National Security and Investment Bill

Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts Excerpts

Committee stage & Lords Hansard
Tuesday 2nd March 2021 Grand Committee

[Lord Vaizey of Didcot (Con) [V]]

Second time lucky. I am not aware that an amendment like this was tabled in the other place when the Bill was being considered. However, Amendment 5 and the subsequent amendments are fairly clear, in that they substitute the word “voidable” for “void”. The amendments are designed to ensure that transactions are not automatically voided if a company fails to comply with mandatory notification procedures. I hope to set out in my opening remarks why that should be the case.

As far as I am aware, the Government have tried to make it clear that they could retrospectively accept a notification, and therefore in effect ensure that a transaction was not voided, so this amendment seeks to realise what I think is the Government’s ambition. Amending the sanctions in this way would therefore be consistent with their position and would show that the power to unwind a transaction to make it void would be a last resort used only in the most exceptional of cases. I accept, of course, that it is important to have significant sanctions in place where a transaction subject to the mandatory notification obligation is completed without first obtaining approval from the Secretary of State, but such sanctions need to be workable in practice—they need to be credible. Treating such an error as to make a transaction automatically void—as currently envisaged in Clause 13—would in reality give rise to a host of practical difficulties that would make it unworkable in practice.

I also venture to suggest that the approach is inconsistent with other established regimes in other jurisdictions, such as Australia, the US and Canada, where a problematic transaction is not automatically void but the authorities are able to step in and issue unwinding orders for parts or all of a specific transaction. It would be far preferable to provide for a similar “voidable” power, giving the Government the power to declare such a transaction—or parts of it—void if it gave rise to national security concerns but not automatically making that the case. This would mean that the Government could consider the circumstances of each transaction and provide workable steps to take to unwind the transaction where that is considered necessary because of national security concerns.

Declaring a transaction void is effectively to treat it as if it never happened. However, the acquisition which has given rise to the exercise of the voiding may be part of a much wider transaction. For example, as part of the acquisition, the acquirer will have paid consideration to the sellers as well. Following the acquisition, the acquirer may have invested in the business, and third parties may have contracted in good faith with the acquirer in relation to the business. Declaring a transaction automatically void due to breach of the standstill obligation could result in a situation where several parties—many of whom may have had no culpability at all for the failure to notify—are left in limbo and may also suffer financial losses as a result. I submit again that the proposed approach seems unworkable in practice, which is implied in the Government’s own approach but not in the Bill.

Will the Minister also consider a situation where the parties to a transaction have selected a law other than English law as the governing law of the agreement? Is it possible that a foreign court would continue to treat a non-notified transaction as valid? Would that not lead to extraordinary uncertainty? While these provisions will have full force and effect in relation to acquisitions governed by English law, I do not see how they can apply if the transaction is governed by US or other law. I beg to move.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, this is the first time that I have spoken in this Committee, so I draw attention to my entry in the register of your Lordships’ House. I wish to speak to Amendments 41 and 44 in this group, which I have tabled with the support of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for which I am extremely grateful. I am also grateful to the Law Society for its assistance.

The two amendments build on remarks made by my noble friend Lord Vaizey in moving Amendment 5. Amendments 41 and 44 are to Clause 13, which is entitled “Approval of notifiable acquisition”. I am afraid I have to argue that that title is, at best, ingenuous because, under the wording of the clause as presently drafted, there is no requirement for the Secretary of State to register his disapproval; instead, his silence is all that is needed. I argue that, from the point of view of providing certainty for investors, bankers and—last, but by no means least—companies, their management and employees, this is not good enough. Furthermore, this silence inhibits a proper degree of parliamentary scrutiny, making it more likely that cases can be slipped through under the radar. It will also prevent Parliament having the opportunity of examining how practice may be shifting as regards preserving the delicate balance that this Bill seeks to create and maintain between protecting national security and providing maximum safety for investors’ property rights.

We need the spotlight to be shone on those tricky areas so that decisions taken by the Secretary of State have to be justified openly and publicly. That is what Amendments 41 and 44 seek to achieve. Famously, TS Eliot wrote:

“This is the way the world ends

Not with a bang but a whimper.”

In this difficult policy area, a whimper is insufficient. I see no reason why in an open society the Secretary of State should not be under the maximum pressure to provide a clear, concise and public declaration of his decision and the reasons for it. Our society, together with our business and investment community, are entitled to no less, so I very much hope that the Government will be able to accept these two amendments.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, it is very difficult to follow the noble Lords, Lord Vaizey and Lord Hodgson, especially after the quotation from the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, of which I think we must be very mindful. I support both in their very similar endeavours, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, in his Amendments 41 and 44, which I have signed.

