Tuesday 9th March 2021
(3 years, 8 months ago)
Grand CommitteeNational Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 View all National Security and Investment Bill 2019-21 Debates Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: HL Bill 165-II Second marshalled list for Grand Committee - (4 Mar 2021)
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Lord Callanan) (Con)
I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this very useful short debate. I welcome the amendments proposed by my noble friend Lord Vaizey. Taken together, as numerous speakers have said, his amendments would exempt UK investors and investors from other particular countries from the Bill’s mandatory notification regime. As it stands, both the mandatory and the voluntary notification regimes provided for by the Bill are both actor and nationality-agnostic. The mandatory notification regime is based on the risks posed by acquisitions of target entities due to those entities’ activities, rather than the risks posed by the acquirers. The risks posed by acquirers are then considered on a case-by-case basis by the Secretary of State as part of the particular national security assessment.
My noble friend is right to suggest that, in many cases, acquisitions by UK nationals and UK-based companies, or those based in like-minded countries, are less likely to give rise to national security concerns, even in relatively sensitive sectors. Such acquirers, if their proposed acquisitions do not give rise to national security risks, will find their acquisitions cleared to proceed by the Secretary of State, following assessment or following call-in, should that be necessary, for further review.
However, an acquirer’s nationality cannot tell the Secretary of State everything he needs to know about that acquirer’s intent. For example, it is possible that a UK acquirer may be paid by a hostile actor or otherwise have strong links to hostile actors based outside the UK. A similar rationale follows for the amendment’s reference to other like-minded countries. So, excluding purely on the basis of nationality could create a loophole to exploit.
The particular approach of the amendments in this group also raises some practical challenges. For instance, the references to nationality appear not to deal with the issue of dual nationality; nor is a change of nationality covered. Key considerations in designing this regime have included ensuring that it is not discriminatory, and that it upholds our World Trade Organization and other international obligations in this regard. It is not clear that these amendments would achieve this.
None the less, we wish to consider over time how we might temper and adjust the regime to take account of areas of lower risk. Under Clause 6, the Bill gives the Secretary of State the ability to make exemptions from the mandatory notification regime based on the “characteristics” of the acquirer. This may include nationality if this is judged appropriate and the various issues that I have highlighted can be resolved.
We will of course monitor closely how the regime works in practice to determine through detailed further work and carefully assess whether any such exemptions should be introduced. Any such regulations would be subject to appropriate parliamentary scrutiny through the affirmative procedure.
I welcome the opportunity to discuss the impact of nationality on the regime with my noble friends and to set out our thinking in more detail. However, for the reasons I have given, I cannot accept my noble friend’s amendments. Before I conclude, I can confirm to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, that the Government will engage with a number of stakeholders on the voluntary and mandatory notification forms. Therefore, given the points I have made, I wonder whether my noble friend will consider withdrawing his amendment.
Lord Vaizey of Didcot (Con) [V]
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for his response. Never have I seen so many noble Lords and noble Baronesses arraign so uniformly against an amendment, so the mood of the Grand Committee is clearly against me. In fact, through the powers of my advocacy I think that I even persuaded the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, to move from being a supporter to an opposer of my amendments, if I followed her speech correctly.
I am not sure that the issue of media ownership threw much light on the power of my amendments. However distasteful we might find the antics of media owners in this country, the British ones are just as guilty as any foreign ones of potentially challenging our democracy.
My noble friend Lord Lansley was correct to say that I included New Zealand along the lines of the Five Eyes, although I notice that he said that the US regime could be helpful to UK businesses if the UK was exempt from the equivalent provisions in the US. That was the purpose of my amendment.
Fundamentally, the point I was trying to make with these amendments, which did not really shine through, is that I seek not to hide any transactions from the national security regime but simply to avoid an overwhelming number of mandatory notifications for the department. Of all the speeches that I heard, the Minister’s was the most supportive. I noted his very welcome comments that the door remains ajar, as the regime develops, to put in place provisions to ease the bureaucracy and the number of mandatory notifications.
Finally, I was inspired by my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley’s speech to potentially draft a new amendment as we progress—perhaps the pub amendment, whereby the only transactions that can be notified in a mandatory fashion to the Government are those that can fit into my noble friend’s local pub. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Callanan (Con)
First, I extend my thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and my noble friend Lord Leigh for the amendments in this grouping. Let me start by addressing Amendments 15A and 17, which concern the scope of the mandatory notification regime.
