Bob Seely Portrait

Bob Seely

Conservative - Former Member for Isle of Wight

First elected: 8th June 2017

Left House: 30th May 2024 (Dissolution)


Foreign Affairs Committee
2nd Mar 2020 - 30th May 2024
Pensions (Special Rules for End of Life) Bill
17th Apr 2024 - 24th Apr 2024
Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [HL]
28th Feb 2024 - 7th Mar 2024
Committees on Arms Export Controls (formerly Quadripartite Committee)
3rd Jul 2018 - 6th Nov 2019
Foreign Affairs Committee
20th Feb 2018 - 6th Nov 2019
Committees on Arms Export Controls
3rd Jul 2018 - 6th Nov 2019


Division Voting information

Bob Seely has voted in 1286 divisions, and 15 times against the majority of their Party.

22 Mar 2021 - Trade Bill - View Vote Context
Bob Seely voted Aye - against a party majority and against the House
One of 29 Conservative Aye votes vs 318 Conservative No votes
Tally: Ayes - 300 Noes - 318
22 Mar 2021 - Trade Bill - View Vote Context
Bob Seely voted No - against a party majority and against the House
One of 26 Conservative No votes vs 318 Conservative Aye votes
Tally: Ayes - 319 Noes - 297
9 Feb 2021 - Trade Bill - View Vote Context
Bob Seely voted No - against a party majority and against the House
One of 13 Conservative No votes vs 341 Conservative Aye votes
Tally: Ayes - 351 Noes - 276
9 Feb 2021 - Trade Bill - View Vote Context
Bob Seely voted No - against a party majority and against the House
One of 31 Conservative No votes vs 318 Conservative Aye votes
Tally: Ayes - 318 Noes - 303
19 Jan 2021 - Trade Bill - View Vote Context
Bob Seely voted No - against a party majority and against the House
One of 11 Conservative No votes vs 344 Conservative Aye votes
Tally: Ayes - 353 Noes - 277
19 Jan 2021 - Trade Bill - View Vote Context
Bob Seely voted No - against a party majority and against the House
One of 34 Conservative No votes vs 319 Conservative Aye votes
Tally: Ayes - 319 Noes - 308
13 Oct 2020 - Public Health: Coronavirus Regulations - View Vote Context
Bob Seely voted No - against a party majority and against the House
One of 42 Conservative No votes vs 298 Conservative Aye votes
Tally: Ayes - 299 Noes - 82
15 Jul 2019 - High Speed Rail (West Midlands - Crewe) Bill - View Vote Context
Bob Seely voted Aye - against a party majority and against the House
One of 12 Conservative Aye votes vs 239 Conservative No votes
Tally: Ayes - 217 Noes - 246
27 Mar 2019 - EU Exit Day Amendment - View Vote Context
Bob Seely voted No - against a party majority and against the House
One of 93 Conservative No votes vs 150 Conservative Aye votes
Tally: Ayes - 441 Noes - 105
27 Mar 2019 - EU: Withdrawal and Future Relationship Votes - View Vote Context
Bob Seely voted No - against a party majority and in line with the House
One of 122 Conservative No votes vs 126 Conservative Aye votes
Tally: Ayes - 139 Noes - 422
14 Mar 2019 - UK’s Withdrawal from the European Union - View Vote Context
Bob Seely voted Aye - against a party majority and in line with the House
One of 112 Conservative Aye votes vs 188 Conservative No votes
Tally: Ayes - 412 Noes - 202
31 Jan 2018 - Restoration and Renewal (Report of the Joint Committee) - View Vote Context
Bob Seely voted Aye - against a party majority and in line with the House
One of 66 Conservative Aye votes vs 164 Conservative No votes
Tally: Ayes - 236 Noes - 220
31 Jan 2018 - Restoration and Renewal (Report of the Joint Committee) - View Vote Context
Bob Seely voted Aye - against a party majority and in line with the House
One of 68 Conservative Aye votes vs 166 Conservative No votes
Tally: Ayes - 234 Noes - 185
14 Dec 2021 - Public Health - View Vote Context
Bob Seely voted No - against a party majority and against the House
One of 97 Conservative No votes vs 224 Conservative Aye votes
Tally: Ayes - 369 Noes - 126
14 Dec 2021 - Public Health - View Vote Context
Bob Seely voted No - against a party majority and against the House
One of 60 Conservative No votes vs 258 Conservative Aye votes
Tally: Ayes - 385 Noes - 100
View All Bob Seely Division Votes

All Debates

Speeches made during Parliamentary debates are recorded in Hansard. For ease of browsing we have grouped debates into individual, departmental and legislative categories.

View all Bob Seely's debates

Latest EDMs signed by Bob Seely

9th December 2022
Bob Seely signed this EDM as a sponsor on Monday 12th December 2022

Special Tribunal on Russian Aggression in Ukraine

Tabled by: Stewart Malcolm McDonald (Scottish National Party - Glasgow South)
That this house seeks justice and accountability for atrocities committed by Russian troops during their invasion of Ukraine, as well as for the crime of the war itself; recognises that the decision by the Russian Federation to launch attacks on Ukraine poses a grave challenge to the post-1945 international order; …
41 signatures
(Most recent: 17 Apr 2023)
Signatures by party:
Scottish National Party: 19
Liberal Democrat: 6
Labour: 6
Conservative: 4
Plaid Cymru: 3
Democratic Unionist Party: 2
Social Democratic & Labour Party: 1
Independent: 1
View All Bob Seely's signed Early Day Motions

Commons initiatives

These initiatives were driven by Bob Seely, and are more likely to reflect personal policy preferences.