The case has been very clearly made that automatic voidness creates excessive legal uncertainty for investors and lenders. The proposed wording would mean no automatic voidness but a power of the Secretary of State to impose it. A voidable power would give the Government power to declare a transaction or part of it void if it gave rise to national security concerns and ensure that workable steps can be taken to unwind the transaction to the extent considered necessary. While it is clearly important to apply significant sanctions when a transaction subject to the mandatory notification obligation is completed without first obtaining approval from the Secretary of State, such sanctions must also be workable in practice. Treating such a transaction as automatically void, as envisaged in Clause 13, will give rise to a host of practical difficulties and is simply not workable in practice.

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The Bill goes against the instincts of many of us who value an open economy and welcome investment into the United Kingdom. Protectionism may well not be a motivation for our current Government, but who knows whether one day we might get a Government with quite different approaches and priorities? We need to make it as clear as possible in the Bill that the powers cannot be used to promote a policy of economic intervention unrelated to what we understand to be national security concerns. The wise electorate saved us from the prospect of a Government led by Mr Corbyn and Mr McDonnell in 2019, but we must never forget the danger that a Labour Government could well present with a statute such as this on the books, and I hope that the Minister will make very clear statements which will put beyond peradventure that the matters raised by my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering could never be considered.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

I put my name to this amendment, but somehow along the way I was left off the speakers’ list, so I am glad to have scraped back on again. My noble friend Lady McIntosh made the case for the amendment clearly and decisively, so I will merely sweep up and say that, at Second Reading, there was general agreement that we were seeking a balance between the fact that the country had to be protected from overseas powers gobbling up key companies in key sectors, yet at the same time keeping our economy open for inward investment, particularly in the tech sector, where we have such a worldwide reputation. We all agreed then, and agree this afternoon, that that is the difficult balance that we seek to strike.

Of course, once the Bill passes into law, Parliament’s opportunity to examine and, where necessary, recalibrate that balance will be limited, to say the least. When the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, talks about the dangers of the markets, I think she is headed in completely the wrong direction, with due respect. My concern about the Bill is about not markets but mission creep: that we will end up with the Bill doing nothing that was anticipated when it was first drafted.

Like my noble friend Lady Noakes, I have no doubt that the Minister and his officials will say they have a very clear idea of how the provision will be used, and there is no question of mission creep under the Bill. As we all know, Ministers, parties and policies change, and there are serious dangers if we do not accept some form of amendment such as this.

First, there is the issue of employment under paragraph (a). How easy is it to see a future Secretary of State, faced with some politically unhelpful headlines about unemployment following a potential takeover, being tempted to press the national security button to avoid some disobliging comments? Under paragraph (c), we should never underestimate the lobbying powers of big companies. Hell hath no fury like a big company that finds its market invaded by a smaller, nimbler competitor offering a better, cheaper product or service. The smaller competitor, perhaps growing faster than its internally generated funds can support, may need to find outside capital, and some of that outside capital may come from overseas—it is likely to. How convenient for the big company if it can lobby the Secretary of State to block funding for the growth of its successful smaller rival on the grounds of national security.

Those are just two examples where mission creep might occur; there are plenty of others. I hope the Government will understand that the purpose behind this amendment is to make sure that the Bill continues to do what it says on the tin.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, it was a pleasure to put my name to the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, because I think that I understand its intentions entirely. It is also a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, in their elucidation of what the amendment is about. I think the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, has entirely misunderstood the essence of this amendment.

Earlier in Committee today we were trying to get some sort of definition of national security, and I think that the noble Lord, Lansley, in his inimitable way, managed to unpick that rather successfully. As far as national security is concerned, it is a mission impossible to try to carry everything in one bundle in a definition. This tries the other way on and, as the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, said, it is designed to avoid mission creep. It is trying to make sure that the definition of national security is not used as a blanket term to cover damage to the economy and society. It has the huge benefit of simplicity; it tells us what is not in national security rather than what is in it. It clarifies that certain factors such as employment, reciprocal investment or trading opportunities, and protectionism will not be taken into account when assessing national security. If there was mission creep in the way that was described, it would undermine legal certainty and damage investor confidence in the way that we have heard from a number of noble Lords.

The Government have kept assuring us that this is not, in the words of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, a national interest Bill but a national security Bill. That is exactly what this amendment is trying to ensure—that we do not have that all-encompassing national security definition used by lobbyists or others to try to bring things into the net. I have seen it happen in the United States. The CFIUS is absolutely that kind of spider-like operation that brings in all sorts of spurious transactions. I very much hope that we will keep this provision absolutely focused, and this amendment is a very good way of doing it.