Clause 6 sets out the circumstances where a notifiable acquisition takes place for the purposes of the Bill. Noble Lords will see in subsection (2) that the types of acquisition covered by mandatory notification are not simply the full list of trigger events in Clause 8. Rather, notifiable acquisitions are objective circumstances based primarily on an acquisition taking a party’s holding of share or votes to or past a particular numerical threshold. The amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, would remove subsection (2)(b) to remove the lowest of the numerical thresholds: 15%. My noble friend’s amendment seeks to amend Clause 8(2)(b).
Let me make three points about these amendments, which I trust will address the concerns which the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and my noble friend Lord Leigh raised in their opening comments. First, acquisitions that take a party’s shares or voting rights in a specified entity to 15% or more, not exceeding 25%, are notifiable even though they are not, by themselves, trigger events that may be called in by the Secretary of State for scrutiny under the Bill. We have, nevertheless, required such acquisitions to be notified, because increases in shares or voting rights to 15% or more may realistically result in the acquirer having material influence, and therefore control, over the policy of the entity, and that would constitute a trigger event.
The notification requirement is thus intended to ensure that the Secretary of State is made aware of the proposed acquisition and can take steps to determine whether material influence will in fact be required. The 15% threshold is broadly consistent with the UK’s merger framework. As the Competition and Markets Authority notes in its merger guidance, although there is no presumption of material influence below 25%, shareholdings of 15% or more may be examined to see whether the holder might be able materially to influence the company’s policy. We think that this strikes the right balance by requiring parties to focus only on a numerical threshold, while still allowing the Secretary of State to be notified about, and then call in if the legal test is met, more subjective acquisitions of control in the most sensitive sectors.
Secondly, my noble friend made an important point: the investment security unit will be required to process notifications for acquisitions of 15%. We expect that, as with acquisitions across the regime, the vast majority will quickly be cleared to proceed. It is vital that the statutory timescales set out in the Bill for processing such notifications are met to maintain business and investor confidence; the Government will resource the investment security unit accordingly to do just that.
I understand that my noble friend has a particular interest in what “material influence over the policy of an entity” relates to. I assure him that material influence is an existing concept under the Enterprise Act 2002. The Competition and Markets Authority sets out what it considers constitutes material influence in its mergers guidance. The Secretary of State intends to apply this in so far as it is possible in the context of this new regime for the purposes of determining whether control has been, or is to be, gained over a qualifying entity. For the avoidance of doubt, the Government have no plans to publish their own separate guidance on material influence.
My noble friend also queried the reference in subsection (3) to excluding acquisitions that are “impossible” to notify from constituting notifiable acquisitions. Let me explain the reasons for this. The Government recognise that there may be circumstances where it is impossible to notify and obtain clearance from the Secretary of State for an acquisition before it takes place. They could include lack of awareness on the part of the acquirer that they were about to acquire control, or where it was otherwise impossible to notify in the time available before the acquisition took place.
Let me give an example. A beneficiary to a will may have no prior knowledge that that they stand to inherit a stake in a business that would ordinarily be a “notifiable acquisition” and will automatically do so on the execution of the will. The Bill does not exhaustively define the circumstances that are “impossible”. I have given one example around inheritance; others might include bankruptcy, intestacy and by operation of law, but these examples are indicative.
The third point I should make, specifically about my noble friend’s amendment, is that, as currently drafted, it would not simply remove the 15% threshold but replace it with a reference to 25%. On this point, I hope he will recognise that subsection (2)(a) of the clause already provides for this—or, to be specific, very close to this effect—as it draws on the existing numerical trigger event thresholds in Clause 8, which start at acquisitions taking a person’s holding past 25%. As such, the amendment would duplicate those existing provisions and would in fact result in a requirement to notify when acquiring specifically 25% and then again if moving beyond 25% in future. I trust he will agree that we should avoid this, I am sure, unintentional effect.
Amendment 19A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, seeks to prevent notifiable acquisition regulations being used to bring asset acquisitions in scope of the mandatory notification regime. Let me start by setting out why it is important that the delegated powers in Clause 6 are not constrained in this way before I address the amendment itself.
The noble Baroness will accept, I am sure, that the future is uncertain, that the threats we face as a nation inevitably change over time and that the ways in which hostile actors seek to bring us harm are constantly evolving. That is precisely why the Bill extends the new investment screening regime’s coverage to acquisitions of individual assets, not just acquisitions of control over entities. We cannot, and should not, rule out the possibility that changes to the scope of the mandatory notification regime may be required, based on the types of acquisition and not just the sectors in which they take place.