MPs who are act as Ministers or Shadow Ministers are generally restricted from performing Commons initiatives other than Urgent Questions.


1 Urgent Question tabled by Bob Seely

Tuesday 27th February 2024

3 Adjournment Debates led by Bob Seely

Thursday 23rd November 2023
Monday 12th December 2022
Monday 13th July 2020

4 Bills introduced by Bob Seely


A Bill to amend the Titles Deprivation Act 1917 to deprive in certain circumstances Princes of their British Dignities and Titles.

Commons - 20%

Last Event - 1st Reading
Monday 11th December 2023

A Bill to establish a regulator of ferry services operating in the Solent; to make provision about the powers and duties of that regulator; and for connected purposes.

Commons - 20%

Last Event - 1st Reading
Friday 24th May 2024

A Bill to make provision for the annual approval by the House of Commons of maximum numbers in respect of immigration and asylum; to provide that asylum may only be granted to individuals identified as refugees by the UN Refugee Agency, other than in specified circumstances; and for connected purposes.

Commons - 20%

Last Event - 1st Reading
Wednesday 22nd May 2024
(Read Debate)

A Bill to make provision about defamation; to make provision about costs awarded in civil cases; to make provision about the application of the rights to privacy and to freedom of expression in civil cases on matters of public interest; to make provision about the regulation of lawyers acting in civil cases; to make provision about data protection; to make provision for the regulation of private investigators; to make provision for the purpose of reducing the use of lawsuits for strategic purposes; and for connected purposes.

Commons - 20%

Last Event - 1st Reading
Tuesday 24th January 2023
(Read Debate)

Latest 50 Written Questions

(View all written questions)
Written Questions can be tabled by MPs and Lords to request specific information information on the work, policy and activities of a Government Department
17th May 2024
To ask the Attorney General, pursuant to the Answer of 20 January 2023 to Question 125287 on Rape: Prosecutions, how many (a) completed prosecutions and (b) convictions there were for murder in England and Wales in each quarter from 1 January 2005 to 30 September 2015.

The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) holds management information on its Case Management System showing the number of defendants allocated the Principal Offence Category of Homicide at completion of prosecution. Please note that homicide consists of a range of offences, including, among others:

  • Murder
  • Attempted murder
  • Conspiring or soliciting to commit murder
  • Manslaughter (corporate, gross negligence, unlawful act)
  • Infanticide
  • Child destruction
  • Aiding or assisting suicide
  • Causing or allowing the death of a child or vulnerable adult
  • Causing death by careless or dangerous driving
  • Manslaughter due to diminished responsibility
  • Causing death by aggravated vehicle taking

The Principal Offence Category indicates the most serious offence with which a defendant is charged.

The table below shows the number of completed prosecutions and convictions for homicide from the start of January 2005 to the end of September 2015. The data provided in the table is in financial quarters.

‘Total completed prosecutions’ refer to the conclusion of a prosecution case against a defendant such as conviction after trial, guilty plea, acquittal, or the prosecution against the defendant being dropped. ‘Convictions’ refer to convictions after trial and guilty pleas.

Quarter

04/05-Q4

05/06-Q1

05/06-Q2

05/06-Q3

05/06-Q4

06/07-Q1

06/07-Q2

06/07-Q3

Total completed prosecutions

338

267

337

335

414

274

305

317

Convictions

253

212

255

283

317

217

239

261

Quarter

06/07-Q4

07/08-Q1

07/08-Q2

07/08-Q3

07/08-Q4

08/09-Q1

08/09-Q2

08/09-Q3

Total completed prosecutions

325

296

328

347

301

344

313

378

Convictions

249

234

269

266

234

288

246

329

Quarter

08/09-Q4

09/10-Q1

09/10-Q2

09/10-Q3

09/10-Q4

10/11-Q1

10/11-Q2

10/11-Q3

Total completed prosecutions

358

266

292

312

305

241

251

276

Convictions

289

209

246

255

236

204

205

224

Quarter

10/11-Q4

11/12-Q1

11/12-Q2

11/12-Q3

11/12-Q4

12/13-Q1

12/13-Q2

12/13-Q3

Total completed prosecutions

269

208

225

245

244

253

289

283

Convictions

212

167

187

207

205

204

223

222

Quarter

12/13-Q4

13/14-Q1

13/14-Q2

13/14-Q3

13/14-Q4

14/15-Q1

14/15-Q2

Total completed prosecutions

201

259

254

236

226

263

220

Convictions

166

206

208

195

174

214

172

Quarter

14/15-Q3

14/15-Q4

15/16-Q1

15/16-Q2

Total completed prosecutions

224

195

268

259

Convictions

180

161

220

196

17th May 2024
To ask the Attorney General, with reference to the Answer of 20 January 2023 to Question 125287 on Rape: Prosecutions, how many (a) completed prosecutions and (b) convictions there were for people smuggling in each quarter from the start of January 2005 to the end of September 2015.

The Immigration Act 1971 (the Act) sets out offences for illegal entry, illegal working, and assisting unlawful immigration into the United Kingdom.

The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) holds management information showing the number of offences charged by way of section 24 (illegal entry/arrival), section 25 (assisting unlawful immigration to member State or the UK), section 25A (helping an asylum-seeker to enter the UK), and section 25B (assisting entry to the UK in breach of deportation or exclusion order) of the Act in which a prosecution commenced and reached a first hearing at a magistrates’ court.

The table attached shows the number of these offences from the start of January 2005 to the end of September 2015.

