National Security and Investment Bill

Lord Grantchester Excerpts

Committee stage & Lords Hansard
Tuesday 2nd March 2021 Grand Committee

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, I am second to no one in my admiration for the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, but I am quite glad that we have the other Minister in the hot seat for this one, the noble Lord, Lord Grimstone. I suspect that in his previous lives he has seen more of the rough and tumble than possibly the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, and the rest of us put together, so will appreciate the nature of the debate introduced by the noble Lord.

For my part, I have usually been on the home team, the one paying advisers such as the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, huge sums of money to do deals or sell businesses. He hinted at the mischief that could be made around this, and I am sure that the Minister will understand the nature of that mischief: it is pretty ruthless and pretty hard. This gives another tool to those who would wish to cause that mischief, and it is not in the interests of the Government or the wheels of commerce for that mischief to occur.

The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, made a really important point. It is also in the interests of the Government to sift what comes across the Government’s desk; it does not behove the department to have tens of thousands of deals flowing across its desk. The Bill is designed to pick out the big problems and issues; it is not designed to deal with sacks of chaff that will come over as well as the wheat. It is important that the objectives of these amendments are taken on board by the Government. I am sure that there are many ways of doing that, and we look forward to the Minister contemplating how “contemplation” will be defined. What is the threshold? Is it the one suggested by the noble Lords, Lord Lansley and Lord Bilimoria—is it publishing? And even then, is it in the sense that the takeover panel would require a board to respond, or is it responding to a rumour? Then we are back into mischief territory again. Some sense of that, and of how the CMA has been able to negotiate this, would be helpful.

My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones, in his amendment with the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, is right that we need some sense of guidance and help as to how this is going to work. I go back to the point that I made at the beginning. How will this thing operate? How will the unit work? The nature of some sort of pre-emptive process seems to take on board more than a unit could normally handle. The advice that the Government have been given by your Lordships is good advice, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Grantchester (Lab)]

I welcome the Minister responding to this group to his second Bill, this one under the auspices of the business department. I am sure that he will find it an enjoyable experience. In addition to Amendment 9 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Vaizey and Lord Clement-Jones, I propose probing Amendment 10 to Clause 3(3), on further considerations. Amendment 9 seeks to ensure that the Government provide guidance to minimise the potential volume of voluntary notifications and any chilling effect that the Bill may have on legitimate business activity. Businesses need to be clear when transactions require notification and when it is not needed. There may soon be a time when the department could find this very useful as well.

In assessing the potential to generate unnecessary notifications, the CBI has estimated that the Government could receive up to 10,000 notifications a year. Does the Minister recognise this amount as an outcome? How have the Government calculated possible outcomes in relation to the numbers that have arisen in other countries’ experience in similar regime circumstances? I would go along with the precautionary interpretation by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. This will have resonance with later amendments probing the resourcing of the new investment security unit and turnaround timings for notifications.

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[Lord Fox (LD)]

I want to pick up where the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, finished: it seems almost punitively value-destroying to have a mandatory process. There will clearly be times when voiding will be the inevitable consequence, but there are others when a retrospective approval would be best for the country, the value, the shareholders, the employees and all the other third parties connected to that business. To lock the Government into auto-voiding seems unnecessary. It may be designed to put people off from not reporting in future but, by their nature, those who do not report probably are not aware of these sanctions, so it is unlikely to have that deterrent effect.

On Amendments 41 and 44, the “Waste Land” amendments, certainty comes up again, as predicted. All they do is ask for a clear signal rather than something simply not happening being the signal. The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, raised external messaging, but such clarity would also help build a body of case law which would help future practitioners understand what they should and should not do. Having that case law and those examples clearly delineated by a full stop rather than the whimper that is currently enshrined in law would be a much better way of exposing such cases for the textbook.

[Lord Grantchester (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, for these probing amendments relating to the penalty of deeming mergers and acquisitions void in the event of proper notifications and subsequent assessments by the Secretary of State not having taken place. The Minister will need to explain how this will work. Most of the amendments in this group focus on Clause 13, “Approval of notifiable acquisition”, in Chapter 3. Subsection (3) states that:

“A notifiable acquisition, in relation to which a final order has been made, that is completed otherwise than in accordance with the final order, is void.”


I appreciate the view of the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, that there could be alternative outcomes to certain elements or aspects of any deal. Has the Minister considered whether the Secretary of State could publish guidance on how the mechanisms of deeming non-compliant transactions void would work in practice? Clarity for SMEs would be most helpful.