None the less, the noble Baroness has spoken powerfully on a couple of occasions about the concerns of the Wellcome Trust and others, so let me say this categorically: the Government have no current plans to bring assets in scope of the mandatory notification regime, and neither subsections (5)(a) nor (6) require them to do so; they merely allow for that possibility, subject to the restrictions in subsection (7). Were we or a future Government to do so, it is clear that such a move would constitute a major change to the regime. It is difficult to conceive of many instances where consultation with relevant stakeholders would not be a practical necessity for a change such as this.
Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)
I thank my noble friend the Minister for his very considered comments, in particular his explanation of Clause 6(3). I think it allows a coach and horses to be driven through most of this legislation if someone can claim an impossibility. The examples he gave were excellent but there will be many other examples where people can claim an impossible circumstance. We will come on later to talk about, for example, the position of administrators and liquidators, and I can think of many others as well. I would have thought Clause 6(3) needed refinement.
Both the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, mentioned “materially control” as opposed to “materially influence”. There is a difference and this is not about materially controlling but about materially influencing. Regarding Clause 8(8), I accept that there are definitions elsewhere of materially influencing the policy. However, I remain of the view that it is not possible below 15%, or indeed below 25%, to materially influence the policy as far as national security is concerned. Therefore, I very much hope that my noble friend the Minister has a chance to reflect on this specifically before Report.
Lord Callanan (Con)
I will take that as a comment and not as a question. I continue to look at all aspects of the Bill to see how they can be improved.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
The Minister referred to the meeting that he and the noble Baroness, Lady Bloomfield, very kindly held yesterday with the Wellcome Trust, and I very much welcome the reassurances that he has read into the record today. The shorthand for this is the nervousness in academia of bringing in assets—IP, information, ideas and software—rather than just entities. That was what we discussed at the meeting yesterday, and the Minister has now read into the record the reassurances he gave there, for which we thank him.
I thought that the suggestion—I was going to call it a wheeze—of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, was rather crafty: if that is what you mean, why do you not say it upfront? However, from what the Minister said, there seems to be a difference between the objective and the subjective criteria. I do not know whether that is why the Government want them in different clauses, but there is a problem with the subjectivity of this phrase. It is not simply, as the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, just said, about material influence rather than material control, but also the policy, and it is hard to define what that means. It seems to me a very subjective test for the big change made in Clause 6. I remain unconvinced that we have got it clear enough.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for explaining where the 15% figure, to which the Minister referred again, comes from. The CMA uses it when talking about mergers, but we are talking here about big companies, not small ones. However, because there is no threshold, much smaller companies will be covered by this. It may be absolutely important for the takeover of very large companies whether competition is taken out of the market. The Minister knows that, as a consumer champion, I am always very happy for the CMA to look at the impact on competition. However, I have my doubts whether a regime defined for competition in consumer goods and access should be lifted and shifted—the Minister said that there will not be separate guidance—into something that will sometimes affect small start-ups and new developments.
I certainly know more about the subject than I did 43 minutes ago, for which I thank all those who have spoken on the amendment. As has been said, I hope that the Minister and his draftspeople will look at whether this is clear enough, necessary and appropriate for the sorts of investments we are dealing with. When the Minister gives a bequest in a will as the reason for including a particular provision in the Bill, that feels like clutching at straws to me. I hope there are better arguments than that, but, for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
I thank the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Bilimoria, for the opening amendments in this group, which give rise to various considerations. We recognise the caveat in Amendments 20 and 24 to mitigate the impact of hostile actors going to complex lengths to hide their interests in a qualifying asset or entity. It is also understandable to set de minimis thresholds. Having the powers in the definition still requires a thought process to initiate using them. There have been several instances in which hostile actors have behaved entirely transparently that have not been identified and prevented. Indeed, mitigating actions may have been rejected even by the Government.
One needs only to recall the debate over the growing dependency of many nations on China and the resultant rejection of identifying potential harm that could result. It could be raised here regarding dependency on research skills and partnerships in the technology fields, with security implications. Indeed, the Government’s assessment of risk can be mysterious. In relation to the Bill, perhaps what we need to see are the ways in which the Government will actively identify evolving and growing risks, whether or not they hide behind complex organisations or a complex process of additionality. Has the Minister considered this and when a risk may change its colours?
To the proponents of the £10 million threshold in the amendments, is there some logic or any evidence that this is indeed the correct level, other than that other jurisdictions may have chosen it? The valuation of some of these types of asset is hard to quantify and the value of a database code or algorithm will be considered much greater once in the hands of a hostile intent. The intention not to overburden SMEs with the bureaucracy of this regime is worthy and commendable, but may not be easily carried out. How many SMEs would be excluded as a consequence and would it also benefit the department not to have to devote resources to excessive screenings of transactions?
