Bob Seely

On 22nd February, my Rt. Hon. Friend the Prime Minister published the Government’s ‘COVID-19 Response - Spring 2021’. The roadmap is a step-by-step plan to ease restrictions in England.

With regard to the reopening of the hospitality sector, Step 2 will take place no earlier than 12 April, when hospitality venues will be able to open for outdoor service, with no requirement for a substantial meal to be served alongside alcoholic drinks, and no curfew. The requirement to order, eat and drink while seated (‘table service’) will remain.

I should be very happy to meet with the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight and representatives of Solent LEP, by teleconference, to discuss the future of the MHI Vestas’ site. My office will be in touch to arrange a suitable date.

As set out in the oral statement of 28 January by the Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, a high risk vendor is a vendor that poses greater security and resilience risks to UK telecoms. That statement also provided details of the non-exhaustive set of objective factors that were taken account of to assess a vendor as high risk. This set of factors has been further elaborated on in the National Cyber Security Centre’s advice on the use of equipment from high risk vendors in UK telecoms networks that was also published on 28 January and can be found on their website.

The NCSC also published a summary of the security analysis for the UK telecoms sector that informed the conclusions of the Government’s Telecoms Supply Chain Review. The summary notes that sensitive networks either route or have access to sensitive information, and include those directly relating to the operation of government or any safety-related systems and in wider critical national infrastructure. The summary of NCSC’s analysis can be found at: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/summary-of-ncsc-security-analysis-for-the-uk-telecoms-sector.

The Government has complete confidence in the independent technical assessment of the UK’s security experts. The security analysis conducted by the National Cyber Security Centre underpinned the final conclusions of the Government’s Telecoms Supply Chain Review.

NCSC published a summary of its security analysis which informed the conclusions of the Review. This analysis includes a summary of NCSC’s assessment of the distinction between the ‘core’ and ‘edge’ of the network under section 8.3.1. The analysis states that:

“In 5G networks, core functions can be relocated nearer the ‘edge’ of the network. This has been described as blurring the line between core and edge. This is technically inaccurate as the ‘core’ is defined by a set of functions, standardised within [5], rather than a location. Consequently, the distinction between the two remains clear, as does the advice above. Our advice remains that HRVs are excluded from performing core functions, and this applies whether these functions are deployed centrally or towards the ‘edge’. Our understanding is that this clarification is unlikely to be consequential in the UK, as we are informed that core functions may run near the edge, but not actually on edge access equipment (such as base stations).”

The summary of NCSC’s security analysis can be found at: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/summary-of-ncsc-security-analysis-for-the-uk-telecoms-sector.

In reaching the final decision on high risk vendors, the UK Government took into consideration the full range of risks, including in relation to malicious code or programming errors.

Huawei’s presence in the UK has been subject to detailed, formal oversight through the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC), and we remain confident in these arrangements. However the Government recognises that HCSEC alone cannot mitigate all the risks, and that is why the final conclusions of the Telecoms Supply Chain Review - as announced on 28 January - set out the additional controls that should be applied to high risk vendors.

The Telecoms Supply Chain Review included an international workstream to take account of the range of international positions so that they could be factored into UK decision-making.

In reaching the final decision on high risk vendors, the Government took into consideration the full range of threats and risks informed by the technical and security expertise of the UK’s intelligence community, led by the National Cyber Security Centre, together with all relevant information, both public and classified, including that from partners.

The Telecoms Supply Chain Review included an international workstream to take account of the range of international positions so that they could be factored into UK decision-making.

In reaching the final decision on high risk vendors, the Government took into consideration the full range of threats and risks informed by the technical and security expertise of the UK’s intelligence community, led by the National Cyber Security Centre, together with all relevant information, both public and classified, including that from partners.

The Telecoms Supply Chain Review included an international workstream to take account of the range of international positions so that they could be factored into UK decision-making.

In reaching the final decision on high risk vendors, the Government took into consideration the full range of threats and risks informed by the technical and security expertise of the UK’s intelligence community, led by the National Cyber Security Centre, together with all relevant information, both public and classified, including that from partners.

The Government has complete confidence in the independent technical assessment of the UK’s security experts. The security analysis conducted by the National Cyber Security Centre underpinned the final conclusions of the Government’s Telecoms Supply Chain Review.

