provided unintentionally, it is essential that the Secretary of State has the power to consider the case one more. Moreover, it may be the case that false or misleading information is provided deliberately by a hostile actor. I hope hon. Members will agree that as well as providing slick and efficient processes for business, the Bill must not leave any loophole to be exploited.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 22 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 23
Meaning of “assessment period”
Chi Onwurah
I beg to move amendment 22, in clause 23, page 15, line 15, leave out from “as” until end of line 16 and insert
“as agreed by the Secretary of State in accordance with subsection (9)”.
This amendment seeks to limit the flexibility of extending the assessment period to the conditions set out in subsection (9), and to remove the need for the approval of the acquirer.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
New Clause 4—Complaints procedure—
‘(1) The Secretary of State shall by regulations set up a formal complaints procedure through which acquirers may raise complaints about the procedures followed during the course of an assessment under this Act.
(2) Complaints as set out in subsection (1) may be made to a Procedural Officer, who—
(a) must not have been involved in the assessment and who is to consider significant procedural complaints relating to this section or another part of this Act; and
(b) may determine or settle complaints in accordance with regulations to be published by the Secretary of State within 3 months of this Bill becoming an Act.’
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to establish a formal complaints procedure for acquirers.
Chi Onwurah
I rise to speak to amendment 22, which is in my name and that of my hon. Friends, and to new clause 4. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship once more, Mr Twigg, and to find the Committee reconvened for the perusal of the rest of this important Bill. I thank the Minister for the letters that he has sent to me and my hon. Friends, and to the Intelligence and Security Committee, to address some of the questions that arose in previous sittings.
I am glad that, with this amendment, we move on to part 2 of the Bill, which deals with the process of addressing our national security concerns as part of the Bill’s implementation. In clause 23, we are particularly looking at the assessment period. As I have indicated, we support the intention and, indeed, the objectives of the Bill, and we would have welcomed such a Bill some years ago. Our intention, as we have shown, is to be a constructive Opposition and to make constructive proposals, so I will say at the outset that amendment 22 is a probing amendment that seeks to clarify how the Minister thinks the clause will work in practice. The amendment seeks to limit the significant flexibility of extending the assessment period to the conditions set out in subsection (9), and to remove the need for the approval of the acquirer.
As we have said, the Bill marks a radical shift in our nation’s approach to takeovers and investments. It has been labelled a “seismic shift” and a “total transformation”. We want that radical shift to give the Government the powers they need to protect our national security, as we have made clear. To be effective in doing that, the Bill needs to ensure clarity, certainty and competence—competence is a key word—for our businesses. As we have said on a number of occasions, we are particularly concerned about the impact on our small and medium-sized enterprises, which will bear the bulk of the compliance requirements and which do not have the resources that are at the disposal of many of our larger companies.
We want the Minister to provide clarity on the parts of the assessment period that we find uncertain. Specifically, the Government have set out an assessment period timeline of up to 15 weeks, which is 30 working days for an initial period and 45 working days for an additional period. Clause 23 sets out that the initial period may be extended by the Secretary of State for a further 45 working days if he
“ reasonably believes that…a risk to national security has arisen from the trigger event or would arise from the trigger event if carried into effect, and…reasonably considers that the additional period is required to assess the trigger event further.”
An extension beyond 75 working days—the initial 30-day period plus 45 days—may be agreed between the acquirer and the Secretary of State, if the Secretary of State
“is satisfied…a risk to national security has arisen from the trigger event or would arise from the trigger event if carried into effect, and…reasonably considers that the period is required to consider whether to make a final order”.
That is described as the “voluntary period”.
Our concern is that the clause offers the potential for unlimited expansion of the timeline—currently labelled, as I said, a “voluntary period” extension. That creates uncertainty for businesses and, indeed, for Government. Subsection (3)(c) suggests that a voluntary period extension
“may be agreed in writing between the Secretary of State and the acquirer”,
and yet subsection (9) sets out the ways in which the Secretary of State might agree a voluntary period where they are satisfied of the need for it. Is it a voluntary period for both parties? Will the voluntary period truly be voluntary for businesses?
According to subsection (9), the decision seems to be for the Secretary of State. Subsection (9) sets out a number of considerations
“on the balance of probabilities”,
but subsection (3)(c) implies that the period is at the agreement of the acquirer. What is the process by which an acquirer can deny the extension and what, if any, is the limit on voluntary period extensions? Businesses up and down the country and international investors in Britain’s high-value start-ups will be looking to the Government for greater clarity. We heard numerous calls for greater clarity during the evidence sessions.
The Bill presents uncertainty for not just businesses but the Government. If a business can deny agreement to extensions under subsection (3)(c), where do the Government go then? The Bill creates a 15-week assessment period, but our existing merger control process can last for 32 weeks with a full phase 1 and phase 2 review. Does the Minister concede that it is possible, especially given the likely resourcing clashes—we have already talked about potential conflicts of interest—that the voluntary period extensions will soon become default period extensions? Have the Government given themselves sufficient powers to trigger extensions, or is the current situation uncertain for businesses and for Government?
That concern is especially important because of the evidential thresholds that are required for the voluntary period extension. The Government have set a bar of reasonable suspicion—that is quite common—for a trigger event to be called in, in clause 1(1). Then there is a separate bar of reasonable belief for the Secretary of State to order an additional period, in clause 23(8), and a third bar of being
“satisfied, on the balance of probabilities”
to get a voluntary period extension. What is the difference between the three standards of reasonable suspicion, reasonable belief, and being satisfied on the balance of probabilities? I am sure that there were specific reasons for drafting those three separate standards. Could the Minister share them with us? Is he confident that this tighter approach for each step will allow the Government sufficient room to ensure that there are robust reviews and to protect our national security, especially given that the regime will be an entirely new one, with an entirely new investment security unit interpreting those three separate bars?
I note that the Government’s impact assessment contains no estimate of how many transactions are expected to require additional and voluntary period extensions. We are about to embark on a vast shift in merger control, with far more engagement and intervention by the Government in our mergers and acquisitions landscape. We seek clarity with this amendment, to give confidence to our small and medium-sized enterprises and to ensure that there is confidence in our national security. We seek to ensure that the Government have a plan and a detailed understanding of it will work to deliver on the Bill’s proposals.
As I mentioned earlier, during our evidence sessions, there was significant demand from experts to ensure the Bill delivers greater certainty. Will Jackson-Moore of PwC said,
“it is about the application of the legislation, in particular the process, the ability to pre-clear and the timelines actually being met. To understand some of these technologies is not going to be straightforward.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 26 November 2020; c. 115-116, Q152.]
Lisa Wright from Slaughter and May said that
“for people doing deals around the world who have already experienced those other regimes, it ought not to have any real negative impact at all, provided that BEIS can deliver on the aspiration set out of a slick and efficient regime, turning around notifications within sensible deal timeframes and providing the kind of informal advice and early engagement promised. That will be critical, particularly in the early stages of the regime.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 26 November 2020; c. 76, Q91.]
I ask the Minister to consider whether the clause provides that. This amendment, which sets out to limit the flexibility of extending the assessment period to the condition set out in subsection (9) and to remove the need for the approval of the inquirer, is intended to probe and highlight that.
The intention behind new clause 4 is to ensure greater clarity about the apparent omission of any formal complaints procedure for acquirers. We are concerned that it seems as though the Government have not reflected on the scale of the change that our mergers and acquisitions regime is going through in their appreciation of the operational shift needed to deliver on it.
In a sort of a mathematical trick that I fail to follow, the Government’s impact assessment talks only of an additional 18% of cases relative to the regime under the Enterprise Act 2002, but also states that there will be an increase from 12 reviews in 20 years—that is the figure under the current regime—to nearly 2,000 under this regime.
Nadhim Zahawi
With your indulgence, Mr Twigg, I intend to speak first to clause 23 stand part, then to amendment 22 and new clause 4.
We are committed to the regime providing as much clarity, certainty and predictability as possible for businesses and investors. It is therefore right that we are setting out how long the Secretary of State may take to carry out a full national security assessment and make a final decision on a trigger event following a call-in notice.
Subsection (3)(a) provides for an initial assessment period of 30 working days. The Government have taken advice from the security community, and we consider that in the majority of cases 30 working days will allow for a full national security assessment and for the Secretary of State to decide whether to clear the trigger event outright or to impose final remedies on it.
More complex cases are possible, however, and it is important that a longer period is available for the Secretary of State to consider them. The clause therefore enables the Secretary of State to issue a notice to extend the assessment by 45 working days to assess the trigger event further, for example to determine the extent of the national security risk or to decide on appropriate remedies. That is referred to as the “additional period” under subsection (3)(b). The clause also provides for the assessment period to be further extended beyond the additional period, but only with the written consent of the acquirer. That is termed a “voluntary period” under subsection (3)(c).
The Government are clear that extensions should not be used lightly. The clause therefore includes specific legal tests for their use. To extend the assessment into the additional period, the Secretary of State must reasonably believe, as the hon. Lady referred to, that a trigger event has taken place, or is in progress or contemplation, and that this has given or would give rise to a national security risk. The Secretary of State must also reasonably consider that the additional time is required to assess the trigger event further.
To agree a voluntary period extension with the acquirer, the Secretary of State must be satisfied that, on the balance of probabilities, a trigger event has taken place, or is in progress or contemplation, and that this has given or would give rise to a national security risk. The Secretary of State must also reasonably consider—the third bullet point the hon. Lady mentioned—that the period is required to consider whether to impose final remedies or what those remedies should be.
What the Secretary of State may not do is simply extend the assessment period because it is convenient. The clause is drafted in this way to ensure that we protect the investors and businesses that the hon. Lady quite rightly cares about, as do Government Members, and allow them to operate and thrive in our economy. I hope that hon. Members feel assured that the Government have sought to carefully balance the flexibility required for the Secretary of State to deal with the most complex cases and the need to provide businesses and investors with clear time lines.
Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)
Just to understand and clarify the point about how realistic the voluntary period might be, in terms of getting the written agreement of the acquirer, in the Minister’s experience, how realistic is it that a business would accede to that? The business might be under financial pressure, looking for cash or a financial injection, which is the whole point about bringing in private equity. How will the Government ensure that that is possible, when all those other pressures are coming into play?
Nadhim Zahawi
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman; it is a great question. We are all worrying about the small and medium-sized businesses that his particular angle would very much apply to. He will recall that, in the evidence sessions, we heard evidence to suggest that business founders and directors are best placed to know if their business has a national security angle, so the Secretary of State will clearly work with those business owners, innovators and pioneers to try to mitigate the national security risk while making sure that they can survive and thrive. It is in no one’s interests for them not to do well in the United Kingdom; that would probably create a greater national security threat.
Matt Western
Just to be clear, if a business is desperately seeking that inward investment, surely it would be less likely to write and agree with the Secretary of State about the additional period, because it is desperate for the funds.
Nadhim Zahawi
I absolutely hear what the hon. Gentleman says. The issue then becomes one of national security. As we heard in the evidence sessions, most founders and directors know exactly what they are inventing and what their intellectual property is, and therefore whether there is a national security risk, however nascent the business may be.
I briefly turn to amendment 22. I am grateful for the Opposition’s continued, and in some ways unexpected, push for ever greater powers for the Secretary of State, who I am certain will be most delighted. The amendment would remove the requirement for the Secretary of State to agree the use of a voluntary period or a further voluntary period with the acquirer to consider whether to make a final order or what provision that final order should contain. I do not believe that would be the right approach.
We have set much store in the statutory timescales provided for in the Bill. It is vital for the businesses and investors that we all care about that they have confidence in when they can expect decisions so that they can plan accordingly, which goes back to the point of the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington about planning for an investment or fundraising event. That is why any extension of the assessment period, beyond the collective 75 maximum working days of the initial period and the additional period combined, requires agreement from the acquirer in recognition of the fact that the process is being lengthened beyond the customary timeline. Enabling the Secretary of State to do that unilaterally would be a matter of concern for business and investment communities alike.
Chi Onwurah
I thank the Minister for his concern about our encouragement, in our probing amendment, of the Secretary of State having greater powers. When the Minister looks at other organisations, such as the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States or, even closer to home, the CMA in the UK, which do not have voluntary period extensions, can he understand why there are concerns about how that process would work? What international comparisons has he made?
Nadhim Zahawi
We talk to our Five Eyes allies and other nations. As the Secretary of State and I set out on Second Reading, we have worked collaboratively with many nations to try to get the balance right so that the Bill does what it does and is proportionate.
I accept that the amendment also attempts to provide some mitigation against that by directly referencing subsection (9). That existing subsection limits the Secretary of State to being able to agree a voluntary period only where he
“is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that…a trigger event has taken place”
or is “in progress or contemplation”, and that
“a risk to national security has arisen…or would arise.”
He may do so only for the purpose of considering
“whether to make a final order or what provision a final order should contain.”
As such, I gently point out to the hon. Lady that the limitations that she seeks to impose on the Secretary of State through the amendment are already provided for by the clause as drafted. Subsection (3) does not provide a parallel or broader power for the Secretary of State to agree a voluntary period or further voluntary periods for other reasons. It is already subject to the limitations set out in subsection (9). I hope that addresses the hon. Lady’s principal concern. I assure her that, as with so many areas in the Bill, we are singing from the same hymn sheet. For those reasons, I cannot accept the amendment, and I respectfully ask her to withdraw it.
I will turn very briefly to new clause 4. I am grateful to hon. Members for contributing to the debate by suggesting a new clause to allow acquirers to lodge complaints. Under the current drafting of the Bill, the Government can already be held to account on their performance on screening investments. First, the Government can be held to account through the annual report that they are required to publish, as provided for in clause 61. That provision requires the Government to report on the number of notifications that they have accepted and rejected, the sectors of the economy in relation to which call-in notices were given, the financial assistance provided and the number of final notifications given.
Secondly, the Government can be held to account through the judicial review process under clause 49. Acquirers, or indeed any party to the transaction, can claim for judicial review of a relevant decision. Furthermore, throughout the review process, the parties to an acquisition can contact the investment security unit for a discussion about their case and can request to speak to a senior official if needed. Creating a formal complaints procedure would be unnecessarily bureaucratic when acquirers already have better routes available to them if they are unhappy with the decision-making process.
Members from across the House have commented that it is important—the hon. Lady mentioned this earlier—that the appropriate resources are allocated to the investment screening unit. The Government are absolutely committed to ensuring that that happens. It would be unwise to divert some of those staff from undertaking scrutiny of issues of national security to staff a complaints procedure, particularly where JR is available for any serious concern regarding the process of assessment.
Chi Onwurah
I hear the Minister repeatedly referencing the judicial review process without, I am afraid, addressing our point: judicial review is not an option that will give relief to a small, nimble start-up.
Nadhim Zahawi
I mentioned judicial review as the second way in which the Government can be held to account. The first is the requirement for the Government to report to Parliament annually. Colleagues and Committees will therefore be able scrutinise the work of the unit. Although I understand the hon. Lady’s objective with new clause 4, I am not able to accept it for the reasons that I have set out, and I hope that she will agree to withdraw it.
Chi Onwurah
I thank the Committee for considering our amendment and new clause, I thank the Minister for his response and I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington for his able interventions.
I am somewhat disappointed by the Minister’s response. I think it is absolutely true, as he said, that as with so much, we are on the same page when it comes to what we are trying to achieve. There are significant issues with the clause as it stands, however, and I do not feel that the Minister has addressed them in his response. He did not, for example—I am happy to take interventions on these points—address the issue of voluntary extensions. We do not see that in the US process, which has a number of stages. It allows 45 days for a national security review, including a 30-day limit for the director of national intelligence to submit intelligence analysis and an option of a 15-day presidential determination if needed, but it does not have a voluntary period for extensions. The CMA in this country does not have a voluntary period for extensions. The Government are introducing a voluntary period.
I thank the Minister for clarifying that as well as having the acquirer’s approval, the Secretary of State has to meet the conditions in subsection (9), and that both the approval and the conditions in that subsection are satisfied on the balance of probabilities. That does not, however, address the issue that my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington raised about whether the acquirer is likely to agree to a voluntary period. Without clarity on that point, the clause allows voluntary extensions that, in practical terms, may not prove to be of use to either the acquirer or the Secretary of State.
On the new clause, I do not want to appear cynical, but I am sure that the Minister and those on the Committee who have worked in and with small businesses—particularly in our tech sector and in some of the 17 areas identified for mandatory notification, such as artificial intelligence and data infrastructure—will agree with me when I say that I do think that any small business would see an annual report to Parliament or a judicial review as a relief, given the ever-present desire for investment finance or for progress and innovation at breakneck speed. The Minister has not made a case against the need for a process to address procedural disputes.
I said that amendment 22 was a probing amendment, but I want to test the will of the Committee on supporting greater clarity and understanding for our small and medium-sized enterprises. I will seek to press the amendment to a vote, as I will for new clause 4.
The Chair
The decision on new clause 4 will be taken at the end of the Bill Committee.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 23, in clause 24, page 16, line 26, at end insert—
“(6) The Secretary of State must publish each year the aggregate amount of days included under subsection (4), the number of called-in events for which such days are included, and the number of times information notices are given for each called-in event in the report required at Clause 61.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish annual reports of how many information notices were given, how many days were added as a result of them, and how many notices were given in each relevant trigger event.
Dr Whitehead
The amendment follows on from a number of concerns that have been raised about small businesses, their role in the production of information and attendance notices, and the effect on those small businesses; and about the potential development of a regime that is far more onerous than those in other parts of the world as we pursue the proper purpose of dealing with information and attendance, and shining a light on the activities of companies that may need to declare what they are doing in a reasonably timely way.
I am reminded of the question of reasonable speed and efficiency, as far as notification and evidence are concerned, as our expert witnesses mentioned earlier in our proceedings. Michael Leiter from Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher and Flom LLP stated:
“I think it will be an issue unless you are confident that small-scale, early-stage investors can have their transactions quickly reviewed within roughly 30 to 45 days. If it is longer than that, that will make the investment climate, I think, worse than other competing markets. I think that could have an impact.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, Tuesday 24 November 2020; c. 47, Q53.]
The question in front of us is how we ensure that that happens, or at least shine a light on the process and monitor it. The amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish each year the aggregate number of days included under subsection (4), the number of called-in events for which such days are included, and the number of times information notices are given for each called-in event in the report required in clause 61.
We have not debated clause 61 yet, but it requires the Secretary of State to produce an annual report of quite extensive proportions on proceedings generally under the Act, as it will be. Hon. Members will note that clause 61 provides for what one might call a quantity report. It will record expenditure, the number of mandatory notices accepted and rejected, the number of voluntary notices accepted and rejected, the number of call-in notices, and the number of final notifications. It is an annual numbers report. The amendment would add quality to that quantity.
Chi Onwurah
I thank my hon. Friend for giving way and for his excellent comments on the amendment. Does he also recognise that the report under clause 61 is the one that the Minister just described as providing accountability to small businesses regarding their concerns about procedure or how they might be affected by the Bill? Does my hon. Friend therefore agree that adding quality to quantity as a function of that report would be a truly important step?
Dr Whitehead
My hon. Friend makes an important point about the overall effect that shining a light on proceedings, and accounting for them, will have. She emphasises that it will be important for small businesses—I will come to the mechanisms by which this might be done—to see how effectively things are run and organised, ideally in their own interest when it comes to the question of turnaround in proceedings. I quoted one expert witness, but a number of them emphasised the point about turnaround and the problems that might arise for small businesses as a result of lengthy periods of consideration.
My hon. Friend emphasises what I want to emphasise, which is that the report under clause 61 does not enable anyone to assess efficiency and effectiveness. A reader of that report could look at what has occurred and what numbers have gone out, but it would not allow them to consider the efficiency with which those numbers have been arrived at. Our amendment would make that possible. The report under clause 61 would be on the numbers, but the amendment would make it much easier for a reader of the report to interrogate the numbers, and it would therefore add quality to quantity.
Katherine Fletcher (South Ribble) (Con)
The hon. Gentleman mentioned quality and quantity. I have been reflecting on the fact that today is a relatively momentous day, with the first vaccines going into arms. The Committee is lucky enough to have with us the Minister, who has probably been up all night doing that. Although I appreciate that I am not quite speaking to the amendment, I wanted to talk about the quality and quantity of vaccination and of the Minister’s time.
Dr Whitehead
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for that interestingly injected intervention—[Laughter.]
Chi Onwurah
It is important that the Committee recognises the momentous occasion of the first use of the vaccine in this country and congratulates the Minister. It is also important that we reflect on the fact that our fantastic NHS and key workers, rather than the Minister himself, made it possible.
Dr Whitehead
Indeed. I was about to reflect on the appointment a long while ago—in another time and another Administration, when there was a severe and prolonged drought—of a Minister for drought, the right hon. Denis Howell. The Minister’s success was amazing: within about three days of his appointment, it poured with rain.
The Chair
Before the Minister intervenes, may I say that it is important to keep to the detail of the Bill.
Nadhim Zahawi
Just to second what the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central said, we have an incredible team in our NHS in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, our military and all the other planners who have delivered today. I want to put that on the record.
Dr Whitehead
I absolutely endorse that. I also congratulate the Minister on the fact that things are really happening on his watch. I do not necessarily make the parallel with drought and rain falling down, but I wish him every success with the programme that is now rolling out, which started remarkably quickly after his appointment.
I want to highlight the difference that the amendment would make between quality and quantity. In practice, the decisions about issuing information notices and attendance notices will be taken by the new BEIS investment security unit, although I have to say that we have not heard much information about that unit—its resourcing, practice or key performance indicators. The operation of the entire new regime, its impact on the UK’s status as a place for investment in high-value start-ups—the impact assessment states that about 80% of transactions in the scope of the mandatory notification will affect start-ups and small and medium-sized enterprises—and its impact on national security will depend on the competence of the new unit when it is set up. So far, the Government have laid out limited plans for securing the capacity and capability it needs. In that context, the extent to which the unit will be able to act efficiently and effectively is a potential concern. To some extent, that is a question of its resourcing and of the way it is set up and required to work.
At the moment, we have no method of assessing how the unit is doing in terms of carrying out what the Bill wants it to do. The amendment, among other things, would bring much greater accountability to the unit to ensure that it carries out an efficient and effective national security screening regime. We have to remember that efficiency is about not just how well the unit goes about its business, but what judgments it makes and, for example, whether it gives multiple information notices out to businesses, as it can under the Bill. Each time a successive notice is given out, it would stop the clock on time limits and extend the period in which that overall examination would take place.
Chi Onwurah
My hon. Friend is making a really important point, because we all know that what is measured throws a light on the process behind it. If these orders are not measured, I am concerned that they will effectively be a way for a hard-pressed department to gain more time. We have all seen during this pandemic—I refer not least to responses to parliamentary questions—how pressure on resources has increased timescales in the operation of Government Departments. This amendment would shine a light on that and prevent such misuse.
Dr Whitehead
My hon. Friend makes an important point on the amendment about how we undertake the difficult job of making sure something is efficiently and effectively carried out, while not taking the wheels from under the organisation as it does its job. That is a difficult process to undertake, because information notices are clearly important, as are attendance notices, and we should have no mechanisms in the Bill that prevent or undermine the ability of the organisation charged with giving notices out to do that properly. That is a given as far as the process is concerned.
However, it is equally important that substantial light is shed on how that process works in practice and whether, over a period of time, that process might be seen not to be working as well as it should be in combining the necessities of those notices with a reasonably fair approach, particularly as far as small businesses are concerned. Managing that metric properly while enabling the unit to carry out its job properly is quite a task.
The amendment would enable us to undertake that task by requiring the recording of quality—that is, the numbers of notices given out, the “aggregate amount of days” that those notices have consumed and the
“number of called-in events for which such days are included”.
By enumerating those numbers and putting them together in each report, we can see whether the unit is doing its job well overall, could improve or could undertake activities to make sure that there was a balance between efficiency, effectiveness and fairness in the whole process.
Indeed, it is not just small businesses that might welcome having a light shone on what is being done to them; it would also be a potentially important tool to allow the Secretary of State to see what the unit, which is essentially carrying out the Secretary of State’s work, would be doing over each period of the year. The Secretary of State could use that reporting mechanism as a way of ensuring that the unit is doing what it should and that the principles we have set out in the Bill for the good expedition of information and attendance notices continue to operate in the best possible way over a period of time.
Adding quality to the quantity in the report is good news all around. It enhances the Secretary of State’s ability to manage his or her own Department. It shines a light for those bodies that ought to be co-operators in the process, but that may sometimes feel themselves as victims in the process. It shines a ray of light on the operation of the organisation itself—the unit carrying out these activities—and is therefore a welcome addition to its activities. That will keep it considering the efficiency and effectiveness of its operations in the knowledge that the information will be stuck in a report each year and will be scrutinised in terms of the unit’s activities in carrying out the wishes behind what will be the Act.
The amendment would be a constructive and careful addition to the reporting process, and one that would considerably enhance the effectiveness of the Bill. I hope the Secretary of State can consider it in the light in which it is intended, which is as an addition to the Bill, and not as seeking to undermine the effectiveness of the process or the activities of the unit itself.
Nadhim Zahawi
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. I intend to speak first to clause 24 stand part and then turn to amendment 23. Clause 24 concerns the Secretary of State’s information-gathering powers in clause 19 and his power to require the attendance of witnesses in clause 20, with the requirement that national security assessments are completed within a defined period, which appears in clause 23.
Clause 24(4) ensures that the clock is stopped on the assessment period while the Secretary of State waits for information or for the attendance of witnesses, as required through the issuance of the relevant notices. That helps to avoid the Secretary of State being timed out of properly assessing a case simply because someone fails or refuses to provide information or to attend to give evidence.
Amendment 23 seeks to require that the annual report, provided for in clause 61, includes additional information relating to how often subsection (4) is engaged. In particular, it seeks to require the Secretary of State to include the aggregate number of days on which the clock is stopped as a result of the Secretary of State awaiting the provision of information through clause 19 or the attendance of a witness through clause 20. It also seeks to include the number of call-in days, and the number of times information notices are given for each call-in.
Our response has three parts, though the Committee will be relieved to hear that each part is distinctly and deliberately brief. First, clause 24(4) is entirely necessary to help to ensure that the Secretary of State is not timed out. Secondly, clauses 19(1) and 20(1) stipulate that the requirements to provide information or evidence must relate to the Secretary of State’s functions under the Bill. In this context, that means that they have to be relevant to assessing the trigger event and making a decision on it.
The Secretary of State will furthermore need to comply with public law duties when issuing an information notice or attendance notice, which would preclude him from doing so for an improper purpose, not that he would ever contemplate such a thing. A decision to issue a notice would also be subject to judicial review. There are therefore appropriate legal safeguards on the use of information notices and attendance notices. Finally, clause 61 does not preclude the Secretary of State from publishing such information should it later prove a helpful metric for assessing the regime.
Stephen Flynn (Aberdeen South) (SNP)
I have a great deal of sympathy for the amendment, but I am conscious that the Minister is unlikely to agree to it, given what he has said. Bearing that in mind, the detail that is being asked for is probably quite straightforward. I would like this on the record: were a Member to ask for such information, would the Department be willing to provide it in the future, notwithstanding the fact that the amendment will likely be defeated?
Nadhim Zahawi
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his ingenious attempt at augmenting this excellent Bill, but for the reasons I have just set out I see no grounds for including the amendment. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Southampton, Test to please withdraw it.
Dr Whitehead
I am not sure that the Minister has given sufficient consideration to what I thought were genuine points concerning, as I set out, both quality and quantity. He says that it will be possible, if the Secretary of State thought it a good idea, to include some of those points in the annual report anyway. That comes back to some of our “may” and “must” arguments. The Secretary of State might, if they want to, decide to do that in an annual report, but the circumstances under which that happened could be that they wanted to say in the report, “The unit is working brilliantly, everything is hunky dory and terrific, and here is the evidence.” Conversely, were the unit not working very well, they might decide not to put those things into an annual report.
Although the Secretary of State would have the ability to add something to the annual report, if they did not want to do it, or they felt that it was a better idea to put such things under the table, away from the light of day, no one else would ever know about it—unless, as the hon. Member for Aberdeen South suggested, some sort of undertaking were given that those numbers were available on request to hon. Members. The formula that the Minister has put forward falls well short of the mark in meeting the three tests that I have put forward for quality plus quality: that the report should be of benefit to the Minister, the unit, and the firms and companies that may be affected. The Minister addresses only one of those three.
Chi Onwurah
Given that, as my hon. Friend sets out, this information should be of use to the unit’s internal workings and that it would, I hope, be readily available in the Department, as part of the workflow in modern-day information management systems, can he think of any reason why the Secretary of State would not want to make it available?
Dr Whitehead
I cannot immediately, because as I mentioned, having that information available in some way or other—we suggest it should be in the report—is a win, win, win all round. It is useful for everybody and potentially important for some.
I do not suggest for a moment that there might be anything untoward about hiding that information away, and I am sure that the Minister absolutely would not want that to happen. However, under the mechanism he has set out and his argument for why this amendment is unnecessary, that is precisely what could happen, which is not something that we should feel very happy about. I hope that, as a minimum, the Minister will address that point, along with the intervention by the hon. Member for Aberdeen South about this information being freely available one way or another, whether in a report or not. An overwhelmingly better idea would be simply and unobtrusively to add it to the report, so that we knew it would come out and could refer to it.
I am not sure whether we would seek to divide the Committee on this—[Interruption]—but I think we might. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central, I am slightly at a loss as to why this provision would not be acknowledged and put in the Bill, or something close to it, one way or another. I invite the Minister to intervene to say whether the disclosure of this information on a regular basis would happen in the report or whether he will give an undertaking to ensure that happens in passing this legislation.
Nadhim Zahawi
We have very carefully considered the types of information that would be helpful to investors. The direction of travel—this was the question raised earlier by the hon. Member for Aberdeen South—for Parliament and the public was to include that information in the annual statement. The Committee should also note that the list does not prevent us from adding other relevant non-sensitive information, as I mentioned earlier. I hope the hon. Member will see fit—I know there is a slight disagreement on the shadow Front Bench—to withdraw the amendment.
Nadhim Zahawi
I heard the hon. Gentleman say that he was going to withdraw the amendment, then the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central said, “No, we’re going to put it to a vote.”
Dr Whitehead
To be precise, I said that I was not sure whether we should divide, because we are a little bemused as to why, one way or another, that information should not be within the report or the Minister could not make a firm statement that it will be regularly available, and the Minister has not said either in his response.
Chi Onwurah
My hon. Friend is making an excellent point. Does he agree that it would be helpful if we could be sure that the Minister’s accuracy were not as low when reporting my hon. Friend’s words as when reporting on the functioning of the clause?
Dr Whitehead
To be kind, I think the Minister was reflecting on what the motives for our brief discussion about dividing might have been, rather than attempting in any way to put words in people’s mouths that were not there.
I will put Committee members out of their misery. I do not think there was sufficient reassurance in the responses that have been given, and I think we ought to record that we would like the amendment to be in the Bill. Therefore, we will divide the Committee.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Nadhim Zahawi
I turn to clauses 25 to 28, which I shall treat together, as they all relate to orders that the Secretary of State may make in relation to notifiable cases under the national security and investment regime. It is important that, during any national security assessment following a trigger event being called in, parties do not act in a way that undermines the assessment or any remedies that might be imposed at the end of it. Clause 25 therefore gives the Secretary of State the power to impose requirements for the purpose of preventing, reversing or mitigating actions that might pre-empt the regime through what is known as an interim order. In practice, this could include requiring that the parties do not complete a trigger event until a final decision has been issued, or, where the Secretary of State is concerned about access to sensitive intellectual property, an order could be used to prohibit the intellectual property from being transferred or shared pending the outcome of the assessment. The power is necessarily flexible to allow conditions to be tailored to particular cases and particular risks, although it rightly comes with important safeguards.
First, interim orders may be made only during the formal assessment period when a trigger event has already met the legal test to be called in for a full assessment. The Secretary of State may not, therefore, impose an interim order before he has called in a trigger event, which I hope hon. Members will agree is a significant bar to meet in and of itself. Secondly, the Secretary of State must reasonably consider that the provisions are necessary and proportionate for the purpose of preventing, reversing or mitigating a pre-emptive action. Any decision to make an order would be open to judicial review.
Thirdly, as an interim measure it is inherently time limited. In a particular case, there might be a reason why a requirement is not needed for the full duration of the assessment period. Consequently, a specific end date might be given in an order. Furthermore, unless an earlier date has been specified in the order, or the order has been revoked, an interim order will cease to have effect once the Secretary of State has given a final notification or made a final order decision.
The Bill also includes specific provisions for interim orders to be kept under review and for those subject to them to request that they be varied or revoked. That is provided for in clause 27. Without clause 25, it would be possible for a dangerous acquisition outside of the mandatory sectors to be completed before the Secretary of State has an opportunity to assess it properly. Indeed, the Government expect a genuinely determined hostile actor to seek to do just that.
Clause 26 provides for the Secretary of State either to put in place effective remedies to counter national security risks discovered during an assessment of a trigger event, or to clear a trigger event where no national security risk is found. The clause therefore provides for both final orders and final notifications, and subsection (1) requires the Secretary of State either to make a final order or to give a final notification before the end of the assessment period. Final notifications act as notice to parties that no further action is to be taken under the Bill in relation to the call-in notice.
Final orders seek to address any national security risks found during an assessment. Those will not be arbitrary and will be subject to a strict legal test. First, the Secretary of State must be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that a trigger event has taken place or is in progress or contemplation and that this would give rise to a national security risk if carried into effect. Secondly, the Secretary of State must reasonably consider that the provisions of the order are necessary and proportionate for the purpose of preventing remedy or mitigating the risk.
The permitted contents for final orders are set out in subsection (5). This includes the power to put certain conditions on a trigger event before it can proceed, or for it to remain in place. The subsection also gives the Secretary of State the power to block a trigger event or, where it has already taken place, require that to be unwound. I make it clear to hon. Members that such a course of action would be a last resort. In the nearly two decades since the Enterprise Act 2002 came into force, no Government of either colour has blocked a deal on national security grounds. However, it is still a necessary power to have. There might be some cases where a trigger event poses such an acute risk that it cannot be allowed to proceed in any form, and it would be irresponsible to leave our country unprotected.
Clause 27 provides important safeguards on the continued operation of interim orders and final orders. First, it requires the Secretary of State to keep interim and final orders under review to ensure that they are relevant and proportionate. Secondly, it empowers him to vary or revoke such orders. Thirdly, it compels him to consider any request to vary or revoke an order as soon as practicable after receiving such a request.
Dr Whitehead
Does the Minister consider that the arrangements in clauses 25 to 28 for variations, revocations and exemptions are a proper subject for inclusion in an annual report? As he will observe, clause 61 on the annual report states that the
“The Secretary of State must, in relation to each relevant period—
(a) prepare a report in accordance with this section”.
Although not specifically covered by the word “must” in the clause, does the Minister consider that the arrangements in these clauses are a proper subject for the annual report?
Nadhim Zahawi
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. We have had that debate already, and we have set out clearly what we think is appropriate to be in the report, notwithstanding what we might do in future if that allows investors to have greater clarity.
Matt Western
I was going to make exactly the same point as my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test. Surely the intent behind the question is how we make the operation of the provision much more efficient. We are starting from a zero base. The suggestion that we consider future demands and implications is a constructive one.
Nadhim Zahawi
I see where the hon. Gentleman is coming from. The House has many levers at its disposal, including the Select Committee process, to probe the effectiveness of the new regime.
I shall now make some headway. The provision is designed to ensure that orders reflect changing circumstances and do not remain in force for perpetuity without further consideration. Parties subject to orders may themselves request that the Secretary of State vary or revoke their order. This is another mechanism to ensure that orders remain appropriate. The Secretary of State must consider such requests unless the request relates to a final order and, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, there has been no material change in circumstances since the order was made or last varied, or if the party concerned has previously made a request to vary or revoke the order since that request.
Chi Onwurah
I thank the Minister for the progress he is making in reading out the provisions of these clauses, but I am trying to understand the length of time that an interim order can be in force. What is the maximum time an interim order can be in force?
Nadhim Zahawi
It is time limited, but that does not specify what the time needs to be. I will happily write to the hon. Lady.
Chi Onwurah
I am not sure that it is time limited, because of the number of additional voluntary periods that the Secretary of State can invoke.
Nadhim Zahawi
I am happy to come back to the hon. Lady on that point.
Clause 28 requires that orders made under this Bill be served on anyone required to comply with them and anyone with whom the call-in notice was served. The clause also places certain requirements on the contents of orders or accompanying explanatory material as well as giving the Secretary of State the power to exclude sensitive information. The clause sets out the process that the Secretary of State must follow after making an interim order or final order. This provides the clarity and predictability that we all want for businesses and investors.
First, clause 25 requires the Secretary of State to serve the order on everyone who needs to be aware of it, including anyone who is required to comply with it as well as anyone on whom the call-in notice was served. That will provide clarity for affected parties. The Secretary of State is also required to serve the order on such other persons as he considers appropriate—for example, a regulator who is considering the trigger event might need to be aware of the terms of an order.
Secondly, the clause sets out the information that must be contained within an order or its accompanying explanatory material, including the reasons for making the order, the trigger event to which the order relates, the date on which the order comes into force, and the possible consequences of not complying with the order. That will help to ensure that parties are clear about why the Secretary of State has made the order and what they must now do as a result.
Thirdly, the clause enables the Secretary of State to exclude information from a copy of an order or its accompanying explanatory material that he considers commercially sensitive or national security sensitive. That will help to ensure that the process of serving orders does not negatively impact on parties’ commercial interest or on our national security interest. The clause makes provision for notifying those affected by variations and revocations of orders, with a view to ensuring that they are properly communicated in a timely manner.
I hope that hon. Members feel reassured that clauses 25 to 28 will frustrate hostile actors and enable the Government to work with business in executing this regime, that there are safeguards to ensure that orders do not stay in place longer than is necessary or proportionate, and that all relevant parties will have the information they need in relation to orders. I therefore commend the clauses to the Committee.
Chi Onwurah
Let me start my thanking the Minister for setting out the purpose and details of clauses 25 to 28, which set out the remedies and the process of the timelines that we discussed in relation to clause 23. As he has suggested, and as the Opposition recognise, many of our amendments and arguments have been focused on trying to ensure that the process of assessment, interim orders and final orders works not just as effectively as possible, but as clearly as possible. It should be as clear as possible to the many businesses that will come under the remit of the Bill, particularly the small and medium-sized enterprises that the Opposition seek to champion.
On the requirements for interim orders, which are set out in clause 25, the Minister is absolutely right to say that we have to have regard to the actions of hostile actors. Indeed, we will be looking for greater clarity on who those hostile actors might be, but we have to recognise that hostile actors might seek to circumvent the provisions of the Bill in order to make off with important intellectual property or to otherwise influence the companies’ assets that they are seeking to acquire. We therefore recognise the importance of interim orders, as set out in clause 25. As I have told the Minister, I am not clear about the maximum timeline that the interim orders can be in place. Regardless of that, it is clearly necessary for them to be put in place and to be defined. They need to be reviewed and rewritten, and other provisions in clause 25 set that out.
My understanding is that interim orders give way to final orders and the final notifications. Although we have some concerns about how those notifications are to be made, which we shall consider later, a final order, made as effectively and quickly as possible, is clearly important.
I am not sure that the Minister made it clear in clause 26(4):
“Before making a final order the Secretary of State must consider any representations made to the Secretary of State”.
This seems to me to be a very broad statement, yet here we see—as I am sure my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test will observe—that it does not say “may”, but “must”. I am not clear what that is seeking to address, as I would have thought that it was normal practice for the Secretary of State to consider representations made to them.
I wonder whether this is setting up the potential for a future judicial—or other—review, should any representation be made that was not considered to have been considered. Perhaps the Minister will write to me to give his view on that, or to set out what part of the process that statement is trying to address or give accountability on.
Nadhim Zahawi
The reason for that is to enable the Secretary of State to tailor remedies accordingly, as a limited list of remedies could result in risks being ineffectively addressed. I am happy to write to her on anything else she requires.
Chi Onwurah
My question is not about the broadness of the orders, or even the discretion that the Secretary of State has, because, as the Minister has observed, we have sought to probe that level of discretion in these powers; it is about the broadness of the provision that:
“Before making a final order the Secretary of State must consider any representations made to the Secretary of State”.
What is meant by “consider”? How would a failure to do so be identified and reported on, and how would the Secretary of State be held to account? I seek further clarity on that. Perhaps it is obvious to the Minister, and perhaps it is just to me that it is not obvious.
I would say, in agreeing to the provisions set out in clauses 25 to 27, that there are concerns that they will not be part of the general reporting, certainly in the provisions of clause 25, and interim reports are not mentioned in clause 61. I share the concerns of my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test about a lack of reporting on the provisions of the Bill, but we recognise the importance of the clauses and will not be opposing them.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 25 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 26 to 28 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)
On a point of order, Mr Twigg. Is it possible to turn up the heating in here? It is incredibly cold.
The Chair
I am afraid that is not in my power. We have 10 minutes more to get through. We will ask about heating, but I do not think there is much we can do about it.
Clause 29
Publication of notice of final order
Sam Tarry (Ilford South) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 27, in clause 29, page 19, line 39, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—
“(a) would be likely to prejudice the commercial interests of any person and where the publication would not be in the public interest, or”.
This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from redacting notices of final order (and information within them) on commercial grounds if redacting is contrary to the public interest.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship on this frosty morning, Mr Twigg. The amendment is on the public interest for disclosure. It is really about preventing the Secretary of State from redacting notices of final order and the information with them. The Opposition believe that commercial grounds for redacting are contrary to the public interest. It is about putting as much information as possible into the public realm about stuff that is particularly controversial but is really about clear protection of our national security.
Our strong belief is that the fundamental task of any Government, and the reason for the Bill overall, is the protection of our national security. A critical driver of that security is the wider public understanding of the rapidly changing threats that we face, and the different sources of those threats. We have heard from various expert witnesses over the past few weeks that other countries understand, perhaps far better than we do, what some of those threats are, and that our public understanding of threats is even more limited.
When Sir Richard Dearlove gave evidence, with vast experience spanning decades, he said:
“What is important about the Bill is that it raises parliamentary and public awareness of the issue.”—[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 24, Q30.]
Everyone on both sides of the House would like to see that. He also said, talking about China specifically:
“We need to conduct our relationship with China with much more wisdom and care. The Chinese understand us incredibly well. They have put their leadership through our universities for 20 or 30 years. We in comparison hardly know anything about China”—[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 20, Q21.]
The wider point in his evidence was that for too long our business priorities and the desire to be an attractive investment destination had overridden some of the security concerns, across a number of different Governments, perhaps creating a pattern of not taking the threats posed by China as seriously as possible.
The Bill requires the Secretary of State to publish notices of final order, setting out the details of persons and events involving national security that meant the notices were made. Those details are critical to our security and to our understanding of the threats. They must be made public. The amendment would put into the public domain the accurate information that will create public confidence on what the clause seeks to achieve.
As drafted, the clause prevents the publication of information that is critical to our security if it prejudices commercial interest. The Opposition believe that is the wrong judgment. The whole point of the Bill is to take a more strategic view, as indicated by Sir Richard Dearlove. The focus should be on long-term security, but the Bill is a way to protect not only security but our long-term commercial interests. The approach in the amendment might mean some short-term commercial challenges, but it is absolutely right for our national security and our longer-term prosperity.
The amendment would require the Government to publish all details of a final order notice where it is in the interests of national security and the public interest, even when commercial interest could be prejudiced. Where a hostile actor acts against our security interests, it is crucial for the British public to know about it and that we have some appropriate conversations in the public domain. Not to disclose such threats or events for the sake of protecting imminent profits in the short term would be the wrong judgment.
Chi Onwurah
I thank my hon. Friend for the amendment and for the excellent point that he is making. Does he think that if a company was being acquired by a hostile actor, and the Secretary of State thought that knowledge of the acquisition would be detrimental to the commercial interests of the company, the clause would allow the Secretary of State to redact that information? It would be in the general public’s interest to know that such an acquisition was taking place.
Sam Tarry
My hon. Friend makes a very good point. It is our belief that national security must be the overriding priority when threats emerge in an ever-changing world. We have heard evidence that threats that should have been seen were not dealt with in the correct way. Bringing that into the public domain through the amendment is incredibly important. That would override the short-term commercial pain if it guaranteed that security was paramount.
If we did not disclose such threats or events, and the focus was just on the short-term protection of swift profits, that would be the wrong judgment, because it would downgrade the overarching purpose of the Bill, which is to use all its mechanisms to enhance our security and ensure that we are on top of it at all times. The amendment would correct the focal point of this area of the Bill, by requiring before any redaction on commercial grounds an assessment of whether publishing would be in the public interest. That puts the onus on, and gives power to, the Secretary of State to make those crucial judgments.
Chi Onwurah
I rise to say a few words in support of my hon. Friend’s amendment. The excellent points that he has made have highlighted a theme of the Committee’s discussions: the potential conflict between the Department’s focus on supporting business and investment into the UK, and our national security. As he set out, the public interest might be in knowing that a hostile acquisition was taking place and in being better informed generally about national security. In addition, I can think of many examples in which the knowledge that a company had come into the purview of the Bill could have a detrimental impact on its stock valuation or reputation.
When the Minister responds, I hope that he will set out what he expects the Secretary of State to do when there is a conflict of interest between public knowledge of hostile actors and specific measures in the Bill to ensure that companies related to potential hostile actors, or those for whom our national security is not in their interests—through chains of influence or company holdings, for example—should not be beyond the reach of the Bill. The clause, by enabling the Secretary of State to leave out details that prejudice the commercial interests of any person, seems to put the focus back on commercial interests rather than national security. The amendment would put the focus back on national security and the public interest.
National Security and Investment Bill (Tenth sitting)
Tuesday 8th December 2020
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 8 December 2020 - (8 Dec 2020)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
Before we adjourned, the Committee was considering amendment 27 to clause 29, and I believe that Chi Onwurah was in the process of concluding her remarks.
Clause 29
Publication of notice of final order
Amendment proposed this day: 27, in clause 29, page 19, line 39, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—
“(a) would be likely to prejudice the commercial interests of any person and where the publication would not be in the public interest, or”—(Sam Tarry.)
This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from redacting notices of final order (and information within them) on commercial grounds if redacting is contrary to the public interest.
Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)
I had been just about to conclude by saying that a key reason for the amendment moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South is that it asserts and requires the supremacy of the public interest over commercial interest in the Secretary of State’s actions in reporting on final notices. I hope that the Minister will accept the amendment.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Nadhim Zahawi)
With your permission, Sir Graham, I will speak to clause 29 stand part before turning to the amendment. The Committee has heard about the careful balance that the Government are striking in this regime by allowing for a discreet and commercially sensitive screening process wherever possible, while requiring transparency at key junctures where not to do so could disadvantage third parties.
Clause 29 is a key clause, the purpose of which is to deliver that essential but carefully chosen transparency. It places a duty on the Secretary of State to publish a notice of the fact that a final order has been made, varied or revoked. The main purpose of publishing notice of those facts is to ensure that third parties who may have a financial interest in a trigger event are not disadvantaged by the provision of information only to the parties involved. Examples of relevant third parties might include shareholders, suppliers or customers of the target entity, and other investors who may be considering investing.
The clause will provide important reassurance to the business community and the wider public about the circumstances in which final orders are made, varied and revoked. It specifies what information must appear in a notice, including, crucially, a summary of the order, revocation or variation, its effect, and the reasons for it. Similarly to the approach on orders, subsection (3) allows the Secretary of State to exclude information from the notice when he considers it commercially sensitive or national security sensitive. The clause is complemented by the requirement in clause 61 for the Secretary of State to report annually to Parliament on the use of the powers in the Bill. Clause 61(2) sets out an extensive list of the aggregate data that the annual report must include. Together, those provisions will help investors and businesses to understand the regime, and will ensure that Parliament can hold the Government to account on their operation at both individual and aggregate levels.
I will now turn to amendment 27 to clause 29. I remind the Committee that the clause requires the Secretary of State to publish a notice when a final order has been made, varied or revoked. As drafted, subsection (3)(a) provides that the Secretary of State may exclude from that public notice anything that he considers likely to prejudice the commercial interests of any person. The amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from excluding such information, unless he considers that publishing it would not be in the public interest.
The Committee has heard about the careful balance that the Government are seeking to strike in this regime, to allow, as I mentioned earlier, for a discreet and commercially sensitive screening process wherever possible, while requiring transparency at key junctures when not to do so may disadvantage third parties. As I set out, this is a key clause, the purpose of which is to deliver that carefully balanced transparency. Inherent in the clause is the degree of flexibility afforded to the Secretary of State to redact information when he judges that to be appropriate, whether for commercial or national security reasons. I hesitate slightly to return to a somewhat recurring theme—the difference between “may” and “shall”—but the fact that the Secretary of State “may” redact information provides him with the flexibility to decide case by case whether that is the right thing to do.
The hon. Member for Ilford South seeks to ensure with this amendment that the Secretary of State will not disregard the public interest when using the flexibility on deciding whether to redact information. The hon. Gentleman need not worry; that is my message to him. The Secretary of State will always seek to serve the public interest in this Bill and in all that he does. I can therefore assure the hon. Gentleman that the Secretary of State will carefully consider any redactions made and that he will not take the decision to exclude information lightly.
Nadhim Zahawi
I suspect that the hon. Member for Ilford South may wonder why, if it makes so little difference, we do not include his amendment and formalise the importance of considering the public interest. I suspect that that is also the point on which the hon. Lady wishes to intervene.
Chi Onwurah
The Committee recognises the importance of giving the powers in the Bill to the Secretary of State in the interests of national security. The powers of redaction are, or could be, in the interests of commercial sensitivity. Does the Minister agree that national security and the public interest should be supreme over commercial sensitivity? Why will he not make that clear?
Nadhim Zahawi
I thought I had made that clear. The Bill strikes that balance between commercial sensitivity and national security.
I return to my reassurance on the importance of considering the public interest. In addition to the general principle that one should avoid amending clauses that, essentially, fulfil their objectives—if it isn’t broken, don’t fix it—I suggest that the Bill is not the place to begin adding references to the public interest. While the Secretary of State cares profoundly about the public interest, this specific regime is intentionally and carefully focused on national security. Although it may be an attractive proposition to certain hon. Members, my strong view is that by introducing ideas of wider public interest into the Bill, we would risk confusing and stretching its scope beyond its carefully crafted calibration. I have a tremendous amount of sympathy with what hon. Members seek to achieve with the amendment but, for the reasons I have set out, I must ask that the hon. Gentleman withdraws it.
Sam Tarry (Ilford South) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Graham, in these temperatures, which are positively balmy compared with the Siberian ones that we experienced this morning.
I thank the Minister for his comments, but I would say that there is no stretch too far on national security. It is positive to hear that the Minister agrees that the focus on national security is crucial, and that we are driving at the interests of national security in our amendment.
Chi Onwurah
Was my hon. Friend as confused as I was when the Minister spoke about this Bill not being the place to introduce public interest? The Government, however, have introduced commercial sensitivity. We are not seeking to modify national security; it is the introduction of commercial sensitivity that requires the introduction of public interest. We are talking about modifying the importance of commercial sensitivity, not national security. Will my hon. Friend join me in rejecting the Minister’s assertion?
Sam Tarry
I agree wholeheartedly with my hon. Friend. We have been clear that the amendment is simply about preventing the Secretary of State from redacting notices of final order on commercial grounds, if redaction is contrary to the public interest. The whole point of this Bill is to together public interest, national security and commercial interest because they are one and the same. National security is our highest priority, but in the post-Brexit scenario we want to be a country that is as open and positive as possible towards investment from international partners if they share our values and our objectives of supporting and building Britain. It feels as though the Minister is agreeing with us in part, but he is not prepared to accept this amendment. For that reason, I will press the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Chi Onwurah
I beg to move amendment 24, in clause 30, page 19, line 44, leave out
“making of a final order”
and insert
“making of an interim or a final order”.
This amendment would enable the Secretary of State to give financial assistance in consequence of the making of an interim order.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 28, in clause 30, page 20, line 3, after “period” insert “or any calendar year,”.
This amendment would make it mandatory for the Government to inform Parliament if financial assistance given in any financial year, or in any calendar year, exceeds £100 million.
Clause stand part.
Chi Onwurah
My hon. Friends and I have set out how we are seeking to provide constructive support and improvement for this Bill. I am disappointed that the Minister seems to feel that no improvement is possible, but I hope to persuade him otherwise with amendment 24. It is not a probing amendment; it brings a much-needed improvement to what I consider to be an incomprehensible omission in clause 30.
Clause 30 provides that the Secretary of State may, with the consent of the Treasury, give financial assistance to, or in respect of, an entity through a loan guarantee or indemnity, or any other form of financial assistance. The financial assistance must be given as a consequence of him making a final order. That is a key point that I will return to.
Clause 30 further states that during any financial year, if the amount given under the clause totals £100 million or more, the Secretary of State must lay a report of the amount before the House of Commons. It states that during any financial year in which a report has been laid before Parliament, if the Secretary of State provides any further financial assistance under this clause, he must lay before the House a report of the amount.
I set that out to indicate that, as I understand it, the amount of financial assistance that can be provided is not limited. A report must be provided when the amount given under this clause totals £100 million or more, but there is no limit on the amount which can be provided. One would expect the Treasury to provide a limit in any year, but the Bill does not set any limit on the amount of financial assistance that the Secretary of State can make available. It does not, however, provide for any financial assistance in the case of an interim order. The provision applies only to a final order, specifically in clause 30, on page 19, in line 44. That is why we seek simply to change that to include interim orders under the scope of the financial assistance clause.
Stephen Flynn (Aberdeen South) (SNP)
I think it was Cicero who said:
“Brevity is a great charm of eloquence.”
In that regard, I will keep my remarks brief. Obviously, what we propose here is incredibly straightforward. It would expand the scope from a financial year to a calendar year. I would not wish to imply that I do not necessarily have complete and utter confidence in the UK Government at all times, and that they might wish, perhaps, to stay away from and overcome any form of scrutiny by making some sort of payment at a certain point in time where the overlap is with a financial year. An amendment such as this, which is succinct and clear, would allow for everyone to be quite happy that where there is a need for the UK Government to put in place a financial assistance level of £100 million, irrespective of whether it is a financial year or a calendar year, Members are fully apprised of that spend.
Nadhim Zahawi
For the benefit of the Committee, I will begin with clause 30 stand part, which makes provision for financial assistance. I will then turn to amendment 24, and amendment 28 from the hon. Member for Aberdeen South.
The Government recognise that final orders, in exceptional cases—and I have to stress in exceptional cases, when we are administering taxpayers’ money—may bring about financial difficulty for the affected parties. This clause therefore gives the Secretary of State the legal authority to provide financial assistance to, or in relation to, entities in consequence of the making of a final order, to mitigate the impacts of a final order, for example. It might also be used where the consequence of a final order in itself might otherwise impact the country’s national security interests.
Hon. Members will know that such clauses are required to provide parliamentary authority for spending by Government in pursuit of policy objectives where no existing statutory authority for such expenditure already exists. I am confident that such assistance would be given only in exceptional circumstances when no alternative was available. For example, the Secretary of State could impose a final order blocking an acquisition of an entity that is an irreplaceable supplier to Government, subsequently putting the financial viability of the entity in doubt. In such a situation, the Secretary of State could provide financial assistance to the entity to ensure that the supplier could continue operating while an alternative buyer was found.
Such spending would of course be subject to the existing duty of managing public money—the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central asked what checks and balances are in place—and compliant with any other legal obligations concerning the use of Government funds. To provide further explicit reassurance regarding the use of the power, subsection (1) specifies that any financial assistance may be given only with the consent of the Treasury.
The clause also covers reporting to the House when financial assistance is given under the clause. I will speak to that further when I turn to the amendments. I am sure that hon. Members will see the clause as necessary and appropriate, and have confidence that our Government, and future Governments, will have only limited, but sufficient, freedom to provide financial support under the regime as a result.
Amendment 24 would permit the Secretary of State to provide financial assistance in consequence of making an interim order, which was the hon. Lady’s point. As she will know, the Government take the management of our country’s finances very seriously, and such a power naturally requires appropriate safeguards to ensure that public money is spent appropriately. Restricting the power to final orders ensures that the Secretary of State may use it only to assist entities once a national security assessment has been completed and final remedies have been imposed—for example, to mitigate the impact of a final order on a company. It would not be appropriate to use the power to provide aid to an entity that is only temporarily affected by an interim order, which will last only for a period of review, likely to take 30 working days and, at most, 75.
Chi Onwurah
I thank the Minister for his comments. When he says that an interim order can be in place for at most 75 days, I think he is adding 30 days, which is the initial period, to 45 days, which is the additional period. I am afraid that he is forgetting the voluntary periods.
Nadhim Zahawi
Yes, but the point remains that no final order has been made, and public money will be spent only in very limited circumstances, as I mentioned, in consequence of a final order. Any expenditure will be subject to appropriate safeguards.
Amendment 28, tabled by the hon. Member for Aberdeen South, would require the Secretary of State to inform Parliament if financial assistance given under clause 30 in any financial year, or any calendar year, exceeds £100 million. If during any financial year the assistance given under the clause totals £100 million or more, subsection (3) as drafted requires the Secretary of State to lay a report of the amount before the House.
If, during any financial year in which such a report has been laid, the Secretary of State provides any further financial assistance under the clause, subsection (4) requires that he lay a further report of the amount, so if he makes a report before the end of the year and then spends more money, which was the hon. Gentleman’s point, the Secretary of State will need to update the report. As I am sure the hon. Gentleman appreciates, the Government are committed to providing as much transparency as is reasonably possible when it comes to the use of the new investment screening regime provided for in the Bill.
The amendment would effectively mean that the Secretary of State must stand before Parliament twice—likely, once at the end of the calendar year and again at the end of the financial year, a few months later—to lay what is likely to be a rather similar report of the amount given in financial assistance grants under the clause. Although the Secretary of State would be flattered by his popularity, I am sure the hon. Member for Aberdeen South would agree that seeing him for that purpose twice in such a short time would be a case of duplication, and the Secretary of State would not want to take up his valuable time unnecessarily. I can assure him that the Secretary of State is fully committed to transparency and will ensure that Parliament has the information that it needs to track the use of the powers in the regime.
For those reasons, I am unable to accept the amendments, and I hope that hon. Members will not press them.
Chi Onwurah
I thank the Minister for his comments, but I am disappointed that he seems determined merely to respond from his notes, regardless of the validity of the points put to him. On why it is inappropriate for financial assistance to be provided in the case of interim orders, his reason—as far as I can understand it—was purely that interim orders were too short to make any difference. Although he cannot say how long an interim order will last—he can say how long he thinks it may last—it could go on indefinitely, because I cannot see in clause 26 a limit on the number or length of voluntary periods that may be agreed for the assessment. On that basis, the assessment could last a significant time.
In any case, I hope that he, as the Minister for Business and Industry, is aware of how fast-paced the technology sector, in particular, can be. The inability to raise finance at a critical moment or to sell to a particular customer, for example, may cause significant financial and commercial damage to a small business or a start-up. I did not hear the Minister reject that point, yet he has rejected the need for any support during the period of an interim order. As I have shown, that is a mistake, and that is why we will press the amendment to a vote.
The Minister also made no response to my question about equity.
Nadhim Zahawi
I apologise—I should have responded to that, and it was remiss of me not to. We will consider all forms of financial assistance, including equity.
To respond to the point the hon. Lady has just made about companies that may have IP or a product in its early, nascent stage of growth, that are struggling and that are fast-moving in terms of raising funds, we at BEIS talk to many companies like that, outside the remit of the Bill, and we look to support them in a variety of ways.
Chi Onwurah
I genuinely thank the Minister for the clarification that equity investments will be included in this bit of the Bill.
Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)
We are focusing greatly on small and medium-sized businesses, but this can also happen to slightly larger organisations, which might be outside the commonly used definition of an SME. When a larger business is distressed because it has lost a major customer and finds itself in financial difficulty, it needs that cash injection, so that sort of assurance is important.
Chi Onwurah
As always, my hon. Friend makes a really important point, and one that I had not thought of. The point about this being applicable to medium-sized businesses is absolutely right. In some ways, medium-sized businesses can often be at a critical point; cash flow is so important, and they could suddenly become very distressed, but with the right cash flow or the right injection of capital, they could expand greatly.
Will the Minister consider this? During the pandemic, when certain innovations have become incredibly important, and cash and support are needed to significantly increase the volume of production—of a vaccine, shall we say, with which the Minister is intimately concerned—a delay of 30, 70 or whatever days will create a huge problem for a medium-sized or growing business, as well as for small businesses.
Nadhim Zahawi
In response to a point made by the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington about a company being in distress because it has lost a client, irrespective of the national security and investment regime we talk to such companies all the time. Whether they are small, nascent, medium-sized or large, we have other avenues of assistance to help those companies. That is the point I was making.
Chi Onwurah
I thank the Minister for that, which brings me to the point that I wanted to make in response to him. I discerned that that seemed to be his point—that the Bill may cause harm to companies, but that rather than seeking redress under the Bill, or this clause in particular, they should seek redress or some kind of compensation through the well-oiled machinery of Government that provides support for small and growing businesses. I am afraid that that response will be met with undiluted cynicism among the many small and medium-sized businesses that have dealt with Government.
Again, we are talking about a fast-moving situation. Perhaps the Minister will provide examples of where, on such timescales, support has been provided. More importantly, if that is a consequence of the Bill, why would it not be addressed in the Bill, especially as we have a clause that seeks to address this issue in the case of notices of final order. I gave the example of OneWeb satellites, which was a major investment that took some time to come about, and we were not clear whether it was a strategic asset or national security. Clarity is critical.
Matt Western
This is important. I take on board exactly what the Minister is saying, but I am sure he can assure me on this. To give one specific example, Imagination Technologies is a fantastic company, which lost its major customer, which was Apple. Chinese-backed investment—private equity—then came in. The US refused the company the chance to buy into a US business in 2017. I would love to think that whoever was in BEIS in 2017 looked at it closely and offered support. This might be beyond our remit, but it is important that such businesses are reached out to. Will someone in the Minister’s team confirm that the Government tried to support Imagination Technologies?
Chi Onwurah
I very much hope that the Minister or his Department will respond to that. My hon. Friend gave an example of an innovative company in need of support from the Department. Presumably it was similar to the cases we are discussing now, and that support was offered. If confirmation is not forthcoming, we should perhaps look for it via a parliamentary question, which might help us.
I want to say one word about amendment 28, which seeks to ensure that the term of the reporting does not undermine what is reported or its effectiveness. The Minister said that if the £100 million barrier was crossed, another report would have to be made on any further expenditure. However, the amendment concerns a small amount of expenditure in a given period, followed by a larger amount, and whether the periods in which the expenditure was made might mean that a report did not have to be made. The Minister also did not address the question of why £100 million was the right threshold for making a report. On that basis, I wish to press the amendment.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Sam Tarry
I beg to move amendment 25, in page 20, line 27, leave out from “in” until end of line 28 and insert
“setting out the reasons for such direction and an assessment of the impacts on grounds for action that may have arisen under Part 3 of the Enterprise Act 2002”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out reasons, and an assessment of the likely impacts, when publishing directions under this section.
Sam Tarry
The amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out the reasons for and an assessment of the likely impacts of published directions under the provisions regarding the Enterprise Act 2002. That is incredibly important because, in one respect, the Bill creates a radical shift by taking the merger control process, which is currently located primarily in the Competition and Markets Authority, and creating an alternative centre for merger control in the new investment security unit in BEIS. That is a big shift. We are trying to focus on setting out the reasons, and an assessment of the likely impacts, when directions come out of the new unit.
I want to expand a little on this. We have a series of reasons for intervention in investment and merger scenarios, such as national security, competition, financial stability, media plurality, public health—the list goes on. Having a single centre for merger control in the CMA helped ensure, partially, that the different reasons for intervention were considered coherently. At the very least, they were coherent as a package, ensuring that where, for example, national security demanded one solution, competition remedies did not force another. The multiple centres that the Bill creates make coherence more challenging. This is about ensuring that the process is as smooth as possible.
The Government must clarify how they intend the CMA’s merger control process to align with their new national security screening and approval process. That is particularly important when we reflect that the Government consultation process currently indicates that national security reviews will be run in parallel with CMA assessments and that the Government will cover interaction between the CMA regime and the new national security regime in a memorandum of understanding. Unfortunately, there is no specific indication of when this will happen. The amendment pushes for clarity now and for statutory accountability when a Secretary of State could otherwise undermine the CMA or take a decision that is contrary to something it will bring forward.
In relation to the Enterprise Act 2002, public interest intervention notice regimes allow the Secretary of State to direct the CMA to ensure that it does not inadvertently undermine the Secretary of State’s decision on national security in addressing competition concerns. The power to undermine the CMA is not in itself a problem, but it is about the accountability—that is what we are trying to drive at here. In the face of a vastly extended set of powers for the Secretary of State, the amendment would provide important clarification.
Previously, the CMA had a good reputation with business for independence and for reasons and rules-based decision making. We are really keen that that is continued, and that is what the driving force for this amendment is. For that reason, we seek greater accountability from the Secretary of State. The amendment would require that whenever the Secretary of State subordinates the CMA’s decision-making process, the reasons for doing so are published alongside an assessment of the impact in terms of whatever reasons the CMA would have had to act under its part 3 powers, whether that be competition, media plurality or quality, financial stability or, as I mentioned earlier, public health.
This is about the smooth and rational alignment of the merger control process. That is important for the integrity and impartiality of our national merger control processes and so that business can have certainty that these will be fully aligned. The question I would really like the Minister to answer is about the assurances the Government can give on providing specific, timely guidance on how many different parts of the merger control process will now work. How will the combination of the new unit and the pre-existing regime produce the guidance, and be driven by Government to do so, in a timely fashion? One thing that businesses are certainly seeking at the moment is assurances that things are set out as early and as clearly as possible. If that happens, it will allow businesses to plan in a much better way. For those reasons, I would like to hear how the Government plan to bring those two elements together.
Nadhim Zahawi
With your permission, Sir Graham, I will speak initially to clause 31 stand part, before turning to amendment 25. As the Bill separates out national security screening from the competition-focused merger control regime, we must, I am sure colleagues agree, ensure that the two regimes interact effectively, while also maintaining the CMA’s operational independence in relation to its merger investigations.
A trigger event under the Bill which is also a merger under the Enterprise Act may raise both national security and competition issues. Not having a power to avoid conflict between the two regimes raises an unacceptable risk for businesses’ operations and, of course, the Government’s reputation. The United Kingdom has a deserved and hard-earned reputation for being a dependable place in which to do business. Transparent regimes are fundamental to building and maintaining this reputation and fostering trust between Government and business.
Currently, under the Enterprise Act 2002, if both national security and competition concerns are raised, the CMA provides a report to the Secretary of State, who would then have the final say on how best to balance national security and competition concerns. This clause will ensure that the Secretary of State continues in his vital role of balancing national security and competition concerns. We will be able to avoid the risk of undue regime interference by maintaining regular and open channels of communication with the CMA.
There may, however, still be a risk that parallel investigations for national security and competition reasons reach conflicting conclusions. That may be particularly true in terms of the remedies required to address national security risks and competition concerns respectively. To remedy that issue, the clause enables the Secretary of State to direct the CMA to take, or not take, a particular course of action. The obligation on the Secretary of State to publish any direction given ensures that the decisions will be transparent, and provides certainty for all parties.
Chi Onwurah
The Minister says that it is unlikely that investigations would trigger concerns on both national security and competition grounds. However, the position that we are in right now with regard to Huawei is one in which the desire for more competition in our telecoms supply chain—that is, to have three vendors as opposed to two—led to a national security impact, which is why we are now in the process of ripping Huawei out of our network. Does he recognise that such examples may happen?
Nadhim Zahawi
I am grateful to the hon. Lady, but the difference is that I was referring to mergers. Such mergers would be rare. I do not think that anyone is merging with Huawei, or will in the future.
Chi Onwurah
It is quite clear that the acquisition of a vendor in our telecoms network by another country would have almost exactly the same outcome, so it may well apply.
Nadhim Zahawi
I was merely pointing out that there was no merger. The hon. Lady will forgive me: she is correct, but I did say that it is a rare occurrence. That is the point that I was making to the Committee.
The amendment seeks to impose a requirement to publish the reasons for giving a direction. We do not think that that is necessary. The clause already requires the Secretary of State to publish a direction in the manner that he considers appropriate. I do not think that I would be disclosing too many state secrets were I to speculate that that would be published on gov.uk. That is a reasonable bet. In many cases, I envisage that it is likely to be accompanied by a high-level explanation, but it is right that the Secretary of State should be able to decide what is appropriate on a case-by-case basis.
The amendment also seeks to require publication of an assessment of the direction’s impact on any grounds for action under part 3 of the Enterprise Act 2002. I have two points to make to the hon. Member for Ilford South. First, such a duty would not be appropriate in all cases—for example, where a direction simply required the CMA not to make a decision on competition remedies until a national security assessment had been concluded. The amendment as drafted would still require an assessment to be published in those circumstances.
Secondly, the predominant impact on grounds for action will of course relate to competition. The CMA is the independent expert competition authority, and nothing in the clause as drafted would prevent it from publishing its own assessment of the impact of a Secretary of State direction on the possible competition issues of a case. The clause also requires the Secretary of State to consult the CMA before giving a direction, so it will be able to inform him of the likely impact and he can factor that into his decision whether to give the direction. I believe that is the right approach and while I understand the hon. Member’s motivations in tabling the amendment, I urge him to withdraw it.
Sam Tarry
One of the questions that sprang to mind while listening to the Minister’s answer was: if there are conflicting remedies, which of security and economic competitiveness would the Secretary of State decide had primacy? In drawing the matter out as clearly as possible, we have seen that one of the issues with telecoms and Huawei was that the primacy of economic competitiveness was viewed as paramount over security. The Bill is not clear about the framework for assessing primacy when it comes to security. We have argued throughout that security needs to be the primary focus, and sometimes that will mean economic competitiveness taking a slight hit. However, we think this is about protecting our long-term economic interest.
Nadhim Zahawi
I want to reassure the hon. Gentleman. He asks whether the Secretary of State can override the CMA’s assessment. To give him some clarity, the power to direct may be used only if a trigger event has been called in for assessment under NSI and either a final order has been enforced or a final notification of no further action has been given. That is stage 1. To direct the CMA without a trigger event having first been called in and assessed would not be either reasonable or proportionate, in the Government’s view. However, if a merger is considered to be crucial in the interests of national security after an assessment, no competition concerns should be allowed to prevent it from continuing or remaining in place. I hope that offers him that reassurance.
Nadhim Zahawi
It is important to ensure that we are able to enforce the regime. If hostile actors realise that there is a gap in enforcement capability, that could serve to undermine the deterrent effect of the regime, and therefore compliance with it, and could cause reputational damage to the United Kingdom’s screening regime. Clauses 32 to 36 focus on enforcement and appeal. I will run through them at a relatively high level, but I am happy to discuss them in more detail if that would be of interest to hon. Members.
Clause 32 establishes the offence of completing without reasonable excuse a notifiable acquisition without approval from the Secretary of State. Completing a notifiable acquisition without approval could put national security at risk. In particular, the risk that hostile actors might seek to immediately extract sensitive intellectual property and transport it to far-flung corners of the world, may already have crystallised. Intervention after the event in such circumstances would too often be irrelevant, as that could not undo the damage done to our national security. I am confident that hon. Members will agree that this offence reflects the severe consequences that might result from completing a notifiable acquisition without approval of the Secretary of State in one of the ways set out in clause 13.
Clause 33 makes it an offence for a person to breach an interim order or a final order without reasonable excuse. Under the regime, interim orders and final orders are the mechanisms whereby the Secretary of State imposes revenues for the purposes of safeguarding the assessment and process of national security respectively. They are, therefore, vital components of the legislation. Given that a breach of an interim order or a final order could undermine the assessment process or put national security at risk, it is right that breaches of such orders carry a clear deterrent. I am confident that hon. Members will agree that it is essential to have robust measures in place to ensure effective compliance with any interim orders or final orders imposed by the Secretary of State.
I will move on to clause 34. It is vital that parties comply with information notices and attendance notices, and that parties do not provide materially false or misleading information to the Secretary of State.
Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)
On how all this will be policed, the Minister is talking about an incredibly important issue that is crucial to the Bill, but it is a bit like the tax evasion problem, in that a tax evader can be prosecuted only when they have been caught. What policing measures are in place to get to the point of imposing sanctions on those who infringe the measure?
Nadhim Zahawi
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Part of it is the screening process and, obviously, the security agencies play a major role in that.
Under clause 35(2), it is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this clause to prove that they reasonably believe that the use or disclosure was lawful, or that the information had already and lawfully been made available to the public. I hope that hon. Members are reassured that Government are committed to the safeguarding of information collected by the regime.
Finally, clause 36 ensures that persons in authority in bodies—for example, a body corporate, such as a company, or an unincorporated body, such as a partnership—can be prosecuted under the legislation where they are responsible for an offence committed by their body. This clause therefore ensures that individuals who are responsible for offences committed by their bodies cannot simply hide behind those bodies and escape responsibility. Instead, they too will have committed an offence and can be punished for it. If you will forgive the pun, Sir Graham, if there are skeletons in the cupboard—or filing cabinets, I suppose—it is not just the bodies that can be held responsible. I hope hon. Members will agree that these clauses are both necessary and proportionate.
The Chair
There is no guidance in my script on what I do if I do not forgive the pun.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 32 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 33 to 36 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 37
Prosecution
Nadhim Zahawi
The Secretary of State makes decisions under the regime and has the power to impose enforceable interim and final orders. However, the institution of criminal proceedings for offences under the Bill is a matter for the appropriate prosecutor. Clause 37 therefore makes clear who may bring proceedings for an offence under the Bill.
Turning to clause 38, the Government consider it important that persons who have committed an offence under the Bill should be held accountable, particularly partnerships and other unincorporated associations. For example, clause 7 provides that partnerships and unincorporated associations are qualifying entities under the regime. Clause 38 therefore provides that proceedings for offences under the Bill may be brought against partnerships and other types of unincorporated association. I stress that the commencement of criminal proceedings in relation to this regime will likely be very rare indeed but it is nevertheless important that a full spectrum of possible offending is covered.
Clause 39 sets out the criminal penalties available on conviction for offences committed under the Bill. It is crucial that the regime carries a sufficiently robust deterrent to ensure compliance. Given the seriousness of the harm that a breach of the legislation might cause, it is right that these offences carry significant criminal penalties. I do not plan to set out all the penalties available but would be happy to discuss them in more detail if it would be of interest. I hope that hon. Members agree that it is clear who can bring prosecutions under the regime, that it should be possible to prosecute partnerships and unincorporated associations, and that penalties should be sufficiently strong for those convicted of breaking this law.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 37 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 38 and 39 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 40
Power to impose monetary penalties
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Nadhim Zahawi
Clauses 40 to 47 cover the civil sanctions under the Bill. I will cover them fairly briefly but I am happy to discuss them in more detail if it would be of interest to the Committee.
It is vital that the Secretary of State has appropriate powers to punish and deter non-compliance with the regime. Should a person breach an order under the regime or fail to provide information or evidence where required, it is vital that the Secretary of State has the power to bring the offender into compliance as quickly as possible to ensure the efficacy of the regime.
Clause 40 provides the Secretary of State with the powers to impose monetary penalties on a person where he is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the person has committed an offence under clauses 32 to 34. Clause 40(6) requires the Secretary of State to consider the amount of a monetary penalty to be appropriate before imposing it and it must not exceed the relevant maximum set out in clause 41. The power to impose monetary penalties instead of pursuing criminal proceedings will contribute to ensuring that the Secretary of State has a number of enforcement options to tailor to the situation.
The Secretary of State will not take the power to impose monetary penalties lightly and is required by clause 40(7) to take into account a number of factors, including the seriousness of the offence and any steps taken by the person to remedy the offence in question. I am confident that hon. Members will agree that the clause is valuable in ensuring that the Secretary of State has the appropriate enforcement mechanism to secure compliance with the new regime.
Clause 41 sets out the maximum fixed penalty and, where applicable, the maximum daily rate penalty that may be imposed. The penalties set out here are substantive, and I recognise that they may seem draconian, but they may have to be issued against companies that have significant financial incentive to disregard legal requirements under the regime and put national security at risk by going ahead with an acquisition, so the penalties need to be an effective incentive to comply. I also remind Members that these are maximum penalties; the Secretary of State will have a duty to ensure that any penalty imposed is reasonable and proportionate.
The clause also enables the Secretary of State to make regulations specifying how the maximum penalties applicable to businesses should be calculated and to amend the maximum penalty amounts or percentage rates. It is important that we can adjust any penalties over time, to ensure that they are a sufficient deterrent against non-compliance.
Clause 42 requires the Secretary of State to keep all monetary penalties imposed under review. It also provides a power to vary or revoke penalty notices as appropriate in the light of changing circumstances. Importantly, under the clause, where new evidence comes to light about a breach, it can be taken into account by the Secretary of State, and the penalty notice can be increased, decreased or revoked as appropriate. In all variations, there is, of course, a right of appeal, which is provided for by clause 50.
It is important that both criminal and civil sanctions should be available against offences committed under the Bill, but it would not be appropriate for them to be used in tandem. Clause 43 ensures that parties cannot be subject to both criminal and civil sanctions for the same offence. The clause is vital in giving businesses and other parties certainty and assurance that they will not be penalised in two separate ways for the same offence, which would clearly be unfair.
Clause 44 gives the Secretary of State the power to enforce monetary penalties by making unpaid penalties recoverable, as if they were payable under a court. Failure to comply with a penalty notice would be enforced in the same way as a court order to recover unpaid debts. It also provides for interest to be charged on unpaid penalties that are due.
Chi Onwurah
I thank the Minister for setting out the provisions of these clauses. Perhaps this is my ignorance, but what will happen to the moneys recouped through the penalties?
Nadhim Zahawi
I am very happy to write to the hon. Lady on that, but I suppose the money goes back to the Treasury.
Chi Onwurah
That was my assumption, but I know that in certain cases penalties can be used to offset the expenses incurred in creating the regulatory regime, or in supporting companies that are adversely affected, as we discussed earlier.
Nadhim Zahawi
I am very happy to come back to the hon. Lady on that point.
Clause 45 ensures that the Government are not unduly burdened with costs relating to the imposition of monetary penalties, which can be expensive. The clause enables the Secretary of State to recover the associated costs from those who are issued with a penalty notice. The amount demanded will depend on the circumstances of each case, but the Secretary of State will need to comply with public law duties in imposing the requirements and in fixing the amount. In particular, the amount will need to be proportionate.
Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)
Pursuant to the intervention of my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central, will the Minister and his Department not only think about, but make a positive decision on, where the penalties go? I have in mind, as he will know, penalties relating to misdemeanours by electricity supply companies.
Those are routinely collected and distributed for good purposes—to keep people’s electricity bills down, among other things. Maybe the Minister will have a similar scheme that could be a good home for those penalties, so that they are turned around and put to good use.
Nadhim Zahawi
I am quite rightly grateful to my brilliant Whip for reminding me that the Bill contains the provision that the moneys be paid into the Consolidated Fund.
Clause 46 requires the Secretary of State to keep cost recovery notices under review and provides him with the power to vary or revoke a cost recovery notice as he considers appropriate. That will reassure businesses and other persons that cost recovery notices remain appropriate. Finally, it is important that the Secretary of State be able to recover the associated costs from those who are issued penalty notices. Clause 47 therefore provides for an effective range of consequences for non-compliance with a cost recovery notice, including the charging of interest, and acts as another important tool in the Secretary of State’s enforcement powers. I hope that the Committee will appreciate the rationale for clauses 40 to 47, which are essential for the effectiveness of the regime.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 40 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 41 to 47 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 48
Enforcement through civil proceedings
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Nadhim Zahawi
The regime relies on parties complying with information notices and attendance notices, and with interim orders and final orders. Those are crucial levers that the Secretary of State will use to identify, assess and address national security risks, so it is vital that he has appropriate powers to ensure that a person who is given such an order or notice complies with the requirements as set out.
The clause provides the Secretary of State with the power to bring civil proceedings for an injunction or other remedy to require compliance. The power applies whether or not the person is in the UK. Failure to comply with an order made by the court in those circumstances is likely to be considered contempt of court. We should not forget that any failure to obey an information notice or attendance notice, for example, could result in the Secretary of State having insufficient information to decide whether to call in an acquisition or carry out an effective national security assessment. Breaching the requirements of an interim order or final order may undermine the assessment process or harm national security.
Above all, I hope that the Committee will agree that the clause further strengthens the Secretary of State’s enforcement powers, playing a key role in ensuring the efficacy of the regime.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 48 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 49
Procedure for judicial review of certain decisions
Dr Whitehead
I beg to move amendment 26, in clause 49, page 30, line 31, leave out “28 days” and insert “three months”
This amendment would extend the period within which applications for judicial review may be made from 28 days to three months.
Dr Whitehead
I have not spoken other than to intervene, so the amendment gives me a brief opportunity to commend the heroism of my fellow Committee members for carrying on proceedings when most of them wish they were somewhere else because they are too cold. I hope that the authorities will consider ameliorative steps so that we can be a little warmer when the Committee meets on Thursday. Alternatively, Sir Graham, we may need to invent a new Standing Order by which the Chair can rule on whether Members have permission to remove their coats, rather than the customary jackets, before the beginning of proceedings. I am sure that would not be necessary if reasonable action were taken.
The amendment concerns what is referred to in the clause title: the procedure for judicial review of certain decisions. It would be helpful if the Minister clarified what the clause means for other decisions that are set out in the Bill but not included in the provisions for judicial review set out in this clause.
Nadhim Zahawi
I am happy to write to the hon. Gentleman on that, but my understanding is that individuals or entities that feel that they have been wronged by the actions of the Secretary of State can JR the Secretary of State.
Dr Whitehead
I thank the Minister for that clarification, which appears to suggest that the whole of the Bill, or the decisions in it, are in principle covered by the ability to bring a judicial review. He will know that under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 there is some pretty clear guidance about the time limits for judicial reviews. Indeed, the CPRs state that claims must be lodged promptly and, in any event, no later than three months after the grounds to make the claim first arose, unless the court exercises its discretion to extend. The judicial review rules are pretty much governed by that three-month time limit.
In the clause, the framers of the Bill have taken out certain elements of the Bill. I mentioned some of them, including the attendance of witnesses and the power to require information. They have said that, while no new procedure has been put in place for reviewing certain decisions—that is, the normal rules of judicial review apply—the big difference is that any action must be brought within 28 days of the event, and not within three months, as is the case in the standard judicial review arrangements.
Chi Onwurah
I thank my hon. Friend for the excellent points that he is making, which give cause for concern and thought. Given the Minister’s earlier assertion that there was no need for a complaints procedure with regard to the provisions of the Bill, does my hon. Friend agree that neither the reporting requirement, which we have identified will not mean reporting on everything, nor the judicial review provisions, which we have now identified are not reviewable in the normal timescales for everything, will be sufficient to address the concerns of small and medium-sized enterprises? Does he also agree that that will clearly not be the case given the complexities that he has outlined?
Dr Whitehead
My hon. Friend makes an important point about the extent to which justice in such circumstances might be like the Ritz: open to everybody, but not necessarily quite as open to some as to others.
Certainly, that is the case with the time reduction applied to those particular things in the clause. Nevertheless, that reduction has to fit in with judicial review rules for everything else. That is, no new procedure is set out in the Bill, which is otherwise reliant on the standard judicial review procedures.
Hon. Members will see that elsewhere the civil procedure rules refer to the provision of skeleton arguments before a judicial review can be heard. Under those rules, such arguments must be undertaken within 21 working days of a hearing, which in practice means close to the 28 days in the clause, which are not as working days. Given the adherence to the rest of the judicial review rules, therefore, the 28 days can conceivably reduce to virtually nothing the period in which a person may apply for a claim to judicial review under the Bill.
Furthermore—this is what I think my hon. Friend was alluding to—given that brief timescale, it is important and I would say necessary to have a clear idea of when the event that caused the 28-day timescale to come in took place. I turned up an interesting article, one of Weightmans’ “Insights”, from October 2013, entitled “Is the clock ticking? The importance of time limits in judicial review”. The point made in that article is that getting the point at which the clock started ticking absolutely right is important.
I am not certain whether all the events specified in the clause have identical starting points. That is, is the starting point a trigger mechanism? Is the starting point the issuing of a notice? Is the starting point the receipt of a notice? If the receipt of a notice is delayed—and the judicial review procedure very much hinges on the actions of the Secretary of State in issuing notices—my hon. Friend can imagine that, for a small business, that could be very confusing and possibly difficult to adhere to. If it turns out that the point at which the 28-day clock starts to tick varies according to different provisions of the clause, descibed as the particular provisions that the Secretary of State has reserved for the 28-day reduction in judicial review, that will be pretty difficult for people to adhere to properly.
Judicial review is a very important part of the process; not that it would often be used, but it is important that it is there in the Bill. It is also important that the people affected by the arrangements have access to the judicial review process. The Government obviously recognise that by putting it into legislation. I am concerned not about the fact that it is in the legislation—it should be—but about whether placing certain areas of concern in the Bill under that 28-day heading has been completely thought out. If it has been completely thought out, why has it been thought out in that particular way? What is it about those things that requires the normal rules of judicial review to be reduced from three months to 28 days?
Chi Onwurah
I am sorry to interrupt my hon. Friend while he is in full flow, and I am immensely grateful for what I am learning about the intricacies of the judicial review process and the importance of understanding the initial timing and what the trigger event was. He mentioned that skeleton hearings must take place within 21 working days. Can he say a little bit more, for my understanding, about how those skeleton hearings affect the following timetables in the process?
Dr Whitehead
My hon. Friend somehow suggests that I have knowledge and expertise beyond my calling. I should say that I am not a lawyer, so I have only limited guidance to give her on this. However, from my reading of civil procedure rules, there are certainly elements, which I think relate to working days in some instances and to simple time in others, that are sub-time limits within the overall limit for judicial review. Civil procedure rules give those sub-limits as working practices for the operation of judicial review overall. The skeleton argument rule requires skeleton arguments to be put to the court within a certain period before the hearing takes place. If the hearing is delayed for a long time after the initial event, the 21 days apply before the court hearing. However, if the court hearing is close to the event, those sub-rules within the overall judicial review rules could affect quite substantially an individual’s remaining time to get their case together prior to the hearing.
Nadhim Zahawi
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his reasoned and thoughtful remarks. As I said in my intervention, all decisions in the Bill are subject to judicial review. Clause 49 does not apply to information sharing post screening or enforcement decisions. The exception to JR is monetary penalties and cost recovery, which have a bespoke appeals process, as he probably knows.
Clause 49 concerns the procedure for judicial review of certain decisions. The clause provides that any claim for judicial review of certain decisions, which are set out in the clause, must be no more than 28 days after the day on which the grounds for the claim first arose, unless the court considers that there are exceptional circumstances. That period is shorter than the usual period in which a judicial review may be sought, as we have heard from the hon. Member for Southampton, Test. Generally, judicial reviews must be sought within three months, and in England and Wales, but not in Scotland or Northern Ireland, they must also be sought “promptly”.
I will set out why that is the case shortly when I turn to amendment 26, but I believe that the shortened time limit strikes the right balance for the regime, enabling sufficient time for a claim to be lodged while providing for timely certainty about the effect of relevant decisions made under the Bill. I should also note that the court may entertain proceedings that are sought after the 28-day limit if it considers that exceptional circumstances apply. The usual route to challenge a decision made by the Secretary of State is via judicial review, and this is entirely appropriate for decisions made under the Bill. However, it is vital that this route does not result in prolonged uncertainty over decisions relating to screening.
I now turn to amendment 26, which seeks to extend the period within which applications for judicial review may be made from 28 days to three months. As I have set out, the Bill’s 28-day period in which claims for judicial review of certain decisions made under the Bill generally must be filed is shorter than the usual period in which judicial review may be sought. Again, it is entirely right that the hon. Gentleman wishes to probe us on why that is the case as judicial review plays a key role, which he clearly agrees with, in ensuring that the Government, and the Secretary of State in the case of this regime, act within the limits of the law. We have thought carefully about that while developing the Bill, and I welcome this discussion.
Why the shorter period? It is undeniably important that the Secretary of State is held independently accountable for his decisions under the regime. That must, however, be balanced—this is the important thing—against the need to avoid prolonged uncertainty over the status of screened acquisitions or the general functioning of the screening regime, which may have a chilling effect on investment, leaving the types of questions that a judicial review would answer, such as whether a decision to clear a transaction was unlawful, potentially still open for three months before it is clear that a judicial review is not going to be sought, which could make it extremely difficult for the various parties affected to plan and adjust following such a decision. Any party with a sufficient interest could seek a judicial review and all parties affected could be impacted. That is why we have come to this decision.
Chi Onwurah
I thank the Minister for the points he is making, which I am seeking to understand. Clause 49(2) mentions “relevant decisions”. Why would “section 19”, “section 20” and “section 21” that deal with the powers to require information and so on cause uncertainty, and not other provisions in the Bill?
Nadhim Zahawi
The point I was trying to make is that the uncertainty in any of those sections means that any party to a transaction can, if they feel they could frustrate the process because the outcome might not be advantageous to them, use the judicial review process to add to the uncertainty of a transaction. In addition, there is also a public interest in timely certainty and finality about decisions made under the regime that are, after all, imposed for the purpose of safeguarding national security. The 28-day limit is also in line with the current merger screening regime that the hon. Member for Southampton, Test asked about, where applications for the competitions appeal tribunal made under the Enterprise Act 2002 to review a merger decision must be made within four weeks, a time period chosen after public consultation. There may be some situations where, for legitimate reasons, 28 days is simply not enough. It is therefore important to remember that this Bill provides that the court may “entertain proceedings” that are sought after the 28-day limit, if it is considered that exceptional circumstances apply.
This shortened time limit and flexibility is for the courts to deal with exceptional circumstances. It strikes the right balance for this regime, in my view. It allows sufficient time for parties to obtain legal advice and mount a challenge, while also providing timely certainty about the effect of the relevant decision made under the Bill. I therefore hope that the hon. Member for Southampton, Test will withdraw the amendment.
Dr Whitehead
I have to be honest, I did not think that was very good. Let us start with who is shortening and who is not shortening. The Minister said that the Opposition seek to lengthen the period; no, the Opposition are not seeking to lengthen the period. The Government are seeking to shorten the period that is standard in the UK justice system as far as judicial reviews overall are concerned.
That is a very important point, because the Opposition are not trying to do something that is not an ordinary principle of British justice; the Government are trying to that. The Minister’s remarks could have applied to a lot of other areas, where it might be a bit inconvenient to have a judicial review being tenable for a three-month period after an event had occurred. However, it is not a question of inconvenience. Is a matter so important to national security that the 28 days can be justified under those terms?
The Minister has sought to justify the 28 days under the terms that there may be some uncertainty if there is a longer period for judicial review to be undertaken. He is potentially right about that, but not right as far as this Bill is concerned. He is right potentially as far as any application for judicial review is concerned, in all sorts of areas in this country. That is the problem of judicial review for the Administration, under any circumstances. When someone comes along and says, “I’m going to JR this,” a lot of people clap their hands and say, “That’s very inconvenient. It really does foul things up, because we would like to do this, that and next thing, but because we have been judicially reviewed, we have to carry out the procedure that is there.”
As several people have said in a number of different circumstances, the fact that the JR procedure is there and that often ordinary people have a reasonable amount of time to get their case together to undertake the JR process, is an important principle of the British justice system. The Minister has made no serious case for why these things should be so special under these circumstances. Interestingly, the consultation document did not make any case at all for the 28 days, other than to note that it was a shorter period. I am sorry to say that this appears to be a shortened period simply for administrative convenience.
Chi Onwurah
Does my hon. Friend think that shortening the JR period for administrative reasons is especially contentious, given that the judicial review process would be the only option for small and medium enterprises to complain about the way in which they are being treated under this process? The Minister says that their only option to make a complaint is effectively to JR it, yet they are given less time to JR it.
Dr Whitehead
My hon. Friend hits the nail on the head. In many circumstances, we are not talking about the sort of JRs that we hear about in the press, where a big corporation has been judicially reviewed on some subject by another large corporation, or some big body has judicially reviewed someone else about a planning decision.
Nadhim Zahawi
With permission, Sir Graham, I will speak to clauses 50, 51 and 52 together. Clause 50 concerns appeals against penalty notices or variation notices. It is only right that parties have the opportunity to appeal decisions made by the Secretary of State in relation to monetary penalties imposed. Clause 50 provides a person who has received a penalty notice or a variation notice with the right to appeal to the court within 28 days, starting from the day after the notice is served.
On an appeal against a penalty notice, the clause provides that the court may confirm or quash the decision to impose a monetary penalty, confirm or reduce the amount of a penalty, and confirm or vary the period in which the penalty must be paid. It may not increase the amount of the monetary penalty. Where the appeal is against a variation notice, the court may confirm, vary or quash the variation, but again it may not increase the amount of the monetary penalty.
Clause 51 provides a right of appeal against decisions made by the Secretary of State related to requirements to pay costs associated with monetary penalties. Clause 52 concerns extraterritorial application and jurisdiction to try offences under the regime. Let me briefly turn back to clauses 32 to 35, which create the offences of the regime. We would normally expect that if those offences occurred, they would happen in the UK. That will not, however, always be the case, and offences will not always involve UK nationals or bodies.
As befits a regime that concerns the actions of international actors in relation to the United Kingdom, the Bill has some application beyond the shores of the UK. For example, the Bill gives the Secretary of State the power to issue final orders on conduct outside the UK by certain categories of person with a connection to the UK, including UK nationals and companies incorporated here. Therefore, clause 52 provides for the offences in clauses 32 to 35 to have extraterritorial effect, including in relation to non-UK nationals and bodies. That means that conduct abroad that amounts to an offence can be prosecuted and it also enables the Secretary of State to impose monetary penalties in relation to offences committed outside the UK. That ensures that regime obligations are not unenforceable simply because they concern conduct abroad. I hope that hon. Members will agree that, in a globalised world where transactions routinely take place across borders, it is important for enforcement to be able to react with equal agility. I therefore submit that the appeals process set out in the clauses should be adopted and that, in a globalised world, it is necessary for extraterritorial regime breaches to be enforceable.
Chi Onwurah
It is a pleasure to respond in this debate and observe how quickly we have galloped throughs parts 2 and 3. I wonder if that may in part relate to the descending temperatures that we are enjoying. While I know that the Committee shares my fascination with the various procedural and judicial issues with which we were wrestling, the temperature gave no scope for anyone to get comfortable enough to fail to pay attention. I recognise that we on this side of the Committee are in an advantageous position in that we are furthest from the open windows.
We recognise the importance of clauses 50 to 52 in terms of appeals against monetary penalties, of appeals against costs and of having extraterritorial application and jurisdiction to try offences. The Minister set out the reasons for that. To return to an intervention from the hon. Member for Wyre Forest, I am concerned about whether the provisions will be enforceable and useable in having extraterritorial application and jurisdiction over those who are not British and where the offence does not take place in the UK. Do the Government envisage––the impact assessment is, once again, remarkably silent on this––issuing international warrants to get access to those thought to have committed offences but who are not in the UK? Will the measures be pursued and enforced actively or are they there to deal with exceptional circumstances? I would be happy for the Minister to intervene.
Nadhim Zahawi
I think that the hon. Lady’s question is whether the Government will genuinely be able to punish offences committed overseas. Clearly, in a globalised world where transactions routinely take place across borders, it is important that we have the ability to punish offences and be as agile as those who wish to do us harm. It is therefore right that these offences have extraterritorial reach. We will work with overseas public authorities to ensure that offenders face justice where appropriate.
Chi Onwurah
I thank the Minister for that intervention. I am reluctant to test his tolerance by bringing Brexit into this, but I hope that we will continue to have the means to engage with overseas jurisdictions in order to pursue those who break UK law, here or abroad. We will not oppose the clauses, and I congratulate the Committee on making such speedy progress.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 50 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 51 and 52 ordered to stand part of the Bill,.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. ––(Michael Tomlinson.)
National Security and Investment Bill (Eleventh sitting)
Thursday 10th December 2020
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 10 December 2020 - (10 Dec 2020)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
Before we begin, I remind the Committee to observe social distancing and to switch electronic devices to silent. The Hansard reporters would be grateful if hon. Members could email electronic copies of their notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk.
Clause 53
Procedure for service, etc
Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 29, in clause 53, page 32, line 30, leave out “may” and insert “shall”.
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out the process to be followed.
Dr Whitehead
We start today’s proceedings with the most innocuous amendment imaginable—it is so innocuous that it is in the realms of “barely noticeable”. It is particularly innocuous in terms of the debates the Committee has already had on the use of the word “may” and the words “shall” or “must”. On this occasion, the amendment merely suggests that in subsection (1)—
“The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for the procedure which must be followed in giving a notice or serving an order under this Act”—
“shall” should be substituted for “may”.
What is interesting about making provision for procedure that must be followed in giving a notice or serving an order is that the impact assessment assumes that that will be done and analyses how those notice-giving arrangements might work. The impact assessment assumes that the Secretary of State will do that, but the Bill does not state that the Secretary of State must do it.
I cannot think of any good reason why that change should not be made. I can see virtually no circumstances in which the current wording will do anything either way in relation to the issuing of the notices and what those notices might consist of. A requirement that the Secretary of State “shall” do those things would be an unalloyed advance in assuring that they happened. It would not have any consequences for national security or for company considerations, other than that companies might consider it rather more comforting that the Bill requires those details, which are important to them, to actually be produced.
The Minister can perhaps enlighten us on the wider issue. I have been on the other side, constructing and putting a Bill together, years ago in my brief but glorious—or inglorious but brief—ministerial career.
Dr Whitehead
I think we can agree that it was brief. Bills would come to Ministers, fresh from the wells of construction and the pushing of pens to get them into good shape. I wonder whether there is a style guide, deep in the bowels of a building somewhere in Whitehall, that says, “Whenever the Minister is supposed to do something, write ‘may’ in small print.” It is such a long-serving style guide that people have forgotten why the word was ever put in the Bill in the first place.
The Minister would do a great service to the writing of Bills if he were able to say, “I don’t want to go along with the style guide. If someone is supposed to do something, I want to have that written in the Bill.” I appreciate that if the Minister were to say that when sitting around with a number of people who had a freshly minted copy of the proto-Bill in front of them, there would be much stroking of chins and suggestions of, “That is a rather brave method of proceeding, Minister.” But the Minister has the opportunity today, entirely divorced from all those influences, simply to say, “Yes, we will accept this amendment as a stake in the ground for the uprating of the style guide, wherever it happens to be.” That would be a great service to the Committee and to the nation, by getting us into a position where Bills are written to mean what they say and say what they mean.
Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)
I do not want to anticipate what the Minister will say, but he has said, with regards to similar amendments, that stating that the Secretary of State will do something does not mean that he definitely must do it. Does my hon. Friend agree that for the sake of clarity—for us in Parliament but also for businesses, particularly those affected by this—changing that one word would greatly improve the understanding of how the Bill will work?
Dr Whitehead
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. If I went to my bank manager, who had called me in about my overdraft, and I said, “I don’t need to say anything other than, ‘I may pay it back,’ but don’t worry, because I will pay it back,” my bank manager might be a little upset and might have something to say about it.
It is curious that we have locutions in the putting together of Bills that fly in the face of common-sense parlance. I agree with my hon. Friend that it really is no great defence to say, “Don’t worry. We don’t need to change this, because we are going to do it.” It would be far better all round if we were straightforward, accurate and clear and put this wording in the legislation, so that everybody knows what we are doing for the future. If, by so doing, the Minister can banish that style guide from the bowels of the building forever, that would be a great service.
Nadhim Zahawi
I beg you indulgence, Mr Twigg: I intend to speak first to clause stand part and then to amendment 29, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test. Clause 53 gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations that set out the procedure that the Secretary of State must follow when giving a notice of, or serving, an order once the Bill becomes an Act. The level of detail that these provisions will involve is most appropriately dealt with in delegated legislation. That will also allow the provisions to be modified more easily if changes are deemed appropriate—in the light of operational experience, for example. I know all colleagues will share with me the wish for the unit’s operations to be as efficient and as slick as we can make them.
Examples of notices and orders include information notices, attendance notices, interim orders, final orders or penalty notices issued by the Secretary of State for non-compliance. The clause sets out what may be included in the regulations. For example, they may include the manner in which a document must be given or served and whether it is allowed to be served electronically—for example, by email.
Amendment 29 would require the Secretary of State to make these regulations, which returns, if I may say so, to the recurring theme raised by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test, about the difference between “may” and “shall”. At the risk of becoming predictable, my thoughts here carry certain echoes of our previous discussions.
As hon. Members will know, clause 53 gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations that will set out the procedure that must the Secretary of State must follow when giving a notice or serving an order once the Bill becomes an Act. It is an entirely laudable objective to ensure that the Secretary of State provides those affected by this regime with the right information on the operation of the regime, and it is one that I shall always support. In practice, though, the amendment is unnecessary.
Although the Secretary of State may make regulations to that effect, in practice, for the regime to function effectively, he must do so. I assure hon. Members that the Secretary of State certainly does not propose to commence the regime without first making these procedural regulations. I therefore assure the hon. Member that the amendment is not required, as he and the Government seem to be in hearty agreement on the importance of such regulation. I ask him to do the honourable thing and withdraw the amendment.
Chi Onwurah
It is an honour to serve under your chairship again, Mr Twigg. I detect a slight rise in temperature, at least on this side of the Committee Room. I do not know whether that is due to the heated exchanges over “may” and “should”—
Chi Onwurah
Warm exchanges. It is certainly something to be welcomed.
I would like to say a few words to clause 53 stand part. As my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test observed, this is another example of a “may” rather than a “will”. The clause exists purely to enable the Secretary of State to make regulations—that is its function—and yet it places no requirement on the Secretary of State to do so.
While the Minister gave a warm response, saying that he and my hon. Friend are on exactly the same page and so on in our desires, I remind him that the Bill is not about our desires; it is about a legislative framework that protects our national security and gives, as much as possible, clarity and certainty to those impacted by it. It is because we recognise the importance of the clause that we wish it to have some effect in law, as opposed to being the gentle suggestion it seems to be at the moment.
Dr Whitehead
The Minister has used a bank manager defence. If my bank manager wrote to me to say, “You have an overdraft that you must pay,” and I wrote back and said, “Dear Bank Manager, I may repay my overdraft,” and then the bank manager called me in and said, “What is the meaning of this letter?” and I said, “Don’t worry, I will pay the overdraft soon. No problem. That letter stands,” that would be a problem for me, but apparently not as far as legislation is concerned. The Minister has effectively said, “Don’t worry. This is definitely going to happen. We are all agreed it will happen,” so why not write it in legislation?
I will not pursue this matter to a Division, because we have exhausted this mine in Committee. The Minister knows that this is not the first time I have raised this issue during the passage of Bills, and I will continue to do so because it is an important principle that legislation should say what it will actually do. Perhaps that is a bit basic, but that is what I think is important. I will indeed withdraw the amendment. I thank the Minister for his reply this morning, although it does not dent my crusading zeal for this particular change to be made in legislation generally. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 53 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 54
Disclosure of information
Chi Onwurah
I beg to move amendment 30, in clause 54, page 34, line 9, leave out
“which appears to the Secretary of State”
and insert
“which, on a reasonable enquiry, appears to the Secretary of State”.
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to only share information, acquired in the course of national security reviews, if the Secretary of State has first undertaken reasonable enquiry.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
Clause 55 stand part.
Chi Onwurah
In clauses 54 and 55, we consider the disclosure of information by the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, and, in clause 55, information held by HMRC.
Clause 54 specifies the circumstances in which information may be disclosed. Subsection (1) provides an information gateway for public authorities to disclose information to the Secretary of State for the purpose of facilitating the exercise of his function under the Bill. Subsection (2) permits the Secretary of State to disclose information received under the Bill to any UK or overseas public authority for specified purposes. Subsection (9) states:
“‘overseas public authority’ means a person in any country or territory outside the United Kingdom which appears to the Secretary of State to exercise functions of a public nature”.
The amendment seeks to address the wide definition of the overseas public authorities to which the Secretary of State might disclose information.
The Minister has previously asserted that Labour Members are looking to give more and more powers to the Secretary of State, but here we wish to help the Secretary of State, which is the motive behind all our amendments. We wish to aid the Secretary of State by somewhat subscribing the persons or organisations with which he—in this case, at the moment, the relevant Minister is a “he”—is allowed to share information, by inserting in clause 54 the words
“which, on a reasonable enquiry, appears to the Secretary of State”.
Therefore, the amendment would not simply leave the process open, as it were, to appearances only, without any inquiry.
Chi Onwurah
I hope the Minister also agrees that we are moving to a much expanded national security screening regime. In 2002, Facebook was a year old or just being born. We are no longer in the place we were in 2002 when it comes to the issues of importance, volume, security and privacy associated with data and data sharing. I hope he will not rely on the 2002 Act as a justification, particularly as we are moving to an expanded national security screening issue and we are in a different data environment.
The strategy says that data is the economic engine, and we must be much better in assuring businesses and investors of their data protection. Instead of relying on appearances, the amendment holds up the standard of reason. Under it, the Secretary of State would have all the relevant powers of data sharing with relevant persons so long as the Secretary of State had reason, based “on a reasonable enquiry”, to think the person to be a relevant public authority.
It is critical that the UK has a national security regime that is grounded in national, competent exercise of state power to protect our security. The amendment would help to build success in that direction by removing a reliance on the use of appearance and instinct, by successive Secretaries of State, and grounding decisions in “reasonable enquiry” instead.
The expert evidence sessions provided support for that view. For example, Chris Cummings from the Investment Association said:
“There is so much around any investment process and the acquisition process that has to remain entirely confidential, that investors would require and would be looking for reassurance that these conversations could be held in the strictest of confidence and that nothing would appear until the right time.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 66, Q78.]
I ask the Committee to consider whether sharing data on the basis of appearances gives that reassurance.
The clause will give information-sharing powers to the Secretary of State. We recognise the importance of that, and we do not want to hinder it unduly, but we expect that the Secretary of State should, and importantly, should be seen to, exercise those powers on the basis of evidence. It is only right that we have clear evidential requirements. Although the 2002 Act uses similar language, it is right that we in this Committee clean up that language based on 19 further years of experience.
Dr Whitehead
I wonder whether my hon. Friend might be tempted to use a bank manager comparison here as well. If I was summoned by my bank manager to the bank, and he or she said, “It appears you’re overdrawn,” and I said, “Why do you think I’m overdrawn?” and he or she said, “I don’t know. It just appears to me that you’re overdrawn,” I might say, “Could you pursue reasonable inquiries to find out whether my account is actually overdrawn or not?” Does she agree that that is an example of the appropriate use of ordinary language, and that the Bill could be put into that state?
Chi Onwurah
I commend my hon. Friend on the extent to which he has used engagement with a bank manager to illuminate much of our discussion. He is absolutely right. To be honest, if any bank invited you to consider an overdraft on such a flimsy pretext, you would, I hope, change your bank, because you could not feel confident in it.
The serious point is that small and medium businesses and start-ups—our great innovation ecosystem in this country—can move, but we do not want them to move. We want them to stay in this country within the legislative framework. We want the new Bill to provide them with the reassurance and confidence that they need to help to implement the Bill effectively and to protect national security. My hon. Friend’s elegant example highlights the failings of the clause.
I anticipate that the Minister will talk about the language in the Enterprise Act. Not only is that 18 or 19 years old, which is one reason that this Bill has been needed for so long, but the person exercising the functions and powers in the Competition and Markets Authority is not a political appointee or political figure. The Bill refers to a political figure, the Secretary of State, so it is all the more important that he or she should be seen to act on the basis of evidence, not on the basis of appearance or instinct.
The Chair
I gently remind hon. Members to address the Chair when speaking. Thank you very much.
Nadhim Zahawi
With your permission, Mr Twigg, I will speak initially to clause 54 stand part and then address amendment 30, relating to clause 54. I will then turn to clause 55 stand part.
On clause 54, for this regime to function effectively, the Secretary of State needs access to the right information at the right time to make decisions with the fullest range of evidence available. All relevant information required by the Secretary of State to make a decision might not be obtainable from the parties to the acquisition, but rather might be stored by other public authorities, both in the UK and overseas. The hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central referred to the speed at which deals have changed; she mentioned Facebook and others. I agree that modern deals are structured in an increasingly complex manner and often across borders and continents. There is a need to work with allies at home and abroad to ensure that we are making well-aligned, timely and correct decisions.
Therefore, the clause provides that public authorities may disclose information to the Secretary of State for the purpose of facilitating the exercise of his functions under the Bill. Equally, it permits the Secretary of State to disclose information to UK and overseas public authorities for the purpose of facilitating his functions under the Bill, but also for a limited number of other purposes, including crime prevention and the protection of national security. I absolutely agree with those who say that businesses do not want slow decisions made by multiple public authorities working in silos. We all want to see an efficient regime in place. Businesses want public authorities that can talk to each other and give a quick and efficient answer that is right first time. Being able to share information is the first step in Government making fast and informed decisions without having to burden businesses unduly, which I know the hon. Lady cares about.
I of course recognise, though, that some hon. Members will feel uneasy about the Government being able to share potentially very sensitive information both within the UK and overseas. The clause includes a number of safeguards relating to the disclosure of information by the Secretary of State. First, the clause prohibits onward disclosure of information shared by the Secretary of State or use for an alternative purpose without his consent. Secondly, when disclosing information, the Secretary of State must consider whether the disclosure would prejudice, to an unreasonable degree, the commercial interests of any person concerned.
Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP)
I fully support the principle that we should share this kind of information with friendly overseas authorities—subject to appropriate precautions to prevent it from being used for the wrong purposes. However, somebody in the UK who breaks this law will get prosecuted, but an overseas public authority cannot be prosecuted in the UK courts, so can the Minister explain why, under clause 54(7), which lists the factors that the Secretary of State has to consider before deciding whether to release information to an overseas public authority, there is no requirement to assess the rule of law in that other place and to consider whether it has equivalent legislation to prohibit the misuse of information? There is no requirement for the Secretary of State to consider whether they have been given guarantees or assurances by a Government whose word we would expect to be able to take. There is not even a requirement to consider whether the request for information itself might be an attempt to undermine national security.
If the Secretary of State is looking at a potential Chinese takeover of a sensitive undertaking in the UK and a public authority in China says, “We need this information for an inquiry that we are doing,” there is no requirement for the Secretary of State to take that into account. Can the Minister explain why none of those things is built into this clause now, and are the Government willing to consider amending the clause at a later stage to give the further protection that we may need?
Nadhim Zahawi
I am grateful to the hon. Member. I hope that in my further remarks, if I can make some headway, I will be able to reassure him on those points.
Thirdly, when disclosing information to an overseas public authority, the Secretary of State must have particular regard to whether the law of the country or territory to whose authority the information is being disclosed provides protection against self-incrimination in criminal proceedings corresponding to the protection provided in the UK, and whether the matter is sufficiently serious to justify disclosure. I hope that addresses the hon. Member’s point.
The Chair
Order. Mr Grant, please keep your intervention short. If you want to speak, you are allowed to later.
Peter Grant
I am sorry to intervene again so quickly, but the precautions in subsection (7) do not address any of the matters that I raised. Subsection (7)(a) in particular is vital and necessary, but it is nowhere near sufficient and does not address any of the points that I raised.
Nadhim Zahawi
I am grateful. If the drive of the hon. Member’s probing is to ensure that the Secretary of State, when he considers disclosing information to a foreign country, takes into account protecting people being caught in the regime who come from that country, I think I have just made it clear that the clause provides protection against self-incrimination in criminal proceedings corresponding to the protection provided in the United Kingdom. I hope that the hon. Member will be satisfied with that.
Finally, the disclosure is subject to data protection legislation, which provides additional safeguards in relation to the disclosure of personal data. I hope that the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central will feel reassured that the Secretary of State may request only the information that he requires in order to exercise his function under the Bill, and that such information will be treated securely.
Amendment 30 aims to increase the scrutiny that the Secretary of State undertakes in deciding whether a person constitutes an overseas public authority for the purposes of disclosing information under clause 54. It is of course important to ensure that any person believed to be a public authority for the purposes of seeking information from, or disclosing information to, is a public authority. I am therefore pleased to reassure the hon. Lady that the Bill does that as it stands. The approach that we have taken mirrors that—I know that she does not like this—in section 243(11) of the Enterprise Act 2002, which includes a similar definition of an overseas public authority for the purposes of disclosure of specified information to overseas public authorities under the Act.
Chi Onwurah
The Minister is generous in giving way. On his rebuttal of my argument on the CMA, it is not about whether I like it. The whole point of the amendment is to take it away from likes, preferences or appearances, and base it on evidence, and the evidence is that the environment has changed dramatically since 2002 in terms of data. Also, the Secretary of State is a political figure.
Nadhim Zahawi
I am grateful to the hon. Lady. I remind her that the legislation requires the Secretary of State to act in a quasi-judicial way, not as a political figure. I appreciate that by a normal reading, “appears” may appear unduly casual, but that is merely a question of the form of legislative drafting, which is consistent, I remind her, with previous relevant legislation.
In addition, I reassure the hon. Lady that the principles of public law apply in any case. The Secretary of State therefore needs to act reasonably in fulfilling his functions under the Bill. That includes having a reasonable basis, supported by sufficient evidence, for coming to the conclusion that a person appears to be an overseas public authority prior to disclosing information. I hope I have provided the Committee with sufficient reassurances, and I therefore hope that the Opposition will withdraw the amendment.
Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)
I just want clarification from the Minister on the point of that being semi-judicial.
Matt Western
Quasi-judicial; sorry. How does that square with the responsibilities of the Minister in the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy?
Nadhim Zahawi
It is not a strange concept that a Minister acts in a quasi-judicial way in making such decisions.
I will now briefly turn to clause 55, which makes provision for specific restrictions in respect of information received under clause 54 from Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. For the regime to function effectively, the Secretary of State needs access to the right information at the right time in order to make decisions with the fullest range of evidence available. One such source of information that might be invaluable to the Secretary of State is HMRC. Although the Government expect that the Secretary of State would seek first to secure the information he needs from the parties, it is important that such information can also be provided from elsewhere in Government, if it is held there.
Clause 55 provides that where information is received by the Secretary of State from HMRC or an onward recipient pursuant to clause 54, it may not be used for purposes other than the Secretary of State’s function under the Bill, and nor may it be further disclosed without HMRC’s consent. Clause 35 provides that disclosing information in contravention of clause 55(1) is an offence, as is appropriate.
Nadhim Zahawi
I am just finishing my point.
I hope that hon. Members will agree that clause 55 provides appropriately robust safeguards for the onward sharing or use of information received from HMRC for the purposes of the regime. I recommend that clauses 54 and 55 stand part of the Bill.
Chi Onwurah
I would like to address a question to the Minister. In his remarks on these clauses, he has highlighted a concern. I might have missed it, but I do not see where the Bill sets out the information gateway through which the Secretary of State will receive information from HMRC in order to exercise his functions under the Bill. Clauses 54 and 55 are grouped together under the title of “Information gateways”. They discuss information gateways from the Secretary of State to public authorities and others, but I would really appreciate it if the Minister could write to me to set out how HMRC will disclose information to BEIS for the functions of the Bill. I am sure I do not need to remind the Committee that information held by HMRC is generally considered very sensitive by businesses and individuals alike, and there are generally clear restrictions on its sharing.
To return to the clauses and amendment more generally, part of the Minister’s argument missed what our argument was. We recognise the importance of disclosing some information, and we also recognise that clause 55 sets out tests with regard to the purposes of disclosing the information, and even to how the information can be shared onwards and to what information should be disclosed. What it does not do is test the nature of the public authority. Although we have had an interesting and, indeed, lively debate about the difference between legal language and casual language, I think we can all agree that it is in the interests of our democracy that our legislation can be read and understood by ordinary people. If the term “appears” is to be understood as it is commonly understood, the clause requires the support of our amendment.
Nadhim Zahawi
Clause 56 places a duty on the CMA to provide information and any other assistance to the Secretary of State to enable him to carry out his functions under the Bill. For this regime to function effectively, the Secretary of State needs access to the right information at the right time to make decisions with the fullest range of available evidence.
The Competition and Markets Authority, by virtue of its position as the market regulator, will naturally have access to information that could be relevant to the decisions made by the Secretary of State. Although in practice we would expect the CMA to be entirely willing to provide support to the regime, and we have worked closely with it in drafting the legislation, the clause ensures that there is no doubt in law about the duty placed on the CMA to provide any information in its possession or any other assistance in its power when directed to do so by the Secretary of State, so long as the information or assistance is reasonably required to facilitate the Secretary of State’s functions under the Bill.
I therefore anticipate that the power in the clause—mirroring section 105(5) of the Enterprise Act 2002—would, in practice, be used only rarely, given the Department’s good working relationship with the CMA. I hope the Committee will appreciate that the clause is quite simply about ensuring that the Secretary of State has access to pertinent information relevant to the decision-making process.
Dr Whitehead
I note that the Minister has used precisely the opposite argument that he used for the last clause, relating to the word “must”. In clause 56, the CMA “must” give the Secretary of State information. [Interruption.]
Dr Whitehead
Even though the Minister has worked well with the CMA, as he has just said, and is assured that the relationship will work well, he has put it into legislation just to make sure that it does.
Matt Western
My hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test has stolen my thunder—had I known that he was going to stand up, I perhaps would not have done so. It is interesting that paragraph (a) says “must” but paragraph (b) says “may”. Another valid point, beyond the semantics, is about the substance and the resource of the CMA, and whether there should be provision for that in the Bill. Can the Minister comment on the capacity of the CMA to support the demands and obligations set out in the clause?
Chi Onwurah
I will say a few words to the clause—reflecting the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test, in particular—because there seems to be a theme in the Bill. I know that the Minister believes that the Bill is beyond improvement, and that he is reluctant even to contemplate any changes, as he said in response to the hon. Member for Glenrothes, but he must recognise that a consistent theme seems to be that requirements, or “musts”, are placed on others and the discretion—the “may”, if you like—is with the Business Secretary. The Minister himself observed that we are keen to allow the Business Secretary the necessary discretion to fully protect our national security, but does he see not that that would better achieved by clearly circumscribing the Business Secretary’s actions?
I also support my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington in his recent contribution. Throughout this Bill, we need to ensure that the resources are there when placing requirements on bodies. I hope that the Minister can give such reassurances. On that basis, we recognise that the clause should stand part.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 56 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 57
Data Protection
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Nadhim Zahawi
Clause 57 provides that the provisions in parts 1 to 4 of the Bill containing a duty or power to disclose or use information do not authorise a contravention of data protection legislation, as set out in the Data Protection Act 2018. In addition, the clause provides that that information may be used or disclosed only if it does not contravene parts 1 to 7, or chapter 1 of part 9, of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which contains provisions about conducting interception, including restrictions on use and disclosure of intercepted information. These standard provisions are included where legislation concerns the use or disclosure of information. I hope that hon. Members will therefore be content to support this standard clause as part of the legislation.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 57 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 58
Minor and Consequential Amendments and Revocations
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to consider that schedule 2 be the Second schedule to the Bill.
Nadhim Zahawi
Clause 58 is purely technical in nature and inserts schedule 2 into the Bill. Schedule 2 provides for minor and consequential amendments and revocations. The Secretary of State currently has the power to intervene in qualifying mergers on national security grounds by issuing a public interest intervention notice, a special intervention notice or a European intervention notice under the Enterprise Act 2002, where the statutory requirements are met. It would clearly be unnecessary for the Secretary of State to retain these powers once the provisions of the Bill come into force. Schedule 2 therefore removes national security as a ground on which the Secretary of State may intervene under the Enterprise Act 2002. The Secretary of State will retain the powers in the Enterprise Act 2002 to intervene in qualifying mergers where these raise issues of media plurality, the stability of the UK financial system or maintaining in the UK the capability to combat and to mitigate the effects of public health emergencies.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 58 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2 agreed to.
Clause 59
Overseas information disclosure
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Nadhim Zahawi
Clause 59 removes a restriction on the ability of the Competition and Markets Authority to co-operate with its international partners on merger cases. At the end of the transition period, the UK will no longer be part of the European Union’s competition system. The CMA will become responsible for investigating the effects on competition of larger international mergers, which were previously investigated by the European Commission. In a globalised economy, effective cross-border enforcement of competition law, which protects UK markets and consumers, relies increasingly on close international co-operation. The ability to disclose confidential information to assist an overseas authority with this enforcement activity, including in circumstances where parties have not provided their consent for the information to be disclosed, is a crucial ingredient of strong co-operation.
Moreover, the willingness of an overseas authority to disclose confidential information will often depend on whether the receiving authority can reciprocate. Any restrictions on the CMA’s ability to disclose such information could therefore inhibit the effectiveness of its international co-operation. The overseas disclosure gateway, which is set out in section 243 of the Enterprise Act 2002, provides an important mechanism for the CMA to disclose information to its overseas counterparts when consent has not been provided by relevant parties. The gateway permits disclosure for the purpose of helping an overseas authority’s enforcement activities.
However, the CMA is currently unable to use the overseas disclosure gateway to disclose information that comes to it in connection with a merger investigation. This means that the CMA is restricted from sharing certain information with its overseas counterparts that might be crucial to their investigation of a merger. This restriction presents two challenges for the UK’s competition authorities. First, it weakens the control of mergers with an international dimension that might adversely affect UK markets and consumers. Secondly, it inhibits the CMA’s ability to receive information that might be critical to its own merger investigations, because it has no ability to reciprocate. That, in turn, could also weaken its protection of UK markets and consumers. Clause 59 rectifies this by removing the restriction in the overseas disclosure gateway and allowing the CMA to use the gateway to disclose merger information to overseas public authorities.
Chi Onwurah
I thank the Minister for setting out clause 59, because I had thought that it was inconsequential. I listened to what he said carefully, as I always do, but I did not hear him use the term “national security” once. The function of the Bill is national security. Although we have not defined it, we have debated that the Bill should be narrowly circumscribed to concerns of national security. Having listened carefully to the Minister, I get the impression that the clause has been added, and for very good reasons, to facilitate and enable the CMA’s competition and mergers powers.
We are putting the national security interest relating to mergers and acquisitions firmly here in the Bill, so the CMA is no longer concerned with and involved in that, yet this clause facilitates the CMA’s sharing of information with overseas public authorities. That information, by definition, will not be with regard to national security, because national security investigations will take place under the powers in the Bill that lie with the Secretary of State. I am somewhat confused as to what this clause is doing in the Bill. Would the Minister like to intervene to illuminate and clarify that the clause has something to do with national security?
Chi Onwurah
I find it somewhat worrying, given our debates about keeping the Bill focused narrowly on national security, that the Government have added a clause to help the CMA in its functions. My hon. Friends and I have been thinking of a number of ways in which we would like to help the CMA in its functions and to improve the Enterprise Act, but we have been resolute in focusing on national security, because that is the matter before the Committee. Yet it seems that the clause, although very well meaning, is designed for an entirely different function.
You are not stopping the debate, Mr Twigg, so I presume it is in order to debate the functions of the CMA in relation to competitions and mergers generally, rather than to national security specifically.
Nadhim Zahawi
It is worth respectfully reminding the hon. Lady and the Committee that this is a separate topic in the Bill that is unrelated to the NSI regime, as set out in the explanatory notes.
Chi Onwurah
I have the explanatory notes, and they do not state that the clause deals with a separate topic. Paragraph 173 states:
“Clause 59 amends the overseas disclosure gateway in section 243 of the Enterprise Act 2002, removing the restriction on UK public authorities disclosing information that comes to them in connection with a merger investigation under that gateway.”
The explanatory notes do not state that the functions of the CMA are separate from national security as clearly as the Minister just has. I do not want to detain the Committee, but I register the Labour party’s concern—
Peter Grant
Does the hon. Lady share my understanding that the definitive statement on what the Bill is about is the long title of the Bill, not the explanatory notes? Does she agree that the long title makes no mention whatsoever of helping the CMA in the general exercise of its purpose?
Chi Onwurah
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his intervention, because he is absolutely right that, rather than having a debate on the contents of the explanatory notes, line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill should focus on what the Bill says, and it does not mention general improvements to our competition and mergers regime, much as we feel that improvements could be made. Although we will not oppose the clause, I register our disappointment that we were not better informed of the Bill’s additional scope.
Nadhim Zahawi
I think that is slightly unfair; it is included in page 4 of the explanatory notes.
Chi Onwurah
The Minister’s argument is to look at page 4 of the explanatory notes, but it does not say that the CMA’s functions are separate from national security.
The Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty’s Treasury (Michael Tomlinson)
“Interaction with” the CMA.
Chi Onwurah
It says “interaction with” the CMA. but it does not say that that is separate from national security. In this afternoon’s sitting, when we discuss the additions that we would like to the remit and definition of “national security”, I hope that the Minister will recognise that the Bill is broader than national security, as was simply understood from his previous responses.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 59 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 60
Defamation
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Nadhim Zahawi
Clause 60 provides the Secretary of State and the CMA with absolute privilege against action for defamation as a result of the exercise of functions under or by virtue of the Bill. The clause has been included to ensure that the Secretary of State and the CMA have absolute privilege from defamation claims, on the basis that the function of the regime to protect national security is too important to be at risk or in any way curtailed by claims of defamation. It is, of course, not the Government’s intention to defame anyone through the regime or more widely. I hope that hon. Members will agree that this is an appropriate protection, supported by a well-reasoned regime that seeks to protect national security while supporting businesses and investors.
Dr Whitehead
I understand the purpose of the clause and, as the Minister indicated, the question of national security is very important. I can imagine circumstances in which the Secretary of State may, for example, suggest that a company is an agent of a foreign power. That might be seen to be defamatory, but in terms of the inquiry that is being undertaken the Minister should be protected against such an action.
However, the clause states that there is absolute privilege, which appears to suggest that the privilege could be exercised even on a wholly unreasonable basis—that is, the Minister could say or write what he or she likes about anybody provided it is under the cover of, or could be attached to the purposes of, the Bill. That seems a bit of a wide-ranging provision.
I appreciate what the Minister said on the provision, and that he has already said that it would not be his intention to defame anybody, but might he provide us with an assurance today, on the record, that notwithstanding the very wide scope of the Bill, he does not see the clause as an opportunity for the Secretary of State to wantonly defame anybody if they felt like it, and that it would be strictly used in terms of inquiries that were being undertaken for the purpose of the Bill, and not for any other purposes?
Nadhim Zahawi
I hope I have already made it clear that the Government would not intend to defame anybody. The reason for the clause is that there are various points in the regime where the Secretary of State will make statements that are, in effect, published and would include communications with other parties as well as those for general public consumption. He may therefore be open to such claims, which is why the clause is in the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 60 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 61
Annual report
Sam Tarry (Ilford South) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 31, in clause 61, page 36, line 20, at end insert—
“(m) the average number of days taken to assess a trigger event called in under the Act;
(n) the average number of days taken for acceptance decisions in respect of mandatory and voluntary notices;
(o) the average annual headcount allocated to the operation of reviews of notices made under sections 14 and 18 over the relevant period;
(p) the proportion and number of Small to Medium Enterprises in the overall number of notices and call-in notices.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to report on the time taken to process notices, the resource allocated to the new Unit and the extent to which Small to Medium Enterprises are being called-in under the new regime.
Sam Tarry
Before turning to the amendment, it occurs to me that the Minister, in his new role as vaccinations tsar, could consider this Committee Room as somewhere to store some of the vaccine.
Amendment 31 would simply require the Secretary of State to report on the time taken to process notices, on the resource allocated to the new unit, and on the extent to which small and medium-sized enterprises are called in under the new regime. It is about requiring greater accountability from BEIS in the investment security unit’s service standards. That sounds anodyne, but it does something very important.
Throughout our discussions, there has been one point of agreement across the Committee: hon. Members, across party lines, have raised concerns about the capacity and capability that a new investment security unit will have to deliver on the Bill’s ambition. A number of the expert witnesses added to that concern, describing the shift as “seismic”—totally transformational—and said that changes will need to be thoroughly resourced in that unit, which should be especially prepared to work closely and efficiently with our innovative start-ups.
Indeed, some of the experts were pretty clear on that point. David Petrie of the ICAEW said:
“The first point I make about that is that this new investment security unit will need to be very well resourced. A thousand notifications a year is four a day; I am just testing it for reasonableness, as accountants are inclined to do. That is quite a lot of inquiries.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 53, Q60.]
Peter Grant
I certainly sympathise with the hon. Gentleman’s desire for that information to be published. Can he explain why the Bill should require that it be published, rather than leaving it to ongoing scrutiny by the relevant Select Committee? Does he think that the wording of paragraph (o) of the amendment needs to be more precise to be part of an Act of Parliament? If scrutiny were left to the discretion of a Select Committee, it would not need to be quite so clear about what “average” means, for example, because five or six different words mean “average” to statisticians.
Sam Tarry
The hon. Gentleman raises a good point. I think that the wording is precise enough. The accompanying guidance to the Bill could perhaps clarify some of those points. The key reason that we want that in the Bill, rather than for it to be overseen in the way that he has suggested, is that—
The Chair
Would the hon. Gentleman face the Chair when he is speaking, please? Thank you.
Sam Tarry
Certainly, Chair. It is incredibly important to give that sense of clarity and time to small and medium enterprises. That has been a running theme for a number of our amendments, and there are three reasons, which it might help the hon. Member for Glenrothes to understand: first, the unit’s efficiency; secondly, its capacity; and thirdly, its focus on SMEs.
I will expand on that. First, on the unit’s efficiency, by reporting the aggregate time taken for decisions—both assessment decisions and initial acceptance or rejection notices—we would have a mechanism to ensure that the new regime works more efficiently for SMEs. Secondly, on capacity, the amendment drives towards taking stock of the resources behind the unit’s work, so that Parliament and the public will have a mechanism for holding the Government to account for what will be a major new centre for merger investment screening in the UK. Thirdly, we in the Labour party have really tried to make that focus on SMEs paramount in the Bill, so that we have a climate in which SMEs can thrive. That would simply mean that the unit could track the focus of SMEs in its work, and would be able to highlight specific concerns and the experiences of our most innovative start-ups when interacting with the new regime. Seeing that in live time would be useful for the forward planning of SMEs, and for the Government and Parliament to be able oversee how the process is working once it is in place.
Each paragraph of the clause maintains the Government’s power to act to protect national security. The clause simply holds power to account through what we would call aggregated transparency.
Nadhim Zahawi
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Ilford South. We are not quite at minus 70 °C, but we are probably very close to it.
I will speak initially to clause 61 stand part before turning to amendment 31. It is crucial for investor confidence that there is as much transparency as possible in the regime, but of course there is evidently a limit to how much the Government can disclose, given that the regime deals explicitly with national security matters. That said, alongside appropriate protections for personal data and commercially sensitive information around national security assessments, the Government are committed to providing as much transparency as possible when it comes to how the new regime functions at an aggregate level.
Chi Onwurah
I wholeheartedly endorse the Minister’s words on the skill and talents in this Committee Room. He said we were improving the Bill, but he is yet to accept any changes, so I am intrigued to understand what improvements he feels we have made.
Nadhim Zahawi
It is the challenge the hon. Lady offers that allows a Minister as junior as the one standing before hon. Members to be able to make the argument.
Finally, the report will also give a sense of the sectors of the economy where the greatest activity of national security concern is occurring. The Secretary of State may include additional information in relation to SMEs if he considers that to be appropriate. For those reasons, I am unable to accept the amendment, and I hope that the hon. Member for Ilford South can withdraw it.
Chi Onwurah
I will say a few words in support of the amendment and on the clause, and will respond to the Minister’s comments. I think we all recognise the importance of reporting annually on the seismic shift in our national security, and of scrutiny of mergers and acquisitions. Yet it has to be said that the Bill does not say what the report’s objective is. Neither did the Minister, in listing what was included, give an understanding of the reasons the items have been included, even as he rejected the amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South, which seeks to add points of particular interest to small and medium-sized enterprises.
I note, for example, that the number of final notifications is given but not the number of interim notifications or interim orders made. It is hard to see whether the objective of the report is to give greater confidence, to enable us to fully understand the working, or to enable us to see whether the limited contents of the impact assessment prove to be accurate. The kind of information in the report, and in my hon. Friend’s amendment, is the information that a well-run Department should wish to have. Although we are unclear on the objective of the report, which is not set out, reporting on those items as fully as possible would certainly improve the workings of the Bill, as my hon. Friend has said he seeks to do.
Sam Tarry
I listened to the Minister’s assessment. We want to tackle a number of other substantial issues this afternoon, so on that basis I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 61 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 62
Transitional and saving provision in relation to the Enterprise Act 2002
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Nadhim Zahawi
I now turn to the Bill’s final provisions. Clause 62 sets out the transitional provisions for cases that may qualify for intervention under both the Bill and the Enterprise Act 2002. The starting point for the transition arrangement is that the 2002 Act continues to apply in relation to national security until the new regime is commenced. That means that qualifying mergers can continue to be scrutinised under the Act where the statutory requirements are met.
However, the Government do not wish to expose to some form of double jeopardy qualifying mergers that take place after the introduction of the Bill but before commencement. The clause means that, in effect, the Secretary of State must use one Act or the other. Not doing so would create significant uncertainty for business and investors and could, at least theoretically, lead to the perverse position of the Secretary of State, following commencement of the Bill, re-examining decisions that they themselves made merely weeks ago under the 2002 Act.
Clause 63 makes provision in relation to the regulations that may be made under the Bill, setting out how they must be made and what they may contain. All the regulations that may be made under the Bill are subject to the negative resolution procedure, except regulations made under clause 6, “Notifiable acquisitions”, clause 11, “Exceptions relating to control of assets”. and clause 41, “Permitted maximum penalties”, where the draft affirmative procedure will apply. Given their nature and effect, the Government consider that regulations under those three powers should be subject to the approval of Parliament.
Clause 64 provides that any expenditure incurred by the Secretary of State under the Bill is to be paid out of money provided by Parliament. Clause 65 is purely a technical one to provide for definitions of the key terms used in the Bill. I do not intend to explore individual meanings of key terms now; I will instead direct hon. Members to lunch and to the relevant clauses that provide them. Finally, hon. Members will appreciate that clause 66 is purely a technical one to set out the Bill’s short title and provide details about the commencement of the Bill’s clauses and the extent of the Bill.
Chi Onwurah
I thank the Minister for setting out the provisions of the clauses and for moving us onwards to lunch and to the end of the Bill. I will not detain the Committee with a detailed consideration of the technical provisions in the clauses and the interpretation of the various terms. However, the Bill as a whole would benefit from greater clarity, as my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test has so well set out, particularly in his reference to the use of language by bank managers.
We will not oppose the final clauses. We congratulate the Committee and particularly the Clerks and all those who have supported us in enabling us to reach the final clauses.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 62 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 63 to 66 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Michael Tomlinson
On this occasion I will, without rudely interrupting anyone, beg to move that the Committee do now adjourn.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Michael Tomlinson.)
National Security and Investment Bill (Twelfth sitting)
Thursday 10th December 2020
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 10 December 2020 - (10 Dec 2020)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)
I beg to move, that the clause be read a Second time.
It is a pleasure to see you back in the Chair, Sir Graham. I am also pleased that the Committee is now moving to the new expanses of new clauses. I see that Committee members have come fully prepared to deal with the environment in which we find ourselves. I should say, Sir Graham, that the previous Chair said that we should be able to put on as many coats as we liked. I think that that is much to be desired. Unfortunately, I left my office in a rush and forgot to bring my coat, as well as the Houses of Parliament Christmas jumper in which I invested only yesterday, in anticipation that it might be needed today. We shall have to take the temperature as an encouragement to press on.
Had we known that, regardless of the title of the Bill, it was actually the National and Security and Investment, and any improvements to the Enterprise Act 2002 we feel it is necessary to make, Bill, we might have ranged somewhat broader in our new clauses. We chose instead to focus on what we felt was absolutely critical to the good functioning of our national security framework. New clause 1 seeks to set out some of the factors that the Secretary of State may have regard to when making assessments under the provisions of the Bill. We recognise some of the implications of including a definition of national security. The Bill is called the National Security and Investment Bill, even if it does go somewhat beyond that title.
James Wild (North West Norfolk) (Con)
I note that the hon. Lady uses the word “may” not “shall” in the new clause. Can she explain why she opted for “may” in this instance?
Chi Onwurah
I am grateful for that intervention. First, it shows that the hon. Gentleman is paying attention, which in itself is something to be welcomed. If I may say so, it also shows that he is taking lessons from my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test. We have considered the matter and this is the correct use of the term “may”. I shall go into more detail later, but this is not about prescribing what the Secretary of State must look at; it is about giving greater clarity, particularly to those who will come under the Bill’s remit. One of the expert witnesses put it very well. Those who will come under the Bill’s remit need to get a sense of what the Government mean by national security, not in a specific and detailed definition.
Simon Baynes (Clwyd South) (Con)
Would the hon. Lady not agree that there is danger that the new clause would start to try to define in a prescriptive way what a national security risk is, whereas the point of the Bill is that it enables the Government, the Secretary of State and the relevant parties to judge what is a risk? That goes back to the point that my hon. Friend the Member for North West Norfolk made about “may” and “shall”. As far as I can see, the new clause should use “shall”, given what the hon. Lady is trying to achieve, but I accept the point about how such legislation is worded. There is a danger that, by listing all these clauses, we imply that other aspects of danger to national security are not included. I am not sure that it would achieve anything. In many ways, it might obfuscate rather than clarify, although I fully accept that her intention is to clarify.
Chi Onwurah
I thank the hon. Member for that intervention, which I think was made in the proper spirit of the Committee, by seeking to improve the Bill, help the Secretary of State, and help those who will be affected by the Bill to understand it. The hon. Gentleman is quite right that there is a trade-off.
During the expert evidence sessions, we heard both from those who felt that there should be a definition of national security and from those who felt that there should not. However, if my memory serves me, they all tended to agree that there should be greater clarity about what national security could include. For example, Dr Ashley Lenihan of the London School of Economics said:
“What you do see in regulations is guidance as to how national security risk might be assessed or examples of what could be considered a threat to national security.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 38, Q42.]
We also heard that in the US the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act 2018 provides for a “sense of Congress” on six factors that the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States and the President may consider—the term “may” is used well here—in assessing national security: countries of specific concern; critical infrastructure, energy assets and critical material; a history of compliance with US law; control of US industries that affect US capacity to meet national security requirements, which is very important; personally identifiable information; and potential new cyber-security vulnerabilities.
My argument is that if we look at examples from elsewhere, we see indications of what can be included in national security without having a prescriptive definition. That is exactly what the new clause tries to set out. It states:
“When assessing a risk to national security, the Secretary of State may have regard to factors including”,
and then it gives a list of factors, which I shall detail shortly.
The question, “What is national security?” is entirely unanswered, for Parliament, for businesses looking for clarity, for citizens looking for reassurance, and if hostile actors are seeking to take advantage of any loopholes in how the Secretary of State construes national security. I do have sympathy with the argument that we should not be prescriptive and limit the Secretary of State’s flexibility to act by setting down a rigid definition of national security that rules things out. That is the spirit of the new clause. It does not rule out the Secretary of State’s flexibility or set a rigid definition; it simply does what other countries have done well, as our experts witnesses have said, by giving a guide on some factors that the Government might consider, while allowing many more to be included in national security assessments. This is critical in order to give greater clarity to businesses puzzled by the Government’s very high-level definitions of espionage, disruption or inappropriate leverage.
Andrew Griffith (Arundel and South Downs) (Con)
The hon. Lady appears to be advancing two arguments simultaneously. On the one hand, I understand the argument about clarity, which is indeed something that many people would look for in this Bill. However, she also talks about flexibility and that we should not seek to tie the Secretary of State down to a particular, prescriptive definition at any point in time, which I think members on both sides of the Committee would agree on. Given that, I am genuinely confused as to why she would seek to advance this new clause, although I find its actual wording wholly unobjectionable. Perhaps the Minister will reply on this topic, because I think the record of these proceedings could provide that clarity without needing to press the amendment to a vote.
Chi Onwurah
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention, which I found very helpful. If he believes me to be presenting both sides of the argument at once, perhaps that is because the Minister has been doing the very same thing so often during the past few sittings. As the Minister has often said, there is a balance to be sought between flexibility for the Secretary of State and clarity for the business community and other communities. This new clause goes exactly to the point made by the hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs, and strikes that balance. That is why—I will say it again—the new clause does not prescribe what national security is, but it does not leave a vacuum into which supposition, uncertainty and confusion can move.