Amendments 52A, 55A, 64A and 67A, also thoughtfully proposed by the noble Lords, Lord Leigh and Lord Clement-Jones, are for the fast-track procedure for notifications. Has such a procedure been considered by the Government? It has yet to be identified how the regime proposed by the Bill will deal with so-called everyday transactions in the business community and the amount of resources that will need to be committed to so-called evidently non-controversial activity. Would this allow the possibility of experience gained through the Bill to mature into a more workable format?
In the drafting of the procedure, care would need to be taken regarding the person being given the ability to give the relevant notice. In one interpretation it could be the company initiating such a request, not only the person acting on behalf of the Secretary of State. That would result in everyone requesting a fast-track procedure. The Minister’s remarks will be interesting in this respect. Overall, it would be perhaps best to ensure that the regime is set up in the first instance in the Bill to be properly resourced and to have properly identified targets for all its notifications.
The Minister of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Department for International Trade (Lord Grimstone of Boscobel) (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley for his Amendments 20 and 24, my noble friend Lord Lansley for his Amendment 25, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for his Amendment 26 and my noble friend Lord Leigh and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for their package of Amendments 52A, 55A, 64A and 67A. I will take them sequentially.
I completely agree with my noble friend Lord Leigh and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that we must be careful to do nothing that diminishes the entrepreneurial or innovative spirit in our country or to diminish the attractiveness of this country for investment. You might imagine that, as the UK’s Minister for Investment, I am especially concerned about the latter point. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, I have spoken to many investors and VCs and, once the rationale and the processes of the Bill are explained to people, I have been very reassured by the reception that the Bill has had. The key point one has to explain is that the investment screening unit will be a rational unit that will seek to minimise time spent and maximise efficiency wherever it can.
With the permission of my noble friend Lord Leigh, I will address his Amendments 20 and 24 together, given that both relate to introducing de minimis thresholds into the regime. Clause 7 defines the meaning of “qualifying entity” and “qualifying asset” for the purposes of the Bill. These definitions underpin reasonable and proportionate powers for the Secretary of State to scrutinise acquisitions of control of qualifying entities and assets where that raises national security risks.
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, for his three amendments in this group and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for adding his name to the first, Amendment 21. He has an alternative to Amendment 27, Amendment 26, which was in the previous group, but both amend activities in general, so that they are more specifically attached to the person controlling those activities. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has recognised his amendment as “rogue”.
The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, queries the extension of Clause 7(3)(b) to suppliers of
“goods or services to persons in the United Kingdom”,
and asks for an explanation. Have there been previous incidents and what specific goods or services were involved, with what implications?
Clause 7(6) specifies land as well as “moveable property” and, in relation to Amendment 27 of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, gives rise to my reflections on the question of land and its use. While clearly an asset, the distinction is not made between the Bill’s application to ownership of land, in the sense of control, and any lease of its use, whereby a person other than the owner could be said to be in control. The Bill merely has the words “used in connection” to activities. Is this distinction relevant and what proof would be needed to clarify which person is in control of land?
One of the key sentences in the Government’s Statement of Policy Intent is in the section on acquirers:
“Clearly, national security risks are most likely to arise when acquirers are hostile to the UK’s national security, or when they owe allegiance to hostile states or organisations.”
Land, and the use of it in such a context, is made relevant as a qualifying asset. Yes, an operation needs to operate somewhere and will require land. Does this require any further reflection with regard to the workings of the regime? Can land in a particular country be considered a particular threat?
Amendment 32, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, to Clause 9, regarding control of assets, returns us to Clause 7(6). The Minister may wish merely to identify the strategic risk attaching to land in particular locations only.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
My Lords, I welcome these amendments from my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, which concern the extraterritorial application of the call-in power. Amendment 21 seeks to ensure that where an entity is formed or recognised under the law of a country or territory outside the UK, it will be a qualifying entity only if it carries on activities in the UK but not where it supplies goods or services to persons in the UK, as the clause currently provides.
I am afraid that I was slightly unclear on the precise intent of Amendments 27 and 32 so, for the benefit of the Committee, I am interpreting them as seeking to remove the provision currently in Clause 7(6)(b): that an asset situated outside the UK or the territorial sea is a qualifying asset if it is used in connection with the supply of goods or services to persons in the UK. This would mean that an asset situated outside the UK or the territorial sea is a qualifying asset only if it is used in connection with certain activities carried on in the UK.
