National Security and Investment Bill

Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts Excerpts

Report stage
Thursday 15th April 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, since this is the first time I have spoken at this stage of the Bill, I add my thanks to those of my noble friend Lord Lansley to the members of the ministerial team and the Bill team for the time they have given and the meetings we have had to clarify and sort out the delicate balance we are all trying to achieve and the changes being made, which are part of the amendments in this group.

I will focus my remarks on Amendment 8, which returns to whether minority investor veto rights automatically bring the investment in question into the provisions of the Bill. It was an issue I addressed in Amendment 29 in its previous incarnation, along with Amendment 72. I found the Government’s arguments about Amendment 72 entirely convincing, so I have not retabled it, but I am not able to say the same about the response I received to Amendment 29, so I have retabled it and have discussed it with the Law Society, which seems similarly confused.

This is important because if we do not get clarity on this issue, there are at least two possible consequences: a potentially large increase in the number of voluntary notifications required, so further straining the system which the department is setting up, and/or a deterrent effect on people’s readiness to invest in the defined sectors of our economy.

I explained in Committee that a private equity investment essentially has two parts. There is the purchase of the shares, which will take place under the standard provisions of the Companies Act, and that is where the control of the entity lies. In parallel, it will be supplemented by a specially drafted, custom-made investment agreement. This is an agreement which both parties—the investee company and the investor—hope will be put into a drawer and never looked at again but, life being what it is, disagreements take place and the agreement is therefore essentially a protective device for the investor against malfeasance or bad performance by the managers of the company. The Minister needs to understand that it is essentially an agreement about corporate governance, not corporate law, which is how the company is controlled. That investment agreement is likely to require the investor’s consent to a number of major issues, such as approval of the budget, major capital expenditure proposals and so on.

When I describe it like this, it can be seen that these are protective provisions, not proactive initiating ones, but although they are protective, they are extensive, and this is where the use of the words “substantially all” in Clause 8(7) becomes significant. If that is the case, the Bill appears to bring within its ambit a range of private equity investments where the new investor has taken a minority position. It might be assumed that the new investor will be taking a minority position for malfeasance reasons, but there are a large number of reasons why private equity houses do not wish to buy 100% of a company. It may be that the existing management will not sell more than 50%. It may be that the new investor wishes the continuing management to have a real incentive to do well, and therefore likes it to have a larger stake. Last but not least, it may be that the investor has a maximum size of investment he can make and that determines the percentage that the investor can hold. So if you have an investor who can put up only £40 million and the company is worth £100 million, it can take only 40% because that is how the maths work out.

The new investors who are in a minority position need additional protections, and if they can obtain those protections only after making a notification then there are these consequences of more voluntary notifications and some diminution in the attractiveness of the sectors covered by the Bill. That does not seem a desirable outcome.

I have said that significant changes to a company’s status come about not from the investment agreement, but as a result of passages of ordinary or extraordinary resolutions under the Companies Act. Amendment 28 is therefore designed to remove some of the wording of Clause 8(6), which is untried, untested and, at least in the view of a number of law firms, open to interpretation, and replace it with company law provisions with which everyone is familiar.

When winding up the debate on this amendment on 9 March, the Minister said, “I believe that his”—that is my—

“intent is very much to seek to exclude acquisitions of minority veto rights from constituting trigger events.”

So far, so good. He then went on to say:

“However, the Government consider that the Bill already achieves this goal to some extent”—[Official Report, 9/3/21; col. GC 637-38.]


because of the provisions of subsection (7). That is the heart of the matter. The concern of the Law Society and others is that the Bill creates uncertainty where no uncertainty need exist. That uncertainty can easily be dispelled if we use familiar company law concepts.