The new clause gives greater clarity to citizens worried about whether Government will act to protect critical data transfers or our critical national infrastructure. Are those areas part of our national security, even though they are not covered by the Government’s proposed 17 sectors? The new clause provides assurance in that case and—this is important—sends a message to hostile actors that we will act to protect British security through broad powers applied with accountability. It should be clear that we also need to consider how this Bill will be read by the hostile actors against whom we are seeking to protect our nation, and this new clause will send a clearer message as to what may be included in that.
The factors highlighted in this new clause are comparable to guidance provided in other affected national security legislation, most notably the US’s Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act 2018. Paragraph (a) would protect our supply chains and sensitive sites, in addition to acting against the disruption, espionage and inappropriate leverage highlighted in the Government’s statement of policy intent. We have heard from experts, and have also seen from very recent history—namely, that of our 5G network—that our strategic security depends not only on businesses immediately relevant to national security, but on the full set of capabilities and supply chains that feed into those security-relevant businesses. We cannot let another unforeseen disruption, whether pandemic or otherwise, disrupt our access to critical supply.
Paragraphs (b) and (c) look strategically at our national security, not with a short-term eye. We have heard consistently from experts that national security and economic security are not altogether separate. Indeed, they cannot be separated; they are deeply linked. A national security expert told us that a narrow focus on direct technologies of defence was mistaken and that instead we should look to the “defence of technology”. That was a very appropriate phrase, meaning not specific technologies of defence, but defence of technologies that seem economically strategic today and might become strategic for national security tomorrow.
Andrew Bowie (West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine) (Con)
The hon. Lady mentions Sir Richard Dearlove’s evidence to the Committee a couple of weeks ago. He made very clear that his opinion, as a former head of MI6, was that having a statutory definition of national security would be very prohibitive and do damage to what we are trying to achieve by getting this Bill on the statute book.
Chi Onwurah
Absolutely. That is why we are not seeking a statutory definition of national security. That is why we are seeking to include and to set out points that the Secretary of State may take into account. The hon. Member should recognise that the Government’s statement of intent is designed to give guidance as to how the Bill will work and be used in practice, and what might be taken into account. The guidance is there. It is just that it is very limited.
We are deliberately not seeking a prescriptive definition of national security. We recognise, as Sir Richard Dearlove did, that it can and must evolve over time. We are seeking to give greater guidance and to promote a better understanding of the remit of the Bill, so that it can be better interpreted and better implemented and so that all those who come under its remit can share that understanding. That is what other nations do. The new clause takes our security context seriously, and signals to hostile actors that we will act with seriousness, not superficiality.
Paragraph (f) bridges the gap between the Government’s defined sectors and focus and the critical national infrastructure that we already define and focus on in our wider intelligence and security work. It brings us in line with allies. Canadian guidelines list the security of Canada’s national infrastructure as an explicit factor in national security assessments. In Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States cases, Congress lists critical infrastructure among the six factors that the President and CFIUS may access.
The provision also acts on the agreement of the ex MI6 chief. In relation to having a critical national infrastructure definition in the Bill, he said:
“I would certainly see that as advantageous, because it defines a clear area where you start and from which you can make judgments”.––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, Tuesday 24 November 2020; c. 24, Q31.]
Some of the interventions have been about whether the new clause hits the right spot between prescribing and defining what national security is and giving greater clarity and focus. We would argue that the evidence that I have just set out shows that it does.
Paragraphs (g), (h) and (i) recognise that national security is about more than a narrow view of military security; it is about human security, clamping down on persistent abuses of law—as other countries do—and recognising that a party that consistently abuses human rights abroad cannot be trusted to do otherwise at home. It is about knowing that the single greatest collective threat we face, at home and across the world, lies in climate risk. It is about acting on illicit activities and money-laundering threats that underpin direct threats to national security in the form of global terror.
I recognise that many Government Members have recently raised the importance of human rights, illicit activities, money laundering and climate change in our security. In the statement on Hong Kong this week, the Minister for Asia acknowledged that human rights should be part of our considerations when it comes to trade and security but said that he did not feel that the Trade Bill was the right place for such provisions. I argue that today’s Bill is the right place for them because it deals with our national security.
The new clause would show the world that the UK is serious about national security. We must protect our national security against threats at home and abroad, and build our sovereign capability in industries that are the most strategically significant for security. We must view security in the light of modern technologies, climate and geopolitical threats. None of those constrain the Government’s ability to act; they simply sharpen the clarity of that action, and its signal to the world.
When we began line-by-line scrutiny, I spoke of my astonishment that the Government’s impact assessment referred to national security as an area of market failure that therefore required Government action. I hope that the Minister can confirm that he does not believe that national security is an area of market failure, but that it is the first responsibility of Government. The new clause sets out to give bones to that assertion and to demonstrate to the world that we understand our national security and the interests at play in promoting and securing it, and that we will act decisively in the interest of national security, taking into account this range of factors to protect our citizens, our national interest and our economic sovereignty, now and in the future.
Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP)
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central although I confess I was not quite able to pay attention to the early part of her remarks, because I was still reeling from the revelation that a born and bred Geordie is capable of feeling cold. I just hope that her constituents do not get to hear of it, or she might be in trouble at the next election.
Perhaps the aspect of the new clause that I am least comfortable about is the title. I think that is what is causing the problem. The title is “National security definition”, but what follows, thankfully, is not a definition of national security. Like a lot of people, I would love to be able to come up with a definition of national security that worked and was robust, but no one has been able to do that. The new clause, however, does not seek to prescribe what national security is, and despite what was said in some of the interventions, it certainly does not attempt to prescribe what it is not. It gives explicit statutory authority to the Secretary of State to take certain factors into account in determining whether and how, in his judgment, a particular acquisition is a threat to national security.
Chi Onwurah
I can only ascribe my lack of the usual Geordie central heating to being so far from home at the moment. I take the hon. Gentleman’s point about the new clause seriously, and I think he is right. The title misleads to the extent that we are not looking to define national security.
Peter Grant
If the hon. Lady thinks she is a long way from home—tell me about it.
There was discussion, and quite a lot of questions to some of the early witnesses, about whether we needed to give some kind of guidance on what national security is not. Some of us vividly remember—I think that the hon. Lady’s constituents will vividly remember—that there was a time when someone was a threat to national security if they were a coal miner who went on strike, or if they had a trade union membership card in their pocket and worked in the wrong places, such as in Government establishments that officially did not exist then. When we look at the honours that are still bestowed on the person responsible for those two abuses of the claim of national security, it can be understood why some of us are always concerned about giving any Government powers to act in the interest of national security unless clear safeguards are built in.
The other side of the coin is that I can foresee times when the Secretary of State might be grateful for the fact that the clause has been incorporated in the Bill. Let us suppose that someone wanted to take control of or influence a software company. I know that software is itself an area we would want to look at. We all know what can happen when the software that helps to control major transport systems goes wrong. We have all been affected by Heathrow terminal 5 effectively shutting down for hours at a time. When there is a major signalling fault caused by a software malfunction at one of the main London stations, the whole of the south-east can be clogged up for hours or even days.
Can that become a threat to our national security? I think there are circumstances in which it could. I can certainly foresee circumstances in which someone who wanted to damage the United Kingdom—for no other reason than wanting to damage its interests—might seek to do so by getting a way in that enables them to interfere with the code controlling software of the transport or financial services infrastructure, for example. It is not in the interest of any of us, at the point when a Secretary of State intervenes to stop such an acquisition, if the matter can be taken to court and it becomes necessary to argue that deliberately causing the national transport infrastructure to freeze is an attack on our national security. I cannot understand why anyone would want not to add a clause to the Bill to allow such an interpretation to be made if the Secretary of State saw fit.
Chi Onwurah
The hon. Gentleman reminds me that I should have mentioned either the impact assessment or the consultation response. I think the consultation response gives the deliberately induced software failure at Heathrow as an example of a failure of national security that the Bill would be able to circumvent by preventing hostile parties from owning that software company, without setting out how that would be part of the definition of national security that the Bill is seeking.
Peter Grant
I am grateful again for those comments. The hon. Lady has referred again to what is in the explanatory notes. Unless somebody has changed the rules, the explanatory notes are not part of the eventual Act of Parliament. In borderline cases, they may be used by a court to help to interpret what the intention of Parliament was when it passed a Bill, but as a general rule, the intention of Parliament is stated by the words in the Act as it is passed. If it does not say in the Act that a Secretary of State can take those factors into account, there will be an argument that will have to be heard and tried in court, if need be, that a Secretary of State should not have taken those factors into account.
Andrew Griffith
I do not know how familiar the hon. Gentleman is with the process by which the courts look at the definitions for judicial review, but one of the dangers of trying to write them down—I accept that it is “may” language, not “must”—is that the court will look at them. We could inadvertently circumscribe the degree to which the Act can be used. I know that is not the hon. Gentleman’s intention, but I have to say that, in practice—he might be familiar with how the courts work, particularly for judicial review—that is absolutely a legitimate consideration. That is one of the reasons why I would argue that the new clause should not be accepted.
Peter Grant
I hear what the hon. Gentleman is saying, but I am also looking at the following words:
“factors including, but not restricted to”.
Are those words completely without meaning? If they are, why is it that the Library has dozens, if not hundreds, of pieces of legislation currently in force that have those exact words included in them? Those words are there explicitly to make sure that the list is not intended to be comprehensive. The fact that the word “may” is in there is because it allows the Secretary of State to take the factors into account, but it does not require them to do it in circumstances where it is not appropriate.
The final aspect that I want to look at is the very last factor in new clause 1: money laundering. Everybody knows that money laundering is bad and that it is a threat to our economy; it is a threat to honest businesses and all the rest of it. If the only concern that the Secretary of State had about an acquisition was that it was intended to facilitate large-scale money laundering in the United Kingdom, can we be sure that a court would accept that, and that alone, as evidence of a threat to our national security? I hope it would. The way to make sure it would is to put it in the Bill right now.
We know there are very strong connections between the acquisition of huge amounts of property, particularly in London, by people who got rich very quickly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, large-scale money laundering and organised crime, with the money sometimes being laundered through London, and the growing effectiveness of the threat that the present Russian regime poses to our national security. The Intelligence and Security Committee report from about a year ago highlighted that very clearly.
We know that money laundering can become part of—[Interruption.]
The Chair
Order. A Division has been called in the House. In anticipation of there being at least three Divisions, I suspend the Committee for half an hour. We shall resume at 3.3 pm. Should a fourth Division be called, the Committee will resume at 3.13 pm. If everybody is back sooner, we can resume earlier.
Peter Grant
Even by my standards, it feels as if it is a long time since I stood up to start speaking, so I will bring my comments to a close, Sir Graham.
The examples that I quoted of a potential software threat to our critical transport infrastructure or facilitation of large-scale money laundering are just two examples where I think it would be to the benefit of the legislation to have those factors explicitly permitted for the Secretary of State to take into account when exercising the powers created by the Bill. I understand Government Members’ concern, but I ask them not to judge the new clause by their understandable and shared concerns about the dangers of having a precise dictionary definition of national security. I ask them to judge it by the additional certainty and reassurance it will give the Secretary of State that if they take those factors into account in all of our interests, there will be no question but that the court will uphold the decision. On that basis, I commend the new clause to the Committee. If, as has happened with depressing regularity, the Committee splits along party lines, I sincerely invite the Government to think seriously about tabling a similar measure at a later stage, because the new clause could improve the Bill substantially and it would be a great shame if it was lost simply for party political considerations.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Nadhim Zahawi)
I am grateful to Opposition speakers, the shadow Minister and the hon. Member for Glenrothes, for their contributions and to my hon. Friends the Members for Arundel and South Downs, for North West Norfolk, for Clwyd South and for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine for their excellent interventions.
On new clause 1, it will not surprise the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central that the Government’s position remains consistent with that of 1 December, when amendments relating to the new clause were discussed. Such amendments included, among others, proposals for the inclusion of a definition of national security in the statement made by the Secretary of State. The new clause seeks to create a new, exhaustive list of factors that the Secretary of State may take into account when considering whether something is a risk to national security.
Chi Onwurah
I am listening intently to the Minister’s response—given the great skills of the Committee he is taking the new clause in the right spirit—but it is not appropriate to say that we are presenting an exhaustive list when we specifically say, “this and other things”. It meant to be not an exhaustive list but a guide and a sense.
Nadhim Zahawi
I apologise. I will say instead that the clause seeks to create a non-exhaustive list of factors that the Secretary of State may take into account when considering whether something is a risk to national security for the purposes of the Bill.
The Bill as drafted does not seek to define national security. It also does not include factors that the Secretary of State will take into account in coming to a national security assessment. Instead, factors that the Secretary of State expects to take into account in exercising the call-in powers are proposed to be set out, as the hon. Lady rightly said, in the statement provided for in clause 3. A draft of the statement was published on introduction of the Bill to aid the Committee’s scrutiny efforts. The draft statement includes details of what the Secretary of State is likely to be interested in when it comes to national security risks. That includes certain sectors of the economy and the types of acquisition that may raise concern.
While it is crucial for investors’ confidence that there is as much transparency in the regime as possible, there is self-evidently a limit to how much the Government can and should disclose in that regard given that the regime deals explicitly with national security matters. Nevertheless, the draft statement goes into some detail about the factors that the Secretary of State expects to take into account when making a decision on whether to call in a trigger event.
The new clause would instead place in the Bill, alongside the statement, a non-exhaustive list of factors that the Secretary of State may have regard to when assessing a risk to national security. That raises a number of issues. First, it is unclear what the benefit is of including a non-exhaustive list of factors that the Secretary of State may have regard to directly in the legislation as opposed to in the statement.
Nadhim Zahawi
I will happily take the hon. Lady’s intervention once I have gone through these points.
Secondly, the new clause would not replace the statement; instead, it would appear to sit alongside it. The Government think that would probably cause confusion rather than clarity, although I have no doubt that the hon. Lady and the Opposition agree that clarity for all parties will be crucial to the regime’s success.
Thirdly, by stating what may be taken into account when assessing a risk to national security under the Bill, the new clause indirectly sets out what can be a national security risk for the purposes of the Bill, and therefore what comes within the scope of national security—many colleagues pointed out some of the evidence suggesting that we should do exactly the opposite of that—which could clearly have unintended consequences for other pieces of legislation that refer to national security. The Bill requires that the statement from the Secretary of State be reviewed at least every five years to reflect the changing national security landscape. Indeed, in practice, it is likely that it will be reviewed and updated more frequently. We think that this is the right approach, rather than binding ourselves in primary legislation.
Fourthly, but perhaps most importantly, I note in this list that the Secretary of State may have regard to an ever-broadening set of suggestions that Opposition Members wish to be taken into account as part of national security. On Second Reading, the shadow Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Doncaster North (Edward Miliband), requested that an industrial strategy test be included in the Bill alongside national security assessments. I am afraid that an industrial strategy test is not the purpose of this legislation.
Peter Grant
The Minister comments on a speech by the shadow Secretary of State at an earlier stage of the Bill’s passage and on the undesirability of building an industrial strategy test into the Bill. I do not see an industrial strategy test mentioned in the new clause, so, for the purpose of clarity, is that part of the new clause that we are debating?
Nadhim Zahawi
I was referring to the shadow Secretary of State’s request on Second Reading that an industrial strategy test be included in the Bill.
As I was saying, factors that the Secretary of State may have regard to through the new clause are wide ranging. This is an important Bill about national security and national security alone. We do not wish to see an ever-growing list of factors for the Secretary of State to take into consideration. That would risk the careful balance that has been struck in this regime between protecting national security and ensuring that the UK remains one of the best places in the world to invest. The Government consider that the Secretary of State should be required to assess national security as strictly about the security of our nation. That is what the Bill requires. These powers cannot and will not be used for economic, political or any other reasons.
While I understand the objectives of the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central, for the reasons I have set out I am not able to accept the new clause. I hope the hon. Member will agree to withdraw it.
Chi Onwurah
I thank the Minister for his response, not all of which was entirely unexpected. I also thank the hon. Member for Glenrothes for his speech and his interventions, which were very much to the point.
I feel that the Minister was, to a certain extent, doing what the hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs accused me of doing—I did say that I had learned so much from the Minister—which was arguing both sides of the question at once. He seems to be saying that there should not be any definition, but that if there needs to be a definition, it is already there in the statement that the Secretary of State has set out. Indeed, I have been looking for that statement, because I did not recognise it from the way the Minister described it when talking about giving detail on the types of national security questions that might arise.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 3—Grace period for SMEs—
“For the purposes of section 32, a person has a reasonable excuse if—
(a) the entity concerned is a Small to Medium Enterprise;
(b) this Act has been in force for less than six months.”
This new clause creates a grace period whereby – for alleged offences committed under Section 32 – Small to Medium Enterprises would have a ‘reasonable excuse’ if the alleged offence was committed within the first six months after the Bill’s passage.
Peter Grant
I am pleased to speak to the two new clauses, which stand in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen South. Throughout our debate on the Bill, Members have spoken—sometimes with a surprising degree of cross-party consensus—of the need to find the right balance between protecting our collective national security and allowing beneficial investment into the United Kingdom to continue. New clauses 2 and 3 aim to give some recognition to the fact that among the Bill’s potential detrimental effects may well be a disproportionate detrimental impact on smaller businesses and early start-up ventures.
Smaller businesses often lack the resources to have their own in-house team of lawyers or other trade law experts, and they certainly cannot afford the services of the very experienced experts that gave evidence to the Committee a few weeks ago. They may be more adversely affected than a bigger business would be by delays in bringing in investment, because they do not have the same resources to fall back on. Compared with bigger businesses that may have more international connections, smaller businesses are unlikely to be as well informed about which possible investors or partners are likely to raise security concerns. There is a danger that small businesses could commit time and resources to negotiating deals, acquisitions, mergers or investments that a bigger business with a more global perspective would immediately know were non-starters. Small businesses may spend a lot of time on abortive deals and negotiations.
All the way through, I have said that these things may happen. I am not trying to reignite arguments about “may” and “must”, but at the moment nobody really knows what the impact of the legislation will be. We cannot possibly know until it has been in place for a few months, or possibly even a bit longer. What we do know is that when this legislation comes into force, we will rely massively on the growth of existing small businesses and the launch of new ones to drive our post-covid recovery. Big businesses will not do it, and they certainly will not do it on their own. We have all got a responsibility to avoid putting unnecessary obstacles in the way of small businesses who want to start to grow. If we do find that we have unintentionally put those obstacles in the way, we need to be able to remove them.
New clause 2 makes two simple requests—it has two simple requirements. The first is that the Secretary of State reports back to Parliament on impacts the Act has had on small and medium-sized enterprises and early-stage ventures, giving Parliament the chance—should it need it—to consider whether we have created unintended barriers to small businesses. The second requirement is for the Secretary of State to provide guidance to those same companies to give them a bit more certainty about what they need to do to stay on the right side of the law without having to spend money on expensive consultants or legal experts.
New clause 3 tries to minimise the potential damage that the Act could do to small businesses, particularly in the early days when they may be unused to some of the impacts. Clause 32 creates a new offence of completing a notifiable acquisition without reasonable excuse and without the proper authority of the Secretary of State. New clause 3 seeks to recognise that small businesses in particular may find themselves in the wrong side of that clause in the early days of the legislation, not through any malice or wilful neglect, but simply through ignorance, lack of experience or being too busy trying to run their business to be keeping an eye on what is happening in the Houses of Parliament. New clause 3 would effectively provide a grace period of six months in which a small business can put forward the fact that the legislation is new to be taken as a reasonable excuse, which would mean that neither they nor the directors were liable to criminal prosecution. It is critically important to bear in mind that nothing in new clause 3 would do anything whatever to dilute or reduce the effectiveness of the Bill in doing what it is supposed to do. It would not have any impact on the ability of the Secretary of State to take action to protect our national security. It would not have any impact on the exercise of powers either to block an acquisition or merger or to impose conditions on it, should that be necessary. It would not change the fact that if a small business during that six-month period completes an acquisition that should not have been completed, that acquisition would be just as void under the law as any other acquisition.
I understand that new clause 3 is a slightly unusual clause for a piece of legislation, but it would allow us to make sure that the Bill continues to protect national security to the fullest extent it can, but at the same time that we do not have businesses being scared to act in case they end up on the wrong side of the law. We would not have the possibility of the courts having to take up time dealing with prosecutions of small businesses or directors who genuinely meant no harm, but who just—
Andrew Griffith
I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s conversion to the zealous promotion of free enterprise and the cause of small businesses, but would he extend his support to any new taxation measures, new business regulation or employment measures that are advanced by the Government? While I support the thrust, the principle and the philosophy from which he clearly speaks, I do worry that the new clause could create somewhat of a precedent, and I am not sure that all of his colleagues have fully thought through the profound implications for the application of the law on business in this land.
Peter Grant
I can assure the hon. Gentleman that I have been a supporter of small businesses significantly longer than he has perhaps. I did make it clear that this is a way that we can protect small businesses without in any way compromising the integrity of the Bill. There is nothing in the new clause that will in any way weaken the effectiveness of the Bill and protecting our national security. I would be happy at another time to debate the reasons why, for example, employment measures in Scotland should be taken by the Parliament and Government elected by the people of Scotland rather than somewhere down here, but that is not a debate for today. I expect, Sir Graham, that neither you nor anybody else would be too pleased if we started to take up time this afternoon on that subject.
James Wild
In clause 32, there is provision to look at whether a reasonable excuse exists in an individual case. The hon. Member’s amendment would give a blanket exemption to any small business by dint of being a small business. Is the case-by-case basis not a better way to approach the issue?
Peter Grant
That is a valid point, but I do not think it is. The difficulty with the case-by-case basis is that it creates uncertainty and worry for the small business concerned. We are talking about a period of only six months. I do not really think that hostile overseas investors are waiting to pounce during those six months to gobble up small businesses in a way that will damage our national security. Let us face it: if they were going to do that in the first six months, they would be doing it now or they would have done it in the last six months.
I hear what the hon. Gentleman is saying, but the new clause is deliberately worded to explicitly recognise the importance of small businesses, particularly during this period. The Bill is likely to come into force at the exact time that small businesses will be trying to get back on their feet. They need all the help they can get. There is a danger that the way that the Bill could be implemented and enforced will be an unintentional barrier to their growth.
All that we are asking is that, for a short period, until smaller businesses get used to the new legislation, it does not allow them to go ahead with transactions that are otherwise prohibited and would otherwise be blocked by the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State will still have the full power to block those transactions or to impose conditions on them. It does not mean that an acquisition is legally valid if it would otherwise be void under the terms of the legislation. The only difference it makes is that it removes the danger of small businesses or their directors spending time defending themselves in court when they should be developing their business and helping to get the economy back on its feet. On that basis, I commend both new clauses to the Committee.
Chi Onwurah
I rise to speak briefly in support of additional support for SMEs. The hon. Member for Glenrothes is a champion of small businesses, which is a pleasure to hear. As he set out, and as has been set out in a number of the amendments that we have tabled in Committee, we are concerned to make sure that the seismic shift in our national security assessment with regard to mergers and acquisitions does not stifle our innovative but often under-resourced small businesses, which are such an important driver of our economy. New clause 2 reflects our intentions, particularly in amendments 1 and 11, to support and give further guidance to small businesses. I hope that the Minister and Conservative Members recognise the importance of supporting small businesses at this time through direct measures in the Bill.
Nadhim Zahawi
I thank the hon. Member for Glenrothes and the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central for setting out the arguments in support of new clauses 2 and 3, which both relate to the treatment of small and medium-sized enterprises in the regime.
On new clause 2, the Government are a strong supporter of SMEs and have sought to provide a slick and easily navigable regime for businesses of all sizes to interact with. We are creating a digital portal and a simple notification process to allow all businesses to interact with the regime without the need for extensive support from law firms, which is a particular burden for small businesses. Furthermore, there is no fee for filling a notification, unlike many of our allies’ regimes, which in some cases charge hundreds of thousands of pounds for a notification. Consequently, we do not expect this regime to disproportionately affect SMEs.
Peter Grant
I hear what the Minister is saying, but I am still not convinced that he was listening to all the comments from this side of the Committee. However, I do not seek to divide the Committee on either new clause. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 4
Complaints procedure
“(1) The Secretary of State shall by regulations set up a formal complaints procedure through which acquirers may raise complaints about the procedures followed during the course of an assessment under this Act.
(2) Complaints as set out in subsection (1) may be made to a Procedural Officer, who—
(a) must not have been involved in the assessment and who is to consider significant procedural complaints relating to this section or another part of this Act; and
(b) may determine or settle complaints in accordance with regulations to be published by the Secretary of State within 3 months of this Bill becoming an Act.”—(Chi Onwurah.)
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to establish a formal complaints procedure for acquirers.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Sam Tarry (Ilford South) (Lab)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Opposition’s new clause 5 deals with high- and low-risk acquirers. It would require the Secretary of State to maintain a list of hostile actors, including potential hostile states and allied actors, to allow different internal security to be applied based on the characteristics of the actors linked to the acquirer. I will attempt to explain the exact thinking behind the proposal.
There has been widespread agreement inside and outside the Committee that we face a geopolitical context in which many—if not all—threats emanate from a set of hostile actors or states. In fact, the Government’s statement of policy intent for the Bill recognises that
“national security risks are most likely to arise when acquirers… owe allegiance to hostile states”.
Throughout this process, the Committee has heard from various experts, including experts on China, as well as from lawyers, intelligence chiefs and think-thank experts. They have told us that origin and state of origin should be important drivers of national security screening processes. Indeed, a number of our allies—most notably, the US—exempt some countries, including Canada, Australia and the UK, from some of the most stringent mandatory notification requirements, and include country of origin among the factors to be considered in assessing security.
In that context, it is perhaps quite concerning that the Minister and the Government have not caught up or been thinking about that. In previous expositions, they have simply maintained that national security is not dependent on a particular country. When we debated a similar provision earlier in this process, I think the Minister said the Government were “agnostic” about the country of origin. That could be a mistake, because national security is not exclusively dependent on a single country. It is short-sighted and, frankly, dangerous, not to see threats that are materially country-specific.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central said, the former head of MI6 told the Committee that, essentially, we need to wake up to the strategic challenge posed by China in particular. I will explore that a little more with some specific examples from around the world of China beginning to tap into start-ups long before they are mature enough to be acquired. In Sweden, for example, between 2014 and 2019, China’s buyers acquired 51 Swedish firms and bought minority stakes in 14 additional firms. In fact, the acquisitions included some 100 subsidiaries.
More worryingly, in 2018, Chinese outfits, two of them linked to the Chinese military, bought three cutting-edge Swedish semiconductor start-ups. There is the 2017 example of Imagination Technologies—a top British chipmaker—which was acquired by a firm owned by a state-controlled Chinese investment group. Before that, a Chinese firm also bought KUKA, a leading German industrial robot-maker.
Andrew Griffith
Although this is interesting, I fear we are drifting a tiny bit off the new clause, which does not refer to geography. Given the Opposition’s desire to continue to shade in any ambiguity with greater clarity and the definition in new clause 5, will the hon. Gentleman give his definition of what “regular” would constitute?
Sam Tarry
I thank the hon. Member for that intervention. The word “regular” would clearly need to be defined in a way that did not overburden the new part of the Department that would oversee the regime, but that would provide the information on a basis that enabled the Minister to make decisions, and to be scrutinised on those decisions regularly enough that the regime was effective and did not lead to oversights.
Chi Onwurah
I thank my hon. Friend for his points on the new clause. The hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs may say that there is no reference to geography, but is it not the case that requiring a list of hostile actors might reflect geography as appropriate, and as the geography of hostile actors changes? Does the number of times that we have mentioned one country in particular—China—not indicate that geographical location can be an indicator of the likelihood of hostile actors?
Sam Tarry
Absolutely. This is not about being particularly anti-China, but it is the strongest example of where we have heard evidence of things that are under way. I will continue with a few more examples. I think this is important, because we are trying to draw back the curtain on exactly what is going on.
Simon Baynes
I perceive a similar issue in new clauses 5 and 1: being prescriptive in this way causes problems, because what happens if a new, potentially dangerous, acquirer appears on the scene who is not incorporated within the terms of the measure?
Sam Tarry
I thank the hon. Member for that intervention, which goes back to what the hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs said. That is why this needs to be looked at regularly enough to be on top of the process. Obviously, threats change. Countries rise and fall and their agendas and Governments change, but we know that in some instances countries are actively making moves to invest in technology companies in such a way that might not be caught by some of the provisions in the Bill. We feel that being more stringent here would allow the Secretary of State more powers to keep, in some ways, a better eye on exactly what is going on.
Perhaps I should explain a little what I mean by that. One of the things that we are trying to uncover and drive at with the new clause is the importance of some of the ways in which venture capital firms are being used, particularly by the Chinese and by some companies. For example, in Cambridge and Oxford—two important tech hubs for our country—start-ups are regularly invited to pitch ideas to the Chinese state investment company. Nothing particularly untoward is happening there, but it is quite interesting that Chinese investors are particularly interested in talking to emerging biotech, internet of things, artificial intelligence and agri-tech companies.
Why is China particularly interested in those areas? The publicly available “Made in China 2025” strategy to become an economic superpower says that the first three things that the Chinese are interested in are biotechnology, the internet of things, and artificial intelligence. It is quite clear that there is a specific move by the Chinese—this could be replicated by other countries, whether it be Russia or others—but it is not as obvious as, “This is a state company that is going to come in and invest.” They will be taking part in buy-ins of some of the companies. This is something that has already happened.
Peter Grant
Although I understand the intention behind the new clause, some of the wording concerns me. I supported new clause 1 because it was quite clearly permissive and expansive. This new clause is quite clearly prescriptive. Does the hon. Gentleman not accept that the Secretary of State will be guided day to day, which is much more regularly than multi-agency reviews can happen? The Secretary of State will be guided day to day by advice from the security services and others, not as to the theoretical characteristics of an acquirer that might make them a threat, but as to the actual identity and track record of the acquirer and concern.
In particular, is the hon. Gentleman not concerned about requiring the production of a list of high-risk and low-risk characteristics, or that subsection (3) of the new clause in particular would create the possibility that, at some point, somebody who ticked all the boxes for low risk, but was still a high-risk acquirer, could prevent the Secretary of State from undertaking the scrutiny that was required? Can he even explain, for example, what he means by “greater” and “lesser” scrutiny? How would I interpret whether the Secretary of State’s scrutiny had been greater or lesser?
Sam Tarry
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. Those are valid points, and part of what we are driving at here is to be more prescriptive. The feeling is that we essentially need to allow the loops in the net to be closed enough such that we catch some of these companies. We do not want a situation where a number of companies have portions of them being owned by, for example, China or another country, and do not fall foul of any of the provisions currently in the Bill. In time, that could mean that countries and entities that were hostile to Britain’s strategic goals ended up having quick and strategic access to things around nanotechnology, agriculture and a range of other areas where they had essentially got their hands into something that I think should be protected far more closely by the UK.
To give an example, in the US—this is already under way—a Palo Alto-based venture capital firm backed by the Chinese Government had dozens of US start-ups in its portfolio. On 15 November 2020, the Office of the US Trade Representative said that 151 venture capital investments in US start-ups had featured at least one Chinese investor—up from 20 in 2010. We are not saying we do not want Chinese investment, but what we do not want is a situation where we are unable to have a grip when we find that loads of our technology companies —our most cutting-edge firms—are essentially all part-owned by the Chinese Communist party or one of its subsidiaries. That is why we have been more prescriptive in many parts of the new clause.
Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)
My hon. Friend is making some important points. One of the striking things about, for example, Canyon Capital Advisors is how the US authorities intervened when it was looking to take over a particular US tech company. However, when it came to Imagination Technologies, of course, the UK Government did not.
Sam Tarry
That is exactly the kind of example on which we are trying to use the new clause to provide more clarity and give more force to the Bill so it can deal with these sorts of thing. If, for example, public investment by Chinese venture capital groups in western countries—whether it be this country or others—is visible but is actually just the tip of the iceberg, that is going to be a real problem. One lesson that Richard Dearlove described clearly to the Committee was that we need to take a longer medium-term view that goes beyond just being the most free-market and economically attractive investment prospect, particularly given the rise of those geopolitical challenges. The Chinese are being explicit about what their goals are. They do not want to build Britain up; they want to take us for as much as they can get. This is about protecting ourselves and ensuring that those smaller things, which may just be going on under the net and may not hit some of the parts on mandatory notices, not the big headline-grabbing things, could be looked at.
I agree with an earlier comment made by the hon. Member for Glenrothes that one problem is that, while we need regular advice from intelligence services and of course it needs to come through to the Secretary of State, having a regularised timeframe in which we know that those things will get full scrutiny is incredibly important. Parliamentarians and the public will want to see if there are any patterns developing in types of investments and the way those investment vehicles are used to buy into some of the most advanced British technology companies.
This new clause does not require the Secretary of State to publish a list of countries; it simply requires that the Secretary of State, working with the agencies, maintains a list of state-driven risks, which feed into national security risks. Our drive, as the Opposition, is our concern that the Minister does not recognise the state-based nature of those major security threats.
If this new clause is accepted, it would provide those guarantees and the extra ability to bring together the agencies that would be able to compile that list of state-driven risks, which can then inform decisions. In that context, it is vital that the country is assured of the Government’s ability to act on intelligence and expertise in protecting British security against hostile actors.
Nadhim Zahawi
New clause 5 seeks to require the Secretary of State to maintain a written list of high-risk and low-risk acquirers, as we have heard, to allow differential internal scrutiny to be applied, by reference to the characteristics of the actors linked to the acquirer, and based on regular multi-agency reviews. I assume that the intention of the hon. Member for Ilford South is that this list would be an internal document, but I would be happy to discuss my concerns about publishing such judgments, if that would be of interest to him.
In order to exercise the call-in powers, the Bill already requires the Secretary of State to publish a statement, which we will discuss later, about how he expects to exercise the call-in power. This statement may include the factors that the Secretary of State expects to take into account when deciding whether to call in a trigger event. Guided by the statement, the Secretary of State will need to consider every acquisition on its own individual facts, as befits the complex nature of national security assessments. In my view, such a list as the one proposed would not, therefore, be the right way forward.
Mark Garnier
Has the Minister made an assessment of the resources that would be needed to look after a list such as this, not only to compile a list of hostile actors but to look after things like GDPR? There could be any number of legal challenges by companies that find themselves on this list unjustly. Perhaps the characteristics of a hostile actor may not individually be hostile, but a combination of several characteristics could be. It could easily exclude quite benign actors who accidentally fall into this. While the intention of the new clause is not unsound, it sounds like a hideous nightmare to administer.
Nadhim Zahawi
My hon. Friend raises an incredibly important point, because, as he rightly says, factors other than the risk profile of the acquirer may determine whether an acquisition is subjected to greater or lesser scrutiny. It is also likely that any list would quickly go out of date. Entities in this space can change and emerge rapidly, especially if parties are attempting to evade the regime and the Secretary of State’s scrutiny. In addition, such lists being intentionally published or otherwise disclosed publicly could have significant ramifications for this country’s diplomatic relations and our place in the world, in respect of both those on one of the lists and those who are not on the list. Publishing the list may also give hostile actors information about gaming the system, to the UK’s detriment.
I would suggest that what the hon. Member for Ilford South describes would essentially be an internal and highly sensitive part of a national security assessment. While I appreciate the sentiment behind the new clause, I do not believe that it would be appropriate to set out such details in writing. It is, however, entirely reasonable for the hon. Gentleman to seek to reduce the burden on business where possible, in particular if the acquisition presents little risk and can be cleared quickly. I have an enormous amount of sympathy with that aim.
Chi Onwurah
I do not intend to make a speech, but I wanted to intervene on this particular point. A part of the source of the new clause is the Minister’s own comments. He said that national security was not dependent on a particular country. He is giving a lot of reasons why there cannot be a list, because of different actors, but does he recognise that national security may relate to a specific country? Has he woken up to the risks that particular countries may pose?
Nadhim Zahawi
I assure the hon. Lady that Her Majesty’s Government do exactly that, but the Bill is deliberately country-agnostic. Indeed, to give parties predictability on small business and to provide for rapid decisions where possible, the regime has clear and strict timelines, as we have heard throughout the debate. Additionally, clause 6 enables the Secretary of State to make regulations to exempt acquirers from the mandatory notification regime on the basis of their characteristics. Arguably, this places the strongest requirement on acquirers, such as where acquisitions by certain types of party are routinely notified but very rarely remedied or even called in. Taken together, these provisions are already a highly adaptable and comprehensive set of tools, so the list and its proposed use would be unnecessary and potentially harmful.
I shall touch briefly on national interests, which the new clause once again references. I have said before that the regime is intentionally and carefully focused on national security. That is specifically the security of the nation, rather than necessarily its broadest interests. This is therefore not the right place to introduce the concept of national interest, which would substantially and, we strongly believe, unhelpfully expand the scope of the regime.
In conclusion, with the strength provided by clauses 1, 3 and 6 already in the Bill, I am of the very strong opinion that the Bill already achieves its objectives. I therefore cannot accept the new clause and ask that the hon. Member for Ilford South withdraw it.
Sam Tarry
As I listened to the Minister, it struck me that one of the witnesses, Charles Parton from RUSI, said:
“Let us not forget that most foreign investment by the Chinese is state owned, so it is not just a fair bet but a fair certainty that any state-owned enterprise investing is fully politically controlled.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 17, Q19.]
That is in part our thinking. One slight contradiction with the Bill is that it does not feel as though it always quite reflects the statement of political intent published alongside it. We support that statement of political intent, so the new clause’s objective was to strengthen the Bill’s commitment to ensuring that the Investment Security Unit is provided with an assessment that recognises the relationship between hostile actors and the countries to which they owe allegiance, which is stated in the statement of political intent.
I hope that the Minister takes time to take stock of what the new clause is trying to do, but on this occasion I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 6
Access to information relevant to national security
“(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for the call-in power under section 1 to be exercisable by the Secretary of State in respect of circumstances where a person acquires access to, or the right of access to, sensitive information but does not acquire control of an entity within the meaning of section 8 or control of an asset within the meaning of section 9.
(2) For the purposes of this section, sensitive information means information of any form or description the disclosure of which may give rise to a risk to national security.”—(Dr Whitehead.)
This new clause would allow the Secretary of State to regulate to include new trigger events, where a person has access to information relevant to national security, even if the party does not acquire control or material influence over a qualifying asset or entity as a result of an investment.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Hon. Members will be sad to know that I have failed in the ballot to be one of the 2,000 supporters to watch Southampton Football Club this Saturday. I will reflect on that, but I have already sat here for much longer than 90 minutes in near-freezing conditions, watching two equally matched teams slug it out together, so I am not too upset about it. That is the last thing I will say about the unpleasant conditions in this Committee Room.
I hope this clause will be seen as helpful to the Secretary of State and as an addition to the armoury of this Bill in dealing with the multitude of different circumstances under which influence may be sought, or technologies and sensitive information may be acquired, as we have discussed. It seeks to give the Secretary of State an exercisable power under the clause 1 call-in powers and it follows on from what my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South said in the previous debate.
Start-ups may be invested in by venture capitalists, but those venture capitalists may turn out to be bodies that are effectively seeking to gain influence in the start-up or small company, by means of investing in it. They are not seeking to control it, or to control either the entity or the asset, in terms of the meaning in section 8 or 9, but to put themselves in a position where it is pretty impossible for those companies to resist providing information to that limited partner.
In the UK, British start-ups effectively rely on foreign investment. In 2019, 90% of large tech investment rounds included US or Asian investors, according to Atomico’s “The State of European Tech.” There are many circumstances in what we might call our UK venture capital ecosystem in which that kind of sourcing of funds is a regular state of affairs. Venture capital-reliant firms in this country are now receiving millions of pounds from Chinese investors, as my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South has enumerated for us.
Those venture capital investments do not end up, and are not supposed to end up, with the seeking of material control of those companies. As I have said, it would be difficult—practically impossible—for that venture capital-based firm to deny its limited partner investors access to technological information from portfolio companies. In such cases, especially when limited partner investments in the fund take place after an initial trigger event, those would be missed by the Bill as it currently stands. Indeed, that is made tougher still by the fact that most venture capital funds do not publish the names of limited partners. So the Government would not even know when those investments happen and when access to information passes into potentially hostile hands. That series of circumstances is becoming pretty widespread in the high-tech world, and does not appear to be focused on very accurately by the provisions already in the Bill.
What the amendment seeks to do, as I have mentioned, is enable the Secretary of State—if it is considered by the Secretary of State to be an issue that warrants further consideration—to make regulations for the provision of that call-in power outside the terms of clause 9 of the Bill. I think that is a potentially very positive additional power that would reside in the Bill and would be an additional piece of armoury in the hands of the Secretary of State on the basis of what we think is a continuing expansion of investment which may have malicious intent to scoop up, by that venture capital arrangement, a slice of sensitive information.
I was thinking about the equivalent of Chinese dragons in “Dragons’ Den”, taking a portion of the company in return for having a hand in that company’s investments. In a sense, that is what venture capitalists will do under these circumstances. Although the control of the company, as we see in “Dragons’ Den”, remains very much in the hands of the person who has gone into the den in the first place, the investment in that company is nevertheless a source of very substantial leverage in what the company does, what information it provides and what sensitive information it gives out.
I offer this new clause in what I hope will be seen as a very constructive spirit. The clause endeavours to strengthen the Bill by providing a particular option to the Secretary of State, when looking at the entire landscape of how influence is sought, at how sensitive information may be provided and at how assets may effectively be acquired.
Peter Grant
The new clause is a significant improvement to the Bill and I hope that the Government will support it. It takes action to close a loophole that I certainly did not spot reading through the Bill the first time. I suspect a lot of others did not spot it either. It was highlighted by a number of the expert witnesses we spoke to a few weeks ago. They pointed out that a hostile operator does not necessarily need to have control or even significant influence over a security-sensitive operation to be able to do us some harm. One of the examples I vividly remember was that if somebody buys up as little as 5% or 10% of the shares of a company, possibly keeping it even below the threshold where it would need to be publicly notified to Companies House, that might still be enough by agreement to give them a seat on the board of directors. That means they will have access to pretty much everything that is going on within that company. For that kind of scenario alone, it is appropriate that we should look to strengthen the Bill.
The way the new clause is worded is entirely permissive. It would not require anybody to do anything, but it would give the Secretary of State the statutory authority to make regulations, should they be necessary, and to word them in such a way that they could be targeted towards any particular kind of involvement by a hostile power—it is difficult for us to predict now exactly what that might be.
I know that the usual format is that an Opposition amendment is not supported by the Government, but if the Government are not minded to support this one now, I sincerely hope they will bring through something similar on Report or when the Bill goes through the other place at a future date.
Nadhim Zahawi
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Southampton, Test for setting out his case for the new clause and to the hon. Member for Glenrothes for his contribution.
When I first read the new clause, I was fortified to see that, despite previous debates that we have had in this Committee, Her Majesty’s Opposition are clearly now firm converts to the “may by regulations” formulation. I am incredibly grateful. We have found much common ground in the course of our line-by-line scrutiny, but this was, I admit, an unexpected area of consensus.
My understanding is that the new clause would enable the Secretary of State to, by regulations, introduce a new trigger event covering circumstances in which a person acquires access to, or the right to access, sensitive information, even if the party does not acquire control over a qualifying entity or asset. The hon. Member for Southampton, Test may have in mind particular circumstances relating to limited partnerships and the role of limited partners.
The attempt to potentially include access to national security sensitive information as a separate trigger event is, in some ways, a reasonable aim, but I fear that it would, at best, sit awkwardly with a Bill introducing a new investment screening regime that is specifically designed around acquisitions of control. At worst it would bring into scope a huge swathe of additional circumstances, outside the field of investment, in which the Secretary of State could intervene, which could be notified by parties and which could create a backlog of cases in return for little to no national security gain.
For example, such a new clause could raise significant question marks about whether the appointment of any employee who might have access to certain information would be a trigger event in scope of the Bill. I am almost certain it would. Similar concerns would apply in respect of any director, contractor, legal adviser or regulator who might have access to sensitive information. That is not the Government’s intention.
If limited partnerships are the specific target of the new clause, I can reassure the hon. Gentleman that there is no specific exemption in the regime for acquisitions of control over a limited partnership. Of course, in practice, the rights of limited partners are, by their nature, limited, so we expect to intervene here by exception. But those acquisitions remain in scope of the call-in power, along with any subsequent acquisitions of control over qualifying entities by the limited partnership—particularly where there are concerns about the general partner who controls the partnership, or limited partners who are exerting more influence than their position formally provides.
I should also highlight that the Bill already covers acquisitions of control over qualifying assets, the definition of which includes
“ideas, information or techniques which have industrial, commercial or other economic value”.
For the purposes of the Bill, a person gains control of a qualifying asset if they acquire a right or interest in, or in relation to, a qualifying asset that allows them to do one of the two things set out in clause 9(1). That means that an acquisition of a right or an interest in, or in relation to, information with industrial, commercial or other economic value that allows the acquirer to use, or control or direct the use of, that information is in scope of the Bill. Therefore, depending on the facts of a case, an investment in a business that, alongside any equity stake, provides a person with a right to use information that has industrial, commercial or other economic value may be called in by the Secretary of State where the legal test was otherwise met.
The Committee heard from our expert witnesses that these asset provisions are significant new powers and that it is right to ensure that we have the protections we need against those who seek to do us harm, but I firmly believe we must find the right balance for the new regime. That is why acquisitions of control over qualifying entities and assets are a sensible basis for the Bill. Broadening its coverage to ever-wider circumstances risks creating a regime that theoretically captures everything on paper, but that simply cannot operate in practice, due to a case load that simply cannot be serviced by Whitehall. I urge the hon. Member for Southampton, Test to reflect on that point, given all we have heard in the last few weeks about the importance of implementation and resourcing, and I respectfully ask him to withdraw the new clause.
Dr Whitehead
I respectfully ask the Minister to reflect carefully on what I and the hon. Member for Glenrothes have said this afternoon. Whether or not the Minister thinks the new clause is one he can reasonably adopt, he has already accepted, in terms of what he says may be in the scope of the Bill, that this is a real issue. This is something that we have to think very carefully about and that, by its nature, is fairly difficult to pin down, because it relates to a series of actions that do not easily fit into the box of control or company takeover. It is much more subtle and potentially wide-ranging, but nevertheless it is something that we know is real. As my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South said, it is happening in silicon valley, Germany and this country. It is happening in a number of places. Interests are being bought up not because of altruistic concern for the health and welfare of that particular start-up, but for other, much more worrying reasons than simply influence as a limited partner in a company.
I am pleased that the Minister put on record that he thought that the extension of this activity might be in the scope of the Bill already, although I think it is stretching what the Bill has to say to take that line. I hope he will not regret that. When he looks at what he has said about what he thinks is in the Bill, he may find, on reflection, that the new clause would have been more use to him than he thought. However, I am not going to press the issue to a vote this afternoon.
I hope the Minister will reflect carefully. He has already said on the record that he thinks that a number of these measures can be squeezed into the Bill. I hope he will not find that there are circumstances where he needs this method of operation but that it can, after all, not be squeezed into the Bill as well as he thinks it can be. I hear what he says and wish him the best of luck with squeezing things into legislation that perhaps were not quite there. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 7
Annual report to the Intelligence and Security Committee
“(1) The Secretary of State must, in relation to each relevant period –
(a) prepare a report in accordance with this section, and
(b) provide a copy of it to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament as soon as is practicable after the end of that period.
(2) Each report must provide, in respect of mandatory and voluntary notifications, trigger events called-in, and final orders given, details of—
(c) the jurisdiction of the acquirer and its incorporation;
(d) the number of state-owned entities and details of states of such entities;
(e) the nature of national security risks posed in transactions for which there were final orders;
(f) details of particular technological or sectoral expertise that were being targeted; and
(g) any other information the Secretary of State may deem instructive on the nature of national security threats uncovered through reviews undertaken under this Act.”.—(Chi Onwurah.)
This new clause would provide the Intelligence and Security Committee with information about powers exercised under this Act, allowing closer scrutiny and monitoring.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Chi Onwurah
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
It is with some regret that I rise to move new clause 7, because it is the last new clause we propose to the Bill. It is a Christmas present to the Minister. Things have certainly been interesting since we began our line-by-line scrutiny. With your leave, Sir Graham, I will take this opportunity to thank all those involved in drafting the Bill, as well as the Clerks, who have worked so hard and played such an important role in helping to draft amendments and provide support to all members of the Committee. I also thank you, Sir Graham, for chairing it so admirably.
We have learned a great deal over the last couple of weeks. I have learned just about everybody’s constituency—
Chi Onwurah
I will not take up the opportunity of a test. We have all learned a lot about air flows—in this room, at any rate—as we seek to maintain some heat. What we have not learned, though, is how the Minister believes the Bill can be improved. All our line-by-line scrutiny has yielded many assurances, compliments on our intention and, indeed, some letters, for which I am grateful, but no acceptance and not even the commitment to go and think about some of our constructive proposals, amendments and new clauses. I urge him to consider this new clause as an opportunity to show that he truly believes, as he said earlier, in the skills, experience and expertise of the Committee by reflecting on the potential for improvement.
The new clause returns to an earlier theme and would require—the Minister will be pleased to note that that is a “must”, not a “may”—an annual report to be prepared by the Secretary of State
“in accordance with this section”
and a copy of it to be provided
“to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament as soon as is practicable after the end of that period.”
It sets out what should be in that report, such as the events, the number of entities, the nature of the risks and
“details of particular technological or sectoral expertise”
and so on. It would provide the Intelligence and Security Committee with information about the powers exercised under the Bill and allow closer scrutiny and monitoring.
The new clause reflects how we have consistently supported the need for the Bill. Our approach to the security threats we face is to push for change specifically to allow broad powers of intervention, but for those using those broad powers to be held to account by Parliament and through transparency. Our international allies do exactly that. The US requires CFIUS to produce a non-classified annual report for the public, alongside a classified report for certain members of Congress, to provide security detail to them, allowing congressional scrutiny while retaining sensitivity of information.
As I think the Minister acknowledges, the Government have been late in following where international allies and the Opposition have led with calls to better protect our national security, so he must not fall behind in following our calls for accountability and transparency. That is critical not just to ensure our security and wider parliamentary understanding of the nature of the threats we face but for accountability.
The Secretary of State is to be given sweeping powers. For the last time, I should say that we will go from 12 reviews in 18 years—less than one a year—to 1,830 notifications a year, which is more than five every single day. The Secretary of State will be able to intervene in every single such private transaction. It will be hard to bring claims against national security concerns in court, where the judiciary will understandably find it difficult to define national security against the Government’s definition. In that context, it is important to bring expert parliamentary scrutiny to the Government’s decisions. I do hope the Minister will reflect on that. Alongside a public report, the new clause would require the Government to publish an annual security report to the Intelligence and Security Committee so that we have greater accountability without compromising security.
I will say a few words about the evidence base and the reason for tabling the amendment. Professor Ciaran Martin said:
“I think that the powers should be fairly broad. I think there should be accountability and transparency mechanisms, so that there is assurance that they are being fairly and sparingly applied.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 26 November 2020; c. 81, Q96.]
My understanding is that the only accountability and transparency mechanism is the public report, which may be published, and the prospect of judicial review, neither of which provide for expert scrutiny on the security issues.
I also ask the Minister to reflect on Second Reading, where member after member of the Intelligence and Security Committee stood up to say that they felt that their expertise would be useful and helpful in the working of the Bill.
James Wild
The hon. Lady said that the annual report “may” be published, but in clause 61 it “must” be laid before the House, so there is no question that the annual report will be published.
Chi Onwurah
The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. It must be published, but the details that it sets out are limited. The reporting on other information, as I think the Minister has said, is something that is intended but is not required. We have requested that several other pieces of information be published, but the Minister has said that they may be.
The hon. Member for North West Norfolk is absolutely right that there will be an annual report, but that is a public report that will provide only the limited information set out in clause 61(2). Obviously, it will not provide anything that might have an impact on national security. With regard to what is published in the final notifications, for example, that can be redacted to take out anything of commercial interest as well as of national security interest. There is no requirement to report on any aspect to do with national security. Given that the only report is a public report, that is understandable. That is why we are proposing that a secure sensitive report should also be published and shared with the Intelligence and Security Committee.
The hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee said that
“there is a real role for Committees of this House in such processes and…the ability to subpoena both witnesses and papers would add not only depth to the Government’s investigation but protection to the Business Secretary who was forced to take the decision”.—[Official Report, 17 November 2020; Vol. 684, c. 238.]
A member of the Intelligence and Security Committee also said that
“we need mechanisms in place to ensure that that flexibility does not allow the Government too much scope.”—[Official Report, 17 November 2020; Vol. 684, c. 244.]
As I have already noted, CFIUS has an annual reporting requirement.
Nadhim Zahawi
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for her contribution on new clause 7, which seeks to require the Secretary of State to provide an annual report to the Intelligence and Security Committee, including detailed information relating to mandatory and voluntary notifications, trigger events that were called in and final orders made. In particular, it seeks to require the Secretary of State to provide details of factors relevant to the assessment made by the regime, including the jurisdiction of the acquirer; the nature of national security risks posed in transactions where there were final orders; details of particular technological or sectoral expertise that were targeted; and other national security threats uncovered through reviews undertaken under the Bill.
I am pleased that esteemed members of the ISC are taking a continued and consistent interest, including in relation to their role in scrutinising the regime provided for by the Bill. The Committee will be aware that clause 61 requires the Secretary of State to prepare an annual report and to lay a copy before each House of Parliament. That clause provides for full parliamentary and public scrutiny of the detail of the regime, which we judge to be appropriate and which does not give rise to national security issues when published at an aggregate level. I reassure hon. Members that that annual report will include information on the sectors of the economy in which voluntary, mandatory and call-in notices were given. It will also give a sense of the areas of the economy where the greatest activity of national security concern is occurring.
We intend to follow the existing, appropriate Government procedures for reporting back to Parliament, including through responding to the Select Committee on Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. The ISC’s remit is clearly defined by the Justice and Security Act 2013, together with the statutory memorandum of understanding. That remit does not extend to oversight of BEIS work. I am sure that the BEIS Committee will continue to do a sterling job of overseeing and scrutinising the Department’s overall work. I welcome and encourage the ISC’s security-specific expertise, which the hon. Lady referred to, and its review of the annual report when it is laid before Parliament.
For the reasons I have set out, I am not able to accept the new clause. I hope that hon. Lady will agree to withdraw it.
Chi Onwurah
I thank the Minister for his response, but he did not address the issue scrutiny of sensitive aspects of how the Bill will work. I recognise that the ISC’s remit does not cover BEIS—that is the exact point of requiring such a report. As I think was discussed on Second Reading, the BEIS Committee will not scrutinise any sensitive information or information that is directly relevant to our national security. I am afraid that I cannot accept the Minister’s reasoning for his rejection of the new clause—namely, that it is effectively already covered by clause 61—so I will put it to a Division.
National Security and Investment Bill
Wednesday 20th January 2021
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 20 January 2021 - (large version) - (20 Jan 2021)
National Security and Investment Bill
Wednesday 20th January 2021
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 20 January 2021 - (large version) - (20 Jan 2021)
17:10 - The House divided: - Ayes: 269 / Noes: 351 - Question accordingly negatived.
17:21 - The House divided: - Ayes: 263 / Noes: 355 - Question accordingly negatived.
17:33 - The House divided: - Ayes: 265 / Noes: 355 - Question accordingly negatived.
Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP) [V]
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 2—Report on impact on Small to Medium Enterprises—
‘Not later than 18 months after the day on which this Act receives Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament—
(a) a report setting out the impacts the Act has had on Small to Medium Enterprises and early-stage ventures, and
(b) guidance for Small to Medium Enterprises and early-stage ventures on complying with the provisions of this Act.’
This new clause would require the Government to produce a report setting out the impacts of this legislation on Small to Medium Enterprises and early-stage ventures, and to produce relevant guidance.
New clause 3—Grace period for Small and Medium Enterprises—
‘For the purposes of section 32, a person has a reasonable excuse if—
(a) the entity concerned is a Small to Medium Enterprise;
(b) this Act has been in force for less than six months.’
This new clause creates a grace period whereby – for alleged offences committed under Section 32 – Small to Medium Enterprises would have a ‘reasonable excuse’ if the alleged offence was committed within the first six months after the Bill’s passage.
New clause 4—Framework for understanding national security—
‘When assessing a risk to national security for the purposes of this Act, the Secretary of State must have regard to factors including, but not restricted to—
(a) the potential impact of the trigger event on the UK’s defence capabilities and interests;
(b) whether the trigger event risks enabling a hostile actor to—
(i) gain control or significant influence of a part of a critical supply chain, critical national infrastructure, or natural resource;
(ii) conduct espionage via or exert undue leverage over the target entity;
(iii) obtain access to sensitive sites or to corrupt processes or systems;
(c) the characteristics of the acquirer, including whether it is effectively directly or indirectly under the control, or subject to the direction, of a foreign government;
(d) whether the trigger event adversely impacts the UK’s capability and capacity to maintain security of supply or strategic capability in sectors critical to the UK’s economy or creates a situation of significant economic dependency;
(e) the potential impact of the trigger event on the transfer of sensitive data, technology or potentially sensitive intellectual property in strategically important sectors, outside of the UK;
(f) the potential impact of the trigger event on the UK’s international interests and obligations, including compliance with UK legislation on modern slavery and compliance with the UN Genocide Convention;
(g) the potential of the trigger event to involve or facilitate significant illicit or subversive activities, including terrorism, organised crime, money laundering and tax evasion; and
(h) whether the trigger event may adversely impact the safety and security of UK citizens or the UK.’
The new clause provides a non-exclusive framework of factors which the Secretary of State is obliged to have regard to when assessing a risk to national security.
New clause 5—National Security Definition—
‘When assessing a risk to national security for the purposes of this Act, the Secretary of State must have regard to factors including, but not restricted to—
(a) the potential impact of the trigger event on the UK’s defence capabilities and interests;
(b) whether the trigger event risks enabling a hostile actor to—
(i) gain control or significant influence of a critical supply chain, critical national infrastructure, or natural resource;
(ii) conduct espionage or exert undue leverage over the target entity;
(iii) obtain access to sensitive sites; or
(iv) to corrupt processes or systems.
(c) the characteristics of the acquirer, including whether it is effectively directly or indirectly under the control, or subject to the direction, of a foreign government;
(d) whether the trigger event adversely impacts the UK’s capability and capacity to maintain security of supply or strategic capability in sectors critical to the UK’s economy or creates a situation of significant economic dependency;
(e) the potential impact of the trigger event on the transfer of sensitive data, technology or potentially sensitive intellectual property in strategically important sectors, outside of the UK;
(f) the potential impact of the trigger event on the UK’s international interests and obligations, including compliance with UK legislation on modern slavery and compliance with the UN Genocide Convention;
(g) the potential of the trigger event to involve or facilitate significant illicit or subversive activities, including terrorism, organised crime, money laundering and tax evasion; and
(h) whether the trigger event may adversely impact the safety and security of UK citizens or the UK.’
This new clause establishes factors which the Secretary of State must have regard to when assessing a risk to national security.
New clause 6—Dedicated Small to Medium Enterprise support—
‘(1) Within 3 months of this Act receiving Royal Assent the Secretary of State must set up, a specific division focused on engagement with Small to Medium enterprises (SMEs) engaged in any provisions of this Act.
(2) The division must focus on four functions—
(a) providing updated, efficient and accessible guidance specific to SMEs on compliance with the terms of this Act;
(b) engaging with SMEs in advance of formal notification that can allow efficient notice and assessment periods, including through use of regulatory sandboxes where beneficial for innovation and national security;
(c) providing regular engagement with and assistance to SMEs throughout the assessment periods for SMEs;
(d) seeking to deliver prompt, proportionate resolution of complaints by SMEs relating to the provisions of this Bill;
(e) monitor the impact on access to investment for SMEs and report to the Secretary of State.’
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to set up a Small to Medium Enterprise (SME) engagement unit to assist and support SMEs through the national security screening process.
New clause 7—Reports to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament—
‘(1) The Secretary of State must, in relation to each relevant period—
(a) prepare a report in accordance with this section, and
(b) provide a copy of it to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament as soon as is practicable after the end of that period.
(2) Each report must provide, in respect of mandatory and voluntary notifications, call-in notices, and final orders made under this Act, details of—
(a) the jurisdiction of the acquirer and its incorporation;
(b) the number of state-owned entities and details of states of such entities;
(c) the nature of national security risks posed in transactions for which there were final orders;
(d) details of particular technological or sectoral expertise that were being targeted; and
(e) any other information the Secretary of State may deem instructive on the nature of national security threats uncovered through review undertaken under this Act.’
This new clause would require the Government to publish an ‘Annual Security Report’ to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament.
Amendment 3, in clause 3, page 3, line 10, leave out subsection (4) and insert—
‘(4) The Secretary of State must review a statement published under this section within one year after the publication of the first such statement, and thereafter at least once every 5 years.’
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to review the statement about exercise of call-in power to be reviewed one year after they are made, and once every five years thereafter.
Amendment 1, in clause 6, page 5, line 3, at end insert—
‘(10) Notifiable acquisition regulations must be reviewed one year after they are made, and once every five years thereafter.’
This amendment would require notifiable acquisition regulations (including which sectors are covered) to be reviewed one year after they are made, and once every five years thereafter.
Amendment 6, page 5, line 3, at end insert—
‘(10) Notifiable acquisition regulations must bring broadcast, print and social media companies within the scope of the mandatory notification regime.’
Amendment 2, in clause 8, page 6, line 38, at end insert—
‘(8A) The fifth case is where a person becomes a major debt holder and therefore gains influence over the entity’s operation and policy decisions.
(8B) For the purposes of subsection (8A), a major debt holder is a person who holds at least 25% of the entity’s total debt.
(8C) The sixth case is where a person becomes a supplier to the entity of goods, services, infrastructure or resources to such an extent that the withholding of the supply would seriously undermine the entity’s ability to continue its operations.’
This amendment would mean that a person becoming a major debt holder or a major supplier would count as a person gaining control of a qualifying entity.
Amendment 4, in clause 30, page 20, line 3, after ‘period’ insert ‘or any calendar year’
This amendment would make it mandatory for the Government to inform Parliament if financial assistance given in any financial year, or in any calendar year, exceeds £100 million.
Amendment 5, in clause 54, page 33, line 42, at end insert—
‘(aa) whether the law of the country or territory to whose authority the disclosure would be made contains provisions and prohibit any use or disclosure of the information contrary to subsection (4),
(ab) whether the Secretary of State considers that disclosing the information to that authority would in itself pose a threat to national security, and’
This amendment would add to the list of factors the Secretary of State takes into consideration a sub-clause to ensure that a country or territory making a disclosure request has sufficient safeguarding in place to prevent any action that would be considered unlawful in the UK.
Amendment 7, in clause 61, page 36, line 20, at end insert—
‘(m) the average number of days taken to assess a trigger event called in under the Act;
(n) the average number of days taken for acceptance decisions in respect of mandatory and voluntary notices;
(o) the average staff resource allocated to the operation of reviews of notices made under sections 14 and 18 over the relevant period;
(p) the number and proportion of notices and call-in notices concerning the acquisition of a Small to Medium Enterprise; and
(q) in respect of the transactions stated subsection (p), the sectors of the economy in relation to which call-in notices were given.’
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to report on the time taken to process notices, the resource allocated to the new Unit and the extent to which Small to Medium Enterprises are being called-in under the new regime.
Stewart Hosie
The new clause is in my name and the names of my hon. Friends, as are new clauses 2 and 3 and amendments 1 to 6.
On Second Reading of this Bill, I described how it was designed to bring additional scrutiny of foreign investment that may have an impact on national security. I agreed that not only was there nothing wrong with having a national security eye on investments in critical areas, but it was in fact absolutely vital. During that debate, the House appeared to acknowledge the concern about the national security implication from investments that are shared globally and that a number of other countries had been tightening up their investment security regimes in response to changing national security-related threats to enabling technology, to intellectual property and so on. The debate also saw descriptions of the tightening of these regulations in Japan, Canada, Sweden, Germany and elsewhere. There was little disagreement on the Government’s proposals where, if the trigger and threshold were both met, an individual investment could be called in by the Secretary of State for approval, the powers could be retrospective, and an investment could be called in after it had occurred. There was some concern about the time to conduct the national security assessments—30 days with potentially an extra 45, which might actually be deemed a little short and it still prompts the question of whether 75 days was actually sufficient. There was, however, broad agreement about the mandatory notification process where investment interests in certain sectors and asset types must be pre-emptively or retrospectively declared. There were real concerns that this may lead to a very large number of notifications from businesses erring on the side of caution.
The Bill also introduced new powers to increase screening in respect of health and preventing hostile acquisition through strategic buying of health supplies, and I welcome that, with the warning that the scope of activities that may be caught is very wide. That is because the statement of policy intent, which describes the core areas as including such things as advanced technology, is perfectly reasonable, but it also contains a much wider definition of national infrastructure.
That debate did focus on the impact assessment for the Bill, which estimated that the new regime would result in somewhere between 1,000 and 1,800 transactions being notified each year—a very high number given that only 12 transactions were reviewed on national security grounds since the current regime was introduced 17 years ago. It does also remain the case that we still need to carefully assess the impact of the Bill—the impact that it will have on sectors and on infrastructure not just in the UK as a whole, but in the devolved nations and in the English regions. On Second Reading, I asked the Minister to take a little time to convince himself that there were no unintended consequences either for the UK or, indeed, for the Scottish Government’s inward investment plans when Government agencies of all sorts are actively seeking investment in some areas, which may be deemed to be critical national infrastructure. That is an issue that I do hope he will still address today. How do we ensure collectively that this Bill does not impede growth or investment in such areas.
The key concern I had was about implementation. The Bill is set to radically overhaul the UK’s approach to foreign investment at a time of significant economic uncertainty. On leaving the EU, the UK Government cannot afford to get their global Britain approach wrong and suffer what has been described as the potentially chilling effect on investment if the measures in the Bill appear to be heavy-handed. That is a concern across the board, given that even microbusinesses are in scope.
I take this brief opportunity to thank my hon. Friends the Members for Glenrothes (Peter Grant) and for Aberdeen South (Stephen Flynn), who served on the Bill Committee. They raised a large number of concerns, including the impact on academic research spin-offs, SMEs and early-stage ventures. They called for a grace period for SMEs falling foul of this new legislation, a review of exercisable call-ins and a review of the notifiable acquisition regulations. They suggested that broadcast, print and social media companies should be in scope. They suggested that major debt holders should be defined as a person gaining control of a qualifying asset and they suggested a requirement to report if financial compensation from Government exceeded £100 million in either a calendar or financial year.
All those amendments and contributions were made for very good reasons. The Scottish National party has long argued that it is right to have this legislation and for it to be made. In some ways it is long overdue, but that does not mean there are no concerns, which is why we have tabled new clauses 1 to 3 and amendments 1 to 6.
New clause 1 would require the Secretary of State to assess the impact of the Bill on academic research spin-off enterprises. New clause 2 would require the Government to produce a report setting out the impacts of the legislation on small and medium enterprises and on early-stage ventures and to produce relevant guidance. New clause 3 would create a grace period whereby for alleged offences committed under clause 32, SMEs would have a reasonable excuse if the alleged offence was committed within the first six months of the Bill being in operation.
I will turn briefly to the amendments. Amendment 1 would require notifiable acquisition regulations, including the sectors to be covered, to be reviewed one year after they are made and five years thereafter. Amendment 2 would mean that a person becoming a major debt holder or a major supplier would count as a person gaining control of a qualifying asset. Amendment 3 would require the Secretary of State to review statements about the exercise of call-in power one year after they are made, and once every five years thereafter. Amendment 4 would make it mandatory for the Government to inform Parliament if financial assistance given in any financial or calendar year exceeded £100 million. Amendment 5 would add to the list of factors the Secretary of State has to take into account. They would have to ensure that a country or territory making a disclosure request had sufficient safeguarding in place to prevent any action that would be considered unlawful in the UK. Amendment 6 would ensure that notifiable acquisition regulations bring broadcast, print and social media companies into the scope of the mandatory notification regime.
All those new clauses and amendments in essence are designed to ensure that the scope of the legislation is appropriate, but that the impact, particularly on investment, is proportionate. I have not determined yet whether to press any of them to a vote. What I would prefer is for the Minister to give a commitment, not simply to have infrequent if regular reviews of parts of this Bill, but to keep the Bill under permanent review to ensure that the scope remains valid—not too wide and not too narrow—and that the impact on investment and risk, particularly in small and medium-sized enterprises, academia and research, is proportionate. Through that, we can ensure that we quite rightly protect national security, but do not suffer from the investment chill that some fear could be the consequence if we get this wrong. With those brief remarks, I commend the new clauses and amendments to the House.
Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
On Second Reading both of this Bill and of the Telecommunications (Security) Bill, it was mentioned that in 2013, the Intelligence and Security Committee first recommended measures to prevent high-risk vendors such as Huawei from penetrating our critical national infrastructure in future. It is always the way: you wait seven years for a Bill to protect against infiltration and takeover, then two come along together.
Given that background, the ISC naturally welcomed the introduction of this legislation, and we greatly appreciated the contact that we have had with the Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Nadhim Zahawi). Not only did he keep his promise to write to us about the points made by Committee members on Second Reading, during my period of self-isolation, but he dealt with ISC concerns at the Committee stage and reached out before today’s debates as well. That is precisely the type of constructive engagement that we should like to have with the Government. If I do not secure the concessions that I want after all of that, I shall be very disappointed!
The issue on which I shall focus is parliamentary oversight. Normally, that would be straightforward. As the future arrangements laid down by the Bill will depend on the input of the new investment security unit, and as that unit will be housed in the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, one would normally expect that general scrutiny could be conducted by Parliament as a whole and specialised scrutiny by the Select Committee on Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. Unfortunately, that does not work in this case: much of the work of the investment security unit will depend on input from intelligence and security agencies and similar sensitive sources that cannot and must not be made public.
Furthermore, on Second Reading, the then Business Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Reading West (Alok Sharma), made crystal clear how central secret material would be to the practical application of the provisions of this legislation. He stated that
“the whole point of the Bill is for it to be narrow on national security grounds”.
He also said:
“These powers are narrowly defined and will be exclusively used on national security grounds. The Government will not be able to use these powers to intervene in business transactions for broader economic or public interest reasons”.—[Official Report, 1 November 2020; Vol. 684, c. 206-210.]
It follows that the very areas in which the BEIS Committee would be perfectly qualified to scrutinise policy are specifically excluded from the application of the powers conferred by the National Security and Investment Bill.
That scrutiny gap was addressed, also on Second Reading, by the shadow Business Secretary, the right hon. Member for Doncaster North (Edward Miliband), who said:
“Given the sensitive nature of the issues involved in this Bill, I do think there needs to be a way…for this House to monitor how this is working in practice.
I do not speak for it, but we have a special Committee of the House—the Intelligence and Security Committee—that can look at these issues. I would like to raise the question with the Secretary of State whether it could play a role in scrutinising the working of the regime and some of the decisions being made, because there are real restrictions on the kind of transparency there can be on these issues…The ISC is in a sense purpose-built for some of these issues.”—[Official Report, 17 November 2020; Vol. 684, c. 214.]
It is hard to disagree with that, although I hasten to add that the Committee has not the slightest wish gratuitously to add to its workload, overburdened as we are due to our delayed reconstitution and the fact that we cannot operate virtually, where sensitive material is concerned, during periods of lockdown. Nevertheless, Parliament should be enabled to scrutinise the implementation of the powers given to Government by this legislation, which explicitly puts national security material at the heart of future decision making. It is obvious that there will be potential conflicts between encouraging business on the one hand and safeguarding national security on the other. In 1994, the ISC was established specifically for circumstances such as these—namely, to examine matters that Parliament could not because they were too sensitive for public disclosure and debate.
It has been suggested that the ISC cannot undertake this role this time because the organisation concerned, the new investment and security unit, is based in the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, rather than Departments like the Home Office or the Cabinet Office, which traditionally handle national security matters. Yet this is fundamentally to misunderstand the legal basis under which the ISC functions.
There are two interlinked documents: the Justice and Security Act 2013 and the memorandum of understanding between the Prime Minister and the ISC for which that Act provides. The long title of the JSA makes it quite clear that it provides not only for scrutiny of MI5, MI6 and GCHQ, but for
“oversight of…other activities relating to intelligence or security matters…and for connected purposes.”
Section 2(1) of the Act refers to those three intelligence agencies specifically, but section 2(2) spells out our Committee’s wider remit:
“The ISC may examine or otherwise oversee such other activities of Her Majesty’s Government in relation to intelligence or security matters as are set out in a memorandum of understanding.”
Section 2(5) explains that that MOU can be altered by agreement between the ISC and the Prime Minister. All that is required, therefore, for a Government activity in relation to intelligence or security matters to be added to the existing list in the memorandum of understanding is a simple exchange of letters between the ISC and the Prime Minister agreeing to do so.
In other words, the 2013 Act and associated memorandum were designed exactly for circumstances such as these, where evolving intelligence and security arrangements create sensitive new functions and/or new units which need Parliamentary scrutiny to be within the same circle of secrecy as the long-established Agencies. To put the matter beyond all doubt, consider finally this extract from paragraph 8 of the MOU about our remit:
“The ISC is the only committee of Parliament that has regular access to protectively marked information that is sensitive for national security reasons: this means that only the ISC is in a position to scrutinise effectively the work of the Agencies and of those parts of departments whose work is directly concerned with intelligence and security matters.”
Inserted at the end of this sentence is a notation for the following footnote which explains:
“This will not affect the wider scrutiny of departments such as the Home Office, FCO and MOD by other parliamentary committees. The ISC will aim to avoid any unnecessary duplication with the work of those Committees.”
Indeed, having chaired the Commons Defence Committee in the previous two Parliaments, I can confirm there was never the slightest friction, overlap or intrusion from the then ISC into the work of the Defence Committee. The ISC looked at defence intelligence and offensive cyber, as set out in its MOU, and the Defence Committee continued to scrutinise everything else.
It really should not be necessary, every time a new unit is set up inside a Department not normally associated with national security or intelligence issues, to spell out in black and white, as I have done today, how and why the framers of the 2013 Act deliberately created the flexible memorandum of understanding arrangement that incorporated its role on the face of that legislation. It was, of course, to deal with exactly the sort of situation facing us today, where the intelligence and security battle in what is increasingly known as the grey zone of conflict mutates and moves into areas of responsibility far beyond traditional boundaries, as Deborah Haynes’ admirable new podcast illustrates so convincingly. That is why Business Ministers, rather than Defence or Security Ministers, are having to grapple with today’s legislation.
Following a constructive discussion with my hon. Friend the Minister yesterday, I was cautiously optimistic that the Government would recognise that the 2013 arrangements provide the correct basis for scrutiny on which to proceed. Of the 14 amendments tabled for today, there is one—new clause 7—that recognises the scrutiny gap in this legislation and proposes that a special report containing the relevant classified national security material should be prepared for, and provided to, the Intelligence and Security Committee. This Opposition amendment has much to commend it, and, as ISC Chairman, I would be minded to support it if it were the only available option. However, an undertaking by the Minister today that the Government will bring forward their own amendment in the upper House to close the scrutiny gap satisfactorily in a more streamlined way would be even better.
In his appearance before the Public Bill Committee, former chief of MI6 Sir Richard Dearlove had the following exchange with the Minister, who referred to the annual report to be prepared for Parliament as a requirement of this legislation. The Minister asked:
“What is your view on balancing transparency and ensuring Government can take national security decisions sensitively? Where does that balance lie in terms of our ability to be as transparent as we can without harming sensitivities around these decisions?”
Sir Richard replied:
“My view would be that the annual report has as much transparency as possible, but you are probably going to require a secret annexe from time to time.”––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 21.]
Whether we go down that route of a classified unpublished annexe to send to our Committee or follow the model used in the ISC’s own reports, which are prepared in full with subsequent redactions made and marked in the main body of the text, such an approach would be the least burdensome for the Department to prepare and for the ISC to scrutinise. Either method would effectively close the scrutiny gap and get this valuable and necessary legislation off to the best possible start.
Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)
It is a great pleasure, as always, to follow the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), and I support many of his remarks.
Let me start by saying that the Opposition’s approach to this Bill is one of constructive support. That should not surprise the Minister: already at Committee stage we tabled nearly 30 targeted amendments and half a dozen new clauses to strengthen protections of our national security, although, regrettably, the Minister did not choose to accept any of them. As the Minister is also responsible for vaccine roll-out, he may have been distracted. I want to thank everybody—all the members of the Committee and the House staff involved in the Committee stage of the Bill—and confirm that we intend to continue that constructive support.
We support the Bill, because it is a Bill demanded by Labour. The problems it tackles are ones that have been highlighted by Labour, and the Government’s action, only after years of delay, seems to be a result of being constantly reminded by Labour. Reminded this Government have been, not least by their failures again and again. They were reminded in 2012, when they let the Centre for Integrated Photonics, a prize British research and development centre, be taken over by Huawei, an event that our recent head of the National Cyber Security Centre said we would not want to happen with hindsight: national security outsourced and British interests relinquished to the market.
The Government were reminded again in 2014 when they let our foremost artificial intelligence firm, DeepMind, be acquired prematurely by Google: national security interests outsourced again on account of blind market faith. They were reminded twice this time when the Government let our world-leading semiconductor firm Arm be taken over first by SoftBank and now by Nvidia. Again, an intelligence expert told our Committee that the UK had limited freedom of choice in this key strategic technology and that the deal undermined our own ability: our national interest outsourced yet again by Ministers prioritising market zeal over British security.
Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)
First, I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah), who has spoken very kindly about the work of the Committee that I am privileged to chair. I also pay huge tribute to the Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, my hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Nadhim Zahawi). He has been tireless—that word has been overused in this place, but he has been tireless—in reaching out to all Members to speak to them about the Bill and ensure that the amendments tabled are helpful and conducive to not only the public good but the national good. He has been doing that at the same time as he has been running a vaccination programme. I have to say that the Minister’s wife’s loss is the nation’s gain: she has been selfless in allowing him to slave away for our country on two very important subjects.
The reality is that this is a hugely important Bill, and because it is so important and such a big change for the United Kingdom, it raises huge questions that are very difficult to answer. The way that the Minister has approached this is exactly right. He started off by speaking to businesses, to our intelligence services and to our regulators to understand what exactly the threat is, how it is affecting our businesses and how it can be addressed. He has had, I hope, as much help as he possibly can from them, and I hope that the help being offered from the Select Committee that I am privileged to chair and the Committee that my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) is privileged to chair is helpful.
We are trying to improve what is already a good Bill and make it into an excellent one. We have had various conversations with not only the Minister but his Whips, who have been extremely helpful—I know that this is a very odd thing to say in the House—in ensuring that he is informed about the way in which we have conducted this discussion. It would not be right for me not to also thank Alice Lynch of our Committee and Nicole Kar of Linklaters, our specialist witness who has helped us through the process of writing this report.
I rise to speak to new clause 4, which is in my name and the names of fellow members of the Foreign Affairs Committee. We looked carefully at the Bill because, over the last two to three years that I have been chairing the Foreign Affairs Committee, much of our work has been on the threat of foreign interference in the UK. One of our earlier reports in May 2018 was entitled “Moscow’s Gold: Russian Corruption in the UK”; I believe the Minister was still on the Committee when we started that report, though he had already been promoted to greater things by the time we published it. The report touched on the way that dirty money plays into our systems and the way in which we must protect those systems.
Since then, we have looked at various aspects of how our foreign policy is fundamentally about keeping the British people safe. We have always focused on the interests of the UK and the interests of the people we are lucky enough to represent. We sit here representing our communities—not other communities, not business and not anybody else, but our communities and what is fundamentally in their interests. We built up, from that early report, into looking at the various ways in which money has moved around, influencing academic freedoms and changing the way in which businesses have acted. As the Minister knows, we have called out those who we feel needed to be called out. That is why I am so pleased that he is in his place and has produced this Bill, because it finally sets a process by which this Government—any Government—can look at decisions that are being taken and assess them properly.
Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)
I congratulate the hon. Gentleman and his Committee on the excellent report they have produced, but this is about the scrutiny of decisions of mainly private companies and others. Does he share my concerns about some decisions taken by Departments, particularly in the light of the Ministry of Defence’s decision to buy E-7 Wedgetail aircraft from Boeing, which results in two of them coming from China?
Tom Tugendhat
The right hon. Gentleman tempts me, but I am not going to get drawn on the Wedgetail discussion, as that is a slightly separate conversation. He is right to say that this Bill affects not just private business, but the way in which the Government will also conduct their procurement, so it is absolutely right that in future decisions may be looked at in different ways. This Bill, however, is slightly different, because it looks at the purchase of British business and not at the UK purchasing others.
Let me come back to where I was before the right hon. Gentleman cunningly got in his complaint about an MOD decision. This Bill goes a long way to making sure that we are in the right place, but it raises a few concerns, which I will touch on. That is why we have introduced new clause 4, which is not supposed to be a definition of national security, because that would, as the Minister knows, constrain the ability of a Government to adapt this law as national security changes. It would in effect tie concepts from 2021 into the law as it progressed. Given the change we have seen in the past 10 or 15 years, that would frankly be unwise. After all, who could have known that some of the decisions we have taken, perfectly innocently and rationally, over the past decade are some of the worst that a Government have made?
I am referring to two decisions. First, the sale of DeepMind to Google was one of the worst strategic moves a UK Government have taken. I am not blaming anybody for it; it was a decision taken rationally at the time, without understanding the future power of artificial intelligence and the extraordinary strength of DeepMind. That is a huge credit to the team at DeepMind and to much of the investment Google has put in, but it is also a recognition that a change of ownership and geographic basing—even though the people do not change, the ownership changes—has undermined the UK. The second is the sale of Arm to SoftBank. Again, this is one friendly company being sold to a company of another friendly nation. These are not geographically specific points; they are entirely geographically neutral. My guess is that one of Arm’s products is in everybody’s pocket, because they are in 95% of computer products and so will be in almost everybody’s phone. This is one of those moments where we risked losing control of an absolutely fundamental technology that could in future promote Britain’s interests greatly. That moves us into a question about Nvidia that I will not get drawn into now; I am just putting into historical context decisions we made that we will live to regret.
This Bill allows us to look at those things and update with the times, which is why I agree that we should not have a fixed definition of national security—we should have a framework for it. Here I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely) and others on the Committee, who came up with this proposal and were extremely rigorous in doing so. I pay particular tribute to Nicole Kar of Linklaters, who helped us with the drafting of it and to the Committee Clerks who got us through it. There is a real opportunity here to enable this framework to defend us.
Governments throughout the European Union and, indeed, around the world have already started to look at how their laws that are similar to ours will apply. If we do not give enough strength to our Government, there is a danger that we will be the only ones found to be naked when the day comes and the choices have to be made. That would be a huge mistake, because the world is changing; there is a lot more cash from state-owned enterprises going around than there has been for many years. Sadly, there is likely to be a prolonged period of economic difficulty as we come out of covid; those companies and countries that are willing to underwrite companies will have an advantage when they start to snap up businesses around the world. That is why we need this legislation now.
Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab) [V]
It is always a pleasure to follow the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, who is doing sterling work in an area of increasing concern to this House and our country; the impact of hostile state actors plays an increasingly important part in how we think about our country’s place in the world. He is doing outstanding work in thought leadership and political leadership in that context.
It was a privilege to serve on the Bill Committee, and it has been a real privilege to work with my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah), who has led the team in an exemplary manner. She has been assiduous in the scrutiny of the Bill and in bringing us together around the amendments—more than 30 of them, I think—that we tabled in Committee.
Unfortunately, while I have huge respect for the Minister in charge of the Bill, he chose not to integrate any of our amendments into the Bill, which is a pity because, as my hon. Friend just pointed out from the Dispatch Box, we have approached the Bill in a spirit of constructive engagement with the Government. We wish to see its substance put in place as rapidly as possible; it is long overdue. It is a pity that that spirit was not reciprocated by the Government when it came to some of our amendments, which we genuinely tabled not for any partisan reasons, but to try to improve the Bill as much as we could.
However, we are where we are. We are through Committee, and we are looking at the Bill as it is. As has been mentioned, we heard from experts in Committee, including the former head of MI6, Richard Dearlove, and Charlie Parton, one of the leading experts on China, and their contributions were enlightening. It is worth touching on what they talked to us about, because it sets out the backdrop against which the Bill is being put on to the statute book.
I will mention two of the key takeaways from that evidence. First, the impact of covid on the ability of the British economy and businesses to withstand a hostile foreign takeover is deeply troubling; it increases their vulnerability. It feels very much like we are out on choppy waters in a relatively difficult economic climate, and are relatively isolated, of course, having left the European Union. We need to ensure that we do all we can to hold on to our strategic national assets. We should not allow them to be snapped up by investment vehicles and businesses that are sniffing around, to use the term of the hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), our business sector, potentially taking over businesses in a way that would be deeply damaging to our economy and national security.
The second key trend that was highlighted was, of course, the rise of China. It was made very clear by Mr Dearlove, Mr Parton and others that successive Governments since 2010 have been profoundly naive and complacent about how we respond to the rise of China. We had the so-called golden era, which was supposed to be about economic integration, and supposed to lead to China beginning to align with the rules and norms of the international rules-based order. Clearly, the opposite has happened, and as a result of that naivety and complacency, we find ourselves very exposed, and in a position that could lead to the undermining of our sovereign capabilities. The Bill is being introduced against that backdrop.
I will speak in favour of new clause 5, which is really important, and on which I worked with colleagues, including my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central, but first I will talk about the Bill’s intentions, and whether it will achieve its goals. The Bill seeks to protect Britain’s national security from the threats posed by hostile business takeovers, and by investment vehicles that are not aligned with the UK’s values and interests, and are potentially even actively hostile and seeking to cause harm to our country. However, there is potentially a flaw at the heart of the Bill. A key part of our national security is our economic security; indeed, I would argue that it is a foundation stone of our national security. It underpins our long-term national security, in the sense that if we lose control of key parts of our economy, it leads to an undermining of our sovereignty, our sovereign capability, and our prosperity. That has a knock-on effect on our resilience and our national security.
We need to put our sovereign capabilities at the heart of the Bill, and ensure that when the Government do national security assessments, they look at long-term, strategic, structural threats in addition to the more immediate threats to our national security of espionage, intellectual property theft, and a range of others.
That is why in Committee I honed in on two issues that I felt were most critical: our critical national infrastructure, and enterprises and investment vehicles that have clear links and allegiance to other states. On the first point, the Bill unfortunately neglects to define critical national infrastructure. The Government consultation lists 17 sectors that might come under the national security regime’s mandatory notification process, but it does not list and define critical national infrastructure as an asset class in itself.
There is a difference between the list of 17 sectors in the Bill and the 13 sectors that the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, which is of course a Government body, defines as critical national infrastructure. The missing five sectors are chemicals, defence, finance, health and water, which I would argue are crucial to our national interest. Potentially hostile foreign takeovers in those crucial sectors should give all of us, and certainly the Government, pause for thought. Those sectors form the basis of the safety and security of every citizen of our country, so I strongly recommend that critical national infrastructure be defined as an asset class in the Bill, and that the gap be closed between those 13 sectors and the 17 listed in the Bill.
Our critical national infrastructure of course needs protecting. Sir Richard Dearlove, in response to my question in Committee about including a defintion of critical national infrastructure, said:
“I would certainly see that as advantageous, because it defines a clear area where you start and from which you can make judgments”.––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, Tuesday 24 November 2020; c. 24, Q31.]
The truth is that we have failed to protect these critical national assets for a decade. Just look at the involvement of Chinese-based investment vehicles in our water, energy and nuclear sectors. This is a serious problem that needs to be fixed urgently. It is also part of the laissez-faire approach that successive Governments have taken since 2010. It leads to a short-term business culture that opens the door to acquisitions, and to our having by far the highest number of successful hostile takeover bids of any advanced economy in the world—certainly as defined by the OECD.
Our strategic assets have too often been flogged off to the highest bidder. The case of Arm—a jewel in the crown of British tech—has been mentioned by several hon. Members; it is, of course, in the process of being sold off to NVIDIA. Huawei acquired the Centre for Integrated Photonics and of course DeepMind was sold to Google; I absolutely agree with the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, who said that that was one of the most egregious decisions taken by a Government in recent political history.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
Order. Could I interrupt the hon. Gentleman to say that we have quite a few more speakers? We do have a fair amount of time, but I am hoping that speakers will take about 10 minutes, and he has now taken 15, so I hope that he might be bringing his remarks to a close before too long.
Stephen Kinnock
With apologies, Madam Deputy Speaker, I am indeed finishing now.
Protecting our national security is just one element of protecting, nurturing and developing the sectors that are vital for the future. Technology sovereignty will be the defining issue of the coming decade. The economic dislocation we have seen from covid means that the case for action is stronger and more urgent than ever.
Jamie Stone (Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross) (LD) [V]
I shall heed your remarks, Madam Deputy Speaker, and try to keep my contribution short. In truth, I have not been involved thus far in this Bill, but I am my party’s defence spokesman and I therefore take a view on it.
Given the constituency I represent at the very top of the British mainland—north coast, east coast and west coast—I intuit from what I see that the Russian navy is no stranger to those waters. Therefore, the defence of the realm is in my mind personally as well as in speaking in the Commons. As I have said many times before, we do, alas and alack, live in a world where there are states that are not about the best interests of the United Kingdom. As other speakers have said, we see the Chinese threat and we see the Russian threat. It is within that context that I say what I say.
I want to make three or four very general points; as I say, I will try to be fairly speedy. The first is about the amendment that seeks to place an annual security report before the Intelligence and Security Committee. Yes, we have heard that the Government are proposing to bring in something similar to this amendment in the upper House, but it would be no bad thing for us to agree on it at this stage, and then let us see what the Government come back with if they decide not to accept it. In recent days, we have seen on the other side of the Atlantic the whole notion of parliamentary democracy come under some challenge. Here in the mother of Parliaments, the idea of Parliament as supreme and of reports brought back to Parliament is very much a part of our democracy. It is a vital mechanism in securing the way we do things nationally and our freedoms.
On the Chinese point, the sale of DeepMind to Google, and Arm, which will go to NVIDIA in due course, is regrettable, to say the least. Let us make no mistake: this is a quite deliberate act by China and other Governments who are hostile to us. At the end of the day, there are front organisations that are trying to get a grip on cherry-picking those parts of the British economy that are fundamental to our workings. That is extremely dangerous, to say the least.
The scope of the public interest test is important to the Liberal Democrats, as we have been saying for a long time. First and foremost, this Bill, which I support entirely, is important to the safety of the realm—to protecting British interests—but at some stage I would like the public interest test to be broadened out. Mention has been made of China. We know how incredibly badly the Chinese are treating their Muslim minority in the west of the country. It amounts to something approaching genocide: let us not muck about with this. When companies buy up a British company or business, I would like the public interest test to be applied, for instance, on child labour and on modern slavery. The trade deals should be examined in that context as well. At the end of the day—we have said it many times in the House of Commons and the House of Lords—we disapprove entirely of the way in which the Chinese have treated the Uyghurs. We have to try to take action to try to influence that. If we can stymie a trade deal on that front, that might be a very good move for the future.
I have discovered—it is a curious factor during my three years in the Commons—that on defence matters there is often broad agreement across the House, which is very encouraging. The idea of constructive opposition is important, and what comes back from the upper House will be of extraordinary interest. I hope that the lesson has been learned, and that when the Bill is enacted there will be a sensible approach to stopping the repetition of DeepMind and the sale of Arm. I give huge credit to the Chairmen of the Foreign Affairs Committee and of the Intelligence and Security Committee, who have worked assiduously, as have their Committees, on a cross-party basis, to protect the best interests of our nation. There I shall conclude my remarks.
Katherine Fletcher (South Ribble) (Con)
I join the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah) in paying tribute to all the members of the Bill Committee. The room may have been cold but, to be fair, the debate was not. I extend my thanks not only to the Front-Bench spokespeople but to all the Clerks and everyone who made that happen.
What occurred to me as I shivered, with the Thames windows open in the Committee room, was that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat) pointed out, this is flipping important, but there is a risk of it becoming dry and remote. I hope that the House will bear with me if I try to bring it to life for people who spend the day on their phone and are not aware of some of the business takeovers that have occurred or of the actions of foreign states that are hostile to us.
I want specifically to speak to new clause 5 and the attempt to seek clarification on the definition of national security. In the spirit of clarity, let me take a step back to take a step forward. What does the Bill do? It enables us to catch up with nations such as America, Australia and Canada, in protecting us from threats from people overseas who try to use business and ideas, candidly, to do us harm. It gives us a legislative framework to address that, and I echo the comments of many Members to put stickers on how important that is.
The Bill gives the Government powers to investigate properly business deals that look a bit fishy or are much worse than that. National security can sometimes end up sounding like that bit in “Men in Black” where, all of a sudden, the sunglasses go on and the pen comes out. What does it mean? To me, it is not a static thing or concept—it is a fast-changing world. In seeking to define it, as new clause 5 does, we risk flagging to our enemies what the “it” of national security is, thus making a big pointy arrow saying, “Go and over there and do this, because we are not thinking about that as a Government at the moment.” The Government need flexibility to be nimble as threats evolve.
To explain that, let me give a hypothetical example. A small firm is curating a TikTok feed and videos on its channel, gaining ad revenue. It is not a huge business—a couple of people—but it is doing quite well. Those videos are funny and political, and are often further left of centre than me. They imply that I, as a Conservative, have only awful motivations for the decisions that I make in this House. Well, such is life. This is the lot that I picked, though, as an aside to the youth of today, I would like to point out that if they are getting their messages from people who are only giving them one side of the story, they should think about it quite hard, because there are always two sides to the story.
Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)
I supported the Bill on Second Reading and continue to do so, because, of course, in terms of putting on the statute book the protection that we need, it is a vital piece of legislation, but, as the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) said, it is possibly some seven years late. That highlights the conflict that takes place within not just this Government, but all Governments, between wanting national prosperity and national security. We had this during the coalition Government—the hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), I think, referred to it as the “golden age”, or, as the Australians would call it “a Government full of panda huggers”—but that has clearly changed. What has also changed since even 2013 is that we have a better understanding of how states are using their economic power not only for defence purposes, but to project their power to change the international world order.
It has come as a great shock to many people that, in the past few years, the international rules-based order, which we have all accepted since the second world war, has come under threat not only from hostile states, but from individuals who basically want to throw everything up in the air and see what lands.
Clearly, when it comes to China, to mention one nation, its investment strategy, including belt and road and other initiatives, is clearly being used not just in terms of projecting its economic power, but for geopolitical reasons. If we look at the long list of Chinese individuals on various standard-raising bodies—whether it be UN bodies or standard setters in the telecoms industry—we can see which areas they want to influence. The Bill is very important in ensuring that we protect that critical national infrastructure. There will be that debate—as Members will see if they read the ISC’s report, in 2013—between prosperity and security. For me, security has got to be the key cornerstone of this legislation, but it will, I think, lead to some very difficult decisions having to be taken.
As I say, I broadly welcome what is being put forward in this Bill, and I will come on to some of the new clauses in a minute, but can I first refer to new clause 7? It has already been spoken to by the Chair of the ISC, the right hon. Member for New Forest East, in terms of oversight. The ISC is not looking for work, I can tell hon. Members that. I have been a member of it for a few years now, and we have a lot on our plate. We do not actually want to be a regulator or in any way to have to decide what should go ahead and what should not—that is the role of Government—but I think it is crucial that those decisions, some of which will be very controversial but taken for perfectly good security reasons, do need to have oversight from outside the Executive.
As the right hon. Gentleman has outlined, that cannot be done by the BEIS Committee. Again, I would not want to take away from any of the work it is doing, but we are the only Committee of all the Committees we have that has the levels of security clearance—it has STRAP clearance—to look at the evidence that will have to be put forward for taking these decisions. I think this would give the public confidence in the Bill, and when such decisions are being taken in future, the public can actually have confidence that there is some oversight of the reasons why they are being taken. So I do support new clause 7, but I accept what my Chairman says about wanting some indication of the Government wishing to take this on board. May I also raise the fact that this is not just for this Bill? I am also serving currently on the Telecommunications (Security) Bill Committee, and it is an issue—exactly the same issue—there as well.
I think the Minister is sympathetic to this, but I can tell him now—and I do not want him to admit it—that he will be getting a lot of pushback from the Cabinet Office, because the Cabinet Office somehow sees it as its role to prevent the ISC from seeing anything. As the right hon. Member for New Forest East said, it hides behind the Justice and Security Act 2013, but as he very eloquently outlined, there is already a mechanism to allow us to look at this. This is going to be an increasing problem. If hon. Members read the Act, they will see that it does not actually say that it is about actual Departments; it is about access to sensitive and secure information. That is going to be an increasing issue, whether for this Government or future Governments, because, as that is used by more Departments, it is important that Parliament and the public at least have some oversight of it.
I do not want to bash the Cabinet Office, but hon. Members will remember, if they look at the 2013 ISC report, that it is the same Department that, even though it was told by BT that BT was going to contract with Huawei, somehow conveniently forgot even to tell Ministers until much later. So, I think it is important to ensure that we have robust oversight. I look forward to the Minister’s response on whether he is going to agree to this letter. If he can give such an indication today, or even when it goes to the other place, that would be welcome, and if that is the case, I think it would be quite right not to press new clause 7. I think this is something that is missing from the Bill.
May I now refer to other new clauses? New clause 4 stands in the name of the hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling and others, and I congratulate his Committee on its report. I accept what the hon. Member for South Ribble (Katherine Fletcher) has just said about defining national security. Putting that on the face of the Bill, as new clause 5 does, limits what can be done, although it is good to have a debate on this. New clause 4 is slightly different, however, because it sets out a framework within which these decisions can be taken.
The Bill does not define national security or the list, and I understand why: because we cannot list the entities, and, as the hon. Lady said, something might come up in the future that is critical national infrastructure but that we have not yet thought about. We need sufficient flexibility to be able to address such situations.
New clause 4 also covers the following important area:
“(g) the potential of the trigger event to involve or facilitate significant illicit or subversive activities, including terrorism, organised crime, money laundering and tax evasion; and
(h) whether the trigger event may adversely impact the safety and security of UK citizens or the UK.”
We see good examples of states that are making strategic investments for geopolitical or security reasons or in order to acquire technologies, but, as came out in the ISC Russia report, many states are increasingly using fronts and other individuals to acquire such assets, and, having not an exhaustive list, but a framework that covers this would also flag up such matters to the Department.
We talk about critical national infrastructure being things such as power stations, electricity grids, gas mains and telecoms, but might we also say that our food distribution network, for instance, is a part of critical national infrastructure? In the early 2000s we had the fuel delivery lorry drivers’ strike, which led to a critical situation, and control of such events could fall under this. These things might be done not by a state, but by individuals related to it, perhaps acquiring large property portfolios in certain areas. Although new clause 4 is not perfect, it covers these matters.
I accept what my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah) is trying to achieve in amendment 7. She wants this unit to have the resources to ensure that it can do its job, and that is very important. However, we also need to ensure that there are no untimely delays, because we do not want this to be a hindrance to business.
Amendment 7 also raises the issue of the personnel who are going to perform this task. I have a huge concern, which I have raised already in terms of the Telecommunications (Security) Bill, about the type of individuals we are going to get in that unit. It is vital that we have people with not only the necessary security clearances but also the right security mindset. Some reassurance on that from the Minister would be welcome.
Overall, however, I welcome this Bill. It takes a huge step in the right direction. As my Chairman, the right hon. Member for New Forest East said, it is strange that we wait for seven years and then get two Bills very quickly, and I also look forward—I hope in the near future—to a further Bill, the hostile state actors Bill, which is another recommendation from our Russia report.
I thank the Minister for the constructive way he has taken this Bill forward—and I will be cheeky and just say to him that if he can deliver extra vaccines in Chester-le-Street this week, that will be very welcome.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)
We now go over to Sam Tarry—oh no, he’s here!
Sam Tarry (Ilford South) (Lab)
I am indeed, Madam Deputy Speaker; I hope you are not too confused that I am here physically. Thank you very much for kicking me off.
I spoke at length on this legislation in Committee, where I moved a number of Opposition amendments to try to strengthen it and where we heard salient and wide-ranging witness statements and testimony on this crucial legislation. Indeed, as many Members across the House have said, the Bill is an important and, frankly, long overdue piece of legislation that will provide more robust powers for the Government to intervene when corporate transactions threaten national security, as the Labour party has long demanded. That is why we support the Bill and have tabled amendments to make it more robust.
Andrew Griffith (Arundel and South Downs) (Con) [V]
May I first take the opportunity today to congratulate our friends in the United States? They are one of our longest and most enduring partners, including in the domain of investment, where we are each one of the largest investors in each other’s economy. In fact, 1 million people in the UK go to work every day for an American company, and 1 million Americans work for British companies.
Unlike many of the other speakers in this debate, I want to talk about investment. This Bill should not be about the NHS or employment law or foreign policy, but it is—or at least it should be—about the world-liberating, poverty-alleviating force that is the global movement of capital to make a profitable return. We are all deeply vested in its continued success. The UK economy is one of the most open in the world, and our prosperity depends on that. The salaries and pensions of one in every three nurses, doctors and teachers depend on the cyclotron of capitalism that combines our world-leading science and intellectual capital with human talent from all over the world to invest in and create economic activity here in the UK. So I am pleased that the Minister, who I know is a great friend of business, has once again confirmed that the Government will always enthusiastically champion free trade and provide the warmest of welcomes to overseas investors. He is right to remind us that, since 2011, over 600,000 new jobs have been created in our economy, thanks to over 16,000 foreign direct investment projects.
In putting forward new clause 5, Opposition Members put forward a veritable laundry list of subjective factors that are at odds with the clarity and certainty that investors need from this Bill. They would put the UK into a concrete overcoat at just the moment of our greatest opportunity. From the buoyant top, we would plummet to the depths of the world rankings in attracting international investment. It is almost as if Opposition Members do not want the British people to taste the fruits of the successful Brexit that they tried to thwart.
From an external perspective, the British economy is a highly attractive investment prospect: a stable, pro-free enterprise democracy with tariff-free access to European markets, close links to the faster-growing Commonwealth countries and native use of English, the universal language used by the fastest-growing sectors and economies of the world. The opportunity is the stability of Switzerland, combined with the dynamism of Singapore.
As net zero champion, I see examples daily of entrepreneurs and investors pursuing opportunities in the expanding clean growth sector. British-based firms are exporting electrolysers to Europe and fuel cells to Asia. The City of London is a world-leading hub for green finance, while our airports and airlines are the same in sustainable aviation. Elsewhere, similar opportunities exist in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, the life sciences, satellites, aerospace and FinTech, where the UK science and research base positions us very strongly. It is not just rhetoric; economists rightly forecast that UK growth this year will outstrip the US, Japan and the EU.
I urge Opposition Members to withdraw their amendments to the Bill and to allow it to go forward today. Having allowed the golden goose of the UK economy to continue to prosper, we can engage in a legitimate debate about how best all may share in the fruits of that success. [Interruption.]
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)
Order. We cannot have Members sitting here in the Chamber—under the cover of masks, so I cannot see their mouths moving—making comments about things that people are saying virtually. It just does not work and, quite frankly, it is not fair. We really must watch the level of behaviour while we are trying to balance this difficult situation in the Chamber.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP) [V]
Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker, for allowing me the opportunity to speak this afternoon. I have followed with great interest every stage of the Bill. I do so with a somewhat vested interest. That is not that I have investment portfolios or similar, because I do not, but because I am fully aware of the potential that exists within Northern Ireland for foreign investment from the positive advantage we now have.
As the previous speaker, the hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs (Andrew Griffith), said, Brexit has given us some opportunities for investment for the future. I see potential for that, as he does, and hopefully as others do, too. Northern Ireland has become the cyber capital of Europe, with our low business rates, superfast broadband in urban areas, wonderful global connectivity—before the pandemic, at least—and a highly skilled local workforce. It is little wonder that more people have decided to make Northern Ireland the home of their global business, and the opportunity is there for much more.
For that reason, I have followed the Bill closely to ensure that it protects our nation as a priority, and I am firmly behind the Government in that aim. I support the objectives that others have set out, and that the Secretary of State will set out at the end of today’s debate. I also want to ensure that the Bill is not overly prohibitive to companies that see opportunity to invest in my constituency of Strangford and in the Ards council area, but have concerns about the mechanism through which the Secretary of State can put a hold on investment for certain reasons.
I share the concerns of my colleagues that more detail is needed on what constitutes a reason for the Secretary of State to become involved. It is my desire that, rather than a substantive statement by the Secretary of State coming after the passing of the Bill, one should be appended to it. I seek some clarification on this matter. That would enable investors and those businesses seeking investment to know the parameters within which they are working.
I must be clear: I do not wish to water down the aims of the Bill—that is not my intention whatsoever. However, I share the concern of some Members that Chinese companies are under an obligation to share information with the Chinese Government. I remain concerned about overly onerous legislative commitments for small investments and small firms, but I must accept the evidence of the loopholes that foreign investment companies have made their way through by purchasing intellectual property rights and the like. I see how our system has been abused thus far, and I stand with Government on the need for an overhaul, which is the purpose of this legislation. However, I believe that we need the detail to have the strong and all-encompassing legislation required to keep our nation safe. I again implore Ministers to consider this. The safety of the nation has been spoken about by many Members, and it is certainly a priority for me and my party.
Bob Seely (Isle of Wight) (Con)
I thank the Minister for his work and for being here for the debate; I know how busy he is, so I am most grateful. I will speak to new clause 4, which provides a definition of “national security”. After listening to some of the speeches, I wonder whether I am going to play the role of General Melchett in “Blackadder” when I insist that “security” is not a dirty word. Let me try to put the argument in favour of a national security definition. My hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat) suggested that I do so, and I am grateful to him for the opportunity. Like him, I thank Nicole Kar and Alice Lynch, who supported the work of the Foreign Affairs Committee.
New clause 4 provides a non-exclusive framework of factors that the Secretary of State would be obliged to regard when he is assessing takeovers or work in this field. It does not limit the Secretary of State in any way, as my hon. Friend the Member for South Ribble (Katherine Fletcher), who spoke eloquently, and others suggested. It provides a public recognition and a public baseline of things that should be considered. As such, it is a sensible amendment to improve the Bill, as well as providing a wider public service by defining national security in the modern era. I would like to make a few background points and then speak for between five and 10 minutes on a few other points.
We need a definition of national security, because the alternative is to have a vague and unstated set of assumptions. The amendment is broad, but it sets quite a high benchmark. It is not a generalised catch-all, nor does it contain a substitute for an industrial policy; that is another debate. The Cadbury takeover would not be included in this, nor would a Stilton creamery in South Notts—it might in France, but not in this country.
In this country we have a tendency to romanticise vagueness, as if planning were a bad thing and muddling through a strategic art as well as a national pastime, with this just-in-time Dunkirk spirit. I think it was Churchill who noted that, actually, Dunkirk was a military disaster, not a victory, and that if we had got our security and strategy right in the years previously, we could have avoided glorifying disasters because we would not have been in that disastrous position in the first place. A more systematic approach to national strategy—frankly, I think we need a national strategy council—but also to security and the definition of national security is important.
My next point is that the nature of national security has changed, and we need to be mindful of that. It is not simply about defence and espionage and the immediate threat to the realm. We have seen from Russia and China a combining of non-military and military, of covert and overt strategies—people call it hybrid war, grey war, under-the-radar war; there are about 25 definitions doing the rounds. This is not a war as such, but it is a form of state struggle and state conflict. Some states in the world, including very significant states such as Russia and, perhaps to a lesser extent, China, see things as a zero-sum game. We need to understand that liberal internationalism is not the only show in town and not the only way to understand international affairs. The west is good at many things, but seeing the world through the eyes of others is not necessarily one of them.
These new states, as many people here have said, use multiple and novel tools, including economic power, energy power, espionage, blackmail, information war and even cultural and religious power, as well as military and paramilitary power, and they use different templates and different tools in different parts of the world. Clearly, the tools that China uses in Xinjiang province are different from the ones that it uses in the City of London or to reach out to parliamentarians. The tools that Russia uses in eastern Ukraine or Kiev are different from the ones that it uses in the UK. Is the Kremlin’s use of Russian Orthodoxy a national security threat to us? No, of course not. But is its use of oligarchs and informal channels to influence senior political and financial elites in our country—the hon. Member for Aberavon (Stephen Kinnock) called it “elite capture”—a potential threat to national security? Yes.
The right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) was right to mention how states are using those new powers and how they use power to bend or break the international system. My hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling has also spoken about that repeatedly, as indeed have many of us on the Foreign Affairs Committee. That international system is not perfect, but it has served humanity well.
It is important to understand that national security is not just about a narrow defence threat; it is broader. China has published a document, “Made in China 2025”, outlining how it plans to dominate data, artificial intelligence, big data and so on. Is it a threat to our communications infrastructure if we are dominated by a one-party state with a very different values system? I am not saying definitely, but potentially it would be.
The Henry Jackson Society and I produced a report on Five Eyes supply chain reliance on China. Over a quarter of British supply chains are dominated by China, and the UK is strategically dependent on China for 229 categories of goods, 51 of which have potential applications in critical national infrastructure spheres. We need to be mindful of the impact of that on our national security.
There are companies that are going to be bought and universities that are going to be working on gait technology and facial technology. I do not doubt that there are some countries in the world that will use that technology to improve their mass transport systems, but there are countries—China is potentially one of them—that will use it as a means of controlling their people more effectively and developing the sort of Orwellian state that is a potential threat to humanity and mankind.
Let me look specifically at new clause 4. As I said, my hon. Friend the Member for South Ribble talked about the need to be nimble, and she is exactly right, but osmosis is not a way to provide a definition of national security. The new clause obliges the Government to look at a series of areas. We tried to make it broad, but it sets a high bar. It requires the Government to look at the critical supply chain, critical national infrastructure and national resource. A year ago, who would have argued that personal protective equipment manufacture, vaccine supply or AstraZeneca’s cyber-security were national security issues? Probably nobody. Who now would deny it? Probably nobody. This is a significant element of our national security.
Another example—one that has worried me greatly—is that the Government did not see Huawei’s domination of 5G as a national security issue. They chose not to listen to those people in the agencies who said that it was and set a clear political direction. It concerned me particularly that, bizarrely, BEIS and other Ministries presented Huawei in this House as a private firm when, clearly, it was part and parcel of the Chinese state. Therefore, having a clear definition in the Bill of what Ministers are obliged to look at would help to guide them to come to good decisions in the national interest, and that is what we are trying to do.
We are trying to do things in the national interest to improve the Bill where we can. Paragraphs (b) and (c) address the threat from individuals and to individuals. Paragraph (c) addresses the nature of potential acquirers of UK firms. The hon. Members for Aberavon and for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah) spoke very eloquently about this, and Huawei is instructive.
My hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling spoke about two companies that were bought when perhaps they should not have been, and we need to look at the nature of potential acquirers of UK firms. It is not an attack on laissez-faire economics or on our role as a free market and dynamic, global economic centre to accept that a national security definition, along with good laws, helps to provide a framework for honesty and integrity in business life. Paragraph (f) addresses national security and our responsibility to oppose modern slavery and genocide, which is an important issue for me, but again it sets an extraordinarily high bar.
Paragraph (g) addresses the potential threat of global organised crime. Again Russia, specifically, has tried to influence other countries in this way. Yes, that could be a potential national security risk. Finally, paragraph (h) gives the Secretary of State the flexibility to take a generalised approach to things that are not in the interests of the UK and are a threat to our interests or our citizens.
This new clause is a baseline, not a limiting factor. It helps to provide guidance for the Secretary of State and for BEIS. Frankly, this should be cross-departmental. We need our own CFIUS, and why we do not have one I do not know. Again, that is a concern. I will not address it now, because it clearly is not in the amendment and I am wrapping up.
I fear that the vagueness on national security does not help this Bill, nor does it help national security and its role. Clarity is needed in the long term to help us provide better strategy and a better understanding of the opportunities and risks that face this country in the years ahead.
Kim Johnson (Liverpool, Riverside) (Lab) [V]
I start by congratulating Joe Biden and Kamala Harris, and by wishing for a violence-free inauguration today. Good riddance to the outgoing President. We will not miss his hate speech.
The National Security and Investment Bill seeks to usher in sweeping reforms to how our Government can scrutinise foreign investment. It proposes strong measures to toughen foreign investment rules and to bring the UK into line with other major countries in key sectors. These steps to keep high-growth and strategically important companies in the UK are overdue and highly welcome, but does the Secretary of State agree that, for the UK to have an active industrial policy that works in the public interest, the Government must go further than just blocking hostile mergers and acquisitions, and instead implement a robust industrial strategy that puts critical national infrastructure at the heart of Government policy?
One example is the recent takeover of Arm, the crown jewel of the British tech sector—a genuine global powerhouse worth more than £31 billion and with more than 6,000 employees. Its recent sale to Nvidia, a US tech giant worth more than £338 billion that is tucked away in the tax-light and secrecy-heavy state of Delaware, provides a clear example of the risky and problematic sale of a British firm to foreign investors, which threatens both security fears and job losses.
Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)
Enhanced protection of our national security is obviously at the heart of the Bill. It has come not before time, too. It has had a gestation period of something like seven years since the Intelligence and Security Committee first raised the matters that it addresses directly. As a member of the Committee, I will not repeat what my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), the Chair of the ISC, or the senior Opposition member of the ISC, the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), have said with regard to oversight of investments. I think the point has been well made, and I totally accept that the Minister gets those points.
Let us be clear, though, that if a potential enemy state can get critical information and technologies, it is highly likely to do so. In truth, as we all know, the UK is a primary target for a broad range of national security attacks from both foreign intelligence agencies and organisations, as well as companies, which certainly are operating at the moment. If a company that is British and world leading in a technology—for instance, artificial intelligence or robotics—is bought by a foreign investor from a country that is not particularly friendly to the UK, we must have a system to ensure that British technology, ideas and even hardware are not simply hijacked and possibly used against us. We have to stop that.
Unless the United Kingdom curbs the right of foreign firms and investors to obtain technologies through the means of mergers and acquisitions and similar, our advanced technologies could easily find their way into weapons systems of foreign, potentially hostile states. These days, weapons systems should be much more broadly defined. They include possible attacks on the way we live. For example, using the internet to turn off water purification and supplies or just sewerage would have a dramatic and immediate impact on British society. I reckon that is a weapons system these days. In future, investors will have no choice but to notify the Government if the ownership of certain businesses is to change hands. That is good news. I note, too, that the Secretary of State will also have the power to call in other businesses if he or she has concerns about national security. That is good, too: it allows for sensible flexibility.
In contrast to others who have spoken, I think we should be careful about defining exactly what national security involves because it changes all the time. It is difficult to pin it down. We know what it is, but I am worried about defining it.
Within the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy will now sit this new investment security unit, which will be tasked with supervising sensitive sectors of our economy. I know that those sectors have yet to be fully defined, but most are pretty obvious—defence communications, energy, cryptography, satellite and space technologies and many more. But in the fast-moving modern world that we live in, it will also be important for the investment security unit to look actively at seemingly innocent technologies and systems, which in the wrong hands could bring our society to a grinding standstill. Others have mentioned the national grid: if that could be disabled by the simple means of remote instructions, the whole of the country’s electricity supplies could be turned off. Just think of how difficult that would be!
Keeping sovereign control over the methods of controlling something like the national grid is crucial. I presume and hope that the investment security unit will spend some time looking out for non-obvious threats. Having once been an intelligence officer, I know that trying to identify the threat, the signals that identify what is about to happen, is really difficult because they are embedded in a plethora of noise. But this investment security unit will have to try.
I am pleased that the Bill extends the current screening powers to allow the Secretary of State to investigate the acquisition of sensitive assets in intellectual property as well as the straightforward acquisition of companies. In short, I support the Bill and I am pleased that it has at last reached this stage.
Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab) [V]
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart). I join my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah) and others in thanking the Bill Committee, the Clerks and others who supported us so well—including the expert witnesses from whom we got to hear during that fortnight. I had not sat through Second Reading, but we had a particularly enlightening series of sessions.
I wish to speak to new clauses 5, 6 and 7, which I will be supporting, along with the Bill. I emphasise how strongly colleagues and I feel about how important national security is, and how much Labour prioritises it. That is why we welcome the Bill, following, as it does, unfortunately, the leadership of states such as the United States, Germany and the EU; perhaps we are just that much behind the curve. I am sorry to say that it is clear that the Government failed to recognise the clear and present danger of the commercial strategy of other powers. Although I very much support the Bill, as it introduces the greater powers for Government to intervene when corporate transactions threaten our national security, it is late, perhaps even a decade or more late.
As so many have said, national security has traditionally been viewed quite narrowly. Perhaps we have had the light touch of economically liberal Governments welcoming investment when in fact those acquisitions are aimed at reducing the competition, improving margins and protecting domestic interests. Also we have seen the purpose being to asset-strip those businesses of their intellectual property, often at considerable cost to the UK in terms of our knowledge base and expertise, but with the risk of seriously damaging our supply chains and having the consequent economic impact. Often this results in those businesses moving overseas. So overall, although the Government’s proposal brings the UK in line with other countries on national security, there is the need for greater powers on mergers and acquisitions, particularly in respect of what may be deemed to be beyond security but actually in the national interest, as in the US and France, where they have the powers to block takeovers of companies deemed strategic or that have major implications for national interests.
I am afraid that the past 10 years show that consecutive Conservative and coalition Governments have been persistently slow and muted in intervening to protect national security in a series of cases: Huawei and 5G has been cited frequently this afternoon: Pfizer and AstraZeneca—the proposal of course failed, but we can only imagine what would have happened to the cost of vaccines had those two companies merged and had we been reliant on one major player; Google and DeepMind; and now Nvidia and Arm technologies. Among a great many others, we have also had the takeover of GKN by Melrose and the acquisition of Cobham aviation. They are now owned by businesses based in a friendly state, which is okay and acceptable, but it is questionable how we are prepared to let some of these important businesses—important leaders in technologies—be disposed of, with the assets, the research and the intellectual properties of those businesses moved offshore, to elsewhere.
New clause 5 seeks to define national security. Interestingly, the right hon. Member for Reading West (Alok Sharma), the former Secretary of State, has stated that the Government had a very narrow interpretation of national security. It was surprising what came to light in the Bill Committee, where we heard that, as I understand it, in drawing up this legislation the Government had failed to engage with the Intelligence and Security Committee in the first instance. That was a shortcoming. The evidence sessions proved more than enlightening, particularly when we were hearing from some of the expert witnesses. Some of what we heard was deeply disturbing. The words spoken by Charles Parton of the Royal United Services Institute were some of the most alarming of all. He said:
“we should not underestimate the degree to which Xi Jinping and the Communist party intend, as Xi said to the first politburo meeting, to get the upper hand against western democracies… When you add that to his policy of civil-military fusion—using civil in the military context—and the fact that he has set up a party organisation specifically to push that forward, and the change in investment policy away from things such as property, football clubs and other things, very much towards benefitting China and its technology, we have to be a lot more careful than we have been in the past.”
I think he said that, perhaps deliberately, with extraordinary understatement. Perhaps most alarmingly, he added:
“I am not aware of a really good assessment of just how much technology has been bought, the targets and so on. Maybe the Government have one—I don’t know—but I do not think that they do.”
––[Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 6, Q2.]
Perhaps that is something that the Minister could answer when he sums up.
Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con) [V]
This Bill is apposite. It is an appropriate response to an ever-pressing but rapidly changing problem: our national wellbeing. I want to speak briefly about its scope, its dynamism, and the oversight that is necessary to make it as effective as it can be.
That national security is inextricably linked to our national interest is axiomatic. It is obvious that our trade and investment also serve our interest. The potentially paradoxical objects of economic interest and keeping our nation safe are brought into sharp focus by the Bill, which I welcome, and I congratulate the Government and the Minister on bringing it forward. The Government response to the changing circumstances that we face could not be more significant. Malevolent forces of ill intent—both hostile state actors and non-state organisations, including global commercial interests—must be countered, curtailed and, where necessary, controlled. As the hon. Member for Aberavon (Stephen Kinnock) said, greater assiduity in this respect is to be commended. No longer can we be naive about the ethics of the free market or free trade; nor should we appease foreign powers that, frankly, embody tyrannical tendencies, in a chilling echo of the worst of the 20th century.
As the scope of the Bill’s provision must be used appropriately, so it should also be used as necessary, and as circumstances dictate. I am afraid it is not enough to count risk and resilience in the way we have, historically; we need to measure risk and prepare the necessary resilience in a new way. So I am sympathetic to new clauses 4 and 5, which look to establish factors to which the Secretary of State must have regard when assessing risk, but I hear what my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) said: given that that risk is as I have described it—dynamic—it is important that there should be a framework, rather than specifying precisely what the risks are or may be. It does seem to me, however, that the Government can do more work, as the Bill continues its passage through both Houses, to be clearer about the circumstances in which the Government might assess risk and define its character and the response to it.
That BEIS is to take the lead in this policy area is new, and it empowers Ministers in a very particular way, but in my estimation, security is likely to be the business of all aspects of Government. As has been said by previous speakers, in respect of health, is it really in the national interest for vital health supplies to be dependent on provision from unstable and unhelpful places? Should the supply of technology, which is so critical to so much of what we do in business, in the public sector and as individuals, be in the hands of those who are either capriciously cavalier or maliciously malign? Should our universities become so dependent on funds from overseas that they are obliged to transfer knowledge to individuals or states that may use it against us?
From now on, the whole of Government have to be associated with the effort to measure risk, develop resilience and understand the threats to our security. In those terms, the Bill must allow sufficient responsiveness to metamorphosising threats, to allow us to alter our response to counter those threats. That implies acting quickly and Ministers using their executive power without the scope, space or time always to seek parliamentary approval. If they did seek such approval, they would be doing so almost every week, certainly every month, and possibly by the day or hour. That is why oversight matters so much, yet the Bill is not yet quite right in that respect, as several contributors to the debate have said.
The existing accountability to Select Committees is valuable, but not enough. As the Chairman of the ISC, my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), explained, that Committee is designated. Indeed, it was set up for precisely this purpose, dealing with highly sensitive information, including secret documents that would normally not pass through the House as a whole because of the public implications of that. Adequate oversight is therefore essential.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Nadhim Zahawi)
May I add my congratulations to President Biden and Vice-President Kamala Harris, and their national security team?
I thank all hon. Members who have tabled amendments and new clauses and have spoken to them so eloquently: the hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie); my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis); the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah); my hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat); the hon. Member for Aberavon (Stephen Kinnock); the hon. Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross (Jamie Stone), who spoke so pithily; my hon. Friend the Member for South Ribble (Katherine Fletcher); the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones); the hon. Member for Ilford South (Sam Tarry); my hon. Friend the Member for Arundel and South Downs (Andrew Griffith); the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon); my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely); the hon. Member for Liverpool, Riverside (Kim Johnson); my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart); the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western), my neighbour; and of course my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes), who reminded us of the words of the great Edmund Burke.
National security is an area of utmost importance, and that has been reflected in a sober and considered debate, with the excellent contributions that we have heard today, and, indeed, over the past few months. I will take this opportunity to respond to some of the points raised this afternoon.
New clauses 4 and 5 create a non-exhaustive list of factors that the Secretary of State must have regard to when assessing national security risks arising from trigger events. In fact, the Secretary of State has joined us to demonstrate how important this Bill is to him. I congratulate him on his elevation to being my new boss at BEIS.
As currently drafted, the Bill does not seek to define national security or include factors that the Secretary of State must or may take into account when assessing national security risks. Instead, factors that the Secretary of State expects to take into account when deciding whether to exercise the call-in power are proposed to be set out in the statement provided for by clause 3, a draft of which was published alongside the Bill. The Secretary of State is unable to call in an acquisition of control until that statement has been laid before both Houses. It is clear from the debate today, and also from conversations with colleagues, that these are the amendments on which there is strongest feeling in the House, and in the Foreign Affairs and Development Committee, so I will take care to set out the Government’s case.
The Bill’s approach reflects the long-standing policy of Governments of different hues to ensure that powers relating to national security are sufficiently flexible to address the myriad risks that may arise. As we heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham, national security risks are multi-faceted and constantly evolving, and what may constitute a risk today may not be a risk in the future. Indeed, the Foreign Affairs Committee, chaired by my hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling, said in its own excellent report that
“an overly specific definition of national security could serve to limit the Government’s ability to protect UK businesses from unforeseen security risks.”
Bob Seely
Does the Minister accept that what is being proposed is not a limiting arena of what constitutes national security but a baseline of what constitutes national security, and that there may be a reason to adapt it over time? Indeed, paragraph (h) of new clause 4 makes an assumption that it can be expanded.
Nadhim Zahawi
My hon. Friend makes an important point. As I mentioned, the statement that the Secretary of State has laid with the Bill takes in much of the direction of travel of this amendment from the Foreign Affairs Committee.
I acknowledge that the Foreign Affairs Committee is pushing for more detail rather than less, but I would reassure them that the Government agree with their main conclusion that the Secretary of State should provide as much detail as possible on the factors that will be taken into account when considering national security. Importantly, however, that is only up until the point that the detail risks the protection of national security itself. That is why the Government have taken this approach in the draft statement provided for by clause 3. In that statement, we identify three types of risk that are proposed to form the basis of the call-in national security assessment. These are: the target risk, which considers the nature of the acquisition and where it lies in the economy; the trigger event risk, which considers the level of control and how it might be used; and the acquirer risk, which covers the extent to which the acquirer raises national security concerns.
I would like to address each of the arguments made in the report, so that I can ease the concerns of hon. Members across the House. First, there are concerns that without a narrow definition of national security, the investment screening unit would be inundated by notifications, hampering its ability to deliver its crucial role. I acknowledge that, for business confidence in the regime, it is essential that we deliver on our statutory timeframes for decisions, which is why it is so essential that we do not allow any broadening of the assessment done by officials as part of the regime to occur, whether by inexhaustive lists, as my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight has just said, or by any other form. To include modern slavery, genocide and tax evasion as factors that the Secretary of State must take into account as part of national security assessments, as these amendments propose, would not reduce the demands on the investment security unit but potentially increase them.
Secondly, there is concern that ambiguity could hinder the success of the regime. Let me be clear that this regime is about protecting national security—nothing more, nothing less—hence its real focus. Thirdly, the Foreign Affairs Committee report suggests that the staff responsible for screening transactions may lack sufficient clarity on what kinds of transactions represent legitimate national security risks, leading to important transactions being missed or to a large volume of benign transactions overwhelming the investment security unit. I want to assure hon. Members, and my hon. Friend the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, that the investment security unit will be staffed by the brightest and best, with many of them being recruited on the basis that they have essentially written the book on national security.
Tom Tugendhat
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for highlighting this point. May I assure him that I have absolute confidence that the people he will recruit into the unit will be the best and brightest? I pay huge tribute and send many congratulations to the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, who is sitting next to him. He is a friend of long standing, and I am delighted to see him serving Cabinet; that is well earned and somewhat overdue. I am sure that they are both going to have the best judgment possible. However—I am afraid there is a “however”—there are other people who are going to have to decide whether or not to file, and there is therefore a danger that people will over-file, even though the judgments will have been very cautiously made.
Nadhim Zahawi
That is something I have been watching carefully as we introduced this legislation, obviously. We have had around 36 inquiries to the team already, so it feels to me that where we have landed is proportionate and right.
Mr Kevan Jones
I have no doubt that the Minister will aim to recruit the brightest and best. However, what assurance can he give that those individuals will have not only the necessary security clearance but the culture of thinking about security, as opposed to business and regulation?
Nadhim Zahawi
They will be able to draw on all the experience, culture and, of course, resources of Government to be able to do their job properly, I assure the right hon. Member of that.
The report sets out a fear, as we have heard elsewhere, that without a definition of national security in the Bill, interventions under the NSI regime will be politicised. I wholeheartedly agree that it is crucial for the success of the regime that decisions made are not political but rather technocratic, dispassionate and well judged. I repeat the words of my right hon. Friend the Member for Reading West (Alok Sharma), the former Business Secretary, who on Second Reading assured the House that:
“The Government will not be able to use these powers to intervene in business transactions for broader economic or public interest reasons, and we will not seek to interfere in deals on political grounds.”—[Official Report, 17 November 2020; Vol. 684, c. 210.]
Indeed, if the Secretary of State took into account political factors outside the remit of national security, the decision could not be upheld on judicial review. It is with this in mind, and our focus on protecting foreign direct investment, which so many colleagues are concerned about, especially as we come out of the covid challenge, that politicised decisions will not be possible under the NSI regime. I hope right hon. and hon. Members feel I have sufficiently explained the Government’s approach. We have sought to deliver what the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Opposition recommend.
Bob Seely
I will not labour the point beyond this. The Minister says that tax evasion will not be a bar. I accept that the Government made that statement. Does he accept that, in Australia, tax evasion is one of those significant elements? He rather implies that tax evasion and tax evaders will not be opposed in buying UK companies, so how high will the bar be set on criminality or on unsavoury characters—maybe people close to Russian Presidents and oligarchs and questionable companies?
Nadhim Zahawi
As colleagues have said, the Bill has been a long time in gestation, from 2017 to the 2018 consultation and White Paper and now today. We look at what other countries do, and I think we have reached a proportionate position. Of course, as I say, the Secretary of State’s statement sets out exactly how he would assess the risks to national security. I hope I have addressed that.
My final point of reassurance is that there will be further scrutiny on this point. As I explained in Committee, the statement provided for by clause 3 will go out to full public consultation prior to being laid before Parliament, and the Government will listen carefully to any proposals for further detail.
Amendments 1, 2, 3 and 6 broadly seek to ensure that the scope of the regime as a whole is right, that mandatory notification covers the right sectors and that both the statement and the notifiable acquisition regulations are reviewed within a year. Amendment 1 would require notifiable acquisition regulations to be reviewed within a year of having been made, and once every five years thereafter. It is right that the Secretary of State keeps a constant watch on these regulations. Indeed, it is vital that he has the flexibility to reassess and, if needed, seek to update the regulations at any time. The nature of his responsibilities under the regime creates sufficient incentive for this regular review.
Amendment 2 would, in effect, introduce two further trigger events to the regime. It would mean that a person becoming a major debt holder would count as a person gaining control of a qualifying entity. The amendment would also mean that a person becoming a major supplier to an entity counted as a person gaining control of a qualifying entity.
We on the Government Benches believe that access to finance is crucial for so many small businesses and large businesses to grow and succeed. They will often take out loans secured against the very businesses and assets that they have fought so hard to build; I did just that when I started YouGov. That is why the Bill allows the Secretary of State to scrutinise acquisitions of control that take place where lenders exercise rights over such collateral, but the Government do not consider that the provision of loans and finance is automatically a national security issue. Indeed, it is part of a healthy business ecosystem that enables businesses to flourish in this country.
Dr Julian Lewis
For the sake of clarity, the annual report that will be supplied to Parliament will not have any security-sensitive information in it. The Minister says that we could request further information. The only information we want to request is the information of a security-sensitive nature that will routinely have played a part in leading to these decisions. I do not want to tell any tales out of school. All I can say is that the Minister seemed very receptive when I put forward the idea of an annexe to the report, which would come to the Committee, or alternatively there could be an unredacted or redacted version of the report. Is he saying that the Cabinet Office is declining to do that? If so, it would appear that the malign influence of one Mr Cummings is not entirely eliminated from that Department.
Nadhim Zahawi
I am grateful for my right hon. Friend’s intervention. What I was saying is that there are no restrictions. His Committee will be able to invite the Secretary of State to give evidence to it, and it will also be able to ask for further information, which the unit will be able to provide.
Mr Kevan Jones
The Minister is wrong when he talks about asking the Secretary of State, because his is not one of the Departments that we overlook, but it is already there that this information be provided. I do not know why he and the Government are resisting this, because it will give certain confidence in terms of ensuring that decisions are taken on national security grounds. If he thinks for one minute that the Cabinet Office will divulge information easily to us, I can assure him that it will not. It does not do so. We have to drag it out of them kicking and screaming every time. I am sorry, but this is very disappointing.
Nadhim Zahawi
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention. Let me repeat again: there are no restrictions on the Committee requesting further information from the unit or from the Secretary of State.
Dr Lewis
Is this what the Minister wants? Every year, the Committee will request to have a comprehensive explanation of the security sensitive information that has underlain the different decisions that the unit has taken. All he is saying is that we can request this ad hoc every year and we will get it—I will believe that when I see it. If that were to be the case, there could be no possible objection to incorporating this in the legislation now so that it is not at the whim of a future Minister to either give us what we need or deny us what we need.
Nadhim Zahawi
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for his intervention and his powerful argument, but I just repeat that there are no restrictions on his Committee requesting that information.
Nadhim Zahawi
I will not give way. There is a lot to get through and time is short.
The Government will more generally monitor the operation of the regime and regularly review the contents of the annual reports, including in relation to academic research, spin-off enterprise or SMEs, and we will pay close attention to the resourcing and the timelines of the regime.
If, during any financial year, the assistance given under clause 30 totals £100 million or more, the Bill requires the Secretary of State to lay a report of the amount before the House. Requiring him to lay what would likely be a very similar report for every calendar year as well as for every financial year, which is in amendment 4, appears to be excessive in our view. He would likely have to give Parliament two very similar reports only a few months apart.
On amendment 5, I can reassure the House that, under clause 54, the Secretary of State would be subject to public law duties when deciding whether to share information with an overseas public authority. That includes a requirement to take all relevant considerations into account in making decisions. These are therefore considerations that the Secretary of State would already need to take into account in order to comply with public law duties.
Moving on to new clause 6, I want to be clear that we do not expect the regime to disproportionately affect SMEs, although we will of course closely monitor its impact. The Government have been happy to provide support to businesses both large and small through the contact address available on gov.uk. Furthermore, the factsheets make it clear what the measures in the proposed legislation are and to whom they apply, so there is real clarity on this. It would therefore not be necessary to provide the grace period for SMEs proposed under new clause 3 and neither would it be appropriate. Notifiable acquisitions by SMEs may well present national security concerns and this proposed new clause would, I am afraid, create a substantial loophole.
To conclude, although I am very grateful for the constructive and collegiate engagement from hon. and right hon. Members across the House, for the reasons that I have mentioned I cannot accept the amendments and new clauses tabled for this debate and therefore hope that they will agree to withdraw them.
Stewart Hosie [V]
This has been a detailed and considered debate. I thought there were some particularly thoughtful contributions from the Chair of the ISC and from the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) in relation to the oversight of sensitive and confidential information that should fall within the remit of the ISC. It was disappointing to hear the Minister’s response in his last contribution. My main concern, however, was to ensure that the scope of the Bill was appropriate and that the impact of the measures was proportionate, particularly for smaller businesses and for academia. Given what the Minister has just said about the regulations and procedures being under constant watch, with the Secretary of State having the flexibility to update them at any time, I am satisfied that, should we identify an overly burdensome course of action being taken in relation to small businesses or academia in the future, the Minister would respond swiftly. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 4
Framework for understanding national security
“When assessing a risk to national security for the purposes of this Act, the Secretary of State must have regard to factors including, but not restricted to—
(a) the potential impact of the trigger event on the UK’s defence capabilities and interests;
(b) whether the trigger event risks enabling a hostile actor to—
(i) gain control or significant influence of a part of a critical supply chain, critical national infrastructure, or natural resource;
(ii) conduct espionage via or exert undue leverage over the target entity;
(iii) obtain access to sensitive sites or to corrupt processes or systems;
(c) the characteristics of the acquirer, including whether it is effectively directly or indirectly under the control, or subject to the direction, of a foreign government;
(d) whether the trigger event adversely impacts the UK’s capability and capacity to maintain security of supply or strategic capability in sectors critical to the UK’s economy or creates a situation of significant economic dependency;
(e) the potential impact of the trigger event on the transfer of sensitive data, technology or potentially sensitive intellectual property in strategically important sectors, outside of the UK;
(f) the potential impact of the trigger event on the UK’s international interests and obligations, including compliance with UK legislation on modern slavery and compliance with the UN Genocide Convention;
(g) the potential of the trigger event to involve or facilitate significant illicit or subversive activities, including terrorism, organised crime, money laundering and tax evasion; and
(h) whether the trigger event may adversely impact the safety and security of UK citizens or the UK.”—(Tom Tugendhat.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Kwasi Kwarteng)
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
First, I would like to pay tribute to my immediate predecessor, my right hon. Friend—my very good friend—the Member for Reading West (Alok Sharma), who took the Bill through on Second Reading. I pay tribute to him for being such a motivating force behind this Bill, and also for providing excellent leadership in our Department up to only a couple of weeks ago. I wish him well, and I am sure he will continue the excellent work that he has already started as president of COP26, which I am sure will be a brilliant and vital success.
I would like to return to the very core of why we need this Bill. As my right hon. Friend told this House, the UK remains
“open for business, but being open for business does not mean that we are open to exploitation. An open approach to international investment must also include”—
has to include—
“appropriate safeguards to protect our national security.”—[Official Report, 17 November 2020; Vol. 684, c. 205.]
This Bill provides those safeguards.
Subject to the debate in the other place and the views of the other place, the Government will be automatically informed of certain acquisitions in key sectors and will be able to scrutinise a range of others across the economy. The Government will also be able to look at deals involving assets, including intellectual property, whose acquisition might pose a national security concern. There will be no thresholds for intervention, as there are currently under the Enterprise Act 2002. This means that acquisitions involving emerging innovative businesses will also be covered by the Bill. All this adds up to a significant upgrade to our abilities and powers to reflect the sweeping technological, economic and geopolitical changes across the globe over the past 20 years.
I would like to make further acknowledgement of the work done so ably by those from across the House and in my Department that has got us to this point. I thank the Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, my hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Nadhim Zahawi), and the Bill team for their fantastic work to date. He even managed to convince me. I know he is working flat out to ensure we can all return to normal before too long. I thank those who have ensured that the proceedings of this House continued without any disruption in the meantime. I therefore place on record, Mr Deputy Speaker, my thanks to you, to Madam Deputy Speaker, and to all the House staff who have ensured that today’s proceedings and previous stages of the Bill were undertaken with exemplary smoothness—no mean feat in the circumstances.
I also thank the members of the Public Bill Committee from across the House for their keen and diligent scrutiny of the Bill, and particularly its Chairs, the hon. Member for Halton (Derek Twigg) and my hon. Friend the Member for Altrincham and Sale West (Sir Graham Brady). I also thank all those who contributed to this very important debate. We heard from eminent Select Committee Chairs. My hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat) is no longer in his place, but I have known him for a very long time, and I was very pleased to hear his able contribution to this debate. I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee. His expertise is widely acknowledged across the House and was brought to bear in the proceedings.
In addition, we heard from Members from across the House, including my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes), and my hon. Friends the Members for Beckenham (Bob Stewart), for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely), for South Ribble (Katherine Fletcher) and for Arundel and South Downs (Andrew Griffith). The right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) is an acknowledged expert, and devotes himself to these highly important issues. There were also contributions I noted from the hon. Members for Aberavon (Stephen Kinnock), for Ilford South (Sam Tarry), for Liverpool, Riverside (Kim Johnson), for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western), for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross (Jamie Stone) and for Strangford (Jim Shannon). I thank all those right hon. and hon. Members for their important contributions.
Although there have been one or two differences, I have above all been struck by the broad consensus that has emerged across the House on the Bill, and by how important it is that we all agree that the Government should act in this area. There is a degree of debate about the details of the Bill. I thank the Opposition Front Benchers—the right hon. Member for Doncaster North (Edward Miliband) and the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah)—and the SNP spokesperson, the hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie). All have acknowledged the need for this crucial legislation. Broadly, they have approached the Bill in a constructive manner. For that, my right hon. Friend the Member for Reading West and I are and have been extremely grateful.
Returning to what my right hon. Friend the Member for Reading West said on Second Reading, this country has always been a beacon for inward investment and a champion of free trade. The Bill does not change that. It does not turn its back on that history, but it feels very apposite for me to say that prosperity and security should go hand in hand. The Bill really captures that insight and represents a proportionate approach to the threats we face in today’s world. On that basis, I commend the Bill to the House.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)
As this is the first time I have been in the Chair since your promotion and appearance at the Dispatch Box, I congratulate you on your new role.
Edward Miliband (Doncaster North) (Lab) [V]
May I begin by adding my congratulations to the new Secretary of State? Promotion to the Cabinet with such an important role as Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy must be a proud moment for him, and it is in the interests of the country that he succeeds, so I offer him my warmest congratulations. I also take the opportunity to pay tribute to his predecessor, the right hon. Member for Reading West (Alok Sharma). We all wish him incredibly well in his important job as the full-time president of COP26. He and I approached our exchanges in a constructive spirit, meeting, I hope, the mood of the times, and I hope that I can have the same relationship with the Secretary of State.
If you will allow me to, Mr Deputy Speaker, I extend our congratulations to President Biden and Vice-President Harris; I think it is right to, as they came to office only in the last hour. The world already feels a better, fairer, and safer place than it did yesterday.