It is important that entities formed or recognised outside the UK which provide goods or services to persons in the UK are captured through the Bill as their acquisition may give rise to national security risks to the UK. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, asked for some examples, and I am happy to provide them. For example, a foreign-registered company that does not carry on activities in the UK may still provide essential goods or services to parts of our critical national infrastructure. If a hostile party were to acquire control over that supplier, it could use that control to degrade our infrastructure. To take another example, imagine an overseas supplier of machinery or compounds to a UK-based entity producing cutting-edge advanced materials for our military. Control over that supplier could provide a hostile party with an insight into certain military capabilities or a means to sabotage the work of the UK entity to harm our military. As my noble friend Lady Noakes recognised, this could have a severe effect on national security.
Similarly, it is important that land and moveable property assets situated outside the UK or the territorial sea and intellectual property assets used in connection with the supply of goods or services to persons in the UK are also captured as their acquisition can give rise to national security risks to the UK. For example, as I have said previously, the acquisition of a wind farm situated outside the UK and its territorial sea that provides critical energy supplies to UK industry and consumers may give rise to national security risks, even though it is not strictly used in connection with activities in the UK. If the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would like to hear this example a third time, he only has to lay a further amendment.
Of course, any extraterritorial use of the powers under this Bill should be proportionate as well as meeting the other tests in the Bill. That is why the Bill explicitly sets out a UK nexus requirement that means that the Secretary of State may intervene to assess an acquisition overseas only where it has a clear connection to the UK. Remedies may be imposed at the end of an assessment only if the Secretary of State reasonably considers that they are necessary and proportionate for the purpose of safeguarding the UK’s national security. As such, the extent of an acquisition’s connection to the UK will be a clear factor in that decision.
The Bill also explicitly limits the application of remedies to persons outside the UK to those who have a clear connection to the UK—for example, UK nationals or companies, or those who carry on business in the UK.
I am conscious that I may not have answered fully the questions from the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester. If I reflect, after looking at Hansard, that I have not, I may write to him. I understand, taking these amendments as a group, the desire to probe the Government in this area, but I hope that, with this explanation, my noble friend will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)
I have received one request to speak after the Minister from the noble Lord, Lord Fox.
Lord Fox (LD)
I am probably being extremely stupid here, so please forgive me. In the first example of a foreign business supplying a critical operation in this country, I understand that that would be a problem were it taken over by a hostile nation. Let us imagine that a Belgian company, or perhaps a Canadian one, is being taken over by a company or a regime that we consider hostile. What is the Secretary of State’s next move in stopping it happening? I do not understand what the Secretary of State’s remit is over that Belgian or Canadian company, other than to suggest to the recipient of the supplies in this country that they have to change their supplier.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for that question. I assure him that it is not stupid. I think the answer is in what I said towards the end of my speech. The Bill explicitly limits the application of remedies to persons outside the UK to those who have a clear connection with the UK, for example, UK nationals or companies, or those who carry on business in the UK. That provides the nexus back to the UK, which I think the noble Lord was searching for.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con) [V]
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have participated in this debate. I was extremely relieved to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that Amendment 26 was a rogue amendment. He and I had both put our names to it originally and I withdrew mine. When I found that he had left his there, I thought he had seen some angle and I was going to be blown apart and take a torpedo amidships. I am grateful to hear that it was a rogue amendment.
I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for the examples. I am still reaching for the implications of the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Fox. I am not yet convinced that the qualifying entity idea has been probed enough, given that it has proved effective in the Bribery Act and has a similar purpose there. I will read what he has to say, think about it and maybe bring this back for a further discussion. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
My Lords, I am still slightly reeling from having to find names of people long since in my past, but maybe Hansard can piece things together.
We have heard today, both in this group and in others, and in the representations that we have all seen, that there are considerable investor concerns about bits of the Bill, some of which Amendments 29 and 72 in particular seek to address. It is important to recognise, although it has been made clear by people in Committee, that the Bill marks a radical transformation of national security screening for mergers and acquisitions. It is a new and different regime, so it is essential that the Government not only maintain business confidence but gain more confidence from businesses and the investors in them. That was why, on the first day of Committee, we set out why we thought we needed a definition of national security to provide clarity for businesses and investors and to build trust in the regime.
However, as has been said in this group, one of the things that would help that confidence is better drafting. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, is right when he says that more work is needed. I know it is the second day back at school, but it feels as if the homework has been self-marked and now needs a slightly more thorough look. As everyone has said, it is not that anyone has objections to the purpose of the Bill; the concerns are about the wording and perhaps the breadth of its scope.