The CPS does not hold data which shows the number of defendants charged with, prosecuted, and convicted for offences created by the Act. The figures in the table relate to the number of offences and not the number of individual defendants. An individual defendant may be charged with more than one offence against the same complainant. No data is held showing the final outcome or if the charged offence was the substantive charge at completion of prosecution.

5th Jan 2022
To ask the Attorney General, what recent assessment she has made of the adequacy of the performance of the Crown Prosecution Service (a) on the Isle of Wight and (b) in the South East.

Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate (HMCPSI) published a report on CPS South East on 12 October 2021. The report found that the Area made strong charging decisions, and handled disclosure issues and victim and witness issues well. In addition, the report found that the quality of the Area’s RASSO casework was particularly good. HMCPSI will conduct a follow-up inspection of CPS South East next year to assess whether improvements have been made.

HMCPSI are currently conducting an inspection of CPS Wessex, which includes the Isle of Wight, and will publish the report on the Area later this year. Recent CPS performance data shows that the Area’s magistrates’ court conviction rate and domestic abuse conviction rate are both above the national average.

30th Apr 2024
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, what information his Department holds on the average number of workdays lost in each strike action in each (a) week and (b) month of 2024 as of 30 April 2024.

The information requested falls under the remit of the UK Statistics Authority.

A response to the Hon. Member’s parliamentary question of 30/04/24 is attached.

John Glen
Shadow Paymaster General
30th Apr 2024
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, what information his Department holds on the average number of workdays lost in each strike action in each month in 2023.

The information requested falls under the remit of the UK Statistics Authority.

A response to the Hon. Member’s parliamentary question of 30/04/24 is attached.

John Glen
Shadow Paymaster General
6th Feb 2023
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, what plans his Department has to increase the Government’s strategic resilience in relation to matters of national importance.

With the increasing volatility and interconnectedness of risks, strong national resilience is more important than ever. The UK Government’s Resilience Framework, published in December 2022, sets out a strategic approach to strengthening the systems and capabilities that underpin our collective resilience to all risks.

Work is already underway across Government to deliver on the principles and approach in the Framework and to act on lessons from recent crises. We have already refreshed the National Security Risk Assessment and will be updating the public National Risk Register later in the year. The Prime Minister has approved a new sub-committee of the National Security Council dedicated to resilience, led by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. We have also strengthened Cabinet Office crisis and resilience structures. The new Resilience Directorate leads on longer-term resilience planning, alongside the COBR Unit which leads on national crisis response and contingency planning.

18th Jun 2020
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, for what reason (a) weddings and (b) weddings with the minimum number of five people are not being allowed to be conducted during the current stage of the easing of the covid-19 lockdown restrictions.

The Government understands the huge significance of weddings. We recognise that because weddings have not been able to take place in recent months this has caused difficulty and distress for many people. As set out in the Government’s COVID-19 recovery strategy, published in May, the Government has been examining how to enable people to gather in slightly larger groups better to facilitate small weddings. We have worked closely with faith leaders and local government on how best to achieve this. The Prime Minister announced on 23 June that wedding and civil partnership ceremonies will be able to take place in England from 4 July. People should avoid having a large ceremony, and should invite no more than thirty family and friends. Venues should ensure they are COVID-19 secure.

17th Dec 2018
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, how much funding his Department has allocated to programmes overseas that is not part of Official Development Assistance in each of the last three years; and how much such funding his Department plans to allocate in each of the next two years.

Cabinet Office has a number of Business Units which have involvement with overseas programmes. However, the data is not held centrally and it would therefore be a disproportionate cost to collect the data.

30th Apr 2024
To ask the Secretary of State for Business and Trade, whether her Department holds data on (a) the average proportion of trade union members (i) voting in ballots and (ii) voting in favour of industrial action in each month of 2024; and the number of industrial ballots that did not meet the threshold required for strike action under the Trade Union Act 2016 in the first quarter of 2024.

Available data relating to ballots for industrial action held by registered trade unions can be found on gov.uk under the Certification Officer’s official list of trade unions and their annual returns. However, data for the 2023 calendar year will not be available until later this year. Data for 2024 will not be available until the following year.

Kevin Hollinrake
Shadow Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities
30th Apr 2024
To ask the Secretary of State for Business and Trade, what information her Department holds on the number of industrial ballots submitted by trade unions in each industrial sector in each month of 2024.

Available data relating to ballots for industrial action held by registered trade unions can be found on gov.uk under the Certification Officer’s official list of trade unions and their annual returns. However, data for the 2023 calendar year will not be available until later this year. Data for 2024 will not be available until the following year.

Kevin Hollinrake
Shadow Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities
30th Apr 2024
To ask the Secretary of State for Business and Trade, what information her Department holds on how many industrial ballots did not meet the threshold set by the Trade Union Act 2016 for strike action in each month of 2023.

Available data relating to ballots for industrial action held by registered trade unions can be found on gov.uk under the Certification Officer’s official list of trade unions and their annual returns. However, data for the 2023 calendar year will not be available until later this year. Data for 2024 will not be available until the following year.

Kevin Hollinrake
Shadow Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities
30th Apr 2024
To ask the Secretary of State for Business and Trade, what information her Department holds on the average percentage of trade union members (a) voting in ballots and (b) voting in favour of industrial action in each month of 2023.

Available data relating to ballots for industrial action held by registered trade unions can be found on gov.uk under the Certification Officer’s official list of trade unions and their annual returns. However, data for the 2023 calendar year will not be available until later this year. Data for 2024 will not be available until the following year.