In this Third Reading debate, let me make it clear that we welcome and support the Bill as a necessary step in protecting our national security interests. It is important that we legislate to ensure that our national security is preserved in the face of evolving geopolitical, economic and, in particular, technological threats. Our country has been behind the curve on this issue and behind our allies, so action is long overdue. The Bill represents a belated recognition that the country requires a stronger regime to protect its national security.
Protecting national security is the essential, first duty of any Government, but it is only the first building block of an industrial policy. Before I discuss the Bill in more detail and how I hope it will be improved in the other place, I emphasise to the Secretary of State that while it is welcome, it forms only one part, though a particularly important part, of protecting, developing and nurturing key sectors of our economy. There are much wider lessons on which we still need to act on industrial policy. That forms the essential context for the Bill, and I flag it to the Secretary of State, as it is early in his tenure.
I say this in the constructive spirit that I mentioned at the beginning of my speech: I gather that the Secretary of State has said that he is a convert to industrial policy after, if I can put it this way, his wilder, free-market days. The days of his notorious pamphlet, “Britannia Unchained”, are apparently over, but there are important lessons that we have to draw on; the most fundamental is that good words from Government on strategic, mission-led industrial policy are welcome, but too often they are still not matched by deeds. That has been clear during this economic crisis.
One example is the scale of support provided to our manufacturing sector. Time after time, I have spoken to manufacturers who look enviously at support in other countries and say that the Government are simply not in the same league. We see it, too, in plans for a green recovery; I am afraid that the stimulus offered by France, Germany and others puts us in the shade. Indeed, while we have been debating the Bill, President Biden has, on being inaugurated, made a $2 trillion commitment to the green economy.
Our takeover regime is not fit for purpose when it comes to matters well beyond national security, either, as events over the last decade have shown—for example, there was Pfizer’s attempted takeover of AstraZeneca, and SoftBank’s takeover of Arm.
It is clearer than ever that when it comes to the big challenges facing this country, from national security to the climate emergency and our future prosperity, an active industrial policy will be one of the most important tools in our arsenal. The challenge for the Secretary of State is to match his words on industrial policy with deeds, and we will judge him on that. We certainly need to drop the tired, failed cliché that all the state can do to support the economy is get out of the way, deregulate, and cut workers’ rights. If that is the Secretary of State’s view of how best to support our economy, let me tell him that we will fight him every step of the way.
On the Bill, we have approached the task of legislating constructively, and I am grateful to the Secretary of State for acknowledging that. I pay tribute in particular to my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah) for the brilliant job she has done in taking the Bill through the House on behalf of the Opposition. I also put on the record my thanks to my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), and my hon. Friends the Members for Southampton, Test (Dr Whitehead), for Ilford South (Sam Tarry), for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western), and for Aberavon (Stephen Kinnock), for their work on the Bill. I acknowledge the role of the Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Nadhim Zahawi), who has a big and important task relating to public health, and has also done an assiduous job on the Bill.
As we saw on Report, there are three particular ways in which Opposition Members believe that the Bill needs to be improved. I will briefly put them on the record, because they represent unfinished business for the other place. First, there is the issue of the definition of national security, and how it can be clarified for use in the Bill. We recognise, as we have said on a number of occasions, the difficulty of providing a comprehensive definition, given the evolving nature of the threats we face as a country. However, the Bill can and should provide greater clarity, not least for potential investors in the UK. I agree with the Secretary of State that it is important that our country be open for business.
That definition could be provided in the Bill or in other ways, and would be an essential source of reassurance for inward investors. The Foreign Affairs Committee published an excellent report on this yesterday, and as we saw on Report, there is agreement between the Opposition and that Committee on these issues. We hope the Government will continue to listen, and will act on this in the other place.
Secondly, support for business, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises, is vital if they are to navigate this new regime. As my colleagues said on Report, SMEs will account for an estimated 80% of mandatory notifications under the new system, according to the Government. Many small firms will struggle to navigate this new system. This comes at a time when hundreds of thousands of SMEs across the country are in perilous circumstances. That is why we called for dedicated help and support for SMEs—to ease the burden as this new system comes into effect. If we are serious about nurturing cutting-edge businesses in sectors such as robotics and quantum technologies, it is critical that SMEs in these industries are supported through the process.
Thirdly and finally, there is the crucial issue—it is worth spending time on this—of the resourcing, accountability and scrutiny of the newly created unit in the Department and its work. We all know from the experience of both parties in government that good intentions can be overwhelmed by challenges of practical delivery. Under this regime, the Government expect that there may be up to 1,830 notifications by businesses and individuals, with a further 70 to 100 being called in by the Secretary of State. The number could well be higher than that as businesses adjust to the new system. The Secretary of State has a big, profound responsibility, as I am sure he recognises, to make sure this system works.
It is also vital that the new regime be scrutinised and monitored. As we have said throughout the passage of the Bill, that should include a role for the Intelligence and Security Committee in providing an oversight mechanism, through which there is regular reporting to the House, and regular scrutiny of the working of the new unit. Secretary of State, our international allies do exactly that. The US, for example, requires oversight of CFIUS in exactly this way. The Chair of the ISC, the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), said that the Committee is open to this idea. It is not about simply saying to the ISC that it can have a look at this if it wants to. It needs a proper, acknowledged role in this. It is in all our interests, and indeed the Secretary of State’s, that the ISC performs this role. That would reassure businesses in this country that there is proper scrutiny—undertaken in the right way, given the constraints around national security—of the working of this new regime. I hope the Secretary of State will ponder this matter and keep it under review. I am sure that it will be raised in the other place.
To conclude, we support the Bill as a necessary measure to protect our national security interests from evolving threats. We do so hoping that the Government have heard the constructive concerns that we have raised throughout the passage of the Bill and will continue to raise and that Members in the other place will raise, because I believe we can build on and improve the Bill as it progresses. We believe—I emphasise this point—that this is the first step for the active industrial policy that our country needs. It only marks the start of what is required.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)
I would like to add my congratulations to the 46th President of the United States of America. In the past, I have worked on three presidential elections. I congratulate both Joe Biden and his Vice-President, Kamala Harris. I am certain that when they visit the United Kingdom, they will be guaranteed a very warm welcome.
Dr Julian Lewis
Mr Deputy Speaker, may I begin this short contribution by warmly endorsing what you had to say by way of congratulations to the new Secretary of State? He is genuinely one of the most popular Members in any part of the House, and I am sure that his delayed but nevertheless entirely merited accession to the Cabinet was greeted with wide acclamation.
The best must never be allowed to be the enemy of the good. This is a good Bill, but there are, as the right hon. Member for Doncaster North (Edward Miliband) said, opportunities for it to be improved further in another place, which I hope will happen. It is never good form to repeat from the lengthier preliminary stages what one has said in any detail in the final Third Reading debate, so I will just quote one small extract from the memorandum of understanding between the Prime Minister and the ISC, which the Secretary of State may not have heard me read earlier. Paragraph 8 of the memorandum of understanding says:
“only the ISC is in a position to scrutinise effectively the work of the Agencies and of those parts of Departments”—
meaning other Departments such as his—
“whose work is directly concerned with intelligence and security matters.”
On Report, the Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, my hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Nadhim Zahawi), said that it will be open to the ISC to request the secret information that cannot be published. That is a great step forward, and I thank him for it genuinely, because previously there were remarks to the effect that the ISC’s writ did not run anywhere near the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. That appears to have been dropped, and that is a big step forward.
The reason why it is necessary to recognise this is not that we want to make extra work for ourselves. It is because we entirely agree with the Government that the security threats constantly change, morph and spread themselves out into different areas of activity and, inevitably therefore, into different areas for which different Departments have responsibility. We cannot possibly do our job of inspecting and scrutinising those parts of security issue information that have to be classified if we are not allowed to go into those Departments only in so far as that type of information has spread with a new threat into a different Department. If the Government are saying—and I see some nodding heads on the Front Bench—that it is now accepted that the ISC can ask the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy for this sort of information, that is a huge step forward, and we thank the Government for it. We still believe that it would be better for it to be formalised in the way that Sir Richard Dearlove suggested in Committee.
I will conclude with a message that I would like the Ministers to take to their colleagues in the Cabinet Office. The Cabinet Office seems to have a strange sort of fear of the Intelligence and Security Committee, because every time we try to do our job, it seems to want to push back. The message I wish to give to them is this: “Friends, colleagues—comrades, even—of the Cabinet Office, the ISC is not your enemy. We are your constructively critical friends. You know what? Sometimes we get it right: we got it right over Huawei. It would have been good if successive Governments had listened a bit earlier over Huawei, but they got there in the end. If you lock us out, you are simply shutting off a safety valve and a mechanism for correcting mistakes that you need not make. Don’t make that mistake again. Apart from that, congratulations on a very good Bill indeed.”
Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP) [V]
I also offer my congratulations to the Secretary of State on his promotion. I thank all the staff who have worked on the Bill so far and the businesses, trade bodies and others that advised on what might or might not be good about the legislation as it has gone through its stages. Finally, I thank Members from all parties—not just those who took part in the set piece debates, but those who put in a shift in Committee as well. They did a fantastic job.
In this short Third Reading speech, I should say briefly that I share the general agreement that this legislation is not just necessary—it is—but overdue. There is a broad consensus that that is the case. Changes may yet be made in the other place—including, I hope, as we just heard from the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, a formal role for the ISC—but whether those changes happen or not, we must now all hope that this legislation will go on to deliver the anticipated additional national security benefits. As that happens, the Government must also step in quickly if the impact of the Bill starts to chill vital investment across different areas of the economy.
I am sure that the first part will happen: that the national security benefits will be there and obvious for all to see. We must all, however, be on our guard and realise that the burdens that we are placing on businesses —to notify when investment is happening or to have investment called in subsequently—may chill investment. We must all guard against that to make sure that, as well as there being additional security for those in the UK, businesses can continue to grow, thrive and seek the investment they need.
Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)
I will make four quick points. The first is that I am pleased that we have improved the prospects for national security through this Bill. Well done, everyone! My second point is that I am also pleased that the Intelligence and Security Committee will have some role in the oversight of sensitive investment decisions, albeit in retrospect. I fully expect that to happen, as the Chair of the ISC has already suggested and the Minister has accepted.
My third point is that I am clear that the new investment security unit will have to have close links with the security services—probably with liaison officers. I make my final point as a member of the ISC. I guarantee that our job is simple: to ensure that the pro-business outlook of the Government is tempered, if necessary, by the requirements of national security.
Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)
I start by congratulating the Secretary of State on his appointment; I wish him well in the years to come. I also thank the Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Nadhim Zahawi), for how he has conducted himself during the Bill—I just say that Chester-le-Street would be a lot happier if extra vaccines arrived this week. I just wanted to get that plug in yet again.
I also thank my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah), who has led on this Bill for Her Majesty’s Opposition. Following the comments from the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) about the scrutiny of this Act, once the Bill becomes one, I welcome the recognition that the ISC has a role. The Minister, in response to me and the right hon. Gentleman, said that there is nothing to stop the ISC asking the Business Secretary to come before it or asking for information on the Bill. I do not for one minute doubt the integrity of the two Ministers, but they—like me and us all—are, to use a Robin Day phrase, “here today, gone tomorrow” politicians. Legislation has to stand for a length of time in terms of different Ministers and people who will look at it. The only way to do that is to formalise this.
If we were asking, in terms of the ISC, for an overcomplicated system or something that was completely alien to the culture of scrutiny, I could accept that, but we are not. As the right hon. Gentleman said, the mechanism is there already. All we have to do is enact it. That means that when the two Ministers and I have moved on, and when even the Chair of the ISC has gone on to greater and better things, there will be a mechanism in place to ensure that there is parliamentary scrutiny of those decisions, because some will be very controversial. As I said on Report, there is no way in which the ISC wants to act as a regulator or to have some veto over decisions—it is for Ministers to do that—but it is important to ensure that Parliament has oversight of those decisions. The only Committee that can do that is the ISC, because of its security classification.
I join the Chair of the ISC in saying to the Secretary of State: this is about standing up to the Cabinet Office. On the idea that the ISC can ask for information, sometimes getting information that, actually, we are entitled to see, is like getting blood out of a stone. If we formalised that, as suggested by the Chair of the ISC, it would give oversight of the decisions taken, which would strengthen the decision-making process and ensure that we could at least see what intelligence is there; no one else could see it, apart from the Ministers taking the decisions obviously. That would strengthen the entire process, so I ask the Secretary of State to reflect on the matter, as clearly it will come up again when the Bill goes to the other place.
There is a tendency, which I never liked when the Labour party was in government, for suggestions to be put forward in this place and the Government then to leave things to be changed in the other place, as though it is somehow a sign of failure on behalf of a governing party—I aim this not just at this Government but at any Government. It is as though, if a Bill is amended by a suggestion from the Opposition or anyone else, it is somehow, in this place, a sign of weakness and failure. It is not. That is what we are here to do. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Doncaster North (Edward Miliband) said, this is a very important Bill, which has cross-party support. Anything that we can do to improve it is not being done from a point of criticism of the Government. We are trying to improve the Bill, and the suggestion from the right hon. Member for New Forest East would do that. It is simple, so I ask the Secretary of State seriously to reflect on it.
In conclusion, I finish where I began by welcoming the Secretary of State and wishing him well in the job that he has before him.
Simon Baynes (Clwyd South) (Con) [V]
Having had the privilege of serving on the Bill Committee, and therefore having analysed it in detail, I believe the Bill ensures that the Government have the necessary powers to scrutinise and intervene in business transactions, such as takeovers, to protect national security. I, too, welcome the Secretary of State to his new role, and congratulate the Ministers, their team, the parliamentary Committees and everyone else involved in preparing this legislation with such care and inclusivity in respect of views and opinions. I respect the Opposition’s constructive approach in Committee and in today’s debate.
Having worked in the financial sector for 25 years before becoming an MP, I believe the Bill provides investors and businesses with the certainty and transparency they need to do business in the UK. As the Conservative small business ambassador for Wales, who strongly believes in the importance of free trade and foreign direct investment for businesses in my constituency, Clwyd South, and in the rest of Wales and the UK, I consider that the Bill strikes the right balance between protecting national security and preserving the position of the UK as an open and liberal international trading partner. Indeed, I would go further and say that the Bill’s provisions strengthen the UK’s position as an attractive place to invest. We are not alone in making such reforms; many of our allies have modernised their investment-screening regimes in recent years, which will mean that investors will be familiar with the approach in the Bill.
In my previous career in finance, I saw at first hand the crucial importance and attraction to overseas investors and companies of the UK’s established legal system, highly competitive tax regime and stable regulatory framework. The Bill reinforces these invaluable assets for the UK by updating our regulatory approach. Having heard many submissions by expert witnesses in the Bill Committee stage, I am convinced that the Bill will also make interaction with Government much simpler and more transparent for businesses and investors, enabling legitimate investments to be screened much more quickly than they are under the current regime.
The Bill is not a signal that the Government have reduced their appetite for foreign investment, but is a proportionate response to the small number of transactions that raise national security threats. One of the most striking parts of the Bill Committee was hearing the severe warnings from experts such as Sir Richard Dearlove about the minority of individuals and regimes that seek to use foreign investment to undermine our national security. The Bill will ensure that that does not happen.
UK citizens’ safety and our economy rely on the Government’s protecting security, and it is only right that with new threats, new powers are put into place to achieve that. If the Government took no further action, unchecked hostile behaviour could leave the UK vulnerable to disruption, unfair leverage and espionage. We cannot let that happen, so I am pleased to support wholeheartedly the Third Reading of the Bill, which brings a much-needed update to the Government’s investment-screening powers, most of which date from 2002 and are not suited to the new world and the modern threats that we face. The Bill is proportionate and measured and will provide much needed long-term security for the UK as one of the most attractive and dynamic countries in which to invest in the world.
Jim Shannon
On behalf of the Democratic Unionist party, I congratulate the Secretary of State on his elevation. It is a well-deserved promotion, so congratulations and well done.
May I echo your comments, Mr Deputy Speaker, in relation to the election of the President of the United States, Joe Biden, and his Vice-President, Kamala Harris? I wish them both well and hope they have a very strong relationship over the next few years.
We are all aware that the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Defence Committee both launched inquiries in 2020 that touch on concerns relating to the current Competition and Markets Authority regime. As the Library briefing for this debate makes clear:
“Comments from the Chairs of the inquiries indicated that there could be support for a strengthened regime in order to protect national security”;
I believe that today the Government and the Secretary of State have ensured that. However, neither Committee has yet reported in full, and I am keen to see their recommendations and findings being part of the foundation of any change in legislation. I know that the Government and particularly the Secretary of State, like me, highly value the work of those Committees and the findings that they present. I would be interested to see the work undertaken by those renowned Committees in tandem with the Bill to ensure that we achieve a holistic approach to this matter of national security.
Will the Secretary of State outline how he believes that those concerns are addressed in the Bill? What surety and certainty can we have, for example, that a small independent business that is setting up in Ards business centre in my constituency—a family-run business, with an American investor who is a close family friend—will not fall foul of this legislation, and that the Bill will not prevent investment by foreign investors in Northern Ireland, which undoubtedly has the UK’s most attractive investment potential? I would say that, of course, but I believe it to be the case as well.
Some have questioned this radical overhaul, particularly given that only 12 national security investigations have been undertaken under the existing regime. There are also concerns, I believe, that the expanded notification system will lead to a dramatic increase in cases subject to review, leading to bureaucracy as well as delay and doubts for potential investment decisions—a situation that might discourage investment. Again, can the Secretary of State assure us that investment will be encouraged? The impact assessment published alongside the Bill indicates that there could be 1,000 to 1,830 transactions notified under the new system each year.
Those are some queries—fundamental questions, too—that I believe deserve acknowledgement and a response, so I would sincerely appreciate it if the Secretary of State gave further assurances that we are equipped and ready to deal with these changes, and that we will not lose investment at a time when the need to rebuild is stronger than at any time since the second world war.
We need investment, but I agree with the Government that the security of our nation is paramount. I give my full support in that aim to the Secretary of State and our Government, and I trust that they will enable investment in areas that are straightforward, without backlogs or delays.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)
In order for Members to leave the Chamber safely and others to come in, and for the sanitisation of both Dispatch Boxes, I will suspend the sitting for a few minutes.
National Security and Investment Bill
Thursday 4th February 2021
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 20 January 2021 - (large version) - (20 Jan 2021)
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Lord Callanan) (Con)
My Lords, this Bill represents a major upgrade to the Government’s powers to screen certain acquisitions on national security grounds. Through the new investment security unit within my department, the new regime provided for by the Bill will act as a vital new tool in the Government’s armoury to protect national security in a rapidly changing world. The UK’s current powers to intervene when mergers or acquisitions pose national security threats date from the Enterprise Act 2002. Apart from some limited exceptions, businesses must have a UK turnover of £70 million or meet a share-of-supply test for government intervention.
The world is of course a very different place now compared to when the Enterprise Act received Royal Assent in November 2002. When it comes to investment, we are seeing novel means to undermine the UK’s national security that go beyond traditional mergers and acquisitions and the reach of our current powers. The case for action in this area could therefore not be clearer.
The Government have carefully considered these reforms over time. We first published a Green Paper in October 2017, followed by a White Paper in July 2018. We have further considered what powers are necessary to reflect the modern economic and investment landscape in the UK. The Bill before us today is the culmination of all that work.
However, none of the provisions in the Bill change the Government’s position when it comes to foreign investment into the UK. Simply put, the UK economy thrives as a result of foreign direct investment. Since 2010-11 over 600,000 new jobs have been created thanks to more than 16,000 foreign direct investment projects. Inward investment stimulates economic growth in every part of our United Kingdom. In 2019-20 over 39,000 jobs were created in England thanks to FDI projects, with over 26,000 over those jobs coming outside London.
We have designed the regime with business in mind. For the first time, timelines for assessments will be set out in law, not decided by the Government on a case-by-case basis. This will give businesses certainty about the length of the assessments that they are subject to, and the Government will be able to revisit decisions only in exceptional circumstances.
The Bill brings our approach into line with many of our closest allies, including the United States, Canada, Australia, France and Germany, but it does not represent any change in our appetite for investment coming into this country from overseas. I will now go through some of its main provisions. Chapter 1 of Part 1 of the Bill provides for a “call-in” power that the Secretary of State will be able to exercise if he reasonably suspects that a trigger event has taken or may take place that could give rise to a risk to national security. Any decision to use that call-in power could follow the receipt of a notification from parties, or could be a proactive choice on the part of the Secretary of State if an unnotified acquisition meets the relevant criteria.
The call-in power must be exercised within six months of the Secretary of State becoming aware of an acquisition, and within five years if he was not made aware of it. However, the five-year limit does not apply to acquisitions subject to mandatory notification. The scope of the call-in power applies to trigger events taking place from 12 November 2020—that is, the day following the Bill’s First Reading in the other place. This is to ensure that no acquisition can be accelerated to avoid scrutiny while the Bill is making its way through Parliament.
Before the call-in power can be used, the Secretary of State must lay a Statement before Parliament setting out how he expects to exercise the power. The Secretary of State published a draft of such a Statement when the Bill was introduced in the other place. I must be clear to the House that the criteria for use of the call-in power are deliberately tightly drawn on the grounds of national security, and the Government have no intention to widen this to introduce any further “public interest” criteria.
Chapter 2 of Part 1 sets out the trigger events that are subject to the scope of the call-in power. There are broadly two types of trigger events: first, the acquisition of control over entities such as companies, limited liability partnerships and trusts; and, secondly, the acquisition of control over assets, including land and intellectual property.
In respect of entities, the Bill sets out situations where the acquisition of certain levels of shares or votes constitute trigger events. I will not set out the individual thresholds to the House now, but broadly speaking they correspond to the ability of parties to pass or block types of company resolution. The Bill also retains the concept of “material influence” over an entity, as used in the Enterprise Act 2002, as a trigger event for the purposes of the Bill.
When it comes to assets, trigger events occur when parties are able to use a qualifying asset or to direct or control how it is used. Chapter 2 also sets out instances where notifying the Secretary of State of some acquisitions in certain sectors is mandatory. Again, I will not explore each one in detail, but the Government have been careful to ensure that only those scenarios where parties can reasonably self-assess whether their acquisition qualifies are captured.
Parties involved in acquisitions that do not meet the criteria for mandatory notification, but which believe that they could pose a national security risk, will be encouraged to submit a voluntary notification to the Government. The Secretary of State will need to take a decision on whether to call in an acquisition for a full national security assessment within 30 working days of accepting a notification, or instead let it proceed. Once he has taken this decision, he cannot revisit it unless false or misleading information has been provided.
To ensure that mandatory notification continues to work as envisaged in the future, the Government propose taking a power to be able to update the situations where notification is mandatory. The power would also allow the Government to exempt certain types of investor from mandatory notification requirements.
In terms of the sectors where some acquisitions will be subject to mandatory notification, the former Secretary of State published a consultation alongside the Bill introduction on the statutory definitions of the proposed 17 sectors. That consultation closed on 6 January of this year. We have had a good number of responses and I thank all of those who took the time to provide valuable insights. We are now working hard to respond to that consultation and to bring forward draft regulations for consideration as the Bill goes through this House.
I would like to stay with mandatory notification for a minute or two longer. Chapters 3 and 4 of Part 1 set out the mechanics of mandatory notification and the consequences of proceeding with a notifiable acquisition without clearance from the Secretary of State. Put simply, if parties proceed with such an acquisition, it has no effect in law. The Government recognise that this approach represents a harsh deterrent to parties that do not comply, willingly or otherwise. I will make just two points on this. First, it is vital for our national security that parties are strongly disincentivised from trying to avoid scrutiny by this regime. This is even more pressing in the sectors of the economy where the notification of certain acquisitions is mandatory. Secondly, affected parties will have recourse to apply to the Secretary of State for retrospective validation of such acquisitions, as set out in Clause 16.
Clause 15 also obliges the Secretary of State to either call in a non-notified mandatory acquisition or retrospectively validate it once he becomes aware of it, if no national security risks arise. Clause 17 obliges him to retrospectively validate a non-notified acquisition if it is called in and subsequently cleared to proceed. The Secretary of State cannot, in other words, simply allow an acquisition to remain void once he becomes aware of it: he must take action, either to grant clearance and retrospectively validate it, or impose remedies. It has to be this way around: that is to say that non-notified acquisitions should be able to be retrospectively validated, rather than retrospectively invalidated.
The remainder of Part 1 provides for a voluntary notification mechanism whereby parties can formally submit a notification to Government. As with mandatory notification, once the Secretary of State has taken a decision to let an acquisition proceed, he cannot revisit that decision unless false or misleading information has been provided. The Government are committed to giving parties clarity when it comes to this regime and voluntary notification is a key part of that. The Bill also provides for information-gathering powers for the Secretary of State to be able to come to fully informed decisions. There are also safeguards on the use and disclosure of such information.
I turn to Part 2, which provides for the assessment process and any remedies following a call-in. The Bill provides for an initial assessment period of 30 working days once a call-in notice has been given, with an additional period of 45 working days. A further voluntary period is possible if certain criteria are met. I believe this represents a significant improvement on the current process under the Enterprise Act 2002, whereby the Secretary of State sets the assessment timetable on a case-by-case basis. For the first time, timelines for assessment will be set out in statute so that investors can build them into their own plans.
In the course of the assessment period, the Secretary of State may wish to impose interim orders to mitigate any national security risks that could arise as he undertakes this investigation. Such orders could be imposed, for example, to stop or prevent parties doing certain things that they would normally do prior to completing an acquisition, such as exchanging sensitive information. At the end of the assessment period, the Secretary of State must either give a final notification to allow the acquisition to proceed, or a final order if he believes that national security risks could arise as a result of the acquisition. All orders must be kept under review and parties are free to request that they are varied or revoked.
The Secretary of State will be supported in making decisions by the investment security unit which, as I said earlier, is being set up within my department. This new unit will be fully resourced to manage the administrative process for screening notifications and undertaking national security assessments. It will draw on expertise from across government and from the security services. If noble Lords permit, I will go through the rest of the Bill a bit more swiftly as I know there are many who wish to speak in this important debate.
Part 3 provides for a range of offences, along with associated criminal and civil sanctions, although I expect criminal cases in relation to offences committed under the regime to be exceptionally rare. Parties will, of course, have recourse to judicial review in relation to certain decisions made under the regime. Parts 4 and 5 of the Bill contain a number of miscellaneous provisions. Clauses 54 to 56 provide for smooth and timely information sharing when relevant between the Government and overseas public authorities, HMRC and the CMA. These are important clauses to ensure that time is not lost to administrative red tape and that information is appropriately handled.
Clause 61 provides for an annual report to Parliament, which will provide details of the number of notifications received, the number of call-in notices given and the sectors of the economy where they were served, among others. I will return finally to the fundamentals of the Bill before us. It is imperative for any Government to have the tools they need to protect national security in what is a rapidly changing world. This Bill will keep the British people safe. I beg to move.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
I thank the Minister for introducing the Bill. He will be pleased to know that, as he will have gathered from its passage through the Commons, the Opposition are fully supportive —we might even say “at last”. We will, however, be wanting to make a few changes to ensure that it works even better than the Government envisage.
Today’s debate, not unusually for your Lordships’ House, will bring together an experienced group of speakers with expertise in industry, defence and security. I particularly look forward to the maiden speech of my noble friend Lord Woodley, who will speak from his own knowledge of the field. Some of his former trade union members, whom he represented, worked in defence sectors and thus played their role in the defence of the realm.
We hardly need to repeat that national security is the number one priority for any Government. We welcome the changes the Bill makes to ensure that investment, whether in companies, land, assets or know-how, never jeopardises our security. Our only surprise, as my honourable friend Chi Onwurah pointed out in the Commons, was that the impact assessment
“regrets that national security is an area of market failure requiring that the Government do something about it.”
As she said about that quite astonishing claim:
“National security is not a private concern first and a Government afterthought second. National security is the first reason for Government. It is not undersupplied by the market; it is outside the market altogether.” —[Official Report, Commons, 20/1/21; col. 998]
Putting that to one side, we welcome the new and updated regime for intervening in business transactions that might raise national security concerns. We applaud both the requirement for automatic pre-acquisition referrals in some areas, as well as a voluntary notification system and the ability to call in acquisitions of sensitive entities and assets where it is thought they need a national security assessment.
I do, however, wonder whether sufficient thought has been given not just to tangible or IP assets but to the brain power which is vital to dealing with the security threats of today. It is not simply a matter of retaining domestic control over key assets, but also of ensuring that we grow and nurture the skill sets needed for this rapidly changing technology, where we need ability and domestic capability here in the UK. Could the Minister reflect on this when he comes to reply? Could he also comment on whether crucial national infrastructure is likely to be covered in the automatic notification part?
The Bill as it stands should be capable, subject to some issues over capacity which my noble friend Lord Grantchester will address when he winds, of protecting vital security interests. Our questions are twofold. First, they are about the security capability and cross-departmental working within BEIS. Secondly, they are about parliamentary scrutiny, which appears woefully thin.
Much of the business department’s work is to foster and promote inward investment, for the best of reasons. The UK has twice the direct foreign investment of France or Germany. That is good for our economy but potentially risky for security. Because of that dual responsibility, it is surely challenging to give the business department almost the opposite role to that of a cheerleader for investment: to check and sometimes prevent such investment. Indeed, it almost looks like a potential case of moral hazard. Can the Minister confirm that, at least, there will be strict Chinese walls within the department?
Perhaps even more fundamentally, it is hard to see how the Minister’s department can be close enough to departments dealing with land use, defence, supply chains, higher education, foreign relations, transport, science and medicine to be fully aware of what is happening across those areas. Traditionally it has been the Cabinet Office that handles such significant cross-departmental or multiagency working.
Having looked carefully at the draft Statement setting out the three types of risk to be considered by the Business Secretary—the target risk, a trigger event, and the acquirer risk, according to the Minister—it is clear that while judgments as to degree of ownership or control of a business fall within his department’s expertise, some of the other security judgments listed, such as the hostility of a particular state or knowledge of our security services, are not among those traditionally made by business specialists. The backgrounds and expertise of the advising personnel will need to be drawn from across other departments, and many of them will require high-grade security clearance. The decisions taken will be serious and could impact on our international and diplomatic relations, including with close allies.
I recognise that this remit has been with the business department to date, but the increased remit of the Bill—the sheer number of cases and their increased sensitivity—makes the future quite different from what was correct in 2002. Is the Minister therefore confident that the passing on of intelligence and advice from around Whitehall will work smoothly in the new set-up?
Allied to the nature of this work is my second question, which is about whether the Bill allows for adequate parliamentary scrutiny of the decisions which will fall to the business department. A strong case was made in the Commons for the Intelligence and Security Committee to be given an explicit role in scrutinising the working of the Bill; indeed, its chair spelled out very clearly how it was well within the committee’s terms of reference to handle it.
The response of the Minister in the Commons was rather disappointing, to say the least. He said that the Intelligence and Security Committee could ask for extra information or invite the Minister to attend if it wanted. However, as a Nobel laureate commented
“they do not know what they do not know.”
Indeed: the committee will not know what it has not been told until and unless it sees a report. The Intelligence and Security Committee, with its security clearance, would be able to do a proper job on behalf of Parliament in seeing how these powers are—or indeed are not—being used.
We need therefore to amend the Bill, along the lines suggested in the Commons, to ensure that reports are made to the Intelligence and Security Committee. Perhaps the Minister could reflect on whether this would be best achieved via a government amendment.
We welcome the Bill, which, as I said, is in some ways sorely overdue. We will scrutinise it seriously and call for changes to be made, particularly in relation to parliamentary scrutiny and ensuring that the new unit has the skill set, working methods and resources to ensure that its decisions are timely, cross-departmental and forward-looking, so that it safeguards our future security. I look forward to working with the Minister as we take the Bill through the House.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD) [V]
I too thank the Minister for his comprehensive introduction. I declare an interest as a member of the advisory board of the corporate finance faculty of the ICAEW, whose members comprise business owners, advisers to business and investors.
I believe that there will be little argument during the Bill’s passage about the principle involved of protecting national security. There will, however, be considerable debate about its scope and practical operation. Foreign investment is crucial to UK businesses and the economy. On these Benches we accept that it is important to put in place legislation to protect against national security risks posed by such investment. But this is a major change from previous provisions under the Enterprise Act, and must be done in a way that is workable and does not deter productive investment.
The Government have argued that it is necessary to give the Secretary of State greater powers to scrutinise investment in the UK, considering the technological, economic and geopolitical changes that have taken place over the past 20 years. However, the scope of the Bill and of the Secretary of State’s powers risk being far too broad, while lacking any industrial strategy to frame them or any clear geopolitical focus. Indeed, there is no definition of what constitutes national security.
How too will the Bill fit within the integrated review? Ministers have made it clear that the Bill is about the protection of national security, not national interest—but where does national security end and economic or commercial security, or critical infrastructure, begin? Will there be overlap between regulators, such as between the ISU and the CMA?
There is also the retrospectivity, which goes back to November and could already be having a chilling effect on inward investment and causing uncertainty in the investment community, not least in pension funds. For such funds the investment environment is crucial, and as a university chair I am only too well aware of the concerns expressed by USS. As the largest private pension fund in the country, its concerns should be taken very seriously. Arguably even more importantly, as the Russell Group has pointed out, the Bill could have a potentially damaging impact on university/business collaborations.
Many of my noble friends will focus on these issues in today’s debate. The key elements needed to achieve the balance required of the new regime will be achieved by pre-empting and mitigating the inevitable risks for the market by setting out a clearly defined scope. The Government have engaged in a long—some would say leisurely—process of Green Paper and White Paper consultation leading up to this Bill over the past three and a half years, but there is still a great deal of uncertainty around how it will work in practice.
The current sectors, as set out in the consultation, are incredibly broad. For instance, in respect of AI, the development of which I am reasonably familiar with, the definition is so wide that it captures any company developing any kind of application involving machine learning or deep neural networks.
We look forward to seeing the outcome of the promised consultation during the passage of the Bill, but we need to considerably narrow the width of the sectors captured. This in itself would not resolve the fact that many, if not most, technologies have both civilian and security uses, which potentially opens every deal to challenge. Taking dual-use biotechnologies as an example, how do we manage national security concerns without stifling innovation?
We also need to question the low thresholds adopted for market share and turnover, and the generous time given to the Secretary of State to intervene—especially given the Secretary of State’s quasi-judicial powers.
We need to reduce uncertainty to a minimum. Even a mandatory notification system for transactions means instituting an open pre-consultation process with market participants. In particular, it is essential, as the ICAEW has emphasised throughout, that the investment security unit publishes meaningful market guidance notes akin to the practice notes published alongside, but not as part of, the takeover code.
The Bill includes the requirement for the ISU to publish an annual report, but formal guidance will be much more useful, and, as they say, it is an important way of dealing with asymmetry of information among the investment and advisory community. A particularly good example will be in respect of trigger events that involve securing influence or control over qualifying intangible assets, such as know-how and intellectual property. It is possible to gain access to intellectual property through means other than ownership, so the question is: how might those intangible assets be applied in ways that could prejudice our national security in some way? The new unit may initially assess that on a case-by-case basis, but it will need to quickly come to establish a basis of precedent for its decisions. Along with the corporate finance community, I believe that the requirement for market guidance notes should be incorporated in the Bill.
All this means properly resourcing the ISU, which will need to determine which of some 1,000 to 1,800 transactions are to be analysed: 70 to 95, it seems, although many think this an underestimate. This compares to just 12 acquisitions reviewed under the Enterprise Act’s national security provisions since 2002. Otherwise, this will result in a huge number of mandatory notifications, which will overwhelm the new unit. The bottom line is that we need to make sure that a proportionate and last-resort approach is applied to government scrutiny of, and intervention in, these transactions.
In addition, given the low turnover thresholds involved—I have noted the Commons debate—many of us are concerned about the impact on SMEs. The impact assessment suggests that “80% of transactions” in the scope of mandatory notification under the Bill would involve SMEs. However, the assessment failed to consider the costs faced by the acquired companies or the impact on funding for start-ups.
However much we try to circumscribe the Bill, it will not always be possible to reduce uncertainty and risk. It will depend on the culture of the ISU to a great extent as well, so, when considering the Bill, we should heed the warning of John Fingleton, former chief executive of the Office of Fair Trading, in his recent article in the Financial Times. We must not let this Bill become an investment killer; it needs to be very clearly targeted and proportionate. I look forward to the debate and the Minister’s reply.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
I remind the House of my interests as recorded in the register.
I am instinctively against all forms of protectionism, including those that apply to inward investment. Our current minimalist framework, set out in the Enterprise Act 2002, with a few recent tweaks, has served us well. As my noble friend the Minister has reminded us, the UK has benefited considerably from inward investment: UK companies with foreign direct investment links accounted for over 30% of UK employment and 40% of GVA, according to the latest detailed analysis by the ONS. Our investment partners, led by the US, are very largely from similar open democracies.
However, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, that the security of our nation is the top priority for any Government, and that is why this Bill has my support. It is our duty as Parliament to ensure that the Government have the powers they need to keep us secure.
Most investments are undertaken with a sound commercial logic, but we know that not all investment is driven this way. In particular, it is right to question the investment motives of organisations within states that do not share our values—or, to put it more directly, assets that are important for our security should not fall under the influence of China or Russia—and a few other states, although they do not on the whole have the resources to make significant acquisitions. I support the Government having powers to achieve that.
At the same time, we must ensure that the Government’s powers are proportionate to the threats and that they do not have unintended consequences. This is especially important in the context of the major economic renewal that is necessary as we deal with the pain inflicted on our economy by the Government’s lockdown policies.
I have some reservations about the Bill, which I look forward to exploring further in Committee. The first—which has been mentioned—is about whether the wording of the Bill gives the Government a secure armoury. It is firmly framed in terms of “national security”, but that is not defined in it, and there are no powers in it to do so. I believe that this is too important to be left to the courts. Instead, the Secretary of State will make a Statement about how he will use the power to call in transactions, including the sectors to be targeted, but Parliament’s involvement is only via the negative procedure. That feels weak.
I also have a concern that the Government’s current view of “national security” is insufficiently comprehensive. The Government are consulting on 17 sectors on which they plan to focus the new powers. While that sounds like a lot, the list does not coincide with the separate list of critical national infrastructure, drawn up by the Government’s Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure. In particular, I cite water and financial services: two quick ways to bring the country grinding to a halt are a lack of clean water supplies and the failure of payment systems. Why would the Government not want to be notified about potential takeovers of major players in these industry sectors as well?
I am concerned about the Bill’s impact on investment in both large and small companies—this has already been mentioned. I fear that the necessary power to block transactions that are undesirable on national security grounds could have a traumatic impact on investment transactions more broadly, and indeed I fear that the UK may lose its reputation as a good place to invest.
It will obviously be necessary for all the mandatory notifications to be handled efficiently, but the volumes will be critical to this. The impact statement has some very wide ranges in terms of the number of transactions that need to be handled, and the Government have very little idea about the volumes of asset rather than share-based transactions, which will come within the ambit of the Bill.
I am absolutely sure that, if there is any possibility of a transaction being within the scope of the legislation, lawyers will recommend notification; the penalties involved make this a no-brainer. If you add to that precautionary voluntary notifications, There could be very large volumes of notifications and they will not be confined to the early days, as people get familiar with the topic, because the risks to transactions will remain throughout the life of this legislation. We will need to explore in Committee how best to ensure that the system is not overwhelmed, with resultant harm to investment activity generally.
The core purpose of this Bill is good, and that is why I support it, but it will need careful scrutiny in Committee to ensure that the balance is right between protecting the UK’s security and growing the economy.
Viscount Waverley (CB)
My Lords, business investment will be central to shaping our competitive and dynamic economy. I am attracted to this Bill because it is a further building block in defining the country we are becoming in a new-look UK. After passing through the parliamentary labyrinth, the Bill should ensure that the UK remains one of the world’s top destinations for foreign investment, which is achieved by maximising its attractiveness for investment, while safeguarding our national security. The Government are setting out our stall with clear messaging of being a force for good, and they are setting an example to the world that we are not just open for business but mindful of standards and accountability.
Care should be taken, however, that safeguards do not unintendedly hamper UK competitiveness or limit investment that does not pose a national security risk. I concur with what the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, said. The mandatory reporting regime for transactions should be narrow and based on evidence of real risk, and should not result in unintended consequences.
The Government’s call-in power under the Bill will be proportionate, sufficient to address any residual concerns that could arise in relation to transactions involving active or passive infrastructure. There are challenges, however, regarding the call-in power, which provides for the Secretary of State to call in transactions triggered by a person gaining control of a qualifying entity or qualifying asset that is considered to give rise to a national security risk. A significant extraterritorial impact also arises from the drafting of Clause 7(6), as these call-in powers could be construed to apply to every export deal from the UK to overseas. Understandably, UK exporters and overseas customers will want to mitigate the risk of call-in by the UK Government, so removing ambiguity from the scope of the call-in power is important—all the more reason to ensure that extraterritorial reach does not become an inadvertent consequence of any ambiguity in the drafting and interpretation.
As things stand, the likelihood is that UK exporters, particularly in sensitive sectors such as defence or military dual-use, will err on the side of caution and seek additional clearances from BEIS for such transactions in addition to making standard UK export licence applications. This interpretation of the Bill could lead, in practice, to a significant annual increase in the volume of voluntary notifications as the means of mitigating the risk of, and uncertainty over, future call-in on national security grounds. I venture, therefore, the need for a targeted amendment to this primary legislation, and for statutory guidance from BEIS, to remove uncertainty.
If I might express this differently: our proposed amendment to the primary legislation could be to the effect that where qualifying assets are authorised for export through the Export Control Act, a transaction or acquisition is automatically exempt from call-in and/or the voluntary notification regime.
Moving on to intellectual property issues, IP licences and assignments are a fundamental offering in business transactions and are inextricably linked with technology offerings both within and outside the UK. The UK export control regime already serves as a robust former national security screening regime for IP assets. Adding a parallel or second national security review under this NSI regime seems unnecessary. Would the Minister be minded to clarify the interplay between these two regimes? If this is the intention behind the Bill, the department will need to publish clear guidance to explain this extraterritorial reach and the interplay. This could bring technology platforms, sales, in-service support contracts with existing foreign customers and in-country technology transfers of capability—whether under Government-to-Government arrangements or in direct sales to a foreign Government or government-controlled entity—into the scope for call-in by the Secretary of State. Such proposals and resulting contracts will be subject to, and conditional on, stringent UK export control licensing processes in addition to any applicable pre-clearances through the MoD Form 680 process, which requires companies to obtain approval from the MoD to release information or equipment classified “official sensitive” and above to foreign entities.
Clauses 7 and 9 will also catch IP offerings that form part of offset transactions related to prime contracts with overseas Governments. This bring licences, assignments and transfers of IP into scope. Clause 7 defines qualifying assets as including
“ideas, information or techniques which have industrial, commercial or other economic value”.
Examples include
“trade secrets … databases … source code … algorithms … formulae”
and “designs”. Clause 7(6) further provides that IP assets are in scope only if they are used
“in connection with … activities carried on in the United Kingdom, or … the supply of goods or services to persons in the United Kingdom.”
Clause 9 states that
“a person gains control of a qualifying asset if the person acquires a right or interest in, or in relation to, the asset and as a result the person is able … to use the asset, or use it to a greater extent than prior to the acquisition, or … to direct or control how the asset is used, or direct or control how it is used to a greater extent than prior to the acquisition.”
Would the Minister comment on these aspects in his response or, at least, commit to a considered response in writing?
In conclusion, the Bill is a good starter for 10.
The Lord Bishop of St Albans
My Lords, I too welcome the Bill and congratulate Her Majesty’s Government on bringing it forward.
At the beginning of each day this House sits, our prayers recognise the delicate balancing act we have to perform. On the one hand, our precious democracy depends on the public wealth, peace and tranquillity of the realm. It is this social capital, this trust, this commitment to the common good, which sets people free to go about their business and allows for innovation, trade and wealth creation. This is fundamental to all we do. On the other hand, our prayers acknowledge that sometimes malign forces at work will look for opportunities to take advantage of us, and we cannot ignore, as the prayers put it, the enemies of the state, which we pray will be vanquished and overcome.
This balancing act has to be maintained, as we have left the European Union and are seeking to establish the role we want to play in the world—the global village. We know that there is strength in collaboration and in sharing information and technology for the sake of the whole world. We want to maximise this, as has been mentioned, in our universities in particular, which are one of our huge success stories. How can we set these groups free to capitalise on all the opportunities ahead? The development of the Covid-19 vaccines is a classic example of the benefits we get when we work collaboratively across the world. Nevertheless, we have to make sure emerging technologies and science are harnessed for the common good and not exploited for the military, economic or political ends of those seeking to undermine what is, nowadays, a fragile democracy, as we see threats in various parts of the globe.
In the past few days, Members of this House have been struggling with questions of how we use our legislative clout and moral leadership as we stand up and defend human rights. I take the Minister’s assurance that the Bill will be tightly defined. Nevertheless, we are going to be operating in a world where horrific stories of the persecution of the Uighurs, the Rohingyas and Christian minorities in places such as China and Myanmar immediately come to mind, which is why I hope, as we work on the details of the Bill, we will come back to the wider context in which we are set.
Some nations are not slow to use their economic power to further their own aims. Think, for example, of the Chinese increase in tariffs on Australian wines last November. We are aware that previous Governments supported Chinese foreign investment, potentially leaving critical national infrastructure under a regime that seems to be diverging further and further from our values and everything I hope we will stand for in the future.
As the Bill works its way through its various stages in this House, I know a number of us will be pushing for clarification in several areas. As the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, noted, there is a need for more careful definition of what we mean by “national security” and which areas are simply “national interest”. We need to do that so that we do not hinder people. There is a danger that the notification process, as others have put far more eloquently than I can, could introduce more red tape and delay at a time when we need our entrepreneurs, especially SMEs, to be agile, nimble and exploiting opportunities more widely.
Despite the promise of an annual report, we need to look at the extent to which Parliament will be able to scrutinise what is going on. We know that in periods of transition, as we have seen in our ports and at customs, we can sometimes be overwhelmed suddenly and get backlogs that harm us. There are vital issues here about making sure there are adequate resources to help this scrutiny go forward.
I will close by saying that I hope that the Bill ushers in a larger conversation about strategic industries within the UK. Perhaps one of the enduring lessons of the pandemic is that when a global crisis comes along, solidarity can quickly go out of the window, as each nation looks after their own. Free trade is important and can bring prosperity but it can leave poorer nations vulnerable. It is important that, should another large crisis occur in the future, we are not only resilient and able to avoid shocks; we also need to think about wider areas such as food security, medicines and access to resources in order to safeguard strategic industries and ensure that we are prepared for what feels like an increasingly vulnerable world that we are living in. I look forward to working on the Bill with others in this House.
Lord Reid of Cardowan (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his introduction and remind the House of my interests, as registered. Thus far, the Bill has enjoyed qualified support from all sides of both Houses during its passage through Parliament. However, I confess some concerns about its scope. For instance, I share the concern expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, that essential elements of our critical national infrastructure appear to be inexplicably missing from the coverage of the Bill.
However, today I want to focus on one general point that I believe may prove potentially dangerous for our economic well-being and, ultimately, our national security. I refer to the Secretary of State’s assertion that the Bill strikes the right balance between encouraging inward investment and protecting national security. That remains an assertion since, inevitably, at present it remains untested and unproven. It can and will be affirmed only by successful implementation.
Colleagues from all Benches have offered several amendments intended to ensure a successful outcome of that balance: all thus far have been defeated. I say to the Government that in due course they may find that their victories on this are proved pyrrhic, so I hope that they will be more open-minded to some of these constructive amendments in the course of our following debates. There are some areas where we can agree. We can surely agree that in a networked world it has become clear that a qualifying entity or asset of concern can no longer be defined just by the size of the venture, its market share or its direct involvement in the defence sector. It is right also that the threshold for concern, the “trigger event”, is changed and that consideration extends for a five-year window.
Yet the threshold for change is no easy matter. Colleagues on all Benches are right to raise questions about basic definitions—not least for “national security” —which made filling the scrutiny gap helpful rather than a hindrance to the intended legislative outcomes. We should proceed with care. Now is not the time for the United Kingdom to hamper productivity gains.
Vaccine nationalism has given us a taste of how counterproductive any isolationism can be. Likewise, many of our most severe national security challenges are global. If “build back better” and “levelling up” are to support a “global Britain”—all slogans at the forefront of the Government’s mind—then imposing disproportionate and unaffordable costs on the wellsprings of productivity will be most unwise. Large organisations may absorb these transaction costs, but networks of small and medium-sized enterprises, not to mention start-ups trying to scale up and, above all, the universities from which these arise, will struggle to absorb such transaction costs.
It is not so much the land or tangible assets that are the problem. It is that amorphous third category of qualifying asset—ideas. Those will be the hard cases. If we are wise, we should track the implications of the Bill back to our universities. The evidence over decades is clear. It is not financiers, nor the entrepreneurial state per se that catalyses innovation-driven productivity —it is our universities. You have only to look at the genealogy of our biggest unicorns to see how much they owe to universities, both directly and with ideas created from research, and in enabling start-ups to scale up with highly educated workers. Ultimately, our security rests on a productive economy. Everything flows from that, and that has to be innovation driven.
The Government’s consultation listed 17 sectors, 15 of which covered almost all growth areas in which SMEs, start-ups and universities catalyse the uptake of innovation. Asking them to master the tracking of dual-use, beneficial ownership or agents of influence seeking to take control is a tall order indeed. If our future productivity is not to experience a severe chill, the sector-specific guidance offered by BEIS’s new investment security unit will have to come with much support from competent staff and adequate resourcing to support SMEs and other organisations or networks unable to fully or adequately provide them themselves. It would be wise too, as several noble Lords have mentioned, for the unit to be properly scrutinised.
If these things are not done, the potential for harm may be hard to overestimate, making a nonsense of the assertion that a proper balance between national security and productivity has been struck. In short, we cannot ignore the evolving security risks and the Government are right to address them in this Bill, but we need to be able to handle them in a pragmatic and proportionate way. Otherwise, in the long run, that would be a real threat to our national security.
Lord McNally (LD) [V]
My Lords, as ever, some very wise words from the noble Lord, Lord Reid, with his vast experience. Of course—[Inaudible.]
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
I am afraid we cannot hear the noble Lord. Can he get closer to his microphone? We may have to come back to him.
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
Yes that is much better. Can the noble Lord start again, as we could not hear?
Lord McNally (LD) [V]
Yes, so long as I get the time. My Lords—[Inaudible.]
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
The noble Lord needs to point his head upwards. As soon as he speaks we cannot hear him again.
Lord McNally (LD) [V]
I will try again. Any Bill with the phrase “national security”—[Inaudible.]
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
I am really sorry but we cannot hear the noble Lord. We will ask the broadcasters to check the connection and we will come back to him.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Henig) (Lab)
I call the next speaker, the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley.
Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con) [V]
My Lords, I really do have to declare some interests in the context of this Bill. I am the senior partner of Cavendish Corporate Finance, which specialises in advising owners of SMEs on their exit, typically by trade sale or to private equity. I started Cavendish some 30 years ago, and mergers and acquisitions has been my line of work for some 35 years. My business has grown, as nowadays entrepreneurs frequently start a business specifically to grow it and then sell it after a few years, to let another organisation take over with different skill sets as the business outgrows its original founders. In days gone by, family businesses were just that—kept in families for generations. Although I have sold an eighth-generation family business, that is very unusual. Years ago, selling out used to have negative connotations; today, it is seen as mark of success and to be applauded. As a result, SMEs have flourished in the UK, accounting for over 95% of enterprises and some two-thirds of employment.
The UK is seen as a world leader in facilitating new businesses to start up and grow. Much has facilitated this explosion in entrepreneurial flair. Recent Governments have made it easy to start a business, and the combination of relatively low regulation, easy access to finance, and a can-do attitude—unique in Europe—has prevailed. I only hope that the Government do not bring it all to a crashing halt by increasing capital gains tax rates in the Budget next month, but that is not a subject for today.
What is for today is to recognise that FDI here has been a tremendous success. We are consistently second or third in the world, and have long been the first in Europe—and those investors can choose to invest anywhere in the world. When they are asked why, one reason cited is our high standing in the World Bank index of ease of doing business; that includes our flexibility in the labour market, which is second to none. I am looking forward to the maiden speech of the noble Lord, Lord Woodley, who may address that subject.
Another really important aspect, and top of many investors’ lists, has been our rule of law. Investors are hugely attracted to the unique UK legal system, and one of its key features is certainty. We may be about to lose that key plus point.
Many speakers here will, like my noble friend Lady Noakes and me, instinctively want the Government to push for economic growth through market freedom, allowing business to flourish away from government interference. Indeed, I am the chairman for the Lords of the Campaign for Economic Growth. Our president is my noble friend Lord Young of Graffham—a role model for many of us—and we see the dilemma that the Government face, brought into sharp focus by the issues concerning 5G and Huawei.
Economic decisions taken for political reasons rarely lead to good results. As we see in this Bill, the definitions are hard to determine. Few companies are in one sector alone; they are in many. Large numbers of acquisitive, seemingly British companies, particularly those backed by private equity, are in fact technically owned by funds based in Guernsey. Uncertainty in investment leads to only one thing: an increase in the return demanded as compensation, so lowering the price, as a result of the risk factors, and of course lowering subsequent tax revenue.
We can readily observe overseas investors stalling transactions at the moment, just to see where this is going. Why risk investing in a UK company if, when the company becomes so successful that it attracts overseas interest, the process to sell it is hampered, and may even be barred, thus reducing its value? I say “may” even be barred, because it will not be possible to give certainty. Warm words might come from this Government, which have been rightly trusted by business, but this legislation will give less competent and less business-friendly Administrations in the future—they might occur—the power to make life difficult for investors from a particular country that they just do not want to make welcome in the UK.
A former Trade Minister told me this week that he wanted to see 10 Downing Street look at every piece of new legislation through the prism of an SME. Is it helpful or is it unhelpful? This Bill is not helpful—or at least, aspects of it are not helpful. So I hope that BEIS, under its new excellent Secretary of State, will table some of the amendments that were discussed in the Commons, and were suggested by organisations such as the corporate finance faculty of the Institute of Chartered Accountants, of which I had at one point the honour to chair.
The proposed investment security unit may well be swamped: there are some 10,000 M&A deals every year. I cannot see how anyone could have made the estimate of up to 1,830 referrals a year—what an odd number. In any event, how can people possibly know? We need to look at really good precedent models like the Takeover Panel, whose appeals committee I served on, which gives guidance, help and advice to ensure an efficient market. Its practice notes could be emulated, and we must have a fast-track pre-clearing system, together with a big hike in the thresholds and the creation of sensible white-list exemptions to avoid a massive crunch in transactions.
We need much greater clarity on what is national security, and fast problem-resolving mechanisms, with a recognition that some industries, such as cybertech, will have real dual-use issues, whereby a small proportion of their business might be caught, thereby prejudicing their chance of attracting investment, as the exit will be hampered.
The UK has a proud reputation as an excellent place to invest and do business. The phenomenal growth of fintech in the UK did not happen by chance. Look at the people running these businesses, and look at where the money has come from. They have chosen the UK as they believe in the UK as a country with a mindset for standing back and letting business get on with generating wealth for our citizens. Let us not disappoint them.
Lord Bilimoria (CB) [V]
My Lords, the National Security and Investment Bill has a number of provisions: a separate national security screening regime, a broadening of the range of investments in scope, a statutory requirement for parties to notify relevant transactions in the most sensitive areas of the economy, and a new process for business investors supported by a call-in power to enable the BEIS Secretary of State to assess deals that may give rise to national security risks. The Bill allows for a retrospective call-in decision for up to five years, with criminal sanctions attached, and a predictable statutory process.
The CBI, of which I am president, supports the principle of the legislation in protecting national security, which will always be a priority. However, the current drafting makes the practical application of the Bill difficult for business. It could lead to additional burden, complexity at a micro level and, potentially, an unintended deterrent to investment at a macro level.
We heard from a wide range of businesses and members who share concerns about the Bill in its current form, from technology and digital to facilities management, to pharmaceuticals, to higher education, to financial services and to defence. There is a concern for a broad subsection of the business community. For example, the Russell Group says that if reporting under either the mandatory or voluntary regimes leads to delays or concerns from the business community over its ability to do business with universities, this could harm its members’ ability to attract investment to all parts of the UK in future.
With no set de minimis thresholds for transactions caught by the legislation, there is a risk that a high volume of notifications will inadvertently represent relatively low-risk activity driven by a maximalist approach from legal teams and counsel. The extraterritorial nature of the provisions of the Bill means that many transactions involving target suppliers supplying goods and services outside the UK will be caught in the notification requirements. Against a backdrop of the maximalist approach in business, there is a real concern about the Government’s capacity to process the projected number of notifications while the regulation is in its infancy.
According to the CFIUS annual report, 231 notices were filed with the US investment screening regime in 2019, with 113 resulting in subsequent investigation. The Government currently estimate that there will be up to 1,800 annual notifications under the regime, and there is concern that the true predicted estimates could reach up to 10,000, although the Government say that the number of transactions called in would be no more than 100. Can the Minister confirm that?
To allow for greater efficiency in the system, the UK might wish proactively to utilise the benefits of a white-list process for countries and/or companies. That could be incorporated through future trade deals if the legislation provides flexibility. However, this investment regime should not have the unintended consequence of deterring foreign investment just when the UK needs to increase its attractiveness to foreign investment, and just as we have come through the pandemic and established the UK as an independent trading nation post Brexit.
We are the second or third largest recipient of inward investment in the world. We have always been a gateway to the European Union, and we need to continue to be a gateway, including for foreign direct investment. The requirements for mandatory reporting in 17 sectors across the economy will vastly increase reporting requirements for business, damage the competitiveness of key sectors such as the tech sector, which relies on investment in start-up and scale-up, and create an impossible workload for British officials.
Companies across key sectors of the economy, from finance to universities, are also concerned that the UK regime is more onerous than its equivalents in the US, France, Germany and Australia, with more stringent thresholds for transactions and less clear guidance in areas. I ask the Government: have they carried out clear benchmarking and taken the best of all other existing regimes before coming up with our legislation now?
We should not forget the SMEs, which do not have the legal departments to wade through the complex provisions of the Bill. We want to work with business, and direct engagement with the Business Department has so far been very good. The Government have shown a willingness to consider targeted changes to the Bill, to ensure that business can help to make it a success.
I will run through a few of these changes, which could include a de minimis; making sanctions for transactions for mandatory filing that has not been made more workable; reducing the extra-territorial application of the call-in power; and introducing a fast-track process for less risky transactions, clarifying the time limits on the exercise of the call-in power. That could include creating checks and balances beyond the threat of judicial review, such as appraisal from an expert panel drawn from Whitehall and industry, introducing detailed guidance for investors. When qualifying assets are authorised for access for export through the UK Export Council regime, consideration should be given to exemption for the call-in. Further changes could ensure that for key sectors there is scope for the mandatory regime to be as clearly and narrowly defined as it is for those sectors that are of material interest to national security. There should be clarifications that IP provisions would not mean that companies exporting sensitive goods with de facto transfer of IP would not need to double report, if they had already received an export licence.
The City of London has given feedback and commented that the Bill represents a significant expansion of the UK’s FDI regime, given that since the Enterprise Act intervention regime was introduced in 2002, nearly 20 years ago, there have been just 12 interventions on the basis of national security. It appears that a new regime will see a large increase in the Government’s workload. Once again, the City of London said that it seems to be a much stricter regime than those brought in by other countries, including the USA, Australia, Japan and many in Europe. City sources also said that they recognise that it now sits alongside the new Office for Investment, a unit designed to attract high value and strategic FDI into the UK.
To conclude, the University of Cambridge—I declare my interest—says that it stands ready to work with the Government to protect Britain from emerging national threats by hostile foreign actors. The university understands and fully supports the dual thrust of the Bill materially to expand the Government’s ability to manage risk and foreign investment on national security grounds while avoiding adversely impacting the UK’s economy, global competitiveness and attractions as a forum for inward investment. However, it is concerned about the possible adverse impact of some elements of the Bill on higher education and the rest of the business sector.
Lord Woodley (Lab) (Maiden Speech)
My Lords, it is a great honour and privilege to join your Lordships’ House and speak in this debate today. Turning to the subject of the Bill, I believe that critical national infrastructures should be controlled and operated in the public interest, and certainly not run for private profit or sold off to corporate investors in a way that jeopardises jobs, safety and the security of the British people.
Before I continue, I thank noble Lords on all sides of the House, all officials and staff for their very warm and hospitable welcome. I also extend sincere thanks to my two distinguished supporters, my noble friends Lord Collins and Lady Blower. I also thank Jeremy Corbyn, for giving me the opportunity to enter this illustrious House, and Gordon Brown, for giving me the encouragement to accept a peerage.
I understand the privilege that I have been given; I also understand poverty. I was born in Wallasey on the Wirral and had a humble upbringing, with my parents fighting to put food on the table each day for me and my sisters in our two-up and two-down house, with no hot water and an outside toilet. They were often unable to pay the rent. Free school meals were a must in those days to feed us kids. Shamefully, as many in this House recognise, 60 years on, the need is as great today. On a lighter note, if I ever see prunes and custard again, I will give up the will to live.
As a merchant seaman at the age of 15, I travelled to most areas of the Far East and beyond, watching the exploitation, poverty and child abuse. The unfairness in our world, at home and abroad, had the most profound effect on me. It helped to create my moral compass and the progressive politics that have driven my life ever since. I became a workers’ representative at Vauxhall Motors in Ellesmere Port, a shop steward and convener, and the last general secretary of Britain’s most famous union, the Transport and General Workers’ Union and a creator of Unite the Union.
Personally negotiating and working with many of the world’s largest companies, CEOs and Ministers, particularly in the automotive and manufacturing industries, has been great. Yes, we had our disputes, but I spent more time working for and with companies for investment, protecting jobs and plants, than we ever did fighting each other. I have always said that I have known many good bosses, but I have never known a generous one.
While we have many good examples in the Bill we are debating, particularly those given by the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, privatisation and outsourcing have all too often become a blight of our lives, leading to the fragmentation of services, operational inefficiencies and the short-termism culture that puts the interest of shareholders before the interests of workers and the wider public. Privatisation has failed again and again. We recently witnessed this with the failure of the part privatisation at the Atomic Weapons Establishment, responsible for no less than the design, manufacture and support of warheads for the United Kingdom’s nuclear weapons, which had to be brought back under direct control of the Ministry of Defence. Need I say more?
At least the Bill represents recognition from Ministers that there is an over-riding public interest in stopping essential assets from falling into the hands of nefarious interests. The general thrust of the Bill is to be welcomed, and I look forward to debating the details as it completes its passage.
Lord McNicol of West Kilbride (Lab)
It gives me great pleasure to follow my noble friend Lord Woodley’s maiden speech and welcome him. While growing up, I am sure very few, if any, of our friends would have ever believed that we would end up here in your Lordships’ House. I have known Tony for many years, through my time at the GMB and his at the Transport and General Workers’ Union. We all know, and we have heard, how proud Tony is of his time as a shop steward, a union officer and general secretary of TGWU, and now Unite.
However, there are a couple of interesting, even surprising, activities that he does not often shout about. He is rightly very proud of his role at Vauxhall Motors Football Club where, as chairman, he has led a committed team in developing the facilities. The club has a new all-weather pitch—a number of pitches—and a new club house. Thousands of children and young people have got involved and played on those football pitches at Ellesmere Port. Forty-seven teams compete in the league from the age of five upwards—it is a real community.
Tony has been involved in the Cuban Five or Miami Five campaign for many years. Not many of us can say that we have been involved in a prisoner swap, never mind one that involved the Pope, our Prime Minister and the US President. In late 2014, the prisoners’ release and exchanges, including Jewish American prisoner Alan Gross, were all secured during the end of a 16-year campaign, and we saw for a short time a step change in the Cuban-US relationships. Tony, welcome to the House.
Turning to today’s debate, I would like to focus on two issues: first, the importance of clarifying national security and, secondly, accountability and oversight. Before I do, allow me to make a few introductory remarks. Safeguarding our national security has always been critical to our nation’s future, but never more so than now. I support the Bill, which strengthens the powers of the Government to intervene when corporate transactions threaten national security. However, I believe that the Bill would be strengthened by a number of amendments, which I am sure will be forthcoming from all sides of the House as it passes through. The scale and sophistication of national security threats have materially increased since the current limited screening regime was introduced by the Enterprise Act back in 2002. Importantly, the Bill follows—if not offers a little UK catch-up—similar moves by many other countries, as outlined by the Minister in his introduction.
Turning to how the Bill should clarify national security, it gives sweeping powers to the Secretary of State but does not give any statutory guidance on the meaning of national security. Surely it would be sensible to include guidance on factors that would be captured by national security, outlining references to critical national infrastructure and economic security specifically. Such guidance would also provide much needed clarity for business.
Although the Bill is aimed at all investments—not just foreign investments—foreign companies, sovereign wealth funds and other international finance vehicles seeking to invest in companies and projects could pose a particular threat, whether that is relevant to critical infrastructure, personal data or cutting-edge technologies. The decline in democratically accountable Governments is highlighted by the Democracy Index, which recently stated:
“The global score of 5.44 out of ten is the lowest recorded since the index began in 2006.”
This is a real cause for concern. Any investment, not just critical national infrastructure, should automatically raise a red flag.
As we heard earlier, Part 3 of the Bill gives the Secretary of State quasi-judicial powers by allowing them to act as the key decision-maker for all decisions under the new regime. As we have heard, BEIS has previously been a cheerleader for Huawei and others, overly open to investment and pro-market to an extent that requires meaningful checks and balances. I do not believe that the Bill as drafted offers these. One option would be for a cross-departmental body to oversee the call-in powers. I listened to the Minister talk about the investment security unit in his introduction but I am not sure that that was clear, as my noble friend Lady Hayter outlined in her introductory remarks. Some further clarity on that would be much appreciated.
Finally, I worry that the Bill does not go far enough on takeovers, mergers and acquisitions outwith the realm of national security. For years the Government have refused to do more to protect growing UK companies so that they are less likely to be taken over, asset stripped or gutted by overseas businesses—which are often anti-trade union. Developing a robust takeover regime is essential if we want firms in our key sectors to grow and provide good jobs here in the UK. It is notable that we are coming into line with other countries on national security but not on takeovers; given the economic impact of coronavirus and potential corporate vulnerability, the case is now stronger, not weaker. The Bill is a missed opportunity to bring forward a comprehensive industrial strategy to help businesses to recover, grow and create jobs.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Henig) (Lab)
I now call the noble Lord, Lord McNally, again.
Lord McNally (LD) [V]
My Lords, I hope I am coming through loud and clear now, otherwise we will have to give up. I welcome the maiden speech of the noble Lord, Lord Woodley. I am very pleased that I am now able to follow him.
The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans posed the moral dilemma of how we trade with the world while standing up for human rights and democracy. I have no direct interests to declare, but I have been a long-time supporter of expanding our relations with China. I say this because the Bill is being interpreted in the media and among policy analysts as mainly aimed at China. I remember, not so long ago, Conservative Prime Ministers extolling a new “golden age” of trade, investment and collaboration with China. We need a very clear statement of where we now stand in these matters. Are we at the start of a new cold war with China? What range of inward and outward investments will this legislation bite on? Will there be guidance on what goods and services will be covered? Will there be national security implications that bite on third countries and trading blocs with which both we and China have relations? We need clarity on this.
My other interest is in the space industry. I act as spear carrier to my noble friends Lord Fox and Lady Randerson, who lead from the Front Bench on these matters for the Liberal Democrats. I am also a member of the all-party space group, and my son is a space engineer working for a Franco-German satellite company in Munich. Last week, I attended a round table with companies involved in the space industry. Concern was expressed about the implications of the Bill for both companies and universities, and about where this legislation draws the line on collaboration and joint working. I am old enough to remember when Britain last tried to go it alone in space with Black Arrow and Blue Streak, and I worry about the extent to which this legislation is a dangerous step away from international co-operation in space. It has even been suggested that this legislation will mean that security and military considerations will dominate future space policy.
It is a reflection of where we are going that in the last century, at the height of the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union were able to co-operate on the international space station and multinational space flights, yet today US law prevents collaboration in these fields with China. The outcome could well be that the next boots on the moon have “Made in China” on them. During the 20th century we were able to de-escalate the Cold War with a series of treaties. Should we not be pressing ahead with international treaties to prevent the militarisation and weaponization of space?
On a broader front, I have been concerned with the number of bodies—from international infrastructure investors to the City of London, the Russell group of universities and the Law Society—which have raised concerns that will need to be explored in Committee, including the expansion of bureaucracy implied by the Bill.
I have no doubt that the Bill will pass. But during its passage through the House I hope we will stress-test its proportionality and explore where it will take us, both in space and other sectors, and assess the chilling effect it will have on relations with those with whom we wish to trade and co-operate.
I thank noble Lords, and I thank the technicians for getting me in touch.
Baroness Northover (LD) [V]
My Lords, the Bill addresses the real concern of the need to safeguard UK national security and reflects the changing nature of threats to that. Indeed, there is much concern now about the rise of China, as my noble friend Lord McNally has just noted. There are clearly both opportunities and threats here. The debate over Huawei reflected this concern, as did Chinese involvement in our energy infrastructure. The concern that our technology might be stolen is also a huge area.
Devising a legal structure that deals with these potential threats has clearly been a challenge. The Law Society of Scotland points out that:
“It is a complex task to create a system which will balance the need to maintain an open business environment and promote fair competition with the need to protect national security.”
There is a real risk that the Bill will constrain investment into the United Kingdom—as the noble Lords, Lord Leigh and Lord Bilimoria have just said—at a time when, post Brexit, that is necessary, or that the EU might regard us as protectionist and penalise us. Clarity and transparency are therefore clearly vital.
As my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans pointed out, national security is not defined, and this therefore leaves much in the hands of Ministers. Difficult as it will be, a definition is surely required. There is huge scope in the 17 sectors which fall under the Bill. Given all the other pressing matters that the Government will have to deal with post Brexit and post coronavirus, their unit is likely to be overwhelmed. On this point, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes—a rare event for me. Companies and their lawyers are indeed likely to err on the side of caution and refer themselves in. The Government have probably made a gross underestimate of the number of cases they will need to assess here. The Government have said that they will bring detail through secondary legislation, but that is itself concerning, as this is presented to Parliament on a “take it or leave it” basis.
As for where we see security challenges, we have already seen concern during the pandemic about overreliance on China; for example, for PPE. Who would have thought that cotton could be seen as a national security question? We must add in the Foreign Secretary’s recent announcement that businesses must, rightly, examine their supply chains and not source from the labour camps of Xinjiang or other centres of human rights abuses. We cannot rely on such appalling sources. Given that much PPE may have originated there, the challenge becomes even clearer.
The integrated review of the defence and security of the United Kingdom should surely have preceded this legislation, so that we could see what the Government think are the major threats facing the country: whether cyber, pandemics or other threats. Will the noble Lord tell us when that review is now expected, so that we can look at it alongside the Bill? The pandemic and Brexit have indeed shown us the risks of outsourcing as much as we now do.
How does the Bill sit with any industrial strategy? As my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones noted, we need that too, to understand better the key areas in the UK economy and the threats to them. In 2012, when my right honourable friend Vince Cable drew up his industrial strategy, he emphasised the biosciences. Investment in the Crick Institute, Oxford, Cambridge, Imperial, and elsewhere was increased, and that has paid off in spades in this pandemic, where we have led the world in genomics, vaccine research and much else.
We understand that the integrated review will also emphasise the UK as a science or bioscience power. Tackling climate change must also be part of that, for the UK but also globally. However, we also know that these are areas where China intends to excel, and surely has the resources to do so. China has disproportionate control, for example, over the minerals required for electric vehicle batteries and wind turbines. So, are these areas where our security is at risk? If so, how will the lines be drawn? How will our universities and research centres be impacted by the Bill, as others have asked? The Russell Group points out that they drew in investment worth over £1 billion in 2018-19, and they are concerned about the scope of the Bill, about uncertainty and delays.
This is a challenging area. There are, indeed, new threats to the UK that were not anticipated when the Enterprise Act was passed in 2002. The balance between encouraging investment and maintaining security needs to be carefully considered. As other speakers have said, there are questions here whether the structures proposed will manage adequately to support that investment while also defending national security. I therefore look forward to the Minister’s response.
Lord Stirrup (CB)
My Lords, let me say at the outset that I welcome the proposition that underpins the Bill—the proposition that we need to act to protect our critical national infrastructure from the possibility of malign actions by external agents operating under the cover of legitimate businesses. We live in an era when those who wish us ill will not confine themselves to traditional forms of confrontation; they will seek to exploit weaknesses in the fabric of our social and economic structure. Technological advances bring with them exciting opportunities to do new things, or to do old things in new ways, but unfortunately, they also introduce new vulnerabilities, and the more complex and interconnected society becomes, the more vulnerable it is to shocks. It is this vulnerability that we must address.
The proposed involvement of Huawei in the UK’s 5G network certainly brought the issue to the fore, and although there were some exaggerations on both sides of the argument, people were right to be worried about the involvement of a foreign Government—the claim that Huawei is a private company free from any influence of the Chinese Government is, frankly, risible—in such a crucial part of our infrastructure. So, in my view there is certainly a serious problem that needs to be addressed. The question is how well this Bill contributes to that process. It is, I think, a good starting point, but we need to take care that it does not end up being more of a hindrance than a help.
I return to my central point: those things that advance the capabilities of our society introduce new vulnerabilities. However, the reverse is also true: those things that introduce new vulnerabilities also advance the capabilities of our society. The free flow of ideas, inward investment, the introduction of new business processes; all these things contribute to the health of our economy, to the opportunities within society and, indeed, to aspects of our national security. So, in constraining a laissez-faire approach—and it does need to be constrained—we must be careful lest we do more damage than we prevent. Our constraints need to be carefully balanced and well targeted, which of course begs the question of how we decide on that balance and on the appropriate targets.
Key to that is our definition of national security and our judgment of how far it needs to be applied to business questions. In thinking about this, we should realise that in our world, there is no such thing as perfect protection. We cannot foresee, let alone protect against, all eventualities. We will make mistakes, since error is a fundamental part of the human condition, and these will undoubtedly come back to haunt us. With that in mind, we should take as our aim not the complete elimination of danger but the creation of resilience.
Resilience depends, in part, upon redundancy. In order to provide such redundancy within critical sectors of our society, we may well need to broaden, rather than narrow, the involvement of overseas companies and inward investors. We must be careful that, in seeking to exclude potentially malign actors, we do not also deter those whose involvement would actually improve our national security. Resilience also depends upon agility, the ability to react swiftly and decisively to changing circumstances, or to challenges that we did not or could not foresee. The potential danger lurking within the Bill is that it could create a rather sclerotic bureaucratic process. Taken together, the mandatory and voluntary schemes are likely to result in a flood of applications. If the mechanisms set up to implement the measures in the Bill become clogged with endless paperwork and ponderous deliberations, we risk a situation where the focus is on process rather than results. Nothing could be further removed from the kind of agile, responsive system that we need. We would not only hamper innovation and flexibility within business, we would also increase, rather than reduce, the risk of a successful attack by a potential and perceptive enemy.
For me, the Bill is not about principle but about practice. How will applications be triaged so that effort is focused on the true risks? How will judgments be reached that strike the appropriate balance? How will they be monitored in a rapidly changing world, and how will they be adapted to take account of such changes? My concern is that government departments are not traditionally good at responsiveness and agility. It seems to me that the composition of the investment security unit within the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy will be an important factor in this regard. If it operates as a fairly standard departmental committee, I fear we will not see the outcome intended in the Bill. To what extent will the new unit draw in external expertise from both the business and security sides of the equation? To what extent will it be able to maintain a long-term view of issues? Will it be able to form a cumulative picture of risk, rather than just looking at each matter on an individual basis? How will its work be audited, assessed and reported?
I support the Bill, but before it is passed into law, I believe we need some firm assurances that the mechanisms and processes set up to give it effect will be fit for purpose in this complex and dynamic world.
Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to speak in this important debate on a critical piece of legislation and to follow the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup. I also welcome the noble Lord, Lord Woodley, to the House and congratulate him on his maiden speech.
There can be no dispute that the powers in this welcome Bill are absolutely essential to protect this country from hostile forces that would undermine our national security. The legislation has been a long time in gestation. The current statutory basis for the scrutiny of takeovers is the Enterprise Act 2002 and our partners have long since updated their legislation to bring it into line with the massive technological and other advances of the past 20 years. It is high time that we did so, too.
The powers in the Bill should be used only on the grounds of national security and not for intervening for wider economic purposes or, of course, political reasons. I ask the Government to clarify how they intend to ensure that that will indeed be the case if “national security” is not defined in the Bill. While protecting national security, we need at the same time to ensure that we do not unnecessarily hinder foreign investment through uncertainty and unnecessary extra administrative burdens. The United Kingdom has always attracted considerable foreign direct investment and my own area, Northern Ireland, has one of the highest proportions of FDI per capita of regions in the United Kingdom outside London and the south-east. The Bill is the National Security and Investment Bill—I stress “and Investment”. It is important that there is proper balance between protecting national security on the one hand and making sure that the United Kingdom remains fully open for business and foreign investment on the other.
The new investment security unit in the business department that has been mentioned a number of times will be crucial to the smooth operation of the new regime and must be properly resourced from day one. We have been told that there could be up to 1,800 notifications a year, although the voluntary notification system could result in a much higher level of work than is currently anticipated. In the early days at least, many companies are bound to seek reassurance, which could lead to the authorities being swamped. People will err on the side of caution. I understand that at present there are about 60 notifications a year to the Competition and Markets Authority, for example. Will the Government ensure that staffing levels will be sufficient, and will the staff and officials in the unit have the training and the technological and other resources to cope from the outset? If there is a greater level of notifications, resources will have to be increased rather than there being any extension of the administrative timelines for the declaration of notifications.
Particular attention, as has been said by other noble Lords, needs to be paid to the situation of small and medium-sized enterprises. Under the previous regime, a business to be acquired must have a UK turnover of more than £70 million and the merger must meet a minimum 25% market threshold. That meant that sensitive smaller companies were not covered. I totally accept that nowadays it is not the size of the business that should be the test of whether threats may be posed by foreign investment, so it is right that the Government take powers to intervene in the case of smaller businesses. But they must ensure that that does not threaten investment in small firms and stifle their growth.
It is expected that small and medium-sized enterprises will now make up some 80% of the transactions under the new regime, so steps should be taken to provide timely guidance to SMEs in particular about the impact of the new regime. It may be that the Government should consider setting up a special unit to engage with smaller and medium-sized companies to help them negotiate the new rules, and they should certainly keep that under review and monitor how the new rules are affecting that sector.
No doubt, many of these issues can and will be explored more fully in Committee but I add my welcome for the principles of the Bill and there should be no question about getting this legislation on to the statute book as soon as possible.
Lord Robathan (Con) [V]
My Lords, I welcome the Bill. It has been a long time in coming. I intend to look at the context of the Bill and its genesis. Over a decade ago, when I was working in the MoD, we saw newspaper reports that 90% of cyberattacks on the UK came from one house in Shanghai. This Bill is largely about Chinese influence being embedded in our critical national infrastructure and that is why we should concentrate on China. I wish the Chinese people well but the Chinese Communist Party is pursuing a policy of hegemony and aggrandisement. The noble Lord, Lord McNally, agreed that this has been generated by China.
I will cite a few examples. The Chinese have been building military bases on reefs built out of concrete on islands in the South China Sea, which they now claim to have territorial waters around. The belt and road initiative, which is eight years old or thereabouts, was welcomed by the media and, seemingly, western Governments. But, in fact, China has been buying up Africa, Sri Lanka and elsewhere with its belt and road initiative. I was in Ethiopia 15 months ago, where there is a brand new airport in Addis Ababa. Ethiopia may find that some of these debts do not get repaid but that is for another day. Over a decade ago, we knew about Chinese reverse engineering whereby they get hold of sophisticated technology and military equipment, work out how to build the stuff themselves and then use western secret technology against us. I hope we understand that now the scales have fallen from our eyes at last. Charles Parton of the Royal United Services Institute, speaking to the Commons Committee on the Bill, described the Chinese Government as pursuing a policy of “civil-military fusion”. That sums it up.
As we can now see, we can believe reports about Chinese treatment of the Uighurs, which perhaps we denied for some time. There are BBC reports today about systematic rape. We know about organ theft [Inaudible] million people. We can see what is happening in Hong Kong, where the Chinese are breaking the terms of the joint declaration, a legally binding international agreement. We can see the military threat to Taiwan and, I fear, the chance of war. We can see Chinese moves to building a military and commercial empire, and using threats and economic muscle against, for instance, Australian wine exports after that country dared to criticise the Chinese and suggest that the virus came from Wuhan.
I support the Bill for those reasons because our national security is under threat. The Government have got the message rather late—Huawei being excluded from 5G is a particular point that I raise—but it is not six years since Xi Jinping was entertained here and declared the UK to be the best Chinese partner in the West. Indeed, George Osborne said that this would be
“a golden decade for the UK-China relationship”.
Today, Manchester University has cancelled an agreement with a Chinese electronics technology company because of that company’s involvement in surveillance in Xinjiang. Ofcom has—again, this day—revoked the licence of Chinese broadcaster CGTN because the company is
“ultimately controlled by the Chinese Communist party.”
Although Cambridge University has helpfully sent us all a briefing paper saying how important Chinese money is to it, I should have thought that the exposure by the noble Lord, Lord Moore, of Jesus College and others in Cambridge and their close ties with China would have shamed it a little, at least.
Surely nobody can doubt any more the unfriendly intent of China. The genocide amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Alton, two days ago showed that the House of Lords understands that the behaviour of the Chinese needs, at the very least, close examination. Sadly, the EU has just signed a huge trade agreement with China, which is regrettable. Yes, we want inward investment, as my noble friend Lady Noakes said, and economic growth. We want to trade with the world, including China, but we need to protect ourselves and peace first, and the Bill goes some way towards doing that. I know that Governments do not always get legislation right, so we will watch the progress of the Bill, and amendments will certainly be needed as it progresses, but its spirit is correct and I support it.
Lord West of Spithead (Lab)
My Lords, first, I congratulate my noble friend, no longer in his place, on his maiden speech. I have to say, though, that Jeremy Corbyn is not my cup of tea, but clearly my noble friend Lord Woodley is a decent fellow, because he is an ex-sailor.
For several years, a number of us have been concerned about the impact of inappropriate takeovers and dual ownership of firms that were key to our critical national infrastructure and essential sovereign capability of cutting-edge research, technology, and equipment production and control. Some seven years ago, the ISC became very aware of this, and it was clear to it that national security issues around investment decisions were not properly being taken into account, so it said to the Government that they should take some action. I am therefore pleased to see this Bill progressing through Parliament. The legislation is vital to protect the UK’s security across a range of areas.
Having waited seven years for the Government to bring forward legislation, it is beholden on us and them to get it right, and there is one rather large hole in the Bill: there is no proper oversight by Parliament. In Clause 61, there is provision for an annual report to this House, but that report will contain the bare minimum of detail. The Minister has told the other place that the BEIS Select Committee will provide further oversight, and indeed that is the case when it comes to the economic aspects of decision-making. The BEIS Select Committee cannot see detailed classified national security material and, by their nature, decisions made under this legislation will require deep engagement with sensitive material and a clear-eyed understanding of the possible conflict between encouraging business and protecting our national security.
There is currently no provision for oversight of national security material on which decisions will be taken. The ISC was established in 1994 to provide exactly that oversight: to examine matters that Parliament could not, because they are too sensitive to be discussed in public. It is therefore surprising that the Bill, as drafted, does not provide for oversight by the ISC. The investment decisions that the Bill covers are currently taken, in modified form—as has been mentioned by a couple of previous speakers—by national security elements within the Cabinet Office. Therefore, they are within the purview of the ISC. As these decisions will move to BEIS, that oversight will now be removed, so the Bill is in fact a step backwards.
During the passage of the Bill through the other place, it was proposed that the ISC should receive an annual report on the sensitive issues covered by the Bill. In response, the Minister said that the ISC could always request that information from his department. That is, frankly, not good enough. As my colleagues on the ISC have already noted, without statutory provision for routine ISC scrutiny in the Bill, there is a possibility that, no matter how well intentioned this Government may be, future Governments may refuse to provide such information to the ISC. The Minister had already argued in the other place that the ISC’s remit does not extend to oversight of BEIS work, which undermines his later claim that the ISC can request information.
Therefore, unless the Minister says something to change my view, I intend to submit an amendment that would expand the current reporting requirements to include reporting to the ISC, incorporating details of the national security decision-making process into the existing annual report in Clause 61, allowing the Secretary of State to redact those matters from the report laid before Parliament and instead provide them to the ISC by way of a secret annexe. I hope the Minister will acknowledge that this is a constructive approach, in that it would lessen the burden upon the new BEIS investment security unit. If, for some extraordinary reason, the Minister is unable to accept this, the alternative would be to assure this House that the work of the new unit will be brought within the remit of the ISC by including it within the memorandum of understanding that sits underneath the Justice and Security Act.
It is critical that there is oversight of matters that Parliament itself cannot oversee. This House should not be passing legislation that allows for action in the name of national security without providing for oversight of that action.
Lord Truscott (Ind Lab) [V]
My Lords, I, too, congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Woodley, on his excellent maiden speech. I welcome this Bill to ensure that our national security is better protected. For too long, it has been far too easy for foreign interests to take over and strip this country of vital companies, as was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord McNicol. Concerns were also expressed by the noble Lord, Lord West. As noble Lords have identified, some of these interests represent hostile Governments and entities; others do not, but the impact on some crucial sectors and the ability of this country to protect itself are just as severe.
Our previous attempts to intervene on grounds of national security have been woefully inadequate, dating back most recently to the Enterprise Act 2002 and the limited role of the Competition and Markets Authority. Forget about hostile state actors, for a moment. Under this legislation, we lost defence giant GKN and satellite firm Inmarsat. We face losing British chip giant Arm in a £30 billion takeover and a buyout of security firm G4S, which is a government contractor at prisons and nuclear power stations. Another UK defence giant, Cobham, was sold in January 2020 to US equity firm Advent, despite security concerns. As noble Lords know, Cobham is a world leader in air-to-air refuelling. Lady Nadine Cobham, daughter-in-law of the firm’s founder, rightly said that such a sale would never have been allowed by the US, France or Japan.
The UK has been behind the curve in protecting sectors vital to our national security from foreign takeover. Take the United States: CFIUS, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, was established back in 1988. It has a history of actively blocking takeovers that are deemed not in the national interest. A federal inter-agency committee, it is chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury. Additional members of CFIUS include the Secretaries of Homeland Security, Commerce, Defense, State, Energy and Labor, the Attorney-General and the director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy. The Americans take this very seriously. Perhaps Her Majesty’s Government should take a leaf out of the Americans’ book and set up a similarly high-powered co-ordinating committee. An underresourced investment security unit in the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, as proposed in the Bill, is hardly the same.
We are not only well behind the US, but behind the EU. The EU is to beef up investment screening rules to block foreign takeovers of European companies tied to national security. Agreed last March, this came into effect in October. The European move was stimulated by Germany’s experience, back in 2016, after the successful bid by China’s Midea Group for industrial robotics specialist Kuka, which prompted a national outcry.
The UK has been slow to wake up to the dangers. Her Majesty’s Government’s national security risk assessment identified the threat in 2015, only after it had been pointed out in Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee report, published two years before. At that time, the ISC investigated Huawei’s involvement with BT and the potential threat to our critical national infrastructure, or CNI. The vulnerability of our CNI, including our communications and national grid, represents one of our greatest security challenges. A debilitating attack on our national grid could cost thousands of lives and billions of pounds. There can be no energy security for the UK where the possibility of interruption to our energy supplies remains.
As one senior nuclear engineer, who has spent decades in the industry, told me, there is no way a country could prevent a foreign-designed or foreign-operated civil nuclear power station from having the means to control it embedded in its systems. We would simply never know. You have to be pretty sure you know who your friends are when it comes to that sort of investment in the UK’s nuclear sector. The ex-diplomat Charlie Parton, who was quoted earlier, said that the Chinese follow a policy of “civil-military fusion”, where it is difficult to see where the state ends and the private sector begins—or vice versa. They are not the only ones globally.
I have a couple of points on the Bill itself. I do not agree with those in the other place and in your Lordships’ House who have talked about amending the Bill to include a definition or framework of national security. The Government must have maximum flexibility to meet any security challenges as they arise. We cannot legislate now for the threats of the future and it would be foolish to attempt to do so.
Secondly, the proposal for an annual report to the Intelligence and Security Committee, as well as to the House itself, is a good idea. Dr Julian Lewis, chair of the ISC, rightly pointed to what would otherwise be a scrutiny gap, as was mentioned earlier by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Lord, Lord West. With proper scrutiny, however, this legislation cannot come too soon.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, this Bill is about intervention when there is a transfer of control that puts at risk our security, and possibly vital supplies and critical infrastructure. I recall concern about vulnerability in the Economic Affairs Committee’s 2017 inquiry and then report, The Price of Power, regarding electricity markets. Indeed, concerns do not have to relate to hostile foreign Governments, and that raises questions about how geographic lines will be drawn for the purposes of this Bill and what part trade agreements play. Will measures under the Bill constitute security measures that trump trade and investment agreements? How far is the Bill directed at not losing technology and R&D capacity more generally, given that undertakings during takeovers are often useless?
The Bill before us has one basic element, the notion of a trigger event relating to control, and then it is rather like a puzzle book. Has the Secretary of State got every possibility covered? Schedule 1 is particularly entertaining to try and design around, but what does it really mean in practice? One thing seemingly left out is an export-only manufacturer. I suppose that export licences would cover security issues, but could that not still be a loss of knowhow? While on that subject, why are licences or intellectual property rights not explicitly mentioned in Clause 7, and perhaps other choses in action—or are they “things in action” nowadays?
If one accepts the “trigger” notion, it becomes an exercise in how to make it work and where the burdens lie. For one thing, it will require people with a wide range of knowledge, including in cutting-edge science and engineering, to do the scrutiny. Notifications will hit at a rate of more than four a day under the Government’s estimate, and may be much higher if there are lots of precautionary submissions. How much time does the Minister consider it takes an individual to scrutinise technology and understand the ramifications? How much reliance depends on the notifier, and what level and volume of information and data will be needed in a notification? A real problem is not where it is already known that there are security implications, but where that is a theoretical potential.
I have experience of battling over secrecy restrictions on patent applications, when key words would trigger a secrecy order because that was all the designated official could understand. Words with dual use implications such as “radar”, “laser” or “spread spectrum” in their time almost always gave spurious, annoying triggers—spurious because when it was known that there were security implications, that was made clear in advance, and annoying because it would be several months before the “all clear” from the MoD review would come back. An insecticide that could be nerve gas famously slipped through. Can we be assured that arts graduates will not be in charge of analysing scientific information? Let us hope that that is a thing of the past, but the scope of this framework Bill has raised concern from universities faced with how to comply with yet unknown notification requirements and the implications of delays when there are short timescales for concluding competitive contracts with sponsors for research.
The unfiltered sectoral scope is presently staggering. Looking at the list of materials, which is of particular interest to me as a solid-state physicist, apart from it being huge, I wondered how on earth people would know at early-stage developments whether something was notifiable if there had not been a specific notifiable type of target use? When designing materials to provide protection in car crashes, would their use in armaments always spring to mind? How early does speculative usefulness count? “Speculative” is a difficult concept in an academic world that demands hard evidence to substantiate claims.
Call-ins do not commence until there is a statement about how powers will be exercised. It is expected that the statement will narrow things to a more manageable scope, but Clause 1(8) says that statements are not actually limiting. Will the Minister confirm that that is meant as an emergency power rather than a regular fallback?
Once the Bill passes, there is a Damocles’ sword over everything in the 17 sectors, which is a problem for businesses needing to plan ahead for investment sources. The statement is all important and I would like to know more about it. Is it to be one big statement covering everything or is it going to be staged in some way, and why does Parliament get a vote only at the end, with no advance consultation or ongoing oversight of any kind? This is an instance where information on the scope of the statement is vital before legislation is passed and before consultation on a draft statement. Can the Minister give an example of what is envisaged in any area to enable a feel for the type of narrowing or detail under consideration? I am not against the notion of interventions, but the Bill should be more than notion and compulsion, and I hope that it is possible to include more direction and balance.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, I am glad to have the opportunity to contribute to what is already an interesting debate. I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for his introduction because it has helped us to see the Bill’s shape very well. I also welcome the noble Lord, Lord Woodley, and look forward to his contributions to our debates on this Bill and in the future.
I was a member of the Standing Committee on what became the Enterprise Act 2002. I do not think that we lacked an understanding at that time, in the wake of the terrorist attack in 2001, of the nature of the emerging risks of asymmetric and unconventional threats to this country. The point is that the Enterprise Act is limited since it relates to qualifying mergers, and of course to some extent it is a post hoc regime when what we need is something that gives people clear notice of and predictability about the nature of any intervention. The scope and the need for these interventions under this legislation is warranted and I support the Bill.
My noble friend the Minister said that there are, as it were, complementary or parallel regimes in other countries. Actually, they are different, and what is being proposed here by the Government for this country is better. For example, the EU regulation relates essentially to the screening of investments across a wide range, but of course, that is not limited to national security. It includes, for example, the media sector because that concerns national security and public security, and it drifts into public order. The fact that we are focused on national security is important. Indeed, one can see from the way the scheme is implemented in France, where it is focused on foreign ownership, that it also drifts into strategic autonomy, which is the new phrase of the moment in the European Union.
We might want to be more autonomous in terms of our supply chains, but this is not the mechanism for doing that. This Bill is about national security and it is rightly focused on that—“project defence”, as my noble friend on the Front Bench referred to it. If we want resilient supply chains, we must have mechanisms which focus on that, but let us not confuse them with the proposition that these necessarily represent a threat to our national security; let us focus on these things separately. For example, promoting foreign direct investment remains an objective that we all support, and the Office for Investment within the Department for International Trade is a welcome step in that direction.
We have a series of distinct purposes with distinct regimes. I will not go on at length because many noble Lords have already helpfully illustrated where we need to look in Committee, particularly at how the regime is going to work. I shall mention some points that I think will be important.
The first is that we have to think about how this regime interacts with all the others. How does it interact with the public interest regime, for example? My noble friend talked about the financial services sector, and of course there is a public interest intervention regime under the Enterprise Act as well, and there is the question of how the competition regime is to work. We want to secure ourselves against risks, but we do not want so to diminish competition as to harm consumers.
We need to look at other regulatory regimes. For example, we need to look carefully at the question of critical infrastructure in the water industry and the utility regulators.
A number of noble Lords have referred to SMEs. If indeed literally 1,000 or more SMEs a year are having to make notifications, we have to think very hard about how we look after their interests and help them through the process.
A number of noble Lords have mentioned the higher education and university sector. The relationship between the kind of technologies that we are dealing with here and higher education and research and development is an important interaction that we need to understand.
That brings me to the point that a number of noble Lords have talked about: defining national security. In this respect I think I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Truscott. We cannot define national security directly but it is already the case in the Bill that, if one looks at the consultation on the specified descriptions, the 17 sectors and how they are described—I have to say, a document that exceeds any other in including terminology that I do not understand—and asks whether there would be a risk if control of all these assets, technologies, activities and infrastructure were to pass into the hands of hostile actors, then by definition you have defined national security. You do not need another definition because it is already there in the Bill.
My final point is that I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead. What he proposes in respect of parliamentary oversight on the security aspects of this is absolutely right, and I hope the Government will listen positively to what he had to say.
Lord Rooker (Lab) [V]
My Lords, that was an excellent maiden speech by my noble friend Lord Woodley. I have no interests to declare but I note that vested interests on all four sides of the House have been well out in force today, and I encourage the Minister to stand firm on this issue during the passage of the Bill, to which I give my full support. It has been a long time in gestation.
I have fully supported many of those Tory MPs concerned in recent years in a very vocal way at the activities of Huawei in the UK and elsewhere in the West. I have never believed a word of the Huawei PR machine operating in Westminster. There is a pattern, and you can see it now, around Burma and China: when you strip away the covers, you find that the revolutionary guard, the army and the Communist Party actually own the companies and the capacity of the country. Free trade is a good, but it is one that needs looking after. It is the very openness of the West that is used against us by those who seek to oppose and undermine our way of life. How far we go in protecting our openness by clamping down is a paradox. In my view, the Bill is a step in the right direction.
I welcome the speed with which the Government are operating now that the Bill is with us—it is less than three months since the Bill was introduced and published on 11 November. I fully accept that, to protect the economy, it was not possible to publish well in advance the sectors of the economy where notification to the Secretary of State was required. I hope that definitions of the sectors will be well-defined, so as to avoid loopholes emerging. I await with interest, as will others, the secondary legislation that will list the sectors in detail.
I also think attention needs to be paid to the mainly London-based blue-chip accountants and legal firms that facilitate foreign investments, particularly those where it is going to be found that they fall down on national security items. A fortune has been made by some of these companies in recent years, but they operate under the cloak of respectability, and that needs stripping away. The Bill needs to be operating as soon as possible.
If I may just turn around the title of the Bill, I think we need a Bill to encourage investment in manufacturing as a means of enhancing national security. If the noble Lord, Lord Heseltine, had made it to Prime Minister, we would have had such a Bill a long time ago. Yes, I approve of foreign investment in the UK—after all, we do a lot of it overseas—but we need more homemade investment to give our economy greater security. I am not for turning the clock back to, say, the 1960s and 1970s, when I worked in UK-owned factories making and exporting things that we no longer make or export, but the shift against manufacturing at home has gone too far. We should pull some of it back, particularly from areas without the rule of law, such as China.
Remarkably, with the Covid crisis, the manufacture of PPE is being pulled back from abroad—relating to national security, when one looks at it that way—and that is a step in the right direction. Obviously it has been born out of the tragedy of the virus, but it ought to be part of our national plan. We have plenty of land for new premises, by the way; only 12% of England has been built up, so there is no argument that we do not have the space, and we certainly have the people. I hope the Bill can make a difference.
A figure in one of the briefings caused me to go back and check an issue that a previous speaker has mentioned: only 12 transactions have been reviewed on national security grounds since 2003 under the current regime, whereas in table 1 in paragraph 83 of the Bill’s impact statement, the estimate is that between 1,000 and 1,830 transactions are expected to be notified in a year. As a previous speaker pointed out—who had loads of interests to declare, although I am not criticising him—1,830 is a very peculiar figure. It could have been from 1,000 to 2,000. You cannot be that precise in these circumstances. The point is that this is serious work compared to what has happened in the past, so it will need key resources. The Minister has to convince the House that the resources will be there.
My final point is that I agree entirely with my noble friend Lord West of Spithead regarding oversight. There is a big gap here. The Bill is a step backwards, leaving it to the BEIS team. The ISC must be involved; it is clearly fit for purpose. My noble friend’s suggestions —there were more than one—are very positive, and I hope the Minister’s response is equally positive.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con) [V]
My Lords, I add my congratulations to the noble Lord, Lord Woodley, on his distinguished if somewhat combative maiden speech.
I congratulate the Government on bringing forward the Bill. It raises some fundamental principles, standing as it does at the intersection between the needs of the nation on the one hand and the rights of the individual on the other. The fact that respect for individual property rights in this country stretches back for getting on for 400 years should not be underestimated as a factor in making the country an attractive investment destination, as my noble friend Lady Noakes pointed out, and it is one that we fiddle with at our peril.
I have a second reason to congratulate the Government. I chair the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee of your Lordships’ House. Early last autumn, we scrutinised the two regulations that are referred to on page 4 of the excellent Library briefing on the Bill, one lowering the thresholds and the other extending the range of categories laid down in the Enterprise Act. Our committee was pretty concerned because we felt that important decisions like that ought to be in primary legislation and were not appropriate for secondary legislation. The Government response then was that primary legislation would come forward when time allowed, and I have to say that my committee was not entirely impressed with that reply. So it is good to see that the Government have acted promptly, and I congratulate my noble friend.
Having complimented him, I was at this point going to give him a mild kicking. I was going to say that it contrasted unfavourably with the slow response to the undertaking that he gave to the House last June about pre-pack legislation, but only half an hour or so ago, at 3.25 pm, a letter from his department pinged into my inbox—he no doubt thinking that I was going to raise this—and I now have to read the letter before I can let the kicking commence.
I go back to the Bill. Of course I understand the macro risks to our national security and I agree that we have to have adequate safeguards in place against them, but in my remarks I want to focus on what may be the practical implications if this Bill does not provide a clear, balanced and stable policy framework. In doing this, I draw the attention of the House to my career in private equity as an adviser, investor, director and chairman.
As the Government have removed the turnover test and extended the categories covered, the number of companies that fall within the provisions of the Bill has grown exponentially. Investing in early-stage companies is, as they say, a tough paper round. Out of 10 investments, probably at least half will fail, two or three will limp along, known in the trade as the living dead, and one, or if you are lucky, two will provide the reward to compensate for the money lost on the others. To get sufficiently attractive returns, the individual company will almost certainly have had to expand overseas. The UK market alone is not really large enough, and that brings the company to the attention of overseas investors and Governments.
Noble Lords can see where I am heading: just as the investors are about to reap their reward, the Government step in with a call-in notice. That is not just devastating to the investors, who the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, was slightly dismissive about; it will be a huge shock to the operations of the company itself. Markets being markets, as my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley pointed out, they will react as the new regime beds down and begin to price in the risk. Due diligence schedules will be amended to include a new inquiry as to whether the company operates in one of the designated sectors. As a result, those sectors, in which we in this country probably wish above all to encourage investment, may find it more expensive to obtain funding.
Much can be done to offset this if the Government can provide maximum certainty about what lies ahead—and I was glad to hear my noble friend’s remark that they understand this. As we go into Committee, I hope that we can discuss more about what constitutes national security, what constraints there are to be on the Government adding more sectors, the need to publish codes of practice on the Government’s detailed approach and to ensure that they are updated frequently in the light of experience and, last but not least, as many noble Lords have said, the need adequately to staff the investment security unit to meet the 30-day deadline—and with an estimated 30-plus references a week, that will be no easy task.
In my last minute I shall make two small points. In our discussion so far, we have tended to talk about successful companies, but there will be unsuccessful companies in the designated sectors which may find that a foreign investor is the only port in the storm. What is the policy response then? Is it to provide the necessary funding from the public purse under Clause 30, to let the company collapse and disappear or to allow the foreign takeover to go ahead?
Finally, in my last 30 seconds, the House should be aware that under this new regime we will be considering not just professional investors and managers but family businesses, men and women who after a lifetime of effort involving considerable sacrifice in building up a successful business now wish to reap their rewards. Under the provisions of the Bill, the Government could prevent the sale of such companies. Will Clause 13 provide compensation for a lifetime’s work in those circumstances?
Lord Bruce of Bennachie (LD) [V]
My Lords, the Bill has arrived in this House from the other place unamended, and across the House there has been general recognition of the need to reform takeover and investment rules to take account of national security considerations. However, for the Bill to be effective and proportionate it needs a clear statement of government strategy on what comprises national interest and security. At the moment, the provisional list of sectors is a catch-all and needs more detail. The Law Society of Scotland has stated reasonably that the Bill should be clear and that definitions of national security and details arising should not be left to secondary legislation. Without clarity, businesses and investors will face uncertainty about whether an acquisition or an investment in an influencing stake should trigger a referral, as other noble Lords have already stated. Should the fact that a foreign agency has a stake or qualifying interest in a UK-based company in any of the key sectors be, of itself, a reason for referral? The Law Society of Scotland and others believe that with a lack of clarity the number of referrals could be high, and that has been raised by a number of noble Lords.
There is also concern that, as the briefing states, almost anything purchased could conceivably be employed to attack national security. Examples are computers, drones, cameras and HDMI cables. So a medium-sized contractor preparing to start a contract could find itself subject to a referral, so delaying the contract and leading to extra costs and potential penalty clauses. This could even arise out of a malicious complaint from a competitor.
The society also highlights issues with Scots law relating to securities. This could be resolved if Clause 8 were amended to make it clear that nothing is triggered where the party taking security does not factually take control. Will the Minister consider this as failing to do so could specifically deter investment in Scottish companies?
There are also concerns that the possibility of referral could have an impact on the investment management industry, which is also important to the Scottish economy. The Institute of Directors, while accepting that the Government’s powers to intervene in the economy on grounds of national security need to be robust, is concerned about politicisation if the law is not clear. It is concerned that there will be a huge increase in workload, with real burdens on SMEs and that this, in turn, could, as the IoD puts it, have a chilling effect on investment.
Writing in the FT John Fingleton, former head of the OFT argues that the Bill goes far beyond measures introduced elsewhere in terms of its scope and in the measures that it introduces, including calling in deals up to five years after they were concluded. The Bill is also retrospective and applies to deals concluded the day after it was published, yet deals that may be affected can be referred to a new investment and security unit. Can the Minister say how that will be established and resourced because, as many noble Lords have said, the workload could be enormous and the specialisation should be very specific?
Both Fingleton and the IoD are concerned that, as the legislation is framed, it could lead to political lobbying for intervention with the possibility of Ministers using subjective, topical, political criteria. With this amount of uncertainty, there is a real danger that potential investors in UK businesses will be deterred and will look elsewhere. Many successful small and medium-sized businesses look for foreign investors to enable them to grow. They may find it harder if they are in one of the key sectors. The time and delay for an adjudication could be a decisive factor in preventing new investment or urgent refinancing or restructuring.
The current UK Government have been driven by their determination to deliver Brexit. The fall-out from the TCA will be felt for many years. What is not clear at home or abroad is what the Government’s strategic objectives are for the UK’s trade and investment future. Where is the industrial strategy? They have decided that our geography is not a prime asset. Why else would we tear up market access in Europe for as yet unquantifiable access to markets on the other side of the world? We have world-class universities and research and areas of technical excellence. I do not suggest that the Government should pick winners, but surely a strategy for building our economy based on our strengths and actively seeking international partnerships is a reasonable task. Of course, security threats may not be anticipated, and the Government need to be able to act when we are threatened, but a clearer set of criteria would balance national security against the need to keep Britain open for business.
In that context, I want Scotland to continue to offer an attractive location for inward investment. It is key to building a modern economy, developing new skills and improving the balance between the public, private and mixed sectors. We can be in the forefront of 5G, AI and quantum computing as well as biosciences and space and science technology, which was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord McNally. Brexit presents bumps in the road, but uncertainty over Scottish independence could create roadblocks. Let not this Bill become another obstacle to investment. If it is clear, targeted and proportionate, it can protect our national security and investment promotion, and I hope that when it leaves this House it will do precisely that.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, I join other noble Lords in congratulating the noble Lord, Lord Woodley, on his arrival in the House. He commented powerfully on the failure of privatisation. They are remarks I welcome and to which I will circle back.
Two Greens are speaking in this Second Reading. My noble friend Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb will talk about the national security aspect of the Bill and I will speak on the investment part. My noble friend will focus on the major, long-identified threats of the climate emergency and the nature crisis, with its many linked dangers, including that of pandemics. On those and other issues, as the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, noted, it is nonsensical that we are debating this Bill while still awaiting the integrated review. I want to focus mainly on the investment part of the title and on another element of national security—poverty, inequality and how the finance curse contributes to them.
There is increasing academic focus on the importance of giving macroprudential regimes a sense of social purpose, including in respect of national security. Excellent work is being conducted at the University of Sheffield, particularly by its Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute, known as SPERI. We have an oversized, overactive, extractive financial sector. A SPERI report conservatively put the cost of the finance curse between 1995 and 2015 at £4,500 billion. That has to be seen as a threat to our national security. Money that could be strengthening our society is lost, as is control over a commodity as essential to a modern society as water or air. The finance curse is built on a sector that, as we learned in 2008, is as fragile and dangerous as an oversized dictator’s statue teetering on an inadequate, narrow pillar.
The other security threat lies in the extractive processes. There are huge and widely acknowledged issues of corporate culture and priorities, as well as regulatory loopholes and blind spots which allow financial funds and senior corporate management to loot companies and hollow out balance sheets. As a society and as a Parliament, we have lost control.
This issue arises particularly in the context of this Bill, where we are talking about investment by foreign companies in foreign states. We might hope that some pressure could be put on domestic companies to act in socially responsible ways by directing at least some of their funds to things we need to keep society running. They have, after all, to exist in this country, even if they seldom keep their profits here. The same constraints do not apply to foreign investors. While we know that a huge percentage of profits from even UK investment ends up in offshore tax havens, we can be sure that those profits will not help us where there are foreign owners.
I want to focus briefly on the nature of a curse—be it finance or resource. We look around the world at nations often identified as suffering from resource curse, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Venezuela, Iraq and South Sudan. They have huge problems of national—and internal—security. Oil is sucked out of their rocks. Our society is milked for cash. Meta-analyses of the resource curse show there is nothing inevitable about this. The quality of governance, the rule of law and the functioning of democracy are crucial to prevent it. Which is where we come back to this law—and the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Woodley.
In the UK, through continuing decades of privatisation, we have sold off the family silver. We are now down to the rather small teaspoons. When, in 2016, the people showed that they wanted to “take back control”, that reality was hidden, but the Government no longer have flamboyantly presented fictions about Brussels to hide behind. When they champion “Singapore-upon-Thames”, they will be held responsible for the consequences. Noble Lords working on this Bill, but particularly the Government, might want to focus on that.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Alderdice) (LD)
The noble Lord, Lord Clark of Windermere, has withdrawn, so I call the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick.
Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Non-Afl) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. I welcome the noble Lord, Lord Woodley, to the House and congratulate him on his maiden speech.
The aim of this Bill is to reform the way in which inward investment into the UK is investigated to ensure that hostile Governments or other entities do not use it to undermine the UK’s national security. It follows calls for reform, including from the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, to which the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, has already referred.
The purpose of this Bill is to prevent international economic crime impacting on major businesses in the UK, but a lot more bureaucracy and resources will be required to execute its provisions. Combined with the provisions in the Financial Services Bill, it will give the Government more legislative teeth with which to address economic crime and corruption. But will the legislation actually benefit businesses and university research? We are still in the Covid pandemic and it will take some time to come out if it.
The Government have argued that these powers are necessary because of the resurgence of state-based threats to national security and the risk of UK businesses being controlled by entities with close ties to hostile foreign Governments. It is important to stress that inward investment and global competitiveness should not be compromised as a result of these new measures, which are undoubtedly the result of private Chinese interventions in the digital sphere. We need to be open for business and to have a continued inward investment platform. As the noble Lord, Lord Dodds of Duncairn, has already mentioned, in Northern Ireland we rely significantly for our manufacturing and business sectors on foreign direct investment. We also work directly with the universities on technology transfer. It is important that those industries are not impacted or undermined further by these proposed legislative developments, because it would have major repercussions for our fragile jobs sector. Our fragile business economy—particularly the aviation sector—must not be further threatened. High-level research must be encouraged and supported.
I want to concentrate on several areas. First, we need to increase parliamentary scrutiny of how the Secretary of State may use the powers in the Bill. This has been referred to during debate on the various stages in the other place. Businesses need clarity about how the powers in the Bill would be used and the definition of national security. We also need to ensure that this is not straight-down-the-line protectionism. There needs to be a mechanism for greater reporting to Parliament about the use of the powers. The Intelligence and Security Committee should have a role. The Secretary of State should publish guidance about the Bill and the regulations made under it within six months of it being passed. Will the Minister ensure that government amendments come forward in Committee or on Report to address the need for greater parliamentary scrutiny?
It is also important that small and medium-sized businesses are not undermined. There is a fear that the notification process could become burdensome on such businesses, which would now fall within the scope of the new regime. The possible impacts on businesses of the new regime must be properly assessed, and legislative measures put in place to ensure that they are mitigated. Will the Minister commit to protecting small and medium-sized businesses in this way?
I turn to the position of universities which host incubators and start-ups. University research and innovation are vital for the UK. They have close links with inward investment and the business and industrial sectors. This must not be compromised as a result of these new legislative measures.
Like many other noble Lords, I have received a briefing from the University of Cambridge, which is involved with the business sector, especially with university technology transfer. I hope that the Minister and his colleagues in BEIS will find some solutions to deal with those issues.
Let us remember that national security has been invoked in the past in the context of Northern Ireland. This led to a major demolition company losing a big contract, with investment and job repercussions. All these issues must be addressed. We need to achieve a balance in the contents and proposals of this Bill.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to take part at Second Reading. I declare my interests and congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Woodley, on his maiden speech. I am supportive of the Bill and wholly supportive of the comments of my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Leigh of Hurley. It is right that we salute innovators, founders and entrepreneurs, those who produce something where nothing existed before. They deserve all our gratitude.
We have the right environment for investment in this nation. The policy environment and the rule of law make the UK an excellent place for inward investment, and indeed, there is no contradiction. Our national prosperity is inextricably and rightly linked with our national security. In my comments I will cover definitions, the notification regime, the ISU and some associated points.
On definitions, we have a national security Bill with no definition of national security. Without broadening the scope of the Bill, does the Minister agree that a broad definition of national security would be helpful here, without taking it to the extent of other nations, where yoghurt producers and bottled-water manufacturers can come within scope of critical national assets? Similarly, it is right to note where national security and national interest come up against one another and sometimes overly overlap. We have seen in recent times, when the pressure was on, Australia reducing the quantum for referrals in its regime to zero. Similarly, with share ownership under the French regime, it has gone from 25% to 10%. These changes are at least interesting.
As for the notification regime, I am a supporter of the identified sectors—but there are difficulties, as other noble Lords have pointed out. Artificial intelligence, for example, is not a vertical sector or even horizontal, but more a coming ubiquity, and how it is dealt with is central to what is within this Bill. Similarly, on the numbers of referrals—12 in the past 18 years under the previous regime—as other noble Lords have commented, with 1,000 to 1,830, if you apply a multiple to that you will probably get closer to the level of referrals that will occur. Can the Minister say why a business would not refer, for want of certainty?
Similarly, on the impact assessment setting out those numbers, there does not seem to be any basis on which those numbers have been arrived at. I worry that, although it is positive that the information required for notification has dropped by two-thirds, microbusinesses are included, which could cause an unnecessary burden for them. We already have a significant scale-up problem in this nation.
On the ISU, there are questions about its digital capability, level of budget and number of personnel. It could, in reality, through notification, suffer from swampification. We have already seen this with the National Crime Agency. Can the Minister tell us what is being done about those 100 people in terms of their skills, their security clearance and their deep knowledge of the technologies involved?
With retrospection, we see a five-year period. Five years is quite a way from what was originally set out in the Green Paper and the White Paper. As for the overall intent of the Bill, I am supportive, of course. However, in Clause 7 most corporate entities are covered, but there seems to be a loophole in terms of individuals. No matter how small it is, is that a loophole that the Minister would consider closing? On oversight, I agree entirely with the noble Lord, Lord West, that there needs to be an addressing of this democratic accountability deficit, and the ISC is the proper place for this to occur.
In conclusion, we have a good Bill. Does the Minister agree that with delicate, nuanced and proportionate amendments, we can make it a great Bill for national prosperity, national interest and national security, for today and for all our tomorrows?
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab Co-op) [V]
My Lords, I, too, welcome my noble friend Lord Woodley to our House, and I thank the Minister for a comprehensive introduction to the debate. My only disappointment was that he sounded almost apologetic when he should be proud to be introducing this Bill to the House. Like my noble friend Lord Rooker, I was interested in the number of declarations of commercial interests by a number of speakers in this debate. I declare that my only interest is that of national security.
I welcome this Bill. It is long overdue, and I fear that we may already be too late in some areas. We may be closing the stable door after a few of the horses have bolted. At the risk of being labelled an “old leftie”, I felt much safer from assaults on our vital infrastructure a few decades ago, before the frenzy of privatisation, particularly during the Thatcher era. We were, for example, at the forefront of all aspects of nuclear technology, including electricity supply, when it was in public ownership. The United Kingdom built the world’s first nuclear power station and was at the forefront of the production of material for civil and military use when it was in public ownership. We felt secure because the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, the Central Electricity Generating Board, the South of Scotland Electricity Board and the immensely innovative North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board were all in public hands and in no danger of takeover by hostile investors.
Similarly, our telecommunications, railways and water supply, all key infrastructure, were all publicly owned and therefore by definition secure. The blitz of privatisation has resulted in all of them—except, thankfully, water in Scotland—being potential prey to hostile interests. The desire among a few of those who are already wealthy to increase their personal wealth has put the vast majority of the population at risk. It has certainly helped the billionaires, but the workers have not been helped to a great extent. Even some of our defence installations are being sold off, and government buildings in Whitehall are the target of the private investors. I have more faith in Governments, even this Government, to look after our national interests than I do in Capita or G4S. So, unlike some others, I am not inclined to ask for a watering-down of the powers in this Bill. Indeed, such strong action is long overdue.
When I was a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, I became increasingly aware of the threats to our infrastructure, not just from Russia, China and other countries, but also from non-state interests. As others have said, the ISC, in its report, called for action as far back as 2013, so the delay is regrettable. Some investments may well have been made in anticipation. Thankfully—I commend the Government for this—some interim strengthening has been made by secondary legislation. I also understand and accept that not all these discussions should be in the public domain as we move to protect the interests of our people, because of the sensitivity.
I agree with those who have suggested that a wider definition of national security might be necessary to take account of technological changes—particularly in relation to the internet and social media—and the expanding range of hostile interests. I am disappointed that the Minister seemed to rule this out, even in his introduction. I hope he will think again.
Finally, I agree with Dr Julian Lewis, the chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, my friend and colleague Kevan Jones, who is a member of that committee, and, of course, my noble friend Lord West, in their view that the ISC should clearly be closely involved in the oversight of this. The committee has the membership and the modus operandi to make it appropriate to undertake this task. Since this House is represented on the ISC by my noble friend Admiral Lord West, we can be assured that our interests are well represented there. I strongly support his proposed amendment, and I hope that the Minister will say that he accepts it in principle and that we might even get a government amendment to that effect.
I end where I began by expressing support for the Bill. I hope that we can get it into law without any delay.
Lord Bhatia (Non-Afl) [V]
My Lords, the aim of the Bill is to reform the way inward investment in the UK is investigated to ensure that hostile Governments or other entities do not use this to undermine the UK’s national security. The Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament actively called for this reform. The Bill would give new powers to the Secretary of State to call in acquisitions, including takeovers, to assess any risk to national security. The Bill would remove the existing business turnover thresholds, meaning that small and medium-sized enterprises could be subject to a national security assessment under the new regime.
The Bill would also establish a mandatory notification regime for certain sensitive sectors of the economy. Under this new regime, any acquisition would need to be registered with the Secretary of State. The Bill would also establish a voluntary notification regime, whereby parties to an acquisition would need to be registered with the Secretary of State. The Bill would also establish a voluntary notification regime, whereby parties to an acquisition not already covered by the mandatory regime would be able to notify the Secretary of State about the potential risks to national security. The Bill sets out the procedures for how a national security assessment would be conducted and resolved.
The Government have argued that these powers are necessary because of the resurgence of state-based threats to national security and the risk of UK businesses being controlled by entities with close ties to hostile foreign Governments. They have argued that the Bill strikes the right balance between encouraging inward investment and protecting national security. In this globalised world, there are many rewards and risks, types of money, and companies registered in tax havens that will hide those companies’ real owners.
My concerns are mainly about the tenders issued by the Government for defence materials. These are international tenders and it is obvious that price cannot be the only consideration unless the Government are certain that whichever company wins the tender is open to scrutiny about who is the ultimate owner and controller of the winner. I submit that where our defence sector is concerned, the Secretary of State for Defence must have full powers to reject the winner of the tender if there is any doubt about its the ownership or integrity.
Lord Naseby (Con) [V]
My Lords, I too welcome the Bill. It follows on from the Financial Services Bill and the Trade Bill, and all of them follow on from the Brexit Bill. I know it is unusual, but I thank in particular my noble friend Lord Callanan on the Front Bench. He has been involved in all these Bills and frankly his work output is quite exciting to say the least.
Our nation has a clear determination to build our economy worldwide. As one who has lived and worked in south and south-east Asia, I find this period very stimulating. On the Bill specifically, I welcome the powers to call in and the extension to small and medium-sized enterprises. I have a small question: am I right to assume that “small” includes partnerships? I am also not clear what the linkage is with the City of London Corporation, particularly in the remembrancer’s department—that is the corporation’s legal side—and those commercial lawyers specifically dealing with international trade and inward and outward investment. That is something we can look at in Committee.
I have looked at the sensitive areas—all 17 of them. I wonder why the pharmaceutical and chemical industries are still not there. In addition, unsurprisingly as an ex-pilot, I wonder why aviation is excluded. If I added these three there would be 20, but at the moment all 17 will be watched over by this new investment security unit in the Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy. That is quite a challenge for those civil servants. I question what we are doing about having a closer link with the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. Our embassies and high commissions could be our eyes and ears if they are properly briefed and if, at the coalface of wherever our representatives are, there is somebody senior who is properly briefed.
I note that there was concern in the Commons, particularly from the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee. He tabled new Clause 4, which would have added a framework of factors that the Secretary of State would have to consider when assessing a risk to national security. The chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee also expressed concern and stated that there was a “scrutiny gap”. Have the Government reflected on the new clause, which was unsuccessful in the Commons, or certainly on the concerns raised? If so, will Her Majesty’s Government respond with their own amendment?
The Government are enthusiastically championing free trade. That is really good and exciting, but I have just one word of warning. There was considerable discussion on the Trade Bill on whether we should not trade with people allegedly committing genocide. The first reaction to that is: yes, correct. However, there are all sorts of allegations of genocide and we need to tread carefully. Far more frequently we have issues of alleged human rights abuses. We had that in the Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill and other Bills. Here in the UK we often see groups of former asylum seekers who seek to get back at the country where they were before with extensive lobbying against that country and any involvement with it. Yes we must have our own high standards, but we must take care not to be overinfluenced by every vested interest or pressure group. Equally, we must avoid a quagmire of mandatory and voluntary notifications, as highlighted by the Global Infrastructure Investor Association. Having said all of that, this is a hugely important Bill for the future of our nation.
Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab) [V]
My Lords, we were all delighted to hear my noble friend Lord Woodley’s maiden speech. I welcome him to your Lordships’ House, and I suspect noble Lords will find him a unique and distinctive voice in this House in the years to come.
I declare my interests as chair of the new National Preparedness Commission, which brings together business, government, academia and civil society, with a purpose of promoting better preparedness in the UK for a major crisis or incident.
The last five years of political discourse have been supposed to be about “taking back control”, allowing this country to make its own decisions and operate independently of other nations—the Minister may recall some of those discussions. However, this is a time of rapid geopolitical change, as US pre-eminence gives way to a multipolar world. China is emerging as a dominant economic power, and the noble Lord, Lord Robathan, described the process by which it is strengthening its world role by ostensibly benign investment. Russia is using hybrid means to maximise its influence, and there are, of course, other nation states that are potential hostile actors. As such, we have little Britain in the world, surrounded by powers that may not be entirely benign.
There is no use taking back control if that independence is a fantasy because other nation states have the ability to control your infrastructure. As the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, says, such matters as our water supply or financial payments system are not included in the definition of the critical national infrastructure—but we would very rapidly notice if they were compromised or damaged in any way. Of course, it is not just ownership but what goes into the infrastructure: the components. This brings us to Huawei, to which my noble friend Lord Rooker referred, as did the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup. However, as the latter pointed out, this Bill does not address the concerns that many people had about Huawei.
We have to recognise that we have a growing reliance on ever more complex and interconnected systems, which creates vulnerabilities, as, in critical services, new systems are overlaid on top of legacy systems in a way that, in some cases, is now almost impossible to disentangle and beyond the experience of many of those responsible for running and maintaining them. This creates its own risks, even before you consider the possibility of external threats being placed at the heart of such complex systems and potentially being manipulated by overseas interests.
Therefore, the Bill is necessary but not necessarily sufficient. Clearly, mechanisms in it need to be proportionate and speedy; I am sure your Lordships’ House will return to this in Committee. Similarly, security issues need to be reviewed by the Intelligence and Security Committee, as my noble friends Lady Hayter and Lord West have said. This has to be written into the Bill, so why is it not there? I hope that, when he responds, the Minister will be able to reassure us that this will be corrected by the Government without this House having to intervene.
The other side of this is: we must not stifle research and innovation. However, we have to recognise that cutting-edge research may be precisely the areas where security is most important, so balancing inward investment in that research needs to be looked at very carefully in the context of security and what that cutting-edge research could deliver.
When he introduced the Bill, the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, reminded us of the importance of inward investment, but, of course, with that, there is a form of dependency. If we are talking about a nation that is able to “take back control”, we do have to look at these issues, at that form of dependency and at the potential infringement of our security.
My noble friend Lord McNicol talked about the need for an industrial strategy. He is absolutely right: we need to balance our need for external investment with our national security, which means that we need what is fundamentally an holistic and systemic approach to the security of our infrastructure and to inward investment. If having an explicitly named industrial strategy is a step too far for the Minister, perhaps he will at least acknowledge that our approach to these questions should be holistic and systemic. He could tell your Lordships’ House how this will be done and who will be responsible for delivering that balance. I am not sure that this Bill provides such an approach, but it is a useful start and step on the journey to taking back control in a meaningful sense.
Lord Vaizey of Didcot (Con)
My Lords, it a great pleasure to follow that tour de force from the noble Lord, Lord Harris. I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Woodley, on his excellent maiden speech—I know from having served with him in the other place that he will be a formidable addition to your Lordships’ House. I also pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Callanan for all his incredible hard work over many years on so many different trade Bills and trade issues.
I think all of us in this House welcome the National Security and Investment Bill. I recall when I was a Minister looking at the potential implications of the takeover of some of our leading companies by companies from states which were perhaps not aligned with our interests and considering how on earth we would deal with that situation. Of course, I was the Minister who looked after, as it were, Huawei when it was still part of our infrastructure system, so national security is an issue that I have taken a great interest in.
It is quite right to echo what the noble Lord, Lord Harris, was saying. We find ourselves in the 2020s in a very different situation from the one we were in perhaps 30 or 40 years ago, in that state actors are now able to use corporate entities to prosecute their foreign policy. It is quite right that we are effectively looking at updating the Enterprise Act and creating a framework for national security.
Clearly the balance has to be struck between ensuring that hostile actors do not intervene with some of our greatest companies while not putting off much-needed inward investment. I refer to my entries in the register of Members’ interests before I continue with my arguments. It is quite clear from the many excellent speeches during this debate that the Government are now well aware of where the most vigorous analysis of the Bill will take place.
Many noble Lords have made the point that the Bill is drafted in a relatively relaxed fashion at the moment. One can see the combination of civil servants wanting to give Government Ministers the maximum flexibility to react to situations which they perhaps cannot anticipate colliding with very highly paid lawyers who will not want to be sued by their clients and so will give them robust advice to report each and every transaction to the new unit.
Therefore, I think that the bizarrely accurate figure cited by the Government of 1,830 referrals is a woeful underestimate of what is likely to happen when the Bill becomes law. I agree with noble Lords who have said that we are looking at something like 10,000 notifications a year, at least in the first instance. I also share the concerns of those who see normal day-to-day activity, such as research and development partnerships, being caught by this legislation, although I acknowledge, again to echo what the noble Lord, Lord Harris, was saying, that the role of universities in our national security is a crucial one that requires some scrutiny. I also share the concerns that the routine purchase of assets, such as software licences, could also inadvertently fall within the scope of the Bill. The general point has also been made that there is not yet a clear definition of national security in the context of the Bill.
I want to use my time in the Second Reading debate to highlight three issues that I hope to be able to concentrate on in Committee. The first is the proposed sanction of automatic voidness for transactions that are completed in breach of the mandatory filing requirement. It is my contention that significant sanctions should certainly apply in these circumstances, but I understand that there is considerable concern among investors about the practical difficulties that arise if the proposed approach is adopted.
I understand that the Government’s position is that the French have a similar system but I understand, certainly in my discussions with experts in this field, that the French system is much more flexible. It seems perfectly sensible to echo what happens, for example, in Australia and the US, so that we have a flexible system of sanctions even when somebody has not complied with a mandatory reporting requirement, so that we will get to a point where the Bill will, I hope, incorporate a voidable power instead of a mandatory voiding.
The other issue is the proposed extraterritorial application of the Government’s call-in power to non-UK companies. Again, this power is out of sync with similar regimes in France, Spain, Germany, Canada and Japan, all of which restrict their transactions to involve targets registered in their jurisdiction. Finally, there is significant concern that the Bill will have a deterrent effect on investment in the UK tech sector, with many of the 17 sectors specified in the Bill being very widely drawn.
I hope that in the short time allotted to me I have highlighted three important areas, which have been highlighted elsewhere. I will not yet get on to the need for parliamentary scrutiny by the Intelligence and Security Committee, which will, I am sure, come up in Committee.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP) [V]
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Bennett for flagging up that I will be speaking about our environmental crisis. I very much enjoyed her speech, particularly the bit about offshore tax havens: that is something that the Government really ought to mop up very fast, because we lose so much money through them.
Several noble Lords have mentioned that it is odd that a Bill titled the National Security and Investment Bill does not even attempt to define or provide any example of what is meant by “national security”. I think the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, was the first to mention that, right at the beginning. Business types might say that not having a definition might be bad for business, because it makes things uncertain. My concern is that it could also be applied far too narrowly, so that the Government do not take the important actions needed when problematic takeovers and mergers are proposed.
We are in a climate and ecological emergency. Parliament has declared this already. Some will try to argue that the Bill should not stray into other issues, such as nature, biodiversity and the environment, but that would be to completely misunderstand the threats we face. The climate and ecological emergency will affect our national security, and global security, for this century and beyond. The Dasgupta review, for example, has warned that humanity must:
“Ensure that our demands on Nature do not exceed its supply”—
its sustainable supply, that is. Greens talk about that quite a lot, but somehow the message does not get through. Dasgupta also says that we should adopt different metrics for economic success. That is obvious, because if we are destroying nature, we have to take that into our calculations. Lastly, it says we must:
“Transform our institutions and systems”.
A changing climate will affect everything and put us at war with nature. Rising sea levels will capture large tracts of territory all across the world. Drought will starve populations and spread wildfires. Habitat loss will inflict genocides on millions of species that can never be recovered—and, of course, uncertainty, resource scarcity and hoarding will cause stresses and create mass migrations and military conflict. This shows us how important climate and nature is to our survival.
If we faced this existential threat from any human or country, it would be blindingly obvious that was a national security issue. But I worry that because it is seen as more esoteric and ethereal—perhaps a bit fluffy—the Government will not use their power to ensure that business and investment is controlled to protect against the huge risks we face. These are not soft issues; they are the hardest and most significant challenges facing our nation and humanity as a whole. The Government must start understanding their role in interfering with ecologically damaging business ventures. We cannot worry about Huawei’s risks to the world wide web when we give a free pass to the thousands of businesses that threaten the world’s web of life.
Undoubtedly, this needs global co-ordination beyond the UK Government. I would be overjoyed if the Minister would give us some plans to address this—for example, by leveraging our presidency of the G7 and COP 26. It would be absolutely incredible and wonderful if we could go into COP 26 with a plan for how to deal with this and get other countries to sign up to it, and understand the danger that we all face.
However, we do not need to wait for global agreement. Our Government should be acting unilaterally as well as bilaterally. The security of our earth impacts the security of all its nations and we have to stop the ecocide. I have two questions for the Minister. First, will he please define national security? Secondly, how does the climate emergency come into that?
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]
My Lords, I welcome the noble Lord, Lord Woodley, and congratulate him on his maiden speech. I also congratulate my noble friend the Minister on so ably introducing the Bill, with its ambitions to control foreign investment. I welcome the Bill in the broad and in principle, but I would like to highlight a number of points that I wish to explore during its passage.
The United Kingdom has a long and proud tradition of being open to foreign investment. What assessment have the Government made of the impact on foreign investments within the remit of the Bill, especially in terms of British technology and manufacturing sectors?
Both the Law Society of England and the Law Society of Scotland have highlighted a number of issues: in particular, why there is no definition in the Bill of national security. Also, the remit of the Bill is very loose and broad. While I appreciate that this is to be refined by secondary legislation, my noble friend the Minister will appreciate that we have very limited powers to review and scrutinise secondary legislation.
I welcome the consultation; I notice that transport is included within that. However, why have the Government proceeded with the Bill without the results of that consultation being known, processed and put before the House? I understand that the Government will put more detail in the secondary legislation, particularly on the transport aspects. But, once again, there is limited scrutiny over that secondary legislation, whereas if it was on the face of the Bill—as the 17 original sectors are—that would give us more powers to scrutinise and discuss this through its passage.
Like my noble friend Lady Noakes, I would like to ask specifically why the water sector is not covered. The provision of water to households and businesses is a strategic matter. It seems an oversight that it has not been included in the remit of the Bill. There may be a good reason for that, and I should be delighted if my noble friend the Minister would share that with us today.
In principle, I welcome the scope of the Bill and the opportunity we have today, and through its passage in Committee and further stages, to scrutinise it. The full remit of the Bill and particular definitions need to be properly understood. I welcome the opportunity that the passage of the Bill will provide in that regard. With those few remarks, I wish the Bill a fair wind today.
Lord Desai (Non-Afl)
My Lords, following the last speaker, I will have to be very inventive in saying anything that is worth saying. First, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Woodley, on coming into the House and wish him good luck. We look forward to hearing his views. I will start with his views, given the nature of the national security issue. I will confine myself to the old-fashioned definition of national security, and not the one about biodiversity—I have only six minutes.
National security is something which, if you define it, you lose. It is one of those things you have to keep very general and as undefined as possible, because people will find ways around any definition that is given.
Software rather than hardware is the nature of warfare now. Russia is able to undermine American security, or any kind of security. It no longer has superior weapons; it has superior hackers, and hackers make the difference. It is not manufacturing industry that makes the difference any more; it is not the space race, as the noble Lord, Lord McNally, was saying. We were all quarrelling about Huawei, because what Huawei does by way of software for 5G is going to make more difference to national security than anything solid. So, while I welcome this Bill, it is cast very much in the old mould, when manufacturing industry was important and people used to aggress on each other through it.
I also agree that we should not do anything that restricts the entry of foreign investment into this country. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, said, “Well, if the Bill creates problems, it creates problems, but there are good things and bad things and we should welcome bad things as well as good things because they interact on each other.” Ideally in a Bill of this sort, the first clause would say that national security means whatever the Government decide it means and the second clause would say that the Minister will do whatever the Minister thinks it is essential to do. We would have a good ISC that would keep guard on the Minister and we would make sure that there was parliamentary scrutiny on secondary legislation—but, of course, that is not possible.
The nature of warfare has changed so much that the next war, when it happens, according to an article in yesterday’s Times, is bound to be nuclear. There are now so many nations with nuclear power that it is hard to predict which way it will go. So, given that sort of background, we have to be inventive and cautious.
I will say one more thing. The importance of universities is overwhelmingly larger than it used to be. The commercial arms formed by universities are important, but so are the reasons students come to universities. Here again is a dilemma. We ought to have open immigration of foreign students, because you never know where a bright man or woman will come from. Their knowledge is useful because they interact and things are created. At the same time, we must be very careful that, in regulating universities, we do not kill research. To give one example: the entire nuclear programme was triggered by a bunch of absolutely unpractical theoretical physicists leaving Europe and going to America. They created the first atom bomb, because all they could do was nuclear physics, which was completely unpractical. So nowadays it will be the universities that determine whether we can fight wars efficiently or not.
So, while this Bill is very welcome, the way it is implemented and the way the Secretary of State restrains herself will depend very much on how intelligent, rich and flexible a definition of national security we have. I say to the Government, “Don’t put it on paper. We trust you. Just have a parliamentary committee that will keep tabs on you—and, those two things being given, the rest will follow.”
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Desai, for cheering us all up with predictions of nuclear war. I also congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Woodley, on his maiden speech, and welcome him. Like the noble Lord, Lord Harris, I hope that his distinctive voice will be heard on a regular basis.
No Peer has stood up and said that the pretext of the Bill is wrong—because no one would. But at the end of his speech the Minister said categorically, “This Bill will keep the country safe.” Actually, I think it is the implementation of some of the principles within the Bill that might help keep the country safe; that would perhaps be a less ambitious statement. It is your Lordships’ job—all of us together—to try to make sure that the law of unintended consequences does not overtake the good intentions of the Bill. That will be the challenge, and that should be our purpose.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, pointed out, there is already a more laissez-faire way of dealing with security issues that the Secretary of State has had for some time—but this Bill proposes a substantial change of gear. That, I can only presume, has been sparked by the Government’s view of a changing geopolitical situation. In fact, it would help the Bill if the Government set out how they see the geopolitical landscape—in other words, what is inspiring this change of gear.
My noble friend Lord McNally suggested that we might be entering a cold war with China. What is the Government’s view on that? With that kind of analysis, understanding the Bill would become a much easier task for the rest of us. As many noble Lords have said, there is no definition of national security. The noble Lord, Lord Desai, made that point, as did the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, and I shall make an observation on that later.
On the wider strategy, we are already seeing elements of what I would call mission creep. The questions that this debate, and the subsequent legislative process, will have to answer are: how much agency do the Government want to exercise in the market, and how do we ring-fence genuine security concerns from a given Secretary of State’s wider industrial economic plans—or do we want to? How can we be sure that future Governments and Secretaries of State will not be more ambitious, or more interventionist, in using the powers that this Government have decided to put in place? That is a big challenge, because it addresses not just what one Secretary of State says, but the future.
As we know, the Bill puts the onus to report on businesses, and on research and finance organisations, and reduces the trigger levels to report transactions. It introduces costs—it must do—and it slows things down; I will come to that later. It also brings smaller transactions into scope than would previously have been the case. It is mildly retrospective and, unlike comparable regimes, it captures domestic transactions and does not include an exemption list.
As noble Lords have said, there are many respectable external voices suggesting that the Bill as drafted could, or would, inhibit investment, and put at risk innovation funding. There is also the scope of the Bill. As we have also heard, there is a separate document outlining 17 sectors of technology, ranging far and wide. Some would like them to range further and wider. There is a consultation, as the Minister set out, and we are looking forward to seeing that more focused document, because it will be very important for the progress of the Bill that we see it.
The list of technologies is extraordinarily wide. Frankly, it would cover almost anything, and we need to see what the focused version will say. But, given that the list is amendable by secondary legislation, and also given the risk that others are very reticent about challenging the secondary legislative process, this is, in effect, a blank cheque. We should also note that, as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, observed, most technologies have dual use—civilian and security use. This opens up many deals to challenge, which might not be necessary. So this calls into question the methodology, and comes back to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, about security risk.
Basically, the Government are seeking to build a comprehensive list of everything—every possible technology—using language that few of us understand. That may be good or it may be bad; we do not really know. So this requires an immense amount of forethought to make the list comprehensive, and it also raises speed bumps in front of all sorts of innocent deals going forward.
The key here is what the technology would be used for. What harm could it cause, or what would losing access to that technology prevent the United Kingdom doing? There is a more methodological approach to this than simply listing everything that could possibly harm us, because that is not possible.
Looking forward, how are the Government going to weigh up the need for the scale-up of technologies? Scale-up organisations need an injection of funds on a regular basis, and delay will be a problem. What is the Government’s view on losing control of this technology—potentially to an ally? For example, is it okay for a US company to buy a UK business and carry this technology off to the United States? I have experience with this, and repatriating the technology to the UK after it has been in the US can and has been stopped by the US Department of Defense. This is not a matter simply of China or Iran; it is a matter of technology moving among our allies as well. We need to understand the Government’s view on these kinds of transfers.
We heard from my noble friend Lady Bowles about how this fits in with free trade agreements. Do clauses in FTAs allowing free market activity override the Bill? If the Bill overrides the FTA, what price an FTA? Overall, what is the principal concern here to the Government? Is it losing access, losing control or handing access to someone we do not like—or is it a formula of all three? How does this work? How does the Bill discriminate between each of these?
Then we have the mechanics of reviewing the deal. The CMA is carved out of this, and a new unit is being set up. How will they work together? Who will guide the market on this process, and how? A previous speaker was very clear about the need for this. As noble Lords have said, there will be at least 30 deals a week—actually, it will be more than that—over 17 different complex technology sectors. How is this unit going to handle, sift and manage these sectors? How big will the unit be? What is the budget? What will its relationship be with other organisations across the sector? We need to understand the mechanics of this operation.
The Bill gives the Secretary of State great power to intervene in the market, and it is unclear which of all the assets will be within scope. Universities in particular have a great deal of concern, as the noble Lord, Lord Desai, just mentioned. There is a lot to be said around universities—how they will work with research deals and through scale-ups—as I have already said. It is quite clear, post Brexit and as we are coming through Covid, that the market is very nervous. How will the Government make sure that the essential flow of the right sort of investment into technology continues?