To summarise, I argue that if no change is made to guard against these uncertainties, legal advisers to private equity investors can be expected to take a belt-and-braces approach and suggest that on all occasions a voluntary notification should be made. When he comes to reply, I invite the Minister either to say that the Government believe that minority investor rights are not covered by the Bill so that we are all clear about that or, if he cannot say that, to please agree to take a further look at it to try to create certainty and dispel uncertainty, and therefore further ensure that we get the right balance between personal property rights and the nation’s security.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak to the Government’s amendment and to Amendment 8 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, but, as regards Amendment 2, the questions raised by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, are valid and it is rather inexplicable that that subsection of Clause 8 is not included in Clause 6.

When we debated the thresholds for the trigger for mandatory notification, the noble Lord, Lord Leigh—I am sure he will get many tributes today for having pushed the envelope and succeeded in having the Government agree with him—raised issues about 15% versus 25%. The principal arguments were that keeping it at 15% would result in a huge number of notifications, the vast majority of which would not give rise to national security concerns, which would place a significant administrative burden on the new investment screening unit, and that that the current filing threshold of 15%, as set out in the Bill, is significantly below the threshold used in a number of other major foreign direct investment regimes such as France, which requires 25%, Australia which requires 20% and Canada which requires 33.3%. I am delighted that the mandatory notification threshold has been increased to 25%, which was the threshold set out originally in the White Paper. I think the Government’s reversion to their original intent is very much to be welcomed.

As regards Amendment 8, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, not having practised company law for many years now, I can only admire his forensic ability in setting out exactly why we need greater clarity under that provision. He has illustrated that the current language does not provide that level of clarity. In his words, it does not dispel uncertainty, but the language in his Amendment 8 certainly would. I believe it is only in the Government’s and the ISU’s interest to acknowledge that, and I very much hope the Government will accede to his request to provide clarity, either by accepting his amendment or by giving assurance that they will look at it further and take that forward at Third Reading.

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[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)]

The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, has withdrawn from the debate, so I call the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, I have put my name to Amendments 11 and 12, tabled by my noble friend Lady Noakes, which concern mandatory notifications, as she made clear. However, I am equally enthusiastic about Amendment 13, tabled by my noble friend Lord Lansley—even though I have not put my name to it—which addresses voluntary issues as well.

I will add a couple of points in support of these two approaches. As my noble friend made clear on Amendments 11 and 12, the use of the phrase “practicable” or “reasonably practicable”—it is not clear why we have one in one place and one in another—has come in for some pretty widespread criticism. As we have discussed before and heard from various legal advisers, the word “possible” would be a big improvement on “practicable”.

Mandatory notifications will be at the sharp end of the Bill and can be expected in many cases to be controversial. There will be a temptation for a Secretary of State, faced with a controversial decision, to try to delay it. It is common ground that, while we need to take appropriate steps to protect our national security interests, it is also in our national economic interest to encourage as much investment as possible in the chosen 17 sectors which will collectively have a significant impact on our economic future.

With great respect, I understand what the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, is trying to say, but the reality is that this is a balance; if we are in a competitive market around the world for investment and are unable to balance it properly, people will go elsewhere. It is as simple as that. Her idea of having an open-ended arrangement for the Secretary of State to make up his or her mind is a recipe for an outflow of investment which might otherwise come here to support this country, with its worldwide reputation in tech and other sectors.

On my noble friend Lord Lansley’s amendment on voluntary notifications, we have been around this course many times before; there will be a substantial flow and the new unit at BEIS may find it difficult to cope. In Committee, we discussed a number of amendments to try to help the Government with this and focus the new regime on the really significant cases. Amendments by various Members of your Lordships’ House, including me, proposed inter alia to exclude intra-group investments, to require only one trigger event for each group of companies and to limit notifications to assets used in connection with activities carried on in the UK—in other words, to limit the extraterritoriality of this Bill’s provisions.

The Government declined to accept any of these, arguing that they needed the widest possible strategic view to prevent evasive tactics by unwelcome purchasers. I must accept the force of that argument, but it means the Government must live with the consequences of those decisions. To provide an appropriate level of certainty for investors, we simply cannot risk a situation where, if a flood of voluntary notifications occurs, the Government could decline to start the 30-day clock.