NCSC published a summary of its security analysis which informed the conclusions of the Review. This analysis includes a summary of NCSC’s assessment of the distinction between the ‘core’ and ‘edge’ of the network under section 8.3.1. The analysis states that:

“In 5G networks, core functions can be relocated nearer the ‘edge’ of the network. This has been described as blurring the line between core and edge. This is technically inaccurate as the ‘core’ is defined by a set of functions, standardised within [5], rather than a location. Consequently, the distinction between the two remains clear, as does the advice above. Our advice remains that HRVs are excluded from performing core functions, and this applies whether these functions are deployed centrally or towards the ‘edge’. Our understanding is that this clarification is unlikely to be consequential in the UK, as we are informed that core functions may run near the edge, but not actually on edge access equipment (such as base stations).”

The summary of NCSC’s security analysis can be found at: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/summary-of-ncsc-security-analysis-for-the-uk-telecoms-sector.

In reaching the final decision on high risk vendors, the UK Government took into consideration the full range of risks, including in relation to malicious code or programming errors.

Huawei’s presence in the UK has been subject to detailed, formal oversight through the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC), and we remain confident in these arrangements. However the Government recognises that HCSEC alone cannot mitigate all the risks, and that is why the final conclusions of the Telecoms Supply Chain Review - as announced on 28 January - set out the additional controls that should be applied to high risk vendors.

The Telecoms Supply Chain Review included an international workstream to take account of the range of international positions so that they could be factored into UK decision-making.

In reaching the final decision on high risk vendors, the Government took into consideration the full range of threats and risks informed by the technical and security expertise of the UK’s intelligence community, led by the National Cyber Security Centre, together with all relevant information, both public and classified, including that from partners.

The Government has complete confidence in the independent technical assessment of the UK’s security experts. The security analysis conducted by the National Cyber Security Centre underpinned the final conclusions of the Government’s Telecoms Supply Chain Review.

NCSC published a summary of its security analysis which informed the conclusions of the Review. This analysis includes a summary of NCSC’s assessment of the distinction between the ‘core’ and ‘edge’ of the network under section 8.3.1. The analysis states that:

“In 5G networks, core functions can be relocated nearer the ‘edge’ of the network. This has been described as blurring the line between core and edge. This is technically inaccurate as the ‘core’ is defined by a set of functions, standardised within [5], rather than a location. Consequently, the distinction between the two remains clear, as does the advice above. Our advice remains that HRVs are excluded from performing core functions, and this applies whether these functions are deployed centrally or towards the ‘edge’. Our understanding is that this clarification is unlikely to be consequential in the UK, as we are informed that core functions may run near the edge, but not actually on edge access equipment (such as base stations).”

The summary of NCSC’s security analysis can be found at: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/summary-of-ncsc-security-analysis-for-the-uk-telecoms-sector.

In reaching the final decision on high risk vendors, the UK Government took into consideration the full range of risks, including in relation to malicious code or programming errors.

Huawei’s presence in the UK has been subject to detailed, formal oversight through the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC), and we remain confident in these arrangements. However the Government recognises that HCSEC alone cannot mitigate all the risks, and that is why the final conclusions of the Telecoms Supply Chain Review - as announced on 28 January - set out the additional controls that should be applied to high risk vendors.

The Government has complete confidence in the independent technical assessment of the UK’s security experts. The security analysis conducted by the National Cyber Security Centre underpinned the final conclusions of the Government’s Telecoms Supply Chain Review.

NCSC published a summary of its security analysis which informed the conclusions of the Review. This analysis includes a summary of NCSC’s assessment of the distinction between the ‘core’ and ‘edge’ of the network under section 8.3.1. The analysis states that:

“In 5G networks, core functions can be relocated nearer the ‘edge’ of the network. This has been described as blurring the line between core and edge. This is technically inaccurate as the ‘core’ is defined by a set of functions, standardised within [5], rather than a location. Consequently, the distinction between the two remains clear, as does the advice above. Our advice remains that HRVs are excluded from performing core functions, and this applies whether these functions are deployed centrally or towards the ‘edge’. Our understanding is that this clarification is unlikely to be consequential in the UK, as we are informed that core functions may run near the edge, but not actually on edge access equipment (such as base stations).”

The summary of NCSC’s security analysis can be found at: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/summary-of-ncsc-security-analysis-for-the-uk-telecoms-sector.

In reaching the final decision on high risk vendors, the UK Government took into consideration the full range of risks, including in relation to malicious code or programming errors.

