National Security and Investment Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Callanan
Main Page: Lord Callanan (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Callanan's debates with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeI thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this very useful short debate. I welcome the amendments proposed by my noble friend Lord Vaizey. Taken together, as numerous speakers have said, his amendments would exempt UK investors and investors from other particular countries from the Bill’s mandatory notification regime. As it stands, both the mandatory and the voluntary notification regimes provided for by the Bill are both actor and nationality-agnostic. The mandatory notification regime is based on the risks posed by acquisitions of target entities due to those entities’ activities, rather than the risks posed by the acquirers. The risks posed by acquirers are then considered on a case-by-case basis by the Secretary of State as part of the particular national security assessment.
My noble friend is right to suggest that, in many cases, acquisitions by UK nationals and UK-based companies, or those based in like-minded countries, are less likely to give rise to national security concerns, even in relatively sensitive sectors. Such acquirers, if their proposed acquisitions do not give rise to national security risks, will find their acquisitions cleared to proceed by the Secretary of State, following assessment or following call-in, should that be necessary, for further review.
However, an acquirer’s nationality cannot tell the Secretary of State everything he needs to know about that acquirer’s intent. For example, it is possible that a UK acquirer may be paid by a hostile actor or otherwise have strong links to hostile actors based outside the UK. A similar rationale follows for the amendment’s reference to other like-minded countries. So, excluding purely on the basis of nationality could create a loophole to exploit.
The particular approach of the amendments in this group also raises some practical challenges. For instance, the references to nationality appear not to deal with the issue of dual nationality; nor is a change of nationality covered. Key considerations in designing this regime have included ensuring that it is not discriminatory, and that it upholds our World Trade Organization and other international obligations in this regard. It is not clear that these amendments would achieve this.
None the less, we wish to consider over time how we might temper and adjust the regime to take account of areas of lower risk. Under Clause 6, the Bill gives the Secretary of State the ability to make exemptions from the mandatory notification regime based on the “characteristics” of the acquirer. This may include nationality if this is judged appropriate and the various issues that I have highlighted can be resolved.
We will of course monitor closely how the regime works in practice to determine through detailed further work and carefully assess whether any such exemptions should be introduced. Any such regulations would be subject to appropriate parliamentary scrutiny through the affirmative procedure.
I welcome the opportunity to discuss the impact of nationality on the regime with my noble friends and to set out our thinking in more detail. However, for the reasons I have given, I cannot accept my noble friend’s amendments. Before I conclude, I can confirm to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, that the Government will engage with a number of stakeholders on the voluntary and mandatory notification forms. Therefore, given the points I have made, I wonder whether my noble friend will consider withdrawing his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for his response. Never have I seen so many noble Lords and noble Baronesses arraign so uniformly against an amendment, so the mood of the Grand Committee is clearly against me. In fact, through the powers of my advocacy I think that I even persuaded the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, to move from being a supporter to an opposer of my amendments, if I followed her speech correctly.
I am not sure that the issue of media ownership threw much light on the power of my amendments. However distasteful we might find the antics of media owners in this country, the British ones are just as guilty as any foreign ones of potentially challenging our democracy.
My noble friend Lord Lansley was correct to say that I included New Zealand along the lines of the Five Eyes, although I notice that he said that the US regime could be helpful to UK businesses if the UK was exempt from the equivalent provisions in the US. That was the purpose of my amendment.
Fundamentally, the point I was trying to make with these amendments, which did not really shine through, is that I seek not to hide any transactions from the national security regime but simply to avoid an overwhelming number of mandatory notifications for the department. Of all the speeches that I heard, the Minister’s was the most supportive. I noted his very welcome comments that the door remains ajar, as the regime develops, to put in place provisions to ease the bureaucracy and the number of mandatory notifications.
Finally, I was inspired by my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley’s speech to potentially draft a new amendment as we progress—perhaps the pub amendment, whereby the only transactions that can be notified in a mandatory fashion to the Government are those that can fit into my noble friend’s local pub. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
First, I extend my thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and my noble friend Lord Leigh for the amendments in this grouping. Let me start by addressing Amendments 15A and 17, which concern the scope of the mandatory notification regime.