Kevin Hollinrake
Shadow Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities
30th Apr 2024
To ask the Secretary of State for Business and Trade, what information her Department holds on how many trade union ballots in each industrial sector there were in each month of 2023.

Available data relating to ballots for industrial action held by registered trade unions can be found on gov.uk under the Certification Officer’s official list of trade unions and their annual returns. However, data for the 2023 calendar year will not be available until later this year. Data for 2024 will not be available until the following year.

Kevin Hollinrake
Shadow Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities
3rd Mar 2023
To ask the Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero, if he will make an assessment of the impact of the British energy security strategy, published on 7 April 2022, on the offshore wind industry on the Isle of Wight.

As set out in the British Energy Security Strategy, the UK has an ambition to deploy up to 50GW of offshore wind by 2030, and the Government estimates that around 90,000 direct and indirect jobs could be supported by the offshore wind sector by 2030.

These jobs offer opportunities throughout the UK, including to the Isle of Wight, where Vestas Wind Systems A/S is already a key employer.

6th Feb 2023
To ask the Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero, what assessment his Department has made with Cabinet colleagues of the effectiveness of Government incentives for companies to invest in Offshore wind innovation.

The Government is supporting research and development in offshore wind technology via the Net Zero Innovation Programme (NZIP), which will provide £60 million of funding for technologies including floating offshore wind and radar mitigation. Each of these programmes includes an element of matched funding from the private sector. The effectiveness of these programmes will be considered as part of the wider benefits evaluation work of the NZIP.

The Government also awarded £3.12 million to the innovative ERM-Dolphin project in 2020, which will develop a floating wind farm to produce green hydrogen at scale with a target capacity of 4GW by 2032.

13th Jun 2022
To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, whether his Department has plans to support the expansion of the offshore wind industry to the south-east coast.

The Government set out in the British Energy Security Strategy its ambition to deliver up to 50GW of offshore wind by 2030. The South-East stands to benefit from the growth of this sector with, for example, RWE developing the 1.2GW Rampion 2 project off the Sussex coast.

9th Jun 2022
To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, what his Department's definition of a SME is; whether micro-businesses, defined as a business that contracts ten or fewer employees, are included in his Department’s SME programmes; and whether those programmes are adjusted to meet micro-businesses specific requirements.

There is no single formal definition of an SME used by the UK government in designing government schemes. Schemes have different eligibility criteria depending on their aims. All businesses, including micro-businesses can apply to government schemes if they believe they meet the eligibility criteria.

The Government provides a range of support that all businesses, including micro businesses can access. These include information on starting up and running a business on GOV.UK, one to one advice via our free Business Support Helpline and through 38 Growth Hubs across England, government backed Start-Up Loans, and businesses with 5 or more employees can access our Help to Grow schemes.

26th May 2022
To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, what plans his Department has to help increase the survival rate of micro-businesses in rural and isolated communities.

The Government is providing a range of support to help small and medium-sized businesses across the UK with rising costs, including those in rural communities. The Government has cut fuel duty for 12 months, raised the Employment Allowance to £5,000, and is zero-rating VAT on energy-saving materials. This builds on existing support, including business rates relief worth £7 billion over five years.

Additionally, Help to Grow programmes will enable eligible SMEs to mitigate the effects of rising costs by providing financial discounts on approved digital technologies up to a value of £5000 and improving SME leadership and management skills though subsidised courses.

17th Mar 2022
To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, what estimate his Department has made of price variations in the cost of units of gas and electricity between low use and high use periods; and what assessment his Department has made of the effect of that matter on average domestic fuel bills.

The setting of tariff rates, including the price variation between peak and off-peak periods for time-of-use tariffs such as Economy 7 is a commercial matter for individual supply companies. Electricity-only households who are on their supplier’s default or standard variable tariffs are protected by the energy price cap. The price cap methodology used by Ofgem enables a separate rate to be set for households who heat their homes using electric storage heaters. These households will also receive £200 discount on their electricity bill this autumn, as part of the Government’s package of support worth £9.1 billion to help domestic energy customers with the cost of rising energy bills.

22nd Jul 2021
To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, what steps his Department is taking to support businesses that are owed significant rent arrears as a result of the covid-19 outbreak.

The Government will introduce legislation to support the orderly resolution of rental payments accrued by commercial tenants affected by the pandemic. The legislation will ringfence rent debt accrued during the pandemic by businesses affected by enforced closures. The legislation will also set out a process of binding arbitration to be undertaken between landlords and tenants. This is to be used as a last resort after bilateral negotiations have been undertaken and only where landlords and tenants cannot otherwise come to a resolution.

24th Feb 2021
To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, what plans his Department has made for the transition away from table service in wet-led pubs as covid-19 restrictions are eased.

On 22nd February, my Rt. Hon. Friend the Prime Minister published the Government’s ‘COVID-19 Response - Spring 2021’. The roadmap is a step-by-step plan to ease restrictions in England.

With regard to the reopening of the hospitality sector, Step 2 will take place no earlier than 12 April, when hospitality venues will be able to open for outdoor service, with no requirement for a substantial meal to be served alongside alcoholic drinks, and no curfew. The requirement to order, eat and drink while seated (‘table service’) will remain.

20th Mar 2020
To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, if he will meet the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight and representatives of Solent LEP to discuss the future of MHI Vestas' site on the Isle of Wight.

I should be very happy to meet with the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight and representatives of Solent LEP, by teleconference, to discuss the future of the MHI Vestas’ site. My office will be in touch to arrange a suitable date.

17th Dec 2018
To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, how much funding his Department has allocated to programmes overseas that is not part of Official Development Assistance in each of the last three years; and how much such funding his Department plans to allocate in each of the next two years.