Clause 8 defines the circumstances in which a person gains control of a qualifying entity, thus constituting a trigger event that may be subject to assessment under the regime. This is clearly a key part that must be got right. Amendment 29 would narrow the third circumstance to make sure that it does not capture minority investor veto rights, as has already been mentioned. Perhaps the Minister could clarify whether it is expected that minority investment veto rights would be captured.
The group of amendments raises some broad questions about the number of cases in which a person gains control of a qualifying entity. We are interested in why other cases are not included. We do not necessarily want them included but want to work out the limits that brought certain things to be put in the Bill. It is quite interesting to know what is not there. For example, is an acquisition involving state-owned entities or investors originating in a country of risk to UK national security not a concern? It is not mentioned. Neither is a person who becomes a major debt holder and could therefore gain influence over the entity’s operation and policy. Is that not of interest? It is not that I want to include them, but I am really interested in how the definitions were put together. Maybe the Government, either in writing afterwards because it may be more detailed, or in answer today could spell out why these particular cases were selected and the sort of advice that was taken in the selection process.
Amendment 97, which the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has discussed, raises the question of why a former partner should remain a person of concern. Probably all of us here have had difficulties with being a politically exposed person, a PEP. We have found it very difficult sometimes just to open or become a signatory to a charity’s accounts because of being a PEP. A number of difficulties were had, but I think they have been got over now after some work in this House. It really did affect those of us who have step-children and former partners and siblings we never see, and things like that.
This issue needs a little more clarification and protection, if you like. No investor or anybody involved in this wants to get caught up by something which they could not have thought at the time was of any interest. I understand that it might look suspicious if somebody divorced their partner two days before to get rid of some assets, but this is a very wide net. Perhaps the Minister can explain why this clause is needed and needs to be drawn quite as widely. This is a net that would catch whales, never mind tiddlers.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
My Lords, I begin by briefly extending my thanks to my noble friends Lord Hodgson and Lord Lansley for tabling the amendments in this group relating to the circumstances determining the control of entities in the Bill, as well as arrangements and the impact of final orders on contracts.
I am conscious of the complexity of some of the matters that we are debating. If I am not able to explain or elucidate these points fully in my comments, I will of course write to noble Lords. I will also be happy to discuss them with noble Lords outside the Committee. Some of these things are quite difficult to get straight across a table like this.
I will start by addressing my noble friend Lord Hodgson’s Amendment 29. For the purposes of the Bill, Clause 8 sets out the circumstances in which a person gains control of a qualifying entity. It explains the four ways in which control can be gained. Subsection (6) sets out the third trigger event:
“The third case is where the acquisition is of voting rights in the entity that (whether alone or together with other voting rights held by the person) enable the person to secure or prevent the passage of any class of resolution governing the affairs of the entity.”
I think that there is broad support for that concept. However, Amendment 29 seeks to narrow this so that only acquisitions of such voting rights over matters that are equivalent to those which require the passing of ordinary or special resolutions under the Companies Act 2006 would be a trigger event.
I sincerely pay tribute to my noble friend for seeking to ensure that the regime is as reasonable and proportionate as possible. I believe that his intent is very much to seek to exclude acquisitions of minority veto rights from constituting trigger events. However, the Government consider that the Bill already achieves this goal to some extent as subsection (6), which my noble friend seeks to amend, is of course subject to the qualifying provision in subsection (7), which explains how references to voting rights in an entity apply to different sorts of entity.
In the case of an entity that has a share capital, this means voting rights conferred on shareholders to vote at general meetings of the entity on all or substantially all matters. In the case of an entity that does not have a share capital—this is where some complexity arises—this means the voting rights conferred on members to vote at general meetings of the entity on all or substantially all matters. The important words in both cases are
“all or substantially all matters.”
I therefore suggest, with deference to my noble friend, that minority veto rights would be captured by subsection (6) only where such voting rights provide the holder with a right to vote on all or substantially all matters, which perhaps takes it rather beyond the worry that some people had about these minority rights being constrained.
I hope that this puts the mind of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, at rest but, again, if a further discussion is needed to clarify how this works, I would be very happy to hold one. I also hope that the Committee agrees that it is only right that minority veto rights, in circumstances where they really are broad enough to cover all or substantially all matters, should be in scope of the Bill. For all intents and purposes, they are the same as majority rights if they are able to do that.