The ability for transactions to be deemed void where they have not been approved by the Secretary of State, have not been notified or are non-compliant with any final order could have large repercussions. Clause 15, “Requirement to consider retrospective validation without application”, and Clause 16, “Application for retrospective validation of notifiable acquisition”, raise the issue of retrospection in relation to the legally void provision. Could transactions that took place in the past, even up to five years previously, be immediately deemed void? If the first transaction in a chain were deemed void, that would leave the legal rights and entitlements of all subsequent transactions’ parties in total confusion. There could be conditions in a transaction that came to fruition or were exercisable over a length of time, with these events deemed the trigger events rather than the merger itself. Those elements would have had impact at the inception of any M&A activity. An impossible series of rights, entitlements and developments would have to be unwound, which would cause great legal uncertainty.

The noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, also raised the issue of other jurisdictions or cross-jurisdictions. Have these circumstances, among the many others, been considered in the provision of this power? What are the legal implications for the process where the possible imposition of a transaction to be void is under consideration? Have the Government made plans to publish guidance in this area, even though they may consider that circumstantial evidence may make such guidance highly speculative? Many speakers have found the provision impractical and unworkable.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, first, I apologise for my noble friend Lord Grimstone, who has had to attend a debate on Kenya in the Chamber. I am afraid you are stuck with me for this one, which is obviously disappointing for the noble Lord, Lord Fox. I thank all noble Lords who have contributed.

We understand the aim of this group of amendments, which is to convert the automatic voiding provisions in Clause 13 into powers to void. Further amendments in this group then seek consistency with associated provisions in the Bill. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Vaizey and Lord Hodgson, for bringing together this grouping. I will first address the purpose of the automatic voiding provisions, before turning to the amendments in detail.

Notifiable acquisitions are those that occur within the most sensitive areas of the economy—sensitive enough that the Secretary of State judges that he must be notified and must clear an acquisition to proceed before it can complete. As such, it is essential that there are clear incentives for compliance with the regime and that any national security risks arising from these sensitive acquisitions being completed without approval are mitigated, as far as possible. Noble Lords present will understand that any Government’s first preference in legislating to create requirements on persons, particularly where the matters relate to serious issues such as national security, is that compliance with such requirements is incentivised and that we do not merely rest on the threat of weighty enforcement.

The automatic voiding provisions in Clause 13(1) mean that there is no way around these requirements and that parties who wish to evade the requirements are unable to complete acquisitions which must be approved by the Secretary of State and have not been. This ensures that the regime mitigates a wealth of national security risks, without the Secretary of State ever being engaged. It is efficient and effective government, and a key tool in protecting our national security.

However, voiding is not a sanction; it is instead the logical implication of not complying with a mandatory regime that concerns only the most sensitive acquisitions. Clause 13(3) ensures that any notifiable acquisition in respect of which a final order has been made, which has been completed otherwise than in accordance with the final order, is also void.

I understand that the voiding provisions have raised some concerns, as outlined by my noble friend Lord Vaizey, that the unaware may be unduly or adversely affected, which would otherwise lead to significant costs for parties who are affected by voiding. I hope that I can offer them the following reassurance. First, those who have been materially affected by the voiding of an acquisition, including sellers and third parties, not just acquirers, may apply for retrospective validation of the acquisition using Clause 16. If a valid and complete application is received, the Secretary of State will have up to 30 working days to decide whether to issue a call-in notice. If he does not issue a call-in notice, for example if there are no national security risks involved, he must validate the acquisition retrospectively. The impact of retrospective validation is that the notifiable acquisition is to be treated as having been approved by the Secretary of State and is, accordingly, not void. Anyone materially affected by the voiding, including those unaware of the requirements, is therefore able to secure retrospective validation, such that the acquisition was always valid in law.

Secondly, there are concerns around what happens if a significant purchase of shares in a publicly listed company is caught by the provision. Usually, for significant purchases, parties are advised by a law firm of high repute. I can also assure the Committee that, where the acquisition involves a takeover, BEIS works closely with the Takeover Panel to ensure the there are no issues in the interaction with the takeover code.

Thirdly, there are murmurings that the voiding provisions might create uncertainty. I do not think that Clause 13 could be clearer and more succinct about the effects of not obtaining the approval of the Secretary of State before completing a notifiable acquisition.