The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy’s expenditure in the last three years on overseas programmes that are not part of Official Development Assistance is set out in the table below.

2016-17 Actual

2017-18 Actual

2018-19 Year-to-Date

2018-19 Forecast

£591m

£575m

£355m

£515m

Funding for 2019/20 and periods covered by the Spending Review 19 have not yet been agreed.

5th Jan 2022
To ask the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, what steps her Department is taking to further support the tourism industry (a) on the Isle of Wight and (b) in other coastal communities.

As set out in the government’s Tourism Recovery Plan, we are committed to supporting the tourism industry’s return to pre-pandemic levels across England including the Isle of Wight and other coastal communities.

So far, the government has provided over £35 billion in support to the tourism, leisure and hospitality sectors over the course of the pandemic in the form of grants, loans and tax breaks.

The latest budget announcement also included a new temporary business rates relief for over 90% of eligible retail, hospitality and leisure businesses in England which will cut at least 50% off their business rates bills during the 2022-23 period which is worth almost £1.7 billion.

On 21 December 2021, HMT announced additional support for businesses who have been impacted by the Omicron variant across the UK, including one-off grants of up to £6,000 for hospitality and leisure premises, plus more than £100 million discretionary funding will be made available for local authorities to support other businesses.

VisitBritain (VB) promotes Isle of Wight and other coastal destinations on their websites, social media and through PR activity to ensure that when international travel resumes, visitors are inspired and informed on visiting our coastal towns and cities.

Coastal destinations were also supported via the Discover England Fund as part of the England’s Coast project. This was up to 2021 however VisitBritain continues to support their initiatives, through marketing, PR and business support.

5th Jan 2022
To ask the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, what support her Department can provide to incentivise major London-based arts institutes to undertake outreach to (a) the Isle of Wight, (b) coastal and (c) rural communities.

The Government is committed to promoting the arts and culture outside of London, and invests in culture across the country through Arts Council England.

Arts Council England’s ambition to ensure the arts are accessible to all is articulated in its ‘Let’s Create’ Strategy 2020-2030, which can be found on its website. The Arts Council encourages London-based organisations to have national reach and impact. It facilitates relationships across the country where there are synergies and/or particular opportunities, and supports organisations from major cities, including London, to share their work in rural areas. In addition, the Arts Council has identified the Isle of Wight as a priority area for increased engagement and investment.

A number of London-based National Portfolio Organisations (NPOs) work in the Isle of Wight as well as rural and coastal areas. One example includes The Reading Agency, which produces programmes delivered by libraries across the country.

10th Feb 2020
To ask the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, if he will make an assessment of the implications for his policies of the findings of the report entitled, Defending Our Data: Huawei, 5G and the Five Eyes published by the Henry Jackson Society in May 2019.

In reaching the final decision on high risk vendors, the Government took into consideration the full range of threats and risks informed by the technical and security expertise of the UK’s intelligence community, led by the National Cyber Security Centre, together with all relevant information, both public and classified, including that from international partners.

7th Feb 2020
To ask the Minister of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, with reference to the oral contribution of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Minister for the Cabinet Office, Official Report, 2 May 2019, column 364, what recent assessment he has made whether Huawei is a private company.

The government’s decision to categorise Huawei as a high risk vendor takes into consideration the potential links between Chinese companies and the Chinese State. And the limits we have imposed on the presence of all High Risk Vendors constitute some of the toughest security measures in the telecoms sector in the world.

We have unique insight through the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC), which was established in 2010. As a result of our work, we know more about Huawei, and the risks it poses, than any other country in the world. Huawei’s operations in the UK are subject to the strongest oversight possible. The company’s presence in the UK has been subject to detailed, formal oversight through the HCSEC, and the HCSEC Oversight Board which has reported annually since 2014.

5th Feb 2020
To ask the Minister of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, what criteria the Government is using to define the safety critical infrastructure that will be excluded from high risk telecommunications vendors.

As set out in the oral statement of 28 January by the Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, a high risk vendor is a vendor that poses greater security and resilience risks to UK telecoms. That statement also provided details of the non-exhaustive set of objective factors that were taken account of to assess a vendor as high risk. This set of factors has been further elaborated on in the National Cyber Security Centre’s advice on the use of equipment from high risk vendors in UK telecoms networks that was also published on 28 January and can be found on their website.

The NCSC also published a summary of the security analysis for the UK telecoms sector that informed the conclusions of the Government’s Telecoms Supply Chain Review. The summary notes that sensitive networks either route or have access to sensitive information, and include those directly relating to the operation of government or any safety-related systems and in wider critical national infrastructure. The summary of NCSC’s analysis can be found at: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/summary-of-ncsc-security-analysis-for-the-uk-telecoms-sector.

5th Feb 2020
To ask the Minister of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, with reference to the oral statement of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, of 28 January 2020, Official Report, column 709, on UK Telecommunications, what his Department's definition is of a high-risk vendor.

As set out in the oral statement of 28 January by the Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, a high risk vendor is a vendor that poses greater security and resilience risks to UK telecoms. That statement also provided details of the non-exhaustive set of objective factors that were taken account of to assess a vendor as high risk. This set of factors has been further elaborated on in the National Cyber Security Centre’s advice on the use of equipment from high risk vendors in UK telecoms networks that was also published on 28 January and can be found on their website.

The NCSC also published a summary of the security analysis for the UK telecoms sector that informed the conclusions of the Government’s Telecoms Supply Chain Review. The summary notes that sensitive networks either route or have access to sensitive information, and include those directly relating to the operation of government or any safety-related systems and in wider critical national infrastructure. The summary of NCSC’s analysis can be found at: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/summary-of-ncsc-security-analysis-for-the-uk-telecoms-sector.