The Bill is being launched into a vacuum. The integrated security review is not there yet; as I have said, we need a better picture of the geopolitical outlook. Furthermore, there is no solid marker on genocide, and we are already hearing it come up here. The Government should and could have allotted time to deal with that in a separate Bill, and they are reaping the whirlwind of not doing that. Of course, there is also no industrial strategy. I firmly believe that work on one is necessary—not so that this Bill can enact industrial strategy but so that there is a separate process. People who want to have an industrial strategy are now wishing it upon this Bill. It is well past time that that discussion was had.
It is inside this vacuum that the Secretary of State will exercise these new quasi-judicial powers, currently with no meaningful parliamentary scrutiny. Free from strategies and unfettered by the nature of regimes, this is a blank cheque. This debate has to work out the constraints for how it will operate. The investment community, space industry, venture capitalists, universities and lawyers—lots of people—have raised legitimate concerns today. Yes, there was a consultation and, yes, there has been some movement, but there is generally much further to travel before the Bill achieves what the Minister set out at the beginning: to make the United Kingdom safer.
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
I start by thanking everyone who has spoken in today’s excellent debate. It reminds me just how extensive the array of expertise present in the House is, especially from the security, defence, technology and business sectors. I join colleagues in congratulating my noble friend Lord Woodley on his maiden speech. My noble friend Lord West welcomed him as a fellow sailor; I welcome him to your Lordships’ House as a fellow Evertonian. I look forward to his further contributions during the Bill’s passage.
As my colleague and noble friend Lady Hayter said in her opening reply to the Minister, national security is Labour’s top priority, as it should be the first and foremost task of any Government to protect their own citizens. That is why Labour strongly welcomes the Bill and agrees that it is necessary. Inward investment is crucial for businesses across the UK and our economy. It is also crucial that the UK Government have the correct powers in place to scrutinise and intervene on business transactions that could have implications for our national security. It is essential that the balance of the Bill is correct to ensure that it does not deter foreign direct investment, while being certain that national security is protected.
Nevertheless, it is regrettable that, once again, Ministers have acted too slowly in bringing forward these changes. They have acted slowly in comparison with other countries, including the US, Germany and France, all of which have already taken steps to update their legislation in line with evolving security threats. In Committee in the Commons, Charles Parton of the Royal United Services Institute—many have quoted him—said that
“the Government have not really been attending to the problem with the attention that they should, given the nature of the threat, particularly from the Chinese”.—[Official Report, Commons, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24/11/20; col. 5.]
The Government have acted slowly in relation to technological change. It was only last year that artificial intelligence was added to the relevant section of the Enterprise Act. The Government have been somewhat behind the curve in recognising this critical sector, explicitly highlighted by the takeover of DeepMind by Google. Naturally, they have acted slowly again on this Bill. Last January—a year ago—the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, promised that the Government would soon be
“publishing a draft national security and investment Bill, to strengthen the Government’s powers to investigate and intervene in business transactions … to protect our national security”.—[Official Report, 9/1/20; col. 438.]
But this—and any pre-legislative scrutiny, as argued for by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee—never happened. This slowness might have implications for our national security, so we are ready to help the Government pass this legislation as soon as possible and will work on this Bill with all colleagues around the House to achieve this.
I turn now to the Bill. Labour will be seeking assurances in some critical areas. During the debate, a number of common themes have emerged, perhaps five main ones: the scope and meaning of national security with enterprise policy; the investment security unit workload and the implications of the process on business; competitiveness, risk and agility; intangible assets, IP and algorithms in a networked world, not forgetting fintech. My noble friend and colleague Lady Hayter mentioned an important fifth theme highlighting how we will look for improvements in scrutiny and a greater role for Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee. This was echoed by my noble friend Lord West. We need to have proper oversight of security issues, to which my noble friends Lord Rooker and Lord Foulkes added their cogent comments.
Returning to the themes, most importantly, Labour will be probing to make sure that the new investment security unit to be set up by the Bill will have the capacity to handle its workload and is properly resourced to help small businesses through the challenges they may face. It is hard to overestimate the extent of this challenge for the new unit. It will have to respond to a large volume of notifications within the tight timeline set out in the Bill. The impact assessment estimates that more than1,800 notifications will be made each year, and many speakers have wondered how imaginary this number is.
During an evidence session in the Commons, the head of national security for the financial firm, Skadden, Michael Leiter, said:
“I am concerned that no Government are ready for that rate of change.”—[Official Report, Commons, National Security and Investment Bill Committee, 24/11/20; col. 41.]
A submission from the Russell Group of universities—I thank the group for its briefing—states: “Research institutions and businesses across the globe require regulatory environments that allow deals to be concluded at pace.” The investment security unit will have to track the development of fast-moving and highly complex technologies, and monitor each of the listed markets. The Secretary of State will have to take decisions on the advice of the unit, which can be challenged in court in the context of highly sensitive information and its wide-ranging powers. The unit will need to develop policy, practice and precedent to provide clarity and certainty to a wide swathe of the economy.
In Committee, it will be important to consider how the new unit is to be sufficiently resourced, have the right skills to monitor a fast-moving landscape and be able to turn cases around fast enough not to hold up possible investments. Many speakers, notably the noble Lords, Lord Bilimoria, Lord Hodgson and Lord Leigh, have defined the Bill as “difficult for business”. We need to probe whether the unit will be sensitive enough to assist SMEs which themselves might not have the capacity to deal with the increased administrative burden being introduced by this new regime. We believe that a specific SME engagement division within BEIS may be needed to assist and support SMEs through the national security screening process. A reporting requirement on the Secretary of State is needed on staff resourcing for the unit.
Another critical consideration will be how cross-departmental working will be assured via the unit, as this will not happen if it is merely siloed away within a department. This cross-departmental independence could be enhanced, as the Minister said in his opening remarks, through representation of all the relevant departments, Armed Forces personnel, and security and foreign policy expertise. It is interesting to note that the Office for Investment was set up only two days before the Bill was introduced to the Commons. How will this cross BEIS-DIT body work with the investment security unit to ensure overall effectiveness and focus? The Office for Investment will need to inform the department on my third and fourth themes of competitiveness and modern intangible assets, as well as the ISC on security implications. The impact assessment states that
“Geopolitical, economic and rapid technological changes are producing an evolving national security landscape.”
Focusing on geopolitical changes, how will the Bill’s measures fit in with the soon-to-be-published integrated review, of which national security will be a key component?
That will lead us to probe again why the definition of “national security” has been omitted from the Bill —the first and foremost theme throughout the debate. Ministers will argue that there needs to be flexibility—a point on which we are not totally unsympathetic. Nearly all speakers examined the implications of that oversight. The Commons considered that a way forward might be provided by a framework scoping key features, while determining national security and flexibility on a case-by-case basis. We will examine how these possible solutions can be made more transparent, as this will be very important for business.
Finally, although it is important legislation, the Bill does not provide the basis for a more active industrial strategy. However, it suggests it and presents a further opportunity for considerations to be made on bringing forward a more comprehensive industrial policy to support and grow British businesses. My noble friends Lord Rooker, Lord Woodley, Lord McNicol and Lord Foulkes all drew attention to the potential benefits of the enhanced security that this might bring. Let us not make this a missed opportunity. Considering the current levels of unemployment, there is a need to encourage businesses to rebuild and create jobs as the country emerges from the pandemic.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions on this important Bill. There is clearly a wealth of expertise on this subject across the House and, as is usual in your Lordships’ House, we have had a thorough and engaging debate, with thoughtful speeches coming from all corners of it.
I start by congratulating the noble Lord, Lord Woodley, on his excellent maiden speech. It is a pleasure to see him in his place today, and I am glad that he has chosen this debate to make the first of what I am sure will be many well-informed contributions. I am glad, too, to have his support for the Bill.
I was contemplating what I had in common with the noble Lord, despite our obvious political differences. We are both from the north, him being from the north-west and me from the north-east; we are both football fans, the noble Lord being a fan of Vauxhall Motors, while I am a fan of Newcastle United; and of course we both have reasons, although different ones, to be profoundly grateful to Jeremy Corbyn. I wish him well, as I do Vauxhall Motors, which, it seems, was on a fine run of form before being stopped in its tracks by the latest national restrictions. Listening to the comments of the noble Lord, Lord McNicol, it seems that his all-weather football pitch would be particularly appropriate on a day like today.
I will do my utmost to respond to as many as possible of the issues raised, but, as always, my door is open to anyone who wishes to discuss the Bill further as it goes through the House.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, and the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, for the constructive tone in which they delivered their speeches. I am glad that a sort of consensus is emerging across the House that the Bill is the right step forward. I even find myself in the very unusual position of having the support of the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, and that self-declared old lefty, the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes—two of my most trenchant critics on other pieces of legislation. These are indeed strange times. I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, that I am indeed proud to introduce this Bill, so he can put his mind at rest there.
I turn, first, to the concerns expressed about the investment security unit being within my department and its potential caseload—a point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and other noble Lords, including the noble Lords, Lord Reid of Cardowan, Lord Dodds of Duncairn, Lord Bilimoria, Lord Rooker and Lord Bruce. I assure them and the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, who also raised it, that the unit will not work in isolation from the rest of government and will not in any way compromise on its duty to put national security first.
When it comes to the operation of this regime, we will not have informational barriers with other government departments. We will work closely with them to ensure that we use skills and experience from right across government. We will, though, have appropriate walls in place with those responsible for promoting investment —some walls but not others. Indeed, other departments and the security services are actively contributing to the design of the unit, thus ensuring that the plans for it take a cross-governmental approach. We have worked closely with our allies around the world on how to create an investment screening process fit for the 21st century.
I reassure noble Lords such as the noble Lords, Lord Bruce, Lord Fox and Lord Rooker, that the unit will be fully resourced to ensure that the Government provide a slick and predictable process for all parties involved. Officials will have a mix of national security, business and casework experience. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, spoke forcefully about the importance of having that mix of expertise, and my noble friend Lord Holmes emphasised that important point.
On the caseload for the investment security unit, I stress that the Government expect a fraction of acquisitions across the economy to be affected by the new regime. Once it beds in and investors become familiar with the process, we expect the number of notifications to decrease further. Of the transactions notified, we expect that fewer than 10% will face a detailed national security assessment and, of those facing one, only a small proportion will likely result in government intervention. We have been clear that businesses and investors will be encouraged to come to the investment security unit in advance of any formal notification, allowing for early discussions with officials about deals, although any final decision will be for the Secretary of State.
A number of noble Lords raised concerns about the impact of the regime on business investor confidence, including in relation to small and medium-sized businesses —a point made by the noble Viscount, Lord Waverley. Among those who also spoke on that issue were my noble friends Lady Noakes, Lord Leigh of Hurley and Lord Vaizey, the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones, Lord Reid, Lord Bilimoria and Lord Bhatia, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle and Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick. The Government are committed to making the regime work for business. We have already published guidance for business on GOV.UK that sets out how the process is intended to work.
Noble Lords are entirely reasonable to expect further high-quality guidance from government to help businesses and investors navigate the regime. My noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts was right to raise that point. On the issue of prepacks, I am pleased that he received my letter in time for this debate and I look forward to further discussions. I know that he has strong views on that subject. That is why we will bring forward further guidance well in advance of commencement to give businesses as much clarity as is meaningfully possible on how the regime will function in practice. We will work directly with businesses and their representative organisations to make sure that we get that guidance right.
More broadly, the Government will never stand in the way of innovative, high-potential businesses setting up in the UK. Our record demonstrates that. Our investment in the British Patient Capital fund has attracted £1 billion of venture capital investment to date and we will continue to invest. By investing alongside the private sector, British Patient Capital aims to support £7.5 billion-worth of investment for British businesses. We have also announced a £7 billion investment in R&D over five years as a first step towards our target to raise total R&D investment to at least 2.4% of GDP by 2027 and 3% in the longer term.
Many noble Lords spoke about introducing a definition of “national security”, including my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lady McIntosh of Pickering, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, the noble Baronesses, Lady Northover, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, the noble Lords, Lord Fox, Lord Clement-Jones, Lord Reid of Cardowan, Lord McNicol of West Kilbride and Lord Bruce, and my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond. The Bill does not set out the circumstances in which national security is or may be considered at risk. That reflects long-standing government policy to ensure that national security powers are sufficiently flexible to protect the nation. National security risks are multifaceted and constantly evolving. What may not constitute a risk today may do so in future. I am glad that my noble friend Lord Lansley and the noble Lords, Lord Truscott and Lord Desai, recognised that point. The ability of the Secretary of State to safeguard national security would be limited if the Bill set out the circumstances in which national security is, or may be considered to be, at risk. By defining what national security is, we would, of course, also define what it is not. This could have grave implications and deliberately show hostile actors where the Government could not intervene. It would also have unintended consequences for other national security legislation.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Lords, Lord Grantchester, and Lord West of Spithead, spoke eloquently on the issue of parliamentary scrutiny with a particular emphasis on a role for the Intelligence and Security Committee in overseeing the work of the regime. I am grateful for the discussion that we had with the noble Lord, Lord West, last week.
As I set out in my opening remarks, Clause 61 provides for an annual report to Parliament, which will be crucial in ensuring parliamentary scrutiny of the work of the investment security unit and the broader functioning of the regime. The Government will very much welcome the Intelligence and Security Committee’s review of the annual report. There are of course no restrictions on the committee requesting further information from the unit or the Secretary of State. Parliament will also be able to scrutinise the Statement, as was mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted.
The former Secretary of State laid a draft of the Statement on introduction in the other place and we would, of course, welcome Parliament’s views on its content. We will carefully consider these views and look to reflect those in the next draft of the document, which will be published for formal public consultation, where the Statement can be fully scrutinised.
Many noble Lords spoke about the sectors subject to mandatory notification, including how they interact with other critical national infrastructure sectors. Considered arguments on this point were made by my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Naseby, and the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones, Lord Reid, Lord Woodley, Lord McNally, Lord Truscott, Lord Rooker and Lord Foulkes. The list of proposed sectors covered by mandatory notifications has been carefully developed across government, with input from all relevant departments and from the intelligence agencies. Put simply, the Government have sought to identify the sectors where certain types of acquisition could give rise to the greatest risks, while balancing this against the need to minimise the burdens on business.
As I set out in my opening remarks, we are working hard to bring forward regulations in time for your Lordships’ consideration. Some sectors, including water, as raised by my noble friends Lady Noakes, Lord Lansley and Lady McIntosh of Pickering, are part of our critical national infrastructure. However, the Government consider that other safeguards provide sufficient protection to not require their inclusion in the mandatory notification sectors. In the water sector, for example, water supply and sewerage licenses are granted by Ofwat based on an assessment of a potential operator’s managerial, financial and technical competencies. Regardless, the Secretary of State will be able to call in acquisitions of control across the economy where the legal test is met. As such, not being in a mandatory notification sector does not mean that acquisitions of control over water, financial services or other critical sectors are exempt from the regime altogether.
Given some of the appalling news around at the moment, it was right that many noble Lords spoke forcefully about human rights—my noble friend Lord Robathan, for example—particularly the situation in Xinjiang. As noble Lords will be aware, the Foreign Secretary made a Statement in the other place setting out a series of measures that the Government are taking in response. The Government are gravely concerned about the human rights situation in Xinjiang. There is growing evidence of large-scale forced labour in the region, alongside the use of extrajudicial political re-education camps and severe pressure on religion and culture. We have been clear that we want a mature approach to China and that we must work together to address global challenges, but we will never hesitate to stand up for human rights as a force for good in the world.
Finally, a number of noble Lords raised the question of the effect of the regime on academia and universities, citing concerns raised by the Russell group. These included the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones, Lord Reid of Cardowan, Lord Bilimoria, Lord Desai and Lord Grantchester, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted and Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick. I assure them that my officials have been engaging closely with the Russell group; we will continue this engagement as the Bill goes through the House to ensure that universities have smooth engagement with the new regime where necessary.
I thank all those who have spoken today and reiterate what I said in my opening remarks: this Government will always be absolutely committed to the free flow of trade and investment. The Bill does not change that; rather, it is a vital upgrade to our current powers that will keep the British people safe. I look forward to discussing it further in Committee but, for now, I commend it to the House.
National Security and Investment Bill
Tuesday 2nd March 2021
(3 years, 8 months ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 165-I(a) Amendments for Grand Committee (for Second Marshalled List) - (1 Mar 2021)
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Healy of Primrose Hill) (Lab)
My Lords, the hybrid Grand Committee will now begin. Some Members are here in person, respecting social distancing, others are participating remotely, but all Members will be treated equally. I must ask Members in the Room to wear a face covering except when seated at their desk, to speak sitting down, and to wipe down their desk, chair and any other touch points before and after use. If the capacity of the Committee Room is exceeded, or other safety requirements are breached, I will immediately adjourn the Committee. If there is a Division in the House, the Committee will adjourn for five minutes.
I will call Members to speak in the order listed. During the debate on each group, I invite Members, including Members in the Grand Committee Room, to email the clerk, if they wish to speak after the Minister, using the Grand Committee address. I will call Members to speak in order of request.
The groupings are binding. Leave should be given to withdraw amendments. When putting the question, I will collect voices in the Grand Committee Room only. I remind Members that Divisions cannot take place in Grand Committee. It takes unanimity to amend the Bill, so if a single voice says “Not Content” an amendment is negatived, and if a single voice says “Content” a clause stands part. If a Member taking part remotely wants their voice accounted for if the question is put, they must make this clear when speaking on the group. We will now begin.
Amendment 1
“Objective of this Act
(1) The overarching objective of this Act is to allow the Secretary of State to safeguard national security in respect of economic and social harm.(2) When making decisions under this Act, including for the purposes of assessing a risk to national security, the Secretary of State must have regard to the objective in subsection (1).(3) The Secretary of State must also have regard to the effect of the application of this Act on—(a) technology investment;(b) the research and innovation environment; and(c) business opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment sets an objective for the bill in relation to national security and includes a number of other elements to which the Secretary of State must have regard.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 1 is in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones. At Second Reading the Minister described the Bill as
“a major upgrade to the Government’s powers to screen certain acquisitions on national security grounds”,
which builds substantially on the Enterprise Act 2002. It certainly is, but perhaps in the Bill we are dealing with architect’s drawing of the upgrade, rather than a 3D model.
First, let me say without equivocation that those of us on our Benches see the need the Government to scrutinise potentially sensitive transactions, and we think that an upgrade is timely and sensible. However, as the Minister has acknowledged, there is the rub. Defining what is sensitive and what is a transaction of concern are key to the effective operation of the Bill. As we progress through the amendments ahead of us, I would say that virtually all seek to better define the operational process of the new investment security unit within BEIS and to ensure that the disquiet it has caused is alleviated.
At Second Reading, the Minister spoke about reflecting
“the modern economic and investment landscape in the UK.”—[Official Report, 4/2/21; col. 2332.]
In fact, what is proposed here is culturally different from what successive Governments have practised. Blair, Cameron—including and excluding us—through May to Johnson have all, so far, rightly or wrongly, pursued a distinctly hands-off approach. It is not hard to understand the alarm that the Bill might cause in the outside world.
Its publishing sends a message about the future nature of interventionism. This concern comes not just from the traditional free traders of the City but from universities, industry trade associations and sectors as wide as space and bioscience. The abiding link to these academic and industrial concerns is that these are, by necessity, international and collaborative activities.
The overwhelming concern coming from all sides of the House in that Second Reading debate was how this unit was to operate effectively without stifling innovation, scaring off capital and becoming a proxy for wider strategic considerations. It is with this in mind that my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones and I penned this first amendment, which sets out the objective of the Act. By exclusion, it also sets out what is not the objective of the Act and thus what is within and not within the purview of the investment security unit. It is designed to send clear messages about how this Bill will operate in practice.
Looking at the amendment in detail, first, in making regulations under proposed subsection (1), the Secretary of State’s overarching objective must be safeguarding national security. This is reinforced by proposed subsection (2). There is no controversy here, given that this is the purpose of the Bill, and on their own the subsections would offer nothing new. That is down to proposed subsection (3), which would add that
“The Secretary of State must also have regard to the effect of the application of this Act,”
on other things. In our case we have listed:
“technology investment … the research and innovation environment … and … business opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises.”
We put those three there, because in our view these areas are key elements of our national security. I am happy to debate what should be on that list, but I will explain why we put these in the amendment.
Technology investment is key to keeping ahead of the security arms race, and it is reasonable that the Secretary of State and, by extension, the unit in BEIS would have regard to this technology base. Similarly, the research and innovation environment is needed to deliver that technology leadership. Without vibrancy in investment here our future security is compromised. Finally, in many cases it is the SMEs that bring true innovation to all the 17 sectors on the Minister’s list. They take technology to market and must not be disproportionately disadvantaged by the application of this Bill.
This amendment is designed to send two messages. One is internal, seeking to influence the nascent culture of the investment security unit to ensure that it recognises publicly what elements contribute to the delivery of national security. The second is an external message to the market, our universities and our innovative businesses, big and small. They need to know that these issues are in the Government’s mind when they are making security decisions. They need to be reassured that this is a vehicle to help to reassure them. The Minister may well say “trust me”, and of course I do, but what of future Ministers and future Governments? This amendment would ensure that the Government have regard to the conditions and the culture that will deliver national security and investment in that security. I beg to move.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, in principle, I do not support proposed new clauses such as this, whether they are called objective clauses or purpose clauses. I have tabled them myself in the past, but they are usually not much more than an excuse for another Second Reading debate, and we had a little of that in the introduction from the noble Lord, Lord Fox.
Amendment 1 could be positively harmful. It confines national security to “economic and social harm”. The obvious item omitted is physical harm, but other harms could be missing. Purpose or objective clauses would be used as an aid to interpretation of the main body of the Act so, if they are there, they have to be comprehensive in their drafting if they are not to act as a constraint on the operation of the Bill.
Similarly, the “have regard” matters in proposed new subsection (3) could act as a constraint on the Secretary of State. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, explained the rationale for his list, but I could not see why “technology investment” was singled out compared to other kinds of investment—for example, in manufacturing capability or intellectual property. What exactly is meant by “research and innovation environment” is unclear from the drafting, and is the omission of “development”, which is the normal companion to “research”, significant or not? Singling out SMEs, which we are all aware are important to our economy, implies that larger enterprises are not important in the considerations.
There is a good reason why Bills do not often contain purpose or objective clauses. They are traps for the unwary and can do more harm than good.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, there are very wide-reaching powers in this Bill and, to start where I ended my Second Reading speech:
“I am not against the notion of interventions, but the Bill should be more than notion and compulsion, and I hope that it is possible to include more direction and balance.”—[Official Report, 4/2/21; col. 2364.]
That is exactly the aim of Amendment 1. It aims to be positive rather than negative, by defining an overarching objective. One might debate whether it could be slightly different, but the idea is to have an overarching objective to safeguard national security in respect of economic and social harm. “Social harm” is a very broad term. Recognising that broad scope, it specifically lists that the Secretary of State must
“have regard to the effect … on technology investment… the research and innovation environment … and business opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises.”
I can almost hear the Minister assuring us that the Secretary of State will have regard to a lot of things, and that would be right, but it is also necessary to make sure that there are correct messages given by the Bill—messages that endure and give confidence to the business sectors most likely to suffer, perhaps entirely unnecessarily, from rumours, concern or finger-pointing from competing jurisdictions.
If we take the starting point that the Bill has good intentions, that there are similar moves internationally, that we have perhaps been too slack in the past, and that there are inevitably burdens arising from both notification requirements and notification concern, that will lead to unnecessary voluntary notification. One wonders if there are not more mechanisms that can give an all-clear signal.
Maybe some will become clearer or develop over time but, wherever that is possible, as we work through the Bill, I am mainly looking to see what incremental steps can be made towards certainty. That can be helped right at the start of the Bill by using the combination of broad objective plus a list of the most sensitive “have regard” matters. This appears in various other pieces of UK legislation, not least in the financial services legislation that is occupying both my time and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, on the days either side of this sitting. Therefore, I hope that the Minister sees the advantage of taking that approach here.
Lord Robathan (Con)
My Lords, I will disappoint my noble friend Lady Noakes by making a comment that is more a Second Reading comment than anything else. But it is important we see this Bill in context. The genesis of this Bill is, I assume, largely about Chinese influence and the debates we have had about Huawei and so on. I want to raise only one issue on the context; it is the way in which British commerce and the economy are so intricately and deeply linked with China. Is that globalisation? I am not sure.
We all know how much we buy now comes from China on the one belt, one road programme or elsewhere. The interdependence between western consumers and economies and the Chinese economy is extraordinarily deep-rooted. I am going to use a little example—a silly one, you may say. Old-fashioned fellow that I am, I try to buy British if I can. Looking for a butter dish online, I bought quite an attractive one from the English Tableware Company. I thought that was pretty safe, until the moment it arrived. I turned it over and found it was made in China, which seems quite strange to me. I took it up with the company, and it came back to me saying its products were all ethically sourced and it had checked the suppliers. Of course, we have no idea about the working conditions or possibility of slave labour in Chinese factories.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I declare my interests as stated in the register. My noble friends Lord Fox and Lady Bowles have cogently outlined the purposes of Amendment 1 and the importance of having a framework of this kind for the Secretary of State when he is exercising his powers under the Bill.
I am taken by the fishing analogy which has been used in relation to the Bill. On these Benches, we support the trawling process and its purpose, but a large number of questions in consequence need answering about the extent of the net, the size of the mesh, and which species will be taken on board and which discarded, and how long that will take. We will come to those questions later in Committee. This amendment asks the broader question: what impact on the broader ecology is the trawling having? The Secretary of State cannot be oblivious to the impact on the investment ecology, as set out in the proposed new paragraphs, but must take account of the impact of what he or she is doing. I am sure that the Minister will want to give us assurances on many questions to do with the Bill as drafted. But we need certainty about this aspect and how the Secretary of State will exercise these considerable powers yet not thereby damage what we have in the UK—a thriving investment climate. As my noble friend Lord Fox has pointed out, it is not just the City but universities, trade associations and sectors such as space and biosciences that have raised concerns about the width of the Secretary of State’s powers.
Today, we have seen the outcome of the sector consultation, all 111 pages of it, which allays concerns somewhat, but I anticipate that many will still believe—as I do—that the net is being too widely drawn. This amendment is designed to constructively allay that concern. I hope that the Minister will recognise its merits. It is far from harmful, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, suggested it was. She asked why we singled out these three elements: it is because, looking at the sectors, it is precisely those areas that we believe are most likely to be damaged if a net is drawn too wide. I am going to resist the temptation to pick up the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Robathan, because I am conscious we are not on Second Reading, but he has raised some interesting questions.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
My Lords, it was clear at Second Reading, and again today from when the noble Lord, Lord Fox, began, that everyone across the House agrees that national security is the number one priority.
The discussion therefore is twofold. First, will what is, and is not, covered in this legislation be clear enough? Secondly, is the balance between security needs and the desire for economic growth, research, innovation and freedom to invest, correctly delineated? On the first issue, it is obvious that the new regime must be based on the best advice coming from across government, as well as on emerging and current threats, and the behaviour and developments of our adversaries. We will come in the next group to the definition of national security.
This first amendment is focused more on the second question that I posed. Will the unit take sufficient account of technology investment, research and innovation, and business opportunities, particularly for SMEs? From everything said at Second Reading and even today, that is an important discussion. We should not expect the Bill, nor its new unit, to be the generator of investment, research and development—that is for an industrial strategy—but the Government must have a careful eye on whether the workings of the Bill have a detrimental impact on technology investment and innovation, while ensuring that the economy does not override security interests. That is a difficult judgment. If it were not, there would never be any problems for the Government to solve.
I read today—others may already have been aware—of possible changes to the listings regime to help the City compete with New York, Amsterdam and Frankfurt in attracting fast-growth companies by creating an “agile” new economy focused on innovation and technology. We welcome such moves and attention being given to making Britain a more attractive place in which entrepreneurs can take companies public.
We hope that the proposals emanating from one of our colleagues, the noble Lord, Lord Hill, on relaxations on the use of dual-class shares, to allow founders to keep control over their companies by giving them deciding votes on decisions such as corporate takeovers, could work in harmony rather than at variance with the objectives of the Bill. I hope there will be an opportunity to discuss those interplays as we go forward.
In the meantime, we will consider future amendments that will look at whether the right procedures, definitions, timelines and so on strike the right balance as to workability in making those fine judgments between security and economic interests. However, this amendment is calling for the Secretary of State to be required to have regard to those other interests. The Minister will say that, of course, he or she is bound to do so. However, it is a question on which some assurance is needed and we look forward to the Minister’s view on that.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Lord Callanan) (Con)
I am grateful to noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Fox, for their introductions to this debate. I thank them for proposing this new clause and for enabling a further discussion on the purpose of the Bill.
Amendment 1 seeks to establish an objective for the Bill and include a number of elements to which the Secretary of State must have regard when using his powers. Let me say at the start that the intent behind this amendment is to provide a clear statement of the scope of the Bill, to prevent so-called mission creep and give certainty to businesses and investors, while avoiding the pitfalls of attempting to define “national security”. However, the legal effect of the amendment presents us with a number of challenges.
The amendment would require the Secretary of State when exercising his powers under the Bill to safeguard national security in respect of economic and social harm, which is reasonable. It is indeed possible that economic or social harms could give rise to risks to national security, but so could other harms such as physical or military harm. For example, a hostile actor could use control over a piece of critical infrastructure to put UK citizens in physical danger or they could acquire companies in the UK defence supply chain and thereby degrade our military capabilities.
The absence of other harms in the factors listed by the amendment suggests that the Secretary of State may not use his powers under the Bill to safeguard national security from those harms that I have outlined. It is also unclear how he should have regard to the factors in subsection (3) of the proposed new clause. As the amendment does not say that they are to be regarded as part of national security, that would suggest the scope of the Bill is being expanded beyond national security. It is important to note that the government position on the issue of defining, wholly or in part, “national security” remains consistent with when amendments in a similar vein to this were discussed at Second Reading and in the other place; I have discussed that with the noble Lord, Lord Fox, previously. The Bill does not set out the circumstances in which national security is, or may be, considered at risk. That reflects long-standing government policy to ensure that national security powers are sufficiently flexible to protect the nation. It also does not include factors which the Secretary of State must or may take into account in assessing national security risks on the face of the Bill.
While it is crucial for investor confidence that there is as much transparency in the regime as possible, there is clearly a limit to how much the Government can and should disclose in this regard, given that the regime deals explicitly with national security matters. National security risks are multifaceted and constantly evolving. What may not constitute a risk today may well do so in future. We may find over time that such specificity becomes outdated. Indeed, as my noble friend Lady Noakes pointed out, it is enough of a challenge to ensure sufficient specificity in the objectives of the Bill, especially with regard to concepts such as those referenced in the amendment.
While I have nothing but gratitude for the noble Lord’s intention—to provide a specific objective for the Bill—it is primarily for the reasons I have set out that I am unable to accept the amendment, and hope that in the light of that he feels able to withdraw it.
Lord Fox (LD)
I am grateful for the Minister’s gratitude. I am also grateful to Members of the Committee who have spoken, but I am a little shocked by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, who seems to have an internal inconsistency. I always think of her as such a logically consistent Peer, but in one breath the amendment was dismissed as legislative fluff and in the next it was the most harmful thing that could happen to the Bill; I suggest that it is either one thing or the other. I appreciate the Minister’s solid response.
My noble friends Lady Bowles and Lord Clement-Jones added to the point that is central to this. The culture of how the Bill is delivered by the investment security unit will be central to how it is viewed in the outside world. If the unit has a combative and aggressive culture, that will affect the way in which the investment community regards investment in this country. The amendment seeks to explicitly influence the culture of that organisation, but I am very happy if the Minister’s lawyers can find better ways to do so. However, a Minister simply saying something will not make the unit run that way. In the end, that will be the measure of how successfully the Bill sets the balance between seeking to assure national security while not throwing out all the good things that our current investment world has.
I look forward to debates on other amendments that seek different ways to do the same thing but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 1.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 13 and 83. Perhaps I will take a little more time than usual over this because it is one of the central issues on which we wish to hear the views of the Committee and, indeed, the response of the Government.
Given that national security is clearly the Government’s priority, it is important that to make the Bill work everyone involved in its provisions and their interpretation are clear about how the Government see national security—its range and depth, if I may put it that way. Therefore, Amendment 13 seeks to establish the issues which should be taken into account because clear rules will be vital for businesses seeking funds, researchers, investors and the unit having to take decisions. They need to work on basically the same template.
Let me take a moment to say that the Government have published 112 pages today—the Minister expected someone to say it, so I may as well say it now—but his letter covering the first amendment arrived as he was speaking to it and the Written Ministerial Statement did not even refer to a policy statement that I gather has also been put out, according to my up-to-date information. I think the Committee will understand that we have not had time to digest this and we may therefore have to try to look at some important issues in that.
One of the points relevant to Amendment 13 is that this response states that several respondents indicated that “national security” should be clearly defined. We are therefore interested to know whether the Minister will listen to those concerns which, in a sense, is what Amendment 13 is seeking to do. It is not trying to define exactly what is national security nor, by implication, what is not. It is setting out how people tasked with scrutinising potential investments may approach the first question—“Might this risk our security?”—by listing the sort of factors to be considered. The “have regards”, while not an exclusive list, indicate to officials, the Secretary of State and those handling investments the matters which should be considered in any decision.
We absolutely agree that neither the Government nor Parliament should prescribe or limit what national security covers, as is long-standing practice, and therefore do not seek by this amendment to curtail the Secretary of State’s flexibility to act, but we nevertheless think that the other parties involved who will be impacted by this legislation need to know the range of issues which will be among those considered by the Secretary of State.
Amendment 13 provides a framework which is neither rigid nor exclusive. It simply does what other countries have done, what experts have recommended and what we have heard that people submitting comments to the Government have also said. The Law Society argues that without something like this, there is a risk that a Secretary of State could become exposed to political influence, and the Investment Association says that a better understanding of national security could help calm investors. Therefore, the amendment indicates factors that the Government might consider, such as the impact of a triggering event on defence capabilities or how a hostile actor might be enabled to gain access to critical infrastructure. I hope that the Minister will accept that Amendment 13 provides such a framework and flexibility to help alleviate the concerns that have been raised, particularly in the defence sector.
We are also keen to ascertain whether critical infrastructure is included in the Bill. As we know from the ISC report published last year, Russia has
“undertaken cyber pre-positioning on other countries’ Critical National Infrastructure.”
It would therefore be useful if the Minister could clarify whether that is covered in the Bill.
Later this month—the rumour is a week tomorrow but certainly while the Bill is in this House—we will see published the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. Perhaps the Minister could confirm its publication date and that it will indeed be a week tomorrow. He nods—I think I am not going to get a yes that question. Can he also outline how the results of the analysis of that review will feed into the work of the new unit and its decisions on what constitutes a security threat? Will the review focus on the private sector and on the role that the Government see for business, as well as on how the interests of innovation both in academia and in business should be promoted?
Amendment 83, to which the noble Baronesses, Lady Northover and Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, have added their names, highlights the relationship between the review just mentioned and the objectives of the Bill and seeks a government statement on it. Given that the Government have said that the review will include the
“long-term strategic aims for … national security”,
there are questions about how these would align with the Bill’s new regime and how we are able to keep an eye on technological developments in the private sector while keeping pace with security challenges. What we do not want to see is an important new national security regime buried in BEIS which does not link with the UK’s wider and longer-term security concerns and priorities.
The ISC noted
“the extent to which economic policy dictated the opening up of the UK to Russian investment”,
whereas the Bill seeks to put security first and our investment needs second. As I said on the earlier group, it is an important but not always easy judgment to make. It is therefore essential that the Government’s view on security is considered by the BEIS unit and that Parliament is able to see how that is happening by way of the statement suggested in the amendment. That statement should focus both on how the Government will align the provisions in this Bill with the outcome of the integrated review and on how the UK will respond to identified threats, including new technology, biological weapons, cyber and misinformation. The reference to new technology is key since new weapon capabilities could as easily be developed in the private sector as in an MoD lab. The Government will need to procure these assets while preventing certain foreign states also purchasing them.
I return to Amendment 2, which probes whether public order and public safety are included within the Government’s view of national security. The similar German regime captures “public order” as part of its national security, while the Japanese regime applies equally to “public order and public safety” and to national security. Is the UK regime narrower than the approach taken by these other jurisdictions? Perhaps the major issue we want clarified within that is whether an investment which could have an impact on the working of our democracy would be covered.
Last year’s Intelligence and Security Committee report on Russia stated:
“The UK is clearly a target for Russia’s disinformation … Russian influence in the UK is ‘the new normal’ … It is clear that Russia … poses a significant threat to the UK”,
including “interference in democratic processes”.
With regard to elections, the discussion at the time of the publication of the report, which of course was written a whole year before it was published, was more on bots, messages, and so forth, the report noting that
“Russia has carried out malicious cyber activity … including attempting to influence the democratic elections of other countries”.
The Government’s own response concluded that
“it is almost certain that Russian actors sought to interfere in the 2019 general election through the online amplification of illicitly acquired and leaked Government documents.”—[Official Report, Commons, 16/7/20; col. 71WS.]
However, an external force intent on interfering with our elections could instead invest in the electronic gear that stands behind our pencil and paper voting, and perhaps pose a threat that way. Given, as the ISC report notes, the
“fusion of government and business”
in Russia, a business providing advanced IT for elections could have very close ties to that regime, or indeed to any other regime. Indeed, the Government’s response to the ISC noted that the Defending Democracy programme in the Cabinet Office includes consideration of
“direct attacks on electoral infrastructure.”
So the thinking is clearly there. Perhaps the Minister could therefore clarify whether foreign investment in democratic electronic infrastructure would come under the remit of the Bill. It is partly about what we think of as national security.
When the ISC covered this, it noted that
“the issue of defending the UK’s democratic processes … has appeared to be something of a ‘hot potato’, with no one organisation”—
I assume it meant within government—
“recognising itself as having an overall lead.”
Could the Minister outline how such responsibility and oversight will sit within the BEIS unit, such that investment in any democracy-related hardware or software could be included in its remit, and explain how the Government will overcome what the ISC describes as
“nervousness around any suggestion that the intelligence and security Agencies might be involved in democratic processes”,
given the committee’s view that
“Protecting our democratic discourse and processes from hostile foreign interference is a central responsibility of Government, and should be a ministerial priority.”?
The answer to the questions may indeed be no, but to have a discussion on national security and the future of our democracy and our safety without considering this seems to us to miss out a vital ingredient. I beg to move.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, for bringing forward this group of amendments. I will speak in particular to Amendment 13.
In preparing for this stage of the Bill we have received a number of briefings from outside bodies. Every single one has said, in the words of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that the trawl is being done far too widely. The Government would not be drawn on that at Second Reading, and it is absolutely appropriate that we try to pin them down through this form of probing amendment.
In leaving the parameters drawn as wide as they are, it is fair to say that all those who have briefed ahead of today would prefer to see a strict definition of what national security is. Am I right in assuming that national security for the purpose of the Bill covers everything that is not defined or covered elsewhere? Water treatment, the water supply and air traffic are covered by other legislation, so does that mean they are not covered by the purpose of the Bill? Are we wrong to assume that the Bill covers critical infrastructure in the way the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, set out? It would be helpful to know whether we have to work on a process of elimination rather than on a specific reference point such as a definition, as is set out in Amendment 13, which is quite wide in its own right, given its number of “have regards”.
The Law Society of Scotland states that
“national security itself is not defined within the Bill. We note that the Enterprise Act 2002 definition refers to EU legislation”.
Are we right to assume that that definition still applies, or can we safely assume that, because we have now left the European Union, it is no longer valid? A steer from the Minister would be very helpful in summing up this debate.
The Law Society of Scotland goes on to say that
“: it might be helpful to introduce a stand-alone concept appropriate to the current context. An exhaustive definition is likely to be neither possible nor desirable but a general delineation of the concept together with detailed additional guidance as to how this is likely to be applied would be helpful.”
Does the Minister intend to do that as the result of this amendment to date?
I, too, received the letter from the Minister within the last half hour, when I was on another call. In the normal course of events, I would have studied such a letter quite closely to enable me to prepare for today, so it is a matter of some regret that we have not had a chance to read it. Perhaps the Minister will cover its main points in replying to this little debate on this group of amendments.
I believe that either we should adopt something like Amendment 13 in the course of proceedings or the Minister should bring forward some definition of the Government’s own drafting during the proceedings, before the Bill leaves the House.
Baroness Northover (LD) [V]
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, laid out in her opening remarks the necessity for clarity about what risks this Bill seeks to address, arguing for a definition of national security in Amendment 13. There are indeed arguments for such a definition, as the Law Society of Scotland, and that for England and Wales, have laid out, lest the Government might, for example, respond to political, economic or electoral pressures to define risks which should not be brought within the scope of this Bill. Others see risks associated with such definitions and further legal minefields. However, the Law Society of England and Wales sees a risk in Amendment 2—that extending the scope of the clause to cover “public order and public safety” could give rise to similar concerns, unless these terms could be strictly defined so as not to include political motives. However, I hear what the noble Baroness says about her aim here, and about the risks to our democratic processes.
I speak here particularly to Amendment 83 in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Hayter and Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, which I have also signed. The amendment is extremely restrained. The Government have made much play of the importance of their proposed integrated review of security, defence, development and foreign policy. From time to time, these reviews are made. There was one after the general election of 2010, and another after the 2015 general election. Of course, that latter one included pandemic as a risk, and emphasised how important it was to the United Kingdom, economically and strategically, to be at the heart of the EU, through which, as it put it, we amplified our power and prosperity.
One might say that a new assessment is indeed desperately needed. It was due last year but was knocked off course by the pandemic, which did not stop the Government pre-empting its conclusions by merging DfID with the FCO and cutting aid, even though in 2015 this was seen as a mark of our global reach—global Britain, you might say. In addition, the Government announced spending levels for the MoD before Christmas, none of this waiting for a proper strategic review.
So now we have this Bill on threats to national security, without that review having been published. We hear that it is imminent. Could the noble Lord update us? Is it indeed being buried by the Budget coverage? We have certainly heard that it has got thinner and thinner, perhaps one-fifth the length of the 2015 one, and that it is large on rhetoric and small on how it is to be achieved. Nevertheless, this should be an important statement of what the UK identifies as threats and ambitions. Therefore, this should have preceded this Bill and underpinned what it was trying to do, if the Government are to be joined up.
Amendment 83 asks that, when the review is finally published, the Government publish a statement that outlines how provisions in the Act will align with the UK’s long-term security priorities and concerns as identified in the review. The amendment states that this should be
“As soon as reasonably practicable”,
a generous phrase that Baroness Hayter used in tabling this amendment, more generous than the one I would have used.
Perhaps, because there is little confidence in the review, as one would have thought these areas would definitely be covered, this statement should also include how the Bill will respond to emerging threats, new technology, biological weapons, cyber, misinformation and military developments by the UK’s adversaries. One of the successes of the 2015 review was certainly the emphasis on cyber and the subsequent and important expansion of UK capacity in this area. I am sure that this will not be neglected in the new review. The amendment asks the Secretary of State to lay a statement before Parliament. It is surely the least that the Government should do to try to ensure that the Bill is aligned with whatever comes forward in the strategic security review. The Government should be able to simply accept the amendment, and I look forward to the Minister’s reply.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, at Second Reading, I said that I felt that a lack of definition for national security was a problem, and I still feel uneasy about that. I understand the need for flexibility to take account of how threats evolve over time. My noble friend the Minister said at Second Reading that national security was not defined in other legislation, but I am not sure that is quite good enough, given that this legislation will have a particularly big impact on commercial transactions, and what the business sector needs is certainty. Other uses of the term have not had that sort of impact on business transactions. I completely understand the difficulties of definition—problems of being too restrictive or insufficiently comprehensive. I think Amendment 13, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, is a better approach than Amendment 1 with its objective clause, but I am concerned that it may still carry some of the defects that I outlined when I spoke to Amendment 1.
The statement that the Secretary of State will make under Clause 3 will certainly help businesses and their advisers but, at the end of the day, national security is the big overarching concept in the Bill which is left without further detail. Several noble Lords have already referred to the letter from my noble friend the Minister to all Peers, which came out while he was speaking earlier. I have had an opportunity to have a quick look at it on my iPad, and I do not think that any Member of the Committee will find that it advances our consideration of the Bill this afternoon at all: it just says that there is a lot more work to do.
If there is no definition or further elaboration of what national security means in the context of the powers created in the Bill, the Government will be giving the courts a blank sheet of paper if, as is probably likely, at some stage a challenge to the use of the powers under the Bill is mounted in the courts. We must remember that we have an activist judiciary, especially over the road in the Supreme Court, and the Government really ought to be alert to that fact and try and proof legislation against what can be done there. I shall be listening very carefully to what my noble friend says are the reasons for leaving national security as such a completely open issue in the Bill, and I look forward to hearing his remarks.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, I should perhaps begin by noting my position as the co-chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Hong Kong. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, in opening this Committee, said that most of the amendments were seeking better to describe national security. The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, said that, without a definition, the Bill is missing a vital ingredient. It would indeed be interesting if, as the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, said, we were to continue to use the EU definition. My personal position is that we should keep as close to the EU as possible, but that has not seemed to be the Government’s position.
The noble Lord, Lord Fox, noted how successive Governments of different hues had taken a hands-off approach to mergers and acquisitions, those involving both national and international assets. We have had, to an extent matched by few other countries in the world, a “Robber barons welcome” sign out in the process of selling off the family silver in a veritable orgy of privatisation and financial isolation. That has clearly had an impact on public order and national security.
I will not let rip with a Second Reading speech—something that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, expressed concern about—but will point out that “have regard to” clauses are at the very core of democracy. If the Government are taking new or extending existing powers, for there to be democratic oversight there surely needs to be an outline of how those powers will be used, a legal framework against which a Government can be held to account, should they go off the rails. As the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, just said, that does not reflect an activist judiciary; rather, it is one doing its job and fulfilling its constitutional role.
We know that the Government do not like to have such oversight, both democratic and legal, but it is surely the responsibility of this Committee to attempt to insist on it—for nothing more than national security, because of the degree to which it was not secured by previous Governments, having been exposed by the Covid-19 pandemic and imminently threatened by the climate emergency. I will address some of those national security concerns in my Amendment 93, which we will get to later, but I speak now on Amendment 13, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. I thank her for her clearly careful and detailed work on it. I will not address all its elements, but focus on a couple of paragraphs, particularly proposed new paragraph (b)(iv),
“enabling a hostile actor to … corrupt processes or systems”.
There is grave concern about the impact of big money on our quasi-democratic processes, particularly in the age of social media. These are so well known that I do not need to expound on them at length, but I will point to how the 2010 national security strategy already referred to such concerns, and they have obviously greatly grown since. Even in our conventional media, we have a quite astonishing concentration of media ownership, often foreign or offshore. That surely needs to be acknowledged as a national security concern. I note the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, about how Amendment 2 seeks to address such issues.
I also point to proposed new paragraph (f) in Amendment 13, which is about
“the likely impact of the trigger event on the United Kingdom’s international interests and obligations, including compliance with legislation on modern slavery and compliance with the UN Genocide Convention”.
This has obviously been of great concern to your Lordships’ House; we reflect on the debate around the Trade Bill. These are surely national security concerns. They are not just moral issues, but of great effect to our national security. A stable world, in which no one is subject to genocide or held in slavery, is a world that is far more secure for every citizen of the UK and the nation as a whole.
I come to proposed new paragraph (g) on
“organised crime, money laundering and tax evasion”.
The security of funding for schools, hospitals, roads, police and all the other services on which we rely depends on companies in our society paying their taxes. When it comes to money laundering, we have seen, in many aspects of our society and internationally, the disastrous impact of dirty money—something that, in some societies around the world, has led to almost a total state breakdown.
Overall, having such a set of definitions, as many noble Lords have said, has been of help to the Government, giving the relevant Minister a list against which their decisions can be checked. Without such a list providing an explanation against its clauses, how can a Minister avoid accusations of corruption, malfeasance or simple neglect of duty?
I am pleased to attach my name to Amendment 83 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, also signed by the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, which refers to the integrated defence review. It is a great pity that we are forced to debate the Bill without that. It is a situation in which we find ourselves in many areas of government work. The reasons for ensuring that we have a tight interlinking between the review and the Bill have been clearly outlined by the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, so I will not go into them further.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, like other noble Lords, I spoke at Second Reading and referred to this question. Together with the noble Lord, Lord Truscott, I took the view that there were inherent problems in attempting a definition of national security and that the best definition is rendered through the Bill as it stands. Once one defines the nature of an entity, the nature of the assets covered, the nature of the acquirer concerned and the extent of control—or the definition of control for these purposes—I think one arrives at what a trigger event is. By definition, a trigger event gives rise to the question: does this trigger event cause a problem for national security?
I do not dispute that large numbers of consultees to the White Paper and speakers in our debates have said that it would be very helpful to define national security and—I would expect nothing less from her—the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, has done as well as one is likely to do. However, I fear that Amendment 13 in particular demonstrates all the flaws with providing such a definition. I will not seek to delay our debate too long, but I will go through a number of them.
The noble Baroness asked whether critical national infrastructure was included. In Amendment 13, critical national infrastructure is included but not defined. We do not know which bits of national infrastructure are in the regime and which are outside it. We know, broadly, the sectors in the scope of the mandatory regime even if we have further detail and amendments to them today. However, if I look at what the Government have published, I find the nuclear industry, the communications industry, data infrastructure, energy infrastructure and transport infrastructure, including ports, harbours and airports. I do not find water infrastructure and food security infrastructure. That is the question and, with the greatest respect, Amendment 13 does not answer whether they are in or out.
We will come on to debate these things but it slightly introduces the concept of whether we are using the EU regulation. My noble friend Lady McIntosh referred to it. The EU regulation includes food security and water. Even if we do not follow the EU lead, which of course now we will not be doing, it at least gives us an interesting list to work from and to question why there are differences.
This brings me to Amendment 2. One of the other differences between our proposed legislation here and the EU regulation is that the EU regulation says that it proposes to safeguard against threats to security and public order. Amendment 2 proposes including public order. However, the European investment screening regime includes freedom and pluralism in the media as one of its investment screening criteria. We are not including that in the Bill. Why are we not including it? It is already in the media public interest regime inserted into the Enterprise Act by the Communications Act 2003, on which I served. I also served on the Enterprise Act Standing Committee in 2002. In that sense, we are not pursuing a public order regime here; we are pursuing a security regime.
I now come to some of the other issues with Amendment 13. Proposed new paragraph (c) talks about the characteristics of the acquirer. If you were to say to me that in my little definition of what constitutes a security risk, we have definitions of the natures of the entities and assets concerned and quite exhaustive definitions of what constitutes control, I would say that what we do not have are definitions of the nature of the acquirer, other than that, presumably, it is hostile in intent.
Amendment 13 effectively tries to give us a list of the trigger events that might give rise to an intervention. In some senses, the amendment is far too narrow. There may be all sorts of unanticipated trigger events that would not be included in primary legislation through this amendment. In other respects, it might be far too wide. Proposed new paragraph (c) talks about
“the characteristics of the acquirer, including whether it is effectively under the control, or subject to the direction, of another state”.
There are virtually no Chinese entities for which that is not true. There are many American corporations for which one could say that that was true. One could certainly say the same of a number of state-owned European companies, including EDF and those engaged in our national infrastructure. What does proposed new paragraph (c) tell us? Does it tell us whether those characteristics are a threat to national security or not? It does not tell us either of those things; all it tells us is that we must have regard to them. We know that Ministers will have regard to them because they are having regard to that kind of issue. It does not get us very far.
The same is true on three occasions, in proposed new paragraphs (a), (e) and (f), which refers to
“the likely impact of the trigger event on”.
It does not say whether the impact is adverse, beneficial or on security. Therefore, almost by definition, all that Amendment 13 tells us is that Ministers should have regard to trigger events in relation to these activities, whether they relate to data or defence capabilities. That is what Ministers are setting out to do.
In a couple of respects, Amendment 13 takes us further than we were intending to go in the Bill. The idea that non-compliance with our international obligations is, by definition, a security risk to the United Kingdom seems to be misplaced. It may be a matter on which we have obligations or be of great policy importance but one cannot construe that compliance with our international obligations in every respect is a security risk to this country.
I am afraid that one also has to look at proposed new paragraph (h), which asks
“whether the trigger event may adversely affect the safety and security of British citizens or the United Kingdom”.
It does not say “British citizens in the United Kingdom”. For example, there are hundreds of thousands of British citizens in South Africa. I was in Natal a few years ago, where there are 500,000 British passport holders, many of whom are British citizens. Are they, by definition, therefore included in this security investment regime?
All that I seek to demonstrate is that although Amendment 13 is a helpful effort, trying to define all the trigger events is bound to fail. Therefore, we should focus on making sure that the listing of entities and assets—as, for example, those published today by the Government—is as good as we can make it, and we will have some debates on that. We should define control properly—not too broadly or narrowly—and we should understand what kind of acquirers we are talking about. We will talk about whether something is foreign or domestic, state or non-state, or hostile and in what circumstances. That is where the lack of definition in the Bill is as yet more important. I refer to the question of what kind of acquirers. I hope that we will talk about that matter in later debates but, for the present, I cannot see the merit of adding Amendment 13 to the Bill.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. Let me first say to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, that I anticipated that she might be a little critical—in her normal, super-polite way—about the letter coming out late. There were some delays in the internal approval process and, faced with a choice of whether to send it out now or wait until after Committee, I thought that, on balance, it was best to get it out to noble Lords. I was fully aware that when I arrived today, some noble Lords might have criticisms for me, but I thought they would like to see the letter rather than not see it before we started Committee. I hope that during a lull in proceedings, Members might have a chance to read the letter—all 100-odd pages of it.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, as well for her amendments to Clause 1 and after Clause 5, which are Amendments 2 and 13 respectively on the Marshalled List, and I give my combined thanks to her and the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, for the proposed new clause relating to the integrated review.
I will begin with Amendment 2, which would expand the scope of the Bill to include public order and public safety, in addition to national security. The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, is of course right that public order and public safety are exceptionally important and some of the highest priorities for any Government. However, the Bill is about national security—nothing more, nothing less. Including public order and public safety as grounds for calling in an acquisition would be a substantial expansion in the scope of the Bill, as has been pointed out. We do not wish to see any additions to national security, to ensure that we maintain the careful balance struck in this regime between the appropriateness of government powers for intervention and ensuring that the UK remains one of the best places in the world for investment.
In addition, I note that the regime has been carefully designed with the protection of national security in mind and not public safety or public order, as important as they of course are. For example, the trigger event thresholds in Clause 8 are calibrated to protect against activity that could harm national security due to an acquisition of control over a qualifying entity. It is far from guaranteed that these would also protect against risks to public order or public safety, or that they would be the most effective or proportionate way in which to do so.
For example, a certain type of investment may give rise to a risk to public safety or public order only if an entity were bought in its entirety or if, conversely, any investment could harm public order or public safety. Of course, there may be situations in which a risk to public safety or public order is considered to give rise to a risk to national security as well. I assure Members of the Committee that, in such cases, the Secretary of State will be able to call in the acquisition in question if it meets the tests in the Bill, and will be able to take action if appropriate.
I will pick up on a specific issue raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. The Bill would apply where a qualified acquisition could undermine democracy in a way that amounts to a national security risk.
Amendment 13 seeks to create a non-exhaustive list of factors which the Secretary of State must take into account when assessing a risk to national security for the purposes of the Bill. It will not come as a great surprise to the Committee to hear that the Government’s position on this issue remains consistent with their position when amendments related to this one were discussed on Second Reading and in the other place.
As drafted, the Bill does not set out the circumstances in which national security is, or may be, considered at risk. That reflects long-standing government policy to ensure that national security powers are sufficiently flexible to protect the nation. It also does not include factors which the Secretary of State must or may take into account under the Bill in assessing national security risks. Instead, factors which the Secretary of State expects to take into account in exercising the call-in power are proposed to be set out in the statement provided for by Clause 3. A draft of that statement was published on introduction of the Bill, to aid noble Lords in their parliamentary scrutiny. The draft statement includes details of what the Secretary of State is likely to be interested in when it comes to national security risks. That includes certain sectors of the economy, and the types of acquisitions that may raise concern.
While it is crucial for investor confidence that there is as much transparency in the regime as possible, there is obviously a limit to how much the Government can and should disclose in that regard, given that the regime deals explicitly with national security matters. Nevertheless, the draft statement goes into some detail about the factors which the Secretary of State expects to take into account when deciding whether to call in a trigger event. The proposed new clause would instead create, alongside this statement, a non-exhaustive list of factors which the Secretary of State must have regard to when assessing a risk to national security.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Healy of Primrose Hill) (Lab)
I have a received a request to speak after the Minister from the noble Lord, Lord Fox.
Lord Fox (LD)
During that comprehensive answer, I think I heard the Minister say something and I would like to test whether I understood correctly. In explaining why people should not be concerned that certain parts of infrastructure are not included in the list, I think I heard the Minister say that the Bill’s call-in power is economy-wide. That suggests to me that the list of 17 issues is irrelevant because everything is on the list. In other words, anything can be called in, whether it is on the list or not. So, the list is merely indicative, but the exhaustive list is the entire economy. Could the Minister explain whether that is the correct interpretation of what I just heard?
Lord Callanan (Con)
If the acquisition in question poses a risk to national security, yes, there is the general power, but the point I was making is that, with regard to areas of political and national infrastructure, there are also separate powers in different pieces of legislation that would help to protect in those areas.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
First, I thank everyone for their contributions, which I found extremely helpful and thoughtful. In particular—this will not surprise the Minister—the Minister confirmed that it would be possible to call in any threat to democracy or anything like that. I am sorry he did not feel able to answer on when exactly the integrated review will be published, but we live in hope.
I was a bit disappointed that the Minister said that he did not want to define national security because it was long-standing government practice not to. My heart sank at that point, thinking that the Minister must have a better reason. Luckily, he did and he gave us answers other than, “It’s always been done that way”, which always seems to me a really bad answer. I am not saying I was completely persuaded by his answer, but it is a thoughtful and useful way of thinking about how we approach this. I hope it is not just because the Government would fear a JR if there are words that could be challenged over whether something should or should not have been brought in.
My fear is about the difference between the list and the call-in power. As the list will be mandatory, people will know what they have to do. Where investors, researchers or companies will probably have the biggest fear in respect of the call-in power is that they will not know in advance. I hope that we will come to the possibility of either safe harbours or a quick turnaround—though that does not get over the call-in power—because that seems the area of greatest uncertainty. We will probably have to return to that. In a sense, it is the same issue when it comes to critical national infrastructure. I guess I should leave it to those far more experienced in infrastructure to know whether those comments are helpful.
We heard a thoughtful and challenging response to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Lansley. If I understood him correctly, he suggested that we start at the back end: we discuss the assets; we discuss the acquirer; we look at the definition of control—which is the end part of the Bill—and use that to define national security in the front part of the Bill. I am bemused by whether that is the right way round; it may be, but by the time we have defined it, we may have got to it. It seems an odd way round to do things to have a Bill that has “national security” in its title and then to have to work through “Well, if it is that sort of asset owned by that sort of people to that sort of percentage” to decide that it comes into the category of national security. However, I want to read more carefully what the noble Lord said because the elements appear to be there, but it seems slightly upside down. The noble Lord also said:
“We know that Ministers are going to have regard … to that kind of issue.”
If we do, what is the harm in writing them down? He may know that Ministers would have regard to those issues, but will everyone else know what they are?
I have a lot more to think about having heard the wisdom expressed today. It is possible that we will want to come back to this issue on Report—maybe in a more refined way; I am sure that those who have read the Commons debates carefully will have noticed that my words were not all of my own drafting. I thank everyone who has contributed—more sincerely, perhaps, than in other debates. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Leigh of Hurley
Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend the Minister and his officials for his briefing and help. I suppose I should thank him also for his letter of 18 minutes before the start of this debate, but that has been explained adequately, so we look forward to reading that in depth. I also thank others who have been helpful on this amendment and the Bill, particularly friends from the BVCA, the ICAEW and Herbert Smith.
I think we all have a common purpose here; we all know what we want to achieve, and this is not a party-political matter. We all recognise that, last year, there was £170 billion of FDI into the UK. We have been so consistently successful in the UK at FDI that we frequently, if not for a decade or so, come second in the world league tables. We all need to do what we can not to damage our reputation as a country that is easy to invest in, with clarity and the rule of law not subject to the power of lobbying and political whims. I believe that there is unanimity in that respect.
The Bill must strike a balance between national security on the one hand and economic growth on the other. At present, it needs amending by amendments such as mine and those of fellow Peers if it is to strike that balance. Funnily enough, I read Isabel Hardman’s book over the weekend, Why We Get the Wrong Politicians. In it she quotes, anonymously, an MP who says, “You can ram Bills through in the Commons, but it’s much harder in the Lords.” I do not want to let her down.
I declare my interests. I am the senior partner of Cavendish Corporate Finance, which specialises in selling businesses, typically private businesses. Nearly all our clients are SMEs, so I have a lot of experience there. Sixty per cent or so of our buyers of our clients’ businesses are based overseas, the principal country being the United States of America, but they have included pretty much most industrial developed countries of the world, including in Asia. Cavendish is, of course, part of finnCap, the AIM nomad broker. So I have worked hard to encourage overseas investment. I was lucky enough to find myself on the business trip to China with David Cameron a few years ago.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, we are grateful to my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley for his amendment, which is a helpful exploration of this issue. I rather enjoyed the way he introduced it as well, although I must say that the MP who was quoted by Isabel anonymously was clearly not in government in coalition.
I have an amendment of my own in this group; I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, for signing Amendment 8 in my name. I shall talk to that amendment and to Amendments 3 and 4, tabled by my noble friend, and leave Amendments 9 and 10 to others, although I think that both add a little to probe the way in which Ministers propose to structure their statement.
Amendment 8 is designed to clarify what constitutes the Secretary of State becoming aware of a trigger event. In the absence of a further definition, a Secretary of State might claim not to be aware in circumstances where any reasonable person would say, “You should have been”. It is a belt-and-braces operation.
What does it mean? I looked to the relevant comparator in the Enterprise Act. The equivalent, in Section 24 of that Act, is whether something has been made public, which is defined as:
“means so publicised as to be generally known or readily ascertainable”.
I simply borrowed that language. Amendment 8 would not say that those are the only circumstances in which the Secretary of State becomes aware, but the Secretary of State should not be able to claim that he was not aware in circumstances that have generally been made public. The purpose of this amendment is to explore what “becoming aware” really means.
Reverting back to Amendments 3 and 4 and the question of “or contemplation”, I think the drafting derives, if it derives from anywhere, from Section 33 of the Enterprise Act 2002 and the question of a merger reference. It is when the Competition and Markets Authority
“believes that it is or may be the case that … arrangements are in progress or in contemplation which, if carried into effect, will result in the creation of a relevant merger situation”,
so contemplation exists in statute.
The guidance issued by the Competition and Markets Authority on this, published most recently in December 2020, said that “at phase 1”, which colleagues will recall is the earliest investigatory phase,
“the CMA will generally consider that ‘arrangements are in progress or in contemplation’ for the purposes of section 33 of the Act if a public announcement has been made by the merger parties concerned.”
When my noble friend defines “contemplation”, he does so accurately, but that is not how the Competition and Markets Authority has interpreted “contemplation”. It means somebody firmly considering such a thing, which Ministers may well be thinking of in this context, but it is important to make that clear in the guidance.
The Competition and Markets Authority and the Enterprise Act do this for mergers, which are defined acquisitions. Here, we are talking of a much wider scope of acquiring activity in relation to intellectual property, technology, assets, land and minority stakes. A merger control has bitten on 15% or thereabouts, in certain circumstances, but it is a much wider breadth of activity. If contemplation of such acquisitions is to be included, Ministers at the very least have to define it in the guidance in a way that corresponds to the way in which “contemplation” has been interpreted by the CMA for mergers.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, this group contains a range of amendments aimed at improving certainty which I broadly support. In particular I favour the removal of the expression “contemplation” because it is a broad expression that in my understanding, if it is not reinterpreted through guidelines, could range from not even a twinkle in the eye to serious preparations.
When I looked at this, it seemed that the first expression of “arrangements are in progress”, followed later on in the clause by
“which, if carried into effect”,
is already quite broad because it poses the notion that the “arrangements” do not have to be substantial enough to have an effect yet, only if carried through. That seems to cover quite a preliminary range of stages. Even if the Minister does not accept that proposition of deletion, is there case law that can point to what “contemplation” means? The noble Lord, Lord Lansley, has provided some useful indicators. I thought about “in contemplation of matrimony to a given individual”, which is accepted in wills as a means to overcome a negation of a will through marriage, but that will itself is a legal document defining intent. That would not necessarily be the case for just a random contemplation.
From my various adventures as a patent attorney I know better the interpretations of “serious preparations” or “effective and serious preparations”. They are used in patent and trademark law, which has received attention and clarification—or rather verification—in courts. If we have to use something, I prefer to use something akin to those terms, although this shows that it is quite difficult to define when a line is crossed.
As has already been raised, the intention of “contemplation” or anything else could be clarified by guidelines, but if that route is needed, is it not just simpler to delete “contemplation” and explain in guidelines what “arrangements are in progress” is intended to cover? To me, that sounded exactly like what the CMA had done: it had taken “arrangements are in progress” or “contemplation” as one and the same thing and then defined that, which implies something much further down the track than simple contemplation. I am therefore on the side of those who think that the wording just looks too vague, and if it has precedent elsewhere, it needs to be clarified that it does not mean anything more substantial. The CMA has pointed the way to showing that the word is not very much use.
I also support Amendment 8 relating to publication, which aims to give some certainty about when the Secretary of State can be regarded beyond doubt as having been aware of a trigger event. As the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, explained, that reflects the wording of the Enterprise Act and it would help to reduce unnecessary notifications.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Caine) (Con)
Lord Vaizey of Didcot. No? We will come back to him. I call the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow some of the early speeches in this group today. Noble Lords have already started to unpick some key elements in the Bill and have shown how much further explanation and guidance is needed. I will come on to Amendments 3, 4 and 8 in a minute, but, given the absence of the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, I will speak first to Amendment 9.
As it stands, given the Bill’s very broad definitions of “trigger events”, “qualifying entities and assets” and “control” of entities and assets, businesses are not clear as to those transactions which require notification and those that do not. Although the Bill is retrospective, the Secretary of State will publish a Statement only after it comes into effect, so there will be little clarity for some time. Probably the word that will be most overworked during the passage of the Bill will be “certainty”, but that is exactly what we are all looking for as we proceed. The first person who used that phrase was my noble friend Lady Bowles, but I entirely agree that we must strive for that. If we are not careful, we will have significant overnotification of irrelevant transactions by businesses in order to avoid the risk of penalties for non-notification or subsequent call-in. As a former practising lawyer, I think I can testify to that.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, there are very wide powers in the Bill, and the amendments in this group are sensible and proportionate and go some way to reining in the extent of those powers. Other noble Lords have spoken extensively about Amendments 3 and 4, which I fully support. When I first focused on that language, I simply could not believe that the Government would have drafted the basis of calling in being the Secretary of State thinking that somebody else is thinking about something. My noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley has set out the very dangerous consequences that could have for prospective transactions.
I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Lansley for explaining the link under the Enterprise Act to how the CMA operates. My view is that we should not simply rely on guidance to make an unsatisfactory formulation in legislation work better. I do not believe that “in … contemplation” is the right place to start, and guidance which will go some way to reversing what the ordinary understanding of “in … contemplation” means is not a satisfactory way forward.
I also agree with my noble friend Lord Lansley’s Amendment 8, given that the Bill, as has been pointed out, gives the Secretary of State time limits that start to run from when he becomes aware of transactions. It is just not reasonable for him ever to claim that he has no knowledge of something that is clearly in the public domain. I fully support that.
I also support Amendment 9, which the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, spoke to a moment ago, because the Government need to consider the negative impact that the Bill is likely to give rise to. It is going to be very difficult to avoid the Bill having negative impacts on legitimate economic activity. It is absolutely right that the Secretary of State should actively consider that fact when he draws up his Clause 3 statement.
Like the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, I believe that the volume of precautionary but unnecessary voluntary notifications is likely to be very significant, and it makes sense for the Secretary of State to ensure that his Clause 3 statement gives as many steers as possible to allow transactions to go ahead without having the Bill hanging over them. If the Secretary of State does not get this right it will result in the security and investment unit being overwhelmed by transactions, and that will do nobody any good at all.
The amendments in this group are soundly based and I look forward to hearing my noble friend the Minister’s response.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Caine) (Con)
I will try the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey again. Lord Vaizey of Didcot?
Lord Vaizey of Didcot (Con) [V]
Yes, I am definitely here. I am sorry that I did not realise that I had to unmute myself, but I will not detain the Committee with my farcical debut in tabling amendments to a Bill. I will simply say how pleased I am to be in this group of amendments with the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, and how much I enjoyed his introduction to his amendment seeking to delete the word “contemplation”, which I have been delighted to support.
As my noble friend made clear, we are all here to serve a common purpose, which is to tease out of the Minister his thinking on the wording of the Bill. The Minister may well come back with a slam-dunk justification for “contemplation”. One of the advantages of the delayed entry of my contribution is the arguments put forward by other Members of the Committee about that amendment. It seems that it boils down to whether the Minister thinks that “contemplation” has a religious, business or technical meaning. If it has a technical meaning, it seems perhaps important that that is teased out in these proceedings to help people in the future.
As far as my own technical amendment is concerned—and I was delighted as well that my technical ineptitude meant that it was much more ably introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones—it seeks to echo some of the points that I made at Second Reading. Most of us who have taken an interest in the Bill and have discussed it with numerous trade bodies and City lawyers are aware that the Government’s estimate of the number of notifications under the Bill as drafted is somewhat low. We can expect thousands of precautionary voluntary notifications to come about, at least in the first instance.
More importantly—and what the amendment in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, seeks to deal with—is that the Bill will start to have a potentially deleterious effect on foreign direct investment. As the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, pointed out, we are second in the world in terms of foreign direct investment. We often proudly say that we have more of it than Germany and France combined, at least as far as Europe is concerned. Over time, more and more companies looking at potential investments and acquisitions may well start to shy away from the UK if they feel that they have to undergo certain additional hurdles.
No one of course is saying that we should not have a national security framework to protect our vital industries. But just as the Secretary of State under this clause is required in a very good way to give guidance on how he or she is exercising the call-in powers, it is important that a very real contemplation of the potential deterrent effect that the new regime may bring about is front of mind alongside the sectors and technical thinking lying behind acquisitions that might be called in. If this amendment were accepted down the line, it would ensure that future Secretaries of State kept this front of mind.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, I am second to no one in my admiration for the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, but I am quite glad that we have the other Minister in the hot seat for this one, the noble Lord, Lord Grimstone. I suspect that in his previous lives he has seen more of the rough and tumble than possibly the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, and the rest of us put together, so will appreciate the nature of the debate introduced by the noble Lord.
For my part, I have usually been on the home team, the one paying advisers such as the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, huge sums of money to do deals or sell businesses. He hinted at the mischief that could be made around this, and I am sure that the Minister will understand the nature of that mischief: it is pretty ruthless and pretty hard. This gives another tool to those who would wish to cause that mischief, and it is not in the interests of the Government or the wheels of commerce for that mischief to occur.
The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, made a really important point. It is also in the interests of the Government to sift what comes across the Government’s desk; it does not behove the department to have tens of thousands of deals flowing across its desk. The Bill is designed to pick out the big problems and issues; it is not designed to deal with sacks of chaff that will come over as well as the wheat. It is important that the objectives of these amendments are taken on board by the Government. I am sure that there are many ways of doing that, and we look forward to the Minister contemplating how “contemplation” will be defined. What is the threshold? Is it the one suggested by the noble Lords, Lord Lansley and Lord Bilimoria—is it publishing? And even then, is it in the sense that the takeover panel would require a board to respond, or is it responding to a rumour? Then we are back into mischief territory again. Some sense of that, and of how the CMA has been able to negotiate this, would be helpful.
My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones, in his amendment with the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, is right that we need some sense of guidance and help as to how this is going to work. I go back to the point that I made at the beginning. How will this thing operate? How will the unit work? The nature of some sort of pre-emptive process seems to take on board more than a unit could normally handle. The advice that the Government have been given by your Lordships is good advice, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
I welcome the Minister responding to this group to his second Bill, this one under the auspices of the business department. I am sure that he will find it an enjoyable experience. In addition to Amendment 9 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Vaizey and Lord Clement-Jones, I propose probing Amendment 10 to Clause 3(3), on further considerations. Amendment 9 seeks to ensure that the Government provide guidance to minimise the potential volume of voluntary notifications and any chilling effect that the Bill may have on legitimate business activity. Businesses need to be clear when transactions require notification and when it is not needed. There may soon be a time when the department could find this very useful as well.
In assessing the potential to generate unnecessary notifications, the CBI has estimated that the Government could receive up to 10,000 notifications a year. Does the Minister recognise this amount as an outcome? How have the Government calculated possible outcomes in relation to the numbers that have arisen in other countries’ experience in similar regime circumstances? I would go along with the precautionary interpretation by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. This will have resonance with later amendments probing the resourcing of the new investment security unit and turnaround timings for notifications.
The Minister of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Department for International Trade (Lord Grimstone of Boscobel) (Con)
My Lords, I extend my thanks to noble Lords for their invaluable contributions to this debate, which will allow me to clarify some important aspects of the Bill. It is a particular pleasure to be debating these matters with the experienced practitioners around the table, who have direct knowledge of these topics.
I speak first to Amendments 3 and 4, relating to when the Secretary of State can call in a trigger event, as tabled by my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley. These amendments would limit the use of the call-in power in respect of trigger events that have not yet occurred to those that are in progress. As drafted, as noble Lords have focused on, the Bill provides that call-in notices may be issued in relation to trigger events that are in progress or contemplation, as well as those that have already taken place. This ensures that potential national security risks can be examined at any stage of the process.
The National Security and Investment Bill draws on precedent in this approach. Under the Enterprise Act 2002, the Competition and Markets Authority and the Secretary of State may investigate mergers that are in progress or contemplation. To reassure my noble friends Lord Lansley, Lord Vaizey and Lady Noakes, this is a tried and tested phrase, and I will come back to that in a moment to elucidate further. Using this precedent ensures the NSI Bill is in good company. It would seem strange to limit the scope of intervention on national security if, through the Enterprise Act, an intervention is allowed on other public interest grounds where a merger is in progress or contemplation.
I said I would give some further details of this. The term “in contemplation” is not new. As I have already said, it features in the Enterprise Act 2002 and, importantly, the detailed guidance that has been issued by the Competition and Markets Authority. Let me give some examples of what this phrase means. First, a party may choose to notify the Secretary of State that they are contemplating a trigger event to get the certainty of the Secretary of State’s judgment. Secondly, a party may notify the Secretary of State that another party is contemplating a trigger event, such as if they have received, or become aware of, an offer to buy their business. We expect that in most cases, call-in notices will be issued following a notification, so these are likely not to be uncommon scenarios. Thirdly, a public announcement of a deal may have been made by one or more parties but not yet implemented. As noble Lords will be aware, there are certain publicity requirements for public takeovers, but this could also happen in relation to a private acquisition. Fourthly, a public announcement of a possible offer or a firm intention to make an offer may have been made, which would itself show that an offer was in contemplation.
Any decision by the Secretary of State to call in a trigger, even in contemplation, would, as with other uses of powers in this Bill, be subject to judicial oversight through judicial review. If the Secretary of State had merely found he had been able to read someone’s mind to know they were in contemplation of a transaction, that would be unlikely to satisfy the requirements of a judicial review. I hope I have provided sufficient explanation of the Government’s approach. It is a tried and tested phrase, which I would say is well known in the market. I hope my noble friend, therefore, feels able to withdraw his amendment.
I welcome Amendment 8 from my noble friend Lord Lansley, which seeks to partially define what is meant by the Secretary of State “becoming aware” of the publicised trigger event by replicating provisions in Section 24 of the Enterprise Act 2002. In relation to trigger events that have already taken place, the Secretary of State would only be able to give a call-in notice within six months of becoming aware of the trigger event. The Bill does not currently define what “becoming aware” means.
The Secretary of State will have a strong incentive to call in trigger events that might give rise to national security risks quickly after becoming aware of them, as he will want to address any risks that they present. Similarly, many parties will have a clear incentive to ensure that the Secretary of State is aware of their anticipated or completed trigger events so that they can achieve deal certainty. That is why we encourage parties to notify trigger events to the Secretary of State, rather than to wait for the trigger events to be detected and called in.
In general, we expect the Secretary of State’s market monitoring team to detect trigger events of interest. However, in a limited number of cases, providing for imputed awareness on the part of the Secretary of State where a trigger event has been publicised so it is generally known or readily ascertainable, may open up protracted arguments about whether the trigger event in question was adequately publicised.
I do not disagree that providing for imputed awareness on the part of the Competition and Markets Authority, as the Enterprise Act 2002 does in the context of merger control, is appropriate. But the NSI regime—this is an important point—will deal with a wider range and larger number of acquisitions, with no de minimis thresholds and a strong likelihood that many will not be comprehensively or accurately reported. This presents much greater scope for ambiguity, and for deals, particularly private transactions, to be publicised in ways that may still cause the Secretary of State to be unaware of the precise trigger event in question. This amendment therefore risks opening up the Secretary of State to greater challenge, while still allowing for substantial uncertainty for businesses and investors.
I will now speak to Amendment 9, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Vaizey of Didcot and Lord Clement-Jones, and Amendment 10 from the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, as both relate to the content of the statement under Clause 3. These amendments seek either to add to the non-exhaustive list of the aspects that the statement may include or otherwise to regulate what can be included in the statement.
I turn first to Amendment 10, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester. I will put to one side his valid points about sector definitions, as we will return to that topic in a future group. This amendment seeks to require the Secretary of State to have regard to the domestic and future capacity of sectors to promote research and development, and innovation, and to protect national security when preparing the statement.
Supporting the UK’s innovative industries, and research and development, are priorities for the Government. However, the purpose of the Bill is to set up an investment screening regime that is concerned solely with the protection of national security. Therefore, the Secretary of State is able to consider innovation, research and development, and future capacity—very important topics though they are—only in so far as they are relevant to national security risk, when he carries out his functions under the Bill.
Amendment 9 seeks to add to the list of the aspects that the statement may include. Of course, the Government want to promote legitimate economic activity and to minimise unnecessary voluntary notifications. The purpose of this statement is to set out how the Secretary of State expects to use the call-in power. I am afraid that these amendments are not suitable for the statement. The statement looks forwards to future use of the call-in power, not to highlight actions already taken. It sets out how the Secretary of State expects to use the call-in power, and it is not intended to serve as an indicator of wider government action in relation to the regime. It is crucial that the acquirers can look at the statement and that it assists them in coming to a judgment about whether to voluntarily notify. With these points, I hope that noble Lords feel able not to press their amendments.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Caine) (Con)
My Lords, I have received one request to speak after the Minister from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that careful analysis, but I must admit that I am not wholly reassured as a result. I feel as though we have gone in a spiral of logic and I think we ended up where we began, in a cloud of uncertainty. In particular, I thought the Minister’s arguments on Amendment 9, that the statement was forward-looking not backward-looking, were very circular. It all depends on how the statement is constructed. It can be made both forward-looking and backward-looking simply in the way the Bill is amended. So the argument there was extremely circular.
I will read Hansard extremely carefully, but to me the question about the Secretary of State being unaware means that the Government have decided that the net is going to be extremely wide. We have assurances on the sifting process, but in the end everything falls in until it is thrown out. That, I think, is what worries quite a lot of us. The contemplation point may have some precedent, but the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, made the point that these transactions are not just mergers but intellectual property licences, know-how transfer, asset sales and a whole range of things. Is the merger regime fit for purpose for this broad range of transactions?
That is all I want to say at this stage. I thought the Minister valiantly tried to justify the current wording of the Bill, but I do not think he succeeded.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and I have had the pleasure of debating these matters at a meeting prior to this Committee, and I must confess that I was probably the author of the fishing analogy, which I may live to regret. The point is that when you are dealing with matters of national security, and these matters are so important, it is perfectly appropriate to use a large net to put the fish in, but then it becomes very important that the way your screening unit works removes fish from that net as expeditiously and efficiently as possible.
Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. As the noble Lord, Lord Fox, pointed out, he almost certainly has much greater experience than all of us in this Room combined in advising on transactions. For the avoidance of doubt, sadly the noble Lord, Lord Fox, has not paid me any fees in any matter, as far as I am aware, but I travel in hope. I have to disappoint my noble friend Lord Vaizey, because it does not look like the Minister will accept his very first amendment in whole. On the other hand, I do not think he has provided a slam-dunk answer, as he hoped, to reject Amendments 3 and 4 in particular.
We are very lucky to have the benefit of my noble friend Lord Lansley’s experience and wisdom from the Enterprise Act 2002, and I accept that that is where it came from. However, I do not quite see why there should be a cut-and-paste approach. The CMA will be dealing with a relatively small number of mergers of largely public companies. This will be dealing with all sorts, from minority investments of a few thousand pounds in 15% stakes to IP and—forgive me—a completely different kettle of fish. Therefore, the last thing one wants to do is to have to rely on a traditional review to see this sorted out. That would be hugely expensive and singularly inappropriate for most of the transactions envisaged, which will be of a much larger volume than the CMA and the legislation were structured to deal with. I very much hope that the Minister will have a chance to reflect on this and that he will be persuaded in particular by the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles—arrangements in progress must be strong enough. I beg leave to withdraw.
Lord Vaizey of Didcot
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, with others in the name of Lord Vaizey that substitute “voidable” for “void”, is intended to ensure that transactions are not automatically void. Instead, the Government would have power to declare a transaction (or parts of it) void if it gave rise to national security concerns.
Lord Vaizey of Didcot (Con) [V]
Second time lucky. I am not aware that an amendment like this was tabled in the other place when the Bill was being considered. However, Amendment 5 and the subsequent amendments are fairly clear, in that they substitute the word “voidable” for “void”. The amendments are designed to ensure that transactions are not automatically voided if a company fails to comply with mandatory notification procedures. I hope to set out in my opening remarks why that should be the case.
As far as I am aware, the Government have tried to make it clear that they could retrospectively accept a notification, and therefore in effect ensure that a transaction was not voided, so this amendment seeks to realise what I think is the Government’s ambition. Amending the sanctions in this way would therefore be consistent with their position and would show that the power to unwind a transaction to make it void would be a last resort used only in the most exceptional of cases. I accept, of course, that it is important to have significant sanctions in place where a transaction subject to the mandatory notification obligation is completed without first obtaining approval from the Secretary of State, but such sanctions need to be workable in practice—they need to be credible. Treating such an error as to make a transaction automatically void—as currently envisaged in Clause 13—would in reality give rise to a host of practical difficulties that would make it unworkable in practice.
I also venture to suggest that the approach is inconsistent with other established regimes in other jurisdictions, such as Australia, the US and Canada, where a problematic transaction is not automatically void but the authorities are able to step in and issue unwinding orders for parts or all of a specific transaction. It would be far preferable to provide for a similar “voidable” power, giving the Government the power to declare such a transaction—or parts of it—void if it gave rise to national security concerns but not automatically making that the case. This would mean that the Government could consider the circumstances of each transaction and provide workable steps to take to unwind the transaction where that is considered necessary because of national security concerns.
Declaring a transaction void is effectively to treat it as if it never happened. However, the acquisition which has given rise to the exercise of the voiding may be part of a much wider transaction. For example, as part of the acquisition, the acquirer will have paid consideration to the sellers as well. Following the acquisition, the acquirer may have invested in the business, and third parties may have contracted in good faith with the acquirer in relation to the business. Declaring a transaction automatically void due to breach of the standstill obligation could result in a situation where several parties—many of whom may have had no culpability at all for the failure to notify—are left in limbo and may also suffer financial losses as a result. I submit again that the proposed approach seems unworkable in practice, which is implied in the Government’s own approach but not in the Bill.
Will the Minister also consider a situation where the parties to a transaction have selected a law other than English law as the governing law of the agreement? Is it possible that a foreign court would continue to treat a non-notified transaction as valid? Would that not lead to extraordinary uncertainty? While these provisions will have full force and effect in relation to acquisitions governed by English law, I do not see how they can apply if the transaction is governed by US or other law. I beg to move.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)
My Lords, this is the first time that I have spoken in this Committee, so I draw attention to my entry in the register of your Lordships’ House. I wish to speak to Amendments 41 and 44 in this group, which I have tabled with the support of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for which I am extremely grateful. I am also grateful to the Law Society for its assistance.
The two amendments build on remarks made by my noble friend Lord Vaizey in moving Amendment 5. Amendments 41 and 44 are to Clause 13, which is entitled “Approval of notifiable acquisition”. I am afraid I have to argue that that title is, at best, ingenuous because, under the wording of the clause as presently drafted, there is no requirement for the Secretary of State to register his disapproval; instead, his silence is all that is needed. I argue that, from the point of view of providing certainty for investors, bankers and—last, but by no means least—companies, their management and employees, this is not good enough. Furthermore, this silence inhibits a proper degree of parliamentary scrutiny, making it more likely that cases can be slipped through under the radar. It will also prevent Parliament having the opportunity of examining how practice may be shifting as regards preserving the delicate balance that this Bill seeks to create and maintain between protecting national security and providing maximum safety for investors’ property rights.
We need the spotlight to be shone on those tricky areas so that decisions taken by the Secretary of State have to be justified openly and publicly. That is what Amendments 41 and 44 seek to achieve. Famously, TS Eliot wrote:
“This is the way the world ends
Not with a bang but a whimper.”
In this difficult policy area, a whimper is insufficient. I see no reason why in an open society the Secretary of State should not be under the maximum pressure to provide a clear, concise and public declaration of his decision and the reasons for it. Our society, together with our business and investment community, are entitled to no less, so I very much hope that the Government will be able to accept these two amendments.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, it is very difficult to follow the noble Lords, Lord Vaizey and Lord Hodgson, especially after the quotation from the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, of which I think we must be very mindful. I support both in their very similar endeavours, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, in his Amendments 41 and 44, which I have signed.
The case has been very clearly made that automatic voidness creates excessive legal uncertainty for investors and lenders. The proposed wording would mean no automatic voidness but a power of the Secretary of State to impose it. A voidable power would give the Government power to declare a transaction or part of it void if it gave rise to national security concerns and ensure that workable steps can be taken to unwind the transaction to the extent considered necessary. While it is clearly important to apply significant sanctions when a transaction subject to the mandatory notification obligation is completed without first obtaining approval from the Secretary of State, such sanctions must also be workable in practice. Treating such a transaction as automatically void, as envisaged in Clause 13, will give rise to a host of practical difficulties and is simply not workable in practice.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, the voiding of a commercial transaction that has already taken place is a massive penalty for those who have entered into the transaction. Parliament should be very wary of legislating in this way if it is not absolutely necessary. I believe that, as drafted, the Bill goes beyond what is necessary.
A transaction may not have been notified where the parties to it did not believe that they were covered by the legislation, perhaps relying on a misinterpretation of the statement that will come out under Clause 3 or perhaps a misunderstanding of advice received from the investment security unit about the transaction. These could occur in situations of good faith, yet the Act is capable of inflicting the penalty of voiding the transaction even in such an instance.
I do not doubt that voiding a transaction may well be the right result if the transaction really does engage national security, but even then it is not necessarily the case that every transaction should be voided. We have to understand that Clause 13 is one of the parts of the Bill that will drive unnecessary voluntary notification, which I know that the Government will wish to avoid. The amendments in this group are helpful and proportionate and I hope that the Government can accept one of the formulations.
Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)
My Lords, we have heard from a chartered accountant, a banker and a lawyer all in unanimity; it is very worrying. As I understand it, this approach is consistent with some regimes in certain countries. The idea of having a transaction fully voided would lead to many innocent third parties being in limbo. Would it not be better that a transaction or certain parts of it were voidable, as some parts of the transaction may not be in any way relevant to national security. That gives HM Government more flexibility. By being voidable, it allows for negotiation, discussion and parts perhaps to be voided and not the whole thing.
Once again, insisting that the transaction could be voided in legislation will simply deter overseas investors and buyers because it is a huge amount of uncertainty to have such a black and white separation. The amendments still allow for the dictum of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, in respect of Clause 15 of non-notified acquisitions being able to be retrospectively validated rather than retrospectively invalidated. Giving the Government maximum flexibility seems a wise and good thing to seek.
Lord Fox (LD)
I want to pick up where the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, finished: it seems almost punitively value-destroying to have a mandatory process. There will clearly be times when voiding will be the inevitable consequence, but there are others when a retrospective approval would be best for the country, the value, the shareholders, the employees and all the other third parties connected to that business. To lock the Government into auto-voiding seems unnecessary. It may be designed to put people off from not reporting in future but, by their nature, those who do not report probably are not aware of these sanctions, so it is unlikely to have that deterrent effect.
On Amendments 41 and 44, the “Waste Land” amendments, certainty comes up again, as predicted. All they do is ask for a clear signal rather than something simply not happening being the signal. The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, raised external messaging, but such clarity would also help build a body of case law which would help future practitioners understand what they should and should not do. Having that case law and those examples clearly delineated by a full stop rather than the whimper that is currently enshrined in law would be a much better way of exposing such cases for the textbook.
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, for these probing amendments relating to the penalty of deeming mergers and acquisitions void in the event of proper notifications and subsequent assessments by the Secretary of State not having taken place. The Minister will need to explain how this will work. Most of the amendments in this group focus on Clause 13, “Approval of notifiable acquisition”, in Chapter 3. Subsection (3) states that:
“A notifiable acquisition, in relation to which a final order has been made, that is completed otherwise than in accordance with the final order, is void.”
I appreciate the view of the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, that there could be alternative outcomes to certain elements or aspects of any deal. Has the Minister considered whether the Secretary of State could publish guidance on how the mechanisms of deeming non-compliant transactions void would work in practice? Clarity for SMEs would be most helpful.
The ability for transactions to be deemed void where they have not been approved by the Secretary of State, have not been notified or are non-compliant with any final order could have large repercussions. Clause 15, “Requirement to consider retrospective validation without application”, and Clause 16, “Application for retrospective validation of notifiable acquisition”, raise the issue of retrospection in relation to the legally void provision. Could transactions that took place in the past, even up to five years previously, be immediately deemed void? If the first transaction in a chain were deemed void, that would leave the legal rights and entitlements of all subsequent transactions’ parties in total confusion. There could be conditions in a transaction that came to fruition or were exercisable over a length of time, with these events deemed the trigger events rather than the merger itself. Those elements would have had impact at the inception of any M&A activity. An impossible series of rights, entitlements and developments would have to be unwound, which would cause great legal uncertainty.
The noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, also raised the issue of other jurisdictions or cross-jurisdictions. Have these circumstances, among the many others, been considered in the provision of this power? What are the legal implications for the process where the possible imposition of a transaction to be void is under consideration? Have the Government made plans to publish guidance in this area, even though they may consider that circumstantial evidence may make such guidance highly speculative? Many speakers have found the provision impractical and unworkable.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, first, I apologise for my noble friend Lord Grimstone, who has had to attend a debate on Kenya in the Chamber. I am afraid you are stuck with me for this one, which is obviously disappointing for the noble Lord, Lord Fox. I thank all noble Lords who have contributed.
We understand the aim of this group of amendments, which is to convert the automatic voiding provisions in Clause 13 into powers to void. Further amendments in this group then seek consistency with associated provisions in the Bill. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Vaizey and Lord Hodgson, for bringing together this grouping. I will first address the purpose of the automatic voiding provisions, before turning to the amendments in detail.
Notifiable acquisitions are those that occur within the most sensitive areas of the economy—sensitive enough that the Secretary of State judges that he must be notified and must clear an acquisition to proceed before it can complete. As such, it is essential that there are clear incentives for compliance with the regime and that any national security risks arising from these sensitive acquisitions being completed without approval are mitigated, as far as possible. Noble Lords present will understand that any Government’s first preference in legislating to create requirements on persons, particularly where the matters relate to serious issues such as national security, is that compliance with such requirements is incentivised and that we do not merely rest on the threat of weighty enforcement.
The automatic voiding provisions in Clause 13(1) mean that there is no way around these requirements and that parties who wish to evade the requirements are unable to complete acquisitions which must be approved by the Secretary of State and have not been. This ensures that the regime mitigates a wealth of national security risks, without the Secretary of State ever being engaged. It is efficient and effective government, and a key tool in protecting our national security.
However, voiding is not a sanction; it is instead the logical implication of not complying with a mandatory regime that concerns only the most sensitive acquisitions. Clause 13(3) ensures that any notifiable acquisition in respect of which a final order has been made, which has been completed otherwise than in accordance with the final order, is also void.
I understand that the voiding provisions have raised some concerns, as outlined by my noble friend Lord Vaizey, that the unaware may be unduly or adversely affected, which would otherwise lead to significant costs for parties who are affected by voiding. I hope that I can offer them the following reassurance. First, those who have been materially affected by the voiding of an acquisition, including sellers and third parties, not just acquirers, may apply for retrospective validation of the acquisition using Clause 16. If a valid and complete application is received, the Secretary of State will have up to 30 working days to decide whether to issue a call-in notice. If he does not issue a call-in notice, for example if there are no national security risks involved, he must validate the acquisition retrospectively. The impact of retrospective validation is that the notifiable acquisition is to be treated as having been approved by the Secretary of State and is, accordingly, not void. Anyone materially affected by the voiding, including those unaware of the requirements, is therefore able to secure retrospective validation, such that the acquisition was always valid in law.
Secondly, there are concerns around what happens if a significant purchase of shares in a publicly listed company is caught by the provision. Usually, for significant purchases, parties are advised by a law firm of high repute. I can also assure the Committee that, where the acquisition involves a takeover, BEIS works closely with the Takeover Panel to ensure the there are no issues in the interaction with the takeover code.
Thirdly, there are murmurings that the voiding provisions might create uncertainty. I do not think that Clause 13 could be clearer and more succinct about the effects of not obtaining the approval of the Secretary of State before completing a notifiable acquisition.
Let me now respond to the heart of the proposition of the amendments in this grouping—that voiding should be exercisable as a power by the Secretary of State, rather than being automatic. I am afraid this raises a number of issues. It is, first, unclear why and when the power to void would be exercised. The Secretary of State is already able to order the unwinding or divesting of acquisitions, following assessment as part of the final order. Why would he need to void the acquisition if it can simply be unwound or divested? Would it be intended that the Secretary of State would decide whether to void the acquisition prior to the assessment? If so, on what basis would he make that decision?
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Caine) (Con)
I have received one request to speak after the Minister, from the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley.
Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)
Does my noble friend the Minister recognise that some countries allow voiding? He pointed out some that do not, but some do. Does he agree that if a transaction is voidable, it could still be declared void?
Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)
If the legislation says a transaction is voidable, it could still be declared void.
Lord Callanan (Con)
Yes, but we are arguing it should be declared void by automatic obligation of statute, rather than it being a power the Secretary of State could exercise. I have just explained that.
Lord Vaizey of Didcot (Con) [V]
Although I mentioned it at Second Reading, I refer noble Lords to my entry in the register of interests. Also, as noble Lords have done throughout Committee, I thank all the trade bodies that have been so helpful in advising noble Lords on some of our amendments and, particularly, for me, Veronica Roberts at Herbert Smith Freehills. Just for the record, may I also say how delighted I am that it is the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, responding on my amendment rather than the noble Lord, Lord Grimstone? I had a touch of the noble Lord, Lord Grimstone, on my previous amendment, and now, to have the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, frankly, my cup runneth over.
I thank all noble Lords who have supported my amendment. Without wishing to pick any winners, I thought that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, put it most succinctly when she spoke of the automatic voiding penalty. She channelled her inner football commentator by saying the automatic voiding was a “massive penalty”. I think that is right. I also point to the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, who has been very good at introducing me to the mysteries of Lords amendments and has marshalled me extremely well. These amendments pose an unanswerable question to the Minister, because if they are accepted and a transaction can be made voidable, it can, by definition, be voided. It is just not automatic. It ensures voiding can apply where the Government think that is the only solution with a transaction that has not been notified.
In the real world, it is unlikely that a mandatory notification would not be made. The tenor of most of the speeches that have been made during the passage of this Bill is that the Government should expect far more notifications than they have estimated so far. The Minister is quite right to say that anyone transacting in the midst of a mandatory area is likely to have some high-powered lawyers advising them.
What I would say in response to the Minister’s excellent response to this debate is that there are certain points that I feel have not been addressed. One is obviously going back to the massive penalty phrase. If you void a transaction where it is part of a wider transaction, how do you go about unwinding it? Would there not be other, more suitable punishments than simply voiding the entire transaction? Indeed, as the Minister indicated, there will be plenty of people—shareholders, for example—who will be unduly punished by the automatic voiding provisions. Surely there must be alternative punishments.
However, by definition, given that you can effectively retrospectively apply to the Government if you have failed to comply with the mandatory notification requirements, you are, as my noble friend Lord Leigh pointed out, effectively making your transaction voidable. You are giving the Government the chance not to void the transaction, yet by introducing an automatic voiding penalty, the Government have precluded themselves from punishing the parties who failed to comply with their requirement for mandatory notification. Giving themselves flexibility by allowing themselves potentially to void a transaction also gives them the flexibility to impose other punishments.
There are other dogs that have not barked in this debate. In other amendments that we have been debating, previous legislation has been cited as an example that has guided the Bill—but there is no similar sanction, as far as I am aware, in any other business-facing legislation in this country. I hope the Minister will not mind me teasing him a bit at the end because I suspect I know—I think I am right in saying—where his sympathies lie in terms of the great debate of the past decade between Brexit and remain. Is there not an irony in him citing the great example of the French and the Germans but ignoring the far more practical Anglo-Saxon common-law tradition evidenced in the US, Canada and Australia? I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Caine) (Con)
Before moving on, notwithstanding the successful last-second intervention by the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, I remind noble Lords that if they wish to speak after the Minister they should email the clerk. We now come to Amendment 6.
Amendment 6
“(2A) For the purposes of this Act, the following shall not be taken into account when considering whether a trigger event may give rise to a risk to national security— (a) adverse effects on levels of employment in the United Kingdom, or a part thereof, except that adverse effects on the employment of one or more specific categories of employee may be taken into account,(b) the existence or extent of opportunities for persons resident or established in the United Kingdom to invest in, or make sales in or into, another jurisdiction, or(c) the protection from competition of business activities carried on in the United Kingdom or business activities carried on by persons resident or established in the United Kingdom, except to the extent that such business activities contribute materially to national security, or are likely to do so in the future.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would clarify that certain factors—namely employment effects, reciprocal investment or trading opportunities, and the desire to protect UK business from international competition—cannot be taken into account in assessing whether a trigger event would give rise to a national security risk.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
I am delighted to move Amendment 6 and I thank my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for lending their support to this amendment. I also thank the Law Society of England for its help in drafting the amendment, and I very much look forward to my noble friend Lord Callanan keeping up his good efforts this afternoon in responding to this debate.
We have not so far succeeded in coming up with a definition of how to limit our understanding of a definition of national security, so I shall approach it by a different route, which is to try to understand, define and limit what constitutes a trigger event. In the view of practitioners, as expressed by the Law Society of England, this amendment is needed as it would ensure that “national security” in the Bill will not be conflated with other issues of political or industrial concern which cannot be seen to relate to security but would still be flexible enough to allow for genuine national security threats to be deemed to be trigger events. I suppose this relates to my noble friend’s earlier comment in summing up a previous debate when he said that trigger events or national security relate to the whole economy, not just parts of it.
The purpose of Amendment 6 is to understand what constitutes a trigger event that would be deemed to lead to or constitute a security risk. It is in terms of being critical to investor confidence in the United Kingdom that the new regime is seen to be focused clearly on national security concerns and free of industrial or electoral influences not relating to national security. Therefore, the Bill would benefit from a clause such as this, explicitly stating the factors that should not be taken into account in assessing whether a trigger event would give rise to a national security risk. I set out here that the factors that would be excluded would cover any,
“adverse effects on levels of employment in the United Kingdom”,
or,
“the existence or extent of opportunities for persons resident or established in the United Kingdom to invest in, or make sales in or into, another jurisdiction”,
and the desire to protect UK businesses from international competition.
I accept that the amendment might not be necessary if we had established a definition for national security but, given that we have not achieved that, I am keen to press this as a probing amendment and include a clause such as this in the Bill, thereby making clear that certain factors such as employment effects, reciprocal investment and trade, and protectionist connections would not be deemed to be trigger events. With that brief explanation, I beg to move.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, with whom I am often in agreement—although, I am afraid, not in this case.
In my little over a year in your Lordships’ House I have noticed a strong tendency for Members to sign up to speak on amendments that they support and not those that they oppose. However, this has a clear and damaging effect, and slants the debate. Proponents get to put their case and the Government attempt to bat it away, often on merely technical grounds, and only one side of the argument is put. That sets the tone of the debate beyond just that day; it unbalances it. There is also the issue that, on Bills such as this, as a noble Lord said earlier, we often have an accountant followed by a banker followed by a lawyer. That is not a representative sample of society or opinion. It is for that reason that I signed up to speak on the amendment and express my strong opposition. I will be brief but clear.
The earlier groups of amendments on which I spoke, including Amendment 2, sought to define the national security on which the Bill seeks to allow the Government to act. The amendment does the very opposite by seeking to restrict the Government’s hand. The former amendments were “have regard to” amendments. This is a “shall not be taken into account” amendment. It is extremely ideological and seeks to assert the primacy of the market and the interests of business—which, by definition, given the nature of the Bill, is almost certainly big business, giant multinational companies—over what might be regarded as a key concern of the Government regarding employment. That is also, I would strongly argue, a national security issue—certainly a public order issue—with regard to Amendment 2.
The market is a human creation, not some natural process or action such as photosynthesis or the tides. To say that the market should have primacy over the well-being of society is a profoundly ideological argument that would have been very strange for most of the 20th century and reflects a particular neoliberal political position. Again, we are back to talking about investor confidence and the idea that we have to be a competitive nation—the very ideology that led us to the 2007-08 financial crash.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I respect the opinions of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, but she will not be surprised to find that I do not agree with a single word of what she said. I agree with the sentiments behind Amendment 6, but I expect that the Minister will say that the amendment is unnecessary because the items listed in it could never be considered to be national security considerations. If I am correct in that assumption, I hope that he will make a very clear Dispatch Box statement to that effect, with no hedging about or qualification.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)
I put my name to this amendment, but somehow along the way I was left off the speakers’ list, so I am glad to have scraped back on again. My noble friend Lady McIntosh made the case for the amendment clearly and decisively, so I will merely sweep up and say that, at Second Reading, there was general agreement that we were seeking a balance between the fact that the country had to be protected from overseas powers gobbling up key companies in key sectors, yet at the same time keeping our economy open for inward investment, particularly in the tech sector, where we have such a worldwide reputation. We all agreed then, and agree this afternoon, that that is the difficult balance that we seek to strike.
Of course, once the Bill passes into law, Parliament’s opportunity to examine and, where necessary, recalibrate that balance will be limited, to say the least. When the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, talks about the dangers of the markets, I think she is headed in completely the wrong direction, with due respect. My concern about the Bill is about not markets but mission creep: that we will end up with the Bill doing nothing that was anticipated when it was first drafted.
Like my noble friend Lady Noakes, I have no doubt that the Minister and his officials will say they have a very clear idea of how the provision will be used, and there is no question of mission creep under the Bill. As we all know, Ministers, parties and policies change, and there are serious dangers if we do not accept some form of amendment such as this.
First, there is the issue of employment under paragraph (a). How easy is it to see a future Secretary of State, faced with some politically unhelpful headlines about unemployment following a potential takeover, being tempted to press the national security button to avoid some disobliging comments? Under paragraph (c), we should never underestimate the lobbying powers of big companies. Hell hath no fury like a big company that finds its market invaded by a smaller, nimbler competitor offering a better, cheaper product or service. The smaller competitor, perhaps growing faster than its internally generated funds can support, may need to find outside capital, and some of that outside capital may come from overseas—it is likely to. How convenient for the big company if it can lobby the Secretary of State to block funding for the growth of its successful smaller rival on the grounds of national security.
Those are just two examples where mission creep might occur; there are plenty of others. I hope the Government will understand that the purpose behind this amendment is to make sure that the Bill continues to do what it says on the tin.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, it was a pleasure to put my name to the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, because I think that I understand its intentions entirely. It is also a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, in their elucidation of what the amendment is about. I think the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, has entirely misunderstood the essence of this amendment.
Earlier in Committee today we were trying to get some sort of definition of national security, and I think that the noble Lord, Lansley, in his inimitable way, managed to unpick that rather successfully. As far as national security is concerned, it is a mission impossible to try to carry everything in one bundle in a definition. This tries the other way on and, as the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, said, it is designed to avoid mission creep. It is trying to make sure that the definition of national security is not used as a blanket term to cover damage to the economy and society. It has the huge benefit of simplicity; it tells us what is not in national security rather than what is in it. It clarifies that certain factors such as employment, reciprocal investment or trading opportunities, and protectionism will not be taken into account when assessing national security. If there was mission creep in the way that was described, it would undermine legal certainty and damage investor confidence in the way that we have heard from a number of noble Lords.
The Government have kept assuring us that this is not, in the words of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, a national interest Bill but a national security Bill. That is exactly what this amendment is trying to ensure—that we do not have that all-encompassing national security definition used by lobbyists or others to try to bring things into the net. I have seen it happen in the United States. The CFIUS is absolutely that kind of spider-like operation that brings in all sorts of spurious transactions. I very much hope that we will keep this provision absolutely focused, and this amendment is a very good way of doing it.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
My Lords, we support the approach of this amendment. As we have all made clear, the new regime must focus on protecting national security. The clue is in the title of the Bill. The definition of national security has to take best advice from across the Government about the threats and behaviour of our adversaries.
While I hope the Government will monitor the impact of the Act on technological investment, innovation and SMEs—which I hope a different part of the Government is actively supporting—those interests, along with employment, investment and competition, cannot and should not trump national security, albeit that I hope that the Government would consider mitigating any detrimental domestic impact of placing security first if that were needed.
Clearly, concerns about any political pressure, rather than any disregard for the issues listed, give rise to this amendment. The tone and the purpose of it are ones that we share.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I thank everybody who has spoken in this debate and thank my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering for tabling the amendment. It seeks to clarify that certain factors, namely employment effects, reciprocal investment or trading opportunities and the desire to protect UK businesses from international competition, cannot be taken into account in assessing whether a trigger event would give rise to national security risks. I was surprised to see that the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and my noble friend Lady McIntosh are now differing on some things. That is most unusual; it is something to be encouraged for the future.
My noble friend articulates a reasonable concern here: that a regime used to screen investment for national security purposes could be used to screen investments more widely. Indeed, the shadow Secretary of State, in his opening speech at Second Reading in the other place, argued that the Bill should include an industrial strategy test—I was therefore surprised to see the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, supporting this amendment.
As such, I have some sympathy with the aims of this amendment. I can, however, reassure my noble friend that the Bill is about protecting national security, nothing more and nothing less. The Bill does not set out the circumstances in which national security is, or may be, considered at risk. As I said on previous groups, this reflects long-standing government policy to ensure that national security powers are sufficiently flexible to protect the nation. The Bill also does not include factors which the Secretary of State must or may take into account when assessing national security risks. Instead, factors that the Secretary of State expects to take into account in exercising the call-in power are proposed to be set out in the statement that we have provided a draft of and is provided for by Clause 3.
The draft statement, published upon introduction of the Bill, includes details of what the Secretary of State is likely to be interested in when it comes to national security risks. This includes certain sectors of the economy, and the types of acquisitions that may raise concern. It does not currently state anything which the Secretary of State intends not to take into account with regard to national security. This is a conscious choice. If the Secretary of State were to start listing areas of the economy or types of acquisition that he considered unlikely to present national security concerns, I suspect that this would result in a long and dense document of little use. We judge that it is therefore more helpful for businesses and investors to set out where the Secretary of State is more, rather than less, likely to use the call-in power.
I understand, however, the concern that without a definition extraneous factors may be taken into account. My reassurance for my noble friend comes from the courts. Were the Secretary of State to seek to use the powers in the Bill for a purpose beyond national security, his decisions could be challenged in the courts through judicial review and could not be successfully upheld. It is with this judicial oversight in mind that the Secretary of State is constrained in delivering the purpose of the Bill. I am therefore confident that the Bill as currently drafted contains sufficient safeguards against inappropriate use of the regime, and that the Government are already providing a good amount of information for parties affected by the regime on its likely areas of focus.
I hope that my explanation, taken together with these points, provides sufficient reassurance to my noble friend, and that she therefore feels able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
My Lords, I am most grateful to all those who have spoken in the debate, particularly my noble friend Lord Hodgson, and the noble Lord, Lord, Clement-Jones, for their eloquent support.
Like the Minister, I am slightly baffled by the sudden lack of support from the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, with whom I have enjoyed a deeply cordial relationship. I obviously take issue with a number of issues to which she referred, not least setting out the importance to the economy of foreign investment, which is well established and repeated in the national security and investment government response published, I understand, this week. I also take issue with the fact that I am not a great expert on the financial crash, although I seemed to lose an awful lot of the small amount of money I had invested in the stock market. What is the saying about how to make a small fortune in the stock market? I have forgotten, but, anyway, that burnt my fingers.
I believe that the start of the financial crash was actually in the US, with the selling of mortgages, both in the US and here, for a greater value than the value of the property, and a lot of grief was caused as a result. I am pleased that my noble friend Lord Callanan feels that the Bill is still perfectly formed and fit for purpose, but I beg to differ. My noble friend referred to the statement in Clause 3, but we are told that the Secretary of State only “may” publish such a statement. Clearly, it would be immensely helpful to have such a statement at this stage, if possible, to give an indication of the direction of travel.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment reduces the timeframe after a trigger event in which the Secretary of State can make a call-in notice from five years to two.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 7 shortens the period in which the Secretary of State may give a call-in notice following a trigger event, under the provisions of Clause 2, from five years to two years. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for his support.
It was interesting that, when giving evidence to the Public Bill Committee in the other place, on 24 November, Michael Leiter—perhaps related to Felix Leiter—head of national security and the committee on foreign investment at Skadden, Arps, the major US law firm, described the Bill as
“a rather seismic shift in the UK’s approach to review of investment.”—[Official Report, Commons, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24/11/20; col. 46.]
He stressed the importance of clarity in what was proposed, given the criminal penalties that are now being introduced and that there is no interim period for familiarisation.
This amendment and all the others that I have tabled, two of which I have already spoken to, aim to test both the clarity and, importantly, the practicality of the proposals that the Bill contains. I stress that practicality because, there can be a danger, when Bills like this are in Committee, of focusing on legal terminology and overlooking the flesh and blood consequences of the decisions that Parliament is about to take. I hope that the Committee will forgive me if I spend a moment on two real-life examples, because they give useful background to this and my other amendments.
Members of the Committee may be aware that I am chairman of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee of the House. In December 2019, our committee was notified of the laying and simultaneous making of two statutory instruments: SI 2019/1490 and SI 2019/1515. The full title of SI 2019/1490 is the Public Interest Merger Reference (Gardner Aerospace Holdings Ltd. and Impcross Ltd.) (Pre-emptive Action) Order 2019. The full title of SI 2019/1515 is the Public Interest Merger Reference (Mettis Aerospace Ltd.) (Pre-emptive Action) Order 2019. These were the first referrals under the new regime with reduced thresholds, and this was the very first time that the Government used pre-emptive powers; that is to say that they were seeking to stop a takeover before any offer was made, rather than reacting to an offer once made. These two statutory instruments therefore give us a glance into the world that the Bill takes us into.
I shall say a couple of words about the protagonists. Gardner Aerospace, the predator and potential acquirer, is based in Derby. It was acquired by Chinese investors in 2017 for some £300 million and has since made a number of acquisitions in the aerospace sector. Mettis Aerospace, one of the targets, is based in Redditch and has sales of £86 million, which is above the old threshold. It is substantially profitable—it made about £9 million of profit before tax—and has some 500 employees. Its customer list reads like a who’s who of world aviation and its two leading customers are Airbus and Boeing.
Mettis’s roots can be traced back to the early days of British aviation. For those who like a historical note to our debates, it produced the framework that held in place the bouncing bombs under the Lancasters flown by Guy Gibson and the men of 617 Squadron in their successful raid on the Ruhr dams in the Second World War. A few years later the company produced the fan blades for Frank—later Sir Frank—Whittle’s first jet engine.
Mettis is owned 25% by the management and 70% by a private equity firm called Stirling Square Capital Partners. The fund through which the investment is being made is based in Luxembourg. Stirling is based in London but, judging by its list of partners, has a strong orientation towards continental Europe. The investment will almost certainly have been made on behalf of third-party investors who have pooled their funds for Stirling to manage. Such investors may very well come from all over the world and this is unlikely to be their only investment in the UK, so if they perceive the treatment of any one of their UK investments as being inequitable, there will inevitably be a ripple effect on their readiness to invest in the UK generally. Mettis made it clear to the Competition and Markets Authority and the Government that it had not put itself up for sale. Gardner’s approach had not been sought and was regarded as being what in the trade is known as a fishing expedition. The outcome was that Gardner pulled away on 27 February, following a heavily redacted CMA report published on 13 February.
The story of Impcross is quite different. It is a much smaller company based in Stroud, Gloucestershire, with a turnover of only £11.9 million, so it would not have been eligible under the old thresholds. It lost money in the year to 30 June 2019, but only a small amount—£350,000—and, significantly, it is controlled by one person. Its accounts reveal a person of significant control, or PSC, holding between 50% and 75% of its shares. That has been built up over a lifetime and it would not be unreasonable if that director now wished to realise the fruits of his efforts. If the state stepped in to prevent that—we cannot be certain exactly what happened—without offering any alternative solution, it seems a hard moral choice. Either way, it all took a lot longer to resolve and it was only on 10 September that Gardner withdrew.
In speaking to Amendments 41 and 45 a few minutes ago, I argued that it was not good enough that, under the provisions in Clause 13, all the Secretary of State had to do to void an acquisition was to say nothing. For Mettis, this was not a problem: the company was clear that the approach was not welcome. For Impcross, there were 10 months of uncertainty with the Secretary of State appearing to set up a sword of Damocles but apparently never having to cut the string. That cannot be the right way to provide certainty for investors in the UK tech sector.
I have one final point. In our debate a moment ago on Amendment 6, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, the Committee expressed concerns about the degree of parliamentary scrutiny of developing practice in this sensitive area. The two cases I have referred to were authorised by a statutory instrument. Statutory instruments are not amendable, and it would seem vanishingly unlikely that either House of Parliament would seek to reject one—the nuclear option—so any scrutiny of future practice will be at a very high level, and even that scrutiny will be ex-post. Both the above SIs were made and laid on the same day, 6 December 2019, at a time when Parliament was in any case not sitting because of the general election. It would be worthwhile if the Minister could confirm whether in this brave new world of these pre-emptive actions, each would still be the subject of a separate SI, so affording at least some degree of parliamentary oversight.
I turn now to the details of Amendment 7. I have tabled it because giving the Secretary of State the ability to unpick a merger or takeover after five years is to ignore the real world. Acquisitions are made with a view that two plus two will make five and that overall, they will be profit-accretive. In the event, that promise is often not achieved, but that is the idea that people set out with and to do that, changes have to take place at various levels.
First, the acquiring company will want to ensure that the financial performance of the two companies are managed on the same basis so that one company’s financial reporting systems will disappear. Secondly, it is inevitable that in any acquisition, there is extreme nervousness among the staff of the two companies about winners and losers in the new configuration. That nervousness can be reduced by an exchange of staff between the two companies, so that they get to know each other. Thirdly, it is unlikely that it will be cost-effective to maintain two separate research and development facilities, so they will be merged as one. Fourthly, marketing and sales teams are likely to be combined to broaden and deepen product range and market reach. Finally, it may be concluded that the new entity would be more effective and profitable if it operated from a single site, so one facility will be closed and the site sold.
Within five years, all of these steps could have taken place and if they had, the companies would be indistinguishable. I appreciate absolutely that the Government need some power to reach back where a case may have been slipped past them, but I argue that two years should be sufficient. At the same time, there is at least a likelihood of there still being a unit that is sufficiently independent to resume an independent life.
Members of the Committee may remember their days in primary school and the magic of mixing paints. If one mixed blue and yellow paints together then, suddenly and miraculously, one had green paint. That is in effect what one does with the merger of two companies: you mix a blue and a yellow company, and the result is a green one. After some time, and certainly after five years, the two constituent parts will be indistinguishable. That of course is vital, considering the position of investors who may find that they still own an investment which they thought had sold five years previously. I would argue that a maximum of a two-year clawback will provide a better balance between the interests of all the parties in this delicate area. If my noble friend is not inclined to accept the amendment, will he tell the Committee how his officials will undertake the practical challenges of separating the green paint into its original blue and yellow parts? I beg to move.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I speak in strong support of Amendment 7, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson. I am a former company secretary and legal adviser to a publicly listed company. I know from personal experience what it is like to wait for competition decisions, takeover panel decisions and for all the uncertainties of regulation external to the company as a result of its commercial activities.
Given that, I am entirely in sympathy as the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, has set out what he calls the flesh-and-blood consequences of the two case studies that he put forward extremely graphically and well. Not least, he has hinted at some of the issues around statutory instruments and the level of scrutiny. There is little that I can add to what he has said about the undesirability of having a massive period of time within which a Secretary of State can act—up to five years. However, I would like to add to the practicality issues that the noble Lord has raised.
The longer a deal has been in place, the more difficult it will be to void or avoid—that is, unwind—a transaction. Unwinding a transaction after five years is a very long time in commercial terms. Thinking back to my own career, subsidiaries are sold, businesses are purchased and the commercial realities change over five years. It would be exceptionally difficult, even if it were possible, for a listed company involving public transactions to unwind those transactions.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, I am glad to follow the noble Lords, who presented a compelling case that mergers of companies should not be sought to be unwound after five years. However, that is not how I interpret the effect of the legislation.
For Amendment 7, we have to direct ourselves to Clause 2 and the structure of Clause 2(2). It requires that a call-in notice given by the Secretary of State cannot be
“given after the end of the period of 6 months beginning with the day on which the Secretary of State became aware of the trigger event”.
Noble Lords will recall that I was interested in the question of when the Secretary of State “becomes aware”. My noble friends have so far rebuffed the idea that we can define “becoming aware” rather better.
In the case of a merger, particularly between listed companies, but between companies of the kind so ably described by my noble friend, the Secretary of State should become aware of it, because it would appear to be publicly known. The Secretary of State could become aware because the parties to the transactions could themselves provide notification to the Secretary of State. Either way, the question of five years does not arise. That arises only in relation to circumstances where the Secretary of State does not become aware.
It is not a matter of people being exposed to an uncertainty; they can remedy the uncertainty by notifying the Secretary of State. That is why we are going to get a lot of notifications and, to some extent, Ministers accepted that when they revised the number of notifications they are anticipating from the original White Paper, which I think was a few hundred, to about 1,800. I think that is partly anticipating that there will be such notifications.
The circumstances we are talking about are probably not mergers but the trigger events relating to assets. As we previously discussed, this involves quite a wide range of acquisitions of assets including technology, transfers of technology, intellectual property or even potentially land that people did not necessarily understand was sensitive. The five years is not an irrelevance because, as Clause 2(2) says, there is a five-year period which would apply in circumstances where the Secretary of State had not become aware of the trigger event.
At this point, I want to ask my noble friend a question. In so far as the trigger event relates not only to the acquisition and the entity or asset but to the understanding of the nature of the acquirer—I keep coming back to this question of who the acquirer is; we talked about it in the second debate—can the Secretary of State apply the five years in relation to the nature of the acquirer being somebody other than the person whom the Secretary of State thought it was at the point at which the Secretary of State became aware of an acquisition? That is when the five years really begins to bite and the uncertainty begins to become more manifest.
That is true not only because the acquirer might be somebody who the Secretary of State did not understand to be hostile but who turned out to be, but because when we get to Clause 10 and we understand the implications of Schedule 1, which Clause 10 brings in, a person may be held to have acquired an interest or right in relation to an asset or entity by virtue of things such as the fact that they are connected persons, they are in a common purpose or they have an arrangement, all of which might not have been evident in public or to the Secretary of State when the Secretary of State saw the acquisition in public material. Indeed, maybe he did not see it at all but became aware of this interest only at a later stage.
There is a reason for the five years being there, because two years is not very long in relation to these kinds of acquisitions. The Minister might entirely reasonably say that five years is not without precedent: there is five years in the French, Italian and German regimes. With this Government, if it is good enough for the Europeans it is good enough for us, as we often say. However, leaving that to one side, we have to be aware that understanding who is in a common purpose, what is the nature of arrangements that might not have been disclosed and what is their nature in relation to assets, not just mergers, gives one a reason to think hard about the circumstances in which the Secretary of State might have to intervene, even though a significant period of time has elapsed. For those reasons I am inclined to live with five years, on the strict understanding that, to get rid of uncertainty, people make a voluntary notification and then six months is the limit.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, it is always very interesting to follow the noble Lord, Lord Lansley. He is approaching this partly in a similar way to me and partly in a different way. I was, and still am, attracted to the notion of trying to get this time of uncertainty down from five years to two. Part of what I would say to the noble Lord is that, if it is going to take five years to work out who might actually have bought something, that is something we should look at in its own right. If you cannot work out whether somebody is hostile and they have had it for five years, you have missed the boat if it is a question of whether they have learned the technology and found out things you do not want them to find out.
I would be interested to hear from the Minister the reasoning behind the length of the period. It could not really be due to a workload of investigating, because one must presume some sort of steady state pipeline with adequate staffing, but how much of it is fear that something new is not recognisable as having a security application until some time later. That thought was going through my mind: was there fear about missing things? This goes back to one of the issues I flagged at Second Reading about sifting being done by the right kind of skilled people—those who have the right kind of applied science or engineering knowledge, plus knowledge of potential usage in national security fields.
I have to say, these things are not necessarily all that obvious. I have experience of working as a patent attorney in the field of defence. I have worked with people whose job it was to invent—put two and two together and have something inventive at the end of it. If you work in a field where those kinds of things are deemed inventive, you will be very short of the people who have that kind of knowledge because, for the main part, they will probably want to be involved in more interesting and economically useful things than participating in what seems to be an overwide fish-sorting process, as it has been termed. I am turning this back to the Minister. On volume, if you cast the net wide, will you have sufficiently skilled people to be able to do the sorting, or will you find that important fish get missed? Will you then be trying to do things to backtrack on what has not been done or give yourself more time to do things?
That is a slightly different take. I know that there are some safeguards in there, but five years is quite a long time to live with uncertainty. If that uncertainty comes about because of ownership, one should sort the ownership or shareholding issues; I am actually among those people who think that we should have a lot more transparency on those kinds of things.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, in his excellent intervention, the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, started out by calling for clarity. We need some clarity on the wording of this part of the Bill because a number of different interpretations have emerged. I must confess, my interpretation is similar to that of the noble Lord; by the way, we would seem to be backed up by the Law Society, which took the same view. If the Government’s intention is something different, some different words need to be used to put that forward.
Assuming that, to start with, the intention was as the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, set out, his counter to that was very clear. I have been involved in lots of what is known as integration, which involves bringing two companies together when one has bought another. Five years is well past the point at which you would find it very difficult to unmake that company. Indeed, the entire product life cycle in the sort of industries we are talking about here is probably about two years, so they will have marched through two and a half product life cycles by the time the five-year period expires.
In a way, I hope that the Government’s intention is more closely aligned to that of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley. If that is the case, I have similar thoughts to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. How long do you need to leave the stable door open before the horse has definitely bolted? To me, five years seems much too long for that bolting to occur; two years is probably long enough in that respect. However, if, on the other hand, the Government’s intention is to offer an opportunity for 20:20 hindsight—in other words, the world changes and, looking back over our shoulder, that deal five years ago now does not look like such a clever deal for the nation and we want to unmake it—that is clearly unfair on investors and others but might perhaps be fair to the country.
We need a real understanding of what the Government’s intention was, and the Government need to understand that their intention needs to be articulated in a way that the outside world can understand.
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
I welcome the probing of Amendment 7, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Hodgson and Lord Clement-Jones, on the extent of five years in which the Secretary of State may issue a call-in notice once a trigger event has taken place.
The debate on how long this period may need to be and the reasons behind these decisions has been interesting. When the Government originally consulted on this, the period was much shorter. The Minister will need to answer why it has changed and been extended for such a long period, as well as the other questions raised. Indeed, five years is a far horizon in today’s fast-moving world—even if it is not long enough for some, often unpopular, Government to be able to continue in office.
Could this length of time threaten the policy stability of the economy across many sectors as well as give rise to unnecessary anxiety for businesses, especially in relation to retrospective elements previously discussed? However, the interpretation of Clause 2 may be that the Secretary of State is unaware of the trigger event but that the intentions of the parties have not materialised. The clause is rather unclear, and I appreciate the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, in his interpretation. I would certainly welcome the Minister’s reply.
Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist (Con)
I thank my noble friend Lord Hodgson for his amendment, which intends to shorten the time limit for the Secretary of State to call in trigger events which have already taken place. The Bill as drafted allows the Secretary of State to call in trigger events up to five years after they have taken place. This ensures that the regime powers can be applied to completed trigger events which have given rise to, or which may give rise to, risks to national security but which have not been notified to the Secretary of State.
The length of five years is important to give the Secretary of State sufficient time to become aware of the trigger event and to make it difficult for the parties to keep the trigger event hidden. However, the proposed change from five years to two would make it easier for hostile actors to hide their acquisitions and effectively time-out the Secretary of State. It would increase the incentives to keep an acquisition quiet or inactive, as hostile actors would need to do so for only two years.
While not necessarily straightforward, this is clearly easier—both practically and financially—than keeping an acquisition hidden for a longer period. For example, if a hostile actor acquires an entity and intends to merge it with their existing operations, there are practical costs of not doing so within five years. They would not be able to merge IT, payroll, HR, et cetera, or take advantage of that entity and its assets. Likewise, if a hostile actor acquired an entity for its technology, that technology might well be obsolete in five years, so they would need to use their acquisition now to get the benefit.
In the Government’s view, five years strikes the right balance between creating a substantial disincentive for efforts to obfuscate and conceal relevant acquisitions while giving legitimate business certainty that they will not be called in after that period. Importantly, this approach puts us into line with our international partners. For example, in Germany a review may be initiated up to five years after the purchase agreement. It is in line with other countries, including France and Germany, and we believe that it is appropriate. Indeed, it is shorter than some partners, including the USA and Japan, which have no time limits. Further, a five-year reach-back period applies only to trigger events which have completed or which will complete after the introduction of the Bill, contrary to what some observers have suggested. That is to say that no acquisition which has been completed prior to 12 November 2020 may be called in under the Bill.
As helpfully noted by my noble friend Lord Lansley, in the Bill the five-year period is tempered by the requirement for the Secretary of State to call in a completed trigger event within six months of becoming aware of it. This further reduces the time limit for intervention and creates greater certainty for parties to a relevant acquisition. If there is doubt, parties should submit a voluntary notification to the Secretary of State. This will give them certainty on whether their trigger event will be called in.
Before I conclude, in response to my noble friend’s query relating to whether final orders can require the unwinding of acquisitions, that is very much within the scope of the power. The order, however, makes commands and may not deal with practical arrangements. How remedies are given effect will be for parties to finalise, subject to the requirements of the order.
My noble friend Lord Lansley asked about the nature of the acquirer. To clarify, the five-year backstop applies to the date on which the acquisition itself took place. Circumstances where the identity of the acquirer is not known until some time after the trigger event took place are precisely why the reach-back period might be important in certain cases. In circumstances where a notification was given and false or misleading information was given about the true identity of the acquirer, the Bill already provides that the Secretary of State can re-examine such cases.
With reassurance provided for business, knowing that we are acting in line with allies, and for the reasons I have set out, I hope my noble friend will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)
I am grateful to my noble friend for her reply. I do not think I heard whether future pre-emptive actions under the new regime will be the subject of a statutory instrument or will just happen from the Secretary of State’s desk. Perhaps, she could answer how this or the other House will know what is happening.
I am grateful to everybody who spoke on this. It is obviously a tricky area. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. Undesirable, uncertain and impractical—I could not have put it better myself. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for drawing attention to the question of the difference between two years and five years, and what will happen in that three-year period other than causing uncertainty among investors. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, raised very practical points.
Let me meet my noble friend Lord Lansley some of the way. I do not think that this will happen very frequently, but, like the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, I am not convinced that the three additional years are really needed. The point my noble friend makes, which has certainly eluded the Law Society, is the interplay between the six-month trigger and the five years. In the tech sector, these companies grow like Topsy: they are nothing now, and they will be quite big very quickly indeed. You could have a situation where some event, ex post, could have been described as a trigger event but was not picked up as such at the time. It is unfair for people to have that uncertainty lasting for five years. The Secretary of State could say, “I never became aware of that, so I have more time to start the unwinding process, as long as it isn’t within the five-year period.” I see my noble friend’s point, and I accept that it is a rare occasion, but I still think there is something to be teased out about how the different pieces fit together, particularly in sectors of the market where very fast growth occurs.
I would be grateful if the Minister could tell me about the statutory instruments and how publicity of pre-emptive actions is to be provided.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)
Does the Minister wish to respond?
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)
The Minister is saying she will respond in writing. Is the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, withdrawing his amendment?
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)
The Minister is going to write, is she?
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)
That was the indication.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)
Was it the fact or just the implication?
Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist (Con)
No, I will respond to the noble Lord in writing.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)
Okay, that is fine. We need to go away and put my noble friend Lord Lansley in the blue corner and the Law Society in the red corner and see how we get on. In the mean- time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Lansley
“(3A) If either House of Parliament resolves not to approve the statement under subsection (2), the Secretary of State may publish a new statement making any changes which appear to the Secretary of State to be necessary in view of the debates in either House of Parliament. (3B) A statement made in pursuance of subsection (3A) above is not subject to the requirements of subsection (1)(a) and (b).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would permit an expedited process for making a new statement where this is required following a resolution not to approve a statement.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, I am particularly grateful that the Government agreed to group my amendment with their technical amendments, Amendments 12, 37 and 75. I do not propose to refer to Amendments 37 and 75, which are purely technical in nature. Amendment 12 is not strictly technical but relates to exactly the same part of the Bill as my amendment. We are considering Clause 4, and the Government in Amendment 12 are changing subsection (7), which states that the requirement for consultation could be satisfied by consultation carried out before the clause comes into force. The effect would be that not only that consultation but changes to the draft policy statement—such a statement was published at the same time as the Bill—in the light of the consultation can take place before the clause comes into force. That is perfectly reasonable.
My amendment looks at the case that arises under Clause 4(2), whereby:
“Either House of Parliament may at any time before the expiry of the 40-day period”,
that is, after the statement is laid,
“resolve not to approve the statement.”
Under those circumstances, the Government, as subsection (3) makes clear, “must withdraw the statement.” My working assumption is that the Government, having withdrawn a statement, would have to make a statement in the same way in which they have made previous statements—that is, engage in consultation, respond to the consultation and make such changes as are required—and then lay the statement again. That is unnecessary.
My amendment would provide that if a statement was not approved by either House, the Secretary of State should lay a new statement on the basis of making such changes as the parliamentary debates on the previous draft statement required. The Secretary of State would not have to go through a public consultation process or make changes in response to one. That is because the parliamentary objection to a statement may be particular. One can speculate on what that might be but I shall not do so in any way. However, if something led one House of Parliament not to approve a statement, a particular and significant change would be likely to be required. If Ministers make that change, as the amendment would require them to do, they should be able to lay that statement directly. The 40 days would continue to apply because all that would happen would be the resumption of the same process in relation to a new statement.
I hope the amendment means, from the point of view that it does not in any way impinge on the parliamentary scrutiny, that a statement could be in place sooner. That is important because a whole range of things flow from the fact that a statement has been not only published but approved. I hope that Ministers may see merit in the amendment. I beg to move.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, I broadly support this amendment, although I am also interested in what happens after a statement is declined by Parliament. Statements take effect immediately and things already done under them are not revoked, even if Parliament votes one down, and I did not think that it was entirely clear whether there was anything to stop a new statement being made immediately, because the Secretary of State is under an obligation only to conduct
“such consultation as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate”.
Could they consider that it is appropriate to do none if there has been something tantamount to an exactly equivalent previous consultation?
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
My Lords, in the spirit first put forward by my noble friend Lord Vaizey, I would like to tease the Minister at this point, if I may. Clause 3 states:
“The Secretary of State may publish a statement for the purposes of this section if the requirements set out in section 4(1) are satisfied”,
and now we have government Amendment 12, which amends Clause 4 to state that responses to the consultation may be required to be pursued through. What is the situation, if one might occur, if the Secretary of State chose not to publish a statement? Does the Bill permit that in this regard, and what would be the circumstances in which the Secretary of State may decide not to publish a statement?
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, said, government Amendments 37 and 75 are technical and Amendment 12 covers the ground of Amendment 11, so I will speak to the latter. I am broadly supportive. Clearly, this is an issue about “may”—my noble friend Lady Bowles and the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, asked the same question. If “may publish” means “may not publish”, where are we in this process, given that the statement is such an important part of setting out the modus operandi of the whole Bill? This is quite an important area.
I support Amendment 11 but it will be important to listen to the Minister’s response to decide how this might go forward in the next stage. I believe that some degree of accountability should not be left as an option to the Secretary of State; there should be an obligation on the Secretary of State to make that statement and, as the Government have said, to have the ability to remake it.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
My Lords, we welcome the Government’s Amendment 12 to make changes to the sectors statement in respect of feedback from stakeholders. Can the Minister confirm whether all the suggested changes that come back in that consultation will actually be published?
I will make a comment about the document that has arrived in front of us today because, in a sense, it gives a very good description of how good consultation works—never mind the timing; we have made that point—in relation to the degree of change that looks as if it is going to happen as a result of conversation on that particular issue. However, it then feeds into what happens if, had this been the statement, changes were wanting to be made. For example, what we have heard today, as a result of some very good consultation, is that the definition of AI has been narrowed significantly to focus on three high-risk applications: identification of objects, people and events; advanced robotics; and cybersecurity.
The interesting thing is what happens after you have had a consultation that has got the Government to rethink and that may then have other implications. In this case, with those changes, does this change the Government’s estimate of the number of notifications that that might give rise to, in relation to the change in definition? It is that sort of issue that might come up, and it would want the dialogue that I think is being referred to in the amendment, in relation to whether there is a second stage—if it is turned down, so to speak—about having to go on further. As such, how we handle the feedback is about both the transparency of what has come back in and the full implications of any changes that that has made.
We keep coming up with the figures where, even though the Government have increased the assumption of how many notifications there would be—less than 1% or so—the CBI and other commentators feel it would be much greater. As such, that degree of dialogue is needed in relation to consultation over these very big issues. Some assurance about the results of such a consultation, as well as a second stage, seems very helpful, along the lines in the amendment.
On the Government’s Amendment 75, it would be interesting to know what advice led to the change—we are not questioning it but wondering why it has been made—to extend the regulatory power from a notice or serving an order to include all documents as well. It would be helpful, certainly to me and possibly to other Members of the Committee, to know what other types of additional documents will thus be added to this regulatory power—could the Minister spell that out?
Lord Callanan (Con)
First, I thank my noble friend Lord Lansley for his Amendment 11. With the permission of the Committee, I will speak first to the three minor technical amendments that the Government wish to make to the Bill: Amendments 12, 37 and 75. Briefly, before I begin, I reassure the Committee that the Secretary of State must lay and publish a statement before using the call-in power.
Amendment 12 is to Clause 4, which concerns consultation and parliamentary procedure for the statement pursuant to Clause 3, in which the Secretary of State sets out how he expects to use the call-in power. At present, Clause 4 enables the Secretary of State to meet the requirement to carry out such consultation as he considers appropriate, in relation to a draft of the statement under subsection (1)(a), before Clause 4 is commenced.
However, it does not make it clear that the Secretary of State is able to make any changes that he considers necessary in view of the responses to that consultation under subsection (1)(b) before the clause is commenced. Amendment 12 clarifies this point, ensuring that stakeholders will be able to see a revised draft statement before it is laid before Parliament.
Amendment 37 is to Clause 11, which provides an exemption for certain asset acquisitions which would otherwise be trigger events. Subsection (2), however, provides that assets that are either land or are subject to certain export controls should not fall within the exemption, and subsection (2)(b) sets out the relevant export control provisions. One of these provisions, Article 9 of the Export Control Order 2008, was revoked on implementation period completion day as a result of EU exit by Regulation 4 of the Export Control (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, with which I am sure all Members are very familiar. The amendment would remove the reference to this revoked provision from Clause 11.
Amendment 75 is to Clause 53, which enables the Secretary of State to make regulations, subject to the negative resolution procedure, prescribing the procedure for giving notices and serving orders under the Bill. At present this clause enables the Secretary of State to specify how a notice or order must be given or served, but does not make it clear that these powers are intended to extend to all documents given under the Bill. The amendment would clarify that point, ensuring that the Secretary of State has the power to make regulations in Clause 53(1) in relation to the procedure for service of documents for all the different types of notices, orders and other documents under the Bill. These are relatively small tweaks to the Bill, and I hope that the Committee will see fit to agree to them.
Amendment 11 was tabled by my noble friend Lord Lansley, and I will begin by briefly setting out its context. Clause 4 sets out a consultation requirement and parliamentary procedure for a statement about the exercise of the call-in power which must be published before the Secretary of State may issue a call-in notice. It requires the Secretary of State, before publishing the statement, to carry out such consultation as he thinks appropriate in relation to a draft of the statement, to make any changes to the draft that appear to him to be necessary in view of the responses, and to lay the final statement before Parliament.
My noble friend’s amendment seeks to clarify the process by which the Secretary of State may publish a new statement if either House resolves not to approve the previous version that he lays before Parliament. The apparent stumbling block that the amendment seeks to remove is that the Secretary of State is under a duty to carry out such consultation as he thinks appropriate in relation to a draft of the new statement, and make any changes to the draft that appear to him to be necessary in view of the responses to such consultation. However, I point out that the Secretary of State must carry out such consultations as he “thinks appropriate”, according to Clause 4(1)(a).
The Bill therefore provides the Secretary of State with some measure of flexibility in deciding whether, for how long and how widely the draft statement should be consulted on. Therefore, the Bill as drafted does not in appropriate circumstances prevent the Secretary of State from publishing a new updated statement, reflecting the debate in Parliament, almost immediately without first undertaking a consultation if he does not think that a consultation is appropriate.
In short, while my noble friend’s amendment seeks to ensure that a new statement may be laid speedily if either House resolves not to approve the previous version, the Bill as drafted already allows for this. I am grateful that he has afforded me the opportunity to make the functioning of this clause clear. Therefore, in the light of the explanation that I have been able to provide, I hope that he will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have participated in this short debate. It is quite helpful just to focus on the question of making a statement because, if one looks back at Clause 1(6), it clearly states:
“The Secretary of State may not give a call-in notice unless a statement has been published (and not withdrawn) for the purposes of section 3.”
Although the word “may” is used in Clause 3, all it means in practice is that, if the Secretary of State chooses not to bring any of this into force, he would not publish a statement—but if he wants to issue call-in notices, he has to publish a statement. My noble friend the Minister is right in the sense that he must do this for the system to operate. The words I want to focus on, however, are “and not withdrawn”. If either House of Parliament resolves not to approve a statement, he must withdraw it. At that moment, the Secretary of State can issue no further call-in notices. My noble friend says the amendment is unnecessary because the Secretary of State has the power to consult only as he thinks appropriate.
Lord Callanan
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that as well as carrying out the consultation on the statement about the exercise of the call-in power, the requirement to make changes to the statement in view of the responses to the consultation may also be met before this section comes into force.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 14.
Clause 6: Notifiable acquisitions
Amendment 14
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would impose a duty on the Secretary of State to consult relevant stakeholders when making regulations as specified.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 14 in my name came about as a result of my working closely with the Law Society of Scotland. I am very grateful to the society for drawing to my attention the fact that, on the present reading of Clause 6, the Secretary of State may make regulations without any further consultation in that regard. The reason for the amendment is that this consultation provides an additional layer of scrutiny by all interested parties. The requirement on the Secretary of State to consult will help to ensure openness and transparency of the Secretary of State’s actions. Imposing a duty to consult will ensure that any draft statutory instrument is exposed to critical comment from stakeholders, which may improve an instrument and help to avoid difficulties when it comes to progressing through Parliament.
All this assumes that the Government will actually pay attention to consultation and the results. It is felt that the provision as drafted gives the Secretary of State very wide discretion to amend the scope of notifiable acquisitions as per the present drafting of Clause 6(5). This can have far-reaching consequences, not least because, as set out in Clause 6(6), it may be used to extend the scope of notifiable acquisitions to acquisitions of qualifying assets. In particular, I want to put on record that Clause 13 states that where a notifiable acquisition takes place without the approval of the Secretary of State, this transaction will be void, although under Clause 15(2) and (3) the defect can be cured retrospectively.
This amendment addresses a concern that there will be a lacuna in relation to the impact on third parties. In particular, if the qualifying asset in question is land, and if it were to be established that a transaction had been void and that the ownership or other interest in the land had not been properly transferred, questions of liability may arise. This could be the case, for example, in relation to environmental or insurance liabilities. Although it appears that the third party would have an action under Clause 16, we are concerned that this could be both burdensome—that is the Law Society expressing its concern—upon that third party and unnecessarily complicated. There is also concern that it might not resolve all the relevant problems.
I welcome my noble friend to her speaking position, for once, this evening; I hope that this is not just paying lip service to diversity. If the Government are not minded to accept this amendment, can she say what the purpose is of introducing regulations at what would be quite a late stage and without having consulted at all with interested parties or stakeholders?
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, I fear I might have missed a trick here. I think we have two quite different amendments and I should have been smarter and disaggregated Amendment 94 from Amendment 14. I apologise to the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, that I am not going to speak to Amendment 14, although I firmly believe that my noble friend Lord Bruce of Bennachie will speak to it later. I will speak to Amendment 94 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones.
Under Clause 6 the Secretary of State has great power to make the regulations concerning how this Bill will work. The Secretary of State can specify the description of the qualifying entity for the purpose of identifying a notable acquisition. He or she can amend the circumstances in which a notifiable acquisition takes place or does not take place, exempt acquirers with specified characteristics from the mandatory notification regime and make consequential amendments to other provisions of the Bill. These will be set before Parliament using the affirmative procedure. This was confirmed by one of the other documents that was circulated just before our proceedings began today.
For the commencement of the regime, the Secretary of State intends to make regulations only to specify the sectors subject to mandatory notification—that is, the 17 sectors we have already referred to elsewhere in this debate. This covers the activities of the entities of both sectors which give rise to an elevated national security risk. In the Government’s own words:
“Mandatory notification of certain types of transactions in 17 key sectors will ensure that the Government is informed of potential acquisitions of control or ownership in these particularly sensitive areas”.
As we have heard, using this list they will take action to investigate and mitigate any national security risk. The list is central to the workings of this regime. Therefore, so is the making and updating of it.
For the avoidance of doubt, and possibly to bore the Committee, I want to put on record the length and breadth of this list. It includes advanced materials, advanced robotics, artificial intelligence, civil nuclear, communications, computing hardware, critical suppliers to government, critical suppliers to the emergency services, cryptographic authentication, data infrastructure, defence, energy, engineering biology—which has now been commuted to synthetic biology—military and dual use, quantum technologies, satellite and space technologies, and transport. We heard from the Minister that in fact the Secretary of State can extend beyond this list if he or she feels it appropriate.
The so-called slimline version was published today, as mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, who has just popped out. She referred to the artificial intelligence sector which has been “slimmed down” to the identification of objects, people and events, advanced robotics and cybersecurity. The underlying software for that is going to be machine learning, and therefore that includes all artificial intelligence. While on the face of it this has been narrowed down, the reality is that if a Secretary of State so chose, anything involving machine learning could be dragged into this process. We need to be very wary of this list, which can be expanded and changed over time.
I expect that the Minister will choose to represent the proposed use of the affirmative procedure in the Bill as meaningful parliamentary scrutiny, but in truth the list can be amended by this and any subsequent Government as they please. For one thing, Parliament cannot amend statutory instruments, and for another, this House has voted down affirmative statutory instruments just four times in the past 70 years. That is nearly as long as my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones has been alive. As the Constitution Committee noted in its 2018 report The Legislative Process: The Delegation of Powers:
“Without a genuine risk of defeat, and no amendment possible, Parliament is doing little more than rubber-stamping the Government’s secondary legislation. This is constitutionally unacceptable”.
Affirmative statutory instruments do not constitute meaningful parliamentary scrutiny. This Government, or any subsequent Government, are effectively free to amend that already long list of technologies at will, so we need some sort of genuine democratic process. I am indebted to my noble friend Lord Sharkey; he proposed a very similar amendment to the Medicines and Medical Devices Bill, and I have ruthlessly plundered his thinking as it is just as apposite to this Bill.
As noble Lords know, there is a delegated legislation procedure that allows for significant parliamentary scrutiny. To the Government, it is known as “exceptional procedures”, and to Erskine May, in part 4, chapter 31.14 as the “super-affirmative procedure”. Erskine May characterises it as follows:
“The super-affirmative procedure provides both Houses with opportunities to comment on proposals for secondary legislation and to recommend amendments before orders for affirmative approval are brought forward in their final form … the power to amend the proposed instrument remains with the Minister: the two Houses and their committees can only recommend changes, not make them.”
Amendment 94, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones, follows this pattern; it is more generally based on the variant of the procedure used by the Government of the day in the Public Bodies Act 2011, so it is not a stranger to government. It refers to the Secretary of State’s regulation-making powers and includes the long list of technologies that I have just read out.
First, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a draft of the proposed regulations and a document explaining them; secondly, he or she must request a committee of either House whose remit includes science and technology and business to report on the draft regulations within 30 days; thirdly, in proposing a draft statutory instrument containing the regulations, the Secretary of State must take into account any representations, any resolution of either House and any recommendations of the committee to which the draft was referred. After the expiry of the 30-day period the Secretary of State may lay before Parliament regulations in terms of the original or the revised draft. The Secretary of State must also state what representations, recommendations or resolutions were given in the 30-day period and give details. He or she must also explain any changes made in a revised draft. After that, the normal affirmative process continues.
Lord Bruce of Bennachie (LD) [V]
My Lords, I support Amendment 14, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, to which I added my name just too late. I also support the more detailed Amendment 94, tabled by my noble friends Lord Fox and Lord Clement-Jones, but as my noble friend Lord Fox has spoken at length and my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones follows me, I will leave them to expand on it, as has already been done. There is a connection, although I accept that there are distinct differences.
Amendment 14 and others that I have tabled reflect concerns that I raised at Second Reading, which have also been drawn to my attention by the Law Society of Scotland. Given the importance of financial services to Scotland and the contribution that Scottish financial services make to the UK economy, surely it is wise to ensure that relevant stakeholders are consulted in advance of any regulations. That is especially important given the importance of the professional services that underpin financial services and draw on different qualifications and traditions within Scotland.
The concerns that are being widely raised across many of the amendments to the Bill are directed not at its purpose, which is broadly supported, but at the possibility of it being applied too widely, with Ministers having too much discretion and with players in the market having inadequate information with which to make decisions and judgments. We are talking about people who have no particular intention to threaten national security but might inadvertently find themselves compromised in doing so.
I see Amendment 14 as trying to avoid unintended consequences or confusion that could prejudice investments made in good faith. As my noble friend Lord Fox has said, the Government can by regulation add new sectors to those designated as covered by the Bill. They can also expand on the definitions within the sectors. So surely it is appropriate that any such changes should be subjected to the same consultation as has been carried out to date with the 17 sectors so far designated. Why would you introduce new sectors or substantially modified ones and not apply the same level of consultation?
There remains a concern that investment transactions may be carried out in good faith, as I have said, without the intention or realisation of a national security dimension. It may therefore not be notified, as people may not feel there is a need to do so. However, if it is subsequently referred or called in and found by the Minister to be in breach, the transaction could be void, and we have had that debate already.
In the circumstance of, say, a land transaction, an area where the Law Society of Scotland has a particular concern, land being transferred could leave significant uncertainty in the air. Land issues have caused problems in Scotland in recent years. For example, landowners—lairds—often made land available for community use in the past, such as for a schoolhouse or cottage hospital. You may argue that that was generous— [Inaudible]— the community appreciated the benefit. Unfortunately, in those cases, formal conveyance did not always take place and, in more recent years, people who have acquired the title to the land have secured financial gain by putting charges on those who acquired the school, building, hospital or what have you and have made a nice little packet. You may say that that has nothing to do with national security, but it shows the problems when there is any confusion in the transfer of land.
Indeed, if I may briefly digress, the mountain from which my title is derived—Bennachie—for 60 years had people, smallholders, living on it on what was common land until, in a land grab, surrounding landowners simply seized that land and gave themselves the title, even though it had been held in common before, and evicted the squatters. We have had some controversial land decisions, but we are more concerned about legitimate transfers of land for environmental, recreational or financial purposes where because, for example, the landowner acquiring or disposing is not a UK citizen or is an institution that the Government may have suspicions about, it could lead to a problem.
Most people engaged in those transactions will look to professional services for appropriate advice. If those professional services have been part of the stakeholder consultation on any changes to the regulations or the detail of them, they will be able to provide transparency and legitimate advice to avoid those kinds of problems arising. That relieves the Minister of a problem and embarrassment and removes the possibility of otherwise legitimate investments being compromised or withheld because of a lack of clarity.
The conclusion I suggest to the Minister is that consulting with relevant stakeholder, when any legislation is being amended or introduced is to the mutual benefit of all players, including the Government and national security. We are talking about a relatively small number of clearly identifiable stakeholders, not a mass of agencies. The Government know who they are and they know who they are. It can be done quickly and efficiently, and the net result is that concerns that were raised would be headed off at the pass. They would not occur, so that we would not finish with legislation that leads to the threat of voiding contracts that in no way compromised national security, but somebody felt that they might have done. Sellers and buyers need clarity on the law; consulting relevant stakeholders will help to achieve this.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, there are distinct common factors in both these amendments. The proposers do not believe that the current way of approving regulations under Clause 6, purely the affirmative procedure, is satisfactory. That is because of the importance of the regulations under Clause 6. As we heard, they underpin the necessity for mandatory notification for certain types of transactions in 17 sectors and they can be changed. We heard, particularly from my noble friend Lord Fox, that the definitions of these sectors are highly complex.
My noble friend took the example of artificial intelligence, a technology I have taken considerable interest in. As he explained, machine learning technology permeates almost every single sector and every use for both consumers and businesses one can think of—fintech, edtech, regtech, you name it. Artificial intelligence permeates those, and the new description of the AI sector published in the government response today states:
“In narrowing the definition, the definition now provides further clarity for businesses and investors”.
However, the definition still covers:
“the identification of objects, people, and events; advanced robotics and cyber security.”
That is pretty broad.
The policy statement published today is also extremely helpful in emphasising the importance of Clause 6 regulations. The policy statement says:
“Under Clause 6, the Secretary of State has the power to make regulations to:… a) specify the description of a qualifying entity for the purpose of identifying a notifiable acquisition; …b) amend the circumstances in which a notifiable acquisition takes place … c) exempt acquirers with specified characteristics … d) make consequential amendments of other provisions of the Bill resulting from provisions set out in paragraphs (b) and (c).”—[Interruption.]
I hope that I am having some impact on the Minister, my Lords. The policy statement goes on to say:
“For the commencement of the regime, the Secretary of State intends to make regulations only to specify the sectors subject to mandatory notification.”
I underline “only” because you would have thought that was significant enough in itself. This is obviously a self-denying ordinance, but it is not a very large self-denying ordinance when you are dealing with the intricacies of those 17 sectors.
My noble friend Lord Fox has rightly quoted the Constitution Committee’s 2018 report The Legislative Process: Delegated Powers, which talked about the rubber-stamping of the Government’s secondary legislation. He also referred to my long life, and in my already long life I have been responsible for overturning a statutory instrument. The Blackpool casino was very much wanted by the citizens of Blackpool, so the SI for east Manchester was defeated by three votes in the House of Lords, and one of those votes was from the Archbishop of Canterbury—the former Archbishop of Canterbury, I am glad to say. It was I who put the Motion, and we passed it by three votes to deny the Government the right to build the casino in east Manchester. Unfortunately, the Government never came back with a proposal for Blackpool, and that is a sad piece of history. I do not know why they did not; it would have been a great place to build a casino.
However, that does show that, on a simple proposition, it is possible to have an effective debate. When you are dealing with 17 sectors and 111 pages of text, which are going to be the subject of this regulation, that illustrates that the form of affirmative resolution proposed in this Bill is not fit for purpose. This kind of super-affirmative procedure means that there would be a genuine debate on the regulations and the 17 sectors and their extent.
I have huge sympathy with the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, because of course one wishes to see consultation among stakeholders. In an ideal world, one would like to see both that and the super-affirmative resolution. But, to be frank, consultation is not the same as, or a substitute for, proper parliamentary scrutiny. These are crucial regulations, and it is right that they are opened up for full debate in this way. I am probably going to embarrass the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, by saying that he said earlier we will have some debates about the sectors—well, not really, unless this amendment is accepted.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
My Lords, as we have just been hearing, these notifiable acquisition regulations are significant and require proper oversight, not just from both Houses of Parliament but also from experts involved, and with the opinions of those experts being made available to legislators. It will obviously be important to ensure that the stakeholders to be consulted are knowledgeable and, if I may say it, at the cutting edge of technology.
Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist (Con)
My Lords, I welcome Amendment 14 from my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering, and Amendment 94 from the noble Lords, Lord Fox and Lord Clement-Jones, which overall seek further consultation and scrutiny on Clause 6 regulations. Perhaps I may say at the outset that we would be delighted to meet the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, to discuss the concerns of the Wellcome Trust, which, as she said, is a world-class research organisation and worth hearing.
Perhaps I may begin by clarifying for the benefit of the Committee that while acquisitions of land are in scope of the call-in power, they are not in scope of the mandatory regime. Acquisitions of land, as with assets more widely, are expected to be called in only very rarely.
I turn first to Amendment 14, tabled by my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering. It would require the Secretary of State to consult relevant stakeholders before making any regulations under Clause 6. Those regulations are of significance as they define the scope of the mandatory notification regime. As such, the Secretary of State has already consulted on sectoral definitions for the qualifying entities proposed to be in scope of the mandatory regime, and further engagement is planned with particular sectors in advance of turning these definitions into draft regulations. Again, I echo my noble friend’s apologies that the information on sectoral scope arrived only as we came into the Committee. The consultation was extensive and lasted from November for eight weeks. We received 94 responses and have not yet finalised all the sectoral definitions. Further targeted engagement to refine these definitions will be made in advance of laying regulations. The Secretary of State will therefore undertake consultation where appropriate.
I can reassure my noble friend Lady McIntosh and the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Bennachie, that, given the importance and potential complexity of any future regulations under Clause 6—defining and bringing new advanced technology sectors into the regime, for example—it is difficult to foresee many instances in which consultation of relevant stakeholders will not be required. As such, there is no need to create a requirement in statute to cater for this. Public law duties already create the right incentives.
The second amendment to Clause 6, Amendment 94, proposed by the noble Lords, Lord Fox and Lord Clement- Jones, would require the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament a proposed draft of any regulations made under the clause for 30 days before the draft regulations themselves are laid and are subject to the approval of both Houses. Amendment 94 would also require the Secretary of State to identify a committee to report on the proposed draft regulations and then himself report on his consideration of the committee’s recommendations. The Bill as drafted provides for regulations made under Clause 6 clause to be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.
While I take the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, that these statutory instruments cannot be amended, they can be declined, as we have seen a small number of times in the past. This ensures an appropriate balance whereby the mandatory regime can be quickly updated should new risks to national security emerge, while still giving Parliament appropriate oversight by requiring it to approve the regulations.
In its report on the Bill published on 22 February, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee concluded that,
“there is nothing in the Bill to which we would wish to draw the attention of the House.”
So, although I was in some way surprised to see the noble Lords’ amendment tabled in relation to Clause 6, in disagreement with the judgment of the committee, we can agree that the powers of the Bill are necessarily drawn widely in order to make the process more efficient. I believe that the committee recognised the careful balance that the Bill strikes in Clause 6 and other clauses between allowing the Secretary of State the flexibility to ensure that the regime is effective in protecting our national security while providing sufficient opportunity for parliamentary scrutiny and input.
I welcome the opportunity to discuss this matter further with noble Lords. However, for the reasons I have set out, I cannot accept these amendments and ask that they be withdrawn or not moved.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)
My Lords, I have received two requests to speak after the Minister: from the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
I forgot to declare at the beginning that I used to work for the Wellcome Trust. It was 20 years ago, but I think it should still be noted.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her response but I do not think that she has quite got to grips with the full concern about this. It is not so much that there has not been consultation about the current sectors; there has been an extensive consultation and the Government have come back with their views and have explicitly said that they may change them even further. Yet they are still going to return to Parliament with a pure affirmative process. It is not as if parliamentarians will be able to change it. The stakeholder discussion and consultation is going forward as she said, but there is no guarantee that when that set of regulations is passed there will be proper debate in the House, nor will there be thereafter if the sectors are changed and made more specific, less specific, added to—whatever. There is no guarantee that consultation will take place.
The Minister said that there are the right incentives. That is a bit thin. If that is the guarantee of government consultation, it is not very solid, and even then, Parliament is entitled to have a view about the width of those sectors in the light of changing circumstances. It might have different views about new risks emerging, to use the Minister’s phrase. Therefore, it would be entirely legitimate to have that debate if those regulations were revised. The Minister has not got the nub of the concern in all of this.
Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist (Con)
I reiterate that we will continue to consult widely on important changes that merit further scrutiny. The Government care deeply that we get these definitions accurately put into the Bill before it receives Royal Assent.
Lord Fox (LD)
I anticipated the Minister’s answer on the subject of time, and 30 days is 30 days, but the Government have shown that they are relatively adept. If there really was a national security emergency requiring quick action using other means, a statutory instrument with a debate in Parliament would act as a plug. My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones made the point that there is such significance, particularly around this list but also around the other elements of Clause 6, so I hope that the Minister will read Hansard and at least find some way of moving towards the very valid arguments that she has heard today on both amendments.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
I thank all those who have spoken on both amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, will recall that we had a lengthy debate about the super-affirmative procedure during the passage of the UK Internal Market Act. I deeply regret that we did not go down the path of that procedure, for reasons that I gave. My noble friend the Minister cares passionately about Wales, and I hope that she will care equally passionately about Scotland and will be prepared to meet with me to bring these matters forward, because I do not accept that it is enough just to have regard to the public law requirements.
The Law Society of Scotland has identified three ways in which these regulations could move the parameters forward which I would like to discuss on a wider basis with her. While an official in the department said that it is not expected at this stage that those three areas will be covered, it is not excluded that that will happen in the future. I want to come back to that, but for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)
That concludes the work of the Committee this afternoon. I remind Members to sanitise their desks and chairs before leaving the Room.
National Security and Investment Bill
Tuesday 9th March 2021
(3 years, 8 months ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 165-II Second marshalled list for Grand Committee - (4 Mar 2021)
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Healy of Primrose Hill) (Lab)
My Lords, the hybrid Grand Committee will now begin. Some Members are here in person, respecting social distancing, others are participating remotely, but all Members will be treated equally. I must ask Members in the Room to wear a face covering except when seated at their desk, to speak sitting down, and to wipe down their desk, chair and any other touch points before and after use. If the capacity of the Committee Room is exceeded, or other safety requirements are breached, I will immediately adjourn the Committee. If there is a Division in the House, the Committee will adjourn for five minutes.
I will call Members to speak in the order listed. During the debate on each group, I invite Members, including Members in the Grand Committee Room, to email the clerk if they wish to speak after the Minister, using the Grand Committee address. I will call Members to speak in order of request.
The groupings are binding. Leave should be given to withdraw amendments. When putting the Question, I will collect voices in the Grand Committee Room only. I remind Members that Divisions cannot take place in Grand Committee. It takes unanimity to amend the Bill, so if a single voice says “Not Content” an amendment is negatived, and if a single voice says “Content” a clause stands part. If a Member taking part remotely wants their voice accounted for if the Question is put, they must make this clear when speaking on the group.
Clause 6: Notifiable acquisitions
Amendment 15
Lord Vaizey of Didcot
Lord Vaizey of Didcot (Con) [V]
My Lords, Amendment 15 and other subsequent amendments seek to bring in an exemption from the mandatory filing requirement for acquisitions and investments by entities that are ultimately controlled by UK nationals or nationals from certain countries allied to the UK. It is important to stress that this is to exempt companies from the mandatory filing requirement, not from having to file at all.
The Bill currently provides that the mandatory filing requirement applies equally to all investors, despite the fact that the Government have acknowledged that UK investors are inherently less likely to give rise to national security concerns. A more targeted and proportionate approach, which would better reflect where national security risks are most likely to lie, would be to exempt from the mandatory filing requirement acquisitions and investments by UK nationals or entities that are ultimately controlled by UK nationals.
In addition, investors from countries which are closely allied to the UK, such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US, plus any other country subsequently specified by the Secretary of State, should also be exempt from mandatory filing requirements for the reasons I have already stated. That is the thinking behind my Amendment 95, which is included in this group. To the extent that national security risks arise in relation to any such transaction, the Secretary of State would still retain the power to call in a qualifying transaction for review. As I say, the exemption would relate solely to the mandatory filing requirements.
Amending the Bill in this way would also better align the UK’s regime with those of other countries, such as the US and Australia, which I have already mentioned. I can understand why the Government may wish to appear agnostic when it comes to providing exemptions to UK nationals and friendly countries. While there is no doubt that, for example, investments from China in sensitive sectors would come under close scrutiny under the new regime—no one should pretend otherwise—it is important to bear in mind that only four of the 12 national security interventions under the existing regimes have involved Chinese investments.
It is important for me to acknowledge that the Government have intervened in eight transactions that involved investors from countries that have historically been allies, such as the US, Canada, Italy and Germany; they extracted undertakings from those investors to protect UK national security interests. A consistent theme in those interventions, in addition to the usual concerns about access to sensitive data, has been the Government’s interest in ensuring continuity of supply to critical services to government and to maintain strategic capabilities. Such concerns, I acknowledge, are effectively nationality-agnostic, because they go to ensuring that critical capabilities, skills and manufacturing are maintained in the UK and not moved abroad. As a result, it is likely that in particularly sensitive sectors we will see the Government calling in transactions involving investors from so-called friendly countries and imposing remedies under the new regime. The Government can, via regulation, exempt certain acquirers from notification requirements but no investors or classes of investor are currently exempt. Nevertheless, these interventions happened before the Bill was introduced, so I do not believe that they undermine my point—namely, that friendly countries and UK investors should be exempt from the mandatory filing requirement, which will not exist until the Bill is passed.
I looked at the evidence given to the Bill Committee in the other place and was particularly struck by two interventions from witnesses. One was from Dr Ashley Lenihan from the London School of Economics, who said that for the legislation to cover domestic investors would be “truly rare” in comparison to similar legislation in other countries and, importantly, that the inclusion of domestic investors will
“lead to a much larger volume of mandatory notifications than most other national security FDI regimes”.—[Official Report, Commons, National Security and Investment Bill Committee, 24/11/20; col. 33.]
This brings out the point that was a theme of our debate on our first day in Committee and at Second Reading, which is that the Government have wildly underestimated the number of notifications they expect to get. As I say, I think we are all united in wanting to see this legislation passed, but we all want to see it passed in a form that is workable, does not overwhelm the new unit that the Government are setting up and does not put off investors by placing too onerous burdens on them.
In addition, other evidence given to the Bill Committee in the other place in the same session included that of Michael Leiter, a lawyer from Skadden Arps, a US law firm. He said that including domestic investors “is probably not wise”. He went on:
“I think trying to take a slightly smaller bite of the apple and not including current UK businesses in the scheme would be well advised.”—[Official Report, Commons, National Security and Investment Bill Committee, 24/11/20; col. 42.]
So I pray in aid those two experts in making the point that this amendment in no way undermines the regime that the Government propose to bring in, but it does make it a slightly more practical approach as this legislation beds down. Indeed, Mr Leiter pointed out later that the Bill can still catch transactions in which the ultimate actor may be foreign, because the unit that the Government are setting up can still look at the ultimate parent or, indeed, at a follow-on transaction.
I understand why the Government may want the legislation to pass in its current form—to have a belt-and-braces approach and to avoid people trying to hide behind a UK investor or a friendly foreign investor—but in my view the Government will still have powers to call in such transactions if they believe that this is the case. I beg to move.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, for introducing his amendments and explaining some issues that I agree with, such as whether the Government are trying to make a failsafe, will it catch too many people and whether there will be too much to do. Although I understand that there may be different levels of concern, depending on the relationship with the country of the acquirer, I do not fully support the amendments in this group.
Where there are already sensitive industries, especially related to defence, who owns them matters in the sense of whether they are fit and proper for that kind of industry. Those considerations can apply within the UK as well as outside so, at some point, they have to be looked at. The question is whether they should be within the same regime or left to other operations that, the Government have considered, do not necessarily pick up everything.
My experience suggests that, in most instances, companies already used to dealing with sensitive matters would already be alert to what might not be desirable, and that it would either not happen or not happen often, but that does not mean that there should be no way of acting when it does. Therefore, they should all be included within this generic framework.
The Bill will apply to more companies or interests than companies used to dealing with sensitive matters, as I have just called them. Quite a lot still looks speculative, so I wonder whether there is, or in due course might be, further subdivision where certain geographies and industries might have different thresholds, depending on how likely they are to be particularly sensitive.
There will certainly be instances where the ownership interests of Five Eyes countries or other allies are of less or maybe no concern, but that may not always be the case if the security of supply or knowledge base is threatened. There are examples in the defence industry where, following takeovers by US corporations, research has been closed down, leaving only certification, assembly or supply of parts as the UK activity. This has led to a serious loss of forward vision and an undermining of the knowledge base, as well as other issues, such as access to technology. Sometimes that might be accepted, but not always.
It is one thing to recognise that we do not—indeed cannot—stand alone on defence issues, but quite another to accept, always and without review, what might be serious diminution or removal of all active participation. Therefore, although I expect the results of reviews to be different for different categories of acquirer, I do not see how there can be any blanket exclusion at the initial filtering stage. I am very interested in how different thresholds may play a part in reducing the number of transactions that would have to be filtered.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, my first instinct was to say that the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Vaizey are obviously correct. I am sure that the majority of cases that would threaten our national security will involve foreign actors and, like him, I am concerned about the volumes of notifiable transactions.
However, I think that there might be circumstances in which the powers in the Bill could appropriately be used in respect of wholly UK companies. In that respect, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted. For example, large company A may have a monopoly or near monopoly in providing something critical to our security. Tiny company B may have developed a new technology, which not only achieves a better result in the light of emerging risks, but at a fraction of the price. If company A acquires control of company B, it can kill the new technology and keep its monopoly profits on its old products. Sometimes, large companies acquire smaller ones to avoid disruption to lucrative markets, rather than to exploit their innovations. I do not think it would apply often, but it is a good reason not to restrict the Secretary of State’s powers in the Bill.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and to agree with her. The point she made—that competition can be a security issue as well as a trust issue—was one I was going to make myself. I was thinking in particular of the concentration of media ownership and the impact that can have on national security.
As the Committee may have guessed, I am speaking in this group, respectfully but strongly, against the inclusion of any of these amendments in the Bill. If we included these amendments, we would be heading down the road of the Dangerous Dogs Act, generally acknowledged as one of the worst pieces of legislation passed through your Lordships' House. It penalised and gave a death sentence to dogs identified as belonging to certain breeds, which completely misidentified the problem, which was not canine genetics but human owners.
The idea that where giant multinational companies are based—those are the kind we will be talking about in many cases—can give any evidence of their loyalties is a great stretch. I was in the Chamber yesterday, speaking about the stance taken by HSBC in backing the Government in Beijing against the interests of the UK, the joint declaration, the rights of the people of Hong Kong and the rule of law.
I want to note concerns about Amendments 95 and 96, which identify a number of countries—Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US—to be automatically excluded. That is a large assumption, and we can probably all think of case studies—maybe different ones—where individual owners of companies from those countries can be of great concern. It is not a measure of risk. I cannot help noticing certain characteristics shared by those countries that the proposer might like to consider and how the grouping of those countries might play in terms of the UK’s international reputation.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, when we discussed the second group, I said that when we are looking at the national security risk, the purposes of the Bill are to define the relevant entities and assets; the extent of control, which is significant for these purposes; and the nature of the acquirer of those entities and assets. I think the third is proving among the most difficult. This group seeks to define that person by reference to their nationality. This is a substantial change to the nature of the legislation, since the purpose of the legislation is to address national security risks; it is not to screen foreign investment in the United Kingdom. The analogies with other regimes—for example, with the European Union’s regulations—do not stretch far because they are concerned with foreign investment.
This group has strayed considerably beyond areas of national security and into the area of what is termed “open strategic autonomy”. I am not sure how open it will prove to be, but it is potentially protectionist by nature. It strikes me that we should really aim to focus on national security, which is the purpose of the Bill, and in the Bill’s broader economic aspects, we should continue to adhere to the principle of non-discrimination. If we include UK domestic actors in the potential definitions of acquirers who raise national security issues, we will be non-discriminatory in our effects, and it is important that we should aim at that. In practice, where national security is concerned, we know that not all foreigners are hostile, and not all those who are hostile are foreigners. So, I am afraid I am not persuaded.
There is also an issue here about authorised countries, which is linked to this but could be separated, although it is not for these purposes at the moment. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States has since last year, I think, had excepted states. Interestingly, they are Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom. The list does not include New Zealand for reasons no doubt well known to the United States Administration but not to me, so I am not entirely sure why my noble friend included New Zealand. The criteria appear to be related to the intelligence-sharing arrangements and the extent of defence integration between those countries’ industries and the United States.
Even where the United States’ excepted states are concerned, this is only temporary. There has to be a determination in the early part of next year of whether we have sufficient investment screening arrangements to give the United States assurance to maintain our excepted state position, which I think the Bill will allow us to do. That will be useful to United Kingdom investors into what are known as TID businesses in the United States—those dealing with sensitive technologies, infrastructure and data.
I say to my noble friend that I am not persuaded by this group of amendments, nor yet by the authorised country issue. I suspect the latter issue is one that it might be useful to come back to and think about under what circumstances we differentiate between people from countries that have comparable investment screening regimes in practice.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Healy of Primrose Hill) (Lab)
The noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, has withdrawn so I call the next speaker, the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley.
Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)
My Lords, the Bill currently provides that the mandatory filing requirement applies equally to all investors, as my noble friend Lord Vaizey said. This is despite the Government stating quite rightly that domestic investors are inherently less likely to pose a national security risk. The Bill is ultimately about managing risk, so we need to ensure that the notifications that the ISU receives are the right sample. Exempting UK nationals from this process would be a far from proportionate approach. Since we are in the business of managing risk in a proportionate manner, we should consider whether investors from specific allies—Australia, Canada, the US and New Zealand have been suggested—should be exempt since, again, the evidence strongly suggests that such investments are less likely to pose a national security risk, although I will come on to one caveat at the end of my remarks.
This aspect would also align more closely with some of our competitor jurisdictions. In any event, since national security is always paramount, it is worth noting that these amendments concern only the mandatory filing requirement. The Secretary of State would remain fully empowered to call in such transactions for review even if they concerned our citizens or allies or were below the threshold for control. That is an important distinction. I hope it means that lots of potential acquisitions by UK players will not get covered by notifiable regulations if we approve these amendments.
I am sure that the legislation is not meant to cover the situation where someone starts a business with a great idea and, say, £1,000. That business might touch on a number of sectors including, say, defence. We know that the sector definitions are very widely drawn. This entrepreneur then goes to some family and friends to seek funding, which might be through an EIS or, even better, an SEIS or possibly an EIS fund. The family and friends are all local. I know one investor who has only ever invested—with great success—in businesses run by someone he has personally met in his local pub. Such investors are vital to the UK economy and, in my opinion, do not carry a risk to security any greater than the person who started the business. As we currently have no size threshold at all, they would be caught by the Bill. It would be a great shame if they decided that they did not want to wait the 30 days or more for the Secretary of State to opine.
We all know the purpose of the Bill and it is not to restrict UK investors investing in UK companies. If we go down the route of exempting UK companies, we need to look more carefully at the definition of a UK company, which Amendment 96 seeks to do. I recognise that this is difficult. For example, many companies have private equity investment in them. They are clearly UK companies with a UK HQ, UK board and UK business but because the general partner investor may be based in, say, Guernsey, for the limited partners requirement—and the limited partner is almost certainly based abroad—they would need to be treated as a UK company to ensure a level playing field.
My noble friend Lady Noakes and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, have made some valid points. It is indeed true, for example, that many companies which are essentially Chinese are listed on NASDAQ. Would we call them American or Chinese? There has to be some very careful examination.
My last concern, which I mentioned in respect of Amendment 95, is to stop shell companies being created in countries such as Australia. Under these amendments, a shell company could buy a UK tech business and be sold immediately thereafter to a non-friendly company. Undertakings would therefore have to be put in to protect against that situation.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, I agree with the analysis of the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, that Her Majesty’s Government have underestimated the potential workload that this unit will get, but I am not convinced that his solution to reducing that workload is the right one. We have heard many speeches but I would single out those of my noble friend Lady Bowles, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, as reasons why we should not be separating out one set of companies due to their nationality. The noble Lord made the point clearly that the criterion should be: is it or is it not a national security risk, rather than, does it or does it not come from Hampshire or New Hampshire? That should be the rule running through this.
The noble Lord, Lord Leigh, when moving into caveat territory, started to explain why singling out foreign companies becomes an extraordinarily difficult thing to do. First, what is one, and is it a shell company? Is it listed on NASDAQ but actually resident in Beijing? Those kinds of complications start to point to the Government’s analysis that all companies are in. Clearly, it will be easier for the company whose owner your friend meets in a pub to get through the process and not be called in, compared with one that hails from the Far East, for example. Surely, the process should be the efficiency with which the unit can deal with and dismiss issues quickly, rather than accidentally filtering out things that we should not.
On the concept that, “Our friends are our friends, so we include them as ourselves”, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, made the wider point about access to the technology. Access can be cut off by our friends as much as by ourselves or, indeed, by external companies. I am sorry, but I am going to repeat the example I gave at Second Reading. A British company with a US-based subsidiary took the technology to the United States, started to produce it and made one small amendment to that technology. The use and sale of the technology back to the UK was then blocked by the Department of Defense under export controls, because it considered it to then be United States strategic technology. I am sure that such things happen all the time—this example is just one that I happen to know about.
Regional agnosticism, the gospel according to the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, is the sensible approach here, and I hope that the Minister can explain his views on this issue.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
My Lords, we have some sympathy with the intention here, which is to seek clarification about whether certain investors or countries should be more or less encouraged to invest here, although this may not be exactly the right way to achieve that. Such clarification is clearly needed and is sought in a different way by Amendment 91, which we will reach next week, I think, and which stands in the name of my noble friend Lord West.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Lord Callanan) (Con)
I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this very useful short debate. I welcome the amendments proposed by my noble friend Lord Vaizey. Taken together, as numerous speakers have said, his amendments would exempt UK investors and investors from other particular countries from the Bill’s mandatory notification regime. As it stands, both the mandatory and the voluntary notification regimes provided for by the Bill are both actor and nationality-agnostic. The mandatory notification regime is based on the risks posed by acquisitions of target entities due to those entities’ activities, rather than the risks posed by the acquirers. The risks posed by acquirers are then considered on a case-by-case basis by the Secretary of State as part of the particular national security assessment.
My noble friend is right to suggest that, in many cases, acquisitions by UK nationals and UK-based companies, or those based in like-minded countries, are less likely to give rise to national security concerns, even in relatively sensitive sectors. Such acquirers, if their proposed acquisitions do not give rise to national security risks, will find their acquisitions cleared to proceed by the Secretary of State, following assessment or following call-in, should that be necessary, for further review.
However, an acquirer’s nationality cannot tell the Secretary of State everything he needs to know about that acquirer’s intent. For example, it is possible that a UK acquirer may be paid by a hostile actor or otherwise have strong links to hostile actors based outside the UK. A similar rationale follows for the amendment’s reference to other like-minded countries. So, excluding purely on the basis of nationality could create a loophole to exploit.
The particular approach of the amendments in this group also raises some practical challenges. For instance, the references to nationality appear not to deal with the issue of dual nationality; nor is a change of nationality covered. Key considerations in designing this regime have included ensuring that it is not discriminatory, and that it upholds our World Trade Organization and other international obligations in this regard. It is not clear that these amendments would achieve this.
None the less, we wish to consider over time how we might temper and adjust the regime to take account of areas of lower risk. Under Clause 6, the Bill gives the Secretary of State the ability to make exemptions from the mandatory notification regime based on the “characteristics” of the acquirer. This may include nationality if this is judged appropriate and the various issues that I have highlighted can be resolved.
We will of course monitor closely how the regime works in practice to determine through detailed further work and carefully assess whether any such exemptions should be introduced. Any such regulations would be subject to appropriate parliamentary scrutiny through the affirmative procedure.
I welcome the opportunity to discuss the impact of nationality on the regime with my noble friends and to set out our thinking in more detail. However, for the reasons I have given, I cannot accept my noble friend’s amendments. Before I conclude, I can confirm to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, that the Government will engage with a number of stakeholders on the voluntary and mandatory notification forms. Therefore, given the points I have made, I wonder whether my noble friend will consider withdrawing his amendment.
Lord Vaizey of Didcot (Con) [V]
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for his response. Never have I seen so many noble Lords and noble Baronesses arraign so uniformly against an amendment, so the mood of the Grand Committee is clearly against me. In fact, through the powers of my advocacy I think that I even persuaded the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, to move from being a supporter to an opposer of my amendments, if I followed her speech correctly.
I am not sure that the issue of media ownership threw much light on the power of my amendments. However distasteful we might find the antics of media owners in this country, the British ones are just as guilty as any foreign ones of potentially challenging our democracy.
My noble friend Lord Lansley was correct to say that I included New Zealand along the lines of the Five Eyes, although I notice that he said that the US regime could be helpful to UK businesses if the UK was exempt from the equivalent provisions in the US. That was the purpose of my amendment.
Fundamentally, the point I was trying to make with these amendments, which did not really shine through, is that I seek not to hide any transactions from the national security regime but simply to avoid an overwhelming number of mandatory notifications for the department. Of all the speeches that I heard, the Minister’s was the most supportive. I noted his very welcome comments that the door remains ajar, as the regime develops, to put in place provisions to ease the bureaucracy and the number of mandatory notifications.
Finally, I was inspired by my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley’s speech to potentially draft a new amendment as we progress—perhaps the pub amendment, whereby the only transactions that can be notified in a mandatory fashion to the Government are those that can fit into my noble friend’s local pub. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Healy of Primrose Hill) (Lab)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 15A. I should inform the Grand Committee that if Amendment 15A is agreed to, I cannot call Amendments 16 and 17.
Amendment 15A
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
Amendment 15A would delete Clause 6(2)(b), because otherwise that paragraph means that someone increasing their interest in a qualifying entity from under 15% to over 15% would then turn it into a notifiable acquisition.
This amendment asks a simple but significant question: why has 15% been chosen and what is the rationale for it? The people we spoke to were a bit bemused by the figure. I think someone mentioned in Committee last week that 15% appeared somewhere else, but those we spoke to across a range of areas could not find, and did not know, where that 15% came from. There is obviously no particular evidence behind it. I am not sure whether it appears elsewhere in legislation, but I am sure the Minister will know the answer and outline the thinking behind that figure.
Not just for pubs but for other early stage start-ups and developments, this could certainly be an impediment to an investment just at the point when it is needed. For these small start-ups there seems to be a more or less continuous need for money, but drip by drip as things develop. It is on a continual basis rather than a great big one-off deal; the more the work begins to show potential, the more extra money is needed. Any concern about suddenly hitting 15% in the case of a small company, particularly a new one, just when it needs the money could jeopardise access to funds when they are most needed.
I am not even absolutely certain about the purpose of Clause 6(2)(b), but, again, I am sure the Minister will elucidate in his reply. Clause 8(2) already describes shareholding thresholds for qualifying entities of a specialist description, where the figures of 25%, 50% and 75% are used, and Clause 8(5) does the same with voting rights. So the references in Clause 6(2)(b) to a 15% threshold for
“a qualifying entity of a specified description”
appear to go over very similar ground, unless the intention is to have two different classes of qualifying entities of a specified description, with the higher-risk one subject to the additional 15% level. If that is the case, it seems to add an extra level of complexity to the legislation. Dropping the 15% level could remove the regulatory burden from at least some fundraising that needs to go on. It might be questionable anyway how much control a shareholding of below a quarter would achieve.
Amendment 29A would delete Clause 8(8), which again is a bit unclear. Perhaps the Minister will be able to spell it out a bit more. It concerns the fourth listed case of a person gaining
“control of a qualifying entity”
as described earlier in Clause 8(1). However, Clause 8(8) is not part of the mandatory regime in the earlier Clause 6, which we are now looking at, because in Clause 8 only cases one to three are cross-referenced with reference to subsections (2), (5) and (6). It does not include subsection (8), so a bit more explanation would be good.
Clause 8(8) is perhaps there to allow for a broad range of call-ins than those covered by the mandatory notification regime, but the imprecision of the language is difficult. It talks of where it
“enables the person materially to influence the policy of the entity”.
As that is fairly broad, it could lead to a lot of excess voluntary reporting and it is hard to know what it means in practice. “Influence” is hard enough to define. Maybe “materially to influence” meets a legal threshold of which I am unaware, but it is quite difficult for a researcher or company to know what that means.
It is true that the CMA uses some of that language when we are talking about much bigger operations. However, it is probably not a phrase that is particularly familiar to most businesses or, indeed, to academia. As I said, it could lead to a lot of extra voluntary notification by parties in an attempt to get certainty. As we have heard, we are worried about too many voluntary notifications clogging up the system.
The reason why 25% in Amendment 17 was chosen might need some spelling out. It may well be correct, but it would be useful to know the thinking behind it.
I beg to move.
Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 17, which is in my name. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, for her comments in respect of her amendment, which might actually be a better amendment than mine but none the less would achieve much the same thing. She probably does it in a more elegant way, but the purpose of my amendment is to understand the logic here and to persuade my noble friend the Minister that he should revert to 25% throughout.
The mandatory notification obligation in Clause 6(2)(b), which the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, wants to delete, is triggered as a result of acquiring over 15% of shareholding or voting rights. In paragraph 52 and elsewhere, the White Paper specifies 25% but forecasts 15% for notifiable acquisitions. Accordingly, it is not, and is not intended to be, consistent with Clause 8, as the noble Baroness said, but that leads us into problems. Let us try to walk through this. It is complicated.
As I read it, Clause 6 is there so that the Secretary of State is given a mandatory notification for them to consider whether a trigger event has happened. Let us look at what a trigger event is, then. For that, we have to rely on Clause 8 to see under what definitions a people has gained control. Clause 8 lists four situations, three of which are where the shareholding is 25% or more. That is fine, but that clearly does not apply in a 15% situation. So you have to rely on the fourth situation, which is set out in Clause 8(8), which bites because it is the scenario where there is the ability, alone or with others,
“materially to influence the policy of the entity.”
Therefore, if an investor goes from, say, 14% to 20%, a lot of work has to be undertaken to see whether that person can materially influence the policy. If the threshold was 25%, there would be no need to do this. So given that it is most unlikely that a sub-25% shareholder can materially alter the policy—more importantly, this will be hard to determine in practice, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, said—are we not creating an unnecessary problem for ourselves? What does “materially influence the policy” mean anyway? Which policy? All policies? Dividend policy? Maybe. Hiring and firing policy? Most unlikely. Again, this will lead to consternation and commercial agreements on shareholders’ rights having to be implemented, which will be hard to negotiate because, when you enter this sort of area, there will be uncertainty over whether you can materially alter policy.
In my plea for certainty and clarity, can we make it 25% throughout? The risk of a 15% shareholder throwing their weight around to demand that action be taken to change a policy that would be against our national interest is somewhat remote. I suggest that, with a 15% threshold, there will be significantly more cases to consider, the overwhelming majority of which will not have national security implications. The current filing threshold of 15% is significantly below the thresholds used in a number of other major foreign direct investment regimes. France’s is 25%, which the amendment proposes, and Canada’s is 33.3%. I note that my noble friend Lord Vaizey is not due to speak on this group, unfortunately, but if he did I am sure that he would continue to encourage the Minister to look to Canada rather than France, which is perhaps a natural progression.
I am aware that some countries have a 15% threshold, but they are not jurisdictions seen as international business headquarters or centres of international business in the same way as we are, and we have to remember that there is a difference. Considering the volume of transactions, it will even, I suggest, lead to transactions that pose a national risk being overlooked because of the volume generated by this very low, 15% threshold.
While we are on this clause, can the Minister help me with Clause 6(3), which is relevant to the clause we are debating? It states:
“But a notifiable acquisition does not take place if complying with the requirement to give a mandatory notice under section 14(1) in relation to the gaining of control, or the acquisition of the right or interest, would be impossible for the person within subsection (2).”
What does “would be impossible” mean? I have asked around, and no one I have asked can be sure. Is this when a public company’s shareholder trips over 15%? What does “complying … would be impossible” mean? Could we all argue that it is impossible, give all sorts of reasons unspecified and that is the end of it? If much, much better brains than mine cannot understand the clause, it must need amending. I cannot amend it because I do not know what it is trying to achieve, but it cannot be good law to have clauses which are not immediately intelligible to, if not the layman, then the reasonably well-informed reader.
The whole of Clause 6 is difficult. It talks about regulations we have not seen and then gives power for those regulations to be amended at will under subsection (5). I think subsection (5) is where a white list is introduced in the regulations, but it, and subsection (6) allow carte blanche and, accordingly, more uncertainty. Can the Minister commit to look at Clause 6 again, specifically with the amendment I have tabled and with the amendment that he can see I will perhaps have to table on Report? Amendment 94, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, which we discussed the other day, would have helped. Can the Minister give some assurances that parliamentary scrutiny will be given to these regulations?
Amendment 17 looks to strike a more proportionate balance between protecting national security and reducing unnecessary burdens on investors. We want to be seen as an investment-friendly country.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for introducing their amendments and exploring the reasoning behind them, which I have found helpful. I put my name down to speak to Amendment 17, which was signed by my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones, for whom I am broadly substituting because he is regrettably unavailable until later today. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, I was wondering why the Government chose 15% as the threshold above which a notification would become mandatory.
On the previous group, I wondered whether we could have different thresholds for different reasons. That would not be without precedent. For example, Australia has different percentage thresholds for lesser and more sensitive assets and different business value thresholds depending on the country of the acquirer. However, here we have 15%, which might be a number above which you fear an activist shareholder, but why?
In the UK, shareholders get some additional rights at 5%: they can go to court to prevent the conversion of a public company to a private company; they can call a general meeting; they can require the circulation of a written resolution to shareholders in a private company; or they can require the passing of a resolution at an annual general meeting of a public company. At 10%, you can call a poll vote on a resolution. At more than 10%, in a private company, you can prevent a meeting being held at short notice. At 15%, you can apply to the court to cancel a variation of class rights, provided that the shareholders have not consented to or voted in favour of the variation. Getting to 25% is significant, because it gives the right to prevent the passing of a special resolution, which could affect various articles and other things. I cannot see that preventing a change in class rights, assuming that a court would agree, is significant. I am slightly bemused about where that 15% number was plucked from.
We get to the point about whether fear of an activist shareholder is what this is all about. We hear of the insistence on having a director, when there is a certain quantity of shares, but they have to be able to control all the other directors, which does not always happen. It brings to the fore a thought about who owns the other shares, which would have to be taken into account in any assessments. Conditions might then be put on a company in respect of what happens to other shareholders to allow a transaction to pass.
As the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, explained, this makes something more complicated for reasons that do not yet seem clear. There are surely other inherent safeguards that would do the job. From that point of view, I support Amendment 17 signed by my noble friend but, as has been explained, there are other ways in which it could be achieved.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, the effect of amendments in this group may be to restrict the Government’s ability of to act where de facto control is the result of an acquisition. We should not underestimate the ingenuity that could be deployed to achieve de facto control or make it easier for people to escape the Bill where there are substantive concerns. For that reason, I do not believe that we should tie the Government’s hands in this way.
I put my name down to speak on this group, in particular on my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley’s Amendment 17, which increases the voting rights threshold for notification from 15% to 25%, and I support the probing Amendment 15A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, which removes the reference to the voting rights test.
While a shareholding needs to be 25% to be certain of stopping a special resolution—the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, referred to that a moment ago—in practical terms that assumes that all other voting rights would be exercised and in the opposite direction. The de facto ability to stop a special resolution kicks in at much lower levels. I am interested to hear what the Minister says about the rationale for 15%.
For many years, I was a director of the Reuters Founders Share Company, which was set up to hold a form of golden share in Reuters to protect the independence and integrity of the Reuters news service and to prevent it falling under the control of any faction. There is a long history to that, which I will not go into. The trigger point for the ability to use the golden share was set at 15%, for the very reasons I have just given. It is the level at which the influence of a shareholding bloc can be significant. In the history of Reuters Founders Share Company, deployment of the 15% was needed on one occasion. For that reason, I am inclined to support the Bill’s cautious approach in this area.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, I want to say a word on this group, because I am particularly interested in Amendment 29A, which would remove Clause 8(8). This is of interest, not least because of the question of how to define “material influence”, which we will come to later.
Listening to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, I understand what she has done; she is testing the question why material influence is there if it is one of the ways in which control of an entity can be established under Clause 8. Currently, it is not referenced in Clause 6(2)(a) as one of the cases by which that control leads to a notifiable acquisition.
Instead, taking subsection (8) out of Clause 8 and putting it into Clause 6(2)(a) would in effect be saying that a notifiable acquisition takes place when a person gains control of an entity. Clause 8 explains how you gain control of an entity. It can be by acquiring various voting shares, as defined, or by exercising material influence over the entity. That has been left out, so putting it into subsection (2)(a)—that is not precisely what we are proposing here, but I am speculating slightly—would be a much cleaner option. It would enable one to do what my noble friend Lord Leigh is proposing, which is to take the 15% out. The 15% is there only because there are conceivably circumstances in which a 15% or more voting share constitutes material influence. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, said, we know that, because the Competition and Markets Authority has on occasion determined such things. It did so on BskyB v ITV, which concerned a 17.9% shareholding, and it did so in the case, which it none the less cleared, of RWE’s stake in E.ON at 16.67%.
We know that voting shares of between 15% and 25% can represent a material influence, but that is not the issue. The point is not about the voting share: 25% is, generally speaking, the voting share that gives rise to an issue of control, but about the need to say, “Material influence is what we are talking about, so why don’t we use that?” Why introduce this potentially rarely used 15% threshold instead?
My contribution is to ask Ministers if they will go away and look at whether it would be cleaner and simpler for Clause 6 to say simply, “A notifiable acquisition takes place when a person gains control of a qualifying entity of a specified description”, and Clause 8 goes on to explain what “control” means.
Lord Fox (LD)
Were my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones here he would pick up his fishing rod again and say that this is a question of mesh size. But, actually, the issues raised by your Lordships should tell the Government that there is work to be done on redrafting subsections in Clauses 6 and 8 to try to clarify. Whatever we come up with, we need clarity, because there seems to be some dissonance in how this is read and regarded.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, asked the right question at the beginning of her speech, which was: what is the rationale behind the 15%? My noble friend Lady Bowles set out the sliding scale of different accountabilities and rights that come with different levels of ownership and said that there was some logical mismatch with the 15%. The Minister has taken refuge in the past in the policies of the other European Union countries, and the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, can happily put his mind at rest that France uses 25%, so clearly, if it is good enough for France, it will be good enough for the Minister.
On a more serious note, the issue of material control is interesting. We have seen so-called shareholder activists reversing into companies with far less shareholding than 15% and making material changes to the strategy of businesses. So what is material and what is a change? The point that my noble friend Lady Bowles brought up about the nature of the other shareholders cannot be left out.
Tracker funds tend not to be active in the way a long or a short fund tends to be, and clearly shares get loaned in situations of activity. All these add up to the mess which the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, described well: who is in control of the business, and what is material control? To some extent, the difference between 25% and 15% is less important than where the control lies. That is harder to enumerate, and difficult for the market to understand, but it is clear that the way this stands in the Bill will not work. I hope the Government can sit down with their lawyers and drafters and come up with something that we can look at next time which takes on board the good advice the Minister has received from your Lordships.
Lord Callanan (Con)
First, I extend my thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and my noble friend Lord Leigh for the amendments in this grouping. Let me start by addressing Amendments 15A and 17, which concern the scope of the mandatory notification regime.
Clause 6 sets out the circumstances where a notifiable acquisition takes place for the purposes of the Bill. Noble Lords will see in subsection (2) that the types of acquisition covered by mandatory notification are not simply the full list of trigger events in Clause 8. Rather, notifiable acquisitions are objective circumstances based primarily on an acquisition taking a party’s holding of share or votes to or past a particular numerical threshold. The amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, would remove subsection (2)(b) to remove the lowest of the numerical thresholds: 15%. My noble friend’s amendment seeks to amend Clause 8(2)(b).
Let me make three points about these amendments, which I trust will address the concerns which the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and my noble friend Lord Leigh raised in their opening comments. First, acquisitions that take a party’s shares or voting rights in a specified entity to 15% or more, not exceeding 25%, are notifiable even though they are not, by themselves, trigger events that may be called in by the Secretary of State for scrutiny under the Bill. We have, nevertheless, required such acquisitions to be notified, because increases in shares or voting rights to 15% or more may realistically result in the acquirer having material influence, and therefore control, over the policy of the entity, and that would constitute a trigger event.
The notification requirement is thus intended to ensure that the Secretary of State is made aware of the proposed acquisition and can take steps to determine whether material influence will in fact be required. The 15% threshold is broadly consistent with the UK’s merger framework. As the Competition and Markets Authority notes in its merger guidance, although there is no presumption of material influence below 25%, shareholdings of 15% or more may be examined to see whether the holder might be able materially to influence the company’s policy. We think that this strikes the right balance by requiring parties to focus only on a numerical threshold, while still allowing the Secretary of State to be notified about, and then call in if the legal test is met, more subjective acquisitions of control in the most sensitive sectors.
Secondly, my noble friend made an important point: the investment security unit will be required to process notifications for acquisitions of 15%. We expect that, as with acquisitions across the regime, the vast majority will quickly be cleared to proceed. It is vital that the statutory timescales set out in the Bill for processing such notifications are met to maintain business and investor confidence; the Government will resource the investment security unit accordingly to do just that.
I understand that my noble friend has a particular interest in what “material influence over the policy of an entity” relates to. I assure him that material influence is an existing concept under the Enterprise Act 2002. The Competition and Markets Authority sets out what it considers constitutes material influence in its mergers guidance. The Secretary of State intends to apply this in so far as it is possible in the context of this new regime for the purposes of determining whether control has been, or is to be, gained over a qualifying entity. For the avoidance of doubt, the Government have no plans to publish their own separate guidance on material influence.
My noble friend also queried the reference in subsection (3) to excluding acquisitions that are “impossible” to notify from constituting notifiable acquisitions. Let me explain the reasons for this. The Government recognise that there may be circumstances where it is impossible to notify and obtain clearance from the Secretary of State for an acquisition before it takes place. They could include lack of awareness on the part of the acquirer that they were about to acquire control, or where it was otherwise impossible to notify in the time available before the acquisition took place.
Let me give an example. A beneficiary to a will may have no prior knowledge that that they stand to inherit a stake in a business that would ordinarily be a “notifiable acquisition” and will automatically do so on the execution of the will. The Bill does not exhaustively define the circumstances that are “impossible”. I have given one example around inheritance; others might include bankruptcy, intestacy and by operation of law, but these examples are indicative.
The third point I should make, specifically about my noble friend’s amendment, is that, as currently drafted, it would not simply remove the 15% threshold but replace it with a reference to 25%. On this point, I hope he will recognise that subsection (2)(a) of the clause already provides for this—or, to be specific, very close to this effect—as it draws on the existing numerical trigger event thresholds in Clause 8, which start at acquisitions taking a person’s holding past 25%. As such, the amendment would duplicate those existing provisions and would in fact result in a requirement to notify when acquiring specifically 25% and then again if moving beyond 25% in future. I trust he will agree that we should avoid this, I am sure, unintentional effect.
Amendment 19A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, seeks to prevent notifiable acquisition regulations being used to bring asset acquisitions in scope of the mandatory notification regime. Let me start by setting out why it is important that the delegated powers in Clause 6 are not constrained in this way before I address the amendment itself.
The noble Baroness will accept, I am sure, that the future is uncertain, that the threats we face as a nation inevitably change over time and that the ways in which hostile actors seek to bring us harm are constantly evolving. That is precisely why the Bill extends the new investment screening regime’s coverage to acquisitions of individual assets, not just acquisitions of control over entities. We cannot, and should not, rule out the possibility that changes to the scope of the mandatory notification regime may be required, based on the types of acquisition and not just the sectors in which they take place.
None the less, the noble Baroness has spoken powerfully on a couple of occasions about the concerns of the Wellcome Trust and others, so let me say this categorically: the Government have no current plans to bring assets in scope of the mandatory notification regime, and neither subsections (5)(a) nor (6) require them to do so; they merely allow for that possibility, subject to the restrictions in subsection (7). Were we or a future Government to do so, it is clear that such a move would constitute a major change to the regime. It is difficult to conceive of many instances where consultation with relevant stakeholders would not be a practical necessity for a change such as this.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Healy of Primrose Hill) (Lab)
I have received a request from the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, to speak after the Minister. I call the noble Lord.
Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)
I thank my noble friend the Minister for his very considered comments, in particular his explanation of Clause 6(3). I think it allows a coach and horses to be driven through most of this legislation if someone can claim an impossibility. The examples he gave were excellent but there will be many other examples where people can claim an impossible circumstance. We will come on later to talk about, for example, the position of administrators and liquidators, and I can think of many others as well. I would have thought Clause 6(3) needed refinement.
Both the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, mentioned “materially control” as opposed to “materially influence”. There is a difference and this is not about materially controlling but about materially influencing. Regarding Clause 8(8), I accept that there are definitions elsewhere of materially influencing the policy. However, I remain of the view that it is not possible below 15%, or indeed below 25%, to materially influence the policy as far as national security is concerned. Therefore, I very much hope that my noble friend the Minister has a chance to reflect on this specifically before Report.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I will take that as a comment and not as a question. I continue to look at all aspects of the Bill to see how they can be improved.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
The Minister referred to the meeting that he and the noble Baroness, Lady Bloomfield, very kindly held yesterday with the Wellcome Trust, and I very much welcome the reassurances that he has read into the record today. The shorthand for this is the nervousness in academia of bringing in assets—IP, information, ideas and software—rather than just entities. That was what we discussed at the meeting yesterday, and the Minister has now read into the record the reassurances he gave there, for which we thank him.
I thought that the suggestion—I was going to call it a wheeze—of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, was rather crafty: if that is what you mean, why do you not say it upfront? However, from what the Minister said, there seems to be a difference between the objective and the subjective criteria. I do not know whether that is why the Government want them in different clauses, but there is a problem with the subjectivity of this phrase. It is not simply, as the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, just said, about material influence rather than material control, but also the policy, and it is hard to define what that means. It seems to me a very subjective test for the big change made in Clause 6. I remain unconvinced that we have got it clear enough.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for explaining where the 15% figure, to which the Minister referred again, comes from. The CMA uses it when talking about mergers, but we are talking here about big companies, not small ones. However, because there is no threshold, much smaller companies will be covered by this. It may be absolutely important for the takeover of very large companies whether competition is taken out of the market. The Minister knows that, as a consumer champion, I am always very happy for the CMA to look at the impact on competition. However, I have my doubts whether a regime defined for competition in consumer goods and access should be lifted and shifted—the Minister said that there will not be separate guidance—into something that will sometimes affect small start-ups and new developments.
I certainly know more about the subject than I did 43 minutes ago, for which I thank all those who have spoken on the amendment. As has been said, I hope that the Minister and his draftspeople will look at whether this is clear enough, necessary and appropriate for the sorts of investments we are dealing with. When the Minister gives a bequest in a will as the reason for including a particular provision in the Bill, that feels like clutching at straws to me. I hope there are better arguments than that, but, for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Healy of Primrose Hill) (Lab)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 20.
Clause 7: Qualifying entities and assets
Amendment 20
Lord Leigh of Hurley
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, and the amendment to page 5, line 20 in the name of Lord Leigh of Hurley, seek to introduce value thresholds for qualifying entities and assets (subject to anti-avoidance provisions to prevent the circumvention of the Act), which would bring the NSI regime in line with other leading foreign investment regimes that have de minimis financial thresholds for notification.
Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)
My Lords, the Bill is probably more important than many people have realised. I suspect it is not by coincidence that, as I was pleasantly surprised to read in my Sunday papers—on the front page of the business news, no less—it has finally attracted attention from the business community. It has, to be honest, been a bit slow in picking up the significance and importance of this Bill. I am delighted that the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, will be speaking to this group of amendments, representing as he does the most important business representative body.
There are significant concerns. Amendment 20 would achieve consistency with other regimes which have de minimis thresholds for notification. A key concern is not to dampen innovation in the UK, where vast VC investment is essential to the growth of businesses, particularly in the tech sector, where we have been spectacularly successful. The cost of investment is high for people watching every penny in a start-up. These are the most mobile entrepreneurs, of course. People just graduating or completing a PhD can choose pretty much any country in the world to start their business. They often start their business knowing it will need a lot of capital to be attractive, and possibly hoping it will be sold to realise capital gain. So, impediments will be a deterrent, particularly for small businesses.
Equally, investors in small businesses want to be sure they can obtain a clean and simple exit. I know that tech businesses can go for astonishingly high valuations and revenue multiples, much to the horror of people like me and, I suspect, other noble Lords in this Committee, who were brought up to regard post-tax profits multiples of seven as perfectly respectable, and are astonished to see revenue multiples of seven on transactions. What we might regard as a small business can have a huge valuation. I hope the Minister finds an acceptable number for a de minimis threshold and, as a result, cuts out a lot of red tape for small businesses, which are looking for government to honour their commitment in these happy post-Brexit days to less red tape for business people—particularly from this Government. Introducing the value thresholds of £10 million in annual turnover in the UK for qualifying entities and £10 million gross value for qualifying assets, subject to anti-avoidance provisions, is a proportionate approach. But, obviously, we look to the Minister to suggest another number if he thinks that is appropriate.
Amendment 52A, which is also in my name, is extremely important. It introduces a fast-track process for transactions that clearly might not raise national security concerns, but which none the less need to be notified due to their targeted activities being in a specified sector. The Bill currently envisages that the ISU will reach an initial decision on whether to clear a notified transaction or call it in for a detailed assessment within 30 working days of accepting the notification as complete. A number of parties who contributed to the public consultation were worried that the ISU would not be able to manage even the modest expected flow of transactions. If a 30-day period is granted and then an extension, which it is within its power to do, one can easily see this becoming the norm. Frankly, this will be far too long. As Ministers know, most things in life, but transactions in particular, have a momentum, and imposing a delay of 30-plus working days could lead to huge uncertainty and worry. People will be aware that the transaction is taking place, and they will be worried about their jobs in case the transaction does not happen. Employers will be nervous, because they will know that this is the point at which their employees are most vulnerable to being poached or headhunted. This long freeze on activity could be a disaster, to the point where business owners become reluctant to take in investment for this very reason, which would be a great shame.
To minimise the deterrent effect of the new regime on foreign investment into the UK, this amendment would introduce a fast-track procedure for non-problematic transactions, enabling the acquirer to request a review period of 10 working days, instead of 30, combined with reduced information requirements for the notification. The use of a fast-track initial review procedure would not prevent the Secretary of State referring a transaction for an in-depth assessment, if considered necessary. The timetable for such subsequent review would not be affected.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, I am pleased to follow my noble friend Lord Leigh. I am sure he is being modest; I would think that tomorrow evening is all sold out. But I agree with him; nobody seems to know anything about the Bill, which is very surprising, given that we are approaching the point at which the trigger events will be in scope and have been for three months. Knowledge about the Bill is woefully deficient. This impels us to crack on, because we have to get this into law quickly, as the period when these trigger events have been taking place, when people do not realise that they are notifiable or that a call-in notice may be issued, is extending every day.
With that said, I will be quick. I forbear to comment on the other amendments and refer just to Amendment 25, which is in my name. It has the effect of adding
“(but are not limited to)”
to Clause 7(5) to find out why it is there. We have the statement under Clause 3, the purpose of which, among other things, is to set out what the qualifying assets are, so we know that. Clause 7(4)(c) tells us that qualifying assets include
“ideas, information or techniques which have industrial, commercial or other economic value”,
which is so broad as to be almost meaningless. It is all-encompassing. Then Clause 7(5) lists a lot of things, but I do not know whether it is exhaustive, as it says they are examples. What I want to know from the Minister is why we are including examples if the list is not exhaustive. If it is not an exhaustive list, why are we not saying
“(but are not limited to)”
to ensure that people realise that it is not an exhaustive list? That is often done in legislation and for good reasons. It is just a drafting practice.
Equally, however, why does this bit of the Bill not refer back to the statement under Clause 3? That would make life a lot simpler: qualifying assets are in these categories and, to see more, look to the statement. Frankly, we will not know until we finally see the statement produced—I know we have seen drafts—whether something is or is not a qualifying asset.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, on his amendments. I think he will cause quite a stir when he gives his annual lecture. I will speak first to Amendments 20 and 24. I refer to my interests in the register.
Amendments 20 and 24 take account of the fact that the Bill as drafted does not include any de minimis thresholds for qualifying entities and assets, in stark contrast to other leading foreign investment regimes. The point behind these amendments is to ensure that mandatory notification requirements involving businesses have a de minimis threshold. Not having one would be disproportionate, given the likely cost of making mandatory filings and the relatively low risk of any national security issue arising in the context of such transactions. It would also act as a significant disincentive to global investors and the start-up and early stage businesses that they fund, which may simply relocate to a jurisdiction that takes a more benign approach. As the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, said, this risks seriously dampening innovation in the UK, particularly in the continued development of the technology sector and start-ups, which rely heavily on venture capital investment.
Introducing value thresholds of £10 million annual turnover in the UK for qualifying entities and £10 million gross value for qualifying assets, subject to anti-avoidance provisions to prevent the circumvention of the Act, would ensure a much more proportionate approach. Value thresholds are also used in a number of other leading foreign investment regimes. For example, Australia and Canada use a tiered threshold system based on the identity of the investor and the nature of the business, and, in the case of Australia, the level of control acquired.
The noble Lord, Lord Leigh, also explained the other amendments that he and I put forward in this group, Amendments 52A, 55A, 64A and 67A, which would introduce another red tape busting proposal: a fast-track process for non-problematic transactions. The Bill currently envisages that the investment security unit will reach an initial decision as to whether to clear a notified transaction or to call it in for a detailed assessment within 30 working days of acceptance of the notification as complete. As the noble Lord explained, a significant number of transactions will fall within the scope of the mandatory notification requirements due to the target’s activities being in a specified sector—we have seen those in the document published last week—but which clearly do not raise national security concerns. To minimise the deterrent effect of the new regime on foreign investment into the UK, these amendments would introduce a fast-track procedure for such non-problematic transactions, enabling the acquirer to request a review period, as the noble Lord again explained, within a period of 10 workings days instead of 30, combined with reduced information requirements for the notification.
I have mentioned Australia and Canada; if the Minister would prefer it, I can refer in this case to a special accelerated procedure recently introduced in France for certain transactions. The use of a fast-track initial review procedure would not prevent the Secretary of State referring a transaction for in-depth assessment, as the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, cogently explained, if this was considered necessary and the timetable for such subsequent review would not be affected.
I very much hope that, as I said, these two red tape busting amendments will be very carefully considered by the Government. Otherwise, we seriously risk the Bill’s impact being disproportionate and having a chilling effect on investment.
Lord Bilimoria (CB) [V]
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 20 and 24 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Leigh. The CBI, of which I am president, supports the principle of the legislation in the Bill in protecting national security, which will always be top priority. However, the current drafting makes the practical application of the Bill difficult for business and could lead to additional burdens and complexity at a micro level and be an unintended deterrent to investment at a macro level.
With no set de minimis thresholds for transactions caught by the legislation, there is a risk that a high volume of notifications will inadvertently represent relatively low-risk activity caught by this maximalist approach from legal teams and counsel. On top of that is the extraterritorial nature of the provisions in the Bill. Many transactions involving target suppliers supplying goods and services outside the nation will be caught in the notification requirements. Given this backdrop of a maximalist approach, there is real concern in business that the Government’s capacity to process the projected number of notifications while the regulations are in their infancy will be a problem.
According to the CFIUS annual report, in the United States in 2019, 231 notices were filed for screening, with 113 resulting in investigation. The Government currently estimate, and I wonder whether the Minister can confirm, that there will be 1,800 annual notifications. However, there is concern that the true estimate could be up to 10,000. We should not have the unintended consequence, mentioned by the noble Lords, Lord Leigh and Lord Clement-Jones, of deterring foreign investment just when the UK needs to increase its attractiveness to it. We are just coming through the pandemic, we have had Brexit, and we are establishing ourselves as an independent trading nation—global Britain. We are the second or third largest recipient of inward investment in the world, and a magnet for it. We are a gateway to Europe when it comes to investment, and we need to continue to be so.
Amendments 20 and 24, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Leigh,
“seek to introduce value thresholds for qualifying entities and assets (subject to anti-avoidance provisions to prevent the circumvention of the Act), which would bring the NSI regime in line with other leading foreign investment regimes that have de minimis financial thresholds for notification.”
Such thresholds provide a critical floor to the regime, ensuring that higher-value, higher-interest transactions, entities and assets are predominantly in focus. Of course the Government should consider national security threats of all sizes. However, in order to provide officials with sufficient breathing space to make a success of the predicted number of notifications, which I spoke about earlier, this threshold should be applied.
Importantly, this amendment would concurrently bring the planned regime in line with other leading foreign investment regimes, as we have heard from other speakers. International comparisons and their consequential impact on the UK’s attractiveness as a location for inward investment should be a continual focus for government when implementing this regime.
Before I come to what the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, mentioned, I should say that the Bill represents a significant expansion of the UK’s FDI. Since the Enterprise Act intervention regime was introduced in 2002, nearly 20 years ago, there have been just 12 interventions on the basis of national security. It appears that this new regime will see a large increase in the government’s workload and, as the noble Lord said, a much stricter regime than those brought in by other countries, including the USA, Australia, Japan and many countries in Europe.
We must not jeopardise, at any cost, our attraction for inward investment. Of course, national security is important, but we have to be a magnet for inward investment and the Bill must not prevent that happening.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]
My Lords, I am delighted to follow the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, who spoke with such passion and, obviously, such knowledge.
I am delighted to support Amendments 20 and 24 and the later amendments in the names of my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I share the concern of my noble friend Lord Leigh that there appears to be little knowledge of this Bill in the wider business community, but I reassure noble Lords that the law societies of England and Scotland are well aware of this Bill and have raised a number of issues, including the ones we will come on to in Amendment 21 in the name of my noble friend Lord Hodgson.
The Bill as it currently stands leaves a number of loopholes and is loose in its drafting, so Amendments 20 and 24, in seeking to set a de minimis rule, are welcome indeed. They would assist the Government for the reasons the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, set out. I welcome the fact that my noble friend Lord Grimstone will respond to this group of amendments and I look forward to what he has to say, but the Government have set themselves a very difficult task. We wish to keep, and possibly increase, the level of foreign investment into this country. It was always one of our greatest achievements while members of the European Union that we attracted more foreign investment than any other EU country. There was a lot of envy of us because of that, because we were, dare I say, a light-touch regime, but there was a regulation in place and it worked effectively.
The noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, touched on the sensitive issue of the level of referrals or own-initiative investigations which the Government, under the Bill as it currently stands, might bring upon themselves. I wish the department well in that regard. Surely it must be of interest to rule out some that, due to the level of investment, do not attract sufficient concern. If the Government are seeking to maintain a balance, which they have successfully kept to date, between encouraging a high level of foreign inward investment and meeting the national security concerns as set out in the Bill, the terms of Amendments 20 and 24, in particular setting the level of investment as an annual turnover of less than £10 million in particular, would not jeopardise national security concerns.
I also support the later amendments in this group in the names of my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley, which seek to set out an accelerated procedure. It cannot be in the Government’s interest to jeopardise what would be a legitimate investment if the procedure was fairly straightforward and could not be met under the terms set out in those amendments. These two sets of amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley would improve the Bill, maintain a flow of foreign inward investment and not unnecessarily jeopardise our national security. I support them, and I look forward to hearing what my noble friend Lord Grimstone says in summing up.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I strongly support the amendments in this group, which seek to set up a fast-track process. Anything that can make the processes more friendly to help non-problematic business transactions is welcome. I am very worried about the impact that this Bill, which I support in principle, will have on the UK’s reputation as a good place to invest, and I echo what other noble Lords have already said today. That is why we have to work to make the operation of the Bill as painless as possible for transactions that fundamentally do not raise concerns.
I am less sure about the other amendments in this group. I understand the desire to protect SMEs and start-ups from the full force of the Bill. I do not believe that national security risks can be sized by reference to a point in time, monetary value of current assets or turnover of a business. So I do not support Amendments 20 and 24 in the name of my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley.
Similarly, I am not convinced about restricting qualifying assets outside the UK to those in connection with activities carried out in the UK, as envisaged by my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts in Amendment 26. I do see a need to be able to focus on supply chains as well as on activities carried out in the UK, and I would not want to deprive the Government of the ability to do that if genuine national security issues arose.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, is correct to say that the Bill is far more important than the outside world seems to realise. When I have been speaking externally, I have been trying to remind people of the Bill’s existence and the need for them to read it. Perhaps we should adopt the policy of the Ancient Mariner and stop in one in three in the street and tell them about it because it does not seem that the message is getting through. Perhaps we will just have to work on their behalf.
A strong case has been made by the proponents of Amendments 20 and 24. When the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, speaks on a number of different issues, he often talks about flexibility and keeping options open. This seems another example of where the Government are seeking to keep their options open and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, set out, there might or might not be good reason for that. When I sat on your Lordships’ Science and Technology Committee, it held an inquiry into the challenge of scale-up and the need for patient capital and for money to come in. It is very clear that the United Kingdom has a way to travel in getting the sort of funding that we are talking about for these scale-up situations. I am interested to hear from the Minister what sensitivity studies have been done on this. How much work has been done in talking to the investment and venture capital community about how it views it? Perhaps the Minister could write to us with the evidence has been received about its reception and the Government’s impression of it. I am persuaded that there is an issue. The question is how big an issue it is, given that we have a suboptimal venture capital regime in this country for this sort of scale-up. How badly and to what extent would damage be wrought?
I read Amendment 25 differently from the noble Lord, Lord Lansley. I read the words “examples include” to mean that that is not exclusive and I think the noble Lord has what he wants without having to put the words in. Perhaps the Minister can clarify that.
I find myself in complete agreement with Amendments 52A, 55A, 64A and 67A. If these transactions are not supposed to be impacted by this, let us get them out of the system as quickly as possible. The doctrine expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, about the workability of the regime, the amount of friction it introduces and our responsibility to remove that friction wherever possible is completely correct, so those four amendments deserve noble Lords’ complete support.
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
I thank the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Bilimoria, for the opening amendments in this group, which give rise to various considerations. We recognise the caveat in Amendments 20 and 24 to mitigate the impact of hostile actors going to complex lengths to hide their interests in a qualifying asset or entity. It is also understandable to set de minimis thresholds. Having the powers in the definition still requires a thought process to initiate using them. There have been several instances in which hostile actors have behaved entirely transparently that have not been identified and prevented. Indeed, mitigating actions may have been rejected even by the Government.
One needs only to recall the debate over the growing dependency of many nations on China and the resultant rejection of identifying potential harm that could result. It could be raised here regarding dependency on research skills and partnerships in the technology fields, with security implications. Indeed, the Government’s assessment of risk can be mysterious. In relation to the Bill, perhaps what we need to see are the ways in which the Government will actively identify evolving and growing risks, whether or not they hide behind complex organisations or a complex process of additionality. Has the Minister considered this and when a risk may change its colours?
To the proponents of the £10 million threshold in the amendments, is there some logic or any evidence that this is indeed the correct level, other than that other jurisdictions may have chosen it? The valuation of some of these types of asset is hard to quantify and the value of a database code or algorithm will be considered much greater once in the hands of a hostile intent. The intention not to overburden SMEs with the bureaucracy of this regime is worthy and commendable, but may not be easily carried out. How many SMEs would be excluded as a consequence and would it also benefit the department not to have to devote resources to excessive screenings of transactions?
Amendments 52A, 55A, 64A and 67A, also thoughtfully proposed by the noble Lords, Lord Leigh and Lord Clement-Jones, are for the fast-track procedure for notifications. Has such a procedure been considered by the Government? It has yet to be identified how the regime proposed by the Bill will deal with so-called everyday transactions in the business community and the amount of resources that will need to be committed to so-called evidently non-controversial activity. Would this allow the possibility of experience gained through the Bill to mature into a more workable format?
In the drafting of the procedure, care would need to be taken regarding the person being given the ability to give the relevant notice. In one interpretation it could be the company initiating such a request, not only the person acting on behalf of the Secretary of State. That would result in everyone requesting a fast-track procedure. The Minister’s remarks will be interesting in this respect. Overall, it would be perhaps best to ensure that the regime is set up in the first instance in the Bill to be properly resourced and to have properly identified targets for all its notifications.
The Minister of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Department for International Trade (Lord Grimstone of Boscobel) (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley for his Amendments 20 and 24, my noble friend Lord Lansley for his Amendment 25, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for his Amendment 26 and my noble friend Lord Leigh and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for their package of Amendments 52A, 55A, 64A and 67A. I will take them sequentially.
I completely agree with my noble friend Lord Leigh and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that we must be careful to do nothing that diminishes the entrepreneurial or innovative spirit in our country or to diminish the attractiveness of this country for investment. You might imagine that, as the UK’s Minister for Investment, I am especially concerned about the latter point. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, I have spoken to many investors and VCs and, once the rationale and the processes of the Bill are explained to people, I have been very reassured by the reception that the Bill has had. The key point one has to explain is that the investment screening unit will be a rational unit that will seek to minimise time spent and maximise efficiency wherever it can.
With the permission of my noble friend Lord Leigh, I will address his Amendments 20 and 24 together, given that both relate to introducing de minimis thresholds into the regime. Clause 7 defines the meaning of “qualifying entity” and “qualifying asset” for the purposes of the Bill. These definitions underpin reasonable and proportionate powers for the Secretary of State to scrutinise acquisitions of control of qualifying entities and assets where that raises national security risks.
Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)
I thank the Minister and all noble Lords who contributed to this group. We did not quite get unanimity, but we got close to it from those who spoke. The second-biggest accolade of my life has to be the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, calling my arguments “cogent”, so I am grateful to him for that.
It is noticeable that the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria—I know that he speaks on behalf of himself—spoke as president of the CBI. It is regarded by some as the advocate for large businesses, but he recognises that small businesses may struggle with this Bill. Although I take the point of my noble friend Lady Noakes that a very small business could be subject to a national security risk, I have to say to the Minister that there must be some level below which this Bill should not apply. He suggested that the Government start with £1 million as a stopgap, but I started with £10 million. What do you say?
I also take his points that revenue and gross asset definitions are difficult sometimes, but there are other ways—for example, just looking at the amount invested in a project or business. If it is less than £0.5 million, would we really think that there is a national security risk from someone taking a 15% stake? Perhaps we could have another look at that.
I thank the Minister again for his comments on the working days needed. I am sure that he is sincere in his view that this will be a deadline but we have seen circumstances where the deadline becomes the norm, and 30 working days with a possible extension of another 40 is a long time. The takeover panel gives rulings within an hour. I would have thought that the Secretary of State might allow himself to be stretched to having the option of allowing a reply within 10 working days in certain circumstances where it is apparent that an urgent matter needs to be resolved for all sorts of extremely important reasons, as we discussed earlier. It could be an opportunity for the Secretary of State to agree to a sticker of 10 working days, as it were, going on a particular case because of a threat to employment, a threat to a business’s viability or certain other criteria.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)
My Lords, we now come to the group beginning with Amendment 21.
Amendment 21
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that only those entities that carry on activities in the UK are qualifying entities.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con) [V]
My Lords, in moving Amendment 21 I will speak also to Amendments 27 and 32.
The first two of those amendments would amend Clause 7, which is entitled “Qualifying entities and assets”. Amendment 32 is a consequential amendment to Clause 9. As has been the case with all the amendments I have tabled, they are designed to give greater clarity to the detail of the proposed regime and maintain the delicate balance between national security and investor rights, which we have all talked about at some length.
I add to noble Lords’ views that the level of knowledge about the provisions of this Bill is pretty low. Last week, I was in the north of England at a conference involving a number of senior professional firms. I do not think that they had hoisted in the reduction in thresholds. They still thought that it was a regime that would apply primarily to large companies. When I raised the point made by my noble friend Lord Lansley—that the regime began to come into force on 12 November last year—they looked fairly astonished.
Turning to the amendments, as before, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for his support and to the Law Society for its help in drafting them. First, I will speak to Amendment 21. Under Clause 7(3), an overseas entity is a qualifying entity if, among other things, it
“carries on activities in the United Kingdom”.
It would be useful if we could have some guidance on the meaning of “qualifying entity” under the provisions of this Bill. There is a useful definition in the Bribery Act; it may be possible to bring that across to give clarity to this Bill as well.
Clause 7(3)(b) also provides that an overseas entity that supplies goods or services to persons in the United Kingdom would be a qualifying entity. Other major jurisdictions do not apply their national security laws to investments in foreign entities. The argument is that the Bill should only treat overseas entities that carry on activities in the United Kingdom as qualifying entities, rather than include entities that simply export to the United Kingdom. To achieve this, Clause 7(3)(b) should be removed.
Amendments 27 and 32 would replace Clause 7(6)(a) and (b) with new wording. The background to this is as follows. Clause 7(4)(c) and Clause 7(6)(b) together provide that non-tangible assets, such as ideas, information or techniques, are qualifying assets if used in connection with the supply of goods or services to persons in the United Kingdom. This provision could inadvertently cover UK businesses that buy, procure or use technological products or services supplied by third-party providers. Under this scenario, a UK company that buys in foreign artificial intelligence technology to help to deliver its business objectives could be covered, as could a UK company that uses foreign computer software in, for example, building and maintaining a database.
The situation I just described could be further complicated if a UK business plans to purchase another UK company covered by that scenario. Although it is a UK to UK transaction, under the nexus set out in Clause 7 these types of deals will be covered and caught under the new regime. Solicitors will have a duty to flag that up as a risk when advising corporate clients, which means that many more companies are likely to seek a voluntary judgment from the Secretary of State for reasons of certainty. This is likely to significantly increase the number of applications for a judgment made to the Secretary of State, and so is likely to slow down business. On the other hand, if a deal goes ahead and the ruling is made after it is completed, it could have significant consequences for the organisations in cost and outcomes.
This possible application of the regime to acquisitions by domestic acquirers is unusual compared to other jurisdictions where Governments have taken national security powers. Concerns relating to national security and domestic investments are likely to be able to be dealt with much more expeditiously under existing regulations—for example, confiscation proceedings under the Proceeds of Crime Act or the director disqualification regime. Amendments 27 and 32 would give effect to this simplification. I beg to move.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I start with an apology to the Minister. Amendment 26 in the previous group was a rogue and should have been deleted, because Amendment 27, introduced so well by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, superseded it. The PBO produced a much better format, so Amendment 26 was left like an orphan in a previous group, but it has been extremely helpful in getting a foretaste of the Minister’s arguments in this group, so I apologise to him, but there is nothing like hearing a good argument twice, and no doubt we will be all that wiser for it.
As the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, has introduced the amendments so well, he has made it clear that they are intended to do two things: to ensure that qualifying assets are only assets used in connection with activities carried on in the UK, but not the supply of goods or services to persons in the UK; and, secondly, to prevent “in connection with” being interpreted in a way that treats all assets within the relevant supply chain as being within scope, even if owned and controlled by unconnected third parties, which may have no visibility of the activities of businesses further down the supply chain.
As drafted, the territorial scope of the Government’s call-in power is extremely broad, extending to non-UK entities that supply goods or services to persons in the UK, and assets situated outside the UK that are used in connection with activities carried on in the UK or the supply of goods or services to persons in the UK. This extraterritorial application is out of line with the approach taken in most other foreign investment regimes, which focus only on acquisitions of corporate entities registered in the relevant jurisdiction. It is also unnecessary. There are a number of other more appropriate ways to protect against a threat to the UK’s national security in connection with a transaction involving a non-UK registered company or assets that are not located in the UK, such as export/import controls, the network and information systems regime for critical infrastructure and other licensing requirements relating specifically to national security. From a practical perspective, it may also be difficult in many cases for an acquirer to analyse fully all aspects of the supply chain in order to self-assess the risk of a particular transaction being called in for review.
Furthermore, referring to supplies of goods or services captures all aspects of the supply chain, however minor. It is difficult for an acquirer of a business fully to analyse the supply chain, and including this as part of a mandatory regime with criminal sanctions is disproportionate. The proposed requirement for control by the person exercising the relevant activities is necessary to prevent “in connection with” being interpreted in a way that treats all assets in the relevant supply chain as being in scope, even if owned and controlled by unconnected third parties that may have no visibility of the activities of businesses further down the supply chain.
There are other more appropriate ways to protect against a threat to the UK’s national security in connection with a transaction involving a non-UK registered company or assets that are not located in the UK. As I said, most other foreign investment regimes have managed to crack that issue. I very much hope that the Government will think again.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]
My Lords, I am delighted to support this small group of amendments. I will speak in particular to Amendment 21 for the reasons my noble friend Lord Hodgson so eloquently and effectively set out.
I am very well aware of the concerns raised by the Law Society of England, as set out by my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Clement Jones, as to the extraterritorial aspects of the application of Clause 7(3) as drafted. It raises a number of practical problems as to how it will be applied. In the view of the Law Society of England, it is potentially inappropriate in its wording.
I am grateful to my noble friend for stepping up to the plate and tabling these amendments. I hope that my noble friend the Minister will look favourably on them, the reason being that, in the definition of qualifying entities and assets currently given under Clause 7(3), an overseas entity is a qualifying entity if, among other things, it “carries on activities” in the UK. The Law Society would very much like to see further guidance on the meaning of this term, as is the case under the Bribery Act and the Modern Slavery Act. It begs the question as to why the Government have not felt able or willing to bring forward such a definition as part of the Bill. My noble friend must understand that it will be up to the practitioners to apply this wording. The courts could have to interpret it as well.
Clause 7(3)(b) also provides that an overseas entity that
“supplies goods or services to persons in the United Kingdom”
would be a qualifying entity. For reasons of international comity, other major jurisdictions do not apply their national security laws to investments in foreign entities. In accordance with this, I support the Law Society’s conclusion that the Bill should treat only overseas entities that carry on activities in the UK as qualifying entities, rather than including entities that simply export to the UK.
In my view, Clause 7(3)(b) should be removed entirely or the wording proposed by my noble friend Lord Hodgson, which I prefer, adopted. I find the Bill unacceptable as it currently stands. I hope my noble friend the Minister will understand that we are not the ones who will have to apply this. Practitioners have raised these concerns with us for very legitimate reasons.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, cleared up the position of Amendment 26 in the previous group, because I struggled, when I came to this group, to work out what else there was to say. I put my name down anyway to see what would emerge from previous speakers.
I said on the previous group that I had concerns about confining the Government’s powers to exclude those outside the UK that provide goods or services to the UK, because I believe that the Government should have as wide a definition as possible. I absolutely believe in making the processes of the Bill move as smoothly as possible and I do not want to add to what I believe will be the big burden of voluntary notifications. But, when it comes to defining where the Government could act, we need to be broad in our approach. If there is one such potential acquisition only, I would still say that it is worth having the power to go there, because these are serious issues about the national security of our land.
Lord Fox (LD)
This follows on quite well. Throughout this debate and lots of debates about Bills, we hear your Lordships use the phrase “unintended consequences”. Actually, giving the department credit, I assume that this is an intended rather than an unintended consequence, so I would like the Minister to explain exactly what it is seeking to achieve or prevent happening. What past examples would have been arrested, had this law been available then? Being a practical person, that would help me and others to understand what the Government are getting at.
This clearly does not have extraterritorial reach, as my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones said. It seeks to deal with all activities when it might be better to separate and segment them. I take the point of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes; it would help us if we understood what the Government are getting at with this wording.
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, for his three amendments in this group and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for adding his name to the first, Amendment 21. He has an alternative to Amendment 27, Amendment 26, which was in the previous group, but both amend activities in general, so that they are more specifically attached to the person controlling those activities. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has recognised his amendment as “rogue”.
The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, queries the extension of Clause 7(3)(b) to suppliers of
“goods or services to persons in the United Kingdom”,
and asks for an explanation. Have there been previous incidents and what specific goods or services were involved, with what implications?
Clause 7(6) specifies land as well as “moveable property” and, in relation to Amendment 27 of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, gives rise to my reflections on the question of land and its use. While clearly an asset, the distinction is not made between the Bill’s application to ownership of land, in the sense of control, and any lease of its use, whereby a person other than the owner could be said to be in control. The Bill merely has the words “used in connection” to activities. Is this distinction relevant and what proof would be needed to clarify which person is in control of land?
One of the key sentences in the Government’s Statement of Policy Intent is in the section on acquirers:
“Clearly, national security risks are most likely to arise when acquirers are hostile to the UK’s national security, or when they owe allegiance to hostile states or organisations.”
Land, and the use of it in such a context, is made relevant as a qualifying asset. Yes, an operation needs to operate somewhere and will require land. Does this require any further reflection with regard to the workings of the regime? Can land in a particular country be considered a particular threat?
Amendment 32, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, to Clause 9, regarding control of assets, returns us to Clause 7(6). The Minister may wish merely to identify the strategic risk attaching to land in particular locations only.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
My Lords, I welcome these amendments from my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, which concern the extraterritorial application of the call-in power. Amendment 21 seeks to ensure that where an entity is formed or recognised under the law of a country or territory outside the UK, it will be a qualifying entity only if it carries on activities in the UK but not where it supplies goods or services to persons in the UK, as the clause currently provides.
I am afraid that I was slightly unclear on the precise intent of Amendments 27 and 32 so, for the benefit of the Committee, I am interpreting them as seeking to remove the provision currently in Clause 7(6)(b): that an asset situated outside the UK or the territorial sea is a qualifying asset if it is used in connection with the supply of goods or services to persons in the UK. This would mean that an asset situated outside the UK or the territorial sea is a qualifying asset only if it is used in connection with certain activities carried on in the UK.
It is important that entities formed or recognised outside the UK which provide goods or services to persons in the UK are captured through the Bill as their acquisition may give rise to national security risks to the UK. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, asked for some examples, and I am happy to provide them. For example, a foreign-registered company that does not carry on activities in the UK may still provide essential goods or services to parts of our critical national infrastructure. If a hostile party were to acquire control over that supplier, it could use that control to degrade our infrastructure. To take another example, imagine an overseas supplier of machinery or compounds to a UK-based entity producing cutting-edge advanced materials for our military. Control over that supplier could provide a hostile party with an insight into certain military capabilities or a means to sabotage the work of the UK entity to harm our military. As my noble friend Lady Noakes recognised, this could have a severe effect on national security.
Similarly, it is important that land and moveable property assets situated outside the UK or the territorial sea and intellectual property assets used in connection with the supply of goods or services to persons in the UK are also captured as their acquisition can give rise to national security risks to the UK. For example, as I have said previously, the acquisition of a wind farm situated outside the UK and its territorial sea that provides critical energy supplies to UK industry and consumers may give rise to national security risks, even though it is not strictly used in connection with activities in the UK. If the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would like to hear this example a third time, he only has to lay a further amendment.
Of course, any extraterritorial use of the powers under this Bill should be proportionate as well as meeting the other tests in the Bill. That is why the Bill explicitly sets out a UK nexus requirement that means that the Secretary of State may intervene to assess an acquisition overseas only where it has a clear connection to the UK. Remedies may be imposed at the end of an assessment only if the Secretary of State reasonably considers that they are necessary and proportionate for the purpose of safeguarding the UK’s national security. As such, the extent of an acquisition’s connection to the UK will be a clear factor in that decision.
The Bill also explicitly limits the application of remedies to persons outside the UK to those who have a clear connection to the UK—for example, UK nationals or companies, or those who carry on business in the UK.
I am conscious that I may not have answered fully the questions from the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester. If I reflect, after looking at Hansard, that I have not, I may write to him. I understand, taking these amendments as a group, the desire to probe the Government in this area, but I hope that, with this explanation, my noble friend will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)
I have received one request to speak after the Minister from the noble Lord, Lord Fox.
Lord Fox (LD)
I am probably being extremely stupid here, so please forgive me. In the first example of a foreign business supplying a critical operation in this country, I understand that that would be a problem were it taken over by a hostile nation. Let us imagine that a Belgian company, or perhaps a Canadian one, is being taken over by a company or a regime that we consider hostile. What is the Secretary of State’s next move in stopping it happening? I do not understand what the Secretary of State’s remit is over that Belgian or Canadian company, other than to suggest to the recipient of the supplies in this country that they have to change their supplier.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for that question. I assure him that it is not stupid. I think the answer is in what I said towards the end of my speech. The Bill explicitly limits the application of remedies to persons outside the UK to those who have a clear connection with the UK, for example, UK nationals or companies, or those who carry on business in the UK. That provides the nexus back to the UK, which I think the noble Lord was searching for.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con) [V]
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have participated in this debate. I was extremely relieved to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that Amendment 26 was a rogue amendment. He and I had both put our names to it originally and I withdrew mine. When I found that he had left his there, I thought he had seen some angle and I was going to be blown apart and take a torpedo amidships. I am grateful to hear that it was a rogue amendment.
I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for the examples. I am still reaching for the implications of the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Fox. I am not yet convinced that the qualifying entity idea has been probed enough, given that it has proved effective in the Bribery Act and has a similar purpose there. I will read what he has to say, think about it and maybe bring this back for a further discussion. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 22.
Amendment 22
Lord Vaizey of Didcot
Lord Vaizey of Didcot (Con) [V]
My Lords, I am delighted that it will be my noble friend Lady Bloomfield answering for the Government on this occasion. Almost every amendment that I have put forward has had a substitute Minister step in and I am flattered that every member of the team wants to have a go at one of my amendments. I will be as brief as possible because it is important that we make as much progress as possible on the Bill. I hope that all the noble Lords and Baronesses who are no doubt lined up to rubbish my amendment will do so as briefly as possible.
Amendment 22 is about land. The Government have stated they expect to use their call-in powers in relation to acquisitions of land only where the land is being acquired proximate to a “sensitive site.” However, there is currently no definition of what is meant by “proximate”—near—in this context, and the location of sensitive sites will not necessarily be public. Given that the onus will be on acquirers to assess the risk of an acquisition of land being called in for review, the Bill should expressly specify that land will be regarded as a qualifying asset only if it is located within one mile of a sensitive site. No doubt we can debate that distance as we progress.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, I am pleased to have the chance to speak briefly to Amendment 38. This group is linked, in so far as we are all addressing issues relating to limitations on the interpretation of the “qualifying asset” in Clause 7. Amendment 38 in my name is particularly directed towards the issue of such assets in Clause 7(4)(c)—ideas and related intangible assets—where they are licensed. In particular, Amendment 38 seeks to regard such assets, which are licensed on a non-permanent basis, and where ownership of the asset is not transferred to somebody else in any permanent or substantive form, as not being controlled. This relates to the set of exceptions in Clause 11, which sets out those circumstances in which assets are not to be regarded as controlled.
We need to do that because Clause 9, “Control of assets”, is very widely drawn—deliberately, I am sure, and probably rightly so. It says that control of a qualifying asset can result in the person being able to use the asset. Of course, if an asset is licensed to somebody for their use, they could be said to be controlling it. But anybody licensing it to them will be doing so with restrictions and provisions. To that extent, they are not controlling it; the person who has licensed it to them is controlling it. So we have an issue not only of definitions but of scope.
The definition of control should not extend to where somebody had something licensed with restrictions imposed upon it. The definition of using the assets is probably, in that sense, too wide to be applied in this case to those kinds of innovative assets. To whom is this important? It is very important to those whose job it is to bring forward innovation and to license their intellectual property, and to do so in circumstances where they continue to control its use and exploitation. We do not want the routine use and exploitation of assets or intellectual property to be seriously impeded every time it is licensed or for this to be regarded as potentially the control of a qualifying asset and hence notifiable. Amendment 38 gives us an opportunity to set proper limitations on the use of licensing for assets on a temporary basis.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, my reason for speaking in this group relates to licences. I generally support the thrust of Amendment 23, if there can be appropriate definitions, but I was not quite sure whether I agreed with Amendment 38. I disagreed with the explanatory statement of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, because whether or not the licenser maintains control depends on quite a lot of things.
An IP licenser may be able to impose conditions when a licence is first granted, but what happens after that and how much control there is over future events is up to whatever is agreed in the licence. If the price and conditions are right, it could be a fully assignable licence; it could be assignable with or without consent of the IP owner; it could be exclusive, so that the IP owner no longer has any rights to use it themselves or to license others; or it could be a sole licence that also effectively restricts supply under the IP. A licence can therefore be for something that is relevant to national security and have both ownership and security of supply implications.
In paragraph (c) of Amendment 38—the substantive economic ownership point—I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, is trying to exclude the exclusive licences that are assignable because, as he would say, economic control had been obtained. I am not sure whether that is the right way to define it, but I understand the sense of what he is trying to do. However, I wonder whether that also captures what could be restriction of supply issues. Those can also happen through licences that would not necessarily mean economic control.
The whole matter of licences is quite interesting, but they can be unique—I used to do them for a living, so I should know. We therefore have to be careful about clarifying, perhaps in a more substantive way, the things that one wants to exclude from review. I think it is necessary to exclude some, because I am absolutely certain that you would get an even bigger deluge if you did not. It may be that things that count as ordinary licences, where there are many licensees—rather like in the other amendment—and no security of supply issues, can be treated the same as any product for sale. However, wherever there is a sole or exclusive licence in particular, it would be necessary just to have a look to make sure there was nothing that you might want to do something about. There could quite possibly be something if it was in a relevant technology area. However, the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, has drawn an interesting point to our attention.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, as has been mentioned, the amendments in this group have a common factor very much along the lines of what the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, said: that it is really important to look at the nature of qualifying entities and assets under Clause 7 with a keen eye. I think that the debate will continue beyond Committee.
One has to make choices here where one thinks it is appropriate to go for a change. I would give this a score of one out of three. I put my name to Amendment 23 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, because the argument there is very straightforward. As he said, it is about “business as usual” procurement and the purchasing of things such as software licences and standard equipment, so that, even if it might technically be caught by the sectors, it is not captured in the definition of a qualifying asset. This is so that, again, we do not have a vast quantity of referral requirements for what are essentially day-to-day transactions, which could be a massive burden on business. The noble Lord made the argument extremely well there.
I am much more nervous about the proposition of taking land out of this, particularly when it comes to reversing the requirement: that is, you publish the sensitive sites and then say whether the transaction is caught because it is next door to that site. The way in which the qualifying entities and assets clause is currently set out, with sensitive sites not being published, is probably a rather safer way of dealing with national security, but that is a purely personal view. I hope that we keep things that way round.
It was a great pleasure to hear what my noble friend Lady Bowles had to say about the third proposition, given her experience and expertise in the whole area of intellectual property. That was exactly my reaction: that licences are animals that can vary in many different ways. As she said, they can be exclusive or non-exclusive, long-term or short-term. I agree that they are not as easy to define as an asset transfer, such as an assignment of copyright or other forms of intellectual property. Nevertheless, in substance, they can mean the transfer for quite a period of time—indeed, the wholesale transfer of knowhow—just as much as an assignment can. One therefore needs to be somewhat wary.
Then you start getting into paragraph (c), as proposed by Amendment 38, which says that
“substantive economic ownership of the asset has not been transferred”.
That is virtually impossible to define for this particular purpose. I am wholly sympathetic to the idea of screening and filtering in a way that cuts back red tape, but at the same time one must recognise that intellectual property is one of the most sensitive aspects that needs to be caught by this Bill. That is the future. Intangible assets are the real Crown jewels of national economies. We must be very careful about that.
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
The amendments in this group split into two: Amendments 22 and 28, and Amendments 23 and 38. Amendments 22 and 28, drawn to our attention by the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, continue reflections on the term “land” through consideration not only of any strategic placement in its own right but in relation to proximity to a sensitive site, as provided for under the US security regime. Here in the UK, Amendment 28 has it as
“any site identified as such by the Secretary of State and published”.
What that proximity is and whether it might need to be adjacent are further considerations.
Amendment 23 seeks to ensure that a disproportionate burden is not placed on businesses generally, although I am not sure whether the drafting of the amendment—
“which are not generally and widely available on the commercial market”—
is quite right. More normal “business as usual” procurement, such as the purchasing of software licences and standard network equipment, does not need to be captured in the definition of a qualifying asset. Procurement is not mentioned in the impact assessment. Certainly there needs to be a balance between protecting procurement contracts and not overburdening “business as usual” procurement. How many notifications does the Minister expect to see arising from procurement, however it may be interpreted?
The data infrastructure section of the consultation document and the Government’s report published last week state that one option for mitigating risk includes producing procurement guidance for data infrastructure operators. Will the Government publish this before Report? Does the Committee need to ask what procurement guidance for other sectors needs to be included, most notably defence?
Amendment 38, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, seeks to carve out from the regime
“Intellectual Property (IP) licences that do not transfer ownership of the asset to the licensee … as the licensor can impose restrictions on the use of the IP.”
It identifies that clarity is needed on how hostile actors may seek to circumvent the provisions of the Bill to acquire important IP or influence the company’s assets that they seek to acquire. This is a difficult area of increasing sophistication. In the Commons deliberations, Charles Parton of the Royal United Services Institute—RUSI—commented:
“On the question of intellectual property rights, China has a very rigorous campaign to get hold of our IP.”
David Petrie from the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales remarked:
“It is possible to gain access to intellectual property through means other than ownership, so … that is something that the unit is going to have to assess on a case-by-case basis.”—[Official Report, Commons, National Security and Investment Bill Committee, 24/11/20; cols. 12-55.]
I listened carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, but it is not clear how permanent transfers might be defined so as to be workable and worth while, as explained by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles.
Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist (Con)
I thank my noble friends Lord Lansley and Lord Vaizey, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for these amendments. They seek to clarify and reduce the scope of the regime in relation to asset acquisitions. The Government expect that the majority of trigger events of national security interest will be traditional mergers and acquisitions, but the Secretary of State must also be able to intervene in the rare circumstances where acquisitions of individual assets, rather than entities, may raise national security risks. The Bill as drafted provides that land, tangible moveable property and intellectual property fall within scope of the regime as qualifying assets; this has a degree of extraterritorial application.
Amendments 22 and 28 seek to restrict the inclusion of land as a qualifying asset only to land located within one mile of a sensitive site, and to require the Government to create an online checking service to identify land that is regarded as sensitive. Amendment 23 seeks to exclude “business as usual” procurement, such as the purchasing of software licences or standard network equipment, from the definition of a qualifying asset. Amendment 38 aims to ensure that intellectual property licences that do not permanently transfer ownership of the IP to the licensee are not treated as an acquisition of control over that IP.
I will first turn to Amendments 22 and 28. In limited cases, the acquisition of land can give rise to national security concerns, in particular, but not limited to, proximity risks. The UK Government do not publish the location of the sites in the UK that they consider sensitive from a national security perspective. To do so would give rise to risks to national security: it would serve as a directory for hostile actors who wish to acquire land proximate to sensitive sites, as well as actors who wish to harm us in other ways. Acquisitions of land and other assets that do not pose a national security risk can be pursued with no expectation of being called in. Parties who are unsure or believe that the land in question may be proximate to a site where the Secretary of State is likely to have concerns can voluntarily notify and receive clearance if no national security risks arise.
Risks to national security can also arise from acquisitions of control over land more than one mile from a sensitive site. Indeed, the US regime under the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, to which my noble friend referred and to which the amendment alludes, includes a limit of more than one mile for some sites. For example, if we are concerned about a hostile party having a good line of sight to a sensitive site, a plot of land sitting atop a hill more than a mile away might still present an excellent view and the associated security risks. Although most land-based risks are expected to relate to proximity to sensitive sites, not all will. In particular, the Secretary of State will be entitled to take into account the intended use of the land, which may be divorced from any proximity concerns.
I will now turn to Amendment 23. Noble Lords are right to argue that, in most cases, there is unlikely to be a risk to national security from the acquisition of control over intellectual property that is generally and widely available on the commercial market, but such a scenario cannot be ruled out. As set out in the draft statement provided for in Clause 3, which was published alongside the Bill, the Secretary of State expects to intervene only very rarely in acquisitions of any assets. The draft statement lists intellectual property in relation to which the Secretary of State expects acquisitions to be more likely to give rise to national security risks, although this does not include intellectual property that is easily available.
Turning to the detail of the amendment, there is no generally recognised definition of an asset being
“generally and widely available on the commercial market”.
For example, it does not specify where or to whom the asset should be available. It may be that certain intellectual property is in general widely available but is not generally or widely available to certain parties. We may wish to ensure that those parties continue to struggle to access that intellectual property.
I now turn to Amendment 38. As currently drafted, an acquisition of control over intellectual property does not require the acquirer to gain ownership of that IP. This is because acquisitions of control over intellectual property, where the asset is being licensed on a non-permanent basis, can still give rise to national security concerns. Such an exemption could allow hostile parties to use licensing arrangements to avoid the regime, for example by leasing intellectual property for an arbitrarily long period of time rather than buying it.
Temporary access to sensitive intellectual property may, for example, also allow a hostile party to copy and transfer abroad parts of it. Of course, the licensor may have some level of control over the use of its intellectual property, and any assessment of a possible risk to national security would take this into account. However, in the same way that there is no guarantee that a party selling sensitive intellectual property would ensure that the sale does not give rise to national security risks, there is also no guarantee that a party licensing intellectual property would do so.
By way of conclusion, I appreciate that these amendments are motivated by a desire to limit how assets are covered by the regime without adversely affecting the Secretary of State’s ability to protect national security. They would effectively limit the scope, but they would also inadvertently expose our national security to additional risk, which I have confidence is not the aim of my noble friend. In answer to the question posed by the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, about how many notifications we expect to arise from procurements, the number is expected to be very low, and we will indeed publish guidance on those procurements.
For these reasons, I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)
I have received requests to speak after the Minister from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I will call the noble Baroness first.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
I have one comment and one question. My comment is that I understand everything the Minister said and I broadly agree, but I think the Government underestimate the amount of licensing they might find has to be reported, because licensing is the new sale. That is the way everything is going: there is no outright purchase of anything any more; everything is licensed, whether the programmes you use on your computer or anything else. Indeed, accounting standards even drive towards that kind of model because in some instances it becomes increasingly difficult to fit true sales into the new IFRS. I cite IFRS 15 as an example.
I meant to ask my question, but I spoke a bit too spontaneously to remember it. I am interested in follow-on activities. If, for example, you have a clearance on an investment into, say, some university research but that also encompasses a right to have a licence, would that licence to the same organisation automatically be cleared if the investment has been cleared or would you have to go round the loop again? You could apply the same to any assignment of a licence: if it is assigned to an essentially similar kind of business and a previous notification has not resulted in a clearing, can you be confident that you do not have to notify again on the basis of such a previous clearance?
Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist (Con)
The noble Baroness makes some very good points—I am conscious of her much greater knowledge of this area than I have—particularly the point she makes about licensing being the new sale. I am pretty confident that we have taken these points into consideration. On her specific point about whether investments would be cleared, the true answer is that every notification would be counted separately.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I bow to my noble friend’s much superior knowledge on intellectual property issues. I entirely agree with her. That is a good reason for keeping provisions about intellectual property broadly speaking as they are. My noble friend pointed out to me that nowadays even Rolls-Royce engines are licensed as opposed to sold, because so much data is given off by their operation. That is proprietary in itself. So it is very difficult to distinguish between an outright sale and a licence in commercial life.
I wanted to come back because I did not think that the Minister was quite positive enough on Amendment 23 from the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey. I laughed out loud; that particular response was like an episode of “Yes Minister” because it tried to draw distinctions that were not particularly helpful in the circumstances. Somebody was being extremely clever when they put the paragraph together, but I do not think it pushes back the argument why that day-to-day type of software —that sort of absolutely bog-standard commercial licence equipment—should be captured in the definition of a qualifying asset. I will look very carefully at that very well-crafted paragraph again before Report.
Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist (Con)
I am grateful for those comments. They will be noted.
Lord Vaizey of Didcot (Con) [V]
My Lords, I would never put my noble friend the Minister in the same paragraph as “Yes Minister”. She is a far classier act than that and a wonderful and effective force in your Lordships’ House. But, in a hesitant fashion, I will say that, when listening to the Government’s response, my concerns continued to grow. It seems that their position, which is perhaps understandable, is that they have crafted a Bill that covers every conceivable transaction. Then they will see how it works in practice, over the next couple of years, and gradually narrow it down. That was the tone of the response that I got from my noble friend Lord Callanan. When my noble friend Lady Bloomfield was responding, I began to wonder whether the sale of an iPhone to a Chinese government official in a phone shop in Westfield in Shepherd’s Bush would count as a transaction.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment tightens the scope of the trigger event so that it does not capture minority investor veto rights that would not give rise to national security concerns.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con) [V]
My Lords, in moving Amendment 29, I shall speak also to Amendment 72. They take us back to some of the issues touched on in our earlier debate on the group beginning with Amendment 15A, and the way that control is exercised in companies and what it means. These two amendments are designed to tease out and provide clarity and protection for third-party investors, who may find that they have invested in a company that, in turn, has been caught up in the provisions of the Bill. I seek the Government’s explanation for how this will work.
Amendment 29 amends Clause 8, “Control of entities”. There is concern about the clause arising from the wide definition of control contained in subsection (6). The real background is as follows. Investments in unquoted companies are normally governed by an investment agreement. When all goes well and the investment performs as expected, the investment agreement remains in a drawer and is never looked at but, sadly, not all investments perform as hoped, and not all directors and managers behave impeccably. Investors need protection against egregious behaviour by company managements.
What form could such behaviours take? It could be a proposal to make an acquisition—not one involving national security issues—the size of which would put the original company at risk if it were to go wrong. It could be a decision to spend a large sum of capital on a scheme that is ill thought out and ill considered, potentially putting the entire venture at risk. It might be a decision by the management to award themselves large salary increases. It might be a decision to recruit to a senior position in the company someone who has a public reputation that is not impeccable or who is perhaps related to one of the existing management team. For obvious reasons, investors need special protection against such behaviours and, as a last resort, the power to block them. It is not clear whether the existence of such blocking powers could bring the company within the control of entities provisions of Clause 8.
These protections for investors have nothing to do with national security; they are concerned with corporate governance and behaviour. An inability to allow those protections will surely be a significant disincentive to third-party investors, so Amendment 29 provides clarity that such protections will not be caught by the Bill. The arguments I have just rehearsed lie behind Amendment 72, which amends Clause 26—“Final orders and final notifications”. It seeks to make it clear that any unwinding or divestment order made by the Secretary of State in no way undermines investor rights of the sort I have been describing. I beg to move.
Lord Lansley (Con)
I shall refer only to Amendment 30, in my name, in this group. Earlier, we discussed the question of material influence. At this point in Clause 8, the fourth case to which we referred—the control of an entity—is, under subsections (8) and (9), effectively material influence. Looking at this, I could not understand why this bit of Clause 8 did not simply replicate Section 29 of the Enterprise Act, which is concerned with obtaining control by stages. I will not read the whole thing, but it is essentially about where a transaction or, in this case, a series of transactions—I will come back to that point—can be treated as occurring simultaneously, but which enables a person
“directly or indirectly to control or materially to influence the policy”
of the enterprise, or enables that
“person or group of persons to do so to a greater degree”.
We have here different language, and I would like the Minister to kindly explain how it works. I can see that it will be a person together with others, because of course it brings in holding an interest or a right by virtue of Schedule 1—working together with others—so that might be sufficient to say “directly or indirectly”. So, that might be covered by a common purpose, the connected arrangements and so on. But subsection (9), as it qualifies subsection (8), appears to suggest that if somebody already exercises a material influence over an entity, the fact that they increase their material influence by stages is not defined as control, unless it is one of the other cases set out in the clause. I think that is a gap. I think it ought to be included, and the clause ought to be constructed in a manner similar to the way in which the Enterprise Act enables control to be acquired by stages. I am not particularly asking for my drafting to be incorporated, but I invite Ministers to see whether it will be simpler to take out subsections (8) and (9) and insert something drawn from and similar to Section 29 of the Enterprise Act when we come back to this at Report.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, it follows from the speeches of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, who introduced Amendments 29 and 72 so well, and the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, who has taken us very carefully through subsection (8), that Clause 8 is a strange beast. It is a mixture of the absolutely specific and then the rather vague in its different cases, which contrast extraordinarily. I have signed Amendment 29, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, which tries to deal with the vagueness in subsection (6) because the scope of that trigger event—the third case—is very broad and unclear, as he described.
It is not clear precisely what resolutions govern
“the affairs of the entity”
as set out in subsection (6). It could potentially capture typical minority investor veto rights or negative protections, which would not give rise to national security concerns. The amendment put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, and supported by me, would narrow the scope, while ensuring that where a person can pass or block resolutions that cover matters akin to those covered by, say, ordinary and special resolutions under the Companies Act 2006, the ability to secure or prevent those resolutions would still be caught—even where the thresholds for passing those resolutions differ from the thresholds for passing ordinary and special resolutions under the Companies Act.
If shareholders of an overseas company can amend the company’s constitution, or wind up the company by passing a resolution with a threshold of 60% of the votes, any shareholder that increases their shareholding from less than 60% to 60% or more will be caught by the third case, if this amendment is accepted. At the moment, that subsection really repays some attention and I very much hope that the Minister will reply positively on this.
Amendment 72, also put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, and explained clearly by him, would
“give investors certainty that any divestment or unwinding order will not render their contractual arrangements unenforceable”,
so they could contractually anticipate the consequences of an unwinding order. That is extremely important. If you cannot do that and everything is void, then you cannot make arrangements that stick after the voidness.
A long time ago when I knew some law, I think we talked about severable contracts. One would find that part of a contract was void but provisions that applied to circumstances in which the contract was void, or voided, would still subsist. It is important that those provisions continue after the voiding decision has been made and I very much hope that the Bill can be amended accordingly; otherwise, many companies trying to anticipate its impact will be absolutely confounded. They will have no way through what will be, in any event, a pretty difficult commercial situation.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I put my name down to speak in this group to support my noble friend Lord Lansley’s Amendment 97, which he has not spoken to. I shall speak to it in this group anyway in case he had no further intention of speaking to it when it comes up later as we go through the amendments on the Marshalled List.
Amendment 97 would remove former spouses from the list of connected persons who are defined in Schedule 1. I was fairly sure that this was a novel and unwelcome addition to the normal scope of connected persons found in legislation. In my view, it is not a common-sense interpretation of what a connected person is. For example, if I had had a brief marriage in my youth, Schedule 1 would continue to count my long-gone husband as a connected person of mine for ever, which is just not sensible. It also includes former cohabitees, so the possibilities of connected persons seem to be endless.
My view of the definition of connected persons was compatible with tax law, company law and even money laundering rules, but I discovered that this wider definition, extending to former spouses, is in the Insolvency Act 1986, which was a surprise to me. That definition was later picked up by the Pensions Regulator. The fact that precedents have somehow managed to find their way into the statute book or into regulations does not make it right, and I will support my noble friend Lord Lansley’s Amendment 97 if he chooses to propose it at some stage in the future.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, it would seem, when looking at Clause 29 and listening to the reasoned arguments of the noble Lords, Lord Hodgson and Lord Clement-Jones, that the Government would be hard put not to agree with the objectives they set out for this amendment, so I suppose we have to listen to the Minister to hear why the Government think that the Bill already does the things which this amendment seeks to achieve, unless the Minister wants to explain why those objectives are wrong. There is a similar argument to be made about Amendment 72, which is more complex. Again, why would the Government not wish to achieve what this amendment is seeking to achieve? If they do, it is not clear in the Bill.
I dubbed Amendment 97 the Gilbert and Sullivan amendment, because you have the cousins, the sisters and the aunts all lining up in the connected parties list, or perhaps not. The noble Lord, Lord Lansley, would probably have made a fabulous argument, but in his stead the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, makes very good points.
Coming back to the substantive point about Clause 8, we have had a long debate on the group beginning with Amendment 15A, and a smaller, shorter debate that has focused on similar issues. My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones called Clause 8 a hybrid, being both specific and broad. I hope the Minister and the Bill team will take from this that there is work to be done on this clause. It is quite clear from the debate we have had that tightening and clarifying are required to take the Bill into Report. Otherwise, I suspect there will be a lot of recalls coming from the sort of debate we have seen, particularly in the Amendment 15A group, but also, to some extent, from this one.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
My Lords, I am still slightly reeling from having to find names of people long since in my past, but maybe Hansard can piece things together.
We have heard today, both in this group and in others, and in the representations that we have all seen, that there are considerable investor concerns about bits of the Bill, some of which Amendments 29 and 72 in particular seek to address. It is important to recognise, although it has been made clear by people in Committee, that the Bill marks a radical transformation of national security screening for mergers and acquisitions. It is a new and different regime, so it is essential that the Government not only maintain business confidence but gain more confidence from businesses and the investors in them. That was why, on the first day of Committee, we set out why we thought we needed a definition of national security to provide clarity for businesses and investors and to build trust in the regime.
However, as has been said in this group, one of the things that would help that confidence is better drafting. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, is right when he says that more work is needed. I know it is the second day back at school, but it feels as if the homework has been self-marked and now needs a slightly more thorough look. As everyone has said, it is not that anyone has objections to the purpose of the Bill; the concerns are about the wording and perhaps the breadth of its scope.
Clause 8 defines the circumstances in which a person gains control of a qualifying entity, thus constituting a trigger event that may be subject to assessment under the regime. This is clearly a key part that must be got right. Amendment 29 would narrow the third circumstance to make sure that it does not capture minority investor veto rights, as has already been mentioned. Perhaps the Minister could clarify whether it is expected that minority investment veto rights would be captured.
The group of amendments raises some broad questions about the number of cases in which a person gains control of a qualifying entity. We are interested in why other cases are not included. We do not necessarily want them included but want to work out the limits that brought certain things to be put in the Bill. It is quite interesting to know what is not there. For example, is an acquisition involving state-owned entities or investors originating in a country of risk to UK national security not a concern? It is not mentioned. Neither is a person who becomes a major debt holder and could therefore gain influence over the entity’s operation and policy. Is that not of interest? It is not that I want to include them, but I am really interested in how the definitions were put together. Maybe the Government, either in writing afterwards because it may be more detailed, or in answer today could spell out why these particular cases were selected and the sort of advice that was taken in the selection process.
Amendment 97, which the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has discussed, raises the question of why a former partner should remain a person of concern. Probably all of us here have had difficulties with being a politically exposed person, a PEP. We have found it very difficult sometimes just to open or become a signatory to a charity’s accounts because of being a PEP. A number of difficulties were had, but I think they have been got over now after some work in this House. It really did affect those of us who have step-children and former partners and siblings we never see, and things like that.
This issue needs a little more clarification and protection, if you like. No investor or anybody involved in this wants to get caught up by something which they could not have thought at the time was of any interest. I understand that it might look suspicious if somebody divorced their partner two days before to get rid of some assets, but this is a very wide net. Perhaps the Minister can explain why this clause is needed and needs to be drawn quite as widely. This is a net that would catch whales, never mind tiddlers.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
My Lords, I begin by briefly extending my thanks to my noble friends Lord Hodgson and Lord Lansley for tabling the amendments in this group relating to the circumstances determining the control of entities in the Bill, as well as arrangements and the impact of final orders on contracts.
I am conscious of the complexity of some of the matters that we are debating. If I am not able to explain or elucidate these points fully in my comments, I will of course write to noble Lords. I will also be happy to discuss them with noble Lords outside the Committee. Some of these things are quite difficult to get straight across a table like this.
I will start by addressing my noble friend Lord Hodgson’s Amendment 29. For the purposes of the Bill, Clause 8 sets out the circumstances in which a person gains control of a qualifying entity. It explains the four ways in which control can be gained. Subsection (6) sets out the third trigger event:
“The third case is where the acquisition is of voting rights in the entity that (whether alone or together with other voting rights held by the person) enable the person to secure or prevent the passage of any class of resolution governing the affairs of the entity.”
I think that there is broad support for that concept. However, Amendment 29 seeks to narrow this so that only acquisitions of such voting rights over matters that are equivalent to those which require the passing of ordinary or special resolutions under the Companies Act 2006 would be a trigger event.
I sincerely pay tribute to my noble friend for seeking to ensure that the regime is as reasonable and proportionate as possible. I believe that his intent is very much to seek to exclude acquisitions of minority veto rights from constituting trigger events. However, the Government consider that the Bill already achieves this goal to some extent as subsection (6), which my noble friend seeks to amend, is of course subject to the qualifying provision in subsection (7), which explains how references to voting rights in an entity apply to different sorts of entity.
In the case of an entity that has a share capital, this means voting rights conferred on shareholders to vote at general meetings of the entity on all or substantially all matters. In the case of an entity that does not have a share capital—this is where some complexity arises—this means the voting rights conferred on members to vote at general meetings of the entity on all or substantially all matters. The important words in both cases are
“all or substantially all matters.”
I therefore suggest, with deference to my noble friend, that minority veto rights would be captured by subsection (6) only where such voting rights provide the holder with a right to vote on all or substantially all matters, which perhaps takes it rather beyond the worry that some people had about these minority rights being constrained.
I hope that this puts the mind of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, at rest but, again, if a further discussion is needed to clarify how this works, I would be very happy to hold one. I also hope that the Committee agrees that it is only right that minority veto rights, in circumstances where they really are broad enough to cover all or substantially all matters, should be in scope of the Bill. For all intents and purposes, they are the same as majority rights if they are able to do that.
I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Lansley for Amendment 30 in respect of Clause 8 and the definition of control of entities for the purposes of the Bill. This clause reflects the fact that there are ways of obtaining control over an entity other than just acquiring shares or voting rights at significant thresholds. As part of the new regime—I say without excuse that we have made this embracing because of the importance of national security—the Secretary of State must be able to scrutinise lower stakes of shares and votes or other rights or interests acquired by a person that allow them materially to influence the policy of the entity. This is consistent with the UK’s merger framework, and businesses and investors alike have welcomed our adoption of the familiar material influence concept that they have been accustomed to under the Enterprise Act 2002.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)
I have received requests to speak after the Minister, from the noble Lords, Lord Lansley and Lord Fox. I first call the noble Lord, Lord Lansley.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, first, I express my warm thanks to my noble friend Lady Noakes, who happily introduced Amendment 97 far better than I would have. I had neglected to notice that we had reached Schedule 1, since we had not even reached the clause that introduced it. Not noticing that was entirely my fault.
If I may, I will go away and read what my noble friend said about Amendment 98, because it is purely a matter of trying to get the drafting right. He may well be correct on that.
On the other two amendments, I kindly ask my noble friend to reflect. The issue about former spouses reflects what is said in Section 127 of the Enterprise Act 2002, but this includes cohabitees, who are not in Section 127, which was subsequently amended to include civil partners. “Associated persons” has turned into “connected persons” and has broadened in ways that nobody told us was a policy.
My other point about the Enterprise Act is that I do not understand what my noble friend is saying. Earlier, he told us that the Government would not issue new guidance about material influence, because the CMA has issued guidance. I have read the CMA’s guidance and it clearly includes reference to obtaining control by stages. Obtaining control by stages, in Section 29 of the Enterprise Act 2002, includes a reference to that
“person or group of persons … materially to influence the policy of … the enterprise … to a greater degree”.
I have not invented this; it is in the Enterprise Act 2002 now. If my noble friend proposes to use the CMA’s guidance and says that everybody is happy that we are using an established understanding of what material influence is, I suggest we go away and look at whether we can use the language and guidance of the Enterprise Act to make it consistent with the practice that people have understood for the best part of 20 years.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
I thank my noble friend very much for those comments. I will reflect on them and communicate with him.
Lord Fox (LD)
This covers similar territory to Amendment 30 and the answer that we were given to it. I will read that carefully, as some of the answers are complex, as the Minister himself said. I ask that the Minister reads his answer carefully because, knowing what he knows from his previous life, there will come a realisation that we are not quite where we should be on this.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
I thank the noble Lord for that. I commit to reading the questions and answers carefully to make sure that they match up with each other as far as possible.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con) [V]
[Inaudible.] I am always slightly nervous when I hear Ministers talk about creating bespoke regimes because it brings to mind the gaps we might inadvertently allow to appear. The length the Minister has had to take to try to explain the way Clause 8 will work—I thank him very much for doing so—indicates that we need to look again at its practical implications. In essence, we are trying to decide whether the shoe pinches and whether it pinches in an unhelpful way. I am not sure that the “substantially all” get-out clause will always work, because in some cases investors will have very substantial rights or protection that might affect substantially all the activities of the company. But that is something one needs to take advice on. I am extremely grateful to the Minister for the trouble and time he has taken to answer the debate. For the time being, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Bruce of Bennachie
“(10) For the purposes of this section, acquiring a right or interest in, or in relation to, an entity by way of security does not constitute obtaining control over the entity, and any such rights or interests held by way of security do not constitute any of the cases described in this section.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to ensure that transactions are only caught where the person gains actual control of a qualifying entity and would exempt securities or other situations where no effective control is obtained.
Lord Bruce of Bennachie (LD) [V]
My Lords, I speak to Amendments 31 and 33, which relate to the continuing debate on Clause 8 and Clause 9 on the control of assets. The effect of Amendment 31 would be to ensure that an event is triggered only where the person gains actual control of a qualifying entity, and it would exempt securities and other situations where no effective control is obtained.
The definition of “control” in Clause 8(1), as has already been said, is framed very widely. It refers to 25%, 50% and 75% shareholding or voting thresholds, which correspond to those applied in the context of the people with significant control regime. Clause 8 also includes provisions adapting the above scenarios to cater for entities that do not have a share capital, such as partnerships.
This should be read alongside Schedule 1, which I suspect the Minister might allude to, which provides for particular cases in which a person is to be treated, for the purposes of the Bill, as holding an interest or right. In particular, paragraph 7 of Schedule 1 states:
“Rights attached to shares held by way of security provided by a person are to be treated as held by that person … where apart from the right to exercise them for the purpose of preserving the value of the security, or of realising it, the rights are exercisable only in accordance with that person’s instructions, and … where the shares are held in connection with the granting of loans as part of normal business activities and apart from the right to exercise them for the purpose of preserving the value of the security, or of realising it, the rights are exercisable only in that person’s interests.”
However, this clarification does not fully account for the situation where a lender becomes the registered holder of shares in security, as is the case with the legal mortgage over shares under the law in England and Wales, or a shares pledge under the law of Scotland.
Where the shares in an entity are transferred in security to a lender, the lender may find first that they have gained control of the entity under scenario one, notwithstanding the fact that under the terms of the security actual control remains with the security provider, for example, through the voting rights being exercisable only in accordance with the security provider’s instructions, as envisaged by paragraph 7 in Schedule 1 and that secondly, they would have triggered the second limb of the notifiable acquisition test.
As paragraph 7 of Schedule 1 refers only to:
“Rights attached to shares held by way of security,”
arguably it covers only the rights attaching to shares and not the ownership of the shares themselves—in other words, the rights rather than the ownership. As a legal mortgage over shares is unusual in England and Wales, but a shares pledge is the only way to obtain fixed security over shares under Scots law, this issue disproportionately affects Scots law fixed security over shares; that is, fixed security over shares in Scottish companies. As I have said in previous interventions on this Bill, the importance of the financial services sector and therefore the law of Scotland requires this to be addressed.
Effectively, we are talking about a situation where, for example, a bank providing a loan to a business takes security over shares unrelated to that business. In that context, the bank neither seeks nor exercises control of the shares; similarly if a parent company for example gives security to its bank over the shares of a wholly-owned trading subsidiary. In this case, the parent company retains direct day-to-day control, which would pass to the bank only in the case of default. Yet, as drafted, there is a risk that taking a fixed security over Scottish shares could trigger the provision, which would be highly disadvantageous to the Scottish economy specifically.
Given that a notifiable acquisition that is completed without the approval of the Secretary of State is void, the Law Society of Scotland argues that paragraph 7 of Schedule 1 should be extended to cater for the situation where shares are held in security by a lender. Paragraph 7 should similarly be extended to carve out security over qualifying assets since the security could be read as giving the security holder rights equivalent to those set out in Section 9. It would be helpful to include an express carve-out that nothing here is triggered simply by the act of holding any asset in security.
The society recognises what the Government are trying to achieve and addresses the situation where the borrower defaults and the terms of the security usually dictate that the asset will be sold. The transaction will therefore form a trigger event in the same way as any other transfer. I guess in rare circumstances, the holder of the security—that is, the lender—might seek to appropriate the asset. However, such appropriation could be caught within the meaning of a trigger event and if it were determined that the lender in question was not a suitable person to acquire ownership and control of the entity, the society considers that it would be possible for the conditions attached to the transfer to stipulate that the new owner would be obliged to sell their shares. They would thus be compensated for the value of their shares and any national security risk would be avoided.
I turn to Amendment 33, which has a similar purpose addressed to assets—namely, to ensure that transactions constitute a trigger event only where the person gains actual control of a qualifying entity and to exempt securities or other situations where no effective control is obtained. Where a lender holds as asset in security that lender may find that it has gained control of that asset, notwithstanding that under the terms of the security actual control remains with the security provider where they are in possession of the security. The second limb of the notifiable acquisition test may be triggered even when no effective control has passed.
Under Scots law, fixed security over incorporeal moveable property, which in English law is intangible property, can be achieved only be transferring the asset to the creditor. This includes, among other things, shares, insurance policies, contractual rights and intellectual property. For those assets where a real right of security can be treated without the transfer of ownership, such as land, a new real right is still being created in favour of the creditor. This right contains certain inherent negative controls—for example, a prohibition on sale—and certain positive controls: often the borrower must insure the property. I think we all know that this is common practice in mortgage arrangements and, as drafted, there is a risk that taking a fixed security over a Scottish asset could trigger this provision and this also would be highly disadvantageous to the Scottish economy.
Taking this into account, it would also be helpful to include an express carve-out, where nothing is triggered by the act of holding any asset. As stated in relation to the previous amendment, provision can be put in place to ensure that the Government’s interests are protected in the event of a default or the transfer of the assets, if triggered in the normal way. As already stated in the context of Amendment 31, such appropriation would be caught within the meaning of the trigger event. Conditions could attach to the transfer to stipulate that the new owner would be obliged to sell the asset; they would be compensated and national security risk avoided.
It appears that the Law Society of Scotland has identified practical issues for financial transactions under Scots law, which these amendments seek to address while fully recognising the Government’s national security objectives. It is a Scots law difference which could affect Scottish banks and Scottish mortgages but does not appear to have been considered in the Bill’s drafting. I hope that the Minister will be able to take this away and confirm whether the Bill needs to be changed in this way to ensure that the Scottish economy does not suffer what could be significant disadvantage as a result. I beg to move.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con) [V]
My Lords, I have tabled two amendments in this group, Amendments 34 and 35, which I shall now address. Again, they seek to provide clarity on the detailed operation of the Bill. As before, I am grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the Law Society.
Amendment 34 proposes a clarifying change to Clause 10(2)(b). It is argued that the existing wording of the clause means that any changes of ownership within the group of a company falling into one of the relevant sectors will require a notification. For example, an ultimate parent company might hold an interest in one such company through a wholly-owned subsidiary and, as a result of a decision to reorganise the group, it is decided that the parent should hold the interest directly. The holding company has the shares transferred to it. Any such holdings which are acquired after the commencement date, when the Bill becomes an Act, will have been through the security screening process, so there is surely no need for further consideration of what is essentially a paper transaction.
That leaves us with the question of how to deal with similar intragroup transfers where the initial investment was made before the commencement date. In such cases, of course, no screening will have taken place. Amendment 34 would require such changes to go through the standard notification and approval process.
Amendment 35 again seeks to provide clarity about how the Bill will operate in practice. Applying the current drafting of Clause 10 to a group which has multiple separate entities appears to require each of them to make a separate notification of a potential trigger event. That surely cannot be a sensible approach and, if followed, is likely greatly to increase the bureaucratic burden of form-filling and checking, and be a strain on the ISU. Amendment 35 establishes that, in the case of a corporate group, only one trigger event would arise and only one such notification would therefore be required.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]
I speak in support of Amendments 31 and 33. As I have the same brief, I do not intend to speak for long but I support all the arguments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Bennachie. I also state that I am a non-practising advocate of the Scottish Bar and a member of the Faculty of Advocates. If my noble friend the Minister is not minded to support the amendments, may I suggest that he meet the noble Lord, Lord Bruce, and me—if the noble Lord, as the author of the amendments, is agreeable—and, I hope, representatives from the Law Society of Scotland?
I honestly believe that this is a potential unintended consequence of the Bill, which could seriously disadvantage not just the Scottish legal profession but, more importantly, the financial service sector and financial investment sector in Scotland, which, as the noble Lord said, is sizeable in its contribution to the economy and employment. I endorse everything that he said and congratulate the Law Society of Scotland on bringing this to our attention. My understanding is that if the Bill is enacted as drafted, it could have grievous consequences for Scots law, Scottish practitioners and the financial sector. It behoves the Government to look favourably on the amendments. If not, I hope we can have the earliest possible meeting to discuss these matters in more depth.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I am not going to speak for any length on Amendments 31 and 33. I just hope that the Minister has a battery of Scots lawyers advising on these amendments because it sounds as if they could be of huge significance and the issues under Scots law may well have been ignored in the drafting of the Bill. I am looking forward to hearing the Minister’s response, no doubt on advice.
I support, in particular, Amendments 34 and 35, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, which he introduced so well. The common factor is that the existing wording of Clause 10(2) appears to catch intragroup investments where an ultimate parent company holds an interest indirectly through a wholly-owned subsidiary and decides to transfer the interest to itself so that it is held directly. Such transactions do not raise new or additional national risks as there is no change in the substantive control. For mandatory filings, as he also described, the initial acquisition will already have been notified and reviewed. Proposed Amendment 34 therefore makes sure that only those transactions where the initial investment took place before the commencement date are caught; they will thus not have been reviewed. Without this provision, each entity within a corporate group would need to make a separate notification for a single trigger event.
Amendment 35 deals with cases where corporate group companies comprise multiple, separate entities because Clause 10, as drafted, also appears to require each entity within the corporate group to make a separate notification for a single trigger event that takes place relating to the group.
These are well-crafted amendments and were well described by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, who, as he said, is supported by the Law Society. We have a Law Society group of amendments here relating to England, Wales and Scotland. I am sure that the Minister will have huge pleasure in responding on this group.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
My Lords, I have no new information to bring to the Committee. As we have heard, a number of transactions appear likely to be caught under the Bill which are probably outwith the intention of the authors of the Bill. I think the Minister has to explain why these provisions are in it, rather than noble Lords who tabled amendments having to explain why the provisions should be taken out. We look forward to his explanation of that and, perhaps, his reassurance to the Committee that the Bill is really fit for purpose across the whole of the UK, including for the Scottish legal system.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
My Lords, with thanks to all noble Lords who have spoken with such knowledge and eloquence on the amendments tabled, I will begin by speaking to Amendments 31 and 33 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Bennachie, and my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering. The noble Lord, supported by my noble friend, clearly raises important questions on the juxtaposition of Scottish law with the powers that we are looking at in this group.
I am grateful to the Law Society of Scotland for having supported this and, if I may, rather than attempting to deal with these points on the hoof I will take them away. I commit to being in communication with noble Lords as to what needs to be done, if anything, in relation to them. More generally, perhaps putting the important Scottish points on one side for the moment, I completely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, that the Bill has to work for every part of the United Kingdom.
These amendments concern Clauses 8 and 9 and the circumstances where acquisitions of control of entities and assets take place for the purposes of the Bill. They seek, I believe, to ensure that rights or interests in, or in relation to, entities and assets held by way of security are exempt from the regime, on the understandable basis that lending and debt arrangements do not give rise to control. Let me agree right away with the thrust of the concern expressed by the noble Lord and my noble friend. The Government do not consider that the provision of loans and finance is automatically a national security issue. Indeed, it is part of a healthy business ecosystem which enables businesses to flourish and grow in this country. Lenders need confidence that they can see a return on ordinary debt arrangements to provide that service, which is of course vital to the proper functioning of the economy. But we must recognise that there are, in a small number of cases, national security risks that can be posed through debt. I will come to this in a moment.
Access to finance is crucial for so many businesses and, to grow and succeed, they will often take out loans secured against the very businesses and assets they have fought so hard to build. That is why the Bill allows the Secretary of State to scrutinise acquisitions of control that take place when lenders exercise their rights over the collateral. The important point is that it is not where the lenders have hypothetical rights but where they exercise their rights over the collateral. This approach is needed because it will prevent hostile actors artificially structuring acquisitions in the form of loans which, following a swift and convenient default—let us put it that way—might otherwise allow them to evade scrutiny. This is a proportionate approach, and one that I am confident will keep finance flowing into UK companies and infrastructure while ensuring that our national security can be protected.
Amendments 34 and 35 in the name of my noble friend Lord Hodgson relate to Clause 10, which, in combination with Schedule 1, sets out various ways in which rights or interests are to be treated, for the purposes of the Bill, as held or acquired. These include indirect holdings whereby, for example, a person holds an interest or right indirectly if that person has a majority stake in an entity that is part of a chain of entities, each of which holds a majority stake in the entity immediately below it, the last company in the chain of which holds the interest or right. That example is relevant because Amendment 34 seeks to ensure that intragroup investments are not covered by Clause 10 and, as a result, Schedule 1 as well.
My interpretation is that my noble friend wishes to prevent internal reorganisations within the same corporate chain of entities from resulting in trigger events by virtue of Schedule 1. I confirm to the Committee that, in the vast majority of cases, that will not have an impact but, depending on the facts of the case, internal reorganisations may be in scope of the Bill. That is because there may be rare cases in which internal reorganisations pose national security risks. That may be true even if the ultimate beneficial owner is the same before and after the trigger event: for example, if there are concerns about changes to the level of control acquired by other links in the chain as a result of the internal reorganisation.
Clause 10(2)(b), which the amendment seeks to amend, is therefore important, because it makes it clear that in circumstances where a person is already treated as holding an interest or right, when something happens that would be regarded as the acquisition of that interest or right by the same person, then it is treated as such.
This means, for example, that an ultimate beneficial owner at the top of a corporate chain transferring existing majority holdings held by entities lower down in the chain to those above them could be a trigger event if it can be regarded as an acquisition by virtue of Schedule 1.
Amendment 35 would insert a new subsection into Clause 10 to provide that only one trigger event arises where more than one person is treated as acquiring an interest or right due to the provisions of Schedule 1. I can clearly see that my noble friend is seeking to help the Government by looking to ensure that the investment security unit is not deluged by duplicate notifications by corporate chains each time a new acquisition is made by an entity towards the bottom of the chain.
I can assure him that we are carefully designing the notification process and forms so that, wherever possible in situations such as these, a single notification providing all the details of the entities in the same corporate structure can be considered together. That is different from his amendment, which would seek to provide in the Bill that only one trigger event takes place. I am afraid that the Government consider that this would introduce ambiguity into the Bill, as it would not make it clear which trigger event is the one which takes place, and which should be discounted.
Hostile actors could try to exploit such a provision to avoid scrutiny by using shell companies at the bottom of long and complex corporate chains to acquire sensitive entities and assets. If only one trigger event is considered to take place by virtue of Schedule 1, the entity immediately above it in the chain could notify the acquisition, while not necessarily disclosing the control acquired by more troubling persons higher up the chain. In these circumstances, the amendment would mean that these could not be treated as separate trigger events, whereas surely they should be.
With the arguments I have outlined and my undertaking to write to the noble Lord, Lord Bruce, and my noble friend Lady McIntosh about the important Scottish matters they raised, I ask that the noble Lord agrees to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)
I have received one request to speak after the Minister, from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. No doubt the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, and my noble friend Lord Bruce will respond very positively to the Minister’s offer on Amendments 31 and 33.
I must say that on Amendments 34 and 35 the Government are really tying themselves in knots in the way that the mesh—to come back to the Minister’s splendid fishing analogy—is woven in this Bill. This is catching minnows—it is catching transactions such as these intragroup transactions. I will read very carefully what the Minister has to say, but, given the number of fish caught by this that will have to be continuously thrown back in the sea after a period—as we have discussed, one that could be unduly protracted—this really is a catch-all Bill the longer we talk about and debate it. I do not think any of us is particularly comfortable with that in this Committee; we have to find a way of making it more proportionate. That will be the key task of the House as the Bill goes forward.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for that comment. Let me take it on the chin and, if I can, answer it.
Some of the hostile actors that we are trying to prevent acquiring sensitive matter are extremely sophisticated and wily. It is not appropriate to go into details, but we know this. We know that they are absolutely capable of structuring transactions to find the most minute loopholes and acquire control of assets that affect our national security. I think we all accept the premise that national security is paramount, and to protect ourselves against these threats we have to have these complex arrangements.
I completely understand noble Lords’ points that some of the things we are describing are complex almost to the point of absurdity. However, they have to be if we are to protect ourselves against these hostile actors. This is key and something that we will have to keep coming back to. It is why it will be so incumbent on the investment security unit to act sensibly and pragmatically. When things have to be notified to catch the important fish—in the noble Lord’s analogy—they will have to be dealt with quickly and moved out; otherwise, we risk circumventing the very thing that we are trying to avoid with this Bill, which is threats to our national security.
Lord Bruce of Bennachie (LD) [V]
I thank the Minister for his response. Given the detail of the response to the other amendments, I might have hoped that the department would be able to give us a little more detail on Amendments 31 and 33, but I genuinely accept his offer to write. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, for her support and suggest that the Minister takes up her offer, on behalf of us both as well as the Law Society of Scotland, to meet to try to find a way through this, because there are clearly some practical concerns about the impact of the Bill as it stands.
These amendments do not seek to undermine the Bill in any way. The concern is that the Bill unintentionally undermines the good working of the legal and financial services sector in Scotland, and it is clear that the Bill needs to take that into account. I accept and appreciate the sincerity of the Minister’s offer, but I suggest that a meeting that includes the Law Society of Scotland would be a more practical way forward than just an exchange of letters. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Lansley (Con)
“( ) For the purposes of this Act a person is not to be regarded as gaining control of a qualifying asset to the extent that the use of a qualifying asset is conducted wholly within the activity of a United Kingdom-based higher education or research institution.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would provide a “safe harbour” in relation to assets wholly controlled within UK higher education and research institutes.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, we come to a group that contains just one amendment in my name, Amendment 36, which touches on the issue of higher education. We will, at a later stage, deal with the question of the time taken to review notifications. That is a pretty central issue for higher education, but I do not propose to talk about that in this group.
Judging from the earlier discussion between the Minister and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, about the meeting to discuss research and higher education interests, I am sure that this is well known to Ministers. The purpose of Amendment 36 is to create a safe harbour for activity undertaken by and maintained within British universities and research institutes. I can perfectly well see the objection to a safe harbour for this activity. It was well illustrated by a report published by my noble friend Lord Johnson of Marylebone and looking at the extent to which there were, in his instance, Chinese interests in university research in this country. Something like 30% of all principal research activity in higher education has Chinese interest somewhere in it.
The point is this: Clause 9, which we have just agreed, extends as structured to the right to use qualifying assets. The breadth of qualifying assets, when one considers them alongside the right to use them, brings in the Lambert report principles, which universities use for research activity. They extend the right to use to their financial, or mostly industrial, sponsors, so a large number of research activities in universities might be the subject of notifications.
I will shorten this debate by saying that, if one does not go down the route of a safe harbour for universities, we need a very positive approach to Amendment 88, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, which says that universities need specific, detailed guidance about the circumstances in which they need to make notifications. Otherwise, the number of notifications will be very large and there will be a substantial diversion of activity of the investment security unit away from areas where the risks are greatest to volume activity, where risks are lower.
I know that universities have plenty of experience—I will come on to in the next group of amendments—of working with the Export Control Joint Unit. If they have a similar relationship with and understanding of the requirements when notification is appropriate and when they can avoid voluntary notifications in large numbers, higher education will be able to live with this regime far better than they fear at the moment.
I move Amendment 36, but I encourage the Minister to respond positively to Amendment 88.
Lord Vaizey of Didcot (Con) [V]
My Lords, this amendment seeks to ensure that research and development partnerships, such as those that are widely formed between companies and universities to create intellectual property and therefore qualifying assets, are not required to provide notification of the creation of these partnerships. If these partnerships lead to the creation of a qualifying asset, the trigger event should be determined to be the point of creation of the qualifying asset. It would minimise the notification burden on business and industry, and avoid discouraging these important relationships. This is the theme of many of my amendments.
To give your Lordships some background, UK companies are major funders of research and development at British universities across the world. They enter into hundreds, if not thousands, of research agreements every year. Those agreements can be a simple, straightforward funding of a PhD student or major multilateral projects valued at many millions of pounds. Business enterprise R&D represents something like two-thirds of the total, according to the latest figures from the Office for National Statistics. The biggest sectors for business enterprise R&D overlap significantly with the 17 sectors identified in the Bill. For example, computer programming is almost £2 billion, aerospace is almost £2 billion and software development is £1.5 billion.
This business investment, allied with our world-class universities, means that the UK is obviously at the forefront of many of these technologies, from quantum technology to artificial intelligence. The purpose of the research is, of course, to create new technology and new intellectual property that can be used by those British companies to grow British businesses, but at the beginning of any partnership the creation of intellectual property is simply an aspiration. It is certainly not guaranteed.
These projects risk being caught by the same minimal risk issue flagged in other debates on the Bill where companies seek pre-emptively to notify where there is a risk of a trigger event because there is a lack of clarity on this issue. All the amendment seeks to do is to postpone the need to consider notification until such time as the research has been successful, in effect by creating a qualifying asset.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I am very pleased to have put my name to all three amendments in this group. Rather like the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, I think that we have to find a way to deal with research and development partnerships in higher education. These are various alternative ways to do that, but whichever one is chosen we must find a constructive way. Having a debate and discussion at this stage is really important.
Although the Bill does not directly reference universities and a great deal depends on the Secretary of State and his statement saying how he will define and use the powers, given the width of the sectors it is clear that there is an intention to catch those partnerships entered into by universities. The Bill’s scope is so wide that it means universities could have to refer a significant proportion of their routine business collaborations for screening.
A key concern is that it is unclear which types of asset transaction should be referred for screening. The proposed definition of assets that should be referred to BEIS is very broad and could cover a significant proportion of what universities might consider run-of-the-mill engagement with businesses, including contract research, consultancy work and collaborative R&D. Elements of the Bill, while introducing measures to protect national security, could have unintended consequences for future investment in UK R&D and could cause BEIS to be overloaded with referrals from the university sector.
Up to 95% of Russell group research contracts grant external partners some form of intellectual property and could therefore be captured by the voluntary regime, given the current broad definition of assets. With uncertainty over definitions, universities will be forced to adopt a cautious approach and therefore will expect to refer a significant proportion of the partnerships that I have mentioned: their contract research, consultancy, and collaborative research projects, including those conducted with British businesses. This will add to lead-in times and create red tape for universities and businesses. That surely cannot be for the benefit of R&D in our universities.
As chair of the governing body of a research-intensive university, I can testify to the fact that protecting sensitive research from hostile foreign actors is now a priority for universities. Universities dedicate significant resource to complying with export control legislation and are now working to implement recommendations arising from last year’s guidance from Universities UK, Managing Risks in Internationalisation. As a result, enhanced due diligence processes have run in parallel to concerted efforts to secure R&D investment from domestic and international businesses. This includes due diligence on risk assessment, international research partnerships, policies and contractual agreements to protect intellectual property and dual-use technologies and export control legislation.
Lord Rooker (Lab) [V]
My Lords, although I spoke at Second Reading and have lent my name to later amendments, supporting my noble friend Lord West and the noble Lord, Lord Butler, I have to say that most of the content is way over my pay grade. I have learned an awful lot as I have listened to the debate this afternoon.
My position on the Bill is the same as on the CHIS Bill: I am with the Government. I realise that higher education is large and varied but I am not prepared to give it the blind support that I have done in the past. As such, I do not support Amendment 36.
I want to raise three aspects: pay, academic freedom and security, as it is tied to the Bill. The pay of vice-chancellors is out of control and, like the Army, where no general gets the sack for failure, no vice-chancellor walks the plank. That is due to poor governance, so it is not down to a single person. Many salaries are well north of £250,000 a year—some are £500,000 a year—with whopping increases into five figures annually, on top of which there are vast expenses and, sometimes, free accommodation. In the meantime, the so-called world-beaters screw down the staff on flimsy contracts, with pensions constantly under attack. The treatment of students during the pandemic has been appalling, in some cases. It reminds me of what I read about the Victorian mill owners’ treatment of their workers—but the students are the payees, not the employees. The leadership is not world-class, except as in snouts and troughs.
Then we see the negative aspects of academic freedom —that is, its decline—becoming the norm. The Civitas report makes for very disturbing reading. The study of campus censorship over the three years between 2017 and 2020 is grim. It covered all 137 registered universities and 22 variables were assessed. Noble Lords will be pleased to learn that I do not intend to detail them, but the key finding was that only 19 of the 137 universities were considered “the most friendly”. Seventy—that is 51% of them—were not performing well and were classed as “moderately restrictive”, leaving 48 universities, including some of the highest-ranked ones, performing badly on free speech. They were classed as the most restrictive. It would take too long to list them so I shall give just seven examples: St Andrews, Cambridge, Oxford, Liverpool, Exeter, UCL and Imperial College, London. There are more. There is a very strong correlation of them with the high pay of vice-chancellors. The Russell group of world-class universities did not come out very well either: 42% were recorded as “most restrictive”; 54% were “moderately restrictive”; and only one registered Russell group university came out with a “most friendly” score.
Before I come to my final point, it is worth pointing out that your Lordships’ House does not hear much about this aspect of education. The last time I checked, which was about three years ago, there were over 40 university chancellors in your Lordships’ House. That speaks volume.
My final point on why Amendment 36 should not be accepted by the Government is that too many universities are almost subsidiaries of the Chinese Communist Party Ltd. Tom Tugendhat, the chair of the Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, has called for a clamp-down on British university research relationships with China to stop the flow of intelligence secrets. Bloomberg has reported that UK intelligence agencies are concerned about these links and the passing of sensitive information about defence technology from the UK to China. Too much Chinese money is going into UK universities. It is alleged that at least 20 British universities have relationships with 29 Chinese universities with strong ties to the Chinese military, as well as some of China’s largest weapons producers.
Earlier today came the report from the Policy Institute, The China Question. I have not had time to read it all, so I will make just two or three points. In 1990, there were 100 co-authored papers between Chinese and UK universities. By 2000, it was 750. In 2019, there were over 16,000. The report, which I have only glanced at, points out the reliance on significant tuition fee income by UK universities from China, which is used to cross-subsidise research. This creates a strategic dependency and potential vulnerability. We are not managing the risks associated with this aspect of our education and Chinese influence.
In short, it is a sorry tale from higher education. While I support my noble friend Lady Hayter’s Amendment 88, the Government should reject Amendment 36 out of hand.
Lord Fox (LD)
I remind the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, that this is a particular Bill designed to do a particular thing. It is not a higher education Bill. While he may feel strongly about many of the issues, I will not comment on them, because they do not fall into the remit of the Bill. I point out that I am also not a university vice-chancellor.
The noble Lord, Lord Lansley, set out the danger, and this was supported by my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones. If this Bill is used to police these issues, the deluge that will fall on the agency will be huge. We are back to the point that my noble friend made on the previous group: we are creating a Bill that does everything, then the Government will gradually calibrate what they do and do not need to do. That is not the best legislative approach.
There are issues with the research relationships that universities may have, but this Bill is not the policing agency that we should be using for them. I do not 100% agree about the outset of a relationship, as set out by the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, in his and my noble friend’s amendment. Sometimes that has to be looked at, as well as the outcome of that relationship, but I do not think this Bill is the place to do it.
To steal a word that was used earlier and use it differently, we are also looking at the nexus between this and export control. Universities seem much more comfortable with export control, and if there is an issue with universities it could be addressed through the increased and more rigorous use of these measures, not through this Bill.
I return to the point which I asked the noble Lord, Lord Grimstone, about last time and which I put to ask the Minister now, what are we seeking to stop? In other words, in putting this Bill together, how many partnership agreements does the Bill team imagine would have been stopped by this process? What sort of things are the Government seeking to arrest, stop or cancel compared to that which the export control regime would be doing anyway?
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
My Lords, as the Minister knows and as has been said, there is considerable concern in the higher education and research sector about the potential impact of the Bill on research partnerships. We agree with the intention of Amendment 40, which is, as we have heard, to provide clarity for the sector. Indeed, it reflects a recommendation from the Russell group which said that a key concern is that it is unclear which type of asset transactions should be referred for screening. That will cause problems for the group as well as to the unit, which could have simply too many referrals. Amendment 40 is also to ensure that research and development partnerships, such as those between commercial organisations and universities to create new intellectual property and potentially qualifying assets, are not required to provide notification of the creation of such partnerships.
Amendment 88 in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, reflects similar concerns. I hope it takes an approach that the Government are able to accept. It would require the Government to publish specific guidance for the HE and research sector, including a clear explanation of asset transactions indicating how contract research, consultancy work and collaborative research and development are affected and how the provisions apply to strategic security partnerships and domestic partners. The amendment also requires—and this is key—the Government to consult the higher education and research sector in a meaningful way in advance of the guidance so that the published guidance reflects what is workable for both sides, particularly in relation to that definition of assets which otherwise could lead to great uncertainty. The amendment therefore is about developing guidance and promoting good practice in that it should be done in co-operation with the sector. I thank my noble friend Lord Rooker and the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, for their support for this approach. The wording of my amendment may not be perfect, and we could perhaps tweak that on Report, but it will be important to have this in the Bill.
Perhaps the Minister who is about to reply—or may be doing that next week—would indicate the Government’s acceptance of this need for guidance as well as the way of getting it. As the Russell group says, without clear guidance a significant proportion of universities’ routine engagement with British business could be inadvertently captured by the Bill. We are all in favour of that engagement between universities and business. We want to make sure it happens. Any hiccups could delay time-sensitive research deals if the unit was preoccupied with this.
Universities want to help make this Bill work. They acknowledge that there are risks. I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Fox. I think that the issue raised by my noble friend Lord Rooker about the amount of collaboration with certain countries is key and we must face up to it. I think that the leaders of the universities are aware of that. They want to be part of the solution, so I hope that the Minister will accept Amendment 88.
Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist (Con)
Let us try to get this done in five minutes.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and my noble friends Lord Lansley and Lord Vaizey for tabling these amendments. I will begin with Amendments 36 and 88, which concern the Bill’s effect on higher education. Amendment 36 seeks to exempt from the regime the use of qualifying assets where that use is conducted wholly within the activity of a UK-based higher education or research institution. Amendment 88 seeks to introduce guidance to explain some of the Bill’s provisions in relation to higher education.
First, I intend to provide some general assurance to the Committee about the asset powers under the Bill. There are no asset transactions that must be notified to the Secretary of State as assets are not subject to the mandatory notifiable acquisitions regime. To quote the statement published on introduction, interventions in asset transactions by the Secretary of State are expected only in
“the headline sectors in which national security risks are more likely to arise than in the wider economy”.
The draft statement states more broadly:
“The Secretary of State expects to intervene very rarely in asset transactions.”
In relation to higher education, I assure the Committee that we do not generally expect the acquisition of qualifying assets for exclusive use by UK-based research or higher education institutions to give rise to national security concerns.
Indeed, to go further, the use of assets where there is no acquisition of a right or interest resulting in control over a qualifying asset would not even constitute a trigger event, although my understanding is that Amendment 36 seeks to go wider than this. We do, however, expect national security risks to arise in the higher education and research sectors sometimes. For example, hostile actors could seek to set up a UK-based research organisation and acquire sensitive assets through this vehicle, or enter into some form of agreement with one and gain control over sensitive assets that way. Exempting such acquisitions from the regime would therefore create a notable gap in the Secretary of State’s ability to safeguard national security.
Turning to the likelihood of the Secretary of State calling in acquisitions related to contract research, consultancy work and collaborative research and development, and the request for guidance, I point the noble Baroness to the three levels of risk set out in the draft statement. The intention of the statement is to provide guidance on the expected use of the call-in power by the Secretary of State. The three levels of risk in the statement give a hierarchy of how likely the Secretary of State is to call in an acquisition. The most likely areas of concern are “core areas”, “core activities” and “the wider economy”. Acquisitions in “core areas” are likely to be of most interest to the Secretary of State. “Core activities” are likely to fall within the “core areas” but may also fall outside them. This covers the sectors proposed to be set out in regulations under Clause 6. The Government have consulted on the definitions of the sectors to be covered by Clause 6 and published their response at the beginning of this Committee. “The wider economy” concerns everything else. The Secretary of State considers these areas unlikely to pose risks to national security. Therefore, they are unlikely to be called in under the NSI regime. I am confident that higher education and research institutions will be able to assess their activities and decide in which of these three areas of risk they fall.
I want to take a moment to assure the Committee that BEIS consulted Universities UK, the University Alliance and the Russell group on the national security and investment White Paper, published on 24 July 2018. They were very helpful. Of course, since the introduction of the Bill, as my noble friend Lord Lansley noted, BEIS has continued to engage with a number of research and academic institutions, including the Russell group. The Government very much appreciate the Russell group’s ideas on inclusion for guidance.
Turning to strategic security partnerships and domestic partners, the Bill deals only with acquisitions of control over qualifying entities and assets; it does not regulate these strategic security partnerships specifically. Any acquisitions of control made by such a partnership will be subject to the Bill in the same way as any other qualifying acquisition—namely, the Secretary of State’s likely interest in them is illustrated in the draft statement under Clause 3.
I now turn to Amendment 40 in the names of my noble friend Lord Vaizey and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. This amendment concerns Clause 12, which provides supplementary provisions about trigger events, including details about when they take place. The amendment seeks to make it clear that, in relation to the creation or potential creation of a new qualifying asset, a trigger event can take place only upon the creation of that asset.
The Government also consider that acquisitions of control over qualifying assets can take place only from the point of their creation, whether in tangible or intangible form. I reassure the noble Lords that the Bill as drafted provides for that. They will, however, be aware that the Secretary of State’s call-in power applies both to trigger events which have taken place and to those which are “in progress or contemplation”. The point at which a trigger event is in progress or contemplation will clearly depend on the facts of the case, but it could include circumstances where research and development partnerships are agreed, and it is abundantly clear what assets are to be developed and what control the funder will be acquiring over them.
We think that this is the right approach, as the primary focus of this regime is acquisitions of control over existing entities and assets. We cannot hope to know the future and how technology and national security risks might develop in every circumstance, so it is right that control of new assets can occur only once they have been created.
With the arguments I have outlined against the amendments in this group, I ask that noble Lords agree not to press them.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)
Before I call the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, to respond, I need to make the Committee aware of the Procedure Committee’s guidance about five hours of sitting, which expired five minutes ago. I do not want to put pressure on the noble Lord to respond on a very detailed debate, but if his response is brief we can probably include it. If not, it might be that the Whip needs to consider moving an adjournment.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, I can be brief. I do not think my noble friend really replied to Amendment 88, so I think that we will return to this on Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Callanan
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes the reference to Article 9 of the Export Control Order 2008 (S.I. 2008/3231) which was revoked by regulation 4(7) of the Export Control (Amendment)(EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I. 2019/137).
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)
That concludes the Committee’s work this afternoon. I remind Members to sanitise their desks and chairs before leaving the Room. I thank very much the broadcasting team and the support team for their assistance.
National Security and Investment Bill
Tuesday 16th March 2021
(3 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 165-III Third marshalled list for Committee - (11 Mar 2021)
Lord Lansley
“(aa) prescribe circumstances which are not to be regarded as gaining control of a qualifying asset which is the subject of an export control order under the Export Control Act 2002 and related provisions, and”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would enable the Secretary of State in regulations to set out where the control of assets under the Export Control Act should not to regarded as gaining control under this Act.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, this first group consists of two amendments, both in my name and both relating to the interaction of the export control regime with the investment screening regime. Amendment 39 would insert into Clause 11, which relates to the exceptions to the general definition of the control of assets, a power for the Secretary of State by regulation to prescribe where the control of a qualifying asset is not to be regarded as controlled under this regime. It would give the Secretary of State freedom to define circumstances where assets that are to be exported and are controlled by the export control regime would not be regarded as controlled for these purposes.
Amendment 87 is a bit more straightforward in that it would introduce a new clause requiring the Secretary of State when making final orders under the Act to take account of the effects of the Export Control Act and related provisions on that qualifying asset. Your Lordships will note in the Bill an interaction with the Competition and Markets Authority regime, but no similar provision is made for the interaction of the export control regime with this regime.
The Bill offers no substantive recognition of the interaction between the export control regime and assets under this regime. That is surprising, because paragraphs 3.85 and 3.86 of 2018 White Paper state—please forgive me, it is a fairly long quote:
“After the introduction of the reforms described in this White Paper, the export control regime will remain the key means of restricting trade in strategic goods where this might raise national security risks … The Government wishes to ensure that the new reforms are as proportionate as possible, and are not used instead of other, more targeted or proportionate policy levers. As such, where national security concerns relate solely or primarily to the export of goods, the Government expects that the export control regime would remain the primary means of protecting national security.”
The purpose of these amendments is to ask whether that is still the Government’s policy. If it is, why is it not reflected in the structure of the powers? Should it not be included in the Bill to make that clear?
The Minister may say that since the export control regime is under the control of Ministers, they have all the administrative means at their disposal to bring the two regimes together, whereas there is a separate statutory and independent agency in the Competition and Markets Authority. But that would not be transparent to those affected. I know from talking to people who would be affected that there is a long-standing relationship with the export control unit of the department and an understanding of how its powers are used. To the extent that that transparency and predictability are maintained explicitly, I think it would greatly assist those who are to be affected by these powers.
It is surely the case that Ministers, when making a final order, will take account of where qualifying assets are the subject of an export control order. That being so, I am looking not only for an assurance from the Minister that it is the Government’s intention to use the export control regime as the principal means by which the export of qualifying assets is controlled but for a recognition of this in some form in the legislation, to enable all those affected to be aware of the relationship between these two regimes and for it to be transparent. I therefore urge my noble friend to consider the merits of Amendment 87, which would introduce a new clause that simply did that without placing any constraint on Ministers. I beg to move.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for bringing forward these questions in such a characteristically forensic manner. The Committee will be aware that I have not participated in it so far, and I therefore intend to be brief and shall raise only a small number of questions seeking clarification from the Minister on the interaction with the Export Control Act 2002 and on an associated issue.
It has been fascinating listening to the contributions in Committee up to this point about some of the opacity in the interaction with the other legislation and, indeed, how the investment security unit will operate within the department that will cover export control licence applications, which will also make considerations on national security grounds and how they interact. It was interesting to note that in the House of Commons, on the Prime Minister’s Statement on the integrated review, Julian Lewis, the chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, criticised the Prime Minister for not allowing there to be full scrutiny of how the investment security unit will operate. I know that my noble friend Lord Fox will raise this later and will lead on it.
How will that interaction be on the export licence regime? One area where there have been calls for the Government to have annual reports on the operation of this legislation was interesting, given the fact that under the Export Control Act 2002 there are annual reports, and there is clarity as to how many applications and the various different criteria for refusal or putting on hold applications. An interesting aspect of the Export Control Act 2002—and I reread the Explanatory Notes to the legislation after seeing the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Lansley—is that, on one reading of the Act, which does not go into the same level of detail for defining companies as this legislation, it refers to people being part of the licence, for them and their knowledge and for their providing technical assistance. There certainly can be companies that operate almost exclusively on providing technical assistance, in the technical services industry in particular; they are covered by the Export Control Act for their work that they will then carry out, and the Government take a view as to whether that is something that should be considered as an export.
Secondly, there are companies that operate within hybrid technologies, as the Export Control Act indicated, for technologies and technical assistance, and controls can be imposed for the transfer of technology from the UK and by UK persons, anywhere and by any means. It is interesting that Section 4 of the 2002 Act says that,
“‘trade controls’ …means the prohibition or regulation of … their acquisition or disposal … their movement”,
and associated activities of any goods. The Minister may say that that means specific items, goods or technologies of a company but not the company itself—therefore, this legislation covers the company. It would be helpful if the Minister could indicate something about the interaction.
It struck me that, if any Government indicated that a certain technology or good required prohibition from being exported or their trade in that to be regulated, that would be considered under criterion 5 for national security grounds. What if the interaction of that company is then the subject of a review under this legislation, or indeed that parent company is taken over, or there are shares that meet the trigger requirement? What is the status of the export licences that that company has—because the Government have already indicated that they have sought and maybe made a decision on national security grounds? It is worth pointing out that we know from the annual report that last year there were 80 refusals on national security grounds under criterion 5 in the UK—it indicates for the national security grounds of the UK, the EU and other friendly countries. In the last set of discussions, it was interesting to hear about the interactions with decisions that other friendly countries make. The Export Control Act makes determinations for that.
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
Amendments 39 and 87, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, probe the Minister around the question of the interaction of the NSI regime with the export control regime. The Committee must be assured that this new regime is not buried within the Business Department but works effectively across government, not least in relation to export controls. The Government’s response to the sector consultation in the report already mentioned states
“how the NSI regime sits alongside export controls to provide a comprehensive regime protecting our national security capability”.
It is not merely a question of sitting alongside, however that may be interpreted, but of interacting and co-ordinating with the Department for International Trade. The Government seem to recognise this in the comment:
“We must ensure that the export control criteria cannot be circumvented by allowing the acquisition of companies that produce such goods, rather than buying the goods themselves, without effective screening.”
More clarity and information in the procedures to this eminently sensible statement would be very welcome from the Minister.
The Government responded to the consultation that they intend to capture all materials that are considered likely to give rise to national security concerns and which are contained in the relevant legislation set out in the UK’s strategic export control list. I would be grateful if the Minister could provide better information on their intentions, and how and when this will become clear and transparent. Will he provide a guarantee that this will happen—the assurances that the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, has required during the passage of the Bill?
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Lord Callanan) (Con)
First, I thank my noble friend Lord Lansley for these two amendments, which seek to ensure seamless integration between the new regime provided for by the Bill and the existing export control regime. I shall take his amendments sequentially.
Amendment 39 seeks to ensure that the Secretary of State can, through regulations, exempt from the regime certain acquisitions of control over qualifying assets that are subject to export control orders. Clause 11 provides for exceptions relating to control of assets. Subsection (1) sets out that acquisitions made by individuals for purposes wholly or mainly outside the individual’s trade, business or craft are not to be regarded as gaining control of a qualifying asset and are therefore excluded from the scope of the call-in power. This does not apply in relation to an asset that is either land or subject to certain export controls set out in subsection (2)(b).
Subsection (3) also provides a power for the Secretary of State to amend the list of assets that are outside the scope of this exemption or to prescribe other circumstances in which a person is not to be regarded as gaining control over a qualifying asset. That includes being able to prescribe circumstances in which the acquisition of an asset subject to export control legislation is not to be regarded as gaining control over a qualifying asset. Any use of this power in subsection (3) would, of course, be guided by the operation of the regime in practice and any patterns of activity that are observed. As such, I can therefore assure my noble friend that the Bill already provides for what his amendment intends to achieve.
Amendment 87 would require the Secretary of State to ensure that any interim orders or final orders made in relation to acquisitions of control over assets take into account controls imposed under the Export Control Act 2002 and related provisions. I thank my noble friend for his proposal and commend the intent behind it. It is, of course, very important that the Secretary of State’s use of the powers provided for by the Bill is in keeping with the Government’s measures under other legislation. The Secretary of State must take into account all relevant factors when making decisions about the use of interim orders and final orders.
The legal tests in the Bill require the Secretary of State, before making an order, to reasonably consider that the provisions of the order are necessary and proportionate for the purpose. In the case of final orders, that purpose is to address a risk to national security, and in the case of interim orders, it is to prevent or reverse an action that might undermine the national security assessment process. Whether controls have been imposed under export control legislation will be relevant to whether the envisaged provisions of an order are necessary and proportionate. For example, where export controls in relation to an asset are already in place, it may not be necessary or proportionate to make an order under this Bill prohibiting the transfer of the asset overseas, but this will depend on the facts of each case.
Addressing the questions of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, about why we need the Bill when we already have the export control regime, I say that the export control regime is a licencing regime for certain controlled goods. It is an important part of the safe- guarding of our national security and it sits well alongside the proposed national security and investment regime. The two regimes are distinct though, and do not perform the same role. For example, the export control regime does not provide the Government with the ability to scrutinise acquisitions of UK companies or direct the use of sensitive assets used in the UK, whereas of course the NSI regime would.
On the noble Lord’s points about standard individual export licences if they have been granted for an export, I tell him that a standard individual export licence is granted to one person to export specified items to a named recipient. If the parties involved precisely follow the terms of a standard individual export licence that has already been granted following an assessment of national security risks, it is unlikely that the Secretary of State would reasonably suspect that the export might give rise to national security risks. In this situation, it is unlikely that he would be able to call that export in under the NSI regime. However, it is important to say that any decisions would need to be made on a case-by-case basis. It is important that the Secretary of State retains the ability to call in and scrutinise trigger events involving the export of assets in the event that national security risks are present.
The noble Lord asked about Northern Ireland. Qualifying entities as assets in Northern Ireland sit within the scope of the Bill, and that ensures that there are no loopholes. A trigger event under the Bill is not based on the application of EU law. For completeness, I should also say that the Secretary of State will, in any event, be subject to public law duties requiring him to consider all relevant factors when deciding whether to make an order under the Bill. Therefore, where export controls are relevant, the Secretary of State will need to take them into account when making that order.
I hope that that has explained, for the benefit of the House, the interaction between the two pieces of legislation. With the explanations that I have provided, I hope that my noble friend will feel sufficiently reassured that his concerns have been taken into account, and that he will not press his amendments.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful for each of the contributions to the short debate. They were helpful and, indeed, added to the questions. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, referred appropriately to the Export Control Act provisions. I remember that I was on quadrilateral committee in the other place, about 15 or 16 years ago, so I remember how these issues were considered at that time. Indeed, there was a level of parliamentary oversight of the export control regime, which may be something we refer to at a later stage. He raised some good points: I thought the point about the EU export control regime was a very good one. The noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, made an interesting point about the interaction with the Department for International Trade in this context.
If I understand my noble friend correctly, he is more or less saying that the power under Clause 11(3)(b) would enable the Secretary of State to prescribe, by regulation, such circumstances as necessary, so in that sense my Amendment 39 is not necessary. I agree; it is not necessary but certainly the explanation of the interaction between the two regimes is desirable. However, Amendment 87, proposing a new clause, perhaps drafted differently to make it clearer about the interaction between the two regimes—both at the point where a call-in notice has to be considered, as well as the point at which interim and final orders are made—would be very useful. What I have heard from my noble friend suggests that, by administrative means, using the powers in the Bill and under public law requirements, the Secretary of State will have regard to the export control regime when using his powers under this regime. That is undeniably true. I think we all knew that, but there is much more that we put into legislation, particularly with a new system, that helps people who are to be affected by it to look at it and understand how it works.
What I found deeply surprising was that such an important part of the Government’s policy intentions—that the export of goods should still be primarily controlled by an export control regime—was not even referred to in the Bill or in the Government’s response to the consultation. It is as if it did not exist, but it does exist and it is important, as the Minister’s reply suggested. I shall reflect on what he said, but it may well be that there continues to be a “desirable interaction” clause in the Bill that makes it very clear to all those affected that the export control regime plays a significant part in the control of qualifying assets where they are to be exported. However, based on what my noble friend said, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment at this stage.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 43. Anyone wishing to press this or anything else in the group to a Division must make that clear in the debate.
Amendment 43
Baroness Noakes
“( ) If an acquisition has been notified under section 14 and the Secretary of State has not issued a call-in notice under section 14(8)(b)(i) within the review period specified in respect of that acquisition, the Secretary of State shall be deemed to have approved the acquisition.( ) If an acquisition has been notified under section 18 and the Secretary of State has not issued a call-in notice under section 18(8)(b)(i) within the review period specified in respect of that acquisition, the Secretary of State shall be deemed to have approved the acquisition.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is to give certainty that if the Secretary of State has not issued a call-in notice in respect of acquisitions notified under the mandatory or voluntary procedures, they can proceed and cannot be voided under Clause 13.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, for adding her name to Amendment 43. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, who commented earlier in one of our Committee sessions that the word that would recur in our deliberations is “certainty”, and that is what lies behind my Amendment 43.
If a transaction is a notifiable acquisition, it will be void under Clause 13 unless the Secretary of State has approved it in the ways set out in Clause 13(2). An acquisition subject to the mandatory notification procedure under Clause 14 will give the Secretary of State 30 working days from the time that he accepts the notice either to give a call-in notice or to notify that no further action will be taken. In the latter case, that is treated as an approval for the purposes of Clause 13.
My Amendment 43 attempts to deal with the situation in which a mandatory notification has been made but the Secretary of State has neither called it in nor made a notification that no further action will be taken. Without this amendment or something like it, a transaction could be stranded in no man’s land, having been neither called in nor told that no further action will be taken. I am sure that there would be the possibility of some form of legal action to force the Secretary of State to do something, but those involved in transactions should not be put to that sort of expense in terms of time and effort. Clause 13 is so draconian in voiding transactions that the parties involved deserve the clarity of a definitive outcome so that they can proceed with certainty.
My amendment also deals with the similar situation that could arise under Clause 18, where a voluntary notification has been made and, at the end of the review period of 30 days, the Secretary of State has neither issued a call-in notice nor made a notification that no further action will be taken. My amendment seeks the same clarity and certainty for voluntary notifications.
Amendment 67 in this group, in the name of my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, would achieve a similar effect in respect of voluntary notifications. I have no particular attachment to my form of drafting, but a solution should be found in this Bill to the problem of both mandatory and voluntary notifications. I beg to move.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)
My Lords, as my noble friend Lady Noakes said, Amendment 67 deals with Clause 18 on the voluntary notification procedure. I entirely support what she has said and her amendment. Like her amendment, Amendment 67 is to deal with no man’s land, but it adds a further wrinkle to no man’s land beyond that which she covered in her remarks. I am grateful for the support from the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Bilimoria, and I have been reliant on the expertise of the Law Society for the detailed drafting.
As I say, this amendment is concerned with voluntary notification procedures. The objective behind the establishment of voluntary notification procedures seems entirely praiseworthy in that it can speed up the investment or divestment process for those involved by seeking in advance a decision by the Government on whether the proposed action will be subject to a call-in notice. If the Secretary of State decides to issue a call-in notice, the clock starts running on the 30-day period for initial assessment.
So far so good, but the Bill as drafted is not clear —as my noble friend made clear—on the time the Secretary of State has in which to decide, following a voluntary notice, whether he or she should issue a call- in notice. The only guide we have is under Clause 18(5):
“As soon as reasonably practicable after receiving the voluntary notice, the Secretary of State must decide”
and so on. This does not give any clear idea of how elongated this process may be. In particular, the use of the word “practicable” is rather strange—practicable for whom and in what circumstances? The solution to this is to redraft the clause so that unless the Secretary of State responds to the voluntary notification, it is deemed to have been accepted. That triggers the 30 working day period, so gives an end date by which the company or the investor will achieve clarity.
Amendment 67 also aims to correct a procedural anomaly in the current drafting, which touches on a point that was the subject of a discussion between myself and my noble friend Lord Lansley on the first day in Committee. I think this point goes beyond where my noble friend’s amendment went. It is as follows: the Secretary of State has this 30 working day review period to decide whether to issue a call-in notice or notify the parties that no further action will be taken, but the drafting of Clause 18(9) appears to muddy that clarity when it says that the review period
“does not affect the operation of the time limits in subsections (2) and (4)”
of Clause 2. This was the point raised by my noble friend on our first day. This would appear to mean that the Secretary of State could fail to make a decision within the 30 working days but would still have up to six months from becoming aware of the trigger or five years from the date of the trigger to serve a call-in notice. The same difficulty applies to Clause 18(8)(b), which allows the Secretary of State to inform the parties after considering a voluntary notification that no further action will be taken. Again, it seems overridden by the provisions of Clause 2(2), with the six months or five-year period allowing for further reflection by the Secretary of State.
Amendment 67 aims to cut through this Gordian knot by requiring the Secretary of State to make a decision on the voluntary notification by the end of the 30-working day period, and the absence of such a decision would be taken as approval. Objectively, that is to give clarity and certainty to investors, as we are trying to do throughout the Bill. Without an amendment such as this, the whole purpose and the advantages of the voluntary notification procedure could be undermined.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, I have added my name to the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and I support everything that she said. I also support what I might call the companion Amendment 67 from the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, which has been signed by my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones. I also agree with what was said there.
I favour mechanisms to give certainty, and the way the Bill operates at the moment means that, absent a call-in or other response, a business is left in no man’s land—as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, called it. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, pointed out that even if you escape from no man’s land, there is a piece of elastic that pings you back in again for up to five years.
I realise that with a new system the Government may not know how well it will operate, but many noble Lords have repeatedly expressed concern, and I am coming from the standpoint that it is totally unreasonable to push all the uncertainty on to industry.
We have operated without these measures for a long time—maybe for too long—but to switch to draconian uncertainty overnight does not seem fair. There needs to be a point at which no response is an all clear, even though that itself is unsatisfactory compared with the positive receipt of an all clear notice in your hand.
I have nothing else to add, but I support the amendments. The Government need to take notice and to make this whole process more workable for industry.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
My Lords, I am delighted to support Amendment 67 and, by the same token, everything that my noble friend Lady Noakes said in connection with her amendment. The two dovetail nicely together. It will be for the Government to determine which drafting is the best. I welcome my noble friend Lady Bloomfield to her position. I am delighted to be in the Chamber rather than in the virtual Chamber; it is an altogether more pleasant experience.
The consequences of the current drafting of Clause 18, as so ably set out by my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, together with Clause 2(2), leave everyone in a very precarious position, as the parties involved would have literally no clarity as to any certainty or finality. My understanding is that the parties would have to proceed to complete the transaction before any time limit started to run. Perhaps my noble friend the Minister could clarify that.
I welcome Amendment 67 in particular as giving clarity. I thank the Law Society for bringing it to our attention and my noble friend Lord Hodgson for bringing it forward, with the able support of the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Bilimoria. I hope that my noble friend the Minister will look favourably on these amendments. If she is not minded to, will she undertake to bring forward amendments of her own? It would be very unfortunate to leave the parties in what my noble friend Lord Hodgson described as a no man’s land, without any degree of clarity or finality.
Lord Naseby (Con) [V]
My Lords, I very much welcome the amendments from my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Hodgson. Any of us who has worked in financial services, either before we came into Parliament or while we were in Parliament at certain stages, knows that it is difficult enough to put together a financial situation, but that the worst thing in the world is to not know the date by which something must be concluded.
Indeed, I reflect that London is, and I hope always will be, a leading financial centre in the world. In that context, we need certainty. Noble Lords will know that I have worked in south Asia. There was continually a degree of uncertainty there on some aspects of financial matters. In fact, major companies always had somebody to explain things to them, or to manoeuvre, in the nicest possible way, a situation. We do not want any of that. We really do want certainty and not this no man’s land that has been referred to.
I wonder about just one point, though. There might at some point be a situation where circumstances are such that, if these amendments are made or made in a slightly revised form, there must be some reserved power for national security. We have possibly experienced it in the pandemic that we are currently in. Some countries smaller than ours have suffered major power failure, and one could see the whole of the City of London being taken off the grid and everything else due to some unexpected event.
I am very much behind what my noble friends said in their amendments. I hope that the Government will respond to them, because they are needed, but I will understand if there is some national security dimension to the Bill that is not immediately obvious.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, have demonstrated exactly why Committee is so important. The way they have teased out the real meaning of these time limits under Clauses 14 and 18 has been revelatory, if we can call it such.
I very much like the no man’s land metaphor used by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, but, under Clause 18(9), my noble friend Lady Bowles also talked about the piece of elastic that brings you back. It is almost as if this Bill was designed to be deliberately obscure. The reference back to Clause 2(2) and (4) has almost been sneaked in, so that the Secretary of State has the ultimate discretion.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, said on the one watchword we have throughout the Bill, we are trying to create an investment regime where there is a high degree of certainty, so that people know what the boundaries are. The time limit boundaries seem to be limitless if they apply to the Secretary of State. An ordinary investor will no doubt be absolutely under the cosh if they fail to meet any time limits that apply to them, but the Secretary of State seems to have absolute discretion.
I do not think I need to add anything further, except to say that we on these Benches strongly support Amendments 43 and 67. I have signed Amendment 67, but both the mandatory and voluntary notification procedures need curing in this respect. I very much hope that the Government will see their way to amending these clauses as we move to the next stage.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
My Lords, this sounds like a “me too” moment, because we also have tremendous sympathy with the amendments, especially after hearing the concerns of stakeholders in the research sector about the uncertainty around the time for notices to be decided by the Government. As we have heard, their concerns reflect others from business and investors.
Could the Minister explain why a default approval should not be included in the Bill if organisations have not heard back within a particular timeframe? She will probably know about the important process for clinical trials involving medical products prescribed in the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations. In that case, where no notice is given or where further information is requested within 60 days, the clinical trial is treated as authorised. I am not suggesting that these are two exact types of decision, but that default authorisation in legislation seems to be one we might look at. I am interested to know whether the Government have looked at a similar default approval to add here. Perhaps the Minister could say what sort of advice the Government have had on whether that would work here.
On Amendment 67, could the Minister indicate whether 30 days is right for such a process? It would be useful to know the Government’s thinking on the expected average turnaround time for a call-in notice.
Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist (Con)
I am grateful to my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts for their amendments, which, I believe with good intention, seek to bring further clarity to the status of acquisitions that have been notified to the Secretary of State after the end of the 30 working- day review period. In particular, they seek to provide that acquisitions notified to the Secretary of State are deemed to be cleared following the review period if the Secretary of State does not issue a call-in notice within that period. Both worry, as other noble Lords have, that such a transaction might be stranded in a so-called no man’s land. Amendment 43, from my noble friend Lady Noakes, would apply to both mandatory and voluntary notifications, whereas Amendment 67 from my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts would apply just to voluntary notifications.
I think we are all agreed it is essential that businesses and investors have the clarity and certainty they need from this regime. That is exactly why we have included statutory timescales for cases—those covered by mandatory notification as well as voluntary notification —to be screened by the investment security unit. That is also why the Secretary of State is already required to give a call-in notice or issue a notification of no further action before the end of the review period in response to both voluntary and mandatory notification. He has no other option, and I hope that noble Lords are reassured by this. The Government consider that this is the right approach as it imposes a legal requirement on the Secretary of State to take a positive action to provide certainty one way or another. I do not believe that the default approval system suggested by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, would add to that certainty.
The Government do not think it would be in anyone’s interest to leave the situation ambiguous as to whether an acquisition has been cleared or requires further scrutiny, so I am pleased to be able to reassure my noble friends of the Bill’s functioning on these matters. Many of the businesses the Government have spoken to about the new regime have emphasised they would not wish to proceed with completing an acquisition without unequivocal confidence that they are cleared to do so. As such, it is not clear to me that my noble friends’ amendments would provide greater confidence in the business and investment communities.
For these reasons, I cannot accept the amendment, and I hope that my noble friend Lady Noakes will withdraw it.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken on this group of amendments, especially my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbots, who explained the interaction with Clause 2(2) and (4), and his Amendment 67, which I had not appreciated.
Apart from my Front Bench, we are agreed that there is a problem here. My noble friend the Minister explained why a time limit is put in the Bill. We understand that, but the Bill still does not give the certainty required: it does not deal with the position if the Secretary of State does not actually do something. We think the investment community is entitled to that certainty. One possibility is the default approval mechanism that the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, referred to. We cannot just take it that because the investment community would like the certainty of a positive approval, we should let this Bill off from the ambiguity over what happens if the Secretary of State does nothing.
I shall read carefully what my noble friend has said in Hansard, but she should be aware that we will need to return to this on Report, because she has not satisfactorily dealt with the problem we have put to her. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Lansley
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is linked to amendments in Lord Lansley’s name to Clause 26 which provide for undertakings to be accepted instead of a final order.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, this group consists of four amendments, all in my name. The few who are watching our proceedings may be slightly confused that all the amendments they have heard have been moved by those on the Conservative Benches. I think three-quarters of the amendments on our Marshalled List today are tabled by Conservative Members. It is because we all support the Bill, and we want to make it work well. I note that our noble friends are commending our intent; I promise them that our intent is positive in all these amendments. Many of them, like those in this group, are about trying to understand the structure of the policy and probing some of the considerations that we thought might go into it.
Amendments 45, 68 and 69 relate essentially to the policy question of whether the Secretary of State should accept undertakings as an alternative either to issuing a final notification, meaning nothing is going to happen, or to making a final order, meaning specific things must be done. Why should the Secretary of State have an intermediate option? The lawyer’s answer is that he does not need it. Since the power in Clause 26 is that a final order
“may include … provision requiring a person, or description of person”
to do or not to do particular things, there is no limit to the power conferred under the Act. Therefore, almost by definition, the legal answer to the question of whether the Secretary of State needs this additional power is no.
However, as so often, we come back to the question of what, in practice, works best. In that respect, the Competition and Markets Authority, which works on both merger cases and public interest cases, can seek commitments and accept undertakings in view of making the equivalent of an order. It does that, first, because it can be quicker: a proposal can be accepted much more rapidly than using the process of examination necessary to arrive at a final order. Secondly, it can be structured in a way that is more flexible. It can be purposive—it can set out what the entity or the person controlling the asset would need to do to satisfy the Secretary of State to mitigate or prevent the risks.
Those undertakings could, therefore, be purposive and long lasting, whereas an order must be prescriptive, a bit like legislation. It will have to tell people precisely what they are going to do, or else—I fear that this may too often be the resort of Ministers—put someone in a position to make decisions about an entity or an asset in place of the people who actually control that company or asset. I will come on to that a little later in this group, on Amendment 71.
The potential for a purposive, flexible and speedy reference to undertakings, which has long been established in relation to the merger control and public interest regimes under the Enterprise Act, would be a good way of proceeding. This is not without precedence in other jurisdictions. For example, we have referred in our discussions to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The number of times the United States resorts to presidential decisions is very modest. The number of times it enters into what is known as a mitigation agreement is much greater. What I am looking for is something a bit like a mitigation agreement.
Amendments 68 and 69 to Clause 26 would insert the ability to accept undertakings. Under Amendment 45, if undertakings were entered into and not adhered to, the notifiable acquisition would become void. Therefore, Amendment 45 is consequential on Amendments 68 and 69. I am looking to find out why Ministers have rejected the option of undertakings, and whether this is something that should be in their armoury, even if they use it rarely.
Amendment 71 relates to the question on Clause 26, which states that the Secretary of State can provide for
“the appointment of a person to conduct or supervise the conduct of activities … with such powers as may be specified or described in the order.”
Who is this person? This is purely a probing amendment to find out. Is this person simply a civil servant operating on behalf of the Secretary of State in all circumstances, and would the Government have such persons available with the qualifications and experience necessary to undertake these functions? If they are not civil servants, who are they? Under what circumstances would they be brought in, and with what qualifications would they be equipped? At the moment, as far as I can tell from the policy material issued with the White Paper and the response to consultation, these questions have not been addressed.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, it is nice to be in the Chamber rather than the glass cubes in which we have been confined. I assure your Lordships, and agree with the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, that noble Lords not only on those Benches but on this side of the House want this Bill to succeed; I think that I can speak for Her Majesty’s loyal Opposition as well. However, the measure of that success will be its efficiency, its certainty and the way it manages this important element of investment.
I listened to the answer that the Minister gave to the last set of amendments; I do not expect the noble Lord, Lord Grimstone, as Minister for this set, to comment on that. However, although it is probably irregular, I ask both Ministers to listen back to the answer that was given there and answer the same questions with their departments: how would they manage a company for five years that is still sitting in that kind of limbo? How would they make investment decisions for that business while it is still not approved but not denied? I ask them to think about the management decisions that they would make. When they have come to a conclusion, I think the Ministers will agree with the proposers of those amendments that some degree of certainty needs to be delivered quickly and efficiently—and that brings us to this set of amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Lansley, has eloquently set out an alternative to the—we might say—digital approach that the Bill has taken, with the option of remedies. Businesses are familiar with remedies, I would say, having worked with the CMA and others. The merits as set out by the noble Lord of speed, flexibility and durability are all things to be aspired to.
I know this sounds patronising, but I remind the Government that the title of the Bill includes the words “security and investment”—the investment part should have equal weight to that of security. It is straight- forward to stop things happening and tick a security box; it is harder to make sure that we have a regime that continues to encourage investment. Everything that takes time or injects uncertainty pushes investment away. The Ministers should listen to the wise words of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, and think about this middle way, which can move things quickly, keep investment in the game and make sure that, at the same time as getting investment, we are also getting the security that the title of the Bill demands.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
My Lords, there is something going around my mind now about letting foxes out of their glass cubes—I am not sure how dangerous that is.
These amendments would allow for undertakings to be accepted instead of a final order—a case well made by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley. During Committee in the other place, Dr Lenihan from the LSE said:
“There are many cases in which a threat to national security can be mitigated by agreements and undertakings without needing to block a deal.”
Perhaps the Minister could inform the House what thought was given to that proposal.
As we have heard, Amendment 71 is in a way a probing amendment to learn more about the type of person the Secretary of State could appoint to supervise a final order. We will be particularly interested to hear the Minister’s reply on this. What sort of specialism would be involved? Would the person need to have any relevant training, background or experience? It would be interesting to know how they would be selected and whether the job description would be included in the report that would in any case be made, so that one could see the basis on which the selection happened.
Clause 26(4) states:
“Before making a final order the Secretary of State must consider any representations made”.
We are interested in what exactly is meant by the word “consider”. Would that be part of a dialogue, perhaps as part of the negotiations, or simply a requirement that representations are in the dossier submitted to the Secretary of State for ratification? Assuming that the representations had not been successful—if there were a final order, that would presumably be against the wishes of the parties—it would be interesting to know whether the reasoning for rejecting them would be noted and reported on elsewhere, possibly to the ISC. It would be important for someone to be able to reflect on the decision-making that had taken place.
The Minister of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Department for International Trade (Lord Grimstone of Boscobel) (Con)
My Lords, I start by extending my thanks to my noble friend Lord Lansley for these amendments. I also thank other noble Lords who have spoken; all I think welcome the broad thrust of the Bill even if they wish, quite rightly, to probe certain aspects of how it will work.
I begin by addressing Amendments 45, 68 and 69. Amendments 68 and 69 would allow the Secretary of State to accept “undertakings” from the acquirer
“as the Secretary of State deems appropriate to remedy, mitigate or prevent any risk to national security”,
rather than issuing a final order or a final notification. Amendment 45 would then, as I read it, make a consequential change to Clause 13 in respect of notifiable acquisitions so that those which are completed otherwise than in accordance with the final order or the agreed undertakings are void.
The Bill as drafted allows the Secretary of State two options once he has exercised his call-in power: first, to issue a “final order”, which contains remedies. I would add here that remedies are not necessarily just black and white—they could have a whole set of actions incorporated into them; some noble Lords may not fully have comprehended that. Secondly, the Secretary of State can issue a “final notification”, which states that no further action is to be taken under the Bill.
Undertakings proposed by my noble friend in these amendments would come into force when the undertakings were accepted. They could be varied or superseded through the Secretary of State accepting another undertaking, replaced by a final order made by the Secretary of State at any time, or the Secretary of State would be able to release the acquirer from their undertaking.
I am grateful that my noble friend is seeking to expand the options available to the Secretary of State but, as I hope to explain convincingly in just a moment, the Secretary of State does not need these additional options. Undertakings would not be appropriate because the Bill already provides the dual benefit of certainty for parties while giving the Secretary of State the “teeth” needed to enforce a regime built around our national security.
The Bill includes the ability for the Secretary of State to establish the terms of any remedy through the power to make final orders. I emphasise that point again. The terms of a remedy may require someone to dispose of part of something or to do something in relation to one bit of an undertaking but not another. It is a comprehensive term which allows all sorts of matters to be included within it. Indeed, the Bill states in Clause 26(5)(a) that a final order may require a person
“to do, or not to do, particular things”.
I am advised that that is a strong statutory footing which the Government consider is both required and sufficient for remedies under this regime.
My noble friend Lord Lansley was right on the button when he said that this gives the Secretary of State all that he requires. The Secretary of State does not need any additional powers because this power gives him all that he might conceivably want to do. Of course, before the Secretary of State determines his final order, he is likely to engage with parties to an acquisition—acquirers and others—to explore potential remedies.
However, it is right for the purposes of national security that these remedies—once they have been considered, and once they might have been discussed and looked at—should then be able to be imposed through a final order rather than assented to by the Secretary of State. We believe that this imposition is necessary because the matters that we are dealing with here are matters of national security. The Bill as drafted provides the Secretary of State with the power to impose remedies through a final order or to take no further action under the Bill, which is all that is required.
With Amendment 71, my noble friend addresses an important part of the Bill; namely, the carrying out of activities pursuant to final orders. The execution of final orders is of course vital to ensure that any remedies imposed by the Secretary of State have their desired effect. There would not be much point in just imposing orders if they were not carried through afterwards. This amendment seeks to make explicit a requirement that anyone who will conduct, or supervise the conduct of, activities mandated by final orders must be “suitably-qualified”. While I appreciate the good intention of my noble friend, I do not believe that this amendment would add anything substantial to the Bill.
First, the Secretary of State is unlikely to appoint someone who could not conduct or supervise the conduct of activities mandated under the final order. It would be daft of him to put someone in to do the job who was not qualified to do it. Why would he or she wish to do that? To do so may undermine the Secretary of State’s remedy; the remedy may not be carried out in full or in part if the person is not qualified, which would be against the decision that the Secretary of State has made. It is therefore very much in the Secretary of State’s own interests that the person appointed has to be “suitably-qualified,” even if the Bill does not say that specifically. I take it for granted that that is what the Secretary of State would want to do.
Secondly, the Secretary of State will be subject to public law duties when providing for a person to be appointed. Those public law duties will require him to act reasonably and take into account all relevant considerations. This would include whether the person is suitably qualified to undertake the task. He would be failing in his public law duties if he appointed someone who was not so qualified.
Thirdly, should it be helpful to noble Lords, I am happy to state categorically on the Floor of the Committee that the investment security unit will comprise eminently qualified people of the right skills and experience. For example, if a particular case requires someone qualified in chartered accountancy or in audit, the Secretary of State will appoint somebody who has those qualifications to carry out what is required.
For these reasons, I believe that although noble Lords are trying to be helpful in putting forward the amendments in this group, they are unnecessary. What they seek to do is already covered by the powers that exist in the Bill, and I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw Amendment 45.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
I have received one request to speak after the Minister from the noble Lord, Lord Fox.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his answer. I want to follow up on his last point. There is a certain ambiguity in his answer around where this person would be drawn from. In one sentence the Minister referred to the ISU and in the next sentence he referred to drawing on a particular power. It is not clear: is this a standing group of people who will be set in or will people be seconded from other companies or pulled in from other departments? A little more sense of what the source of these people is would give us more security around this.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for that question. It will be horses for courses. It will be either qualified people from inside or, if a person from inside does not have the qualifications, someone will be drawn in from outside and appointed to do it. The test will be to make sure that the person you ask to do the role has the capabilities and the qualifications to do it. I say yet again: why would the Secretary of State wish to do other than to appoint somebody who is qualified to do this task?
Lord Lansley (Con)
I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for his responses to this short debate, and indeed to those who participated in it. It was helpful to elaborate some of the issues, although I am not sure that we solved many of the questions that were posed.
My noble friend correctly deduced that I did not see Amendment 71 as needed. It was designed to find out who these people are. Although my noble friend did not say so, the implication is that they are the staff of the department, working in the investment security unit. In a sense, that tells us already that, when we come on to think about some of the implementation of this and the annual reports and so on, we are dealing not only with a flow of cases through the investment security unit but with a continuing role for the unit in the scrutiny and the conduct of the activities that are the subject of final orders. I hope that we will be dealing with only some dozens of final orders a year, but it will build up over time since many of these final orders in relation to entities will have a continuing relationship.
I did not expect the “suitably-qualified” question to arrive at any other answer than that they are civil servants recruited into or drawn from the department, but if they were other than that, it would be very useful for us to be told. I am assuming that they are not.
On the question of undertakings, as I surmised at the outset, the Secretary of State has all the powers the Secretary of State requires. The point, however, is that when making final orders, it may be flexible from the Secretary of State’s point of view, since the Secretary of State can include anything the Secretary of State wishes to include in it. However, it is not necessarily flexible from the point of view of the people affected, since once the order is made, the flexibility has completely disappeared. What is flexible about undertakings is the ability of the acquirers to make commitments at the time they are contemplating an acquisition in order to bring those two things together to enable the acquisition to continue—the noble Lord, Lord Fox, made that point, perfectly reasonably. If we want to promote investment and to assist those who are acquiring entities and assets in the United Kingdom, other foreign direct investment jurisdictions such as the US allow for mitigation agreements. The American one does not impose orders, or rarely does so. There may still be merit in having the flexibility to enter into agreements with acquirers rather than imposing orders on them. I am surprised that the Government have simply dismissed that possibility. Having it on the statute book does not mean that Ministers have to use it, but if it is not on the statute book, they cannot do it. That is why we are thinking about it at this stage.
However, in the light of what my noble friend says by way of the powers in the Bill, I suppose that at this stage it is probably best to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to reduce the regulatory burden for persons who have submitted notifications on previous occasions.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 48A, I shall speak to Amendments 67B and 67C, and propose that Clause 30 should not stand part of the Bill.
On the first three amendments, I have been assisted by the Global Infrastructure Investor Association and its legal advisers, Ashurst. The association, as its name suggests, represents major investors who participate in multiple infrastructure projects around the world. The purpose behind these amendments, as with so much of our debate today and on the previous two days in Committee, is to provide clarity, certainty and speed. My noble friend Lady Noakes, the noble Lords, Lord Fox and Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, all talked about the extraordinary impact of uncertainty and time on companies. Let me give a brief example.
A few years ago, I was a non-executive director of a public company that was the subject of what is known as a dawn raid. My chairman was rung at 8.30 am by the chairman of a major competitor to say that, overnight, it had purchased 28% of our share capital from our investors. It was immediately referred to the Competition and Markets Authority, because these were two quite large companies in the sector, and we had a collective, organisational nervous breakdown. This went on for three or four months. The predator spent the whole time trying to persuade the CMA that there was no reason why the purchase should not go ahead; meanwhile, we in the victim company were trying to preserve morale, keep business going and assure people that their jobs were safe. But there was a degree of uncertainty, because it was not our decision in the end. The Ministers on the Front Bench deal with this in a sort of “it’ll be all right on the night” way, but it is very difficult in the real world out there. I give that example having been through this extraordinarily difficult period myself, and seeing how it could arise if we do not get the wording, clarity and speed of the Bill right.
Amendment 48A is the first. It would insert a provision for a more streamlined procedure for those who may be making frequent applications under the provisions of the mandatory notification procedure in Clause 14. Subsection (4) of that clause gives the Secretary of State powers, by regulation, to decide the “form and content” of any mandatory notification. The background to Amendment 48A is that there are many low-risk investors in the UK who currently and regularly invest in sectors that could trigger a notification once the Act comes into force. It would reduce the bureaucratic load if, once an investor had made a notification, or maybe one or two notifications, such an investor could make streamlined notifications, allowing them to avoid submitting the same information repeatedly —always, of course, with a statement that there had been no change in their circumstances in the meantime.
In the debate a few days ago on the group beginning with Amendment 15, the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, talked about the proposal in Clause 6(5), which does not entirely break new ground. It provides for the Secretary of State to make exceptions
“by reference to the characteristics”
of the acquirer. All that Amendment 48A seeks to happen is to move that sensible clarification and proposal into this subsection for this group of investors.
Amendments 67B and 67C are linked and seek to clarify the position of the Secretary of State under the stop-the-clock provisions of the assessment period and to ensure that any such powers are not abused. This is an add-on to the point made by my noble friend Lady Noakes earlier about no man’s land; the stop-the-clock provisions can be used to extend the period.
The two amendments relate to Clause 19, which concerns the power to require information, and Clause 24, which concerns the effect of the information notice and attendance notice. It is understandable that the Government may well need, and should be able to seek, further and better particulars for any transaction, but the extent of the power needs to be considered against two factors: first, the context of a regime where the basic assessment period is already quite long—75 working days or 15 working weeks for a national security assessment, or 30 working days or six working weeks for the initial screening process; and, secondly, that this statutory period can be extended by the Secretary of State using the stop-the-clock power. Under this power, the Secretary of State can require further information and must set a time limit by which it must be provided. Without being too cynical, it is perfectly possible for a Secretary of State with a tricky, controversial decision to make frequent requests for more information, stopping the clock on each occasion by imposing an unreasonably short time for the supply of the information. The process by which he or she pushes the pea around the plate could, eventually and ultimately, frustrate the transaction, without the Secretary of State ever having to take a decision at all.
Amendments 67B and 67C attempt to deal with this by a twin-track approach. Amendment 67B proposes that any information notice served under Clause 19 must allow a reasonable period of time for response, which must, in any case, be not less than three days. Without this safeguard, as I have said, the Secretary of State could repeatedly ask for more information, each time stopping the clock almost immediately. In parallel, Amendment 67C amends Clause 24, so that the stop-the-clock powers are discretionary and not automatic. Therefore, if complex questions take longer to answer, the Secretary of State does not have to stop the clock. Such an approach would mirror that followed by Section 34ZB of the Enterprise Act, in granting extensions to the statutory time limits to which the Competition and Markets Authority is subject for merger control purposes.
The final proposal in this group is that Clause 30 should not stand part of the Bill. I had thought about degrouping this, but decided that we have enough groups and should crack on. Clause 30 is entitled “Financial assistance”. Its wording can best be described as wide, and the Explanatory Notes are not much more helpful. In principle, there is nothing wrong with the Secretary of State having the power to compensate for the consequences of him or her making a final order under Clause 26. This is a probing amendment to ask my noble friend to provide what I might describe as a stream-of-consciousness description of how these powers are likely to be used.
For example, how is any compensation process to be initiated? Will it be at the request of the party which is the subject of a Clause 26 order or an offer by the Secretary of State? Is there an official or a body that will consider and assess such requests or will the decision flow from the Secretary of State’s desk? It may be that the expert person referred to by my noble friend Lord Lansley has a role to play here. What factors will be taken into account? Who decides the quantum of any compensation? Lastly but most important, how long is any process expected to take to complete?
If the subject of a Clause 26 order is a small, fast-growing company in urgent need of additional finance in the form of working capital to fund its expansion and the investment is suddenly blocked, any long delay may well prove terminal for the company as a whole. What about smaller companies where a single individual has spent a lifetime building up the business? Now he or she wishes to retire to enjoy the benefits of years of toil. Such a sale is then blocked on grounds of national security. What compensation or redress is available? It would be helpful if my noble friend could explain how this will work. In the meantime, I beg to move.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, I support the amendments in this group, which, as usual, the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, has done a very good job of introducing. I was particularly drawn to the notion of streamlining, as suggested in Amendment 48A. I admit that my interests are probably wider than in this particular instance, but what we are dealing with here is a situation where there may already have been a previous notification and much of the same information might be needed again. If this is thought too wide, in that it goes on for ever so that it is hard to believe that updating might not be required, perhaps the streamlining could be for a certain period and, as the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, also suggested, on the condition that nothing else has changed or, perhaps as an alternative, that one has to notify only what changes have been made.
This also raises the question of how much record-keeping the Government are going to undertake. I raised a somewhat similar query last week when I was thinking about licences and an investment agreement that covered options for licensing and whether they could be covered at once or, as perhaps this amendment envisages, there could be some kind of streamlining. However, the response from the Minister was that each instance had to be dealt with on its own. That would be a great shame from the industry side of things. That is no way to build up, if you like, intelligence, and for that to work both for the department and industry in helping to make it simpler to get through these notifications and to understand what is going on.
Looking at how a lot of notifications are made on a precautionary basis—much of the interest in the Bill is about making sure that an acquisition is safe—if an acquisition has already been cleared as being not of interest in response to a voluntary notification, for example, is it then sold on again? Is it safe to assume that, if there has been no significant change in activity but it was felt previously to have fallen within the definitions, it is safe to go ahead again with a voluntary activity? That is because again there will otherwise be a temptation to think that safety requires another notification. I would have thought that it was in everyone’s interests to cut down on the number of voluntary notifications.
Amendment 67B is self-evident, given that the “reasonable in all circumstances” provision must cover not only any urgency perceived by government but also the facilities at the disposal of the person. One interesting point that I would like to make here, although it goes a little beyond what the amendment is all about, is that Clauses 19 and 20 bear some resemblance to clauses in the Internal Market Act 2020, which were in turn lifted from the CMA information requirements. If the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, was answering this —although it is not—I am sure there would be a recollection that I recalled bitterly that those conditions were inappropriate. It is interesting to see that, in what might be called rather stronger situations, a slightly lighter touch is nevertheless being adopted here; that is, when individuals are involved in something that is necessarily of a security interest. Perhaps that reflects some recognition by the Government that people who have done no wrong should not be subjected to overly coercive requirements as though they were wrongdoers. That is a comment on an aspect of this part of the Bill, rather than in direct relation to the amendments.
I support these amendments. I was not sure what the noble Lord was going to say on the financial clause. Some very good points have been made, but I tend to be of the view that if the Government’s requirements have caused disaster to befall a company through delay, there should be a mechanism for compensation. However, how that is to operate needs to be made clear.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. I shall speak briefly to this group because my focus is solely on the final provision, which is that Clause 30 should not stand part of the Bill. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, for drawing our attention to this issue.
The whole subject of government spending, in particular where it relates to contracts but also to government aid, is now a matter of great public interest and concern. It is therefore important that this whole area should be given a great deal more attention and focus. We have seen, through our concern about international trade deals, the way in which companies carrying out their business and taking risks, which is supposed to be our economic model, have sought to attain compensation for, for example, government decisions about environmental matters or public health. We need to be concerned about the links in this, in particular as regards the ISDS arrangements, which I have debated with other Members of your Lordships’ House.
I would also ask the Minister if, either today or perhaps in the future, he would spell out how the Government see this working, especially what the mechanisms would be, and put a specific question to him about democracy and transparency. Clause 3 states that this legislation is to cover spending of £100 million or more. How has that figure been arrived at? Given that we are talking about government money, should it not perhaps be lower?
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. I support the amendments in this group and I am delighted to have the opportunity to speak to the proposal that Clause 30 should not stand part.
The impact assessment sets out graphically what the financial implications of the measures in this Bill will be. It states that the costs are to be found in two main areas where the new regime could incur additional costs, notably additional administrative costs and the potential impact of a new regulatory regime on investment decisions. Of course, what we do not know are the known unknowns of possible investments, particularly in infrastructure, that may be cancelled. I am delighted to see that my noble friend Lord Grimstone is the Minister to reply, given his background with the Trade Bill. However, do the Government have any idea what the implications might be?
I understand that the Government have put a figure in the cost-benefit analysis of the costs to business and the Government together being, on average, between £26.2 million and £73.1 million per year. My understanding was that, when we were in the European Union, we attracted more foreign direct investment than any other EU country, and that, as of 2019, we currently have the seventh highest inward foreign direct investment flow, as the impact assessment tells us. I have some involvement in the OECD and water policy and note that,, in paragraph 168 of the impact assessment, we are told that:
“ The National Infrastructure Pipeline details long-term plans to invest over £400 billion (including £190 billion to be invested—”
this year—
“across 700 projects in water, energy and transport infrastructure. A large proportion of this would have been in conjunction with overseas investors.”
Water is attracting a high proportion of foreign investment, which the Treasury and the Government have consistently and rightly encouraged.
My noble friend Lord Hodgson, in his remarks on the question on whether Clause 30 stand part of the Bill asked a lot of the right questions regarding who will decide and so on. I should add a few other questions. Are these loan guarantees or indemnities recoverable and, if so, what would be the timeframe within which they would be recovered? I should also be interested to know from which budget the grants, loans and indemnities would come. The clause recognises the financial hit that many of the parties and investors might attract, which is welcome, but, as my noble friend Lord Hodgson identified, we do not find a great deal of information in the clause. There is no supporting schedule that one might normally expect in those circumstances and the Explanatory Notes say little. That is why I welcome the opportunity to ask those questions and I look forward to my noble friend’s responses when he sums up.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts in all his amendments. This House has an obligation to ensure that the Bill does everything possible to ameliorate the practical impact that it will have on business transactions. While most of the transactions will not, by the Government’s reckoning, engage national security issues, the fact is that they might do so and will inevitably result in a lot of precautionary notifications. We have to minimise the impact of the processes on ordinary investment decisions.
I particularly wanted to speak in respect of the question on whether Clause 30 stand part of the Bill and support what my noble friend Lord Hodgson said. It is extraordinary that a Bill about stopping certain transactions could have morphed into one whereby the Government will stuff public money into the pockets of one or more of the parties involved, with almost no explanation. As my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering has said, one will find nothing in the Explanatory Notes or any of the other documents around the Bill. There is no comparable power in relation to the activities of the Competition and Markets Authority. That is extraordinary because the Government have taken the decision-making power to themselves in respect of transactions. They can then use public money in almost any way they choose. At the very least, we are entitled to have some clarity on how the Government expect to use the power.
I expect that the other place will claim financial privilege if we try to do anything to the clause, but we should not be deterred because of that.
Lord Naseby (Con) [V]
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Hodgson for tabling the amendment because what is behind it is absolutely right, as a number of my noble friends have said in the debate. That is fine, particularly in a situation whereby we are hoping to set the environment in which new companies can be created. After the pandemic, we are highly likely to see a number of movements in that area that would not normally happen.
One area on which I have a slight query is the preference to be given to someone who has done it before, particularly if they are not a company but someone who is handling the matter. That gives an advantage over someone who has not done it before. Therefore, regarding the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, about a time limit or distance limit in terms of time, there needs to be some stop on that. Otherwise, an unfair advantage is given to one party over another.
Another element that I worry about a little, which covers security matters as much as anything, is that some people out there are enormously creative in terms of manoeuvring and so on. Two things may seem similar but can be yards apart—miles sometimes. Not all that is written on the outside packet of a product or company represents what is happening underneath.
While I support the broad thrust of my noble friend Lord Hodgson, I have those reservations and shall listen carefully to my noble friend on the Front Bench.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has coined another phrase that will run through this Bill—notably, “practical impact”. It is interesting that among those of us who have taken part in the debates on the Bill many have a practical understanding of what its impact could be. We have been in walks of life that have brought us into the investment community—not least the Minister himself—and we see the potential for major issues arising under the legislation because of the way in which it is drafted. This group of slightly disconnected amendments illustrates that. The noble Baroness, Lady Hodgson, and my noble friend Lady Bowles forensically took us through the amendment and Amendments 67B and 67C. I shall come to the question on whether Clause 30 should stand part of the Bill in a moment.
However, the amendment is definitely the kind of red tape-busting amendment that we need. My noble friend Lady Bowles said that we needed provisions that actually met the needs of the investment community and were tailored to it. The amendment is a classic example of what could be done in terms of making sure that we do not have a situation in which companies have to make notification after notification. The inter- twining of the mandatory and the voluntary notification aspects provided for in the amendment is extremely important.
Then we come to Clauses 19 and 24, and Amendments 67B and 67C. The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, also has a way of coining a phrase, such as “stop the clock” provisions, which again give the Government all the cards and the poor old investor could be stuck for some period of time. As the noble Lord pointed out, the extent of the powers in terms of the periods are already quite long—75 working days or 15 working weeks for a national security assessment, or 30 working days or six working weeks for the initial screening period. We are not talking about modest periods but, rather like the referee in a rugby match, the Government can stop the clock and there is no control over that, as far as I can see. Therefore, we on these Benches firmly support those amendments.
On Clause 30 stand part, I liked the phrase of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes: “stuff these companies with public money”. If that was the case, it would be pretty egregious. Now that noble Lords have drawn our attention to it, we can see that the Explanatory Notes on Clause 30 are vanishingly small. There is virtually nothing in there: there is no control over what the Secretary of State does. He may have to give a report if it is over a mere £100 million—and what is £100 million but small change in the circumstances? The Secretary of State can make more or less any decision and then say, “We have made the decision, but we have plenty of cash that we can stuff into your pocket.” It is the opacity, the lack of reporting and any real control in Clause 30 to which the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, has rightly drawn attention. This is another area where I hope the Minister has something to say that not only gives quite a lot of further assurance but undertakes to create greater control over the powers in that clause.
After a bit, one gets a feeling for a Bill, and this one seems overly weighted in favour of the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State is more or less footloose and fancy free, and it is the poor old investor who will have to bear all the consequences.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
The lead amendment, Amendment 48A, would introduce a streamlined form for mandatory notification, and Amendment 67B would make any time limit for an information notice not less than three working days. That seemed a sensible—I think the word used was “pragmatic”—proposal.
Turning to the interesting Clause 30, the Minister in the other place said,
“final orders, in exceptional cases … when we are administering taxpayers’ money—may bring about financial difficulty for the affected parties”,—[Official Report, Commons, National Security and Investment Bill, 8/2/20; col. 288.]
which is why Clause 30 allows the Secretary of State to give financial assistance to an entity through a loan guarantee or indemnity as a consequence of making a final order.
It would be interesting to know a little more about the whole of this, as we have heard, and when a potential recipient might know that they were even in line for such help. How early in the process would it be indicated—not the actual decision but that that was a possibility? Or is it like Father Christmas appearing at the end?
As we have heard, the figure of £100 million is interesting, and it is interesting that there is no regulation-making or guidance-providing requirement such that guidance on the use of the power might have to be, if not agreed by Parliament, at least provided and open for debate and scrutiny. Will such guidance exist and how many cases a year are envisaged involving £100 million? Who would make the decision and how, as has been asked, and will it be reported in a timely manner—or, indeed, at all?
If this is the Government’s desired outcome, it seems that Clause 30 does not provide for any financial assistance in the case of an interim order. Perhaps the Minister could outline the thinking behind that, given that an interim order could also impose major costs on a British start-up or prevent an acquirer investing in one if it was thought that that investment might increase the acquirer’s level of influence unduly and trigger the next stage. There could also be the loss of a business-critical investment. It would be useful to know the thinking behind making money available to cover one sort of loss but not another. I look forward to hearing more of the thinking behind how this would work in the Minister’s response.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
My Lords, first, I thank my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts for tabling Amendments 48A, 67B and 67C. I hope that the transaction he referred to had a happy ending.
Amendment 48A seeks to make it explicit that a streamlined mandatory notification form may be provided for in regulations if a person has previously submitted a mandatory or voluntary notification to the Secretary of State. The Bill requires a mandatory notice to be submitted to, and receive clearance from, the Secretary of State prior to the completion of a notifiable acquisition. Clause 14(4) provides for the Secretary of State to prescribe the form and content of a mandatory notice in regulations.
The amendment would amend the regulation-making power to make it explicit that such regulations could provide for those who have previously submitted either a voluntary or a mandatory notification form to submit a streamlined form. I am pleased to say that we are completely aligned with noble Lords who want the process under the Bill to be as streamlined as possible. As the Minister for Investment, looking to the interests of investors, I completely endorse that. I reassure noble Lords that the regulation power as drafted already provides for that.
In addition, the Government are designing both the voluntary and mandatory notification forms with business in mind, while ensuring that the Secretary of State receives the information that he needs to decide whether to issue a call-in notice in relation to a proposed notifiable acquisition.
I stress that the Government are keen to ensure that all the forms are clear and simple to complete. A draft notification form was published for comment during the Commons passage of the Bill, and the Government continue to engage interested parties to test the ease of completing the forms and the clarity and relevance of the questions.
Amendment 67B seeks to create a floor for the minimum time which the Secretary of State must provide to a party for responding to an information note. The minimum floor proposed is three working days. As noble Lords will be aware, Clause 19 provides for an information note which the Secretary of State may issue to require any person to provide information which is proportionate in assisting the Secretary of State in carrying out his functions.
An information notice may include a time limit for providing the information and the manner in which the information must be provided. An information notice must specify the information sought and the purpose for which it is sought, as well as the possible consequences of not complying with the notice.
It will be in the Secretary of State’s interest that any party from whom information is required is provided appropriate time for collecting and providing such information, or else confirming that they do not possess it. Providing insufficient time for doing this will only lead either to incomplete information being provided or to information being provided in a form which is more difficult to analyse. It might also lead to unwelcome outcomes, such as a party undertaking due diligence as to whether they possess the relevant information, but there then being insufficient time for them to establish that with certainty.
It is with these issues in mind that I assume that my noble friend tabled his amendments. I reassure him that the Secretary of State will already have the appropriate incentives to allow appropriate time for a response, and that, more widely, public law duties will require him to take a reasonable approach in setting a time limit for responding to an information notice under the Bill.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord McNicol of West Kilbride) (Lab)
I have received two requests so far to speak after the Minister—from the noble Lords, Lord Fox and Lord Clement-Jones.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his thorough answers. In his answer on Clause 30, the Minister referred to “affected parties” and did not rule out the aggressor, as well as the target, from potential compensation—or mitigation, as I think the Minister described it. Am I right in assuming that the aggressor might also feel that they are eligible for mitigation?
Secondly, the nature of that mitigation seems to rule out the Government taking a share in a potential company, rather than simply bailing it out. Given that this Government have already spent $500 million taking a 20% share in OneWeb, which was not even strategic, why would they not leave themselves open to taking a share in a company so important that they felt they needed to prop it up?
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
I thank the noble Lord for that question. I will give him an additional example of where this power or type of power might be used. As I stressed earlier, it is not a general compensation power and will only be used in instances where the public interest, particularly national security interests, require it. As I also said earlier, any financial assistance would be subject to Treasury consent and would have to be shown to provide value for money. For example, if the Government provided a loan, it would normally have to be at market rates. The clause does allow the Secretary of State to bail out any business, either directly or surreptitiously, through soft loans.
Equally, the aim is not for this Bill to cause businesses financial distress, nor do we anticipate it doing so. The Secretary of State—this is the key point—may make a final order only if he “reasonably considers” that it is “necessary and proportionate” to address an identified national security risk.
Let me give an example. A case might arise whereby an asset has to be secured to prevent the national security risk of someone else getting hold of it. The Secretary of State might have imposed a final order that blocked a trigger event of a UK company that was working on unique or world-leading technology. If the company could not immediately find an alternative buyer, and if the collapse of the company could itself pose a national security risk, the Secretary of State could consider using this power. In such a situation, the Secretary of State may decide that he or she wishes to provide financial assistance to ensure that the company could continue operating until an alternative acceptable buyer was found. As such, this power will be used only in very tightly drawn circumstances where doing so is clearly in the national interest.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I know that the Minister is trying to be as helpful as possible by tying down the way Clause 30 will work. However, “tightly drawn” is not how I would describe its wording, so I assume he is really saying that it is the risk of judicial review hanging over the Secretary of State that keeps him honest in the circumstances. That is not a very good place to be when you are dealing with a Bill of this kind.
The other aspect is transparency. The noble Lord did not really explain the reason for the threshold of £100 million. He said it was for transactions—or compensation, if you like—and financial assistance under £100 million in aggregate would have to be reported for the annual review. However, if it was £99 million, say, that would not apply and it would not be subject to a separate report; it would just be aggregated along with all the financial assistance given over the course of the year. Why?
These powers are very wide; we need to know how they are being used and what direction the financial assistance is going in. Therefore, simply drawing a line at £100 million does not seem to be very satisfactory in the circumstances.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for his question, and I understand the concerns that he raised.
I will first deal with the £100 million figure. Of course, that is a lot of money for the Government to have to spend without having to report to Parliament. However, I assure noble Lords that, in order to offer this level of financial assistance, the situation would have to be truly extraordinary. The only circumstances I can envisage where the Secretary of State would need to use this power would be for some of the most significant nationally important firms. The significant nature of these firms means that they may be large, so the Government have put in this reasonable cap of £100 million. Personally, I would be very surprised if anything like that were spent. However, of course, any spending under this power will be subject to Treasury consent, as I have said—and the Treasury does not rush forward with money for departments in situations like this.
I have to say—and, in a sense, apologise—that the nature of national security makes it very hard to predict where some of these issues might arise. However, where they do and where national security is an issue, it is important that the power is there, provided that it is only ever used responsibly and respectively.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord McNicol of West Kilbride) (Lab)
As there are no further speakers, I call the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)
My Lords, I thank all those who have spoken in the debate, as we struggle—that is the only word—to find the balance between national security and investor rights, and do so against a background of what is practical and realistic in the marketplace. I thank my noble friend the Minister for his extensive reply and tell him that I did not have a happy ending: we got taken over after four months, but never mind.
He has made a valiant effort. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, used the rugby match “stop the clock” analogy; I will use a cricketing analogy. I think the Minister’s officials have written him a speech that is a series of forward defensive prods, and it is rather like watching Geoffrey Boycott nought not out at lunch—but he has made a hugely valiant effort along the way.
On Amendment 48A, he says that we are completely aligned because the regulations provide for a streamlined procedure. Of course they do, but it will never happen because, unless something is written there, people will say, “Why go there, Minister? Why not just have the same old procedure we have always had?”
On Amendments 67B and 67C, I am not quite sure what appropriate incentives the Secretary of State had in mind to work the system appropriately. To be candid, it is unrealistic to say that judicial review is a possibility when you are working to the timetable these sorts of things will have to work to: it is not in touch with the reality of the marketplace.
On Clause 31, other noble Lords have made the relevant points. My noble friend the Minister made a determined effort to explain, but the loopholes and opportunities for difficulties with this are great. His example was that, if a firm’s takeover were to be blocked, help might have to be given until another buyer could be found. He knows better than any of us that, once a firm is known to be in trouble, any other offers will be very low indeed; the differential between someone selling on the uptick and when they know that the firm is a wounded bird will be very great indeed.
There is a big question to be answered about that, which he is much more familiar with than I am, of trying to meld together the realities of the marketplace with the needs of national security. We have not yet got the balance right. We have been advised by a number of leading law firms, and a number of Members of the Committee have practical experience. I cannot believe that we are wrong in everything that we are saying and that all the law firms are wrong. I cannot believe that some of the things that have been put forward are not worthy of much closer and further assessment. We are now in the territory of, “Are they fit for purpose?” “Oh yes, they are”, “Oh no they’re not”. I want the opportunity to go away, talk to the people who advised us, see what the Minister and his officials say, and then decide whether we should come back to these and other amendments at the next stage of the Bill.
In the meantime, I thank the Minister for the long speech that he made, and all other noble Lords who have spoken, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Noakes
Member’s explanatory statement
This would require the Secretary of State to make a decision on whether to accept a mandatory notification within 5 working days to give more certainty to those who wish to progress notifiable acquisitions.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I shall also speak to Amendments 53, 62 and 65. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, and my noble friend Lord Lansley, for adding their names to all these amendments, and the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, who has added his name to Amendments 49 and 62.
These amendments address some aspects of the length of time for which transactions might be caught up in the processes under the Bill. They are probing amendments for today, to understand what is driving the approach to the timing of the early stages of this Bill’s processes, but they are against a background that parties to transactions must be confident that their transactions will be dealt with speedily and efficiently, whether they are in the mandatory notification category or are voluntarily notified.
I remind my noble friend the Minister that there is much scepticism, around the Committee and outside the House, about the volume of transactions likely to be caught up in these processes when the Bill becomes law. Most of us believe that very large numbers of transactions will be notified, particularly on a precautionary basis under the voluntary procedure. If the UK is to keep its reputation as a good place to invest and do business, we cannot afford to let these processes, set up to protect national security, end up being a major barrier to investment.
A mandatory notice given under Clause 14(5) requires the Secretary of State to decide, as soon as “practicable”, whether to accept or reject the notice. Similar wording applies to voluntary notifications by virtue of Clause 18(4). My Amendments 49 and 62 replace
“as soon as reasonably practical”
with “five working days”. This should be the easiest part of the notification procedure for the Secretary of State to deal with, and a loose formulation such as
“as soon as reasonably practical”
gives no certainty to the parties to a transaction. The Secretary of State should be able to make the preliminary judgments on whether to reject the notification or trigger the review period, which will result either in a call-in notice or a notification that no further action will be taken.
Amendments 53 and 65 deal with the review period of 30 working days in which the Secretary of State gets to decide whether to issue a call-in notice once he notifies an applicant that he has accepted a notification under the mandatory or voluntary notification procedure. A decision to issue a call-in notice is not the end of the process; it is the start of the process of the Secretary of State deciding whether to approve a transaction. The question is: how long does it take to work out that there are issues which suggest that close examination is required? This review period is not, or should not be, a part of the period of assessment, which is also specified at 30 working days, under Clause 23, with the possibility of an extension of a further 45 working days. The Clause 14 and 18 review periods should be as short as possible. A case has not been made for 30 working days—six whole weeks—just to decide that a transaction should be looked at in more depth under the call-in process.
On our last day in Committee, we had a run around the issues when my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, spoke to amendments which would have introduced a fast-track procedure. My noble friend Lord Grimstone of Boscobel said that the 30 working days was worked out by officials based on
“past cases and mock scenarios”.—[Official Report, 9/3/21; col. GC 616.]
I hope my noble friend the Minister can tell the Committee how Ministers got comfortable with this. Was it subjected to independent scrutiny or challenge, for example, by using red teaming? My noble friend Lord Grimstone, who is not speaking to this group of amendments, will know from his own career in the Civil Service that there is no incentive for officials to be anything but ultra-cautious on things such as timetables.
My noble friend Lord Grimstone said on the previous Committee day that he expected many transactions to be cleared within a six-week period, and it was not a target. I suspect that my noble friend temporarily forgot what it was like to be a civil servant. There is no reward for speed and no penalty for taking whatever time the law allows. It is fair to say that the investment community will have little faith in the process being speedy with such extraordinary time limits being enshrined in law.
I also draw my noble friend the Minister’s attention to the points raised by my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley in respect of insolvency: administrators and liquidators must act speedily if they are to preserve value as well as protect viable businesses and jobs. I would add to that situations of corporate financial stress which can occur before formal insolvency remedies are invoked. For example, if a company cannot raise new debt or equity until it can be sure that it can sell a part of its business, a delay of six or more weeks, even assuming that no security issues result in a call-in notice, might in turn be enough to cause the business to go under. My noble friend Lord Grimstone did not answer those points last week; I hope my noble friend Lord Callanan can today. I beg to move.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend Lady Noakes for introducing this group of amendments. She has explained very well how we want to ensure that the greatest possible certainty and the least possible delay intrudes into these processes for investors. I have four amendments in this group. Amendment 51 probably relates to the next group so, if the Minister is content, I do not propose to speak to Amendment 51 now. It is almost consequential on Amendments 50 and 63 in the next group, and is linked to Amendment 50, so I will not refer to it now.
My Amendments 54, 64 and 66 are rather like my noble friend’s amendment in trying to explore much more specifically how these timetables work. Amendment 54 relates to mandatory notifications, and Amendment 66 to voluntary notifications, but they would have the same effect. Amendment 54 looks at the review period, which Clause 14(9) says is
“30 working days beginning with the day on which the notification under subsection (8)(a) is given to the person who gave the mandatory notice.”
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, I added my name to the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, as they are yet another way to incrementally reduce the various points of uncertainty. It is notable how many of these can be found as we go through the Bill. As the noble Baroness explained, these amendments relate to the time for accepting a mandatory notice, from which other time periods can also flow, and then shortens the time for deciding whether to issue a call-in notice. As she explained, this is not meant to be part of the assessment and can therefore be short.
Now that the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, has explained his take on solving what is basically the same problem, I wonder whether it is better to look at the whole period, or to keep it cut up into segments so that people know where they are as they go along. As the noble Lord explained, it is very important not to start the process with two “as soon as practicable” requirements, because that just looks like a bottomless pit.
I will not repeat what has been said, and I am sure I can anticipate the Minister’s answer, but it seems that at every point in the Bill, the balance of convenience rests with the Secretary of State and the department. It does not make for a good business environment when there is no pressure put on the department. It reminds me of conversations I had not that long ago when I was chairing a regulatory strategy group looking at doing business in China. The repeated refrain from the business side was, “How do we get legal certainty?” The answer was always that you cannot; it is when the party decides. That is where this Bill puts us, and I fear the collateral damage it will create. I regret that I have to use the language of warfare and bombs to bring that home, but this should be made much more business-friendly.
Lord Naseby (Con) [V]
My Lords, I shall be very brief. I am full of admiration for my dear noble friend Lady Noakes for the thoroughness with which she has trawled through the Bill and these particular aspects. I have been in and have knowledge of a situation of a mandatory notice—I make no comment on the other aspect—and my noble friend is absolutely right: we need certainty in life. Whether five working days is the appropriate length of time I personally am not able to judge, but it seems entirely reasonable, and if its sponsors and their experienced colleagues from the City believe in it, I am more than happy to go with it. It does not seem to allow for any wriggle room; the worst thing in politics and making law is to allow for wriggle room, so I am absolutely behind Amendment 49.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, outlined very clearly what this group is about. She may not be entirely surprised that I am coming from the opposite angle, although we can perhaps agree that this is a question of balancing public good—making decisions about national security—versus private profit and convenience. The financial and other implications that might arise from more time being taken over whether or not to progress are weighed against both the chance of missing something important and using significant public resources, making a fuller assessment unnecessary.
I am here, rather unusually, to defend the Bill against the amendments. Broadly, in this debate we have heard a great deal of uncertainty about how the Bill, once enacted, will work: how the details will play out in practice, how many firms will be involved and what resources will be required. I am not sure how five days was arrived at as a firm deadline, given that there is such uncertainty about the actual operation of the Bill. As it currently stands, deciding whether to accept a mandatory notification should take as long as it takes; it should not be subject to an arbitrary—a very short —deadline.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, these amendments are very much of a piece with many of the amendments we have heard in Committee—all designed to create a much tighter and less discretionary regime. That is quite right in the case of these amendments, which one would have thought the Government would find extremely straightforward to accept.
Under Clause 14, the Bill currently envisages that the investment security unit will reach an initial decision as to whether to clear a notified transaction or to call it in for a detailed assessment within 30 working days of acceptance of the notification as complete. As the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, said in her excellent introduction, there will be a significant number of transactions that fall within the scope of the mandatory notification requirements—they are set out in the impact assessment—due to the target’s activities being in a specified sector but which clearly do not raise national security concerns.
Timescales for decision-making are currently extremely unpredictable. Even before defined timescales for decision-making kick in, the Secretary of State has an initial period, as has been described, to decide whether a notification has been submitted in the correct form. The Secretary of State must make this decision as soon as reasonably practicable. That is a set of weasel words which suit the convenience of the Secretary of State, not the investor.
This lack of clear timescales creates uncertainty for investors, universities and businesses, making domestic and foreign investment in university spin-outs less attractive, while disincentivising industry partners from engaging in collaborative R&D. These are all the downsides of uncertainty, as we have heard throughout this Committee. In addition, the Secretary of State has 30 days in which to review the notice after acceptance. Especially in circumstances of fast-moving corporate finance transactions, 20 days, as proposed, seems much more proportionate. Similarly, under Clause 18, relating to the voluntary notification procedures, greater certainty would be achieved if these amendments, regarding when a voluntary notice is accepted and setting out how long the review period should be, were included.
The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, made an extremely good point: these provisions, where the timescales say “as soon as practicable” or 30 days, will be adhered to, to the letter. They are not going to be done speedily. Civil servants are going to interpret them extremely conservatively, as my own profession—the legal profession —would, because the penalties of getting it wrong will be seen to be too high. People will not want to get it wrong, whether they are in the position of giving advice to the Secretary of State or advising investors. That is why we need very clear provisions in the Bill, and we are certainly not there yet.
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, for her Amendment 49, to which I have added my name. It leads this group of probing amendments which focuses on one theme: how long will businesses and organisations have to wait in suspense for responses from the Government concerning the notification procedures? This theme stems in part from the fear that the Government will be swamped by notifications, with the CBI suggesting that the department could have to deal with up to 10,000 of them each year. Some discipline needs to be set up from the outset that will require the Government to keep up.
Of course, we support the aims of the Bill to monitor, guarantee and protect our UK national security, so in this probing group I have not added my name to Amendments 53 or 65, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. This is not because I specifically disagree with her—quite the contrary. However, it can be appreciated that some notifications will take more time than others to review, with some of them likely to raise more concern—alarm, even—thus requiring more extensive considerations and checks. The length of the period is a maximum duration, not a target for delay and procrastination. It should be understood how financial takeovers can become incredibly complex, so it is entirely correct that complexity is reviewed sufficiently and deeply. However, perhaps the Minister could answer as to whether a full six weeks may be needed and whether a four-week period could be maintained.
Overall, it is understood that unnecessary delays can lengthen anxieties that legitimate investments may fall through and exclusivity terms expire, leading to research partnerships breaking down or, in worst-case scenarios, businesses running out of cash and finance facilities. This heightens the requirement for the new unit to be properly and adequately resourced. This could be enforced through transparency about the turnaround times for notifications. These amendments also pair up neatly with Clause 14 on mandatory notifications and Clause 18 on the voluntary notification procedure. As the wording in the Bill is consistent across both alternatives, are the two distinctive categories so similar in importance and workload to require symmetry in their determinations?
With these thoughts, I have added my name to Amendment 62 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, giving the Secretary of State five working days instead of the nebulous “reasonably practicable” length of time. What does “reasonably practicable” actually mean to a Government? It is vague for SMEs and an elastic piece of time for the department. The Law Society has raised concerns, especially on the voluntary notice procedure in Clause 18, as “practicable” implies that a degree of delay will be acceptable and is to be tolerated. How does the Minister react to that? Can he explain whether five working days could be practicable and, if not, why not?
Lord Callanan (Con)
I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this brief debate, particularly my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Lansley for their contributions. I will start with Amendments 49, 62 and 64, which for the convenience of the Committee I will take together.
As drafted, the Bill provides that the Secretary of State must decide whether to reject or accept a mandatory or voluntary notice
“as soon as reasonably practicable”
after receiving it. He must then inform relevant parties of his decision as soon as is practicable. Amendment 49 would require the Secretary of State to decide whether to accept or reject a mandatory notice within five working days, as opposed to the current drafting. Amendment 62 would have the same effect, but for voluntary notices. Amendment 64 would require the Secretary of State to notify each relevant person whether a voluntary notice has been accepted within five working days of it being accepted, as opposed to the current drafting of doing so as soon as practicable.
As I am sure noble Lords would agree, mandatory and voluntary notifications should include the necessary information to enable the Secretary of State to determine whether to call in an acquisition for further scrutiny. Once a notification is accepted, the Secretary of State will be required to issue any call-in notice within 30 working days or else clear the acquisition to proceed. It is therefore important that the Secretary of State is able to reject a notification if it does not meet the requirements specified in the legislation. Of course, it is important that all decisions made under this regime by the Secretary of State are made promptly.
I therefore assure the Committee that the Secretary of State will make great efforts to ensure that decisions to accept or reject notifications are made quickly and that parties are notified in a timely way. In fact, one of my officials was keen to point out that the record so far for responding to informal guidance is 19 minutes. Civil servants will of course have different ways of going about it and will pursue different speedy methods, so I am sure that will not always be the case. Nevertheless, we will endeavour to reach these decisions to provide help and guidance to businesses and companies as speedily as possible.
As noble Lords will be aware, the Government intend to lay regulations setting out the form and content of the types of notification soon after Royal Assent. The draft notification form was published alongside the introduction of the Bill to help interested parties understand what information is likely to be required. Parties will therefore have clarity, and certainty about the information that they should provide when notifying the Secretary of State. We therefore expect notifications to be generally of high quality and, where this is the case, the Secretary of State expects to be able to decide quickly and then inform parties of decisions to accept their notices, in many cases, clearly, more quickly than the five working-day limit proposed.
However, it is important that there is scope for flexibility in the relatively rare circumstances where more time may be needed. For example, a hostile actor could intentionally provide very large amounts of unnecessary information that would take many days to read through to establish that important information was missing or incorrect. Or there might be multiple parties involved in a particularly complex acquisition that had all submitted notifications. In the event that the notifications do not match up, more detailed verification may be needed. I would argue that it is better for the Secretary of State to take the time to ensure that he has the information that he needs at the start of the process rather than risk finding gaps in information later on.
I turn to Amendments 51, 54 and 66. I know that my noble friend Lord Lansley did not speak to Amendment 51, but it is in this grouping, so, if he will forgive me, I will address the issue at this point. Clause 14 provides for the mandatory notification procedure, including subsection (6), which sets out the grounds on which the Secretary of State may reject a mandatory notice, and subsection (9), which explains when the 30-working day “clock” for reviewing a mandatory notice begins. These amendments go to the heart of both matters, so let me address each of them briefly.
Amendment 51, to which my noble friend referred although he did not speak to it, would remove the third ground for the Secretary of State to reject a mandatory notice, which is where
“it does not contain sufficient information to allow the Secretary of State to decide whether to give a call-in notice in relation to the proposed notifiable acquisition”.
I imagine that noble Lords may well consider that the first two grounds—which enable the Secretary of State to reject a mandatory notice where it does not meet the requirements of this clause or as prescribed in regulations—will cover most bases. However, we must also ensure that an acquirer cannot meet the technical requirements of providing a notice by doing so in a limited way or with incomplete information. Noble Lords will appreciate that if, for instance—in a purely hypothetical example, I was required to fill in the name of my chief executive on a mandatory notice, the ISU would have a pretty good chance of working out who “Boris” was, but in the case of the chief executive of a small start-up company that might have been operating for only a few months, a mandatory notice that had the same information would provide little to go on. I understand that it is an outlandish example, but it illustrates why we must not prevent the Secretary of State rejecting notices from those who plainly look to game the system.
Amendment 54 would adjust the timing for the beginning of the 30-working day review period from, as now, the date on which the Secretary of State confirms acceptance of a mandatory notice to the date on which he received the notice. Amendment 66 would make the equivalent changes in respect of voluntary notices. I can assure my noble friend Lord Lansley and other noble Lords that in the vast majority of circumstances we expect to confirm acceptance quickly and to begin the clock on the review period. However, the process of initially determining whether a valid and complete notice has been submitted is separate from fuller screening of the acquisition itself. Some acquisitions are likely to be complicated and a significant amount of information may be provided as part of the mandatory notice. In these instances, it is conceivable that the investment security unit may need a short time to ascertain that the relevant information has been provided. None the less, the screening will not yet have begun and, accordingly, it is right that the clock does not do so either.
Amendments 53 and 65 would reduce the time available to the Secretary of State to screen mandatory and voluntary notifications from a maximum of 30 working days to 20. I mention “maximum” again because that is exactly what these deadlines represent. In many cases, we expect the Secretary of State to be able to review and clear notifications much more quickly. The question, therefore, is what is appropriate in more complex cases and whether the ISU may need to gather input and expertise from across Whitehall on those acquisitions. The total figure of 30 working days is not arbitrarily chosen by the Government. I apologise to my noble friend Lady Noakes for saying yet again that it reflects detailed work undertaken across Whitehall to test past cases and mock scenarios against the new regime—I repeat that because it is our position. Some acquisitions may involve complicated ownership structures; the technology and activities of the target entity may not be immediately clear, and the format of the acquisition itself may be unconventional. It is vital the Secretary of State has the necessary time to examine an acquisition and to make an informed decision.
I again commend my noble friend’s efforts to make the new regime even more nimble and fleet of foot, but I hope she will understand—even if she does not agree with me—why I am unable to accept these and other amendments that I have addressed in this group. Therefore, I hope that both my noble friends will choose not to press their amendments.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord McNicol of West Kilbride) (Lab)
My Lords, I have received no request to speak after the Minister, so I call the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. Important issues have been raised. I particularly like the idea behind my noble friend Lord Lansley’s Amendments 54 and 66, which would create one period in the initial phase rather than two or more. Taken overall, the various time periods throughout the Bill, including “as soon as reasonably practicable”, “30 working days”, an additional “45 working days” as well as the ability to stop the clock here and there, represent an extraordinary period of uncertainty to which a business transaction could be exposed. At the end of the day, the transaction might not even raise what are adjudged to be national security issues and many of those who go through the process are likely to end up being cleared. I liked the analogy drawn by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, with China, and this seeming a bit like “when the Party decides”: it is when BEIS decides that a transaction can be dealt with and cleared.
Thirty working days is a long period of time. We talked about it as six weeks. Six weeks is actually 42 working days. If you are in the private sector and doing an acquisition, your processes do not respect weekends. You would expect to be working right the way through, and I am not sure that we should expect any less from those in the Civil Service handling the processes. The new unit being set up may need to be completely re-engineered from the normal Civil Service way of doing things, which is clearly driving the assessment of the time limits involved. My noble friend the Minister again gave me the mock scenarios and detailed analysis by civil servants of the time they would like to take handling these things, but he did not answer my specific question as to whether that had been independently challenged, potentially by using red teaming, and whether the processes had been rethought from the perspective of how we give certainty to the business community, which needs to progress investment decisions.
My noble friend the Minister gave us the example of 19 minutes for informal guidance. That is a complete red herring, because it is informal guidance and not a decision made under any of the provisions of the Bill. Nobody will expect 19 minutes to be the answer for any of the mandatory procedures or voluntary notification procedures taken under this Bill.
I said that my amendments were probing, and I do not intend to take them forward today, but we need to step back and reflect on the cumulative impact of the time periods set out in the Bill on the way in which the UK is perceived as a good place to do business and to invest. If we lose that, we will lose the potential for continuing economic growth. Our economic growth has been boosted considerably by the inward investment that we have been able to attract. If we become a bad place to do business, this country will be hurt in many ways that are worse than might be feared in respect of national security implications. We will need to return to this in one way or another on Report, but, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Lansley
Member’s explanatory statement
The purpose of this amendment is to ensure that the requirement for information to support a decision by the Secretary of State will need to be specified in the Regulations.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, there are just two amendments in this group. They are both to the same purpose. As I explained previously, one relates to mandatory notifications, the other to voluntary notifications. My noble friend the Minister answered on Amendment 51 in his response to the previous group, but for my purposes it is linked to Amendment 50 in any case, so I will touch on it.
Amendments 50 and 63 essentially raise two questions. The first relates to circumstances where somebody gives a notice to the Secretary of State and they meet the requirements in the regulations—they have looked and said, “To give a notice to the Secretary of State, I have to tell the Secretary of State A, B, C, D”, or however many pieces of information. That should be specified in the regulations. As the Bill is drafted, the Secretary of State can then come back to them and say, “Yes, you provided all the information required under the regulations, but you didn’t provide us this further information, which would enable us to make a decision whether to accept or reject your notice.”
The purpose of these amendments is to say that we should not arrive at that situation. Somebody starting this process with a notice should be able to rely on the information specified in the regulations to accompany a notice being sufficient to start the process definitely, one way or the other. That is why Amendments 50 and 63 say what they do. As my noble friend Lord Callanan said in response to the previous group, the two initial points—does it meet the requirements of the section and the requirements prescribed in regulations?—should be enough, but the amendments would add, to make it absolutely clear,
“including as to the information required to be provided in relation to the notifiable acquisition”
or the trigger event in the case of a voluntary notification, so that there is no uncertainty about this. The regulations should say what information has to be provided. If it is provided, then the notice should be rejected or accepted.
The second question that arises from this is on voluntary notifications. Since it is not explained in the Bill, what happens if the Secretary of State receives a voluntary notification, decides that there is insufficient information, rejects it, sends a letter to the person who supplied the voluntary notification saying “You didn’t give me additional information X, Y or Z”, and the person concerned then decides not to bother? What would the Secretary of State do about this? It is not a notifiable acquisition. If it were the Secretary of State would have a degree of control, but on a voluntary notice there is no such control. I do not see what happens when a notice is rejected under those circumstances.
Perhaps when my noble friend replies on this short group he would also explain why notices should be rejected because people have not supplied the Secretary of State with information that he did not ask for, and what happens if somebody makes a voluntary notification, the Secretary of State rejects it and they then do nothing about it. I beg to move.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
I thank my noble friend Lord Lansley for tabling these two amendments. I would like to speak to Amendment 63, which gives me the opportunity to raise an issue raised with me, and I am sure with other noble Lords, by the Law Society of England. I put a direct question to the Minister in summing up this small group of amendments. Can he confirm that the Government have actually considered, and have regard to, the impact of the sheer large numbers of filings that they may receive on the new regime’s ability to dispense with these filings in a timely manner? My noble friend has done us a great service here by highlighting the level of information required in the first instance or that may be required at a later date.
The estimated volume of filings stated in the impact assessment, deemed to be between 1,000 and 1,830 transactions notified per year is, in the view of the Law Society, an underestimate. That is because, for reasons that my noble friend gave, there is likely to be a very large number of voluntary filings and requests for informal guidance, especially when the regime is new and businesses are accustoming themselves to its requirements. In my view, the Law Society has raised legitimate concerns, which are reflected in these two amendments. Can I have a reassurance that there will be sufficient resources to deal with the sheer number of requests that are expected to avoid delays and burdens for businesses, which could be avoided in this regard?
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
My Lords, I extend my thanks to my noble friend Lord Lansley for his Amendments 50 and 63. I shall deal first with a couple of points that have been made. If a voluntary notification is incomplete, it is not effective. That may mean that the Secretary of State may choose to exercise his call- in powers at some point in future in relation to that.
My noble friend Lady McIntosh asked whether we had underestimated the number of transactions that were likely to come before the unit. She referred to the work that the Law Society has done on that. All I can say is that we have thought about this carefully, and I am happy to repeat the assurance that we will make sure that the unit is fully resourced. If the number is greater than we anticipate, the resources of the unit will have to be expanded to cope with those greater numbers.
I extend my thanks again to my noble friend Lord Lansley for Amendments 50 and 63 which both relate to the information that must be provided as part of a notification. Clause 14 sets out the mandatory notification procedure and Clause 18 the voluntary notification procedure. Both clauses provide powers to the Secretary of State, by regulations, to prescribe the form and content of a mandatory notice and a voluntary notice respectively. Both clauses also provide that the Secretary of State may reject a notice where it does not meet the requirements of the clause, or the requirements prescribed by the regulations.
These amendments seek to make it clear that the Secretary of State can reject a mandatory or voluntary notice where information relating to either a notifiable acquisition or a trigger event has not been provided despite being specified as required in regulations. These amendments also seek, as a result, to ensure that any such regulations include a requirement to provide the information about the notifiable acquisition or trigger event needed to make a call-in decision.
I am happy that I can reassure my noble friend, I hope completely, that the Secretary of State absolutely intends to use the regulation-making powers under both these clauses to prescribe both the form and content of mandatory notices and voluntary notices. Indeed, our view is that the regime simply cannot work and will not work without such regulations being made. The primary entry mechanisms into the regime are based on notification, so it is vital that we are clear with businesses and investors about what information they must provide and in what format.
That is why, ahead of Committee in the other place, we published a draft of the information likely to be required as part of a mandatory notice or voluntary notice. I continue to welcome comments from noble Lords about that draft, but I think I can reassure my noble friend that information about notifiable acquisitions and trigger events will certainly form part of such requirements.
With that said, I fear that my noble friend’s amendments would therefore be duplicative in this instance. Clause 14(4) and Clause 18(4) allow the Secretary of State to make these regulations. Clause 14(6) and Clause 18(6) allow the Secretary of State to reject a notice where it does not meet the requirements specified in the regulations. The Government consider that this approach provides the powers that the Secretary of State needs to reject a notice where insufficient or the wrong information has been provided, whatever the final notification forms look like.
I hope my noble friend is reassured by my explanation of these clauses and the Government’s general approach on this matter, and I hope, therefore, that he feels able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Lansley (Con)
I am grateful to my noble friend. I think he slightly confused two things together at the end, in talking about insufficient or wrong information. If there is wrong information, then clearly a notice can be rejected. The question about the sufficiency of information is the point I am coming back to. My noble friend was quite clear on—and I think it is very clearly set out—what it is the Government expect to be provided by way of information for these notices. The question is: why should they have a power to reject a notice on grounds that they require more information beyond what has been asked for in the material that has already been published? That is the power they are taking.
If the Government say—as my noble friend Lord Callanan said—one must set out who the chief executive is, and someone puts their given name but not their family name, they can reject it. The point is, however, that that was specified in the regulations. The question is: does it require his other information, and what is the other information? People might reasonably say, “You have rejected it because I did not provide the information that you required, but you didn’t tell me you required it.” That is my problem.
I will go away and think about this a bit more; maybe it is not important enough for us to persist with. For the moment at least, I will make my point and beg leave to withdraw Amendment 50.
Lord Butler of Brockwell
“( ) Before a final order is made, the Secretary of State must share with the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament any intelligence relevant to such an order, and a final order shall not be made before the Intelligence and Security Committee has made a report to Parliament on the order.”
Lord Butler of Brockwell (CB)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, has added his name to this amendment, although he is not able to speak today. I shall also speak to other amendments in this group.
Something strange is happening here. The Bill gives the Government extraordinary powers to intervene in, and possibly prevent, private sector commercial transactions. I accept that there may be occasions on which the Government need to protect British industries against incursions from foreign companies, particularly if those companies are under the control of unfriendly states, but these powers are extraordinary and their exercise, and the justification for that exercise, will often depend on intelligence information that the Government cannot, naturally, make public. How then is Parliament going to scrutinise and the Government to justify the use of these powers in those circumstances?
In the Intelligence Services Act 1994, the Conservative Government established a parliamentary mechanism precisely for this purpose, by setting up the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament. The coalition Government reinforced the committee’s powers in the Justice and Security Act 2013. That committee comprises Members of both Houses of Parliament with experience of intelligence who are admitted within the ring of secrecy so that they can have access to highly classified information and advise the Government and Parliament on its use. I declare an interest, having served on the committee for five years. Yet the Government have refused to provide, in the Bill, for the ISC to have a role in scrutinising the use of the powers in it. It is as if the Government have acquired a watchdog, yet are unwilling to let it bark just when it is needed.
This point was raised by the Opposition parties in the other place, and the Minister produced repeated excuses for denying the ISC an explicit role. Ultimately, the Minister said that the ISC could review the annual report which the investment security unit established by the Bill is required to make to Parliament. That made it necessary for the chairman of the ISC, Dr Julian Lewis, to intervene and say that the annual report would be a public document, which could not, by definition, contain classified information. The Minister’s reply to that was that the ISC could subsequently ask the Secretary of State for such classified information.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, with the support of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, has tabled Amendment 82, requiring that the Secretary of State should publish a separate annual report to the ISC which can include classified information. The noble Lord, Lord West, who is your Lordships’ current representative on the ISC, has put down an amendment, with the support of the noble Lords, Lord Rooker and Lord Campbell of Pittenweem, requiring classified information to be contained in a confidential annexe to the annual report of the investment security unit, to be made available only to the ISC. I will support these amendments if my own amendment is not acceptable, but if I may respectfully say so, an annual report after the event involves examining the operation of the stable door after several horses may have bolted.
My own amendment requires that, when a transaction is called in, any relevant intelligence should be made available to the ISC, and the ISC should make a report to Parliament before the Secretary of State makes a final order. The assessment period of 30 days under the Bill, extendable to 45 days, provides adequate time for the ISC to assess the intelligence provided to it, take evidence and give its opinion to Parliament. It seems to me unlikely that there will be so large a volume of transactions actually called in as to make this an unsustainable burden. In this House, we are used to Select Committees such as the Delegated Powers Committee and the Constitution Committee scrutinising Bills in short order and reporting on them to the House before the Bills go forward. If Parliament is to have any effective scrutiny of the use of the powers in the Bill, this seems preferable—if it is practicable—to an annual report after final orders have been made.
It is a matter for speculation why the Government have been so coy about giving the ISC an explicit role in the Bill. Paragraph 8 of the memorandum of understanding agreed between the Government and the ISC after the 2013 Act, says that
“only the ISC is in a position to scrutinise effectively the work of the Agencies and of those parts of Departments whose work is directly concerned with intelligence and security matters.”
Those were the words agreed between the Government and the ISC. The irony is that the ISC’s role is potentially helpful to the Government. Only the ISC can have access to the intelligence information justifying the Government’s intention to intervene. To give an example, I recall that, when I was a member of the ISC, there was a press story that GCHQ was piggybacking on the American NSA to obtain intelligence that it could not obtain under its own powers. The ISC examined the records and was able to reassure Parliament and the public that the reports were false.
Is the reluctance on the part of the Government a hangover from their embarrassment over publication of the ISC’s report on Russian interference before the 2017 election, or is it a result of government pique about the committee’s appointment of its own chairman in place of the Government’s nominee? Whatever it is, it is difficult to understand what the Intelligence and Security Committee is there for if not to have a role on behalf of Parliament and the public in sensitive matters of this sort. I beg to move.
Lord West of Spithead (Lab)
My Lords, I am speaking to my Amendment 78 and will touch on Amendment 70 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Butler, to which he has just spoken, as well as Amendment 82 in the name of my noble friend Lady Hayter and Amendment 86 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley. All relate to the same concern and try to resolve it in slightly different ways. I also thank the noble Lords, Lord Campbell of Pittenweem and Lord Rooker, for their support, and the noble Lords, Lord King and Lord Janvrin, for having expressed support for the measure in broad terms. It is rather good that this is the first amendment this afternoon being raised from this side rather than from the Government; that is quite interesting I think.
Noble Lords will be aware it was the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament which first raised the fact—and the alarm—that when the Government were considering major investment decisions, national security concerns were not being taken into account. There are those in this House who served on the committee at that time and should be thanked for their work bringing this issue to light. This was some seven years ago, and noble Lords will know from my previous interventions on this topic that I strongly support the need for this Bill, as I think all of us do in this Chamber.
However, there is a glaring hole in the legislation which the Government have not yet resolved: namely, there is no meaningful oversight. This Bill has national security at its heart, yet the Government will not let anyone oversee this secretive heart. The Minister has said that the ISC—the one body Parliament expressly established to oversee secret matters on its behalf—will not be given proper oversight of this secret activity. The offer that the ISC can scrutinise the public report and ask for any further information it wants is not good enough. The public annual report is just that, as the noble Lord, Lord Butler, said—it is public. Parliament itself can therefore scrutinise it, so there is no role for the ISC, which is designed to look at secret reports, not public ones. The Minister says that the ISC can request further information. But there is no obligation for that information to be provided. The ISC can only require information from those bodies that fall within its remit, and the investment security unit is not one of those bodies.
Without specific provision, there is a possibility that, even if this Government are well intentioned—which I am sure they are—future Governments may refuse to provide such information to the ISC. Consequently, I am afraid the Minister’s proposals do not meet the requirement for proper oversight. Worse than that, they represent a step backwards from the current oversight provisions. The unit that currently takes these decisions—the investment security group in the Cabinet Office—is overseen by the ISC. By moving this activity to the investment security unit in BEIS, the Government are actively removing it from ISC oversight. I am sure that this cannot be what the Government intend. This is the glaring hole in the Bill that we must fix, and my amendment does that. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Rooker and Lord Campbell of Pittenweem, for putting their names to this amendment.
Clause 61 mandates the Secretary of State to produce an annual report to Parliament. The information in that report is limited and obviously will not include any sensitive security information. My amendment to Clause 61 will add to that annual report further categories of information: details about the jurisdiction of acquirers; the nature of national security concerns raised; the particular technological or sectoral expertise being targeted; and any other information that the Secretary of State deems instructive on the nature of national security threats uncovered in the new regime.
The amendment then provides a mechanism for the Secretary of State to redact any of this information from the public report, should it be deemed damaging to national security. That information must be moved into a classified annexe, ensuring that, if Parliament cannot scrutinise it, the ISC can, on behalf of Parliament. This is an approach already used by organisations such as the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016.
The amendment proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, provides for a second separate annual report to the ISC. It seeks to achieve the same outcome as mine—namely, oversight of the security matters at the heart of the Bill. My understanding was that Ministers in the other place had found the annexe solution more palatable, in that it would minimise the reporting burden on the new unit. However, the ISC itself is ambivalent as to whether there is a secret annexe or a separate report; the key is that there is reporting on the security aspects, in whatever form that takes.
This is not a power grab by the ISC—far from it; we have more than enough work to do as it is, and nor do we have any interest in the wider work of BEIS. It is only the intelligence and security work of the new unit, which is, after all, our job. The ISC was expressly established to scrutinise the intelligence and security activities of government—as the noble Lord, Lord Butler, said—initially, within the three intelligence agencies, and then from 2013, throughout the full national security apparatus. That change in 2013 was a result of the Justice and Security Act. The long title of that Act refers to
“activities relating to intelligence or security matters”,
and these are set out in a memorandum of understanding under the Act, which was then deemed to be a practical vehicle for listing those bodies overseen by the committee, since it could be easily kept up to date. This was best explained by the then Security Minister, who, during the passage of the Act, said:
“Things change over time. Departments reorganise. The functions undertaken by a Department one year may be undertaken by another the following year.”—[Official Report, Commons, Justice and Security Bill Committee, 31/1/13; col. 98.]
And that is exactly what has happened.
Under this Bill, intelligence and security activity is moving from the Cabinet Office to BEIS, yet the Government have not updated the MoU to include it. They have not honoured their clearly stated intention that the ISC should have oversight of all government intelligence and security activities, and it is not just this unit; other units have been set up in other departments to carry out national security and they have not yet been added to the ISC’s MoU. This is not good enough.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, I will speak briefly to my Amendment 86 in this group and express my support for Amendments 78 and 79, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead. I will not repeat his arguments; I thought they were compelling. Amendment 86 would put the investment security unit of the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy into the remit of the Intelligence and Security Committee in the Justice and Security Act.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for supporting the amendment; I am sure he agrees with me on this. We would not need it if Ministers would permit adding the investment security unit of BEIS to the memorandum of understanding, as part of the remit of the Intelligence and Security Committee. If forced to, it would be better to amend the Act to put it into the remit, rather than to put something in the legislation that directly impacts the memorandum of understanding. That is not the way that the MoU should work.
I remind your Lordships that the memorandum of understanding, which was published with the annual report in 2013-14, said:
“The ISC is the only committee of Parliament that has regular access to protectively marked information that is sensitive for national security reasons: this means that only the ISC is in a position to scrutinise effectively the work of the Agencies and of those parts of Departments whose work is directly concerned with intelligence and security matters.”
That is precisely the point being made here: the ISC must complement the other committees, including the BEIS Committee, in its scrutiny of this work. As the footnote to the MoU said:
“This will not affect the wider scrutiny of departments such as the Home Office, FCO and MOD by other parliamentary committees.”
It is consistent with scrutiny of activity generally but, for scrutiny relating to intelligence and security matters to happen, confidential material may need to be supplied to the ISC and the ISC needs to have it added to its remit. I hope my noble friend can give us that assurance, if not today, on Report.
Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)
My Lords, I too shall begin by declaring an interest, having been a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee for seven years, five of which were enhanced, if I may say, by the presence of the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell. I have a further advantage because I have been listening, along with other noble Lords, to the three preceding speeches in this debate, which have set out the principles clearly and powerfully against what appears to be intransigence on the part of the Government. At this point, therefore, I shall adopt what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, with which I agree entirely. I am also influenced to some extent by the fact that your Lordships have been exemplary in the dispatch of business today. I have been watching from the pavilion, as it were, and it seems that the conduct of this Committee stage so far could be recommended or possibly even compelled for the Committee stages of other Bills.
There is nothing that I can usefully add to the arguments put forward by the three preceding speakers, but I can make one further contribution. In advance of the debate today, I consulted the 2013 report of the Intelligence and Security Committee entitled Foreign Involvement in the Critical National Infrastructure. The noble Lord, Lord Butler, and I were members of the committee at the time and the chair was Sir Malcolm Rifkind. Among other things, the committee applied its mind to the issue of Huawei, in particular to its entry into the United Kingdom market and the fact that in doing so it entered into contractual arrangements with BT. What happened was that BT did as it was supposed to do and advised the relevant government departments of the position, but the officials then communicated what had been brought to their attention by BT not to any of the Ministers with responsibility for national security but to the then Secretary of State at the Department of Trade and Industry. That was done on the ground that the only thing which appealed to the officials to draw to ministerial attention was the possible impact on British businesses.
That having happened, for quite a long time, Huawei enjoyed not a privileged but certainly an unremarkable position in the British economy. It was only some years later that it became clear that there were other implications to be drawn from its interest in the economy of the United Kingdom. At that point, the Intelligence and Security Committee deemed it appropriate to include it as part of the inquiry whose report I have described. As a consequence, the committee was able, as has been hinted at already, to come to a much better and more informed judgment about Huawei because of its access to intelligence that would not otherwise have been available either to committees or to Parliament itself. I recommend the report as a good illustration of how an inquiry of that kind should be carried out and how profitable, if you like, the consequences are of so doing.
The issue is clear. If, at the stage of the involvement of Huawei in the economy of the United Kingdom it had been understood and perused by those with access to a very high level of classified intelligence, perhaps, since the moment of Huawei’s arrival into this economy, there would have been a much greater understanding throughout government of the significance of its entry into the United Kingdom and the implications for security which that has necessarily involved. For these and other reasons that I have indicated previously, I support the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, to which I have added my name.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, I have attached my name to Amendment 82 in this group, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, and signed by the noble Lord, Lord Fox. It is perhaps unfortunate that the structure of the debate means that neither of them have spoken in favour up to now. Some of the other speakers have briefly outlined what that amendment consists of. As with all the amendments in the group, it is an attempt to ensure proper parliamentary oversight of the operation of the Bill.
This is a classic “prepare a report” amendment and specifies in considerable detail what would be in that report, including the nature of the national security risks posed in transactions for which there were final orders, the particular technological expertise that was being targeted and any other relevant information. I admit that, having listened to the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, introduce Amendment 70, which essentially calls for oversight scrutiny to be in real time as decisions are being made, [Inaudible], and having listened to the debate, on reflection, that would be the best outcome. If I were to make a case for Amendment 82 in comparison, there would be advantages in having a specified list of what the report contains and making sure that full information is being provided to the ISC. I rather suspect that the ISC would be strong-minded if it thought that it was not getting the information it needed.
It is interesting how support for this group of amendments is coming from all sides of the Committee, and it is clear that there is a real problem for the Bill without some kind of provision on reporting to the ISC. That would ideally be done in real time but there should certainly be some democratic oversight. The noble Lord, Lord Butler, was pre-empting a ministerial suggestion that there would not be enough time. As the noble Lord said that, I thought about sitting in the Chamber of your Lordships’ House on 30 December and how much legislation those in both Houses of Parliament were able to get through in that one day. I am sure that the ISC could cope with the level of work required.
The noble Lord, Lord West, put it well. Without one of these amendments, there is no oversight. No one has referred to this yet but about an hour before we met, the integrated review was finally published and I skimmed through it as fast as I could. One matter highlighted in it was the competitive advantage coming from Britain’s democracy. I will be raising that issue again later but if we are going to claim competitive advantage from democracy, it would be good to have some of it. We have heard the phrase, “Take back control”, a great deal. The structure of our alleged democracy is supposed to rest within Parliament, which is where scrutiny and oversight of the Executive is supposed to happen. I join other noble Lords in saying that we must have some form of reporting to the ISC.
Lord King of Bridgwater (Con) [V]
My Lords, I am delighted to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, who has bravely intruded in this debate involving an old-school reunion of former members of the ISC. I am delighted to follow two of the promising newer Members, in the shape of the noble Lords, Lord Butler and Lord Campbell. Another, the noble Lord, Lord Janvrin, is still to come.
The examples given by the noble Lords, Lord Butler and Lord West, set out the arguments very clearly. Having been involved, as I was for so long, with the founding of the ISC and its initial seven years of operation, what was carried on subsequently—[Interruption] —bugger! I am sorry; excuse my language.
Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Non-Afl) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater. Unlike him and other noble Lords who have spoken on this issue, I do not have any particular expertise in the ISC or in intelligence and security matters. None the less, it is a privilege to follow the noble Lord, who, as a former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, was fully aware of many of the intelligence and security issues. I will refer later to one which I think arose during his tenure as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
Notwithstanding that, I support the amendments in this group, the context of which was initially addressed at Second Reading by many of their movers: the noble Lords, Lord West of Spithead and Lord Rooker, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. They all revolve around the need for parliamentary oversight and accountability, and thus the involvement of the Intelligence and Security Committee in Parliament.
I am concerned about the impact of inappropriate takeovers and dual ownership of firms that are key to the development of the UK’s infrastructure, including the digital sector. The gaping hole in parliamentary scrutiny and oversight needs to be examined and legislative provision made for it. That is where the hole lies in this legislation.
All noble Lords who have spoken have elaborated on the sensitive nature of investment issues involving other countries which may have a strategic or other ulterior interest in the UK. Those need to be subject to parliamentary scrutiny, particularly decisions on notifications that will be taken by BEIS. A strong case was made in the Commons for the Intelligence and Security Committee to be given an explicit role in scrutinising the outworking of the Bill, but unfortunately the Government rejected it. I thank noble Lords who have spoken and I agree with them. The Intelligence and Security Committee could do a proper and adequate job if it was given a report on how the powers in the Bill are or are not being used.
There is currently no provision for oversight of national security material on which decisions will be taken, hence my support for these amendments as they would expand the current reporting requirements to include reporting to the ISC, incorporating details of the national security decision-making process into the existing annual report in Clause 61, an issue already referred to by the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead. It is vital that there is oversight of matters that Parliament cannot itself oversee. Oversight and parliamentary scrutiny are key in this respect.
The ISC was established in 1994. I recall that in 1987-88 a company in Northern Ireland that was allocated a demolition contract for Northern Ireland Electricity Service had its contract and its ability to act as a subcontractor withdrawn on national security grounds. It never found out the nature of those national security grounds. No doubt various views were attributed to it. This case was subject to legal proceedings, and the European Court of Justice eventually sided with the inappropriateness of the actions that the Government had taken. I honestly believe that if the ISC had been established at that time, it would have been able to examine papers associated with that case and to judge the appropriateness of the actions and the company. That parliamentary oversight was unfortunately not available at that time, but it is now available and should be utilised to scrutinise global contracts and notifications within the unit in BEIS.
Parliamentary scrutiny is not something that should be feared. It allows engagement, consultation and a degree of transparency, subject to the rules of confidentiality. I support the amendments in this group.
Lord Janvrin (CB) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick. I speak as yet another former member of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament. I strongly support the Bill, but there is a scrutiny gap which has been well identified in this short debate. Other speakers have made the key point in support of explicit oversight by the Intelligence and Security Committee of decisions taken under the Bill based on classified evidence from secret intelligence sources, and I strongly endorse those arguments.
I want to underline very briefly the important point of principle underlying these amendments. The ISC is a vital part of the intelligence agencies’ licence to operate in a democracy by making the agencies accountable to Parliament. It helps maintain public trust and confidence in the secret activities of the state. This obviously includes maintaining trust in government decisions about the activities of the intelligence community. Those broad decisions are taken in the interests of the nation as a whole, but maintaining public trust will surely be just as important when it comes to government decisions that may be narrower but could directly affect the future of individual British companies and the livelihoods of their employees.
The Bill will set up a regime that could materially change people’s lives in the wider interest of national security. However, as drafted, it does so without those people knowing for certain that any decisions based on secret evidence are not automatically subject to scrutiny and examination by the one committee of Parliament specifically set up to be able to do this: the ISC. This seems wrong in principle.
There is then the point of practice. I think we would all argue that effective scrutiny leads to better decision-making. The Minister in another place said that there is nothing to stop the ISC calling for evidence on a specific decision. That may be true, but is it practical? It calls to mind Donald Rumsfeld’s “unknown unknowns”: how does the ISC know which decisions to examine in detail? I question whether such a hit-or-miss approach to scrutiny would lead to better decision-making.
Amendments 70, 78, 79 and 82 all suggest means to provide effective ISC scrutiny. As has been pointed out, Amendment 70, in the name of my noble friend Lord Butler, has the merit of real-time accountability. This should be examined carefully, but the other amendments ensuring regular and automatic classified reporting to the ISC will, I believe, do much to ensure public trust in the processes of the Bill. As the noble Lord, Lord West, said, without one of these amendments, there would be no effective oversight.
I very much look forward to the Minister’s reply, and I hope he will be sympathetic to some kind of movement on this important issue. As I said at the beginning, this is a matter of trust.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, it is a huge pleasure to follow such assembled knowledge and experience. I shall do my best to sum up from these Benches.
On a previous Committee day, we debated an amendment, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, on defining national security. In his answer to that amendment, the Minister—the noble Lord, Lord Callanan —responded that enshrining national security in law would be an inflexible response and the Government sought the ability to have a “flexible” response to future threats. I found this reasonably persuasive. However, who in the Government and department is defining, at that point in time, what the threat to national security is? Where does the expertise lie? Herein come the amendments before us—all except for Amendment 90, look towards the ISC for that expertise.
In his speech, the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, set out what is at stake. These are extraordinary powers that the Government are taking upon themselves to stop private sector activity. That has been the concern of many of us throughout all the amendments that we have been putting forward. A lot of those powers are being kept very close to the Minister and very flexible, as my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones said when speaking on a previous group today.
One of the problems that has concerned those of us speaking about the investment part of the Bill is mission creep. Having a role for the ISC at the heart of it would ensure that this really is about security, rather than other issues that can creep into the picture.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
My Lords, the case has been well made as to why the ISC should, and indeed must, have a role in scrutinising the use of powers contained in the Bill—or maybe if not scrutinising them, then, as the noble Lord, Lord Butler, says, having a role before they have been exercised. As my noble friend Lord West and others have said, we have been clear throughout that we support the need for the Bill. However, when broad powers of intervention are expanded, those using such powers must be held to account by Parliament and through greater transparency, as other noble Lords have said.
In the Commons Public Bill Committee, Professor Martin from Oxford University said that
“there should be accountability and transparency mechanisms, so that there is assurance that”
the powers
“are being fairly and sparingly applied.”—[Official Report, Commons, National Security and Investment Bill Committee, 26/11/20; col. 81.]
Sir Richard Dearlove said that while the annual report should have as much transparency as possible, it could
“require a secret annexe from time to time”—[Official Report, Commons, National Security and Investment Bill Committee, 24/11/20; col. 21.]
such as is now provided for in Amendments 78 and 79.
Amendment 82 in my name and those of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, would put on the face of the Bill the case made convincingly here today but also in the Commons, where the chair of the ISC set out how this oversight fell well within his committee’s remit. However, the belt-and-braces approach of Amendment 86 is also welcome, just in case the Government’s only answer to a role being given to the ISC is that such scrutiny would go beyond its existing terms of reference. If so, they should amend the terms of reference.
It is important not simply that the ISC has a role, but—to give confidence to this new regime—that everyone, particularly business and researchers, knows that it has such a statutory role. This will be particularly important, as the noble Lord, Lord Janvrin, just said, where a key investment is stopped or voided. Everyone concerned will want reassurance that the security questions that have come into play were indeed properly analysed and assessed.
The power to be used needs reviewing, and it is not sufficient to say—as I have heard said—that the Business Select Committee is equipped for that. It has neither the specialism and expertise nor the clearance to handle and judge such security information. Nor, as the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, said, is it even able to do so, according to the quotes that he gave us. It is also a committee drawn only from the Commons, which would preclude, as the noble Lord, Lord Fox, just said, those in this House being able to have any input into the scrutiny that can take place through the ISC.
As we heard, in the Commons, the Minister said that the ISC could seek information—so clearly there is no problem in it having the information. We simply say that it should not have to ask—as was pointed out, it can then be rejected—but it should also not have to ask to see what has gone on. The noble Lord, Lord Janvrin, reminded us about Donald Rumsfeld and his “unknown unknowns”. You do not know what you do not know, therefore you do not even know what you should be able to ask. As I pointed out at Second Reading, how do you know what the questions are if you do not know what you have not been told?
Then there is, as has just been referred to, the Bill title. We do not even have to go into the content of it; the words “National Security” are in the title, so it is slightly hard to see why the security committee should be excluded.
Amendment 82 therefore provides for an annual report to the ISC, including certain detailed information in relation to state-owned entities, the expertise being targeted, the jurisdiction of acquirers and other national security threats. We are not wedded to the particular wording—I am sure that we can come to an agreement on what should be there—but it is important for our functioning democracy that new, extensive powers for the Secretary of State go hand in hand with accountability. I would think that the Minister would welcome the expertise—indeed, the challenge—of the expert and experienced members of the Intelligence and Security Committee and the confidence that the knowledge that the committee is looking at it would give to the wider group of stakeholders.
I turn now to what the noble Lord, Lord Fox, called an orphan amendment. Maybe I should have put it into a different group; if so, I apologise. Amendment 90, in my name, and those of the noble Lords, Lord Fox and Lord Rooker, is a probing one, to ask the Government to spell out why they think that BEIS is the correct home for the new unit. We seek assurances that the balance of interests between those concerned with the economy and those with our security have proper channels to have their views heard, and heard in a way that is sufficiently speedy and effective to deal with real or imagined problems.
We have heard a lot, quite rightly, about whether business can get its information handled quickly enough, but the same is true for security: those demands and queries must also be handled in a timely manner. There is a balance between those who are interested in the economy and those who are interested in security—it is the same people, very often—and it is always a challenge to get that balance right. As the ISC noted:
“There is an obvious inherent tension between the Government’s prosperity agenda and the need to protect national security.”
Locating the unit in the business department is a statement about which they think is the more important. It makes some sense, obviously, because the issues are about investment, but it will be vital that all sorts of intelligence, from across Whitehall, about possible targets and areas of investment are considered.
The Department for Transport will know a lot about where investment is flowing and it and others will have critical infrastructure where they need to be involved. The ISC’s Russia report, having reflected on Russia’s attempts to influence electoral outcomes in other countries, notes that the Government’s defending democracy programme and their work to protect the democratic processes from interference is under the leadership of the Cabinet Office. It would be useful to know whether consideration was given to collocating this new unit also under the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, or, indeed, how sufficient input from the Cabinet Office will flow into this unit.
More widely, the ISC, reviewing the co-ordination of security policy across Whitehall when it was looking at Russia, noted that responsibility fell to 14 different departments and agencies. The requirements of the Bill may well be similar: it will need tentacles all across those agencies and departments. It would be helpful to have some reassurance that there is a strong and appropriate lead and that the Government are confident that that lead is correctly placed in the business department rather than in the Cabinet Office, which normally does that cross-department work—the cross-Whitehall responsibilities are often put there for exactly that reason of drawing on expertise.
The amendment also suggests an advisory body, but what it is really pointing to, again, is the importance of pulling in all relevant parties and stakeholders with expertise to what will be big decisions. We have heard about the sort of investments that could be stopped by this, so these are big and important decisions. We look forward to some reassurance that all the right expertise will be used.
I turn to what is the main subject of this group, the ISC. I do not know whether it is the intransigence mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, or whether it is something else that has turned such a cold shoulder on what we would all expect normally to be involved in this issue—that is, the ISC. We are not asking for much from the Minister today, perhaps just a cast-iron assurance that the MoU will be adopted in the way suggested. I think that that would satisfy most of us. I suggest that he puts the speaking notes that the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, passed to him to one side. What we really want to hear from him is that he has listened to the debate today, that he will take this back to the department and that it will be given serious consideration.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, the noble Lords, Lord West of Spithead, Lord Rooker and Lord Butler of Brockwell, and my noble friend Lord Lansley for their amendments on the role of the ISC in relation to the national security and investment regime. I assure the noble Baroness that she will hear my own words rather than those of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan.
I start by saying that I have the deepest respect for the expertise and experience of the noble Lords who have spoken in the debate this evening. I have listened to what they have said carefully and with great attention. However, despite the eminence of those who have spoken, I fear that I may disappoint them in this speech.
I assure noble Lords that the Government are committed to publishing information in relation to the regime that properly balances the desire for information with protecting national security. I shall come back later to the important point about parliamentary scrutiny and accountability. What I am saying also takes account of the existing position in relation to scrutiny of the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, BEIS.
These amendments represent a number of approaches to requiring the Secretary of State to provide sensitive information to the ISC. Amendments 78 and 79 would in practice require him to create a confidential annexe to the annual report. Amendment 82 would require an additional, separate confidential report to be provided to the ISC. Amendment 70 would require him to share intelligence relevant to a final order with the ISC and not to make that order until the ISC has reported to Parliament on it.
Amendment 86 would extend the remit of the ISC through amending the Justice and Security Act 2013 to enable the committee to scrutinise the operation of the Investment Security Unit. As we heard, Amendment 90 seeks to relocate the Investment Security Unit, within six months of the Bill becoming law, from the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy to the Cabinet Office. It would also establish a wide-ranging advisory board to the Investment Security Unit, which should include, but not be limited to, representatives from relevant government departments, security and defence organisations, and business bodies.
I will address Amendments 78, 79 and 82 together. The reports proposed under these amendments would contain very similar information, including in relation to mandatory and voluntary notifications, trigger events that were called in and final orders made. In particular, they would require the Secretary of State to provide details of factors relevant to the assessments made by the regime. These include: the jurisdiction of the acquirer; the nature of national security risks posed in transactions when there were final orders; details of particular technological or sectoral expertise that was targeted; and other national security threats uncovered through reviews undertaken under this Bill. I note that similar proposals were put forward in the other place and it is perhaps not surprising that my views on this align closely with those expressed by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business and Industry at the time.
I respectfully draw noble Lords’ attention to Clause 61, which requires the Secretary of State to prepare an annual report and to lay a copy of it before each House of Parliament. This clause provides for appropriate scrutiny of the regime. We judge this to be appropriate, because that information does not give rise to national security issues when published at an aggregate level. It will also rightly give a sense of the areas of the economy where activity of the greatest national security concern is occurring.
Of course, it is right that there is also wider scrutiny of the work of BEIS and the work of the unit within BEIS. We therefore intend to follow the existing appropriate government procedures for reporting back to Parliament, including through responding to the BEIS Select Committee, which, I have to say, does an excellent job of scrutinising the work of the department. Indeed, I note that the BEIS Select Committee can and does handle sensitive material; for example, on our civil nuclear programme. The UK’s merger control regime under the Enterprise Act 2002 currently includes screening on national security grounds, and this function is overseen by the BEIS Select Committee.
In case there is any doubt of this—and coming back to the specific point that the noble Baroness made—there is no barrier to the BEIS Select Committee handling highly classified material, subject to agreement between the department and the chair of the committee on appropriate handling. The BEIS Select Committee will be able to see all the material that it needs in order to make its assessments within its role.
I argue that it is the right committee to oversee the work of the investment security unit within the broader remit of BEIS. We should not forget that the BEIS Select Committee is as much a part of our structure of parliamentary scrutiny and democratic accountability as the ISC. With great respect, I would not want any of our comments to appear to be disparaging to the work of the BEIS Select Committee and the very valuable scrutiny work that it does.
I believe that the BEIS Select Committee is excellently placed to consider how effectively and efficiently the regime interacts with the business community and investors. It can also ensure that the NSI regime does not create disproportionate impacts on the economy, and, with its business expertise, it is able to scrutinise whether the regime is effective in scrutinising relevant acquisitions of control. I have to say, with deep respect, that I would therefore question some of the narrative I have heard that suggests that the BEIS Select Committee is not well placed to scrutinise the NSI regime.
I turn back to the ISC. There are, of course, no restrictions on the ISC requesting further information from the unit or from the Secretary of State for matters where it falls under the remit of that committee. The Intelligence and Security Committee’s remit, however, is clearly defined by the Justice and Security Act 2013, together with the statutory memorandum of understanding. I know that this irritates noble Lords, but that remit does not extend to the oversight of BEIS’ work. I therefore welcome and encourage the Intelligence and Security Committee’s considerable security-specific expertise and its review of the annual report when it is laid before Parliament.
Before turning to Amendment 86, I will first revisit precisely what the Justice and Security Act 2013 provides for. I remind noble Lords that this Act sets out the role of the Intelligence and Security Committee alongside a memorandum of understanding. The Act sets out that
“the ISC may examine or otherwise oversee the expenditure, administration, policy and operations of … the Security Service … the Secret Intelligence Service, and … the Government Communications Headquarters.”
The Act also provides that:
“The ISC may examine or otherwise oversee such other activities of Her Majesty's Government in relation to intelligence or security matters as are set out in a memorandum of understanding”
agreed between the Prime Minister and the committee.
The present memorandum of understanding states that the ISC is, in addition, responsible for overseeing the activities of parts of the Ministry of Defence, parts of the Cabinet Office—including the National Security Secretariat and the Joint Intelligence Organisation —and the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism. The ISC must report to Parliament annually on the discharge of its functions, and may make such other reports as it considers appropriate concerning any aspect of its functions. Redactions are agreed by the Prime Minister for any material that may prejudice the functions of the intelligence agencies or of other parts of the intelligence and security community.
Extending the remit of the ISC to oversight of the investment security unit would be a substantial amendment. In particular, the Justice and Security Act currently refers only to intelligence agencies, of which the investment security unit is not one. Noble Lords will have seen the strength of feeling in both this House and the other place concerning the role of the investment security unit in relation to the national security and investment regime—I am well aware of this. I understand that this proposed new clause is the result of careful consideration and an attempt to find a compromise, and for that I am grateful to my noble friend. However, for the same reasons that the Government have cautioned against other amendments that seek to provide for a more formal role for the ISC in relation to the NSI regime, I cannot accept it.
Amendment 70 seeks a similar privileged role for the ISC but in a way that, I have to say, would present additional problems. The Bill as currently drafted requires the Secretary of State, as the sole and quasi-judicial decision-maker, to follow clearly and tightly defined timescales and to handle sensitive information from a range of sources. Requiring the ISC to review every final order before it could be made would risk adding substantial delays into this process, harming both national security and business certainty.
The Government have faced amendments seeking for a national security assessment to be completed in one-third less time on large and complex acquisitions, for the purpose of limiting any wait by business. This amendment, however, while at the end of the process—and while final orders will, of course, be more limited in number than national security assessments undertaken—seeks to add potentially significant further delay without a clear benefit. There is also a risk that, depending on how long it takes the ISC to produce its report, the Secretary of State could be timed out of making a final order at all, as the tests for extending the assessment period do not currently allow for an extension due to ISC scrutiny. It would also, I think, be an unprecedented role for a parliamentary committee, although I have no doubt that others such as the noble Lord, as an ex-Cabinet Secretary, will have a much better sense of precedent in this area.
The report laid before Parliament, which this amendment would require, would be based solely on intelligence. It would therefore likely need to be so highly redacted as to make it uninformative. I can instead assure the noble Lord that, in making a final order, the Secretary of State will draw on information and expertise from across government, including the intelligence agencies, to ensure that he has all the information he needs.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
I have had four requests to speak after the Minister, from the noble Lords, Lord West and Lord Rooker, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Lord, Lord Campbell. I will call them in that order. Lord West of Spithead?
Lord West of Spithead (Lab)
My Lords, I am a poacher turned gamekeeper, as a fully signed-up member of the rolled-up trouser-leg and funny handshake brigade. For many years in the intelligence world, I hated the thought that government, Parliament or anyone else could look at my intelligence; how much nicer not to give any of that away. I am very glad that system does not work in this country. We have set up a mechanism whereby Parliament can see that highly sensitive intelligence that all of us involved in that world are immediately nervous when anyone touches. Of course if you have that intelligence, you want to hang on to it and not tell other people about it. It sounds to me as though the BEIS Select Committee will be delighted that it is to be the one making all the decisions based on the intelligence that it has. I do not really like that as a way of going forward. I could say a lot more about the response from the Government because I am not very happy about it.
Can the Minister look again at this debate and what has been asked for, because it seems very sensible for the ISC, which after all was tasked in the Justice and Security Act to do exactly this? The BEIS Committee was not. It is not too much to ask that this is looked at; it sounds very sensible.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
I thank the noble Lord for his courteous comments. Of course I will review the contents of this whole debate to see whether there are any lessons that I can learn from it.
Lord Rooker (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I much regret that, due to my own IT incompetence, I was unable to speak today. However, I say to the Minister as politely as I can that he has completely misread the House, and I think he will have to look at this again. The ISC is not a bog-standard Select Committee. I have a question for him, based essentially on the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Janvrin, which I do not think he referred to. How could rumours about government action in respect of a private company which may be market-sensitive be dealt with to public satisfaction unless the ISC has oversight? It would not matter if the ISC reports were redacted; Parliament would accept that; the media would accept it. The Government have a democratic licence to operate only because of Parliament. The Minister should go away and, before Report, explain to those who have spoken and other Peers where the Government’s democratic licence to operate is in this respect, having ruled out parliamentary scrutiny in a very precise way.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
I thank the noble Lord for his comments. I apologise to noble Lords if they feel that I have misread the mood of the House. The key point that I want to make in response to him is that the BEIS Select Committee—I say it again—is part of our parliamentary scrutiny and has democratic accountability in the other place. The Government are not avoiding scrutiny of the investment security unit; they are putting it somewhere where they believe that the scrutiny will be most effective, looking at the work of the unit in the round. They believe that the most effective overall scrutiny of the ISU will be found in the BEIS Select Committee.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
I have a couple of questions for the Minister. He said that the remit of the ISC under the 2013 Act does not cover the work of BEIS. If that is the case, that justifies even more an amendment to the Bill to amend the 2013 Act to put in such a provision. If the Government wanted to do it, that would be the way. I do not think that we should use the law as an excuse. The law can be changed; we are making an Act now.
I have just double-checked the names, but can the Minister confirm that the current members of the BEIS Select Committee are not all even privy counsellors and certainly do not have security clearance which goes beyond Privy Council? Can he confirm that there is no House of Lords Member on the BEIS Select Committee? Can he also confirm that nothing that we have done in any of these amendments to give the ISC a role removes the role of the BEIS Select Committee—in other words, it can still look at the industrial or investment parts? We are not taking those away from it, so it would continue to have the role that he has spelt out for it, but we are adding another bit. Can he confirm those three points?
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
I thank the noble Baroness for those questions. First, I repeat that there is no barrier to the BEIS Select Committee handling highly classified, top-secret material. Appropriate arrangements can be put in hand to ensure that the members of that committee have access, after processes have been gone through, to that material. Secondly, of course, the committee is a committee of the other House —that is self-evident. I come back to my core point. Where the agencies which report to the ISC have done work of relevance to this, the ISC will be able to speak to them about such work, but that is very different from the ISC being responsible for monitoring the work of the ISU, which goes far wider than the responsibilities of the ISC. I have deep respect for the opinions that have been put forward, but I am afraid that I do not agree with them.
Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)
My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity to remedy an omission from my earlier remarks, to some extent stimulated by the response of the Minister. During my time in the other place, I was a member of the Trade and Industry Committee, the Defence Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee. Unless things have changed very considerably, in my time as a member of these committees we were never admitted to intelligence of the quality which is available on a daily basis to the Intelligence and Security Committee. We were never required to sign the Official Secrets Act, which is an obligation incumbent upon those who wish to serve on the Intelligence and Security Committee.
Since the nominations are made by party leaders, it is not unknown for reservations to be expressed about the reliability of a possible member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, the result being that the leader of the party in question determines to withdraw that nomination. To suggest that the quality of information available is the same in Select Committees on security matters as that available to the Intelligence and Security Committee is to misunderstand the different obligations incumbent on membership.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
I thank the noble Lord for these comments and in no way want to second-guess the deep experience that he has on these matters. But I repeat yet again: there seems to be a worry that BEIS Select Committee members will not have sufficient security clearance to be able to do the work required of them. I repeat from this Dispatch Box that there is no barrier to BEIS Select Committee members handling top-secret and other classified material, subject to agreement between the department and the chair of the committee on appropriate handling. I am not sure that I can say more than that, but they will be able to have the information they need to carry out their functions.
Lord Butler of Brockwell (CB)
My Lords, I am grateful for this debate. I am afraid that I have to say to the Minister that, while he may have used his own words in answer to the debate, he used the brief that would have been used by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. I do not want to decry the work of the BEIS Select Committee at all, but the Minister gave the game away when he said that access to highly classified intelligence for the Select Committee would be based on an agreement between the chair and the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State would control it. In that case, Parliament would be in the position of Glendower in “Henry IV”, who says:
“I can call spirits from the vasty deep.”
So you can, is the reply:
“But will they come when you do call for them?”.
Under the memorandum of understanding, the Intelligence and Security Committee has a right to get the intelligence that it needs. A Select Committee of the House of Commons does not have that similar right.
What has run through this debate, from everybody who has spoken apart from the Minister, is that we want one simple thing. We want to make proper use of a tool that is there for Parliament and has been created for this purpose: the Intelligence and Security Committee. There are various ways of doing it, as has been made clear. It could be by annual reports; it could be by changing the terms of reference, which can be done so easily; it could be a transfer to the Cabinet Office, which would bring it within the terms of the ISC.
I suggested that this should be a real-time operation. If I may say so, the Minister misrepresented that. There is no reason why that should extend the time necessary for the assessment. The Intelligence and Security Committee will be looking at one thing—the highly classified intelligence on which the Secretary of State is acting—and reporting on that. That is not a huge job. The ISC could say quite shortly that it was satisfied, and 99 times out of 100, I think, it would say that there were good grounds for the order that the Secretary of State was proposing to be make. I think that could quite easily be done within the 30 days allowed under the Bill for the assessment. It would not even need to make use of the 15-day extension.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that the power to make regulations in clause 53(1) in relation to the procedure for service of documents extends to cover all of the different types of notices, orders and documents under the Bill.
Lord Lansley
“( ) whether the United Kingdom has a reciprocal agreement with the country or territory to whose authority the disclosure would be made, and”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to take into consideration whether there is a reciprocal agreement in place when deciding to disclose information to an overseas public authority.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, this group should not take us very long. There are just two points in it. Amendment 76 relates to Clause 54, “Disclosure of information,” and in that clause, there is a power for the Secretary of State to disclose information
“to a public authority or an overseas public authority.”
When deciding whether to disclose information to an overseas public authority, under subsection (7) of that clause, there are two issues the Secretary of State must have regard to: the protection against self-incrimination in criminal proceedings; and whether the matter in respect of which disclosure is sought is sufficiently serious to justify making that disclosure.
Amendment 76 in my name proposes to add one further matter to which the Secretary of State must have regard—whether there is a reciprocal agreement with the country or territory concerned. It would not mean that where there was no reciprocal agreement the Secretary of State could not make a disclosure to an overseas public authority, but it should be something that he should have in mind.
I am glad that my noble friend is on the Front Bench because he will have fond memories of Amendment 77. It concerns the disclosure of information where a statutory gateway is made and how such a statutory gateway is to be considered alongside the prohibitions to be found in data protection legislation and in the Investigatory Powers Act. The amendment to Clause 57 covers this. My noble friend will recall that under the Trade (Disclosure of Information) Act 2020, where there was a power to disclose information that might contravene the data protection legislation, that would be prevented, but the duty or power in the 2020 Act was to be considered alongside that prohibition. We can see that in Clause 57(2)(a), which makes it clear that the duty to disclose in this legislation would not contravene data protection legislation or the provisions of the Investigatory Powers Act, but that the duty or power in this legislation must be taken into account.
Clause 57 puts that qualification alongside the data protection legislation, but it has not put it alongside the prohibitions in the Investigatory Powers Act; I do not know why. I know why it is there because we went through this on the Trade Bill. It is there because of the 2016 Supreme Court decision in The Christian Institute & Others v The Lord Advocate made it clear that the decision-maker should have in mind both the prohibitions and the powers in the Act, and balance the two together. In Clause 57(2)(a) this legislation enables the Secretary of State to balance the two. The question is: why not in the Investigatory Powers Act? If the answer is that under no circumstances would a prohibition under the Investigatory Powers Act be overridden by reference to the duty or powers in this legislation, I will be content with that. However, otherwise I do not understand why it is not included in Clause 57(2)(b) in the same way as it is in subsection (2)(a). I beg to move.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, I rise to beat the rush and clamour to respond to these two amendments. Taking them in turn, from these Benches, Amendment 76 seems to make a relatively straightforward point. I will be interested to hear from the Minister what possible objection there might be to it. My suspicion about Amendment 77 concerns what normally happens to amendments like this tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley. The Minister will say, “We do not need these powers because—”. I have looked at the legislation and I cannot find any evidence of where the “because” might be. I shall sit down and wait to find out.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
We have not heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, so I call the Minister.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
My Lords, I turn to the amendments relating to information sharing and data protection. As always, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Lansley, who we know examines these Bills with such a critical eye that nothing can escape his eagle gaze. The first amendment relates to Clause 54 and seeks to require the Secretary of State, when deciding whether to disclose information to an overseas public authority, to have regard to whether there is a reciprocal agreement with the country or territory to whose authority the disclosure would be made.
As this clause is about sharing information, I believe that my noble friend is envisaging the reciprocal agreement with another country or territory to be in relation to the sharing of information for a specified purpose, such as facilitating the exercise by the Secretary of State of his functions under the Bill or the prevention or detection of crime. Clause 54(7) specifies certain considerations that the Secretary of State must have particular regard to when deciding whether to disclose information to an overseas public authority. It includes consideration of whether the law of the country or territory to whose authority the disclosure would be made provides protection against self-incrimination in criminal proceedings corresponding to the protection provided in the UK, as well as consideration of whether the matter is sufficiently serious to justify making the disclosure. The clause permits the Secretary of State to disclose information but, I stress, does not require him to do so.
The Secretary of State, as often elsewhere in the Bill, will be subject to public law duties when deciding whether to share information with an overseas public authority under this clause. These duties include a requirement to take all relevant considerations into account, although this will obviously depend on the facts of each case, and whether there is a reciprocal agreement in place. In some circumstances, for example where information is to be shared for the purpose of protecting national security, it may well be appropriate to proceed in the absence of a reciprocal agreement. When deciding whether to disclose information to an overseas public authority, the Secretary of State will also be bound by the data protection legislation provisions, which include certain restrictions in respect of international transfers of personal data and consideration of appropriate safeguards. There is therefore no need to include additional restrictions in the Bill.
I turn to Amendment 77, which relates to Clause 57. It seeks to ensure that when considering whether a disclosure or use of information pursuant to a duty or power under Parts 1 to 4 of the Bill would contravene the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, the duty or power itself would need to be taken into account. A similar provision exists in relation to consideration of whether a disclosure or use of information would contravene the data protection legislation. Clause 57 states that the provisions in Parts 1 to 4 containing a duty or power to disclose or use information do not authorise a contravention of the data protection legislation as defined in the Data Protection Act 2018. The clause also sets out that such a duty or power to disclose or use information does not authorise contravention of Parts 1 to 7, or Chapter 1, Part 9, of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. That Act contains provisions about conducting interception, including restrictions on use and disclosure of intercepted information. These are standard provisions included where legislation concerns the use or disclosure of information.
To reassure my noble friend, there is no call for the Secretary of State to consider the duty or power to disclose or use information under the Bill to determine whether a particular disclosure or use pursuant to it would contravene the Investigatory Powers Act. This will simply require consideration of what the relevant provisions of the Act prohibit, and none of the prohibitions turns on whether a duty or power exists or its terms. In comparison, the data protection legislation provides a framework for processing personal information but allows for other provisions, such as those found in the Bill, to specify more details about the use or sharing of personal information. Therefore, a duty or power to disclose or use information under the Bill will need to be taken into account when considering whether a disclosure or use of personal information pursuant to it would contravene the data protection legislation. As explained, this is not required when considering compatibility with the Investigatory Powers Act, due to the differing nature of the legislation.
Therefore, while I understand the objectives of my noble friend and his desire, as always, to be helpful, for the reasons I have set out, I am not able to accept these amendments, and I hope that my noble friend will agree to withdraw or not move them.
Lord Lansley (Con)
I am grateful to my noble friend for his response. I will read it carefully, but, if I understand it correctly, I entirely agree with him on the explanation of Clause 57 and the different approach to data protection legislation on the one hand and investigatory powers on the other, so there is no problem there.
To be perfectly honest, I do not understand the argument regarding Amendment 76. If my noble friend is resting his argument on the fact that there is a public law duty and that all relevant considerations must be taken into account, why does that not equally apply to the considerations specified in Clause 54? If they are to be specified there, I do not understand why a reciprocal agreement could not be properly included. It is a matter of policy as to whether it should or should not, and it seems to me that there is a good argument that it should be considered, but I will reflect further on that and, for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 76.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)
At last, we move to the group beginning with Amendment 80.
Amendment 80
Lord Grantchester
“( ) the average number of days taken to assess a trigger event called in under the Act,( ) the average number of days taken for acceptance decisions in respect of mandatory and voluntary notices,( ) the average staff resource allocated to the operation of reviews of notices made under sections 14 and 18 over the relevant period,( ) the number and proportion of notices and call-in notices concerning the acquisition of a small or medium-sized enterprise,( ) in respect of the acquisition of a small or medium-sized enterprise, the sectors of the economy in relation to which call-in notices were given,( ) the minimum, average and maximum turnaround times for notifications.”
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
I am pleased to open this group of amendments by moving my Amendment 80, concerning the department’s annual report on this legislation. Generally speaking, Governments, regrettably, do not tend to offer widespread information in reports, whether annual or not—except, of course, where they consider that they heap praise on themselves.
Clause 61 can be made to look extensive, comprising as it does a total of 12 mandatory pieces of information—13, should the addition of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, not be considered unlucky. This list can form the basis of information on the way the Government provide a dashboard to view the new unit. However, in considering how well it is performing and its relationship with and effect on the business community, any audit certainly needs to ask for the additional six listed in my amendment.
My Amendment 80 requires the Secretary of State to report on the time taken to process notices, which was part of our earlier discussion on the resource allocation to the new unit and the extent to which small and medium-sized enterprises are called in under the new regime. The amendment is about requiring a greater degree of accountability from the department regarding the investment security unit’s service standards and functions. It states that the report needs to include the aggregate time for decision-making, in both assessments and initial answers, acceptances and rejection notices, providing a measure to ensure that the screening process is working effectively and efficiently for SMEs.
Secondly, on elements of capacity monitoring, the amendment enhances the ability to take stock of the resources behind the unit’s work, so that Parliament and the public can appreciate the report as a mechanism for holding the Government to account for what will be a major new centre for merger investment screening for the security of the UK.
Thirdly, we are keen to maintain a business climate in which SMEs can thrive. It would be beneficial in this respect for the unit to track and monitor the focus of SMEs in its work. Information would be able to highlight any specific concerns and the experiences of the most innovative start-ups in their interactions with the new regime.
The general questions across the Committee regarding how the new unit will operate, be resourced, perform and impact those throughout the economy whom it will affect can be answered in the more comprehensive information that an annual report can offer. In addressing the Commons Committee, David Petrie of the ICAEW wanted to test the capabilities of the regime in an accountant’s way by assessing the reasonableness of his assumption that even 1,000 notifications a year amounts to four a day and a considerable workload. How will that work and what information must be provided to check it through the annual report? What will be the annual budget for this regime and what increase for the department will be necessary? Will the new unit be able to request and receive additional funding to meet the challenges it has yet to experience?
I will not steal the thunder of the mighty guns of my noble friend Lord West by saying much at this point about his Amendment 91, which is in this group. He has already spoken authoritatively on security matters. However, we are sympathetic to and support his amendment, as businesses in the defence sector have asked that the impact of the new regime on them be clarified. The amendment reflects the Defence Committee’s report on foreign investment, which called for banning investments in the UK’s defence supply chain from certain countries, namely, China and Russia. What is the Minister’s view on this?
In considering the annual report and the guidance my noble friend seeks for the defence sector, and the other reports undertaken under, for example, Amendment 78 or Amendment 82 in the name of my noble friend Lady Hayter, it would be helpful if the Minister could also outline the relevant interactions, not least with reports from the export control regime, in order to provide a comprehensive assessment. It would be unfortunate to find information disappearing into gaps between them and vulnerability opening up in the security screening process. I beg to move.
Lord Lansley (Con)
Noble Lords will be pleased to know that this is the last time they will hear from me in this Committee. My amendment is terribly simple. In so far as the annual report lists the number of final orders made, Clause 27 provides the power for the Secretary of State to vary orders or revoke them. One of the things that one might want an annual report to do is to enable one to understand the stock of orders as well as their flow. Therefore, I have suggested in Amendment 81 that the number of orders varied or revoked should be added to the list of subjects in the annual report.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)
I call the guns of the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead.
Lord West of Spithead (Lab)
My Lords, I am going to be using secondary rather than main armament for this particular amendment.
I see Amendment 91 as more of a probing amendment than anything else. It is in fact a direct recommendation from the HCDC report, Foreign Involvement in the Defence Supply Chain, which came out last month:
“The Ministry of Defence’s open and country-agnostic approach to foreign involvement means that the defence supply chain has been open to potentially hostile foreign involvement, with reports of companies being owned and influenced by foreign Governments whose values and behaviours are at odds with our own”.
That is, of course, part of the whole point of this Bill. It also said:
“The Ministry of Defence should publish a list of countries it considers friendly and from whom investment should be encouraged. All those countries falling outside of this list should be barred from investing in the UK’s defence supply chain”.
The committee’s reasoning was that these companies, particularly the SMEs and smaller companies, need to know because they do not have the ability to initially assess the risk of dealing with some of the countries with which they often come into contact, and it was felt that this needed to be made clear. This would mean that time and money would not be wasted pursuing contracts and deals that were not going to be allowed. It all relates to that high degree of certainty to which so many of the amendments discussed today have related. I need say no more than that.
Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD) [V]
My Lords, this is my one foray into the National Security and Investment Bill, and I am speaking to Amendment 91, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord West of Spithead and Lord Alton of Liverpool, and myself.
As the noble Lord, Lord West, pointed out, this is in many ways a probing amendment, but it is very important. The relevance is clear: the HCDC report talks about the presence of Chinese business already in the defence supply chain. It goes slightly wider than that; anyone who has been in the armed services or happens to be in the Armed Forces Parliamentary Scheme might have looked at the labels of the uniforms—the camouflage—and noticed that they were made in China. I have always thought it slightly strange that NATO-issued uniforms should be made in China, but that seems to be the case. That does not necessarily endanger our national security, but it does raise some very odd questions about what we are actually doing and why we are purchasing kit from China. The HCDC notes that seven companies in the defence supply chain have been acquired by Chinese companies; that at least needs to be looked into.
This is a very modest amendment, which asks for a report. It does not go quite as far as the HCDC recommendation, because it does not say that other countries should be barred from investing in the supply chain, but will the Minister consider what signals the current approach to allowing investment in the defence supply chain sends, particularly on the day that the integrated review has been published?
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)
The next speaker on the list, the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, has withdrawn from the debate, so I call the noble Lord, Lord Fox.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, I will make two brief points. On Amendment 91, I add in support of the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, that, having worked for a business that was both in the defence supply chain and was also a civil supplier, some companies do not even realise that they are selling into the defence supply chain—particularly SMEs, which tend to sell to whomever will buy their product, often across civil and security sectors. Advice on how you know when you are coming into the remit of the Bill is going to be very important.
Speaking to the long list set out in Clause 61, which would become longer should the advice of the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, be accepted, I have a problem because it is essentially a process. It is “What we have done this year”; it is a list of things we did. The Bill has two purposes: one is to keep the country safe, and the other is to not harmfully impact the flow of investment. It is impossible to infer any of that from these things. If we are going to have an annual report—I am remiss for not having tabled an amendment myself—let us have one that enables us to judge the success of the Bill year on year. What has been the effect—the impact —of the Bill on the investment landscape in this country? Are we still safe? We could have done all the things on this list, and, frankly, all the things on the list of the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, and the stable door could be wide open, but we would not know it from this annual report.
I have prepared lots of business annual reports: literally thousands of things are reported, none of which is actually useful information about what the business is doing but is required by law. So my suggestion, for what it is worth, is: let us have an annual report that enables us to effectively judge the Bill’s success—are we safe and has the investment landscape not been impacted?
Lord Callanan (Con)
I thank those who have taken part in this short debate, in particular my noble friend Lord Lansley and the noble Lords, Lord Grantchester and Lord West, for their considered and thoughtful comments on the amendments. Amendments 80 and 81 seek to add a number of additional areas of information to the annual report, namely around time taken processing cases, the resources of the investment security unit, the extent to which acquisitions involving SMEs are being called in, and the number of final orders being varied or revoked. The aims of these amendments are commendable, and the Government are a strong supporter of SMEs and government transparency.
The first part of Amendment 80, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, seeks the inclusion of the average number of days taken to assess a trigger event which has been called in. Noble Lords will recall that Clause 23 provides statutory time periods for assessment under the regime. The Secretary of State must assess any trigger event that has been called in within a period of 30 working days, as we have discussed in earlier debates, or, if additional time is required, within the additional period of a further 45 working days, or within any further voluntary extension or extensions agreed with the acquirer.
As there are these time limits, and they are as short as we are able to make them while also ensuring there is time for appropriate national security assessment, it does not seem that there would be any additional benefits from including average times in the annual report. Clause 61 sets out the minimum reporting requirements that the Secretary of State must meet in the annual report. The information provided in the annual report will provide Parliament with good insight into how the regime is functioning in practice.
Furthermore, the amendment seeks to add additional reporting on the minimum, average and maximum turnaround times for notifications in the annual report. The Government have laid out clear statutory timelines for responding to voluntary and mandatory notifications in Clause 23, providing investors and businesses with the certainty that they need. However, I would be happy to discuss this proposal further with the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester. The time taken to assess trigger events that are called in will vary on a case-by-case basis; therefore, it would not be helpful to share the average time.
Secondly, on the time taken for deciding whether to accept mandatory and voluntary notices, the Bill requires that the Secretary of State must do so
“as soon as reasonably practicable”,
as we discussed, after receiving a notice. In practice, this is likely to be a matter of days, but it is important to retain flexibility so that an accurate assessment of the completeness of the information is undertaken. Additionally, if the Secretary of State decides to reject a notice, he must as soon as practicable provide reasons in writing for that decision to the notifier. Where the decision is to accept a notice, the Secretary of State must as soon as practicable inform the parties of the decision.
Thirdly, where the noble Lord seeks inclusion of the average headcount of the investment security unit in the annual report, I can only repeat what my colleague Minister Zahawi said in the other place: resourcing would, of course, be
“an internal matter for the BEIS permanent secretary.”—[Official Report, Commons, National Security and Investment Bill Committee, 10/12/20; col. 334.]
I am unsure whether very high numbers would demonstrate appropriate resourcing, or insufficient efficiency. In any case, we have committed to ensuring that the investment security unit is appropriately resourced. I am sure that the Permanent Secretary will make sure that that is the case.
Furthermore, on SMEs, the report is intended to give a sense of the sectors of the economy where the greatest activity of national security concern is occurring. The Secretary of State may include additional information relating to SMEs if he considers that appropriate.
Turning to Amendment 81, tabled by my noble friend Lord Lansley—I am sorry that this is the last occasion we will hear from him—I am pleased to confirm that Clause 29 already places a duty on the Secretary of State to publish notice of the fact that a final order has been made, varied or revoked. This intentionally complements the annual report in Clause 61. We must not encumber the investment security unit with ever greater reporting as this will draw focus away from scrutinising acquisitions and responding to businesses as soon as possible. Individually, these amendments of greater reporting may seem reasonable, but combined they can be quite burdensome for the unit.
On Amendment 91, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, I am grateful that this came with only his secondary armament—although I noticed that he had the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, for additional offensive capability. The amendment relates to the provision of guidance for the defence sector. It would require the Secretary of State to publish guidance for businesses in the defence supply chain about the provisions in the Bill, including a list of countries which the Secretary of State considers less likely to give rise to a risk to national security and from which investment is encouraged.
The noble Lord’s amendment highlights the importance of the defence sector and its supply chains, which is part of the reason why the defence sector is intended to form part of the Bill’s “mandatory notification regime”. A robust defence sector is vital to our national security and essential for the development of innovative and first-class military capabilities that enable us to protect our people, territories, values and interests at home and overseas. The defence sector, including businesses in its supply chains, such as those providing emerging technologies, must remain resilient to a wide range of national security risks, including those posed by hostile actors.
We are keen to ensure that the mandatory notification regime works proportionately and provides sufficiently clear parameters to inform businesses and investors of the need to notify and obtain prior approval. That is why we have consulted on the definitions of sectors covered by mandatory notification in the recent public consultation. This approach has enabled experts from the defence sector and its supply chains, along with the legal profession, businesses and investors, to help us refine the final definitions to ensure that the regime is appropriately targeted and provides legal certainty.
The noble Lord’s amendment also seeks to require the publication of a list of countries which the Secretary of State considers less likely to give rise to national security risks, and those from which investment is encouraged. As it stands, as I have said before on other amendments, both the mandatory and voluntary notification regimes provided for by the Bill are actor- and nationality-agnostic.
The mandatory notification regime is set based on the risks posed by acquisitions of target entities due to those entities’ activities rather than risks posed by the acquirers. The risks posed by an acquirer are then considered on a case-by-case basis by the Secretary of State as part of the particular national security assessment. It would not be appropriate to set out through guidance a variation to the legislation; that would confuse more than it would clarify, and it might give rise to legal challenge.
On whether guidance can be provided more generally for the defence sector on the provisions in the Bill, we must also guard against legislating through guidance. The Government will of course consider what appropriate explanatory material should accompany the regulations to define the sectors subject to mandatory notification, including the defence sector.
I thank all noble Lords and my noble friend for their amendments. For the reasons mentioned, I am afraid I cannot accept them. Therefore, I hope the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)
I have received no requests to speak after the Minister, so I invite the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, to conclude the debate on his amendment.
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
I thank those who have taken part in this short debate on the annual report, especially the Minister for the tone of his reply. It has been very helpful. The dashboard of information to be provided in an annual report must be extensive enough to provide clarity on the operation of the unit and how it has performed. I have always considered annual reports an excellent opportunity to promote an organisation’s credentials and it is surprising to hear that the Minister would not wish to show how the unit has performed effectively against statutory targets. I thank him for expressing the wish to discuss this further and I look forward to doing that with him.
Defence in the supply chain is a particular vulnerability and, on my noble friend’s guidance, the need can be found in the government response to the sector consultation. The defence chapter states:
“Some respondents stated the definition could capture contractors or subcontractors who are providing goods or services unrelated to defence”.
This returns the Committee to its considerations regarding clear definitions of national security and how these may be provided. They are certainly important issues to consider further in the light of the Minister’s reply. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment at this stage.
Lord Grantchester
“Equity stakes and national security review
(1) Within one month of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must conduct a review of business loans and grants which have been distributed in response to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) to sectors in relation to which the Secretary of State considers that trigger events are more likely to give rise to a risk to national security.(2) If loans and grants have been accepted by businesses in these sectors, the Secretary of State must consider converting loans and grants into equity stakes if there is a clear economic and national security rationale for doing so.”
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
I am glad I am providing balance for the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, before he departs the Committee. This side of the House is tabling amendments and challenging the Government on this legislation. We too want the Bill to work well and consider that it is important that various elements have been fully considered. One of the elements to reflect on concerns the effect on the SME sector. We champion clarity and support for SMEs and innovative start-ups, so often the engine of growth, jobs and prosperity.
SMEs may experience degrees of anxiety about potentially having to engage with a whole series of new regulations under the Bill. Amendment 84 is a probing amendment to ask whether the Government are considering whether the Covid business loans and grants in any sectors under national security screening could be converted into equity stakes should there be a clear economic or national security rationale so to do. The public will generally look back in appreciation of the support provided by the Government to businesses over the pandemic interruptions. That could also mean ensuring that gains from public support—not merely the losses of failure—accrue to the benefit of all of us. Simply, are equity stakes being considered in these circumstances, even if the Government are generally not in favour of taking equity risks, even in terms of securing our national security? What are the recoverabilities of loans and the implications for security of these vulnerabilities? What assessments have the Government given to this?
Amendment 85 would go a long way towards ending uncertainties and anxieties for SMEs, ensuring that the Government act with clarity, competence and care. It would ensure a business climate of appreciation of the SME sector in which it can thrive. SMEs have been inquiring how best to engage with government in the many changes that will apply. We propose that part of the new unit be dedicated to the SME sector, as some 80% of the likely notifications of the new regime and the requirements this will generate will be borne by SMEs. The screenings will also be most challenging for them, especially in regard to SME funding rounds, especially since, for tech start-ups, the necessary speed of response that could be required to the many weeks of inquiries could present insurmountable challenges. SMEs do not generally have deep pockets to fund a comprehensive array of advisers to help them navigate the Government’s less than clear process. The unit, and consequently the legislation, need to be aware of the pressure this puts on innovation start-ups, which need the confidence to be able to respond effectively.
A dedicated SME division, as outlined in Amendment 85, would do just that. It would ensure prompt, accessible guidance, as industry experts have been demanding in their briefings, to engage with SMEs prior to formal processes to ease the burden of bureaucracy. Could the Minister outline the specific support that the Government could provide SMEs in assistance targeted on the good working of the new investment unit? How will a focus on SMEs be hard-wired into the new unit? I beg to move.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)
The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, whose name is next on the list, has withdrawn from the debate on this amendment. I call the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria.
Lord Bilimoria (CB) [V]
My Lords, I speak to Amendments 89 and 92. Amendment 89 would require the Secretary of State to undertake a review of the impact of the Act on national security and foreign investment. Ensuring the success of this regime requires formal review. For balance, it is crucial that this review reflects both positive impacts on national security, as well as unintended consequences to foreign investment in the UK. As such, a specified periodic review by the Government would provide industry with reassurance that the regime is being formally monitored and that such consequences will be redressed, should they arise.
Concurrently, formal review would provide the Government with the opportunity to outline any positive impacts that the regime has had. Failure to formally review the regime will leave industry with little understanding of the feedback cycle for the regime. Business is committed to making a success of the regime but, concurrently, wants to know that the Government are willing to review its impact.
Amendment 92, on market guidance notes, would require that:
“Within six months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must publish market guidance notes to provide information to assist with compliance of the Act”
and:
“The market guidance notes must be updated and re-published not more than every six months thereafter.”
This would ensure the success of this regime. It requires active engagement from BEIS and other government departments with industry. One critical function that the Government play here is the development and provision of detailed guidance for firms and the wider market to view and act on, ensuring compliance with the legislation. Timely provision and consequent updating of this guidance will allow firms to enter the process of notification with as much information and steer as possible, reducing the likelihood of unnecessary notification but, critically, capturing those transactions that rightly demand scrutiny. Failure to provide guidance, in partnership with key business organisations, could slow the process of notification or, importantly, lead to instances of failure to notify, where it is necessary to do so.
To conclude, the current drafting of the Bill makes its practical application difficult for business. It could lead to additional burden and complexity at a micro level and, potentially, an unintended deterrent to investment at a macro level. The CBI, of which I am president, has heard from a wide range of businesses with concerns about the Bill in its current form— from technology and digital to facilities management, pharmaceuticals, higher education, financial services and defence. As such, the Bill is of concern to a broad subsection of the business community. Although there is no doubt that national security is paramount and the first priority of any Government, we are the second-largest or third-largest recipient of inward investment in the world. Nothing in the Bill should jeopardise that, with Britain continuing to be a magnet for inward investment.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, particularly as I am speaking to the two amendments that he has spoken to, because he speaks with huge authority and considerable backing.
To start with Amendment 85, we on these Benches are very sympathetic to the cause of SMEs. Whether this is the best way of catering for the considerable issues that they will face under the Bill is a matter for debate. I would prefer to see the thresholds altered to accommodate the needs of small businesses, but the heart of Amendment 85 is certainly in the right place.
I turn to Amendment 89. As we have heard, throughout the course of the Bill’s passage concerns have been expressed about its impact and the culture of the ISU as it enforces the Bill’s provisions. As ever, my noble friend Lord Fox anticipated some of my arguments in the previous group. It is critical that a regular review is undertaken to ensure that the Act is achieving its aims proportionately while not unduly deterring foreign investment.
Other aspects of the Bill include the five-yearly review of the Secretary of State’s statement about the exercise of the call-in power under Clause 3 and, of course, the annual report that we have just been talking about, which is inadequate in many ways. It is currently envisaged in Clause 61 and, as we debated in the last group, it does not go nearly far enough. Neither provision makes any reference to the effectiveness of the overall scheme of the legislation, whether it is achieving its objectives and, indeed, whether its overall purpose is being achieved. As my noble friend said, two key questions need answering here—effectively, are we safe and is our investment climate healthy? Where in any of the Bill’s provisions is the provision for that to be considered?
Amendment 89 would require the Secretary of State to undertake a review of the Act and report to Parliament every three years. This would involve a cost-benefit analysis of the regime’s impact, as set out in proposed subsection(2)(c).
I support Amendment 92 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, and have signed it. I am sure that the noble Lord would have introduced it with far greater panache than me. But the Minister—the noble Lord, Lord Callanan—said at Second Reading:
“Noble Lords are entirely reasonable to expect further high-quality guidance from government to help businesses and investors navigate the regime.”—[Official Report, 4/2/21; col. 2391.]
That is reassuring but, as was made very clear by David Petrie, the head of the Corporate Finance Faculty of the ICAEW—I declare an interest as a member of its advisory board—in the Public Bill Committee on behalf of the members of the ICAEW, and as the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, has confirmed, the most effective way of tackling asymmetry of information in the business, investment and advisory communities would be the periodic production by the ISU of meaningful market guidance notes, modelled around the practice statements that accompany the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers.
Market guidance notes would be an important way for the ISU to engage closely and on an ongoing basis with businesses, investors and professional advisers. They would signal a culture of professionalism and openness to investment in UK businesses. They would support a necessary communication and awareness campaign of the legislative requirements. By setting out in an accessible way and in consultation with business, professional and sector bodies why and how businesses may be affected, the ISU could ensure that consistent and accurate information reaches the population of businesses and their advisers. Of course, future updates could also be issued in this format.
Beyond raising awareness, issuing market guidance notes over time would help to inform market participants on what they could be doing to make sure that the process works with more certainty, speed, clarity and transparency—all these cultural things that we have been talking about throughout the Bill, things which financial markets and the wider UK economy need to see. There would be a positive impact on productivity as a result; they would help to ease potential resourcing pressures on the ISU by increasing the proportion of notifications being submitted correctly, with all relevant details included.
I hardly need to say that market guidance notes would not form part of the Act and accordingly would not be binding on the Secretary of State. They would be issued to provide informal but meaningful guidance to businesses, investors and professional advisers on matters such as the level of information required in a mandatory or voluntary notification, and they would also provide commentary on the ISU’s normal approach to various provisions of the Act and greatly assist market participants seeking to establish the extent to which the Act may apply in a particular case. The ISU can also use them to share insights into trends where this would benefit the process. They would be amended periodically, or withdrawn as necessary, without the need for legislation—so extremely flexible. Each note could indicate the date on which it was issued, and so on.
There are other details that I could provide. There is great enthusiasm for this instrument, and I very much hope that the Bill will provide specifically for these. It would be an extremely useful indicator of the way in which the ISU proposes to operate.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Grantchester, Lord Leigh and Lord Clement-Jones, for their amendments in relation to equity stakes of affected parties, small and medium-sized enterprises, an impact review of the regime, and market guidance.
I first turn to Amendment 84, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester. This amendment seeks to require the Secretary of State to analyse the financial support provided by government, as part of Covid-19 support, to sectors considered more likely to give rise to national security risks. It then seeks to require him to consider converting loans and grants to equity stakes when there is a clear economic and national security rationale for doing so.
There is no doubt that the impact of Covid-19 on businesses and livelihoods of people across the country has been truly terrible, and I have a massive amount of sympathy for those affected. I can assure noble Lords that the Government are committed to supporting all UK businesses through the Covid period. The Government continue to provide extensive support to businesses to survive the pandemic, so far totalling over £280 billion, including through furlough, the Self-employment Income Support Scheme and business grants. However, I do not think that converting loans into equity stakes necessarily represents the best use of public money. As noble Lords will be aware, Clause 30 provides for the Secretary of State to give financial assistance to, or in relation to, entities in consequence of the making of a final order. However, it is expected that this will be used only in exceptional circumstances. What the noble Lord is proposing would be much wider than this and, while I am sure that it is very well intentioned, is very much a substantive diversion from the main purpose of the Bill.
I turn to Amendment 85, which would require the Secretary of State to create a small and medium enterprise engagement unit within three months of this Bill being passed. This unit would take particular actions in relation to SMEs and their interaction with the regime. I note that this amendment bears a strong similarity to an amendment proposed during Report in the other place, and it will not surprise noble Lords that my views on the subject are closely aligned with those of Nadhim Zahawi, my fellow Minister. The Government strongly support SMEs and so have sought to provide a clear and easy regime for businesses of all sizes to interact with. The Government have been happy to provide support to businesses both large and small through the contact address available on GOV.UK and discussions with BEIS officials. The Government have published fact sheets on GOV.UK which make clear what the measures in the proposed legislation are and, importantly, to whom they apply.
We are also creating a digital portal and a simple notification process to allow all businesses to interact with the regime without the need for extensive support from law firms. Furthermore, there is no fee for filing a notification, unlike many of the regimes operated by our allies. Consequently, we have no reason to believe that this regime will disproportionately affect SMEs or that this new clause is necessary.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)
I have received one request to speak after the Minister, and I call the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I should thank the Minister for his response; I am not sure I really want to. I found it rather extraordinary, particularly to Amendment 89. We have a Bill on foot with a purpose in mind but, when it comes to reviewing it, we are told that it is far too sensitive and we cannot possibly review whether it has met its objectives. We can keep it under review—within the department in some shape or form, I assume—but we cannot possibly undertake a periodic review of any kind. Even a normal post-legislative review process would expect to see whether an Act of Parliament was meeting its objectives. The Minister cannot even say whether that will take place at any stage.
This really adds to one’s concerns about this Bill in so many ways. It is a rather furtive creature that, if we are not careful, will be hiding in the dark for quite a long time and will not get reviewed. There is no way of seeing whether it is achieving its purpose other than the kind of review the Minister was talking about, which is purely internal to government and part of the government department’s overview. This is not particularly reassuring.
On Amendment 92, the Minister talked about just making statements about the call-in power or having the annual report. I said a set of market guidance notes would do; I did not adumbrate about six points that a set of market guidance notes could set out. They are far more extensive and market friendly than anything that is going to be caught by the call-in power statement or the annual report. We are talking about real guidance to business so that it knows what to expect and the parameters within which the Secretary of State is operating—particularly when it comes to guidance about the kinds of sector that will be caught and the current issues that the Secretary of State believes would give rise to a call-in notice and other aspects dealt with by the ISU. The idea that five years is a reasonable time to adjust a call-in power statement is laughable in the commercial world. The Takeover Panel updates its notes on a regular basis, and that is exactly what the ISU should do with market guidance.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I am not sure there were any questions for me there; the noble Lord has made some observations. I understand that he was unhappy with my replies, but I am afraid I cannot agree that the Bill is “furtive” or “hiding in the dark” at all. We are committed to transparency as much as possible. He says he has six additional points on market guidance notes. If he wants to send them to me, I will happily have a look at them and see what we can do. We said a maximum of five years, but of course the Secretary of State has the ability to do earlier reviews if necessary. That is a maximum date, and we could bring that forward. I take on board his points and am sorry if he is disappointed by my replies.
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, for his amendment in this group proposing a review of the Act and its engagement with businesses. I am sure it will become clear and the appropriate responses will be forthcoming from the department.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for his sympathy. The effect of the regime on SMEs is very relevant, and high-quality guidance for businesses has been recognised in the Minister’s replies. I thank him also for his replies on the pandemic and the business environment with the call-in powers of the Secretary of State. He returns to the issue of the annual report, thus giving room for these matters to be considered slightly further. With that in mind, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“Statement on climate, environment and ecological security
(1) Within six months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must publish a statement on how the provisions contained in this Act will be exercised in relation to national security impacts caused by climate, environment and ecological damage.(2) The statement must include, but is not limited to—(a) a review of how damage to climate, environment and ecological impacts affect national security;(b) an assessment of how climate, environment and ecological damage affects biosecurity risks, including pandemics; and(c) a list of conditions in which it is likely that the actions or omissions of a qualifying entity or qualifying asset are likely to be deemed as a risk to national security due to their impact on climate, environment and ecology.”
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, we started this day, the final day of Committee on the National Security and Investment Bill, with an advantage that we have not previously enjoyed: access, finally, to Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy—if only just, as it appeared on the Government website about an hour before our debate started. It is particularly useful in presenting this amendment, particularly given our debate thus far, which has often been stuck in a narrow, pre-21st century idea of what delivers “security”.
Certainly, the term “cyber” has been thrown around a lot, and there are provisions that address—and we have debated—crucial issues of resilience and the dangers of complex, interlinked technological systems, but it has been noticeable that the answers always seem to involve more complex technology rather than consideration of what technology should and should not be doing, and the dangers it represents. I note the important work in this area of the NGO, Drone Wars.
I have to doubt, with the greatest respect to the participants, the level of expertise in covering these complex, fast-moving and highly technical areas of cybersecurity. It is a pity that we have not seen some of the House’s cyber experts in this Committee. I noted in the Financial Services Bill just how thin the debate was, how small the number of Peers participating and how short were many of the debates. I note the adjective “furtive” used by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, in the debate on the previous group. That is in stark contrast to the debates on the Domestic Abuse Bill, where scores of Members of your Lordships’ House are passionately engaged, as is a broad swathe of civil society. That observation applies even more strongly in this Committee. All we can do is what we can do, and in this amendment I am obviously on natural ground for a Green Peer—but, then, as a talk show host said to me recently, “Everyone’s talking green now.”
I have been skim-reading the integrated review and can confirm just that. In the foreword, the Prime Minister says:
“COVID-19 has reminded us that security threats and tests of national resilience can take many forms.”
Yes. The existence of nuclear weapons is clearly a huge security threat. The world cannot be secure until the global ban on these hideous weapons of mass destruction is delivered. That that is a threat we intend to increase is a decision that can be described only as incredibly dangerous, heightening tension in an unstable world. I also remind the Committee that the Trident nuclear replacement has been forecast to cost nearly £200 billion over its lifetime—surely more now if there are more weapons—while the Government’s 10-point plan for a green industrial revolution has a budget of £12 billion. Choices are being made, choices that are terrifyingly bad for the security of us all.
Thinking about the Government’s decision-making under this Bill, what if a key manufacturer of wind turbine components were to be threatened with takeover by a company wanting to convert it to weapons manufacture pumping out more arms into a world already awash with them? It would be a lose-lose for national security. Amendment 93 addresses one side of that scenario: the climate, environmental and ecological emergencies, fittingly being debated on a day when we are reminded of the dangerously poor state of our natural world, with the disappearance of yet another hen harrier beside a grouse moor.
Before the Whips start questioning what hen harriers have to do with national security, I shall paraphrase a long-term Green saying: there is no security on a dead or dying planet, or in a country with a collapsed natural world. If noble Lords prefer, I shall quote the financial costs identified in the integrated review, which states that
“nature loss could result in a cumulative economic cost of up to $10 trillion between 2011 and 2050”.
Should we have—we can but hope—a company making, say, massive strides in restoring a large spread of our carbon-depleted, nature-razed uplands, its takeover by another with intentions to return to driven grouse shooting management would be a security issue for the nation, a climate issue, a biodiversity issue and, very directly, an issue for the flood-threatened communities downstream of it.
The Prime Minister’s foreword to the integrated review says that
“Her Majesty’s Government will make tackling climate change and biodiversity loss its number one international priority”—
albeit that that is in the final paragraph of the second page of a 2.5-page foreword. I did a little analysis of our Committee’s debates thus far, looking for mentions of the climate emergency and excluding occasions when “climate” appeared in the context of “investment climate”. On day 1, the word did not come up once. On day 2, it did, when I referred to it. The noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, twice mentioned the net zero carbon target on day 1. As for “nature”—in the biodiversity sense—or “ecology”, those did not come up, although I will give credit to the noble Lord, Lord Grimstone of Boscobel, who appears to have a pleasing attachment to offshore wind farms as a case study.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, I feel justifiably aggrieved to have been admonished by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, for not being passionate or plentiful enough. Telling people off who are here because there are not enough of us is perhaps a little unfair. Perhaps she could reserve her fire for colleagues who have decided not to be here. There is also a certain symmetry here. During our debate on the first amendment I had the pleasure of speaking on I was roundly admonished by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, for using it as a chance to repeat my Second Reading speech—which of course I denied.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, has a point. There is a very important element of security around the climate emergency and she is right to highlight that we need to factor in how climate, environment and ecological damage will affect the future security of this country. When we debated Clause 6 much earlier in this process, we looked at the 17 technologies that had been identified by the department as technologies of concern. That is an area where I think some input on this level could be made, and I would be happy to work with the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, going forward to look at that list and make some suggestions on whether there are missing technologies related to environmental and ecological damage issues that should be factored in.
I do not like to be self-referential—but I will be anyway. During the Budget debate I made it very clear that one of the things missing from the Budget was a strategy to get to the 2050 net-zero target. It was completely absent. There is no strategy to get there. I would advise that that is where we should focus our energy. The Government, the Opposition and everyone in Parliament should be delivering an integrated strategy to get to what in this case is our public policy for 2050. I know that different parties have different targets, but that process would tease out the technologies, the businesses and the areas of activity that we need to make sure we retain access to in order to move forward and deliver on the strategy.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, is right to bring this issue up, but I am not sure that adding a clause to this Bill is the right route. As I say, however, I would be happy to work with her on the list of technologies, and indeed I am happy to work with everyone to try to deliver the route map to get to net zero.
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
My Lords, unlike the noble Lord, Lord Fox, I am not unduly fearful of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. I have always thought that being Green does not allow for having a whip. However, I thank the noble Baroness for proposing this new clause to the Bill. I am certainly clear that the climate emergency must hang as a backcloth to every action that we undertake.
The aim of Amendment 93 is completely understood and appreciated. It seeks a Ministerial Statement on how the provisions set out in this Bill will be exercised in relation to the national security impacts caused by climate, environmental or ecological damage. The climate crisis is not only a threat to our way of life in the long term but a threat to national security in the short to medium term. Only last week, Jens Stoltenberg, the NATO Secretary-General, said that
“climate change makes the world more unsafe, so NATO needs to step up and play a bigger role in combating it.”
A few weeks ago, even the Prime Minister made a comment that climate change is a threat to our society. How will the new regime take account of this and reflect on his comments?
The Committee has already questions about the list of sectors affected, especially the energy sector, as well as about protecting green infrastructure. I have raised with the Minister the EV infrastructure, solar and wind industries and how their growth should be protected. It is certainly important that we hear more from him on the issue and what the difficulties would be in undertaking to produce the kind of statement being proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. If the Government are resistant to producing such a statement, could the issue be included as an integral part of the annual report?
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, let me thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, for her amendment and begin by expressing my heartfelt sympathy to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, on being admonished by her. All that I can say is, welcome to the club.
The amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish within six months of the Bill becoming law a statement on how the regime will be exercised in relation to national security impacts caused by climate, environmental and ecological damage. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, knows—we have debated these matters on numerous occasions in this House—this Government are committed to tackling climate change. We are especially looking forward to the COP 26 conference in November, which will highlight our leadership on this issue and promote co-operation on climate action through the UK’s G7 presidency, as Alok Sharma MP set out in a speech to the UN on 8 February. Of course, the COP 26 preparations continue to be led by Alok Sharma, who opened Second Reading on the Bill in the other place. I am sure that we all wish him well as he strives to bring the world to ambitious agreements in Glasgow.
The Bill, however, focuses on national security risks arising from acquisitions of control over qualifying entities and assets. If we were to view national security through a particular lens, as the amendment seeks to do through environmental concerns, we would be in some way defining national security. We have deliberately avoided defining it in the Bill, a matter that we have debated previously. We have expounded on that at some length in this House and in the other place.
Without rehearsing those arguments, which I am sure noble Lords are familiar with, I hope they will understand that we cannot accept amendments that seek to define national security in a particular way. The noble Baroness’s amendment asks for a statement on how the provisions in the Bill will be exercised. The most fundamental provision is the call-in power. The Bill already requires the Secretary of State to publish a statement on how that is expected to be exercised before being able to use the power. A draft of that statement was published on introduction of the Bill in November. The Government would be very pleased to receive comments and have committed to consult on it publicly. The final version of the statement must be laid before Parliament and will be subject to the negative resolution procedure.
Finally, two provisions in the noble Baroness’s amendment—proposed new paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b)—address specifically environmental concerns. Laudable as they are, they are not directly connected to the national security and investment regime proposed in the Bill. That is because the regime concerns whether the acquisition of qualifying entities and assets poses a risk to national security, not the actions of those entities or assets themselves. Given the Government’s commitment to environmental policies, but recognising that the Bill deliberately avoids defining national security, and given that a statement on how the call-in power is expected to be used is already provided for, I hope that the noble Baroness, in the light of what I have said, is able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response and for pointing out how the Committee has taken a neatly circular route, almost like a circular economy, in getting back to more or less where we started—debating definitions of national security. I also note his welcome for comments on the statement on the call-in power, which I certainly hope to pick up and run with.
I should perhaps begin with an apology to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, if he took my comments as being directed at him or anyone taking part in this debate. As is often the case with Greens, I am not concerned with individual behaviour but systems change. It is clear that the systems in your Lordships’ House tend to result in a narrow range of Peers taking part in Bills related to financial matters. Yet, in our heavily financialised society, and given that finance is such an important part of security in this instance, we need input from a broader range of sources. I am certainly not blaming the noble Lord for that, although perhaps he could encourage fellow Peers from his party and others to engage on this issue.
I very much thank the noble Lord for his offer to work together, particularly on the list of technologies, which is also something I will be taking up. I understood his suggestion that we should all be focusing on the need for the Government to have an integrated strategy for 2050, but I pick up on the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, who said that every action we undertake has to take account of the climate and ecological emergencies. To use a technical term, we are talking about mainstreaming. The climate emergency and ecological crisis must be at the forefront of our minds in every aspect of what the Government and your Lordships’ House do.
This is an emergency. Looking at the Chamber now, as I speak remotely, I think back to what it was like in March 12 months ago, when all anyone was thinking about was the Covid emergency, but we are also in a climate emergency and an ecological emergency.
I am aware that this is the final amendment to be debated. I hope we will see more people engaged in this debate when we get to Report. We have made some progress, I think, and so, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment, although I expect I will still be looking at what we may do on Report.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)
My Lords, that concludes proceedings on the Bill.
National Security and Investment Bill
Thursday 15th April 2021
(3 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 183-I Marshalled list for Report - (12 Apr 2021)
18:12 - Division on Amendment 24 - Ayes: 296 / Noes: 232 - Amendment 24 agreed.
19:07 - Division conducted remotely on Amendment 39 - Ayes: 118 / Noes: 255 - Amendment 39 disagreed.
Lord Lansley
“( ) details of the circumstances in which the application to an asset of any export control, transfer control, technical assistance control or trade control imposed under the Export Control Act 2002 and related provisions may affect the Secretary of State’s exercise of the power to give a call-in notice, and”
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, it is a privilege to open proceedings on Report. I want to say generally that Members across the House, on all sides, are supportive of the principles of the Bill. It has been clear that all the amendments tabled have the intention of trying to make it as clear, effective and workable as possible, and—as we will discuss later—to make sure that there is proper accountability and transparency in the proceedings. Several of my noble friends have tabled amendments in that spirit. I know that Ministers in charge of the Bill have responded in kind with a willingness, even in the past few days, to supply additional material on how the workings of the national security and investment regime will be made more transparent and clear to those it affects, who are substantial in number.
I come to one of the issues in the two amendments in this group, both in my name, which relate to the interaction between the national security and investment regime and the export control licensing regime. Amendment 1 relates to the exercise of the call-in power by Ministers. Amendment 37 relates to the making of interim and final orders by Ministers. I start with the first amendment.
I quoted the 2018 White Paper at more length in Committee but it stated, on behalf of the Government, that
“where national security concerns relate solely or primarily to the export of goods, the Government expects that the export control regime would remain the primary means of protecting national security”.
In Committee, I asked the Minister responding to reiterate that expectation. He failed to do so, nor did he offer any specific assurance about how the two regimes would interact. I am grateful to Ministers because, since then, they have committed to the publication of guidance, which will include the interaction of the national security and investment regime with the Competition and Markets Authority, the Takeover Panel and the export control regime. We have not, of course, yet seen the text of that guidance. Nor is a reference to the export control regime being included in the draft statement, which has to be made under Clause 3, that will explain where and in what circumstances the Secretary of State will exercise his call-in power.
The importance of that is illustrated not least by the references from time to time in the consultation on the sectors in scope of the mandatory regime, in which a number of respondents made it clear that they thought there was a widespread interaction and overlap. For example, paragraph 3.76 said that one respondent suggested that the pre-existing export control licensing regime was appropriate, for which a number of businesses had robust and sophisticated compliance programmes, noting a significant overlap between the lists and a number of the other proposed mandatory sectors.
The noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, on the Front Bench opposite, in Committee instanced other references to that in the consultation response. Indeed, he may have looked at the strategic export control list, which is 309 pages long, and the sectors in scope of the mandatory regime for the national security and investment regime. The overlap is very large indeed. It is important to those affected that these two regimes interact positively and sensibly.
Amendment 1 seeks to require that there be such a reference in the Clause 3 statement and a commitment to explaining to people how the two regimes will interact. Why does that matter? First, given the nature of the assets in the strategic export control list, a change of control of the entities that own them will often be a notifiable acquisition and therefore be subject to a mandatory notification. But will the acquisition be called in? That question will be in the minds of those affected and will depend upon the level of risk. If the acquisition is by a hostile actor, it is a fair argument that the national security and investment regime adds an extra safeguard beyond the export licensing process. However, it will be important for those who own sensitive assets to know when that issue—the nature of the acquirer—is the prompt for a call-in, not simply the sensitivity and nature of the assets themselves, since they can be safeguarded for national security purposes through the export control licensing regime. Therefore, those asset owners need to be able to reasonably predict when a call-in will be made.
Secondly, the Clause 3 statement should offer clarity about the distinction between the use of an asset and its control. The national security and investment regime is about ownership and, hence, control of assets. Export controls are directed to their use, specifically outside the United Kingdom by way of export. However, we should consider what will happen if we follow the American lead. Following the enacting three years ago of the latest US legislation, there are circumstances in which the American export control regime, because it anticipates that a given ownership could lead to a transfer of technology within an entity, deems such assets to be exports. We already see an increasing overlap between the question of control and the question of use. The statement needs to be clear about that distinction, too.
What I am really looking for from my noble friend on the Front Bench is, first, an assurance that these issues will be fully dealt with in the guidance to be published, and that there will be a specific reference in the statement to matters dealt with under Clause 3, even if that is supplemented in detail by the technical guidance.
Amendment 37 raises an important further interaction. When Ministers make interim or final orders, given the extent of overlap between assets in the scope of this regime and those in the strategic export control list, it is likely that the entities that control such assets may, if they pass into new ownership, be subject to such orders. Those orders are about not just the situation today but what should happen in future. There will be a temptation on the part of Ministers to make orders that, like contracts in law, provide for every set of circumstances in future.
My point is simple: when making orders, Ministers should always rely on the export control licensing regime to do its job effectively. They should not try to substitute for the export control regime in future by restricting, through orders, what entities are or are not able to do. Even though they have the power to do that, they should not do it. They should live up to the expectation of the 2018 White Paper that the export control regime is the means by which Ministers exercise control of the export of sensitive assets.
There are two units involved. The Export Control Joint Unit is made up of officials from the Ministry of Defence, the Department for International Trade and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, and there is the unit for the national security and investment regime. The interaction between the two units needs to be excellent. In the shape of my noble friend the Minister on the Front Bench, we have the embodiment of the relationship between the Department for International Trade and the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. I hope that he makes sure that these two work together well.
We should not see orders under the NSI regime supplanting what should be licensing procedures under the export control licensing regime, not least because—I pre-empt an issue that we will come on to later—export control licensing is the subject of greater and specific parliamentary scrutiny by the Committees on Arms Export Controls in the other place. There is no such direct scrutiny of the orders being made under this NSI regime. I hope that I do not need to say that Ministers should not fall prey to the temptation to incorporate measures into orders under this regime because it entails less parliamentary scrutiny than would be the case for export licensing under the other regime.
When we get to Amendment 37, I hope that I will be able to rely on Ministers’ further assurances that they will not simply take account of the export control regime and will rely less on administrative law issues. It was slightly ironic that our debate in Committee was followed the following week by a debate on administrative law that suggested that statute should be as clear as possible about the requirements that people have to live up to and not rely on a general public law duty—but that is exactly what Ministers profess to rely on here. I would prefer Amendment 37 to be adopted by the Government and it to be very clear that Ministers will take full account of the export control licensing regime. Even if they are not happy to amend the legislation, I hope that what my noble friend says in response to this debate will make it clear that that will be the case. I beg to move Amendment 1.
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, for returning to the issue of the interaction of the NSI and export control regimes. He is correct to probe further with the explicit inclusion of Amendment 1, so that the new NSI regime is not buried within BEIS but works effectively across government, specifically across both regimes.
Amendment 37 underlines the need to recognise proper co-ordination in this regime. The Government had recognised only that the two regimes are distinct and would sit alongside each other, as the expression goes, yet they were concerned by activities that could circumvent the export control criteria. With the extent of the overlap to which the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, refers, this would be surprising.
Since Committee, further consideration has been given to the issue. We agree with the noble Lord in calling for greater clarity about the interaction needed with export controls, especially when a call-in notice has to be considered and when interim and final orders are being made. We are supportive of the intention behind these amendments regarding concerns about how this regime will interact with functions under the export control regime. Why does the Bill remain silent on the export control regime in its drafting?
The Minister of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Department for International Trade (Lord Grimstone of Boscobel) (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Lansley for his Amendments 1 and 37, which explore the interaction between the export control regime and the regime created through this Bill. As we start this session, I thank your Lordships for the constructive way in which they have approached this Bill and the constructive debates that we have had.
Amendment 1 would provide that the statement about the exercise of the call-in power may set out how the Secretary of State will factor in controls placed under the export control regime when deciding whether to call in asset acquisitions. Amendment 37 would ensure that the Secretary of State takes into account controls placed under the export control regime when imposing interim or final orders on asset acquisitions. These amendments follow discussions in Grand Committee on the links between export controls and NSI; I thank noble Lords for the insights that they have shared.
I am happy to confirm to my noble friend that the Secretary of State will need to take into account the impact of any controls placed under the export control regime, as well as other relevant regimes so far as they relate to national security considerations. This is required by both the legal tests in the Bill and public law duties. This is the case when he decides whether to call in an acquisition of control; whether to impose interim orders or final orders in relation to such acquisitions; and what form those orders should take.
In particular, if existing controls under the export control regime already address any national security concerns arising from the acquisition of an asset, I am happy to confirm for my noble friend that it is unlikely that the Secretary of State would be able to call in that acquisition. As has been referenced by noble Lords, I commit that we will provide guidance on the interaction of the NSI regime with other relevant regimes, including export control, which will ensure that affected parties are clear on this point.
My noble friend also asked specifically about the Statement. I am happy to confirm that the Government will consider specific reference to export controls in it if we judge this to be appropriate following the consultation on the Statement. I thank my noble friend Lord Lansley for this suggestion.
I appreciate the intent behind these amendments, and I hope that I have finally given my noble friend sufficient reassurance on these matters not to press them.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Fookes) (Con)
I have received one request to speak after the Minister. I call the noble Lord, Lord Fox.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, I think I heard the Minister say that the export control regime and the regime established by this Bill will be equal, rather than one being precedent to the other. The noble Lord, Lord Lansley, quoted a White Paper which very clearly set the export control regime as having precedent over this regime. That is not what I heard the Minister say —so, in order of precedence, how does the Minister expect these two regimes, which I hope will be complementary and not conflicting, to work together?
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
I thank the noble Lord for that point. It is hard to give a black-and-white answer, because it would depend of course on the circumstances. Let us remind ourselves what the difference is. The export control regime, which is the licensing regime for certain controlled goods, is one important part of the safeguarding of our national security, and, of course, it sits well alongside the national security and investment regime. The two regimes are distinct and do not perform the same role. To give an example to clarify that, the export control regime does not provide the Government with the ability to scrutinise acquisitions of UK companies or the ability to direct the use of sensitive assets used in the UK, whereas the NSI regime would. In a nutshell, the precedence between these two regimes must and will depend on the circumstances that are being covered.
Lord Lansley (Con)
I thank your Lordships for this very short but useful debate—useful not least in assisting those who will be affected by the regime. I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Grantchester and Lord Fox, for their contributions.
The point about the White Paper and the commitment to use the export control regime primarily to deal with national security risks relating to the export of these assets, and specifically the qualifying assets, is that the export control regime sets specific limitations on the export of specific items to specific persons and places. It is very targeted in that sense. As the Minister says, it does not bear upon the question of control of entities or the overall ownership of assets, so there is a compelling need now for this new regime; it just does not need to reproduce or trespass upon those things that are being achieved through the export control regime. That is what I understood the White Paper to say, and I understood the noble Lord, Lord Fox, to be asking for that to continue to be the expectation.
I hope that Ministers will make it very clear to those affected that, where they have a compliance regime in place for export control, that will continue to be sufficient for the purposes of the management of qualifying assets, because Ministers have made it clear that rarely would they expect to invoke the national security investment regime in relation to specific assets. It is really targeted on the ownership and control of entities and, by that route, the ownership and control of large-scale assets. I am sorry to have had to explain that again, but I do hope that Ministers will take it on board.
I am most grateful to my noble friend for going further than we were able to go in Committee, and, in particular, returning to Amendment 1, what he was able to say about the Statement under Clause 3 and the additional guidance has moved us on quite a long way from where we began. I am most grateful for that, and I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 1.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Fookes) (Con)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 2. Anyone wishing to press this or anything else in this group to a Division must make that clear in debate.
Clause 6: Notifiable acquisitions
Amendment 2
Lord Lansley
2: Clause 6, page 4, line 15, leave out “or (6)” and insert insert “, (6) or (8)”
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, I apologise for speaking to two groups in a row. It is how chance would have it with the structure of the Bill.
Clause 6 of the Bill is where there is a definition of “notifiable acquisitions”. This is linked to Clause 8, which sets out the circumstances in which entities come under the control of a person, and the link between these two, as I understood it, was that if somebody takes control of an entity by any of the routes described in Clause 8, that acquisition would be notifiable under Clause 6 if it relates to a sector in scope of the mandatory regime. Therefore, I was slightly surprised that the cases presented in Clause 8 relate, in the first three instances, to shareholdings in total, or voting rights. My noble friend Lord Leigh has secured a notable concession from the Government, which he will no doubt refer to in a moment—actually, he may not, looking at the list—that secured a change. However, on his behalf I thank Ministers and I congratulate my noble friend on securing that change in the Bill in relation to shareholdings over 15%. It is a sensible shift.
However, I was looking not at shareholdings or voting rights but material influence, as defined under the Enterprise Act 2002. On the face of it, it seems that if one acquires control by virtue of material influence over an entity, why would that not also come under the Clause 6 requirement that it be a “notifiable acquisition”? In a very helpful exchange of correspondence, Ministers have explained to me that their intention is that the mandatory regime should apply only where those affected can be very clear that there is a mandatory notification requirement. Material influence, by its nature, is a less clear test. It is a subjective test and of course it can vary dramatically over time. It is much better, in the view of Ministers, that it should be governed by the voluntary notification regime or the Ministers’ power to call in if they are concerned, rather than by requiring everybody who acquires material influence over a sensitive entity to notify any change of material influence. They have explained that to me and I am very happy—so, in that sense, I am not pushing Amendment 2 any further.
I suppose the point of this short debate is to enable Ministers to explain that point, because otherwise, of course, people could fall into exactly the same confusion that I did: namely, is it control or not? The answer is that, where material influence is concerned, it may be control of a kind—you may be able to influence the policy of an entity—but there should then be a subjective question in the mind of somebody who acquires that kind of influence over the policy of a relevant entity in scope of the regime, and they should think that they should make a voluntary notification rather than being required to make a mandatory one. It does not take them out of the regime, but it changes their interaction with it. I am content that the Bill achieves that, but it is useful to explain that to those who might be affected. Otherwise, I very much welcome the government amendments in this group, and for the moment, I beg to move.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)
My Lords, since this is the first time I have spoken at this stage of the Bill, I add my thanks to those of my noble friend Lord Lansley to the members of the ministerial team and the Bill team for the time they have given and the meetings we have had to clarify and sort out the delicate balance we are all trying to achieve and the changes being made, which are part of the amendments in this group.
I will focus my remarks on Amendment 8, which returns to whether minority investor veto rights automatically bring the investment in question into the provisions of the Bill. It was an issue I addressed in Amendment 29 in its previous incarnation, along with Amendment 72. I found the Government’s arguments about Amendment 72 entirely convincing, so I have not retabled it, but I am not able to say the same about the response I received to Amendment 29, so I have retabled it and have discussed it with the Law Society, which seems similarly confused.
This is important because if we do not get clarity on this issue, there are at least two possible consequences: a potentially large increase in the number of voluntary notifications required, so further straining the system which the department is setting up, and/or a deterrent effect on people’s readiness to invest in the defined sectors of our economy.
I explained in Committee that a private equity investment essentially has two parts. There is the purchase of the shares, which will take place under the standard provisions of the Companies Act, and that is where the control of the entity lies. In parallel, it will be supplemented by a specially drafted, custom-made investment agreement. This is an agreement which both parties—the investee company and the investor—hope will be put into a drawer and never looked at again but, life being what it is, disagreements take place and the agreement is therefore essentially a protective device for the investor against malfeasance or bad performance by the managers of the company. The Minister needs to understand that it is essentially an agreement about corporate governance, not corporate law, which is how the company is controlled. That investment agreement is likely to require the investor’s consent to a number of major issues, such as approval of the budget, major capital expenditure proposals and so on.
When I describe it like this, it can be seen that these are protective provisions, not proactive initiating ones, but although they are protective, they are extensive, and this is where the use of the words “substantially all” in Clause 8(7) becomes significant. If that is the case, the Bill appears to bring within its ambit a range of private equity investments where the new investor has taken a minority position. It might be assumed that the new investor will be taking a minority position for malfeasance reasons, but there are a large number of reasons why private equity houses do not wish to buy 100% of a company. It may be that the existing management will not sell more than 50%. It may be that the new investor wishes the continuing management to have a real incentive to do well, and therefore likes it to have a larger stake. Last but not least, it may be that the investor has a maximum size of investment he can make and that determines the percentage that the investor can hold. So if you have an investor who can put up only £40 million and the company is worth £100 million, it can take only 40% because that is how the maths work out.
The new investors who are in a minority position need additional protections, and if they can obtain those protections only after making a notification then there are these consequences of more voluntary notifications and some diminution in the attractiveness of the sectors covered by the Bill. That does not seem a desirable outcome.
I have said that significant changes to a company’s status come about not from the investment agreement, but as a result of passages of ordinary or extraordinary resolutions under the Companies Act. Amendment 28 is therefore designed to remove some of the wording of Clause 8(6), which is untried, untested and, at least in the view of a number of law firms, open to interpretation, and replace it with company law provisions with which everyone is familiar.
When winding up the debate on this amendment on 9 March, the Minister said, “I believe that his”—that is my—
“intent is very much to seek to exclude acquisitions of minority veto rights from constituting trigger events.”
So far, so good. He then went on to say:
“However, the Government consider that the Bill already achieves this goal to some extent”—[Official Report, 9/3/21; col. GC 637-38.]
because of the provisions of subsection (7). That is the heart of the matter. The concern of the Law Society and others is that the Bill creates uncertainty where no uncertainty need exist. That uncertainty can easily be dispelled if we use familiar company law concepts.
To summarise, I argue that if no change is made to guard against these uncertainties, legal advisers to private equity investors can be expected to take a belt-and-braces approach and suggest that on all occasions a voluntary notification should be made. When he comes to reply, I invite the Minister either to say that the Government believe that minority investor rights are not covered by the Bill so that we are all clear about that or, if he cannot say that, to please agree to take a further look at it to try to create certainty and dispel uncertainty, and therefore further ensure that we get the right balance between personal property rights and the nation’s security.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I shall speak to the Government’s amendment and to Amendment 8 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, but, as regards Amendment 2, the questions raised by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, are valid and it is rather inexplicable that that subsection of Clause 8 is not included in Clause 6.
When we debated the thresholds for the trigger for mandatory notification, the noble Lord, Lord Leigh—I am sure he will get many tributes today for having pushed the envelope and succeeded in having the Government agree with him—raised issues about 15% versus 25%. The principal arguments were that keeping it at 15% would result in a huge number of notifications, the vast majority of which would not give rise to national security concerns, which would place a significant administrative burden on the new investment screening unit, and that that the current filing threshold of 15%, as set out in the Bill, is significantly below the threshold used in a number of other major foreign direct investment regimes such as France, which requires 25%, Australia which requires 20% and Canada which requires 33.3%. I am delighted that the mandatory notification threshold has been increased to 25%, which was the threshold set out originally in the White Paper. I think the Government’s reversion to their original intent is very much to be welcomed.
As regards Amendment 8, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, not having practised company law for many years now, I can only admire his forensic ability in setting out exactly why we need greater clarity under that provision. He has illustrated that the current language does not provide that level of clarity. In his words, it does not dispel uncertainty, but the language in his Amendment 8 certainly would. I believe it is only in the Government’s and the ISU’s interest to acknowledge that, and I very much hope the Government will accede to his request to provide clarity, either by accepting his amendment or by giving assurance that they will look at it further and take that forward at Third Reading.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I rise to speak for the first time on this Bill. I declare my interests in the register as a director and former director of a number of companies, although none is obviously affected. I have not spoken until today because I support this Bill, and it has been making good progress without any help from me and with the forensic assistance of my noble friends Lord Lansley, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, Lady Noakes, Lord Leigh and others right across the House.
There has been a succession of regrettable takeovers of UK jewels in recent years without proper scrutiny by the authorities. The SoftBank raid was the most egregious, yet it was welcomed by the then Chancellor. ARM—my favourite firm when I was Intellectual Property Minister, if I may now say so—was the world’s leading chip maker, headquartered relatively modestly in Cambridge and run by the talented Warren East, who must look back with pleasure to that time. Allowing its subsequent takeover was a serious mistake for UK interests.
This Bill is concerned primarily with security, so I suspect it would not have caught another controversial deal, that of Kraft/Cadbury, though it would have been useful had that too been caught. That example highlighted the fact that it is not only jobs but both R&D spend and cultural support that tend to go with the head office of a company or group.
Decades of such highly leveraged deals have contributed to damage in this respect. Think of aerospace pioneer Cobham and satellite service provider Inmarsat. As an aside, how lucky those of us who have benefited from its vaccine are that AstraZeneca held out against Pfizer a few years ago. We ought to have powers to prevent such a proposal if it arose again and was not in the UK interest. The powers in this overdue Bill should, among other things, slow the sale to overseas interests of companies engaged in tech and biotech, as well as emerging forms of AI and intellectual property.
My concern today is not with the Bill but with government Amendment 3 and its associated provisions, which, as we have heard, raise the threshold, from 15% to 25%, at which investors are required to notify the Government of their deals. I know this is done for apparently good reasons, summarised by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones—notably to avoid needless blockages and queues of deals awaiting approval in the new unit at the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, my old department—but I believe it is the wrong call. No doubt the ARM deal would have been caught by the new rules anyway, but less radical deals might not. I believe that it would be better to invest more in administration at the business department, to keep the threshold as it is and to improve the incentives to discipline and speed in processing of applications.
This is such an important matter for our future that we should not skimp on the new unit, which should be staffed by top people with the ability to work at speed. My noble friend Lady Noakes and others have rightly expressed concerns on this score, which I will support later. It would be a tragedy if this new Act were undermined by administrative inadequacy.
If we are to flourish in this more competitive and dangerous world, we need to prevent British science, technology and intellectual property leaving these shores without anyone noticing or reviewing it. We need thorough scrutiny of the deals identified in this Bill, so, for me, Amendment 3 goes too far and I would find it difficult to support the Government if the House chose to divide.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
My Lords, I am delighted to speak on Report. I congratulate my noble friend Lord Leigh on raising this persistently and so eloquently at earlier stages of the Bill. I congratulate my noble friend the Minister on listening to and acting on the concerns expressed across the House at that stage by bringing forward the amendments that he has today.
I particularly associate myself with Amendment 8, to Clause 8, in the name of my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts. I would like to press the case a little further with my noble friend the Minister and ask that we pause for a moment at this stage and ensure that we are not going to scare off potential large investors with an increase in referrals that perhaps could not be managed or see a deterrence to potential investment, therefore possibly damaging the economy.
The way in which I would like to press my noble friend the Minister follows on from what my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe said in her opening remarks just now as to what extraneous factors may be taken into account that could damage potential investment in this country. Those further factors that I ask my noble friend to rule out have been put forward at earlier stages by the Law Society of England, which I supported in Committee and repeat in connection with Amendment 8 here.
Can my noble friend clarify and give greater certainty as to what constitutes national security? Will he specifically rule out extraneous factors such as employment effects, reciprocal investment and trading opportunities in other jurisdictions and a desire to protect UK business from international competition as factors that would be taken into account when assessing whether a trigger event would give rise to a national security risk? In terms of Amendment 8 and our earlier discussions, it would give clear guidance to those practitioners at this stage if we could rule out that those extraneous factors would ever constitute a potential national security risk.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, we have had a short and interesting debate. Speaking to Amendment 2, the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, has as ever uncovered an incongruity in the way the Bill is drafted. I suggest the Government are wise to listen to his advice. Similarly with Amendment 8, there is a need for clarity for people. Where do they stand on this issue? That is all people deserve when trying to manage their affairs.
We then come to the extraordinary intervention of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. It is a shame that she was not around to give a Second Reading speech, which perhaps might have guided us through some of our decision-making, and arrived only at this late hour to offer her help. I suspect that, had she involved herself a little earlier, she might have been less concerned with the issues than she is now. For fear of doing the Minister’s work for him, I ask him to confirm that the regime retains the right to call in deals that are less than 25% at any time. The notion that there are deals that the regime may not see is one of the points inferred by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe.
This is the point: the unit has to be sufficiently resourced and efficient in its work to be able to pick these issues up. We shall talk later about where it gets its information and how the security guidance is fed in, because that comes under another group of amendments. However, with all the issues coming through, the point is how well the regime is actually operated; the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has mentioned this on many occasions. That will be the rub, in terms of how business will be affected by the Bill. The more the Minister can reassure us that the resources will be there to deliver this, the happier most of us will be.
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
My Lords, we remain committed to the principles of the Bill, and join others in thanking the Minister and his team for the way they have conducted discussions with us to resolve any issues on the Bill. One of the issues that remains involves the extensive adventure of the unit into the business environment. In Committee, my colleague and noble friend Lady Hayter introduced an amendment to delete Clause 6(2)(b), and asked why the Government wished to make subject to mandatory notification all acquisitions that resulted in only a minimum 15% stake in an entity. We consider that disproportionate. The noble Lord, Lord Leigh, also spoke passionately on the point, as did several other noble Lords. My noble friend apologises because, understandably, she cannot take part in these proceedings today.
However, it is to be welcomed that the Government have heeded the concerns about the unnecessary impact on businesses and the largely intrusive workload for the new ISU section in the department. Government Amendment 3, together with the consequential amendments in this group, would remove the 15% threshold for notifiable acquisitions from the regime. Throughout the proceedings on the Bill, we have been concerned about the impact on businesses, especially in the SME sector, and the huge workload that the Bill would create. That government concession goes a long way towards meeting those concerns.
The Government will still be able proactively to call in transactions involving acquisitions under the 25% threshold of shares or votes if such an acquisition could be deemed to result in “material influence”. However, the ISU would be notified only of transactions most likely to raise national security risks in the most sensitive sectors of the economy. This is plainly sensible. The removal of the 15% threshold will also remove unnecessary impediments to investments in smaller start-ups and enterprises, which might have concerns about hitting the 15% threshold.
Initially the Government reckoned that the new screening regime would result in about 1,800 notifications per year. We expressed scepticism at that estimate, as did several others, including the CBI. Whatever would have been the result, have the Government now recalculated how many notifications the department is likely to receive, having deleted the 15% threshold? I would be grateful if the Minister could give the House the new figure, with any further explanations as to its determination. It would be useful to reflect on it, in the light of the experiences of the unit that are to come.
I am grateful, too, to the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, for his Amendment 8, which redrafts Clause 8(6). I understand very well the point he is making, and I await the Minister’s reply.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Lord Callanan) (Con)
I am grateful to noble Lords for an interesting debate, and I am particularly grateful to my noble friends Lord Lansley and Lord Hodgson for their respective amendments in this group concerning the scope of the regime. I will turn to those in a moment, but let me start with a few remarks on the amendments in my name.
Debates on the Bill, both in this House and in the other place, have reflected that there is a strong degree of cross-party consensus on its underlying principles. I am grateful to the Opposition for making that clear. All sides agree that reforms are necessary to keep the country safe and to bring our investment screening powers in line with our friends and allies. There has also been a shared recognition that the requirements of the mandatory regime must be no more than are necessary and proportionate for the protection of our national security, so that business and investment are not unduly burdened or stifled.
The noble Lord, Lord Fox, put it well in Committee when he reminded us that the clue is in the name. This is the National Security and Investment Bill, and it is vital that we secure both these interests. To that end, the Government have reflected carefully on the scope of the mandatory regime and, in particular, on the comments made by a number of noble Lords in Committee on the 15% starting threshold. I pay particular tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, who raised this—and who is, I am pleased to see, in her place, taking a break from her “get out the vote” campaign. Perhaps she would be better advised to be getting out the vote, but I am grateful that she has joined us. I am also grateful to my noble friends Lord Leigh and Lady Noakes, the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, who all spoke powerfully in support of her amendment.
The Government have concluded that the right approach is indeed to remove acquisitions between 15% and 25% from constituting “notifiable acquisitions”; Amendment 3 gives effect to this decision. We recognise that acquisitions between 15% and 25% will not result in material influence being acquired as a matter of course. Indeed, in many cases, we anticipate that material influence will not be acquired. We have always sought to ensure that the mandatory regime is reasonable and proportionate, and this is an important change, which I believe businesses and investors alike will welcome. I hope that it will reduce the business burden and allow the investment security unit to focus on notifications and cases that will necessarily result in control being acquired.
Let me make two further points on this amendment. First, there may be some noble Lords—my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe was one, I believe—who will say that this is a weakening of the regime. Let me explain why I do not believe that that is the case. As the noble Lord, Lord Fox, pointed out, the Secretary of State will continue to be able to call in acquisitions across the economy at or below 25%—and, indeed, if necessary, below 15%—where they reasonably suspect that material influence has been or will be acquired. That call-in power will be available up to five years after an acquisition takes place, so the incentive for parties to notify cases of material influence that may have national security implications remains, in order to achieve deal certainty. The five-year period also provides the Government with a significant window to identify acquisitions of concern and for the Secretary of State to call them in for scrutiny.
Secondly, the Clause 6 powers enable the Secretary of State to amend the scope of the mandatory regime through regulations. Notwithstanding this amendment, that would include the ability to introduce, if necessary, a 15% threshold or, indeed—assuming the will of Parliament, of course—any other threshold that would be relevant to determining whether a trigger event would take place, for mandatory notification in future if that is considered appropriate. The Government do not currently envisage doing so, but I am sure that noble Lords will agree that it is important that the Bill provides the power to do so, subject to the will of Parliament, if the evidence of the regime in practice suggests that this matter should be revisited. I hope that that reassures my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe.
Amendments 4, 5, 10 and 21 are all consequential amendments that reflect the removal of the 15% threshold, so I do not intend to dwell on them further.
I now turn to the other amendments in this group. Amendment 2 in the name of my noble friend Lord Lansley would make the acquisition of material influence a notifiable acquisition. I have to say that, in his speech, my noble friend did such a good job of advocating for the Government’s position on his own amendment that perhaps we should welcome him back to the Front Bench at some stage; actually, he would probably make a better job of it than me.
The Government do not consider that broadening the scope of the mandatory regime to material influence would be appropriate. The mandatory regime, given that it is underpinned by voiding and criminal and civil sanctions, must be defined with sufficient certainty for acquirers to determine their obligations objectively.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Watkins of Tavistock) (CB)
I have received a request to ask a short question for elucidation from the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley.
Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)
I suppose I should say that modesty had forbidden me from putting my name down for this group. I wanted to have a point clarified and to thank the Government for listening to the Back-Benchers. I think it was fairly random that I took the 15% point: I cannot remember how it was allocated. I thank the Minister for listening to the many people who made representations.
In respect of the point from the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, about the fourth case—Clause 8(8)—we debated this and I think I raised the question at the time as to what influencing the policy of the entity means. To return the compliment to the Government, I agree with them in this instance because if we had Clause 8(8), I can see a lot of discussion and debate as to the meaning of enabling a person to materially influence “the policy”. We discussed the meaning of this at length. I return the compliment and agree with my noble friend the Minister.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I will just say that, as always, I agree with my noble friend.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, it has been a helpful debate, not least from the point of view of helping those—I imagine that over time, there will be more of them than we imagine—who will look back and ask what the intentions were behind the Bill as it was brought forward. If I perhaps can say by way of comfort to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe, the point that we have discovered going through the Bill is that there are two tracks here—I confess that my Amendment 2 was tabled originally not quite getting that point. First, there is mandatory notification, which is required in respect of a notifiable acquisition, so the definition of notifiable acquisition needs to be specified very clearly. Then there is voluntary notification but also the power of Ministers to call in any transaction. That is precisely the point that the noble Lord, Lord Fox, made very clearly and which my noble friend on the Front Bench reiterated.
The common theme here is that taking out the 15% threshold and, indeed, not including the material influence test in notifiable acquisitions, means that it is not subject to a mandatory notification requirement. As my noble friend said, we should not ignore the fact that under Clause 13(1):
“A notifiable acquisition that is completed without the approval of the Secretary of State is void.”
The risk associated with an unclear boundary between what is notifiable and what is not is that potentially large numbers of acquisitions that should be notified are not and therefore those transactions are void. We do not want to arrive at that position. We want people who run the risk of their transaction being a notifiable acquisition either being captured by the mandatory requirement or voluntarily notifying. Frankly, for many people voluntary notification will probably be the better and simpler resort.
Taking out the 15% threshold does not mean, in any sense, that those transactions are taken out of the scope of the regime but simply means that they are dealt with within the regime in a more flexible manner than would be the case through the mandatory notification requirement. Some of the press reports I have seen about this slightly miss the point. This is not a hard-and-fast threshold. It is a threshold for mandatory notification, not voluntary notification. The regime still applies.
My noble friend very helpfully responded to my Amendment 2 in precisely the way that I anticipated and quite correctly and, on that basis, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 2.
Lord Callanan
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment has the effect of omitting a category of notifiable acquisitions from the scope of the mandatory notification regime, namely where a person acquires a right or interest in a qualifying entity such that their shareholding or voting rights in the entity increases from less than 15% to 15% or more.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment and the amendments at page 4, line 42, page 8, line 30 and page 21, line 7 are consequential on the removal of Clause 6(2)(b).
Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement to the amendment at page 4, line 22.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Watkins of Tavistock) (CB)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 6. Anyone wishing to press this, or anything else in this group, to a Division, must make that clear in debate.
Amendment 6
“( ) In making regulations for the purposes of this section the Secretary of State must have regard to the risk to national security posed by climate change and to the role of qualifying entities and assets in mitigating that risk.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to have regard to the risk to national security posed by climate change when making regulations relating to notifiable acquisitions.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, at the very end of the third day of Committee your Lordships had a short debate around the impact of climate change on national security. On these Benches, our view is that this is still not considered appropriately by the Bill as it is currently drafted. Climate is also possibly missed in some of the 17 technologies; I guess we will have a chance to debate that when the detailed list arrives formally. Infrastructure issues are also somewhat neglected, as we have heard on some occasions, not least from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, opposite.
During that debate, I suggested that the best route might not be a lengthy definition of national security, which included a part for climate change. Rather, I suggested, something that focused on Clause 6 might be a better approach. This amendment is the response to that suggestion. Amendment 6 in my name would require the Secretary of State to
“have regard to the risk to national security posed by climate change”
when making regulations relating to notifiable acquisitions. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, and to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, for their signatures and, of course, to my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones.
It is quite clear that climate change is already causing national security issues. We have only to look at climate-inspired migration crises, which are hitting many countries, and the related security issues that arise from that mass migration, to appreciate the nexus between these two issues. It is also clear that, when it comes to meeting these challenges, access to both technologies and the raw material to deliver those technologies are crucial to our national response to the climate change threat. Further, the ownership of key infrastructure which will, I hope, help to deliver a zero-carbon footprint will be a matter of concern going forward.
All of this could implicitly fall within the remit of the Bill, and I accept that. This amendment calls for a more explicit recognition of the potential for climate change—which, in my view, includes biodiversity—to affect national security, and that is what I am looking for from the Minister today.
The Minister has previously indicated his allergy to “have regard” amendments, notwithstanding the fact that there are such clauses in Bills that the Government have asked your Lordships to approve from other departments, so perhaps this allergy is simply reserved for the BEIS area. But, recognising this, I ask the Minister, and expect him to explain, why this amendment would contaminate this Bill, because the Government have voiced their concerns around climate change, and it is easy to make that connection in some cases.
At the very least, I think it is possible for the Minister to acknowledge that climate change and its influence will be one of the factors that should be taken into consideration when making regulations related to notifiable acquisitions. I think that he could find his way to confirming that the technology and raw material issues that I set out earlier would also be on the investment unit’s checklist, because they are important elements of national security. I remain hopeful that the Minister will be able to do that while, of course, retaining the option of putting my amendment to a vote. I beg to move Amendment 6.
Amendment 7 (to Amendment 6)
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, as this is my first contribution to Report stage of this Bill, I make reference to the Law Society briefing. In summary, it expresses concerns about the Bill’s lack of a clear definition of national security, the definition of qualifying entities and assets, and the procedure for voluntary and mandatory notifications— the whole Bill then. There are grave concerns about the degree to which this has been thought through, through no fault of anyone here in this debate—a small number of people have put in a huge amount of often detailed work. On this point, it is right to note how appropriate it is that the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, opened the debate on Report. I ask noble Lords to forgive me if anything in my speech today is unclear, since I am still in recovery from a minor bit of dental work this morning.
I speak now to Amendment 6 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Fox, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Grantchester, to which I have attached my name, making it truly cross-party. It requires the Secretary of State to have regard to the risk to national security posed by climate change when making regulations relating to notifiable acquisitions. I also beg to move Amendment 7 and speak to Amendment 38 in my name. Amendment 7 adds “biodiversity loss” to the matters posing a risk to national security that the Secretary of State must have regard to when making regulations relating to notifiable acquisitions. Amendment 38 in some ways ties this all together, along with other matters, stating that:
“Within 6 months of the passing of this Act the Secretary of State must publish a statement which outlines how provisions in this Act will align with the United Kingdom’s long term security priorities and concerns which have been identified in the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy.”
That amendment is a repeat of an amendment in Committee—tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, and signed by the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and myself—which has been only minorly updated to take account of the publication of the integrated review.
In introducing this group, the noble Lord, Lord Fox, has already spoken clearly and eloquently on the way in which the climate emergency is a national security issue. I note his focus on the list of technologies, which he has kindly offered to work with me on. I have not yet managed to get to that, but I will, and I very much appreciate his offer. I can also go to the Prime Minister’s foreword to the integrated review, which states:
“Her Majesty’s Government will make tackling climate change and biodiversity loss its number one international priority.”
I know that there are now few Members of your Lordships’ House who would at least actively deny the issue of the climate emergency. That does not include, I hope, any members of the new Environment and Climate Change Committee. Therefore, I will focus my remarks primarily on Amendment 7, which adds the concern about biodiversity to that of climate change. I might for completeness have made this amendment refer to planetary limits as a sustainable development goal-informed way of addressing the multiple national security threats from environmental degradation, social inequality and poverty, but this is at least a step along the way towards genuine systems thinking in our legislation.
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
My Lords, in Committee we debated the climate emergency as the most pressing issue that affects every aspect of everyday life. The climate crisis is not only a threat in the long term to our survival and that of the planet but a threat to security in the short to medium term. According to the Government’s own statistics, nature loss will result in a cumulative economic cost of up to £10 billion between 2011 and 2050. While the Minister may say that climate change is not directly connected to the national security and investment regime proposed in the Bill, actions by hostile actors that stifle our modern green infrastructure can only make us more vulnerable. As the former civil servant Paddy McGuinness has recently said, green networks
“provide an attractive opportunity for an adversary to unbalance, intimidate, paralyse or even defeat us."
I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Fox and Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, who have returned with simple “must have regard to” wording in Amendments 6 and 7 regarding climate change and biodiversity loss. Of course, all Governments will have regard to all legislation on the statute book that impacts on our activities and lives. Nevertheless, it is imperative that the risks of climate change be recognised in the new regime being initiated through the Bill, and the Secretary of State must consider how to mitigate these deepening risks.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, for retabling our Amendment 38 from Committee, which asks for a statement to be made on emerging threats in the light of priorities identified in the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. It allows me to follow up with some further questions on the integrated review and its associated documents.
Can the minister provide an outline of how the ISU will work effectively with the MoD directorate for economic security? It is all very well to say that the ISU will be drawing on the expertise in the MoD and the Defence Secretary will be able to make representations to the Business Secretary, but what mechanisms will be set up to co-ordinate across departments? Will there be a mechanism whereby the MoD directorate can give advice directly to businesses in a defence and supply chain through policies initiated from the ISU in the business department, especially in connection with technologies and future associated threats? It would be helpful if the Minister could respond or follow up with a letter in due course.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I am grateful once again to the noble Lords, Lord Fox and Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett—I am particularly grateful that she has joined us after her dental work and of course we wish her a speedy recovery—for their respective amendments in this grouping.
With the permission of the House, I will take Amendments 6 and 7 together. Amendment 6 seeks to require the Secretary of State to
“have regard to the risk to national security posed by climate change”
when preparing secondary legislation under Clause 6 in relation to the scope of the mandatory notification regime. Amendment 7 then seeks to amend Amendment 6 to require the Secretary of State to also have regard to the risk to national security posed by biodiversity loss.
I commend the sentiment of the amendments regarding tackling climate change. As I set out in Grand Committee, this Government are of course committed to tackling the climate crisis. I can also confirm, in response to the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, that, just as the Prime Minister has said in his foreword to the integrated review, biodiversity loss very much sits alongside that as the UK’s top international priority. The Government continue to promote co-operation on climate action through the UK’s G7 presidency, and we look forward to the COP 26 conference in November, which will allow us to highlight our leadership in tackling the climate crisis, including biodiversity loss.
However, the Bill is focused on the risks to our national security posed by the acquisition of control over qualifying entities and assets. As the noble Lord, Lord Fox, correctly predicted, we are therefore unable to accept amendments seeking to set out what is or is not a factor to be considered when looking at national security, including factors relating to climate change and biodiversity loss, without edging closer to defining it—which, as he knows, we are reluctant to do. I hope that having my comments on the record in response to these issues provides due assistance to noble Lords. I can further reassure them that, as drafted, the Bill provides the flexibility for the Secretary of State to consider all types of risk to national security that are relevant in the context of this regime, including those that are environmental in nature.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, for her Amendment 38, which seeks to ensure that the national security and investment regime is consistent with the recently published integrated review. I note that a similar amendment was tabled in Grand Committee by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hayter and Lady Northover. However, whereas that amendment asked for a report
“as soon as reasonably practicable”,
the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, has opted for “within six months”. As noble Lords will be aware, the integrated review provides a comprehensive articulation of the UK’s national security and international policy. It outlines three fundamental national interests: sovereignty, security and prosperity.
I understood the benefits of an amendment in Grand Committee when the Government had not published the integrated review but, now that we have, the alignment is clear for all to see. For example, the NSI will be tremendously valuable in countering state threats, in maintaining the UK’s resilience and in helping us to work with and learn from our allies, to name but a few areas of alignment. Indeed, as noble Lords would expect, this Bill is explicitly referenced within the review.
As noble Lords will know, the National Security and Investment Bill will prove a key tool in enabling the UK to tackle its long-term security concerns and pursue its priorities. The Bill will create carefully calibrated powers for the Secretary of State to counteract concerns around acquisitions and the flexibility to respond to changing risks and a changing security landscape. As part of this, the regulation-making powers in the Bill allow the Secretary of State to keep pace with emerging threats as they arise, such as by enabling them to update the sectors covered by mandatory notification.
Therefore, for the reasons that I have set out, I do not see a strong case for the amendments and I very much hope that their proposers will feel able to withdraw them.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Fox (LD)
I thank noble Lords for that debate and I thank the Minister for his response. It was entirely predictable, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, who has just slipped out, said when we discussed the previous group.
What I heard the Minister say—
“types of risk … including those that are environmental in nature”—
was slightly more explicit than what is in the Bill. My sense when the Minister talks about long-term security is that the technology needed to maintain or further our fight against climate change will increasingly become a long-term concern. I suspect that this unit will find itself embroiled in calling in transactions that indeed concern the environment because they deal with technologies that are environmental in nature.
I will think again on this issue, and obviously I will read Hansard to make sure that I have got the words correct, but in the meantime I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)
We now come to the group consisting of Amendment 9. Anyone wishing to press this amendment to a Division should make that clear in debate.
Amendment 9
Lord Bruce of Bennachie
“( ) For the purposes of this Act, a person does not gain control of a qualifying entity if the person acquires a right or interest in or in relation to the entity—(a) solely by way of obtaining security; and(b) in a situation where they obtain no effective control.”
Lord Bruce of Bennachie (LD) [V]
I thank noble Lords. Amendment 9 is self-explanatory:
“Clause 8, page 6, line 38, at end insert—
“( ) For the purposes of this Act, a person does not gain control of a qualifying entity if the person acquires a right or interest in or in relation to the entity—
(a) solely by way of obtaining security; and
(b) in a situation where they obtain no effective control.”
The purpose of this is to ensure that transactions constitute a trigger event only where the person gains actual control of a qualifying entity and, very specifically, to exempt Scottish share pledges or other situations where no effective control is obtained. I moved a previous amendment in Committee, and I thank the Law Society of Scotland, which has drawn this matter to my attention. I thank both Ministers, the noble Lords, Lord Callanan and Lord Grimstone, for engaging with me, the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, and representatives of the Law Society of Scotland to discuss this issue, which the Law Society still feels has not been satisfactorily addressed by the Government. Obviously, this amendment would be an attempt to ensure that it was.
There is a particular point about Scots law. The amendment is intended to exclude a situation whereby the sole fact of pledging shares in security, under Scots law, would be classed as a trigger event. A Scottish shares pledge does not allow a security holder to exercise effective control over the relevant shares in a Scottish company. The primary concern is that the current proposal suggests that a trigger event would take place in a situation where no control has in fact passed. The Ministers will be aware that not only did we exchange very useful views in discussion in meetings— I repeat, we are grateful to the Ministers for engaging with us—but the Law Society president then wrote to the noble Lord, Lord Grimstone, copying in the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, to express the concern that there was still an outstanding issue that needed to be addressed. As set out in the letter, the Bill as currently drafted fails to align with clear statutory precedents for treating shares that are the subject of Scottish share pledges as still being controlled by the pledger. For example, there is the definition of “subsidiary” in Section 11(59) of the Companies Act 2006, as supplemented by paragraph 7 of Schedule 6 to that Act. That reference obviously comes from the Law Society and not from me. This would create a disparity between Scotland and England—that is the real concern —and could make it harder for Scottish companies to obtain loan finance, as well as disincentivising potential investors from establishing vehicles under Scots law.
The amendment would ensure that a trigger event was recognised at the point at which the transfer of control actually occurs. In doing so, it would enhance the ability of the Secretary of State to carry out a national security assessment and impose any safeguards, but at the most appropriate point.
The Law Society, very helpfully, has set out a hypothetical example reflecting what it would say is a common, real-life scenario. For the purposes of this, it is control over company C which gives, or may give, rise to national security concerns. The situation is this: company A is seeking to raise finance, by way of a loan, and approaches bank B. Bank B agrees to lend the money against security over the shares held by company A in its wholly owned subsidiary, company C. Under current Scots law, the only way to obtain fixed security over shares is by way of a share pledge, with the shares being transferred to bank B or its nominee. As such, it can be said that bank B holds the shares, as per Clause 8(2)—that is, the bank holds 100% of the shares in company C. However, holding the shares in this scenario is not ownership in the true sense, and does not give the security holder effective control. Bank B will be unable to sell the shares, has no right to be paid dividends, has an obligation to immediately retransfer the shares on the money secured being repaid and, most importantly, will be unable to exercise voting rights, other than in conformity with company A’s wishes. In practical terms, company A therefore remains in full control of company C, and bank B is not, in fact, in a position of control.
In the previous debate, Schedule 1 was acknowledged and it appears to address the issue, recognising a scenario where a person grants security over shares but continues to exercise de facto control. However, the clarification refers to rights attached to shares, rather than the holding of the shares. Therefore, it does not fully account for the different situation, where a lender becomes the registered holder of shares in security. That has been the case with a share pledge in Scotland and has been standard Scottish legal and business practice since the 19th century. This is different from English law because, by way of comparison, under an English charge over shares this situation just simply does not arise, because no formal transfer of the charge shares is required to perfect the charge. In the parallel English scenario, the same relationships of control or lack of control exist but—this is crucial—no trigger event is recognised. The disparity between the situations in Scotland and England is one of real concern, which has been highlighted. It is not only prejudicial to existing Scottish businesses, by increasing obstacles to obtaining finance, but risks making Scotland less attractive as a jurisdiction in which to establish a business vehicle. I do not need to remind your Lordships how important the financial services sector is to Scotland. Indeed, Scotland’s contribution to the UK economy is disproportionately large in this sector. So, in project financing, investors could prefer an English vehicle, if this makes it easier to obtain funding. The practical effect is that long-established Scottish legal and business practice is being treated adversely compared to its English counterparts. I am sure that is not the intention of the Government or Ministers, but that remains a continuing concern of the Law Society of Scotland.
Acquisitions will, of course, be notifiable only in relation to the listed sectors. However, it is not the notification requirement per se that poses the risk to the ability of Scottish business to access finance. As identified in the context of the PSC, lenders are reluctant to enter into arrangements that suggest that they have control over an entity when this is not the case. The breadth of the call-in power, the potentially broad scope of national security concerns, means that many transactions may be called in for up to five years after the event has taken place. This creates uncertainty, and uncertainty, of course, opposes a commercial risk. The potential for transactions to be called in after the event in other sectors, may ultimately have a greater impact by disincentivising lenders. I hope the House is clear that this is a point of real and substantive concern.
In real life, it is very unlikely that bank B would seek to appropriate the shares in company C, in the scenario I outlined earlier. The most common scenario, following an event of default, would be for bank B to notify company A that it was going to enforce the security, and then sell the share in company C to repay the debt. The sale of the shares in company C to another purchaser—purchaser P—would constitute a trigger event under Clause 5. There is also the potential that bank B would decide instead to retain the shares. Having given notice to company A, bank B would therefore, at that point, enter into control of company C, acquiring all voting rights, dividend rights and the ability to sell the shares. That is the point at which the trigger event should occur. Entering into control of the shares following a default could indeed be specifically recognised as a trigger event, but that scenario is already suitably covered by Clause 8(2).
In a situation where company C falls within one of the 17 listed sectors, bank B’s acquisition of control would be recognised only if the appropriate notification had been given. In a situation where the Chancellor was not compulsorily notifiable, the five-year call-in period would begin to run at the point bank B assumed control. This could give the Secretary of State a longer timeframe in which to assess any risks posed by ownership of the shares vested in bank B. Notice of bank B’s interest would appear as a matter of public record, subject to the default occurring after the annual return showing that the share pledge had been taken. That would all happen long before bank B was able to take control. For these reasons, there is no real risk of hostile actors targeting lending arrangements as a means to gain control of national security-sensitive entities. The Secretary of State would retain discretion over available remedies, which could be applied at the appropriate time.
Nothing in the remarks that I have just made will come as a surprise to Ministers, because it has been set out in detail in a letter from the president of the Law Society of Edinburgh, addressed to the noble Lord, Lord Grimstone, and copied to the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. I hope that the Minister will acknowledge that there is an outstanding point of concern. As I say, we are all grateful to the Minister for engaging with us and showing understanding that this is a real issue.
None of us is of the view that there is any intention to put Scotland and Scottish businesses at a disadvantage, but, without this amendment or some comparable amendment that the Government might agree to or introduce, there remains a real possibility of discrimination against Scottish financial services and investment businesses, which would be politically awkward and embarrassing as well as practically damaging to the interests of both Scotland and the United Kingdom sector. I hope that the Minister can acknowledge that this issue needs to be addressed head on and that assurances can be given that the concerns outlined will not actually take effect. I beg to move.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
My Lords, I am delighted to speak in support of, and to have co-signed, Amendment 9. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Bennachie, for moving and speaking to the terms of the amendment so thoroughly. I also echo his thanks to the Law Society of Scotland for highlighting this issue at Committee stage and bringing forward this amendment for Report. I also thank my noble friends Lord Grimstone and Lord Callanan for the time that they spent with the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Bennachie, me and members of the Law Society of Scotland going through the issue with us. I remind the House that I am a non-practising member of the Faculty of Advocates.
This is quite a sensitive time to be raising this matter, mindful of the fact that elections are going on in Scotland—they will be held on 6 May—so I am sure that it is not the intention of a British Government whom I overwhelmingly support to seek to disadvantage Scotland at this time. We are here to assist the Government and bring to their attention the ramifications of the preventions of the Bill currently before us. Amendment 9, so eloquently moved by the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Bennachie, would simply ensure that transactions constitute a trigger event only where a person gains actual control of a qualifying entity—and to exempt Scottish share pledges in relation to other situations where “no effective control” is obtained.
Of all the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Bruce, I echo the comparison that he made with English law, which could cause some confusion and has perhaps led to this regrettable situation. Of all the things that I recall from the conversation that we had on the call with my noble friends the Ministers, I want to impress on the Government that this is not just an issue but potentially one of some magnitude—my noble friend Lord Callanan seemed not to grasp that during the call, so I pause to emphasise it to him.
By way of comparison, under an English charge over shares, this situation does not arise, because no formal transfer of the charged shares is required to perfect the charge. In the parallel English scenario, the same relationships of control or lack thereof exist, but no trigger event is recognised. I am sure that this is just an unfortunate situation that has arisen, which is why it is timely to bring it to the Government’s attention today. The disparity between the situations in Scotland and England is one of the concerns that we seek to highlight as not only being prejudicial to existing Scottish businesses and increasing obstacles to obtaining finance but risking making Scotland less attractive as a jurisdiction in which to establish a business vehicle. I support all the comments that the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Bennachie, made.
In the spirit of openness, as this is an extremely technical issue—I can quite understand if my noble friends perhaps do not fully grasp the situation in which we find ourselves—I have taken the opportunity to bring it to the attention of the Advocate-General, my noble and learned friend Lord Stewart of Dirleton, who will fully consider the ramifications. As such, I have every confidence that, before the Bill leaves this place, full and due consideration will be given to Amendment 9 and what we are seeking by moving it today.
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Bruce, and the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, for looking critically at the legislation in relation to Scotland and its legal approach. Clause 8 defines the circumstances in which a person gains control of a qualifying entity, thus constituting a trigger event that may be subject to assessment under this regime. Throughout this process, we have stressed the importance of clarity on who qualifies for assessment under the regime.
Amendment 9, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bruce, aims to ensure that transactions constitute a trigger event only when the person gains actual control of a qualifying entity and to exempt securities or other situations where no effective control is obtained. The amendment’s purpose is to avoid the potential unintended consequences of the Bill for financial transactions under Scottish law, as identified by the Law Society of Scotland. Under the amendment, rights and interests in, or in relation to, entities and assets held by way of security would be exempt from the regime, on the basis that lending and debt arrangements do not give rise to control.
We have been clear that the Bill must be fit for purpose across every part of the United Kingdom, and I ask merely whether the Minister can provide reassurances to the House that it has been properly considered in relation to its impacts on the Scottish legal system in particular. Can he reassure the House that consultation has taken place between the Scotland Office and the Scottish Administration and that there are no outstanding issues to be resolved in this respect?
Lord Callanan (Con)
I am of course grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bruce, and my noble friend Lady McIntosh for Amendment 9 in their names. As they outlined, it seeks to exempt from the call-in power acquisitions made by way of obtaining security over a qualifying entity where no effective control is obtained. I start by placing on record my thanks to the noble Lord, my noble friend and the Law Society of Scotland for meeting my noble friend Lord Grimstone and me following Grand Committee to discuss this issue in detail. Indeed, we have considered all the points that were made.
As I emphasised in that meeting and in our subsequent correspondence, the Government do not consider that the provision of loans and finance is automatically a national security issue. Indeed, lenders need confidence that they can see a return on ordinary debt arrangements in order to provide that service. However, we must also recognise that in a small number of cases national security risks can arise through debt arrangements. Noble Lords have particular concerns about the Bill with regard to Scotland. I understand—and the noble Lord, Lord Bruce, stated—that this is because it is usual practice in Scotland for a lender to become the registered holder of shares in security through a shares pledge.
Having heard the concerns, the Government have reflected carefully on the issue, but we continue to believe that an exclusion would not be appropriate in this case. In such circumstances, the legal title to shares will, as a matter of fact, have been acquired by the lender, and it is important that we do not inadvertently create a loophole that those who wish us harm might otherwise seek to exploit.
While I note that the proposed amendment has been updated since the version debated in Grand Committee, reflecting my noble friend’s intention to limit the exemption to situations where “no effective control” is obtained, I fear that this would be difficult to reconcile with the mandatory regime.
It would introduce a new, inherently subjective concept that would sit uncomfortably with the need for acquirers to be able to objectively determine their legal obligations. I hope that noble Lords who have stayed the course on this Bill—a small, gallant band—will know by now that it is focused on the central premise of acquiring control, with these circumstances defined in detail in respect of entities in Clause 8. This amendment would lead to a circular argument in the Bill, in which a trigger event is the acquisition of control—except for when control is not acquired. I am sure that a number of lawyers in this country would be licking their lips with that provision in the Bill.
I mentioned particular concerns about how this would affect the mandatory regime, but the Government also consider that this would cause difficulties for voluntary notification and for the Secretary of State’s call-in power. None the less, both my noble friend Lord Grimstone and I have committed to monitoring the operation of the regime in practice with regard to this issue. Clause 6 provides the Secretary of State with the power to make “notifiable acquisition regulations” to amend the scope of the mandatory regime. That could be used in future, if considered appropriate, to exclude circumstances related to acquisitions by way of security from the mandatory notification regime.
I will address head-on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Bruce, that this will be particularly disadvantageous to Scotland. It is important to emphasise that such lending arrangements are also possible in England and Wales—albeit we know that they are less common. This Government are staunch supporters of Scotland and it is vital that the Scottish legal and finance sectors continue to flourish.
Let me briefly make three other points on this amendment, which I hope will provide further reassurances to the noble Lord and my noble friend. First, the Bill broadly mirrors the existing approach of the persons with significant control register, which does not exclude legal owners of shares acquired by way of security. I take great confidence from the fact that this has been in place since 2016 and has had no discernible effect on the willingness of lenders to provide finance in Scotland.
Secondly, the mandatory notification and clearance element of the regime is proposed to apply only to entities of a specified description within 17 sectors of the economy. The number of circumstances requiring notification where a lender acquires the legal title to shares at or above the thresholds in this Bill is therefore likely to be low and, as with all acquisitions, the Government expect that the overwhelming majority will be quickly cleared to proceed.
Thirdly, as has been previously debated, I am sure my noble friends will welcome the removal of the 15% threshold I spoke about in a previous group. This will further reduce the number of cases covered by the mandatory regime in relation to securities.
So, for all the reasons I have outlined, I hope that both noble Lords will accept the arguments I have put forward and will feel able to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Bruce of Bennachie (LD) [V]
I thank the Minister for his response and for addressing the details. I am not convinced that the Law Society will be entirely satisfied that the difference between Scottish and English law has been fully appreciated. The Minister talked about legal title but, as I said in my opening remarks, legal title is meaningless if the shares pledge explicitly excludes any mechanism for dealing with the shares—either receiving voting rights, dividends, or the right to sell and an obligation to have them back when the loan is repaid. It simply is not control.
I take note that the Minister is concerned that the Scottish situation is not unique and therefore could cause complications in England and Wales, but the practice is clearly well established in Scotland. As I said in my opening remarks, it has been since the 19th century and is relatively unusual elsewhere in the UK.
I understand that the Minister believes that there will be relatively few instances, but part of the problem with the Bill is that an awful lot is undefined, in terms of the 17 sectors, the details of how those will be determined, the circumstances in which triggers will happen and the definition of national security. All of those things are explicitly not set out in detail.
I welcome Ministers saying they will monitor the situation closely. The assurance I would be looking for if we withdraw this amendment—obviously we will ask the Law Society what it feels about the unamended Bill—is that, if it becomes apparent there is a significant negative impact on Scottish business and the Scottish sector, the Government will be prepared to act to remove such discrimination.
It is a long-established fact that one reason the Scottish financial services sector is so strong is that it has a long history of prudent asset management and insurance, which has given Scotland a disproportionate share of both national and international business because of its reputation for, if I may put it in these terms, “canniness” in managing investments and other people’s money. That being the case, we do not want a situation where the law as introduced somehow compromises that. That would not be good for Scotland or the UK either.
I hope these remarks will be noted by Ministers and they will undertake to consult and respond to any representations that emerge showing that the concerns we have outlined are real and significant. If the Minister is correct in his assurance that, though they may be real they will not be very significant, perhaps the matter can rest. But I am sure that I, the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, and others will make it clear to him that, if it becomes apparent that there is a significant problem for Scotland and that uncertainty is disadvantaging Scotland, he will hear about it. In the meantime, I withdraw the amendment.
Lord Callanan
Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement to the amendment at page 4, line 22.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 11. Anyone wishing to press this or anything else in this group to a Division must make that clear in debate.
Amendment 11
Baroness Noakes
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment imposes a specific time limit on the notification required to be made after the Secretary of State has decided whether to accept or reject a mandatory notification.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I rise to move Amendment 11 and I will speak also to Amendment 12 in my name and Amendment 13 in the name of my noble friend Lord Lansley, to which I have added my name.
With this group of amendments, we are returning to the issue of timing that we discussed quite extensively in Committee. There is a high level of concern in the business community that the timescales set out in this Bill are excessive and breed uncertainty. If a transaction is called in, the Secretary of State has 60 working days—with the possibility of a 45-day extension—to make up his mind what to do. That adds up to five months elapsed time, which could kill many deals and, if the target company is in financial distress, could spell the end of its existence.
I accept that, if national security issues are genuinely involved, we have to allow the Government sufficient time to examine transactions in order to make the right decisions in the interests of our nation. I am, however, concerned about the timing at the front end of the process, once a transaction has been notified to the Secretary of State for both mandatory and voluntary notifications.
I hope that most mandatory notifications will not result in a call-in notice, and it is important that the parties to a proposed transaction get clarity about whether they have to enter the tunnel of uncertainty due to a call-in notice or can proceed with their deal. Under the terms of Clause 14 the Secretary of State gets 30 working days—six weeks in real money—to decide whether to call in a transaction, but that is extended by two indeterminate periods.
In the first of these, the Secretary of State has an unlimited period of
“as soon as reasonably practicable”
in which to decide whether to accept or reject a notice. We challenged this in Committee, but the Minister told us that the Government could not define this period because it would be affected by the nature and quality of the supporting information that came with the notification. I have given the Government the benefit of the doubt on that.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, I am very glad to support my noble friend Lady Noakes in her Amendments 11 and 12. I am grateful to her and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for adding their names to Amendment 13.
My noble friend explained Amendments 11 and 12 extremely well. Let me say why separately there is an additional amendment in relation to the voluntary notification separate from mandatory notification. It is precisely because our expectation must be that there will be a significant number of voluntary notifications, particularly in the early days as people involved in various sectors begin to understand how this regime is to act and under what circumstances they should make a notification. Our expectation would also be that, partly for precisely that reason and in the early days, there will be a significant number of voluntary notifications that do not lead to further action on the part of the Government because there is not a national security risk involved and they do not need to review it any further— that is, they do not need to take it through the call-in notice for an assessment.
For many of these transactions, because of the level of uncertainty associated with this—of course, these might be transactions where the seller brings them forward to the Secretary of State to understand under what circumstances they contemplate an acquisition, and whether they should proceed and how rapidly—there are a lot of reasons why this should happen quickly. In looking at Clause 18, about the voluntary notification procedure, our problem was that the review period had “30 working days” applied to it, but that period, as is the case with the mandatory one, follows two indeterminate periods. First, there is the period of time between a notification being made to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of State deciding whether to accept or reject it and, subsequently, the Secretary of State, after a period of time—this might be very short; I hope it would be very short—notifying each relevant person. The 30 working days, therefore, could be added to by two other periods.
The purpose of Amendment 13, therefore, is straight- forward. It is to say, “Let’s try to make sure that this is no longer than it needs to be, and that the pressure inside the Investment Security Unit is for what are essentially the bureaucratic processes”—in effect, saying, “We have received a notice. Is it compliant or not?”, then, “Okay, we have accepted the notice. Have we notified all the relevant persons?” Those things happen very quickly because the important thing is that the 30 working days are devoted as far as possible to the review period to get the decision right as to whether this potential trigger event should be called in or not. That is the crucial thing. All the time should be devoted to that review. Amendment 13 says that the 30 days start at the point at which a seller or an acquirer gives a notice to the Secretary of State. I hope that that is helpful.
I noted—no doubt we have a similar view—that the bureaucratic processes should be as short as possible, but the Government, as my noble friend Lady Noakes noted, have put forward their own amendments in a later group. The one that is relevant here is Amendment 27, which would tell us how long the period is between the receipt of a notice and the decision to accept or reject it, and tell us to report that in the annual report. Frankly, that is useful, but we would rather that the pressure was built into the statutory arrangements rather than simply through the question of what is in the annual report by way of performance against that.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, in speaking to these three amendments, I am extremely fortunate to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble Lord, Lord Lansley. I do not think anyone could have explained more succinctly how these different timescales work for both the mandatory and the voluntary notification, so I will not go through it again. I really appreciate the persistence of both noble Lords, and the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, in teasing out the real consequences of these very indeterminate timescales, which may differ between the voluntary and the mandatory notification procedures but create uncertainty in both cases. As the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, said in Committee,
“we want to ensure that the greatest possible certainty and the least possible delay intrudes into these processes for investors.”—[Official Report, 16/3/21; col. 229.]
That has been our common theme throughout this Bill.
We have heard some graphic phrases throughout, such as the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, decrying both the “no man’s land” that we must not and do not want to fall into and the powers to “stop the clock”. We also heard the noble Lord, Lord Grimstone, try to reassure the Committee that the Secretary of State has
“no desire to push his peas around the plate”,—[Official Report, 16/3/21; col. 222.]
another phrase introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson; he will probably write a book at some stage with all these phrases included. However, that is not the same as the assurance and certainty contained in statute.
The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, said in Committee that
“the process of initially determining whether a valid and complete notice has been submitted is separate from fuller screening”.
We understand that, but there should be clear time limits in that case. He tried to give us a reassurance:
“I mention ‘maximum’ again because that is exactly what these deadlines represent. In many cases, we expect the Secretary of State to be able to review and clear notifications much more quickly.”—[Official Report, 16/3/21; col. 235.]
Businesses need certainty on whether to proceed with a transaction. A delay in the Secretary of State making a decision outside the time limits—because they can—would cause uncertainty over the validity of the transaction. This lack of a clear timescale could create uncertainty for investors, universities and businesses, making domestic and foreign investment less attractive and disincentivising industry in the process.
I heard what the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, said about the later amendments on what should be contained in the annual report; I entirely agree that more transparency is very desirable, but that is not the same as specifying exactly what the timescales will be.
There is also the question of what I think the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, called the “bureaucratic processes”. There is not yet a great deal of reassurance on that basis. We do not know how the regime will operate. Throughout this, especially on these timescales, the impression is that all the cards are in the Government’s hands, not the hands of the potential investor. That could be a real deterrent. I hope the Government will respond to the very consistent view throughout the passage of this Bill that there needs to be a considerable tightening up in this direction.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, I will be brief, but I wanted to speak in this debate having spoken on similar amendments in Committee. I oppose Amendments 11 and 12—I will reserve judgment on Amendment 13 until I have heard the full debate—and find myself in the unusual position of supporting the Government’s proposed legislation and opposing changes to it.
The noble Lord, Lord Lansley, in introducing Amendment 13, talked about the pressure from bureaucratic processes; these amendments are trying to impose a pressure for speed. We hear talk of not wanting these rules to slow things down or to have too many limits or controls. This very much reflects the kind of language we have heard about “cutting red tape”. I always go back to the words of the hazards at work campaign: better red tape than red bandages. What are referred to as red tape are very often the rules that keep us safe, protect us and ensure our security, in the terms of this Bill.
I wanted to make sure that the Government hear voices from the other side in this debate, saying that we have to privilege the public good and national security. Processes must take as long as they need to take to be done properly and have full and proper scrutiny.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)
The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, has withdrawn from the debate, so I call the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)
My Lords, I have put my name to Amendments 11 and 12, tabled by my noble friend Lady Noakes, which concern mandatory notifications, as she made clear. However, I am equally enthusiastic about Amendment 13, tabled by my noble friend Lord Lansley—even though I have not put my name to it—which addresses voluntary issues as well.
I will add a couple of points in support of these two approaches. As my noble friend made clear on Amendments 11 and 12, the use of the phrase “practicable” or “reasonably practicable”—it is not clear why we have one in one place and one in another—has come in for some pretty widespread criticism. As we have discussed before and heard from various legal advisers, the word “possible” would be a big improvement on “practicable”.
Mandatory notifications will be at the sharp end of the Bill and can be expected in many cases to be controversial. There will be a temptation for a Secretary of State, faced with a controversial decision, to try to delay it. It is common ground that, while we need to take appropriate steps to protect our national security interests, it is also in our national economic interest to encourage as much investment as possible in the chosen 17 sectors which will collectively have a significant impact on our economic future.
With great respect, I understand what the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, is trying to say, but the reality is that this is a balance; if we are in a competitive market around the world for investment and are unable to balance it properly, people will go elsewhere. It is as simple as that. Her idea of having an open-ended arrangement for the Secretary of State to make up his or her mind is a recipe for an outflow of investment which might otherwise come here to support this country, with its worldwide reputation in tech and other sectors.
On my noble friend Lord Lansley’s amendment on voluntary notifications, we have been around this course many times before; there will be a substantial flow and the new unit at BEIS may find it difficult to cope. In Committee, we discussed a number of amendments to try to help the Government with this and focus the new regime on the really significant cases. Amendments by various Members of your Lordships’ House, including me, proposed inter alia to exclude intra-group investments, to require only one trigger event for each group of companies and to limit notifications to assets used in connection with activities carried on in the UK—in other words, to limit the extraterritoriality of this Bill’s provisions.
The Government declined to accept any of these, arguing that they needed the widest possible strategic view to prevent evasive tactics by unwelcome purchasers. I must accept the force of that argument, but it means the Government must live with the consequences of those decisions. To provide an appropriate level of certainty for investors, we simply cannot risk a situation where, if a flood of voluntary notifications occurs, the Government could decline to start the 30-day clock.
In his concluding remarks, my noble friend may refer to Amendment 27, which the Government have tabled, about the contents of the annual report. If it is accepted by the House, as I expect it will be, it will include details of the number of days taken to give a decision, or the time taken to reach a voluntary notification. I do not want to add to the points the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, made, but I have to say to my noble friend that it is really shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted to be told, a year later, that we have not been able to hit the targets or that they are being missed widely. There is nothing wrong with that, but we are trying to create a balanced regime that hits the ground running, and to learn, a year later, that “the system is overwhelmed”, which a number of us in this Chamber feel is likely to happen, is simply not an adequate answer.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, set out his view of a balance, and I will set out another dichotomy—between thoroughness and timeliness. I do not think any of us in the Chamber are asking for this process to be less thorough. I think we are all saying we want a thorough process. But that thoroughness cannot be at the expense of timeliness, which is what these amendments are seeking to establish.
I do not think it is the Government’s intention to sow the market with uncertainty; I am absolutely sure that is not the intention of the Bill or this element of it. However, we all know that once things get written into law, they move into a departmental process and there is a unit dealing with this, unless there are specific guidelines on achieving timeliness, things will drag and take time. Departmental clocks can run at a different speed to business clocks. We should be clear that that will cost jobs and opportunities, because the longer a transaction takes, the longer it is in play, the fewer opportunities those companies have and the more threat there is for them. This is particularly clear in sales out of distress and in businesses that are already in play. Once they are in play, they become victims of exploitation, and the longer this department maintains a business in play through this process, the more danger those businesses are in.
The Government’s “intent” has come up many times in speeches, and that is an important element here. The way this Bill is currently drafted does not reveal an intent for rapid resolution. It does not reveal an understanding of the importance of timeliness, and that is what these amendments seek to establish.
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble Lords, Lord Hodgson and Lord Clement-Jones, for returning to the issue of the impact of this legislation on businesses and the uncertainty it would create within a business environment as businesses must interface with its bureaucracy. It has been interesting to hear the reflections from debates in Committee.
In Committee, we were sympathetic to Amendment 11 and others in the group as we have also pushed the Government to ensure greater clarity and transparency regarding how long businesses and organisations will have to wait for answers from the Government concerning notifications. It is important not only that statutory time limits are laid down to each stage of assessment but that the overall accumulated length of time of the whole process is defined. We remain supportive of the intentions behind the amendments in this group, and I am grateful to the many business interests that have expressed concerns to us. I merely ask again: what does “reasonably practicable” mean as a length of time?
In Committee, the Minister did not address whether and to what extent five working days could become practicable. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, asked many pertinent questions concerning the operation of the unit and its systems in addressing the tasks it will have to be administrating. Could the Minister provide more clarity? Can he give assurances today that officials in the department will engage effectively with business and provide updates and explanations regarding issues under consideration to businesses, should an answer not be forthcoming within the defined five-day limit proposed in this amendment, rather than expect businesses to delay and wait for an unspecified length of time to be proved practicable? Communication of the position would prove extremely reassuring to businesses.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Hodgson for their contributions and all the other noble Lords who have contributed so far. Perhaps it is not out of order to especially thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, for her rare support of the Government in this instance. I will begin with Amendments 11 and 12 together.
As currently drafted, the Bill provides that the Secretary of State must decide whether to reject or accept a mandatory or voluntary notice as soon as reasonably practicable after receiving it. They must then inform relative parties of the decision as soon as practicable. I will later draw the distinction again between “as soon as practicable” and
“As soon as reasonably practicable”.
Amendment 11 would require the Secretary of State to provide written reasons to the notice “within 5 working days” if a mandatory notice is rejected, instead of “as soon as practicable.” Amendment 12 has a similar effect but would require the Secretary of State to notify each relevant party that a mandatory notice has been accepted within five working days of acceptance, rather than as soon as is practicable, as currently drafted.
My noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Hodgson asked about the distinction in places in the Bill between the timescales, “as soon as practicable” and
“As soon as reasonably practicable.”
These different tests reflect that some requirements are more onerous. For example, determining whether a valid notification has been given will be dependent on the facts of the case, so it is appropriate, in that instance, to use
“As soon as reasonably practicable.”
However, communicating the decision to parties should be possible without delay, so in that instance, the Secretary of State must do so as soon as practicable. I hope that clarifies that for noble Lords.
The Secretary of State already expects to be able to quickly decide to accept or reject notifications in many cases—then inform parties of those decisions—much faster than the five-day working limit proposed. However, I must stress that it is important that there is scope for flexibility in the relatively rare circumstances where more time may be needed. When notifying relevant parties that a notification has been accepted, there may, for example, be multiple, potentially international, parties needing to be contacted whose details are not immediately available.
In some cases, purely as a matter of practicalities, the Secretary of State may need more than five working days to notify a party that their notification has been rejected. Take a notification sent in by letter, from either a UK or a foreign company, without proper contact details and which does not meet the requirement for notification. The Secretary of State would, therefore, be likely to reject it. This may seem trivial, but it may take more than five working days to find the contact details for the notifier to notify them of the rejection. If the letter contained commercially sensitive or personal information, it is particularly important to get that right to make sure that any correspondence from the Secretary of State is not sent to the wrong person. This is just one practical example where it could take longer than five days to notify of an acceptance or a rejection.
Just imagine: the amendments could enable sophisticated hostile actors to game the system. There will be people out there who will want to game this system, if they can, but I am sure that that is in no way the intention of my noble friends.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for taking part in this debate—even the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, with whom I never agree. This is a Government trying to take the maximum possible scope for manoeuvre in the Bill because of bad actors out there. We understand that, but we have essentially been pressing practical issues. I was disappointed by what the Minister said, because he gave us lots of extreme outlying examples of where people might be trying to game the system, which I do not quite understand, but little about what the Government will do in practice to address the uncertainty that is feared by the business community, because of a lack of concentration on timeliness will in practice be part of that.
For example, I asked my noble friend the Minister whether there would be a prioritisation or triaging system, so that those transactions that have a great need for speedy resolution can, if possible, be dealt with quickly. I heard nothing on that. I am beginning to wonder whether Ministers have a handle on what the practical arrangements will be within the ISU. My noble friend said that Ministers would be accountable. That is good because if this starts to go wrong, transactions will be caught up, which will end up doing more damage to the UK economy by creating an environment in which no investment comes to us. That would be very damaging. I had hoped that the Minister would go further and say what sorts of practical steps would be taken to increase a focus on timeliness and what the implications would be.
I will not press my amendment to a Division today but, I must say, I do not have the impression that Ministers have a grip on this yet. We accept that the Bill needs to ensure that nothing bad can happen in the area of national security. On the other hand, the Government need to accept that the business community needs much more reassurance than Ministers currently appear willing to give. I beg leave to withdraw.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord McNicol of West Kilbride) (Lab)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 14. Anyone wishing to press this or any other amendment in the group to a Division must make that clear in the debate.
Clause 30: Financial assistance
Amendment 14
Member’s explanatory statement
The amendments to Clause 30 in the name of Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle seek to ensure that Parliament is able to scrutinise financial assistance before the Government is committed to its provision.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, I speak to move the linked Amendments 14, 19 and 20, which appear in my name. I must begin by offering my profound thanks to the Public Bill Office for providing the expert legal assistance to deliver a legal framework for the purpose set out in the explanatory statement, which is
“to ensure that Parliament is able to scrutinise financial assistance before the Government is committed to its provision.”
Noble Lords will recall that, in Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, drew our attention particularly to Clause 30, which provides the Secretary of State with the power to compensate for the consequences of him or her making a final order under Clause 26. I quote the noble Lord from that debate:
“Its wording can best be described as wide, and the Explanatory Notes are not much more helpful.”
The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, said in that debate that,
“if the Government’s requirements have caused disaster to befall a company through delay, there should be a mechanism for compensation. However, how that is to operate needs to be made clear.”
The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, asked a good question about
“from which budget the grants, loans and indemnities would come.”
I will now disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, by proving that it is possible for us to agree, at least occasionally, for I entirely agree with her comment in Committee that
“a Bill about stopping certain transactions could have morphed into one whereby the Government will stuff public money into the pockets of one or more of the parties involved, with almost no explanation.”
I conclude my little roundup with the words of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, who started this debate. He said that
“there is no control over what the Secretary of State does.”—[Official Report, 16/3/21; cols. 215-20.]
I apologise to your Lordships’ House that these amendments appeared late. Given all the discussion in Committee, I was rather hoping that someone with more experience of legislating than me would pick the issue up but, when I saw that that had not happened, I thought that I should at least give the House a chance to find the solution to a problem so clearly identified in Committee. What I am doing is taking the financial compensation—the potentially swingeing payout—from the hands of the Minister and handing it to the best possible democratic control and greatest transparency: that of Parliament.
To run through some of the regular reactions that we hear from Ministers, if the Government say, “This could be better drafted”, I would be happy for them to do so. If they say that there should be a lower limit to the sums concerned, that is certainly something to talk about. If they suggest that this would slow the process, I would point to recent times when Parliament has proved able to act very quickly—the events of 30 December 2020 come to mind—if the money is needed and justified.
However, I think that there is clearly greatly increased public concern about the Government handing over money to the private sector; that concern has increased even more since our debate in Committee. In the interests of not being seen as political, I will resist the urge to expound at length on the reasons why there is growing public concern, because I am making a serious attempt here to see if some improvement, clarity or democratic oversight can be provided to the exercise of Clause 30.
Last night, during the Financial Services Bill, we were talking about regulatory capture and, indeed, political capture—a situation in which the Government are often seen to be acting as a wing of, or advocates for, business, rather than as an advocate for the common good. I am not saying at this moment that I will not push this matter to a vote but am not saying that I will. I want to hear the, albeit rather disappointingly short, debate and anyone who might want to question the Minister’s response before making a decision on that. I should like there to be some movement, clarity and reassurance on the use of Clause 30. I beg to move.
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, for the amendments in this group. We recognise the importance of financial assistance in relation to the regime where it would have financial impacts on businesses, following a final order being made. We understand the public significance of financial assistance and are supportive of there being parliamentary oversight and agreement to that assistance. The issue of how practical it is to undertake that before any final order is made, presumably after close contact with an affected business, is an interesting point that the Minister will address.
The noble Baroness will understand that consideration of regulations is not generally contentious. Nevertheless, her points are well made. Any greater clarity that the Minister can give in the parliamentary process regarding awards made in consequence of government decisions would be helpful. Will all individual cases of those receiving financial assistance be made public? It would be interesting to understand the Government’s intentions and the role of Parliament in scrutinising financial assistance.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
My Lords, perhaps I may extend my thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, for the amendments she has tabled. I also welcome to the Chamber one of my supporters, the noble Baroness, Lady McDonagh.
These amendments would remove the requirement for financial assistance to be given with consent from Her Majesty’s Treasury. They would require, instead, regulations to be approved by Parliament before financial assistance is given. Amendment 20 would consequently remove the reporting requirement when financial assistance exceeded £100 million in any financial year.
I think it is a sensible check in the context of this regime to set out in the Bill a requirement for the consent of HM Treasury. Parliament has a choice today in the final stages of this Bill on whether to approve the principle that financial assistance should be made available in consequence of the making of final orders. Requiring that an affirmative statutory instrument be laid each time money is proposed to be spent for these purposes would be excessive and possibly cause that principle to be debated each time. Indeed, parliamentary approval for each occasion of spending is likely to be impractical in many circumstances because of the time required. The delay could lead to the UK losing important capabilities that we may have otherwise been able to support while an appropriate acquirer was found.
On accountability, I remind the House that Parliament will already have voted on the spending estimates, and BEIS will need to account against those. The BEIS accounting officer is ultimately responsible for ensuring that budgets are spent in the correct ways. I am therefore unable to accept these amendments.
Finally, and more generally, I know that several of your Lordships are concerned about the seeming opacity of providing financial assistance. Perhaps I may say a few words to explain the provision further. The reporting provisions are intended to ensure that Parliament will be able to see what assistance the Secretary of State is providing, at least on an annual basis, and more frequently if spending rises over £100 million in any relevant period. Your Lordships may also, at any time, ask Questions to the Minister about spending on financial assistance, which will have to be answered in the House. Additionally, HM Treasury will not be forthcoming in its consent to spending unless a strong case is made, and use of the power will be subject to all obligations on using public money.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord McNicol of West Kilbride) (Lab)
I have received no requests to speak after the Minister, so I call the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, for his contribution and the Minister for his response. I particularly note that the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, shared my concern about the need for greater clarity on the use of Clause 30, his focus on the need for payments to be made public and the need to understand the rationale behind them.
The Minister suggested that there was a problem with the principle being debated each time a payment was proposed. I am not sure that it is necessarily bad that principles should be debated regularly. It was interesting that he said that this proposal would be impractical in many circumstances. I must admit that I find a matter of concern his suggestion that that might be something that happens often. He also said that accountability was through the BEIS accounting officer. However, what we are talking about there is after the fact, and in the depths of a great deal of varied and complex spending.
In his general comments, the Minister said that it was always possible for your Lordships to table Questions in the House but people have to know what is going to happen if they are to have any hope of intercepting it, or at least throwing light on it, before it happens. I am concerned that there will be no separate guidance about the use of the power, which is, as in the nature of the whole Bill, a novel use of government spending.
None the less, although we have not reached where we need to get to, it is clear that I have not found the route to get there, so I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord McNicol of West Kilbride) (Lab)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 15. Anyone wishing to press this or anything else in the group to a Division must make that clear in the debate.
Amendment 15
Baroness Noakes
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment probes whether there could be any circumstances beyond a risk to national security which would result in financial assistance being given under Clause 30.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I shall move the amendment and speak to Amendments 16 and 17 in my name. I thank my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for adding their names. I have also added my name to Amendment 18 in the group, in the name of my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbots.
My amendments are probing amendments, following the interesting stand part debate that we held in Committee on Clause 30, which gives the Government extraordinarily wide powers to give financial assistance. The Minister’s response in Committee raised as many questions as he answered and we have therefore tabled amendments to gain further enlightenment.
There is no constraint on the ability to provide financial assistance in the Bill, other than that it can be only
“in consequence of the making of a final order”.
My noble friend the Minister sought to reassure us that this was
“not a general compensation scheme”
and would be used only in exceptional cases. The Minister said the power
“will only be used in instances where the public interest, particularly national security interests, require it”.
Later, he said that
“the nature of national security makes it very hard to predict where some of these issues might arise. However, where they do and where national security is an issue, it is important that the power is there”.—[Official Report, 16/3/21; cols. 223-26.]
I was puzzled by this. Is national security a necessary condition for the use of the power or not? Our horrible hybrid working practices mean it is not easy to pursue questions in Committee when the Minister gives answers, so I tabled Amendment 15 to explore this further.
Amendment 15 adds to Clause 30(1) the words “if he or she”—that is, the Secretary of State—
“considers that there is a risk to national security”,
so that the financial assistance power could be used only if it were necessary on national security grounds. There could easily be other grounds for giving financial assistance—for example, if we had an industrial strategy, which I am definitely not advocating. I do not believe it would be appropriate to allow considerations broader than national security to underpin financial assistance under this Bill. If my noble friend the Minister thinks anything beyond national security could be involved, I suggest he needs to explain to the House what those circumstances could possibly be.
Amendment 16 takes out some words from Clause 30(2) so that financial assistance can be provided only by way of loans, guarantees or indemnities. The current wording allows practically anything under the sun and certainly allows grants and soft money. My noble friend the Minister will know that I am deeply sceptical about giving a Government powers to throw taxpayers’ money around. Powers such as these, drafted with good intent, can end up being used as cover for politically expedient expenditure. The best way to stop that happening is not to have the power in statute, as it is too much of a temptation and, even if I trust the current Government to act responsibly, which of course I do, I would not trust Governments of a different party—if we were unlucky enough to experience that again.
Lastly, Amendment 17 says that financial assistance has to be provided on arm’s-length terms. I should probably have drafted this in terms only of loans, guarantees or indemnities, as I do not think that subsidies or grants—which I am sure my noble friend the Minister will tell me he needs the power to provide—can ever be on arm’s-length terms. I was prompted to table this by what my noble friend the Minister said in Committee:
“For example, if the Government provided a loan, it would normally have to be at market rates.”—[Official Report, 16/3/21; col. 224.]
I hate weasel words such as “normally” almost as much as I hate throwing taxpayers’ money around in non-commercial transactions. I therefore ask my noble friend the Minister to say a little more about the boundary between commercial and non-commercial terms for assistance given under Clause 30. What will drive the use of market rates and, I hope, market terms and conditions? What criteria would be used for abandoning arm’s-length terms?
I would have preferred not to have this broad and undefined power sitting on the statute book, because it implies an intent to provide financial assistance. The Government could have relied on the Appropriation Act for genuinely exceptional circumstances. However, if the Government are set upon having the power, Parliament is entitled to some better explanations than we got in Committee of its potential use. I beg to move.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)
My Lords, once again I have the pleasure of flying in the slipstream of my noble friend Lady Noakes. Before I turn to my own Amendment 18, I will say that I entirely support the remarks she made about Amendments 15, 16 and 17, to which I have added my name.
Amendment 18, like my noble friend’s, is a probing amendment and seeks to discern the possible financial impact of this Bill on the small battalions. I hope the House will forgive me if I become a little granular and practical about how this clause might work. It can far too easily be assumed that this Bill will impact only on big companies. That is not the case. It has not been the case in the past and certainly will not be the case in future, with the big increase in the number of sectors of the economy falling within the provisions of the statute.
I would like to take the House back to our first day in Committee, when I raised the case of Impcross Ltd. Impcross had been the subject of a reference under the old regime. It was statutory instrument 2019/1490. I am not—repeat, not—going to ask my noble friend to comment on the details of the Impcross case. It would be utterly improper for me to ask, and probably even more improper for him to answer. But I want to use the Impcross case as an example of how drastic an impact the provisions of this Bill could have on smaller companies and their owners.
Impcross is based in Stroud and machines parts for the aerospace industry. Its annual turnover is just shy of £12 million, so it is not a large company but a small one, and one that in the year to 30 June 2019—according to the records at Companies House—made a small operating loss. Significantly, it has a person with significant control. In this case, the accounts reveal that a particular individual owns between 50% and 75% of the company. If you look back through the records, you can see that the individual appears to have been at the company for many years, so it is not fanciful to believe that the company is the result of a lifetime’s work and effort and, further, that perhaps the particular individual is now considering his future options, which might involve selling up the company and enjoying the fruits of his labours.
One exceptionally important and helpful aspect of the Bill the Government have brought forward is the establishment of timeframes, which we have already talked about today. We are a bit nervous about how good the timeframes are—we think they may be a bit too flexible for our wishes—but nevertheless there are some there. The Impcross case was referred in early December 2019. It was not until 10 September 2020, nine months later, that Gardner Aerospace, the Chinese-owned potential buyer, withdrew. That cannot have been an easy nine months for all involved, but it serves to underline—if I may say so to my noble friend on the Front Bench—the real importance of sticking to the fixed timetables. Otherwise, the company in the gun sights has a very uncomfortable time indeed.
This does not deal with any potential economic consequences. Let us take the example a little further. If companies are in interesting sectors, they are often sold on a multiple of turnover. Let us say it is two and a half times turnover, which would mean Impcross was worth £30 million. Let us suppose that was the figure that Gardner Aerospace offered, but that when it was refused permission to complete the transaction the next best offer was £27 million, a reduction of 10%; it could well be more. My noble friend the Minister, who has enormous and extensive experience of the City, knows that once an offer has failed to complete, there is always a concern among other buyers that there is something they have not spotted and that there is something wrong that they will need to look at more carefully.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I am again very fortunate in following the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson. I have signed Amendment 18 and my noble friend Lord Fox has signed Amendments 15 and 16. I entirely endorse what the noble Baroness and the noble Lord said about the lack of clarity and the important implications of this clause.
In our clause stand part debate in Committee, the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Grimstone, described the clause as “tightly drawn”. Today, he has talked about strong checks on the power, but I would have thought that it is now abundantly clear from the debates we have had, not only on the previous group of amendments but particularly on this group, that there is insufficient clarity about the operation of the clause. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, described the clause as extraordinarily wide, in particular in terms of transparency, the reporting requirement, an inadequate and arbitrary cut-off point, the nature of affected parties who could be compensated, the lack of alternatives to compensation, as mentioned by my noble friend Lord Fox, such as taking an equity stake, and the lack of a specific reference to public interest and national security in the clause. It seems we have to rely on the threat of judicial review rather than the wording of the Bill to ensure that the Secretary of State reasonably considers that the compensation is “necessary and proportionate”.
The Minister assured us that the power would be used only “responsibly and respectively”—I am not quite sure what “respectively” means in that context—but that the circumstances were hard to predict. Nothing that has been said so far today has dispelled the opacity, which I know the noble Lord intended to do. It is still extremely cloudy, and that was illustrated by both who have spoken. All this argues for a much tighter framework, such as suggested and probed by these amendments. I hope that the Minister will either take that on board or give pretty clear, detailed assurances about the workings of the clause or, probably even better, separate guidance. I understand from the Minister that that will not be provided, which seems highly regrettable. I hope that the Minister can give much greater detail about the operation of this clause, as required by these amendments.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, I am grateful that the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, is arriving back in his place, as I am not intending to speak for very long, so he had better get there swiftly.
This seems to be the other half of the amendments that went with the previous debate, and the group, with the exception of the noble Lord, is mutually exclusive, but it is still around subsidy payment money and what it is. The central question about Clause 30 is: what was in the Government’s mind when it was drafted? What is it for? The longer the Minister refuses to be specific in answering that question, the more I am drawn to the supposition that the Government do not know what it is for and that it has been put there as an insurance measure, just in case. Frankly, that is typical of the way this Bill has been written. It has been written as widely as possible to give the department as much leeway as possible in the event of stuff happening, stuff which is as yet undefined or is perhaps undefinable. That is not a good example of what Governments should be bringing to your Lordships’ House for approval.
The questions that have been asked very clearly by the previous speakers are important. If the Minister wants to prove that there is some guiding force behind Clause 30, and not just “We’ll put it in just in case we need it”, which is what it looks like to me, I look forward to hearing his comments.
In speaking to the previous group, the Minister implied that the fact that the Treasury would have a hand on the tiller should give us comfort. If the only comfort we have is that the Treasury will be looking over your shoulder, it does not sound very comfortable. The department should know what this money is for, why it is there and what it is going to be used for. We should not have to rely on the good offices of Her Majesty’s Treasury.
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for looking after my welfare.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble Lords, Lord Hodgson and Lord Fox, for pressing further through this group on the scope of Clause 30 concerning financial assistance, how far and in what circumstances financial assistance will be provided to businesses resultant on government decisions, and what the Government have in mind when under Clause 30(2)
“any other kind of financial assistance (actual or contingent)”
could be helpfully provided.
Amendment 18 is important in raising the issue of compensation, which I am sure the Government will continue to resist. Greater clarity will be always be helpful. Does the Minister envisage assistance being given beyond a certain figure? The sum of £100 million is specifically mentioned in the Bill. It seems to us, however, that the scope of the provision in Clause 30 is adequately drawn up.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful for the attention that your Lordships have paid to Clause 30 today and in Grand Committee. As we know, the clause enables financial assistance to be given to, or in respect of, entities in consequence of the making of final orders. The key challenge from your Lordships towards this clause has been about transparency and how the system will work. I will do all I can today to cast some further light on this.
First, I shall address Amendment 15, tabled by my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Hodgson and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, which would limit financial assistance to situations in which the Secretary of State considered that there was a risk to national security. I am pleased to be able to reassure the House that this Bill already requires that financial assistance may be given only where there is a risk to national security, since it states that financial assistance may be given only when a final order has been imposed. As final orders may be imposed only once a risk to national security has been determined to exist, I am happy to confirm and to reassure noble Lords that a risk to national security is a necessary part of granting financial assistance.
All financial assistance will be further subject to the usual scrutiny and agreement of HM Treasury, as I said in Committee. I may not be completely reassuring to all noble Lords, but I have no doubt that it would be scrutinised thoroughly by HMT. Essentially, the Secretary of State will not be able to hand out money in any way they choose, or, in my noble friend Lady Noakes’s phrase, to
“stuff public money into the pockets”—[Official Report, 16/3/21; col. 218.]
of companies.
Turning to Amendments 16 and 17, tabled by my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Hodgson, and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, Amendment 16 would limit the forms of permissible financial assistance to loans, guarantees and indemnities. Amendment 17 would specify that financial assistance would need to be given on “arm’s length terms”, which might be subject to a degree of interpretation in this context, but I appreciate that both amendments are probing the nature of any financial assistance.
It is important that the Secretary of State has some flexibility in the types of financial assistance that might be given, because there may be circumstances—perhaps unforeseen at the moment—where a form of assistance other than loans, guarantees or indemnities, will be appropriate. It would be most unfortunate if we had tied the Secretary of State’s hands so that they could not give such assistance just when it was needed. I assure noble Lords that the Government will be guided entirely by prudence when deciding what form of assistance is appropriate. However, we should not limit financial assistance in the way proposed by the amendments in lieu of a clear case for why this must be done. I am afraid I have not heard that clear case today, although I am very grateful to my noble friends for their points of explanation.
Picking up a point made in Committee, I reassure my noble friend Lady Noakes that financial assistance may be recoverable, depending on the terms set by the Secretary of State. Just as the decision to grant financial assistance will be taken on a case-by-case basis, so the terms of that assistance will be fixed on a case-by-case basis, including whether it should be recoverable. Indeed, I expect that in many circumstances the assistance would be recoverable. All such spending would be made clear in the annual report and in a separate report to the House of Commons if spending exceeded £100 million in any relevant period.
It may be the case that following a final order, only non-recoverable financial assistance would ensure that the UK does not lose capabilities considered important enough for the Secretary of State to intervene to protect them in the first place. If they are important enough to prevent losing them to actors who may do us harm, it should be open to the Secretary of State to decide whether they merit unrecoverable support. If financial assistance is given to a firm, that does not mean, in these circumstances of national security matters, as my noble friend Lord Hodgson said in Committee, that the firm is somehow a wounded bird or has become inherently unattractive. In most circumstances it may just mean that the Government are tiding it over until a more suitable acquirer, which does not pose a risk to national security, is found. To be absolutely clear, the Government do not intend for financial assistance under the NSI regime to be used as a form of back-door subsidy control. Under the Bill, financial assistance may be given only in consequence of a final order—to mitigate the effects of a final order, for example.
Amendment 18 would provide that financial assistance may include compensation given to anyone who suffers economic harm because of actions taken under the Bill. I remind your Lordships that subsection (1) already limits financial assistance to assistance given
“to or in respect of an entity in consequence of the making of a final order.”
Therefore, even with this amendment, Clause 30 is not a general compensation scheme. It relates only to final orders. Additionally, I have doubts as to whether the amendment would be straightforward to apply. For one thing, it is not entirely clear what would constitute “suffering economic harm” as a result of actions under the Bill. Furthermore, it is not clear how such harm would be assessed, what evidence would be needed or what sort of assistance would be appropriate.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. I was not expecting many answers from my noble friend the Minister, and I was not disappointed. We can conclude that we have heard nothing that explains this clause any more clearly; it is still opaque. This probably indicates that Ministers do not know how they will be using this power, but they would like it in their back pocket just in case. I am not at all surprised by this being the case.
This will mean that ex post scrutiny and accountability of Ministers’ use of this power will become very much more important. Obviously, if there is a large amount—over £100 million—in one year, an ad hoc report will go to the other place. Otherwise, there is the content of the annual report, which will become quite important. There is the BEIS Committee in the other place, which I am sure will have an interest in this, and your Lordships will be aware that this House has recently set up the Industry and Regulators Committee, to which I am pleased to have been appointed. This power, if used, would be the kind of thing that your Lordships’ Committee would want to look at, to see how it had been used in practice and whether it had been used prudently, as the Minister has assured us it will be.
I do not think we can take this any further forward today. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement to the amendment at page 4, line 22.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord McNicol of West Kilbride) (Lab)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 22. Anyone wishing to press this or anything else in this group to a Division must make that clear in debate.
Clause 53: Procedure for service, etc
Amendment 22
Lord Callanan
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that regulations under Clause 53 may make provision in respect of non-individuals required to give notices and any other documents under the Bill, as well as those in receipt of such documents.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, I rise to move Amendment 22 in my name, but with the permission of the House I will also speak to Amendments 23, 25, 27 and 32. I shall begin with Amendments 25, 27 and 32.
A strong theme of debate in Grand Committee, and in the other place, has been whether there is sufficient accountability in the regime—in particular, through the reporting requirements in the annual report. In general, as the House will be aware, the Government’s position has been that, as the Secretary of State may add anything judged appropriate to the annual report, there is no need to amend the Bill to include additional reporting requirements. The Government have, however, listened to proposals, including those made through amendments tabled in Grand Committee, and seek to add additional reporting requirements where it is judged that they would provide significant additional value for parliamentarians and the general public.
Amendment 32, in my name, will therefore increase the level of detail provided on final orders in the annual report, so that in addition to their total number being published, the number of orders varied and revoked will also be published. We recognise that final orders will be significant and reflective of government intervention following the call-in of an acquisition. There will already be a duty on the Secretary of State, in Clause 29, to publish notice of the fact that a final order has been made, varied or revoked. It is therefore appropriate that we provide information on the total number of orders varied and the total number of orders revoked. I thank, in particular, my noble friend Lord Lansley for this proposal, and for our discussions on how to improve this Bill prior to, during, and following Grand Committee. His counsel has been much appreciated.
Amendments 25 and 27 address the concern that the requirements on the Secretary of State to decide whether to accept or reject a mandatory notice or voluntary notice are insufficiently specific. As it stands, the Secretary of State must decide
“As soon as reasonably practicable”
after receiving a notification, and thereafter notify parties of his decision as soon as practicable. I set out during Grand Committee that the Secretary of State would strive to ensure that decisions to accept or reject notifications were made quickly. In many cases “as soon as reasonably practicable” is expected to be a very short period indeed, but we do not consider it appropriate to limit the period to a specific number of days, so as to provide scope for flexibility where required. In place of that, the Government propose reporting on the average number of days taken to respond to voluntary notices and mandatory notices. This additional detail will, we believe, ensure that parliamentarians and the wider public will be able to judge whether the Government’s expectation that this will be a matter of hours or days is proving correct year on year. Of course, these changes do not preclude the Secretary of State from going further by providing more information than required, where the information provides value to Parliament, and where, in particular, it provides reassurance where there is no time limit expressed in terms of a number of days.
Amendments 22 and 23 are minor amendments. Noble Lords will be aware that Clause 53 provides for regulations to be made setting out the procedure for service of documents under the Bill. These changes are intended to put the scope of the power beyond doubt. A change is proposed in subsection (2)(g), so that it is clear that the regulations may specify what must, or may, be done in relation to service of documents by senders outside the United Kingdom. A corresponding change is then made to paragraph (e), to avoid any doubt that the regulations will be able to set out what must, or may, be done where a sender is not an individual.
I hope that I have made clear the principles on which the Government are approaching the amendments in this group. I beg to move.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I have a number of amendments in this group, all of which would amend the annual reporting requirements. Some of them overlap with amendments that my noble friend has just spoken to. In particular, my Amendments 26 and 28 are similar to his Amendments 25 and 27. The difference is that my noble friend’s amendments ask for the average time to be given, whereas I ask for both the average and the maximum, because averages can be very misleading. However, we shall have some data, and I am sure that those can be used as a springboard for further examination of BEIS Ministers and officials, if either House wished to do that, so I shall not pursue those amendments.
Of my other amendments, Amendment 29 asks for differentiation between call-in notices issued for mandatory and for voluntary notifications. That is not given, and it is quite an important bit of information, which would be useful to enable us to see how important that mandatory notification route turns out to be. The other thing I have asked for is a focus on timing—the time between issuing the call-in notice and getting to the end of the process and giving the final notifications and the final orders. I continue to believe that those areas would be important for keeping an eye on how well the process is operating, especially as there are very long times available once the call-in notice is issued. Again, I am sure that questions can be tabled and Ministers can be interrogated in the usual way, so I am not worried about that. I am glad that my noble friend has moved towards more transparency, although he has perhaps not gone quite as far as I would have preferred.
Although I have not added my name to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, I think it is important for annual reporting to keep a focus on the resources dedicated to this, because the timing performance will be in part a reflection of whether adequate resources have been dedicated. Of course, giving numbers never gives an idea of the quality of resources, so that can only ever be an imperfect picture, but it is important for Parliament to have an opportunity to review and keep in focus the resources dedicated to the ISU processes. That is where the biggest impact is likely to be felt by businesses as they come up against the system. Well done for bringing in some transparency; a bit more would have been better.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, as I noted earlier, the administrative arrangements for consideration of deals referred to BEIS are incredibly important. This is a good Bill, but it must not be undermined by poor implementation, or UK plc will be cast in a bad light. As others have said in Committee, delays create cost and uncertainty, which can jeopardise beneficial takeovers or combinations. Deals in the 17 categories must be reviewed, but this must be done professionally and quickly.
I therefore welcome the Government’s amendments, and thank my noble friend the Minister, but I do not think they go far enough. At the least, I feel that he should also accept some or all of Amendments 28 to 31, tabled by my noble friend Lady Noakes—either in the Bill at Third Reading or through a commitment to add to guidance.
I have years of experience of being regulated, by the CMA and other anti-trust and investment authorities round the world, mainly in my former retail role. Good people, and good regulators, are both thorough—I know that has been a cause for concern right across the House—and timely. I can tell noble Lords that authorities use the set timeframes as a defence, and almost never, in my experience, report or publish ahead of the deadlines. So the timelines need to be clear, and, as argued by my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Lansley, and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, in the debate on Amendment 11, they need to be tight. They could perhaps also be shorter for smaller or struggling companies, which have more to lose. It would be helpful if my noble friend could have a look at that, if it is not already envisaged that we will take special care with those categories.
It is a worry that we are running out of time for the Bill in this legislative Session. As I have said, I supported the Bill at the start, and I am keen to get it on to the statute book, as I know the Government are as well.
In the light of discussion, I have four questions that probably go slightly wider than the annual report. Perhaps I could ask the Minister to respond either today or before Third Reading. My first question is whether in principle the Minister has the ability to consult on sensible arrangements on timeliness and timelines and put them into statutory guidance or whether a new power is needed, which is rather suggested by my noble friend Lord Leigh’s Amendment 36, which we will come on to.
Lord Lansley (Con)
I can be brief. I acknowledge with thanks that the Minister has brought forward government amendments that respond both to my Amendment 81 in Committee, about the number of orders varied or revoked and, in part, to what the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, had to say on Amendment 80 in Committee, including on the time taken to decide whether to accept or reject mandatory and voluntary notifications. I will not rehearse what my noble friend Lady Noakes had to say. Knowing more about the time taken, in addition to what is already intended to be in the annual report, will certainly give us reassurance about these administrative processes, which I think will be very important—especially at the outset, bearing in mind that we start with already potentially five months’ worth of relevant transactions that are within the scope of the regime but the legislation has not yet entered into force. Operating rapidly in relation to all those potential notifiable transactions will be really important, even in the first annual report.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I shall speak to the amendments tabled by the Minister, and I thank him for doing so. I shall also speak to those tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and Amendment 34, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, which I have signed and strongly support. The noble Lord, Lord Lansley, has highlighted the extra importance of transparency in the annual report in these circumstances where we already no doubt have a backlog of potential action.
I thank the Minister for responding to concerns in Committee and in the meantime and for taking us towards greater transparency. While the noble Baroness did not use the expression “half a loaf”, since it is perhaps three-quarters of a loaf, it goes some way towards giving us a greater understanding of how effective the regime is, particularly given the Government’s desire to keep these rather uncertain timescales that we were talking about in Committee.
In Committee, I hoped to persuade the Government to undertake a regular review of whether the Act was achieving its aims. It seems good practice to make sure that we have the right balance between the investment climate and national security concerns. The Government were unpersuaded by that, but I hope they will take on board the contents of the amendment by the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, particularly new paragraph (p),
“the impact on levels of foreign investment in the United Kingdom brought about under this Act”,
which would be inserted as a requirement in the annual report. Currently, the annual report does not go far enough. Surely, seen in the round, one of the most important factors is the impact of the Bill on foreign investment. Is this not a key indicator that should be included in any annual report? How can we judge how the balance of the Bill’s requirements are working? Is foreign direct investment not sufficiently important to be included in the annual report? I hope that the Minister can perhaps explain, if there is no explicit reference to it, why not, and if not, whether there will be a description of how the regime is operating.
Other aspects of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, are extremely important. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, mentioned the average staff resource allocated to the operation of reviews and so on. That resource aspect is going to be very important so that we can see transparently what resource is being devoted. Then there is the whole aspect of SMEs, which potentially could be impacted very heavily. The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, talked about this. I think that is a very important aspect too.
The way that the regime in the Bill impacts is extremely important. The Minister has given us some transparency, but I very much hope that he will accede to further requirements that could be included in the annual report really without very much difficulty.
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
I welcome the lead amendment in this group from the Government, providing greater clarity to the Clause 53 procedure for service. However, the bulk of the amendments in this group concern Clause 61, on the annual report. I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate.
In commerce, I have always championed annual reports as a strategic publicity document for an organisation, displaying how it is performing, how effective it has been, what results and achievements it has attained and what wider societal responsibilities it has performed. It can be far more than a dry, lumpy statutory document that has to be produced and is a chore to be complied with. I am sure it should be the same for government departments and public agencies.
I am grateful, therefore, for the dialogue since Committee with the Minister and his team regarding this issue. I am very glad that the Government have looked again at Clause 61 and at the material that could be provided in the annual report of this new unit and its operation. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, for looking at this and extending the information to be provided to cover both mandatory notifications as well as voluntary notices.
The noble Baroness has also added many more aspects that would provide greater visibility for the activities of the ISU. It is important that the Government are transparent about these areas so businesses can see the impact on their activities and compare experiences. Parliament and the public can monitor the work of the unit and determine the value to national security activities and how far legitimate businesses are being affected. These amendments were all supported by the UK BioIndustry Association. I thank it for the briefings it has sent throughout the Bill.
However, we still believe that there is more that the Government could do to assist the understanding of this new regime. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for adding his name to my Amendment 34. Greater transparency could still be given on the resources allocated to the new unit, the extent to which small and medium-sized enterprises are called in under the regime and the Bill’s impact on foreign investment. This is about requiring greater accountability from the department on the unit’s service standards.
The business community still remains somewhat nervous concerning the impacts on it as a result of the Bill. Throughout its passage, we have sought to champion clarity and support for SMEs and innovative start-ups, which are the engine of growth in the economy, create many new jobs and enhance prosperity. We are keen to foster a business environment in which SMEs can thrive.
It would be beneficial for the Government to report on the unit’s work with SMEs in the annual report. This can only be helpful in providing detail and reassurances to SMEs on the operation of the unit and its impacts on them. I would be very grateful if the Minister could provide reassurances that his department will embrace the annual report in a positive manner and provide as wide a range of information as possible.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, first, I thank all noble Lords who spoke in this debate, particularly my noble friend Lady Noakes—for her Amendments 26, 28, 29, 30 and 31—and the noble Lords, Lord Grantchester and Lord Clement-Jones, for Amendment 34.
I also thank my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe, to whom I will reply first. The Government have written on plans for a range of guidance, as my noble friend said. This is intended to aid parties in understanding and complying with the Bill. Timings and matters of requirements are set out in the legislation; they were consulted on, and of course they cannot be added to in guidance. As in the past, the Constitution Committee advised us quite strongly against legislating through guidance. Of course, we remain open to further proposals for guidance that assists in understanding and complying with the basic provisions in the Bill.
I move on to Amendments 26 and 28, which seek to require the Secretary of State to report on the “maximum and average time” taken to process mandatory and voluntary notices. These amendments would also require the Secretary of State to report on the “maximum and average time” taken between a notice being accepted and a call-in notice or notification of no further action being given or issued. Clauses 14 and 18 already set out that, if a notification is accepted, the Secretary of State has up to 30 working days to either give a call-in notice or notify each relevant person that no further action will be taken under the Bill.
I outlined in Grand Committee that these timings are a maximum, not a target. I have also set out the principles by which the Government consider it appropriate to specifically amend the Bill to require additional reporting, rather than to judge over time whether it would be beneficial to publish the information. It is already clear in the Bill that the maximum time that can be taken to make a call-in decision is 30 working days.
On the point of including average times, as I hope noble Lords will appreciate, each case will turn on its own facts. Therefore, reporting an average time without explaining the complexities of every individual case would be meaningless, in my view. For example, there may be a low average for some response times where particularly straightforward cases were prevalent—this may be held up as an efficient case review. There may be another period where particularly complex cases are dealt with exceptionally efficiently but none the less slightly more slowly. What would a comparison of the averages without further details on the cases provide? To my mind, it would provide nothing but a misunderstanding.
Amendment 29 seeks to require the Secretary of State to separately report on the number of call-in notices given in response to mandatory and voluntary notifications. I reassure the noble Baroness that the Bill already allows for the Secretary of State to do this in the future if deemed useful. Clause 61 sets out minimum reporting requirements that the Secretary of State must meet in the annual report.
Amendments 30 and 31 seek to require the Secretary of State to report on the “maximum and average time” taken between a call-in notice being issued and the making of a final order as well as the “maximum and average time” taken between a call-in notice being issued and a final notification that no further action will be taken under the Bill. In my view, the same argument applies in response to these amendments.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Henig) (Lab)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 24. Anyone wishing to press this or anything else in this group to a Division must make that clear in debate.
Clause 61: Annual report
Amendment 24
Lord West of Spithead
Lord West of Spithead (Lab)
My Lords, I will also speak to my Amendment 33, which is consequential to Amendment 24 and part of it. Both are supported by the noble Lords, Lord Butler of Brockwell, Lord Campbell of Pittenweem and Lord King of Bridgwater —a pretty impressive front row, I think noble Lords will agree. The amendments have general support across the House—I know this from my ex-CDI hat, having gone around and checked. I should make it clear that if the Government are not able to resolve this issue, I intend to test the opinion of the House on these amendments.
In Committee, the question of oversight of the investment security unit was raised—specifically, that the Bill does not allow for any oversight of the sensitive intelligence of its work, and that that oversight should be provided by the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament. There are many in this House who have served on the ISC, and who were therefore very concerned—as I was—by some of the misunderstandings about the operation of the ISC put forward by the Minister in Committee and what appeared effectively to be a reneging by the Government on the very clear commitments made to Parliament during the passage of the Justice and Security Act.
I assume that the Government accept that there should be a process for evaluating the national security implications of investment in British companies. That concern was first raised by the ISC. Indeed, the Government have stated that the Bill puts national security concerns at the very heart of the process—so why are those national security concerns which will be at the very heart of the process not to be properly overseen? It would mean the Government avoiding scrutiny of their decisions, and that is precisely what Parliament is here to ensure does not happen.
The Government have said that they expect the intelligence scrutiny to be undertaken by the BEIS Select Committee. With the greatest respect to the BEIS Select Committee, which is eminently qualified to scrutinise the work of BEIS, it cannot provide scrutiny of intelligence, because it cannot have access to all the national security material concerned.
The Minister has argued that the BEIS Select Committee does have access to sensitive material, and I grant that, in theory, that may be the case. The Osmotherly Rules allow the Minister discretion to give Select Committees top secret information. In practice, however, that is not the case. We know that the BEIS Select Committee has not been given any top secret information—sensitive information perhaps, but not top secret information. The reality is that it cannot be given top secret information. The BEIS Select Committee, with its excellent chairman, members and staff, cannot be given top secret material because it does not have the requisite security apparatus in place to do so. The committee’s staff do not have the security clearance required to see such material, and the committee does not have the facilities to store or discuss top secret information or have a statutory process to safeguard against the publication of top secret material. Therefore, unless the Government are intending to break their own rules on the handling of top secret material—something that would prompt an ISC inquiry in itself— the BEIS Select Committee cannot provide the scrutiny required. It cannot consider the national security material at the heart of the decision, and therefore the decision itself.
Now that we have established that the BEIS Select Committee cannot in practice be given the top secret material in question, and therefore cannot provide oversight, the question is, who can? Fortunately, the Government and Parliament had the foresight to create a body which can be given top secret material on a regular basis because it does have the requisite security apparatus in place. In 1994, the Intelligence and Security Committee was established expressly to scrutinise the intelligence and security activities of Her Majesty’s Government.
The ISC’s remit was extended through the Justice and Security Act 2013. Noble Lords will have heard it said during earlier stages in this House that the JSA provides the ISC with oversight of the three intelligence agencies. That is, perhaps, a little misleading. The ISC does not only oversee the agencies: it was established to oversee all intelligence and security matters across Government—or at least that was what Parliament was told.
The long title of the Justice and Security Act is,
“An Act to provide for oversight of the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service, the Government Communications Headquarters and other activities relating to intelligence or security matters”.
The memorandum of understanding which sits underneath the JSA, and which was expressly agreed by the Prime Minister, says that this means,
“those parts of Departments whose work is directly concerned with intelligence and security matters”.
Both Parliament in the JSA, and the Government in the MoU, have already expressly agreed that the ISC has oversight of all intelligence and security matters across Government.
In case there can be any lingering doubt, I draw your attention to the commitment given by the then Security Minister during the passage of the Bill when he said that it was,
“the intention of the Government that the ISC should have oversight of substantively all of central Government’s intelligence and security activities to be realised now and in the future”.
I trust the Minister has noted the wording there: “now and in the future”.
At the time the MOU was written there were seven such organisations, and these are therefore listed in the MOU. The then Security Minister also made it very clear during the passage of the Bill that the MOU was intended to be updated. He told Parliament:
“Things change over time. Departments reorganise. The functions undertaken by a Department one year may be undertaken by another the following year. The intelligence world is no different from any other part of Government ... An MOU is flexible: it can be changed much more easily than primary legislation”.—[Official Report, Commons, Justice and Security Bill (Lords) Committee 31/1/2013; col. 98.]
Clearly, the Minister’s argument that the ISU is not listed in the MoU is irrelevant. That is what the Minister said. His Government have already committed to changing the MOU when necessary in order to ensure the ISC has oversight of all intelligence and security matters. It really could not be any clearer. It is therefore of very grave concern that, despite Parliament’s clear intent and the Government’s clear commitments, oversight is being expressly denied.
The Minister also said that the ISC does not need to be given oversight expressly because the ISC can scrutinise the public report and can ask for other information about the ISU. Again, I am afraid this misses the point entirely. Of course the ISC can ask for information: we can ask for information from any part of the Government, but that does not mean to say that they will give it to us. By contrast, the organisations listed in the MoU—and therefore within the Committee’s remit—are required to provide information to the ISC. This is quite a different proposition, and demonstrates why the ISC should expressly be given oversight.
One last argument that has been put forward is around demarcation. There is concern that the work of BEIS should be overseen by the BEIS Select Committee, and therefore concern that to give the ISC oversight of the work of the ISU would have the ISC parking its tanks on the BEIS Committee’s lawn. This is simply not the case. The ISC chairman has already discussed this with the chairman of the BEIS Committee and they recognise that this issue cannot be overseen by the BEIS Committee and that some accommodation is required.
The ISC already oversees parts of departments that, for the most part, fall to a departmental Select Committee. The OSCT—I think it is now called Homeland Security—in the Home Office is just one such example, and the ISC and HASC have worked harmoniously for some years. I draw the Minister’s attention yet again to the commitments already given in this respect. The MoU clearly states that:
“Only the ISC is in a position to scrutinise effectively the work of the Agencies and of those parts of Departments whose work is directly concerned with intelligence and security”.
This will not affect the wider scrutiny of departments such as the Home Office, FCO and MoD—ditto BEIS —by other parliamentary committees. It really could not be any clearer and the Government have already recognised that demarcation is not a problem. So, I hope the Minister does not seek to put it forward today as an argument against ISC oversight.
I trust that I have demonstrated thus far why proper oversight is needed, why that can only fall to the ISC, why there is no reason for it not to fall to the ISC, and how the Government have already given commitments previously to Parliament that the ISC will oversee these matters. Now perhaps I might explain the amendment I have laid, with the support of the noble Lords I have mentioned. It seeks to provide this missing oversight and thereby enable the Government to honour their commitment.
Clause 61 mandates the Secretary of State to provide an annual report to Parliament. The information in that report is limited, and obviously will not include any sensitive security information. My amendment to Clause 61 would add two further categories of information to that annual report and provides a mechanism for the Secretary of State to redact any of this information from the public report, should it be deemed damaging to national security. That information must be moved into a classified annexe, understandably, which must then be provided to the ISC, thereby ensuring that if Parliament as a whole cannot scrutinise it—which clearly it cannot because of its classification—the ISC can.
Noble Lords will have noticed that this amendment simplifies the amendment I laid in Committee. The ISC has consistently tried to engage with the Government on this issue, to understand their concerns about our approach, and to try to chart a course through. Despite this, the committee and I remain wholly ignorant of the real reason for the Government’s intransigence. The arguments put forth by the Minister in this House in Committee were flawed, I am afraid, as I think I have shown. They cannot therefore be the real reason why the Government appear to be seeking to renege on the commitments given to Parliament during the passage of the Justice and Security Act.
The noble Lord, Lord Butler, has questioned whether there is some deep-seated dislike of the ISC at the heart of Government. Certainly, oversight is not comfortable, but it is not meant to be comfortable. I cannot believe that the Government would prioritise a petty squabble regarding the committee’s Russia report or the chairmanship of the committee over the clear commitments that they have given to Parliament. I am sure that cannot be the case, knowing the Minister as I do. We will therefore see the Government, I hope, honour their commitments today.
To show that I am an unusually flexible naval officer, I wish to reiterate the offer I made to the Government in Committee. If our amendment is unacceptable, for some reason that they have not yet told us, then the alternative is to put the Investment Security Unit into the MoU and provide for oversight by the ISC in that way. The MoU was intended to be a living document; it is very simply amended by way of an exchange of letters between the Prime Minister and the committee chairman. Perhaps the Minister was unaware of the simplicity of the mechanism, when he said that putting the Investment Security Unit into the MoU was a “substantial amendment”.
The Minister may be unaware that in the work of the Investment Security Unit, the unit which currently takes these decisions is the Investment Security Group in the Cabinet Office, and that is currently overseen by the ISC. Therefore, adding the Investment Security Unit to the MoU is not some radical step but simply preserves the status quo, rather than actively removing it from ISC oversight.
Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)
My Lords, I was flattered to be included in the front row that my noble friend set out. I have one qualification about it though, and that is that these days, such is the pressure of rugby that the front row is often completely substituted at half-time. But this is a front row that has not been substituted at half-time. I and the noble Lords, Lord Butler and Lord King, have lasted the pace.
It is not necessary for me to expand in any way upon what were, if I may say so, the most compelling arguments put forward by the noble Lord just a moment or two ago. I acknowledge my interest in these matters, having been a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee for seven years, but I am afraid that I take issue with some of the flavour of the correspondence that has passed between some of us on this matter. The dismissal of the amendments, and the arguments that lie behind them, has been, in my respectful view, cavalier and verging on the insulting. This is a fundamental issue and it demanded a more reasoned set of arguments for simply refusing to accept the amendments that have just been so eloquently proposed.
I will say a word or two repeating to some extent what I said in Committee. When Huawei was first raised it was not raised with the Intelligence and Security Committee, as it ought to have been, but officials sent it to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. Had the importance and understanding of the Intelligence and Security Committee been properly recognised perhaps some of the difficulties that ultimately presented themselves with Huawei would have been avoided.
The other point I want to make is slightly self-aggrandising, I suppose, but those who have chosen to be members of the Intelligence and Security Committee are carefully vetted. On some occasions, when the leaders of political parties have made nominations, these have been turned down. It is supposed to reflect those with experience and judgment, who can be relied on to accept the onerous responsibility that membership brings. That involves signing the Official Secrets Act and going through the necessary processes attached to it. I do not understand that the BEIS Committee will be subject to that. Although the Secretary of State may offer classified information, the BEIS Committee will not have the statutory rights, as pointed out so eloquently by the noble Lord who last spoke. I fear this is yet another illustration of how the Government believe that, with a docile majority in the House of Commons, they can, if not ignore what happens in this place, at least enter their opposition in the hope, belief and perhaps the knowledge that if it goes back to the other place the Government’s position can be restored.
The last point I want to make is this: what can be more important than issues of national security? What can be more important than ensuring that those charged with oversight are given every opportunity, based on experience and judgment, to consider these issues and reach conclusions? There seems to be no recognition of that in this issue. It is deeply disappointing.
As the noble Lord who introduced the amendment pointed out, there are not only undertakings on the part of the Government but statutory principles to be observed. My submission is that the Government should think again, but they have already said that, irrespective of argument, they will not accept this amendment. They can hardly be surprised, therefore, if those who support it believe that the attitude of the House must now be taken.
Lord King of Bridgwater (Con) [V]
My Lords, in supporting the amendment I will first say how disappointed I am to be here at all. As we have gone through the Bill’s stages the argument has been very clearly made. I think a mistake was made in the original construction of the Bill and there now seems to be a determination not to repair the one problem that exists.
I say this as somebody who strongly supports the Bill. We need to have powers for the Secretary of State to prevent serious loss and threats to our national security. I note my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe’s comments, citing some of the pretty valuable businesses that should not have been allowed to go. If wiser counsel had prevailed that could have been prevented. This Bill would have helped that.
The other important thing that the Government have got absolutely right is ensuring that, if we are going to have this Bill and give the Secretary of State these new powers, there has to be proper parliamentary oversight of it. But they either were negligent or perhaps unaware of the important background: there are limitations affecting the operation the BEIS Committee. It is not qualified and will not be able to see any “top secret” information. If anybody on the government side seriously suggests that there could not possibly be any “top secret” information arising in connection with some possible takeover or acquisition, that position is not one they can seriously seek to sustain in a rapidly changing, increasingly technical and pretty dangerous world, as the noble Lord, Lord West, said. This is a pity, because I would like to pay my compliments to the Minister for the way he has handled the Bill. In every other respect it has been a model of parliamentary oversight and the proper review of it.
Referring again to what we now call the front row of the scrum, it seems, if I may say so, that we in your Lordships’ House each come from a different background. I, having been Secretary of State for a number of departments and then, for seven years, chairman of the ISC, was able to see this from both sides and saw the importance of there being, in the end, proper oversight of the intelligence agencies and of the intelligence and information that may be coming to them which government Ministers might be relying on.
Somebody has kindly sent me a copy of the letter sent by Jacob Rees-Mogg to Julian Lewis, and I echo something the noble Lords, Lord Campbell and Lord West, said: it is pretty dismissive and merely says that the committee’s role should not be on an ad-hoc, Bill-by-Bill basis, and that it would be a significant precedent, providing parliamentary oversight of the UK’s intelligence community. Although my noble friend Lord Grimstone paid what may have been a perfectly well-deserved tribute in Committee to the qualities of the BEIS Select Committee, the simple fact is, as my two colleagues have said, it will not be allowed to see any top secret information. It is not cleared for top secret intelligence that comes in, which might, on some occasions, be the key consideration that affects a decision the Secretary of State takes, for which there would then be no parliamentary accountability or oversight.
I have some sympathy with the Minister, because there are others who seem to have dug their heels in on this one, but even at this late stage, the argument does not stack up. A sensible decision by the Government would be to include this limited amendment to an otherwise excellent Bill and get on with it. Otherwise, it is a serious gap, and we could well pay the price for it in the future.
Lord Butler of Brockwell (CB)
My Lords, in my rugby-playing days I played in the back row, and I think I am right in saying that the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, played on the wing. However, I am very happy, in this case, to be in the front row with the noble Lords, Lord West, Lord Campbell and Lord King, even though the rules might say that that is one too many.
This is a very important amendment, and the House and the Government have to take it seriously. The noble Lord, Lord West, has made an irrefutable case for the involvement of the ISC, on the basis of what the Government promised Parliament during the passing of the Justice and Security Act and subsequently, and there really can be no answer to that.
I will come to the role of the ISC in a moment, but first I will draw attention to an oddity of Clause 61 in its present form if the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord West, is not accepted. We have been discussing the content of that clause, which stipulates that the Secretary of State must make an annual report to each House of Parliament about the exercise of the powers in the Bill. The clause requires that the annual report should cover details in no less than 12 areas, and the Government are now proposing to add to that. So much detail—but all the details are administrative. The clause in its present form omits the essential matter in which Parliament and the public will be interested: namely, the actual decisions of the Secretary of State and the justification for them—the grounds on which they were made. That is an extraordinary omission, and the first part of the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord West, puts it right.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, I express my support for the amendments presented by the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, and his colleagues. Curiously, we seem to have four on the front row, but I am perfectly happy where I am, because I am quite a big chap and used to play left lock, so that will be fine.
Colleagues will recall that I had an amendment in Committee to extend the remit of the Intelligence and Security Committee under the 2013 Act. I think the place we have reached on Report is right; my amendment was unnecessary and might have led to precisely the criticism which my successor bar five as Leader of the House of Commons has put to the chair of that committee—that it is expanding the role of the committee beyond its original statutory function. Jacob Rees-Mogg has expressed this criticism about where we are now, but I am afraid he is plain wrong. That is precisely not what this amendment seeks to do; it seeks to ensure that the Intelligence and Security Committee can fulfil the role it was given in precisely the terms that the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, set out in introducing his two amendments. I very much support him.
I fear the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, may have hit on why the Government are resisting this; not for the reasons they have expressed, but because it will enable the quality of some of those decisions to be examined in detail, including with reference to the security risks that must be incorporated into this decision-making. Perhaps they do not wish that to happen, but that is why we have parliamentary oversight and why, in particular, the Intelligence and Security Committee was originally instituted. I was not a Member of the other House at the time it was instituted, but I was director of the Conservative Research Department and my deputy director is now chair of that committee—as my mother would say, as these things go around, they come around. I am very happy to support their role.
I will mention one other thing. He is not with us this afternoon, but in Committee the noble Lord, Lord Janvrin, made an essential point about the Government’s argument that the ISC can go after the information it is looking for and make inquiries of whoever. He said:
“I think we would all argue that effective scrutiny leads to better decision-making. The Minister in another place said that there is nothing to stop the ISC calling for evidence on a specific decision. That may be true, but is it practical? It calls to mind Donald Rumsfeld’s ‘unknown unknowns’: how does the ISC know which decisions to examine in detail? I question whether such a hit-or-miss approach to scrutiny would lead to better decision-making.”—[Official Report, 16/3/21; col. 250.]
We do not want a hit-or-miss approach. Even less, frankly, do we want the ISC to have to go out on fishing expeditions to try to find out on what the intelligence material on which decisions were made was based. I would far rather it was done in a well-constructed manner. I support these amendments for that reason and hope my noble friend, at the very least, will be able to say that the Government will bring back their own amendments at Third Reading to serve this purpose or amend the memorandum of understanding in the right way. If not, I will have to support these amendments this afternoon.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, the fact that such esteemed Members on all sides of the House have coalesced on this amendment speaks volumes for your Lordships’ concern about this issue.
It has been a heavyweight debate, with all due respect to the four amigos who have been speaking. I will now bring it down to earth with a bit of politics. It has been an authoritative debate and, all other things being equal, we would expect and hope that it causes the Minister not just to listen but to act. However, I fear his hands—metaphorically if not actually—are tied behind his back by other things. A couple of previous speakers mentioned the letter from the Lord President of the Council, Leader of the House of Commons, to wit, the right honourable Mr Jacob Rees-Mogg. This seems to indicate the bindings the Minister is currently under.
In this short tome, as we have heard, Mr Rees-Mogg tells the right honourable Dr Julian Lewis MP, who is, as we know, chairman of the ISC, that decisions regarding committees’ roles and remits should not be made on an ad hoc, Bill-by-Bill basis, and that there needs to be careful consideration.
I suggest this is a patronising view of the proceedings of your Lordships’ House. When have your Lordships’ considerations not been careful? The most reckless behaviour I have seen during the course of this Bill has been the Minister’s wholesale consumption of sugar-based products, so where is the carelessness that the right honourable Member for North East Somerset speaks of? We should be a little outraged by that suggestion.
This Bill is written by BEIS, and it is understandable that BEIS would want to favour its own Select Committee. I am sure that is how we set out along this route. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Butler, who said that we have set out in the wrong direction. I feel sure that is what happened. Good governance would be to understand that, take advice and make changes.
It would not be so bad if the BEIS Committee had not been so obviously exposed by the comments we have heard today to be the wrong committee to do the security part of the scrutiny of this very important Bill. It is absolutely clear that it is the wrong committee. If the Minister cannot make or promise changes, I believe he can undertake to accurately reflect both the strength of feeling of your Lordships’ House and the facts, rather than the assumption of the facts that appears to be driving the letter that Jacob Rees-Mogg has written.
I ask just one question of the Minister. If the Bill in considered by the Government to be an ad hoc process, what is careful consideration? What does careful consideration look like if it is not the careful scrutiny of legislation?
Lord Rooker (Lab)
My Lords, they did not do rugby at my secondary technical school, and I am only guesting for my noble friend on the front row for this debate. I will be brief, as I do not want to repeat what was said in this debate or in Committee, when I spoke briefly.
As has already been commented, my noble friend Lord West has made an irrefutable case for the amendment. It is quite clear that there is a serious problem here. No one is arguing with the committee in the other place or wants to devalue or undermine the role of elected Members of Parliament and the departmental Select Committees. They have been an enormous success since they were introduced in, I think, the 1980s and early 1990s. But they have a specific role, which does not cover security matters. Parliament and government decided together to form a different structure for that purpose, which is effectively what we are debating today.
With all due respect, I feel sorry for the Minister, because others are making the decisions on this and he is but their messenger and will give us their message. The fact is that no acceptable, reasonable reason has been given by anybody in government for opposing the procedure envisaged in this amendment: that the Intelligence and Security Committee should have oversight of these decisions. We have no reason for it at all.
The noble Lord, Lord Campbell, referred to the Government’s docile majority. We have to be careful about that; we are hoping that docile majority will support your Lordships’ House, so in my view they are obviously all very intelligent, alert parliamentarians, putting the interests of the country and their constituents first. It is very important that we take that on board.
The noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, mentioned the cruciality of parliamentary oversight in respect of the committee he once chaired—indeed, he was the first chair—and made it clear that the Select Committee in the other place that oversees the department’s day-to-day activities cannot possibly have the relevant information put before it in all the cases. One is not arguing that every single case of a takeover or merger will be referred.
The noble Lord, Lord Butler, made the point that of course the principal role of scrutiny of BEIS lies in the Commons with the departmental Select Committee. However, the Government seem to be ruling out the ability for questions to be asked of the security services by opposing the amendment. That cannot be good. He wants to know what the objection is.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, perhaps I may start by welcoming back to the Front Bench the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, who is an extremely adequate substitute, if I might say. It is a delight to see him back and fully recovered from injury.
There have been a lot of analogies about rugby and positions in this debate. I did not really play much rugby in my career, which is probably a good thing, but the occasional time that we played at school, I seemed always to be the hooker, which seemed, in the poor quality of rugby that we played, to be the one in the middle of the scrum being kicked by everybody else—somewhat appropriate in this debate.
I thank the noble Lords, Lord West and Lord Butler, for their Amendments 24 and 33, which would require the Secretary of State to provide additional information on regime decisions, either in the annual report, or, where details are too sensitive to publish, in a confidential annexe to the Intelligence and Security Committee. This information would include summaries of decisions to make final orders or to give final notifications, and summaries of the national security assessments provided by the security services in relation to those decisions.
A number of noble Lords have spoken with such passion and knowledge on this important issue, both in this debate and when we previously discussed amendments in this area during Grand Committee. I am particularly grateful—I say this genuinely—to the noble Lords, Lords West and Lord Butler, for their careful consideration of the words used by my colleague my noble friend Lord Grimstone during Grand Committee, and for their continued pursuit of an amendment that attempts to satisfy all parties.
The noble Lords’ amendment would effectively require the Secretary of State to include material provided by the security services in a confidential annexe. Of course, the ISC is already able to request such information from the security services as part of its long-established scrutiny of those organisations, as is set out in the Justice and Security Act 2013 and its accompanying memorandum of understanding.
I will directly address the issue raised by the noble Lord, Lord West, and others, about the BEIS Select Committee and its access to sensitive or classified information. The Government maintain their view that there is no barrier to the committee handling top-secret or other sensitive material, subject to agreement between the department and the chair of the committee on appropriate handling. As part of its role, the BEIS Select Committee can request information, which may include sensitive material, from the Secretary of State for BEIS, including on the investment security unit’s use of information provided by the intelligence and security agencies. The Select Committee already provides scrutiny of a number of sensitive areas and there are mechanisms in place for them to scrutinise top-secret information of this kind on a case-by-case basis.
The amendment would also require sensitive details to be provided to the ISC of the Secretary of State’s decisions in respect of final notifications given and final orders made, varied, or revoked. As we discussed earlier, the Bill already provides that the Secretary of State must publish details of each final order made, varied, or revoked. The Government have also recognised that providing this information at an aggregate level will be helpful, and Amendment 32 in my name would require the Secretary of State to include the number of final orders varied and revoked in the annual report. Even without Amendment 32, Clause 61 already requires the report to include the number of final orders made. The Secretary of State must also include in his annual report a number of other details pertinent to this amendment. I am confident that this will provide a rich and informed picture of the Government’s work to protect our national security from risks arising from qualifying investments and other acquisitions of control.
As I have said before, for further scrutiny, we welcome the fact that we can follow existing appropriate government procedures for reporting back to Parliament, including through responding to the BEIS Select Committee, which does such an excellent job of scrutinising the work of the department. As the Secretary of State for BEIS said on 13 April, during a session of that committee, the NSI Bill “sits within BEIS” and the powers of the Bill sit with the Secretary of State for BEIS.
The chair of the BEIS Select Committee—who, I remind noble Lords, is an Opposition Member of Parliament—supported the view that his committee should scrutinise the investment security unit as part of its oversight of the department. Therefore, it makes sense that, from a governance perspective, the BEIS committee should be the appropriate scrutinising committee.
As this was discussed at length in Grand Committee, I do not wish to try the patience of the House by repeating the assurance that my noble friend Lord Grimstone, the Minister, provided to the House on the ability of the BEIS Select Committee to request and see materials regarding the work of the investment security unit. Therefore, I hope—it is probably more in hope than expectation—that noble Lords will accept my explanation and feel able to withdraw their amendments.
Lord West of Spithead (Lab)
My Lords, I thank all those who had an input in this debate, particularly those supporters. We almost got a full scrum, with the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, added as well—we had a bit of weight there. We are more second than front row, to be quite honest, but I have now found that the Government Minister is actually a hooker, so we have a bit of front row around. As he rightly says, the hooker gets punched by everyone—I am afraid that that is the way that it is going tonight.
I have considerable sympathy for the Minister: I was in that position when I had to argue for 90 days pre-trial detention. Because I am not really a politician, I had actually already said on the “Today” programme that I thought that this was a very dodgy thing to do—and then I had to stand at the Dispatch Box and argue for it. Lo and behold, I am in Guinness World Records for the biggest defeat of the Government since the House ceased being entirely hereditary—so I feel for the Minister.
However, I am afraid I question a couple of the things that he said—for example, the chairman of the BEIS Committee has no objection to my amendment at all, so he was given some wrong information there. I also fear that the Minister has failed to provide an explanation for the Government’s intransigence and indeed seems willing to stop Parliament having a mechanism whereby it can scrutinise highly classified intelligence, based on which key decisions are made. To cut it short—I have spoken for far too long—I therefore have no choice but to test the opinion of the House on this key amendment.
“(da) the average number of working days—(i) from receipt of a mandatory notice to notification of a decision to accept that notice, and(ii) from receipt of a mandatory notice to giving written reasons for a decision to reject that notice,”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment adds a reporting requirement to ensure that the average length of time taken to give notification of a decision to accept or reject a mandatory notice is included in the annual report that must be made by the Secretary of State under Clause 61.
“(ga) the average number of working days—(i) from receipt of a voluntary notice to notification of a decision to accept that notice, and(ii) from receipt of a voluntary notice to giving written reasons for a decision to reject that notice,”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment adds a reporting requirement to ensure that the average length of time taken to give notification of a decision to accept or reject a voluntary notice is included in the annual report that must be made by the Secretary of State under Clause 61.
“(m) the number of final orders varied,(n) the number of final orders revoked.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment adds a reporting requirement to ensure that the number of final orders varied or revoked is included in the annual report that must be made by the Secretary of State under Clause 61.
Lord West of Spithead
“(m) in respect of final notifications given, and final orders made, varied or revoked— (i) a summary of the decision of the Secretary of State under section 26(1), and(ii) a summary provided by the Security Services of any national security risk assessment provided under section 26(3)(a)(ii) relating to each decision under section 26(1).(2A) Where the Secretary of State considers that publication of any information listed in paragraph (2)(m) would be contrary to the interests of national security, those details may be excluded from publication and instead must be included in a confidential annex to the report provided to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament on the same day that the rest of the report is laid before each House of Parliament.”
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Lexden) (Con)
We now come to Amendments 35 and 36. Anyone wishing to press this or anything else in this group to a Division must make that clear in debate.
Amendment 35
Lord Rooker
“Higher education guidance
(1) Within three months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must publish guidance for the higher education and research sector in relation to provisions in this Act, which includes, but is not limited to—(a) a clear explanation of asset transactions in respect of which higher education institutions must give notice to the Secretary of State;(b) how the provisions of the Act affect contract research, consultancy work, and collaborative research and development;(c) the application of the provisions of the Act to strategic security partnerships and domestic partners.(2) The Government must consult the higher education and research sector on draft guidance and include feedback in the final publication.”
Lord Rooker (Lab)
My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 35, which was tabled in the name of my noble friend Lord Grantchester.
As my noble friend Lady Hayter said in Committee, there is considerable concern in the higher education and research sectors about the potential impact of the Bill on research partnerships. Organisations have been crying out for clarity. Amendment 35, which I move on behalf of my noble friend—I thank the noble Lords, Lord Lansley and Lord Clement-Jones, for signing it—would require the Government to
“publish guidance for the higher education and research sector”,
including
“a clear explanation of asset transactions”
indicating how
“research, consultancy work, and collaborative research and development”
will be affected and how the provisions apply to
“strategic security partnerships and domestic partners.”
The amendment would also require the Government to
“consult the higher education and research sector”
in a meaningful way in advance of the guidance. The amendment is therefore about developing guidance and promoting good practice, in that it should be done in co-operation with the sector. I certainly hope that the Government will agree to that.
The Russell group has said that, without clear guidance, a significant proportion of universities’ routine engagement with British business could inadvertently be captured by the Bill. I am grateful to the Minister for his engagement on this issue; I understand that there has been an indication that the Government have listened. Without getting ahead of the Minister, when he comes to wind up, will he confirm when the guidance will be published by the Government and how higher education and research institutions will be involved in drafting it? Will a draft of the guidance be published beforehand, for example? How will higher education institutions be highlighted in the critical sectors? Will the guidance include hypothetical scenarios so that people can plan?
Universities want to help to make the Bill work, as we all do; the Bill has enormous support across Parliament. We can all be united in recognising the benefits of businesses working with research institutions, which we want not only to continue to support and allow to flourish but to continue increasing. I beg to move.
Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)
My Lords, I thank the Minister, my noble friend Lord Callanan—he is not in his place—for his letter to us regarding guidance products. I was a bit confused by the word “products” but let us let that pass for the moment. The letter tells us about the expert panel, which is welcome; I gather that it has already sat, so that is a good start. I was slightly disappointed not to see any representatives from the insolvency profession on that panel because I think that, when they wake up to it, they will find that this Bill affects them much more than they realise. R3 had already told me that it would like to be on the panel, and no doubt the IPA, after its annual lecture the other week, will be keen to have representations on it. I also hope that the expert panel might include members of the public and practitioners who feel that they can contribute usefully.
Lord Lansley (Con)
I am very glad to support Amendment 35 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, so ably moved by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker. It follows a debate in Committee led by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, which I thought drew out some of the issues for the higher education and research sector very well.
I am really pleased that our noble friends on the Front Bench have responded that they will provide guidance. I was originally looking for what amounted virtually to a safe harbour for higher education and research institutions, which I accept may be a stretch too far, but there is a substantial range of transactions that the higher education sector is concerned may be within scope.
When one looks at the consultation on the scope of the regime and the range of assets that are in scope, one sees that its concern about it is entirely justifiable. What it really comes down to is understanding through guidance and the sort of scenarios that the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, was referring to, how this is actually going to work. One of the central issues is that this is a regime about ownership and control, not about use. I am sorry; I have not given my noble friend notice of this question so if he wants to write to me about it subsequently I will completely understand, but I will take one example, which is non-exclusive licensing.
There are instances, and I think they are reasonably frequent, where the licensing process will allow people the use of an asset but will not allow them control of it, which remains within the higher education institution. It would be really helpful if the Minister were able to say, “Yes, the guidance will cover that and our expectation is that non-exclusive licencing would not be within the likely call-in”, not least because if the assets were to be used outside the United Kingdom and by particular persons outside it then, coming back to my earlier point, the export licensing regime would catch that use. The two regimes, working alongside each other, would work in harmony in that sense but would focus on the control and ownership of the technology in question rather than trying to capture all its potential uses.
With that said and with that question asked, I am glad that the Minister was able to give us some guidance —I should not say “guidance about the guidance”—or some expectation of the use of the guidance in the way that we wanted that to happen. I am very glad to support Amendment 35 but hope that, in reiterating that expectation, the Minister will allow this to be withdrawn.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to speak on this group of amendments because of the progress that has been made. It is also a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, in his new Front-Bench incarnation. Long may it last.
On Amendment 35, I declare an interest as chair of the governing body of Queen Mary University. As I said in Committee, although the Bill does not directly reference universities, given the width of the sectors included in the scope of the Bill, it is clear that there is an intention to capture partnership entered into by universities. Elements of the Bill, while introducing measures to protect national security, could have unintended consequences for future investment in UK R&D and could cause BEIS to be overloaded with references from the university sector. That would add to lead-in times and create red tape for both universities and businesses, and that would not be to the benefit of R&D in our universities. I am delighted that the Government have now accepted the case that there is a need for specific guidance for higher education when the trawler of the noble Lords, Lord Grimstone and Lord Callanan, goes by. It is really about the specificity that the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, mentioned; the nature of the guidance needs to be specific.
In Committee the noble Baroness, Lady Bloomfield, assured us that
“we do not generally expect the acquisition of qualifying assets for exclusive use by UK-based research or higher education institutions to give rise to national security concerns. Indeed, to go further, the use of assets where there is no acquisition of a right or interest resulting in control over a qualifying asset would not even constitute a trigger event”.
I hope that kind of thing is going to be spelled out. Similarly, the noble Baroness pointed to the three levels of risk set out in the draft statement on the Secretary of State’s call-in power. She said:
“I am confident that higher education and research institutions will be able to assess their activities and decide in which of these three areas of risk they fall.”
Again, I very much hope that that is spelled out in the guidance. The summary certainly looks quite promising in terms of talking about the scenarios that are going to be outlined. She concluded:
“The Government very much appreciate the Russell group’s ideas on inclusion for guidance”,—[Official Report, 9/3/21; cols. 657-58GC.]
and I very much hope that they will continue to listen. I see that the Russell group is represented on the expert group, and I think that is extremely helpful.
I think we can be much more confident that the Government will turn that appreciation into tangible guidance, but I hope that the Minister will—in the way that the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, mentioned—give further comfort on the nature of the consultation, the timing and with whom it will take place, in respect of that particular set of guidance.
Turning to Amendment 36, I am delighted to follow the noble Lord, Lord Leigh. I declare an interest as a member of the advisory board of the corporate finance faculty of the ICAEW. Of course, it follows that the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, and I have been very carefully following the correspondence between the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, and David Petrie of the ICAEW. Again, I am delighted that the Minister has accepted that the statement about the exercise of the call-in power will not be sufficient for the investment community and that the annual report—and, indeed, the fact sheets mentioned in Committee—is not the best vehicle and that the Government have now committed to issuing market guidance.
But the market guidance notes really must do what they say on the tin. The noble Lord, Lord Leigh, had a slightly veiled criticism of how detailed these were going to be in terms of their use to those who are transacting. This has rather different wording from that applied to higher education. It seems to me that the wording is much more helpful when it talks about scenarios in higher education; this talks about drawing on analysis of patterns or trends in notifications received by the investment security unit. It is all about the notifications; it is not an end-to-end analysis of the trends as regards the Secretary of State’s decisions, call-in and so on. There is a great deal more that could be covered. I welcome the flexibility shown by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, in his letters to the ICAEW, offering to make progress on developing guidance notes. I very much hope that will happen now that the ICAEW is part of that expert group.
I think it might be helpful to put on record significant detailed additions that could be put into the guidance notes. In addition to some of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, I suggest that it would be useful to have contained in the market guidance notes details about at what stage in a transaction advisers or companies should contact the ISU, and how sellers seeking to retain control of the process might manage that element of the transaction—although, of course, we know that most of the emphasis is on the acquirer notifying the unit. It might also be useful to have advice for investors on the provisions that could be exercised and the circumstances in which the Secretary of State has declared deals as null and void, and commentary that recognises the need for maintaining competitive tension in an investment or sales process in order to obtain optimum terms from investors or acquirers, in terms of enabling a limited number of final bidders in a trade auction process. These are the sorts of the things that could be envisaged. It could also include advice about mechanisms to prevent bidders submitting vexatious or deliberately incomplete notifications, and advice designed to avoid frequent requests to investors and/or acquirers for additional information.
A market guidance note might be useful when it becomes clear that the Secretary of State is unwilling to permit investment and control in particular subsectors that have been identified. Additionally, I think that the ICAEW has mentioned that a market guidance note specifically for private equity investors would be useful. Of course, publishing these market guidance notes in a timely and regular fashion as circumstances change is really important. Again, on the question of the consultation, I very much hope that the Minister will say who will be consulted and when such market guidance notes might be available—that would be good.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their amendments, which seek to require the provision of guidance. As a former practitioner, I am very pleased with the progress we have made in this area with your Lordships’ help. It is an important topic.
Amendment 35 requires that the Secretary of State provides guidance for the higher education and research sector within three months of the Bill passing. This amendment also requires the Government to consult the higher education and research sector on the draft guidance. I thank the noble Lords, across three parties no less, for their amendment. As has been said, this amendment and others encouraged my noble friend Lord Callanan to write to all Peers on Tuesday setting out our intention to publish guidance. I am pleased to be able to commit on the Floor of the House that the Government will provide guidance to the higher education sector within three months of Royal Assent.
I am happy to assure the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, that we are already working with the Russell group and others as part of our expert panel across all guidance. This panel is providing feedback and input to ensure that parties have the utmost clarity and assistance in understanding and complying with the regime. In this guidance, we will pay care, as the amendment seeks, to the treatment of assets under the regime. I can confirm that the Government will also engage with representatives from the broader research sector as part of this work.
I will just make a few further, brief points. First, I wish to make it clear that asset acquisitions will not be in scope of the mandatory notification regime, so there will be no obligation to notify any asset acquisition. Secondly, as my noble friend Lady Bloomfield set out during Grand Committee, the statement provided for in Clause 3 sets out core areas and core activities to which the Secretary of State is likely to pay closer attention, and the majority of research, consultancy work and collaborative research will fall outside these areas. The guidance we are publishing will provide higher education and research establishments with hypothetical scenarios—effectively case studies—of where acquisitions in the research sector could fall in scope of the regime. It is our aim that the guidance will aid the higher education sector’s understanding of where acquisitions in its sector may be in scope and will prevent unnecessary voluntary notifications, which is clearly in everyone’s interest.
Thirdly, the amendment makes reference to the application of the provisions of the Bill to security partnerships and domestic partners. I am pleased to clarify that this Bill covers only acquisitions of control over qualifying entities and assets, so does not apply specifically to the formation of partnerships. An acquisition of control by a partnership will be in scope of the regime in the same way as any other acquisition of a qualifying entity or asset by a party but, if there is no acquisition of control, this regime would not apply.
Amendment 36, from my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley, would require the Secretary State to provide market guidance notes within six months of the Bill passing and every six months thereafter. Such market guidance notes would provide information to assist with compliance with the regime.
I am pleased to confirm to my noble friend and other noble Lords on the Floor of this House that it is indeed the Government’s intention to provide market guidance notes, sometimes known as practice statements or practice notes, and we will draw on the expert panel. The composition of the panel was set out in the letter that noble Lords recently received, and no doubt the composition of the panel can be adjusted over time to make sure the appropriate experts are on it.
These practice statements will be issued periodically and based on an analysis of the notifications received and, of course, feedback on what it would be helpful for them to contain. I believe this guidance will be helpful to advisers in particular. It will refer to and emphasise aspects of the statement where it is clear such emphasis would benefit parties in coming to a judgment about whether to notify. The statement will be published by the Secretary of State on how he expects to exercise his call-in power as provided for by Clause 3. We remain open to considering over time what further information will be helpful to guide parties as part of such market guidance. I have already carefully noted the suggestions noble Lords made today in that respect.
I thank noble Lords for these amendments, and for their discussions with me. The Government have listened and acted as a result of their helpful suggestions, and I have no doubt that the regime will be better understood as a result. I hope I have reassured noble Lords with the commitments I have made in the House today and I therefore ask that they do not press their amendments.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Lexden) (Con)
My Lords, I have received a request to speak after the Minister from the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
I thank the Minister for what he has said, particularly on education. I am also grateful for the letter sent by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, which I expressed my appreciation for when speaking on Amendment 22.
My question relates to something said at that time: the suggestion that market guidance to buyers and sellers could not cover timelines, timeliness and the modus operandi. There was a reference to the Constitution Committee apparently making that problematic. Clearly, guidance on such issues is very helpful to operators, so I wondered whether it would be possible to have a little more detail—not now, but later—as to why there is a problem in covering that in guidance. If there is a problem, perhaps the Minister would consider whether we need to take a power, which I think the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Leigh provides for. This would ensure that we can give operators the sort of guidance they need to make operations work well, as we all hope.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
I thank my noble friend for those comments. It certainly seems a bit weird that the Constitution Committee will have a role in this. If I may, I will look into the matter, write to the noble Baroness and put a copy in the Library.
Lord Lansley (Con)
I wanted to inquire whether my noble friend might write to me about the question of non-exclusive licensing of technology in the higher education sector, as I mentioned earlier.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
Yes, I am very happy to give my noble friend the assurance that I will write to him on that topic.
Lord Rooker (Lab)
In the main, the Minister’s reply was a model of its kind. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Lexden) (Con)
My Lords, we now come to Amendment 39. Anyone wishing to press this amendment to a Division must make this clear in debate.
Clause 63: Regulations under this Act
Amendment 39
“(6) Before making regulations under section 6(1) the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament— (a) the proposed draft of the regulations, and(b) a document which explains the proposed draft regulations.(7) Where a proposed draft of the regulations is laid before Parliament under subsection (6), no draft statutory instrument containing the regulations is to be laid before Parliament until after the expiry of the 30-day period.(8) The Secretary of State must request a committee of either House whose remit includes industrial strategy, economic affairs, science or technology to report on the proposed draft regulations within the 30-day period.(9) In preparing a draft statutory instrument containing the regulations, the Secretary of State must take account of—(a) any representations,(b) any resolution of either House of Parliament, and(c) any recommendations of a committee under subsection (8),made within the 30-day period with regard to the proposed draft regulations.(10) If, after the 30-day period, the Secretary of State wishes to make regulations in the terms of the proposed draft or revised draft regulations, they must lay before Parliament a statement—(a) stating whether any representations, resolutions or recommendations were made under subsection (9),(b) giving details of any representations, resolutions or recommendations so made, and(c) explaining any changes made in any revised draft of the regulations.(11) The Secretary of State may make a statutory instrument containing the regulations (whether or not revised) if, after laying a statement under subsection (10), a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament as outlined in subsection (5).(12) In this section, reference to “the 30-day period” in relation to any draft regulations is to the period of 30 days beginning with the day on which the initial proposed draft regulations were laid before Parliament.(13) For the purposes of subsection (12) no account is to be taken of any time during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or during which either House is adjourned for more than four days.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would introduce the super-affirmative procedure for regulations made under section 6(1).
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, your Lordships will be pleased to know that I will not repeat the entire, long speech that I gave in Committee. The wording of this amendment has not changed between Committee and Report, but there are a few points I want to remind your Lordships of. I am sure the speech is still fresh in noble Lords’ minds. To be clear, I will be putting this amendment to a vote at the end of this process.
Under Clause 6, the Secretary of State has great power to make the regulations concerning how the Bill will work. The Secretary of State can specify the description of the qualifying identity for the purpose of identifying a notifiable acquisition. He or she can amend the circumstances in which a notifiable acquisition takes place or does not take place, exempt acquirers with specified characteristics from the mandatory notification regime and make consequential amendments to other provisions in the Bill.
The Minister has represented, as he did in Committee, the proposed use of the affirmative procedure in the Bill as meaningful parliamentary scrutiny. However, the truth is that, from the perspective of these Benches, this means that Clause 6 can be amended by this and any subsequent Government as they please. Parliament cannot amend statutory instruments and, perhaps more importantly, this House has voted down affirmatory statutory instruments just four times in the past 70 years. I refer, as I did last time, because it is important, to the Constitution Committee’s 2018 report, The Legislative Process: The Delegation of Powers, which states:
“Without a genuine risk of defeat, and no amendment possible, Parliament is doing little more than rubber-stamping the Government’s secondary legislation. This is constitutionally unacceptable.”
For this reason, affirmative statutory instruments do not constitute meaningful parliamentary scrutiny. This Government—or, I remind the Minister, any subsequent Government—are effectively free to amend the Bill as and when they please. The Minister sort of said this when speaking to the second group of today’s amendments.
Regrettably, I do not think Her Majesty’s loyal Opposition will roll behind me when this moves to a vote. That is the indication I have been given. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, is as up for scrutiny as any man or woman. He likes a bit of scrutiny, and he is possibly not averse to knocking back legislation from time to time. However, his colleagues, particularly those at the other end—who are, even now, trying to measure up ministerial curtains in advance of their march towards power—would not welcome the democratic speed bumps proposed in this amendment, so their reaction, while regrettable in the great scheme of things, can be explained in that way.
Those sitting on the Benches opposite will live to regret not putting in place such measures. Members of their own party are not above adapting powers of Bills to create micromanagement, but we certainly heard enough at Second Reading, from some Members of Her Majesty’s Official Opposition, to feel that there are those who will seek to use this as a proxy for interventionist market strategy. I support having a collaborative strategy for national prosperity, but this Bill should not be used to enforce such aspirations.
The super-affirmative procedure in the amendment would provide both Houses with opportunities to comment on proposals for secondary legislation, and to recommend amendments, before orders for affirmative approval are brought in their final form. However, the power to amend the proposed instrument remains with the Minister. The two Houses and their committees can only recommend changes, not make them. So I ask the Minister what there is to fear from that. I beg to move Amendment 39, and I give formal notice that, unless a miracle occurs, I expect to divide the House on this issue.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
Noble Lords will be relieved to hear that I have very little to add to what my noble friend has just said. The basic fact is that everything we have discussed in the course of our consideration of the Bill could be changed by regulation. If noble Lords do not believe me, they can look at Policy Statements Regarding Statutory Instruments Required for the Commencement of the NSI Regime, as updated on 2 March 2021. There are eight extensive areas—my noble friend mentioned a few of them—for changing the sectors covered. If that is not a massive change, I do not know what is. Changing the trigger thresholds, which we have been debating today, would effectively change the entire mandatory regime. These changes could all radically change the nature of the Bill. Whether or not noble Lords accept the scenarios put forward by my noble friend, that should be a real wake-up call. No primary legislation should be subject to the possibility of change as broad as that. So I support my noble friend’s amendment, and I very much hope the Minister will rethink the attitude taken by the Government in Committee to this self-same amendment. The super-affirmative process is a good one; it gives proper deliberation to changes and it is far more democratically accountable.
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Fox and Lord Clement-Jones, for the amendment, which proposes a super-affirmative process for regulations under subsection (1) of Clause 6, “Notifiable acquisitions”. This was debated at length in Committee, and we certainly agree that parliamentary scrutiny of regulations is not always as meaningful as it might be. We can feel sympathy with the view that notifiable acquisition regulations are highly significant and require proper oversight, not merely by both Houses of Parliament but also by many experts who might become involved.
The opinions of those experts could be sought and made available to Parliament and deliberated on. The importance of consultations with stakeholders who are knowledgeable and familiar with the situation at the leading edge is also recognised. However, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee did not call for the super-affirmative procedure to be adopted for these regulations under the Bill. Indeed, in its report of 22 February it said that
“there is nothing in the Bill to which we would wish to draw the attention of the House.”
It would be unusual to take a view contrary to the considered opinion of that well-respected committee of your Lordships’ House.
We remain somewhat sceptical about how the super-affirmative procedure would work in practice, over and above the normal affirmative procedure, in this case, even if custom and practice deemed the process less than ideal in all circumstances. We feel that experience needs to be gained first before undertaking this extra affirmative process. I hope this confirmation of what the noble Lord, Lord Fox, may have heard about our view on his amendment may not greatly startle him.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, I of course welcome the amendment from the noble Lords, Lord Fox and Lord Clement-Jones, which seeks further parliamentary scrutiny of Clause 6 regulations, and the opportunity to put forward the Government’s case once more. I can spare the noble Lord, Lord Fox, the agony and tell him that, great though my ministerial powers are, I am not a miracle worker and, therefore, probably will not satisfy him.
The Bill as drafted provides for regulations made under Clause 6 to be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. This amendment would require the Secretary of State to lay a proposed draft of any regulations made under Clause 6 before Parliament for 30 days before the draft regulations themselves are laid and subject to the approval of both Houses. It would also require the Secretary of State to identify a committee to report on the proposed draft regulations and then report on their consideration of the committee’s recommendations.
We have, as the noble Lord, Lord Fox, said, previously discussed the importance of regulation under Clause 6, and I thank the noble Lords for their commitment to ensuring meaningful parliamentary scrutiny of the making of such regulations. However, the Government’s position remains that the affirmative procedure—or regulations made under Clause 6—ensures such scrutiny by requiring Parliament to approve regulations. In Grand Committee, the noble Lord also highlighted the importance of the Secretary of State maintaining “serious technology foresight” and making any regulations under Clause 6 to protect our national security effectively. I can assure noble Lords that the Government are committed to keeping regulations under constant review to ensure that this regime is effective in protecting our national security and reflects technological changes.
The affirmative procedure will, in addition, provide the Secretary of State with the flexibility to update the mandatory regime quickly should new risks to national security arise. For all these reasons, I ask that the noble Lord withdraw his amendment though, in the absence of the requested miracle, I suspect that he is not going to do so.
Lord Fox (LD)
I thank the Minister for his response and the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, for his speech. The Minister is correct: there was no miracle, and there was no surprise. Of course, I was aware that the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee had not recommended opposing this in any way. Sitting through three days in Committee and a day on Report would activate many people who worry about the way in which Governments run their affairs. Therefore, with all due respect to everyone, having been through that process, it would be remiss if someone did not bring an amendment of this kind before your Lordships’ House. To that end, I would like to test the mood of the House.
National Security and Investment Bill
Thursday 22nd April 2021
(3 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 183-I Marshalled list for Report - (12 Apr 2021)
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Lord Callanan) (Con)
My Lords, I start by expressing my gratitude to noble Lords from across the whole House for their contributions to the passage of the Bill. In particular, I thank my noble friends Lord Grimstone and Lady Bloomfield for their steadfast help, guidance and support throughout its passage. I also place on record my thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town—my commiserations on the results of the Lord Speaker election—and to the noble Lords, Lord Grantchester and Lord Rooker, for their constructive attitude and helpful challenges from the Opposition Front Bench throughout the passage of the Bill. I also thank the noble Lords, Lord Fox and Lord Clement-Jones, for their customary ability to ask the most difficult questions at totally wrong times during the passage of the Bill.
It would also be remiss of me not to thank some of my noble friends who have taken a particular interest in ensuring that we get the Bill right. I am thinking in particular of my noble friends Lord Lansley, Lady Noakes, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, Lord Leigh of Hurley, Lord Vaizey of Didcot, Lady McIntosh and others.
Noble Lords from across the House have rightly held the Government’s feet to the fire in a number of areas, in the finest traditions of this House, and I can honestly say that the Bill leaves the House in a better state as a result of that scrutiny. I extend my particular thanks to parliamentary counsel for their exemplary drafting and to the clerks and all the House authorities for shepherding us through these exceptional times. The smoothness with which proceedings flow masks the sometimes immense and exceptional logistical operation going on behind the scenes.
I also extend my thanks to the officials and lawyers within my department, who have worked tirelessly on the drafting and subsequent passage of the Bill, for their immense patience in explaining some of the difficult concepts to a mere simpleton such as myself. In particular, I thank Dr Sarah Mackintosh, Mike Penry, Danny McCarthy, Arash Abzarian, Alex Midgley and George Kokkinos, who embarked on their NSI journey before I was even a Minister in this department. In my view, they act in the finest traditions of our civil servants, and I am very grateful to them for all their expert help, support and guidance. Finally, I thank the wonderful Melissa Craig, in my private office, and the immense Yasmin Kalhori in the Whips’ Office, who is ever-helpful in feeding forward suggested speaking notes—not all of which I can use in this House.
I said at Second Reading:
“This Bill will keep the British people safe.”—[Official Report, 4/2/21; col. 2335.]
In the meantime, we have had lengthy discussions on fishing, lectures to insolvency practitioners and—in one memorable case—the makeup of a particularly hawkish rugby front row. These discussions and others have made me certain that the Bill will go a long way in ensuring that the UK’s defences are fighting fit, both now and long into the future.
I am heartened that, in the finest traditions of this House, all parties have recognised the Bill’s importance, even if we have disagreed on some of the detail. In that sense, it has genuinely been a cross-party effort, and I am grateful to all noble Lords who have participated. I beg to move.
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
From these Benches, it is a pleasure to thank the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, for the way that he handled this important Bill and steered it through your Lordships’ House, so ably supported by the noble Lord, Lord Grimstone, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bloomfield. At the end of a long season and Session, it is very rewarding to examine the legislation of the noble Lord, who, with his team, engaged so positively with us and the House. This resulted in real and productive improvements to the Bill—especially on new public guidance, the expert panel and turnaround times, among other features, being included in the annual report.
I am grateful to the Bill team, ably led by Mike Penry, and the department, for their exemplary attention and courtesy shown to us at all times. The broadcasting team were excellent and managed our hybrid proceedings throughout without a hitch. I am also grateful to my lead and boss on the Bill, my noble friend and colleague Lady Hayter, who was disappointed that she could not see it through all its stages to the conclusion.
I would not have been able to step up to the grade without the support my very able legislative assistant in our office, Dan Harris, who, with Ellie Robson, was able to guide me over the hurdles, draft our amendments and take the negotiations with the Public Bill Office completely out of my clumsy hands. I am very grateful to them.
Our team is especially grateful also for assistance that came from outside the House—from the Russell group of universities, the CBI and the Wellcome Trust, as well as the Henry Royce Institute, the BioIndustry Association, the Law Society and the Law Society of Scotland. They have all provided insights and appreciation of the Bill’s likely workings and omissions, which proved invaluable to our attention within the House.
A clear feature of the Bill is how co-operatively the Minister and his team have worked with us and the House throughout, to understand and accommodate the pertinent issues in the Bill from our perspective. Of course, there is one clear divergence of opinion between the House and the Government, which we are sending to the Commons for their consideration. For the achievement of that task, I am very grateful to the front row team, marshalled into a complete scrum by our admiral, my noble friend Lord West, at roll call on Report. I am also grateful to my noble friend and colleague Lord Rooker, who guested as a heavyweight on the Front Bench for the occasion. It is very good to see him back in the Chamber and back to good health.
I trust that the positive engagement from across the House—including the Lib Dem and Conservative Benches —and the commitment shown by all noble Lords to a successful outcome, will give the Bill a fair wind to find safe harbour in the Commons.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, there has never been any doubt that the Bill’s aims were supported across the whole of the House, and that has added to the quality of the debate from the start. That said, actually delivering a balanced approach to protecting the UK’s security, while ensuring that the necessary flow of investment will not be interrupted, will be a challenge. The debates that we have had have underlined the subtlety of that challenge.
However, the stakes are high. The UK has arguably been one of the most open economies in the world, and it is clear that this openness has let through some transactions that, in retrospect, should not have been permitted. The onus is now on the Government to act in such cases.
The skeletal nature of the Bill has informed quite a lot of the debate that we have had, and it is clear that, from the outset, the Government have sought to keep their options open. To my mind, phrases such as “We will take things on a case-by-case basis” have popped up too often. So I hope that, over time, there will be fewer “case-by-cases” and fewer exceptions—because people need clarity, and that clarity needs to be supported by strong communication. People need to understand how the decisions will be made. If this unit acts as a black box, that will not happen, and investment will definitely be discouraged.
Finally, before the long thank-yous, I apologise for coming back to the amendment on Report that set out the importance of climate change with respect to national security. I will say—with all due respect—that the Minister grudgingly went along with the thesis, but only to the minimum extent necessary. Perhaps his natural combativeness prevented him really appraising or acknowledging the risk.
Therefore, before the Minister moves from this Bill to his next important project, I recommend that he reads an op-ed in Politico by the NATO Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg, which came out today. In it, he says that it is clear that climate change
“is making the world a more dangerous place”,
with,
“rising sea levels and more extreme weather … increasing competition for scarce resources and fueling tensions and conflict.”
He states:
“Climate change threatens global security”.
Please note, Minister. That should be reflected in the activities of the new unit.
Of course, one outstanding issue between us remains, symbolised by the flankers here—the noble Lords, Lord West and Lord Campbell—and I hope that the Minister and the Secretary of State will see some sense on that. Otherwise we will be back for ping-pong.
That said, the passage of this Bill has been efficient, and, as the Minister has said, the overall quality of the Bill has been improved through that process. I commend the openness of the noble Baroness, Lady Bloomfield, the noble Lord, Lord Grimstone, and the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, who has shown his characteristic empathy in the process. The noble Lord listed the very considerable Bill team and all the support that has delivered the Bill, and I second, indeed third, that, because without them there would certainly be no Bill—and, of course, without many of them there would be no unit to make the Bill a reality.
I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, for their engagement in this process, and I thank particularly the Members opposite. There are two representatives of them here—the noble Lords, Lord Leigh and Lord Lansley—but there are others, such as the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh. They must have added to the pressure that the Minister feels: when the noises are coming from behind as well as in front, it makes it harder to resist.
As for the home team, I hope that my colleagues will not mind if I single out, first, Sarah Pughe in the Lib Dem legislative team, who has done a magnificent job supporting us. Among Members, I would mention the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles, Lady Berkhamsted, Lady Northover and Lady Smith of Newnham, the noble Lords, Lord Bruce of Bennachie, Lord Campbell of Pittenweem, Lord McNally and Lord Purvis of Tweed, and, last but no means least, my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones, who has been here in support. I hope that we do not have to come back—I hope the Government see sense on that amendment. That said, the Bill leaves this House in a much better state than it arrived in.
Lord Bilimoria (CB) [V]
My Lords, from the Cross Benches I join previous speakers in thanking all the House of Lords officials and the Bill team.
As we have previously outlined, the Bill has a valid and important principle at its heart: the protection of national security and the lessening of economic interference in industrial control by hostile actors. Nobody would disagree with that intention, and the business community is no different. The CBI, of which I am president, supports those principles and stands ready to help make a success of the new regime. We have heard from a wide range of businesses likely to engage with the regime, many of which have complex international supply and value chains and all of which recognise the need for such regimes and already comply with counterpart regimes across the world.
However, to make a success of such a regime in a manner that reflects the approach of many of our international counterparts, the concerns of a wide subsection of the business community should continue to be heard. As I have noted previously, the extra- territoriality of the Bill, combined with no set de minimis function, could inadvertently lead to a real rise in bureaucracy at micro level and slow inward investment at macro level, so it is critical that the Government continue to engage with business and industry on the practical application of the regime. The fast-track processes and expert advisory panels that have been discussed are a very welcome move. The amendments moved by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, on future reporting on the progress of the regime and on omitting the 15% threshold for significant control are also welcome.
Business welcomes the Bill, and I give credit to many noble Lords who have taken part, including the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, and the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson —I could go on. The more detailed reporting requirements provide more clarity on the average processing or decision time for notifications, whether mandatory or voluntary. Business has been concerned about the transparency of the statutory process, so we welcome the Government’s reflection of that in the Bill. Moreover, the removal of the 15% threshold for significant control is welcome, as, while such a percentage may represent a critical investment in other areas, it is unsuitable when applied to significant control more widely.
Looking ahead, the spirit of dialogue that has allowed such amendments to be moved should continue to ensure that both business and government are equipped to make a success of the regime. This Bill shows the House of Lords at its best: it has greater strength by far in depth and breadth of world-class expertise than any other Chamber in the world. This Bill has seen this skill applied on a cross-party basis, enabling this House to play its role as a revising Chamber to help change legislation for the better. This can only happen, however, if the Government are prepared to listen—which they have. We are grateful to the Government, and long may the spirit of collaboration continue.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I thank noble Lords for their kind words and renewed support for the Bill. Empathy is not something I normally get accused of—I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Fox, did not have his tongue in his cheek, so I will take that as a compliment. As I said earlier, there has been genuine cross-party enthusiasm for the Bill and, with the exception of one important detail, I have been heartened by the House’s desire to get it on the statute book. The debate has been excellent and shows the finest traditions of this Chamber.
I will certainly take up the suggestion made by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for my considerable reading list. My in-tray is very high at the moment, but I will look at the article he referred to, and I am sure that it will enhance my understanding of the subject. For a final time, therefore, I beg to move.
National Security and Investment Bill
Monday 26th April 2021
(3 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Commons Consideration of Lords Amendments as at 26 April 2021 - (26 Apr 2021)
23:45 - The House divided: - Ayes: 366 / Noes: 260 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Paul Scully)
I beg to move, That this House agrees with Lords amendment 1.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
With this it will be convenient to consider:
Lords amendments 2 to 10.
Lords amendment 11, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendments 12 to 14.
Lords amendment 15, and Government motion to disagree.
Paul Scully
I am delighted that the Bill has returned to this House from the other place and I am delighted to be able to speak to it briefly today following the excellent handover from the Minister for Covid Vaccine Deployment, my hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Nadhim Zahawi), who is successfully jabbing the nation as we speak. As we are at a late hour, I will not take up too much of the House’s time. I will just quickly summarise some of the changes to the Bill.
Lords amendments 1 to 10 and 12 to 14 were all tabled by my colleague in the other place, Lord Callanan. Lords amendments 1, 5, 8, 9 and 10 are what the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel would call minor and technical. Lords amendments 12, 13 and 14 pertain to the annual report as provided for by clause 61, and they reflect the decision to include additional reporting requirements that will provide further value for parliamentarians, businesses and investors. Lords amendments 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 were made to the Bill in the spirit of a shared recognition that the requirements of the mandatory notification regime must be no more than necessary and proportionate for the protection of our national security, and that businesses and investments are not unduly burdened or stifled.
I wholeheartedly agree with the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah), who said on Report that we need
“robust powers to guard our national security and…change that backs our best small businesses and our capacity for innovation. Both of these goals are possible; indeed, they are mutually reinforcing.”—[Official Report, 20 January 2021; Vol. 687, c. 1000.]
That is why we have reflected carefully during the passage of the Bill on the 15% starting threshold for the mandatory regime. Lords amendment 2 removes acquisitions between 15% and 25% from constituting notifiable acquisitions under the mandatory regime. The House will recall, though, that the Bill provides the power for the Secretary of State to call in acquisitions of control across the economy. That power remains in place. Provisions in the Bill also ensure that the Secretary of State can amend the scope of the mandatory regime through secondary legislation, which could include the introduction of a 15% threshold if deemed appropriate, although we do not currently anticipate doing so.
I will turn to Amendments 11 and 15—
Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)
On those amendments, my hon. Friend will know that there are profound and continuing concerns about scrutiny associated with the provisions and powers that the Bill provides. He will furthermore know that the Intelligence and Security Committee, of which I am a member, performs an important role in scrutinising all such security matters. He will know that there is a memorandum of understanding that underpins that between the Government and the ISC. Will he be quite clear that there is no attempt to dilute, to obscure or to escape from the provisions of that memorandum, which says that the ISC can inquire into security matters across the whole of Government?
Paul Scully
I always value the contribution from my right hon. Friend who, as a former Security Minister and a member of the ISC, is very wise and experienced in these matters. I can confirm that the memorandum of understanding absolutely pertains and that the ISC can continue its great work to scrutinise the work of the security services, which will include where the security services’ work supports the work of the Investment Security Unit. It is also important to remember, as we consider these amendments, that we value the work of the ISC, and of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee and the Science and Technology Committee, which I will speak about as well.
Sir John Hayes
To be absolutely clear, that memorandum is, by definition, flexible. The Government have acknowledged that by history, by example and so on. That flexibility should allow the ISC to scrutinise the additional powers in this Bill, and I gather from what the Minister says that he is comfortable with that principle and that the ISC will continue to perform its role in that way. On that basis, I will support the Government tonight in any Division that might ensue.
Paul Scully
I am grateful for my right hon. Friend’s enlightening words about his intention. I can indeed confirm that the memorandum of understanding is flexible. The ISC does good work and continues to do so, and I look forward to working with him.
Greg Clark (Tunbridge Wells) (Con)
My hon. Friend is giving helpful clarification. The Secretary of State wrote to the Chair of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee and copied in the Chair of the ISC and me as Chair of the Science and Technology Committee. Will the Minister confirm that he is prepared to commit in a memorandum of understanding to the Chairs of those Committees being able to see, on Privy Council terms, information that might not be otherwise in the public domain?
Paul Scully
We have got to the nub of the matter quickly. I can indeed confirm that. In the letter the Secretary of State sent to the Chair of the BEIS Committee, copying in my right hon. Friend the Chair of the Science and Technology Committee, he spoke about the fact that the BEIS Committee is able to access the material it needs to scrutinise the work of the ISU, including for example details of some of the risks that the ISU has identified under the NSI regime and the measures taken to address them. As part of that, the Secretary of State confirmed that the Department can provide the Chair of the BEIS Committee with confidential briefings on Privy Council terms, and that he would be happy to set those out in more detail in either a memorandum of understanding or further exchange of letters. The Secretary of State went on to say that he would encourage the STC to provide scrutiny of the work of the ISU where the work of the unit falls within the specific remit of that Committee. He also welcomed the Intelligence and Security Committee’s continued scrutiny of the work of the security services, which will include where the security services’ work supports the work of the ISU.
Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
I hate to be slightly disobliging, but it is a fact, is it not, that the staffs of these Select Committees do not have the clearance necessary to see or handle top secret material, and showing a top secret document to the Chair of a Committee on his or her own, briefly in very limited circumstances, does not amount—as I will explain shortly—to effective scrutiny?
Paul Scully
I look forward to hearing my right hon. Friend’s explanation.
I believe that the Bill as amended by the other place through amendments 11 and 15 would require the Secretary of State to provide a confidential annexe, to be provided to the ISC. I am advised by my noble Friends Lord Callanan and Lord Grimstone that there is considerable strength of feeling in the other place about ensuring that the operation of the regime receives appropriate parliamentary scrutiny, and I welcome the passionate and expert debate that this question has already received. It has been proposed that the ISC is better placed than the BEIS Committee to scrutinise the Investment and Security Unit, despite the Secretary of State for BEIS having responsibility for the unit. The implication of the amendments is that the Select Committee responsible for holding the Secretary of State to account across their responsibilities is insufficient in that regard. It is also suggested that the ISC would have inadequate access to information to carry out its duties.
In essence, the amendments would require sensitive details to be provided to the ISC regarding the Secretary of State’s decision on final notifications given and final orders made, varied or revoked, but the ISC is already able to request such information as soon as is appropriate from the security services where it forms part of its long-established scrutiny responsibilities under the Justice and Security Act 2013 and, as I hope I have made clear, its accompanying memorandum of understanding. In addition, the Bill provides that the Secretary of State must publish details of each final order made, varied or revoked, and clause 61 already requires the annual report to include the number of final orders made, together with a number of other details. Indeed, that clause was amended in the other place to include further such information in the annual report.
We do not disagree that further information may be required for appropriate parliamentary scrutiny. Where that is the case, the Government will follow existing procedures for reporting back to Parliament, but that should be done primarily through responding to the BEIS Committee as it goes about its work of ably scrutinising the work of the Department. We will ensure that the BEIS Committee is able to access the material it needs.
It is of course right that the ISC continues its excellent scrutiny of the work of the security services. The work of the security services on investment security in support of the ISU clearly falls within the remit of the ISC. That does not require any statutory change to be made. As I said, the memorandum of understanding pertains to the continuing work of the ISC, and I look forward to working with colleagues on that Committee. As such, and with the BEIS Committee having appropriate assurance that it will be provided with the information necessary, there is no need for these changes made to the Bill by the other place to stand.
In summary, with the exception of amendments 11 and 15, I believe that this House is today presented with an improved set of measures to safeguard our national security. The ISC will not have its powers—existing powers —diluted through the discussion of the memorandum of understanding, as we have already said. Therefore, I commend the amendments, with the exception of amendments 11 and 15, to the House.
Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab) [V]
Let me start by welcoming the Minister to the National Security and Investment Bill, and I would like to wish his predecessor well in his work on the vaccine roll-out. I would also like to thank colleagues in the other place who have worked so hard to improve this Bill, and the Members of both Houses who scrutinised its important provisions.
Labour is the party of national security, and has long called for a new regime to deal with evolving national security threats in corporate transactions. A robust takeover regime is also essential if we want firms in our key sectors to grow and provide good jobs here in the UK. So we support this Bill, which allows the Government to intervene when mergers and acquisitions could threaten national security. Unfortunately, the Bill in its original form lacked certain provisions, and particularly the oversight necessary to ensure it was successful in protecting our national security and national interest. So we have sought to improve the Bill along the way, and we are pleased that the Government have adopted some of our suggestions.
Members across party lines raised concerns over the capacity and capability of the new Investment Security Unit to deliver on the Bill’s ambition. We are pleased that the Government have acted on this, and Lords amendments 12 to 14 to clause 61 are based on Labour’s original amendment 31 during the House of Commons Committee stage, and a later amendment tabled by Labour at Lords Committee. Reporting the aggregate time taken for decisions will help to ensure that the new regime works more efficiently for small and medium-sized enterprises, and I was pleased to hear the Minister quoting my remarks to that effect.
We are also pleased to see that the Government have taken steps to address concerns regarding the 15% threshold for a notifiable acquisition. This follows Labour’s probing amendment 16 during Lords Committee stage and Cross-Bench concern. The Wellcome Trust labelled the 15% threshold as a
“regulatory burden for those that may not be able to afford it”.
With Lords amendment 3, the Secretary of State will still be able to call in acquisitions across the economy at or below 25%—and, if necessary, below 15%—where they reasonably suspect that material influence has been or will be acquired. But this amendment will bring the notifiable acquisition threshold in line with our allies in France, Australia and Canada. We are pleased the Government have listened to Labour and made a change that will be beneficial to small and medium-sized enterprises.
It is also welcome to see that the Government have now committed to issue public guidance, which Labour called for with our amendment 17 at the Commons Committee stage. This is good news for transparency. Our approach has been to ensure that our small and medium-sized enterprises have clarity, and that those investing in the UK understand what the rules are and how they will work. The publication of guidance will boost confidence in the new regime for national security screening.
But we are here today because of Lords amendments 11 and 15, and to vote on the Government motion to disagree. Labour believes that the Intelligence and Security Committee scrutiny is essential to provide the robust and sensitive oversight and accountability that matters of national security require. The Bill gives significant new powers to BEIS, a Department traditional lacking in national security experience. The BEIS Committee does not have the security clearance necessary to provide scrutiny, and the confidential briefings to the Chair described by the Minister will not change that.
Dr Julian Lewis
The Intelligence and Security Committee greatly appreciates the work of the Minister and of his predecessor on this important legislation. I was on the Committee in June 2013 when we identified the risks posed by foreign investment and takeovers to the United Kingdom’s critical national infrastructure, citing Huawei as a case study—and we know what happened after that. We strongly support the Government’s decision to address those risks and we welcome their assurances that national security concerns sit at the very heart of the Bill. That is exactly as it should be.
However, what was not as it should be, with the Bill as originally drafted, was the lack of adequate oversight arrangements for those security concerns and for the process when they are weighed against business and other commercial concerns by the new Investment Security Unit. The Government ought to accept amendments 11 and 15 from the other place, introduced on a cross-party basis by former Security Minister and current ISC member Lord West, former Cabinet Secretary and former ISC member Lord Butler, former party leader and former ISC member Lord Campbell, and former Defence Secretary Lord King—who was of course the first Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee when it was established. Their amendments make provision for that previous lack of oversight. They would require the annual report produced by the new Investment Security Unit in BEIS to include, for each final order and notification made, the Secretary of State’s decision, along with the security services’ assessment of the national security risks uncovered. They would allow the Secretary of State to move any classified information into an annex and to provide that classified annex to the ISC. With the amendments in place as they currently are, we could be confident that the Bill will create the robust regime needed to protect the United Kingdom.
Given the powerful speeches from all quarters and the size of the majority in the other place in support of the amendments, it is surprising and disappointing that the Government remain opposed to them and are seeking to overturn what is clearly common sense. The amendments provide for the ISC to scrutinise the highly classified national security elements and the weighing of those classified elements against commercial concerns.
There appear to be three arguments employed by the Government against the amendments. The first claims that because BEIS is not listed in the Justice and Security Act 2013 or in the associated memorandum of understanding on the scope of our work, the ISC cannot look at decisions taken by the new unit in BEIS. That is based on a false premise.
During the passage of the 2013 Act, the Government explicitly and repeatedly told Parliament that the Act and the MOU would provide the ISC with oversight of all security matters across Government. The MOU mechanism, again, in the Government’s own words, was a “flexible” way to ensure that the list of organisations working on security matters and therefore subject to ISC oversight would be kept up to date.
Dr Lewis
I will give way in a moment, because I would like my right hon. Friend to hear this next bit, as I think there was a bit he was missing in his earlier intervention.
These words were used in Committee in my presence by the then Security Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (James Brokenshire), when introducing the 2013 Act. He said:
“I want to be clear that the Government intend that, through the provisions of the MOU, substantively all of central Government’s intelligence and security activities will be subject to ISC oversight.”––[Official Report, Justice and Security Public Bill Committee, 31 January 2013; c. 97.]
As if that were not clear enough, he went on to say, and this is the bit that matters:
“Things change over time. Departments reorganise. The functions undertaken by a Department one year may be undertaken by another the following year… An MOU is flexible: it can be changed much more easily than primary legislation. It will enable the intention of the Government that the ISC should have oversight of substantively all of central Government’s intelligence and security activities to be realised now and in the future.” ––[Official Report, Justice and Security Public Bill Committee, 31 January 2013; c. 98.]
The setting up of the new Investment Security Unit in BEIS is therefore precisely the situation that the Government assured the House that the MOU was designed to address, and the unit can easily be added to the MOU by a simple exchange of letters. Indeed, if the Government were willing to give an undertaking here and now to add the new unit to those listed in the MOU, the need for these amendments would disappear.
Sir John Hayes
That is precisely why I drew the Minister’s attention to the flexibility of the memorandum of understanding and asked him whether the Government stood by the terms of that memorandum. The Minister was as clear as crystal. He said that he believed in that memorandum, and he saw no attempt in what the Government were doing to dilute the powers of the ISC or its ability, of the kind that my right hon. Friend set out, to range across government, if I can put it that way, where security is concerned. I think we have had reassurance from the Minister sufficient to support the Government.
Dr Lewis
Unfortunately, and I am afraid unusually for my right hon. Friend, he missed one little part that was missing in turn from the Minister’s answer, because the MOU as it stands does not include the Investment Security Unit. The MOU has a list of seven organisations that we can currently scrutinise. The whole point about flexibility is that, as these units are set up in other Departments, they can be added to the MOU, but the Minister has given no undertaking to add the ISU to the MOU. I am happy to give way to the Minister. If he would like to say that he will add the ISU—the new unit within BEIS—to the organisations listed in the memorandum of understanding, I will stop my speech immediately and say, “Well done, Minister,” but I fear that that is not going to happen, so I will continue with my speech.
The Government’s second argument is that the BEIS Committee is both capable of providing and best placed to provide the necessary oversight. I have the greatest respect for the work and experience of the BEIS Committee, chaired by the hon. Member for Bristol North West (Darren Jones), from whom we will hear later. He and his Committee are indeed best placed to provide oversight of the business functions of the new Investment Security Unit, and there can be no doubt that that Committee will do an excellent job in that respect, yet it is simply impossible for it to provide substantive scrutiny of the highly classified national security elements or of the overarching decisions taken about how to balance them with the commercial elements.
Select Committees cannot be given proper access to top-secret material in order to scrutinise effectively. Ministers have suggested that the BEIS Committee can substantively scrutinise such material, but that is impossible. While it is true, as we have heard tonight, that the provision of classified information can be negotiated with Select Committees on a case-by-case basis, the laying out of classified material in a secure room in the Department for Members to come in and read for an hour or so—but without allowing them to take any notes, without allowing them to retain it, without allowing them to share it with their staff, without allowing them to discuss it and without allowing them to report on it since any one of those would constitute a very serious security breach—does not amount to effective oversight.
Proper oversight of the national security elements of any decision under this new regime within BEIS must include the ability to access, analyse and discuss top-secret material frequently and fully. The Government already have one body, and only one body, that can do all those things and that they created for that express purpose: the ISC. Members of the ISC are all subject to the Official Secrets Act and have a dedicated office with appropriate security facilities to store and discuss top-secret material freely, and staff who undergo the most stringent Government clearance processes before they are allowed to handle such material—I said in an intervention earlier that the staff of other Select Committees of this House are not so cleared. There is also a lengthy process through which the Committee’s reports must go ahead of publication.
Greg Clark
My right hon. Friend will know that the call-in power and the power to refuse permission for mergers to proceed on national security grounds is long standing. It is vested in the Business Secretary and sometimes in the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport. During all this time, scrutiny has been available to the ISC on those decisions. Has my right hon. Friend found that deficient in some way?
Dr Lewis
I am not sure that without concrete examples of what my right hon. Friend has in mind, I am in a position to give an answer to that question. What I do know is that it is the work of the ISC, on a basis of professional, full-time constant monitoring, to be able to look at the activities of those agencies that cannot be looked at by other Select Committees. He seems to be talking about the power of Secretaries of State to call in decisions, and I am not sure quite how that relates to the work of either Select Committees or the statutory Committee, which is the ISC.
Greg Clark
Perhaps I did not explain myself well. What is proposed in the Bill is an amendment of the current powers. There is a long-standing power for mergers to be blocked on national security grounds. It is one of three grounds on which an intervention can take place, so this is not a new power or a novel departure. The ISC is able to scrutinise the security services’ input into that now, as it will be in the future.
Dr Lewis
The ISC, on behalf of Parliament, is able to scrutinise the input of the intelligence agencies into these processes. It would not be able to scrutinise how that input is then handled, and the trouble is that because that input is top secret, the BEIS Committee would not be able to scrutinise it either. That means that there would be a scrutiny gap between what was being scrutinised by us as it went into the process of the new unit and what was being scrutinised by BEIS minus that sensitive material, so there would be no effective parliamentary scrutiny of the process whereby, as I said earlier, the highly sensitive security requirements were being balanced and offset against the commercial imperatives. Indeed, that may be the very reason why the Government are so reluctant to let the ISC see what is going on.
Mr Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)
I fear that my right hon. Friend may have just answered my question before I ask it, but I am most grateful to him; he is making his speech with tremendous passion and is very persuasive. I just looked up the definition of “top secret” and I am wondering what will be missing from the output of the process that would mean that there are some scrutiny gaps. I think he has just explained that he wants to scrutinise the process and I can see why he would make that case, but will he just give us some indication as to what he expects would be top secret in that analysis, if that is at all possible?
Dr Lewis
If I gave an example of something that would be top secret—even if I were in a position to do so because we had started the work that we are not being allowed to start—I would then immediately be breaking the Official Secrets Act so, no, I cannot, and I would not even if I could. However, what is a certainty is that where there are circumstances where the intelligence agencies are advising on the security aspects, for example, of a potentially hostile state buying, overtly or covertly, into a strategically important asset, such as buying up a company engaged in cutting-edge technology. This unit will have to balance that against the possible commercial advantages of major investment from that other country.
The fact is that nobody on behalf of Parliament will be able to scrutinise that process unless either these amendments are accepted or the ISU—this new unit—is added to the list of units already on the memorandum of understanding. As I have said before and say again, if at any time the Minister wants to give me the assurance that it will be added, I am happy to let these amendments go from the face of the Bill.
As I explained, this is the reason that the ISC was set up as it is. If any Committee could do what the ISC does, it would not be necessary for the ISC to have all those unique facilities and arrangements. That is why paragraph 8 of the memorandum of understanding between the Government and the ISC categorically asserts:
“The ISC is the only committee of Parliament”—
I will say that again:
“the only committee of Parliament that has regular access to protectively marked information that is sensitive for national security reasons: this means that only the ISC is in a position to scrutinise effectively the work of the Agencies”—
and please listen to these next few words—
“and of those parts of Departments whose work is directly concerned with intelligence and security matters.”
A footnote to that sentence helpfully explains:
“This will not affect the wider scrutiny of departments…by other parliamentary committees. The ISC will aim to avoid any unnecessary duplication with the work of those Committees.”
With that machinery already in place, it is all the more baffling that the Government are now refusing to use the very body they created. Without including oversight by a properly structured and fully cleared security body, the Government are not placing security at the heart of the Bill.
The Government’s third and final argument is that if the ISC had a role, it would encroach on the BEIS Select Committee’s remit. This, too, is baffling and not borne out by experience. The Government’s own MOU already expressly states that the ISC scrutinises the classified parts of some Government Departments, leaving the remainder to the corresponding departmental Select Committees. That is what has always happened, perfectly harmoniously, in respect of a number of other Departments, so it is, again, bizarre that the Government now see this as a problem when they themselves have already made express provision for it.
The ISC can work seamlessly with the BEIS Select Committee on oversight of the Investment Security Unit, as it already does with other Select Committees such as the Defence Committee and the Home Affairs Committee, and in respect of the work of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. Far from being an “overreach” of our remit, in this particular case the ISC is trying to prevent its existing scope from being reduced. The unit that currently carries out investment security work is based in the Cabinet Office. Consequently, it is already overseen by the Intelligence and Security Committee. The ISC already scrutinises these activities in their current form in the Cabinet Office, so it cannot be “overreach” to do in future something that we already do. If the Government do not maintain this existing ISC scrutiny when the new Investment Security Unit takes over, it will be a step backwards from the current position.
If national security really is at the heart of the Bill, the ISC, as the national security oversight body, must be allowed to oversee it. The Government gave assurances to the House in 2013 that the ISC would oversee all security and intelligence matters. It is as simple as that. The sensible solution is that which was proposed and accepted in the other place—namely, the amendments that we are now being asked to reject for, as I have demonstrated, no good reason.
If, for some reason we have not been told, the Government cannot accept provision for oversight on the face of the Bill, there is the other solution that I have previously indicated. The Justice and Security Act and the memorandum of understanding linked to it set out the ISC’s role and remit, which the Government expressly told Parliament was the oversight of all intelligence and security matters across Government, now and in the future. The memorandum of understanding mechanism was rightly described by the security Minister at the time, my right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (James Brokenshire), as “flexible” because
“it can be changed much more easily than primary legislation.”––[Official Report, Justice and Security Public Bill Committee, 31 January 2013; c. 98.]
The matter before us today is exactly as described in 2013: an area of Government in respect of which the ISC has oversight responsibility has been moved to a different Department. The memorandum of understanding could therefore be updated to reflect this, by way of a simple exchange of letters, to add the Investment Security Unit to the list of bodies covered by the MOU. The ISC would happily accept a commitment from the Minister to this effect tonight, in lieu of the amendment. Either method will ensure what is needed: real oversight of the national security elements of this legislation by the only body constituted and equipped to carry it out, rather than what might be described as “scrutiny in name only”.
Stephen Flynn (Aberdeen South) (SNP)
I am very much of the view that, as Shakespeare said, “brevity is the soul of wit”. Notwithstanding that, the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), made an incredibly professional and profound set of points that I hope the Minister listened to closely.
As the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah), did, I welcome the Minister to his place, notwithstanding the fact that the previous Minister, the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Nadhim Zahawi), is off doing a fantastic job—I think it is fair to say—getting the entirety of the UK vaccinated, of course in partnership with our colleague in Scotland. I am sure that he regards it as a step up in terms of ministerial oversight of the Bill.
On the Bill itself, my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie) spoke on Second Reading and on Report with passion and knowledge of the subject in respect of the scrutiny that should be provided by all of us when looking at such serious matters. We have tried to be constructive with the Government and to make helpful suggestions. I am pleased with many of the amendments moved by those in the other place that the Government are agreeing to—on beefing up scrutiny and perhaps offsetting some of the concerns that some of us might have had about the danger of investment chill, which was certainly real given the original nature of the Bill.
Improvements have been made, therefore, but there is still scope for further improvement. In that regard—as I said, I will be brief, Madam Deputy Speaker—I again urge the Minister to give cognisance to the wise words of the Chair of the ISC.
Adam Holloway (Gravesham) (Con)
I welcome the powers that the National Security and Investment Bill introduces and I am very much in favour of the amendments moved by the Government in the other place.
Those amendments temper the impact on investment of the Bill, allowing a greater proportion of transactions and investment decisions to go ahead without requiring Government approval. Furthermore, the Government’s power to intervene on their own, if needed, will be retained. That is a good compromise between the Bill’s objectives: to grant the Government the powers to defend the UK against losing companies and expertise to unfriendly competitors, without stifling the investment that we need to become the home of the industries of the future. That is vital to our national security and to our future prosperity.
We must ensure that the technologies that are so frequently developed by our brilliant scientists here in this country can also transform themselves into successful world-leading companies here. I think of the many university spin-out programmes and how often extraordinary technology is immediately shipped off somewhere else. Developing more powerful computers and software, but allowing them all to be commercialised and deployed most effectively elsewhere only makes us less secure, not more secure. They will only be commercialised and deployed here if the Government protect them from being snapped up by our competitors, thereby damaging our long-term security interests.
We have seen the impact of such problems in the past. Only last week, the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport called in the potential NVIDIA-Arm deal as representing a potential threat to our national security. If Arm, the Cambridge-based silicon fen semiconductor and software design company, can pose a threat to national security, so could the sale of other critical companies in developing industries.
Quantum computing is about to revolutionise the digital age, and the UK has some of the leading research establishments, notably in London and at the University of Bristol. However, many leading companies have moved abroad in the past. The British academics who founded PsiQuantum, the company that believes it is on track to build the world’s first usable quantum computer, moved to California some years ago. I have absolutely zero financial or other interests in that company—it is only that I wish to see the UK lead the world in quantum computing, with all the associated industry and benefits that will follow that.
The four professors from Bristol and London Universities recently made an offer to the Government to build that first usable quantum computer here in the UK, ensuring that the security offered by its cutting-edge technology is based in the UK. I think we can all agree that it would have been far easier and a lot less expensive if those academics had never left the country in the first place.
Sarah Olney (Richmond Park) (LD) [V]
In common with other hon. Members who have spoken tonight and on other occasions, the Liberal Democrats support the broad principles of the Bill. It is sensible, at a time of geopolitical uncertainty and increasingly globalised trade, to have provisions for the Secretary of State to intervene in business transactions where those transactions may have a bearing on national security. It is important, however, that the parameters of such a Bill are carefully drawn to ensure both that the transactions that may pose a threat can be caught, and that undue constraint is not placed on transactions that ought to be able to proceed freely.
The concerns raised about the Bill have focused on the fact that many of the definitions in it can be drawn too widely, and that the powers of the Secretary of State to call in transactions can be triggered too easily. That creates an environment of uncertainty for investors, as a wide variety of activities come into the scope of the Secretary of State’s powers. That will potentially act as a brake on investment, and at a crucial moment, when we are looking to strike new deals with global partners to replace the trade we are losing as a result of leaving the European Union.
I therefore welcome Lords amendments 11 and 15, which would require the Secretary of State to provide an explanation for choosing to exercise the powers granted to them. That seems to be a rational compromise. Instead of attempting to frame more precisely definitions and powers that will quickly become outdated as technology and trading practices progress, we would maintain the wider definitions but explain how and why they were being exercised.
That would provide a framework of precedent that investors could refer to when assessing investment risk. It would provide a much greater degree of transparency and accountability to the Secretary of State’s decision making. We have all seen the value of greater transparency over the last few weeks. Adopting these amendments would show that the Government were attempting, in good faith, to regain public trust after that trust has been shaken by recent revelations.
There is a distinct danger that the Bill, without amendment, will leave the Secretary of State vulnerable to pressure from those whose interests go beyond national security. We have seen this Government act to help developers avoid taxes, bankers win access to Government schemes, and shell companies win multimillion-pound personal protective equipment contracts. There is a very real danger that the UK’s reputation as a safe and orderly place to do business may be undermined, and these amendments offer the Government an excellent opportunity to restore our reputation once more. I very much hope that the Minister will take it.
The Bill is valuable and necessary, but it is only part of what is required to boost the UK’s attractiveness as a global trading partner. The scrapping of the industrial strategy in the last month and the continuing failure to construct a workable plan for achieving net zero are holding the UK back from being able to achieve all that it is capable of achieving as we emerge from the difficulties of coronavirus.
Darren Jones (Bristol North West) (Lab) [V]
I will focus my remarks on Lords amendments 11 to 15 to clause 61, which, as we have heard, have arrived from the other place on the basis that the BEIS Committee, which I chair, does not have the access to the intelligence information that it would need in order to adequately scrutinise the Investment Security Unit in the BEIS Department. Let me start by thanking their lordships for their highly informed debate on this issue and their hard work in drafting these amendments.
It is a matter of fact that the Intelligence and Security Committee has a level of security clearance and powers to demand classified information that no other Committee of this House has, including my own. I was therefore surprised to learn that the Government were not going to update the memorandum of understanding with the ISC to extend its remit specifically to include the Investment Security Unit. That is why their lordships have sent us these amendments, which I have no issue with. On that basis, I commend the Chair of the ISC for his eloquent speech this evening. However, the Government have made it clear to my Committee and to the House that they have no intention of supporting the amendments, and nor will they be extending the memorandum of understanding in respect of the ISC.
The Secretary of State did agree with me in Committee that the Bill extends the powers of the Government to intervene in the market and that adequate scrutiny of that function is therefore important. On that basis, my Committee has received a letter from the Secretary of State, which we will formally report to the House tomorrow morning, setting out three key points. First, my Committee will be guaranteed appropriate levels of information and briefing to understand why Ministers have acted in the way they have—this is noting the points made by the ISC Chair this evening. On that basis, my Committee and the Department will enter into a new MOU to reflect this. Secondly, the Secretary of State will brief me, as Chair of the Committee, on Privy Counsellor terms, as required. Thirdly, the Science and Technology Committee, which also has standing in this area, will be recognised as sharing the scrutiny responsibility, alongside the BEIS Committee, in addition to the work of the ISC. I welcome the comments made by the Chair of the Science and Technology Committee in this evening’s debate.
My Committee has discussed this issue and wants to ensure effective scrutiny of the wide-ranging and important powers in the Bill. Given that the Government are unwilling to support their lordships’ amendments this evening, and therefore having the main scrutiny responsibility resting with the BEIS Committee, the agreement to enter into a new MOU with my Committee, and to ensure the Chair’s briefing on Privy Counsellor terms, is the next best available option. The BEIS Committee will continue to serve the House in holding the Department to account, and we will of course make it known if we are unable to do that effectively. I therefore look forward to hearing the Minister, when he sums up the debate on the Floor of the House this evening, reconfirming the commitments made by the Secretary of State and promptly agreeing the MOU in due course.
Paul Scully
I very much appreciate the spirit and detail with which this issue has been covered in the Chamber today and the consideration that has come from the other place. I am glad that we have been able to bring forward a number of amendments to improve the Bill, ensuring that we can keep the certainty for business and are responsive to the needs of business, while clearly keeping that central focus on national security. It is so important that we keep the flexibility in the definition of “national security”, in order to future-proof the Bill, while none the less making sure that businesses and potential investors in this country know exactly the competitive regime we have here.
That goes to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Gravesham (Adam Holloway) about PsiQuantum. Quantum computing is an exciting technology. The Bill tackles national security, but we must also ensure that the UK is a competitive, good home for technologies such as quantum computing, not least by making sure that we can unleash innovation, and make the UK the science superpower that is the envy of the world, with people wanting to come to build quantum technology units here in the UK, through our use of research and development and by ensuring that we are competitive in all our offerings, while being able to protect businesses for our national security.
I appreciate the kind words of the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah), and indeed those of the hon. Member for Aberdeen South (Stephen Flynn) when he talked about my coming to this place. Indeed, not only did I follow my hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Nadhim Zahawi) in leading on this Bill, but I stole his flag for my office, for fear of missing out otherwise when I am on my Zoom calls, because that does symbolise the vaccination process and the fact that the Union has come together—the UK has come together—in an amazing programme.
I am really keen to tackle two more points. The hon. Member for Richmond Park (Sarah Olney) talked about flexibility versus scrutiny, which I have already talked about. She mentioned that she did not want other countries or other businesses to undermine the UK economy. Clearly, we do not have to go that far to have people undermining the UK economy; we have only to go to the Liberal Democrats for that. It is important that we do not allow that speculation—the sort of muckraking we heard from that contribution—to detract from what is a really important Bill for the UK national security regime, and from that optimism and confidence that is needed for attracting investment within this country.
I understand the concerns of my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), but I reiterate the fact that it is for the BEIS Committee to oversee the work of the Department. The Committee is particularly well placed to consider how effectively and efficiently the regime interacts with business communities and investors.
Mr Steve Baker
I thought my right hon. Friend the Chair of the ISC really made an open and shut case, and I hope that he will not mind my saying so. If the Minister will not amend the memorandum of understanding, will he be really clear why he will not do so, because my right hon. Friend made an open and shut case that he should?
Paul Scully
I appreciate my hon. Friend’s intervention, and I will come back to that. Let me first develop the point about scrutiny. Clearly, the BEIS Committee has business expertise and is able to determine whether the regime is effective in scrutinising relevant acquisitions of control. I do question some of the narrative that I have heard that suggests that the BEIS Committee is not well placed to scrutinise the NSI regime. Furthermore, there are no restrictions on the ISC requesting further information from the unit or the Secretary of State where it falls under the remit of that Committee. There is no barrier to the BEIS Committee handling top secret material or other sensitive material subject to the agreement between the Department and the Chair of the Committee on appropriate handling.
As part of its role, the BEIS Committee can request information that may include sensitive material from the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, including on the Investment Security Unit’s use of information provided by the intelligence and security agencies. The Select Committee already provides scrutiny over a number of sensitive areas, and there are mechanisms in place for it to scrutinise top secret information of this kind on a case-by-case basis.
As the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy explained in front of the BEIS Committee last week, and indeed in his letter to the Chairman of the BEIS Committee, which was copied to my right hon. Friend the Member for Tunbridge Wells (Greg Clark), Chair of the Science and Technology Committee, there are three Committees that should act in collaboration. The BEIS Committee provides the primary work of scrutinising matters within BEIS competence, but two important additional Committees—the Science and Technology Committee and, indeed, the ISC—were acting in an auxiliary capacity, making sure that the essential cross-cutting nature of the Investment Security Unit benefits from the rigour of those Committees, with expertise in each area that the unit covers.
The Government therefore do not believe that we need to update the existing memorandum of understanding, because it is flexible and it does still pertain. As I have said, there is no dilution of the ISC’s work in this. The current arrangements are sufficient to ensure that we can have the correct scrutiny of this.
Dr Lewis
I appreciate that I have tried the patience of the House, but on that one point let me say that the MOU is flexible in the sense that we can add new organisations to it. The flexibility is not being used by the Government because they are refusing to add this new unit to the MOU, so the flexibility is rendered nugatory.
Paul Scully
As I say, the direction from the Secretary of State in his letter to the Chairs of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee and the Science and Technology Committee was clear in terms of his expectations of how this should work. The Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee should be the prime Committee to scrutinise BEIS competence, but similarly the Science and Technology Committee and the Intelligence and Security Committee should absolutely be there to look at places within their competence to ensure wider scrutiny.
As I said, we have listened to Parliament. We have tabled a number of amendments to increase the amount of information included in the annual report and the various threshold. We have responded.
Lords amendment 1 agreed to.
Lords amendments 2 to 10 agreed to.
Clause 61
Annual Report
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 11.—(Paul Scully.)
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
In order to observe social distancing, the Reasons Committee will meet in Committee Room 12.
National Security and Investment Bill
Wednesday 28th April 2021
(3 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Commons Consideration of Lords Message as at 28 April 2021 - (28 Apr 2021)
14:07 - Division conducted remotely on Motion A1 - Ayes: 318 / Noes: 241 - Motion A1 agreed.
Lord Callanan
That this House do not insist on its Amendments 11 and 15, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 11A.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Lord Callanan) (Con)
My Lords, with the leave of the House, I will speak also to Motion A1. I will, of course, address any further comments at the end of the debate.
It goes without saying that I am delighted to be back in the Chamber after a short respite while the other place has considered our amendments to this Bill. I am pleased to advise noble Lords that there was resounding support for all the amendments made by this House, with the mere exception of two. The other place has resolved against amendments which, in effect, would have introduced a reporting requirement to the Intelligence and Security Committee in relation to the NSI regime.
Amendments 11B and 11C in lieu, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord West, draw on his earlier amendments. They would require the Secretary of State to include in the annual report provided for in Clause 61 a summary of his decisions in respect of final notifications given and final orders made, varied or revoked, as well as a summary of any national security risk assessment provided by the security services in relation to those decisions. Where publication of any of that additional information would be contrary to the interests of national security, the Secretary of State may instead place that information in a confidential annexe provided to the ISC. The amendments before us would end those requirements should the memorandum of understanding that governs the remit of the ISC be amended to bring the Secretary of State’s activities under Clause 26 in scope of ISC scrutiny.
I merely echo the words of my colleague, the Minister for Small Business, Consumers and Labour Markets, on Monday, when he welcomed the “passionate and expert debate” this issue has seen in both Houses. In particular, I repeat the praise offered in this House for those who previously spoke in favour of this amendment. Rugby analogies aside, it is a particularly serious, knowledgeable and experienced group of Peers, and I of course acknowledge the weight and credibility that they undoubtedly bring to these issues.
However, the other place resolved by a significant majority of 106 to restore the Bill to its previous form in this regard. The elected Chamber has given this issue its due consideration, and a majority of 106 elected Members has made the position of the other place very clear. This includes four of the seven members of the ISC, who, similarly, sit in the other place voting with the Government, with only one Conservative Member in the entire House voting against.
I do not intend to try the patience of the House and repeat the arguments that we have heard many times before which the Government have already made on this issue, but I will address the specific changes in this amendment from the original which this House has previously considered.
The Government do not consider that the addition of an endpoint for the effective requirement on the Secretary of State to provide confidential information to the ISC makes the approach any more necessary or appropriate. It is our view that the BEIS Select Committee remains the most appropriate committee for scrutiny. It is capable, it is interested and it stands ready. The Secretary of State for BEIS has written to the chair of the BEIS Select Committee to confirm this, and this was acknowledged by the chair of the committee in the other place, also on Monday. The BEIS Select Committee will be ably supported by the Science and Technology Committee, where that is appropriate.
The Government hugely value the Intelligence and Security Committee, but we also hugely value the BEIS Select Committee and the clear and appropriate scrutiny that it provides. We do not need to conflate the two through amending this Bill, the memorandum of understanding or, indeed, anything else in this field.
The Government’s position, and that of the elected Chamber, is clear, and I can tell your Lordships that the Government have no plans to concede on this issue. I therefore ask that noble Lords respect the clear wishes of the other place and, while I am of course grateful for noble Lords’ insight and passion on this matter, I hope that this House does not insist on these amendments. Therefore, I beg to move.
Motion A1 (as an amendment to Motion A)
Lord West of Spithead
At end insert “and do propose Amendments 11B and 11C in lieu—
“(2A) Until the condition in subsection (2C) is met, each report must also provide, in respect of final notifications given, and final orders made, varied or revoked—
(a) a summary of the decision of the Secretary of State under section 26(1), and
(b) a summary provided by the Security Services of any national security risk assessment provided under section 26(3)(a)(ii) relating to each decision under section 26(1).
(2B) Until the condition in subsection (2C) is met, where the Secretary of State considers that publication of any information listed in subsection (2A) would be contrary to the interests of national security, those details may be excluded from publication and instead must be included in a confidential annex to the report provided to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament on the same day that the rest of the report is laid before each House of Parliament.
(2C) Subsections (2A) and (2B) have effect only until a revised memorandum of understanding between the Prime Minister and the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament under section 2 of the Justice and security Act 2013 has been laid before Parliament which provides for oversight by the Intelligence and Security Committee of the activities of the Secretary of State under section 26 of this Act.””
Lord West of Spithead (Lab)
My Lords, the question put back to this House is not whether the Government should take national security risks into account when considering investment but whether Parliament should have oversight of that process—that careful balancing of our national security against our prosperity. This House delivered a very clear message to the Government on Report that if the Bill is to provide the Secretary of State for BEIS with wide-ranging new powers, it must also provide for meaningful oversight of those powers. That meaningful oversight of high-level intelligence can be conducted only by the ISC, as the body which Parliament established for that express purpose.
I thought the strength of feeling in this House on the matter had been very clear, and, indeed, the rugby scrum to which the Minister alluded which I gathered in support had unbelievable knowledge and background in this whole area of intelligence, security and the ISC. It is therefore very disappointing that my amendment was rejected in the other place yesterday. I remain of the view that, without that amendment, the Bill does not provide for meaningful oversight by Parliament. Nevertheless, I have sought yet again to offer the Government an opportunity to see common sense on this and, therefore, rather than insisting on the original amendment, I have tabled this amendment in lieu. It requests the same substantive material—a summary of the decisions by the Secretary of State and a summary by the security services of any national security risk assessment in respect of final notifications given and final orders made, varied or revoked, which can be provided to the ISC in a confidential annexe—but it now provides that that material need not be provided if and when those activities are formally added to the memorandum of understanding, at which point ISC oversight is provided for through that route.
I have already set out why the ISC must have oversight and why it can only be the ISC, so I have no wish to try your Lordships’ patience by repeating those arguments, or indeed those made by noble Lords from across the House who spoke in support of my amendment. The substantive point has been made, and I have to say that the argument has been won—I know that from having talked to people in the other place.
I wish to examine more closely the assertions made more recently by the Government in the other place, as I would not wish any of them to muddy the water on this issue. The Government’s starting point was that the ISC can already scrutinise the information provided to the ISU by the security services. That is indeed the case—we can require the security services to provide us the information which they provide to the ISU on the national security risks—but that is missing the point. What the ISC must be able to scrutinise is the balancing of those security risks against the business elements. It is that crucial balancing which is at the heart of the Bill. There is little point in seeing what the national security risks are if you cannot see what decision has been reached regarding those risks. That is precisely why my amendment makes reference to the decision of the Secretary of State.
Moving on to that decision, the Government’s next argument is that the ISC cannot oversee decisions made by the Secretary of State for BEIS because BEIS is not listed in the ISC’s memorandum of understanding. That is indeed the case but again that is, I am afraid, missing the point, deliberately or otherwise. As I have already explained to noble Lords, the Government gave a commitment to Parliament that the ISC would, through its MoU, oversee all security and intelligence matters across all of government. The seven bodies currently listed on the MoU are those that were carrying out security and intelligence matters in 2013. That list of bodies should be kept and updated, as the Government told Parliament was their intention. It would be very simple to add something such as BEIS to the list.
With that argument dispatched, the Government move on to their next line of defence—that decisions by the Secretary of State for BEIS must be for the BEIS Committee to scrutinise, and that the ISC should not encroach on that remit. That is, I am afraid, a direct contradiction of the Government’s own MoU. The Government have already expressly said that the ISC’s scrutiny will not affect the wider scrutiny of departments such as, for example, the Home Office, FCDO and MoD by parliamentary committees. The same would be true for BEIS. If the decisions by the Secretary of State for Defence or the Home Secretary can be scrutinised by the ISC, why are the decisions by the Secretary of State for BEIS any different? I am curious as to what it is about BEIS that sets it apart and means that the ISC should not oversee it?
At this point, the Government resort to their final argument. I have to say here that I find it rather tenuous to argue that the ISC does not need to provide oversight because the BEIS Select Committee can do it. The Secretary of State for BEIS has written to the chair of the BEIS Select Committee talking about confidential briefings in a most reasonable manner. However, we need to examine what that does not say, which is, “The Government will hand over our top secret information to you, your committee and your staff for you to hold, scrutinise, take notes on, discuss, question us about and report on”. That is because the Government cannot do that. The words being used belie the practicalities of the Government’s own security procedures—unless, of course, the Minister is going to tell us that the Government are prepared to breach their own security procedures.
The proposals do not amount to meaningful scrutiny. I say this with the greatest respect to the BEIS Select Committee, whose chairman, in a most thoughtful and measured speech in the other place yesterday, supported the ISC’s oversight of this area. The BEIS Select Committee does excellent work and should rightfully be the primary oversight body for the work of BEIS and the business elements of the work of the ISU. However, the ISC is the only body that can provide oversight of the intelligence elements and balance them with the business elements. The ISC is the only committee of Parliament that has regular access to protectively marked information that is sensitive for national security reasons. This means that only the ISC is in a position to scrutinise effectively the work of those parts of departments whose work is directly concerned with intelligence and security matters, as the Government have said repeatedly until now.
The Intelligence and Security Committee was created by Parliament to handle classified information where Select Committees could not. The Government committed to using the ISC to scrutinise all their intelligence and security functions. Now we are told that the BEIS Committee is able to do exactly that. In this instance, apparently, the ISC is no longer needed. Let me be clear: the ISC currently does oversee this area of work, so the Government’s proposal is deliberately removing it from ISC oversight. Is that what is going to happen in the future? Will security work be hived off successively to departments that will be told that the ISC cannot oversee them because it is not listed in a nine year-old MoU that the Government have failed to keep up to date?
I see the longer-term consequences of rejecting our amendments and wonder whether more areas of government are destined to follow suit. This could become a very slippery slope, denying Parliament and, indeed, the nation proper scrutiny of intelligence decisions if we do not take action now. For this reason, I have sought to offer the Government yet another opportunity. Rather than simply retabling my original amendment, I have offered them an alternative. Either the Government can provide the ISC with a classified annexe covering security and the Secretary of State’s decision, or they can add those decisions to the existing MoU.
My amendment is a reasonable attempt to provide the Government with a way forward and a way out. I know that the Minister opposite has been put in a very difficult position on this issue. While recognising the strength of feeling across this House, there must be meaningful oversight of these new powers, and that can only mean the ISC. I am not looking for more work for myself, I can tell noble Lords, but only the ISC can do it. I beg to move.
Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)
My Lords, as I have done throughout this process, I support the noble Lord, Lord West, and, having had the advantage of hearing him today and earlier, I endorse without qualification his remarks and powerful arguments in support of Motion A1.
I am encouraged in that because the Government are yet to produce any reason against these proposals that could be regarded as substantive. I am further encouraged by the fact that the chair of the BEIS Committee supports the proposition and the principle that the amendment embraces. It has been suggested, although not perhaps so strongly today, that confidential information will be made available to the BEIS Committee. There is a difference between confidential and classified. What is confidential as between one Minister and another can easily not be classified. In that respect, the Government have simply not proved their case.
What will that confidential information amount to? It will amount to what the Secretary of State thinks the committee can see. One could describe that, rather pejoratively, as being spoon-fed, but it will certainly come not with its interest in objectivity but with its interest in the subjective opinion of the Secretary of State. In that respect, it is quite different—I repeat, quite different—from the role, powers and the exercise of those powers of the Intelligence and Security Committee. I am further encouraged in my position because I read that the Commons Reason for Motion A is that it is “appropriate and sufficient”—which is probably what Oliver Twist was told when he asked for some more. The words mean what people want them to mean and that, yet again, exposes the poverty of the argument offered by the Government.
I shall finish by reminding the House that members of the Intelligence and Security Committee are chosen for experience and a reputation for balanced judgment. As I have said previously, there have been occasions when nominations made to the committee have been turned down because a particular individual was not thought to have the necessary experience or qualities for the discharge of a quite remarkable responsibility. Members sign the Official Secrets Act and the procedure attached to that is a solemn moment. They form an intimate relationship with the security services—one of trust, which cannot be replicated in any circumstances, in my respectful view, by the relationship between the BEIS Committee and the Secretary of State.
The truth is that the Government do not have a good argument here and that is why they would be wise, even at this late stage, to adopt this amendment.
Lord Butler of Brockwell (CB)
My Lords, I too believe that the noble Lord, Lord West, is right in insisting that the Government and the other place look again at another way of giving the ISC an explicit role in scrutinising highly classified intelligence underlying the Secretary of State’s use of the powers in this Bill. The Government’s position is, frankly, indefensible. On Report, the noble Lord, Lord West, reminded the House that at the time of the passing of Justice and Security Act 2013, the then Minister for security announced
“the intention of the Government that the ISC should have oversight of substantively all of central Government’s intelligence and security activities to be realised now and in the future.”—[Official Report, Justice and Security Bill Committee, 31/1/13; col. 98.]
The Minister in the other place confirmed on Monday that the Government stand by that statement, yet they refuse to amend the memorandum of understanding under the Act, to bring the Investment Security Unit in BEIS within the purview of the ISC. Frankly, I cannot understand why. In his amendment, the noble Lord, Lord West, has offered the Government an easy way out. If they will amend the memorandum of understanding to bring the Investment Security Unit explicitly within the purview of the ISC, as it would have been had it remained within the Cabinet Office, the problem will be solved at a stroke. There will be no need for this amendment, and if the Minister will give that assurance today, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord West, would be prepared not to press his amendment.
In the other place, a Conservative Member, Steve Baker, said that the chairman of the ISC, Dr Julian Lewis—another Conservative Member—had made an open-and-shut case for amending the MoU, and yet Mr Baker, under the constraint of his Whips still voted against the amendment. If the Minister’s reply is that the ISC can cover the Investment Security Unit without amending the MoU, I am bound to ask: what is the point of having the MoU at all? The Minister has only to say that the Government will make this amendment to the MoU and he will save the Government and all the rest of us, a good deal of trouble. Will he do so? I suspect that the Government’s position is a result of the arrogance of a Government who have a large majority in the other place. They have taken a position and refuse to change it, however strong the arguments on the other side.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)
The noble Lord, Lord Lansley, has indicated his desire to speak.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, I am very pleased to follow the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell. I agree entirely with what he had to say and with the noble Lords, Lord Campbell and Lord West of Spithead, too. It comes down to a very simple proposition: throughout, we have been very clear that if the Government would simply amend the memorandum of understanding with the Intelligence and Security Committee to include reference to the Investment Security Unit, there would be no need for any amendment to the Bill. That remains the case now. The question why the Government are not doing this.
The Minister in the other place said on Monday night:
“The work of the security services on investment security in support of the ISU clearly falls within the remit of the ISC.”—[Official Report, Commons, 26/4/21; col. 154]
If that is the case, what is the impediment to adding the ISU into the memorandum? I think it is that the Government do not interpret the ISC as having a remit that extends beyond what the intelligence services themselves have offered by way of information to the Investment Security Unit in BEIS, to the point where —as the noble Lord, Lord West, quite accurately summarised—the scrutiny of how national security is being maintained in the decisions that become part of the interim or final orders made under this Bill.
The Government’s problem may be that they think that if they were to include the ISU in the memorandum of understanding, they would effectively create some duplication between the scrutiny of the order-making power by the BEIS Select Committee and the Intelligence and Security Committee’s scrutiny. That need not be the case. It is perfectly clear already, within the memorandum of understanding that was quoted by Dr Lewis in the debate on Monday night, that the ISC’s work in looking at the intelligence services
“‘will not affect the wider scrutiny of departments…by other parliamentary committees. The ISC will aim to avoid any unnecessary duplication with the work of those Committees.’”—[Official Report, Commons, 26/4/21; col. 160]
It seems to me that the resolution is very simple—the Government should simply add the Investment Security Unit into the memorandum of understanding. It is clear from what the ISC’s chair and members have said that they would not expect to duplicate the work of BEIS —the primary scrutiny of BEIS’s work—in implementing this legislation, but there are specific questions that relate to the use of intelligence and highly sensitive intelligence materials.
I was not comforted by reading that the chair of that committee in the other place has been told by the Secretary of State that he will brief him on privy counsellor terms. That tells us that the chair of the committee may know something, but the BEIS Select Committee in the other place will not generally know it. Its members will not be able to discuss that information and they will not be able to report on that basis. There is clearly a deficiency, as Dr Lewis quite rightly said—a scrutiny gap—in relation to the use of top-secret material on a routine basis in informing decisions made under this legislation. The inclusion of the ISU in the remit of the Intelligence and Security Committee will close that scrutiny gap.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, the Minister used the word heavyweight; I would use the word authoritative about the speeches we have heard from the noble Lords, Lords West, Lord Butler, Lord Lansley, and my noble friend Lord Campbell. I do not have the same authority, but I have an eye for process and an eye for a discontinuity. At the heart of this is a central contradiction. This Bill is called the National Security and Investment Bill, and its central premise is that the world of security has changed. It is not about armies and air forces; it is about technology—the spread of technology and access to that technology. The Bill is built on the idea that we need an approach to the commercial use, sale and protection of this technology for the security of this country.
The speeches that the Minister has heard were characterised in his preceding speech as somehow decrying the abilities of the BEIS Select Committee. The BEIS Select Committee was not put in place to assess the security issues that these companies are facing. That is not its job; its job is to do what BEIS was there to do. This Bill, by its nature, by its very name, is a hybrid of two very important issues: investment and security. The BEIS Select Committee is there and is an expert on the first of those. The ISC is there to protect the country and to offer scrutiny on security issues. There is no problem in asking both of those committees to do what they are good at in order to fulfil the very important task that Bill seeks to undertake.
We can only conclude that, because the Government decided not to do this and because, as the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, put it, they have a large majority in the other place, they will continue down this road. There is another opportunity for the Government to think again and do the most sensible thing, which is to amend the MoU. It does not require primary legislation, in my understanding, and would be done very quickly with the consent of this House. For that reason, if the noble Lord, Lord West, decides to put this to a vote, these Benches would like to ask that question of the people across the way, at least one more time.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
My Lords, it is clear that the Government have no good reason for refusing to accord the ISC its proper role in overseeing the intelligence input into a decision by the BEIS Secretary of State to forbid an otherwise bona fide investment in an enterprise—the sort of investment that the noble Lord, Lord Fox, has just described. I am sad to say that the Minister cited only the size of the House of Commons majority and gave no argument against proper parliamentary scrutiny. Frankly, if we are to say that this House should never question what the majority in the House of Commons does, you would wonder whether there is any role for this House. The size of the majority down there is not important; what is important to the security of this country is the correctness of the views that we take.
At one point, I think in this House, it was suggested that the Government did not want to amend the MoU case by case, but why not? As the noble Lord, Lord Fox, has said, if a new law comes in that has “national security” in its title and gives powers to a Secretary of State that depend wholly on intelligence, why not scrutinise that intelligence in respect of the use to which it is put? As we have head, neither the BEIS Select Committee nor its highly respected chair—who I assume will now be made a privy counsellor, since he is about to be briefed on Privy Council terms; I will be there to congratulate him if that happens—have the security clearance or experience to question the intelligence in the sorts of ways that we have been hearing from around the House. So why not let our experts carry out that work, on behalf of Parliament? What my noble friend is asking for is simple: an amendment to a memorandum of understanding. Is that too much to ask of the Government?
Lord Callanan (Con)
I thank all noble Lords who have contributed; it has again been a good demonstration of the quality of contributions from this House. I have listened very carefully to the points that have been made, in particular by the noble Lords, Lord West, Lord Campbell and Lord Butler, and by my noble friend Lord Lansley.
I will address the primary issue head on. This was raised by the noble Lords, Lord West and Lord Campbell, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. It is the issue of whether the BEIS Select Committee will have access to “top secret” information. We will make sure that the BEIS Select Committee has the information that it needs to fulfil its remit and scrutinise the work of the ISU under the NSI regime. Much of this is unlikely to be highly classified and, where the Select Committee’s questioning touches on areas of high classification, it is likely that the relevant information could be given in a way that does not require as high a classification and provided to the committee confidentially. If, however, the BEIS Select Committee requires access to highly classified information, we will carefully consider how best to provide it, while maintaining information security in close collaboration with the committee’s chair.
Another point made by the noble Lord, Lord West, was that the current system for scrutiny is run out of the Cabinet Office and therefore comes under the ISC’s unit, so the Bill reduces the ISC’s remit. The Government’s main powers to scrutinise and intervene in mergers and acquisitions for national security reasons in fact come from the Enterprise Act 2002; the powers under that Act sit with the Secretaries of State for BEIS and DCMS, not in the Cabinet Office. Giving the BEIS Select Committee oversight of the new NSI regime is entirely in keeping with this and does not represent a reduction of the ISC’s remit.
A point made particularly by my noble friend Lord Lansley was about changing the memorandum of understanding, but the question here is not whether the MoU allows for the role proposed by noble Lords, but whether that role is appropriate. Our answer—and I appreciate that noble Lords will disagree—is no. The Government have made their case, which comes off the back of a resounding vote by the elected Chamber, that no change should be made to the Bill in relation to reporting to the Intelligence and Security Committee. We maintain our view that the BEIS Select Committee remains the place for scrutiny of the investment security unit and that the Intelligence and Security Committee remains the appropriate committee for scrutiny of the intelligence services, in accordance with the memorandum of understanding and the Justice and Security Act 2013. With acknowledgement to all who have spoken and with regard to the points that I have made, I appreciate the difference of opinion on this, but ask once again that the House does not insist on these amendments.
Lord West of Spithead (Lab)
My Lords, first, I thank those who spoke in support of my Motion. They have an incredible amount of knowledge about this issue. I find the Government’s position extraordinary and I feel sorry for the Minister opposite—for whom I have great respect—who has to parrot arrant nonsense. As an admiral and a captain who had defaulters in front of me, I have had people spouting arrant nonsense at me and I know how to spot it. This is arrant nonsense and I find that rather sad. It is unfortunate that he has to do this as I am sure that, deep down, he does not believe it, because he is an intelligent chap. I am appalled that the Government are not willing to give ground on this and I cannot understand why—I really cannot. This is not a great party-political issue or anything like that. It is quite extraordinary, so I am afraid that I will test the opinion of the House.
Royal Assent
Thursday 29th April 2021
(3 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 12 March 2021 - (12 Mar 2021)