Clause 6 sets out the circumstances where a notifiable acquisition takes place for the purposes of the Bill. Noble Lords will see in subsection (2) that the types of acquisition covered by mandatory notification are not simply the full list of trigger events in Clause 8. Rather, notifiable acquisitions are objective circumstances based primarily on an acquisition taking a party’s holding of share or votes to or past a particular numerical threshold. The amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, would remove subsection (2)(b) to remove the lowest of the numerical thresholds: 15%. My noble friend’s amendment seeks to amend Clause 8(2)(b).
Let me make three points about these amendments, which I trust will address the concerns which the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and my noble friend Lord Leigh raised in their opening comments. First, acquisitions that take a party’s shares or voting rights in a specified entity to 15% or more, not exceeding 25%, are notifiable even though they are not, by themselves, trigger events that may be called in by the Secretary of State for scrutiny under the Bill. We have, nevertheless, required such acquisitions to be notified, because increases in shares or voting rights to 15% or more may realistically result in the acquirer having material influence, and therefore control, over the policy of the entity, and that would constitute a trigger event.
The notification requirement is thus intended to ensure that the Secretary of State is made aware of the proposed acquisition and can take steps to determine whether material influence will in fact be required. The 15% threshold is broadly consistent with the UK’s merger framework. As the Competition and Markets Authority notes in its merger guidance, although there is no presumption of material influence below 25%, shareholdings of 15% or more may be examined to see whether the holder might be able materially to influence the company’s policy. We think that this strikes the right balance by requiring parties to focus only on a numerical threshold, while still allowing the Secretary of State to be notified about, and then call in if the legal test is met, more subjective acquisitions of control in the most sensitive sectors.
Secondly, my noble friend made an important point: the investment security unit will be required to process notifications for acquisitions of 15%. We expect that, as with acquisitions across the regime, the vast majority will quickly be cleared to proceed. It is vital that the statutory timescales set out in the Bill for processing such notifications are met to maintain business and investor confidence; the Government will resource the investment security unit accordingly to do just that.
I understand that my noble friend has a particular interest in what “material influence over the policy of an entity” relates to. I assure him that material influence is an existing concept under the Enterprise Act 2002. The Competition and Markets Authority sets out what it considers constitutes material influence in its mergers guidance. The Secretary of State intends to apply this in so far as it is possible in the context of this new regime for the purposes of determining whether control has been, or is to be, gained over a qualifying entity. For the avoidance of doubt, the Government have no plans to publish their own separate guidance on material influence.
My noble friend also queried the reference in subsection (3) to excluding acquisitions that are “impossible” to notify from constituting notifiable acquisitions. Let me explain the reasons for this. The Government recognise that there may be circumstances where it is impossible to notify and obtain clearance from the Secretary of State for an acquisition before it takes place. They could include lack of awareness on the part of the acquirer that they were about to acquire control, or where it was otherwise impossible to notify in the time available before the acquisition took place.
Let me give an example. A beneficiary to a will may have no prior knowledge that that they stand to inherit a stake in a business that would ordinarily be a “notifiable acquisition” and will automatically do so on the execution of the will. The Bill does not exhaustively define the circumstances that are “impossible”. I have given one example around inheritance; others might include bankruptcy, intestacy and by operation of law, but these examples are indicative.
The third point I should make, specifically about my noble friend’s amendment, is that, as currently drafted, it would not simply remove the 15% threshold but replace it with a reference to 25%. On this point, I hope he will recognise that subsection (2)(a) of the clause already provides for this—or, to be specific, very close to this effect—as it draws on the existing numerical trigger event thresholds in Clause 8, which start at acquisitions taking a person’s holding past 25%. As such, the amendment would duplicate those existing provisions and would in fact result in a requirement to notify when acquiring specifically 25% and then again if moving beyond 25% in future. I trust he will agree that we should avoid this, I am sure, unintentional effect.