Huawei’s presence in the UK has been subject to detailed, formal oversight through the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC), and we remain confident in these arrangements. However the Government recognises that HCSEC alone cannot mitigate all the risks, and that is why the final conclusions of the Telecoms Supply Chain Review - as announced on 28 January - set out the additional controls that should be applied to high risk vendors.

The Government has complete confidence in the independent technical assessment of the UK’s security experts. The security analysis conducted by the National Cyber Security Centre underpinned the final conclusions of the Government’s Telecoms Supply Chain Review.

NCSC published a summary of its security analysis which informed the conclusions of the Review. This analysis includes a summary of NCSC’s assessment of the distinction between the ‘core’ and ‘edge’ of the network under section 8.3.1. The analysis states that:

“In 5G networks, core functions can be relocated nearer the ‘edge’ of the network. This has been described as blurring the line between core and edge. This is technically inaccurate as the ‘core’ is defined by a set of functions, standardised within [5], rather than a location. Consequently, the distinction between the two remains clear, as does the advice above. Our advice remains that HRVs are excluded from performing core functions, and this applies whether these functions are deployed centrally or towards the ‘edge’. Our understanding is that this clarification is unlikely to be consequential in the UK, as we are informed that core functions may run near the edge, but not actually on edge access equipment (such as base stations).”

The summary of NCSC’s security analysis can be found at: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/summary-of-ncsc-security-analysis-for-the-uk-telecoms-sector.

In reaching the final decision on high risk vendors, the UK Government took into consideration the full range of risks, including in relation to malicious code or programming errors.

Huawei’s presence in the UK has been subject to detailed, formal oversight through the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC), and we remain confident in these arrangements. However the Government recognises that HCSEC alone cannot mitigate all the risks, and that is why the final conclusions of the Telecoms Supply Chain Review - as announced on 28 January - set out the additional controls that should be applied to high risk vendors.

The UK has been vocal in drawing attention to the systematic human rights violations against Uyghur Muslims and other ethnic minorities in China. Ministers and senior officials regularly raise our concerns both directly with the Chinese and multilaterally. On 29 October, at the UN Third Committee, the UK read out a joint statement, on behalf of 22 other countries, drawing attention to the human rights violations in Xinjiang and calling on China to uphold its obligations to respect human rights. The UK also co-hosted an event on Xinjiang during the UN General Assembly in September.

The Government has also set out its expectations of businesses in the UK National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights and continues to encourage all British businesses to undertake appropriate levels of due diligence before deciding to do business or invest in foreign companies. The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights advises UK companies to respect human rights wherever they operate including adopting appropriate due diligence policies to identify, prevent and mitigate human rights risks, and commit to monitoring and evaluating implementation

The department is revitalising the technical education system by introducing T Levels that are backed and designed by employers to get people into skilled work and further training. T Levels are at the centre of our long-term reforms to technical education, building on the recommendations in the Sainsbury Report, published in 2016. Alongside the introduction of T Levels, the department is reviewing post-16 qualifications at level 3 and below. We have withdrawn funding approval for more than 5,000 qualifications that had no or low enrolments. The next phase of our reforms is to remove qualifications that overlap with T Levels for 16 to 19 year olds, which will reduce complexity for young people and employers.

The department is also reviewing the qualifications that sit alongside A levels and T Levels at level 3 and below. Our reforms will ensure that all students have confidence that every qualification is a high-quality option, and that it supports their progression to employment or further study, including higher education.

Funding for schools in the Isle of Wight, through the dedicated schools grant (DSG) and the indicative figures for the schools’ supplementary grant for mainstream schools combined, is forecast to rise by £4 million in the 2022-23 financial year, an increase of 6.0% per pupil. This per pupil funding increase excludes ‘growth’ funding, which is additional funding, provided for schools seeing significant increases in pupil numbers. This takes total funding for the 2022-23 financial year in the Isle of Wight to over £83.2 million.

On top of this funding, over £100 million of funding will be made available to support Education Investment Areas, including the Isle of Wight.

The table below shows the funding per pupil in the Isle of Wight, compared to the national average:

The funding per pupil from the financial years 2017-18 to 2022-23 is through the DSG (actual funding received) but from the 2019-20 financial year onwards, excludes growth funding. To note, in the 2021-22 financial year, the funding per pupil includes the teachers’ pay and pensions grant that was rolled into the national funding formula (NFF) and for the 2022-23 financial year, additional funding from the supplementary grant is included into the funding per pupil figure.