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Moved by

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

7: Clause 2, page 2, line 18, leave out “5” and insert “2”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment reduces the timeframe after a trigger event in which the Secretary of State can make a call-in notice from five years to two.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 7 shortens the period in which the Secretary of State may give a call-in notice following a trigger event, under the provisions of Clause 2, from five years to two years. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for his support.

It was interesting that, when giving evidence to the Public Bill Committee in the other place, on 24 November, Michael Leiter—perhaps related to Felix Leiter—head of national security and the committee on foreign investment at Skadden, Arps, the major US law firm, described the Bill as

“a rather seismic shift in the UK’s approach to review of investment.”—[Official Report, Commons, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24/11/20; col. 46.]

He stressed the importance of clarity in what was proposed, given the criminal penalties that are now being introduced and that there is no interim period for familiarisation.

This amendment and all the others that I have tabled, two of which I have already spoken to, aim to test both the clarity and, importantly, the practicality of the proposals that the Bill contains. I stress that practicality because, there can be a danger, when Bills like this are in Committee, of focusing on legal terminology and overlooking the flesh and blood consequences of the decisions that Parliament is about to take. I hope that the Committee will forgive me if I spend a moment on two real-life examples, because they give useful background to this and my other amendments.

Members of the Committee may be aware that I am chairman of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee of the House. In December 2019, our committee was notified of the laying and simultaneous making of two statutory instruments: SI 2019/1490 and SI 2019/1515. The full title of SI 2019/1490 is the Public Interest Merger Reference (Gardner Aerospace Holdings Ltd. and Impcross Ltd.) (Pre-emptive Action) Order 2019. The full title of SI 2019/1515 is the Public Interest Merger Reference (Mettis Aerospace Ltd.) (Pre-emptive Action) Order 2019. These were the first referrals under the new regime with reduced thresholds, and this was the very first time that the Government used pre-emptive powers; that is to say that they were seeking to stop a takeover before any offer was made, rather than reacting to an offer once made. These two statutory instruments therefore give us a glance into the world that the Bill takes us into.

I shall say a couple of words about the protagonists. Gardner Aerospace, the predator and potential acquirer, is based in Derby. It was acquired by Chinese investors in 2017 for some £300 million and has since made a number of acquisitions in the aerospace sector. Mettis Aerospace, one of the targets, is based in Redditch and has sales of £86 million, which is above the old threshold. It is substantially profitable—it made about £9 million of profit before tax—and has some 500 employees. Its customer list reads like a who’s who of world aviation and its two leading customers are Airbus and Boeing.

Mettis’s roots can be traced back to the early days of British aviation. For those who like a historical note to our debates, it produced the framework that held in place the bouncing bombs under the Lancasters flown by Guy Gibson and the men of 617 Squadron in their successful raid on the Ruhr dams in the Second World War. A few years later the company produced the fan blades for Frank—later Sir Frank—Whittle’s first jet engine.

Mettis is owned 25% by the management and 70% by a private equity firm called Stirling Square Capital Partners. The fund through which the investment is being made is based in Luxembourg. Stirling is based in London but, judging by its list of partners, has a strong orientation towards continental Europe. The investment will almost certainly have been made on behalf of third-party investors who have pooled their funds for Stirling to manage. Such investors may very well come from all over the world and this is unlikely to be their only investment in the UK, so if they perceive the treatment of any one of their UK investments as being inequitable, there will inevitably be a ripple effect on their readiness to invest in the UK generally. Mettis made it clear to the Competition and Markets Authority and the Government that it had not put itself up for sale. Gardner’s approach had not been sought and was regarded as being what in the trade is known as a fishing expedition. The outcome was that Gardner pulled away on 27 February, following a heavily redacted CMA report published on 13 February.

The story of Impcross is quite different. It is a much smaller company based in Stroud, Gloucestershire, with a turnover of only £11.9 million, so it would not have been eligible under the old thresholds. It lost money in the year to 30 June 2019, but only a small amount—£350,000—and, significantly, it is controlled by one person. Its accounts reveal a person of significant control, or PSC, holding between 50% and 75% of its shares. That has been built up over a lifetime and it would not be unreasonable if that director now wished to realise the fruits of his efforts. If the state stepped in to prevent that—we cannot be certain exactly what happened—without offering any alternative solution, it seems a hard moral choice. Either way, it all took a lot longer to resolve and it was only on 10 September that Gardner withdrew.