I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Lansley for Amendment 30 in respect of Clause 8 and the definition of control of entities for the purposes of the Bill. This clause reflects the fact that there are ways of obtaining control over an entity other than just acquiring shares or voting rights at significant thresholds. As part of the new regime—I say without excuse that we have made this embracing because of the importance of national security—the Secretary of State must be able to scrutinise lower stakes of shares and votes or other rights or interests acquired by a person that allow them materially to influence the policy of the entity. This is consistent with the UK’s merger framework, and businesses and investors alike have welcomed our adoption of the familiar material influence concept that they have been accustomed to under the Enterprise Act 2002.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, first, I express my warm thanks to my noble friend Lady Noakes, who happily introduced Amendment 97 far better than I would have. I had neglected to notice that we had reached Schedule 1, since we had not even reached the clause that introduced it. Not noticing that was entirely my fault.
If I may, I will go away and read what my noble friend said about Amendment 98, because it is purely a matter of trying to get the drafting right. He may well be correct on that.
On the other two amendments, I kindly ask my noble friend to reflect. The issue about former spouses reflects what is said in Section 127 of the Enterprise Act 2002, but this includes cohabitees, who are not in Section 127, which was subsequently amended to include civil partners. “Associated persons” has turned into “connected persons” and has broadened in ways that nobody told us was a policy.
My other point about the Enterprise Act is that I do not understand what my noble friend is saying. Earlier, he told us that the Government would not issue new guidance about material influence, because the CMA has issued guidance. I have read the CMA’s guidance and it clearly includes reference to obtaining control by stages. Obtaining control by stages, in Section 29 of the Enterprise Act 2002, includes a reference to that
“person or group of persons … materially to influence the policy of … the enterprise … to a greater degree”.
I have not invented this; it is in the Enterprise Act 2002 now. If my noble friend proposes to use the CMA’s guidance and says that everybody is happy that we are using an established understanding of what material influence is, I suggest we go away and look at whether we can use the language and guidance of the Enterprise Act to make it consistent with the practice that people have understood for the best part of 20 years.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
I thank my noble friend very much for those comments. I will reflect on them and communicate with him.
Lord Fox (LD)
This covers similar territory to Amendment 30 and the answer that we were given to it. I will read that carefully, as some of the answers are complex, as the Minister himself said. I ask that the Minister reads his answer carefully because, knowing what he knows from his previous life, there will come a realisation that we are not quite where we should be on this.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
I thank the noble Lord for that. I commit to reading the questions and answers carefully to make sure that they match up with each other as far as possible.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
My Lords, I have no new information to bring to the Committee. As we have heard, a number of transactions appear likely to be caught under the Bill which are probably outwith the intention of the authors of the Bill. I think the Minister has to explain why these provisions are in it, rather than noble Lords who tabled amendments having to explain why the provisions should be taken out. We look forward to his explanation of that and, perhaps, his reassurance to the Committee that the Bill is really fit for purpose across the whole of the UK, including for the Scottish legal system.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
My Lords, with thanks to all noble Lords who have spoken with such knowledge and eloquence on the amendments tabled, I will begin by speaking to Amendments 31 and 33 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Bennachie, and my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering. The noble Lord, supported by my noble friend, clearly raises important questions on the juxtaposition of Scottish law with the powers that we are looking at in this group.
I am grateful to the Law Society of Scotland for having supported this and, if I may, rather than attempting to deal with these points on the hoof I will take them away. I commit to being in communication with noble Lords as to what needs to be done, if anything, in relation to them. More generally, perhaps putting the important Scottish points on one side for the moment, I completely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, that the Bill has to work for every part of the United Kingdom.
These amendments concern Clauses 8 and 9 and the circumstances where acquisitions of control of entities and assets take place for the purposes of the Bill. They seek, I believe, to ensure that rights or interests in, or in relation to, entities and assets held by way of security are exempt from the regime, on the understandable basis that lending and debt arrangements do not give rise to control. Let me agree right away with the thrust of the concern expressed by the noble Lord and my noble friend. The Government do not consider that the provision of loans and finance is automatically a national security issue. Indeed, it is part of a healthy business ecosystem which enables businesses to flourish and grow in this country. Lenders need confidence that they can see a return on ordinary debt arrangements to provide that service, which is of course vital to the proper functioning of the economy. But we must recognise that there are, in a small number of cases, national security risks that can be posed through debt. I will come to this in a moment.