Funding per pupil for the Isle of Wight has been lower than the national average because the NFF directs resources to schools with more pupils with additional needs, such as those indicated by measures of deprivation, low prior attainment, or English as an additional language, to help them meet the needs of all their pupils. In addition, schools in more expensive areas, like London, attract higher funding per pupil than other parts of the country to reflect the higher costs they face. This also affects the national average funding per pupil figures in the table above.

Funding for schools in the Isle of Wight, through the dedicated schools grant (DSG) and the indicative figures for the schools’ supplementary grant for mainstream schools combined, is forecast to rise by £4 million in the 2022-23 financial year, an increase of 6.0% per pupil. This per pupil funding increase excludes ‘growth’ funding, which is additional funding, provided for schools seeing significant increases in pupil numbers. This takes total funding for the 2022-23 financial year in the Isle of Wight to over £83.2 million.

On top of this funding, over £100 million of funding will be made available to support Education Investment Areas, including the Isle of Wight.

The table below shows the funding per pupil in the Isle of Wight, compared to the national average:

The funding per pupil from the financial years 2017-18 to 2022-23 is through the DSG (actual funding received) but from the 2019-20 financial year onwards, excludes growth funding. To note, in the 2021-22 financial year, the funding per pupil includes the teachers’ pay and pensions grant that was rolled into the national funding formula (NFF) and for the 2022-23 financial year, additional funding from the supplementary grant is included into the funding per pupil figure.

Funding per pupil for the Isle of Wight has been lower than the national average because the NFF directs resources to schools with more pupils with additional needs, such as those indicated by measures of deprivation, low prior attainment, or English as an additional language, to help them meet the needs of all their pupils. In addition, schools in more expensive areas, like London, attract higher funding per pupil than other parts of the country to reflect the higher costs they face. This also affects the national average funding per pupil figures in the table above.

Overall absence data is collected in the termly school census collection and figures for January 2022 are not yet available at this time. Full year figures for the 2020/21 academic year will be available from 24 March 2022, including by amount of absence.

The department currently publishes on-site attendance and COVID-19-related absence data at a national level on a fortnightly basis and at a local authority level on a half-termly basis. Data covering 31 January 2022 will be published routinely, on this basis.

The latest published local authority level data ends in Week 50 2021. During the 2021 autumn term, at a national level, on average 89.8% of pupils were in attendance on-site and 2.3% were absent for COVID-19-related reasons. Over the same period, on the Isle of Wight, 88.5% of pupils were in attendance on-site and 2.9% were absent for COVID-19-related reasons.

The full most recent national, regional and local authority data can be found here: https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/attendance-in-education-and-early-years-settings-during-the-coronavirus-covid-19-outbreak.

National level pupil data can be found in Table 1B of the underlying data files, whilst local authority data can be found in Table 1C.

The daily education settings survey asks schools and colleges to report data such as on-site attendance and COVID-19 absence.

The most recent published data at national level is 20 January 2022 and can be found here: https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/attendance-in-education-and-early-years-settings-during-the-coronavirus-covid-19-outbreak.

It is more crucial than ever before that we tap into the brilliant talent that our country has to offer, and make sure that university places are available to all who are qualified by ability and attainment to pursue them, and who wish to do so.

It was announced in December 2021 that a proposal led by Solent University, in collaboration with the Isle of Wight College amongst others, has been successful in the government’s £120 million competition to establish the next wave of innovative new Institutes of Technology across the country, offering higher technical STEM education and training mainly at levels 4 and 5.

Although there are no immediate plans to expand the provision of higher education to other isolated areas and island communities, this government is committed to a sustainable funding model that supports high-quality provision, which meets the skills needs of the country and maintains the world-class reputation of UK higher education.

The Government supports a competitive agri-food supply chain that provides opportunities for all businesses, including farmers, processors and abattoirs. We are working across government, with industry and stakeholders to ensure that the UK maintains its high-quality slaughtering facilities within a robust and competitive market providing options for farmers particularly in rural and isolated communities and reducing animal welfare impacts.

The Food Standards Agency is working closely with a business in England who are looking to introduce a mobile slaughter unit which will service local suppliers and support the rural economy. If this model can meet regulatory requirements and is deemed viable it could be replicated in other parts of the country where facilities for slaughter are in decline.