In speaking to Amendments 41 and 45 a few minutes ago, I argued that it was not good enough that, under the provisions in Clause 13, all the Secretary of State had to do to void an acquisition was to say nothing. For Mettis, this was not a problem: the company was clear that the approach was not welcome. For Impcross, there were 10 months of uncertainty with the Secretary of State appearing to set up a sword of Damocles but apparently never having to cut the string. That cannot be the right way to provide certainty for investors in the UK tech sector.

I have one final point. In our debate a moment ago on Amendment 6, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, the Committee expressed concerns about the degree of parliamentary scrutiny of developing practice in this sensitive area. The two cases I have referred to were authorised by a statutory instrument. Statutory instruments are not amendable, and it would seem vanishingly unlikely that either House of Parliament would seek to reject one—the nuclear option—so any scrutiny of future practice will be at a very high level, and even that scrutiny will be ex-post. Both the above SIs were made and laid on the same day, 6 December 2019, at a time when Parliament was in any case not sitting because of the general election. It would be worthwhile if the Minister could confirm whether in this brave new world of these pre-emptive actions, each would still be the subject of a separate SI, so affording at least some degree of parliamentary oversight.

I turn now to the details of Amendment 7. I have tabled it because giving the Secretary of State the ability to unpick a merger or takeover after five years is to ignore the real world. Acquisitions are made with a view that two plus two will make five and that overall, they will be profit-accretive. In the event, that promise is often not achieved, but that is the idea that people set out with and to do that, changes have to take place at various levels.

First, the acquiring company will want to ensure that the financial performance of the two companies are managed on the same basis so that one company’s financial reporting systems will disappear. Secondly, it is inevitable that in any acquisition, there is extreme nervousness among the staff of the two companies about winners and losers in the new configuration. That nervousness can be reduced by an exchange of staff between the two companies, so that they get to know each other. Thirdly, it is unlikely that it will be cost-effective to maintain two separate research and development facilities, so they will be merged as one. Fourthly, marketing and sales teams are likely to be combined to broaden and deepen product range and market reach. Finally, it may be concluded that the new entity would be more effective and profitable if it operated from a single site, so one facility will be closed and the site sold.

Within five years, all of these steps could have taken place and if they had, the companies would be indistinguishable. I appreciate absolutely that the Government need some power to reach back where a case may have been slipped past them, but I argue that two years should be sufficient. At the same time, there is at least a likelihood of there still being a unit that is sufficiently independent to resume an independent life.

Members of the Committee may remember their days in primary school and the magic of mixing paints. If one mixed blue and yellow paints together then, suddenly and miraculously, one had green paint. That is in effect what one does with the merger of two companies: you mix a blue and a yellow company, and the result is a green one. After some time, and certainly after five years, the two constituent parts will be indistinguishable. That of course is vital, considering the position of investors who may find that they still own an investment which they thought had sold five years previously. I would argue that a maximum of a two-year clawback will provide a better balance between the interests of all the parties in this delicate area. If my noble friend is not inclined to accept the amendment, will he tell the Committee how his officials will undertake the practical challenges of separating the green paint into its original blue and yellow parts? I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I speak in strong support of Amendment 7, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson. I am a former company secretary and legal adviser to a publicly listed company. I know from personal experience what it is like to wait for competition decisions, takeover panel decisions and for all the uncertainties of regulation external to the company as a result of its commercial activities.

Given that, I am entirely in sympathy as the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, has set out what he calls the flesh-and-blood consequences of the two case studies that he put forward extremely graphically and well. Not least, he has hinted at some of the issues around statutory instruments and the level of scrutiny. There is little that I can add to what he has said about the undesirability of having a massive period of time within which a Secretary of State can act—up to five years. However, I would like to add to the practicality issues that the noble Lord has raised.

The longer a deal has been in place, the more difficult it will be to void or avoid—that is, unwind—a transaction. Unwinding a transaction after five years is a very long time in commercial terms. Thinking back to my own career, subsidiaries are sold, businesses are purchased and the commercial realities change over five years. It would be exceptionally difficult, even if it were possible, for a listed company involving public transactions to unwind those transactions.

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[Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist (Con)]

I thank my noble friend Lord Hodgson for his amendment, which intends to shorten the time limit for the Secretary of State to call in trigger events which have already taken place. The Bill as drafted allows the Secretary of State to call in trigger events up to five years after they have taken place. This ensures that the regime powers can be applied to completed trigger events which have given rise to, or which may give rise to, risks to national security but which have not been notified to the Secretary of State.