In his concluding remarks, my noble friend may refer to Amendment 27, which the Government have tabled, about the contents of the annual report. If it is accepted by the House, as I expect it will be, it will include details of the number of days taken to give a decision, or the time taken to reach a voluntary notification. I do not want to add to the points the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, made, but I have to say to my noble friend that it is really shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted to be told, a year later, that we have not been able to hit the targets or that they are being missed widely. There is nothing wrong with that, but we are trying to create a balanced regime that hits the ground running, and to learn, a year later, that “the system is overwhelmed”, which a number of us in this Chamber feel is likely to happen, is simply not an adequate answer.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, set out his view of a balance, and I will set out another dichotomy—between thoroughness and timeliness. I do not think any of us in the Chamber are asking for this process to be less thorough. I think we are all saying we want a thorough process. But that thoroughness cannot be at the expense of timeliness, which is what these amendments are seeking to establish.

I do not think it is the Government’s intention to sow the market with uncertainty; I am absolutely sure that is not the intention of the Bill or this element of it. However, we all know that once things get written into law, they move into a departmental process and there is a unit dealing with this, unless there are specific guidelines on achieving timeliness, things will drag and take time. Departmental clocks can run at a different speed to business clocks. We should be clear that that will cost jobs and opportunities, because the longer a transaction takes, the longer it is in play, the fewer opportunities those companies have and the more threat there is for them. This is particularly clear in sales out of distress and in businesses that are already in play. Once they are in play, they become victims of exploitation, and the longer this department maintains a business in play through this process, the more danger those businesses are in.

The Government’s “intent” has come up many times in speeches, and that is an important element here. The way this Bill is currently drafted does not reveal an intent for rapid resolution. It does not reveal an understanding of the importance of timeliness, and that is what these amendments seek to establish.

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[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I shall move the amendment and speak to Amendments 16 and 17 in my name. I thank my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for adding their names. I have also added my name to Amendment 18 in the group, in the name of my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbots.

My amendments are probing amendments, following the interesting stand part debate that we held in Committee on Clause 30, which gives the Government extraordinarily wide powers to give financial assistance. The Minister’s response in Committee raised as many questions as he answered and we have therefore tabled amendments to gain further enlightenment.

There is no constraint on the ability to provide financial assistance in the Bill, other than that it can be only

“in consequence of the making of a final order”.

My noble friend the Minister sought to reassure us that this was

“not a general compensation scheme”

and would be used only in exceptional cases. The Minister said the power

“will only be used in instances where the public interest, particularly national security interests, require it”.

Later, he said that

“the nature of national security makes it very hard to predict where some of these issues might arise. However, where they do and where national security is an issue, it is important that the power is there”.—[Official Report, 16/3/21; cols. 223-26.]

I was puzzled by this. Is national security a necessary condition for the use of the power or not? Our horrible hybrid working practices mean it is not easy to pursue questions in Committee when the Minister gives answers, so I tabled Amendment 15 to explore this further.

Amendment 15 adds to Clause 30(1) the words “if he or she”—that is, the Secretary of State—

“considers that there is a risk to national security”,

so that the financial assistance power could be used only if it were necessary on national security grounds. There could easily be other grounds for giving financial assistance—for example, if we had an industrial strategy, which I am definitely not advocating. I do not believe it would be appropriate to allow considerations broader than national security to underpin financial assistance under this Bill. If my noble friend the Minister thinks anything beyond national security could be involved, I suggest he needs to explain to the House what those circumstances could possibly be.

Amendment 16 takes out some words from Clause 30(2) so that financial assistance can be provided only by way of loans, guarantees or indemnities. The current wording allows practically anything under the sun and certainly allows grants and soft money. My noble friend the Minister will know that I am deeply sceptical about giving a Government powers to throw taxpayers’ money around. Powers such as these, drafted with good intent, can end up being used as cover for politically expedient expenditure. The best way to stop that happening is not to have the power in statute, as it is too much of a temptation and, even if I trust the current Government to act responsibly, which of course I do, I would not trust Governments of a different party—if we were unlucky enough to experience that again.