Amendment 19A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, seeks to prevent notifiable acquisition regulations being used to bring asset acquisitions in scope of the mandatory notification regime. Let me start by setting out why it is important that the delegated powers in Clause 6 are not constrained in this way before I address the amendment itself.
The noble Baroness will accept, I am sure, that the future is uncertain, that the threats we face as a nation inevitably change over time and that the ways in which hostile actors seek to bring us harm are constantly evolving. That is precisely why the Bill extends the new investment screening regime’s coverage to acquisitions of individual assets, not just acquisitions of control over entities. We cannot, and should not, rule out the possibility that changes to the scope of the mandatory notification regime may be required, based on the types of acquisition and not just the sectors in which they take place.
None the less, the noble Baroness has spoken powerfully on a couple of occasions about the concerns of the Wellcome Trust and others, so let me say this categorically: the Government have no current plans to bring assets in scope of the mandatory notification regime, and neither subsections (5)(a) nor (6) require them to do so; they merely allow for that possibility, subject to the restrictions in subsection (7). Were we or a future Government to do so, it is clear that such a move would constitute a major change to the regime. It is difficult to conceive of many instances where consultation with relevant stakeholders would not be a practical necessity for a change such as this.
I thank my noble friend the Minister for his very considered comments, in particular his explanation of Clause 6(3). I think it allows a coach and horses to be driven through most of this legislation if someone can claim an impossibility. The examples he gave were excellent but there will be many other examples where people can claim an impossible circumstance. We will come on later to talk about, for example, the position of administrators and liquidators, and I can think of many others as well. I would have thought Clause 6(3) needed refinement.
Both the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, mentioned “materially control” as opposed to “materially influence”. There is a difference and this is not about materially controlling but about materially influencing. Regarding Clause 8(8), I accept that there are definitions elsewhere of materially influencing the policy. However, I remain of the view that it is not possible below 15%, or indeed below 25%, to materially influence the policy as far as national security is concerned. Therefore, I very much hope that my noble friend the Minister has a chance to reflect on this specifically before Report.
I will take that as a comment and not as a question. I continue to look at all aspects of the Bill to see how they can be improved.
The Minister referred to the meeting that he and the noble Baroness, Lady Bloomfield, very kindly held yesterday with the Wellcome Trust, and I very much welcome the reassurances that he has read into the record today. The shorthand for this is the nervousness in academia of bringing in assets—IP, information, ideas and software—rather than just entities. That was what we discussed at the meeting yesterday, and the Minister has now read into the record the reassurances he gave there, for which we thank him.
I thought that the suggestion—I was going to call it a wheeze—of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, was rather crafty: if that is what you mean, why do you not say it upfront? However, from what the Minister said, there seems to be a difference between the objective and the subjective criteria. I do not know whether that is why the Government want them in different clauses, but there is a problem with the subjectivity of this phrase. It is not simply, as the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, just said, about material influence rather than material control, but also the policy, and it is hard to define what that means. It seems to me a very subjective test for the big change made in Clause 6. I remain unconvinced that we have got it clear enough.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for explaining where the 15% figure, to which the Minister referred again, comes from. The CMA uses it when talking about mergers, but we are talking here about big companies, not small ones. However, because there is no threshold, much smaller companies will be covered by this. It may be absolutely important for the takeover of very large companies whether competition is taken out of the market. The Minister knows that, as a consumer champion, I am always very happy for the CMA to look at the impact on competition. However, I have my doubts whether a regime defined for competition in consumer goods and access should be lifted and shifted—the Minister said that there will not be separate guidance—into something that will sometimes affect small start-ups and new developments.
I certainly know more about the subject than I did 43 minutes ago, for which I thank all those who have spoken on the amendment. As has been said, I hope that the Minister and his draftspeople will look at whether this is clear enough, necessary and appropriate for the sorts of investments we are dealing with. When the Minister gives a bequest in a will as the reason for including a particular provision in the Bill, that feels like clutching at straws to me. I hope there are better arguments than that, but, for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.