The length of five years is important to give the Secretary of State sufficient time to become aware of the trigger event and to make it difficult for the parties to keep the trigger event hidden. However, the proposed change from five years to two would make it easier for hostile actors to hide their acquisitions and effectively time-out the Secretary of State. It would increase the incentives to keep an acquisition quiet or inactive, as hostile actors would need to do so for only two years.

While not necessarily straightforward, this is clearly easier—both practically and financially—than keeping an acquisition hidden for a longer period. For example, if a hostile actor acquires an entity and intends to merge it with their existing operations, there are practical costs of not doing so within five years. They would not be able to merge IT, payroll, HR, et cetera, or take advantage of that entity and its assets. Likewise, if a hostile actor acquired an entity for its technology, that technology might well be obsolete in five years, so they would need to use their acquisition now to get the benefit.

In the Government’s view, five years strikes the right balance between creating a substantial disincentive for efforts to obfuscate and conceal relevant acquisitions while giving legitimate business certainty that they will not be called in after that period. Importantly, this approach puts us into line with our international partners. For example, in Germany a review may be initiated up to five years after the purchase agreement. It is in line with other countries, including France and Germany, and we believe that it is appropriate. Indeed, it is shorter than some partners, including the USA and Japan, which have no time limits. Further, a five-year reach-back period applies only to trigger events which have completed or which will complete after the introduction of the Bill, contrary to what some observers have suggested. That is to say that no acquisition which has been completed prior to 12 November 2020 may be called in under the Bill.

As helpfully noted by my noble friend Lord Lansley, in the Bill the five-year period is tempered by the requirement for the Secretary of State to call in a completed trigger event within six months of becoming aware of it. This further reduces the time limit for intervention and creates greater certainty for parties to a relevant acquisition. If there is doubt, parties should submit a voluntary notification to the Secretary of State. This will give them certainty on whether their trigger event will be called in.

Before I conclude, in response to my noble friend’s query relating to whether final orders can require the unwinding of acquisitions, that is very much within the scope of the power. The order, however, makes commands and may not deal with practical arrangements. How remedies are given effect will be for parties to finalise, subject to the requirements of the order.

My noble friend Lord Lansley asked about the nature of the acquirer. To clarify, the five-year backstop applies to the date on which the acquisition itself took place. Circumstances where the identity of the acquirer is not known until some time after the trigger event took place are precisely why the reach-back period might be important in certain cases. In circumstances where a notification was given and false or misleading information was given about the true identity of the acquirer, the Bill already provides that the Secretary of State can re-examine such cases.

With reassurance provided for business, knowing that we are acting in line with allies, and for the reasons I have set out, I hope my noble friend will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

I am grateful to my noble friend for her reply. I do not think I heard whether future pre-emptive actions under the new regime will be the subject of a statutory instrument or will just happen from the Secretary of State’s desk. Perhaps, she could answer how this or the other House will know what is happening.

I am grateful to everybody who spoke on this. It is obviously a tricky area. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. Undesirable, uncertain and impractical—I could not have put it better myself. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for drawing attention to the question of the difference between two years and five years, and what will happen in that three-year period other than causing uncertainty among investors. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, raised very practical points.

Let me meet my noble friend Lord Lansley some of the way. I do not think that this will happen very frequently, but, like the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, I am not convinced that the three additional years are really needed. The point my noble friend makes, which has certainly eluded the Law Society, is the interplay between the six-month trigger and the five years. In the tech sector, these companies grow like Topsy: they are nothing now, and they will be quite big very quickly indeed. You could have a situation where some event, ex post, could have been described as a trigger event but was not picked up as such at the time. It is unfair for people to have that uncertainty lasting for five years. The Secretary of State could say, “I never became aware of that, so I have more time to start the unwinding process, as long as it isn’t within the five-year period.” I see my noble friend’s point, and I accept that it is a rare occasion, but I still think there is something to be teased out about how the different pieces fit together, particularly in sectors of the market where very fast growth occurs.

I would be grateful if the Minister could tell me about the statutory instruments and how publicity of pre-emptive actions is to be provided.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)]

Does the Minister wish to respond?

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)]

The Minister is saying she will respond in writing. Is the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, withdrawing his amendment?

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

The Minister is going to write, is she?

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)]

That was the indication.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

Was it the fact or just the implication?

[Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist (Con)]

No, I will respond to the noble Lord in writing.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

Okay, that is fine. We need to go away and put my noble friend Lord Lansley in the blue corner and the Law Society in the red corner and see how we get on. In the mean- time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 7 withdrawn.