Let me now respond to the heart of the proposition of the amendments in this grouping—that voiding should be exercisable as a power by the Secretary of State, rather than being automatic. I am afraid this raises a number of issues. It is, first, unclear why and when the power to void would be exercised. The Secretary of State is already able to order the unwinding or divesting of acquisitions, following assessment as part of the final order. Why would he need to void the acquisition if it can simply be unwound or divested? Would it be intended that the Secretary of State would decide whether to void the acquisition prior to the assessment? If so, on what basis would he make that decision?

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[Lord Grantchester (Lab)]

I welcome the probing of Amendment 7, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Hodgson and Lord Clement-Jones, on the extent of five years in which the Secretary of State may issue a call-in notice once a trigger event has taken place.

The debate on how long this period may need to be and the reasons behind these decisions has been interesting. When the Government originally consulted on this, the period was much shorter. The Minister will need to answer why it has changed and been extended for such a long period, as well as the other questions raised. Indeed, five years is a far horizon in today’s fast-moving world—even if it is not long enough for some, often unpopular, Government to be able to continue in office.

Could this length of time threaten the policy stability of the economy across many sectors as well as give rise to unnecessary anxiety for businesses, especially in relation to retrospective elements previously discussed? However, the interpretation of Clause 2 may be that the Secretary of State is unaware of the trigger event but that the intentions of the parties have not materialised. The clause is rather unclear, and I appreciate the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, in his interpretation. I would certainly welcome the Minister’s reply.

[Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist (Con)]

I thank my noble friend Lord Hodgson for his amendment, which intends to shorten the time limit for the Secretary of State to call in trigger events which have already taken place. The Bill as drafted allows the Secretary of State to call in trigger events up to five years after they have taken place. This ensures that the regime powers can be applied to completed trigger events which have given rise to, or which may give rise to, risks to national security but which have not been notified to the Secretary of State.

The length of five years is important to give the Secretary of State sufficient time to become aware of the trigger event and to make it difficult for the parties to keep the trigger event hidden. However, the proposed change from five years to two would make it easier for hostile actors to hide their acquisitions and effectively time-out the Secretary of State. It would increase the incentives to keep an acquisition quiet or inactive, as hostile actors would need to do so for only two years.

While not necessarily straightforward, this is clearly easier—both practically and financially—than keeping an acquisition hidden for a longer period. For example, if a hostile actor acquires an entity and intends to merge it with their existing operations, there are practical costs of not doing so within five years. They would not be able to merge IT, payroll, HR, et cetera, or take advantage of that entity and its assets. Likewise, if a hostile actor acquired an entity for its technology, that technology might well be obsolete in five years, so they would need to use their acquisition now to get the benefit.

In the Government’s view, five years strikes the right balance between creating a substantial disincentive for efforts to obfuscate and conceal relevant acquisitions while giving legitimate business certainty that they will not be called in after that period. Importantly, this approach puts us into line with our international partners. For example, in Germany a review may be initiated up to five years after the purchase agreement. It is in line with other countries, including France and Germany, and we believe that it is appropriate. Indeed, it is shorter than some partners, including the USA and Japan, which have no time limits. Further, a five-year reach-back period applies only to trigger events which have completed or which will complete after the introduction of the Bill, contrary to what some observers have suggested. That is to say that no acquisition which has been completed prior to 12 November 2020 may be called in under the Bill.

As helpfully noted by my noble friend Lord Lansley, in the Bill the five-year period is tempered by the requirement for the Secretary of State to call in a completed trigger event within six months of becoming aware of it. This further reduces the time limit for intervention and creates greater certainty for parties to a relevant acquisition. If there is doubt, parties should submit a voluntary notification to the Secretary of State. This will give them certainty on whether their trigger event will be called in.

Before I conclude, in response to my noble friend’s query relating to whether final orders can require the unwinding of acquisitions, that is very much within the scope of the power. The order, however, makes commands and may not deal with practical arrangements. How remedies are given effect will be for parties to finalise, subject to the requirements of the order.

My noble friend Lord Lansley asked about the nature of the acquirer. To clarify, the five-year backstop applies to the date on which the acquisition itself took place. Circumstances where the identity of the acquirer is not known until some time after the trigger event took place are precisely why the reach-back period might be important in certain cases. In circumstances where a notification was given and false or misleading information was given about the true identity of the acquirer, the Bill already provides that the Secretary of State can re-examine such cases.

With reassurance provided for business, knowing that we are acting in line with allies, and for the reasons I have set out, I hope my noble friend will withdraw his amendment.