5th Feb 2020
To ask the Minister of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, with reference to the Foreign Secretary's oral statement to the House of 27 January 2020 on Huawei, Official Report, coulum 533, for what reason the Government decided to give different permissions to high risk vendors for critical and non-critical cyber infrastructure.

The Government has complete confidence in the independent technical assessment of the UK’s security experts. The security analysis conducted by the National Cyber Security Centre underpinned the final conclusions of the Government’s Telecoms Supply Chain Review.

NCSC published a summary of its security analysis which informed the conclusions of the Review. This analysis includes a summary of NCSC’s assessment of the distinction between the ‘core’ and ‘edge’ of the network under section 8.3.1. The analysis states that:

“In 5G networks, core functions can be relocated nearer the ‘edge’ of the network. This has been described as blurring the line between core and edge. This is technically inaccurate as the ‘core’ is defined by a set of functions, standardised within [5], rather than a location. Consequently, the distinction between the two remains clear, as does the advice above. Our advice remains that HRVs are excluded from performing core functions, and this applies whether these functions are deployed centrally or towards the ‘edge’. Our understanding is that this clarification is unlikely to be consequential in the UK, as we are informed that core functions may run near the edge, but not actually on edge access equipment (such as base stations).”

The summary of NCSC’s security analysis can be found at: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/summary-of-ncsc-security-analysis-for-the-uk-telecoms-sector.

In reaching the final decision on high risk vendors, the UK Government took into consideration the full range of risks, including in relation to malicious code or programming errors.

Huawei’s presence in the UK has been subject to detailed, formal oversight through the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC), and we remain confident in these arrangements. However the Government recognises that HCSEC alone cannot mitigate all the risks, and that is why the final conclusions of the Telecoms Supply Chain Review - as announced on 28 January - set out the additional controls that should be applied to high risk vendors.

5th Feb 2020
To ask the Minister of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, what assessment he has made of the implications for his policies of the findings of the report by the Henry Jackson Society, entitled Defending our Data: Huawei, 5G and the Five Eyes, published on 16 May 2019.

The Telecoms Supply Chain Review included an international workstream to take account of the range of international positions so that they could be factored into UK decision-making.

In reaching the final decision on high risk vendors, the Government took into consideration the full range of threats and risks informed by the technical and security expertise of the UK’s intelligence community, led by the National Cyber Security Centre, together with all relevant information, both public and classified, including that from partners.

5th Feb 2020
To ask the Minister of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, what representations the Government has received from the (a) French Government, (b) Australian Government, (c) US Administration and (d) Czech Government on the safety of Huawei systems.

The Telecoms Supply Chain Review included an international workstream to take account of the range of international positions so that they could be factored into UK decision-making.

In reaching the final decision on high risk vendors, the Government took into consideration the full range of threats and risks informed by the technical and security expertise of the UK’s intelligence community, led by the National Cyber Security Centre, together with all relevant information, both public and classified, including that from partners.

5th Feb 2020
To ask the Minister of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, for what reasons the Government's assessment of the safety of Huawei systems is different to the assessments of those systems made by the (a) French Government, (b) Australian Government, (c) US Administration and (d) Czech Government.

The Telecoms Supply Chain Review included an international workstream to take account of the range of international positions so that they could be factored into UK decision-making.

In reaching the final decision on high risk vendors, the Government took into consideration the full range of threats and risks informed by the technical and security expertise of the UK’s intelligence community, led by the National Cyber Security Centre, together with all relevant information, both public and classified, including that from partners.

5th Feb 2020
To ask the Minister of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, what assessment his Department has made of the adequacy of the model provided by the UK Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre on mitigating the risks to UK national security of Huawei's involvement in the UK's critical networks.

The Government has complete confidence in the independent technical assessment of the UK’s security experts. The security analysis conducted by the National Cyber Security Centre underpinned the final conclusions of the Government’s Telecoms Supply Chain Review.

NCSC published a summary of its security analysis which informed the conclusions of the Review. This analysis includes a summary of NCSC’s assessment of the distinction between the ‘core’ and ‘edge’ of the network under section 8.3.1. The analysis states that:

“In 5G networks, core functions can be relocated nearer the ‘edge’ of the network. This has been described as blurring the line between core and edge. This is technically inaccurate as the ‘core’ is defined by a set of functions, standardised within [5], rather than a location. Consequently, the distinction between the two remains clear, as does the advice above. Our advice remains that HRVs are excluded from performing core functions, and this applies whether these functions are deployed centrally or towards the ‘edge’. Our understanding is that this clarification is unlikely to be consequential in the UK, as we are informed that core functions may run near the edge, but not actually on edge access equipment (such as base stations).”

The summary of NCSC’s security analysis can be found at: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/summary-of-ncsc-security-analysis-for-the-uk-telecoms-sector.

In reaching the final decision on high risk vendors, the UK Government took into consideration the full range of risks, including in relation to malicious code or programming errors.

Huawei’s presence in the UK has been subject to detailed, formal oversight through the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC), and we remain confident in these arrangements. However the Government recognises that HCSEC alone cannot mitigate all the risks, and that is why the final conclusions of the Telecoms Supply Chain Review - as announced on 28 January - set out the additional controls that should be applied to high risk vendors.

5th Feb 2020
To ask the Minister of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, what assessment his Department has made of the comments by former Chief of MI6, Sir Richard Dearlove in respect of the Government's UK Telecommunications strategy.