Lastly, Amendment 17 says that financial assistance has to be provided on arm’s-length terms. I should probably have drafted this in terms only of loans, guarantees or indemnities, as I do not think that subsidies or grants—which I am sure my noble friend the Minister will tell me he needs the power to provide—can ever be on arm’s-length terms. I was prompted to table this by what my noble friend the Minister said in Committee:

“For example, if the Government provided a loan, it would normally have to be at market rates.”—[Official Report, 16/3/21; col. 224.]


I hate weasel words such as “normally” almost as much as I hate throwing taxpayers’ money around in non-commercial transactions. I therefore ask my noble friend the Minister to say a little more about the boundary between commercial and non-commercial terms for assistance given under Clause 30. What will drive the use of market rates and, I hope, market terms and conditions? What criteria would be used for abandoning arm’s-length terms?

I would have preferred not to have this broad and undefined power sitting on the statute book, because it implies an intent to provide financial assistance. The Government could have relied on the Appropriation Act for genuinely exceptional circumstances. However, if the Government are set upon having the power, Parliament is entitled to some better explanations than we got in Committee of its potential use. I beg to move.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, once again I have the pleasure of flying in the slipstream of my noble friend Lady Noakes. Before I turn to my own Amendment 18, I will say that I entirely support the remarks she made about Amendments 15, 16 and 17, to which I have added my name.

Amendment 18, like my noble friend’s, is a probing amendment and seeks to discern the possible financial impact of this Bill on the small battalions. I hope the House will forgive me if I become a little granular and practical about how this clause might work. It can far too easily be assumed that this Bill will impact only on big companies. That is not the case. It has not been the case in the past and certainly will not be the case in future, with the big increase in the number of sectors of the economy falling within the provisions of the statute.

I would like to take the House back to our first day in Committee, when I raised the case of Impcross Ltd. Impcross had been the subject of a reference under the old regime. It was statutory instrument 2019/1490. I am not—repeat, not—going to ask my noble friend to comment on the details of the Impcross case. It would be utterly improper for me to ask, and probably even more improper for him to answer. But I want to use the Impcross case as an example of how drastic an impact the provisions of this Bill could have on smaller companies and their owners.

Impcross is based in Stroud and machines parts for the aerospace industry. Its annual turnover is just shy of £12 million, so it is not a large company but a small one, and one that in the year to 30 June 2019—according to the records at Companies House—made a small operating loss. Significantly, it has a person with significant control. In this case, the accounts reveal that a particular individual owns between 50% and 75% of the company. If you look back through the records, you can see that the individual appears to have been at the company for many years, so it is not fanciful to believe that the company is the result of a lifetime’s work and effort and, further, that perhaps the particular individual is now considering his future options, which might involve selling up the company and enjoying the fruits of his labours.

One exceptionally important and helpful aspect of the Bill the Government have brought forward is the establishment of timeframes, which we have already talked about today. We are a bit nervous about how good the timeframes are—we think they may be a bit too flexible for our wishes—but nevertheless there are some there. The Impcross case was referred in early December 2019. It was not until 10 September 2020, nine months later, that Gardner Aerospace, the Chinese-owned potential buyer, withdrew. That cannot have been an easy nine months for all involved, but it serves to underline—if I may say so to my noble friend on the Front Bench—the real importance of sticking to the fixed timetables. Otherwise, the company in the gun sights has a very uncomfortable time indeed.

This does not deal with any potential economic consequences. Let us take the example a little further. If companies are in interesting sectors, they are often sold on a multiple of turnover. Let us say it is two and a half times turnover, which would mean Impcross was worth £30 million. Let us suppose that was the figure that Gardner Aerospace offered, but that when it was refused permission to complete the transaction the next best offer was £27 million, a reduction of 10%; it could well be more. My noble friend the Minister, who has enormous and extensive experience of the City, knows that once an offer has failed to complete, there is always a concern among other buyers that there is something they have not spotted and that there is something wrong that they will need to look at more carefully.