Access to finance is crucial for so many businesses and, to grow and succeed, they will often take out loans secured against the very businesses and assets they have fought so hard to build. That is why the Bill allows the Secretary of State to scrutinise acquisitions of control that take place when lenders exercise their rights over the collateral. The important point is that it is not where the lenders have hypothetical rights but where they exercise their rights over the collateral. This approach is needed because it will prevent hostile actors artificially structuring acquisitions in the form of loans which, following a swift and convenient default—let us put it that way—might otherwise allow them to evade scrutiny. This is a proportionate approach, and one that I am confident will keep finance flowing into UK companies and infrastructure while ensuring that our national security can be protected.
Amendments 34 and 35 in the name of my noble friend Lord Hodgson relate to Clause 10, which, in combination with Schedule 1, sets out various ways in which rights or interests are to be treated, for the purposes of the Bill, as held or acquired. These include indirect holdings whereby, for example, a person holds an interest or right indirectly if that person has a majority stake in an entity that is part of a chain of entities, each of which holds a majority stake in the entity immediately below it, the last company in the chain of which holds the interest or right. That example is relevant because Amendment 34 seeks to ensure that intragroup investments are not covered by Clause 10 and, as a result, Schedule 1 as well.
My interpretation is that my noble friend wishes to prevent internal reorganisations within the same corporate chain of entities from resulting in trigger events by virtue of Schedule 1. I confirm to the Committee that, in the vast majority of cases, that will not have an impact but, depending on the facts of the case, internal reorganisations may be in scope of the Bill. That is because there may be rare cases in which internal reorganisations pose national security risks. That may be true even if the ultimate beneficial owner is the same before and after the trigger event: for example, if there are concerns about changes to the level of control acquired by other links in the chain as a result of the internal reorganisation.
Clause 10(2)(b), which the amendment seeks to amend, is therefore important, because it makes it clear that in circumstances where a person is already treated as holding an interest or right, when something happens that would be regarded as the acquisition of that interest or right by the same person, then it is treated as such.
This means, for example, that an ultimate beneficial owner at the top of a corporate chain transferring existing majority holdings held by entities lower down in the chain to those above them could be a trigger event if it can be regarded as an acquisition by virtue of Schedule 1.
Amendment 35 would insert a new subsection into Clause 10 to provide that only one trigger event arises where more than one person is treated as acquiring an interest or right due to the provisions of Schedule 1. I can clearly see that my noble friend is seeking to help the Government by looking to ensure that the investment security unit is not deluged by duplicate notifications by corporate chains each time a new acquisition is made by an entity towards the bottom of the chain.
I can assure him that we are carefully designing the notification process and forms so that, wherever possible in situations such as these, a single notification providing all the details of the entities in the same corporate structure can be considered together. That is different from his amendment, which would seek to provide in the Bill that only one trigger event takes place. I am afraid that the Government consider that this would introduce ambiguity into the Bill, as it would not make it clear which trigger event is the one which takes place, and which should be discounted.
Hostile actors could try to exploit such a provision to avoid scrutiny by using shell companies at the bottom of long and complex corporate chains to acquire sensitive entities and assets. If only one trigger event is considered to take place by virtue of Schedule 1, the entity immediately above it in the chain could notify the acquisition, while not necessarily disclosing the control acquired by more troubling persons higher up the chain. In these circumstances, the amendment would mean that these could not be treated as separate trigger events, whereas surely they should be.
With the arguments I have outlined and my undertaking to write to the noble Lord, Lord Bruce, and my noble friend Lady McIntosh about the important Scottish matters they raised, I ask that the noble Lord agrees to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Bates) (Con)
I have received one request to speak after the Minister, from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones.
Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for that comment. Let me take it on the chin and, if I can, answer it.
Some of the hostile actors that we are trying to prevent acquiring sensitive matter are extremely sophisticated and wily. It is not appropriate to go into details, but we know this. We know that they are absolutely capable of structuring transactions to find the most minute loopholes and acquire control of assets that affect our national security. I think we all accept the premise that national security is paramount, and to protect ourselves against these threats we have to have these complex arrangements.
I completely understand noble Lords’ points that some of the things we are describing are complex almost to the point of absurdity. However, they have to be if we are to protect ourselves against these hostile actors. This is key and something that we will have to keep coming back to. It is why it will be so incumbent on the investment security unit to act sensibly and pragmatically. When things have to be notified to catch the important fish—in the noble Lord’s analogy—they will have to be dealt with quickly and moved out; otherwise, we risk circumventing the very thing that we are trying to avoid with this Bill, which is threats to our national security.
Lord Callanan
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes the reference to Article 9 of the Export Control Order 2008 (S.I. 2008/3231) which was revoked by regulation 4(7) of the Export Control (Amendment)(EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I. 2019/137).