The Telecoms Supply Chain Review included an international workstream to take account of the range of international positions so that they could be factored into UK decision-making.

In reaching the final decision on high risk vendors, the Government took into consideration the full range of threats and risks informed by the technical and security expertise of the UK’s intelligence community, led by the National Cyber Security Centre, together with all relevant information, both public and classified, including that from partners.

5th Feb 2020
To ask the Minister of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, what assessment his Department has made of the adequacy of the UK Cyber experts' review of security risks in respect of the Government's proposed 5G solution.

The Government has complete confidence in the independent technical assessment of the UK’s security experts. The security analysis conducted by the National Cyber Security Centre underpinned the final conclusions of the Government’s Telecoms Supply Chain Review.

NCSC published a summary of its security analysis which informed the conclusions of the Review. This analysis includes a summary of NCSC’s assessment of the distinction between the ‘core’ and ‘edge’ of the network under section 8.3.1. The analysis states that:

“In 5G networks, core functions can be relocated nearer the ‘edge’ of the network. This has been described as blurring the line between core and edge. This is technically inaccurate as the ‘core’ is defined by a set of functions, standardised within [5], rather than a location. Consequently, the distinction between the two remains clear, as does the advice above. Our advice remains that HRVs are excluded from performing core functions, and this applies whether these functions are deployed centrally or towards the ‘edge’. Our understanding is that this clarification is unlikely to be consequential in the UK, as we are informed that core functions may run near the edge, but not actually on edge access equipment (such as base stations).”

The summary of NCSC’s security analysis can be found at: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/summary-of-ncsc-security-analysis-for-the-uk-telecoms-sector.

In reaching the final decision on high risk vendors, the UK Government took into consideration the full range of risks, including in relation to malicious code or programming errors.

Huawei’s presence in the UK has been subject to detailed, formal oversight through the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC), and we remain confident in these arrangements. However the Government recognises that HCSEC alone cannot mitigate all the risks, and that is why the final conclusions of the Telecoms Supply Chain Review - as announced on 28 January - set out the additional controls that should be applied to high risk vendors.

5th Feb 2020
To ask the Minister of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, what assessment he has made of whether Huawei has the ability to remove malicious code introduced by third-parties.

The Government has complete confidence in the independent technical assessment of the UK’s security experts. The security analysis conducted by the National Cyber Security Centre underpinned the final conclusions of the Government’s Telecoms Supply Chain Review.

NCSC published a summary of its security analysis which informed the conclusions of the Review. This analysis includes a summary of NCSC’s assessment of the distinction between the ‘core’ and ‘edge’ of the network under section 8.3.1. The analysis states that:

“In 5G networks, core functions can be relocated nearer the ‘edge’ of the network. This has been described as blurring the line between core and edge. This is technically inaccurate as the ‘core’ is defined by a set of functions, standardised within [5], rather than a location. Consequently, the distinction between the two remains clear, as does the advice above. Our advice remains that HRVs are excluded from performing core functions, and this applies whether these functions are deployed centrally or towards the ‘edge’. Our understanding is that this clarification is unlikely to be consequential in the UK, as we are informed that core functions may run near the edge, but not actually on edge access equipment (such as base stations).”

The summary of NCSC’s security analysis can be found at: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/summary-of-ncsc-security-analysis-for-the-uk-telecoms-sector.

In reaching the final decision on high risk vendors, the UK Government took into consideration the full range of risks, including in relation to malicious code or programming errors.

Huawei’s presence in the UK has been subject to detailed, formal oversight through the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC), and we remain confident in these arrangements. However the Government recognises that HCSEC alone cannot mitigate all the risks, and that is why the final conclusions of the Telecoms Supply Chain Review - as announced on 28 January - set out the additional controls that should be applied to high risk vendors.

5th Feb 2020
To ask the Minister of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, what assessment he has made of the durability of the distinction between core and periphery in the 5G network in respect of the Government's decision to limit Huawei's involvement to core aspects of that network.

The Government has complete confidence in the independent technical assessment of the UK’s security experts. The security analysis conducted by the National Cyber Security Centre underpinned the final conclusions of the Government’s Telecoms Supply Chain Review.

NCSC published a summary of its security analysis which informed the conclusions of the Review. This analysis includes a summary of NCSC’s assessment of the distinction between the ‘core’ and ‘edge’ of the network under section 8.3.1. The analysis states that:

“In 5G networks, core functions can be relocated nearer the ‘edge’ of the network. This has been described as blurring the line between core and edge. This is technically inaccurate as the ‘core’ is defined by a set of functions, standardised within [5], rather than a location. Consequently, the distinction between the two remains clear, as does the advice above. Our advice remains that HRVs are excluded from performing core functions, and this applies whether these functions are deployed centrally or towards the ‘edge’. Our understanding is that this clarification is unlikely to be consequential in the UK, as we are informed that core functions may run near the edge, but not actually on edge access equipment (such as base stations).”

The summary of NCSC’s security analysis can be found at: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/summary-of-ncsc-security-analysis-for-the-uk-telecoms-sector.

In reaching the final decision on high risk vendors, the UK Government took into consideration the full range of risks, including in relation to malicious code or programming errors.

Huawei’s presence in the UK has been subject to detailed, formal oversight through the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC), and we remain confident in these arrangements. However the Government recognises that HCSEC alone cannot mitigate all the risks, and that is why the final conclusions of the Telecoms Supply Chain Review - as announced on 28 January - set out the additional controls that should be applied to high risk vendors.

5th Feb 2020
To ask the Minister of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, what assessment he has made of the human rights implications of the decision to use of Huawei systems in the UK's 5G network.

The UK has been vocal in drawing attention to the systematic human rights violations against Uyghur Muslims and other ethnic minorities in China. Ministers and senior officials regularly raise our concerns both directly with the Chinese and multilaterally. On 29 October, at the UN Third Committee, the UK read out a joint statement, on behalf of 22 other countries, drawing attention to the human rights violations in Xinjiang and calling on China to uphold its obligations to respect human rights. The UK also co-hosted an event on Xinjiang during the UN General Assembly in September.

The Government has also set out its expectations of businesses in the UK National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights and continues to encourage all British businesses to undertake appropriate levels of due diligence before deciding to do business or invest in foreign companies. The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights advises UK companies to respect human rights wherever they operate including adopting appropriate due diligence policies to identify, prevent and mitigate human rights risks, and commit to monitoring and evaluating implementation

13th Mar 2019
To ask the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, what the timescale is for the conclusion and response to the Telcoms Supply Chain Review.

The Telecoms Supply Chain Review is progressing to schedule and due to be completed by spring 2019.

14th Sep 2017
To ask the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, if she will make an assessment of the potential merits of giving additional powers to local authorities to review, amend and revoke betting premises' licences for establishments with fixed-odds betting terminals which those authorities consider to be detrimental to their local communities.

The Government announced a review of gaming machines and social responsibility measures in 2016 to ensure that we have the right balance between a sector that can grow and contribute to the economy, and one that is socially responsible and doing all it can to protect consumers and wider communities. We hope to publish the findings of the review by October at the earliest.

3rd Jul 2023
To ask the Secretary of State for Education, whether her Department has made an assessment of the potential merits of increasing funding to help support the recruitment and retention of staff in further education colleges.

The department is making significant investments to support the recruitment and retention of high-quality teachers. The Spending Review 2021 made an extra £1.6 billion available for 16-19 education in the 2024/25 financial year, compared with 2021/22. We are investing £125 million of available funds in the 2023/24 financial year for 16-19 education to increase the national funding rate by 2.2% from £4,542 to £4,642, and boost specific programme cost weightings by 10%, to support the additional costs of recruiting and retaining teachers in construction, manufacturing, engineering, and digital subject areas.

The department is supporting teacher recruitment in the sector through a national campaign to encourage industry professionals to become further education (FE) teachers. We have supported the creation of new, high-quality routes into FE teaching, including a revised Level 5 Learning and Skills Teacher apprenticeship for those planning to work in the FE sector. We are providing bursaries worth up to £29,000 each, tax free, to support FE teacher training in priority subject areas for the 2023/24 academic year.

Our Taking Teaching Further (TTF) programme has supported around 1,000 people to retrain as FE teachers since it launched in 2018. In addition, the department is piloting a new £6,000 financial incentive for TTF recruits teaching in some of the most hard-to-fill subject areas, including digital, construction and the built environment, engineering and manufacturing, and maths.

15th Mar 2023
To ask the Secretary of State for Education, what recent estimate she has made of the number of children who were registered at schools in England before the covid-19 outbreak and who, having deregistered during that outbreak, are now once more entered on school rolls.

The information is not readily available and could only be obtained at disproportionate cost.

15th Mar 2023
To ask the Secretary of State for Education, what recent estimate she has made of the number of children who were registered at schools in England prior to the covid-19 outbreak and who are no longer registered for reasons other than having passed statutory school age.

The information is not readily available and could only be obtained at disproportionate cost.

15th Mar 2023
To ask the Secretary of State for Education, what estimate she has made of the number of children living in the Isle of Wight who were registered at a school prior to the covid-19 outbreak and who are no longer registered for reasons other than having exceeded statutory school age.

The information is not readily available and could only be obtained at disproportionate cost.

27th Feb 2023
To ask the Secretary of State for Education, if her Department will provide schools on the Isle of Wight with funding for systematic synthetic phonics programmes.

In 2018, the Department launched the £26.3 million English Hubs Programme, which is dedicated to improving the teaching of reading, with a focus on supporting children making the slowest progress in reading, many of whom come from disadvantaged backgrounds.

The 34 English Hubs in the programme are primary schools which are outstanding at teaching early reading. A further £17 million has been allocated for this school to school improvement programme, which focusses on systematic synthetic phonics, early language, and reading for pleasure.

Schools on the Isle of Wight may contact their nearest English Hub, Springhill Catholic Primary, if they wish to receive funding support for phonics. The hub has, so far, recruited one partner school on the Isle of Wight and is actively reaching out to other eligible schools, including planning an Isle of Wight specific engagement event in the coming term.

24th May 2022
To ask the Secretary of State for Education, if he will introduce skilled, sustainable and vocationally appropriate courses to replace the low-quality courses he plans to remove.

The department is revitalising the technical education system by introducing T Levels that are backed and designed by employers to get people into skilled work and further training. T Levels are at the centre of our long-term reforms to technical education, building on the recommendations in the Sainsbury Report, published in 2016. Alongside the introduction of T Levels, the department is reviewing post-16 qualifications at level 3 and below. We have withdrawn funding approval for more than 5,000 qualifications that had no or low enrolments. The next phase of our reforms is to remove qualifications that overlap with T Levels for 16 to 19 year olds, which will reduce complexity for young people and employers.

The department is also reviewing the qualifications that sit alongside A levels and T Levels at level 3 and below. Our reforms will ensure that all students have confidence that every qualification is a high-quality option, and that it supports their progression to employment or further study, including higher education.

Alex Burghart
Shadow Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster