Financial Services Bill
Monday 9th November 2020
(4 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Financial Services Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (John Glen)
Earlier today, we heard the Chancellor describe the UK’s financial services industry as fundamental to our economic strength. I wholeheartedly agree with that statement. This is an extraordinary industry: it drives growth and generates millions of jobs in every corner of our country, it has secured our reputation as a dynamic and world-leading financial centre, and it contributes vast sums to the public purse—money that has helped this Government to support millions of individuals and business through the pandemic. Now, however, as we leave the European Union and start our recovery from coronavirus, we commence a new chapter in the sector’s story.
We have set out a vision to create an industry that is even more open, more technologically advanced and greener than before; an industry that serves the people of this country and drives our economic recovery. That is underpinned by an unwavering commitment to high quality, agile and responsive regulation, and safe and stable markets. Through this Bill, I am laying the legislative foundations on which we will build to achieve those goals. I will speak briefly about the context in which the Government are bringing forward the Bill.
Until now, most of our recent financial services regulation was introduced through EU legislation. Having left the EU, we now have the opportunity to take back control of decisions governing the sector and, guided by what is right for the United Kingdom, to regulate differently and regulate better. That is why the Government are also undertaking a more fundamental review of our financial services regulatory framework, which will allow us to consider how the way in which we make our future rules might change to reflect the UK’s position outside the EU. The review will take time, however; the Government are consulting on it and there are changes that need to be made now. The Bill is therefore an important first step in taking control of our financial services legislation, which will support our position as a global hub for the sector in line with international standards.
In many parts, the Bill is consistent with the approach we took while this country was still part of the EU, but there are areas where it will better suit us to choose our own path, and this Bill marks the start of a process of evolution towards our goals. The Bill has three objectives: first, to enhance the UK’s world-leading prudential standards and protect financial stability; secondly, to promote openness between the UK and international markets; and thirdly, to maintain the effectiveness of the financial services regulatory framework, along with sound capital markets. I will speak about each of those objectives, starting with the first.
Clauses 1 and 2, along with schedule 2, require the Financial Conduct Authority to create a tailored prudential regime for investment firms—businesses that provide a range of services that allow investors to access financial markets. At present, investment firms are part of the same prudential regime as banks, even though their services are quite different and they do not pose the same risks to financial stability. The Bill will therefore require the UK’s independent regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority, to set more proportionate prudential requirements, which better reflect these firms’ risks. These measures will drive healthy competition across the sector, while allowing the UK investment industry to thrive outside the EU.
The UK’s regulators are globally respected, in large part as a result of the expertise of leaders such as Nikhil Rathil of the Financial Conduct Authority, Sam Woods at the Prudential Regulation Authority, and, of course, Andrew Bailey as Governor of the Bank of England. That is why it is appropriate to delegate responsibility to them for this complex and technical area of financial regulation. However, I can assure the House that the Bill also introduces an accountability framework to ensure greater scrutiny and transparency of the FCA’s decision making when implementing this regime.
This framework will sit alongside the prudential regime for banks and the largest investment firms, whose failure would impact the wider economy. They will remain subject to internationally agreed prudential standards. That is why clauses 3 to 7, along with schedule 3, will enhance the prudential regulatory regime in line with the latest global Basel banking standards endorsed by the G20. That will increase the UK’s resilience to economic shocks, while meeting our international commitments to protecting the global financial system. The Bill will enable the PRA to implement the standards in its rulebook. It, like the FCA, will be subject to an accountability framework. These measures illustrate this Government’s commitment to global financial stability.
Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (Ind)
Is there any chance, therefore, that, as part of this process, some of the commitments the UK has signed up to, such as those under Basel III, will be watered down?
John Glen
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. The driving principle guiding the Government in bringing forward the Bill is to maintain the highest possible standards; indeed, our reputation globally relies on the maintenance of such standards. However, it will be in the role of our regulators, with their technical expertise, to determine how those standards are implemented.
Let me move on to the next part of the Bill.
Kevin Hollinrake (Thirsk and Malton) (Con)
My hon. Friend mentioned the word “banks”, which obviously stimulated my interest as the co-chair of the all-parliamentary parliamentary group on fair business banking. He mentioned prudential risk around banks. Currently, the capital adequacy requirements for banks are all pretty much treated the same, which can deter competition from new entrants, such as regional mutual banks. Is he interested in looking at that issue in this legislation or in a future piece of legislation?
John Glen
My hon. Friend has unrivalled expertise and tenacity in bringing these matters before the House. He is right that there is a challenge to examine the relative regimes for different sized banks and institutions. That is something that regulators, subsequent to this Bill, will need to look at—indeed, they are keen to look at it—and I would welcome my hon. Friend’s further interventions in discussions in this place as we move forward on that legitimate question.
Eight years ago, the world was shocked by the LIBOR scandal. As the House will recall, traders at multiple banks attempted to manipulate that crucial benchmark, which contributes to interest rates for everything from complex derivatives to mortgages. Since then, significant improvements have been made to the benchmark’s administration. However, the Financial Stability Board, an international body that monitors and makes recommendations about the global financial system, has stated that continued use of LIBOR and other major interest rate benchmarks poses a serious source of systemic risk. That is because the decline in the inter-bank lending market has meant that such benchmarks depend increasingly on the judgments of panel banks rather than actual transactions. UK regulators have been encouraging firms to gradually shift away from LIBOR and are at the forefront of the global response to the transition, so to ensure that that transition was orderly, the FCA agreed with the LIBOR panel banks that they would continue to contribute to the benchmark for a temporary period. However, that temporary period will expire at the end of 2021, and after that point there is a risk that the benchmark will become unrepresentative of the market that it measures, potentially leading to disruption.
While we want firms to take the initiative in migrating from LIBOR, we recognise that there are some contracts that cannot be realistically amended to achieve that goal, so clauses 8 to 19, along with schedule 5, will give the FCA the powers that it needs to oversee the orderly wind-down of critical benchmarks, including LIBOR, and clause 20 will extend the transitional period for benchmarks with non-UK administrators from the end of 2022 until the end of 2025. This will avoid difficulties for our firms while the Government consider any changes required to our third country benchmarks regime to ensure that it is appropriate for the United Kingdom.
I will move on to the second objective of the Bill: to promote openness to overseas markets. I am delighted that clauses 22 and 23, along with schedules 6 to 8, establish a framework to provide long-term market access between the UK and Gibraltar for financial services firms. As many will know, Gibraltar boasts an array of thriving businesses in the sector, many of which are UK household names, including Admiral and Hastings, to name just two. The new Gibraltar authorisation regime in this Bill delivers on an earlier ministerial commitment and recognises our long-standing special relationship.
Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)
I refer to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. May I say, as chair of the all-party group on Gibraltar, how delighted I am to see this in the Bill? I know that that is echoed by Her Majesty’s Government of Gibraltar and the whole Gibraltar community. The Government have made good on a promise and it is very welcome. The Minister is right to set out that some 20% of UK insurance contracts are written by Gibraltar-based insurers. Will he undertake that, as well as this important piece of legislation, we will now build on it with his colleagues in other Departments to develop a full free market—a free-trade area effectively—between the UK and Gibraltar in services and goods?
John Glen
My hon. Friend is absolutely right with that 20% statistic and to point to the extensive orientation of the Gibraltarian insurance industry towards the UK. Ninety per cent. of the business that it writes comes to the UK. He is right to say that this is foundational to a deepening relationship, and I will ensure that Gibraltarian firms can continue to access the UK market on the basis of aligned regulation and supervision. I look forward to listening to him, as we move forward, on further steps that he thinks would be appropriate.
The proposals will guarantee close co-operation between our regulators, and this measure highlights the spirit of openness that underpins our approach. The same can be said of clauses 24 to 26 and schedule 9, which make up the overseas funds regime. These measures will simplify the process under which overseas investment funds are marketed in the UK. Under the present system, the FCA has to assess the protection standards of every individual fund before allowing it to be offered to UK consumers. However, the Bill will allow the Treasury to give market access to entire categories of funds from other countries that have so-called equivalent regulatory standards to those in the UK. Funds in this group can then undergo a simpler application process, due to the confidence provided by their home regime, which will allow overseas investment funds to be marketed in the UK, maintaining the UK’s position as a global centre of asset management. There are currently over 9,000 funds that passport into the UK from the EU, and let me stress that the existing process will remain for funds that have not been declared equivalent.
Sir Robert Neill
I am grateful to the Minister for correcting me. Of course, my figure of 20% related purely to motor insurance policies; it is 90% for all Gibraltar-based insurance. Can he help me on the specific point of the overseas funds regime? It is widely welcomed in the sector that he will allow access for overseas funds that have not yet achieved equivalence, but can he help give some clarity on a matter that is of concern to some providers? What is the position if people have invested in the fund and for some reason equivalency is withdrawn? What would then happen in practical terms if, for example, additional money is invested in the fund after suspension? Can he help as far as that is concerned? It is important for many people.
John Glen
It would not be for me at this point to set out the deductions to be made on individual funds, but I would like to follow up with my hon. Friend formally on that matter, because a process is under way for that to be examined, and I am happy to engage with him further in due course.
I will move on to the importance of ensuring that the FCA has an appropriate degree of oversight over firms that could register under the regime. To my hon. Friend’s point, there is a tension between the objectives set in Parliament and the regulators’ judgment on the ground. We need to ensure not only that they are accountable, but that we have set the right prescription for the outcomes we wish to see.
Richard Fuller (North East Bedfordshire) (Con)
Will my hon. Friend spend a moment putting the Bill in context? Earlier today, we heard the Chancellor outline the bold initiatives on green finance and on making the UK a leader in transparency internationally and financial technology. As we leave the European Union, we are keen to accelerate away from a sclerotic, introspective set of financial markets. The Bill looks very worthy, but can he put it in the context of those broader ambitions for financial services? Is this the first of a series of Bills we will see, or is it clearing things up so that afterwards we are in a position where we can move forward to capture that opportunity?
John Glen
This is a portfolio Bill of 17 measures, some of which I have been wanting to introduce for some while. It is the first step on a journey, and there will, if the authorities allow me, be further financial services legislation that we will need to make following the consultation on the future regulatory framework. We need to be ambitious for financial services. We live in a dynamic world where financial services are evolving all the time, and we need to have regulators that are nimble in developing world-class regulation that allows us to continue to grow, and that is reflected in our appetite for FinTechs, stablecoins, digital currencies and the right regulatory framework for firms of different sizes, as my hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake) referred to earlier.
The third objective of the Bill is to maintain the effectiveness of the financial services regulatory framework and ensure sound capital markets. Clause 28 introduces a streamlined process for the FCA to remove an inactive firm’s authorisation and position on the public register. That will improve accuracy, while reducing opportunities for fraudsters.
Clause 29 makes small changes to the market abuse regulation, making the regime more effective, while reducing some of the administrative burden facing firms. I draw attention to clause 30, which raises the maximum sentence for two kinds of financial market abuse from seven to 10 years in prison, bringing the penalties for those offences in line with other forms of economic crime, such as fraud. Clause 31 will ensure we can enforce the rules that apply to trusts. The Government are also taking proportionate and effective action elsewhere to prevent the misuse of these trusts, collecting a range of ownership information on those that have a connection to the UK.
Kevin Hollinrake
My hon. Friend mentions economic crime, the prevention of fraud and the penalties for fraud, but one of the things the Government are committed to doing is bringing forward a corporate offence for the failure to prevent economic crime. It is not within this Bill. Is there any reason why not? What timescale might we see around that kind of legislation?
John Glen
As my hon. Friend mentioned to me a few days ago, he is aware that the Ministry of Justice is conducting a consultation on that matter, and that will drive the Government’s response overall, but it is a matter we take seriously. Following the Financial Action Task Force review at the end of 2018, we needed to move forward a number of measures to improve and tighten our regime. It is critical for the integrity of the United Kingdom’s financial services industry to have in place the appropriate sanctions and the important regulations on reporting standards across the whole of financial services.
Let me turn to clause 32, which will strengthen our breathing space scheme that supports people with problem debt. That has long been a priority of mine as City Minister, and I put on record my gratitude to my hon. Friend the Member for Rochester and Strood (Kelly Tolhurst), who introduced a private Member’s Bill on this issue, for all her efforts, and to Members across the House for the consensus on that legislation’s introduction. The Bill contains crucial amendments that are required to implement fully and effectively statutory debt repayment plans, which will help people facing problem debt to pay back what they owe within a manageable timeframe. The Bill’s measures will allow us to compel creditors to accept these new repayment terms, providing greater peace of mind to consumers, many of whom will be vulnerable.
Bim Afolami (Hitchin and Harpenden) (Con)
I congratulate the Minister on the work I know he has done over many years on this subject. I understand that the Bill amends the Financial Guidance and Claims Act 2018 to ensure that the statutory debt repayment plan can include debts owed to the Government or Government Departments. Will he explain a bit further how that will work in practice? What will the ranking for claims be for creditors? Will it require a mediated process?
John Glen
I thank my hon. Friend for his question. As he says, the purpose of the measure is to provide, during the eight-week moratorium—longer for those with a mental health condition—a set of options, and it is key that the Bill will allow us to compel creditors to accept the new repayment terms. He is right to say that it will provide peace of mind to all consumers, with a compulsion under the provision to bring in debts owed across the public and private sector. He asked me to list the hierarchy of debts, which is probably beyond my capacity at this point, but I am happy to write to him to set out in more detail what the provision gives us room to do.
Clause 33 complements the Government’s pioneering Help to Save scheme, which supports people on low incomes to build up a nest egg. These changes will ensure that people can continue to save through a National Savings & Investments account after their participation in the scheme ends.
As I mentioned earlier, there will be some areas where this country will decide that it is right to diverge from EU regulation. Clause 34 is a good illustration of that, making amendments to the packaged retail and insurance-based investment products regulation, commonly known as PRIIPs. That EU legislation was laudable in its aims, although, one might argue, not quite as laudable in its outcomes and achievements. Concerns have been raised by Members across the House, and most tenaciously by my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron), that it is not working as intended and that there is a risk that consumers may be inadvertently misled by disclosures that firms must provide under the regulation. I am pleased finally to be able to address those concerns. The Bill will allow the FCA to clarify the scope of the regulation. It will tackle the issues around misleading performance scenarios and allow the Treasury to extend an exemption from the PRIIPs regime for undertakings in collective investments in transferable securities—UCITS—which are a type of investment fund.
These are some examples of how we intend to take advantage of a new ability to address issues in retained EU law. However, we have no intention of needlessly, ideologically or recklessly diverging from EU legislation. Instead, we will maintain existing regulations where they make sense for the financial services industry in this country. One instance of that approach is clause 35, which finalises reforms to the European market infrastructure regulation, which the UK supported as an EU member state, while clause 36 contains a change that should provide certainty to markets by ensuring the legal validity in the past and in the future of the financial collateral arrangements regulations.
Finally, clause 37 will make the role of the chief executive of the Financial Conduct Authority a fixed five-year term appointment that is renewable only once, in line with other high-profile roles in financial services regulation. That was recommended by the Treasury Committee not so long ago.
I recognise that Members might be concerned that some of the Government’s prior commitments are not included in the Bill. I assure the whole House that our focus on these issues has not wavered. One issue that came up in questions to the Chancellor earlier was access to cash. The Government are committed to ensuring that everyone who needs it has easy access to cash. I have heard representations on the issue from Members across the House in recent weeks, including my right hon. Friend the Member for Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale and Tweeddale (David Mundell), whom I met recently, and Members from across Scotland and the whole UK.
Earlier this month, we launched a call for evidence, seeking a wide range of views on the subject’s key considerations. Once we have reviewed the findings, we will bring forward legislation as soon as parliamentary time allows.
Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)
I thank the Minister for making that point, because I was not going to make a great deal of it in my remarks. Does he appreciate the fears on the SNP Benches that by the time the Government get around to legislating on this, there will be no banks left?
John Glen
I understand the hon. Lady’s anxiety—it is one she has expressed to me a number of times over the past nearly three years.
We asked Natalie Ceeney to do a review last spring. Immediately the review was completed, we put together the JACS process—the joint authorities cash strategy—and brought together the Payment Systems Regulator, the FCA, the Bank of England and the Treasury. We are working closely with LINK and the banks to look at a new way of making cash available. The cashpoint network in this country is not fit for purpose and urgent work is going on behind the scenes to bring forward a cohesive solution.
The prospect of legislation remains, and the call for evidence a week or so ago is another step in moving this forward as rapidly as possible. This problem has been extended and made worse by our recent experience of covid. I assure the hon. Lady that I am committed to getting to the end of this in a positive way.
To conclude, the Bill marks an important moment in the history of the UK’s financial services sector. It is the next step of an ambitious programme of regulatory reform that will be guided by what is right for UK industry. In short, the Bill will support financial stability and high regulatory standards, promote openness between the UK and international markets, and maintain the effectiveness of this country’s financial regulatory framework. I commend it to the House.
Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)
I thank the Minister and his officials for the information they have shared about the measures in the Bill over the past couple of weeks. I have, of course, been riveted by the Bill in recent days, but I confess that I had to put it down for a while at 5 o’clock on Saturday to watch CNN when something more exciting than the Bill came through on the news.
Harriett Baldwin (West Worcestershire) (Con)
Will the right hon. Gentleman clarify whether that is where all his colleagues are this evening? I note that he does not have many behind him. In fact, his Benches are empty.
Mr McFadden
There is a phrase: I am not my brother or my sister’s keeper. They will have to answer for themselves.
The backdrop to these measures is formed by two significant events in recent years. The first of those is not Brexit but the financial crash of 2007 and 2008, which exposed the risks being run in the financial services industry and the huge knock-on effects for the rest of the economy when those risks go wrong. That experience prompted a global rethink about banking regulation, the capital levels that banks and other financial institutions are expected to hold, resolution measures in the event of banking failure, and the balance of obligations between the industry and the state. Much of that rethinking was expressed in the series of directives with which the Bill deals and in the Basel process on capital rules.
For all the complexity in the detail of these things, at root the questions are quite basic. First, how much capital should institutions hold as insurance against things going wrong? Secondly, who should be on the hook if things do go wrong? And thirdly, how do we insulate the wider economy from the consequences of instability in financial services? It is on these questions that much financial services regulation has focused over the past decade. The UK has been a key player in this process at both a European and a more global level. These are not things that have been imposed on us; we have played a significant role in the design of the measures that we are onshoring through the Bill.
The second event is, of course, Brexit and the consequent withdrawal from the European regulatory institutions responsible for the oversight and implementation of these directives. By definition, the process requires a recasting of regulatory responsibilities in the UK, and much of the Bill is concerned with that. The key question, then, is not so much the onshoring of the regulations themselves, but what happens next. Do the Government intend to diverge significantly from the rulebook, and in which direction will they go?
Jonathan Edwards
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for setting the scene. Many of us are concerned that the Basel III regulations did not go far enough—that is, they did not really solve the “too big to fail” issue. We need to be very careful that we do not water down the proposals. Does he agree with that position?
Mr McFadden
I do, and I will talk later about the Basel III regulations; certainly Basel II did not prove to be any kind of protection against what happened in 2007 and 2008.
The other issue that we will have to consider is the role of Parliament in debating and deciding these matters. The approach that we will take is to ask at each stage what these measures will mean for the UK financial services industry, for the wider economy and for consumers. Do they guarantee robust regulation in the public interest, or do they expose the consumer to greater risk?
There is a particular onus on the UK to get this right, because we are a medium-sized economy with a globally significant financial sector. There are obviously crucial benefits of that to the UK: the huge number of jobs generated around the country by financial services; the investment that comes into the country through being a world leader in the sector; and, of course, the tax revenue that goes towards supporting our public services. But, as we have also learned, there are risks if things go wrong, and it is in no one’s interest for the post-Brexit regulatory system to result in a race to the bottom, where the public are exposed to greater risk in the name of increased competitiveness.
We know that parts of the financial services sector will be knocking on the Minister’s door. They will not put it in terms of watering things down; they will tell the Minister that they could be so much more competitive if only he changed this rule or that rule, or gave them this or that exemption. Of course, we do not argue that any rulebook should be frozen in time. Regulation must adapt to circumstances and innovation, but these things are there for a reason. Capital has to be held against lending and other products for a reason. These rules are the public’s insurance policy against the risks involved in the enormous capital flows that go across countries and between financial institutions. They are the as yet untested firewall against a repeat of what happened across the globe a decade ago.
Bim Afolami
What is the right hon. Gentleman’s view on an expanding, ever more complex set of measures obscuring good supervision and prudential management of the financial services sector? To what extent would he welcome any efforts—whether cross-party or by the Government—to simplify regulatory standards while also ensuring that they continue to be robust? There is a danger for many in different parts of the industry not of watering things down, but of such complexity making it very difficult to manage a business on an ongoing basis.
Mr McFadden
Nobody should be wedded to complexity for complexity’s sake. As I said, beneath the complexity, the issues are actually not that complicated. They are about the safety of insurance and resilience when things go wrong, and that is what we are focused on, rather than defending complexity for complexity’s sake.
The second thing that we will have in mind as we debate the Bill is the broad question of what financial services are for. The Chancellor set out green goals for the UK financial services industry in his statement today, and we welcome, for example, what he said on green gilts. But those green goals are not mentioned in the accountability framework set out in the Bill. Indeed, in schedule 3, the accountability framework states that the regulator must have regard to
“relevant standards recommended by the Basel Committee”.
The hon. Member for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr (Jonathan Edwards) was right to say that that should be a minimum, not a maximum, given the importance of resilience and robust regulation. The regulator must also have regard to
“the likely effect of the rules on the relative standing of the United Kingdom as a place for internationally active credit institutions and investment firms to be based or to carry on activities”
and
“the likely effect of the rules on the ability of…firms to continue to provide finance to businesses and consumers”.
Nothing there speaks of the green goals. Do the Government intend to amend the Bill as it progresses, to reflect the statement made by the Chancellor today? There is an opportunity here to put regulatory power behind the goal of net zero and, indeed, broader social and governance considerations for the greater public good. As it stands, the Bill is silent on that—it does not do that yet. When will the Bill be reconciled with the statement that we heard this afternoon?
Thirdly, we will want to ensure that the UK maintains the highest standards when it comes to transparency, money laundering and corruption. We have already had the report from the Intelligence and Security Committee referring to the “London laundromat”, where illicit funds can be washed and corrupt financing rendered more obscure. The UK’s globally significant financial services sector must not be tainted with any sense that this is an easy place for illicit or corruptly obtained finance to be washed through different institutions. As the Bill progresses, we will seek to ensure the highest possible standards with regard to these issues. Of course we want a successful, globally competitive financial services sector, but it has to be based on clean money, honest endeavour and socially responsible goals.
I turn to some of the individual measures in the Bill. As the Minister said, clauses 1 to 7 deal with new prudential regulation requirements, the implementation of the Basel rules and the new accountability framework, which I quoted from a moment ago. As I said, the schedule on the accountability framework states that, when making these new rules, the regulator must have regard to the likely effect on the “relative standing” of the UK as a place for firms to be based or carry on activities. I want to explore that with the Minister. Does that clause about the relative standing of the UK mean that, every time a regulated entity says, “We don’t want you to do that because it will affect our competitiveness in relation to other countries”—and they are liable to say that quite a lot when regulatory proposals are put forward—the regulators have to keel over and give in? How does this point to the UK being a leading player in the kind of environmental or social regulation that can help to ensure that the power of our financial services sector is a force for good? What is the guarantee that the provision does not, in fact, become a deregulator’s charter, on the basis that we should not do things that some in the industry could claim put us at a competitive disadvantage relative to other countries? The wording is crucial. The accountability frameworks, Parliament’s role in them and what they should cover will be the subject of significant debate as the Bill progresses.
On capital ratios, the FCA has estimated that total pillar 1 capital requirements will decrease by 5%. What is the justification for decreasing the capital requirements when we know that over-leveraging was a key cause of the financial crisis? How can the Government ensure that the onshoring of these powers does not result in a chipping away of the public’s insurance policy on financial risk? Similarly, in relation to Basel reforms, the Bill’s impact assessment talks of
“flexibility to tailor the actual detail of these subject areas to the UK.”
Given the weakness of the Basel rules in the past, it is clear that they should be seen as a floor, not a ceiling. Adherence to international standards is a minimum, not a maximum to be wriggled out of when we get the chance, so what exactly is the flexibility to be used for?
Clauses 8 to 19 deal with LIBOR and the governance of benchmarks. For my sins, a few years ago I served on the cross-party Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, which was established in the wake of the LIBOR scandal, which exposed manipulation, mutual favours and price setting based on conjecture rather than actual trades. The benchmark was abused to benefit traders, rather than markets or the end consumers of those trades, so it is right that it goes, but so many contracts around the world have been based on it that the Bill has to put in place a system for dealing with such so-called tough legacy contracts. The principles behind benchmarks should be clear: they should be based on actual trades and costs and should be insulated against manipulation for personal gain by those who submit the information to the benchmark in the first place. That will be the task of the FCA.
Clauses 22 and 23 establish the new Gibraltar authorisation regime. I share the warmth towards Gibraltar that is felt in all parts of the House. The measures could be described as a necessary consolation prize for taking Gibraltar out of the EU, by ensuring continued market access on a free basis between Gibraltar and the UK.
Clauses 24 to 26 give us a picture of how equivalence will work from the UK point of view, at least in part, by establishing the overseas fund regime, which negates the need for fund-by-fund approval and will instead be based on country-by-country approval and extending the time period for such funds to trade in the meantime. In his statement earlier this afternoon, the Chancellor had more to say about how we will grant equivalence recognition to others, but of course he could not say what would happen to UK companies that sell services overseas, because over that he has no control.
What was announced today dealt with one end of the telescope, because that is the position we are now in. Whatever this can be described as, it certainly cannot be described as taking back control, for we are now dependent on a response from others in respect of the crucial UK companies in the overseas markets in which they want to trade. There is also the question of how equivalence decisions are to be granted. Are such decisions a matter of economic policy or foreign policy—or both? I would be grateful if the Minister addressed that when he responds.
Jonathan Edwards
Considering the amount of work that needs to be done on this issue before the end of the transition period, is not the reality that the best we can hope for for the financial sector is some sort of base deal? The negotiations on what the situation may be down the line will then take many, many months, if not years.
Mr McFadden
If we read the political declaration, we can see that this was all supposed to be wrapped up by June. We are now approaching mid-November. The hon. Gentleman is certainly right to suggest that the time has slipped.
Subsequent clauses in the Bill go through a number of other EU directives and the onshoring process. They cover the markets and financial instruments regulation, the market abuse regulation, European markets infrastructure regulation dealing with over-the-counter derivatives, and the EU financial collateral directive. I have no doubt we will have a lot of fun with all of them in Committee. On money laundering, we will want to see as strong a system as possible to ensure that the UK is no safe harbour for anyone who wants to wash dirty money, avoid taxes or evade accountability. Again, I am sure the Minister is expecting more discussion of this as the Bill progresses. He and I debated the statutory debt repayment plan a few weeks ago, and Labour supports moves to create this system. It will be particularly important in the light of the increasing debt burden on many families due to the covid pandemic, and the sooner it is in place, the better.
On PRIIPS, the Government propose to remove the performance scenarios. The question, of course, is what they will be replaced with, how useful and accessible the information for consumers will be and what protections will be in place against the mis-selling of products or fraudulent claims. The imbalance of information is always a challenge in financial products because, in most cases, the seller knows more than the purchaser. Regulators have an important duty to be on the side of the consumer when it comes to the marketing of such products, so if the current performance scenarios are to go, they must be replaced with something better that will genuinely help the consumer. Other measures, including the fixed term for the FCA chief executive, have finally found the legislative home for which they have been waiting in the Treasury for some time.
That is, broadly speaking, what the Bill legislates for, but there are important areas, as the Minister said, that are not included. The most obvious is access to cash. Cash use has declined markedly this year, as people have moved to more online shopping and many businesses have moved to card-only payments, but this is not a trend that falls evenly on the population. Most of the population might need less cash or, in some cases, no cash in the future, but we have a duty to ensure access to cash for those who still need it, including many on low incomes for whom cash budgeting is a vital way of making ends meet. If we do not do that, inequality will be sharpened and there is a real danger that cash-dependent consumers will be cut off from important areas of economic activity. The Government have said—the Minister repeated it tonight—that they want to ensure access to cash, but if that cannot be done through this Bill, we urge the Minister to come forward with appropriate measures as soon as possible.
Standing back and looking at all this, I get an overwhelming feeling of it being all deckchairs and no iceberg. The Government can, of course, rearrange the regulatory furniture, and in many areas that is a necessary consequence of leaving the EU, but the bigger policy decision to downgrade financial services in the negotiations was taken a long time ago. The Chancellor talked today about the economic and employment importance of this industry, and he was absolutely right to emphasise that, but the more he emphasises it, the more it begs the question why market access for this crucial sector, and indeed services in general, has not been a negotiating priority for the Government. The truth is that, in this negotiation, services have been thrown under the bus.
On manufacturing, we have also moved further and further away from the earlier promises of frictionless trade, exact same benefits and all the rest. The fact that these things are not front and centre of the final round of talks is not because agreement on them has already been reached, but because the Government have decided not even to prioritise them. That is a louder testament to where we have ended up in this process than anything in the Bill. This is a series of measures that are trying to compensate for much bigger decisions. This will create more trading friction and more market barriers for our crucial financial services, and for our broader services industry and manufacturing. In the end, no amount of cutting and pasting of EU directives or last-minute vision statements can change that bigger picture.
Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)
My colleague from the Treasury Committee, the hon. Member for West Worcestershire (Harriett Baldwin), mentioned earlier that some of the Benches in this place are a little empty this evening. I am sure that that is not because this is not a wonderfully exciting Bill—well, perhaps. But we have to look at the reality of the situation that we are in. We are here in London in lockdown and people are being advised not to travel. So I do not hold a grudge against any Member who has decided not to travel today, for their safety or the safety of their constituents and their families. It is important that we consider each other in this place as well as those out there in every street in the country as coronavirus continues to spread.
I thank the Minister for his briefing on Thursday evening. It was a very good distraction from all the events in the United States. I also thank all the organisations that have provided such helpful briefings in advance of the Bill. The financial services are a significant part of the economy in Scotland in terms of the number of businesses, the number of employees and their contribution to the wider Scottish economy, particularly in the growing area of FinTech, where we have much innovation coming out of our universities.
The Bill is, relatively speaking, a wee bit dull and a wee bit functional. Some bits have been taken out of the back of the drawer at the Treasury and presented in the Bill tonight.
Alison Thewliss
The Minister says that is harsh, but he said himself that there are things here that he has wanted to do for quite a wee while and has not found the mechanism to do. It is a portfolio Bill, as he called it generously, of some things that hang together and some things that are a wee bit tacked on.
The regulations are important, and they affect us all in some way or another. The purpose of financial regulations is to protect us as citizens from the worst extremes of the financial inclinations of those who wish to grab the cash a wee bit quicker. We would all live with the consequences of deregulating to an extreme, so we need to be very careful of the regulations that we make.
The Bill’s objective is to enhance
“the UK’s world-leading prudential standards and promote financial stability”,
to promote openness
“between the UK and international markets”
and to maintain
“an effective financial services regulatory framework and sound capital markets”.
I am sure that that is all very laudable. It is what we had as a member state of the EU. Who could really object to any of those aims? We on the SNP Benches will not be opposing this Bill on Second Reading tonight, but we do hope to put together some constructive amendments for the Government to ignore in Committee. If they would like to surprise me and take them on I would be absolutely made up, but we shall see. I shall go ahead and hope rather than look at experience.
I hope that we can have some good discussions on the things that should be put into the Bill to give people greater protection, and where things should be that wee bit tighter. Despite what the Chancellor said earlier about unilateral equivalence, the reality is much more complex and many firms do not yet know what they are preparing for. Whether it is the worst or not quite the worst, it will still cost money, time and resource, at a time when covid affects us all, and it will still be significantly less advantageous than it was under EU membership or even single market membership.
I am nervous, as are many others, about Parliament’s role in the regulatory framework and where that ends up. CityUK has expressed concerns, as has Barclays, about taking back these powers to hand them straight over to the PRA and the FCA. This is hardly taking back control. I worry that with the safeguards that we have, we will not find out that something has gone terribly wrong until it is far too late, and far too far down the line. I worry that Parliament will find out about these things when it is too late, because that has been the experience of the banking crisis and other things. We need to be careful that we do not end up going down those same roads. A statutory limit on the term of the FCA chief executive is not quite taking back control in the same way. This is giving a whole lot of power to these institutions and cutting out Parliament.
I have some questions and I would be grateful if the Minister picked them up. For example, the Bill will allow Her Majesty’s Treasury to revoke the capital regulation in favour of PRA rules, so what happens to those who are already working to the CRR2 EU regulations and what do they now need to do? Will regulatory decisions and implementation be in line with broader public policy objectives and is there a safeguard within that, because Parliament should be satisfied that existing appeals mechanisms are sufficient and, as Barclays says, that they are commensurate with the increased level of autonomy and rule making for those regulators?
The ABI is also concerned about a number of areas. It talks about the need for the Gibraltar authorisation regime, saying:
“We welcome that Government will work with the FCA to ensure that, once the GAR comes into force, individuals and eligible small businesses using financial services sold in the UK by Gibraltar-based firms can refer disputes to the UK Financial Ombudsman Service”.
That protection ought to be there in black and white but it does not appear quite yet to be at that stage. People need to have that protection—that recourse—if something goes wrong.
It is of huge concern to us that the UK regulators have threatened to deviate from EU rules on share trading if Brussels does not deliver market access permissions to the City of London. The ABI has said that the equivalence process has occasionally been used as a political weapon to wield against third countries. It is concerned about where the overseas funds regime sits within this, particularly because it does not know what might happen should there be a negotiating advantage for one side or another when the cost is borne by companies and consumers.
There are further questions on what this means for existing investors if equivalence is withdrawn. What happens if someone has money in a particular fund and then it goes? What are the practicalities there? What do they need to do as an investor in those circumstances? We need urgent clarity for people so that they know where they stand on these issues. Perhaps the Minister cannot give us those answers yet. That is part of the wider problem that people do not know exactly what is going to happen and how they can prepare for it. There could be a risk that people will withdraw from these funds altogether rather than keeping their money there, which would have further knock-on effects.
We support the increased sentences for insider dealing and market abuse. It is quite right that those should be increased. However, as I have said many times in this House, enforcement is key—having the tools in the box to make sure that we can find these frauds, market abuses and insider dealings and then punish those responsible. That is crucial, because if people are felt to get away with these things, then having the rules is really not enough.
On people exploiting rules and general misbehaviour, I want to talk about money laundering. I was on the Committee that considered the Bill that became the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 and I worked on it in this House. Clause 31 amends schedule 2 of SAML to ensure that regulations can be made in respect of trustees with links to the UK. Without it, any powers that HMRC sought to exercise to access information on such trusts are at risk of being held invalid under legal challenge. The Government say that this technical change
“will reaffirm the UK’s global leadership in the use of public registers of beneficial ownership, as identified by the Financial Action Taskforce’s Mutual Evaluation of the UK in 2018. This will further support the public and private sectors to efficiently and effectively target their resources towards potential criminal activity using trusts, maintaining the resilience of the UK’s defences against economic crime.”
That does not stack up to me because there have been opportunities to deal with this.
I was on the Committee on the Registration of Overseas Entities Bill, which sought to look at trusts as well. We took lots of evidence on how trusts are an open door for people to move money around, yet the Government are not really acting to deal with that. The Registration of Overseas Entities Bill went through the whole pre-legislative scrutiny process and then just disappeared. The difficulty is that people are moving money around and buying properties, largely in the city of London, where they can launder that money. There are huge buildings sitting empty in the city because people are using that as a means of moving money about. There is a huge homelessness problem as well, so this is a really pernicious problem that the Government need to get their head around.
I do not understand why there is not more to deal with the issue of trusts, or with the issue, as I have mentioned ad nauseum, about Scottish limited partnerships and proper reform of Companies House. The Chancellor mentioned the consultation on that earlier. That consultation has been going on for ever, it feels like, and nothing has yet changed. The Government have this huge, big, wide, gaping loophole in Companies House that allows people to move money around. If they want to do something properly, I would suggest that they deal with that, and do a lot more to take action on trusts and other means of shunting money about. Not doing that makes this country a home for dirty money. Lots of research has been done on this issue by Transparency International and others. The evidence is there; the action, unfortunately, is not.
The debt respite scheme in clause 32 can be enhanced further. I know the Minister is committed to doing this and wants to act on it. I would be curious to find out a bit more about what he has learned from what Scotland has done so far and how the schemes will work together, because we have had the debt arrangement scheme in Scotland since 2004 and the statutory moratorium since 2011. There are always improvements that Scotland can make and the UK can make as well. I would be very interested to hear what more can be done to improve upon that.
I have been contacted, as many other Members might have been, by Macmillan’s duty of care campaign. What conversations has the Minister had with the Financial Conduct Authority on that campaign? Macmillan fears that many people—people with cancer who are struggling —are finding things incredibly difficult. Can he say with certainty that the guidance put out by the FCA is enough? Could more be done to protect people in the most vulnerable of circumstances?
Help to Save customers have enough on their plate at the moment without having to navigate myriad changes to their saving products. We firmly believe that the accounts should continue to earn interest until this crisis is over. Savers who do not withdraw the funds after maturity and whose balance remains in the account do not seem to be eligible for further bonuses and they are also not earning interest. It seems very unfair to expect low-income savers, who are potentially dealing with the risk of redundancy and are worried about the risk of covid, to change financial products at this time to avoid losing interest. Some of this is the UK Government’s fault for not having set an end date when the scheme was introduced. We argue that they should extend the active period of these accounts at least until the end of this pandemic, so that nobody loses that all-important interest.
What is the communications strategy from the UK Government to make sure that nobody loses out? Since the launch of the scheme, more than 222,000 people have opened Help to Save accounts, with some £85 million deposited, I understand. So this is not a small amount of money for people at the very lowest end of our economy and they need to have some certainty that the scheme will not be rolled up and that they will not lose out because of the changes the Government seek to make in this Bill.
I wish to close by discussing a briefing I received from the Finance Innovation Lab, which makes three well made points about the Bill. First, it says that the Bill threatens to introduce a democratic accountability deficit in financial sector policymaking, and I made that point earlier. We cannot be in the situation where we take all these powers back from Brussels and hand them straight over to unaccountable, arm’s length organisations. They might come before the Treasury Committee once every six months or so, when we will ask them some questions, and that is the extent of the scrutiny they get from this House. We do the best job we can to ask them questions—I see some colleagues from the Committee on the Government Benches tonight—but that is not the same.
Secondly, the FIL also argues, as the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) did, that the purposes of the Bill should be broadened to economic, social and environmental outcomes. The Chancellor talked a lot earlier about how important those environmental outcomes are, but they are missing from this Bill. I do not know whether that is because one part of the Treasury is not speaking to the other or how else that has come about, but if the Government are now saying today that these environmental aspects are incredibly important and they should be a key part of COP26, as the former Governor of the Bank of England has also argued, they need to be in the Bill. If they are that important, the Government need to put them in the Bill.
Lastly, the FIL suggests that the Bill should help the UK to be a leader in financial regulation that sets high standards. There should be no backsliding on the standards we have built up as part of being in the EU. It is an area in which we had huge and significant influence as a member state in making a lot of these rules. Now if we want to have equivalence and have access, we are going to have to abide by some rules made by other people, rather than being able to make the rules ourselves. I believe firmly that we should not have less power as Members of this House than MEPs have to scrutinise all of those things that come before them, and we should have a bit more than we have in statutory instruments Committees; we cannot vote on those and we cannot amend them either. So we need to have a whole lot more by way of scrutiny of financial services in the future. In those Committees, I have argued regularly to the Minister that we need a plan and a framework, and we need to see the whole spectrum of what this Government propose for financial services. It needs to involve everybody—the people in the sector and Members from across parties in this House—so that we can build something resilient that we can all have trust and faith in. That trust and faith in financial services is what we all need. We need to be able to trust the institutions and that our money will be well managed and we will be protected in the event that anything goes wrong.
This is all about building something new, but there is really not a huge amount that is new in the Bill. The Government need to do a whole lot more on financial services, which have been neglected as part of the Brexit negotiations, put to one side and not prioritised, despite being an absolutely massive sector of the economy in Scotland and the rest of the UK. I hope very much that we will be able to make amendments to the Bill to improve it and that the Government will listen to those amendments and take them forward in good faith.
Harriett Baldwin (West Worcestershire) (Con)
It is a pleasure to follow my Treasury Committee colleague, the hon. Member for Glasgow Central (Alison Thewliss).
The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) talked about the historic events that had distracted him from preparing for his speech, although I do not think anyone would ever have known it, because he spoke in a very well-informed way. We often recognise historic turning points—certainly, Saturday at 5 pm was one of them, and today’s announcement of the Pfizer vaccine is another—and that is why I am a little disappointed that there are so few colleagues here for what is an important turning point in the UK financial services sector. I do not say that because the measures in the Bill are gripping, although they are sensible, practical measures, and they will no doubt be expatiated on at greater length by colleagues. Rather, I put in to speak in today’s debate because I wanted to hear the Minister at the Dispatch Box talk about the vision for post-transition UK financial services.
We are at an important inflection point, which is why I welcome the fact not only that the Minister outlined that vision today, but that the Chancellor was able to come here earlier to talk about the future, as he sees it, for this incredibly important sector. He emphasised in his statement, as the Minister did at the Dispatch Box, what a significant export sector this is. It is our biggest export sector. It pays £75 billion a year in taxes. It helps to fund the public services we all rely on. That is why we need it too to do well in the future and why it is important to note this historic turning point. We may look back at this moment, as we look back on the big bang in 1986, as being a really significant inflection point.
The Chancellor set out today three ways in which we can really build on our existing comparative advantage to become the leading financial services sector of the 21st century. He made some bold statements this afternoon that really reflected what financial services are going to become. First, he spoke about our global openness. It is a matter of regret that we have not been able to mutually agree equivalence with the EU. Obviously, we are entirely equivalent, and it would have been much more satisfactory if we had been able to respect each other’s starting point as being completely equivalent and to go forward from there. It is clear from the way in which the European Union has not been prepared to offer us equivalence that it will continue to use EU regulation in financial services as a bit of a stick with which to beat up on this sector, in which the UK already excels. I am sorry to say that, and it gives me no pleasure, but that would clearly be unacceptable.
In the Treasury Committee, we heard from the Governor of the Bank of England that it would be dangerous to financial stability if we were to allow an external regulator to suddenly take away equivalence from our financial services sector. So the judgment that was made to come to the Dispatch Box and say, “Do you know what? We’re unilaterally going to do it for the UK,” was regrettably the right decision to take historically. It was accompanied with the three statements about the kind of financial services sector that we envision for the 21st century—one that is globally open and inviting of inward investment and listings from around the world, not just from other EU countries.
Secondly, the Chancellor said that the financial services sector should also be technologically innovative. That is so important. We have led the world in the FinTech sector and regulation, and have set up FinTech bridges with other countries. Singapore, another FinTech innovator, was the first with which we established a regulatory bridge. That is clearly how financial services will evolve in the 21st century, and the announcement about the leadership we are showing on digital currencies was incredibly important.
Thirdly, the headline measure—the one that will no doubt get coverage around the world—was the equally important announcement that we will issue a green gilt. I am the first to congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Grantham and Stamford (Gareth Davies), who has been assiduous in calling for that. We have had announcements on the global vision, the technological vision and the importance of the UK being the lead financial centre for financing the climate revolution of the 21st century. We financed the industrial revolution, and we will finance the green industrial revolution. Countries from around the world will issue bonds in the UK against the green gilt benchmark, so this Bill is historic.
I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Minister for the work he has done on breathing space. I know how passionate he is about it. He and I were elected in 2010, and he has always championed that issue, so it is wonderful to see him bringing forward legislation to make progress on it.
I want to ask the Minister a few questions. He and the Chancellor highlighted the UK’s importance as a global financial centre. First, what progress has been made on what the UK is hoping to achieve on a US financial services free trade agreement? That has always struck me as important. We are the biggest investors in each other’s countries, and the ability to do more in terms of financial services would help consumers in both countries, so what are his aspirations and ambitions for that?
Secondly, what is the Minister’s vision for the Basel framework, particularly with regard to the very high risk weighting that it gives to investments in Africa? When I was Africa Minister, one of the things that used to get me excited was the potential for inward investment into Africa. We had a big Africa investment summit in January. The risk weighting for assets in many African countries is incredibly high under the Basel rules, so can the Minister update the House on anything he is doing to try to make those assets appear less risky on bank balance sheets?
My third question is about the assets we still own as a result of the financial crash in 2008. Will the Minister update the House on what the exit strategy is for those remaining financial services assets?
Those are my three questions for the Minister. Given the general direction and strategy the Government have announced today, I think this is a historic moment for UK financial services. In 10 or 15 years, we will look back on it as equally significant as the announcement from Pfizer and the US election. I congratulate the Minister on introducing the Bill and I look forward to hearing more detail when he responds.
Christine Jardine (Edinburgh West) (LD)
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for West Worcestershire (Harriett Baldwin). I agree with her that we have seen significant changes in the last few days; historic turning points that for many of us seem like we are beginning, finally, to emerge from a very dark four years, not just for this country, but for the United States and Europe. I agree with the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden). It was very distracting for five days and I am not quite sure how I am coping now without CNN. It has been so long since I was actually in front of a screen.
In that context, with everything that is happening in the world at the moment, it is difficult to overstate the importance of the Bill, not only to the financial services sector but to our wider economy in this country. As the MP for Edinburgh West, that is particularly significant to my constituents. Edinburgh has the second-largest financial sector in the United Kingdom. Hundreds, if not thousands, of jobs in my constituency are dependent on the Government getting this right—thousands of jobs across the country as well. As we approach at great speed the end of the transition period from our exit from the EU, that becomes increasingly important day on day. I thank the Minister for being so open at his briefing the other night, but there are areas where the Liberal Democrats believe the Bill falls short of what is needed to protect those jobs and the financial sector itself.
The Government claim that the Bill will ensure that the UK maintains its world-leading status as a financial sector. However, I feel that the truth is that because of the Government’s reckless handling of Brexit, the financial services industry now faces unprecedented challenges that the Bill will have to face. For more than two decades, the greatest strength of our financial sector was being at the heart of the EU. That is no longer the case and it leaves in its place the problem of how we protect a market whose capacity is in the UK but whose bulk of custom is in the EU. Banks looking to consolidate may no longer do so in the UK. We have already seen, as was mentioned earlier, that more than £1 trillion—yes, £1 trillion —worth of assets moved to the EU from our sector. Thousands of jobs have gone with them. Barclays’ European investment arm has gone to Dublin. British-registered financial firms will lose the passporting rights that have allowed them to sell funds, debt, advice or insurance to clients across the EU as if we were in the same country.
Positive spin from those on the Government Benches about the Bill will not make up for what we have lost, and stand to lose, from a vital sector of our economy. We have to get it right. More than that, by being intent on breaking international law through the internal market, the Government risk damaging the UK’s standing as a global financial centre by throwing into question our commitment to the rule of law. The now President-elect of the United States is one of those who criticised the Government for the United Kingdom Internal Market Bill. I believe that the Financial Services Bill falls short of what the sector needs, particularly in three crucial areas on which my party intends to bring forward amendments in Committee.
On green finance, for example, although we had the welcome statement from the Chancellor today, we believe that the Bill requires some form of provision—more provision than we have heard—to take potential environmental impacts into account. The Chancellor’s earlier statement was welcome, but I do not believe it is accurate to say that we are leading the world. In fact, I think it is too little and too late. Since the start of the pandemic, our international competitors have announced billions of pounds worth of stimulus to their green economies. Germany has pledged €9 billion. France will spend €8 billion on electric vehicle charging. China has also pledged. We are acting too late. If the Conservative Government are committed to green finance, we have to acknowledge that selling off the Green Investment Bank in Edinburgh in 2017—the Liberal Democrats, as part of the coalition, were instrumental in setting it up—was a mistake. It was the first bank of its kind globally and would have been crucial at this stage in the development of our financial sector.
Indebted households across the UK will also need relief measures of some sort to support them through the hell that covid-19 has been and continues to be. Like every other Member, I am sure, I get calls every day, a huge proportion of them from people who have been left behind—people the Government have completely excluded from support. The Bill needs to recognise the scale of that problem and do more to protect them and those in other households who now find themselves in deep financial hardship. Specifically, we need breathing space. A moratorium period and a statutory debt repayment plan are welcome steps, but they were designed for the pre-covid world. Surely they need to be addressed now that that more households are in more debt and we have a different situation ahead. We want the Chancellor to amend the Bill to extend the 60-day breathing space period and to improve access to debt advice services.
I agree with the Opposition spokesman, the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East, that money laundering will in future be a serious problem for this country. It needs to be addressed.
We are at a crossroads in many sectors of our economy, but financial services more than any other sector has been our strength in recent years. We cannot afford to let anything come in the way of that. I hope that in its final form the Bill will protect the sector.
Kevin Hollinrake (Thirsk and Malton) (Con)
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Edinburgh West (Christine Jardine). I agree with many of the things she said; one thing I disagree with is her apparent belief that leaving the European Union brings only disadvantages. She does not see some of the economic opportunities we may have after we leave. I was pleased to hear my hon. Friend the Economic Secretary talk about opportunities, including the opportunity to do things differently and better. I will focus my remarks not on what the Bill does, but on the different and perhaps better things that might be done by the Bill in its later form or by another piece of legislation.
I am not a great fan of too much regulation. We should avoid regulating more than is absolutely necessary, but we need to make sure that we regulate better—that we think not about regulations but about effective regulation. Sadly, that is missing from some of our current financial services framework.
My first suggestion for the Minister, which I have talked about before, is that small and medium-sized enterprises should be allowed rights of action for breaches of the FCA handbook. At the moment, those are allowed only to private persons, not to SMEs, partnerships or corporates. As not all businesses know, that leads to SME commercial lending not being regulated above £25,000—here I speak in my capacity as co-chair of the all-party group on fair business banking; I also draw the House’s attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. As a result, if an SME is mistreated by a bank, for example, its ability to go to court relies purely on the letter of the contract or agreement it signed with the bank.
We have seen disgraceful scandals, some of which have been mentioned already, such as the LIBOR rigging, the swaps scandal, the RBS Global Restructuring Group SME banking scandal and the Lloyds HBOS Reading scandal. In those situations, SMEs cannot challenge the banks in any significant way, first, because it is almost impossible to take a bank to court due to the costs involved, and secondly, because when they get to court they only have the letter of the agreement to work with.
My hon. Friend the Economic Secretary has introduced some important new provisions—an expansion of the remit of the Financial Ombudsman Service to deal with larger businesses with turnover of up to £6 million, and an organisation he got me involved with called the Business Banking Resolution Service, which will deal with businesses with turnover between £6.5 million and £10 million. Businesses with turnover of up to £10 million will be able to take their case to an alternative dispute resolution service at no cost to themselves, and the case will be judged on a fair and reasonable basis. It will mean, effectively, that SMEs have a place to go, but will the Minister consider another alternative that would involve the key principles, including principle 6 of the PRIN rules, which is about treating customers fairly?
Another area that was mentioned in an earlier intervention was the Government’s commitment to make the failure to prevent economic crime a corporate offence. It is great that they have said they will do that, and that will start with a Law Commission review to see how best it can be done. As the Law Commission rightly said, if we do not change the rules on that, the UK risks falling behind international standards, which I am sure we would not want. That is clearly something to bring forward, but it could be done more hastily in the Bill, with a framework added on later, which would expedite the process. That would make a huge difference.
The Serious Fraud Office has tried to take forward many cases—those involving Serco, Barclays and Olympus, for example—but it could not do that because it had to establish a directing mind principle for the people at the top of those organisations before it could proceed with the offence of corporate fraud. The proposed measure would make that much easier. It is great that the Government are willing to take it forward, but they could do so more quickly.
Regulation is tight in the UK on personal and mortgage lending, and in the past—most famously in the case of Northern Rock—we have allowed regulated entities and the owners of mortgage books to sell those books to unregulated entities outside the country, including inactive lenders. There is no doubt that there is a regulatory gap around that. For example, some of the books from Northern Rock were sold into the clutches of Cerberus, an international private equity firm, and the rates charged to individuals, who were often mortgage prisoners, climbed significantly from below 2% to often in excess of 5%. The Financial Conduct Authority has confirmed that, as did the Financial Ombudsman Service in an email, which stated that there is a regulatory gap. I know there is a debate between the Treasury and the FCA about whether there is a regulatory gap between a mortgage book that is owned by an unregulated entity overseas, and one that is regulated in the UK, but the FOS is clear:
“While our standards have some reach into unregulated activity by regulated lenders, since the loan is now owned by an unregulated entity our rules and guidance on lender conduct, including treatment of vulnerable customers do not apply.”
We are allowing a regulatory gap by permitting mortgage loan books to be sold to unregulated entities, and it is my feeling, and that of many others, that that should be stopped, so that a regulated entity can sell a loan book only to another regulated entity.
As I said in an another intervention, we need to be more flexible on prudential risk. These provisions are reducing the opportunity for new entrants to the banking market, particularly regional mutuals, which in other countries have been successful in extending SME finance, particularly through difficult times. Many other jurisdictions, including the US, Germany and Japan, have a high number of regional mutual banks as part of their banking system, and they tend to be far more patient in their provision of capital through difficult times. For example, in the UK, SME lending between 2008 and 2013 reduced by 25%, whereas in Germany it increased during that period by 20%.
There is a real opportunity to use regional mutual banks with a much more long-term approach based on financial inclusion for businesses and individuals, but there are issues about the adequacy of requirements that make the need to raise capital far too high. It would be good to look at this, and to reduce the requirements on that to make it easier for regional mutuals to be established, and also perhaps to use some dormant assets to provide some seed capital for some of these regional mutual banks to make it easier for them to start, get up and get going.
Finally, one that has been discussed before is country-by-country reporting. Again, there is perhaps a place in this legislation for that. We know, despite the best efforts of the Treasury—with the digital services tax, for example, to try to clamp down on the likes of Amazon and others—that companies are bypassing those rules and passing such a levy on to sellers in their marketplace and not applying it to their own sales. We do need to make sure that the large multinationals pay a fair share of their tax. If we look at Google’s accounts, we see that internationally it turns over £137 billion. It had net income on its accounts in the last year of £31 billion, which is a 22% profit margin. The UK turnover is about £10 billion, and with a 22% profit margin, its profits should be about £2.2 billion, so it should pay tax of about £420 million in the UK on 19% corporation tax, but it actually pays about £67 million. So the provisions we have currently, although we have gone further than most countries in trying to make sure that companies pay a fair share of tax, are working to some extent, but not to the extent that we would like. Country-by-country reporting could make a big difference.
I will leave it there, Madam Deputy Speaker. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss those ideas with the House, and I look forward to discussing them at later stages of the Bill.
Stephen Flynn (Aberdeen South) (SNP)
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake). It is safe to say, as others have done, that this is not a debate that will have folk at home sitting on the edge of their seat awfully excited, that is for sure. None the less, it is an incredibly important debate. It is an incredibly important matter for the UK economy, but also for the Scottish economy, as my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow Central (Alison Thewliss) outlined. The financial services sector in Scotland is incredibly important, and it is linked to tens of thousands of jobs across our nation. It is in that broader context that we are obviously quite content to let this Bill pass on Second Reading, bearing in mind the fact that a regulatory framework is needed at this stage. I hope the Government will be amenable to some of the amendments we will put forward. Those amendments will broadly—how shall I put it?—be borne out of frustration that perhaps the Bill does not necessarily go as far as it could or should go. I will seek to touch on a couple of those matters during my speech today.
The first one I would like to touch on is about clause 31, which is on money laundering. Clause 31 in itself appears to be one that is quite self-congratulatory in its nature. To quote, as I feel is appropriate to do on this occasion, the Government say that the Bill
“will further support the public and private sectors to efficiently and effectively target their resources towards potential criminal activity using trusts, maintaining the resilience of the UK’s defences against economic crime.”
On the face of it, that looks like a fantastic thing, but when we look a little bit more at what we on the SNP Benches have been saying for a number of years now about Scottish limited partnerships, it appears that the warm words of the Government do not actually bear fruit given the reality of the picture on the ground. It should not need to be said to Members on the Government Benches, but when we are talking about Scottish limited partnerships, we are talking about organisations through which people can access financial products without having to name who they are. If that is not an open invitation to money laundering, I do not know what is. When we look at money laundering in the context of Scottish limited partnerships and also of tax avoidance and £35 billion tax gap that exists in the UK at this moment in time, it is probably safe to say that the public are a little bit sceptical about whether the Government take this as seriously as they should.
Our frustrations do not stop there. They also relate to clause 32, on the debt respite scheme. The Government say that clause 32 will
“empower the Government to make regulations which will compel creditors to accept amended repayment terms”.
Again, on the face of it, that seems like a perfectly legitimate and correct thing to do, but does it necessarily address the situation at this moment in time, when businesses across Scotland and the UK have taken out bounce back loans and coronavirus business interruption loans that they will not be able to pay back? Does it meet the reality of the situation? I am very sceptical as to whether it does.
The Government have two options on that front. They could simply write off that debt for small to medium-sized enterprises, which are the lifeblood of our economy, or they could take strategic moves to turn some of that debt into equity stakes, where it would be appropriate to do so, to boost economic activity and perhaps gain some money back for the public purse. Unfortunately, again I am sceptical as to whether the Government will seek to do either of those things. That is not in any way a positive outcome.
Thirdly, I want to touch briefly on clauses 24 to 26, on the overseas funds regime. As my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow Central said, the ABI has expressed concerns about the potential for equivalence to be used as a political football. I think all of us have that concern. We heard warm words from the Chancellor earlier today about the fact that he would not seek to use it as a political football, but being a bit of a sceptic about this Government, I think that warm words from the Chancellor at the Dispatch Box are not quite good enough. The record of this Government when it comes to saying one thing and doing the complete opposite is all too clear for everyone to see, so I have grave concerns in that regard.
The issue of equivalence takes me on to the final point that I wish to make, which is about the ongoing shambles in relation to Brexit. The UK Government website states that the Bill will “promote financial stability”. We do not have a trade deal with the European Union, and the transition period is a matter of weeks away. We do not know whether it will be possible for our financial services to access markets in Europe uninhibited. The scale of that issue is immense, particularly when we consider the fact that the City of London alone accounts for just under a third of all capital market activity across Europe. The market that we are seeking to leave is enormous, and this Government appear to have no plan and no desire to act prudently.
We heard from the Chancellor earlier, and we will probably hear it again from Government Members, that the blame for this lies at the EU’s feet, because it is refusing to partake in discussions in a proper and appropriate way. Who can blame the EU when, as the hon. Member for Edinburgh West (Christine Jardine) said, this UK Government are actively seeking to break international law? Who can blame the EU for being a little bit sceptical about the intentions of this Conservative Government? The sabre rattling needs to end, and the Government need to realise that the financial services industry must have the access it needs to support the tens of thousands of jobs that are reliant upon it, not only in England but in Scotland.
To conclude, I want to once again clarify that this Bill is very much born out of necessity, and we broadly support the regulatory framework around it. However, what is clear from this Bill, from the Brexit shambles and from the fact that the UK’s credit rating once again got downgraded just three days before the Bill was published, is that this Tory Government are no longer a Government of financial stability. I long for the day when Scotland no longer has to take its decisions in this place but can take its own decisions as an independent European nation.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)
I call Gareth Davies. I will give him a moment in case he is here—I should have gone to Specsavers. I call Jim Shannon.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
You almost caught me unawares, Madam Deputy Speaker—I thought that the hon. Member for Grantham and Stamford (Gareth Davies) would be about.
I broadly support what is in the Bill, but I have a couple of requests, as others have had. I want to make three specific points on the LIBOR transition, debt respite and the inadequate FCA regulatory framework for SME lending. I say, first, that it is a pleasure to see the Minister in his place. He is always very responsive to us all on the questions we ask him, and he always keeps a smile on his face—it is always something you do extremely well, even though the questions that we may put to you are hard and perhaps not always put in the way that they should be.
LIBOR, the London interbank offered rate, is an interest rate benchmark used to indicate banks’ costs of funding their activities: for example, the cost of obtaining money for a loan they will make. It has been used and continues to be used as a reference in hundreds of trillions of pounds-worth of financial contracts, so this is a very important issue. The former FCA chief executive officer and now Bank of England Governor, Andrew Bailey, said that after 2021 the FCA will no longer persuade or compel banks to submit the underlying data that goes to calculating LIBOR, causing concern that it could cease to exist. Minister, it is a really big issue for us all, and certainly one that people have contacted me about. There have been many loans in the past and that are still in force where banks have used LIBOR.
I understand that the existing powers on benchmarks granted to the FCA, passed under EU law and to form part of UK law from 2021, are seen as insufficient to ensure a smooth transition away from the use of LIBOR, so again, Minister, perhaps you can give me an answer on that. I welcome, among other things, clauses 8 to 19, which appear to grant the FCA greater powers to compel the continued publication of the benchmarks, to prohibit the use of benchmarks and to oversee the orderly wind-down of benchmarks. I hope that the new FCA chief executive officer will now deploy these powers at the earliest opportunity. Again, Minister, perhaps we will be able to get some indication of a timescale for that, if possible, to assure us on where we are.
I welcome the fact that the Government have made a commitment to Gibraltar. Others have referred to it and others will—it is certainly one of the issues that I am concerned about. This gives peace of mind to that sector and we thank you for that.
Can I, Minister, perhaps underline another issue—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)
Order. The hon. Gentleman cannot say, “Can I, Minister—”. How many millions of times have I said this to the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon)—only usually, I do not, because there is no time and there is a lot going on? Here I have my opportunity: he has heard my request to him a hundred times to please address the Chair. He cannot say, “Minister, will you do this?” And even worse, when he is addressing the Prime Minister, he must not say, “Prime Minister, will you do this?” He has to say, “Will the Prime Minister do this?” and “Will the Minister do this?”—in the third person, not the second person, please.
Jim Shannon
I stand corrected, Madam Deputy Speaker, and I will use my best endeavours to do that. Sometimes I get carried away in the emotion of the debate—it is a very emotional debate, of course—and I find that maybe I do not use the correct words.
Will the Minister look at the issue of money laundering in Northern Ireland? I make that comment because in all the countries across the globe, and particularly in this United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, money laundering is one of the issues that concerns me greatly. We have had many cases of money laundering over the last while, and we have many cases in Northern Ireland where paramilitary groups are involved in clear money laundering activities, which are against the law. With the Bill coming forward, will the Minister be able to give an assurance on money laundering, particularly in Northern Ireland? What discussions have taken place with the regional Assembly and the Minister in the Northern Ireland Assembly with responsibility for policing and justice, and what has been the feedback from that? I think that if we are going to do this well, we have to ensure that contact is made with the regional devolved Administration and that there are discussions outside that, particularly with the Republic of Ireland. Many illegal things are taking place in respect of transport across the border in all places, but we must tackle the ability of paramilitary groups to actively use the border with this purpose in mind.
Secondly, on the debt respite scheme, will the Minister confirm that clause 32 will amend the Financial Guidance and Claims Act 2018 to empower the Government to make regulations that compel creditors to accept amended repayment terms; provide for a charging mechanism through which creditors will contribute to the costs of running the scheme and repayment plans; and include debts owed to a Government Department at any level, including the devolved Administrations, in the statutory debt repayment plan? Again, I make a plea for the Northern Ireland Assembly: what will be the position in relation to any debts that are due? When do the Government expect to bring forward the relevant regulations? What discussions have taken place with the devolved Administrations on the statutory debt repayment plan?
The Treasury will be aware that the Business Banking Resolution Service has to be part of an effective solution under this process. The Democratic Unionist party remains concerned that we are not on track to do that. While the income from financial services is notable, so is the responsibility not only to shareholders but to the Government. We must ensure that that obligation is understood completely by enforcing the BBRS within legislation.
Thirdly and lastly, I refer to the bank lending regulatory framework. I finish with this because I believe it is the most important point. I know that the Minister is fully aware of it from discussions with the DUP and others who have contacted him. I have been in contact with him regularly about this issue since he first spoke about it at the Dispatch Box in January 2019. Of course, I have also been in touch with the Chancellor over the past month. The Minister must agree that it is crucial for SMEs to have the opportunity to export their products and services to the global economy, and the support to do so. I believe that our financial services industry, and banks in particular, must be regulated by the FCA in a much more legally effective way under this Government. Minister, it is very important that we have the bite, so to speak. It is all very well having words, but we need the strength of legislation to govern the banks’ small business lending post-Brexit.
The Government must get this right. I know that they can and I know that there is a will to do so. It is important that the future legal and regulatory framework allows our SMEs to have confidence in the 21st century global economy. I believe we have an opportunity to get it right this time, and it is time to do just that.
Madam Deputy Speaker, I hope that is to your satisfaction. Thank you very much.
Stephen Hammond (Wimbledon) (Con)
It is always a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon), as I have on many occasions in this House.
The ambition of the Bill is clearly stated:
“To make provision about financial services and markets; to make provision about debt respite schemes; to make provision about Help-to-Save accounts; and for connected purposes.”
The Minister was absolutely right in his opening remarks that financial services are a key industry for this country. If we are to have a global Britain and a globally successful Britain, financial services—and services in the widest sense—must thrive.
It is also right that the Bill is an important part of trying to ensure that we have the right regulatory framework at the end of the Brexit transition. If we are to remain a world-leading financial centre, it can be guaranteed only by having financial services that are underpinned by a strong and proportionate regulatory framework. The Bill, as the Minister conceded, is the start of that, not the end. I suspect that this is the first of several Bills that will come before us.
If the framework is to do anything at all, it must protect the consumer, enhance competitiveness and, as the Minister said, make the UK an attractive place in which to invest. I welcome the Bill because that is necessary, but it is right to recognise at the outset that, notwithstanding the equivalence regime or the new equivalence criteria that the Chancellor rightly set out this afternoon, as recently as February a briefing paper from the Government stated that the UK hoped to secure “permanent equivalence” that would last for “decades to come”. Indeed, at the time, the Governor of the Bank of England was campaigning for super-equivalence in order to allow a new standard to be set for multilateral collaboration. That would have been a better context in which to be considering these matters this evening; none the less, the Chancellor’s statement this afternoon was welcome. Everyone in this House must now deal with the world as it is, not the world as we would like it to be if it were more economically rational.
This Bill is necessary and it does a number of things to ensure that the regulatory regime is in place at the end of the transition period, and to allow financial services to prosper. It makes a start on sorting out the relationship between Parliament and the regulators, starts to define the accountability and objective of the regulators, and ensures that the regulation and legislation are in place. That will be important as we look forward to 1 January.
A specific of the Bill that I particularly welcome—the Minister touched on this in his opening remarks—is the prudential regulation of investment firms. That recognises, quite rightly, the differing risks between banking businesses and investment management businesses. The Bill aims to put in place a prudential regime that is fit for purpose. That in itself has been widely welcomed across the financial services industry. It sets out four principles, as well as how the implementation of that prudential regulation may recognise the differing capital risks. However, there are some concerns, which I hope the Minister might address later, or about which we will be reassured in Committee.
The first concern is how Parliament is going to scrutinise the principles. I will return to that point in a bit more depth later. The specific issue raised is that Her Majesty’s Treasury intends to revoke the capital requirements regulation with a view to replacing it with standards set out by the PRA that are to be guided by Basel II. However, the Bill contains little clarity on exactly what will be in the PRA regime, how it would differ from the capital requirements regulation or how the Government intend to implement these new measures. I trust that the Minister will set that out today or that it will be clarified in Committee, because it is hugely important to the success of those provisions.
I welcome the provisions on the onshored EU PRIIPs regulation. This has been widely welcomed. It gives the PRA powers to make clarification, but there is an important duty to ensure not only that the regulations put in place are effective, but that they help the investing community and the public, ensuring protection for the consumer. It is not yet clear how those powers are going to be enacted and what is going to be there.
As the Minister has acknowledged, this is a wide-ranging Bill, so I want to touch on a couple of other issues of concern that can probably be cleared up now or in Committee. It is clear that we need to safeguard the ability of our world-renowned investment management industry to offer investment funds from overseas jurisdictions into the UK post transition. As the Minister set out, that is the aim of the Bill. If that were not so, it is clear that 9,000 individual funds would have to seek separate registration. From my reading of the Bill, it is not yet clear whether the temporary permissions regime—the regime which would allow that to continue—must be extended or whether a new, fully functioning regime is to be put in its place. That is important, because it signals the free flow of capital into the UK and signals that the UK remains open for investment and business. I have spoken to a number of those in the investment management industry over the weekend, and there is still some concern in the industry that it is not fully clear how that will operate.
The Bill also clearly states that it is meant to maintain a world-leading regulatory system and, among other things, enhance the competitiveness of the financial services sector, yet if we look at the history of regulation in the United Kingdom, a large number of people believe that the system has often rightly sought to give the consumer extensive protection, but with the cost of over-specification, a lack of accountability and, in terms, a narrowness of focus from the regulator. If the Bill is to achieve its ambitions, the Government need to look at those faults and be clear about how they are going to change them during the Bill’s passage.
The Bill allows for the transfer of hugely increased powers to regulators. The question for us therefore is how we balance the extra powers with the necessary scrutiny and accountability, without encroaching on the necessary independence or eroding consumer protection. I suggest that the Treasury needs to consider carefully what performance objectives it sets the regulators and how it will then manage their measurement. Previously, it has been clear that the overriding objective has been competition, but secondary objectives have been in place, and all too often regulators have not given those the regard that many would have expected. The regulators’ attitude to risk will need further definition if the Bill is to achieve the objective of enhancing and maintaining the UK’s international competitive position.
Who exercises the judgment on whether the criteria are being met and how the trade-off of benefit and risk is determined will be key. Schedule 2 is the key part in determining that. New sections 143G and 143H link to the broader questions of the FCA’s mandate, role and accountability. The Treasury has rightly just recently published a consultation document on the broader review of the framework for financial regulation, so this Bill is the first exploration of the issues around the oversight of the FCA.
New section 143G identifies a number of “Matters to consider” and therefore matters that the FCA must “have regard to”, including the relevant international standards and the effect of the rules on the UK’s international standing. Those are all to be welcomed, but are they really effective? I suggest, first, that the obligation is too weak, as it only requires the FCA to “have regard to”. Secondly, the obligation is too narrow. A number of other issues, such as sustainable growth and employment across regions, should also be part of the mix and part of the consideration. Therefore, I suggest we need to be prepared to go further and consider changing the FCA’s primary objective, or at least strengthening the secondary objective, such that it ranks almost pari passu with the primary objective.
There also needs to be rigorous scrutiny of the regulators’ rule-making powers by Parliament. As I said earlier, the Bill puts in place some major increases in powers for regulators, so it is completely appropriate that Parliament sets the scrutiny and accountability objectives. There are many ways to do that, and I know colleagues will suggest other methods later, but it is clear that one of the great successes has been the OBR, which analyses, scrutinises and gives an independent verdict on financial policy. It may well be appropriate that one of the ways that Parliament holds financial regulators to account is a similar body for financial regulation.
I was encouraged to be short, and I have already taken rather longer than the Whips wanted me to take this evening. I think the Bill is absolutely necessary. Therefore, notwithstanding some of the issues I have raised, and others that I am sure the Minister recognises and will want to address as the Bill progresses, I wish the Bill well and look forward to supporting its Second Reading.
Nickie Aiken (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)
I am grateful for the opportunity to speak in this debate and to highlight, as other hon. Members have, the invaluable contribution that the financial and professional services industry makes to UK plc: more than 60,000 companies providing 2.3 million jobs and 10% of the UK’s overall gross value added. While two thirds of those jobs are outside London, I must stand up for my constituency by saying that the City of London alone contributes approximately 25% of the sector’s GVA.
I have spoken to businesses and business groups in the City of London, who are broadly in favour of the Bill’s overarching objectives. They want to see an efficient regulatory framework after our transition from the EU and would welcome in particular changes that help to ensure the UK’s regulatory regimes are more coherent and attractive to international firms. They also strongly believe that the new regime must maintain the highest of global standards to maintain the sector as a strategic national asset and ensure sound capital markets. Businesses also welcome the clear way in which the Treasury and my hon. Friend the Economic Secretary to the Treasury have sought their views in coming to their position and are keen to maintain a dialogue as the Bill and the future regulatory framework review progress.
I will turn, if I may, to address the specific content of the Bill. Businesses in my constituency are supportive of the Bill’s objective to enhance the UK’s world-leading prudential standards and promote financial stability, but they would appreciate clarity from the Government on specific clauses. In particular, with regard to the implementation of Basel III, as some businesses have been working towards the implementation of EU capital requirements regulation 2, further guidance would be welcome on how the UK regime may differ from the EU regime. With regards to the LIBOR wind-down and benchmarking, again I urge the Government to ask the FCA to provide the further detail and clarity that businesses require as soon as possible.
I turn to how the Government intend to promote openness between the UK and international markets. The businesses I spoke to in my constituency again welcome the changes, but, crucially, they would also welcome further clarity on how the Treasury intends to make equivalence decisions under the new frameworks. Business would also welcome assurances from the Government that they will continue to look to improve the UK’s global competitiveness. I would like the Bill to be more explicit in that area and expressly signal the objective to maintain and even expand our competitiveness on the world stage. I hope the Government will continue to work with the financial sector to ensure that that crucial aspect can be developed in relation to further rules and, in particular, when considering differing international tax regimes and access to talent.
I turn to the Bill’s third objective: maintaining the effectiveness of the financial services framework and sound capital markets. These provisions have been broadly welcomed. As businesses in my constituency know that an effective financial services framework has a significant impact on both business and customers, ensuring clarity in regulation and providing sound support mechanism for customers must be welcomed. However, the Bill also enshrines significant powers in regulators. I ask Ministers to consider whether they are satisfied that existing appeal mechanisms are sufficient. Will they increase the level of autonomy given to regulators? May that be worthy of consideration in the House at another time? In that vein, I would welcome from the Government a financial services strategy for the sector. That may enable arm’s length financial regulators to ensure that they interpret the “have regard to” objectives in the context of the Government’s vision for the sector.
Finally, in the light of the ongoing covid-19 crisis, the objective of maintaining sound capital markets should not be underestimated or forgotten. The capital market provides a vital source of funding for businesses, alongside the lending market. The measures in the Bill will help to support a market that is vital to the re-energising of the economy post covid.
I encourage the Government to consider, with one eye to the future, how the Bill demonstrates UK leadership in addressing digital and sustainability-related regulatory challenges, because although a recovery from covid may dominate the short-to-medium term, the continued development of FinTech and our response to the global climate crisis will surely be long-term considerations for the financial sector.
The Bill should be welcomed as a necessary but early step as we leave the EU, but a fuller, more comprehensive overhaul of the UK’s regulatory framework is required to ensure that the UK—and in particular the City of London in my constituency—retains its competitiveness as a global financial centre. I look forward to working with businesses and Treasury Ministers throughout the passage of the Bill and the others that will surely follow to implement the necessary changes to ensure just that. I commend the Bill to the House.
Richard Fuller (North East Bedfordshire) (Con)
It is a great pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Nickie Aiken). As an adviser to a venture capital firm, I draw the House’s attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.
I commend the Minister for such a thoughtful and thorough presentation of the Bill on Second Reading. I look forward to the Bill’s passage through the House. I also pay tribute to the Opposition spokesman, the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden), for his general welcoming of the Bill and for some of the important points that he made. He mentioned two of the contextual factors for the Bill: the financial crisis and Brexit. On the first, one issue that came from the financial crisis was not the absence or otherwise of regulation, but the fact that the regulations themselves were confused, as was the responsibility among different agencies. The various Governments since 2010 have made some progress towards streamlining the regulatory framework, and the Minister talked about further moves to make sure that regulatory organisations and their roles were streamlined.
A second issue from the financial crisis, about which the right hon. Gentleman will be aware from his time on the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, was the lack of criminal sanction for the people who broke the law and the effectiveness with which criminal sanction could be brought to bear on those who misused their position in financial services. Through the right hon. Gentleman’s work on that commission, that has now been changed somewhat, and today the Minister presented further steps forward in providing criminal sanction for those who misuse their powers or rights in the financial sector. Those steps are to be welcomed.
On leaving the European Union, I would say from the other side of the argument that Brexit is a great opportunity for the United Kingdom. One of the things we are leaving behind is the scale of the European Union, but that gives us the opportunity to focus on those things that matter most to our country and to have the agility to make changes. On the point of equivalence, about which we have heard some shroud-waving from Opposition Members, my personal view is that the EU will come to regret quite strongly the decision not to provide equivalence on a mutual basis with the UK.
I wish to add three further issues to those contextual factors. The next is that we now have the opportunity to define the role of the financial services sector. We want the sector to be world beating and world leading—the Minister spoke directly about that—but we also need to make sure that, as many Members have said, it contributes to the wider British economy.
The fourth issue has not been commented on today but will be an important test for the regulations under the Bill: the context that we are living through an era of very inflated global assets. What is that going to do to the financial services sector in the next five or 10 years as we unwind the context of quantitative easing and other inflated assets? I would not mind hearing a bit from the Minister on that when he responds.
The fifth point, which the Minister touched on, is on innovation and technology. These regulations will meet a period of much more substantial technological change in finance. This country will be faced with choices between regulation and innovation, and trade-offs will need to be made. Unfortunately, too often in this House, we make vacuous statements about regulations. We talk about maintaining a gold standard on regulations or avoiding a race to the bottom on regulations. Both those statements are completely meaningless because they are entirely in the eye of the beholder. They mean nothing when we communicate them to one another. We should be focusing not on how tough regulations sound when we talk about them, but on how effective those regulations are in doing what we wish them to do. What is important about regulations is that they do what they are supposed to do and no more.
There are obviously some areas where regulation is important, as we have seen in the Bill in relation to protecting vulnerable customers. I welcome those measures in the Bill, but it is important to have regulation that promotes competition rather than entrenching established interests. There is a balance to be struck there in terms of innovation, which it will be interesting to discuss. There is also an important need to avoid systemic risk, which has been mentioned.
What concerns me, on the day when we are celebrating the vaccine, is that in our zealousness in this House to impose regulations, we forget that the innovations of private sector companies left to their own devices often provide the best outcomes for the people of our country and around the world. Pfizer, the company that has developed the vaccine we are talking about today, directly refused any Government assistance because it did not want the regulation and bureaucratic hand-holding that came with it. Sometimes we feel that the private sector is unable to deliver things that are a public good, but the truth of the matter is that most public goods are delivered either directly or indirectly by the actions of private companies and private citizens, and not by state diktat. The Bill has to provide the underpinning for that principle of deregulation and freedom for innovation, and for the opportunity for us to take advantage of our leaving the European Union. It must not provide a cloud of regulation that makes us feel good when we talk about it but does not actually do what it says when it is brought to test.
One of my concerns about the Bill is that we might be putting too much reliance on regulatory agencies. This was mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Wimbledon (Stephen Hammond) and I know it will be mentioned by other hon. Friends later. There is a subsidiary tendency for us, in our zealousness to regulate, to then pass these matters on to a regulatory agency. The hon. Member for Glasgow Central (Alison Thewliss) made the point that there is too little parliamentary oversight of such regulatory agencies. We do not have the necessary mechanisms in this Parliament. I hope that, as we progress the Bill, the Minister will consider that, given what is contained in the essence of the Bill.
Bim Afolami (Hitchin and Harpenden) (Con)
I am reminded of something that Lyndon Johnson, who is a bit of a political hero of mine, said at some point in the 1960s when he was talking about speeches on economics and finance. I hope I do not test your indulgence too much, Mr Deputy Speaker, because he said that making a speech on economics was a bit like peeing down your leg: it seems hot to you, but never to anyone else. I am reminded of that before I embark on my detailed comments on the Bill. I strongly welcome the Bill, and I do not want to repeat what other hon. Members have said about the good things in it. I speak as a former corporate lawyer working in strategy and restructuring at HSBC. Before that, I was a corporate lawyer at Freshfields and at Simpson Thatcher. Over the weekend, I was speaking to several people in the industry, including a constituent who I happen to have done a few deals with in the past—a man called Tim Lewis, who is an expert on financial regulation at Travers Smith. There are technical points I want to make to the Minister, and indeed I have written to him separately on some of them. I do not expect him to deal with them all in his summing up, but I think they are worth considering. He is looking forward to that, I can tell.
The Bill’s core purpose is to ensure a regulatory regime that continues to operate effectively after the end of the transition period at the end of this year. The first point I want to make is that the Bill empowers the FCA to impose obligations directly on certain parent undertakings of MiFID—markets in financial instruments directive—investment firms. But the current parent undertaking concepts in the Bill go beyond the equivalent EU legislative drafting in two important ways. I will not bore the House by going through that in immense detail, but proposed new clause 143B uses the wider concept of authorised parent undertaking. That matters because, effectively, it covers any entity that is regulated by the FCA. In its discussion paper, the FCA indicates that it currently regulates about 3,000 MiFID investment firms. However, it states on its website that it regulates nearly 60,000 firms in total. Those additional firms include, for example, small credit brokerages and insurance intermediaries. Therefore, the current proposal is, in short, a huge expansion of FCA power over smaller firms, going much further than what the equivalent European regulators can do. That is something we have to think about.
There is another way in which the proposals go beyond the EU regulation, and that is in relation to non-authorised parent undertakings. Today, it is accepted that parent undertakings will be caught by the regime where those undertakings are incorporated in the UK. However, it is not the case that any parent undertaking that has a UK office will be caught by the current regime. For example, a US-incorporated holding company with a US head office and a UK branch would ordinarily be out of scope of the rules.
Why does that matter? It matters because if the definition of non-authorised undertaking is retained in its current form in the Bill and is adopted by the FCA, that would lead to a significant expansion of the current rules. The effect might be to require some firms to restructure to close down existing UK branches of overseas businesses. It might push firms to ensure that overseas holding companies that carry out no substantive operating activities cease all UK activity, such as holding meetings in the UK, to avoid having a UK place of business. Again, this is a technical point, but it is an important one. To come to some of the points that have already been made, the Bill sees a big expansion of FCA powers, and we have to be very careful about that, particularly as we come out of the transition period and they expand beyond what is happening in the European Union. That is a particularly important point.
I also speak as the Member for Hitchin and Harpenden. In my constituency, I have not only many people who work in financial services, but some small financial services firms. The technical term for one group of firms is exempt CAD—capital adequacy directive—firms. The Bill and the FCA discussion paper leave open the question of how such firms will be treated. These firms are investment consulting, corporate finance and private equity firms, and their activities are limited to giving investment advice and arranging deals. In that sense, they do not hold much money; they are effectively providing advisory services. Today, they have a capital requirement of €50,000. The default position in the Bill is that the new rules will apply to them in full. If that is the case, many will see a significant increase in their capital requirements shortly after losing the benefit of the cross-border EU services passport, which some of them use. The Bill again effectively leaves it to the FCA to determine whether to make an exemption or transitional provision for these firms. Again, I make the point that the FCA needs to be scrutinised really carefully in relation to the powers it has under the Bill.
When making rules to implement and maintain parts of the investment firms prudential regime, the FCA will be required to have regard to a new list of matters. I do not want to repeat all the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Wimbledon (Stephen Hammond), but these matters relate to important public policy considerations, including the relative standing of the UK as a place for internationally active investment firms to carry on activities. This point needs clarifying a bit further, whether from the Treasury Bench or in the Bill. It is clear what the Treasury is trying to do. It is trying to have a balanced approach between maintaining our reputation as a safe financial services centre in regulatory terms and ensuring that we do not fall too far behind other jurisdictions in our general attractiveness. However, I think we need to push the regulators much harder. I would like further clarity in this Bill on how regulators will need to actively seek to ensure that the UK financial services industry will be able, first, to support the UK economy and our ability to compete with overseas firms internationally, in addition to the UK’s relative attractiveness as a place to do business. This may sound like a technical difference, but I assure the House that it is not. If we do not clarify this and do not choose to try to expand the regulator’s requirement to think about our relative standing and competitiveness, not just in relation to this investment firms’ prudential regime, but across all of its rule making, I fear that this may be another example of the creeping weight of regulation and complexity that we have seen in recent years. I ask the Minister to confirm that the Government will at least consider publishing a financial services strategy in due course.
I wish to talk about how we are going to scrutinise the regulators and how this House and indeed this Parliament as a whole can do that more effectively. It is clear to me that the weight and volume of legislation and regulations after we leave the transition period will be quite significant, and I urge the Minister to consider strongly, within the review that the Treasury is already conducting, setting up a specialist financial services Committee in this House, perhaps a Joint Committee with the House of Lords, to consider not just statutory instruments that come through this House, but the actions of our regulator. What happens without that detailed oversight, involving a specialist group of people who are spending a huge amount of time on it? Financial services regulation is technical, as everybody in this House who has been listening to me for the past 10 minutes knows. We need to consider that.
My hon. Friend the Member for North East Bedfordshire (Richard Fuller) made the point about the huge changes in global finance—the growth in asset prices, and the increasing role of central banks and quantitative easing. Regulators are playing a huge role in those decisions, yet the oversight by Parliament is relatively slight. So I want the Government to consider how we can strengthen this House’s ability to scrutinise our regulators, particularly as they are getting a huge number of powers in this Bill. However, I would like to finish by saying that I commend the Bill, the Minister—I know the hard work he has been doing—and his team. I also commend the industry, which has been feeding in and discussing the Bill with the Government and other Members. The Bill is very important. It is a landmark Bill. I am sure there will be more financial services Bills to come, and I support it.
Mr McFadden
With the leave of the House, I should like to respond to the debate and pick up on a few of the contributions made over the last couple of hours. The hon. Member for West Worcestershire (Harriett Baldwin) spoke of historic turning points, citing the change of presidency and the potentially huge announcement today on a workable vaccine. She is right about those, but I thought it was a bit of a stretch to include this Bill in the same bracket, as a historic turning point.
The hon. Member for Edinburgh West (Christine Jardine) spoke of the importance of financial services jobs in her constituency and in many other parts of the country. The hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake), as chair of the all-party group on fair business banking, spoke of some of the past banking scandals, mistreatment of small businesses and so on. The hon. Member for Wimbledon (Stephen Hammond) told us that this might be the first of several such Bills, which gives us all something to look forward to in these long winter nights. He gently and right reminded us of the contrast between where we are and what was promised. He and the hon. Member for Hitchin and Harpenden (Bim Afolami) focused on the issue of accountability frameworks and the role of Parliament. That is very important because—let us be honest—that is what the discussion will be like in the Treasury. We have this big increase in regulatory focus in the UK. We have these existing regulators. We are going to pass a lot of this new power to the regulators through the onshoring of these directives and MPs will be standing up in Parliament saying, “Well, what about our role in this?” I suspect there is some scepticism about giving Members of this House a very active role in these regulations.
Exactly the same discussion took place during the financial crisis. Here, in the United States and in other countries, emergency measures had to be introduced and decisions had to be taken quickly by Executives, and the discussion was: what role for elected politicians? Hon. Members can be sure that there will be significant resistance to giving MPs in this House a big role in things such as capital ratios or whatever else is being discussed.
We will continue to debate these issues. To recap, our approach will be to protect consumers and the wider economy as these measures go through; and to focus on accountability frameworks and try to bring them closer to the policy aims of finance and what it can really do. We have broadened our understanding of that. The Chancellor, whether he meant to or not, has opened the door for us to discuss that through his statement this afternoon on the importance of green finance. Thirdly, our approach will be to try to ensure that this globally significant industry operates on the basis of finance that is clean, that is not a place for illicit funding and stops any race to the bottom on standards.
I look forward to debating these things with the Minister in Committee, but it is impossible not to contrast what is before us with what was promised all the way through and what was said earlier. The announcement today on equivalence is not taking back control; it is the opposite of taking back control. It was a symbol of our lack of control. It was, in fact, an act of unilateral financial disarmament. We decided to give companies operating here, for reasons of market continuity, the right to continue to practise. I understand why that was done, but the fact that we have no guarantee of what the response will be is a symbol of where we have ended up. It is certainly not taking back control. I fervently hope that that move is reciprocated, because that is in the interests of UK companies that are trading abroad, jobs here and this very important industry, but the fact that we cannot guarantee it and have no control over it speaks volumes about where we have ended up in this process.
The announcements on green finance were welcome, but they are not in the Bill. We have to ask why not, given that the Chancellor chose today to make his announcements, just an hour or so before we started debating the Bill. I am sure we will discuss that as we go forward.
To repeat, we have to have a UK-based system as a consequence of leaving the EU, and we will not oppose the Bill because we understand that reality, but that does not balance out or make up for the significant downgrading of our globally important financial services sector in the Brexit negotiations that are taking place at the moment. The fact that it is not front and centre in what we are trying to negotiate speaks volumes about where we have ended up.
John Glen
With the leave of the House, I too would like to speak a second time. I thank hon. and right hon. Members for their contributions and I welcome the broad support that I believe exists across the House on the Bill. Clearly, I will not be able to address all the points that have been made, but I have taken extensive notes and I shall write to colleagues where I feel I can say something meaningful at this point. But I look forward to further comments to address some of these points in Committee.
The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) is right to say that the UK is a key player in the global effort to ensure that globally active banks are subject to strong regulation. I have huge respect for him and his experience in Government. I think he set out very clearly and plainly the fundamental challenges with which we are grappling in this industry. The track record we have in the United Kingdom should give him and other Members comfort that this Government have no intention of watering down regulations that have been agreed on the international stage. High-quality, agile and responsive regulation is absolutely key to the continuing success of the UK financial services sector and to addressing the potential challenges raised by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Bedfordshire (Richard Fuller) in his characteristically powerful speech.
On the matter of equivalence, I would like to address the wide-ranging questions from across the House. Equivalence assessments are an autonomous technical process. We have been clear from the beginning that the politicisation of equivalence is in no one’s interests. We are committed to an outcome-based approach. That means acknowledging how different approaches to regulation can achieve the same regulatory objectives.
A number of Members, including the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East, raised green finance. While he acknowledges that it is not directly related to the Bill—he wonders why—I hope the measures announced today show that the Government take their commitments in the green finance space very seriously. I look forward to engaging with him on the substantive points about how regulatory oversight works with the announcements made today.
I welcome the comments from the hon. Members for Glasgow Central (Alison Thewliss) and for Aberdeen South (Stephen Flynn) regarding overseas trust. The Government are taking proportionate and effective action to prevent the misuse of trust, through clause 31. The Government also intend to implement a register, the first of its kind, of beneficial owners of overseas entities that own or buy land in the UK.
Alison Thewliss
We both know that the Registration of Overseas Entities Bill was a Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Bill. Does the Minister have any further gen on what happened to it and when it might come back to this House?
John Glen
I think I have demonstrated that I have quite a lot to deal with in the Treasury, but I would be very happy to correspond with the hon. Lady further on the status of that Bill. I know she takes a very close interest in those matters.
On the hon. Lady’s words on the duty of care, the Government believe that the FCA, the UK’s independent conduct regulator, is best placed to evaluate the merits of a duty of care. She will know that last year the FCA published a feedback statement on its discussion paper on duty of care and announced that it will undertake further work to examine how best to address potential deficiencies in consumer protection, in particular by reference to its principles for businesses. The Government will continue to engage with the FCA, as I have done during my time in office, on a very regular basis.
The first objective of the Bill is to enhance the UK’s world-leading prudential standards and promote financial stability. On that theme, my hon. Friend the Member for Hitchin and Harpenden (Bim Afolami) asked a number of characteristically insightful questions that I expect to cover in detail in Committee. But I will also look to respond to his letter urgently.
Let me address the constructive points made by all Members on the important issue of the democratic oversight of the regulation of the financial services sector. Our independent expert regulators are a key strength of the UK’s existing framework. The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East and my hon. Friend the Member for Wimbledon (Stephen Hammond) should be reassured that it is these expert regulators who will be setting the firm-level requirements. We therefore think that they should continue to play a central role in developing and maintaining regulatory standards, in line with their statutory objectives. However, as my hon. Friend the Member for Wimbledon pointed out, that must be balanced with appropriate strategic policy input from Government and parliamentary scrutiny.
This Bill delivers for the specific purposes of implementing the remaining Basel standards and introducing a new prudential framework for investment firms. It introduces an enhanced accountability framework, specifying regulatory principles that the regulators must have regard to, as well as additional consultation and reporting requirements for the regulators when implementing the changes in the Bill. That sits alongside their existing statutory objectives. In addition, I recently issued a consultation on broader reforms to the regulatory framework as a whole: the future regulatory framework review. As I noted in my earlier remarks, this Government are committed to promoting openness to overseas markets. That is the Bill’s second objective.
My hon. Friend the Member for West Worcestershire (Harriett Baldwin), who is one of my predecessors, spoke to our ambitions for building our relationship with the USA in the area of financial services. I value her comments. It is important that we continue to maintain a truly global outlook, and we have well developed regulator-to-regulator relationships. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill) for his intervention concerning the Gibraltar authorisation regime. A number of Members mentioned the overseas funds regime, for which I am grateful, and I hope that the complexity of this technical measure can be fully discussed in Committee.
As our third objective, it is essential that we maintain the effectiveness of the financial services regulatory framework and sound capital markets. I have outlined the measures in the Bill that will help to achieve both those things. Finally, I listened with particular interest to the typically well-informed speech from my hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake). He covered a lot of important issues, some of which I may have heard before, and I look forward to discussing them further, as I always do; we do discuss these matters further, and we do make progress on some of them.
This Bill is a critical first step in taking control of our financial services legislation. As I said, it has three objectives: to enhance the UK’s world-leading prudential standards and promote financial stability, to promote openness to overseas markets, and to maintain the effectiveness of the financial services regulatory framework and sound capital markets. I am confident that the Bill will succeed in achieving all three, and I commend it to the House.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read a Second time.
Financial Services Bill (Programme)
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),
That the following provisions shall apply to the Financial Services Bill:
Committal
1. The Bill shall be committed to a Public Bill Committee.
Proceedings in Public Bill Committee
2. Proceedings in the Public Bill Committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion on Thursday 3 December 2020.
3. The Public Bill Committee shall have leave to sit twice on the first day on which it meets. Proceedings on Consideration and up to and including Third Reading
4. Proceedings on Consideration and any proceedings in legislative grand committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which proceedings on Consideration are commenced.
5. Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day.
6. Standing Order No. 83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings on Consideration and up to and including Third Reading.
Other proceedings
7. Any other proceedings on the Bill may be programmed.—(David T. C. Davies.)
Financial Services Bill (Ways and Means)
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 52(1)(a))
That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the Financial Services Bill, it is expedient to authorise provision enabling sums payable in respect of a debt in accordance with a repayment plan under the Financial Guidance and Claims Act 2018 to be payable towards costs of operating repayment plans of the debt respite scheme operated under that Act.—(David T. C. Davies.)
Financial Services Bill (First sitting)
Tuesday 17th November 2020
(4 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Financial Services Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 17 November 2020 - (17 Nov 2020)
The Chair
Before we begin, I have a few preliminary announcements: please switch electronic devices to silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings. Can I emphasise the importance of social distancing? Spaces available to Members are clearly marked. As you can see, not all Members can fit around the horseshoe. Will Members sitting at the side of the Room or in the Public Gallery please use the standing microphone if they wish to ask a question? Date Time Witness Tuesday 17 November Until no later than 10.25 am Prudential Regulation Authority; Financial Conduct Authority Tuesday 17 November Until no later than 10.55 am UK Finance Tuesday 17 November Until no later than 11.25 am International Capital Market Association Tuesday 17 November Until no later than 2.45 pm The Investment Association Tuesday 17 November Until no later than 3.30 pm TheCityUK; City of London Corporation Tuesday 17 November Until no later than 4.00 pm The Association for Financial Markets in Europe Tuesday 17 November Until no later than 4.30 pm The British Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Tuesday 17 November Until no later than 5.00 pm StepChange Debt Charity Thursday 19 November Until no later than 12.15 pm Spotlight on Corruption Thursday 19 November Until no later than 2.45 pm The Association of British Insurers Thursday 19 November Until no later than 3.30 pm Transparency International Thursday 19 November Until no later than 4.15 pm The Finance Innovation Lab; Positive Money Thursday 19 November Until no later than 5.00 pm Hon Albert Isola MP, Minister for Digital, Financial Services and Public Utilities, Her Majesty’s Government of Gibraltar
Today we will first consider the programme motion on the amendment paper. We will then consider a motion to enable the reporting of written evidence for publication, and then a motion to allow us to deliberate in private on our questions before the oral session begins. In view of the time available, I hope we can take these matters without debate. I call the Minister to move the programme motion standing in his name, which was discussed yesterday by the Programming Sub-Committee for this Bill.
Ordered,
That—
(1) the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 9.25 am on Tuesday 17 November) meet—
(a) at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 17 November;
(b) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 19 November;
(c) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 24 November;
(d) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 26 November;
(e) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 1 December;
(f) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 3 December;
(2) the Committee shall hear oral evidence in accordance with the following table:
(3) proceedings on consideration of the Bill in Committee shall be taken in the following order: Clause 1; Schedule 1; Clause 2; Schedule 2; Clauses 3 to 5; Schedule 3; Clauses 6 and 7; Schedule 4; Clauses 8 to 21; Schedule 5; Clause 22; Schedules 6 to 8; Clauses 23 and 24; Schedule 9; Clauses 25 to 27; Schedule 10; Clause 28; Schedule 11; Clauses 29 to 44; new Clauses; new Schedules; remaining proceedings on the Bill;
(4) the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Thursday 3 December.—(John Glen.)
Resolved,
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(John Glen.)
The Chair
Copies of written evidence that the Committee receives will be made available in the Committee Room. I call the Minister to move the motion about deliberating in private.
Resolved,
That, at this and any subsequent meeting at which oral evidence is to be heard, the Committee shall sit in private until the witnesses are admitted.—(John Glen.)
The Chair
Q
Victoria Saporta: Good morning everyone, and good morning, Chair. I am Vicky Saporta, executive director for prudential policy in the PRA within the Bank of England.
Sheldon Mills: Good morning. I am Sheldon Mills, interim executive director of strategy and competition at the Financial Conduct Authority.
Edwin Schooling Latter: Good morning all. I am Edwin Schooling Latter, director of markets and wholesale policy at the Financial Conduct Authority.
The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (John Glen)
Q
Victoria Saporta: Thank you for the question, Mr Glen. Yes, we worked closely together, as you would expect for a Bill that proposes to revoke elements of the acquis and give the regulators specific powers. Ultimately, of course, it is for the Government to introduce the Bill and for Parliament to take it forward. However, the working relationship was very close, and because of that we are content with the content of the Bill and the proposed measures.
John Glen
Q
Sheldon Mills: We have had close interaction with you and your officials throughout the drafting of this Bill, and also the preparations for a new UK financial regulatory system, as we move to exit from the EU. We think it is important that there is an agile and confident UK financial services regulatory system, which will support the UK financial services industry and, importantly, also protect consumers and ensure market stability. We feel that the Bill is a good first step in that direction, to enable us to play our role in those goals and objectives for the UK financial services industry.
John Glen
Q
Edwin Schooling Latter: Yes, of course. Committee members will be aware that LIBOR is a benchmark that has had a troubled past. It is also a benchmark that probably does not suit the needs of its users as well as some alternatives; but it is very deeply embedded in the financial system, so while we think it is the right thing to move towards the end of LIBOR and its replacement with better alternatives, we need to be able to do that in an orderly way. The provisions in front of you contain some important measures to enhance the FCA’s powers to manage an orderly wind-down—for example, to identify the point at which the benchmark is no longer sustainable and to take measures to ensure that its publication ceases in the least disruptive way possible for the many hundreds of thousands of contract holders who have mortgages or more complex financial instruments that reference the benchmark in some way.
Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)
Before I begin, can I get some sense from you, Mr Davies, about whether we can have a few questions?
Mr McFadden
Q
Victoria Saporta: Yes, I am happy to do so. The way the EU tends to function in terms of regulations—particularly banking regulations, which are part of the provisions of the Bill that relate to the PRA—tends to be quite unique relative to other non-EU regulators. Essentially the Commission proposes very technical regulations, which in banking are often agreed by technocrats in the Basel environment—in the Basel committee—and then these are debated in the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, and become directly-applicable law. The reason for that way of doing it relates to the single market, so that every EU member state has exactly the same regulations. As I said, that is very unique. Every other member of the Basel committee, for example—all the G20 jurisdictions with the exception of Switzerland, which is another federal democracy—would have its regulators applying these technical rules that they have themselves negotiated internationally.
Pre the treaty of Lisbon and before the single market rulebook, this was the way that regulation was done in the UK through the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. Primary legislation set out the objectives, framework and constraints through which regulators would operate and the regulators would then go about implementing the rules for the purpose, so that they could achieve the objectives that Parliament would have set for them.
Traditionally, UK regulators have done that in the prudential sphere, which is my current sphere. To preserve safety and soundness and contribute to financial stability, the PRA currently has a secondary objective of facilitating competition, but with the remit that the Government give them and always with an eye to preserving responsible openness and dynamism.
Mr McFadden
Q
Victoria Saporta: There is a considerable body of empirical research that suggests that regulatory independence is strongly correlated with stronger financial stability. Particularly in the banking system, there are lower losses under stress. One of the reasons for that is because regulators—at least in theory, but I happen to believe from my experience that that is the practice—potentially have longer horizons than Governments, and therefore regulatory independence tends to be more robust to such lobbying in the longer term, subject, of course, to accountability and objectives set by Parliament.
Mr McFadden
Q
Sheldon Mills: It is a good question. The starting point is our statutory objectives. We set our priorities for the year and also over three years on the basis of our statutory objectives, which are consumer protection, competition and market integrity. We then work out whether, serving those objectives, certain types of activities will help protect consumers, and help us ensure market integrity or further competition.
If you take the example of net zero, it is quite clear, regardless of where Government’s ambitions are in relation to net zero, that the move towards net zero forms a part of the issues that we face globally in terms of climate change. Those are risks in the economy and therefore impact the firms that we regulate and in turn may impact the consumers that we seek to protect. In a sense, we have little choice but to consider and be cognisant of Government’s aims in relation to net zero, because if we are not thinking about those climate risks and challenges, which our firms face, we would not be doing our job and serving our statutory objectives.
Quite often, you find that the aims of Government are merely looking at some of the risks that are impacting markets, impacting the firms, and therefore it is right and proper that we have work in relation to those areas, and we do have work in relation to net zero and climate change.
Mr McFadden
Q
Edwin Schooling Latter: In answering that question, I think that an important starting point is to recognise that the UK regulators, including the FCA, played a very large role in designing a lot of that EU regulatory framework. So the overall picture is definitely one where we support the nature of that framework and the provisions within it. There are a few areas where compromises to span 28 countries perhaps do not suit as well as they might the particular circumstances of UK markets. I think that there are some areas, for example in the MiFID regime, where we could look at an approach that was better calibrated to the UK’s capital market infrastructure, but areas where we would diverge are the exception rather than the rule.
Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)
Q
Sheldon Mills: We have an obligation under FSMA such that all authorised firms will sit on our financial services register, and that allows a sense of public transparency as to who is authorised and what they are authorised to do. As the Committee may or may not know, we regulate tens of thousands of firms, upwards of 60,000 firms, so the register is quite large. The current rules allow firms that are authorised on the register to maintain their registration even though their activities are, in effect, dormant and they are not actually carrying out certain financial services. We need to give them rights to be heard in order to remove them from the register, and that takes time. Therefore, having a different regime, whereby we can give notice to firms that their removal might be pending unless they prove to us that they are active, is going to be a much more efficient and effective way of operating the register. This is important because harms are occasioned by the presence on the register of dorman firms. There is the activity of cloning, whereby firms use dormant names on the register to practise certain fraudulent and scam activity, which is a significant problem that we are seeking to tackle. We are committed, of course, to removing people from the register as swiftly as possible, but the provisions in the Bill will really help to accelerate that for us.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Sheldon Mills: It is not a resourcing issue as such. The process that one needs to go through in order to remove somebody from the register is time and resource-intensive and requires quite a lot of back and forth to execute, so this will be a more efficient process, which still respects the right of the person on the register to explain to us that they are using their licence or authorisation, but which will allow us to move forward a bit more quickly.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Sheldon Mills: I will need to come back to you on that.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Sheldon Mills: We can always do with more resources—that is a common refrain of regulators. Naturally, we will have to reorder our priorities in order to ensure that we are able to take on the onshored rules, to provide them with the right level of attention and make the right decisions. They will fall into two categories. Some we will be able to accept quite quickly and onshore reasonably easily, but others will have areas where we will rightly need to work through how they sit within the specifics of the UK market in a post-Brexit world, and they may take a little more time. All of them will require some form of consultation with the public, so that will take some time. I feel, however, that we have the expertise, experience and knowledge that certainly help us to have the head start on onshoring.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Sheldon Mills: I do not think so. What Ms Delfas was referring to is the need for firms to ensure that they are making efforts to be ready for transition. We have worked with firms and the Prudential Regulation Authority to ensure that firms are ready for transition. When we describe a “cliff edge”, what one is describing is the need to ensure that we are prepared for what we know is coming. We are working closely with firms and putting the right sort of pressure on them to be ready for that point.
Ms Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)
Q
Sheldon Mills: As I said, we have a significant amount of expertise in the United Kingdom. The reason we have that expertise is that—I have to be careful how I put this—much of the financial services legislation that has come about in the EU, the UK has fully participated in, often leading on the legislation. If we take the investment firms prudential regime, which is in the Bill, our colleagues at the FCA were leaders in that space, setting the pace and direction in the EU. So I think we have the expertise and the experience.
When I think about resources, there are areas where we will need to consider hiring more people, in particular the area of prudential expertise—that is a specific area within the FCA where we will need to hire. We will need to consider our resourcing carefully, as more parts of the acquis are onshored, but currently, where we stand, we think we are capable of moving around our resources in order to meet the demands.
The impact that it could have is of course the speed at which we are able to turn to the different pieces of legislation. If the ask was to do everything on day one, there would be an impact on resources; if we have a sensible framework and approach, I think we can manage.
Ms Eagle
Q
Are you sure that will not cause your resources to be stretched in a way that you had not anticipated? For example, if we have to approve new ways of doing things, onshore all these things and get new systems up and running, those who might wish to carry on can just shift to the internal market and carry on doing things, without having to wait for all the consultations that you and your colleagues will be doing to try to re-establish a UK-based regulatory system.
Sheldon Mills: The starting point is that the foundations of the system are clear to all financial services markets in the UK, so there will not be a gap that means organisations will not know the type of regulatory system that they expect when they are authorised a licence to operate in the UK. We will ensure that that is maintained and is clear throughout the transition and into the future.
On what I think you are referring to as the competitive regulatory system that we might enter into, I can assure you that we are engaged internationally through all international bodies. We play leadership roles in the ESB, the Financial Stability Board and all sorts of international bodies in financial services. Therefore, we are key actors in regulatory systems and the latest approaches to regulation across the world, and that will also support our being a sensible regulatory environment in which firms wish to operate. We are clearly engaged with negotiations and discussions with the European Securities and Markets Authority in relation to a range of regulatory activity, so I am confident that we will not have any significant gaps or issues that would cause issues for the UK financial services industry or for those who wish to come and play an active role in that industry.
Ms Eagle
Q
Sheldon Mills: The Bill is a matter for Government to take through Parliament. The important thing for us, as regulators, is that the Bill provides us with sufficient flexibility to meet the needs that we face as we move through the transition and into the future. In a sense, the Bill is silent on whether we are divergent or equivalent. Equivalence is a policy matter for Government, as opposed to a matter for us. All we need is sufficient flexibility to ensure that we have an appropriate regulatory system, depending on how Government policy emerges in relation to equivalence.
Ms Eagle
Q
Sheldon Mills: Neutral is too strong a word. My point of view is that we are interested in what I would call outcomes-based regulation. Equivalence can be done in one of two ways within the bounds of equivalence: it can be done line by line and letter by letter, or it can be done on the basis of seeking to meet equivalence objectives within an outcomes-based regulatory system. We are moving towards the position of the latter. Overall, equivalence is a matter for Government.
Ms Eagle
Q
Sheldon Mills: I do not think so at all. To give an example, it may look like it would take an army of 50 or 60 people to do the work of the investment firms prudential regime, but in reality it takes around 10 people to do that work. These are significant specialists in the technical architecture of designing prudential regulation. We would not ordinarily use those people in our consumer protection work, and they have different skills and are involved in different activities. I do not think that we will be any less vociferous in protecting consumers. During the crisis, those who watched us saw that we were at the forefront of ensuring that we tried to provide relief to consumers during the pandemic. We will continue in that vein. As the FCA’s conduct regulator, I am committed to ensuring that the consumer is at the heart of everything we do.
Abena Oppong-Asare (Erith and Thamesmead) (Lab)
Q
Sheldon Mills: I will go first and then pass over to Vicky. It is useful to start with our current accountability, because the Bill and future regulatory frameworks being consulted on by the Government deal with that issue. We wish to be accountable. As an independent regulator, an important part of our process is for us to have public accountability. We serve the public and ultimately are scrutinised by Parliament. Our main form of scrutiny is that of the Treasury Select Committee, but we attend many other Committees. Explaining our activity to Parliament is an important part of our work. Below that, within the Financial Services and Markets Act for the FCA specifically, are our statutory panels. They are there to scrutinise our work in a much closer engagement with the organisation. Then we have the consumer panel, the practitioner panel and the small business practitioner panel, as well as the advisory panel on markets and listings. They are able to make public their views, and—believe me—they do very often make public their views on our activity. In addition to that, we will consult on our policies when we do policy-making work ourselves, as do other public authorities. We will also provide access to non-confidential information and data so that all interested parties can make their views known to us.
We also evaluate our work to ensure that it meets its intended outcomes. We already have an existing accountability framework that would sit well with the additional rule-making powers we may get through the Bill and as we move forward with the proposed reform to the financial services regulatory regime. The future regulatory framework is out for consultation, so I will not say much in relation to it, but we of course acknowledge that there may need to be adjustments to the accountability framework to accord with the additional powers that we are getting. We look forward to seeing the responses to the Government’s consultation in relation to that.
Abena Oppong-Asare
Q
Sheldon Mills: As I said, we acknowledge that we will be getting additional powers and there may need to be changes to that accountability framework. Within the Bill, you see the foundational approaches in terms of how things may change. Within each of the specific policy areas, if we take the investment firms prudential regime review, there are certain “have regards” obligations that we will need to take account of in that regime. I think that is a sensible approach to take as you bring in onshored regulation. There are specific needs that Parliament considers it is appropriate for us to consider for that onshored regulation. Then, that “have regards” mechanism of pointing that out to us and us being accountable for meeting those “have regards” in accordance with our statutory objectives is a sensible approach and adds an additional layer of accountability and scrutiny for us.
There are other mechanisms within the future regulatory framework, which is out for consultation. Again, I do not have a strong view on them. I recognise that we are getting more rule-making powers and we may need to have more strengthening of the accountability framework.
Abena Oppong-Asare
Q
Victoria Saporta: To response to your question directly, yes, from the very beginning we had discussions with Treasury colleagues about how, within the narrow confines of this Financial Services Bill—I can talk about the related but quite distinct issue of the future regulatory framework—we could be more accountable, given that the Bill effectively gives the Government powers to revoke particular narrow areas of what will become, on 1 January, primary legislation, and then asks the regulators to fill in those particular gaps. The Government were keen that the process should be part of an enhanced accountability framework.
As Sheldon has said, within the confines of this Bill, the enhanced accountability framework applies to the updating of the rulebook to take into account the new Basel III provisions and the investment firms regulation, and three new “have regards” regulatory principles, which are set out in the relevant schedule and refer to us having to take regard of relevant standards recommended by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. That applies obviously to the PRA. We need to take the likely effect of the rules on the UK’s relative standing as a place for internationally active credit institutions and investment firms to carry on activities. Also, we need to take into account the likely effect of the rules on the ability of firms to continue to provide finance to households and businesses. This is an enhanced accountability framework, and the Bill also obliges us to publish how we have taken into account these “have regards”.
Those measures are within the proposals in the Bill to enhance our accountability publicly. There is the separate issue of the consultation that the Government are currently doing on how the future regulatory framework will look, what the enhanced accountability provisions within that are and how they should apply. I would not want to pre-empt that consultation but, clearly, the Government are interested and are trying to look at ways of keeping our feet to the fire, and that is absolutely appropriate.
Harriett Baldwin (West Worcestershire) (Con)
Q
Sheldon Mills: We have not undertaken a cost-benefit assessment of the Bill. That would be a matter for the Government. We have considered, as we discussed in response to earlier questions, the impact on resources within the FCA. Our current intention is to keep that within our current financial envelope, so we are not predicting at this stage an increase in fees or levies to take account of the Bill. That is all I can say at this stage.
In terms of the impact of the Bill and the onshored legislation, when we review the regulations on the investment firms prudential regime and so on, we will do a cost-benefit analysis of the rules and regulations that we are proposing at that stage. At this stage, we will not be doing that—that would be a matter for the Government, not for us.
In terms of the impact on consumers more generally, as I said, there are aspects of the Bill that are very consumer enhancing. I do not think they came up very much on Second Reading, but the provisions in relation to breathing space will be very helpful for consumers facing issues around statutory debts, which we are interested in as a financial regulator. The issues in relation to the register will be extremely helpful for us in terms of tackling fraud and scams. There are many elements of the Bill that are helpful. It is complicated, but the investment firms prudential regime is also consumer enhancing; currently, the capital requirements facing investment firms are those for the systemically important banks, and they are not fit for purpose. This regime will help us have a capital and prudential regime that is fit for investment firms. So there are a whole host of aspects of the Bill that are supportive of consumer interests and will not necessarily increase costs in a way that will be inimical to their interests.
Harriett Baldwin
Q
Sheldon Mills: All these measures are Government proposals, so the cost-benefit analysis that is required will be carried out by the Government and not by us. Once the Bill has been passed, in whatever form—we are bringing forward rules and regulations—we will undertake a cost-benefit analysis. I am giving an indicative view, as opposed to one based on a cost-benefit analysis that we are not required to carry out at this stage.
Stella Creasy (Walthamstow) (Lab/Co-op)
Q
Sheldon Mills: It is a broader question than the Bill, but I will answer by giving our approach to debt.
As a regulator, our approach is not to have a policy on whether people should be able to access credit, but we are concerned about the impact on people of firms providing credit. We want firms to be able to provide credit in a way that treats individuals fairly, takes account of their needs and circumstances and, in particular, supports vulnerable customers if they are in debt.
We work closely with debt charities. Some of the issues that we are seeing, which we all face and of which the FCA is cognisant, include the accumulation of debt among certain parts of the population, which is why it is important that rules and processes are in place to support people with debt management and why a breathing space policy forms an important part of that. I think that answers your question, but you might have more specific questions.
Stella Creasy
Q
Sheldon Mills: I think it is for Government to decide whether we should have that “have regard” regime, but there are current rules that firms should take account of the needs of customers. If customers are clearly displaying signals that they are taking on debt that is not affordable—and, in that sense, is not sustainable—firms should have in place mechanisms to ensure that they do not provide further credit or loans to them. There are rules in place on unaffordable lending.
It is for Government to decide whether we have “have regards”, but I do not think that we necessarily need them. I agree that there are issues with debt throughout society that we need to tackle, but I believe we have the right rules in place to ensure that firms make appropriate lending decisions.
Stella Creasy
Q
Sheldon Mills: You will have seen that we have done a significant amount of work in relation to high-cost credit and unaffordable lending. We have put caps in relation to forms of high-cost credit; we have tackled payday loan operators; we have a business priority that relates to consumer credit; we have introduced a review, which our former interim CEO, Chris Woolard, is undertaking in relation to aspects of unsecured consumer credit. We are extremely proactive in this area, and the overall system—in terms of the regulatory system—works well. The fact that consumers are able to go to the Financial Ombudsman Service, where they have had certain issues and the service is therefore enabled to give redress to those customers, is an important part of the system. However, I would not want you to think that that we are not proactively seeking to tackle the issues in this area.
Stella Creasy
Q
Sheldon Mills: I will let my colleagues go first, then I will come in.
Edwin Schooling Latter: Let me raise one area where work is under way. FinTech was mentioned, but the area of crypto-assets has been popular in some quarters. That is an example of an area where we have taken a very proactive approach to putting limitations on where those can be marketed to retail investors who may not fully understand the difficulties of valuing those, the risks attached to them, or the possibilities that they would lose all of their money the more speculative end of that product range.
Sheldon Mills: I would agree with Edwin. The main area which we will see in relation not just to financial services, but to any product, is the continued development of digital means both of accessing and of providing products and services. Our approach to that is twofold: one approach is to encourage innovation. These products and services can bring efficiency and lower cost, and they can bring different levels of access for consumers, including vulnerable consumers. However, while doing that, we ensure we are clear on the ethics and consumer protection aspects of these new forms of products and services. Those are some of the areas where we will see future opportunities and challenges within the financial services system.
Stella Creasy
Q
Sheldon Mills: With respect, I cannot regret not acting on something which I do not regulate. However, what we are doing is looking at that area through the form of this review. As you know, and as is implicit in your question, that does sit outside our specific regulation.
The Chair
Victoria, I think you were about to say something.
Victoria Saporta: Sorry, I am conscious of the time. I have basically one comment to make in our particular area. I agree very much with Sheldon on digitalisation and with Edwin on crypto. Another particular area that we are looking at—
The Chair
Order. I am afraid that brings us to the end of the time allocated for this session. I thank our witnesses on behalf of the Committee for their evidence.
Examination of Witnesses
Simon Hills and Daniel Cichocki gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear from Simon Hills and Daniel Cichocki from UK Finance, who are joining the sitting remotely. Can you introduce yourselves for the record?
Daniel Cichocki: Good morning, Chair. I am Daniel Cichocki. I am the London inter-bank offered rate transition director at UK Finance and, as such, am focused on the benchmark elements of the Bill.
Simon Hills: Good morning. I am Simon Hills. I lead the prudential policy work at UK Finance, so my particular area of expertise is the prudential regulation of banks.
The Chair
I remind colleagues that we have until 10.55 am for this session, so it is much shorter than the previous one. I hope that colleagues will be mindful of that.
John Glen
Q
Simon Hills: It is important to recognise that the Prudential Regulation Authority has been a strong supporter of Basel 3.1. It has been very influential in the way it was finalised, and I think that it is committed to implementing the Basel 3.1 framework in an internationally aligned way. That is important for our members, particularly if they are internationally active, because they want a coherent and harmonised regime across the world. If you are a UK bank operating in the UK, North America, Europe and Asia, you want one version of Basel 3.1 and you want it to be implemented in a coherent way. If not, and if there are different approaches to regulatory reporting, to how credit risk is assessed and to liquidity requirements, you have to implement a number of different versions of Basel 3.1, which will be more difficult.
In terms of UK Finance’s competence in, if you like, holding the PRA to account, we have a wide range of members for whom Basel 3.1 implementation is very important. I am pleased to say that I have good working relationships with Vicky and her colleagues at the PRA.
John Glen
Q
Daniel Cichocki: Certainly, the issues with the lack of sustainability of the LIBOR benchmark are very well documented, and it is important, as the Financial Stability Board has acknowledged at an international level, that we move away from LIBOR on a smooth and timely basis. It is also very important, certainly from an industry perspective, that as a result of moving away from LIBOR on to more robust reference rates, customers who have contracts referencing LIBOR are not inadvertently affected by that transition.
What this Bill seeks to do—and we are very supportive of its provisions—is to make sure there is a safety net in the form of powers being granted to the FCA, to ensure that those contracts that cannot be migrated on an active basis before LIBOR ceases have a solution so that the customer has a clear outcome for the contracts beyond LIBOR cessation.
These powers are important because before 2017, and the acknowledgement that LIBOR would cease, many contracts did not have clear, robust terminology setting out what would happen if LIBOR ceased. They may include terminology addressing if LIBOR should be unavailable for a day or two, and that might be the reference point those contracts would take. In that instance, without these powers, we may have seen customers falling back on to the last available LIBOR rate to the point of cessation, essentially becoming a fixed-term contract. We may have seen customers falling back on to cost of funds, which would create very diverse and disadvantageous outcomes for them. Equally, we would have seen fairly significant levels of contractual disputes beyond the end of 2021. These powers, in preventing all those negative outcomes for both customers and market integrity, are absolutely critical as part of the transition.
Mr McFadden
Q
Simon Hills: I am not sure that we would want the UK Government and authorities to diverge significantly, if at all, from other standards. We are not sure yet what Europe will do in respect of Basel 3.1. We do not expect draft legislation from the Commission until around Easter next year. That said, from the way in which the Commission has implemented previous iterations of Basel, I would expect it to stick quite closely to that Basel 3.1 framework, for the same reasons I have mentioned: international coherence and harmonisation, and easing the comparison of different banks and jurisdictions.
Mr McFadden
Q
Simon Hill: Yes, I think there is likely to be work to be done there. Of course, one of the accountabilities the Financial Services Bill gives the PRA is to take financial services equivalence and international competitiveness into account, and, importantly, the banks’ ability to continue to provide finance to UK businesses and consumers on a sustainable basis. I think we will all want to understand how different regulators around the world—not just in Europe—look at the PRA’s implementation when it gets down to those technical standards, which is why it is important for both Parliament and UK Finance to make sure there is no inappropriate deviation from international standards. I can assure you that if UK Finance members see that there is, we will speak up about it.
Mr McFadden
Q
Daniel Cichocki: It is absolutely right to acknowledge the issues with conduct around LIBOR in the past and the reforms that have taken place to make sure that those things are prevented. That includes the FCA oversight of the LIBOR benchmark, the introduction of the benchmark regulations at a European Union level, and transcribed into UK law, and broader reforms since the financial crisis, including the senior managers regime to ensure that the issues with LIBOR are not repeated. As the Committee will be aware, the fundamental reason why it is important to move away from LIBOR is that the underlying markets on which the rate is based have largely dried up. Therefore it is right to move us on to robust reference rates based on markets that are highly liquid and not reliant on expert judgment.
Simon Hills: It is important to remember that individuals in banks who are responsible for benchmark submission and administration are classified as so-called certified persons under the senior manager certification regime and they have to be certified as fit and proper every year by their firm. If they are not certified as fit and proper, they will lose their job and will find it very difficult to find a role in financial services again.
Mr McFadden
Q
Daniel Cichocki: LIBOR as it is formed today includes both elements of actual transactions and expert judgments of firms. These expert judgments, as a result of the issues in the past, are subject to those very high levels of governance control that I have talked about being introduced as a result of the benchmark regulation—absolutely appropriate as a result of the issues with LIBOR in the past. The underlying reason why we need to move away from it is that we want to be internationally on rates that do not require that expert judgment.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Simon Hills: Shall I go first and talk about the prudential regulation of banks? The Financial Services Bill achieves what it sets out to do: to implement a coherent version of Basel 3.1 in the UK. It is quite important to our members that we do Basel 3.1 the same in all the major financial centres in which firms operate. If a firm that is regulated by the UK operates in a different host country and the host country says, “That UK firm operating on our patch is supervised by the PRA and the PRA has introduced a watered-down version of Basel 3.1”, then they would add extra supervisory levels to bring it back up to the Basel 3.1 standard. That leads to a bifurcated approach with different regulatory standards in different countries, which makes life very difficult. A coherent approach, which is what the Bill seeks to achieve, is what we and our members want.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Simon Hills: We would not want to see wholesale deviation from Basel 3.1. Of course, Europe itself may choose to deviate from Basel 3.1, and that is a matter for its legislative process. I would not want to see the UK deviate from the agreed framework for Basel 3.1.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Simon Hills: I think there is a difference of approach in some G7 countries. Some perhaps apply a graduated or targeted approach to regulation. Canada, Japan and the US apply different iterations of the Basel standards to different sorts of firm. A large, internationally active bank would face the full gamut of Basel 3.1 in all its glorious granularity—in my view, that is right and proper—but a smaller, less systemic bank might face a different approach.
Of course, Basel 3.1 is applied by Europe—and that is what we are bound by at the moment—to all banks, not just those internationally active banks that are the target of Basel 3.1. The EU took the decision back, I think, in 1992—before even I got involved in this space—to apply the Basel III framework to all banks, from the smallest local Sparkasse in Germany to the largest, internationally-active bank.
I feel we must ask ourselves whether that is right; should there not be a risk-adjusted approach to safety and soundness? A sub-regional building society operating in the UK, for instance, has a vanishingly small probability of bringing the whole financial services system crashing down if it fails. Is it right to ask that firm to comply with all aspects of Basel 3.1? Maybe not.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Simon Hills: We don’t know yet how Europe will determine equivalence. I hope that our colleagues in the EU will look at our implementation of Basel 3.1, compare it with their own implementation and ask themselves the question, “Does this achieve what Basel 3.1 is seeking to achieve?” If they do, I hope there will be a form of equivalence—however we term it in the future—determination.
Ms Eagle
Q
Daniel Cichocki: As the Committee can imagine, from an industry perspective, we are absolutely focused on ensuring that the transition away from LIBOR—which is the right thing to do—is done in a way that treats customers fairly and consistently.
There is an awful lot of work being done at both an international and domestic level to agree standardised approaches to transition, where possible, but also to ensure that there are clear expectations from our regulators—here in the UK, it is the Financial Conduct Authority—about how that transition should be done.
Lots of work has been done and lots of work remains to be done, and, as you can imagine, we are speaking very frequently to the regulators here in the UK, and also working through the national working group to ensure that customers are transitioned on a fair and transparent basis.
Ms Eagle
Q
Daniel Cichocki: We are one voice from the perspective of the banking and finance industries, but it is important also to recognise that, within the overall national working group in the UK, there are voices that, rightly and properly, represent the end users of LIBOR, be they corporates themselves or the representatives of corporates. Although those voices are important in our national transition working group, it is equally important to address the concern that you articulate, which is absolutely right: the guidance that the FCA has provided to all firms that are transitioning their customers that the process should not be used to move customers on to inferior terms or rates that would be expected to be higher than LIBOR would have been. After speaking to our members in the industry, that message from the UK conduct authority has been heard loudly and clearly. All of us who are focused on moving away from LIBOR are acutely aware of the history of the benchmark and committed to ensuring that we move away from it in the right way and in a manner that treats customers fairly.
Ms Eagle
Q
Mr Hills, the industry has been lobbying the Government, Parliament and regulators to design regulations that will make UK firms more internationally competitive. Indeed, all of us in the room would share the aim of protecting our financial services industry. Do you think that the Bill achieves that?
Simon Hills: Yes, I think it does. The important thing is that the Bill achieves that by setting expectations of how the Basel 3.1 framework is implemented in an internationally coherent way. The PRA has to think about not only international competitiveness, but financial services equivalence, and the Bill achieves that.
Ms Eagle
Q
Simon Hills: I do not think that it is in the interests of the UK financial services industry and banks to introduce a divergent regime. We are talking about the importance of the City, and we want people to bring their money to the City for the right reasons, not the wrong ones. UK Finance members are certain that it is in no one’s interest to diverge from internationally agreed frameworks because that creates the risk that we bring in the wrong sort of people.
The Chair
If there are no further questions, I thank the witnesses for their evidence.
Examination of Witness
Paul Richards gave evidence.
The Chair
Q
Paul Richards: I am Paul Richards. I am a managing director at ICMA, which is the international bond market association. I am here to give evidence on the transition from LIBOR. I am involved in the transition from LIBOR to SONIA—the sterling overnight index average—because I chair the bond market sub-group, which consists of issuers, banks, investors and four major law firms. We work closely with the FCA and the Bank of England. If you will permit me, I shall make a short introductory statement.
I hope to be able to give you a bond market perspective on the Bill but, for the market as a whole, we are all trying to move away from LIBOR to risk-free rates while minimising the risk of market disruption and litigation. The Bill is welcome and very important for the bond market because it will give the FCA extra powers to deal with tough legacy LIBOR contracts and wind them down in an orderly manner.
There are three main points on which it would be very helpful if the Committee was willing to strengthen the Bill. First, the Bill needs to provide continuity of contract between the current definition of LIBOR and the new definition of LIBOR for legacy transactions once LIBOR is prohibited for new transactions. Legacy contracts referencing LIBOR under the current method of defining LIBOR need to be read as references to LIBOR under the new definition as determined by the FCA, so that there will be continuity there—this is sometimes called a deeming provision. This will reinforce the message that LIBOR will continue to appear on the same screen page, and it should also help to remove uncertainty and minimise the risk of a legal challenge on the basis that the current definition of LIBOR and the new definition are not the same and one party or another is worse off.
This is particularly a risk in the bond market in cases where LIBOR is specifically defined in legacy bond contracts in terms of its current definition. Continuity of contract or deeming provision like this was used when the euro was launched in 1999, and it worked well. Clearly, it would need to be drafted with the help of the Treasury and it would probably need to be drafted in terms of an article 23A benchmark in the way that the Bill is looked at. That is the first point.
The second and related point on which I hope the Committee will help is that the provision of the continuity of contract under the Bill needs to be accompanied by a safe harbour against the risk of litigation. This would provide that the parties to contracts would not be able to sue each other as a result of the change in the definition of LIBOR, and it would allow them to make conforming changes to bond market documentation.
The third point on which I hope the Committee will help is that the safe harbour and contract continuity provisions in the Bill need to be drawn as widely as possible, to protect any entity that uses the new definition of LIBOR for legacy transactions in place of the current definition of LIBOR. This would need to cover not just supervised entities in the Bill, but non-supervised entities, as the range of institutions involved in the international bond market is very wide.
Finally, I would like to draw your attention to two other points where there are significant legal risks under the Bill. One is that there needs to be equal treatment between legacy LIBOR bonds when the new definition of LIBOR takes over from the current definition, so that some legacy bonds are not preferred to others and there is no discrimination between them; otherwise, legal problems may arise. This would be a matter for the FCA under the Bill.
The other point is that there needs to be alignment internationally between the Bill and the similar legislation that is being introduced in the US and the EU, so that the rate used for legacy dollar bonds under English law and legacy dollar bonds under New York law is the same. Thank you, Mr Davies. I would be very happy to do my best to answer your questions.
John Glen
Q
Paul Richards: Thank you, Minister. First, as I mentioned, we welcome the Bill. The only question is: can it be improved to minimise disruption and litigation? The essential point is that, in the bond market, we have moved to SONIA as the risk-free rate, and new issues have been in SONIA for over two years now. That is the first step in the process.
The second step in the process is that we actively convert as many bonds as we can from legacy LIBOR to SONIA. We are making some progress there, but the third point is that we will still have tough legacy contracts that cannot be converted, either because they are too difficult to convert or because there are too many to convert by the end of 2021. In those circumstances, the provisions in the Bill are extremely helpful, because they provide for an orderly wind-down of tough legacy contracts. From that perspective, the Bill is very helpful. My questions relate to when the current definition of LIBOR is replaced by a new definition. Will there be contract continuity and a safe harbour to minimise the risk of disruption in the market and litigation?
Mr McFadden
Q
Paul Richards: LIBOR was set by a panel of banks. As the market no longer uses the underlying information that it used to use for banks, it has now changed, or will change, with the admission of SONIA, to a different definition. SONIA is essentially an overnight rate. It is a robust rate, because it is used widely in the market, whereas LIBOR is no longer used in the market as it was 30 or 40 years ago. That is one difference. A second difference is that LIBOR is a term rate—it is expressed over one month, three months or six months—whereas the liquidity in the SONIA rate is focused on the overnight market, which is therefore a much more representative selection and does not require expert judgment, unlike LIBOR.
A third point, perhaps, is that it is not just a UK proposal to replace LIBOR with risk-free rates in SONIA. A similar change is taking place globally. In the US, USD LIBOR is being replaced by the secured overnight financing rate, which has a similar sort of construction, and the situation is similar around the world. Those are the main reasons for the change.
Mr McFadden
Q
Paul Richards: As you say, LIBOR depended on expert judgment in many cases, because the market was no longer using LIBOR in the way it had been constructed. With SONIA, it is a much more liquid market and there is no need for expert judgment at all. That is one of the reasons why it is being preferred as the replacement for sterling LIBOR, and similarly around the world in other currencies.
Mr McFadden
Q
Paul Richards: A significant difference between LIBOR and SONIA is what is called the credit adjustment spread, which takes account of the difference between LIBOR and SONIA. In the consumer market, the proposals are, at a general level, to treat customers fairly. In the wholesale market, the aim is to have continuity of contracts between the old definition of LIBOR and the new definition that will be used for legacy transactions. This will be determined under the Bill by the FCA. It is not specified how it will determine it. There are market assumptions about that, but it is not decided yet how they will determine it. It is thought that it will consult the market before making a decision, but the end result will be that the rate that arises under the new definition of LIBOR will take over from the old definition of LIBOR, and there will be continuity of contracts between them. If that is emphasised in the Bill, that will give legal protection for all those involved, which is one of the main reasons for providing it. It needs to be accompanied by a safe harbour provision, which would protect all the different market participants involved. I would like to be able to tell you that this will eliminate the risk of litigation, but I cannot tell you that. What I can tell you is that it will minimise the risk of disruption and litigation that might otherwise occur because of the huge volume and value of transactions.
Mr McFadden
Q
Paul Richards: They are both needed, I think. The FCA’s judgment about treating customers fairly relates primarily to consumers. The protection that a safe harbour would provide, so that parties would not sue each other as a result of the change from the old definition to the new definition, is essentially designed for the international markets. So they are both needed. The FCA is already making statements about treating customers fairly, but the Bill should include both the continuity of contracts provision and a safe harbour protection to accompany that. The broader the safe harbour protection is drafted in the Bill—the Treasury, I am sure, could help on this—the better and more effective it will be in minimising disruption and the risk of litigation.
Mr McFadden
Q
Paul Richards: These are points that law firms that work in the City are acutely aware of from their previous experience. The law firms have been looking at what needs to be done to ensure that there is continuity of contract and a safe harbour protection. Of course, I hope that the Treasury will take account of that, as your Committee will take account of it before reaching a final conclusion. We should do everything we can to minimise the risk of market disruption and litigation, within the context of the overriding point, which is that we do need to move away from LIBOR to risk-free rates. That is, of course, what we have done, with new issues in the bond markets and with the conversion of legacy contracts from LIBOR to SONIA. We have a tough legacy problem for the future, which needs to be dealt with. The Bill helps to deal with that.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Paul Richards: Sorry, I did not quite catch the last point.
Alison Thewliss
You mentioned the uncertainty of how the FCA makes decisions around LIBOR contracts and benchmarking. Do you feel that needs to be set out more explicitly in the Bill so that you can know what to anticipate?
Paul Richards: I think it would be helpful for the Bill, specifically, to make provision for continuity of contracts—the deeming provision—and also for protection against litigation through a safe harbour, to be drafted as broadly as possible. That is not because the move away from LIBOR is not something that we should do—on the contrary, it is something we must do and we have made great progress in doing it already—but because, to deal with the tough legacy contracts in the Bill, we have to make sure that the new definition and the old definition are treated in the market as the same.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Paul Richards: I think that we are talking about 23A benchmarks in general in the Bill. What I have been talking about is specifically relevant to LIBOR. When the Treasury looks, as I hope it will, at whether anything is needed to advise you to strengthen the Bill, it might need to draft that in terms of benchmarks in general and not just LIBOR in particular.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Paul Richards: In the bond markets, we have to convert legacy contracts bond by bond, so it is the number of the bonds that is important, not just their value. In the sterling bond market, we think we have about 520 different legacy bond contracts, or 780 if you include the different tranches of securitisations. We have converted just over 20 of those so far in the market, but we know that we will not be able to convert all of them because some are too difficult to convert and there are too many to convert.
The FCA has an international role and English law applies in dollars as well as in sterling, so we need to take account of dollar legacy bond contracts under English law. In terms of number, we understand that there are more than 3,000 of those. In terms of value in bonds, we think we have around 110 billion in sterling outstanding.
The critical point for us in the bond market is that we need to convert them bond by bond. You will notice that that is different from the derivatives market, where there is a multilateral protocol that enables the market to do everything at once, which is currently in course. We cannot do that in the bond market.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Paul Richards: It is impossible to estimate the cost of litigation. The great thing is to avoid it wherever you can, and the Bill presents an opportunity to minimise the risk of it.
Alison Thewliss
Okay. It sounds like a good time to be a lawyer in this area. Thank you.
Ms Eagle
Q
Paul Richards: In the US, the alternative reference rates committee, which is the group equivalent to the sterling risk-free reference rates working group, has proposed legislation that is not identical to the UK’s but has the same effect, and so the concepts of continuity of contract and protection through safe harbours in the UK context will be recognised, we think, internationally as well.
Of course, we are not dealing here just with the proposals under New York law. We are having to look more generally. The EU has a proposal for legislation as well. It is important to recognise that the FCA has an international role, because the FCA is the regulator of the administrator of LIBOR, so what the FCA, through this Committee, decides in the UK will have an international impact.
Ms Eagle
Q
Paul Richards: No, I hope that the Government will consider this and say yes. I hope that that will happen, but it needs to be looked at in the context of the Bill as a great help to the market. It needs to be looked at in this context: can anything be done to strengthen the wholesale market?
Ms Eagle
Q
Paul Richards: The FCA has great powers under the Bill and I am sure that it will exercise them wisely, but we are dealing here with law internationally, and anything that can be done to strengthen that—and the Bill has the capacity to do that—will be helpful. I hope that it will also be helpful to the FCA.
The Chair
If there are no further questions from Members, I thank the witness for his evidence. That brings us to the end of our morning sitting. The Committee will meet again at 2 pm in the same room to take further evidence.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(David Rutley.)
Financial Services Bill (Second sitting)
Tuesday 17th November 2020
(4 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Financial Services Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 17 November 2020 - (17 Nov 2020)
The Chair
I remind members of the Committee sitting on this side of the room, or in the Public Gallery, to use the standing mikes when posing their questions. Our first witness this afternoon is Chris Cummings from the Investment Association. Mr Cummings, welcome.
Chris Cummings: It is a pleasure to be here. Thank you for your time.
The Chair
We have until 2.45 for this session. Mr Cummings, can you first of all introduce yourself for the record?
Chris Cummings: Good afternoon. My name is Chris Cummings. I am chief executive of the Investment Association, the representative body for UK-based fund managers, an industry now of some £8.5 trillion pounds, based here in the UK. Our products and services are used by three quarters of UK households, and we are deeply grateful for the opportunity to give evidence to your Bill session this afternoon.
The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (John Glen)
Q
Chris Cummings: Thank you for the opportunity to speak to one of the most central parts of the Bill. May I take a moment to congratulate you and your team on introducing the Bill? It provides much-needed reassurance to my industry, so thank you for that.
The industry is very pleased to see the overseas funds regime introduced as part of the Bill. Around 9,000 funds are currently available to UK investors as a result of the current regime. The reason we feel it is in the interests of UK savers and investors to have access to such a variety of funds is that it brings to the market not only choice but much-needed competition. It means that individual investors have greater choice and an ability to tailor their portfolio in a way that makes sense to them and reflects their risk profile. It is really the foundation of why the UK is the pre-eminent fund centre, not just in Europe, but globally. As the Minister knows, the UK has long enjoyed a reputation for being an attractive centre for fund management. That is built on the ability of UK investors to access an innovative and ever-adapting fund market.
We support this measure in the Bill wholeheartedly. At the moment, as the Minister knows, we manage around 37% of Europe’s assets, which is enabled through measures such as this. It is important for UK savers and investors; having such a variety of funds goes to the heart of having such a sophisticated savings environment in the UK.
It is important to note that if there was a cliff edge—if UK investors were not able to access these funds—that would constrict consumer choice. In trying to replicate something akin to what we have at the moment, we would bring a heavy burden of extra costs on to the industry and greater bureaucracy. It would reduce significantly the number of funds to which UK investors could have access. That is why we believe that the overseas fund regime is material.
It is worth contrasting that with what we see at the moment. In order to help navigate these turbulent waters through the Brexit period, I was delighted that the Government heard our calls to introduce a temporary permissions regime with the Financial Conduct Authority. I am pleased to note that the Bill extends the period from three to five years for that requirement, which is very good. It also allows us to tackle two particular issues wrapped up in the overseas funds regime.
First, there is a review of section 272, which is the current structure by which a fund sponsor or investment management company would seek to have their fund recognised by the FCA—our regulator here in the UK. Section 272 is okay, but it is rather cumbersome. It does not stand up well compared to international comparators. It is a rather lengthy form, which takes a while to complete and gives the FCA a six-month period to look at approving that particular fund.
The proposals in the Bill take us to a completely different level, where the FCA is able to look at fund structures across the piece rather than at each individual fund. We feel that is a big step forward. While section 272 could be reviewed and reformed, there is a different category of opportunity presented by the Bill and that is why our industry is so keen to see the Bill come forward and have the overseas fund regime baked into it as a measure that goes ahead. I will pause there in case there are comments before I move on to comment on equivalence, as you were kind enough to mention.
John Glen
Q
Chris Cummings: Currently, we enjoy unfettered marketing right across the whole of Europe and the EEA. Post Brexit, naturally, that will come to an end. The way that the regulatory authorities assess whether a particular fund is suitable is to judge the equivalence of the regime of the sponsoring organisation or where the organisation is based. Having that judgment of equivalence has been one of our industry’s clear calls throughout the Brexit process.
We were pleased that the Chancellor took a step forward in recognising and granting equivalence to a limited measure in the House of Commons in his statement last week. We think that was absolutely in the right direction. We have been unstinting in our calls for the European Commission and our European regulator, the European Securities and Markets Authority, to respond to those in kind and move forward so that the equivalence determination could have been made by now and be working. We were sorely disappointed that in June ESMA decided not only not to make a decision on equivalence, but to defer it for a period of time until after the IFR comes into effect.
We feel that that was a missed opportunity to settle the fact that the UK and the EU would be equivalent, which we currently are, having adopted, rather in full vigour, the European rules under which our industry labours. We are hopeful that continuing industry efforts to encourage ESMA and the European Commission to recognise the UK as equivalent will come through, but we are more than pleased with the steps that the Chancellor announced and the comments that are carried forward in the Bill. At the moment, we see that as a first step, but we look forward to greater work being done on this in the months and years ahead.
Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)
Q
The Bill does lots of different things, but I would like to mention two. First, it onshores or incorporates a significant body of EU law through different directives into UK law and gives the governance of those to the UK regulators. Secondly, it sets up this overseas fund regime, by which it grants equivalence on a country-by-country basis. It says that the Treasury will make these equivalence decisions as well. The Chancellor announced the direction of travel last Monday.
How do you see the relationship between these two different parts of the Bill? In theory, in future, having onshored the body of EU law and the directives, we are now at liberty to depart from them if we so choose. Do you see a relationship between that debate around divergence and the degree of divergence that the UK decides to opt for and the equivalence decision that we now need from the rest of the EU?
Chris Cummings: It is worth reflecting on the good work that has been done so far in trying to bring the different regimes together and match equivalence. Looking to the future, there is a strong argument for the UK to continue to bolster its presence in the international standard-setting fora, whether that is the Financial Stability Board, the International Organisation of Securities Commissions, Basel, and so on. Our authorities can continue to play a very strong role in arguing for what our industry would prefer, which is global and international standards.
We continually push for international standards as a global industry because that allows us to operate with reduced bureaucracy and by taking costs out of the organisation so we can really focus on looking after client needs. The UK has an outstanding track record of having its policymakers and regulators taken seriously in those international fora, because of the scale of the market that we have in the UK and the sophistication of our capital market in particular. At that level, if we can push for international standards in an international environment, that reduces some of the potential friction between the EU and the UK or other jurisdictions about where divergence may or may not be happening. That is the first thing we would like to stress—the international nature.
Secondly, something that has become part of the discussion in terms of the future relationship of the UK and the EU, and which our industry thoroughly supports, is a much clearer focus on outcomes and outcome-based regulation. It is noticeable that across the EEA there are different approaches in different European jurisdictions, all of which have been judged equivalent so far. Recognising that different jurisdictions will walk up to the same issue from different directions, yet seeking to achieve the same thing, that is the material part.
The third area I would just point to, if I may, is the depth of relationship between the UK authorities and those across the EU, not just in ESMA, our European regulator, but in the national domestic regulatory authorities. It is still absolutely the case that the UK policy-making apparatus—the UK regulatory bodies—is seen to have considerable expertise to offer. So just because we start in different places, it does not mean that we should not see the UK taking a little leadership and the EU tacking towards us in terms of lessons learned because of the sophistication of the market that we can offer. That was one of the reasons why we in the IA, among many other organisations, through the Brexit process was keen to press for a regulator to regulate a dialogue, which could be technically oriented, focused on bringing market and regulatory understanding to bear and making sure that there was a no-surprises, keeping-markets-open focus through the process that we have been through.
So I do not see equivalence and divergence as axiomatically pulling in different directions. I think what we will undoubtedly see is a period where the definition of equivalence needs to be—we need to have a thoughtful discussion, actually, about the substance of equivalence, moving away from its ephemeral nature and the fact that it can be granted or dismissed within a 30-day notice period. We need to have a much more joined-up and mature discussion about how two major markets can keep on doing business together, particularly in investment management when, as I mentioned earlier, 37% of Europe’s assets are managed here in the UK and when, for certain member states, whether it is the Dutch pensions industry or something else, the quality of investment management conducted here in the UK is seen as a prized asset and something that they want to learn from and continue to enjoy the benefit of.
Mr McFadden
Q
Chris Cummings: We have been helping our members prepare for all shades of Brexit outcome over the last four years. Firms have taken the decisions that inevitably they would take, so they have set up extra offices, they have recruited further staff, they have gained the necessary permissions and licences from the national competence authorities. At the moment, even with, perhaps, no deal or a rather thin deal, we are as well prepared for that outcome as it is possible to be. We are giving much more thought to the companies that we invest in—everything from life sciences to technology, to transport and infrastructure, to make sure that those companies are well prepared for the Brexit outcomes, but from our industry’s point of view, recognising the equivalence decisions that have been made today, we are set as fair as any industry can be. I am trying not to over-promise, but suggesting to you that the industry has thought long and hard about potential outcomes, and we are as prepared as we can be for immediate issues.
Mr McFadden
Q
Chris Cummings: Thank you for the question. You have touched on such an important issue for our industry. Through the consultation on PRIIPs we highlighted to EU policy makers and regulators, to our own Financial Conduct Authority and others, the dangers that we saw in the PRIIPs key information document, the PRIIPs KID. Because of how the methodology for PRIIPs was created—taking a rather avant-garde view of the calculation basis—it meant that we could have negative transaction costs. Somebody could trade in the market and it would not only not cost them any money; they could actually lose money by making a trade. That led to some perverse outcomes that were pro-cyclical in the presentation of the information they gave.
Let me give you an example by reflecting back on a new fund that has had just two or three years’ experience. Imagine if, over the course of its life, that fund had had a very strong performance; it had done very well over a three or four year period. Because of the pro-cyclicality of how it had to report performance scenarios—looking to the future—it would have to present a potential investor with scenarios that were entirely positive and that generated levels of return that nobody in the industry would seriously put in front of a retail investor to suggest that this was what they could actually get. They were being forced to do it because of the methodology—the calculation basis—which reflected only that, if you had a few good years of performance, your fund would continue to have good years of performance. Similarly, if your fund had had a few bad years of performance, all you could project was that that bad performance would just continue and continue. That was because of the calculation basis and the way that the rules were written.
As an industry, we kept drawing this issue to the attention of the policy-making community in order to say that, if nothing else, when it comes to disclosure and investment, we have managed to convey the central message that past performance is no guarantee of future performance. Please let us keep on reminding people that past performance is no guarantee of future performance. Sadly, that requirement was taken away. The new calculation basis was introduced, which led to the industry ultimately being forced by its regulator to produce this pro-cyclical—and deeply misleading, in our view—information.
We continued to lobby against the wider introduction of the PRIIPs KID, arguing first that it should not be introduced. Secondly, having lost that argument and seen that that it was introduced only to closed-ended funds, we argued that it should be kept there until the wider implications were seen and not extended into the world of undertakings for the collective investment in transferable securities, because of the scale of UCITS and how many millions of people across the UK and Europe rely on them.
We were genuinely heartened when the Treasury announced that, post Brexit, it would be undertaking a review of the PRIIPs KID. What we hope to see, actually, is a wider-scale review of disclosure, whereby we can start from a different position. Given the technologically advanced world that we are living in today—the greater use of mobile phones, applications and computers, and just understanding that people engage with financial services in a very different way—could we have a rounder discussion about how we can do the thing that we want to do as an industry? We want to have a more engaged client base and to help them understand the different funds that are available and the different risk profiles of those funds, so that they can invest with more confidence, and certainly with more clarity about likely outcomes, rather than having to give false performance scenarios that simply nobody trusted in the industry.
Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)
Q
Chris Cummings: I think this is a “two ends of the telescope” question, if you pardon the analogy. We tend to think a lot about the UK changing rules and changing approaches, and there are one or two examples of that in the Bill—we have just mentioned PRIIPs KID. There always seems to be a sense that it would be the UK moving away from the central European view of regulation. Of course, that need not be the case. There are a number of regulatory reviews that are timetabled to be considered by the European Commission. There is the alternative investment fund managers directive. There is the review of PRIIPs and so on. Looking two or three years out, there are quite a few opportunities where, actually, the UK may stay still because the rules work in practice and it could be the European Commission that is drifting away from the central scenario that we are in today. That is perhaps almost inevitable, looking 10 years out; there are bound to be changes to the regulatory architecture and the regulatory regime, because the UK will need to modernise its approach to regulation, and not only here and across Europe, but more globally, every economy is thinking about growth-oriented policies as a result of the covid crisis.
That is why, for us, we approach the discussion around equivalence very much from a point of view of saying, “Okay, even if the words on the page change, how can we make sure that the bandwidth is agreed by all sides, so that minor degrees of divergence from equivalence are not the straw that breaks the camel’s back?” That is why I come back to the point I was making just a moment ago about having a regulator to regulate a dialogue—a set, established forum where the FCA and the Prudential Regulation Authority can meet the European Securities and Markets Authority and the European Central Bank and so on, in order that information can be shared, regulatory approaches can be discussed and data can be shared as well, on a “no suprises” policy, so that we can make sure that in the UK and Europe there is a commonality of view, or a commonality of outcome certainly, that is being laboured towards.
I am confident that that would make sure that any discussions on equivalence are structurally much more sound and that we remove the political overlay. Across the industry, there is a concern that equivalence could be used as a political process rather than a regulatory one, which perhaps does not really lead to an outcome that is in the interests of savers and investors.
Every time a new rule is introduced that is different in the European Union from the UK, that adds costs to the industry, because we have to navigate our way through two sets of rules, which might not contradict, but simply do not join up. There are different reporting deadlines for data and so on. That is why we would really like to make sure we move to an outcome-based approach, rather than to a prescriptive, words on the page, exact phraseology, which will simply prove a headache for all.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Chris Cummings: Our friends in Switzerland have been navigating these waters for a period of time. The Investment Association continues to cultivate deeper relationships with our Swiss opposite number to see how it has mapped the terrain. We should make sure that we learn the lessons from how the US and the EU have negotiated when it has come to major directives. We have had a few instances where either the US was trying to apply its rules extraterritorially, into the EU, or where the EU sought to apply its standards and approaches outside the EU.
A really noticeable one was around costs of research. The EU, as part of the MiFID approach, suggested that all research had to be paid for. Investment managers had to pay for research produced by investment banks; in effect, we had to hand over cash. In the US, those payments were illegal. So the two regulatory regimes, both trying to protect consumer interests, found themselves at loggerheads.
Through industry intervention and working very closely with the regulatory authorities in the UK and in Europe and the SEC in the US, we were able to come up with a reasonably uncomfortable but workable compromise that has lasted over three years now, which gets reviewed on an ad hoc basis, but which allows both markets to function, even though the rules do not align. It is that kind of approach that makes you think, well, it works but it is sub-optimal. It feels ephemeral and, from an industry point of view, it is something else that is a distraction from the work of looking after our clients and investors. That is why we think that an openness and transparency around regulatory initiatives and regulatory thinking will help cement relationships into the future.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Chris Cummings: Actually, I think the Bill is a rather comprehensive document. I would defer to others who may have different opinions, but from the investment management industry, there is a good discussion about the overseas fund regime, which was essential for us; the future of passporting; a review of section 272, which we felt very strongly about; and of course equivalence. If anything, it goes towards what is most essential for our industry, which is protecting the delegation of portfolio management, because our industry in the UK is underpinned by an ability to manage the clients’ investments—yes, from the UK, but across Europe and much more internationally. Ensuring that ability to protect and preserve delegation is simply mission critical for the investment management industry, which is one of the few UK growth success stories that we have seen really expand over the past decade.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Chris Cummings: This is a matter that we have been working on very closely with our regulator, the FCA, and talking to Treasury about. It is part of the reason why, in firms’ preparations for—forgive the terminology—a no-deal or a hard-deal Brexit, the industry had to do the thing that we exist to do, which is look after our clients. So that has led to more substance, regulatorily speaking, being established in other jurisdictions, particularly in Luxembourg and Ireland, which have traditionally been the places where most investment management back-office work has been done, with the UK, of course, being the centre for fund management and the actual investment aspect of the industry.
Abena Oppong-Asare
Q
Chris Cummings: I am terribly sorry. I was having an IT glitch and I missed your question. I do apologise. Can I ask you please to repeat the question?
Abena Oppong-Asare
Q
Chris Cummings: Thank you for the question. We take the very strong view that we, as investors, rely entirely on public information. The quality of information produced by management is pivotal to the investment decisions that we make as investors. That has led to the point now where the investment management industry has a stake in more than a third of the FTSE. We think long and hard about investing in any particular company, listed or unlisted, and that is why we believe that it is the investor who is the client of the audit. A company pays for the audit, but it is the investment community that is the client of the audit. That is why we are so outspoken in pushing for better quality audits, and ensuring that the chairs of the audit committee take their responsibilities towards their investors seriously.
We absolutely worry about too close a relationship between an auditor and the company that they are auditing. That is why we feel that audits should be reviewed and we are constantly striving to have a more competitive ecosystem in the audit world, so you raise a very good point. If I may, I will offer to review that section of the Bill in more detail, and if we see anything that strikes us as being too weak or in need of strengthening, I will write to you with our proposals on that very quickly.
Abena Oppong-Asare
Q
Chris Cummings: Indeed. The audit profession has been through three major reviews recently. We entirely support the proposals to bring ARGA into existence. The work the FRC has been doing to prepare for the transition to ARGA has been commendable, but we need to go one step further and actually encourage policy makers to ensure that ARGA is brought into being as quickly as possible. Personally, I have been impressed by the new head of the FRC’s ability to convene and cajole the audit companies to exercise some soft power, to encourage them to improve the quality of audit. Still, it is not the same as having that statutorily recognised independent regulator, and we encourage this Committee—and other parliamentarians —to push for the establishment of ARGA as soon as possible.
The Chair
I call Gareth Davies. Gareth, I think you will have to move to the microphone over there.
Gareth Davies (Grantham and Stamford) (Con)
Q
Chris Cummings: You are right in saying around 75% are UCITS. UCITS have become a global brand. It is a high watermark, at least currently, in an investor-centric investment vehicle, and rightly recognised by jurisdictions across Europe and internationally. In thinking about how the UK develops its own UK fund regime, which is some work that the IA has put forward to the Treasury and the FCA, we have taken the UCITS regime as our benchmark to think about how it can be expanded upon; how can it be modernised given the experience with UCITS over the last few years.
One of the core issues that the industry takes very seriously is better governance of funds. That is one of the reasons why we supported our regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority, in stipulating that, at fund level—not at company level—there must be an independent, non-executive director who asks the big questions about governance of the fund, and ensures that there is a clear value for money assessment at least annually, to drive down costs for investors and to ensure that investors are getting a better deal out of those funds. In terms of modernisation, we think that a great deal is already happening in the industry, with more to come.
Although money market funds are used by some retail investors, they are seen more as a capital markets instrument. Given their brevity, they tend to attract a lot of overnight money. Their particular structures are perhaps for more sophisticated professional and institutional investors. They are a useful counter, but really for us UCITS are the gold standard at the moment. We are naturally keen to extend the UCITS regime, especially post Brexit.
That is why we brought forward our own proposals for a long-term asset fund, which we think will not only modernise the UK fund regime but draw together some of the more interesting parts from other fund regimes. It has the benefits of an open-ended fund, and some of the advantages of a closed-ended fund, with an extra layer of governance. It will allow UK savers and investors, institutional as well as retail, to invest more in infrastructure, taking a longer-term view, and in what traditionally have been higher-growth companies—technology companies, life sciences, biotech and so on—taking a much longer-term perspective. We think that the long-term asset fund will be a great complement to the existing UK and European fund family.
The Chair
Does anyone else on the Committee wish to catch my eye in the remaining four minutes? In that case, thank you very much, Mr Cummings, for your evidence.
Examination of Witnesses
Emma Reynolds and Catherine McGuinness gave evidence.
The Chair
We move on to our second panel of the afternoon, and the fifth in total. We have Emma Reynolds, formerly of this parish, now at TheCityUK, and Catherine McGuinness from the City of London Corporation. We have until 3.30 pm for this panel, and I will pull the plug if it goes over. Emma and Catherine, could you first introduce yourselves for the record, please?
Emma Reynolds: I am Emma Reynolds from TheCityUK. We represent the UK-based financial and related professional services industry, which employs 2.3 million people, two thirds of whom are based outside London. We are the largest taxpayer, biggest net exporting industry and contribute over 10% of the UK’s total economic output.
Catherine McGuinness: I am Catherine McGuinness, policy chair at the City of London Corporation. We are the local authority for the square mile. In addition, we work very closely with the UK’s financial and professional services sector, which carries our name even though, as Emma says, it is a UK-wide sector.
John Glen
Q
Emma Reynolds: Thank you, Mr Glen. We support the measures in the Bill, and both the overarching and the stated objectives. It is absolutely right that the UK Government are onshoring the regulations. There are obviously other measures within the Bill that are extraneous to that, which we support. The Bill is a welcome first step, but we look forward to working with the Government to develop an overall strategy for the financial services sector that could pull all the different strands together, building on what the Chancellor said last week, which was very welcome.
John Glen
Q
Emma Reynolds: It is a very welcome first step. All I would say is that we, as an industry, have a broader agenda about our industry’s long-term competitiveness going forward. I would not have expected to see that in this Bill. We had a very good relationship with Government, particularly with the Treasury, but some of the other issues that we are concerned about relate more to other Departments, whether it is access to skills and talent from abroad or green finance or other issues that are not in the Bill. It is a welcome first step.
John Glen
Q
Catherine McGuinness: Thank you for inviting me to give evidence. I cannot answer on the technical ability of the regulators in detail, other than to say that, in our experience, they are very capable of adapting and innovating. Indeed, we heard last week at Mansion House from both the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority about their plans. Obviously, the regulators will be gaining significant powers under the Bill. It is important that we look at how those powers are scrutinised, including by Parliament.
On that front, the International Regulatory Strategy Group, which both TheCityUK and the City Corporation support, has suggested that parliamentary scrutiny be strengthened and reordered, and that the role of the Treasury Committee be complemented by setting up a joint Select Committee on financial regulation to look in detail at specific pieces of financial services regulation. That would be important to strengthen scrutiny, as we hand more responsibility to the regulators. It would also be useful––and the IRSG has recommended it––to increase the transparency of decision making by both the Treasury and the regulators, and to improve scrutiny. I am not sure if I have fully answered your question.
Mr McFadden
Q
The Bill does lots of different things but two big things are that it transposes, or onshores, lots of different parts of EU regulation from many different directives. It gives powers to the UK regulators to govern all that. In doing that, as we come to the end of the transition process, there is greater freedom for either the Treasury or the regulators to diverge from that body of EU law. The Bill does that, but it also has this overseas markets vision, which is granting equivalence on a country-by-country basis, to the 9,000 funds that are domiciled overseas but which operate in the UK. I want to talk a bit about these two different parts of the Bill. Starting with you, Emma, what do you think your members’ attitude is to onshoring this body of EU law? Do they broadly regard it as something that they would like to stick with or are there areas that they would quite quickly want to diverge from and, if so, what would be the most prominent areas?
Emma Reynolds: We were delighted that the Government took the unilateral decision last week to grant the EU equivalence in a number of different areas. We are still hopeful that the EU might follow suit. We have been calling for a technical outcome-based approach to equivalence for some time now. Within that, you could have different rules but the same outcomes. Even if there are pinch points around Solvency II—only some elements of Solvency II—you could have different rules in the UK that achieve the same objective.
From now until 1 January, we will remain technically equivalent. Inevitably, over time, there will be some changes in regulation, both on our side in the UK and in the EU. The EU is currently reviewing some of its own directives, MiFID being a case in point, but there are others too. We do not want to see divergence for divergence’s sake. We would like to encourage a strong dialogue between regulators in the UK and the EU. There already is that dialogue, but we would like to see a framework for that plan. If you are a member of ours who trades across borders, you want similar or the same rules.
Mr McFadden
Q
Emma Reynolds: We are still hopeful that the EU might take a similar decision to what we saw last week. We would not like to see divergence for divergence’s sake. There is no immediate appetite for great divergence from EU rules from our members. Does that answer your question?
Mr McFadden
Q
Catherine McGuinness: First of all, I do think the regulators can handle this, but I think it is important that we look at the right degree of scrutiny. Yes, when we speak to practitioners with the International Regulatory Strategy Group, it is their view that a joint Select Committee on financial regulation, which could look in detail at pieces of financial services regulation, would be a useful way of enhancing and embodying that scrutiny.
The Chair
For the Scottish National party, first of all, their spokesperson, Alison Thewliss.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Catherine McGuinness: Actually, what I was mentioning was the International Regulatory Strategy Group, which is a cross-sectoral group of practitioners, who come together to look at a number of issues and make recommendations. We can provide the Committee with their recommendations in this space. As I said, they are suggesting that we look at a joint Select Committee on financial regulation in Parliament. I am happy to share with the Committee more details about the International Regulatory Strategy Group and its current programme of work, if that would be useful, and to provide copies of the paper in this space.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Catherine McGuinness: Regulation is a complicated issue. I think that if we are handing powers to the regulators to make regulation, when over the past few years we have made regulation through the EU, where there is level after level of consultation and development, we need to look at how we replicate that and put in the appropriate level of scrutiny as we take things forward ourselves.
I have to say that we very much welcome this Bill as a step in the right direction in getting the framework in place but, as people have said, it is a first step. We think it is then important to move on and look at the next round in the Treasury’s consultation on the regulatory framework, as well as how to implement—to stray a little from your question—the Chancellor’s statements in his announcement last week.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Emma Reynolds: I would agree with Catherine and echo what she has said. Obviously, there are significant transfers of powers to the regulators, given that we are onshoring this regulation. In an EU context, we had the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, which is a sizeable Committee with huge resources and an enormous amount of time to write and draft amendments in this area.
It is not in the tradition of our Parliament to have such Committees. In a way it would mean this Bill Committee sitting permanently. In Parliament, working with industry and Government, we need to work out exactly how we will do it, bearing our traditions in mind. That is why the IRSG, which is a point of contact between us and the City of London Corporation, came up with some of the ideas in the paper, which Catherine mentioned. We are very willing to share that with the Committee.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Emma Reynolds: Yes, we sent that briefing out. Thank you for referring to it. Yes, we would like to see more guidance and clarity from the Government as to whether the UK’s version of the so-called CRR II—Capital Requirements Regulation II—is going to differ in any substantial way from the EU’s CRR II. Some of our members have put resources and time into planning for that. It is just a question of ensuring that we have the most efficient planning for what comes next.
Ms Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)
Q
Catherine McGuinness: The Bill must be viewed as part of a package with what we then heard from the Chancellor’s announcement. It is a first step, but it does not set out an ambitious overarching strategy for financial services for the future. This is a critical part of our economy and we would suggest that we need that strategy as we move forward. The Chancellor’s announcement last week and the emphasis on openness, innovation and green seem to us to be a significant next step, but we need to look at an overall direction for this important part of the economy.
Ms Eagle
Q
Emma Reynolds: We agree entirely with what Catherine has just said. I think the Chancellor has made a start prior to the consideration on Second Reading of the Bill. He obviously set out certain key reforms in certain areas, most notably in green finance. He also launched a number of calls for evidence and taskforces. Working in partnership with Government, industry would like to see the Government come forward with a strategy that pulls all of that together. That is not an easy thing to do, but we are a world-leading financial services sector in the UK, and we want to see that continue. This is a question of partnership with the Government. We are not saying we want it done to us without us being in the room, but we do think there is probably more to do to create a more coherent strategy for going forward.
Ms Eagle
Q
Emma Reynolds: If you are a global company that trades across borders, not just in the EU but in other jurisdictions, what you really want is the same or a similar set of rules. You certainly want global norms and standards on which those rules are based. There is no clamour for significant divergence from what we have. It is worth saying that although we are technically equivalent right now, and that will not change until 1 January, there will need to be responses from regulators, in terms of new regulation going forward.
We have the rise of FinTech, which brings its own challenges, but is a great asset to the UK. We have green finance, as well as some of the socioeconomic trends that have been accelerated by covid. All of these bring new challenges, and so our regulation cannot afford to sit still. We want to avoid unintended divergence when the EU and the UK are facing some of the same challenges. We may go about making our rules in a very different way, but if we could achieve broadly the same outcomes, that could mean we were equivalent, and that would provide advantages to those of our members who trade here and in the EU.
Ms Eagle
Q
Catherine McGuinness: I would say two things here. First, if we are not at the table helping to shape the regulation, there is, of course, the risk of divergence from either side as we exercise our own autonomy. I think that global standards are going to be critical for all of us, because we are talking about markets that operate across borders. It is in all our interests—the EU’s, ours and the institutions in the sector—to have a set of global standards around global issues. So, yes, there is a risk of divergence from either side. Keeping the conversation going as the regulation develops is going to be critical.
Taking the green question, for example, we have the EU, which is fairly advanced with its own taxonomy. We are now going to be looking at our own taxonomy, and I think that is a great thing that we should be doing. I also think that green finance is an area in which we can really lead the way, including in regulation. It will be important that we look at how those systems mesh together, and this is a conversation that the sector is encouraging our regulators to have with other countries, too—not simply the EU. I was nearly late because I came from a panel in the US speaking about the importance of a regulator-to-regulator discussion about some of these issues, and the role the sector might play in helping to develop thinking. It is possible that we may diverge, but it is in the interest of customers and businesses that there should be well regulated financial markets, with consistent rules and regulations over cross-border challenges.
Ms Eagle
Q
Emma Reynolds: I hope you do not mind if I take your last question first, because I think it sets the scene for the rest of your questions. There is very little in the deal for financial services, if there is a deal. However, our industry thinks it is incredibly important that there be a deal, because that would leave the door open for the EU granting equivalence in certain areas of financial services, and for other agreements that are essential to services more generally, such as provisions around data; frankly, if there is not a better agreement on that between the two sides, that could be very difficult, not only for our members, but for other service industries, too. I hope that answers your question on deal versus no deal.
There is nobody in our industry I could name who wants a race to the bottom. That is not the way to make yourself more competitive. We view the UK’s high standards as giving us an competitive edge. We have some of the highest standards in the world. We do not think that there will be a race to the bottom in that way.
On your question about protectionism, I think there is a live debate right now in the EU. One EU interlocuter put it to us very succinctly the other day as the trade-off between location and efficiency. European business has access at the moment to deep and liquid capital markets in the UK, which they find very useful, and which they cannot find in the EU currently. We would like to see that continue—that is in the interests of businesses not only here, but on the continent—but you are right that there is a live debate about what happens next, and whether location is more important to the EU. That debate is going on not only in the EU; covid has accelerated the trend towards protectionism, which is why it is so good to see that the UK Government are taking such an open approach in the Bill. We would encourage that to continue, because we think it is one of our strengths, and it gives us that competitive edge.
Ms Eagle
Q
Catherine McGuinness: Yes, but I think it is welcome that the FCA, under its new leadership, is also carrying out a review. That is appropriate. Clearly, we are asking a new role of it, and it is absolutely appropriate that it should review how it operates as it takes that on. I am very confident in our regulators, but I am also pleased to hear that the FCA is carrying out its review. Secondly, I would go right back to my point around the need for scrutiny and challenge in that space. That should involve not just the Joint Select Committee, but looking at the Treasury’s role.
May I revisit the question about how the UK can retain its voice in setting standards?
Ms Eagle
Q
Catherine McGuinness: I feel I missed a couple of points there. It is true that part of the way we will retain our global leadership in standard setting is by bilateral dialogue and co-operation, regulator to regulator, with other countries. There is also the question of how we work with the multilateral organisations. We need to take a good look at how we engage, on our new footing, with the Basel committee—how we engage with other global standard setters. We have a good story to tell. I think next year gives us a very good opportunity, as we take up the presidency of the G7 and with COP26 coming up. I have already mentioned our potential leadership on green standards. We should really look at next year as part of this new chapter for financial services, and look at how we can make clear our place in standard setting, and in that conversation around global standards.
Stella Creasy (Walthamstow) (Lab/Co-op)
Q
Emma Reynolds: There are measures in the Bill that do, as I understand it, reflect some of the measures that the EU has taken around prudential requirements. In the past, there has been a bit of a one-size-fits-all for different sizes of companies. For smaller companies that carry a smaller risk, you need to take a proportionate approach to regulation. That is by no means saying that we want lower standards, or a race to the bottom; it is about considering firms of different sizes and the risks that they bring.
Obviously, there are challenges every time there is a significant change such as this, and 1 January will look and feel very different, but there are some opportunities, too. For example, we will be in a position where the UK is making laws and regulations for one member state. I mentioned the fast-moving challenges coming up, involving socioeconomic changes to do with covid, FinTech and green finance; the UK will have more flexibility and agility, and so can perhaps act more quickly than before, or than the EU can, operating with 27 member states.
Catherine McGuinness: I think that is right. To add to what Emma has said, the Bill is very helpful in demonstrating the planned way forward. People will be looking for an ongoing commitment to high standards—and, yes, agility in how we make our rules, but also a rigor in that. We cannot stress often enough the importance of this country’s openness to welcoming trade and business, and to high standards, against our strong regulatory backdrop.
It is very welcome that the Treasury will be looking at the strong patchwork of the bases on which people can come into the UK and operate here—the overseas persons exemption and so on. The Treasury will look at how that whole framework can be knitted together in a more coherent manner, as I understand it. What people will be looking for is an ongoing commitment to high standards and the ability to do their business.
The Chair
Are there any further questions? In that case, I thank our two witnesses on this fifth panel. Emma and Catherine, thank you for your evidence.
Examination of Witnesses
Adam Farkas and Constance Underwood gave evidence.
The Chair
For this third afternoon evidence session—the sixth in total—we have Adam Farkas and Constance Underwood from the Association for Financial Markets in Europe. It is our first panel in person. We have until four o’clock for this session. Adam and Constance, do you want to start by introducing yourselves for the benefit of the Committee, and for the record?
Adam Farkas: Good afternoon. Thank you for inviting us both. We are delighted that we decided to come physically. We did not know what the other invitees would decide. I am Adam Farkas, CEO of the Association for Financial Markets in Europe. AFME is a pan-European trade group representing a broad array of European and global participants in the wholesale financial markets. Our members include banks headquartered in various jurisdictions, spanning from Japan to the United States, and inside and outside the EU. What they have in common is that they all do business in the UK and the EU. Our purpose is to serve as a link between capital markets, participants and policy makers across Europe.
My experience in the financial services sector spans over 30 years, covering both private and public sector bodies. Prior to joining AFME this February, I was executive director of the European Banking Authority for nine years, and before that, I acted as executive chairman of the Hungarian financial supervisory authority. In my capacity at the EBA, I also served on the Basel committee for eight and a half years. I should note that there are a few topics directly related to my prior position at the EBA that I am not permitted to address today because of my restrictions, but Constance will address those as appropriate.
Constance Usherwood: I am Constance Usherwood, director of prudential regulation at AFME. My experience also covers both public and private sectors. I also worked at the European Banking Authority some time ago, and have worked for a globally systemically important bank. I am very grateful for the invitation to be here with Adam today to give evidence. I hope that that is helpful to the panel.
John Glen
Q
Adam Farkas: I will try to answer the first part of the question, but then I will leave it to Constance. because this is one area where I was personally involved, and I am not allowed to comment.
On the first part of the question, it is beyond doubt, and everybody in the public and private sector recognises it, that the UK as part of the European Union was playing a leading role in shaping and forming financial services regulations in the Union. That is clearly evidenced by the leading role of London and the UK more broadly as the financial services centre or hub of the Union. That is beyond any doubt. It was respected as such, and had a very strong voice in shaping the different regulatory initiatives. For the future relationship, it is important to have engagement and openness, and that a co-operative attitude, or co-operative setting, is retained, with two autonomous decision-making jurisdictions, in which the two sides can co-ordinate, exchange views and possibly even influence each other’s new initiatives or the evolution of their respective regulatory frameworks, with the potential aim of maintaining as much consistency as possible and practicable. On the investment firms regime, I pass the floor to Constance, because I was part of the development of the standards at the EBA, so I must refrain from comment.
Constance Usherwood: With the investment firms prudential regime, the UK authorities have played a key role in the development of the prudential regime that is specifically targeted to the business models of investment firms and making sure that it is proportionate. In that respect, we fully support the approach that is being taken today. In terms of the application to the different prudential frameworks and of the regimes versus the CRR, the bulk of our membership will probably not be directly impacted by the regime due to their size and activities. That would also tally with the approach that the EU has taken.
John Glen
Q
Constance Usherwood: Yes, I would agree with that, absolutely.
John Glen
Q
Constance Usherwood: I am going to apologise, but I think that Adam is probably best placed to come in on this one.
Adam Farkas: We very strongly support the clear and oft-repeated message of the UK authorities that active transition by transaction parties to the new risk-free rate is the only way to achieve certainty of outcome in the transition. We have promoted this message regularly and we have developed market standard language to support it that can be used by investors to assist them in this process.
A very difficult part of the transition process relates to what happens to legacy contracts already in place that reference the old LIBOR rates that are being phased out. Within legacy contracts, there are the so-called tough legacy contracts, which are very difficult to repaper or change the reference in. They cause the most complex challenges for end users as well as for members of AFME or other financial services providers. We therefore very much welcome the provisions of the Financial Services Bill that give the FCA new powers to mitigate that risk by directing the administrator to change the methodology of LIBOR if doing so would protect the consumer and market integrity. That would enable the FCA to stabilise certain LIBOR rates during the wind-down period so that their limited use in legacy contracts can continue. The answer is yes, we are very supportive. None the less, we welcome the further clarity which, I think, will be forthcoming on 25 November from the FCA and the Treasury on what steps the authorities are planning to further this objective, because there are some outstanding questions that require clarification. I would be happy to go into them, but in the interests of time, I will stop there.
John Glen
Q
Adam Farkas: That is a difficult question to answer because we have not speculated on different outcomes, but certainly the path that the Bill is taking is something that we can very strongly support.
Mr McFadden
Q
Adam Farkas: Very briefly, equivalence determinations provide the major legal framework for different jurisdictions to provide access to service providers that are licensed and supervised in each other’s markets. To answer your question, if equivalence determinations by the EU are not forthcoming, or not brought forward at pace or with the width that is expected, that will put limitations on the access of service providers—financial services companies and firms—to the EU market. This is really an issue of market access.
Mr McFadden
Q
Adam Farkas: In very simple terms, if a company is licensed in the United Kingdom and does not have access, or loses access, to the EU—of course, that is completely free under passporting regimes—it will find limitations in serving clients or trading with counterparts in respect of the financial services that it provides in the other jurisdiction, which would be across the channel in this case. A lack of equivalence has been a risk throughout the process of the negotiations, so authorities have made significant efforts to prepare regulated entities—financial firms—and to force them to prepare for all eventualities. In other words, everyone is hoping for the best but preparing for the worst.
AFME members—of course, our membership is tilted towards the large players—have made extensive preparations over the years to get ready for the worst outcome, which would limit direct market access from the United Kingdom to the EU, by way of setting up entities, moving activities across the border and making all necessary arrangements to allow them to continue to serve their clients across the European market. Of course, if equivalence is granted and access is provided on that basis, it would improve the general situation of market access between the EU and the UK, so we welcome the Chancellor’s announcement and the UK Government’s determination last week to grant equivalence within a certain scope to third countries, including EU countries.
Mr McFadden
Q
Adam Farkas: With a lack of equivalence. If no market access is provided on another basis, the main mechanism is to establish entities that are licensed, capitalised and supervised in the other jurisdiction, meaning that that entity can have access to the market, but that involves costs and operational implications.
Mr McFadden
Q
Adam Farkas: It is a very difficult question. We all know the history of what happened. What is important is what happened afterwards and how the authorities decided to move away from the possibility of manipulating these rates. There is a global co-ordination effort and a long-standing global discussion on transitioning out of the old way of setting different financial benchmarks.
Regulations were put in place, changes to methodologies were put in place and public institutions took a stronger role to make sure that benchmarks are more robust and not prone to manipulation or potential distortions. I think, in that sense, this issue of reputation and the credibility of these benchmarks has been very strongly addressed by the authorities globally, and also in the UK by the authorities. I believe strongly that this will lead to a much sounder and more credible framework once the transition is completed.
Mr McFadden
Q
What is your view of what will happen on the EU side, absent a British influence, as financial services regulation inevitably evolves and develops? We no longer have one table, if you like. We have two tables—a British one and a European one. Does that mean, inevitably, that the two sets of regulations gradually spin off in different directions, or is that not the case?
Adam Farkas: Before I answer the bilateral question, I think that there are other forms of international co-ordination of financial services policy. One is multilateral in the form of the FSB, IOSCO—that is on market rules—and the Basel committee, which deals with prudential rules. Both the EU and the UK are significant players and participants in this global co-ordination. In the interest of having open, transparent, and well-functioning financial markets and maintaining international flow in capital movement, allowing both banks and corporates to manage their risks cross-border, these multilateral engagements are extremely important. They actually provide a very good platform to co-ordinate the major direction of financial regulation globally.
Now, the bilateral co-ordination will change, because it will take the form of the so-called bilateral regulatory dialogue—or whatever similar term the EU uses—with third countries, which provide a platform. Inevitably, if two jurisdictions take a separate course in legislation, there will be some divergence between the rules. What is very important is that if that happens, it is transparent to this multilateral setting as well as in the bilateral context; it is well-explained and co-ordinated as much as possible; and it is only done if there is a real justification for it.
Mr McFadden
Thank you. Constance, do you want to add anything?
Constance Usherwood: I would add that in the context of the Basel framework, that does allow for some adjustments or tailoring for jurisdictions when it comes to implementing that in law. That is certainly something that we would expect the PRA to look at, going forward—such things as mortgages and trade finance. There are little aspects of the Basel framework that already allow for some consideration of how that is best tailored to the market in which it is being implemented.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Adam Farkas: The Bill provides the possibility to achieve those recommendations. It provides the framework for future UK financial regulation. It provides the possibility, delegated to the respective regulatory authorities, to shape the UK’s financial regulation. However, if it is going to be a transparent process, as it is expected to be under the Bill, that opens up the possibility of retaining co-ordination with the EU in a new setting. The Bill sets the foundation to meet the policy recommendations that we put forward, but it does not guarantee it.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Adam Farkas: Yes.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Adam Farkas: I am probably not qualified to answer that. I am allowed, but I am probably not qualified. I think the FCA, as an authority, has been playing a leading role globally in the whole transition process and the whole global co-ordination process. The Bill’s intention to give a strong role for the FCA in defining the last steps of what happens with the legacy contracts and with LIBOR as a benchmark is pointing in the right direction, but I will not go further than that.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Adam Farkas: That is probably a legal question.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Constance Usherwood: The Basel 3.1 aspect, in particular, is about ensuring that banks hold capital commensurate with the risks that they take. As such, the Basel framework that it seeks to emulate in UK law does not consider climate risk as a risk. That is not to say that that work is not under way in international forums. The Network for Greening the Financial System is certainly looking at how to incorporate climate risk—or whether it can be incorporated—into prudential regulation. It is at a very nascent stage. I think the work that the PRA is doing in that forum is very positive, as well as such things as climate risk stress testing.
That is something that the PRA might want to open the door to later, once it is more considered and technically advanced. Certainly, the sustainable lending aspect is an important mandate that it has to look at. We remain interested in how it develops that mandate in its consideration of the rules.
Angela Richardson (Guildford) (Con)
Q
Adam Farkas: Answering the first question involves a bit of speculation into the future. Given the importance of the City of London as a global financial centre, and given the weight and experience of UK authorities in global standard-setting bodies, I would be inclined to confirm that yes, the United Kingdom is expected to remain a strong voice in multilateral standard-setting bodies and in multilateral discussions on financial stability, as well as in micro-financial regulation, markets, insurance and prudential banking regulation.
There is probably no conclusive answer to your second question, but the Bill certainly opens up the possibility of creating a framework within the United Kingdom that will delegate a lot of rule-making powers to the respective authorities—the PRA and the FCA. It will provide a well-defined, clear and transparent framework, and it will also define an accountability regime with that framework. In my view, that will establish the possibility—subject to the detailed rules that will then be adopted—that financial regulation as a whole will continue to ensure financial stability in a global financial centre.
Gareth Davies
Q
Adam Farkas: I do not know. What I can say is that the equivalence determination process consists of two stages. One is a technical assessment that involves a detailed assessment of the rule book for the set of regulations, with questions and interactions. In every jurisdiction there is a second stage, which is the determination itself after the technical assessment. That stage is a much more political decision, or is a decision of a more political nature; it considers other aspects in addition to the interests of the jurisdiction making the determination. The answer probably lies there, but I have no information on why equivalence decisions have not yet been made on the EU side. It is not true to say that no equivalence decisions have been made; some have been determined and published, even if on a temporary basis.
Gareth Davies
Q
Adam Farkas: I do not think I would like to express a view. One point of correction I would make is that there is no such thing as overall equivalence; unfortunately, the equivalence decisions are very technical and made bit by bit. There are equivalence provisions in different parts of the EU legislation, and there are equivalence decisions possible in parts of the UK legislation. Looking at the announcements from the Chancellor, it is very specific and is focused on certain activities or institutions that are deemed equivalent to the domestic regime. There is no overall equivalence, and there will probably not be.
On the Swiss equivalence case, I will refrain from commenting, if you will allow that.
The Chair
We have until 4 o’clock for the entire session, so you can ask a quick question.
Gareth Davies
Q
Adam Farkas: As an association, we are very strongly advocating the openness of markets, both in the United Kingdom and in the EU. We are very strongly advocating maintaining the co-ordination of dialogue and the consistent implementation of global standards. Of course, it is very difficult to speculate which way the EU will go. What I can say is that our members have a very clear view on this issue, and we are—
The Chair
Adam, can you please speak into the microphone? For the recording, you need to be in the right place.
Adam Farkas: Yes, of course.
Our position on this issue is very clear, and we have been open and transparent about our members’ position on arguing for market openness, maintaining consistency and, on the basis of constituency, maximum market access and flow of capital and services between the UK and the EU.
The Chair
Constance, do you have anything to add?
Constance Usherwood: Generally, we hope that the EU and the UK will establish a close, co-operative and stable long-term relationship for financial services, and it is very important to underline that that should be the long-term goal. I think the Bill leaves the door open for doing that.
Julie Marson (Hertford and Stortford) (Con)
Q
Constance Usherwood: It is very clear that the UK Government’s intention is that the UK should maintain high, consistent and global standards. From my knowledge of interaction with the PRA, it is committed to doing that. That was also made clear last week by Sam Woods in his Mansion House speech—it is not about a race to the bottom. In so far as a jurisdiction maintains a predictable, open and transparent rule-making process—we expect the PRA to do that with consultation processes—and operates a high, globally consistent standard, that is a really good competitive base from which global banks can operate out of.
Ms Eagle
Q
Adam Farkas: Given that it is providing a framework for the future regulatory architecture in financial services, I am not suggesting that these are missing, but I will list what is important for the industry: that the framework is predictable—that is key for the players—that the framework provides transparency, so that when the rule making is happening under the Bill, the process is transparent; that it is possible for the industry to engage, so when different rules or pieces of the rules are consulted on, there is sufficient accountability provided, but that is not for us to decide on; and that sufficient time is provided for implementation—that is always a critical issue for the industry.
I think that what is proposed in the Bill goes very far on all those points. In that sense, it is difficult to give a definite answer of what else would need to be in the Bill. Those are the points that we are looking at with great interest in relation to the final adoption of the Bill.
Ms Eagle
Q
Adam Farkas: I agree that this is an issue that will need to be addressed. There is a question as to whether it needs to be addressed in this particular Bill or in the context of the future rule making by the FCA, but the points raised are valid ones and we also agree with them.
Ms Eagle
Q
Constance Usherwood: Yes, I think we support it. One thing that I would note is that there are a lot of rules to implement; the Basel III framework that is going into this part of the Bill is over 160 pages long, so there is a lot of technical detail that will need to be considered. We hope that the full impact assessment is therefore done on that basis for the UK banking sector, and also that the consultation process allows the industry to have a meaningful input. I notice that there have been a couple of smaller consultations done recently by the PRA that have only required a month or two months for consultation, and certainly that is something we hope will be fully considered when they put the rules before industry.
Ms Eagle
Q
Constance Usherwood: Yes, I think that is probably the best way forward and I agree with the approach that has been taken. The other alternative is that it would all have to come before you and you would have to look at all these pages. I think that the regulatory authorities are best placed, and the most technically capable of really assessing it, and doing the impact assessment that will ensure that it is tailored to the UK banking sector.
Ms Eagle
Q
Constance Usherwood: Usually we would expect the impact assessment to be done before the rules are formalised, but it is a fluid process and I would not be certain what the PRA has in mind. We imagine it would take place at some stage prior to any finalisation of the rules.
Adam Farkas: Normally when detailed rules are produced there is some sort of obligation on the authority to provide an impact assessment with it, on the basis of the draft rules. Then, typically, there is a consultation, so opinions are sought from different stakeholders, and then the rules are finalised. The impact assessment is clearly a key feature of financial services rule making, at EU level and at national level. It is part of the broader accountability, which is very important.
The Chair
If there are no further questions, I thank our two witnesses for their evidence.
Examination of Witness
Gurpreet Manku gave evidence.
The Chair
Q
Gurpreet Manku: I am Gurpreet Manku, the deputy director general and director of policy at the British Private Equity and Venture Capital Association. The BVCA represents more than 300 private equity and venture capital firms in the UK, ranging from the smallest venture firms investing in start-ups, all the way through to growth-capital and mid-market firms investing domestically. We also have a number of larger pan-European and global fund managers.
The Chair
Thank you very much. We are going to follow the time-honoured tradition of going first to the Government, then to the Opposition, and then to other members of the Committee. We will start with the Minister, John Glen.
John Glen
Q
Gurpreet Manku: We welcome the Financial Services Bill as it implements a prudential regime for investment firms that is tailored to the specificities of the UK market while maintaining world-class regulatory standards. To give you some context, the UK has already regulated private equity and venture capital firms. Broadly, there are two categories. First, we regulate the managers of private equity and venture capital funds. Those entities are regulated under the alternative investment fund managers directive. We also regulate advisory entities under MiFID. Those firms will be most impacted by the investment firms prudential regime. These advisory firms advise on and arrange private equity transactions for other regulated fund managers, sometimes within the same group. Those other managers tend to be based overseas, including in the US, Asia and Europe.
That is important because the fact that the UK has a lot of those advisory entities signifies that the UK is a global hub for private equity and venture capital. Many international firms choose to make the UK a base for carrying out UK, European and, in some cases, international investment and fund-raising activity. Since the inception of the investment firms review, the BVCA has been in dialogue with both the FCA and the Treasury about its implementation.
We welcome the introduction of a tailored regime that appropriately covers the activities of these firms, as well as their size, and the relative risk they pose to the financial system when compared with other banks and financial institutions. The new regime will lead to additional requirements for some of those firms, particularly the advisory entities that I mentioned, including higher capital requirements. We submitted feedback to a recent FCA discussion paper on the need to calibrate these new requirements for the risk posed by those firms. Our key ask for the FCA and the Treasury is that an appropriate transition period is available to those advisories.
Interestingly, the FCA’s discussion paper acknowledges that while there are transition provisions in place for other categories of investment firms, there is a gap for the category that includes these private equity advisers. That FCA category in the UK is known as exempt CAD—capital adequacy directive—firms. That is not just an issue for private equity and venture capital firms. There are many other types of firms in this category. My understanding is that they tend to be smaller financial services firms, such as corporate finance advisory boutiques and other consultants. That reflects the UK market, which has a huge number of financial services firms at the smaller end.
We think that the omission of this transitional period in the EU text was not deliberate and was just a mistake. The category of advisers that we are referring to should also have a transition period. The benefit of the Financial Services Bill is that it will enable the FCA to correct this omission and ensure that all types of investment firms benefit from transition rules.
Finally, I welcome the confirmation that the target implementation date is January 2022, because I think that will give sufficient time for the FCA to consult on the detailed rules and we need that lengthy consultation period. It will also give firms the time that they need to implement them.
John Glen
Q
Gurpreet Manku: Interestingly, we have been speaking to the FCA about this since 2016. The need for a special investment firms prudential regime emanated out of discussions in the UK, because there was a recognition that regulatory requirements that apply to banks do not necessarily work in an investment firms context.
The FCA does understand the breadth and variety of firms that operate in the UK. The confirmation that there will be a bit more time to think through how the detailed rules will operate in practice is really welcome. If I had one ask, it would have been for more time to look at the details of what would follow.
Mr McFadden
Q
Gurpreet Manku: No, actually they will be holding more. The bulk of the members most affected are in that category known as exempt CAD. It is an odd category that exists in UK legislation. At the moment, that broad category of firms is required to hold a level of capital set at €50,000. Under the new regime, the calculation methodology will change to a quarter of their fixed annual overheads. For many firms, that will lead to an increase in capital requirements, which is why I referenced the need for a transitional period. A few years ago, we recognised that this was coming, and the transitionals were always going to be a feature of this regulation. In terms of what it means in practice, for some firms, there would have been a fixed requirement of €50,000, and that will move to several million pounds; for others, it might not be much of a jump. There is a wide variety of firms out there in the UK market. Those that might not be in my constituency could also be significantly affected.
Mr McFadden
Q
Gurpreet Manku: What I have seen in recent years is that other jurisdictions have tried to emulate what we have here. That is because the UK has always been an attractive jurisdiction, because of its highly regarded legal and regulatory framework, as well as the quality and depth of the financial and broader professional services ecosystem. In practice, that means that global institutional capital can be raised from here. So when it comes to the onshoring and the development of regulation in the future, we would be looking for continued high standards, but clear and effective regulation.
Mr McFadden
Q
Gurpreet Manku: Sorry, I had not thought about that for this session. Interestingly, one of the regulations that probably caused the most concern was referred to earlier—the PRIIPs regulation. Most of our members will market to professional institutional investors rather than to retail ones, but where that particular regulation is relevant, it has led to information that many have felt is misleading. Seeing that changed and the changes being introduced in the Bill is welcome.
The investment firms regime is probably one of the biggest changes to come—we are implementing that now. If we are looking ahead a few years, we want to look at how the alternative investment fund managers directive changes. The way it was implemented in the UK historically—through the work that our authorities and regulators have done—has meant that it was implemented in a proportionate and sensible way. We want that to continue.
Mr McFadden
Q
Gurpreet Manku: Throughout the past few years, we have continued to work with both the Treasury and the regulators. Given the body of legislation that has come to the UK’s shores and the work that we have done historically, it makes sense for the policy-making and rule-setting process to sit within the regulator, and there is an appropriate accountability framework around it.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Gurpreet Manku: I think that what will be important to see over the next year and in future is sufficient time for consultation, because that leads to further transparency. The documents that the FCA publishes are generally quite good and detailed, but I have seen some cases in recent years, and not just domestically, where there were very short windows to respond to quite technical consultations. Ensuring that there is sufficient time to review and digest any changes and to sit down and speak to the regulator about them will be helpful, and will also support the transparency objectives.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Gurpreet Manku: A typical consultation process is usually three months, which is usually enough time for us to gather the feedback from our members, whether they are large or small firms, and turn it into an industry-wide submission.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Gurpreet Manku: Yes, I believe it does, because robust regulatory standards and a clear and stable legal and tax framework attract global investors. While I recognise that there are concerns about Brexit, over recent years we have seen the continued ability of our members here to raise international capital and invest it.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Gurpreet Manku: Equivalence is important for us as well. I agree with all the feedback that has been provided to you throughout the day; I have been listening in on some of the sessions. Our members are prepared for all eventualities, which in practice means looking at setting up additional structures and obtaining additional licences in Europe to cover a period where equivalence decisions might not be available. Thinking about institutional fundraising more broadly, there are other ways to access EU investors, and some firms will have been looking at those routes in the absence of equivalence.
The Chair
If there are no further questions from Members, let me thank Gurpreet—who did a panel all on her own, remotely—for her evidence.
Examination of Witness
Peter Tutton gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now move on to our final panel of the afternoon. It is another one-man virtual panel, with Peter Tutton from StepChange joining us remotely. We have until 5 o’clock, when we must adjourn. Peter, could you introduce yourself for the record and for the members of the Committee?
Peter Tutton: Good afternoon, everyone, and thanks for inviting me. My name is Peter Tutton; I am head of policy at StepChange Debt Charity.
John Glen
Q
Peter Tutton: That is a good question. We are delighted that the two new debt schemes are going forward. We think that they will be a very important help for people who are struggling. What we think they will do is partly driven by our experience of being a deliverer of the debt advice scheme in Scotland. From when we have spoken to our clients, we know that the protections that both the breathing space scheme and the statutory debt repayment plan will offer––a sort of guarantee that if you keep up with your payments you will have protection from your debt spiralling, from collections activity, with people asking you to pay money that you cannot afford, and the threat of enforcement action––deal with the things that frighten people and make them stressed and anxious. They damage people’s health and lead them to do things like borrowing more to cope with unaffordable demands. The lack of a guarantee of forbearance can really impede people’s recovery from debt and financial difficulty.
We are very pleased: those protections have existed in England and Wales for insolvency solutions for some time but not for people who are able to repay their debts. Very often, clients will come to us after an income shock. As we sit here now, people are losing their jobs, having income reductions or falling ill. Their income will drop significantly for a time, but then it takes time for them to recover and get back on track. In those cases, these kind of schemes, first the breathing space scheme to help people to get advice and then the statutory debt repayment plan to help people pay their debts off within that safe space, will be really important in helping people. A lot of the fine detail about how they will work has still to be worked out. It will be important to ensure that they are accessible and that they fit together.
One thing we are interested in is when someone gets to the end of their breathing space scheme. If someone is still recovering, as we call it, from their financial difficulties, will they be able to go into the statutory debt repayment plan, where it may not be apparent that they can pay their debts within their long-stop period at that point, but where we have good reason to believe that their income will recover and that they have a good chance of getting back into work? It would be useful if the two schemes aligned so that people do not, first, get protection, then fall out of protection and only come back into it later. There could be a position where creditors could all pile in to take enforcement action or debts could begin to grow again. That is one of the things where we are keen to see the detail to ensure that the two schemes align and that we can move people from one to the other, with a long-stop on “How long is a reasonable period to repay their debts?” but one that is not worked out very strictly at the beginning while people’s circumstances are still fluid.
There is lots of fine detail to work out. We are going through the process at the moment with the Insolvency Service creditors and debt advice. Agencies are working out the detail of how the scheme will work in practice. What is important for both schemes is that we as debt advisers need to be able to administer them without significant extra cost. We might come to that later. With breathing space, there is no direct funding so the cost situation is very important. If it is very burdensome for us to deliver, it may be hard to do. We then need to do some work still with the creditors to make sure that everyone is getting the information that they need to get protection quickly to people who need it. There is a bit more work to be done there. Likewise, with regard to the way in which the statutory debt repayment will work, there are practical details such as how people will go into the scheme; how the “fair and reasonable” test will work—there is a need to make sure that it is not too cumbersome, and that it is effective and cannot delay protection unduly—and ensuring that creditors do not abuse the right to object, although they must have that right, in a way that can slow the whole scheme down. These are the sorts of things we will need to work out.
John Glen
Q
Peter Tutton: I think this is a necessary measure. We should cast our minds back to the child trust fund. In some ways that was similar, as it was a way of encouraging people to build up savings, although in that case the savings were for their children. As you may remember, one aspect of the child trust fund is that people got a voucher and then had to put it somewhere. A huge number of those vouchers ended up in default. We know that, especially among people who are less experienced in using financial services and in lower income households, it can be quite daunting when a choice has to be made between a number of different savings products that they do not really understand, and when they do not really know the difference.
That can create inertia. It makes a great deal of sense to give a safe way of moving people automatically into a successor product so that we do not have that problem of trying to contact them to get them to make a decision. The clause is worded so as still to allow people to make their own decision, which is quite right, and having safeguards seems sensible. We are big supporters of the Help-to-Save scheme, which is a cracking scheme. Our own research shows that having a pot of precautionary savings can significantly reduce people’s chances of falling into debt. If I had one criticism—
John Glen
I agree with that. We are trying to do what we can to improve awareness and get people to use small amounts; I think they can put by up to £1 or £2 minimum.
Peter Tutton: But it is a good scheme, and it is sensible to allow people who have saved into the scheme to put their savings somewhere else. They can make a choice if they want to, but we know that some of the people whom the scheme is designed to attract may struggle to choose between superficially similar financial service providers and get stuck in the middle. This makes sense.
Mr McFadden
Q
Peter Tutton: In an ideal world, we would like the breathing space period to be longer. We can understand why it has been set up as it has. It is very good that it includes, for instance, Government debt; it is a new thing that people will have protection from Government and local government debt; things like council tax are a very big problem for our clients. We can see that the Government may be nervous about a longer scheme. Perhaps if there was a way of looking again soon, once we are satisfied that it works okay, we could give that breathing space a bit more time. There are two things that the breathing space can do. There is what it does at the moment, which is largely about allowing people to get advice and get into a debt solution, but there is also time during which people need to recover.
As I said earlier, when people come to us they are often still in quite a degree of difficulty and their circumstances have not resolved themselves. We cannot always instantly put them into a stable long-term solution. One of the things that might help that would be a longer period of breathing space while they are recovering. In lots of cases, there is an obvious solution to put people into; if their circumstances are not going to improve and debt relief is the right solution, we will put them into that. We may be able to deal with that by articulating the statutory debt repayment plan and the breathing space such that there is a gap in the middle. Ideally, a longer period would be good. There may be a way of effecting that just by making sure those two things align, so that people whose circumstances are still recovering—they come to us and have a very small amount of money, but we believe that they will back into work, and for a lot of our clients that is what happens—can keep that protection going through until their circumstances improve and they can get back on the track of repaying their debts. That would be the one thing, instantly, that we would think about changing.
Another thing is that in the Treasury policy statement, including this legislation, there is a provision for funding the statutory debt repayment plan. The Treasury policy statement talks about that funding for debt advice providers being around 9% if you distribute funds as well. That is something that may need to be looked at again—not a lot, but a bit. That 9% is a bit less than the funding that we currently get from what is called fair share funding, which is [Inaudible] funding we get for helping clients with debt management plans. That funding actually allows us to do a lot of things.
One of the things that we are not yet sure about and are not able to model is what the additional costs of the statutory debt repayment plan will be. For instance, there is a provision in there for creditors to have a vote as a safeguard before a plan can be accepted. If we have to administer that vote in some way, for instance, it would mean an extra cost. There are some bits and pieces around that that may need looking at a bit more once the precise details of the debt repayment plan scheme are better understood.
Mr McFadden
Q
Peter Tutton: That is a really good question. I agree that that is what we are seeing—we put a report out last week. We see a growing number of households struggling because of covid—those who have lost their jobs. Furlough may be picking up 80% of their wages, but if you are on low pay, that is a big jump and a big cut can put people into difficulty.
You are absolutely right: this is growing. In an ideal world, it would be great if we had those breathing space protections tomorrow so that people had a safe place to go and we could start getting them back on the road towards control of their finances and stopping their debts growing. For practical reasons, I do not think that it will be possible to put that in place tomorrow. For the scheme to work and for us to be able to do it at the scale that we think it would need, it needs to work as an online remedy.
It also needs to work for advisers, to make sure that where we capture information or when someone inputs information into our online system debt help tools, for example, we do not then have to copy that again into the Insolvency Services portal, which is incredibly expensive. That is something that happens with DROs and can be very expensive. The software and APIs need to be developed so that there is a seamless process and the cost is minimised for the scale that we need to get people into this. I do not think it is possible to do that or for us, as debt advice providers, to be organised to do it on the scale that we would need to, much before the implementation date.
Bringing the scheme forward, for practical, implementation and software reasons—all that kind of stuff—is going to be hard, but I think there are things that the Government can do, in the areas that we are really worried about at the moment, to bring forward the protections, if not the breathing space scheme. One of the things that our polling estimates, and other people have said the same thing, is that a large number of people have fallen into rent arrears. Those people [Inaudible] in the private rented sector have relatively little protection against eviction for rent arrears. There are longer notice periods, but that will start unfolding quite soon—it probably already is—so are there protections? Similarly with council tax, there are people falling behind who may be subject to enforcement by bailiffs, which we know can be intimidating and expensive and can make people’s problems worse.
It seems to me that the Government and Parliament supported breathing space. There was cross-party support for the idea that people in financial difficulty need protection from unaffordable collections and enforcement that make their problems worse, so I think there is something the Government can do. That may not be through the breathing space scheme itself now, but it is in the spirit of those protections, particularly for key debts: things like rent arrears and council tax, and maybe other types of debt enforcement that will have lasting, harmful consequences if they are not addressed. That is something that the Government should be looking at now, to make sure that in the coming months people are not worrying more and more about what will happen to their house if their incomes do not recover, or worrying about a bailiff for council tax. Those are things that can be done by Government without the whole breathing space scheme, so I agree: with covid, there is a pressing need to look at the different things that Government may be able to do to help people through this period. Otherwise, we are likely to see some of those harsh enforcement actions starting to happen, and people experiencing harm because of covid. No one really wants to see that.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Peter Tutton: That is a very good question, and I am not sure I have a complete answer for you off the top of my head. First, the Government have some communications routes: those eligible for help to save are effectively those people who are in receipt of universal credit and tax credits, so these are people whom Government can identify and should be communicating with anyway.
To a certain extent, the thing about the transition is that because it is automatic, it is about ensuring that people know where their money is. I do not have an answer straight away when it comes to the best way of doing that. We know that it can be difficult to communicate and get people to engage. It is one of these things where we need a trial wording approach, communicating, and making sure that that communication is very clear that this is something that is happening to your benefit: “Here it is, and here is how you can get at it.” At the same time, there need to be more comms, perhaps to recipients of universal credit—the numbers of whom have grown quite a lot recently, as you will know—about the fact that this scheme is available to help them, and that if they put some money into it now they will get a bonus, which they may be able to use quite soon to deal with their difficulties. Those are the two things that spring to mind immediately.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Peter Tutton: I think that is a good idea. There is a maximum amount of savings, so if you can afford to save the full £50 a month, you will get the full bonus. If you are only able to save £20 a month, you will not, but if you allow the £20 savers to save for longer, they would get more of a bonus. There is definitely an argument there to say, “If we want people to build up a precautionary savings pot, we should give those who have started saving the best opportunity to build that savings pot where possible, albeit by leaving the accounts open a bit longer within the scheme.” That sounds sensible.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Peter Tutton: Yes, we are supporters of a duty of care as well: we have spoken with Macmillan about this, and we can see the point. It is an interesting one to attach to the Bill. The FCA said that it is due to reply to a consultation on a duty of care. That response probably will not come until Q1 next year, so it has been a bit delayed. That is a bit unfortunate, because if there is a need to legislate or it concludes that there is a need to legislate, the opportunity of doing so through this Bill will have passed.
We agree that there is a need for a duty of care. There has been a succession of problems over the years with financial services. The FCA does a good job: it does rules, and it is getting on top of some of the wide-ranging historical problems we have seen, from unauthorised overdraft charges to payday lending, other bits of high-cost credit, aggressive collections, and a whole range of things in my areas of interest. It is starting to get on top of these.
We think the measure could still be clearer. We think a duty of care, or at least being specifically required by a rule-making power to think about a duty of care and what that means, and empowering the FCA to make rules would be helpful. We have a particular take on duty of care. There are lots of definitions of it. One thing that we see is the idea of having regard to consumer protection. A duty of care could also help better define the consumer protection definition.
We still see too many cases where people who are vulnerable or face constraint choices because of lower incomes and are forced to use credit and things like that or because of behavioural biases built into products. People are in a situation where effectively there are firms exploiting those circumstances. This is the sort of thing that we think a duty of care could deal with. We need a more explicit statement in the legislation about the way firms need to understand the measure. In vulnerability guidance, we would make that more explicit and biting on the way firms have to think about their products and services, and making sure that they do not have the effect of exploiting vulnerable consumers.
We are not quite there yet with financial services, because these problems keep happening. It would sharpen that up and give a better line between what is regulatory policy and what is social policy. We would start to be able to have a better debate about when it is reasonable for someone on a low income to be on credit, the sorts of credit they may be offered that make their debt problems worse and why that is happening . That may help to stop that happening. For lots of reasons, we are supportive of the idea of a duty of care. It would sharpen the focus on vulnerability. It would sharpen the focus on the kind of detriment that people face when they are using financial circumstances as a sort of distressed purchase. For us, the measure is a good thing and something we would like the FCA to take forward.
Andrew Jones (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (Con)
Q
Peter Tutton: We spend quite a lot of time looking at the experience of our clients, and we survey our clients and poll them to see what has happened to them. When we were looking, back in the day, at breathing space we were trying to understand what brought our clients to advice and what helped them to recover. What we found was that our clients often had multiple creditors. On average, they would have about five or six. Typically, we find that some creditors, even most, will be very good, but it only takes one creditor to defect from good practice and to push for more money to destabilise people’s financial situation and restart the process of juggling bills and borrowing more to deal with a particularly aggressive, unaffordable payment demand.
There was a very strong message from clients that that impeded their ability to recover. At the same time, we spoke to our clients who were in the debt arrangement scheme in Scotland, and we got a very clear message from them that that kind of guarantee—the statutory framework that the debt arrangement scheme in Scotland gave them—reduced their anxiety and gave them a really good, strong and solid platform for recovery. They knew that if they paid what they could afford to pay and kept doing that, nothing else bad would happen to them in terms of unaffordable demands and escalating enforcement.
In that sense, we have known for a long time that people need protection from their creditors in certain circumstances. Both the experiences of clients who do not have that protection in England and Wales outside of insolvency and the experiences of clients who do have it in Scotland persuaded us that what has become breathing space in the statutory debt repayment plan was a necessary additional protection that we did not have at the time.
Andrew Jones
Q
Peter Tutton: Yes, I will dig some out.
Stella Creasy
Q
With the debt repayment schemes, I think all of us recognise that the breathing space is a very positive development. First and foremost, I want to ask for your view on the midway review element. Do you have any thoughts on what impact that might have as currently drafted?
Peter Tutton: It is a good question. We were very concerned initially about the midway point, simply because it could be very expensive and hard to administer the debt advice. The provision is now not quite as onerous, so we are not having to do full outbound calls and things like that. We are now reasonably comfortable with it as something that is a touching point, where clients touch in with us to ensure that they are still engaged with the process. That is something we do anyway. If someone has come for advice and there is a recommendation that the next step of a particular debt solution requires them to do further things for us to help them, we will follow up and keep in contact with them to ensure that they do not drop out of the process and that they have some help. The initial relief of having spoken to someone about it can lead people to think, “Well, I’ve got that out that way,” whereas it is important to keep going and get people into the debt solution.
There is some element of the midway review that is not dissimilar from the kinds of things that we would do anyway. The important thing is that the way it is done in practice should not become an onerous burden that does not really have any practical use to it. I think we are sort of there. We are talking to the Insolvency Service about the guidance and the way it will work. I think we will get to a place that we can live with. My operational colleagues who are implementing this are not saying it is unworkable at the moment, so we are reasonably comfortable with it, but time will tell. [Inaudible.] If, six months in, it turns out to have been really onerous with no practical effect, that is something we would ask the Treasury to come back and look at again.
Stella Creasy
Q
Peter Tutton: That is a good question. Our starting point here is that we would end the breathing space scheme as soon as it is no longer needed. At the moment, people come to us in a variety of different situations, and a number of different debt solutions are appropriate for them. If the most appropriate solution for them is a debt relief order, which is a type of insolvency for people with very low incomes or with disposable incomes and no assets, and they want to do it, we would put them into that as quickly as we can. If that can be done—sometimes it can, and sometimes it cannot—before the breathing space period ends, the breathing space will end.
There is actually a provision in the Bill that means that if you are in a debt solution before the review, it will end. It certainly is not a case of putting people in breathing space until it comes to the end of its 60 days, and then putting them in a solution. We will always try to get people into the right solution as quickly as they can. The other end of your question is that there might sometimes be cases whereby there is a debt solution but, for whatever reason, it takes a bit longer to get them into it. In exceptional circumstances, there might be a case to extend the breathing space, if for some reason it takes us longer to get someone into a DRO or something like that.
There is another question about this. One of the problems with debt relief solutions at the moment—debt relief orders and bankruptcy in particular—is that they have fees. These people are so poor and their debts are so big that they need to go into insolvency, but they have to find a fee, and the fee is hundreds of pounds for bankruptcy. Very few of our clients could afford that; they would have to save up for a year or two years to meet the fee.
There is a bit here that Government will need to think about, in relation to breathing space, if someone has come for advice and we have given them protection and worked out that the best thing for them is bankruptcy, but it will take them ages to find the fee to actually go bankrupt. They will fall out of that statutory protection, as it were, back into the mosh pit before they can get their protection in bankruptcy.
So you raise a really good question. There are two ends to it. One bit is that we would not keep people in longer than we needed to; that is a case of getting them into the debt solution they need. But there may be other people who will not be able to progress to the right debt solution for them, for a variety of reasons, before the breathing space runs out. That is something that Government may look at. Perhaps we need to build some evidence of that problem as we go along, but it would be good to do a quick review to see whether there are circumstances where the period needs to be extended or, indeed, whether elsewhere in Government we need to look at things like the barriers to accessing debt relief that mean it is not a good option, either because of the cost of getting into it or because it is still quite a stigmatising process and puts people off. There is another need, elsewhere in Government, to look at how the whole debt relief thing is working.
Stella Creasy
Q
Peter Tutton: The particular issue with the insolvency schemes for England and Wales—well, one of the issues—is the application fee. That is a point that is slightly different from the threshold; that is an issue about people having to find money to pay for those solutions.
Stella Creasy
Q
Peter Tutton: It makes some sense to look at this, because a debt relief order is so much cheaper than bankruptcy. Debt relief orders have a restriction on debt size and, as you say, a restriction on disposable income, both of which are to safeguard the creditors, because the Insolvency Service will not do a full investigation. The idea is that it is the people who have really got no money, no assets, and so if we let them into insolvency without an investigation, there is nothing squirreled away that otherwise would benefit creditors.
DROs have been running for many years now, and I think you are right: it is time to look at whether we could have an easier route into them rather than bankruptcy, which might mean lifting the disposable income threshold a bit or the debt threshold a bit, or both. There is now a bunch of people for whom we would be advising bankruptcy who are never going to get into bankruptcy because they cannot afford it, and often it is the debt size as well.
I think it is the right time for the Government to do this. Given what we might see after the fallout from covid of more households, more people, facing financial difficulty, it is a good time to review how these debt solutions work at the moment and to see what can be done to increase accessibility for those who need that help.
Stella Creasy
Q
The Chair
Order. Can we be a little briefer? We are slightly straying from the scope of the Bill. A very quick answer, please, Peter Tutton.
Peter Tutton: That is a good point. There are things we can do. There are a number of interventions, from lending rules to product features and price. Also, on the relationship between who is using high-cost credit, there is a social policy point here. Is there more to be done to give people affordable alternatives, so that they do not have to go to those products? It would be good to talk more about all of that, because it is absolutely key.
We estimate that survival borrowing under covid—people having to borrow to make ends meet—is up to about £6 billion. There is a big pile of debt building there, which people will not be able to afford to pay down. Some action now to give them an alternative and think about how to deal with that debt is timely and important. We should try to do something now before it gets much bigger.
The Chair
If there are no further questions, let me thank Peter Tutton. A few times we thought that your technology would fail us, but we got through, so thank you. I thank all our witnesses from our eight evidence sessions today. That brings us to the end of the oral evidence for today. The Committee will meet again in the same room at 11.30 am on Thursday.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(David Rutley.)
Financial Services Bill (Third sitting)
Thursday 19th November 2020
(4 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Financial Services Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 19 November 2020 - (19 Nov 2020)
The Chair
We will now hear from Susan Hawley, from Spotlight on Corruption, who is joining us remotely. I remind colleagues that we have until 12.15 pm for this session. Sue, please could you introduce yourself for the record?
Dr Hawley: Hello. I am Susan Hawley, executive director of Spotlight on Corruption. We are an anti-corruption charity that monitors the UK’s enforcement of its anti-corruption and economic crime laws.
Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)
Q
Dr Hawley: Than you, Pat. We very much focus on, and our expertise is on, the potential of the Bill to bring the UK into greater equivalence with the EU on money laundering and to ensure high standards of corporate governance in the financial services sector. Overall, we support some of the points made by our colleagues, which I think you might be hearing later today—from Jesse Griffiths of the Finance Innovation Lab, for example—around ensuring that there really is strong parliamentary accountability for regulatory changes.
Mr McFadden
Q
Dr Hawley: Absolutely. We really welcome this opportunity, and many thanks for inviting us to give evidence to the Committee. We want to make the case for the urgent introduction, through the Bill, of a “failure to prevent economic crime” corporate offence. We think that could fit in the “Insider dealing and money laundering etc” part of the Bill. We want it to focus particularly on the areas of fraud, money laundering and false accounting.
Just to explain the problem we think needs addressing, fundamentally at the moment, particularly after the judgment in the Barclays case, which was the only prosecution for financial crime following the last financial crisis, there is increasing legal commentary that large financial institutions are beyond the reach of prosecutors for certain economic crimes. Legal attempts to resolve this have failed—in fact, the Barclays judgment has now made it even more difficult for prosecutors to prosecute large financial institutions—and only action by Parliament can change that.
If I may, I will say a little about the reasons why this amendment is needed. We outline in our evidence four broad areas that we think the amendment would resolve. One of them is about the protection of market integrity. The real issue is whether the current state of the law, particularly after Barclays, promotes strong enough corporate governance and deters corporate wrongdoing. The Treasury Committee has already highlighted that it does not—in its words, it is “wrong” and “dangerous”.
The second issue is about fairness and ensuring equality before the law for large and small financial institutions and companies. That is particularly important, we think, in the context of the burgeoning fraud crisis, which is being exacerbated by the pandemic. It cannot be fair or right that small companies face the burden of prosecution in the UK and that large companies can be seen as getting away with it.
The third area is about equivalence, or parity with international standards, on the enforcement of economic crime. The Law Commission—I will come on to the Law Commission later in our evidence, if I may—has announced it is doing a review of corporate crime rules. It has said that one of the reasons for that is so that the UK does not fall behind. We think there is a real danger that the UK falling behind might happen very speedily. It is already quite behind the US—we have seen a lot of commentary from legal experts about how the UK, effectively, outsources its economic crime enforcement to the US, which means that some British institutions are being fined very heavily by the US authorities, and that money is going to the US Treasury.
It is not just the US, but the EU. There is a real emerging issue with the sixth EU anti-money laundering directive, which requires EU states, from early December this year, to have strong corporate criminal liability for anti-money laundering. That liability must include where there is a lack of supervision or control, and the Government recognised when they looked at whether we should opt into this directive—which they chose not to do—that the UK’s corporate liability regime would not fit the directive but would need to be amended if the UK were to opt in. A real issue here is that UK companies might end up operating in the EU to higher standards than they are operating to in the UK, and that might become more of an issue of market access for UK financial services.
The final area is consistency across economic crime. We have seen a “failure to prevent” offence introduced for bribery and for tax evasion. No less harm is caused to society by fraud and money laundering than is caused by the other offences, and it creates real problems for enforcement agencies. Prosecutors have long asked for that “failure to prevent” offence to be extended to other economic crimes. We think its introduction would benefit the UK, because it would see more enforcement—higher fines—coming into the UK Treasury, and it would benefit society, because when companies have in place procedures that prevent economic crime, it helps to reduce the cost of that crime to society.
I will stop there, in case there are any questions. I am very happy to talk about how we think this amendment is compatible with the ongoing Law Commission review.
Mr McFadden
Q
Dr Hawley: Absolutely. We think that the corporate offence is essential, but that does not mean we do not think that individual accountability is very important. There is also a real issue about how senior executives are held to account. If we take LIBOR as an example, I think there were four convictions out of 13 prosecutions for the rate rigging in the UK, and in a lot of those cases people said, “The management knew we were doing this.” That was their defence. If that is really the case, you are not going to change the culture. There are two really important reasons for having a corporate offence, and part of it is about changing the culture. If corporates know that they might face a huge fine, they will put in place procedures to stop that happening. That is really important.
Mr McFadden
Q
Dr Hawley: Under the current law, if there is not a “failure to prevent” offence in a piece of legislation, a company can be held to account only if its directing mind can be found to have intended for the crime to occur. In a small company, the directors are much more hands-on, so it is much easier for prosecutors to pin the blame on someone at a senior level—it has to be at the board level—and therefore prove that the company is guilty. That is not how large corporations and businesses work, and that is what prosecutors have been saying for a long time. They work on a much more devolved basis.
The problem is that the way the law is at the moment, not only does it make it easier to prosecute small companies —small companies bear the burden of prosecution—but it incentivises bad corporate governance in larger companies because it encourages people to insulate the board from knowledge about wrongdoing. That is the point that prosecutors and people in the legal community have been making for some time.
Mr McFadden
Q
Dr Hawley: This is what we write about in our evidence. HMRC, in its consultation on its new “failure to prevent tax evasion” offence, specifically highlighted that these laws encourage bad corporate governance. It says that they provide incentives for senior management to turn a blind eye to wrongdoing in order to shield the corporate body from criminal liability and they disincentivise the reporting of wrongdoing to senior members of corporate bodies. That is not me; that is the Government consultation on the “failure to prevent tax evasion” offence for criminal finances, but that is no different from the other economic crime offences. That is a corporate governance issue that cuts across all these economic crimes.
Mr McFadden
Q
Dr Hawley: In the UK at the moment there are two ways in which companies could be held to account for money laundering. One of them is under the money laundering regulations, and that is a minor offence. To give you a comparative example, if it is an individual being fined for that, they would get two years in prison. The kinds of fines we are seeing are around the £5,000 mark. There have been some higher marks—sorry, that was HMRC’s enforcement at a regulatory level. We have not seen any corporate criminal fines in this space at all. There is no criminal enforcement going on under the money laundering regulations, but that is a different issue. To explain the law, theoretically companies could be held to account, but it is a relatively minor offence. That is very different from holding them to account for the main offences under the Proceeds of Crime Act, which, for an individual, carries a maximum sentence of 14 years. You can see from that that it is a very different type of offence, and the courts would treat it very differently.
Under the EU’s sixth anti-money laundering directive, all states must have corporate criminal liability and must impose criminal and non-criminal sanctions that are proportionate and dissuasive. We are already seeing countries such as Germany taking really strong steps to implement that. It has a corporate sanctions Bill coming up, which has a clause that requires prosecutors to investigate suspicions of corporate crime. It is a very strong Bill. Before that, Germany was the outlier and had no proper corporate criminal liability. We see it in the Netherlands as well, where increasing levels of corporate fines are being imposed for money laundering, and there is a very strong corporate liability framework there as well. In Ireland, the Irish Law Commission has recommended changes to the law on corporate liability. We are seeing a raising of standards across the EU that the directive will bring in the context of money laundering.
Mr McFadden
I have no further questions, although my colleagues might have.
The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (John Glen)
Q
There is a Law Commission consultation going on. We have fully transposed the fifth anti-money laundering directive in line with international best practice. You gave us some perspectives on Germany and Holland in terms of future orientations, which is something that I imagine we would look at in the context of that review. How would the provisions of the Bill help?
Dr Hawley: Obviously, we have welcomed the leadership that the Government have taken on beneficial ownership and the implementation of the fifth AMLD. My colleagues from Transparency International, who are giving evidence later to the Committee, have done more work on the beneficial ownership side. They are the people to talk in more detail about how the Bill specifically relates to that.
We hope that there will be other legislative vehicles brought forward soon to introduce the property register of beneficial ownership and the Companies House reforms. It is excellent that that consultation has now come out and the Government have taken strong steps towards looking at how Companies House can be strengthened, because, as FATF noted, it was, as you have mentioned, an area of weakness.
I do not want to bang on about it, but FATF also highlighted the lack of high-end money laundering convictions in the UK and questioned whether that was really reflective of the risk within the UK. We are carrying out some analysis into what is happening with regulatory fines in this space. The number of fines seems to be going down dramatically, and we are not seeing an increase in high-end money laundering convictions. To be honest, we are a bit worried that the Law Commission review, which we really welcome, will take too long.
John Glen
Q
Dr Hawley: I am actually saying something different. That review rightly focuses on the identification doctrine that was the primary focus that the Law Commission was given, and it is absolutely right that the Law Commission does that. We monitor bribery cases as they go through the courts, and we have seen that, even with the Bribery Act, there is still an ongoing unfairness. A small company can be prosecuted for a main offence and a “failure to prevent” offence. We have heard directly from prosecutors that they can say to a small company, “Look, if you co-operate with us, we will only prosecute you for failure to prevent. But if you don’t, we will prosecute you with section 1 or section 2.” We also have the fact that a section 1 or a section 2 offence incurs mandatory debarment from public procurement and a “failure to prevent” offence does not. So small companies face the risk of being excluded from public procurement in a way that large companies do not. We think that that is not compatible with the Government’s stated intention of levelling the playing field for small companies in public procurement.
What we would say—and it is something we have always said—is that we absolutely need the Law Commission to look into the identification principle, but we do not think it would pre-empt the review to introduce the “failure to prevent” offence for these crimes, because we already have that offence for bribery and tax evasion. That would complement the Law Commission’s work. We still need the review of the identification doctrine, and that cannot be done by anyone other than the Law Commission.
Stephen Flynn (Aberdeen South) (SNP)
Q
“However, there is no corporate offence in the FSA and it is therefore not clear that prosecutors would be able to hold companies to account were similar conduct to reoccur.”
I will be open and honest with you: I do not have a legal background, so perhaps you could elaborate on that further. Either there is the ability to do something or there is not. That ties in with the remarks about Barclays in point 21, which quotes remarks that it
“effectively removes companies with widely devolved management and functioning boards”.
The term “effectively” implies that it could or could not. Can I have a little more clarity on that point?
Dr Hawley: Yes, absolutely. We have checked that with lawyers, and it is the case currently under the Financial Services Act that if you wanted to bring a prosecution for misleading statements on benchmarks—let us hope that will not happen again because financial institutions have learned the lessons from last time—the only way that you could hold a company to account would be under the directing mind principle that I mentioned earlier. You would have to show that one of the directors knew and intended for this to occur. There is no comparative offence, as there is under the Bribery Act, of a failure to prevent misleading statements being made, for which there could be a corporate fine. That would be almost impossible to do if a bank were making misleading statements.
The Barclays judgment has made that even more difficult and narrower. Prosecutors and the Serious Fraud Office can no longer say, “We’ve got the evidence on the CEO and CFO, and we think we can prove it, so we will take this to court.” The court then turns round and says, “No, it’s not just that. You have to show that the board actually delegated authority to these people.” It set a whole new hurdle for how you hold corporates to account. What we are hearing from people is that this is going to lead to a massive decrease in corporate prosecutions, because the grounds for bringing a company to account are so narrow now that they are almost impossible. I cannot say that it would not happen, but I can say that it would be an extremely brave prosecutor to risk public money in the courts to try.
Stephen Flynn
Q
Dr Hawley: The corporate route?
Stephen Flynn
Yes.
Dr Hawley: We do not see any dangers, because, generally, if you can hold the company to account, you are more likely to be able to hold the individuals to account. There is some evidence from the US, where the lack of senior executives going to jail has been contentious.
I think there is a real issue around senior executive accountability. We have seen a series of acquittals in the UK courts, in the Tesco’s case and in the Barclays case. There are some quite serious issues that need to be looked at in terms of how senior executives are held to account. I could argue to bring forward an amendment to address that as well, but that is not what we have done in this written evidence. We are just focusing on the corporate offence, and we do not see any reason why it would undermine efforts to hold senior executives to account. I would be interested to hear those arguments, because I have not heard any coherent arguments about why it undermines individual accountability.
The Chair
It might be helpful for colleagues and our witness to say that we have 18 minutes left and three people who want to ask questions, so people might want to be mindful of that.
Abena Oppong-Asare (Erith and Thamesmead) (Lab)
Q
Dr Hawley: We actually have two suggestions. One is to introduce a “failure to prevent” offence for individuals, where, effectively, you are in a senior position and this happens on your watch. That is one way of doing it. The other way is to do what happens with the Competition and Markets Authority, where the court has the power to disqualify a director where there is a corporate offence. That is something that was put down in an amendment to the sanctions and money laundering regulations. Those are two legislative options—one of them a bit more radical than the other. The Competition and Markets Authority one is already there in law; it is just a matter of making it effective for these particular economic crimes.
We also think that there needs to be some more blue-skies thinking about whether, when there is a deferred prosecution agreement, companies should be required to claw back some of the money from the senior executives who were running the company when the wrongdoing occurred, because it is unfair that they get to move on, often with huge financial benefits. We saw that with the recent Airbus case—the director left with a massive golden handshake, and then the company and shareholders were left to pick up the fine. I think there is a way to make how the corporate fine is shared fairer. There are quite a lot of potential ways to do it, and we would be happy to provide a paper on that before 3 December, if it would be useful to the Committee.
Abena Oppong-Asare
Q
Dr Hawley: It is welcome that it has increased. Higher sentences are important, as we see in the US—there are higher sentences for white-collar crime, and people actually go down. To be honest, it is also about enforcement. Actually, quite a few prosecutions for a certain level are better than very few for a high level. It all comes down to regular enforcement, which is something that we very much hope there will be greater thinking about—enforcement resourcing for any of the laws that will be put in place.
Abena Oppong-Asare
Q
Dr Hawley: The basic and essential one is that if you introduce a “failure to prevent” economic crime, it immediately covers that gap; it immediately brings larger companies into the reach of prosecutors for economic crimes. We still think the Law Commission will need to look at how the identification doctrine still applies and carries on creating unfairness, even after you have introduced a “failure to prevent” offence, but it would be an immediate stopgap that would stop that happening. I cannot think of any other way of doing that.
Julie Marson (Hertford and Stortford) (Con)
Q
I was looking at some of the specialist fraud and financial crime law firms’ response to the Law Commission’s review, particularly how it relates to the “failure to prevent” suggestion. They have called the Government’s desire to look at that in the round a very measured approach, and they have pointed to the fact that there have been lots of developments in regulatory and legal environments since the call for evidence. They have said that, actually, the best approach is probably to wait and see—to review, and to look at the entire issue in the round. Given the complexity and the cost to business, what is your response to that?
Dr Hawley: What has happened since the call for evidence closed is the Barclays judgment. We have also had a judgment in the Serco case, in which Serco was involved in procurement fraud against the MOJ, and it could not be the party to a deferred prosecution agreement—only its subsidiary could—because of these corporate liability rules. How it fits with the regulatory system is a really important question. As you will have seen from our evidence, we think that can be really properly thought through and hammered out at the guidance stage to the “failure to prevent” offence. That is where you would have a really good discussion with the private sector, bringing them in to show how you make those parts fit together.
I would like to add that on the regulatory side, as I mentioned earlier, we are seeing a worrying decline in the number of fines imposed by some of the regulatory bodies, for instance in the money laundering space. Creating a criminal offence—it is important to note that it is not a new criminal offence, but a different way of holding people to account for the same criminal offence—would open up a broader range of people who might bring action against a company. We have seen criticism in the paper, including from some of the law firms, about a lack of action by the Financial Conduct Authority on money laundering regulations, very few investigations and no prosecutions of corporates. If it were a criminal offence, companies might be looking at investigations by the SFO, which would really make them sit up.
I think it is about deterrence and how you ensure that compliance with the regulations is not just a box-ticking exercise, which is the risk if you take only a regulatory approach. What is really interesting about the responses to the Government’s call for evidence is that the vast majority of respondents do not think that where a serious crime occurs, a regulatory approach is appropriate; there need to be criminal approaches. I was really struck by how common that was. I think there is some urgency, if I am honest, particularly in relation to the UK falling behind emerging standards elsewhere, but also with the problem of inequality before the law, which I think could become really heightened when the response to the covid crisis plays out. You might get quite a lot of resentment when large actors are seen as getting away with it.
Julie Marson
Q
Dr Hawley: Since the call for evidence, we have seen the SMCR and the money laundering regulations, but they were kind of around and being introduced—the SMCR in 2016 and the money-laundering regulations were on the books for 2017—so I do not think that there has been anything dramatically new since then. Those were on the cards at the time of the 2017 call for evidence. This does need private sector consultation and it needs to be thought through carefully.
On the consensus about where to go, another problem we are worried about is that that lack of consensus will be replicated in the Law Commission’s consultation, because you have essentially two options—that is how it has been put to me, quite often by prosecutors. You go with the US model, with vicarious liability, or you have a “failure to prevent” offence. There was not really any clarity in the way the call for evidence was worded that would result in a kind of consensus. Quite a lot of law firms think we should have vicarious liability, because that is the strongest form of liability there is.
I worry about coming to the end of the Law Commission consultation with exactly the same result: no consensus about the way forward, let’s not do anything, and then we will be stuck in the same place. Do you see my point with that?
Ms Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)
Q
Dr Hawley: That is not my wording; I think that one of the business press has used that phrase. Do you want me to explain why I think that?
Ms Eagle
Q
Dr Hawley: I am afraid it is widely held consensus that what we do here is significantly inferior to what happens in the US, and I do not think there can be any doubt about that. I could share some research we did in 2019, which very specifically compared only London and New York banks, so that we did not get an unfair comparison because of the much larger size of the US. The level of fines that the US imposes, both criminally and on a regulatory level—that is, the money laundering space—is 22 times higher.
Ms Eagle
Q
Dr Hawley: The law is certainly an issue with fraud, money laundering and false accounting.
Ms Eagle
By the way, without meaning to be rude, you have three minutes to answer this or the Chair will cut you off.
Dr Hawley: Absolutely, it is an issue of the law and of enforcement—law is only as good as its enforcement. We need a fairly wide consensus among the enforcement community, non-governmental organisations and academics in this space. We need a massive boost to economic crime enforcement in this country.
With the FCA, what we hear is it is much easier for them to bring civil actions, and that is what they do. For corporates, they are not using the corporate criminal liability laws that we think need to be used to ensure real deterrence, and that corporate wrongdoing, when it does occur—by the few bad people—is properly held to account and prosecuted. I know the Competition and Markets Authority wants to get rid of its prosecuting function to the SFO. Some people, such as Jonathan Fisher QC, have argued that we need one big super-enforcer in the criminal sphere, because regulators will always have more interest in taking the easier, quicker and cheaper route, taking the regulatory approach rather than the criminal approach.
Ms Eagle
Q
Dr Hawley: It is a really complicated issue, which I am very pleased the Law Commission is looking at. One of the options is vicarious liability. Some people feel a bit uneasy about vicarious liability and say it is too strong, but that is where you need the best legal minds of the Law Commission. However, the immediate gap can be immediately filled by the introduction of the “failure to prevent” offence. Otherwise, large companies are beyond the law; the “failure to prevent” offence brings them within the reach of the law.
The Chair
Order. I am afraid that brings us to the end of the time allotted for the Committee to ask questions. I thank our witness for her evidence on behalf of the Committee. That brings us to the end of the morning sitting. The Committee will meet again at 2 pm in the same room to take further evidence.
Ordered, That further consideration now be adjourned. —(David Rutley.)
Financial Services Bill (Fourth sitting)
Thursday 19th November 2020
(4 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Financial Services Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 19 November 2020 - (19 Nov 2020)
The Chair
Good afternoon, everyone. We will now take evidence from the first of our afternoon witnesses, who is joining us remotely. I remind hon. Members on the right-hand side of the room and in the Public Gallery to use the microphone near the window when they pose their questions. We will hear first from Hugh Savill, from the Association of British Insurers. We have until 2.45 pm for this session, so lots of time. Hugh, will you introduce yourself for the record, please?
Hugh Savill: I am Hugh Savill, director of regulation at the Association of British Insurers.
The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (John Glen)
Q
I would like to probe your views on the measures that we are introducing with respect to access arrangements between the UK and Gibraltar for financial services firms. How do you see the issues around maintaining the same quality of regulation between the Gibraltarian and UK regimes? Do you foresee any challenges with that? How important do you think that that level playing field will be?
Hugh Savill: A level playing field between Gibraltar and the UK is essential. I think that about 20% of the British motor insurance market is in fact serviced by firms from Gibraltar so, clearly, whether people are working from the UK or from Gibraltar, that needs to be on the same basis. Given that you have two regulatory authorities, and that can always be quite awkward, we think this strikes a good balance. There is good dovetailing of the relationship between our regulators and the Gibraltarian regulators, and we really hope that the Gibraltar authorisation regime works and provides a smooth basis for business in the future.
John Glen
Q
Hugh Savill: This is mainly derived from our experience of conduct regulation at the European level over the past 10 years or so. To be honest, it has not shown the European Union at its best. We have the PRIIPs regulation, which is mentioned in the Bill—well, we are having to correct it—and there have been other measures, such as the insurance distribution directive, which, frankly, have been no better. It is not entirely to do with the way that the European Union makes rules; it is because consumers expect different things in different countries. All you have to do is put together all the things that consumers want. It makes for a very heavy-handed—[Interruption.]
The Chair
I’m sorry, Hugh, could you please pause for a moment? We have a noisy bell. It is gone now, so please carry on. Can you start that sentence again?
Hugh Savill: Worse things might happen at my end.
John Glen
We won’t go there.
Hugh Savill: The fact is that consumers expect different things; they have different traditions. Introducing conduct regulation at the international level—setting what people expect from their bank, so that it fits the conditions in Japan, Brazil and the UK—is too big an ask. You will end up with a very unwieldy rule book that is not particularly suitable for British consumers. We think the retail conduct rules need to be set with British consumers in mind.
Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)
Q
Hugh Savill: I should say that we are equally blunt when we see shortcomings in British regulation, as well as European regulation, but, yes, we have criticised some of the European rules. In effect, the Bill sets out the first step towards a UK regime for financial services, and there will be others that follow. Really, this needs to be tailored to the needs of the British market—first to the needs of British consumers and secondly to the needs of British providers of financial services. Now that we have left the European Union, we think that is the way to go forward, and that is what we are hoping our legislators and regulators will concentrate on.
Mr McFadden
Q
Hugh Savill: I would be surprised. Ideally, what the Gibraltar authorisation regime sets out is the same basis, whether you are doing business in the UK or from Gibraltar. It is quite an enterprise to move your business to Gibraltar, and I am not certain you would be able to take all your skilled people with you. It is expensive to shift domicile like that. I see no big advantage in firms that are servicing the UK market from the UK moving to Gibraltar. Most of the Gibraltarian firms that have moved into the UK market, particularly the motor market, have done so as new entrants.
Mr McFadden
Q
Hugh Savill: I will have to let you know on that point. I believe there is a small value added tax advantage, but I will let you know that in due course.
Mr McFadden
Q
Hugh Savill: They are all slightly different circumstances. I am by no means an expert on the relationship between, say, the Channel Islands and the UK, Gibraltar and the UK, and so on. What was unusual about Gibraltar was that it was part of the single market in a way that the Channel Islands were not, so you had an existing passporting arrangement between Gibraltar and the UK, which, for the sake of the smooth continuation of the motor market, would be helpful to continue.
Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)
Q
Hugh Savill: There was a question about whether British consumers who were using Gibraltarian firms had access to the Financial Ombudsman Service in the UK. We think it is extremely important that all British consumers have access to the Financial Ombudsman Service—it looks at individuals’ difficulties in a way that other regulators cannot. I am particularly pleased that that has been clarified in the Bill. Let us hope that it works well.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Hugh Savill: I never say never, but all the people who operate in the British market are subject to the conduct rules of the Financial Conduct Authority, so I think there should be the same standards for those selling from Gibraltar as in the rest of the UK.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Hugh Savill: Some of them will be, some of them will not. I am not a great reader of the small print in my insurance policy, any more than anybody else is, but if we have a similar regime, I hope that that would not be a major preoccupation of somebody buying an insurance policy.
The Chair
I open the questioning to other members of the Committee. Does anyone else have questions? I call Miriam Cates.
Miriam Cates (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Con)
Q
Hugh Savill: If you are buying insurance in the UK, you tend to buy it online for general insurance, or you will quite often use an independent financial adviser to buy life insurance and savings policies. That does not happen on the continent of Europe. There, there is a little shop in most small towns, and people go and buy their general insurance from that shop. If they want savings policies, whether that be insurance or other kinds of savings vehicles, they will go to their bank, so it is a completely different approach and entry into financial services.
Andrew Jones (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (Con)
Q
Hugh Savill: Sorry, from the market access arrangements, did you say?
Andrew Jones
Yes, just generally. We are seeing a large provider have access to our markets. That could traditionally see increased supply. Increased supply tends to mean price competition, with consumers benefiting both in quality and innovation of product and in the price they pay for it, but equally it can work the opposite way. So do you think there will be any price implications for UK consumers as a result of these measures?
Hugh Savill: I do not think they would be because of these measures, in that the suppliers from Gibraltar already have 20% of the market, and it is not this Bill that is going to change that. There will be changes in price—there are always changes in price, and there will be other things that drive that—but I do not think that will be driven by this Bill.
Stella Creasy (Walthamstow) (Lab/Co-op)
Q
Hugh Savill: That is why I offered to write. I am afraid I do not know exactly what the VAT arrangements are, and I will have to write it down. If I said any more, I would get something wrong.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Hugh Savill: We do not think very much of equivalence as a means of arranging market access. As set out by the EU, it is extremely easy to end equivalence and to leave both provider and client hanging and not knowing where their policy is going to go. We also think that the European system of equivalence is far too open to political interference in what ought to be a technical matter.
This said, if I look back to the Chancellor’s very welcome statement last week, in the supporting document to that, the Treasury set out a far more grown-up view of what equivalence ought to be—a rather more technical decision, where there is open consultation and a discussion between the two jurisdictions, that is actually looking for a long-term relationship between the two jurisdictions, and that cannot just be terminated at short notice. On equivalence generally, we really do not think much of the way that the EU runs its equivalence regime. We are very reassured by the vision of equivalence that the Treasury has put out.
Turning to the detailed point about those accessing the overseas fund regime, what is important is that, in the unlikely event that a trusted jurisdiction moves out of trusted jurisdiction status into untrusted jurisdiction status, there are, as the Bill suggests, mechanisms for ensuring that customers are not orphaned from their provider. That is extremely important, particularly when you have some long-term contracts such as annuities.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Hugh Savill: I think they should have enough reassurance here. The overseas fund regime allows investors to access a much wider range of funds than would otherwise be available. As I said, choice is a good thing. It gives a wider choice and, ideally, better products and prices. I think the safeguards are there.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Hugh Savill: Not at the moment, no.
Mr McFadden
Q
Hugh Savill: I am not aware of the corporation tax differences between the UK and Gibraltar, so, again, I am sorry but I will have to cover that in my reply later.
The Chair
Thank you. This letter is getting longer.
Hugh Savill: Do not worry—I will not make it too long.
The Chair
Good, good. If there are no further questions, all that remains is for me to thank you, Hugh, for your evidence as our first witness this afternoon. We finished a bit ahead of time. Thank you for that.
Examination of Witness
Duncan Hames gave evidence.
The Chair
We move on to our second witness this afternoon and the only one who is appearing in person today. Duncan Hames is no stranger to this place. He is now from Transparency International. Duncan, do you want to introduce your job title for the record, and what you do?
Duncan Hames: Yes, happily. My name is Duncan Hames and for more than the past four years I have served as the director of policy at Transparency International UK. Transparency International is part of a worldwide anti-corruption coalition, and because those engaged in corrupt activity need to launder the proceeds of their crimes, we have become quite knowledgeable about the practice and policies around the prevention of money laundering and the need to have effective supervision and enforcement.
The Chair
We have until half-past 3 for this session, so a good long time. Unusually, we are going to the two Opposition spokespeople first, and then to the Minister. We are shaking it up a bit. We will start with shadow Minister, Pat McFadden.
Mr McFadden
Q
Duncan Hames: There is much in the Bill that I am not qualified to comment on, but certainly in relation to regulatory duties around money laundering it is our contention that the challenge is as much about means of implementation and the expectations placed on the private sector in relation to supervision, which needs addressing. There is an analysis—in fact, it was probably our conclusion on seeing the Financial Action Task Force evaluation—that there are many good policy measures in place, but that they are yet to be fully implemented, and therein lies the nub of this problem.
Mr McFadden
Q
Duncan Hames: We have found with the UK Bribery Act 2010, which has been in force for 10 years now, that a “failure to prevent” offence within that legislation has served to enhance corporate governance. That is not just our view; it was the conclusion of the parliamentary post-legislative review into that legislation a year or two ago. Government Ministers have expressed their interest in seeing that model—which they have described when introducing it in other areas, such as failure to prevent tax evasion, as effective—applied more widely in areas of economic crime. That is certainly something we would consider there was an opportunity for in the Bill.
Mr McFadden
Q
Duncan Hames: Yes, we would. That is separate to the discussions about the identification doctrine, on which, as I am sure you will be aware, the director of the Serious Fraud Office has frequently shared views and on which now the Law Commission has been invited to bring forward its own options for reform. These are complementary measures.
We now have a “failure to prevent” offence in relation to two areas of offending: one, the Bribery Act and, two, failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion. Applying a “failure to prevent” offence more widely, while still considering reform of the identification doctrine in regard to the substantive offence, would be entirely complementary, rather than the House having to consider doing one or the other.
Mr McFadden
Q
Duncan Hames: If I were in the business of money laundering, I would be laughing at the glacial pace at which reform happens. So I would counsel against waiting. As I say, we have two “failure to prevent” offences, and it would be entirely possible to apply that more widely in economic crime. Sadly, it has taken the Government over three years to reach their conclusions in response to the call for evidence on failing to prevent economic crime, and Law Commissions are not generally considered to move more quickly than ministerial responses to consultations. I would not want to estimate quite how long we will have to wait before the conclusions of the Law Commission are enacted in law. I think that is plenty of time to put in other measures, which will help the corporate sector improve their corporate governance, as we have seen in the case of Bribery Act.
Mr McFadden
Q
Duncan Hames: I certainly think we need to look at the area of supervision. This is a regulatory function. We have private sector supervisory bodies tasked with helping the business sector to put in place the necessary preventive measures to prevent money laundering.
While we welcome the introduction of the Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision a couple of years ago, its reports—these are not activist or campaigner reports; these are Government regulatory reports—have been very damning of the effectiveness of the supervisory bodies. It is very fragmented—I think there are 14 supervisory bodies for the accountancy sector alone.
OPBAS has identified conflicts of interest between the advocacy and supervisory functions of those bodies. The effectiveness of their enforcement activity is really inadequate. If we take Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs as one of the supervisory bodies, the fines imposed are barely a couple of thousand pounds and will quite possibly be less than the value of the commission or fee on any individual transaction. That is clearly an inadequate incentive for private sector actors to say no to handling illicit funds.
The quality of the money laundering defences in the private sector has also been found to be poor. The Solicitors Regulation Authority recently conducted reviews into about 60 companies. In nearly half of those cases, they are pursuing the findings they had for potential disciplinary action. A similar proportion of cases were found to be areas of weakness in money laundering defences in other sectors.
So we have a problem with supervision. The first line of defence against money laundering is tasked to the private sector, and yet the supervisory bodies that are meant to ensure that that is being done well, both in terms of guidance and in subsequent enforcement of regulations, are not effectively ensuring that those defences are good.
At the end of the day, the police estimate that the impact of money laundering on the UK economy is of the order of £100 billion a year. We can have lots of good measures and lots of good policies, which at times the Government will have been congratulated for, but the upshot is that we still have a big problem, which is not going away. That is why we think taking action where we can to improve the defences is urgent.
Mr McFadden
Q
Duncan Hames: We have to recognise that the FinCEN files were a leak; I would want us to be hearing about suspicious transactions as a result of enforcement having been taken by law enforcement agencies. It has been a concern of the now Secretary of State for Justice that too often we see enforcement, effectively, outsourced to the United States authorities. I do not think that is good for the corporate reputation of UK plc, and I do not think it is how we would want things to proceed as Britain defines a newly independent role in international commerce.
John Glen
Q
This Bill ensures that HMRC retains its ability to access information on the ownership and beneficiaries of UK-linked overseas trusts, building incrementally on things that have been done previously. Can you explain why this information is important? This is a key measure and, I would have thought, the most relevant.
Duncan Hames: It is certainly a welcome measure. We have found that some of the complexities of the structures and design of different corporate entities have proved difficult, in terms of the implementation of existing legislation. That was a feature of the recent Baker et al case in relation to appeal against an unexplained wealth order; there was a South American foundation, which was perhaps not the corporate structure that Members of this House had in mind when that legislation was being decided.
Addressing trustees and overseas entities, to strengthen and ensure there are no loopholes in existing legislation, is definitely to be welcomed. In the past, when the House has been considering legislation to address money-laundering risks—do not forget that another piece of legislation related to leaving the European Union is the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018—it has focused on what can be done about the transparency of ownership, and not just of UK limited companies but of overseas entities, too.
John Glen
Q
Duncan Hames: Certainly. Although some of the things we have already discussed this afternoon are not in the economic crime plan, there is much in that plan that we welcomed at the time. It was about 15 months ago that that plan was adopted by the Government. Some of the measures in that plan require legislation, and I am sure the Minister is itching for legislative opportunities to enact his policy.
John Glen
Q
Duncan Hames: Indeed. I think we have recently completed a consultation on it, and I hope, therefore, that it will be in the Queen’s Speech.
The register of beneficial owners of overseas entities enables us to know who really owns the foreign companies that own property real estate in this country. It was a Government commitment announced around the time of the London anti-corruption summit, which was four and a half years ago. Although that legislation has already been through pre-legislative scrutiny in both Houses, the conclusions of which were, “Get on with this; we must advance quickly,” it still has not been brought forward. These are both measures in the economic crime plan. It is great that they are in the economic crime plan, but it would be much better if they were implemented. I hope that that will be addressed very soon, but, equally, given how long one waits for legislative opportunities to keep up with the pace of nefarious actors in economic crime, if you have an opportunity to make progress in this Bill, in any additional manner, we would obviously be keen to see you take it.
John Glen
Q
Duncan Hames: I think we would see the creation of OPBAS as a very helpful staging post in addressing this problem of inadequate supervision, albeit that it can address and challenge only the professional body supervisors. HMRC has been found wanting, and I have already criticised the level of its fines. OPBAS cannot do anything about HMRC, and I think we have been party to discussions about that in other proceedings of the House.
What OPBAS has found is pretty devastating. In its 2018 report, 62% of accountancy supervisors had some overlap between their advocacy and regulatory functions. Those represent a conflict of interest. There are some really choice quotes from OPBAS in that report, about what supervisors said about the impact on their membership income, were they to take more assertive enforcement action. That really is a conflict of interest in these supervisory bodies.
I think what we need, Minister, is for you or your colleagues to have the ability to respond to these reports—I think we have now had two annual reports from OPBAS—and, where necessary, to strip the supervisory duties from bodies that are failing in this regard. Obviously, all bodies should address their own conflicts of interest, but performance is a really important issue.
The report I was referring to earlier was HMRC finding that about half of the businesses it had reviewed were non-compliant with its anti-money laundering regulations. So, the changes that have been made recently to the regulatory landscape, in and of themselves, are not enough to address the holes in our money laundering defences that are overseen by this very fragmented regulatory arrangement. I said there were more than 14 accountancy sector supervisors; I think we are at 25 anti-money laundering supervisors, altogether.
The Chair
I call the third Front Bencher, Alison Thewliss, for the Scottish National party.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Duncan Hames: We might want to talk about beneficial ownership transparency. As I say, Ministers had a duty placed on them in the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act in relation to Britain’s overseas territories and what would need to happen if they did not adopt public registers of their own volition, and I think they have found that duty helpful. Certainly at a diplomatic level, Ministers in the Foreign Office would celebrate the statements that have been made by those overseas territories as that deadline has approached. That is illustrative of how effective using legislation like this to convey a duty on a Minister can be, in order to rachet up the pressure for change.
The problem we have, of course, is that in some cases, those overseas territories are quite grudgingly coming around to this position. The last statement to complete the set was from the British Virgin Islands, and in his statement the Chief Minister—having agreed to the things the Government were hoping he would agree to—started to list a whole list of reservations and conditions, and concluded by saying that of course, this would only happen at a pace at which they consider deliverable. That does not fill me with hope that, without further incentive or, ultimately, the threat of action through Orders in Council, this will actually happen, which brings me back to my original point about implementation. It is one thing to have the policy—another, even, to have the laws—but if we have not had the implementation, we have not really changed anything. I would encourage you to look at what levers you might be able to grant Ministers through additional measures in a Bill such as this.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Duncan Hames: That is a creative tension, isn’t it? I think we should welcome international scrutiny of the effectiveness of our own measures. As the Minister said, there has been a consultation about new powers and duties for Companies House, in relation to the quality of the data we have. We are already beginning to see signs of a cultural change in Companies House as a result of the directions it is being given and the anticipation of future legislation. We need it to be a partner in preventing crime, not just a registrar—not just providing a service to companies that wish to be registered.
As I say, we recognise the pattern of change there, but ultimately it has to work within the law, and if the laws do not empower it to take the actions necessary, we need to change that. We are anticipating that the Government will bring forward legislation, so that when we are trying to persuade other financial jurisdictions to address their own contribution to money laundering, including in Britain’s family of offshore financial centres, we are able to hold our head up high and know that we are doing everything we can to ensure that the quality of our own defences is adequate.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Duncan Hames: I suspect that it is Parliament’s role to hold Government to account for acting on what those regulators are finding. They are often quite forthcoming in their criticisms of where things are going wrong, but they need the frameworks in which they can act on that. As I have said, I think the powers rest with Government to strip supervisory bodies of their duties where they are failing, but I cannot think of a time when it has happened. I believe OPBAS has provided plenty of evidence—indeed, unattributed in some reports—but I am sure it could point the finger for Ministers where necessary, in order to be able to take action.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Duncan Hames: I think trusts are intended to be in the scope of the registration of overseas entities Bill. That is definitely something required by the fifth anti-money laundering directive as well, so we should consider them within scope. Whether we have yet got that working, I am not so confident. For example, if we take something that I am sure is of interest to you—Scottish limited partnerships—the Financial Action Task Force report, which the Government are very pleased with, noted that there remains a weakness in terms of scope for abuse of that corporate structure. I should acknowledge that those are regulated by UK law, not by decisions made in Scotland. Those partnerships can be partnerships with two corporate entities—so, no human personality. If those two corporate entities are registered in jurisdictions where beneficial ownership is not clear—it is not public—we essentially have a UK entity that has got around all of the strictures that the Government are very proud of, in terms of the transparency that the UK’s own registry demands.
There are other issues with having corporate partners of a legal partnership. Obviously, it all comes down to accountability. It is very important if we want to be able to hold corporate entities accountable for their role in economic crime. I am afraid that many such complexities remain to be addressed. We cannot just take the bits we like when a report like that is presented.
The Minister is correct: the UK outcome was very favourable compared with other FATF evaluations. I hope, by the way, it will give the Treasury the confidence next time around to invite civil society representatives to give evidence to the FATF assessors. None the less, FATF came up with a number of things that it identified needed to be addressed, and the Government have a plan, but we seem to lack a timetable for implementing a number of these things. If the Minister is able to give us a timetable for when the legislation to introduce measures such as robo, which is in the economic crime plan, will be introduced, I think we would all be very glad of it.
John Glen
The point is, as Duncan well knows, that a whole range of interventions have been provoked by that FATF report. I am glad he acknowledges its world-leading nature for the UK. It is good that we should be pleased about that, but there were significant elements that need to be worked on. They are obviously taken in different ways across Whitehall, and there will be more to be said about that in due course. I am responsible for what I am responsible for in this Bill, and the purpose of this conversation is about that.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Duncan Hames: I doubt you need primary legislation to fix that. I expect that secondary legislation giving direction to Ministers and regulatory bodies to ensure that fines are commensurate with the level of offending would be helpful. I suggested that the level of fines by these professional bodies supervisors and by HMRC is just not commensurate with the financial advantage of taking part in these transactions.
Indeed, if you are a solicitor, and someone complains to the Solicitors Regulation Authority about you because you have been holding up a transaction, that will still be investigated. You will still incur quite a discomfort in responding to that investigation. That is quite a powerful incentive just to go along with the transaction, whereas the fine you might receive for having gone along with a transaction that you should not have could well be less consequential for you. That needs to be addressed.
Fines wielded against trust and company service providers by HMRC, for example, are pitifully low. We were told by the trade body that its experience of fines imposed by HMRC on trust and company service providers was typically no more than £1,000.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Duncan Hames: I do not think that the measures with regard to Gibraltar particularly focus on money laundering. Obviously, Gibraltar is covered by the fifth anti-money laundering directive. I think they would consider themselves to be among the earlier adopters of the measures required under that directive. What we see in the Government’s language is an emerging global standard. That has been recognised in the past year or so by the Crown dependencies and, increasingly, by British overseas territories.
Although the US starts from a very far-back position on public beneficial ownership transparency, on the basis of bipartisan—as I think they call it, or on both sides of the aisle—working on this issue, even with a Republican Senate it seems set to advance new regulatory requirements around a central register of beneficial ownership. The tide is definitely moving in the direction of greater transparency. I think it would help British overseas territories to be encouraged to keep up with that direction of change.
Julie Marson (Hertford and Stortford) (Con)
Q
I am interested to hear your reaction to the criticisms of the report that that phrase came from. It was felt that the scope of the report did not include, for example: the bribery and corruption statistics, including on the “failure to prevent” provisions; the period after the financial crisis, which meant that much implementation was not included in the report; or the way prosecuting in the US often involves plea bargains, which are used to extract fines, so the measurement of the extraction of fines is not necessarily a justified comparison between the UK and the US. What is your reaction to that?
Duncan Hames: The corruption perceptions index measures views of the prevalence of corruption in public sectors, whereas for the most part here we are talking about enforcement of corporate wrongdoing. None the less, you are right to record where those countries are in the index.
“Exporting corruption”, our recent report produced for the OECD anti-bribery working group—part of a series of reports published every other year—is the one in which the UK is recognised to be an active enforcer of anti-bribery laws and laws to prevent foreign corporate bribery. None the less, the US is top of the table and, while it is good that Britain remains an active enforcer, the calculation that grants that assignation is such that the UK hung on by a hair’s breadth this year and there is no room for complacency.
The statement that I reference from the Secretary of State for Justice was made when he was Solicitor General, at the Cambridge International Symposium on Economic Crime. His words were that these differences in how the law operates
“result in other jurisdictions holding British companies to account where ours has not.”
He said he was making that observation in an argument in favour of moving towards the “failure to prevent” approach to economic crime.
For all of America’s challenges, I do not think anyone would criticise it for being less assertive in enforcement of the law that it has. Even at a time when one might have feared political interference or the undermining of the Department of Justice, its level of enforcement has remained high, without signs that it is falling back. I think we have to reflect on why that is. It is partly to do with resourcing, but it is principally to do with the challenges of our arrangements for prosecutors.
Lisa Osofsky, the director of the Serious Fraud Office, describes what we have as “a very antiquated system”. She said:
“We are hamstrung right now by the identification principle”.
She explained to the Justice Committee that she can “go after Main Street”—forgive the American references; I am sure you will be able to translate them—but she
“cannot go after Wall Street, and that is unfair”.
When we think about the businesses that each of you represent, you would want there to be a level playing field, where traditional businesses with perhaps traditional ownership models are not facing a greater requirement to uphold the law than much larger, perhaps more anonymous, conglomerates in complex corporate structures spread over many jurisdictions.
Julie Marson
Q
Duncan Hames: I think Ministers observed that responses to the consultation were mixed. It is regrettable that responses to the consultation are not public and people can form their own views about them. If you conduct a consultation about enforcing criminal law and those who might be subject to that enforcement, in a way that they are not currently, are able to make submissions in response to that proposition, then one would hope that in evaluating those responses they would not carry the same weight as more objective respondents. If we were asking how much chicken wire we should put around the hen coop, I would hope that we would largely disregard the foxes’ views.
Stella Creasy
Q
I want to ask your opinion on whether we might be able to learn from the specific proposals in that report. In particular, it recognises that although this does tend to happen, there is no legal requirement to reject applicants with a criminal background in Gibraltar. If we will allow Gibraltar and the UK to operate in the way that this Bill does, do you think we could make it a requirement in the Bill to look at the criminal background of people applying for financial services?
Duncan Hames: I should acknowledge that Gibraltar is not within the scope of the work that I do. I will not profess expertise on the rules as they apply in Gibraltar. I think Bloomberg reported today on a bank in Luxembourg and some of its practices. You ask a good question about the personal credentials that enable one to take on responsible roles in our financial system, whether in banks or other institutions.
I note, for example, that the proposals in relation to Companies House are not that it should be more discerning in the acceptance of the directors of companies registering, but rather that it should simply verify the accuracy of the identity and the information provided. Current initiatives do not go as far as you are suggesting would be reasonable. It seems hard enough just to get us responsible for ensuring the accuracy of the data, which is provided as a piece of our economic infrastructure, without getting to a position of demanding some kind of individual assessment.
Stella Creasy
Q
Duncan Hames: Dedicated supervision of the accountancy sector is part of what has got us into this mess of having 25 supervisory bodies. I think one must weigh the benefits of particular sectoral knowledge and some of the issues I raised earlier around potential conflicts of interest and incentives to supervise assertively. As we explained in our report “At your Service”, which was published about this time last year, it is definitely the case that the non-financial sector is very much touched by the money laundering problem. It is not enough to rely on the requirements of banks without raising our defences in other sectors—whether that is accountants, solicitors, estate agents, trust and company formation agents and so forth. In some areas, such as private education or charitable giving, an educational training supportive approach might be appropriate to try to raise standards, but in other areas, as I have outlined, clear financial incentives need to be addressed. A firmer approach to supervision is proving necessary given the findings of, for example, the studies that I cited from HMRC, the SRA and OPBAS.
The Chair
If there are no further questions from the Committee, I thank Duncan Hames for his evidence and we can move on to the next witnesses.
Examination of Witnesses
Jesse Griffiths and Fran Boait gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear from Jesse Griffiths and Fran Boait, who are from Finance Innovation Lab and Positive Money. We have until 4.15 for this session. Jesse and Fran, do you want to introduce yourselves?
Fran Boait: I will go first. I am the executive director of Positive Money, a non-profit organisation that campaigns and researches on reform of the money and banking system to enable a fair, democratic and sustainable economy.
Jesse Griffiths: I am the CEO of Finance Innovation Lab, a charity that helps people to try to transform the financial system for people and the planet.
The Chair
Thank you. We will return to the traditional format with questions first from the Minister and then from the two Opposition spokespeople.
John Glen
Q
Fran Boait: Shall I kick off? This is definitely one of the key issues in the Bill that I wanted to raise. Although I understand that the Bill is about regulation and tidying up a few things, it does set the framework and direction for future financial regulation. It is important to say at the outset that we are only 11 years on from a global financial crash that resulted from deep regulatory failures. Neither my organisation nor Jesse’s existed 10 years ago—they were formed since the crash. Without a number of amendments to the Bill, it could pave the way for a repeat of that failure.
To put it in context, I remind you that, according to the Bank of England’s chief economist, Andy Haldane, the banking cash cost Britain about £7.4 trillion and it would take the financial services sector’s tax contribution about 100 years to make up for that. It is a really important Bill that sets the direction, but accountability and transparency are severely lacking in its current form. The civil society sector is tiny, relative to the industry lobby. Although we have engaged in FCA and PRA consultations, the fact that we are onshoring so much legislation right now means that we need to think about the balance of input from the industry and civil society. It is worth noting that the EU, which obviously to date has been where the scrutiny for much of this legislation has been, funded civil society consumer, environmental and social groups in order to provide a balance to the industry lobby, because it recognised that this area is severely complex and critical.
The substantial transfer of power to the financial regulators—the Treasury, the FCA and the PRA—is concerning if there are not increases in parliamentary scrutiny and more detail about the accountability framework. I noted this morning that a number of amendments have been put forward, and I think a lot of them enhance accountability and require parliamentary scrutiny and reporting. I would really welcome that. I could list them—I have some of the numbers. An MP put forward a suggestion for a new specialist financial services Joint Committee between the Commons and the Lords, and that would be welcome, especially if it engaged with civil society.
From where we are starting, in its original form the Bill really is quite concerning in relation to accountability and transparency, but we would welcome all the amendments being put forward—and more—to improve those aspects.
John Glen
Q
The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, introduced under the previous Labour Government, was about setting an approach for how the regulators worked, looking at an outcome-based approach with the observation of technical standards. I note that you refer to the proposal about Parliament’s role. Are you really saying that you do not support that fundamental architecture? Given the complexity of the regulations and technical standards, do you think it is realistic for Parliament, in terms of capacity and expertise, to offer the sort of scrutiny that you think is lacking?
Fran Boait: Fundamentally, we want robust frameworks that allow for input and do not just allow legislation, such as the capital regulation requirements, to be changed without scrutiny, because they have really significant consequences for the whole UK economy. That is why I started by laying out how critical the direction of financial services is.
It is worth saying that we are not out of the repercussions of 10 years ago, so we do not want in any way to go back to the days of regulation being done behind closed doors. I understand that there is a capacity issue, but is about having those opportunities for both Parliament and the wider public—civil society—to feed in.
It is also worth thinking about the regulators themselves. For example, one of the things that the new chief executive of the FCA has said is that they will also be liable for legal attacks on what they are having to implement, so putting all the onus on them is an issue. At the same time, we know that there has been an issue with the revolving door between our regulatory bodies—the Treasury, the FCA, the PRA and the Bank of England—and the industry.
There is a grave concern about this transfer of power. If capacity is an issue, Parliament surely wants to be looking at how to resource things better, in terms of more Clerks or staff, plus thinking about how the EU funded civil society, rather than saying, “Actually, no, it’s fine. We will just have reduced transparency and accountability.”
John Glen
Q
Jesse Griffiths: Thank you. I think they are extremely important questions, and that is one reason why this Bill is so important as part of the other important consultations and discussions that you have mentioned—because we are now setting, if you like, the precedent for how we might deal with financial sector regulation in the new era, where the focus will be in London and not in Brussels. Actually, I worked for seven years in Brussels on related issues, so I have some experience from there to share.
I think I agree with the points that Fran has made about the fundamental importance of trying to find ways to support broader civil society engagement in these types of discussion. Perhaps it links to another important point on the Bill, which is that part of the issue will always be ensuring that the purpose of the regulations and the regulators includes social and environmental purpose, so that it is clear that that is an extremely relevant angle from which to discuss these things. One thing that definitely came out of my experience in Brussels was that the role of Parliament is very important, or can be very important, not just because it is important in itself, but because it does open a window for broader input and discussion.
I will explain one particular amendment or change we would welcome. As I understand it, the current Bill allows changes to capital requirements and other regulations under the affirmative procedure. That is obviously more welcome than the negative procedure, but it does not actually specify a role for specialised Committees, so finding a way in which specialised Committees in the House of Common or Lords, or both, could have input would be both a useful step and an entry point for a broader discussion for groups likes ours to help to support the new framework.
Could I say one other thing on a kind of related point? We recognise that it is important that different institutions have different regulatory frameworks and that this is not just about making every single type of institution abide by extremely stringent regulations. That sort of principle is involved in the Bill, and we would welcome that being extended to, for example, the nascent mutual banking movement. We know that the co-operative banking movement is struggling to get off the ground, because the regulations are not tailored to its particular circumstance. I would be willing to talk more about that. It is something that could perhaps also accompany this Bill as a commitment and that Government might like to think about.
Mr McFadden
Q
The Bill, in schedules 2 and 3, sets out new accountability frameworks for the regulators. They are to abide by relevant international standards and to have regard to the relative standing of the UK as a place for internationally active investment firms to be based, or to other matters specified by the Treasury. I would like to ask whether you think it is appropriate for broader goals to be considered in that regulatory framework, and I am thinking particularly of environmental, social and governance goals. The UK wants to be a leader in that area. The Chancellor of the Exchequer set out an ambitious environmental agenda for our financial services industries in his statement about 10 days ago. Do you think that the Bill is an opportunity to put regulatory weight behind the ESG agenda?
Fran Boait: That is a really great question. It is definitely something that stood out for me when I first read through the Bill. The Bill sets the direction, and it needs to integrate the needs of the wider economy, social responsibility, the environment and thinking about how we set a direction that is different from the one that led to the global financial crash in 2008.
As you mentioned, there is clearly cross-party agreement, and we have had announcements from the Government this week and last week on wanting to be a leader in green finance, especially ahead of COP26. There is also pretty much cross-party agreement on issues such as the banking sector severely under-serving small and medium-sized businesses. In his speech yesterday, Andy Haldane, the chief economist at the Bank of England, mentioned that the funding gap is £20 billion. We know there is cross-party agreement on wanting more of our productive and manufacturing sectors to grow, and we need to level up. Some Conservative MPs, such as Kevin Hollinrake and Danny Kruger, have done reports on that and on the need for a different banking system. We have to recognise that that will all require quite a significant shift in the direction of financial regulation, yet there is not anything in the Bill that suggests that such a shift in direction is something that the Treasury is interested in at the moment.
We would certainly support the hardwiring of ESG considerations into the regulation. I looked this morning at the proposed amendments, and we would be very supportive of amendments 20 and 24, which have regard to climate and net zero in terms of investment firms and CRR—that is on climate and environmental. There are some other amendments on social practice and corporate governance that are really important, and there are potentially bigger amendments that we could be thinking about, which would embed sustainability in the regulatory framework of our regulators, such as the FCA and the PRA. That would involve further amending the Financial Services and Markets Act, which I know is being amended already in the Bill, but we could add an environmental sustainability objective, for example, to the FCA’s or PRA’s objectives.
It is worth noting that the UK’s financial institutions are among the worst culprits in Europe for fossil fuel financing. HSBC and Barclays alone have funnelled about £158 billion into fossil fuels since the signing of the Paris agreement. If the UK really wants to be a leader in green finance in a serious way, we need our regulators to be on board with that mission. Obviously, that starts with this piece of legislation and others. We would fully support the amendments to the Bill that have been put forward already, and we would potentially suggest further ones.
Jesse Griffiths: I think that the absolutely fundamental issue with regards to the Bill is that it is an opportunity to put social and environmental purpose at the heart of both the regulation and the duties of the regulators. I do not think it would take a huge change, or huge amendments to the Bill, to set that precedent and really kick-start what I agree is a cross-party consensus that we need to deal with the climate crisis and the rising problems —inequalities caused by covid and so on—and that the financial system is central to that. How it is regulated determines a lot about how it will react to those points.
I can give some examples. Of course, it would be helpful if the Bill required the FCA to refer to the Climate Change Act when preparing secondary legislation. If you wanted to be more ambitious, it would obviously be helpful if capital requirements for investment firms introduced weightings on environmental, social and governance issues—for example, by penalising assets that have climate risks.
I know the Bill covers legislation on PRIIPs—packaged retail and insurance-based investment products—which is a huge, €10 trillion market in the EU. One specific example we have suggested is that, if we could improve the key information document that investors receive when they are looking at PRIIPs to include disclosure on environmental, social and governance issues, and ask the FCA to ensure that that happens, that would be an important signal.
I think that there are real opportunities here to change the nature of the discussion and set the UK as a leader in this area. We know that the direction of travel is towards much greater ESG integration across the financial sector. Investors are pushing for it. We do a lot of work with the big four banks in the UK, and many of them are pushing a purpose-driven agenda. It is the way that we are going, and I think about this as a real signal that the UK wants to be the leader in this field and takes it very seriously.
Mr McFadden
Q
If we are giving the regulators these big new responsibilities, both at the prudential and the conduct level, how would a more active role for Parliament work? We have one Select Committee that is active in this area, which already has a really broad agenda of work—the Treasury Committee. We have members of it on this Bill Committee, and they all do a great job, but things are pretty thinly stretched. Could you tell us more about how you think Parliament could have a more active role after the onshoring of all this regulatory responsibility? Again, I will start with you, Fran.
Fran Boait: I think we agree that this is the critical part of the Bill. That is why I mentioned the suggestion that has been put forward of a new potential Joint Committee between the Commons and the Lords. That would be absolutely right. The direction of the financial services sector is fundamental to the direction of the UK. We are really at a crossroads. We have been a large financial sector in the world, and generally the Treasury would say that it has prioritised the international competitiveness of our financial sector in the global market. It has held that in greater reverence than domestic competition that serves the needs of the people—your constituents, your businesses and the productive UK economy.
I think it is in Parliament’s interests to think about how we set up processes for greater scrutiny and about engaging civil society actors in that as well. I would have thought that quite a few people sitting within those regulatory bodies would welcome that. They are under immense stress from the last 10 years of post-crash change. As I mentioned, they are subject to legal challenge from the industry.
Although, ideally, there would be greater scrutiny in Parliament, and I think that a Joint Committee would be good, some of the amendments that have been tabled on specifics, such as an annual review of capital regulation requirements, are really great additions—I hope the amendment on that will go through.
I also think that we need to ensure that the regulators are given the right direction for financial services, which is why I would also welcome the amendment that was put to us about this Government’s strategy for financial services. As I said, we are at a kind of crossroads, and understanding what direction the Government want to take it in is critical for the regulators. I support a lot of the amendments that have been put forward. Setting up a new Select Committee or some kind of Joint Committee is also a strong proposal.
Mr McFadden
Q
Jesse Griffiths: I think it is extremely important that there should be some Committee, whether it is a financial services Committee or some other way of doing it, that gives Parliament that role. That could be operationalised in a number of different ways, but it should be done in a way that makes sure that consideration is given to the way the Bill and, I presume, future legislation delegate a lot of power to the Treasury and the regulators to change, through secondary legislation, regulations that were previously agreed jointly between the European Parliament and the European Council. Some kind of check that that has been done in the correct way, and that it has been done with regard to the fundamental purposes of that legislation, is the role that the Committee would fulfil.
Obviously it would need more resources, which is a key lesson from the European experience. You are right to say that it is not an easy thing to do, nor is it something that can be done in addition to what is already being done by the Treasury Committee, for example. Resources is a key point.
The second key point, of course, is that such a Committee, and potentially the Bill and some of the amendments that have been referenced, can allow the regulators to report and explain more clearly why they are making certain changes, so that is a useful transparency and information point. The third point is that, without such parliamentary oversight, it becomes extremely difficult for civil society organisations such as ours, which are trying to ensure that the voice of the environment and social issues are raised in financial sector regulation, to be heard as effectively as other voices that are trying to influence that regulation. So it helps to create a better balance of lobbying, if you like, or of advocacy in this area.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Jesse Griffiths: One of the main issues that we would have loved to have seen in the Bill—I recognise that it would be outside the scope to introduce it now—is a proportionate regulatory regime for mutual banks. One thing that is important, or one problem that is very evident in the UK financial sector, is its lack of diversity of institutions. Across Europe, co-operative banks have an average of more than 25% of assets, and in the UK they were not even legal until 2014. The mutual banking movement is now trying to establish that vital part of the system that would help to improve services for customers, improve competitiveness and bring important countercyclical and social and environmental benefits. That would have been nice, given that the Bill recognises that there is a need for a different regime for investment firms from banks, for example. There is a huge unmet need for a more proportionate regime for those institutions. That would be my wish list of what might have been in the Bill. Perhaps as part of the Bill discussions, we might get a commitment to consult on such a proportionate regime.
Of course, the other point to make here—to repeat some of the points we have made about social and environmental purpose and accountability—is that the main issues with the Bill are the things that are missing that could make it much more ambitious and set a much better precedent for financial sector regulation going forward.
Finally, one issue that is worrying to us is the danger of a return to framing the purpose of financial regulation as being about the competitiveness of the UK financial sector globally. That appears in a few places in the Government’s explanatory notes to the Bill. The key point is to make a distinction between competition, which is good, and competitiveness, which can be dangerous when applied as a principle for regulation. Framing regulation within that competitiveness framework is widely recognised as one of the main contributors to the global financial crisis. It was easy to make the case for relaxing regulation to make any particular financial sector more competitive compared with others, when actually I think what we want to establish, through the Bill and other actions, is that the UK financial sector will seek to set high standards and to be the leader in that, not to introduce a competitiveness framing that raises the risk of standards being lowered.
Fran Boait: I can build on that. I agree with a lot of what Jesse has said. For us, the overarching areas are accountability and seeing more that it in the Bill, the environmental, social and governance aspects, and the purpose. On that last point, while we understand the Bill is onshoring and tidying up, as I have said before, it sets the direction, and that strategy for the financial services sector has not been laid out by the Government. I think that is key because, as Jesse has mentioned, it is concerning to see competition and competitiveness in there—in the run-up to the crash, that was shorthand for deregulation—at the same time as handing a lot of power to regulators. Again, it is worth noting that the FCA chief executive said himself that they would prefer high standards to the idea of competition, so there is support for that. Making the direction clear is critical.
On a few specifics that have been left out, over the last few years Positive Money has been working on things such as access to cash and the need to protect people’s right of payment in different ways—I noted that there were a few questions on that—and thinking about financial inclusion. Thinking more about the financial services’ role in the wider UK economy is absolutely critical at this time, and there is not too much in the Bill in terms of the direction of that.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Fran Boait: I welcome the Help-to-Save scheme, but again, I point to the wider issue—it is the focus of what Positive Money does—of how the financial services sector contributed to the global crash, which has undermined a lot of our economy in terms of people being able to meet living standards, pay bills and so on. Critically, we have to understand that where the money goes from financial services really determines that shape of the UK economy. If most of the money goes into property and financial markets, which it does, and we have four big banks occupying pretty much the whole market in the UK, as Jesse mentioned, we have an economy that has an oversized finance sector and property bubbles, and we have less money going into creating jobs, supporting small and medium-sized businesses and getting into people’s wages. We have a crisis of living standards in this country, as well as a household debt crisis. I am not a debt specialist, but I welcome some of the changes put forward for breathing space and debt repayments.
Again, we need not only to look at fixing some of the symptoms, but to think about the cause. I sound a bit like a broken record, but this is why, unless we get a grip on the direction of the financial services sector that we want—whether we want financial services to serve the UK domestic economy and not just international financial markets—I do not see us really stemming the problems with problem debt, limited savings and incredibly low savings across low-income households in the short, medium and long term.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Jesse Griffiths: Before I turn to the risks, I want to recognise that it is not the case that more regulation is better or that regulators should not have leeway to design proportionate regimes. That is absolutely not the case, and we need to recognise that. However, I think there are risks involved in turning over quite so much authority to regulators as the Bill proposes. As we mentioned, it will allow them to make changes to important regulations with limited parliamentary oversight. Secondary legislation will become one of the main ways in which regulations are changed.
The risks come from different angles. The obvious risk—we have seen this in the past in the run-up to the global financial crisis—is that there is a potential problem of regulatory capture, where the regulators become very close to the people they are regulating, who have regular discussions and meetings with them. The more those decisions take place behind closed doors, the greater that risk becomes.
From our perspective, another big risk is that you miss out on the opportunities to have a broader section of voices contribute to framing regulatory changes, from the kind of organisations that Fran mentioned, which represent the people who are the most badly affected by problems in the financial sector—those with problem debt or who are highly financially vulnerable—to those who think about the environmental impacts of the different regulations. The other risk is that we will not be able to reflect some of the most important impacts that changes in regulation will have.
I will make one final point. It is extremely important for Members to think about how they can actively encourage participation and engagement in those discussions by more of the groups that represent those affected by the financial system. This is in no way a criticism of the Treasury, which I know has a lot on its plate now, but there was an important consultation we noted over the summer that had a one-month consultation window during August, which basically made it impossible for groups that are not directly involved in that particular issue to think about the implications and whether they should contribute. Having requirements to consult in a certain way that allows more groups to participate would be useful.
The Chair
I have seen two other Members indicating. First, I will come to Abena Oppong-Asare.
Abena Oppong-Asare (Erith and Thamesmead) (Lab)
Q
I want to clarify something you mentioned, which is that there should be an element of penalising large organisations for not carrying out environmental risk assessments. As we know, there are large organisations and companies such as Barclays that do that. I wanted to hear from you about how those penalties would be carried out. Are they financial ones? The concern that I have is that big companies would be able to afford to pay financial penalties, so is that really a great incentive or way of holding them to account?
Fran Boait: This idea is really in the capital requirements regulation, the idea being that financial institutions and banks lending towards high-carbon sectors would have to hold much more capital against that loan. I agree with the concern that they would maybe go ahead and do it anyway, but I think this is an important mechanism for pricing in climate risk, which has taken off in the past couple of years. There is obviously a recognition from the Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England that climate risk is a huge risk to financial stability—both transition risk and physical risk—so we need to think about that.
Implementing a penalising factor requiring them to hold higher capital should have an important effect. We have seen a similar thing already done in the housing system, which has not completely solved the problem because it is systemic, but it is an important step forward in regulation and really signals to the market that the regulators do want to keep control of the situation. It is not going to solve everything—it is not going to completely stop lending into the fossil fuel industry—but it is quite an important step forward.
The key here is that there should also be a mechanism for scrutinising the CRR that we are onshoring. At the moment, it seems to say, “We are not going to say what we are going to do. We are going to let the financial regulators decide what it is,” which is very dangerous. As Pat McFadden pointed out, it was capital and the lack of banks needing to hold it that resulted in the crash, and it will be the lack of banks needing to hold capital against fossil fuel lending that will keep that carbon bubble, if you like, being pumped up. I am keen to continue the conversation about wider regulation and other things that need to be done alongside that in order to ensure a transition out of fossil fuels, and towards a green economy.
Abena Oppong-Asare
Jesse, do you have any further comments?
Jesse Griffiths: Yes. I think it is another extremely important question, and it is an extremely important way to think about the impact of regulation, as being about what kind of incentives it places on different actors to behave differently.
With regard to climate, there are three key points. One is about disclosure: that is why, for example, we made the recommendation on the PRIIPs point that the key information document should have better disclosure on environmental and social governance issues. That creates an incentive between the sellers of those products and the investors buying them, and we know there is strong demand in the investment industry to know much more about those issues and try to redirect their investment towards greener ends. That is important. Disclosure is obviously also important in terms of civil society and the public understanding what different institutions are doing, and also the Government.
The second point on incentives is the point that Fran has made, which I would fully support. Finding ways to disincentivise or penalise fossil fuel investments in particular is extremely important. The scientific research shows us that if we exploit only those oil and gas reserves that are already being exploited, we will still go above the dangerous 1.5° threshold, without even taking coal into account. There really is not any room for further investment in fossil fuels, so it would be an important signal to think about how we fundamentally disincentivise that by introducing penalties for that within the capital requirements of organisations.
The third point is that this is a newish area for regulators. Although we have been thinking about it for a long time and many regulators have been discussing it, it is not like all the answers are known. We had a report a couple of years ago called “The Regulatory Compass”, which explored what it would look like if regulators put a social and environmental purpose at the heart of what they do. There is a lot to do, and a lot of thinking to do there. The first step is, through Bills such as this, giving regulators the responsibility to think about that. I think that is extremely important.
Those are the three main things. The fourth incentive point is that regulation does not solve everything, as Fran said. It is important not to try to solve all problems through this lens, but to think about all the other things that we should be doing—investing in the green future and so on—if we are to solve the climate crisis.
Abena Oppong-Asare
Q
Jesse Griffiths: You can. I do not have anything in particular to say that goes beyond the evidence from StepChange and others on this point. I fully support what they said.
Fran Boait: Similarly, a point that StepChange brought up that it is critical to keep in mind when looking at this kind of regulation is how we look at debtors and the stress and strain that they are under. We need to ensure that their needs are prioritised above those of creditors.
Earlier I made a macroeconomic point about financial services: unless we get our financial services sector better aligned with the needs of the people, small businesses and different parts of the economy in this country, household debt will keep rising. Obviously, we also need good direction from the Government’s fiscal spending plan. The direction of financial services and the direction of Government spending are critical in tackling household debt. If we do not look at some of those underlying systemic causes, we will keep kicking the can down the road, in terms of household debt being a problem. Although changes such as breathing space are welcome, they do not tackle the underlying causes and the need to get the number of people in problem debt down.
Stella Creasy
Q
Jesse Griffiths: Yes, I think that is very sensible. The main point I would make is that those institutions are very different from other types of financial institution, and need a proportionate regulatory regime. The point that you raised is important. They frequently raise the idea of establishing a network of 18 regional banks on the model of the German Sparkasse system. For that to work, they would need to centralise IT and other services so they do not have to replicate those across the different institutions. As they have, embedded in the network idea, an agreement that they will not compete with each other, they can fall foul of competition regulations, so those would need to be considered.
Those are some of many examples that show you need a different regime for these types of institutions. On following a model like the Sparkasse system, in Germany those regional institutions are jointly responsible for each other, so that creates a very powerful incentive for them to be prudent and responsible lenders. If that internal incentive is already there, you should consider which other regulations are not so necessary for those institutions because, by their nature, they are highly prudent lenders.
Stella Creasy
Q
You and Fran talked powerfully about trying to ensure that this Bill has at its heart a positive approach to consumer regulation. Perhaps one of the things missing from it is consideration of its inevitable impact on consumers. Do you have a view about the benefits of reviewing how the Financial Conduct Authority has acted for consumers, and are there are areas where you think it could have gone further and been more proactive? The Bill gives the FCA new regulatory powers. I have an interest in high-cost credit. If we wanted the FCA to take a more proactive view in using these new regulatory powers for consumers, where would you want it to act?
Fran Boait: That is a great question. To build on what Jesse said about mutuals and your wider point about consumer regulation, the issue with our financial services regulation is that all regulation tends to favour the status quo—the incumbents. That is where Parliament’s voice is so crucial, as is having more of a civil society voice than we had pre-crash. It might not be obvious how the FCA regulates a mutual bank. Without direction from Parliament that the regulator’s purpose is to look at diversifying the UK banking or financial services sector to include different ownership models, the FCA is not really in a position to understand fully or quickly, or move fast on how it can support the emergence of new banks.
On banks and consumers, since the crash, we have seen all these challenger banks coming in, but they are operating very much the same model of a shareholder bank, with short-term profits, and without any kind of wider thought for environmental or social mission-driven aims, or regional considerations. We have not really diversified the sector, and it will be very challenging for us to do so unless the regulators think differently. I think that Jesse and I agree that one of their goals should be to diversify the sector’s ownership models, in terms of mission, geographic location and so on. For consumers, and especially someone setting up a new local co-op or small business, that would be a lot better, particularly as we emerge from the pandemic wanting to build back better.
I definitely support a lot of your work on high-cost credit, but although there were some wins on payday loans and in other areas, that issue tended to be transferred to other areas, such as credit cards; some good proposals were put forward on how to regulate those. Obviously, we hope to see the FCA moving fast on trying to ensure that regulation is put forward as quickly as possible where there is a clear issue with extremely high interest rates on high-cost credit.
I repeat that we need to bring this back to the systemic problem of such a large sector of society being on low pay with high living costs. We need to think about the underlying macroeconomic issues, which are very relevant to the direction of financial services. If we are serious about taking things in a more positive direction as we emerge from the pandemic and Brexit, we need more voices for consumer rights in financial services, and for environmental and social considerations. That will be critical if we are to see a more positive direction from financial services, in terms of serving consumer needs.
Stella Creasy
Q
Jesse Griffiths: Absolutely; I agree. On consumers, to bring this back to high-cost credit—this links to the point about the purpose of regulation—regulators should always have at the front of their mind the impact on the most vulnerable people in society, and those who are in many ways excluded by the financial system. This is not just about consumers as a whole, although they are important; it should be about those consumers who will lose most if their needs are not taken into account.
One example that we have been discussing are the new regulations on open banking and open finance, which can lead to further exclusion of marginalised people, who might get their income, withdraw it as cash, and operate in the cash economy, or who often—this has been raised—get income from a lot of different sources, and in such small amounts that it is not recognised as income by the open banking system, as it is set up. Those are just small examples, but if the regulator is not thinking, “What is the impact on these people?”, they get missed. Unfortunately, in that example, it feels a bit like that discussion has been, “Well, if it works for 95% of consumers, then it is good.” If it does not work for 5%, that is probably the biggest impact that we should care about.
The Chair
I thank both witnesses for their evidence. Our final panellist is poised and ready to go, so thank you, Jesse and Fran.
Examination of Witness
Hon. Albert Isola MP gave evidence.
The Chair
We have a treat now. Every other word seems to have been “Gibraltar” this afternoon. Our final witness is the hon. Albert Isola, Minister for Digital and Financial Services in Her Majesty’s Government of Gibraltar. Minister, thank you for being with us. Will you introduce yourself for the record?
Albert Isola: I am Albert Isola. I am charged with responsibility for financial services in Her Majesty’s Government of Gibraltar. I have with me the chief executive of Gibraltar Finance, who has driven much of the work on the matters under discussion today, and Mr Julian Sacarello, who is the head of policy at the Gibraltar Services Commission. You cannot see them, but they are in the room with me.
John Glen
Q
Albert Isola: I thank you and your team in the Treasury, as well as the regulators at the PRA and the FCA, who have engaged with us over a three-year process of looking at all the areas of market access, all the challenges and opportunities, and how, post Brexit, we can best replicate what we had under the European Union, as that ends and we begin something new. It has been an interesting and almost enjoyable journey. It has been extremely hard work, but the professionalism of your team has been exemplary, and I am extremely grateful to all of them for the conversations that we have had. Sometimes they were difficult, but they were always positive and proactive in looking for solutions, for which I am extremely grateful.
On the relationship between Gibraltar and the United Kingdom on financial services, it is important to remember that when the United Kingdom joined the European Union in 1973, because the United Kingdom was responsible for Gibraltar’s external relations, we joined with you. As a consequence of that, for many years, up until 2001, we were striving to enjoy the benefits of that membership. With that came the responsibilities of adhering to the many directives and complying with regulations that were passed from Brussels.
We talk about 28 or 27 member states, but there was another competent authority, the Gibraltar Financial Services Commission, in financial services; it was able to issue a banking licence, an insurance licence or any other financial services licence in exactly the same way as all the other competent authorities within the remainder of the European Union. I ask the Committee to think through the fact that Gibraltar has complied with all European Union directives and legislation in all areas, including financial services. That includes all the anti-money laundering perspectives, which you may wish to discuss later.
For all intents and purposes, Gibraltar and the UK, from a financial services perspective, are aligned. We have the same rules. As we discussed with your teams over the past few years, this is about outcomes—where we get to, and how we get there. We have been through a very long assessment with an independent contractor that was jointly engaged by Her Majesty’s Government and the Government of Gibraltar to deep-dive into insurance, which is the largest area of interest between the United Kingdom and Gibraltar, to analyse in enormous detail, and to conduct a sort of gap analysis of whether we were getting to the same outcomes. Where we felt that we were not, we have dealt with that.
Parallel to that process, we also had what you call the legislative reform programme, which was a three-year piece of work, which started before Brexit, to completely redo our financial services legislation. Before, we had 87 pieces of legislation; we now have one Financial Services Bill, which encompasses everything, and is far more aligned to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 than we were previously.
This legislation came into play in January this year. Section 20(2) refers to the Gibraltar regulatory regime aligning its standards and supervisory practices with that of the United Kingdom. We had that before, and we again have it in 2020. We are drawing closer together under the new regime that we are discussing; that relationship should continue and prosper, so that consumers in the United Kingdom can have more choice and competition. At the same time, we can know that our aligned standards of law and practice match those of the United Kingdom. I apologise if I have gone on a bit long, but I thought it was important to put today’s discussions in context.
Mr McFadden
Q
Albert Isola: The fundamental question for us is, do we continue to have market access? The answer to that, of course, as you know, is yes. As you have rightly pointed out, we lose single market access to the remainder of the European Union with the United Kingdom on 1 January, and this is where we will look for our future. If I can put it a slightly different way, some 90% of our financial services business before Brexit was with the United Kingdom, so that puts in focus how important this legislation is for all of us here. In each of the different areas in which we have worked, we have developed a niche—an area of specialisation and expertise—that has served those who work here with us well. We very much hope that that will continue into the future.
Mr McFadden
Q
Albert Isola: As the Minister with responsibility for financial services, I would love to see our businesses grow —of course I would—but responsibly and in a manner that matches the standards that we have with the United Kingdom in terms of the regulatory approach. The reason that we have been successful in motor insurance is because we have developed expertise and specialisations in the firms that have come here. It is not that we switched on one morning and had 20% of the United Kingdom motor market; that has grown over a 15-year period. As they have grown, so have we, in terms of the business we do with the UK. There are a number of other businesses that have tried in other areas of insurance, and they do well, but with nothing like the success that the motor insurers have enjoyed in working with the UK.
Mr McFadden
Q
Albert Isola: My experience, put quite simply, is that of all the firms that have come and set up here in the last seven years while I have been in this job, not one of them has ever said they are coming for tax purposes. There is a tax differential—I think the rate of the UK’s corporate tax, or profit tax, is 19%; in Gibraltar, it is 10%—but that has never been cited as one of the reasons for setting up in Gibraltar.
It is far more about our agility as a jurisdiction and the accessibility of the regulator. I can arrange to meet every single insurance company in Gibraltar in two weeks if there is something that I would like them to do or be more conscious of. That is just not possible in the United Kingdom. The accessibility of our regulator for all our insurance firms is the No. 1 point that they measure as to why Gibraltar has been so good to them. They have that access and they have that contact. Then you have the expertise we have developed: the lawyers, the accountants, the insurance managers, who are able to provide the services that they need. These are far more important to the firms than the corporate tax. I have to say, if I may—allow me this plug—the quality of life is obviously important too. The sun shines here for a little longer than it does in the City of London, and I think that is important too.
Mr McFadden
I am sure it is; your weather is certainly better. I have no further questions. Thank you very much, Minister.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Albert Isola: Forgive me, I did not hear the question particularly well. Would you mind repeating it?
Alison Thewliss
Apologies; you are quite far away, I suppose. You mentioned that insurance is the largest area in which you have dealings. Are there any other aspects of financial services that are not covered in this Bill that require any further legislative action, or does the Bill cover everything that you require it to?
Albert Isola: This legislation is like the enabling legislation, if I can call it that. If I can just say what it does for us, this requires alignment of normal practice, and it also requires, as a secondary condition—if I can call it that—co-operation between regulators and between Governments. In terms of the aspect that you are referring to, what will actually happen post 1 January 2020, I expect, when we begin the serious work, is that we and the Treasury will work through each of the different activities that we wish to have to access to, to the United Kingdom. The Treasury will then satisfy themselves, or not, that we meet the standards required to be able to have those passed through a statutory instruments in 2022, as one of the subsets of the activities that we can do. Insurance will be one; banking will be another; funds will be another. All of these are different subsets of controlled activities regulated in the United Kingdom, which we will work on with the Treasury in the coming 12 months to satisfy it of our ability to meet and match the standards that we have discussed here today.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Albert Isola: No, not at all, but again, simply because today we can passport our services under the European Union or Gibraltar order, mirroring the European Union provisions. We both have the same rules today: that is obviously true in insurance, in banking, and in the funds sector. We all have the same rules and regulations today, so I have every confidence that we will meet the standards that the Treasury will ask us to meet in the next 12 months in each of those different areas, because we are at one already today.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Albert Isola: Yes, because we need to be aligned in terms of authorisations, supervision, capital finance and enforcement, so the whole array of measures that a UK consumer can expect to receive in the United Kingdom, they can fully expect to receive from us also.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Albert Isola: No, no, absolutely not. On the contrary, as the UK moves in whichever direction it moves post 1 January 2021, whether there is divergence or not, we will obviously, in respect of the areas that we seek market access, follow those through.
The Chair
Stephen Flynn, could you make your way to the mic and speak right into it? That one will work, although it has Duncan Hames’s name by it.
Stephen Flynn (Aberdeen South) (SNP)
Q
Thank you, Minister Isola, for presenting yourself before us today and for the information that you have provided. I would like to follow on from the shadow Minister’s questions about the competitive advantage that Gibraltar may or may not have. As I see it, the Bill seeks to create a level playing field, but it could be inferred that Gibraltar has a competitive advantage over our constituent parts of the United Kingdom—indeed, the home nations—given that it has abilities in relation to corporation tax and other forms of taxation that the home nations do not. How would you assess that? I appreciate that you sought to answer Mr McFadden in that regard, but do you feel that we could see a situation in which businesses will seek to take advantage of what is clearly a level playing field with a competitive advantage for yourselves?
Albert Isola: The simple answer is no, and I will tell you why. If you think about it, we have been setting our own tax rates for the past 20 years, during which we have had access to the United Kingdom market through the European Union single passporting system. I do not think that I have ever heard any discussion in the financial services environment about different tax rates in different member states of the European Union, let alone Gibraltar, having an impact. It is not as if an advantage were being created by the Bill that would endure to 1 January next year and beyond. Where we are today is where we have been for the past 10 or 15 years with different tax systems.
I do not think that you will find a company that—with the level of investment that it requires in terms of capitalisation, particularly with respect to insurance—will make a judgment call on a difference of 9% in corporate tax, assuming that it can make a profit. As I said to the shadow Minister, the information that I have from the firms that have come here is that that is very low on their list of priorities, if it is there at all. I do not see it having the impact that you suggest; if there were such an impact, it would already have happened a long time ago. As I mentioned, the firms that are in Gibraltar today have been here for a very long time, and as they have grown, so have we. Our market share has been 20% for the past year or two; it was a lot less before those businesses grew and became more successful.
The Chair
As there are no further questions, I thank you, Minister, for joining us remotely from Gibraltar as our final witness of the day. This is the end of our fourth and last evidence session.
The Committee will meet again, not here but in Committee Room 14, on Tuesday at 9.25 am—bright-eyed and bushy-tailed for our first sitting of line-by-line scrutiny.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(David Rutley.)
Financial Services Bill (Fifth sitting)
Tuesday 24th November 2020
(4 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Financial Services Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 24 November 2020 - (24 Nov 2020)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
Before we begin, I have a few preliminary points to make, some of which you will have heard before. Please switch electronic devices to silent; tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings and, again, I remind everyone about the importance of social distancing and thank you all for complying with that. The Hansard reporters would be grateful if Members could email any electronic copies of their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk.
Today, we begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room and shows how the selected amendments have been grouped together for debate. Amendments grouped together are generally taken on the same or a similar issue, and decisions on amendments do not take place in the order they are debated, but in the order they appear on the amendment paper. The selection and grouping list shows the order of debates; decisions on each amendment are taken when we come to the clause that the amendment affects.
If a Member wishes to press to a Division an amendment that is not the lead amendment in a group, it would be helpful to indicate that in advance. I will use my discretion to decide whether to allow a separate stand part debate on individual clauses and schedules, following the debates on the relevant amendments. We start with clause 1 and amendment 19.
Clause 1
Exclusion of certain investment firms from the Capital Requirements Regulation
Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 19, in clause 1, page 2, line 21, at end insert—
“(7A) The Secretary of State must, within three years of this Act being passed, prepare, publish and lay before Parliament a report on the impact of the amendments to the Capital Requirements Regulation made by this section and Schedule 1 to this Act.
(7B) The report must assess the impact on—
(a) financial stability;
(b) competitiveness; and
(c) consumer risk.”
This amendment would ensure that, where departures from current capital requirements take place, the Government carries out a review of the impact on competitiveness and consumer risk.
Thank you for your chairmanship today, Mr Davies. With your indulgence, I would like to explain to the Minister broadly the approach we are going to take with these amendments. A number will be about reviewing, producing reports, parliamentary accountability and so on. Another number get into the accountability framework for the regulators and that “have regard to” list, and we will want to explore that quite deeply. Then there will be another set around the later parts of the Bill, relating to the savings provisions, the debt scheme and so on. That might help the Minister and the Committee to understand broadly where we are coming from when we move these amendments.
This first amendment, amendment 19 to clause 1, is in the first of those groups. Clause 1 exempts certain categories of investment firms from the requirements of the capital requirements regulation. This amendment explores what the effect of that might be and not only our right to know that effect, but our obligation to understand it. The reason we tabled this amendment is that capital, or the lack of it, was at the heart of the financial crisis. The banks that keeled over were over-leveraged and behaved as though a rainy day would never come. In fact, it is estimated that when the financial crisis hit, Royal Bank of Scotland, which was one of the biggest banks in the world at the time, was leveraged to a degree of about 50:1, so they had very little cushion of resilience for when more troubled times came.
The Basel II rules, which were in place at the time, failed to stop either the collapse or the public’s having to step in—through taxpayers and Governments around the world—to bail out the sector. Last week, when we were taking oral evidence on the Bill, I quoted Paul Volcker, the former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, who gave evidence in this House about a senior banker who had told him that his bank did not need any capital at all, that money could always be borrowed on the wholesale markets and that the banks could operate without capital. The crash proved that not to be true. The banks need capital. They need a cushion. That is not just their insurance policy, it is ours—it is the public’s insurance policy too.
Following the crash, the world’s regulators, whether in the United States, the UK or the European Union, set out to solve the problem of “too big to fail”, which has been characterised as privatising the profits and nationalising the risks, and developed a new set of capital requirements for banks and financial institutions. It was designed to make them more resistant to downturns. Those rules, on a global level, are set out in the Basel III process, now revised to the Basel 3.1 process, in the CRR and in the actions of national regulators. That is important, because the Basel rules should not be regarded as a maximum when it comes to the safety of our financial institutions. They should be regarded as a floor.
Most banks and regulators will say that today they hold significantly more capital against their loan books and that they are better equipped to handle a downturn or economic shock than they were 12 years ago. That is broadly true. Banks are better capitalised now than they were. However, they do not all like that situation, in truth. They will also say—I am sure that some banks tell the Minister and the regulators—that if only they did not have to hold so much capital they could lend more. They may well be saying that more loudly during the covid situation, when, as we see light at the end of the tunnel, we want to get the economy moving again. The smaller banks and new entrants will complain about being held to the same capital rules as larger and more established institutions. They will argue that that is a barrier to market entry and that it acts to reinforce the oligopoly in the UK where there are four or five major high street institutions, which it is difficult for new entrants to compete against. Other institutions will complain of being held to the same rules as deposit-taking institutions, which is part of the exemptions in clause 1, arguing that the character of their business is different.
Clause 1, as I have said, equips the regulator to respond to some of those points. We are not only onshoring, as it were, the capital requirements regulation, we are making provision, through the clause and other subsequent clauses, for the regulators to depart from it. Of course, departure from a common rulebook is a consequence of Brexit. Indeed, some might argue that it is the whole point. The clause allows it, and it is important that the Committee understands that the amendment would not prevent it. Neither does it seek to relitigate the referendum or to prevent the common rulebook to which we have subscribed for many years from ever being changed. That is not what the Opposition are saying. We are saying that, Brexit or not, and inside the EU or not, capital requirements still matter and they are there for a reason.
I would argue that for the UK the need for financial resilience is even greater than it is for most economies. We are a medium-sized economy with a huge financial sector. The consequences of that sector getting into deep trouble are potentially all the greater for our economy than for some others. Having a big financial sector is in many ways a great strength, of course. It brings employment, tax revenue and investment to the country, but it is a risk when it gets into trouble, as we found out in our recent history.
The other thing that we learned during the crash was how interconnected the system was. With so many institutions lending to and trading with one another, when one falls over the consequences for the whole system can be catastrophic. That old saying “The thigh bone’s connected to the knee bone” was certainly true during the financial crash, as it is of our interlocked and interdependent financial system. We therefore have a duty, at the very least, to be vigilant about capital requirements. They are, as I said, the public’s insurance policy against having to bear the costs of another crash or steep financial crisis. The changes that have been made since 2007 and 2008 through the CRR, the Basel rules and other steps are, as yet, untested. Yes, the regulators do conduct stress tests and scenarios about what would happen if employment rose to this level or GDP fell to that level, but these are inevitably not quite real-world exercises. They are as real as war games compared to the real thing.
All the amendment does is ask for a report from the Treasury after three years of the new regime. That report should cover the impact of any departure from the current capital requirements in three areas: financial stability, that is to say the overall health of the system, because we learned how interconnected it all was; competitiveness, which is built into the regulator’s aims in the Bill and is bound to be the argument for any changes to the capital requirement rules; and, importantly, consumer risk. If we are only thinking about the competitiveness of our financial institutions and not considering consumer risk, we have not learned from the financial crisis. That is the other side of the scales. We can make the system ultra-competitive by asking institutions to hold hardly any capital but that exposes the consumers and public to greater economic risk. That last point is crucial.
To recap, the amendment does not attempt to freeze the situation forever as it is now. It does not stop clause 1 doing what the Government want it to do. It does ask for a report on the consequences and broader issue of divergence from capital rules, should the regulator allow greater divergence in the future. We should not allow this regime to be set up and then opened up to all the banking and industry lobbying that is likely to take place without making sure we have a means of understanding the consequences of that. Given the importance of this sector for the UK economy, we should be careful of these consequences. By enshrining these in a report from the Treasury, we can ensure that Parliament and the public see the consequences of divergence. That is the purpose of amendment 19.
Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mr Davies. I rise to support the amendment. I think it is perfectly sensible that we make assessments and ensure that the changes the Government are putting in place are worth while and valid and that we keep a close eye on them, because of the very risks that the Labour Front-Bench spokesman set out. We cannot predict the future, but we can assess how things are going and make sure that neither consumers nor businesses are at risk. I support that very much and do not have much to add to his comprehensive speech.
Ms Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)
I repeat that is a pleasure to see you in the Chair today, Mr Davies—there will be a bit more of that as we make our way through the Bill. I support my right hon. Friend’s amendment, and want to tease out some of the Government’s intentions in this very technical Bill. We may not have known before 2008, but certainly know now, that highly technical things can be crashingly important if we do not keep a close eye on them. Given that we are now onshoring all these directives, and that the Government have decided, before the transition period is even over, in anticipation of changes to the capital requirements regimes, to diverge from what was put into UK law as part of the withdrawal agreement, I think the Minister owes us—I am sure he will be prepared to do this—a detailed explanation of what the Government perceive to be the advantages of diverging from rules that we had such a crucial part in writing when we were in the European Union.
It was certainly the case when I was a Minister, and I am sure it still is, that because of the relative size and importance of the financial services industry in the UK, our technocrats, if I can call them that, were always very involved in drawing up and agreeing the financial service directives that were in effect in the whole of the European Union. We used to have quite vigorous arguments with the European Union about the nature of some of that, given the slightly different culture that we have in the Anglo-Saxon world, if I can put it that way—the Minister knows what I mean—compared with some things that more routinely happen in the EU, and also because, frankly, our financial services sector is far larger than most financial services sectors within the EU and differs in its make-up. There were always these cultural issues.
However, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, there was widespread recognition and agreement—not only in the Basel III and 3.1 regulatory negotiations and how those agreements were put into EU law, which we are talking about now—about what had gone wrong; about needing to identify systemically important companies and make sure they were regulated appropriately, given the risk that under-capitalisation posed to the economies of countries in which those organisations were based; and about having rigorous and intrusive regulation to avoid some of the mistakes and traps that were fallen into in the run-up to 2008.
I am particularly interested in—I hope the Minister will explain it—how this will work, given that the Bill gives our regulators the power to change what has just been onshored to create a completely different system for investment firms, and then to take that forward in future regulation. We know that we have to be eternally vigilant to the way that companies evolve to respond to regulatory systems. If we end up fighting the previous battle, we will probably miss the next bubble. I would therefore appreciate it if the Minister—in commenting on the amendment, which is probing, in that sense—will explain how he believes that the regime that the Bill introduces will be able to respond to the challenges of the evolution of threats. Once the nature of what had been going on during the financial crisis was laid bare—a lot of it had been going on under the radar—one of the surprises was the connection between investment companies and banks, particularly the investment arms of banks. We discovered their trading of derivatives and the leverage they got out of those derivatives to make more money for themselves, more commission and more remuneration. Actually, a lot of what was in those derivatives was not sighted, and the regulation had essentially involved taking on trust the rating agencies’ assessments of what those derivatives were worth, without looking inside the packages.
The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (John Glen)
I would like to take this opportunity, at the beginning of the Committee scrutiny stage, to say what a pleasure it is to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Davies, and to consider this important legislation with all Committee members. I welcome the opening comments of the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East, who described how the Opposition will approach the eight sittings over the next two weeks. I also broadly acknowledge and agree with virtually all of the comments that he and the hon. Member for Wallasey made in respect of the history of financial services regulation, and I look forward to responding to the points made and to a wide-ranging and constructive discussion over the next two weeks.
As I set out on Second Reading, this Bill forms an important part of the Government’s wider strategy for financial services at this critical moment, as we approach the end of the transition period. I just want to say at the outset that financial services, as some of us know––I look particularly to the hon. Member for Glasgow Central who has been in multiple Committees with me over the last three years––is necessarily a complex topic with a sometimes impenetrable vocabulary of its own. I will do my utmost to ensure that, in speaking to the Bill and any Government amendments, my comments are as clear, accessible and accurate as possible. Please feel free to challenge me on this and if at any point Committee members feel that I have fallen short of that ambition, I look forward to trying to correct that.
Let me move to amendment 19. The Government are fully committed to ensuring that any delegation of responsibility to the regulators is accompanied by robust accountability and scrutiny mechanisms. Members referred to divergence and regard to consumer interests. The differentiation between different categories of firms depends on an assessment of eight systemically important firms that will continue to be the responsibility of the Prudential Regulation Authority. Amendment 19 seeks to add a requirement for the Secretary of State to publish a report within three years of this Act, including an assessment of the impact of amendments to the capital requirements regulation on financial stability, competitiveness and consumer risk.
The amendments to the capital requirements regulation tell only a small part of the story. The Bill amends the capital requirements regulation to remove Financial Conduct Authority investment firms from the scope of the banking regime. The more important story will be told by the FCA’s rules that implement the investment firms prudential regime. I want to be absolutely clear on the point about divergence. Obviously, as we get towards the end of the transition period, we will get to a point where we have left the EU and the provisions of alignment within the transition period. Therefore these measures reflect the reality of where we will be on 1 January. As the hon. Member for Wallasey said, the UK’s regulators, Ministers and officials played an instrumental role, given the size of the UK financial services industry, in shaping those regulations on an EU-wide basis. But it is surely only appropriate that, when we have left the alignment provisions of the transition period—and rightly so—we should look to actually govern and set the regulatory environment that suits the particular needs of our industry. The configuration of that industry, as was understood in the speeches that have been made, is different.
When the FCA does implement the IFPR, the Bill requires the FCA to demonstrate how it has regard to several considerations, which I shall set out now. First it must have regard to relevant international standards: Basel 3.1. That goes to the point about the relative standing of the UK. The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East made a point about the risk around individual firms lobbying for differentiated treatment. It is right that the regulators are responsive to the needs of the UK industry, but they are also accountable to those international standards––the relative standing of the UK––in addition to the current statutory objectives under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to protect consumers and the integrity of the UK financial system.
This approach aligns with the March 2020 House of Lords EU Financial Affairs Sub-Committee recommendation to delegate more power to the regulators, underpinned by more and strengthened parliamentary scrutiny. We are delegating this to regulators because they have the technical expertise, not the Government. The Bill’s reporting provisions should provide the information that Parliament is seeking. This amendment would create a duplication of efforts by the regulator and the relevant Departments on undertaking such an assessment.
Ms Eagle
I want to come back on that and press the Minister on a couple of questions that, with all due respect, I do not think he answered in his response. Clearly, our amendment is a hook on which to hang a debate about transparency, so that we know what the regulators are doing, and about accountability, because, as I said earlier, if these organisations begin to respond to particular inducements, such as their own remuneration, they can cause risk to happen in a way that can be severely detrimental to consumers and entire economies, as we have seen in recent history. I think that, in the light of that, we are perhaps owed a little more of an explanation from the Minister—I am putting this gently—about what the approach of the regulators will be. The Minister can stand there and say, “The regulators are going to right-size regulation.” That sounds like a fantastic thing because of the very phrase that the Minister has used—“right-size”—but how are they deciding?
We clearly got the wrong size because of evolutionary behaviour to avoid regulation and increasingly risky behaviour in the global financial system in the run-up to the global financial crisis in 2008, which was caused by or began in the subprime mortgage market in America but which brought most of the—if I can put it this way—western-style banking systems close to ruin in the rest of the very interconnected economy because of what had been happening with derivatives. Therefore I wonder whether the Minister might be able to say a little more about the benefits of having the regime that he called right-sized regulation; why we might wish to move away from the current position so quickly after the transition period is over; and what he sees as the benefits of doing this. Refusing our amendment means that there will be no transparent analysis of the effect on the public domain, so we will not be able to discuss it.
I for one think it is important to get these very technical, dry regulations out into the open and to translate them, with the seriousness they deserve, into the potential implications that they present for all our constituents. Our amendment seeks to do that by at least having a transparent publication of these kinds of analyses. The Minister wants to keep it in the regulators’ ambit, in which there is not so much light, to be honest. It is highly technical, and it is hard for those on the outside to have a look inside to see what the implications are. I have hardly had any correspondence from outsiders on the Bill to help me through the long hours and sittings to come. That rather illustrates my point: that a light needs to be shone on this area, because of the risks if we get it wrong.
The Minister rightly wants to get it right, but surely it is relevant to hear from him and to have a bit of transparency, and to put something on the record now about how he sees the advantages playing out, as opposed to the risks. Will he have another go?
John Glen
I am very happy to have another go. The hon. Lady is at risk of suggesting that there is somehow a clumsy, rushed delegation to regulators and a risk that—in that delegation—the industry will influence regulators to right-size in a way that damages consumers. I draw her attention to the fact that the legislation gives the FCA responsibility to have regard to the impact on consumers, on the market and on firms—that is, the impact on themselves—of not having the appropriate capital requirements.
The right-sizing comment refers to the fact that the firms are currently bound by rules that align them to other institutions that are clearly functionally different. Nobody really believes that it would be right for there to be a prescriptive mandate from primary legislation on exactly how those technical rules and those capital requirements on a firm-by-firm basis should exist. The FCA has the right to reclassify firms and monitor that reclassification as firms evolve. The PRA will retain oversight of systemically important firms.
I contend that the Bill contains sufficient mechanisms to ensure public and parliamentary scrutiny of both the FCA and the Treasury through the draft affirmative procedure and the FCA reporting requirements. That combination of the FCA’s existing statutory duties and the “have regards” set out in the Bill cover the areas that amendment 19 seeks to address.
I make one further important point that goes to the heart of the wider regulatory framework. The future regulatory framework consultation that we launched on 19 October sets out over a 12-week period to look holistically at what should be the constitutional relationship between the FCA, the PRA, the Treasury and Parliament to embed an enduring accountability framework on a much broader basis. There will be another consultation subsequent to that. I anticipate that the response to the consultation might be, “Why haven’t you done this before?”. The bottom line is that the measures are required to meet international standards within an internationally determined timeframe of expectations. I declared on Second Reading that this is the first in a series of pieces of legislation, and I have always said so. This first piece of legislation sets the accountability framework for the initial measures.
Stella Creasy (Walthamstow) (Lab/Co-op)
I do not think any of us doubt the Minister’s intention to get this right and to recognise that these decisions have a consumer impact. The challenge, which I think we all see, is that it is one thing for the FCA to conduct a public consultation on high-cost credit firms, for example—he knows my specialist subject—but on something like LIBOR or the Basel regulations, which is less tangible but no less impactful, the argument he is making seems rather to strengthen the point the amendment makes about including consumer risk as one of the things to be reported on, because it does not immediately grasp people’s imagination until a catastrophe such as the last financial crisis happens. He says he envisages the FCA’s performing this role, so will he set out how he sees it performing that role if we do not say, “Actually, could we in a couple of years’ time get some information on how consumer risk has been identified and addressed in this process?”. That is harder to quantify, but no less important.
John Glen
I am very happy to respond to that point and I thank the hon. Lady for her comments. I recognise her expertise, particularly on high-cost credit, and I look forward to—I imagine—further amendments on that, perhaps next week.
The FCA will be required to publish an explanation of how having regard to the additional considerations that I have set out has affected the proposed rules that it comes up with. When the FCA makes those final rules, it will publish an explanation complying with them, as well as a summary of those new rules, aligned to the FSMA publication requirements.
The challenge here is a bit of a mismatch between the concerns that we have collectively in Parliament to maintain standards that will not allow a repeat of what the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East eloquently set out as the problem leading up to 2008 and to have regard to the enduring and ever-transforming consumer risks, which derive from rules and technical standards that we in this place are not well placed to deliver, given their design. What we must do subsequently with the future regulatory framework review—it is not some short, rushed exercise, but a deliberately open exercise of consultation to try to examine best practices—is to come up with something that gets that balance right between the direction that Parliament sets in primary legislation and the accountability to this place that will exist for our regulators, through the Treasury Committee and through potentially significantly enhanced accountability mechanisms.
However, setting out the enduring final framework of that relationship between the regulators and Parliament is the point of that consultation exercise. With respect to this measure, I believe that the accountability mechanisms set within it and the procedures set out will achieve the accountability that is necessary and appropriate at this stage.
The Chair
Before I call the shadow Minister, I say that one of his many qualities is that he is very softly spoken, which is not conducive to Committee Room 14 with social distancing in place, so I encourage him to speak up; I am sure that would be appreciated by all.
Mr McFadden
I am a softly spoken and moderate man; it has not always done me good, but I am on track here at the moment.
I want to respond to the Minister’s reasons for advising us not to press the amendment. I talked at the beginning about three pots of amendments, and it strikes me that there are really two or three pots of reasons why Ministers say no to amendments. The first is that the amendment is wrong or not competently written in some way. Pot two is that it has completely misunderstood the Bill and therefore is not just incompetently written, but actually wrong in its intent. Pot three is to say that it is covered anyway. Usually, if somebody is not going to say yes to an amendment, it falls into one of those categories. The Minister has gone for pot three today. He has not really argued that the amendment is wrong in its content or that there is anything wrong with the way it is written; he has argued that this kind of thing is covered anyway. There is a problem for us in accepting that.
Ms Eagle
Does my right hon. Friend agree that there is a fourth one, which is to say, “This should not be on the face of the Bill; we are going to do it, but we are going to put it in secondary legislation,” which of course is unamendable and usually rammed through this House in a way that makes scrutiny even harder?
Mr McFadden
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Perhaps there is even a fifth one, which is, “Wait for the consultation on something else.” The problem with going for pot three and saying the amendment is covered anyway is that that concedes that it would be completely harmless and there would be nothing wrong if it were accepted. The Government are, in effect, agreeing with its intent and saying they will do it.
John Glen
As ever, the UK remains committed to the highest level of regulatory standards. The UK is also committed to better regulation—regulation that is fit for purpose and appropriate to the risks, size and activities inherent to UK firms. At present, investment firms are supervised by either the FCA or—for those that are systemically important—the PRA. However, both currently operate under the same prudential regulatory regime as banks, which is not appropriate for non-systemically important investment firms. Such investment firms do not typically grant loans or accept deposits, so the risks they face and pose are different from those of banks.
A new, bespoke regime is required for investment firms, and the first step in that process is to remove non-systemically important FCA investment firms from the relevant regulations for banks. That is precisely what clause 1 does: it sets out the necessary amendments to remove FCA investment firms from the scope of the capital requirements regulation. Only credit institutions and PRA-designated investment firms will remain under the CRR. That is appropriate, as systemic investment firms pose similar risks to financial stability as the largest banks.
Clause 1 also introduces a definition of “designated investment firm” that recognises that only investment firms that conduct bank-like investment activities may be designated by the PRA as systemic institutions. As such, commodity dealers, collective investment undertakings and insurance undertakings that are not bank-like are excluded from the definition. That reflects the EU’s approach. The remaining investment firms—all FCA investment firms—will be regulated under the new investment firms prudential regime, which I will turn to when we debate clause 2 and schedule 2.
Clause 1 also amends the Capital Requirements (Country-by-Country Reporting) Regulations 2013. The amendments are necessary to ensure that FCA investment firms adhere to tax reporting requirements that are consistent with the new investment firms prudential regime, and not with the current banking regime. For example, the smallest FCA investment firms will be exempt from the reporting requirements, which is in line with the IFPR’s more proportionate application of regulatory requirements on the smallest firms.
Clause 1 is merely a first step in the introduction of the investment firms prudential regime, but it is a crucial step. I therefore recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr McFadden
I just have a couple of questions for the Minister. He described the rationale behind the clause, but can he tell us how many firms we are talking about? How many of the non-deposit-taking investment firms are likely to be exempt from the capital requirements regulations under the terms of the clause?
What is the Minister’s response to the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Wallasey and I have been trying to make about interconnectedness? He has advanced a reason as to why such investment firms should be treated differently, but how will the regulators cope with the interconnectedness of the system if companies are treated differently in that way?
Alison Thewliss
My concerns very much lie around the interconnectedness, because the system will be only as strong as the weakest part within it. If the weakest parts start to pull down everything else and make everything else unravel, we have a real problem on our hands.
My questions are about the monitoring of risk within the system that is being established. How can the Minister be certain that the risks are being closely monitored by the regulators, that the regulators understand the business that smaller firms are doing in their part of the market, and that the activities that those smaller firms are engaged in does not pose a risk to everything else? There is definitely cause for them to be monitored in order to have an eye kept on them, and to ensure that their activities do not cause wider risk. If attention is not being given to them, how can we ensure that their activities are above board and are not causing further risks anywhere else within the system?
How will the monitoring be scrutinised more widely by Parliament and others? The Treasury Committee gets the opportunity to question the regulators, but getting down to such a level of detail is not necessarily something that we would do. How does the Minister envisage Parliament having a role in that scrutiny in order to ensure that, should something happen or go wrong, we find out about it timeously rather than when it is too late to have any impact and when the whole thing has tumbled down?
Ms Eagle
Like the hon. Member for Glasgow Central, I am on the Treasury Committee. We have a very full programme. The hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford also shares the pleasures of being on the Treasury Committee. However, it would be very difficult for us to question the FCA with this level of granularity. Therefore, given the onshoring and the importance of this regime as it evolves, how does the Minister expect the transparency, oversight and accountability to be put in place going forward? Does he expect that to also include consumer authorities and the consumer interest, and will explain what he expects these companies to be able to do under this regime that they cannot do now?
John Glen
I am grateful for those questions, and I shall seek to bring some clarity. The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East asked me two questions about the numbers. I cannot give a specific number here, because it is fluid and would be something for the FCA to determine. I am sure the FCA would be very happy to give him an indication on that.
To the other point around interconnectedness, made by the hon. Member for Glasgow, Central as well, the classification will be based on the evolving nature of the activities, and this is something the FCA makes judgments on all the time. The PRA is responsible for eight systemically important institutions, covering Goldman Sachs and J. P. Morgan, among others, which are of a size and scale such that their interconnectedness means they are of systemic significance.
There are a lot of complex relationships between financial institutions. Therefore, as acknowledged by the hon. Member for Wallasey, as people who are technically capable of evaluating those interconnected elements, it is appropriate and in their interest to make those judgments, and that sort of decision making does go on currently.
The scrutiny process links back—I will not keep repeating it—to the point that the right hon. Gentleman made about the “Future Regulatory Framework Review”, which will look at the appropriateness in a situation where that scrutiny has previously happened at an EU level, through combined conversations, the Council of Ministers, work that is then is auto-uploaded to the regulators. What is the new mechanism to hold regulators accountable in a situation where they are given the task from this place? That would be the purpose of the extended regulatory review and future legislation. It may involve an enhanced role for the Treasury Committee, with additional resources to augment the expertise that already exists, but that is a matter for that consultation.
In answer to the question from the hon. Member for Wallasey about what I expect the companies will be able to do that they currently cannot, this comes back to some of the evidence we heard last week from the British Private Equity and Venture Capital Association, which says there is a wide family of firms with different activities. The question is: are the regulations as they apply at the moment—as fitted for 28 countries, where obviously some compromises were made—appropriate for the configuration of firms as they exist?
What I would expect to see is consideration given for capital requirements that match the actual profile of activities, notwithstanding the very legitimate points made around the interconnectedness and the risks associated with their broadest activities. I have stressed throughout the passage of this Bill so far, and I reiterate now, that the essential purpose of the Government’s approach is to ensure that we have the highest regulatory standards. Our reputation as a centre for financial services is based not on finding quick fixes that shortcut regulatory standards, but on finding something that fits the nature of our industry, aligned to international standards, that gives us the best opportunity to grow and prosper in a way that is safe and secure for consumers.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 1
Exclusion of certain investment firms from the Capital Requirements Regulation: consequential amendments
Question proposed, That the schedule be the First schedule to the Bill.
John Glen
Schedule 1 complements clause 1, in so far as it makes consequential amendments to the Capital Requirements Regulation 2013 and the Capital Requirements (Country-by-Country Reporting) Regulations 2013. For example, many of these consequential amendments remove references to the Financial Conduct Authority as the competent authority under the CRR in recognition of the fact that henceforth only the Prudential Regulation Authority will be responsible for regulating credit institutions and PRA-designated investment firms under the CRR. Taken together, these technical amendments achieve the aim of removing FCA investment firms from banking rules while keeping the most systemically important investment firms under the regulation and supervision of the PRA. I therefore recommend that the schedule be accepted.
Mr McFadden
I have just one question. The Minister mentioned country-by-country reporting, which we may come to at other points in the debate. Could he help the Committee by telling us what is covered in the country-by-country reporting? There is an ongoing and very live debate about what we expect multinationals to cover in country-by-country reporting in order to avoid tax arbitrage or transfers between countries that do not stand up to scrutiny. What are the things covered by country-by-country reporting in schedule 1?
Alison Thewliss
I just want to ask the Minister about the additional responsibilities in the schedule. When we took evidence last week, Sheldon Mills said:
“We can always do with more resources”.––[Official Report, Financial Services Public Bill Committee, 17 November 2020; c. 9, Q12.]
What further discussions has the Minister had about ensuring that the PRA and FCA are adequately resourced for these additional responsibilities? It is an awful lot of extra work. We are moving an awful lot of work over to them while they have covid and Brexit to look at too. I just wondered whether there had been any further detail about what additional resources might be available or required in the months and years ahead.
John Glen
I will come first, if I may, to the hon. Lady’s point about the resourcing of the FCA. It is resourced by a levy, which it determines. It is under review, but it is approved and set by the FCA. The hon. Lady has asked that question a number of times over the past 18 months. She is right to draw attention to the enormous pressure that the FCA is under, in terms of giving guidance about the forbearance measures for consumers and banks. That will be a matter for the FCA. I have six-weekly conversations with its chief executive officer. That is not a matter that he has raised with me, but it will be under review. I support it in what it needs to do to secure those resources.
The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East asked about the Capital Requirements (Country-by-Country Reporting) Regulations. They were designed to ensure that appropriate tax reporting regulations are imposed on firms regulated under the banking framework. They require firms to report relevant information on tax and revenue in each country that it has operations. An objective of the IFPR is to make regulations for FCA investment firms more proportionate to the risk, size and activities of those firms. That will be reflected in the country-by-country reporting. That will enable certain investment firms, such as the smallest FCA investment firms, to have reporting requirements consistent with their size and activities, and ensures that such firms are competitive. Furthermore, the smallest investment firms do not typically have overseas operations, making these requirement irrelevant for them. I cannot say any more about that at this point, but I am happy to follow up further if the right hon. Gentleman wishes to have information.
Question put and agreed to.
Schedule 1 accordingly agreed to.
Clause 2
Prudential regulation of certain investment firms by FCA rules
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr McFadden
I do not really have substantial questions at this stage, because schedule 2 sets out the detail, and I think we will probably have an extensive debate on it.
Ms Eagle
The clause inserts a new part 9C into the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which forms the legal basis for the new regime that the Bill introduces for investment companies. We have been talking about the minimum amount of capital required. We have covered some of that, although we will get further into it when we come to the Basel 3.1 bits.
Will the Minister say a bit about remuneration policies? That is another issue that will be regulated. We know from what happened in the financial crash and the build-up to that bubble that remuneration policies formed a key part of the bad incentives that created the behaviour that caused the crash. How will the Government be dealing with the regulators about remuneration? What will the principles be? Getting the right incentives for remuneration is a key driver for behaviour, and behaviour is a key driver for activities in that area, as we know only too well. If we did not know that from 2008, we would know it from the Wall Street crash in 1929. It is part of a set pattern. How will the Government ask the regulators to deal with that issue?
John Glen
I am happy to respond to that. The risk that the hon. Lady sets out—that, broadly, this country will go down a route where we deviate significantly from the new established norms of the regulation of remuneration and the rules around rewards and bonuses and so on—is a matter for which the regulator has responsibility. It will be incumbent on the Government to look at evolving best practice and the appropriate way to bring continuity to such regulations in line with those highest standards.
It is not our wish to create deviation for the sake of it. We will continue to look at the market situation. The point has been made already that we have to be alert to evolving new practices. In the same way, I think the hon. Lady would acknowledge that, in the light of the last crisis, there was an evolution in business models with respect to high-cost credit. There is always a risk in the sort of environment that we are in now that there will be new developments. I cannot prescribe precisely how we will look forward, but we will look to adhere to global high standards, because the integrity of our reputation relies on it.
Ms Eagle
I thank the Minister for his indulgence. Clause 2 is also partly about enforcing regulations; there are references to fraud and criminal offences, which again we will come to in more detail later. Will he let us know whether fraud enforcement will be beefed up? We can have a great regulatory regime and redefine fraudulent behaviour, but if enforcement is not up to scratch, that will not really deter. This is area where, if enforcement is too weak, the rewards are very high and the risk of being caught and prosecuted or fined is very low. Can he give some reassurance on that point at this stage?
John Glen
I am happy to. The hon. Lady makes a fair and reasonable point. We have to maintain the highest standards of regulation. The FCA and the PRA are extremely well respected globally, but that does not lead me as the Minister to be complacent. We must continually be vigilant about whether those standards of compliance and intervention into non-compliance are sufficient and adequate. We will always seek to maintain that.
To return to the principle, these capital requirements for firms are extremely detailed and technical. The regulators have the right expertise to update them. They will have increased responsibility, but they will need to consider the principles set out in the Bill. We are following the advice of the House of Lords Financial Affairs Sub-Committee, which said that these delegations would be appropriate. The broader conversation about the direction of travel around what sort of framework we wish to have in the UK is not fully addressed at this moment, but there will be more to say in the context of the response to the future regulatory framework two-stage review and the legislation we bring forward subsequently.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2
Prudential regulation of FCA investment firms
Mr McFadden
I beg to move amendment 20, in schedule 2, page 63, line, at end insert—
“(ba) the target for net UK emissions of greenhouse gases in 2050 as set out in the Climate Change Act 2008 as amended by the Climate Change Act (2050 Target Amendment) Order 2019, and”.
This amendment would require that, when making Part 9C rules, the FCA must have regard to the UK’s net zero 2050 goal and the legislation that has been passed in pursuit of this goal.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 39, in schedule 2, page 63, line 5, at end insert—
“(ba) the likely effect of the rules on the UK meeting its international and domestic commitments on tackling climate change, and”.
This amendment would ensure the likely effect of the rules on the UK meeting its international and domestic commitments on tackling climate change are considered before Part 9C rules are taken.
Amendment 24, in schedule 3, page 79, line 29, at end insert—
“(ca) the target for UK emissions of greenhouse gases in 2050 as set out in the Climate Change Act 2008 as amended by the Climate Change Act (2050) Target Amendment Order 2019, and”.
This amendment would require that, when making CRR rules, the FCA must have regard to the UK’s 2050 net zero goals and the legislation underpinning those goals.
Amendment 42, in schedule 3, page 79, line 29, at end insert—
“(ca) the likely effect of the rules on the UK meeting its international and domestic commitments on tackling climate change, and”.
This amendment would ensure the likely effect of the rules on the UK meeting its international and domestic commitments on tackling climate change are considered before CRR rules are taken.
Mr McFadden
Amendment 20 focuses on the new accountability framework for the FCA set out in schedule 2. If anyone wants to follow the detail, I am referring to the list at the top of page 63 of the current edition of the Bill. Returning to my opening remarks this morning, we tabled a similar—possibly identical—amendment to the accountability framework set out for the PRA in schedule 3, but we will come to that in due course.
As the Bill stands, the accountability framework in schedule 2 asks the FCA to have regard to three things: international standards, which I do not think anyone would argue with; the relative standing of the UK as a place to do financial business, which can be interpreted in a number of ways, but could be summed up as a competitiveness criterion; and other matters, which may be specified by the Treasury. I ask the Minister, why were those three picked out of all the things that we wanted the FCA to have to regard to in this brave new world, where we are onshoring all this, and not others?
We take the view that this list is incomplete and could be usefully added to. The regulators have an expanded new task, between schedule 2 and schedule 3, of regulating this huge, globally significant financial services industry with a lot of new powers, so what should they have regard to when they do this? There could be a number of things added to this “have regard to” list. Perhaps the most obvious is the UK’s climate change goals, specifically the commitment to reach net zero emissions of all greenhouse gases by 2050.
Why do we want to add that in particular? There are several reasons. First, this is completely bipartisan. The Government are committed to it and the Opposition support it. It does not divide the parties in this House; it has multi-party support. Secondly, we are not asking for something that has not already been legislated for. It was legislated for on two important occasions in this House. We are not tacking on a new, previously undiscussed climate change commitment to the Bill. The legislative history of this, as hon. Members will know, is that the original goal of an 80% reduction in greenhouse gases by 2050 was legislated for in the Climate Change Act 2008 under the last Labour Government, which the Conservative Government changed to a commitment to net zero by 2050 through the 2019 order referred to in the amendment, so this has already been legislated for twice, once at 80% and now at net zero.
Stella Creasy
Is it not also important to recognise that some of the strongest drivers for reaching some of those emissions targets will come from the financial sector itself? For example, the move towards decarbonising pension funds has been hugely beneficial in promoting renewable energy. It makes sense to join the dots when it comes to our country’s financial objectives and our wider social and climate objectives.
Mr McFadden
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Joining the dots is exactly what we should do. Of course, she is right that individual investment firms will make their own decisions on these things, perhaps sometimes pressed by pension fund members, consumer groups or trustees in some ways. We applaud firms that do that, but how much more powerful would it be if that was a goal of the regulators, set out in our own financial services legislation? It would be more powerful, because the UK has this huge financial sector, which has around it this cluster of expertise, which we refer to a lot—legal and accountancy firms and all the rest—and because our own domestic commitments can bend the power of that sector towards the net zero goals.
The amendment goes with the grain of what more and more firms and people in this sector are talking about. By including this change, we can take all the fine-sounding commitments on corporate websites and put them at the heart of our regulatory mission. It can mark out the UK financial services regulation as having a new post-Brexit mission. If asked what we want the UK financial services sector to do in this post-Brexit world—we debated divergence and capital rules and all the rest earlier—what would be a better answer than making sure that the power of this is bent towards us achieving net zero, and in so doing encouraging financial sectors elsewhere in the world to go down the same path?
Finance will play a huge role in whether or not we meet the target. I do not propose, Mr Davies, to go through what the Committee on Climate Change has said that we need to do to reach the target in great detail, because we would be here all day, but I want to give the Committee an idea of a few headings that will require enormous investment.
If we are going to achieve the target, we will need a quadrupling of the supply of low carbon electricity. We have done well on low carbon electricity in the UK, in the last 20 years or so. We have vastly expanded the provision of renewables that go into the grid, but even after doing well we need to quadruple that if we are going to meet the target.
We will need a complete automotive transition, from internal combustion engines to electric or other zero emission vehicles. Just a few days ago, the Prime Minister himself announced a new, more advanced target for the phasing out of internal combustion engines.
There will need to be a huge programme of investment in buildings and heating. Whether that is through heat pumps or hydrogen boilers, there will need to be a huge programme of retrofitting equipment to millions of houses throughout the UK.
There will need to be a large programme of afforestation, because remember this is net zero. It will not be that we never have emissions, but we will have net zero. One of the main vehicles, if you like, in absorbing the emissions that we are still responsible for is afforestation, so we will need a huge programme.
We will need changes in farming and food production. We have the return of our old friend, carbon capture and storage. That takes me back, because a decade ago, when I was sitting where the Minister is now, we were announcing carbon capture and storage. It was announced again last week. There might be Members here who are quite new to Parliament, such as my hon. Friend the Member for Erith and Thamesmead, the hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford and maybe others who were elected in 2019. I look forward to them coming back in 10 years’ time and debating a Bill where new carbon capture and storage has been announced. Maybe we will even have achieved it by then, who knows?
Alison Thewliss
Members may indeed remember carbon capture and storage well, because we were promised a huge project in Peterhead, ahead of the indy ref, which has not yet emerged.
Mr McFadden
The hon. Lady is quite young, so she might be here in 10 years’ time—
Mr McFadden
Perhaps it is not her ambition to be here in 10 years’ time. Carbon capture and storage is back. There are more things that we will have to do, but all of those headings will need finance, capital and investment. That will not all come from the state. It has got to be a combination of public and private investment, if the country is serious about this goal.
This is not an ordinary piece of legislation or A. N. Other Bill that we want to tack on to the regulatory framework. It is an overarching piece of legislation that will inform investment patterns and work production in a whole range of areas. It is one of the most significant pieces of legislation in this country since the end of the war. Perhaps we do not always realise that, but it really is, if one thinks about the list that I have gone through.
All of those things will take finance. It seems to me not odd to add this to the regulatory framework, but very odd that it has not been added already, particularly because the Government have made so much of the country being an international leader in the area, including asking the former Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, to play a leading role. We absolutely welcome that.
Gareth Davies (Grantham and Stamford) (Con)
The right hon. Gentleman sets out very well the problem that our generation faces. I say that as someone who has worked in financial services and has a family member who also works in the sector. The right hon. Gentleman is totally right that the key to unlocking progress towards 2050 is through private capital, but will he not concede that the Government have already made significant announcements such as those on the green gilts, the long-term asset fund and the green homes grant? Many announcements that have been made will help to mobilise capital towards the goals that he seeks.
Mr McFadden
The hon. Gentleman is right and he goes for pot 3 in terms of my reasons. I repeat: the problem about pot 3 is that the reason not to accept an amendment is that it concedes that it is absolutely heartless to do so. He is absolutely right. The Government have said that they want the UK to be a leading player and they appointed Mark Carney, who is a champion of green gilts, I believe. I was pleased to hear the Chancellor’s announcement, because green gilts have been issued by other countries in the past year or two. They have often been oversubscribed, which shows an investor appetite for products geared to that end.
Let me put the point back to the hon. Gentleman. If there are new financial innovations, such as green gilts, that Governments can issue to finance the list of things I mentioned from the Climate Change Committee and if there is investor appetite, as there seems to be, for the limited number of green gilts that have already been issued, why on earth would we not put at the heart of the regulator’s mission that they should have regard to these goals and use them as a guiding principle, particularly as we are going into a post-Brexit world where we will be asked on many fronts what we are for now given that we have left an existing framework? It is particularly appropriate to add this proposal to the Bill. This will require investment and it cannot all be done by the state. It will require innovation in finance. We have mentioned green gilts but other kinds of saving products, investment products, bonds, loans and all sorts of instruments will all have to be geared to the necessary changes to meet the net zero target.
The final reason for the proposal is to stress the ambition of the target. Any one of the things that I read out would require a lot of ambition and a lot of investment. It is pretty hard to see how this can all be achieved if it is not an explicit goal of financial regulation.
To recap, the amendment seeks to make these changes in the least possible contentious way. We have not added a syllable or comma to anything that the Government have not already legislated for. All we are asking for is that the Government signal that they are taking their own legislation seriously by adding the net zero commitment, which the House has already legislated for, to the mission of the financial regulators. That seems to be a most uncontroversial and reasonable thing we can do in the post-Brexit financial regulatory framework.
Alison Thewliss
I support Labour amendments 22 and 24 and wish to speak to amendments 39 and 42 in my name and those of my hon. Friends.
I agree very much with the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East. Our amendments are trying to help the Government out. That is unusual but, in the spirit of cross-party consensus and doing things together to save the environment, that is perhaps how we should proceed. On 9 November, the Chancellor said that he wanted to lead the world in the use of technology and green finance. Unfortunately, the Bill somehow missed the boat. It is unfortunate that the Chancellor’s statement came just before the Minister made his Second Reading speech because the Bill would be the place to start with this ambition.
Abena Oppong-Asare (Erith and Thamesmead) (Lab)
I am delighted to speak in favour of amendment 24. In just 12 months, the UK will host and hold the presidency of the 26th UN climate change conference of the parties in Glasgow, where the world will be watching. The amendment shows that the UK means business on climate change and that the Government are putting in place their promise to join forces with civil society, companies and people on the frontline of climate action ahead of COP26. It has the support of all political parties, so this is in no way party political or controversial.
Last week the Committee heard evidence from the likes of the Finance Innovation Lab and Positive Money, which support the amendment. The witnesses mentioned that it would be helpful if the FCA could refer to the Climate Change Act when preparing secondary legislation. Will the Minister therefore consider putting in capital requirements for investment firms, introducing weighting on environmental, social and governance issues such as penalising assets that have climate risks? As we know, the Bill covers legislation on packaged retail and insurance-based investment products, which will bring the £10 billion market to the EU.
We also heard last week that the Bill could be improved further, with a key information document that investors receive when looking at PRIIPS to include disclosure on environmental and social governance issues, and to ask the FCA to ensure that happens. I am sure the Minister will agree that that would help the Prime Minister achieve his ambitious 10-point plan—it is certainly ambitious—for the green industrial revolution.
It is important to know that there is a drive towards greater ESG integration across the financial sector, which investors are pushing for as well. This is an opportunity for the Bill to be shaped more robustly, and it sends a really strong message that the UK takes climate change seriously.
As we sit here today, hundreds of young people are meeting virtually at the mock COP, ensuring that net zero goals are deliverable. I am therefore surprised that elements of the amendment are not already in the Bill, given the Prime Minister’s ambitious 10-point plan for a green industrial revolution, which will not be deliverable if we do not reinforce our commitment to environmental sustainability in the Bill.
The amendment, which I believe is rather reasonable, would lay the foundations for sustainable environmental infrastructure with substance. As mentioned by a number of colleagues, this is not controversial but something that we really need right now. Particularly as we are dealing with covid, we need to be thinking seriously about the environment. The only way we can ensure that this is delivered is by putting something in the Bill that requires firms and the regulator to step up on this issue.
We do not have time for delay. This is an opportunity for us to put our heart into the Bill and deliver what we have promised, and it falls in line with what all political parties have been asking for.
Stella Creasy
The shadow Minister is making a powerful speech. I take the point made by the Government side, but I always wonder: what about the counterfactual? What problem will there be if we do not put these things into legislation? What message would that send about what might be jettisoned if, God forbid, we had another crisis on a similar scale to this year’s? Action on climate change is something that we simply cannot afford to go slow on. The counterfactual on this is an important issue, because it gives us an opportunity to say that if we do not put it into legislation, we are sending a message that this might be an optional extra, rather than an integral part of our future as a country.
Abena Oppong-Asare
My hon. Friend makes a good point. The UK Government constantly say on their website that they plan to go further and faster to tackle climate change. As my hon Friend has mentioned, this is a perfect opportunity to ensure that this is implemented in the Bill. I am surprised, frankly, that it is not in there. All that we are asking for is a reasonable amendment that already falls in line with the Government’s objectives. It is not going to create any extra work. We need to think about the future, particularly if we do not take action to address climate change, because we are heading for difficult times and I am really worried about the future for younger generations.
John Glen
Let me say at the outset that the Government are fully committed to reaching our climate change aims both domestically and internationally. We have set our commitment to net zero in legislation. When I was listening to the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East discuss the range of interventions and announcements that the Government have made in recent weeks and pivot back to the good work done previously, this underscores the fact that looking at this through a bipartisan lens is probably the most effective way. The aims that we share should be supported by sectors across the economy, not least financial services, as the Chancellor set out in his recent statement to the House.
Amendment 20 would insert the net zero target into the FCA’s accountability framework for the implementation of the investment firms prudential regime. Amendment 39 is similar, as it would insert an additional consideration into the FCA’s accountability framework, requiring the FCA to have regard to the likely effect on the UK’s domestic and international commitments on climate change.
I fully support the intention behind these amendments, of course, but the aim of this measure is to enable the implementation of a specific prudential regime to apply to a specific type of firm. The current “have regards to” provisions in the Bill are those that the Treasury found to be immediately and specifically relevant and that reflect issues raised by industry. I think about our relative standing and the importance of considering and aligning with international standards. Those are the ones that also relate to the equivalence decision and are directly tied to the implementation of the IFPR.
As the Chancellor set out in his statement outlining the new chapter for the financial service in the UK, if we are to achieve the net zero target it will mean putting the full weight of private sector innovation, expertise and capital behind the critical global effort to tackle climate change and protect the environment. The Treasury and the regulators are already making ambitious strides to that effect, and Members have referred to the role of the former Governor, Mark Carney. I draw attention to the green finance strategy, which the Government published just 15 months ago, and to the work across a number of activities in the City on which I have been seeking to lead over the past three years. The green finance strategy is something that the regulators have actively supported.
Stella Creasy
Apologies; I did not realise the Minister was going to move on. He has made an incredibly powerful case for the importance of including such a commitment, and he has essentially said that the Treasury might look to include it. He said that it had looked only at the immediate and specific regulatory requirements. Of course, many of us believe that we are facing an immediate and specific crisis, so can he tell us why the Treasury has not already taken on the issue of climate change, given that he has made a case that it should be part of it? He has gone for pop No. 3 in the shadow Minister’s list. There might be a sixth option here, which is: “If we did not come up with it, we are not going to support it.” That would be rather short-termist, surely.
John Glen
I hope I would never be accused of taking such an approach. The reality is that I want the Bill to work most effectively. As I just said, the regulators are already taking into account climate change as a risk to the economy. The FCA/PRA climate financial risk forum and the Bank of England’s climate change stress test are alive and working, and I am confident that they will continue to consider climate change risk when making rules for the prudential regimes. In that context, we will look carefully at the need to add that specific additional reason. I have also stressed the work that is going on internationally. We should ensure that what we put in primary legislation is actually best practice and in line with the evolving consensus on how to deal with such matters.
I turn now to amendments 24 and 42, which make a similar set of changes to the Prudential Regulation Authority’s accountability framework for the implementation of the remaining Basel standards. As I have already said, the Government are already considering how best to ensure that the regulators and the financial sector can meet the commitments, and the Bill grants the Treasury a power to specify further matters in both accountability frameworks at a later data, which could potentially be used to add such a “have regard” in future, if appropriate. Therefore, after serious consideration, I respectfully ask the right hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.
Mr McFadden
The Minister is effectively saying that this is not the right time or place, but it is something that the Government will carefully consider. Given the things that have happened in politics in recent years, prediction is a dangerous game, but I expect that this is something that the Government will eventually decide to do, and I think they will make a virtue of doing it at that time. Indeed, I can see the Chancellor making the statement to the House of Commons right now, saying, “This new requirement for the Bank of England, for regulators, for the whole of Government, puts the UK at the heart of this shift to green finance and the achievement of tackling climate change.”
I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow that the more the Minister said he agrees with this, the more it begged the question of why he does not do it now; we have to start somewhere, and putting it in here would only encourage it being put in broader financial regulatory systems. We also have this consultation in the future regulatory framework; it might even be part of the conclusion to that. For that reason, I am minded to press the amendment today.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Financial Services Bill (Sixth sitting)
Tuesday 24th November 2020
(4 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Financial Services Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 24 November 2020 - (24 Nov 2020)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
We now continue the line-by-line consideration of the Bill. I think everyone is okay with all the normal announcements about social distancing, Hansard and tea and coffee. The Clerks have told me that you have to ask my permission to remove your jackets, so I can unilaterally grant everyone permission to strip off—to remove their jackets if they so wish. As you know, we may debate amendments together when that is logical, but the votes on them will not necessarily be in the same sequence.
Schedule 2
Prudential regulation of FCA investment firms
Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 21, page 63, line 5, in schedule 2, at end insert—
“( ) high standards in social practice and corporate governance including pay, adherence to equalities legislation, transparency and corporate responsibility, and”
This amendment would require that, when making Part 9C rules, the FCA must have regard to high standards in social practice and corporate governance including pay, adherence to equalities legislation, transparency and corporate responsibility.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 25, page 79, line 29, in schedule 3, at end insert—
“( ) high standards in social practice and corporate governance including pay, adherence to equalities legislation, transparency and corporate responsibility.”
This amendment would require that, when making CRR rules, the FCA must have regard to high standards in social practice and corporate governance including pay, adherence to equalities legislation, transparency and corporate responsibility.
Mr McFadden
Thank you for your chairmanship, Dr Huq. Your initial instructions threaten to make the proceedings a lot more interesting than this morning’s. We will not take them too literally when it comes to how much clothing we remove.
Like amendment 20, on which we concluded debate this morning, amendment 21 relates to schedule 2 on page 63 of the printed Bill. It is designed to ensure that the regulators have regard not only to environmental regulations, which we tried to press this morning, but to social and governance considerations.
Committee members who have anything to do with the sector or industry will know that the letters ESG—environmental, social and governance—come up a lot. I am sure that, like me, the Minister does lots of roundtables, meetings and so on, and he will be struck by the enthusiasm with which City voices are speaking about ESG. We dealt with “E” this morning when discussing amendment 20; amendment 21 is about the “S” and the “G”.
The agenda of prioritising those things goes with the grain of what investors and fund managers say, at least, they are doing of their own accord. However, we believe that adding it to the Bill and the regulatory framework would put regulatory force behind these trends, which already exist with varying degrees of enthusiasm in the investor world.
The Chair
Order. I think you were told this morning that if you crank the volume up a bit, it is better for the recording.
Mr McFadden
I apologise, Dr Huq; I shall try to speak up.
There are many fine-sounding statements about ESG principles on corporate websites. Some of the toughest money management companies in the world are now telling us that it is no longer just about quarterly or annual returns, but about long-term sustainability. We are told that investors do not want to be making money on the back of poor governance or shoddy or illegal working practices; they want their investments to be in companies and projects that are sustainable for the long term and are run in the right way.
With your indulgence, Dr Huq, I will illustrate that with an example that has been in the news recently. I want to consider what these corporate statements were worth in the case of the clothing firm boohoo. When The Sunday Times exposed the shocking conditions in boohoo’s supply chain back in July, including paying workers in the supply chain well below the minimum wage and serious fire risks in the factories in which the clothes were made, the company commissioned an independent review of the supply chain. That was chaired by Alison Levitt QC; she reported in September. She found that the allegations about the supply chain were
“not merely well-founded but substantially true”.
On the corporate governance side of things, her findings were damning. Her report says:
“No member of the Board I interviewed mentioned that the responsibility for what is happening in the supply chain derived from the duty of the company’s officers to act in the best interests of all the shareholders.”
In other words, the board did not understand that it was not in the interest of their own shareholders to allow a supply chain in which these illegal practices were taking place. Ms Levitt was effectively concluding that the board did not know it was their duty—or that if they did know, they did nothing about it.
Ms Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)
Does my right hon. Friend agree that the lack of effective enforcement is also an important factor in boards’ thinking that the risk may be worth taking? Lack of effective enforcement has been a feature of the last 10 years, as enforcement authorities have been starved of funding and retreated further and further from the frontline, where these practices are going on.
Mr McFadden
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The point I am making in moving the amendment is that, although there are arguments to be made about enforcement and minimum wage inspectorates and so on, there is another side to the issue: the considerations for investors in these companies and the role of regulators. That is what the amendment is about.
Following Ms Levitt’s report, my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester West (Liz Kendall) wrote to all of boohoo’s main shareholders—the list reads like a “Who’s Who” of blue-chip City firms: it includes Jupiter, Fidelity, Invesco, BlackRock and Standard Life Aberdeen. None of those firms—with one notable exception, which I will come to—has taken meaningful action. They talk about engaging and following the situation closely, but only one has actually followed through. All the firms have on their websites very fine-sounding statements about ESG, corporate governance, social considerations, sustainability and so on—indeed, some have set themselves up as champions of those causes.
Let me come to the exception to the rule on that list: Standard Life Aberdeen. It has sold all its shares in boohoo and is clear about why. In a letter to my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester West, the Standard Life Aberdeen chairman Sir Douglas Flint says that the firm had been concerned about the supply chain for some time and that
“Our patience with the company’s responses on the issue had been diminishing during the last year. That patience evaporated this summer with the company’s response to the media allegations and that is why we took the decision to sell our remaining shareholding.”
Standard Life Aberdeen is run by serious people. It is a very reputable, important financial management firm and it has decided to act in accordance with its ESG principles and wants to uphold them. What the story shows is that too many companies do not and that often it is just words.
Our amendment seeks to put some regulatory force behind the upholding of these principles. Firms say that they want to uphold them, but, as the story shows, too often that is not the case—action is wished away with talk of engagement and monitoring the situation and all the rest of it. The amendment would make the regulator have to have regard to the exploitation of workers and make upholding high social and governance standards a hallmark of the UK financial services industry. In that way, we would not just depend on good people such as Sir Douglas Flint and on companies that are the exception to the rule; we would send a clear signal to the whole investment industry about the kind of response that we want to see. Otherwise, the fear must be that, although there will be plenty more warm words and mission statements, they will be of little comfort to someone working in an overheated factory and earning £3 or £4 an hour—about half the minimum wage—and that, when the story is exposed and the exploitation is no longer hidden, the investors in the company that is ultimately responsible will not do anything about it.
I ask the Minister to imagine the signal that such a regulatory duty could send. Not only would there be a minimum wage law, as there is now, but the UK’s supercharged, empowered regulators would have social and governance considerations at the heart of what they do.
We have had many debates about standards and what would happen in the UK after Brexit on this issue. Time and again, the Prime Minister has said that he does not want a race to the bottom: he wants the UK to uphold high international standards and there is absolutely no reason to think that our departure from the EU should be any threat to rights of work or any considerations like that. This amendment is a chance to prove that and put it at the heart of financial regulation.
The truth is that companies are much more likely to take such considerations seriously if their investors are tapping them on the shoulder and saying, “Why aren’t you doing that?” It is clear that Standard Life Aberdeen tried to do the right thing for a time with boohoo and eventually got so exasperated that it divested itself of its shares in the company. That is what we want to see more of from major investors and shareholders. It is not happening enough at the moment. The fine words on corporate websites are not matched enough by that kind of action.
Adding what is in the amendment to the regulators’ “have regard to” list and the accountability framework in the Bill would send a powerful signal about the character of post-Brexit financial services. That is why we have tabled it today.
Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Dr Huq. I rise to support the amendments tabled by the Labour Front Bench. It is really important to hold financial services firms to account; the example of boohoo given by the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East is a perfect example. Standard Life Aberdeen really should not be the exception rather than the rule. All financial firms should take their duty seriously, look all the way through their supply chains and act responsibly. It is clear that if the carrot of “doing the right thing” is not working, we need further means to hold companies to account.
The amendment is one of those that make me ask myself, “Why wouldn’t the Government want to do this? Why wouldn’t the Government want to support these things? Whose interests do they serve if they do not want to put this in the Bill?” The Scottish National party feels strongly that, although ESG is not the end of the movement towards a fairer, more sustainable future, it is certainly a vital part. We support the growing trend in the private sector towards greater corporate responsibility. By taking a greater stake in the communities where they operate, firms can become partners for social progress.
I was struck by the evidence given by Fran Boait in the session last week. She said:
“The Bill sets the direction, and it needs to integrate the needs of the wider economy, social responsibility, the environment and thinking about how we set a direction that is different from the one that led to the global financial crash”.––[Official Report, Financial Services Public Bill Committee, 19 November 2020; c. 112.]
The amendments set a good example of that change in direction and responsibility, and of the strong message that the Government need to send out.
To an extent, we have been able to do that in Scotland. We have promoted social responsibility in corporate culture, not least through actions such as the Scottish business pledge. We welcome a wider framework, which would encompass the financial sector and encourage them to do their bit. The partnership between the Scottish Government and business is based on boosting productivity and competitiveness through fairness, equality, environmental action and sustainable employment. It is a commitment to fairness, with businesses signing up to mandatory elements of the Scottish business pledge such as paying the real living wage—not the pretend-y living wage that the Government like to promote: the real living wage, as set by the Living Wage Foundation—and closing the gender pay gap, which has slipped during covid and may well fall back.
Stella Creasy (Walthamstow) (Lab/Co-op)
We should put on the record that the gender pay gap has not slipped but has been abandoned as a commitment by the Government. I hope the Government will rethink that quickly, given the importance of the case that the hon. Lady makes. It has not slipped—it has gone.
Alison Thewliss
I meant more that the actions of businesses had slipped, but the hon. Lady is correct to point out that the Government have abandoned that commitment as well. I was going to go there with that point. If companies are not held to account, that slippage will become irreversible. Companies have worked so hard to try to bridge that gap, and going backwards really is unacceptable.
By bringing those elements together, companies across Scotland have shown that they can improve productivity and competitiveness and build sustainable growth in a way that achieves fairness, equality, opportunity and innovation. We have the UK’s highest proportion of living wage employers in Scotland because the Scottish Government made that commitment. That is what we can do with the limited powers that we have. If we were to put into legislation here far more responsibility and accountability, it would certainly move that agenda forward.
In addition, we believe that moves such as increasing worker representation on company boards, which is commonplace among our more productive, investment-rich European competitors, would promote much greater social responsibility among companies that had that representation, as would increasing the representation of women and minority communities on public and private sector boards.
Scotland is on track to ensure that all public sector boards have a 50/50 gender balance due to the statutory targets that we put in place. We would support similar UK legislation for the private sector, because if these things are not in place, it will take a very long time before we see any meaningful change. The evidence shows that it is good for companies and organisations to do that, because they do better when they better represent society.
It is important that we make sure that companies are held to account in this way. The amendments tabled by the official Opposition are good and sound. I am interested to hear why the Minister thinks that they are not good ideas worthy of pursuit.
The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (John Glen)
It is great to be under your chairmanship again, Dr Huq. I thank the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East and the hon. Member for Glasgow Central for their comments.
The right hon. Gentleman opened with a depiction of the appalling situation with Boohoo, the Levitt review and the challenge of securing widespread adherence to higher standards of corporate governance. He mentioned the actions of Sir Douglas Flint from Standard Life Aberdeen, with whom I have worked closely during the last three years.
Many of the particular aspects of that case are beyond the scope of the Bill, but the right hon. Gentleman uses it to illustrate the reasons why he tabled the amendments, which would introduce a new “have regard” in the accountability regime to which the Prudential Regulation Authority and Financial Conduct Authority would be subject when implementing the Basel standards and the investment firms prudential regime respectively. The amendments would require the PRA and FCA to consider higher standards in social practice and corporate governance when making new rules under the Bill.
It is unclear from the wording of the amendments whether regulators would need to look at their own best practices or those of the firms they regulate. Regardless, I fully support the intention behind the amendments. Indeed, I have chaired the asset management taskforce over the past three years: we have had 10 meetings with industry representatives, including Catherine Howarth, whose responsible investment charity ShareAction has done some significant work on stewardship and how we can get better transparency across the whole of the ESG agenda. Indeed, I believe that our report on that will be produced imminently.
There is no doubt that the regulators are committed to the highest levels of equality, transparency and corporate responsibility. For example, the UK has some of the toughest requirements on bonus clawback and deference in the whole world. The Government, working with the regulators, were also world-leading in the design of an accountability regime for senior managers in the industry; sequentially, over the past three years, that has extended to more and more parts of the financial services industry.
FCA solo-regulated firms are expected to have undertaken a first assessment of the fitness and propriety of their certified persons by 31 March 2021. The senior manager and conduct regime, implemented for all banks, building societies, credit unions and Prudential Regulation Authority-designated investment firms in 2016, was extended to cover insurance firms in December 2018 and most other FCA-regulated firms by December last year.
However, the track record of our regulators should not make us shy away from making them legally accountable for upholding the highest standards going forward. The fact is that the regulators, as public authorities, are already subject to the requirements under the Equalities Act 2010, as are businesses across the UK, including firms within the scope of the PRA and FCA remits. They already have existing powers and duties under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which is being amended by this Bill, in respect of pay, transparency and principles of good governance. In fact, they are already responsible for making rules on remuneration under these two prudential regimes.
I recognise that when I think about the City, there are significant elements that need more work. For the past while, I have been responsible for the women in finance charter. I am currently conducting a series of challenges to the CEOs of banks, looking at what they are doing to address, beyond the targets, a pipeline of talent, so that there are better opportunities for more women to reach the executive level. I will speak more about that later this year.
Sound governance is necessary to support the regulator’s primary objectives of safety and soundness, market integrity and prevention of harm; a new legal obligation in this space would only be duplicative and redundant. It would likely conflict with existing obligations on the regulators in exercising their duties to ensure the sound governance of regulated bodies, creating confusion over whether these vaguer concepts conflict with the regulator’s general objectives.
I do not believe that this Bill is the right place for such changes, but there might be other routes to reassert how important we think these matters are. The Government are currently considering the policy framework in which the regulators operate through the future regulatory framework review, which I mentioned this morning and on Second Reading. I would welcome right hon. and hon. Members’ engagement on this important question—I really would. The matters that the regulators need to have regard to as part of this Bill reflect considerations immediately pertinent to these specific prudential regimes and, I believe, provide the right balance.
Abena Oppong-Asare (Erith and Thamesmead) (Lab)
I am really happy to put forward amendment 25, because it will require that, when making capital requirements regulation rules, the FCA must have a high regard to standards in social practice and corporate governance, including pay, adherence to equalities legislation, transparency and corporate responsibility.
We know that best practice corporate governance results in social and economic gains, and that is something the Government are particularly passionate about. Companies that persist in treating climate change solely as a corporate responsibility issue, rather than a business problem, are running a risky business and stand to lose out.
We have seen businesses turn the need to tackle climate change into successful business opportunities. For example, BrewDog, the world’s largest craft brewer, will remove twice as much carbon from the air as it emits every year, becoming the first carbon-neutral brewery. If companies can already shoulder this social responsibility and incorporate it into a successful business model, there is no reason not to hold all businesses to the high standards our country needs to tackle imminent social and political issues.
Climate change affects every facet of everyone’s lives. The effects of climate on companies’ operations are now so tangible and certain that the issue demands a strategy and leadership from the Government. Government intervention has worked before, and it will work again, particularly through amendment 25. Take the Equal Pay Act 1970, for example, which was mentioned previously. Business and civil society converged, and companies with over 250 employees were made to publish data on pay gender discrepancies, resulting in a win-win scenario. Excellent work is now being done to tackle this further and understand racial, gender and environmental concerns, which are intricately linked. We have to follow civil society’s work on equal pay and extend the reporting to data collections on the grounds of racial equality and environmental equity, because our actions will be futile if our evidence is not fertile.
There is no one-size-fits-all approach to climate change: each company’s approach will depend on the particular business and strategy. What we are calling for in this amendment is for the Government to support and enable employers to publish an action plan to tackle climate change and social inequalities, including initiatives to mitigate climate-related costs and risks in client value chains. Jesse Griffiths, the CEO of the Finance Lab, had some important advice for the Committee last week. He said:
“I think that the absolutely fundamental issue with regards to the Bill is that it is an opportunity to put social and environmental purpose at the heart of both the regulation and the duties of the regulators.”—[Official Report, Financial Services Public Bill Committee, 19 November 2020; c. 113.]
Environmental engagement is economic effectiveness, and this amendment will improve the economic health of our businesses and the environmental health of our country.
The amendment would also ensure that regulators can act in accordance with social needs, and ensure that businesses maintain corporate responsibility while still thriving in a competitive marketplace. When the Government asked Ruby McGregor-Smith to review the diversity pay gap, I welcomed that initiative. Campaigners have moved mountains in terms of identifying the profitability, both social and economic, of deepening our commitment to diversity and opportunity of wealth and health creation for all. In McGregor-Smith’s review, “The Time for Talking is Over, Now is the Time to Act”, she highlights how for decades, successive Governments and employers have professed their commitment to racial equality, yet we see that vast inequalities still exist. We must ensure this does not happen with our commitment to environmental stability, and the amendment will help ensure that.
Racial equality, gender equality and environmental stability can never be achieved unless we understand the ways in which they are intricately linked. As Ruby says, the time for talking is over, and I am sure that all the young people participating in the mock COP as we speak agree. I know that I mentioned this earlier about young people, but they are important: they are our future, and we really need to take them into consideration. With 14% of the working-age population coming from a black or minority ethnic background, we know that employers have to take control and start making the most of our talent, whatever their background.
The point stands out when looking at the pay gap for disabled people in the UK. In 2018, the median pay for non-disabled employees was £12.21 an hour, while for disabled employees, it was £10.63. The Minister mentioned earlier that he sat on the asset management taskforce—
Abena Oppong-Asare
Chaired—apologies; I have bad hearing. He gave examples of shared actions and how to get better transparency, and mentioned that regulators are already committed to higher transparency. I am sure he agrees with me that businesses need to be held to account. The amendment will also help to create an environment that nourishes talent equality and protects our natural habitable environment.
The amendment basically brings huge financial, environmental and social rewards. Companies must realise they cannot ignore those issues anymore. However, we know that most companies will act only when they see a reason to do so. What we need is less talk and more action.
John Glen
I have listened carefully to the points made by the hon. Lady, who touches on a wide range of subjects, some of which I responded to in my response to the shadow Minister. I would just say that a number of initiatives are under way and intensifying. Just a few hours ago, I launched a piece of work with the Corporation of London on social diversity, a taskforce to bring people together to look at what we can do to improve access to financial services. That follows the work that we have been doing and that former Minister Mark Hoban is doing with the Financial Services Skills Commission. I mentioned the work of Women in Finance, but there are a lot of other pieces of work that my colleague the Exchequer Secretary is also looking at in her dual role as Equalities Minister.
I made clear in my response a few moments ago that I believe the provisions we have already give the regulators significant licence to operate in this area and, although I do not rule out any changes subsequently, I believe at this time that the amendments should be resisted.
Stella Creasy
The challenge that the Minister has with these instruments is exactly the issue around the gender pay gap. We were told that that did not need to be written into the legislation, because there would be a commitment. As we have seen this year, that commitment has not been absolute. It has been abandoned by the Government.
The Minister has said that he agrees with those commitments and the issues that the shadow Minister has raised, and that they might be put into legislation. Does he recognise that, for those of us who are committed to those high standards, the point of such amendments is to put it beyond doubt that they will actually happen? As we have seen, if we do not put them beyond doubt, it is tempting for future Administrations and future regulators to remove or weaken the protections.
John Glen
I thank the hon. Lady for those points. As public bodies, it is clear that the regulators are answerable and accountable to Parliament, and I have explained how that will be enhanced, but they are also subject to legal duties to publicly consult on the new rules and to how Parliament wishes to scrutinise them. I recognise the point that she is making, but I believe that putting that obligation into legislation in that way would not immediately lead to the outcome that she supports. Across those areas of completely legitimate aspiration, many of which I share in an identical form, this is something that we would need to look at in the round following the regulatory framework review.
Alison Thewliss
I appreciate the work that the Minister and other Ministers are doing in this area, but does he accept that he if puts it into the legislation, he might actually have less work to do, because everybody will then be obligated to do it, rather than him having to ask nicely?
John Glen
Unfortunately, I do not share that view. Given the arguments that I have made about the complications that it would bring, because of the overlap with existing provisions, I do not think that would be the right way to go. I am very sympathetic, however, to many elements of the speeches made concerning the aspirations that we should have to improve the overall quality of corporate governance and behaviour across the City.
Mr McFadden
I am sure that the Minister is completely genuine when he says that he supports this agenda and the aims behind the amendment, but anyone who has followed the issue over the years will realise that we have had taskforces galore on it in the City. We have had taskforces on women on boards and on diversity; now we have a new one on social mobility. I wish that well but, after all those taskforces, do those in the top jobs in this sector—the real pool of decision makers—reflect the country as it is today?
Mr McFadden
Of course they don’t. We cannot conclude that, for all the taskforces and all the well-meaning, great people who have been involved in them, they have made enough progress.
This is not just a British agenda by the way. I read in the news the other day that the upper echelons of German industry are having exactly the same debate about whether to mandate quotas on boards for so many women and about the broader equalities agenda that my hon. Friend the Member for Erith and Thamesmead referred to.
Stella Creasy
If we are recognising that, it is worth noting that other nations that we compete with have already put gender quotas into legislation and beyond doubt, so we are behind our economic competitors. Ultimately, as we all know, the point about such regulation is that it would also make us more competitive. Blasting through the discrimination that has stopped us doing it would help our economy as well as our society.
Mr McFadden
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. For those reasons, we made specific mention of equalities legislation in the amendment.
It comes down to one’s view of the difference between encouragement, taskforces and all that, and legislation. This amendment is not particularly prescriptive. It calls for high standards of social and corporate governance. Hon. Members might say, “How do you define ‘high’?” and so on, but it is no less defined that talking about the relative standing of the United Kingdom as a place for internationally active investment firms to do business.
Once we have been through two or three of these debates, we begin to see a pattern in the way that the Committee works. I find myself a bit unconvinced that voluntary action will do this. There is not just an opportunity but a duty on us to start to define the post-Brexit financial services sector and what its characteristics will be. I want to put a few teeth behind all the fine words we have heard about the commitment to high standards, having no race to the bottom and all the rest of it. I always remember the plea of the former Chancellor, George Osborne: anybody in politics should be able to count. I look around the room and I can count, but I still want to press the amendment to a vote.
Alison Thewliss
I beg to move amendment 38, page 63, line 5, in schedule 2, at end insert—
“(ba) the likely effect of the rules on trade frictions between the UK and EU, and”.
This amendment would ensure the likely effect of the rules on trade frictions between the UK and EU are considered before Part 9C rules are taken.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 41, page 79, line 29, in schedule 3, at end insert—
“(ca) the likely effect of the rules on trade frictions between the UK and EU, and”.
This amendment would ensure the likely effect of the rules on trade frictions between the UK and EU are considered before CRR rules are taken.
Alison Thewliss
One of the things that concerns us most about where we are going with Brexit is the risk of trade disputes. We need only look at how one dispute can overspill into another, such as the overspill from Airbus/Boeing into Scotch whisky and cashmere—it is not very wise to spill Scotch whisky on cashmere. Our amendments are therefore sensible. They strengthen what is already in the Bill.
Proposed new section 143G(2) to the 2000 Act states that
“the FCA must consider the United Kingdom’s standing in relation to the other countries and territories in which, in its opinion, internationally active investment firms are most likely to choose to be based or carry on activities.”
Proposed new section 143G(3) states that
“the FCA must consider, and consult the Treasury about, the likely effect of the rules on relevant equivalence decisions.”
That adds further consideration to the impact on trade frictions.
Mr McFadden
I will speak briefly in support of the amendment. I think it adds an interesting new angle to our considerations on the schedule. There is quite a lot in the schedule about the UK’s standing as a place to do business. Proposed new section 143G(1)(b) to the 2000 Act talks about the
“relative standing of the United Kingdom as a place for internationally active investment firms”.
Proposed new section 143G(2) says that
“the FCA must consider the United Kingdom’s standing in relation to the other countries and territories in which, in its opinion, internationally active investment firms are most likely to choose to be based or carry on activities.”
None of us has argued that those are not completely legitimate considerations. Of course we want to consider our standing in relation to other countries, but that is different from the trading aspect.
The amendment points out that decisions can be taken that are facilitated by the Bill, for example on divergence, which we have discussed and will discuss further, and those decisions can have one impact on competitiveness but a very different one on the ability to trade. That is particularly important when this equivalence decision is still on the table. I think these amendments on considering our trading position usefully add to the job description of the regulators, which should be about not just competitiveness, but market barriers, market access and our ability to trade into other countries. Considering both of these proposals would be a good addition to the “have regard to” list set out in schedule 2.
John Glen
It is a pleasure to respond to the hon. Member for Glasgow Central and the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East. The hon. Members for Glasgow Central and for Aberdeen South propose to introduce a new “have regard” for the FCA and PRA when making rules for the new investment firms prudential regime and implementing the Basel standards respectively. That would require the regulators to consider the likely effect of their rules on trade frictions between the UK and the EU, as the hon. Lady set out.
Again, I understand and share the ambitions for frictionless trade between the UK and one of our biggest trading partners, the EU, but, as I am sure the Committee will understand, I am not able to discuss the details of our ongoing negotiations. We want a free trade agreement outcome with the EU that supports our global ambitions for financial services, and we have engaged with the EU on the basis that the future relationship should recognise and be tailored to the deep interconnectedness of those relationships across financial markets. The EU has made it clear that it does not support such an approach. We remain open to future co-operation with the EU that reflects our wide, long-standing, positive financial services relationship, and we will continue to engage in a constructive manner.
The regulators do not have oversight beyond their financial services remit. It would therefore be highly disproportionate to require them to assess the impact of their rules on all trade matters, covering goods and services. Furthermore, trading partnerships with overseas jurisdictions are the Government’s responsibility, not the regulators’. We consider that regulators should not be asked to go beyond the scope of their capabilities and duties. We have already discussed the capacity of the regulators; the amendment would really go beyond that.
We agree that financial services firms care about the UK’s relationship with overseas jurisdictions, which has a real impact on them. That is why the accountability framework that the Bill will introduce already requires regulators to consider the likely effect of their rules on financial services equivalence granted by and for the UK. Financial services equivalence will be the main mechanism underpinning financial services relationships between the UK and overseas jurisdictions. I believe therefore that the accountability framework, as proposed, meets the aim of the hon. Member for Glasgow Central.
In addition, the amendments focus solely on the relationship between the UK and the EU. That is obviously a matter of enormous concern, but we need to make legislation that accounts for the future. Equivalence or trade in financial services considerations must relate to all jurisdictions. It is crucial that we recognise that in the context of financial services firms, which often have a global footprint and global operations. That also reflects the UK’s present and future ambitions.
The accountability framework recognises the importance to UK firms of our relationship with overseas jurisdictions in financial services matters, while upholding broader international obligations. The Bill already supports the intentions behind the amendment, and for that reason I ask the hon. Lady to withdraw it.
Alison Thewliss
I would prefer to press the amendment to a vote because it fits well with the other parts of the Bill. Asking the FCA to consider the UK’s international standing with other countries aligns with other areas in which it is taking on wider roles, and the amendment reflects that. Regulators should have regard to the wider impact of their decisions and to problems that their rules might cause to trade between the UK and the EU, which could be quite significant. It seems wise to put that in the Bill so that the regulators are mindful of it in the decisions that they make.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Mr McFadden
I beg to move amendment 22, in schedule 2, page 63, line 10, at end insert—
‘(2A) The FCA must not make Part 9C rules unless—
(a) a draft of those rules has been submitted for scrutiny by a select committee of either House of Parliament which has a remit which includes responsibility for scrutiny of such rules, and
(b) any such committee has expressed a view on the draft of those rules.’.
This amendment is designed to enhance the accountability framework for the FCA by requiring it, prior to making Part 9C rules, to submit a draft of those rules for scrutiny by a relevant Parliamentary select committee before making any regulatory changes.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 26, in schedule 3, page 79, line 35, at end insert—
‘(2A) The PRA must not make CRR rules unless—
(a) a draft of those rules has been submitted for scrutiny by a select committee of either House of Parliament which has a remit which includes responsibility for scrutiny of such rules; and
(b) any such committee has expressed a view on the draft of those rules.’.
This amendment would enhance the accountability framework for the FCA by requiring it, prior to making CRR rules, to submit a draft of those rules for scrutiny by a relevant Parliamentary select committee before making any regulatory changes.
Mr McFadden
We slightly change tack with this amendment. We have had some discussion of the “have regard to” list in the schedule, but the amendment covers a different aspect, dealing with the relationship between the enhanced role that regulators are to be given under the Bill and the role of Parliament. There are two important aspects to the role. First, in which way should Parliament be involved? Secondly, when should Parliament be involved? By that I mean, at what point in the regulatory process is it appropriate to have parliamentary involvement?
On Second Reading and several times today, the Minister has encouraged us not to look at the Bill in isolation but to see it as part of a process of reform, possibly involving other such Bills in the future. This may be only the starter and, if hon. Members are really lucky, they could be invited back here next year for the main course—who knows? In particular, he has asked us to look at the Bill alongside the consultation document on the future regulatory framework review, which was published a month ago. That document, which is I think 30 to 40 pages long, has a whole chapter devoted to accountability, including parliamentary accountability.
To anticipate the Minister’s response to the amendments, of course the document does not yet reach conclusions because it is a consultation inviting responses. In the part about parliamentary accountability, the document sings the praises of the Select Committee system and the Treasury Committee in particular. My hon. Friend the Member for Wallasey had to pop out, but we have at least another three members of the Treasury Committee in the room, and I am a former member of it. There is no doubt that it is an esteemed Select Committee, which we all accept does a great job in this House, but the work of that Committee is very stretched. It has to cover a huge amount of business: not only banking and financial services more generally, but taxation, fiscal policy and everything else that the Treasury does.
I do not want to be unfair, but when I read that part on parliamentary accountability, I found it hard to escape the conclusion that it was written to give the impression that not a lot should change—the system we have at the moment is just tickety-boo; it is just fine. The underlying assumption seems to be that we can take this huge exercise in onshoring—this large-scale set of regulations, directives and all the rest of it—expand in a very significant way the role and remit of our regulators, and just tack that on to the present framework. I hope the Minister does not think I am being unfair, but that is the impression that I got when I read the future regulatory framework review.
Stella Creasy
As this is my first speech, let me say how fantastic it is to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Huq—none of us ever says anything other.
I rise partly to presage what I am sure the Minister knows is coming, given our previous correspondence on my concerns about existing financial regulation in this country and where the voice of the consumer is heard in that. I am sure he has looked avidly at some of the new clauses that I have tabled, which seek to get at that and which I note will come much later, in the shape of new clauses 15, 18, 21 and 23.
The shadow Minister has set out clearly how amendment 22 reflects those concerns. Again, where in the new financial regulatory regime being brought in by the Bill will the voices of our constituents be heard? The shadow Minister has focused on the consequences of leaving the European Union and the lacuna that will be created in terms of financial regulation by the Bill if we do not have that clear commitment with the Treasury or any other financial body to look at Select Committees and the role they might play. I want to focus on the other end of that telescope and what it has been like to seek to give consumers voices within the existing regulatory framework, what lessons that might offer us in the future regulatory framework and why involving Select Committees might be a way forward.
I am sure the Minister would say that working out how we make sure our constituents are heard is a work in progress. We talked this morning very strongly about the impact of financial regulation on people’s everyday lives, the financial crisis and what could be learned from that. Many of us will have seen among our constituents people whose lives were decimated when financial institutions were found wanting and how that has driven the concerns about consumer protection in the wider work of the FCA. My concern as a Member of Parliament who has long had an interest in personal debt in this country has been about how that conversation is part of those bigger questions.
As I mentioned this morning, often we look for specific issues when it comes to consumer voice and financial regulation. On the wider impact, it is almost a given that somehow regulators will think about consumers. The reality is that over the past six or seven years of having the Financial Conduct Authority that has not always been the case. The Bill gives those regulatory bodies more powers. As the shadow Minister has pointed out, it removes one of the mechanisms for consumer voice through the democratic process within the European Union. Therefore, it is right that we ask how we replace that and whether there are gaps in what has happened to date that mean it is even more important, when asking whether the financial regulators are living up to the issues we might want them to have regard to, that that consumer voice is being heard in that process.
Amendment 22 is an eminently sensible idea to say, “Hang on a minute, where there had been previous scrutiny and challenge from democratic institutions, we need to replicate that within the UK Parliament.” It comes from that perspective of saying that it is in everyone’s interest to have that check and balance because it has been of benefit under the previous regime and, under that regime, there has been too narrow a consumer voice. I am not going to prosecute that argument in full today, because I am going to save it for the Minister for the new clauses that I have put down and how I think he can do that. I can see his disappointment already. However, I argue that it is worth looking at where the Select Committee process can add value to financial regulation in this country because, so clearly, it is our constituents who have paid the price when financial regulation has not looked at consumer risk and has not been able to ask questions before a crisis happened.
Many of the issues that our Treasury Committee, for example, as one body that may be involved in this, has looked at have come from our constituents raising concerns and a recognition that something might be on its way. Many of us would argue, and I suspect the Minister would agree, that sometimes regulators have been slow to react because they have been trying to balance the needs of the industry with questions about whether interference might cause more harm. The amendment is a way of getting that right, of having a place where those conversations could take place around financial regulation with a regulator that now has much more extensive powers than previously. It is a way of making sure that, as a democracy, we have a space where we can raise those concerns before problems happen.
When we get to the new clauses I have tabled, one of the concerns I will raise is where we see other regulators—in particular, I think of the financial ombudsman having to intervene where our financial regulators have not been able to do their job around supporting and protecting consumers, and so the ombudsman has picked up the pieces. Under the model we have coming forward in this Bill, it is not clear to me, without the involvement of Select Committees, where those conversations could take place, apart from with the financial ombudsman. Again, we are waiting until institutions potentially fail and organisations can pick up the pieces for that consumer voice to be heard.
Alison Thewliss
I very much agree with the proposals brought forward by the official Opposition. I congratulate them on their drafting and having found a way to put these amendments forward. Our attempt at this comes in new clause 32, and I will discuss that a bit further when we eventually get to it.
I agree that it is vital that there is scrutiny of these institutions and these powers. It is surely unacceptable that the Government have made so much play of taking back control from the EU only to hive it off to regulators because it is far too terribly complicated for us parliamentarians to worry our sweet heads about. That is not acceptable. That is not the way that it works in the European Union, and it certainly should not be the way Westminster operates. We should trust ourselves and our colleagues slightly more to do that scrutiny. If European parliamentarians, some of whom are now in this place, can do it, we can certainly look at a way that this can be done and that accountability can be taken for these powers.
I agree with those who have said that the Treasury Committee is stretched in its business. Having had a brief discussion yesterday in our pre-meeting about the sessions to come in the weeks and months ahead, I can tell the Committee that those sessions are already very full, running at two sessions in most weeks. We are certainly being kept very busy with all the important things our constituents bring to us, the responsibility the Committee has to scrutinise the Government and all the other things the Committee wants to do. The logic of setting up a new Select Committee to examine these things is certainly very compelling to me, because it will need that specialist knowledge in addition to the heavy burden of work it might have.
I noted that the hon. Member for Hitchin and Harpenden (Bim Afolami) made a very good plug for this on Second Reading. I think his feeling is that it helps out the Government to have this additional scrutiny. It helps everybody see what is coming, prepares the ground and tries to make decision making better, which should be in the Government’s interest—trying to get to the right thing for all our constituents and for the financial services sector as a whole.
So that is important, and we should have no less of a role in all this than MPs currently have. I draw the Minister’s attention to the evidence given to the House of Lords EU Financial Affairs Sub-Committee, whose reports I am sure he is an avid reader of, for International Regulatory Strategy Group, which also recommends enhanced parliamentary accountability and scrutiny. Its suggestion is a new system of Committee oversight in not just the Commons but the Lords, as we suggest in new clause 32.
The group has a series of principles it thinks such oversight should stand to, such as it being cross-party and apolitical—those are the principles of Select Committees, but it is important that we look at this. It mentions the ethos of the Public Accounts Committee in the way it goes about its business in scrutinising regulatory authorities. It also believes that oversight needs to be authoritative and expert, building up expertise within Committees, that it needs to be risk-based and mainly ex-post, and that it should be open to stakeholder input, which is incredibly important. We all know Select Committees do that; they take evidence and they have good records of bringing in expertise and evidence from people, but they need to be able to use that evidence in a practical way to inform the best strategy and best way forward as we take these powers back.
I very much recommend to the Minister the evidence given by the IRSG. What is he doing to meet this challenge of the “accountability deficit”, as the Finance Innovation Lab put it? We cannot have a situation where more powers are coming back, yet we give them away. That is certainly not what was promised on the side of any Brexit bus, and it should not be the way we go forward. As the honourable grandee, the hon. Member for Walthamstow, said, it stores up a risk that we do not see something coming, that we have not identified a problem on the horizon and that we all end up in a bit of a crisis because we did not have the opportunity to scrutinise properly, to look at the regulations as they come forward and to ensure we do what is best for our constituents and the wider economy. There is logic in having some form of Committee to look at this, in whichever format the House wants to bring that forward. It is essential that that scrutiny exists and that it is at least as good as what was done in the European Parliament.
John Glen
I am very pleased to address the points raised by the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East, the hon. Member for Walthamstow and the hon. Member for Glasgow Central. I have listened carefully to what they had to say, and their remarks go to the heart of the distinction between the provisions of the Bill that we are scrutinising in Committee and the broader questions around the future scrutiny mechanism, and the necessity to ensure that we do not undermine the legitimate and appropriate scrutiny by Parliament of our regulators.
It is critical that we ensure sufficient accountability around the new rules of the UK’s financial sector. Capital requirements for firms are extremely detailed and technical. It is right that we seek to utilise the expertise of the regulators to update them in line with international standards.
In return for delegating responsibility to the Financial Conduct Authority, this Bill requires it, under proposed new clause 143G of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, to publish an explanation of the purpose of its draft rules and of how the matters to which it is obliged to have regard have influenced the drafting of the rules. The Bill introduces a similar requirement for the Prudential Regulation Authority, under proposed new clause 144D of the Financial Services and Markets Act.
These matters concern public policy priorities that we consider to be of particular interest to Parliament. I have looked carefully at the amendments proposed by the right hon. Gentleman, and the amendments envisage Select Committees reviewing all investment firms prudential regime and capital requirements regulation regulator rules before they can be made. Under that model, Parliament would need to routinely scrutinise a whole swathe of detailed new rules on an ongoing basis. That is very different from the model that this Parliament previously put in place for the regulators under the Financial Services and Markets Act, where it judged it appropriate for the regulators to take these detailed technical decisions—where they hold expertise—within a broader framework set by Parliament.
It should not go unnoticed that, if Parliament were to scrutinise each proposed rule, the amendment does not specify a definite time period in which any Committee must express its view on them. That could bring a great deal of uncertainty to firms on what the rules would look like and when they would be introduced. That makes it more difficult for these firms to prepare appropriately for these changes. Ultimately, there is currently nothing preventing a Select Committee, from either House, from reviewing the FCA’s rules at consultation, taking evidence on them and reporting with recommendations. That is a decision for the Committee.
My officials have discussed this amendment with the regulators, and they have agreed that they will send their consultation draft rules to the relevant Committee as soon as they are published. The FCA and the PRA both have statutory minimum time periods for consultation and will take time to factor in responses to consultation—so this is not a meaningless process—providing a more than reasonable window within which the Committee can engage the regulators on the substance of the rules, should it desire to.
The Government agree that Parliament should play an important strategic role in interrogating, debating and testing the overall direction of policy for financial services, while allowing the regulators to set the detailed rules for which they hold expertise.
Before I conclude, I would like to address the point the right hon. Gentleman made concerning the document that was published a month ago on the future regulatory framework, and to address the supposition he very courteously made that, somehow, the Government believed that everything was fine and little needed to change.
The purpose of this extensive consultation is to do what it says: to consult broadly to ensure that, through that process, the views of industry, regulators and all interested parties and consumer groups are fully involved, such that, when we then move to the next stage of that process—I would envisage making some more definitive proposals—it would meet expectations on a broader and enduring basis. This Bill is about some specific measures that, as I explained earlier this morning, we need to take with an accountability framework in place, but I do not rule out any outcome.
The right hon. Gentleman made some observations about the prerogative of Government over mandating Parliament and Select Committee creation. I think we are some way away from that. We want to do these things collaboratively and end up with something that is fit for purpose, and I recognise the comments he made about the resourcing of such Committees with respect to the role they would play.
I do believe that this scrutiny process, as set out in the Bill, is extensive, and, for the reasons I have given, I again regret that I must ask the right hon. Gentleman to withdraw this amendment.
Mr McFadden
I cannot resist the irony of pointing out that the Government are resisting what could be termed the “take back control” amendment and do not want to add it to the Bill. There are many illustrious Members of this House we could name this amendment after; they have been arguing to take back control for many years.
The Minister said that the amendment would cause a lot of uncertainty; that it might be too much work; that it might require a Committee—whichever Committee it was—to look in too much detail at rules, when it would probably be more concerned with the broad direction. He also pleaded with us to allow the consultation to play out.
There is a serious point at the heart of this about the sovereignty agenda. There will be some kind of consequence at some point, possibly a backlash, that will draw attention to how this is done and the new powers that the regulators have. At that point, people will ask, “What was Parliament doing? What role was Parliament playing?”
John Glen
I beg to move amendment 1, in schedule 2, page 76, line 31, leave out “143O(4), (6) or (8)” and insert “143O(3), (6) or (8)(b)”
This amendment corrects a cross-reference to new provisions inserted by Part 1 of Schedule 2.
This is a technical amendment that corrects a cross-reference from section 395 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to new section 143O, as proposed in schedule 2.
Amendment 1 agreed to.
Question proposed, That the schedule, as amended, be the Second schedule to the Bill.
John Glen
Investment firms have a significant role to play in enabling investors to access financial markets, but the current prudential framework that applies to FCA investment firms was made for banks, which is why we need a new bespoke investment firms prudential regime. Schedule 2 contains relevant provisions that enable the FCA to implement a tailor-made prudential regime for non-systemic investment firms.
The new regime will set out new capital and liquidity requirements that will ensure that firms can wind down in an orderly way without causing harm. The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East and the hon. Member for Walthamstow are rightly concerned about consumer harm, so I draw their attention to the fact that the FCA will have to set those requirements in relation to the risks that firms pose to consumers, as well as the integrity of the financial system.
The FCA will also be required to make rules for parent undertakings of investment firm groups, because appropriate regulation and supervision are as important at the group level as at the individual firm level. Parents, as heads of the group, should be held responsible for the prudent management of the group.
It is right that specific rule-making responsibilities should be delegated to the FCA as an independent expert regulator, but those responsibilities must come with enhanced accountability. Schedule 2 requires the FCA to have regard to a list of important public policy considerations when making its rules in relation to the new investment firms regime, including any relevant international standards and the relative standing of the UK as a place for internationally active investment firms to carry on activities. To support scrutiny, the FCA will need to report publicly on how its consideration of those matters has affected its decisions on the rules in relation to the IFPR.
The FCA will also have to consider the impact on financial services equivalence, both by and for the UK, and consult the Treasury on that. Consulting the Treasury ensures that the FCA has appropriate accountability for technical choices that might have an impact on firms, while recognising that the Government retain responsibility for international relations and therefore equivalence. These three considerations are those that we have deemed to be immediately pertinent to the new investment firms prudential regime today.
However, as I have mentioned previously, the accountability framework is meant to reflect the changing context. That is why the Treasury will have power to add additional considerations, which would be done following discussions with the regulators and industry, and following parliamentary scrutiny. That is the overall framework that will allow greater scrutiny and transparency, and provide the direction the FCA will take in implementing the new regime in the UK, while rightfully leaving the detail to the experts.
In the longer term, any wider deregulation will need greater debate and the proper scrutiny of Parliament. The Government intend to address that part through the future regulatory framework, as I have discussed, which is now out for consultation. I therefore recommend that that this schedule stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Schedule 2, as amended, accordingly agreed to.
Clause 3
Transfer of certain prudential regulation matters into PRA rules
Mr McFadden
I beg to move amendment 23, in clause 3, page 4, line 31, at end insert—
“(9A) The Treasury must, within six months of making any regulations under this section, prepare, publish and lay before Parliament a report setting out—
(a) the reasons for the revocation of the provisions of the Capital Requirements Regulations being made under the regulations;
(b) the Treasury’s assessment of the impact of the revocation on—
(i) consumers;
(ii) competitiveness;
(iii) the economy.”
This amendment is intended to ensure the Treasury reports to Parliament on the impact of divergence from CRR rules.
In debating this amendment and this clause, I am hoping the Minister will be able to explain the relationship between this clause and clause 1. Clause 1 specifies the certain type of investment firms to which CRR rules need not apply, and he was at pains to say that that was a specific, targeted approach, but clause 3 looks to range very widely on the Treasury’s powers to revoke aspects of the capital requirements regulation.
The list in clause 3(2), on page 2 of the Bill, has many different headings, including business lends such as mortgages, retail investments, equity exposures and so on. Without getting into the detail of the technicalities of the Basel rules, not all capital is treated as equal. A pound is not just a pound. It depends against which line of business it is weighted. For example, financial institutions will argue that mortgages pose a particular category of risk, probably quite low risk, compared with another line of business where they may be lending against business loans, commercial property or some other activity. The Basel rules do not judge all these activities equally and they apply what are known as risk weights to them.
The clause allows the Government pretty sweeping powers, as far as I can see, to depart from and to revoke aspects of the capital requirements regulation, against all these different types of business. I would be very interested for the Minister to set that out and clarify it.
Through this process, the capital ratios are allocated. Again, I draw the Committee’s attention to the important paragraph (m) at the bottom of page 3 of the Bill, the leverage ratio. That is described in the notes on clauses as the “backstop.” I hope that that term does not cause too much excitement in the Committee. Like all backstops, it is there in case the list from paragraph (a) to paragraph (l) does not prove sufficient.
This particular backstop of the leverage ratio casts aside all this stuff about risk ratings. It takes the whole lending book and the whole lending business, and says that a certain proportion of capital must be held against the whole thing. It is a bit of an insurance policy in case the risk ratings do not do the job. It is true that the risk ratings are where this is open to all kinds of lobbying, as people will say that one line of business is less risky than another.
At the core of this is a debate between regulators who must consider the safety and resilience of the system as a whole, and individuals who will argue that if only they did not have to hold all this capital, they could lend more, stimulate more economic activity, and so on. That is the debate that takes place. Without wanting to go over all the ground that we covered this morning, the amendment asks for a report on the degree to which the divergence—the leeway powers, as we might call them—will be used, and the Treasury’s assessment of the impact on the economy. As I said this morning, we believe it is important that such a report should consider the impact on consumers, because they do not want to be on the hook for decisions that allow capital levels to fall too much, thereby weakening the resilience of the financial institutions in question.
This is a “lessons learned” amendment. It is important that the debate about capital ratios does not take place altogether in the dark—that it is exposed to what my hon. Friend the Member for Erith and Thamesmead called the daylight of scrutiny—and that we do not hear just from financial trade bodies. If they all genuinely have no intention of lobbying for a less safe system, have no desire for a race to the bottom and want the highest possible global standards on regulation, they have absolutely nothing to fear from this amendment. It does no more than ensure that we have reports from the Treasury on what happens when these powers are passed to UK regulators, and what happens if the divergence that is facilitated in clause 3—in this long list on pages 2 and 3 of the Bill—takes place.
Alison Thewliss
I agree very much with what the right hon. Gentleman has said. It is important that we are kept up to date, in the absence of other scrutiny mechanisms. At the very least, within six months of Royal Assent, we should find out the impact of any revocations. The point was well made about consumers, because in many ways they are very far away from where this Bill is, and they may not see any issues that are coming up. It is important that we, as parliamentarians, are sighted on what those issues might be and have some degree of scrutiny over what happens with the regulations.
Stella Creasy
We are talking in quite abstract terms, but it is worth remembering that when Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac fell apart in America, consumers were the first to feel the repercussions that were felt around the world. This financial regulation comes in in the aftermath of that, because it is still going on. There are still people and families who are paying the price for what happened in the financial crisis. This is not about reheating and repeating the arguments about who caused the financial crisis. It is about recognising that consumers in all our constituencies paid the price, first and foremost.
As others have said, when we think about financial regulations, it can feel quite technical, distant and obscure because of the language we use, but let us remember back to those days. Many years ago, when I first came into Parliament, we were dealing in 2010 with the aftermath of the financial crisis, and it was a very painful crisis for many. Everybody asked why we did not see what was happening. Why did we not see it coming? How could we not have seen that banks were over-leveraged? How could we not have seen that mortgages were being resold in the subprime market? The truth was that it was a closed shop, so everybody was marking each other’s homework and saying, “I am sure this will be fine.” This seems to me the mildest of amendments, simply asking whether we have the information to ensure that such an occurrence could never happen again, when we are talking about something as simple as the capital requirements that banks and financial institutions should have. After all, that is exactly what happened in 2008: everybody leveraged each other, so the capital was gone, and when the roundabout stopped, it was our constituents who paid the price. I know by now, on the first day, that Ministers will think we are a broken record, but to ask the Treasury simply to provide that information and to look at it from a consumer perspective does not seem an unfair thing to do, given the history and the legacy of this that we have seen for so many in our constituencies.
John Glen
In addressing this amendment, I want to start by saying that the Government are fully committed to ensuring that this greater delegation of responsibility to the regulators is accompanied by robust accountability and scrutiny mechanisms. To pick up on the point made by right hon. Gentleman about clauses 1 and 3, they amend the existing banking framework for different reasons. Clause 1 only removes FCA investment firms from the CRR. Clause 3 enables the implementation of Basel standards for the remaining firms, credit institutions and PRA investment firms by enabling the Treasury to revoke parts of the CRR that relate to Basel. That is so that the PRA can fill the space with its rules.
Amendment 23 seeks to add a requirement for the Treasury to assess and report on the impact of its revocations of the capital requirements regulation on consumers, competitiveness and the economy. However, I would argue that the emphasis is in the wrong place. The Treasury will only make revocations to enable the introduction of the PRA’s rules. A stand-alone assessment of the provisions being deleted would not provide meaningful information for Parliament—it is unnecessary. Those revocations are to be subject to the draft affirmative procedure, so they will be explained to Parliament and Parliament will be able to debate their appropriateness before they are made.
I agree with the principle of scrutiny, but the emphasis should be placed on the PRA’s rule making, and that is what this Bill does. The Bill includes provisions requiring the PRA to publicly report on how it has had regard to upholding international standards and relative standing in the UK, as well as facilitating sustainable lending. Those are in addition to the PRA’s existing statutory objectives on safety and soundness of financial institutions and its secondary competition objective, so they overlap with the areas that the amendment attempts to address.
The provisions in this Bill sit alongside existing provisions in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which require the PRA to publish a cost-benefit analysis alongside its consultation on rules. That will provide Parliament and the public with the information required to scrutinise the PRA’s actions. Therefore, the current provisions in the Bill, combined with those existing provisions in the Financial Services and Markets Act, already ensure that the information that Parliament is seeking will be in the public domain. The hon. Member for Walthamstow asked me to set out a vision, almost, for the conduct regulator with respect to the future operating environment. To some extent, that is deferred to the future regulatory review, but I will give her my view because this goes to the core of the future of financial services. We need an environment in which the regulator is accessible to consumer concerns. I recognise the work that she has done and the shortcomings that she perceives with the regulator’s current dynamic. We need Parliament to be at the heart of scrutinising its activities. The legislation would give it an obligation to report, but then we need meaningful scrutiny from Parliament.
The challenge is based on the work that the hon. Lady did after 2010—we came into Parliament at the same time—after which there was a rapid evolution in business models and new types of things. That is why I am delighted that Chris Woolard is doing a high-cost credit review and looking at some of the areas that she is engaged in, such as buy now, pay later. He is looking at that urgently so that we do not make the mistakes of the past and do not face some of the emerging challenges, in terms of behaviours—[Interruption.] She smiles. I suspect that she is not completely convinced by what I am saying about the provisions. We are resisting the amendment because in the narrow confines of what we need to achieve, with respect to the translation of these directives appropriately at the end of the transition period, that is distinct and different from an enduring solution. I look forward to her contribution to the regulatory framework review, because that will drive a meaningful discussion about how we achieve the sort of accountability that she and I want and think should be enhanced.
Stella Creasy
I am sure the Minister will have some delightful conversations about the regulatory framework that will keep many people wide awake for hours to come, but the two are not mutually exclusive. This amendment and this debate are about capital holdings.
Does the Minister recognise that what I said about what happened in 2008-09 is directly linked to this? We need to keep a tight eye on this, especially because of the global context in which it is happening. We cannot protect our economy and our constituents without some form of scrutiny and control. The Minister said that it is important to have parliamentary involvement, but he has just refused an amendment that would have brought the Select Committees into the process.
I am struggling to understand why in this instance, with this amendment and this requirement of the Bill, given the role of the FCA in overseeing capital requirements, the Minister feels that it would not be important to have the data, so that we are not in a position in which that subprime lending happens again in a different guise. If we have learned anything—this is not just about the high-cost industry—it is that these models evolve. It is like water: exploitation in the system will find a way through unless we have robust procedures. It is possible to have both this report and a regulatory framework; the two are not mutually exclusive. If there is not a reporting provision, the Minister leaves a gap until one is in place.
John Glen
This legislation provides the regulators with the responsibility and the reporting obligation to Parliament. What the hon. Lady has done is make an explicit relationship between conduct failure and capital requirement decisions. Decisions about the overall framework for accountability for the regulators are embedded within this Bill. The point of disagreement between us is whether there are sufficient obligations, in terms of reporting and scrutiny, for these narrow measures. We obviously disagree. I am trying to signal that, more broadly, on the wider issues of the future dynamic among Parliament, the Treasury and regulators, there is scope for significant review, and appropriately so given the changing nature of where these regulations are coming from. I do not have anything else to say.
Mr McFadden
The Minister said that he does not want to accept the amendment because he thinks it is in the wrong place. I would find that a little bit more convincing if I really thought he would accept it if he thought it were in the right place, but so far today, Members on the Government Benches have steadfastly voted against this kind of reporting back and reviewing of things to do with the capital rules, as well as the other amendments tabled. I am sure that the Minister has read the whole amendment paper, and will have seen that I have tried to come at the same issue from a number of different angles and different timetables. This morning, we pressed to a Division an amendment asking for a report after three years, which was defeated. I will not press this one, Dr Huq, but we will be coming to other, similar amendments very soon. I therefore ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
John Glen
The 2008-09 financial crisis led to significant economic hardship. Since then, post-crisis regulatory reforms set by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision have supported financial stability, which underpins our economic prosperity. We in the UK intend to uphold our international commitment to the full, timely and consistent implementation of these reforms, alongside other major jurisdictions, and clause 3 creates the space in legislation for the financial regulator—the Prudential Regulatory Authority—to implement the remaining Basel standards. Like our approach to investment firms, our intention is to delegate the responsibility of implementing these to the PRA with enhanced accountability, as I have described. This is the right thing to do: the PRA has the technical expertise and competence to implement these post-crisis reforms as they should be implemented.
However, in delegating this responsibility, this Bill ensures that checks and balances are in place. First, clause 3 ensures that we transfer only some elements of the capital requirements regulation, or CRR, to the PRA, and that the extent of the Treasury’s powers to delete will be constrained to those areas of the CRR that are necessary to implement the Basel standards and ensure the UK upholds its international commitments. Secondly, this clause ensures that the deletions the Treasury makes take place when it is clear that adequate provision has been made by the PRA to fill the space. Those deletions will also be subject to the draft affirmative procedure, providing the opportunity for Parliament to scrutinise the Treasury’s actions. The clause also allows the Treasury to make consequential, supplementary and incidental deletions to parts of the CRR. This is to ensure a coherent regime across the CRR and other PRA rules, amounting to a clear prudential rulebook that industry can follow.
Further, clause 3 enables the Treasury to make transitional and savings provisions to protect cliff edges from the deletion of certain provisions on the operations of a firm. This will allow the Treasury to save permissions already granted by the PRA, to modify capital requirements and avoid the need for firms to reapply for those permissions under new PRA rules where they are being replicated in the rulebook as a result of the Bill. This clause is essential to the delivery of our international commitments, and I therefore commend it to the Committee.
Mr McFadden
I do not want to force the Minister to go over the same ground again and again, but I am just trying to fully understand this. He used a phrase something like “the clause allows for departure from the CRR in order to implement Basel”, if I have understood him correctly. I am not trying to be obtuse, but I want him to explain fully to the Committee what that means. Why do we have to “depart” from the capital requirements regulation in order to implement the Basel rules? On the face of it, the list contained in clause 3 is a very wide list of things from the CRR that the Treasury is taking powers to revoke, and I am therefore trying to fully understand what the effect of this clause is. Is it just to implement Basel, or does it give a wider, ongoing power to the regulator to change capital ratios against these lines of business that are set out in the amendment? I genuinely want to understand that.
My second question is about the potential impact on risk weightings and how capital ratios can look. There is a potentially perverse effect here—almost a mathematical one. Because these things have risk weightings attached to them, if the regulator makes a decision to reduce that weighting—from 50% to 40%, for example, or whatever it is—but the bank still holds the same amount of capital against that stream of business, it has the effect of making the bank look more safe and secure, even though it does not have any more capital—even though nothing has changed.
John Glen
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his points. On the first point about why we are deleting what we are deleting, we are deleting elements of the capital requirements regulation to the PRA so that it can implement the provisions of capital requirements II, which the EU is commencing, in the appropriate way for our firms—that is basically it. The EU is on a journey of implementing CRR II, and we need to do what is appropriate for our firms, as I have discussed.
John Glen
The future in terms of the evolving rulebook of the EU and other jurisdictions and how we seek to do that here will be subject to the future regulatory framework. We cannot anticipate the future evolving regulatory direction of new directives that have not yet been written elsewhere. What we have to do is to build the right framework for origination of rules in the Treasury and from the regulators, with the right accountability framework in place.
The problem we have conceptually in this discussion is that we are coming out of an embedded relationship in which we have auto-uploaded stuff that we have discussed, crudely, elsewhere. We have a legacy set of issues over which we have not had complete control this year that we are obliged to implement, but as we approach the end of the transition period, we have to make provision for things that actually make sense and we want to do anyway, in an appropriate way.
The driver of the right hon. Gentleman’s remarks— I understand why—is this desire to scrutinise the appetite for a sort of ad hoc, and I do not mean to be pejorative, but almost opportunistic, divergence, when what we are trying to do is to enable the regulator to do what is appropriate for a set of entities that will not naturally conform to the enduring direction of travel of the CRR II within the EU, because of the different nature of our firms and, as we have discussed, the different treatment of capital that is appropriate, given what they are actually doing vis-à-vis banks.
Secondly, he asked some detailed questions about risk weight.
Mr McFadden
Before the Minister moves on to the potentially perverse effects, does clause 3 simply give the regulators the powers to implement Basel 3.1, or does it give the regulator broader powers to change risk weightings against those lines of business in ways other than under Basel 3.1?
John Glen
My understanding is that the licence to operate given to the PRA is to make it consistent with Basel 3.1, in the context of the evolving rules that are being implemented elsewhere, but the notion that there is a single downloadable format of the Basel 3.1 rules in every single jurisdiction is a false proposition. Every regulator in different jurisdictions will do that in different ways. It is important, therefore, that whatever decisions they come to around the specific decisions on different entities will be published and scrutinised, such that it could be justified against the international standing and the other factors that we have put in place as a meaningful accountability framework.
I am probably close to the limit of my capacity to answer further on this point, but I am happy to reflect further and to write to the right hon. Gentleman and make it available for the Committee, to clarify anything that would be helpful to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5
Prudential regulation of credit institutions etc by PRA rules
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 1—Annual review of the CRR rules—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, once each financial year, prepare, publish and lay before Parliament a review of the changes to CRR rules made by the PRA in the relevant financial year.
(2) The review must include an assessment of the impact of any changes to CRR
rules on—
(a) consumers;
(b) competitiveness; and
(c) the wider economy.”
This new clause would require regular reviews of any departures from the current regime of capital requirements.
Mr McFadden
This is my third attempt to get the Government to commit to reporting on the impact of these measures. Clause 5 and the accompanying provisions in schedule 3 insert new part 9D into the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. This new part 9D will empower the PRA to make changes to capital requirements regulation rules. Schedule 3 also sets out the accountability framework, which we have discussed quite a lot throughout the day.
New clause 1 is an attempt to understand and explain the effect of changing these rules. It calls for an annual review to be published of changes to the CRR rules and their impact on consumers, competitiveness and the wider economy. As with similar amendments, all of this is an attempt to ensure that we do not simply pass all these powers from the EU to UK regulators without having processes in place, making clear what the changes we are making do and giving Parliament a proper voice in debate over these matters.
As I have said in relation to other amendments that, as things stand, unless we strengthen the parliamentary side of this, we could end up having less input to these issues in the future than we do at present. All these capital rules are there for a reason. We have thrashed it out today. It is important that we have proper transparency and a full understanding of the consequences if we depart from these rules in a significant way in the future.
My hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow described these amendments as mild. I think they are mild. None of them say even that we should not have any of these departures. They simply ask for some process to understand the effect of them, which is open to Parliament. That is what new clause 1 would do.
John Glen
I really respect the right hon. Gentleman’s approach to this. It is very constructive. I accept his frustration with what I am saying, but I do respect his patience with me through this process. Each time, I will try to justify what we are doing.
This Bill enables the implementation, as the right hon. Gentleman understands, of the Basel standards. That will be done by deletion of parts of the capital requirements regulation that need to be updated, so that the PRA can make those Basel updates in their rules. As a result, we will see a split in this prudential regime, perhaps temporarily, depending on the end result of the future regulatory framework across legislation and regulatory rules.
The regime is already split in this way to an extent, with some rules for firms set directly by regulators and others contained in retained EU law or law that has originated in this Parliament, and it will continue to work in this way. However, we will seek to ensure that this is done as effectively as possible through clause 5. Clause 5 ensures that cross-references between legislation and PRA rules work properly on an ongoing basis. It also requires the PRA to publish an explanatory document outlining how it all fits together. Finally, the clause introduces schedule 3, which contains further detail to ensure that the regime works. As the elements contained in the clause help to ensure a workable framework for the UK to remain Basel-compliant, I recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
New clause 1 seeks to add an annual reporting requirement, as the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East said, for the Government to carry out and publish a review of PRA rules that implement the Basel standards, including an assessment of the impact of changes to the rules on consumers, competitiveness and the wider economy. The Bill will require the PRA to demonstrate how it has regard to several considerations: the international standards that it seeks to implement, the relative standing of the UK and the ability to finance businesses and consumers sustainably.
However, I regret that the amendment has the potential to duplicate the PRA’s reporting duties. I respectfully contend that this additional annual reporting requirement is not necessary, because through the Bill the PRA will also be required to publish a summary of the purpose of the rules it makes when implementing the Basel standards and an explanation of how it has complied with its reporting duties. Furthermore, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 already requires the PRA to make an annual report to the Chancellor on its activities, including on the extent to which its objectives have been advanced and how it considered existing regulatory principles in discharging its functions. The Chancellor must lay that report before Parliament.
I therefore question whether the proposed review would really provide much more insight than what the current reporting arrangements already achieve. I have myself checked whether there are no reporting requirements and we are entering some sort of wild west environment, but I do not think that that is the case. The amendment duplicates efforts that are already in place. Ultimately, to require the Treasury to undertake such an assessment would undermine this delegation and the regulator’s independence. I therefore ask the right hon. Gentleman not to move the amendment.
Mr McFadden
The Minister has given a pot 3 defence. I apologise for using that in-joke from this morning’s session; I am happy to explain it to you later, Dr Huq. A pot 3 defence means that it is already covered. It is my pleasure not to move the amendment.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 3
Prudential regulation of credit institutions etc
Alison Thewliss
I beg to move amendment 40, in schedule 3, page 79, line 25, after “activities” insert
“in the UK and internationally”.
This amendment would ensure the likely effect of the rules on the relative standing of the United Kingdom as a place for internationally active credit institutions and investment firms to be based or to carry on activities are considered both in terms of their UK and international activities before Part CRR rules are taken.
This is quite a modest amendment. The Bill is supposed to ensure that Scotland, the City and the rest of the UK remain internationally competitive but robustly regulated, as the sector and everyone beyond a few marketeer ideologues are looking for. The amendment seeks simply to ensure that the FCA has regard to the standing of the UK as a base for financial firms that operate internationally. It is a kind of reflection amendment. It is common sense. It is really a drafting amendment. There is not terribly much more to it.
John Glen
As I have said, the UK is committed to maintaining its high standards. We heard during evidence sessions last week that these high standards will not hinder the UK’s ambition to remain an attractive place to carry out business. None the less, the Government want to ensure that our regulators have specific regard to these ambitions, particularly for international businesses, which bring jobs and innovation and, I believe, improve our economic prospects and prosperity.
The amendment aims to ensure that that is the case, and I welcome the intention, but I reassure the Committee that the Bill as drafted will deliver that. I highlight in particular to the hon. Member for Glasgow Central that subsections (1)(b) and (2) of proposed new section 144C to the 2000 Act requires the PRA to
“consider the United Kingdom’s standing in relation to the other countries and territories”
that could affect where international firms
“are most likely to choose to be based or carry on activities.”
I believe that that is adequate to address the concerns that have been raised.
Alison Thewliss
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Mr McFadden
I beg to move amendment 27, in schedule 3, page 80, line 8, at end insert—
“(7) The PRA must, at least once every five years, review the provisions of this section.
(8) The Treasury must lay before Parliament a report setting out—
(a) the outcomes of this review; and
(b) any changes the Treasury proposes to make as a result of this review.
(9) The Treasury may by regulations make any changes identified in subsection (8)(b).
(10) Regulations under subsection (9) may not be made unless a draft has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This amendment would ensure there is a review of the accountability framework for regulators once in each Parliament and give it a role in approving subsequent changes to the accountability framework.
This will be my last attempt. I have tried to get reviews after six months, one year and three years; this is the attempt at once in every Parliament. Of all the mild amendments, this has to be the mildest. Once in every Parliament, we are asking for the PRA to review the provisions of proposed new section 144C in schedule 3, and for the Treasury to lay before Parliament a report setting out the outcomes of that review and any changes that it proposes to make as a result. I really think it reasonable to expect that as a minimum, given the sensitivity and potential combustibility of the provisions, which is why we have tabled the amendment.
John Glen
On a human level, I have found this process quite challenging, because my instincts are to try to accommodate the right hon. Gentleman when he sounds so reasonable and plausible. The amendment seeks to introduce a requirement to review the PRA’s accountability framework for Basel implementation and, as he said, it would require the PRA to conduct a review every five years, which is the least demanding of his requests today.
It is right to ensure that the accountability framework is fit for purpose and up to date. Indeed, that is one of the aims that we want to achieve through the Bill: flexible and agile regulation. The Bill’s purpose is to enable the implementation of the Basel standards, and the international deadline for Basel 3.1 reforms is 1 January 2023. By 1 January 2023, the bulk of Basel-related rules made as a result of the Bill should therefore already be published. The accountability framework that the Bill introduces for the PRA to make rules to meet Basel requirements relates only to the implementation of the specific so-called Basel 3.1 rules and does not relate to the ongoing prudential regulation of financial service firms that is being considered by the future regulatory framework review. The review is consulting on the important split of responsibilities between Parliament, Government and the regulators now that the UK has left the EU.
Reflecting the wisdom of the right hon. Gentleman with respect to the value of reviews, in that context a five-year review would clearly be appropriate. However, in the current context, it would be inappropriate to ask the PRA to report on an Act of Parliament given that the Bill already includes a more appropriate reporting requirement for the PRA, as set out in proposed new section 144D, that is adapted for the CRR rules. That requirement is to publish an explanation of how the matters in the accountability framework have impacted on the PRA’s rules whenever it consults on and publishes final rules to implement Basel. That will directly attend to the logic and rationale for what it has done.
The amendment would also add a new power for the Treasury in relation to the accountability framework. The Treasury already has a similar power in the Bill to add additional matters for the PRA to consider. The power proposed in the amendment goes further, allowing the Treasury to amend the list, including removing matters from it. It is not clear to me why the Treasury should ever remove, for example, the requirement for the PRA to have regard to the Basel standards. Such matters are immediately pertinent to the prudential regime and would have been agreed by Parliament through the Bill process. Therefore, the existing provisions in the accountability framework already appear to achieve the aims intended in the amendment in the best way possible and, as such, do not need to change. For those reasons, I regret to ask the right hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.
Mr McFadden
Is the Minister saying that if there were a Basel 3.2 or a Basel IV process—that is quite likely, because at some point there will be a revision to the capital rules because things change and the system has to evolve—somehow the part 9D provisions cannot be used? Are they only for Basel 3.1? That is the implication of his response. I would have thought that giving the regulator powers over all those areas would be applicable to future Basel revisions and not just this one. In other words, we are not making a regulatory snapshot; we are creating a movie. This is a genuine question: the part 9D rules must be applicable to any future revisions of the Basel process, too. If so, there is a strong case for a once-in-a-Parliament review of how that is going.
John Glen
Those rules will have regard to future Basels. The reporting mechanism we have and the accountability to Parliament when those rules are published is more immediate and comprehensive. My contention is that a five-year provision would be out of date because we would have done it by then. That is why I am apprehensive about the right hon. Gentleman’s suggestion.
However, within the context of the future regulatory review—I cannot be bound on the outcome of that, because it is genuinely consultative—and what would be the appropriate reporting, there is a difference between short-term reporting on a particular measure or decision and a more fundamental review of the strategic dynamics of the relationship between the regulators, which we have seen evolve over decades. On the principle, there may be the need to have something like that. I am straining to be positive and constructive in my engagement with the right hon. Gentleman.
Mr McFadden
The truth is that there is no science about what is exactly the best timetable for reviewing these things. I am not pretending that one of the various timescales that we have mooted is perfect, and there is probably a legitimate debate to be had about that. However, as the Minister has just confirmed that we have given the regulator the power to make rule changes regarding future Basel changes on an ongoing basis—I am sure he is right about that—having a review and a report on this once every five years is a reasonable timescale to say what the impact of these things has been. I therefore wish to push the amendment to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
John Glen
I beg to move amendment 2, in schedule 3, page 84, line 19, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—
“(b) section 144D (explanation to accompany consultation on rules);
(c) section 144E(1) and (4) to (7) (exceptions from sections 144C and 144D).”
This amendment corrects the explanatory words in a list of provisions that apply to section 192XA rules that are not CRR rules.
This technical amendment corrects a reference to words contained in parentheses to make it clear that those words apply only to proposed new section 144D to the 2000 Act, and it adds the correct words in parentheses to the references in proposed new section 144E. The words in parentheses explain the scope of the clause.
Amendment 2 agreed to.
Schedule 3, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 6
Power to amend the Credit Rating Agencies Regulation
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
John Glen
The Basel standards include rules relating to credit assessments—also called external ratings—which some firms use to assign risk ratings. Risk ratings are used to determine the minimum amount of capital that must be maintained by a firm, and the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East has already drawn attention to this matter.
In the UK, credit ratings agencies, or CRAs, that issue credit assessments are regulated by the credit ratings agencies regulation, and the changes needed to the CRA regulation to implement Basel are minor. Consistent with the 1 January 2023 international deadline, however, the PRA has yet to issue its rules implementing the Basel 3.1 reforms, and it makes sense to consider changes to the CRA regulation as part of the wider 3.1 package of changes. Therefore, the clause gives the Treasury a power to amend the CRA regulation while requiring it to consider the Basel standards when that power is exercised. That confirms our intention to use the power only to implement changes stemming from Basel. The changes to the CRA regulation will help to ensure that the UK is fully Basel-compliant.
Mr McFadden
I have a couple of questions, because credit rating agencies did not cover themselves in glory in the financial crisis, so I want to be clear about what clause 6 does and does not do with regard to them. How does the credit rating agencies regulation regulate them at the moment, and how will that be altered by the provisions in clause 6? For example, does clause 6 deal with the situation where a credit rating agency charges a fee to those who are asking for a rating and with the potential conflicts of interest involved in that process? That played out in the financial crisis, as anyone who has watched the movie “The Big Short” will have seen. The clause does talk about the regulation of the credit rating agencies, so I wonder if the Minister could explain a bit more how they are regulated and how that would be altered by the clause.
John Glen
I am happy to do my best. In terms of the changes and why they are not set out in the Bill, the changes that need to be made to the CRA regulations stem from “Basel III: Finalising post-crisis reforms”—the Basel document—which is part of the most recent Basel 3.1 package of reforms. Most of those have not been legislated for in the UK or the EU, and it makes sense to consider changes to the regulation as part of the wider implementation of the 3.1 package, which will be done through the future rules. They will be consulted on prior to the deadline.
The power to amend the regulation will be used solely to implement Basel 3.1. There are a number of minor amendments contained in that “Basel III: Finalising post-crisis reforms” document of December 2017. The two eligibility criteria that credit rating agencies need to satisfy are added. The power in clause 6 safeguards that intent as it requires the Treasury to have regard to the standards rather than making other amendments for unrelated reasons.
In terms of the other limited changes made in schedule 4 as part of the implementation of the UK regime equivalent to the EU’s second capital requirements regulation, they again relate to earlier Basel III standards. I do not think I can answer with enough specificity to do justice to the right hon. Gentleman, so I think I will need to write to him on this matter.
In what I have said, I hope that I have explained the confines and drivers of the reform; the powers that we are giving to the regulator; and the consistency with which they will be exercised to the Basel 3.1 proposal. I have previously spoken about accountability for that. I need to write to the right hon. Gentleman to give more clarity, and I am happy to address the issue at further stages in the Bill’s passage.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 4
Amendments of the Capital Requirements Regulation
John Glen
I beg to move amendment 32, in schedule 4, page 89, line 11, at end insert—
“11A (1) Article 500d (temporary calculation of exposure value of regular-way purchases and sales awaiting settlement in view of COVID-19 pandemic) is amended as follows.
(2) In the heading, omit ‘Temporary’.
(3) In paragraph 1, omit ‘until 27 June 2021,’.”
This amendment removes the time limit on the availability of the derogation under Article 500d of the Capital Requirements Regulation.
This is a minor amendment. In 2017, as I mentioned, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision introduced favourable treatment for firms in how they calculate the leverage ratio. The EU was due to introduce that treatment through its second capital requirements regulation on 28 June 2021. Given that the revised calculation will reflect the leverage of a transaction more appropriately, and at the same time increase the capacity of an institution to lend and to absorb losses amid the covid-19 pandemic, the EU brought this provision forward through a derogation to the first capital requirements regulation that is currently in effect. The UK supported that approach. This derogation is time-limited in the EU to 28 June 2021, as that is when the relevant EU CRR II comes into force, which will put in place the new permanent provisions on leverage ratio.
As the Committee will be aware, the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 provides that EU law, as it is in effect at the end of the transition, will continue to apply in the UK. This means that the first capital requirements regulation as it exists on 31 December will remain in place in the UK until it is amended by this Bill. That means that the derogation would also cease to have effect in the UK on 28 June 2021, because we will have adopted it on the terms that it is now live in the EU. The UK has not legislated a date by which to update its prudential regime in this Bill, because it is most important that our regulators get the rules right and have enough time to consult and finalise them, and also to minimise disruption.
The UK is targeting 1 January 2022 for firms to have implemented the PRA CRR rules. This decision was made after introduction of the Bill, in response to industry concerns about the general volume of regulatory reform in 2021. I referred earlier to the future regulatory framework review. The first stage of that was a piece of work that the Treasury did with industry and the regulators following Chancellor Hammond’s work 18 months ago, which sought to rationalise and understand the range of regulatory interventions that were ongoing.
UK financial services providers would have to revert to the previous rules from June for a period of approximately six months, which would be costly for industry and inconsistent with the EU regime during that period. This amendment therefore removes the time limit on the derogation, so it will remain in place until the new permanent provisions are in place in the UK, giving clarity and certainty, and not seeking to cause disruption. That is why I ask hon. Members to accept this amendment.
Mr McFadden
Can I ask a question about this? The Minister said that the leverage ratio had been changed so that institutions could lend more. I assume that means it is being reduced as a temporary measure during the covid crisis. He then said that, while at EU level that was to be for six months, the UK had not decided when such a change should end. The implication is that we are allowing a reduction in the leverage ratio without an end date. That is potentially very significant in terms of the discussions that we have had about capital today.
I appreciate that it is late in the afternoon and all the rest, but having listened to the Minister, and given how sensitive this issue of leverage ratio is—how can I best put this?—I would be grateful if he could undertake to write to the Committee with more detail on how this will operate. A permanent or long-term reduction in the leverage ratio would be a very big regulatory decision and would be precisely the kind of thing that we have been talking about all day, and precisely the kind of thing that we have been saying should have proper reports back, which those on the Government Benches have been resisting all day. I would like to find out more about what exactly this means and how long it will last for.
John Glen
To the right hon. Gentleman’s point, the UK has not legislated a date by which to update the prudential regime in this Bill, because it is most important that our regulators get the rules right. On the amendment made for the covid crisis that we have aligned to, which essentially ends next year, he is asking about the potential for us not to end it and therefore to be at odds with the prevailing new situation in the EU after 28 June.
John Glen
Well, whatever the enduring reversion environment is in the EU following the end of this special measure. I will be happy to write to the right hon. Gentleman on that, but the key point is this: it would not be appropriate for the UK to determine where we would be beyond 28 June in advance of the regulator’s looking at those matters, when at the same time the EU’s definitive position at the end of June is not yet known. I will write to him, because I recognise that he is saying that he is apprehensive about the fact that we will have an apparent 18-month period from next June until January 2022 where we are at odds with the prevailing norms, and that is a risk. If I have understood him correctly, I am happy to address that point.
Mr McFadden
I am grateful to the Minister, but it is not an EU alignment point that I am making. He is right that, yes, this has arisen because of a disalignment with the EU, but my point is not that we have to always look at this through the lens of being aligned with the EU on capital requirements. I am talking about a public safety point; I am talking about a UK regulator taking a view on the leverage ratio, not necessarily in the light of what the EU is doing after June, but precisely because of all the points we have been making about the importance of capital after the financial crisis.
John Glen
I am happy to restate what I said. We have inherited an environment and indeed we have been obliged—quite reasonably—to absorb into law where the EU has got to at the end of the transition period. My point is that, in order to get the right enduring solution for our capital requirements for the UK, as it is in the UK, we have to allow a regulator to do that work.
The point the right hon. Gentleman is making is about the potential deviation of that enduring solution, and the gap between its implementation and the capital requirements that are normative globally, next June. I will undertake to clarify how we consider, in essence, the trade-off between that potential deviation and the disruption to firms. However, what I have tried to convey throughout today’s proceedings is that our desire is not to deregulate or to deviate from international norms, but to set out a UK framework that is necessary and appropriate for the institutions that exist in the UK.
Financial Services Bill (Seventh sitting)
Thursday 26th November 2020
(4 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Financial Services Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 26 November 2020 - (26 Nov 2020)
The Chair
Before we begin, just a few reminders: please switch electronic devices to silent; no tea and coffee during sittings; and, again, I thank everybody for observing the social distancing regulations. As you have seen, the spaces are marked and now cannot even be moved, so there is no excuse for not social distancing. The Hansard reporters would be grateful if Members emailed any electronic copies of their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk.
We continue now with line-by-line consideration of the Bill.
Clause 8
Review of which benchmarks are critical benchmarks
Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 28, in clause 8, page 7, line 38, at end insert—
‘(7) In reviewing critical benchmarks in accordance with Article A20 of the Benchmarks regulation as amended by this Act the FCA must have regard to—
(a) ensuring a benchmark is based on actual trades or contracts;
(b) preventing a benchmark from manipulation for the benefit of anyone submitting information to that benchmark; and
(c) robust sanctions up to and including custodial sentences for anyone found to be engaged in manipulation or attempted manipulation of a benchmark.’
This amendment would require the FCA to have regard to ensuring a benchmark is based on actual trades or contracts, that it is not open to manipulation and that robust sanctions are in place for those who manipulate, or attempt to manipulate, a benchmark.
Thank you for your chairmanship today, Mr Davies. Perhaps with your indulgence I may, as I did the other day, explain how I shall try to approach this morning’s sitting. I believe that within a sometimes impenetrable Bill the clauses we are to debate this morning may be the most impenetrable. That is often the case when clauses change provisions elsewhere, as in this instance. I shall, as I go through my remarks on the provisions, ask the Minister some questions. The real meat will come at about clauses 13 to 16, and I will speak for a bit longer. I just want to give the Committee the shape of my approach.
To return to the amendment, it begins, I guess, with LIBOR. I want by way of illustration to ask the Committee to think about the price of bread. If we were all asked what the benchmark price of a loaf is, it would be easy to establish it. We would go to a supermarket, look on the shelf, and see the price of a loaf. If we were keen shoppers with a good eye for a bargain, we might go to two or three supermarkets and compare the price of a loaf. I could pop-quiz the Committee, but I shall not put anyone through that.
The price of a standard loaf in one of our supermarkets is roughly £1.10, give or take; people who want to go for one of those sourdough loaves can pay a bit more if they want, but for what I would call a normal brown loaf it is about £1.10. That is the benchmark price of a loaf, dictated by the supply and demand of a competitive supermarket environment.
Now I want Members to imagine a different way of setting prices, where we were setting the price of a loaf and could all submit our opinion on what the price of the loaf might be—and we owned bakeries, and were selling loaves. We would have a debate every day to set the price of bread. Perhaps the Minister and I would converge on about £1.10, but someone else might say, “Look, could we just edge that price up? Could you do me a favour and make today’s price £1.11 or £1.12? It would be a really good favour and, by the way, if you do it I might send you a case of champagne at Christmas.”
The trader might be saying those things in the knowledge that they had a lot of loaves to sell that afternoon—maybe millions. The penny difference in price could make a great difference to the profit. Alternatively, a benchmark price of £1.09 instead of £1.10 could mean that they would lose a lot of money on the bread they had to sell. That is basically what was happening with LIBOR. That is the problem that was unveiled.
The problem is exacerbated where there is not a liquid market for bread and where the benchmark relies more and more on what our oral witnesses last week called “expert judgment”. That is one phrase for it, but we could also call it opinion, and if we did not have supermarkets selling millions of loaves every day and the price of bread was down to the opinion of only the bakers, we can see there would be the potential for price manipulation.
That is what was happening with LIBOR and what was uncovered as traders around the world shaved tiny proportions off the daily rates. The volume of money being traded meant that even a tiny proportion—0.01% or something like that—could make a huge difference to their own trading account over the course of the year. That is the problem that this set of clauses is trying to deal with.
How do we deal with the problem? We focus a lot on what the Bill calls the representativeness of the benchmark, because there is not really a problem when millions of loaves are being sold and there is a competitive environment; if I do not like the price at Tesco, I can go to another supermarket and try my luck elsewhere. But when wholesale markets were not very liquid and relied more and more on expert opinions, there was the potential for—indeed, the reality of—manipulation. That is what happened.
That matters because this benchmark underpins trillions of pounds’-worth of trades, yet was found to be vulnerable to the kind of manipulation I have just tried to illustrate. I have tried to show that even the tiniest movement in the daily benchmark could make a big difference to traders because of the volumes of money that they were trading. The benchmark’s flaws were exposed a number of years ago, yet its use to underpin trading has persisted because of the volume of contracts linked to it.
One of the problems in the complexity of this set of clauses is that it takes us into the area of contract law, which is both complex and, in this case, international. Huge volumes, contract law and international jurisdictions are involved, so—to be fair to the regulators and the Treasury—it is not easy to get this right. Our amendment does not try to get into the contract issue, which we will come to later when we debate a few clauses further on, but rather tries to set out some ground rules for the regulator in establishing and sanctioning successor benchmarks to LIBOR.
The criteria that we have set out ought to be uncontroversial. The first is that the benchmark should be based on actual trades in the market for which real prices were paid. I confess I have been away from the issue for a while, although I served on parliamentary inquiries into it some years ago, but we learned last week that those so-called expert judgments are still being used to set LIBOR prices. That is someone’s opinion of what a trade might cost, not necessarily what it does cost in a real marketplace. That use of expert judgments has created the potential—and, as we have seen, more than the potential—for manipulation.
We also learned that SONIA, the sterling overnight index average and the favoured successor to LIBOR in the UK, is based on much more liquid markets. That is a good thing, but there is also a potential problem. LIBOR is an internationally used benchmark. While we are debating this legislation, the United States is also legislating, the European Union has parallel legislation and the Swiss have parallel legislation—and they have all gone for slightly different successors. That raises the problem, which the Minister and I will get into discussing: how to take contracts based on an internationally used benchmark and try to ensure fairness to those who signed up to contracts under it when the countries legislating for successors to it are all choosing slightly different overnight rates for those successors.
The amendment, therefore, goes with the grain of how trades are moving. We all agree that a benchmark based on large liquid markets will be more accurate than one based on opinion. The second and third elements of the amendment give the regulator a duty to prevent manipulation by those submitting information to the benchmark and to have robust sanctions, including custodial sentences, when that occurs.
We will get back to debating that elsewhere in the Bill. When the LIBOR scandal unfolded some seven or eight years ago, I remember that both the Treasury Committee and the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards heard evidence from chief executives of the major banks. Often, their defence was, “I had no idea what my traders were doing. I did not know that they were doing this.” There was a constructive ignorance built into the system. Although that did not make the chief executive look good, it was far better than the chief executive admitting that they knew what the trader was doing but they looked the other way because it was making more profit for the bank and the trader. The sanctions and the responsibility up through the institution are very important.
All that is hugely important for trust in the system. The average constituent probably does not know much about LIBOR or what it does, but the truth is that the financial products they buy are often related to this benchmark, so it does have an impact in the real world. No matter how esoteric the financial products are—they have become too esoteric—in the end there is a customer, and the customer should only pay a fair price. The imbalance of information should not result in the customer being fleeced or the trader being unfairly enriched, and it is the job of the regulator and the financial institution for which that trader works to ensure that is the case. That is the intention behind our amendment: to set that as a clear goal for the regulators before we get into the meat in the clauses of how we will transition from LIBOR to other kinds of benchmarks.
The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (John Glen)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Mr Davies. I appreciate the opening remarks of the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East and his compelling attempt to contextualise the complexity of the scrutiny of the clauses that we will undertake this morning. In that spirit, it might be helpful if I contextualise for the Committee what benchmarks are, what the LIBOR benchmark is and where we are with the EU benchmarks regulation before I respond to the Opposition amendment.
A benchmark is a standard against which the performance of a fund can be measured or by reference to which payments can be calculated. They are most commonly found in financial instruments, but are used to compare a variety of products, from commodities—oil, gold and diamonds—to the weather. The most widely used benchmarks are interest rate benchmarks, such as LIBOR, the Euro Interbank Offered Rate and SONIA. They reflect interest rates for inter-bank lending and borrowing. They are regularly calculated and made publicly available. As was mentioned, they are used in a wide array of financial instruments used in global financial markets. They also have a use in trade, finance, valuation, accounting and taxation.
Stella Creasy (Walthamstow) (Lab/Co-op)
It is wonderful to serve under your chairmanship, as ever, Mr Davies. The Minister is explaining that there is a process for enforcement. We all know that this issue is very specialist. If he thinks the current regulations and sanctions are appropriate, could he set out how they are being enacted and monitored? Frankly, it requires someone with a specialist understanding of how these rates can be manipulated to enact them in the way he outlines. If he does not want to add the amendment, could he explain how these issues can be investigated, and what resources there are to do that?
John Glen
I thank the hon. Lady for her point. These matters are administered by the FCA. I have set out the framework under which it operates. Its resourcing is a matter for it, and I speak on a six-weekly basis to the chief executive about that. The sanctions available to the FCA vary considerably according the nature of the breaches. Some will be small, modest technical breaches.
Stella Creasy
The Minister has set out the criminal sanction. I am interested in whether there is support and resourcing expertise in relation to the criminal element, as opposed to the regulatory element.
Stephen Flynn (Aberdeen South) (SNP)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Davies. I will be brief. The Minister has made a compelling case, but perhaps not as compelling as that made by the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East, who made illuminating remarks on the potential price of bread, although I encourage him to go to Aldi, where he will get it for a lot cheaper than £1.10.
What is proposed here is a common-sense approach that would give the wider public confidence that the Government are taking this matter seriously, notwith- standing the Minister’s remarks thus far. In general terms, I do not think there is a huge difference between the two positions, but looking at both sides, I think the common-sense approach would be to tighten this process and make it more robust; that would provide the public with the confidence they feel they need on these matters, particularly given the scale of past scandals.
Mr McFadden
I listened carefully to what the Minister said. I do not think anyone looking at the issue would conclude that the responsibility for these actions had been fairly allocated, so there is an issue. I am not saying we want to go around looking to put people’s heads on spikes—we do not want that sort of politics—but it does rankle with our constituents when certain types of crime that are, candidly, easier to understand are met with heavy punishments while somebody who does a very complex crime that is more difficult to understand can somehow get away with it.
Having said that, I accept that legislation for criminal offences, and particularly for custodial sentences, needs to be very carefully drafted in exactly the right way, and I cannot say that I am 100% certain that my amendment is, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
John Glen
Clause 8 is the first of 14 clauses that amend the benchmarks regulation in order to provide the FCA with the powers it needs to oversee the orderly wind-down of critical benchmarks such as LIBOR. Critical benchmarks are benchmarks that meet certain criteria—for instance, they are used in a significant volume of transactions, or the benchmark is based on submissions by contributors, the majority of whom are located in the UK. A number of powers in the benchmarks regulation are limited to the oversight supervision of critical benchmarks or the administrators of such benchmarks.
Clause 8 adds new criteria for what may be designated as a critical benchmark. As a result, a benchmark will be considered critical if its cessation would cause significant and adverse impacts on market integrity in the UK, even where the benchmark has market-led substitutes, provided one or more users of the benchmark cannot move on to a substitute. The new test means that, as a critical benchmark winds down, the value of contracts that use the benchmark diminishes. The powers available to the FCA to manage the wind-down of critical benchmarks will remain available, provided that the benchmark meets the relevant tests to remain designated as a critical benchmark.
In addition, one of the existing tests for what may be designated as a critical benchmark has been changed. The test originally stated that a benchmark would be designated as critical where it met either both a qualitative and quantitative threshold of use in more than €400 billion-worth of products, or the qualitative threshold only. The quantitative threshold has now been removed, as it has become redundant. This measure has been welcomed by industry as an important development in managing LIBOR transition, and will ensure that the FCA has the powers it needs to manage the orderly wind-down of this critical benchmark.
I am aware, as a result of my engagement with industry—indeed, the Committee heard evidence of this last week—that there is support among market participants for additional safe harbour provisions to complement the provisions in this Bill. I can assure the Committee that we are committed to looking into that further issue and providing industry with the reassurance it needs. That conversation is ongoing and, I think, is to the satisfaction of the industry; we are working to a conclusion with it. However, given what I think the Committee will concede is the complexity of the matters involved, I cannot commit to an outcome, and I think the industry recognises that.
Abena Oppong-Asare (Erith and Thamesmead) (Lab)
I want to go back to what happens if moving to another benchmark is “not reasonably practicable”. I note that the Minister is looking into that and seeking reassurance. One thing that we are particularly concerned about in this clause is the question of whether “one or more users”, if it is reasonable and practicable, can switch to a market-led substitute benchmark. How do the Government define what is reasonably practicable in this case? Will he explain that to me, please?
John Glen
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her question. In terms of the benchmark’s being classed as critical and the appropriateness of substitutes, certain contracts face barriers to moving off a benchmark. While some contracts are bilateral and that renegotiation may be possible, many contracts are multilateral and involve the consent of multiple parties before a change can be made. Therefore, in some cases, achieving consensus on the changes is likely to be difficult or impossible, due to the absolute number of parties that will be involved, or due to the threshold at which consent would be achieved. In those situations the existence of an appropriate substitute is not relevant, as users will not be able to move on to it. The complexity of what they are on means that there is not anything substitutable.
Abena Oppong-Asare
On the point about the Government making a direct evaluation, if the benchmark user argues that it would not be reasonably practical to move to a market-led substitute, but the Treasury disagrees with that, what recourse does the user have to challenge this decision?
John Glen
These matters will be governed by protocols with the industry. The industry would have a dialogue with the FCA, through which these matters would be resolved. There would be a dispute, I would imagine, about the number of contracts, the number of people involved in those contracts, and the readiness of an available alternative. Usually, these matters would be resolved through dialogue and consultation.
Abena Oppong-Asare
That is really helpful, in terms of the dialogue with the FCA. Will a process be followed to ensure a fair system is applied with regard to substitutes that disagree with the Treasury process, or will how it is done be judged at that time?
John Glen
The complexity of these contracts and their reference to these benchmarks necessitates ongoing dialogue. There is a significant team in the FCA that deals with this work. The industry has been very concerned about this. This is a live, ongoing conversation. Given the context, and the history that the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East and I set out, and how appalling this situation was previously, there is wide consensus that this should be done in an open and collaborative way. This regulation will be used in that spirit.
Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)
Paul Richards from the International Capital Market Association, who gave evidence last week, said there were around 520 legacy bond contracts to be moved over, and only 20 had been converted in the market so far, because it is a difficult and time-consuming process. Is there more the Government could be doing to reassure and help? Does the Minister envisage bringing forward any amendments to make this any easier? It sounds like this process will cost the markets money.
John Glen
I thank the hon. Lady for her question. The evidence from the ICMA last week underscored the ongoing complexity and challenges of this. It may be that legislation will be required in a future Session, but that would be subject to a resolution. There is no point of crystallisation from the industry; it is not compelling us to bring something forward. There is no resistance on the part of the Treasury to doing that; it is a question of working out what would be appropriate for the market. That dialogue will continue, and the Government will respond in the appropriate way in due course. I think the gentleman who gave evidence last week was appropriately making the Committee aware of that ongoing additional dialogue regarding that safe harbour provision. But there is no point of conflict between the Treasury and the industry on this matter.
Mr McFadden
The questions asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Erith and Thamesmead expose the potential for litigation if the Government and regulators are moving contracts from one basis to another; some of the people involved will have deep pockets and expensive lawyers. The Minister tells us that it will all be sorted out—thrashed out—and I hope he is right; but I am not sure that we can guarantee that.
I have a couple of questions about the clause and those clauses that follow. First, is it all about LIBOR, even though it talks about critical benchmarks, or is it more general? For example, might the provisions be used on a benchmark related to the price of a particular metal, or something like that? For our understanding of the matter, should we, wherever the provisions refer to a critical benchmark, just be thinking about LIBOR—because that is what we really mean; and is there some parliamentary drafting reason why the Bill does not say that?
Secondly, the clause deals with a review of which benchmarks are critical benchmarks. The Minister said, and the clause says, that that seems to be a benchmark for which a market-led substitute exists, although for some reason it is not practical to transfer activity to such a market-led substitute. That is what is confusing about the clauses. We are told that the policy decision, and the regulatory decision, is to move away from LIBOR and to cease using it by the end of 2021. That is my understanding. Yet it seems that the clauses both facilitate that and facilitate the continued use of such benchmarks.
My reading of the clause and the one that follows is that the FCA will retain the power to compel organisations to submit information to a critical benchmark, even though the policy decision has been made to move away from that benchmark. The question then is why the regulator would want to do that, and what the power means for the 2021 LIBOR end date. Does the power mean that the FCA could compel submitters to keep submitting information to LIBOR, and is that because so many contracts depend on it? Is that really why the power to continue submitting information to critical benchmarks is engaged in this? What I am really asking is whether the clause is putting the brakes on LIBOR or, in some ways, continuing a facilitation of LIBOR after the end of 2021, for some things.
John Glen
In the UK, LIBOR is the only critical benchmark. However, for reasons that the right hon. Gentleman has alluded to, we do not want the provision to be on just the LIBOR benchmark. For reasons to do with the type of legislation that that would mean—private legislation referring to something specific—a different process would be created. We have to use benchmark legislation—benchmark regulations; but LIBOR is what it pertains to. That is the only critical benchmark in the UK.
A mechanism to compel panel banks to continue to submit data beyond the end of 2021 does not exist. We have to be able to wind down in an orderly way and make provision for continuity, which is needed for the tough contracts that continue to exist and will need some reference point. We need to do that in a way that satisfies the market and maintains stability. It is in that context that we are giving the FCA the powers.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 9
Mandatory administration of a critical benchmark
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
John Glen
Clause 9 amends article 21 of the benchmarks regulation, which concerns the mandatory administration of a critical benchmark.
Article 21 gives the FCA the power to compel the provision of a critical benchmark where the administrator notifies the FCA of its intention to cease providing the benchmark. Clause 9 amends article 21 to increase from five to 10 years the maximum period for which an administrator can be compelled by the FCA to continue to provide the benchmark. This will increase the time which the FCA has to manage the wind-down of a critical benchmark.
Under the clause, if the FCA decides to compel an administrator to continue publishing the benchmark, the FCA must assess the capability of the benchmark to measure the underlying market or economic reality and inform the administrator in writing of the outcome of this assessment. The FCA’s assessment that a critical benchmark is no longer representative of its underlying market, or is at risk of becoming unrepresentative, is the first step in providing the FCA with its wider powers to manage the wind-down of such a benchmark. We therefore wish to ensure that the FCA can take steps towards starting the managed wind-down of a critical benchmark in circumstances where the benchmark administrator itself proposes to cease the benchmark. I recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr McFadden
The clause takes us, in a sense, to the next step after a review. Again, I have a couple of questions. First, subsection (2) refers to a period of 10 years. The Minister made clear a few minutes ago that LIBOR is definitely winding up by the end of 2021, so to what does 10 years refer? With something that is supposed to be winding up in one year, I still cannot quite understand why we are giving the regulator powers to continue it in a form for up to 10 years. I am confused about that, and I do not know if I am the only one.
Secondly, subsection (3) refers to an assessment of a benchmark. That assessment revolves around the question of the representative nature of the benchmark. It says that the FCA will always give either
“a written notice stating that it considers that the benchmark is not representative of the…economic reality”—
perhaps it has become too illiquid, in the way we discussed, or too reliant on expert opinion—or
“a written notice stating that it considers that the representativeness of the benchmark is not at risk.”
In other words, we have a good competition going here for the price of the bread. Does the 10-year period of extended mandatory information apply when the FCA has judged that the benchmark is not representative, or could it apply in cases where it is judged that it is representative as well? Subsection (3) seems to indicate that the assessment could go either way. I am trying to get at what this 10-year power is for and to which kind of benchmark it applies.
John Glen
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his entirely reasonable and appropriate questions. The compulsion period of 10 years is about having a timely period to continue with the revised methodology of the synthetic LIBOR. One of the main aims of the Bill is to provide an appropriate mechanism for the wind-down of LIBOR and to reduce the risk of contractual frustration in the event of an unplanned or sudden cessation of LIBOR. To enable a managed wind-down of LIBOR, it may be necessary for the FCA to compel the benchmark administrator to continue to provide the benchmark for a period of time, to allow a portion of LIBOR-referencing contracts to mature and end. We expect a significant number of outstanding LIBOR legacy contracts at the end of the five-year compulsion period, and those outstanding contracts will still pose a material financial stability risk, as the Financial Stability Board noted in 2014.
Mr McFadden
The Minister’s phrase, “synthetic LIBOR”, helps us to understand this. I think it might mean something like this: that the regulator has the power to designate a benchmark as critical when it is unrepresentative of market reality, but in a way LIBOR is not really ending at the end of 2021, because we have synthetic LIBOR—the ghost of LIBOR, we might say—and the ghost of LIBOR is necessary because of those legacy contracts.
Where I still get confused is that the reason LIBOR is being wound up, and the reason that the FCA can designate it in this manner, is that it is unrepresentative—yet for the ghost of LIBOR, or synthetic LIBOR, to have any validity, the FCA has to continue to compel submitters to submit information to it. I do not know what the implications of that are for the quality of the ghost of LIBOR; we must remember that the reason it has been designated in the first place is that it is failing the market representativeness test. How is it, therefore, that for up to 10 years we can compel submitters to submit information to something that the regulator has judged invalid?
John Glen
The right hon. Gentleman has accurately summarised the issue around synthetic LIBOR, but we are getting into suppositions about the time period for which that synthetic LIBOR would be necessary. The FCA recently published a paper on this. It is about evolving circumstances in the market. It is very difficult to be prescriptive, hence the 10-year provision. We are now getting into the realm of market operating realities at some point in the future. We have to have something that references the fact that we have a considerable volume of contracts that reference the historical LIBOR and we have to have a reference point going forward. I hope that is helpful.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 10
Prohibition on new use where administrator to cease providing critical benchmark
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
John Glen
Clause 10 inserts article 21A to the benchmarks regulation. This article provides the FCA with the power to issue a notice prohibiting some or all new use of a critical benchmark by supervised entities. The FCA may use this power where the administrator has stated that it wishes to cease providing the benchmark and the FCA has assessed the administrator’s plans to cease the benchmark or otherwise transfer it to a new administrator.
The FCA can exercise this power only if it considers that it is desirable to advance its consumer protection objective or its integrity objective under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. The notice will contain the reasons for the prohibition, the date when it is to take effect and any further information that the FCA considers appropriate to allow supervised entities to understand the decision. The FCA’s ability to prohibit new use in circumstances where the administrator is seeking to cease to provide the critical benchmark is an important step in preventing the pool of contracts referencing a benchmark from growing ahead of its possible cessation. I therefore recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr McFadden
I thank the Minister for his explanation. This clause is about the prohibition of the use of benchmarks. Again, I have a few questions. Is it the case that prohibition can take place only after the kind of assessment of the representative nature of the benchmark that we discussed under clause 9(3), or are there other grounds for issuing a notice prohibiting the use of a benchmark, such as suspected criminal activity or manipulation in some other way?
My second question is about use. New article 21A prohibits “new use” of a benchmark. I think the Minister is saying that there should not be new use of a benchmark, but there may be continued use for the reasons that we have discussed—for legacy reasons. Could the Minister confirm that existing contracts referenced in the benchmark would not be covered by this “new use” provision?
My third question is about paragraph 4 of new article 21A, which says that the FCA must have regard to effects outside the UK of any decision to cease use of a benchmark. I can see why such a provision would be there, because LIBOR is used to underpin contracts all over the world. However, what can the regulator, which only has jurisdiction in the UK, do to stop the use of a benchmark elsewhere in the world? To what degree does this require work with other regulators through, for example, the Financial Stability Board, or is the judgment that action by the FCA alone would be enough, even though that action might have international effects, because of the importance of UK benchmarks? I suppose it is as if some jurisdiction has a particular influence in a sport, so when they change the rules, everybody else has to change the rules, too.
I assume that those criteria about the protection of the consumer and so on that the Minister referred to are in the Bill to protect the FCA from litigation risk by making clear that in acting on this, it was doing so in line with its statutory objectives, because the danger of litigation risk runs right through this.
John Glen
The right hon. Gentleman raises a number of questions, and I should start by making it clear that we in the UK cannot stop use overseas. The provision applies to UK-supervised entities working with international partners. He is right to say that there is interconnectedness between those institutions, and the FCA has a significant role in terms of LIBOR.
The simple purpose here is that, where a benchmark is to be ceased, the pool of contracts referencing that benchmark should stop growing. The prohibition power that the right hon. Gentleman referenced is available only at the point at which the benchmark administrator has informed the FCA that it is planning to cease to publish it and the FCA has considered whether it is realistic for the benchmark to be ceased or transferred to a new administrator. Clearly, it would not be desirable for the pool of contracts that reference the benchmark to continue to grow in circumstances where it is likely that that benchmark is on a pathway to ceasing to be used. It is therefore appropriate at that stage to stop supervised entities entering into new contracts that reference the relevant benchmark.
In terms of the rules broadly governing the FCA in exercising this power, it can do that only if it is desirable to do so in order to advance this FSMA consumer protection objective or the integrity objective, so it would have to be confident that it would secure an appropriate degree of protection for consumers or advance the integrity of the market, and it would have to publish a statement along those lines. I recognise that this is complex, but we are really trying to give an appropriate toolkit to the FCA to do what is necessary not only to safeguard the appropriate ongoing construction of benchmarks, but to ensure that it has the authority to justify the management of the wind-down in circumstances where that is necessary.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 11
Assessment of representativeness of critical benchmarks
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
John Glen
Clause 11 introduces two new articles to the benchmarks regulation. New article 22A requires the administrator of a critical benchmark to undertake,
“an assessment of the capability of the benchmark to measure the underlying market or economic reality”.
The administrator must undertake such an assessment when a contributor to the benchmark is proposing to withdraw, when the FCA requires the administrator to undertake a review of the benchmark, or every two years as part of a biannual review process. New article 22A also requires that:
“If a supervised contributor…intends to cease contributing input data to a critical benchmark”,
it must provide written notification to the administrator at least 15 weeks ahead of the date it intends to cease contributing. That replaces the existing four-week notice period, which is insufficient.
New article 22B requires that the FCA must conduct its own representativeness assessment of the benchmark once it receives an assessment from a benchmark administrator under article 22A. The FCA may also proceed with its assessment where the administrator has failed to provide an assessment within the timelines specified by the legislation. After making its assessment under this article, the FCA must provide the benchmark administrator with a written notice setting out its findings, which could be that it considers that the benchmark is not representative of the economic reality it is intended to measure, that it is at risk of not being representative, or that the representativeness of the benchmark is not at risk.
Those assessments play a crucial role in the process we have designed for managing the wind-down of a critical benchmark. A finding that a benchmark is no longer representative or that its representativeness is at risk is the first step in activating many of the new powers that are being granted to the FCA. I recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 11 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12
Mandatory contribution to critical benchmarks
John Glen
Clause 12 amends article 23 of the benchmarks regulation, which concerns the mandatory contribution to a critical benchmark by supervised entities. Article 23 already provides the FCA with certain compulsion powers over the administrator and supervised entities, which contribute to a benchmark, including the power to compel supervised contributors to continue to contribute to a benchmark. These powers were previously only available where the representativeness of the benchmark was judged to be at risk.
The clause amends the article to ensure that it works with the new representativeness assessments we are introducing under the Bill, and that these powers are available either where the benchmark is at risk, or where the benchmark has actually become unrepresentative. The changes mean that, for instance, the power to compel a contributor will now become available whenever the FCA has made a finding that the benchmark is unrepresentative, or its representativeness is at risk.
The clause also extends the compulsion powers to supervised third country contributors and requires that if a contributor gives notice that it intends to withdraw on a specific date, it may not cease contributing on that date without written permission from the FCA. It also clarifies that the FCA’s compulsion powers and other powers in paragraph 6 of article 23 are available specifically for the purpose of restoring, maintaining or improving the representativeness of a benchmark.
These powers are important in ensuring that a critical benchmark does not simply cease in circumstances where the representativeness of the benchmark could reasonably be maintained or restored through appropriate FCA action. I recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr McFadden
I have one or two questions to the Minister. The clause gives the FCA the power to mandate contributors, including those outside the UK—it will be interesting to see how that works—to continue to submit information to a benchmark for up to five years. However, clause 9 states that synthetic LIBOR—the ghost of LIBOR—can be kept going for up to 10 years. Why is it five years in this clause but 10 years in clause 9?
John Glen
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his question. He draws attention to the discrepancy between the provision for five years in clause 12 and 10 years elsewhere. It is important to remember that the powers in the Bill are not just for LIBOR but will be relevant to benchmarks that are designated as critical in the future. The changes in the clause ensure that the existing compulsion powers work with the amendments made to the wider regulation. Where we have a benchmark that is unrepresentative or is at risk of being unrepresentative, the FCA should have access to these powers.
With respect to LIBOR, the amendments ensure the FCA will have the required time to implement the various processes that we are introducing, to access their new powers, and to mitigate the risk of the rate simply ceasing due to insufficient input data. The 10-year provision is a contingency about the ongoing use of the benchmark. The timeframes are constructed with respect to both the LIBOR provision and the wider needs of benchmarks and have been constructed in consultation with the FCA over quite a long period.
Mr McFadden
I am not sure that that is entirely convincing, because neither clause refers specifically to LIBOR, for reasons that the Minister has explained. They both refer to benchmarks in general.
The different timescales used throughout this section are somewhat confusing. There are reviews every two years; other timescales of three months are mentioned here and there. I am genuinely confused about why clause 9 gives the power to compel contributions for up to 10 years, yet here we are a few clauses on talking about five years. I accept that the Minister says that the 10 years might be a maximum, but if these powers are to deal with the issue of legacy contracts, I am still not sure why we have this discrepancy. It could be that I am not understanding something or that I am missing something. That is certainly possible. Is this an arena where the Government may come forward with an amendment during the later stages of the Bill’s passage?
John Glen
I am always open to looking at the possibility of amendments, as I have demonstrated during the sittings we have had so far. The 10-year reference was under the revised methodology for LIBOR to be produced by the administrator. It will probably be useful for me to reflect on this exchange, and to write to the right hon. Gentleman and the Committee to clarify the apparent discrepancies and rationale for this. I recognise that this is genuinely complicated. I want to bring satisfaction to the Committee and I am happy to do that.
Julie Marson (Hertford and Stortford) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Davies. The shadow Minister is obviously concerned and quite rightly scrutinising the detail of every clause. Does my hon. Friend agree that it would be apposite to recall from the evidence from the regulators, including the Prudential Regulation Authority, the FCA, and specifically the LIBOR transition director for UK finance, how supportive they are of the provisions of this Bill? The LIBOR transition director said explicitly in his evidence:
“These powers, in preventing all those negative outcomes for both customers and market integrity, are absolutely critical as part of the transition.”––[Official Report, Financial Services Public Bill Committee, 17 November 2020; c. 18, Q30.]
That plays back into the consultation and regulators’ support for the Bill.
John Glen
I appreciate my hon. Friend’s intervention. It demonstrates that there is widespread concern for this legislation to be passed. The right hon. Gentleman is pressing me, quite appropriately, on these apparent anomalies, and I am happy to submit to his questions. The issue is that synthetic LIBOR is related to the 10-year provision, but the five-year provision is for other critical benchmarks, which do not have the same context in terms of their contractual longevity. As I said in my response to the right hon. Gentleman, I will write to him and to the Committee to bring clarity on this matter. It is an important matter that needs clarifying.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 12 accordingly order to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 13
Designation of certain critical benchmarks
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
John Glen
The clause inserts a new article into the benchmarks regulation that, in essence, provides the FCA with the power to designate a critical benchmark as an article 23A benchmark, if they consider that the representativeness of the benchmark cannot reasonably be restored, or there are not good reasons to restore and maintain its representativeness. This designation allows the FCA to use a number of the new powers that are set out later in the Bill, such as the ability to require that the administrator change the benchmarks methodology.
Given the significant impacts of making such a designation, we have included a number of safeguards to the designation power. First, if the FCA considers it appropriate to designate a benchmark, they must inform the administrator and allow 14 days for the administrator to make representations before proceeding with the designation. If the FCA decides to proceed with the designation, they must publish a notice. That should include, among other things, the reasons for their decision, the date it takes effect and any further information that the FCA considers appropriate to assist supervised entities in understanding the effects of the designation.
In summary, clause 13 sets out the procedure by which the FCA can designate a benchmark and access the powers detailed later in the Bill. I therefore recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr McFadden
I am grateful to the Minister. Before I begin, I say to the hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford that we are under a duty here to try to understand what we are doing. It is in that spirit that I am asking these questions. I was reminded by a colleague about a different kind of Standing Committee, which some years ago was considering the Hunting Bill. He told me that after a month they were still on clause 1, which was about the title of the Bill, so I do not think we have gone over the top in asking these questions.
With your and the Minister’s indulgence, Mr Davies, I would like to make a few points about the next few clauses; I think they go together and get to the heart of what this area of the Bill is about. As I said, the Opposition understand why LIBOR is being wound down; we have gone over the history of the manipulation and so on. It is why the Bill rightly places such an emphasis on benchmarks being representative of market activity: so far, so uncontroversial.
However, there is a problem in the transition from LIBOR to SONIA or other new benchmarks. As we have referenced several times, there will clearly be some impact on the value of LIBOR-based contracts. That impact is openly acknowledged by the FCA when it says:
“Where parties to contracts referencing LIBOR cannot reach agreement on how those contracts would operate in the event of LIBOR’s cessation, discontinuation could cause uncertainty, litigation or loss of value because contracts no longer function as intended. If this problem affects large volumes of contracts it could pose risks to wider market integrity of contracts/financial instruments.”
Remember that, given the volume of money involved—we are talking about not millions or billions but trillions—this is a systemic risk, as well as a risk to individual parties to contract.
My understanding of the provisions in clause 13 and a few that follow is this. When the FCA feels that a benchmark is no longer representative of the market to which it relates or that that representativeness is at risk, it can designate the benchmark under article 23A of the benchmark regulation. Then there are various provisions about notices being published, reasonable fees being charged and so on; we can leave those aside. When such a benchmark is designated by the FCA, that can only be done in line with the statutory duties, to which the Minister referred, of consumer protection and market integrity. When a benchmark is designated in that way, new use of the benchmark is prohibited, but—this is the critical “but”—the FCA can mandate continued legacy use of that benchmark. The Minister may come back to me about timescales—five years, 10 years or whatever it is.
Finally, if the potential disruption brought about by the discontinuation of LIBOR—or a critical benchmark, if we want to refer to it in that way—is too great, it is suggested in the Bill that the FCA may compel its continuation, as we have discussed. How realistic is it for the FCA to continue to compel administrators to submit information to something that they have said they want to phase out in a year’s time? The provisions are intended to allow the FCA to wind down a critical benchmark but in a way that protects these legacy contracts, which are based on the old benchmark. That brings us to those legacy contracts and what is or is not included, and to the potential legal risks.
As I understand it, there might be two issues. First, what is the definition of a legacy contract? Is it one where there has not been agreement between the two parties to transfer to the new benchmark, or is it something different? What are we talking about when we discuss legacy contracts? What would we do if there were a dispute between the parties about whether something should be treated as a legacy contract or not?
Secondly, how will the provisions cope with the potential legal action and/or market disruption as a result of parties feeling aggrieved, for one reason or another, about the switch from one benchmark to another or, in consequence, taking action that results in disorderly markets? In other words, to what degree is the process subject to disruption through legal action by the parties involved, which could feed into market operation, given the volume of money involved in these contracts?
Mr McFadden
However, I thought it better to take these next few clauses together and raise those points with him in this way.
Alison Thewliss
I want to ask a quick question about what is perhaps neither synthetic nor ghostly LIBOR, but zombie LIBOR, because it seems to be lurching on and not quite dead.
I am curious about the monitoring of whether these critical benchmarks are becoming unrepresentative, how that practically would work and at which stage that happens. I also note that there is an obligation under clauses 13 to 16 to bring things to the attention of the public and the supervised entities, but no such requirement to bring them to the attention of Parliament. Will the Minister reflect on whether it would be useful to us as parliamentarians to hear about those things? We cannot necessarily be expected to monitor things on the FCA website as members of the public, and those things might be something that parliamentarians might usefully want to find out.
John Glen
I thank the hon. Lady and the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East for their questions, and I will do my best to address them.
On legacy use, this is broadly where a benchmark was used in specified existing contracts or instruments prior to its designation as an article 23A benchmark. The right hon. Gentleman went on to ask a series of questions about the concept of safe harbours, the different jurisdictions of legal process, and the compulsion process. The Government believe that the proposal is realistic. The administrators do not submit information; the contributors do. On safe harbours, which we picked up on from the evidence from the gentleman from the trade association last week, we recognise the challenges identified in that session, and the powers are designed to assist those contracts that cannot feasibly move away from LIBOR, as Paul Richards described. I am committed to looking to address the issue of safe harbour through further work with industry.
In practice, it will not be possible to table amendments during the passage of this Bill, but that is not down to my unwillingness to do so; it is a matter of the maturity of the conversation, and I think that will be acknowledged. A live productive conversation is going on.
Mr McFadden
Is the parallel legislation in the United States and the EU part of that consideration? When we received the oral evidence last week, I confess that I had not appreciated that parallel legislation on this subject, with safe harbour provisions, was going through in those two jurisdictions. Given the co-operation that already exists through the FSB, involving in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Bank of England, is that part of the consideration?
John Glen
We are looking and working internationally. We have an active dialogue with the US through a regulatory working group, and we will be monitoring that. There is no question of us seeking to find some competitive advantage in this; there will be a need to find as much alignment as possible to give as much clarity and certainty to the market actors. However, the conversation is not at that stage yet here. There is no sense that that is jeopardising the integrity of this process. This is the first step, but we reserve the right to do other things further to the conclusion of those conversations.
As for accountability to Parliament, as raised by the hon. Member for Glasgow Central, the legislation requires the FCA to produce statements of policy and notices when exercising the powers. There is also a requirement to review the exercise of its methodology every two years and to publish a report following that review. The FCA is required to exercise its powers in accordance with the two statutory objectives: consumer protection and market integrity. That is the relationship to parliamentary accountability.
Turning to the other matters raised by the right hon. Gentleman around the administrator challenging a designation, if the FCA decides to designate a benchmark under this article, the benchmark administrator has the option of referring the matter to the upper tribunal. The FCA is required to inform the administrator of its right to refer the decision to the upper tribunal and the procedure for doing so.
As for the continued publication of a benchmark that has been deemed unrepresentative, in the case of a critical benchmark such as LIBOR, the benchmark is so widely used that its discontinuation would represent a risk to financial stability and create disruption for market participants. Therefore, this Bill provides the FCA with the power to require a change to how a critical benchmark is determined, including input data, to preserve the existence of the benchmark for a limited time period to help those contracts that otherwise would not realistically transfer to an alternative benchmark.
I hope I have done justice to most of what the right hon. Gentleman raised. I will seek to review what we have exchanged and, if there are outstanding matters, to write to him. I am relieved we have moved beyond clause 1.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(David Rutley.)
Financial Services Bill (Eighth sitting)
Thursday 26th November 2020
(4 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Financial Services Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 26 November 2020 - (26 Nov 2020)
The Chair
The same drill as the other day: I am happy to permit Members to remove their jackets. Apparently permission has to be sought from the Chair to remove a jacket, so there you go—that is how nice I am. I saw you a lot on TV yesterday, Minister; it is nice to see you in the flesh.
Clauses 14 and 15 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 16
Review of exercise of powers under Article 23D
The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (John Glen)
I beg to move amendment 3, in clause 16, page 23, line 13, leave out “latest” and insert “most recent previous”.
This amendment clarifies what the FCA has to review before re-exercising the power under Article 23D(2) of the Benchmarks Regulation.
Clause 16 introduces a new provision: article 23E of the benchmarks regulation. It requires the Financial Conduct Authority to conduct and publish a review of an exercise of its article 23D powers to direct the administrator of an article 23A benchmark to change the methodology rules, or code of conduct, of the benchmark. Where the FCA has exercised a power under article 23D, the FCA is required to conduct and publish a review of the exercise of that power two years after the power is first exercised. The FCA must then conduct and publish such a review in each subsequent two-year period until the benchmark ceases to be published.
The FCA will also be required to review the exercise of this power under article 23D whenever it intends to re-exercise its power in relation to the same benchmark. The FCA must conduct and publish a review of the latest exercise of its article 23D power before re-exercising the power where that is reasonably practicable. In circumstances where it may not be reasonably possible for the FCA to conduct its review prior to the use of the power, the FCA must conduct and publish its review as soon as is reasonably practicable after the re-exercise of its article 23 power. For instance, it is possible that the FCA may need to take such a course of action when it needs to access its article 23D powers urgently to prevent significant market disruption or financial stability risks.
In concluding the review, the FCA will be required to consider whether the exercise of its power has advanced, or is likely to advance, its statutory objectives to protect consumers and market integrity. It must also have regard to the statement of policy that the FCA has published in respect of the use of its article 23D powers. The clause provides a statutory mechanism through which the effectiveness of the FCA’s exercise of its powers under article 23D can be evaluated. It also serves to increase the accountability of the FCA in the exercise and re-exercise of the powers.
I apologise for not acknowledging you in the Chair, Dr Huq; it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. I recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)
I thank you, Dr Huq, for chairing this afternoon’s session. For clarity, we had a fairly extensive debate on clauses 13 to 16 together, hence the speed of our progress at the beginning of this session.
John Glen
Amendment 3, which stands in my name, is a technical amendment. As the explanatory note says, it is intended to clarify the scope of the review that the FCA is required to undertake where it re-exercises its article 23D(2) powers in relation to the same benchmark. Article 23D(2) provides the FCA with the powers to direct the administrator of a critical benchmark to change the methodology rules or code of conduct of the benchmark. The amendment serves to put beyond doubt which exercise of power the FCA is required to review at this point in time.
I would like to address the point raised by the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East just before we broke for lunch on the international LIBOR transition. The Government have followed related global regulatory developments closely, including what is going on the United States, as he mentioned, with the US Alternative Reference Rates Committee’s legislative proposal. We continue to work with regulators to engage our international counterparts directly, as well as through the Financial Stability Board’s official sector steering group and the International Organisation of Securities Commissions.
It is quite clear that, as the right hon. Gentleman stated, we will need a co-ordinated global approach, and we aim to provide consistent outcomes for users. The Government are committed to ensuring that their dialogue with international counterparts continues, and aim to firmly limit any unhelpful divergence to outcomes. I hope it will be helpful for the Committee to have that put on the record.
Mr McFadden
I am grateful to the Minister; I suspect that is a harbinger of a Government amendment at some point, because of the debate we had on safe harbour provisions. If they are coming in in the US and the EU, I suspect, given what he has just said about marching together on this internationally, we may see an amendment from him on this at some point.
The Chair
It sounds like fine-tooth comb stuff this morning.
Amendment 3 agreed to.
Clause 16, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 17
Policy statements relating to critical benchmarks
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
John Glen
Clause 17 introduces a new provision, article 23F of the benchmarks regulation. This clause requires the FCA to publish statements of policy and to have regard to those statements when exercising certain new powers set out in the benchmarks regulation. The FCA is required to publish a statement of policy with respect to the exercise of this power to designate a critical benchmark as an article 23A benchmark. This is the designation the FCA can make where it determines that a benchmark’s representativeness cannot be restored or maintained, or that there are good reasons not to restore or maintain representativeness.
The FCA must also publish a statement of policy with respect to the exercise of its powers under article 21A, which allow it to prohibit new use of a critical benchmark when the administrator of that benchmark has notified the FCA of its intention to cease providing the benchmark. The FCA is also required to publish a statement of policy in exercising its powers under article 23C, which allow it to permit certain types of legacy use of an article 23A benchmark by supervised entities. Finally, the FCA must also publish a statement of policy in exercising its power under article 23D, which allows the FCA to impose requirements on the administrator of an article 23A benchmark to change the methodology, rules or code of conduct of the benchmark.
The Bill states that the FCA’s duty to prepare and publish those statements of policy can be satisfied before as well as after this legislation comes into force. On 18 November, the FCA published two consultations inviting industry feedback on statements, which ask for views on how the FCA intends to exercise its article 23A and article 23D powers granted under this Bill. It has also stated its intention to engage with industry stakeholders and international counterparts in the development of its statements of policy with respect to its powers under articles 21A and 23C.
This clause increases transparency regarding how the FCA will exercise certain new powers set out in the Bill to support the orderly wind-down of a critical benchmark. In developing statements of policy, the FCA will be able to engage with industry and international counterparts. The clause also requires the FCA to have regard to those statements when exercising its new powers, reducing uncertainty for market participants. Therefore, I recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr McFadden
I just have a question about these policy statements. We have been through quite a lot about how the FCA will designate, compel and continue the submission of information and all the rest of it. What role do these policy statements play in all of that? Is the policy statement simply putting into law a requirement on the FCA to say why it has acted as it has, or is it, as part of what I think is behind some of the stuff in these clauses, insulating the FCA against the threat of legal action because of the possible effect on contracts? Is this a nice to have, best practice or is it something that helps to protect the FCA against the threat of litigation, which has been a thread through this discussion?
Ms Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)
Obviously, this is a very technical area, to say the least. I just want to ask a couple of questions so that I can get my head round how the FCA will use the power. We have different regulators who could make different determinations as to what constitutes benchmarks going forward, and yet those benchmarks write contracts worth trillions of pounds and dollars into the future. Any arbitrage opportunity in the way that those contracts work could make some people very rich and ruin others. This will be decided as one goes along. Some of these contracts are being made, but some are already projected into the future.
To ensure that markets are not distorted and the potential for nefarious profit by some with insider information is minimised, we need reassurance about how the FCA will perform the task, particularly in its interactions with the other regulators. I am not sure what the Government’s intention is, apart from saying they are going to liaise with other regulators. Is it the Government’s intention that these benchmarks ought to be similarly designed and defined across different regulatory jurisdictions, since this is almost a currency, or are we seeking divergence here as well in order to perhaps increase our chances of being the place where some of this business is written?
Perhaps the Economic Secretary could reassure me on that, because the FCA’s powers are pretty strong, but what is the intention? That might be in all of the many consultations, which I confess I have not read, so it might be set out there. If the Minister could put a little more on the record, we might at least have some certainty there, not least for Pepper v. Hart purposes.
John Glen
I thank the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East and the hon. Member for Wallasey for their observations. The hon. Lady demonstrates her experience and professionalism in being able to jump in on the first clause, having not been here this morning—no disrespect intended.
John Glen
The point that the hon. Lady makes is absolutely clear. We need to ensure that the regulations are in line with global practices because the issue is global. The interconnectedness of financial services markets demands, as in the statement I made just now, that we work very closely with regulators in other jurisdictions. It is absolutely right that we learn the lessons that the right hon. Gentleman, in his work on the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards several years ago, drew attention to with respect to the appalling abuses in the market. This measure is designed to give us a framework and to give the FCA the powers to ensure that we have global best practice and no ambiguity.
John Glen
This clause introduces a new provision, article 23G, into the benchmarks regulation. The clause makes provision about critical benchmarks provided for different currencies, or for different maturities or periods of time. This type of benchmark is known as an umbrella benchmark. LIBOR, for instance, is an umbrella benchmark. It is published in five different currencies over seven different time periods, ranging from overnight to up to one year. Those five currencies and seven time periods are paired to form 35 individual LIBOR settings, referred to in the legislation as “versions” of the benchmark. An example of a version of LIBOR would be three-month US dollar LIBOR.
Paragraph 3 of article 23G sets out that specified articles of the benchmarks regulation will apply to umbrella benchmarks as if each version were a separate critical benchmark. Paragraph 4 sets out how provisions under paragraph 3 of article 21, paragraphs 1(a) and 2 of article 22A and paragraph 1 of article 23E of the benchmarks regulation are modified in relation to an umbrella benchmark.
The Treasury will be able to make, by regulations, provisions about the operation of the UK BMR in respect of umbrella benchmarks. The regulations must be made by way of the affirmative procedure.
This clause sets out that the FCA will be able to exercise certain new powers to support the orderly wind-down of a critical benchmark in different ways in relation to different versions of an umbrella benchmark. It also clarifies the existing operation of certain provisions of the benchmarks regulation and how the FCA’s powers apply to versions of a benchmark. Those clarifications of the FCA’s powers will be of aid in supporting the orderly wind-down of a critical benchmark. For example, where panel banks begin to withdraw their submissions to some or all versions of LIBOR after the end of 2021, the different versions of LIBOR are likely to become unrepresentative, as we discussed earlier, or be at risk of becoming unrepresentative at different speeds.
It would be neither practicable nor appropriate for the FCA to exercise its new and existing powers uniformly across all versions of LIBOR simultaneously. For example, it is possible that if the robust input data necessary for an alternative methodology is not clearly available for certain versions of LIBOR, the FCA may not be able to exercise its power to direct a change in its methodology. In other cases, market participants may prefer to cease publication of some LIBOR versions. The FCA will consider evidence and views from market participants and global authorities in deciding the best course of action in respect of LIBOR versions.
It is critical to the wind-down of LIBOR, and future umbrella benchmarks, that the FCA can apply its powers under this legal framework to different versions of an umbrella benchmark at different times and in different ways. I therefore recommend that this clause stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 19
Changes to and cessation of a benchmark
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
John Glen
The clause introduces amendments to article 28 of the benchmarks regulation, including new paragraphs 1A to 1E. Article 28 of the benchmarks regulation stipulates requirements for benchmark administrators and supervised entities in preparing for changes to, or the cessation of, benchmarks. I will refer to this as the change and cessation procedure.
The clause inserts the word “robust” in paragraph 1 of article 28 to define and strengthen the nature of the change and cessation procedures that benchmark administrators are required to publish. The clause also inserts new paragraphs 1A to 1E, which set out requirements for the written change and cessation procedure that a benchmark administrator must publish.
New paragraph 1A establishes that the administrator must publish a robust written change and cessation procedure alongside the publication of the administrator’s benchmark statement, which, among other things, sets out the market or economic reality that the benchmark intends to measure. The documents must be published within two weeks of the benchmark being registered in the FCA’s register. Wherever a material change occurs, the benchmark administrator is required to update its written procedure. For critical benchmarks, the proposed changes in new paragraphs 1B to 1E set out additional and more stringent requirements.
When publishing its written procedure, the administrator of a critical benchmark is required to provide an assessment to the FCA, on the basis of the information available to it, that considers the nature and extent of the current use of the benchmark, the availability of suitable alternatives, and how prepared users are for changes to, or the cessation of, the benchmark. Before publishing an updated written change and cessation procedure, critical benchmark administrators must also provide that assessment together with their updated written procedure to the FCA for review. The FCA is required to review and consider whether the procedure is sufficiently robust. The administrator must not publish an update of its procedure without receiving written notice from the FCA that its procedure is sufficiently robust.
In order to be designated as a critical benchmark, a benchmark must be used extensively, and its cessation may pose significant and adverse impacts on market integrity, financial stability, consumers, the real economy, or the financing of households and businesses. It is therefore reasonable and proportionate to require administrators of critical benchmarks to demonstrate via an assessment that their cessation plans are robust. We do not expect it to be an overly burdensome assessment for benchmark administrators. The clause will support increased preparedness in the event of changes to, or the cessation of, benchmarks in the future. I therefore recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Ms Eagle
Again, I have just a few questions so that I can get in my head precisely what the reason is for putting this in primary legislation. LIBOR clearly had its issues but it was used for a very long time. Is the Minister anticipating that benchmarks will change much more rapidly in the future, or does he want some kind of stability with the new benchmarks that are based on actual prices, rather than the guesses of participants in the market, as LIBOR came to be defined prior to its demise?
Is the Minister expecting that this kind of provision for ceasing benchmarks will be used regularly? I anticipate that the answer will be, “Only when it is needed because of what is happening in the market.” If this kind of procedure is theoretical and on the face of a piece of legislation but hardly ever used, does that mean that the mechanisms that the Minister is setting out in clause 19 and other parts of the Bill will rust away? They will be there in theory, but there will be nobody there to work them properly. How does he anticipate that the market, the FCA and the benchmark administrators will maintain the capacity to do this if cessation is a very irregular, rare thing?
Will the Minister spend a bit of time defining what “robust” means in this context? In my time in this place, I have had many arguments with Ministers, and made many arguments as a Minister, about why we must not put particular words on the face of Bills and what their meaning is. Can the Minister enlighten us as to what he, the FCA and the Treasury mean by “robust” and how they are defining that in law, so that I can have a bit more confidence that they have got it right on the face of the Bill?
John Glen
I thank the hon. Lady for her comments. Although the provisions of this legislation are under the heading of benchmarks, they really refer to the capacity that we need to have to deal with the LIBOR issue. She is right to raise the question of the enduring provision and how tested and exercised that capacity would be, but this is about setting a framework for future use, which is very difficult to anticipate. We want to ensure that it is fit for purpose for the future.
The hon. Lady asks when the framework could be used, which is not a matter that I can reasonably be drawn on, because it would be about market conditions evolving, but it certainly means that we are ready for whatever might evolve, in terms of benchmarks on the path towards becoming critical. However, it will be for the FCA, in conversation with the market and Parliament, to determine how to bring that forward.
Ms Eagle
Does the Economic Secretary think that, given the incredible trouble that the wind-down of LIBOR has caused in the markets—not least because of what is on the face of the Bill and the very difficult issues caused by having to exit the LIBOR benchmark—it is best to try to get the next benchmark sorted and future-proofed, so that it does not turn into LIBOR 2 and cause his future successor in the Treasury and me all this kerfuffle in a Public Bill Committee?
John Glen
Absolutely. It is absolutely right that we give the power to the FCA but also keep a vigilant eye on evolving market conditions, so that we are well placed to move earlier to deal with any failures in benchmarks.
The hon. Lady asked me to define “robust” in the context of the Bill. I am reluctant to be drawn on that, because it is a matter of legal definition, but I would be very happy to write to her on that and respond at subsequent sittings of the Committee, if she wishes me to do so.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 19 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 20
Extension of transitional period for benchmarks with non-UK administrators
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
John Glen
The clause amends article 51(5) of the benchmarks regulation, which provides for a transitional period during which the UK’s supervised entities can continue to use all third-party benchmarks. Those are benchmarks that are provided by administrators located outside the UK. When the UK onshored the EU benchmarks regulation, the transitional period for third-country benchmarks was extended from the end of 2019 to the end of 2022. The extension was made to provide third-party benchmark administrators with more time to apply for continued access to UK markets. For the UK’s supervised entities to continue to use benchmarks that are administered outside the UK after the end of 2022, the benchmarks or their administrator must be listed on the FCA benchmarks register.
The benchmarks regulation provides three access routes for third-country administrators or benchmarks. They must apply for the endorsement of specific benchmarks or for recognition as an administrator, or they can benefit from an equivalence decision made by the Treasury with respect to their home jurisdiction’s regulatory framework. As of October 2020, however, only 14 third-country benchmark administrators have come through the access routes that are outlined in the EU benchmarks regulation. Industry engagement has also revealed important concerns about the operation of the current regulatory regime for third-country benchmarks under the benchmarks regulation. For example, many non-European economic area jurisdictions do not have specific regulator rules for benchmarks.
The UK will explore how best to support the use of global, non-UK benchmarks that adhere to equivalent regulatory outcomes. The endorsement and recognition access routes both rely on third-country administrators being willing to apply for market access, and require the appointment of a UK entity to facilitate their application for ongoing market access. Some third-country benchmarks are provided on a non-commercial basis, however, meaning that those administrators lack an economic incentive to apply. Smaller firms may also be reluctant to appoint a third-party UK entity to oversee their benchmark administration.
Mr McFadden
I just want to ask the Economic Secretary a question to ensure that we have properly understood the clause. All through this part of the Bill, we have talked about the different timescales in different clauses, and here we have another, which extends the transition period for benchmarks with third-country administrators until the end of 2025.
For my clarity, and perhaps for that of colleagues, will the Economic Secretary clarify whether the measures are different—I think they are—from the five and 10-year timescales in clauses 9 and 12, relating to the FCA designating what the hon. Member for Glasgow Central called zombie LIBOR? Is this five-year period about something different or does it relate to that?
Having debated this matter for a couple of hours, I am not sure that we have resolved it. My feeling is that we are leaving quite a lot to the FCA. I hope that the clause minimises the risk of harm. We have talked a lot about the risk of litigation, but there is also the risk of harm to those who have entered contracts based on LIBOR in good faith. The Government and regulators are trying to move away from that system for reasons that we understand are to minimise harm to those who signed up in good faith, but I suspect that there is still a fair bit of work for the regulator to do to ensure that that is the case.
Ms Eagle
Will the Economic Secretary share with the Committee the intention behind the extension to 2025? He said that it was to create certainty—I can understand that. Is the intention to transition to something different—the new third-country regime—after the extension, or is it to develop and introduce it earlier if it looks like there are advantages to doing so? I know that I am asking him to gaze into the future, but this will be in the Treasury and regulators’ work list and they will presumably schedule it at some stage. Does he expect the creation of a third-country regime to be difficult or quite easy? Are the Government thinking of basing it on the existing regimes or diverging from what we are used to? Will he give us a little more information about how the Treasury intends to proceed with this piece of technical but very important work.
John Glen
I am very happy to address those points. The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East raised the issue of the different time periods. This is different from the LIBOR transition; it is about the third-party benchmarks exclusively. It is a response to the market reality, as we have seen in the number of applications. I will come to the point of the hon. Member for Wallasey in a second.
The right hon. Gentleman also asked about the risk of harm concept and how important that is. Clearly, the LIBOR transition, as we have established today, is an incredibly complicated matter with a great deal of legal complexity, an imperative to align to global best practice, the need to produce a synthetic alternative and the evolution of policy around that. It is also designed to protect. He is right to say that there is a lot more work to be done; there is no off-the-shelf solution. This measure allows the formal framework for that to evolve.
The hon. Member for Wallasey asked me to comment on the future time period by which the new third-country benchmark regime would be constructed. The extension is a response intended to resolve industry concerns and to ensure that UK markets can retain access to the third-country benchmarks. There is no intention to find some way of deviating from norms on that. It is in our interest to have complete alignment to global best practice. The extension gives UK firms the legal and economic certainty. As soon as it can be done, it should be done. I cannot give her the precise location of where that is in the work plan—the FCA has a lot on at the moment—but she is right that we need to operationalise it appropriately, recognising the different obligations on different sized firms. I will be working with the FCA to keep an eye on that in the coming weeks and months.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 21
Benchmarks: minor and consequential amendments
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
John Glen
This clause inserts schedule 5, which sets out minor and consequential amendments to the benchmarks regulation to provide for the effective operation of that regulation in the context of the amendments introduced by clauses 8 to 19. I therefore recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 5 agreed to.
Clause 22
Regulated activities and Gibraltar
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
It was projected that we would get up to clause 20 by the end of this morning, in fact.
John Glen
I allowed myself a moment of light-heartedness, but I can see that that was not appropriate.
In financial services, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 allows for several categories of authorised persons to carry on regulated activities in the UK, such as firms with domestic part 4A permission or, until the end of the transition period, EEA passporting firms. The clause provides a regime through which firms authorised for activities in Gibraltar can be recognised as authorised persons in the UK.
When significant areas of financial services regulation were set at EU level, that meant that the UK and Gibraltar followed the same rules. Now that the UK and Gibraltar have left the European Union together, the legal framework that provides for mutual market access and aligned standards needs amending. Without new permanent arrangements, Gibraltar will lose its current breadth and depth of access to the UK market, which not only would damage Gibraltar’s economy and our special and historic relationship but could lead to disruption and more limited choice for UK consumers.
The detailed application of the regime is set out in two schedules, which in turn insert two new schedules into the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000: schedule 2A, as inserted by schedule 6, governing the operation of the arrangements for Gibraltar-based firms; and schedule 2B, as inserted by schedule 7, which provides for the requirements that outgoing UK-based firms must meet before accessing the Gibraltarian market.
I should clarify that we are not legislating for Gibraltar. The measure is primarily about Gibraltar-based firms’ access to the UK. The Government have a responsibility to ensure financial stability and the correct operation of the UK financial services system, particularly when we open our markets to other jurisdictions. The clause therefore also requires the Treasury to lay a report before Parliament about the operation of the regime every two years.
The report will explain the Treasury’s assessment of whether the three conditions in the clause—that is, compatibility with the objectives in the clause, the alignment of law and practice, and co-operation—have been met during any reporting period, and whether the Treasury therefore proposes to enable market access for particular activities. That will give Parliament confidence that regulatory and supervisory standards are being applied in a consistent manner by UK and Gibraltarian institutions, so that UK consumers can benefit from products from a wide range of providers without additional risks.
Given that clause 22 is central to the creation of permanent market access arrangements between the UK and Gibraltar, I recommend that it stand part of the Bill.
Mr McFadden
Like the Minister, I too bid a fond farewell to LIBOR. Clauses 22 and 23 and schedules 6 and 7 establish the Gibraltar authorisation regime, which could be described as a sort of mini-single market in financial services between the UK and Gibraltar. The Government have set out many detailed pages in the schedules in particular about how that mini-single market should work.
Up until now, Gibraltar has been regarded as a European territory that was a member of the EU through its status as a British overseas territory. That meant that Gibraltar had full access to single market rights, including those in financial services. Given that Gibraltar, as well as the UK, has now left the EU and is coming towards the end of the transition period, the Government clearly felt that they had to put a regime in place to be the basis of future trade in financial services between Gibraltar and the UK.
Such a regime was, to some extent, necessary, because of the volume of trade in financial services that already exists between the UK and Gibraltar. We heard during last week’s oral evidence that roughly one in five car insurance policies in the UK is held by Gibraltar-based insurance companies. As I said during an oral evidence session last week, there is great good will towards Gibraltar on both sides of the House. The people of Gibraltar voted to remain in the EU by an overwhelming margin—I think it was about 95%—so we could describe the clauses and the accompanying schedules as the consolation prize to Gibraltar for having to depart the EU at the same time as the UK.
I know that under clause 22 the Treasury will report every two years on how the regime is operating. I cannot fail to reflect that that is precisely the kind of regular reporting mechanism that the Minister so stoutly rejected about four times on Tuesday when we were trying to insert it into the clauses on capital requirements. Why is it right and necessary for the Treasury to review this regime every two years but not to review the impact of change in the capital requirements on major parts of our financial system?
According to schedule 6, the report must have particular regard to paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of that schedule, which set out the details of the new regime. Paragraph 7 tries to instil protections for the UK into this process, including for the soundness and stability of our own system, and, according to paragraph 7(c),
“to prevent the use of the UK financial system for a purpose connected with financial crime”.
It goes on to talk about ensuring markets work well, the protection of consumers and, interestingly, according to paragraph 7(h), about the need
“to maintain and improve relations between the United Kingdom and other countries and territories with…significant markets for financial services.”
Stella Creasy (Walthamstow) (Lab/Co-op)
My right hon. Friend is making a powerful and important case about the importance of ensuring that we do not inadvertently support money laundering or standards that could enable that by accident. It is worth reflecting that in February this year, the EU anti-money laundering watchdog, MONEYVAL, called for Gibraltar to do more. One question for us in this legislation is whether there are things we can do to ensure that we are not inadvertently creating access that would enable such behaviour, now that we are leaving the European Union, which might have been offering that level of scrutiny. Does my right hon. Friend have a view on joining up those dots?
Mr McFadden
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. In fairness, I do not think that the UK system on money laundering and financial crime is perfect—we have our own issues, which we have debated before and will debate later in our consideration of the Bill—but these findings should be taken seriously, particularly as we are creating a new situation. In the past, both the UK and Gibraltar were part of the EU and we operated under the single market rules, including those on financial services. I do not know whether what we are creating is unique—I will ask the Minister about uniqueness—but it is certainly a new concept: a mini-single market in financial services between two territories.
What is the Minister’s response to the report’s findings? In particular, given that protection from financial crime has been written into the Bill through the Government’s two-year review process, what contact has there been between the Treasury, the relevant regulators and the financial institutions in Gibraltar since the report was published a year ago? What actions do the authorities propose to take? I certainly believe that the Gibraltar authorities will want to act in good faith and try to uphold proper standards, but some of the report’s findings are concerning.
Another issue raised last week was the difference in corporation tax between Gibraltar and the UK: Gibraltar’s main corporation tax rate of 10% is significantly lower than our own. The Minister from Gibraltar said in his evidence, with some charm, that corporation tax would not be a factor in location—that, if anything, quality of life was more important. I have no doubt that the quality of life in Gibraltar is very good; looking out on a slightly gloomy London autumn afternoon, I have no doubt that the weather and climate is a big attraction, too. I am sure that he was right about that, but it is a big tax difference. He also pointed out—again, quite fairly—that the corporation tax differential predates our departure from the EU and has been in place for some time. However, this is a new situation, with a new, specially designed market access regime for Gibraltar being enshrined in UK law. Has the Treasury made any assessment of the likelihood of corporate relocations from the UK to Gibraltar as a result of the new measures under discussion?
I also ask the Minister about the condition, which I have described as interesting, about relationships with other territories with significant financial services markets. Why has it been written into schedule 6 as something that the Government should consider in their biennial review? Is it considered that this mini-single market will create some sort of vulnerability in those other relationships? Why is it thought possible that the arrangement might affect our relationships with other territories?
Finally, how unique and specific to the Gibraltar situation is the new regime? Could it conceivably be extended to other territories such as Jersey and the other Channel Islands? As the Minister will know, some Crown dependencies have been accused of being tax havens or of being susceptible to money laundering. Is it possible that such a regime could, in effect, be used to extend the reach of UK regulators to territories other than Gibraltar? This is a very big topic that has been debated quite a lot over recent years. I suppose I am asking about the Treasury’s thinking, rather than just about the Bill: might the arrangement with Gibraltar be a model for the treatment of other Crown dependencies or overseas territories, or should we view it as specific and purely a consequence of Gibraltar having to leave the European Union? I would be grateful if the Minister considered and responded to some of those points.
Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Dr Huq. I just have a few quick questions, mainly coming from the evidence we heard last week. During the fourth sitting, at column 125, the Minister, Albert Isola, said that the Bill is akin to enabling legislation, and that other things would need to be worked through in relation to other aspects of the financial services that are currently dealt with. If the Minister could clarify what would happen about those other areas, that would be useful.
Secondly, perhaps the Minister could give further assurances about access to the Financial Ombudsman Service. It is important that consumers here should have adequate protections in the new arrangements, and that those should be made clear. That is the kind of scenario that would not be found out until a consumer needed to make a complaint. Something would have to go wrong for it to be addressed, and I would not want to be such a consumer, feeling in those circumstances that I did not have recourse to the protection that I would have had if I had chosen an insurance policy not based in Gibraltar. It would be useful to hear about that.
Lastly, it would be helpful to have any further clarity that the Minister can give about what would happen to UK businesses and customers if market access were suddenly withdrawn, and where that would leave consumers in the UK. Would they be left without policies and protection? What would happen as a reaction to that, should market access be withdrawn for a period of time? Would it mean that businesses would dry up, withdraw their UK services and go somewhere else, or does the Minister envisage other scenarios happening in that case? I appreciate that it is a scenario that he would want to avoid at all costs, but it could well arise, and I want to ask what state the Government’s preparations for such a scenario are in.
Ms Eagle
I suppose I want the Minister to reassure me about the fact that financial markets are rapid and regulation—if there is an equivalence regime, or mini-single market as my right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South East put it—allows the Gibraltarian authorities to do the regulation and then have immediate access to the UK. That may be done in a way that gives us some benefit; perhaps the Minister will say what the benefits of the regime are, particularly for UK consumers, given that Gibraltar does 90% of its business with the UK anyway. Perhaps he will also say what the risks would be.
My right hon. Friend spent a little time raising some of the risks and I suppose they can be characterised by the view that in a very liquid and rapid global money market, if there are vulnerabilities or back doors into regimes that are interconnected, that causes risks. We saw some of those risks playing out during the global financial crisis. To what extent does the Minister believe that the Gibraltar regime for which the clauses legislate will be—I am going to use that word—robust enough to prevent the opening of back doors to vulnerabilities for all sorts of money that is sloshing round the world? My right hon. Friend mentioned some of that—money used for money laundering, drugs and terrorism. It is important that the defences that we have against coming under that kind of influence should be maintained and strengthened, rather than weakened.
Stella Creasy
My hon. Friend is giving the speech that I wanted to give, so I thought I would intervene. One example, to express some of the concerns we might have, is the fact that in the Gibraltar regime there is currently no legal requirement to refuse registration to someone with a criminal record. In practice that does happen. It is something that the FATF report flags, but it is not inevitable. One thing we might want to think about for our regulatory regime—and I take the point made by the shadow Minister about not suggesting that the UK regime is perfect—is looking at whether there are lessons in the report that should be put into the Bill to make sure we do not create such a back door. That seems an eminently practical example of the sorts of things that might happen if people with criminal convictions, who may still be able to access financial regulations as a result of the Gibraltar regime, are now able to operate in the UK.
Ms Eagle
My hon. Friend gives an example of exactly the kind of point I was trying to make more generally about ensuring that these regimes are correct. Given that Gibraltar governs itself, the Bill makes it clear that Gibraltarian regulators will continue to do that job in Gibraltar and supervise the companies based there after this arrangement has been legislated for. That is quite proper in many ways, but it does give our regulators in a small number of narrowly-defined circumstances—I think this is the phrase—the duty or the right to leap in and do some regulation or enforcement presumably. Will the Minister say a bit more about that? He did mention it in passing in his introduction to the clause, in which he talked about financial stability. We clearly had some recent examples during the 2008 crash, where some robust enforcement had to take place with offshore island countries or territories that were trying to take money out of our jurisdiction in ways that were unacceptable at the time.
There is therefore a financial stability issue, but there is surely something about consumer protection, fraud and money laundering here as well. Perhaps he could talk in more detail about what those narrow circumstances are. Our regulators will be reluctant to romp and stomp all over Gibraltarian institutions and their regulators. Yet, by definition, Gibraltar is a small territory, and it will have less capacity to deal with some of the sophisticated fraudsters and international terrorist, money-laundering types than we do here. I am not saying that our regime is perfect, if we are honest, and we will get on to that later in the Bill.
My worry is that this might inadvertently create some vulnerabilities. I suppose what I am seeking from the Minister is some reassurance that the regulators have got a handle on this, that they will not allow the wish not to infantilise the Gibraltarian regulators to be a reason for not paying close attention to this, and that there will be some close supervision of what is happening, particularly once the regime is established. Once these things settle down, it is then that things start to happen. If a door is opened inadvertently somewhere, this money swilling around tends to find it, and then things can start changing very rapidly.
What warning flags does this regime put up to ensure that if that dynamic begins to happen, we can close it down rapidly? Does the Bill expect some kind of relationship between the Gibraltarian regulators and the Treasury? How does the Minister expect that relationship to work out? Obviously, I do not want to spend all my time being so negative about these things, so will the Minister also say a little more about what the benefits might be?
Will the Minister also talk about consumer protection in his response? Motor insurance is one of the largest components of the financial services that Gibraltar currently sells into the UK, and clearly there is a big retail consumer protection angle to such financial services.
Stella Creasy
While we are considering the variations for companies based in Gibraltar as opposed to the UK, it would be helpful if the Minister answered the question that the insurance bodies could not: about VAT benefits for companies based in Gibraltar and the likelihood, now that we have left the European Union, of companies moving more industry to Gibraltar because of that benefit, which could also affect consumers. Does my hon. Friend agree that it would be helpful if the Minister set out those figures? The industry seemed slightly coy when we spoke to it about those matters.
Ms Eagle
Clearly, the potential situation is there now. In evidence, the response—reasonably—was that that has not happened to date, even though there have been close connections between Gibraltar and the UK. However, these things tend to be dynamic and, once the agreement with Gibraltar is established, our tax regimes may diverge even further. If the Chancellor has his way after yesterday’s statement, I suspect they might have to.
Will that create more of a temptation for financial service companies to offshore to Gibraltar outside of the UK? Is the Minister convinced that that will not happen as a result of the Bill? I want reassurance from him about those potential weaknesses or risks and about consumer protections. He might even want to say a bit about benefits, if he feels up to it.
John Glen
I counted several questions in those four contributions and I will do my best to address them. First, I will reiterate what we are trying to do: to create the market access regime for Gibraltar-based financial services wishing to operate in the UK, and to make provision for outbound UK-based firms wishing to operate in Gibraltar.
The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East made a number of points, which I will start to address. He asked about the two-year reporting mechanism. The Gibraltar authorisation regime provides a broader and deeper market access into the UK market—including to the retail market—than other market access regimes, so the Treasury needs to be satisfied continuously that all conditions are met. We will therefore work carefully with the Minister we spoke to last week from the Government of Gibraltar to ensure that those conditions can be satisfied on an ongoing basis.
It is important to contextualise the nature of the relationship with Gibraltar. There has been a lot of dialogue, visits—not latterly—and evaluation of each other’s situation with respect to market access. In the lead up to the new regime, the Treasury will assess Gibraltar against the relevant market conditions for the sub-sectors to which it seeks access, and we will work closely with the Government of Gibraltar. The most significant area is the Gibraltarian insurance market, and 90% of that is UK facing.
The right hon. Gentleman compared the two-year review to our refusal to review the prudential regimes. As we have already discussed, the prudential measures include an accountability framework; we had a different view on the suitability of the one we suggested versus the amendment. The regulators have the expertise to set rules in the complex and technical areas of financial regulation and can do so in an agile way.
The right hon. Gentleman also referred to the FATF report. I have not read it in full, but I am aware of its broad indications of the challenges that exist. I am also aware that, while we had a good report, there are some challenges that we need to address in the UK. I will not hold back on admitting that. I will write to him specifically on those measures that pertain to Gibraltar, because I ought to do justice to his proper scrutiny.
There is an issue with the extension of the Gibraltarian regime to other countries. That is a bespoke regime that has been specifically designed for Gibraltar, recognising what the right hon. Gentleman and others will acknowledge is a special historical relationship, and our past common membership of the EU. These circumstances do not apply to any other jurisdictions, so that is not designed as a model or, as he said, a mini-single market to be extended elsewhere.
The hon. Member for Glasgow Central asked about the scope of the FOS jurisdiction over products sold by Gibraltarian firms. Our intention is that all Gibraltar-based firms with a schedule 2A commission will be covered by the FOS’s compulsory jurisdiction. That ensures that individuals and small businesses can seek appropriate redress. However, the extension of the FOS’s jurisdiction to schedule 2A firms does not require express wording in this Bill. The Bill makes schedule 2A firms a type of authorised person, so the FCA be able to make rules about them, bringing them inside the FOS’s remit. The FCA will be reflecting that change in the rules governing the FOS’s jurisdiction. Firms already under the FOS’s voluntary jurisdiction will transfer to the compulsory jurisdiction, with no loss of eligibility for their consumers in respect of actions occurring before they entered the compulsory jurisdiction.
The hon. Member for Glasgow Central also asked about the withdrawal of equivalence. If market access were to be withdrawn, schedule 2A puts in place winding down arrangements that enable the Government to pass secondary legislation providing for Gibraltar-based firms to exit the market in an orderly fashion, with appropriate protections for UK consumers. That is what would happen in market failure.
Stella Creasy
The Minister was just talking about the Financial Ombudsman Service being extended. One of the things that we might be concerned about is that our constituents might experience fraud from companies based in Gibraltar, perhaps in relation to insurance. Many of us can think of some famous Brexit backers who run insurance companies in Gibraltar and might have concerns about these issues. The FAFT report tells us that at the moment the supervision is only for new companies. There is a historical legacy of companies that have not previously been registered that might, therefore, under new supervision, be companies that we would not want to see operating in the UK. The Minister talked about the FOS’s requirements being retrospective, but that will be the same with the FCA. Can he clarify that if there are companies that are historically registered in Gibraltar, which we would not want to see registered here, perhaps because the people running them have criminal records, will they retrospectively be denied a licence, or is it only those from new registrations onwards, as with the current Gibraltarian regime?
John Glen
I wish to examine that matter carefully on the basis of the FATF report. I totally understand the clear point the hon. Lady is making about the retrospective nature of this and what could we essentially onshore, in terms of access to UK consumers, and the inherent and apparent risks in that. If the hon. Lady will permit me, I would like to examine that and get back to her.
The hon. Member for Wallasey asked about the independent Gibraltarian regulator and whether it will remain the supervisor of Gibraltar-based firms. The explicit intention for the UK regulators, contained in proposed schedule 2A, is to guarantee the protection of UK consumers, but that will be exercisable only on specific grounds, for example where a situation is urgent or if a Gibraltar-based firm is contravening a rule. We are not trying to take over their regulator.
The hon. Lady asked if the parties will co-operate sufficiently. There has been close and frequent co-operation over the past three years, between both Governments and regulators. They are developing their regime, and I am confident that will continue. The Minister in Gibraltar —effectively, my opposite number there—was positive about that last week. Schedule 2A will create a framework for this effective co-operation. That also means that the UK and Gibraltar Governments, the respective regulators and the Financial Services Compensation Scheme will put in place effective procedures to carry out any dialogue and co-ordinated action for the good functioning of the regime.
The hon. Members for Walthamstow and for Wallasey asked about consumer protection. It is obviously of the upmost importance that we provide the right level of protection for UK customers of Gibraltarian products, and that the level of protection afforded is communicated to them. Under this regime, most UK-based consumers purchasing products from Gibraltarian providers will receive a similar level of compensation as those purchasing their products from UK firms, whether through the FSCS or through the equivalent Gibraltarian schemes.
John Glen
I beg to move amendment 4, in schedule 6, page 100, line 31, at end insert—
“(i) an order under section 143S, or”.
This amendment extends the definition of “prohibition order” in paragraph 19 of new Schedule 2A to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to include an order under section 143S (inserted by Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Bill).
John Glen
These very simple and limited amendments are necessary to ensure that the measure functions as intended. As the explanatory note states, amendment 4 expands the definition of “prohibition order” in paragraph 19 of new schedule 2A to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to include an order made under section 143S, as inserted by part 1 of schedule 2 to the Bill.
The amendment ensures that UK regulators can reject a notification in relation to a Gibraltar-based firm if a senior manager of the Gibraltar-based firm is prohibited from performing a function by a part 9C prohibition order made under new section 143S, in line with the treatment of other firms in the Bill. A part 9C prohibition order may be made by the FCA in relation to an individual if the FCA believes that the individual is not of sufficiently good repute or does not possess sufficient knowledge, skills and experience to perform a function relating to an activity carried on by a non-authorised parent undertaking of an FCA investment firm.
Amendment 5 expands the definition of “prohibition order” in paragraph 19 of new schedule 2A to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to include an order under the law of Gibraltar that the appropriate UK regulator considers to be equivalent to an order under section 143S as inserted by part 1 of schedule 2 to the Bill. That is a simple and limited expansion enabling the UK regulators to reject a notification if a senior manager of a Gibraltar-based firm is prohibited from performing a function by a prohibition order under the law of Gibraltar that they consider to be equivalent to an order under section 143S.
Finally, amendments 6 to 11 clarify the UK regulators’ powers to give directions altering the meaning of “protected contract” and “existing contract” for the purposes of part 10 of new schedule 2A to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 in the event that a UK regulator or the Gibraltar regulator cancels the permission of a Gibraltar-based firm.
Amendment 4 agreed to.
Amendments made: 5, in schedule 6, page 100, line 34, after “56” insert “or 143S”.
This amendment extends the definition of “prohibition order” in paragraph 19 of new Schedule 2A to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to include an order under the law of Gibraltar which a UK regulator considers to be equivalent to an order under section 143S (inserted by Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Bill).
Amendment 6, in schedule 6, page 123, line 32, leave out “67” and insert “67(1)”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 11.
Amendment 7, in schedule 6, page 123, line 38, leave out “67” and insert “67(2)”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 11.
Amendment 8, in schedule 6, page 124, line 37, leave out “67” and insert “67(1)”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 11.
Amendment 9, in schedule 6, page 124, line 43, leave out “67” and insert “67(2)”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 11.
Amendment 10, in schedule 6, page 125, line 17, leave out
“this Part of this Schedule”
and insert
“paragraph 64 or 65 (or both)”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 11.
Amendment 11, in schedule 6, page 125, line 19, leave out
“The power under sub-paragraph (1) includes power to”
and insert
“A UK regulator may, by giving a direction,”.—(John Glen.)
This amendment and Amendments 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 clarify the UK regulators’ powers to give directions altering the meaning of “protected contract” and “existing contract” for the purposes of Part 10 of new Schedule 2A to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.
Question proposed, That the schedule, as amended, be the Sixth schedule to the Bill.
John Glen
New schedule 2A to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 sets out in detail the operation of the new market access arrangements for Gibraltar-based firms into the UK. Part 1 of the schedule defines key concepts of the new framework, such as approved activity. Part 2 sets out that the Treasury will be able to designate a regulated activity as an approved activity for market access only if the following conditions are met: if approval of an activity is compatible with certain objectives, such as financial stability and consumer protection; if the Treasury is satisfied that the relevant law and practice between the UK and Gibraltar is sufficiently aligned; and if the Treasury is satisfied that there is co-operation between the UK and Gibraltar Governments, our respective independent regulators and the FSCS.
Part 3 will introduce a simple notification process by which Gibraltar-based firms will be able to obtain permission to carry on an approved activity. I stress that this is not intended to be an application process; Gibraltar-based firms will automatically obtain a schedule 2A permission once the period for the UK regulators to consider a notification has expired. Parts 4 to 6 provide for the Gibraltarian regulator or the UK regulator to be able to vary or cancel a schedule 2A permission, or to impose, vary or cancel requirements on a Gibraltar-based firm, and set out the process the regulators could follow in each case. None of those powers dilutes the fact that Gibraltar-based firms will continue to be supervised by the Gibraltarian regulator and remain subject to the laws of Gibraltar. The intervention powers for the UK regulators will be available only in specific defined circumstances, as set out in paragraph 28. The option of withdrawal of approval for an activity will remain available to the Government as a tool of last resort. However, were any issues to emerge, the Treasury would work closely with the Gibraltarian authorities to ensure that all conditions of market access can be satisfied.
To provide clarity and transparency, part 11 will require each UK regulator to issue a statement of its policy on the use of its intervention powers. Part 12 imposes duties on the UK regulators to inform, consult and obtain consent from one another, as well as to keep the Gibraltarian regulator informed to support the functioning of the regime. Similarly, part 13 will require co-operation between the UK and Gibraltar Governments, our independent regulators and the manager of the FSCS, including setting out procedures and approaches to resolving any supervisory concerns to support the delivery of the regime.
I have summarised the effects of proposed new schedule 2A in the legislation. It sets out in great detail the new market access arrangements for Gibraltar-based firms looking to operate in the UK and it will lead to the renewal and strengthening of our relationship with Gibraltar. For that reason, I therefore recommend that the schedule be agreed to.
Question put and agreed to.
Schedule 6, as amended, accordingly agreed to.
Schedule 7 agreed to.
Schedule 8 agreed to.
Clause 23
Power to make provision about Gibraltar
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
John Glen
The new regime introduced by clause 22 revolves around activities covered by the so-called Gibraltar order, which provides Gibraltar-based firms accessing UK markets and UK-based firms accessing Gibraltar markets with rights equivalent to the passporting rights conferred on European economic area firms. Certain regimes conferring rights on UK and Gibraltar firms sit outside the remit of the Gibraltar order, as they are authorised not under the Financial Services and Markets Act but under separate regulatory regimes, and therefore need to be addressed separately.
The majority of these regimes are not as central to the UK-Gibraltar bilateral relationship as the regimes under clause 22, as they represent smaller sub-sectors such as e-money and payment services. The Government are requesting a delegated power to make provision for these regimes, which will allow the Treasury to safeguard the rights that Gibraltar firms currently exercise, to ensure that the legislative framework works efficiently and, wherever possible, to subject these regimes to principles and mechanisms similar to those in the new section 32A of and schedules 2A and 2B to the Financial Services and Markets Act, to ensure consistency with the rest of the regime introduced by clause 22.
Regarding the regime introduced by clause 22, it is right and proportionate that the Government are able to make adjustments to take account of the UK’s and Gibraltar’s new position outside the European Union and in relation to the regimes not captured by the Gibraltar order. The power that the Treasury is requesting is not unlimited, but is constrained at multiple levels. The power is limited in scope, as it only applies to a narrow pool of legislative regimes, as described in clause 23, which are not covered by clause 22. Further, this power can be exercised only in a manner that is compatible with the objectives set out in clause 23, such as financial stability and consumer protection. In addition, the Treasury must consult the FCA, the PRA and the Government of Gibraltar before making certain regulations. Finally, all regulations made in the exercise of this power will be subject to the affirmative procedure, giving Parliament effective oversight of the exercise of these powers by the Treasury.
The clause is crucial to ensuring a consistent approach to regulatory supervision, co-operation and other relevant standards and requirements across different financial services regimes. It achieves the right balance between accountability and effectiveness, so I recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Ms Eagle
Given that some of the areas caught by this part of the regulation were previously quite esoteric, but might not be so esoteric in the not-too-distant future—I am thinking of electronic money, which a few years ago would have been a tiny amount of transactions and is now very much larger—can the Minister reassure the Committee that, if the size and importance of these transactions grow, they are confined in the right area of the law for regulation? Does the Treasury have any views on how to take account of the changing importance and size of this area and to change the regulations around it in future? As we see, the pandemic has meant that many people who used to use cash no longer use it. Payment services and e-money are growing areas and could grow rapidly.. Is he convinced that this is the right regime to have in and around areas of perhaps rapid evolution?
John Glen
I thank the hon. Lady for that relevant question about how we intend to apply these powers to smaller regimes that are of increasing significance to consumers and potentially to stability. As a Government, our intention is to ensure that existing cross-border activities are not disrupted in any way. We are asking for the ability to update these regimes to reflect the growing relationship and the evolving domestic mechanisms and principles.
To some extent, many of these areas being looked at now—crypto-assets, stablecoins and so on—are evolving globally and there is is a spectrum of approaches, so we need to examine the appropriateness of the application. We would work to examine closely where the risks are, and therefore where the application of new and evolving orthodoxies of regulation would apply to Gibraltar. We are committing to ensuring that the necessary legislative arrangements are in place in any event, but we rule nothing out in terms of scope and application to new sectors as the world of financial services evolves, which it has done considerably in recent years.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 23 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 24
Collective investment schemes authorised in approved countries
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
John Glen
The clause introduces the new overseas funds regime, which delivers on the Government’s commitment to introduce a simpler way for large numbers of investment funds from other countries to be marketed to retail investors, including the general public. The OFR will promote openness to overseas markets, allowing the UK to offer broad market access to investment funds from other countries. It will also allow consumers to benefit from the widest possible choice of funds, while maintaining existing levels of investor protection.
The new regime could provide a more efficient way of allowing large numbers of investment funds from the EEA to market to retail investors on a more permanent basis. Many EEA funds are marketed into the UK through the EU’s passporting regime, which will end after the transition period. Although the Government have introduced a temporary marketing permissions regime to allow existing EEA funds to continue marketing after the transition period, these funds will need to apply for permission to market on a more permanent basis. If the OFR were not legislated for, the funds would have to apply for recognition under the existing regime; that regime allows overseas funds to be marketed to the general public, but it requires an assessment of each individual fund. Establishing the OFR could therefore provide a more permanent basis for these EEA funds to continue marketing in the UK, provided that the EEA member states are found equivalent. It will also allow for the possibility of funds in other countries gaining easier access to the UK if they meet the criteria set out in the schedule. The new regime has been welcomed by the UK’s asset management industry, and the majority of consultation respondents were highly supportive.
I will now detail how clause 24 introduces the new OFR. The clause adds to the legal definition of a recognised scheme, so that it includes funds recognised under the OFR. That will allow the funds to market to the general public in the UK. The clause also introduces schedule 9 to the Bill, which comprises the main operational elements of the OFR and any minor and consequential amendments needed to ensure the new regime is fully functional. Compared with the current assessment of individual funds, the OFR enables the Treasury to make equivalence determinations which allow specified categories of funds from other countries and territories to be marketed in the UK. Therefore, the OFR has the potential to promote the interconnectedness of financial markets and consumer choice, to provide a more appropriate basis for recognising the large number of EEA funds currently marketing through the temporary marketing permissions regime, and to support bilateral agreements with other countries.
The clause is necessary to ensure that the OFR is inserted into the relevant legislation and can fulfil its potential. I recommend that it stand part of the Bill.
Mr McFadden
I thank the Minister for his explanation. As he said, this clause, schedule 9 and clause 25 create an overseas fund regime for establishing the recognition of collective investment schemes based outside the UK. It is estimated that there are about 9,000 such schemes, which are often known as UCITS.
Up until now, those schemes have operated under the European Union’s passporting provisions, as have UK-based schemes operating in other countries; it has been a two-way street. It was not inevitable that passporting had to end when the UK left the EU. There were models of leaving that could have preserved those rights for UK-based firms. Indeed, there were votes in Parliament that sought to guarantee the continuation of passporting rights, but the Government set their face against that, so the first thing to say about these provisions is that the need for them has arisen out of choices made by the Government.
That there would be an adverse impact on services from this decision was acknowledged. It seems the dim and distant past now, but back in the halcyon days of 2018, we had something called the Chequers plan. That document was issued in July 2018 with—I noted when I had another look at it—a foreword from the current Foreign Secretary. The Minister could usefully remind him of that the next time he bumps into him. The document said that the Government
“acknowledges that there will be more barriers to the UK’s access to the EU market than is the case today.”
It went on to note that
“these arrangements will not replicate the EU’s passporting regimes”.
Let us look at what the document’s verdict was on equivalence, which is the thing that we are trying to achieve and in part legislate for today. This is the Government’s own verdict on the kind of regime in clauses 24 and 25 and schedule 9. It said:
“The EU has third country equivalence regimes which provide limited access for some of its third country partners to some areas of EU financial services markets. These regimes are not sufficient to deal with a third country whose financial markets are as deeply interconnected with the EU’s as those of the UK are. In particular, the existing regimes do not provide for:…institutional dialogue…a mediated solution where equivalence is threatened by a divergence of rules”—
we have discussed divergence of rules quite a lot in this Committee—
“or supervisory practices…sufficient tools for reciprocal supervisory cooperation…This would lead to unnecessary fragmentation of markets and increased costs to consumers and businesses; or…phased adjustments and careful management of the impacts of change, so that businesses face a predictable environment.”
That is not my verdict on equivalence; it is the Government’s verdict on equivalence when they published their own plan two years ago. So there we have it in the Government’s own words. That which they have been as yet unable to secure from the EU was dismissed as inadequate for the UK’s financial services sector even if we were able to secure it, which we have not, or at least not yet. The Government were aiming for something different, because it was deemed by them to be inadequate. They were aiming for
“a bilateral framework of treaty-based commitments to…ensure transparency and stability”,
because, as the document goes on to say, equivalence
“is not sufficient in scope for the breadth of the interconnectedness of UK-EU financial services provision. A new arrangement would need to encompass a broader range of cross-border activities”.
The Government wanted common principles, supervisory co-operation and
“a shared intention to avoid adopting regulations that produce divergent outcomes”.
Where did all that go? What happened to all of that? That was the aim. Why is it now the summit of the Government’s ambitions to achieve an outcome for the UK’s globally significant financial services sector that they dismissed as inadequate only two years ago? Why is this not at the heart of the UK-EU negotiations, in this crucial period? We have just over a month left—less, in real terms—to strike a deal. We must think of the significance of this sector to the UK economy and look at the employment, the investment and the tax revenue.
Stella Creasy
The shadow Minister is making a powerful case, and I suspect he is about to move on to this point. In layman’s terms, the Government are asking financial companies, which represent hundreds of thousands of jobs in our country, to deal with more paperwork, more bureaucracy, more regulation and a tougher business environment in which to operate. Does the shadow Minister think that these major financial companies are going to adhere to that because they are rather fond of London, or might they make different commercial decisions because we have not secured the kind of regulation he is talking about as yet and move themselves to other parts of the European Union?
Mr McFadden
We will come on to their reaction. It is extraordinary that a sector this important has been relegated so far in the Government’s priorities. It is absolutely extraordinary that in these final days of renegotiation this is not front and centre. We just need to look at the employment, the investment and the tax revenues, and the role that the sector can play in global standards. Yet it has been relegated by the Government to an outcome that they admit is inferior and which, right now, they have not even been able to achieve.
All we can legislate for here is what we do. The fact that it is not front and centre of the negotiations right now speaks volumes about how far we have drifted from talk of achieving all the same benefits and securing a free trade zone from Iceland to the Urals—do hon. Members remember that? All of that has gone.
Mr McFadden
That is the OBR’s estimate of the additional cost of a no-deal scenario, on top of the already long-term hit in the deal scenario. My hon. Friend is absolutely right to set that out.
The fact that this has happened slowly over the past couple of years, and maybe the fact that the industry has become weary of arguing about it—as, perhaps, have all of us—should not disguise the importance of what has happened. It is important to set that out and to put these clauses in perspective. The Government chose to relegate the importance of UK financial services industries in the Brexit negotiations. Having made that decision, they then relegated financial services even further by aiming for an outcome that they openly admitted was inadequate, and they have not even been able to achieve that outcome. That is the context of these clauses.
I have a few questions on the details of the regime being established by the clauses. First, how does this relate to the Chancellor’s statement on financial services on 9 November? The clause and schedule 9 set out a country-by-country approval system for equivalence decisions, but in his statement on 9 November the Chancellor said that he was publishing a set of equivalence decisions for the UK and the EEA member states—those member states who still have access to these passporting rights, even though they are not EU members. Clause 24, as I said, implies a country-by-country process. Does the Chancellor’s statement mean that in policy terms, the equivalent recognition has already been given to all EU and EEA member states? Is that for all the financial products that are produced to which such equivalence might apply—that is, those traded on a cross-border basis?
Alison Thewliss
I have one or two further questions about people who are invested in things for which equivalence is withdrawn. The Association of British Insurers said in its written evidence:
“While the regime states that investors can stay invested in funds if equivalence has been withdrawn, they do not to spell out the practicalities of the situation an existing investor may face if a fund they are invested in has been suspended, for example if additional money is invested after a fund suspension. For the regime to fully work for consumers, situations such as this need to be clarified.”
What happens to investors in those funds if equivalence is withdrawn? What information will they receive from the Government, from regulators or from anybody else if that happens, so that they know what they have to do in that scenario, if anything? That could affect many people and would be very complicated to unravel, so it would be useful to set out people’s obligations in those circumstances.
John Glen
We were treated to more of a Second Reading response there from the shadow Minister, with all that he said about the frustrations of the last three years. Having been Minister for three years under three Chancellors and seen the evolution in the nature of that negotiation, I have a lot of empathy with his analysis about the evolving nature of a negotiation, which is of course what happens.
I can tell the right hon. Gentleman that the whole issue of the importance of financial services has gripped me since 9 January 2018, when I came into the role, and he is absolutely right to say that it is a very important industry and that we must do all that we can to maximise opportunities for it. I very much regret where we are on what we thought would be a technical process of equivalence granting. We filled in 2,500 pages of forms over about 40 questionnaires by June last year and, self-evidently, we have been leaders in the regulation of financial services within the EU. We have not heard anything from the EU on the equivalence determinations, which is strange. We regard the EU as some of our most important trading partners, and we look forward to continuing a constructive dialogue.
The right hon. Gentleman raised a number of questions about the Chancellor’s statement, the registration process and the situation for jurisdictions beyond the EU, and I will address those. On the equivalence for UK firms, although the EU does not currently have an equivalence regime for the marketing of investment funds—we cannot speak for any future changes to the EU’s equivalence framework—the Government are introducing the new equivalence regime for overseas investment funds to market to UK retail investors, to allow our consumers to benefit from the widest possible choice of funds. We are doing that to support and preserve consumer choice for UK investors. Currently, about 9,000 EEA-domiciled funds use passporting to market to retail investors in the UK. That makes up a substantial proportion of the overseas funds that are on offer to UK investors. In comparison, about 2,600 UK-domiciled funds are available to UK investors, and UK funds do not commonly sell into the EU.
The geographic scope of the OFR could be used to find any jurisdiction equivalent, but a fund from another jurisdiction could be permissible even if the jurisdiction is not equivalent. That would use a different process—the existing process, which I think is provided for in section 272 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. We hope and expect to refine that to align it with this process to remove any uncertainty.
The Chancellor’s announcement of 9 November, when we made 17 equivalence decisions, is separate to the OFR, which is a new equivalence regime that the UK is introducing for EEA funds. The withdrawal of equivalence can happen at the country level, but the FCA has powers to suspend or revoke the marketing permissions of individual funds. If funds from a country are found equivalent under the OFR, they will not need to go through the section 272 provision, so this will be a faster route.
The hon. Member for Glasgow Central asked what happens to investors if equivalence is withdrawn or a fund is suspended. Obviously equivalence is necessary to ensure that UK investors can assume at least equivalent investor protection to that of the UK. If the Government believe that that is no longer the case, it would be appropriate for the Treasury to act and to make that clear to potential existing investors by withdrawing equivalence.
We recognise the importance of clarity and stability regarding the potential withdrawal of equivalence, so withdrawing an equivalence determination will be undertaken in an orderly and controlled manner to ensure that investors are protected and businesses have time to adjust. In the event of equivalence being withdrawn, funds from the country or territory in question will no longer have recognised status and can no longer be marketed to the general public in the UK.
The Treasury does not envisage that investors will be forced to divest their investments in the fund, and the funds should continue to service them; however, the loss of recognition could make it more difficult for investors to continue investing in the fund.
For example, the loss of recognition might result in investment platforms no longer offering the fund on their platforms. The Bill also includes a power so that the Treasury can take steps to smooth the transition for funds to the existing regime if equivalence has been withdrawn.
Alison Thewliss
I thank the Minister for that clarification. I am just trying to get my head around the practicality or how this would work. If equivalence is withdrawn, how do people who have money in the funds find out about it? Is there an obligation on the funds to tell them, or on the Government to ask the funds to tell them? Do the Government somehow contact these people, and what is the timeline of those things, should that occur?
John Glen
That procedure would depend on the particular breakdown of the fund and the scale of the problem. It would be for the regulator to work with the individual fund to demonstrate that, and to give clarity to consumers. It is difficult without a specific example to set that out, but the provision is there and the provisions are comprehensive in terms of being able to do that.
The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East asked about the relationship between equivalence and the divergence allowed for by the Bill. The Bill makes no assumptions about what the relationship between the UK and the EU will be in the area of financial services. That negotiation is ongoing. That is entirely consistent with the mutual findings of equivalence. It ensures that the right framework is in place for making equivalence decisions and for ensuring that any likely impact on existing equivalence decisions is taken into account when making rules in an area covered by the Bill.
I have tried to cover everything that has been raised. I am sure that I have not covered everything, but if I find anything substantive when I reflect on today’s proceedings, I will write to the right hon. Gentleman and make the letter available to the Committee.
The Chair
These letters are coming back quite quickly. The one from the other day is already here, so we look forward to any future ones.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 24 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 9
Collective investment schemes authorised in approved countries
Amendments made: 12, in schedule 9, page 151, line 16, leave out
“granting an application under section 271A”
and insert
“under section 271A granting an application under that section”.
This amendment clarifies that both the application and the order are made under section 271A.
Amendment 13, in schedule 9, page 154, line 43, leave out “271G” and insert “271A”.
This amendment and Amendments 14, 15, 16 and 17 correct cross-references to the section under which an order recognising a scheme is made.
Amendment 14, in schedule 9, page 155, line 14, leave out “271G” and insert “271A”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 13.
Amendment 15, in schedule 9, page 155, line 24, leave out “271G” and insert “271A”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 13.
Amendment 16, in schedule 9, page 156, line 7, leave out “271G” and insert “271A”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 13.
Amendment 17, in schedule 9, page 156, line 29, leave out “271G” and insert “271A”.—(John Glen.)
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 13.
Schedule 9, as amended, agreed to.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(David Rutley.)
Financial Services Bill (Ninth sitting)
Tuesday 1st December 2020
(4 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Financial Services Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 1 December 2020 - (1 Dec 2020)
The Chair
Before we begin, I have a few preliminary points to make. Please switch electronic devices to silent. Tea and coffee are forbidden during sittings, but I will allow Members to take their jackets off, as Chris Clarkson politely asked at the start, so feel free to remove outer layers if you wish.
I remind Members of the importance of social distancing. Everyone is sitting in the right place, but if necessary, people will have to sit in the Public Gallery. Hansard reporters have asked for speeches to be sent to hansardnotes@parliament.uk. Today we will continue with line-by-line consideration.
Clause 25
Individually recognised overseas collective investment schemes
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (John Glen)
Thank you for your continued chairmanship of this Committee, Dr Huq.
The clause makes changes to section 272 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which allows individual investment funds from other countries and territories to be marketed to the general public, including retail investors, in the United Kingdom. Although we have separately introduced a new overseas funds regime to allow specified categories of overseas funds to market to retail investors, section 272, the existing provision, will remain and will be available for investment funds that do not fall within the scope of an equivalent determination under the OFR, but still wish to market to retail investors in the UK. Investment funds that are eligible to apply under the OFR will not be able to make an application under section 272. This is to ensure that funds always apply through the most efficient route possible.
We have proposed simplifications to section 272 and sections relating to it, which are supported by both the Financial Conduct Authority and industry. First, the changes will streamline the FCA’s assessment of individual investment funds from other countries. In making its assessment, the FCA would now need to consider only issues that are subject to existing rules on UK authorised funds rather than potential laws that do not yet exist. Secondly, we will simplify when the fund operators have to notify the FCA of changes to their funds and, thirdly, we will make wider changes so that section 272 is compatible with the new OFR.
Also, provisions are added to FSMA, mirroring the ones in the OFR, to enhance consumer protections and ensure consistency in comparability between the two regimes. This includes requiring fund operators to notify such persons as the FCA may direct, such as investors, if the fund’s permission to market is suspended or revoked. The FCA will also have the power to make public censure if certain rules and requirements are breached. Finally, we are also making it clear that sub-funds can be recognised under section 272 if investment funds are part of an umbrella and sub-fund structures.
As I noted earlier, an umbrella fund is a legal entity that groups together different sub-funds where each sub-fund has a separate pool of assets that typically has its own investment strategy. The changes set out in clause 25 will improve the process in section 272, reducing the administrative burden for the FCA and asset management firms. I therefore recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Huq.
I want to ask the Minister where the clear water is. In simple terms, is this about granting equivalence recognition to individual companies from countries where we do not grant the overall country the equivalence recognition? The Minister nods, so perhaps that is what it is about. That implies that those firms might need a higher level of monitoring or observation, given that they are from countries that have not been granted equivalence recognition—presumably, we think that the regulatory system in the country in which they are based is perhaps not quite of the standard of some other countries. Will he tell us a little more about how that would work? Will there be a set of firms that the FCA keeps an extra eye on? If the FCA decided that equivalence recognition permission should no longer be granted to an individual firm, how would the process work? Is it something that can be withdrawn quite quickly if we think things have changed?
John Glen
I thank the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East for his questions. His characterisation of what this is about is absolutely right: the clause provides a mechanism to ensure that funds that are not eligible for the new overseas fund regime may still apply and secure access. In terms of the FCA, monitoring and protection, it is important to point out that the FCA’s online register shows that there are currently four stand-alone funds, seven umbrella funds and 27 sub-funds that have permission to be marketed to UK retail investors under section 272. Some of those funds have been carried over from a previous regime for overseas funds marketing to the UK, set out in section 270 of FSMA.
To give some comfort about investor protection, the FCA is required to examine whether the fund gives adequate protection to investors in the scheme. It will examine whether the fund’s arrangements for constitution and management are adequate; the powers and duties of the fund’s operator, trustee or depositary must also be adequate. It is another mechanism to be applied in conditions where a country as a whole is not given the adequacy equivalence decision.
Under the clause, the FCA has suitable powers to verify the full context of the fund’s operations and to take account of the risks associated with the fund. It would make a determination based on the full range of factors available to it.
Mr McFadden
We will be discussing a couple of similar clauses very soon, but it strikes me that quite a big role is envisaged for the FCA in advising the Government on equivalence recognition and regulation in other countries. It has not performed such ongoing monitoring up until now. It is quite easy to go through the Bill clause by clause, subsection by subsection, and think that each change is a nothing more than a small change here and a small change there that do not add up to much, but the impression gained is that the Bill creates a big job for the FCA. Is it properly resourced and equipped to carry out that role?
John Glen
As ever, the right hon. Gentleman makes a very reasonable point. In this context, the obligations on the FCA and the Prudential Regulation Authority will continue to be considerable. They will have significant responsibilities. In previous sittings, we talked about the necessity of having a clear framework for the regulator to be accountable to Parliament, subject to Parliament’s determination of what that will be. The resourcing of the FCA with the right sort of skills to carry out the proposed functions will be an issue that its new chief executive will consider in due course. We will seek to co-operate with him to ensure that he has those resources.
The section 272 provision is extant and I outlined the number of funds that are using it, but I accept the right hon. Gentleman’s general point about the FCA. It is something of which we are very aware.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 25 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 26
Money market funds authorised in approved countries
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
John Glen
Clause 26 is a core element of the overseas funds regime, the equivalence regime for money market funds. As I am sure a number of colleagues know, money market funds are a type of investment fund that invests in liquid assets such as cash, Government bonds and corporate debt. They are considered to be a low-risk, short-term and high-liquidity investment. Many organisations in the UK, such as local authorities, use money market funds to invest their cash in the short term as an alternative to bank deposits, and the vast majority of money market funds currently available to UK investors are domiciled overseas. UK investors need continued access to those overseas money market funds to use for cash management purposes. Money market funds are subject to separate regulations for other types of funds, and the Government therefore believe it is necessary to have a separate equivalence regime for money market funds that allows the Government to consider the additional factors and regulations.
Clause 26, and the new article 4A equivalence regime that it creates, will ensure that overseas money market funds that wish to become recognised in the UK must be from a country or territory where the relevant regulations have equivalent effect to the MMF regulation in the UK. I therefore recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr McFadden
We have met the capital requirements regulation, we have met undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities, and now we meet the money market funds regulation. I have a couple of questions for the Minister on this issue. First, new article 4A(2) of the money market funds regulation says that the Treasury must be satisfied that the requirements on money market funds
“have equivalent effect to the requirements imposed by this Regulation.”
The key phrase here is “have equivalent effect”. That is the yardstick by which judgments will be made. How will this be assessed? What exactly will the Treasury be looking for when it makes such an assessment? How are we judging equivalent effect?
Secondly, article 4A(4) says that when considering the revocation of equivalence,
“the Treasury may ask the FCA to prepare a report on the law and practice of the country”
that is involved. That harks back to what I said a moment ago. Will preparing reports on the law and practice involved be a new task for the FCA? The Bill states only that the Government “may” ask the FCA, but I would have thought that if the Treasury were to consider the revocation of one of the equivalence recognitions, it would be pretty essential that the FCA be involved in that.
Thirdly, there is nothing in new article 4A that requires the UK to continuously monitor the law and practice of other countries once equivalence has been granted. That is important, because we grant the equivalence recognition on the basis of a view at the time that a country’s regulations have equivalent effect. However, how can we guarantee that there might not then be a process of regulatory or deregulatory change in the country that had been deemed equivalent, with consequential risks for UK consumers if—to put it in lay terms—the rules become a lot more lax in that country? Really, I am asking how this will all be monitored again in the future, and I would be grateful if the Minister has some comments on that.
John Glen
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for those questions. Essentially, there are two parts. The first is about how the assessment will be made. The UK is committed to what we describe—I have said it before—as an outcome-based approach to equivalence. That is based on the principles of FSMA, which means acknowledging how different regulatory practices can combine to achieve the same outcomes, as opposed to the prescriptive rule-by-rule-based approach that our friends in the EU have often preferred. We would not expect to see identical line-by-line regulations.
The OFR does not require countries to have those exact rules and regulations, but they must have laws and practices that have an equivalent effect in terms of the outcomes achieved. Obviously, there is considerable expertise involved in evaluating that and a particular group of people who are capable of doing that within the FCA. We believe that that outcomes-based equivalence can provide a high level of consumer protection while also allowing the UK to maintain a competitive market for overseas funds.
The second part of the right hon. Gentleman’s question addressed the issue of future evolution and divergence in standards, and how that would be monitored. The monitoring would be conducted in line with the equivalence guidance document that the Government published on 9 November. It sets out the framework for ongoing monitoring, recognising this outcomes-based approach, but being cognisant of changes in the underlying regulatory regime. This would not be a question of going through a gateway, gaining approval and that would be it forever. There would be some monitoring proportionate to the nature of the risks and the assurance that we had around the regime. I hope that answers the right hon. Gentleman’s question.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 26 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 27
Provision of investment services etc in the UK
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
John Glen
Clause 27 gives effect to schedule 10 and amends the markets in financial instruments regulation. MiFIR is a piece of retained EU legislation that will continue to have effect in the UK after the end of the transition period, with amendments made under the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 to ensure that it continues to operate effectively.
In summary, the amendments that the Bill makes to MiFIR broadly reflect the changes that the EU has introduced to its own third country regime, so it makes sense for us to do so. The third country regime in MiFIR established the basis on which overseas investment firms will be able to offer investment services and undertake investment activities in the UK. It allows overseas firms to apply for recognition that will allow them to provide cross-border services to more sophisticated clients, without establishing a local branch, if there has been an equivalence in respect of their home jurisdiction.
The changes made in this Bill will ensure the effective operation of the equivalence assessments and the subsequent operation of the recognition regime. That will mean that we can access the EU and treat EU investment firms in the same way that the EU will assess the UK and treat UK firms in the future. I will detail the specific amendments that this Bill makes to MiFIR during my explanation of schedule 10. I recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr McFadden
I have two questions about schedule 10. The Minister has set out what it is intended to do, but I want to ask a few questions on the theme of monitoring and compliance.
New paragraph 5A of article 46 of the regulation defines reverse solicitation, and therefore an exemption from the equivalence rules, as when a business is not initiated at a client’s own initiative. Is the Minister confident that this is a tight enough turn of phrase to mean that firms cannot solicit business in the UK while dodging the stricter regulations that come within such marketing activity?
Secondly, and more important, new paragraph 1C of article 47 of MiFIR says that when making an equivalence determination the Treasury must take into account whether a country is classed as high risk for money laundering. Surely that is not strong enough. We will talk more about money laundering shortly. Why do we not say outright that the UK should not consider any such jurisdiction as equivalent until it is no longer considered a high-risk location for money laundering?
New article 48A of the regulation gives significant powers to the Treasury to impose additional requirements on third-country firms, but there are no details of what those requirements might be. Again, I would be grateful if the Minister said a bit more about that.
John Glen
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his comments. He raises a number of specific points around drafting, and if there is anything that I cannot answer, I shall write to him today.
On the first point, the FCA needs to register overseas firms, which will give the right oversight, and also needs to monitor the overseas framework on an ongoing basis. From June 2021, the EU will be able to assess the UK and treat UK firms under a new regime. These changes are necessary to ensure that the Treasury is well equipped to assess the EU and that the FCA can exercise the appropriate level of oversight over overseas investment firms operating in the UK under this regime.
The core thrust of the right hon. Gentleman’s questions relates to the apparent weakening of the UK’s position. The Treasury has not yet determined which additional requirements, if any, would apply to overseas firms; that will be done when an equivalence determination is made, after the Government have fully considered the views of the FCA and other relevant matters.
The point the right hon. Gentleman makes about protection for consumers is obviously a critical one. Firms operating on a cross-border basis under this regime are not allowed to service UK retail consumers. The regime only applies to more sophisticated professional clients such as other financial services firms. None the less, I recognise that it is clear that we need to ensure that firms that are accessing UK markets from overseas are subject to similarly robust regulatory standards to those we place on our firms at home, and these amendments will do exactly that.
The Treasury will be able to determine whether a third country has a regulatory framework that has an equivalent effect to the UK’s, meaning that we can be confident that these third-country firms are regulated to the same level as our own. For firms that do not play by the rules, it is important that we have the right mechanisms to call that out, and the FCA will be able to step in where needed to protect UK investors and the integrity of our financial system.
On the right hon. Gentleman’s last point about money laundering specifically, we need to assess a jurisdiction’s regulatory framework as equivalent. That provides a high bar for anti-money laundering risks, and that is reflected in the guidance document that I referred to earlier. I will make the general point, though, that I understand the sensitivity to this fear and anxiety around wilful divergence to have a less regulated and less secure environment. I want to put it on the record that the Government do not see the changes as a mechanism to achieve some loosening. However, we will need to take account of the new directives that the EU continues to develop without our being at the table, and we will also need to develop our own response. Even though it will not be identical, that does not mean that we will not observe the high standards.
Mr McFadden
I think the Minister is getting to the heart of it. I asked detailed questions, but at the core of them is this one: is there a policy intent in these little changes of words, when we transpose the regulation, to have a loosening in some way, or are those little changes almost incidental—with no policy intention to have a less rigorous regime than MiFIR proper would apply to money laundering, recognition or any of the other things that I asked about?
John Glen
There is no intention to moderate or significantly alter the effect of the regulation. This is about doing what is necessary to ensure that we regulate the services and activities of overseas investment firms following an equivalence determination. The changes are designed to be consistent with the direction of travel that we have pursued within the EU, but making changes that are necessary for the different outcomes-based approach that we have always taken in the UK.
Ms Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)
Just briefly to add to the questions from my right hon. Friend, why on earth is there all this faffing about when we are having total equivalence and companies will want the rules to be the same? Is this just another obtuse obsession with sovereignty, which will cost a hell of a lot more money because we will have to have our own bespoke regime that is meant to do exactly the same thing?
John Glen
I think the hon. Lady’s point goes back to the decision made to leave the EU and the implications of that. I recognise that we had a conversation in the previous sitting about the nature of the regimes that have been mooted as a possible solution.
I did an extensive session with the Lords EU Services Sub-Committee yesterday morning dealing with the issue of equivalence. We see this as a technical process. We have filled in several thousand pages of forms across 17 questionnaires for the EU, and it has not made those determinations, so we moved forward and made our determinations of the EU and are seeking to bring as much clarity as possible. This is another example of our bringing clarity to industry in as straightforward a way as possible, and the changes reflect that.
Ms Eagle
I praise the Minister for his diplomacy. Having been a Treasury Minister myself, I know that diplomacy is extremely important when he sits in his bivouac. Has he made any assessment of the extra red tape that he is putting on our own financial services sector by insisting, for reasons of sovereignty, on a different but hopefully equivalent route? He and I both know that the minor differences between what is allowed and what is not can turn into weaknesses and reasons for arbitrage and rule breaking if those who regulate are not extremely careful.
John Glen
I acknowledge the hon. Lady’s deep experience in this matter and I am grateful for her empathy with the need to be diplomatic as a Treasury Minister. The measure is about extending limited supervisory powers to replicate EU powers. Her general point about the additional costs that can accrue to industry is something that we are very concerned about. We have always had within the UK a different approach to onshoring regulations, and that will continue.
FSMA 2000 gives us that outcome-based approach. When we downloaded the directives that we participated in creating in the EU and the Commission process, we always did it in our own way as per those principles. The hon. Lady’s main point is a key concern for the Government. That is why we are anxious to give assurance of continuity where it is plainly necessary and illustrate how we can do things as smoothly as possible, to minimise disruption to industry in a time of prolonged uncertainty, which I hope will come to an end soon.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 27 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 10
Amendments of the Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation
John Glen
I beg to move amendment 18, in schedule 10, page 164, line 7, leave out “services” and insert “investment services, or performing investment activities,”.
This amendment provides that the Treasury’s regulation-making power under new Article 48A of the Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation applies to third-country firms performing investment activities, as well as to third-country firms providing investment services.
The intention of this amendment is to make a correction to article 48A for the markets in financial instruments regulation by replacing the word “services” in line 7 of page 164 with
“investment services, or performing investment activities,”.
This will mean that the Treasury may impose requirements on overseas firms performing investment activities in the UK in addition to overseas firms providing investment services in the UK.
Amendment 18 agreed to.
Question proposed, That the schedule, as amended, be the Tenth schedule to the Bill.
John Glen
Schedule 10 amends the retained Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation. This regulation will continue to have effect in the UK after the end of the transition period. In part, it regulates overseas firms that provide investment services and activities in the UK, following an equivalence determination, as I described in relation to clause 27.
Under MiFIR, investment firms in a jurisdiction the regime of which has been found to be equivalent can provide a specified range of services in the UK under a recognition regime. The amendments the Bill makes to MiFIR broadly reflect the changes that the EU introduced to its own overseas regime for investment firms where those changes make sense for the UK. These changes will ensure that we can assess the EU and treat EU firms seeking to operate in the UK in the way the EU will assess the UK and treat UK firms in the future.
Schedule 10 provides the FCA with a power to specify reporting requirements for overseas firms that register under the regime. As the expert regulator, the FCA is best placed to specify that level of detail. Schedule 10 also updates the assessment criteria for equivalence to reflect the latest changes in the UK’s prudential regimes, as updated by this Bill. Countries will be required to have provisions in place that are equivalent in effect in areas such as prudential rules, business conduct, market transparency and other areas. That means that overseas firms accessing UK markets will be subject to the same level of investor protection and prudential regulatory standards as that which we place on UK firms.
The process of equivalence is a dynamic one. Indeed, we need to ensure that equivalence can be monitored, not only now but in the future—that speaks to the point made earlier by the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East. That is why the FCA will be required to monitor the regulatory and supervisory developments and enforcement practices of an overseas country that has received an equivalence determination and report its findings to the Treasury. By doing that, we will be able to ensure that we can continue to protect UK consumers as much now as in the future.
Schedule 10 also enables the FCA to temporarily restrict or prohibit an overseas firm from accessing UK markets if the firm does not co-operate with the FCA. In some cases, the FCA may withdraw an overseas firm’s registration. These important tools need to be exercised carefully and, as such, schedule 10 also specifies the procedures that the FCA must follow when using them.
Finally, schedule 10 will enable the Treasury, where appropriate, to impose specific requirements on overseas firms that register under the MiFIR regime as part of the equivalence decision. That will allow the FCA to account for the specific nature of overseas firms providing services across borders to UK markets. The schedule therefore provides the Treasury and the FCA with the appropriate powers to ensure that the UK remains open to global investment, while upholding the highest standards of investor protection and ensuring the effective functioning of UK markets.
Mr McFadden
I asked some questions about this matter in relation to clause 27, so I do not intend to speak again.
Ms Eagle
The powers are necessary to prevent not only exploitation that might pose some systemic risks to the financial system, but catastrophic loss to UK investors due to rogue investors or investments. Regulators are reluctant to use the more draconian end of their powers, and there is little evidence that they actually go there.
Is the Minister satisfied that the practical effect of the changes will be that the FCA is determined to use those powers, if need be? It seems to be reluctant to go to the stage of closing firms down. That would be a huge decision that may involve considerable disruption. Is he convinced that the FCA has the resources, the aptitude and the determination to do that if necessary?
John Glen
The hon. Lady makes a good point. This goes to the heart of the evolution in the FCA’s responsibilities in an environment where it is being asked to do things differently and to account to Parliament for its actions. The future regulatory framework discussions through the next six months will allow us to solidify what those responsibilities will be.
The hon. Lady is right to say that the FCA will be required to make significant judgments on regulatory and supervisory developments, enforcement practices and other relevant market developments in third countries. The Treasury will request reports from the FCA with regards to overseas jurisdictions. We will consider those reports and other sources of information and take appropriate action, which would involve reviewing and equivalence determination or withdrawing equivalence.
Resourcing is a matter for the FCA itself, which it reflects on and establishes a levy for. I have conversations every six weeks with the FCA’s chief executive and chairman, and such matters are under ongoing review. Clearly, in the light of these changes, the FCA will need to update its provision. The FCA has a new chief executive officer who is undertaking a significant transformation project. I welcome his appointment and his plans, but reviews will be ongoing, and I am confident that he and his organisation will rise to the occasion.
Ms Eagle
I am sorry to press the Minister again, but this area is crucial to ensuring that our financial services industry is properly and appropriately regulated. We will be discussing crime, money laundering, and market abuse later today, I think, but the powers arranged against a regulator wanting to take drastic action, particularly in the form of disruption, trouble, lawyers, threats and all that, can mitigate decisive action. With Action Fraud and the failures in some of these areas, we have seen that even when criminal liability and offences are in the mix, rather than just regulatory offences, we do not seem to have developed a system that is as effective as it needs to be.
To what extent does the Economic Secretary think that the FCA’s use of levies to finance that activity is good enough given their volume and the drastic effects of some decisions, especially considering the funding of other regulators? Across the pond—we will increasingly have to look across the Atlantic—regulators are much better resourced than our own. Is he convinced that he has got the balance right for capacity and resources?
John Glen
The hon. Lady is taking me further and further away from the Bill. Her core point is about the suitability and sufficiency of the FCA’s capability. The FCA has provision to take account of consumer and market conditions and intervene, and I am clear that it has the capacity and the experience to do that work. The broader economic crime challenges that she mentions are why the March Budget contained an additional £100 million economic crime levy to support existing public investment and levies.
These are an ongoing, challenging, evolving and changing set of risks across that market, with the application of new technology—I have mentioned cryptocurrencies—and new ways of doing business that mean that the nature of crime is also evolving. I would never be complacent about the capacity of the FCA, and I recognise that it needs constant review and refresh to ensure that it is aligned with the other agencies involved in monitoring and dealing with threats to market integrity.
Question put and agreed to.
Schedule 10, as amended, accordingly agreed to.
Clause 28
Part 4A permissions: variation or cancellation on initiative of FCA
John Glen
Clause 28 introduces schedule 11, which amends the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to put in place a new process so that the FCA can more quickly cancel the authorisation of firms that it believes are no longer continuing regulated activity.
Since the existing grounds and method for cancellations were introduced, the FCA-regulated population has expanded, such that the FCA now regulates approximately 59,000 firms. Under the current cancellation process, it can take considerable time for the FCA to build its evidential case that the firm is no longer carrying out authorised activity, even when it is likely that the firm is no longer doing so. That means that there is a delay between the firms being identified as inactive by the FCA, and the FCA being able to remove or vary their authorisation.
The FCA estimates that at any point in time, the number of firms no longer carrying on FCA-regulated activities but which have not sought cancellation to their authorisation is about 300 to 400. Although that is a small proportion of the 59,000 FCA-regulated population that I mentioned, the Government nevertheless consider that it creates a risk, particularly in regard to the financial services register. Fraudsters can take advantage of inaccuracies in the register to their benefit by cloning inactive firms to scam consumers. That involves impersonating a firm that is on the register to give people the impression that they are dealing with a regulated entity.
Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)
What is the interaction between that register and the Companies House register? If we removed an inactive business from one register, it would make sense to remove it from the other.
John Glen
As far as I am aware, the Companies House register is a separate entity run from the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. A considerable amount of work is going on at the moment to look at how the data around Companies House registration works, reflecting concerns raised in the December 2018 Financial Action Task Force report. The hon. Lady makes a very reasonable point about the alignment of the two registers, and I will need to come back to her on that matter. Clearly, it would be perverse to remove an FCA-registered entity but not have a forfeit of registration from Companies House. I shall write to the Committee and to the hon. Lady on that matter.
I want to ensure that consumers can take informed financial services decisions. To achieve that, we need to ensure that the financial services register is accurate and that consumers are not exposed to unnecessary risk. This new process will sit alongside the existing process, to allow the FCA to streamline cases in which it suspects that a firm is no longer carrying on an authorised activity, enabling the FCA to more quickly cancel the firm’s authorisation and update the financial services register accordingly. In cases in which the FCA is looking to cancel a firm’s authorisation for another reason, this will continue to pass through the existing process.
I therefore recommend that this clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr McFadden
I suspect that I am going to follow up on the question from the hon. Member for Glasgow Central. As the Minister has explained, the problem that this clause and schedule are intended to resolve is dormant companies that no longer do the things that they were doing when originally registered with the FCA. Regulation is sometimes described as a needle-in-a-haystack problem, because there are so many companies and there is so much going on. Okay, it is not a massive number; it is 300 or 400 among 59,000 companies, but if we can strip those out, we make the job of the regulator that little bit easier because it is monitoring fewer companies and there is less danger of the cloning activity that the Minister described.
However, this does prompt a question: if 59,000 companies are regulated by the FCA and some 4 million to 5 million are registered with Companies House—we will come on to this under other clauses shortly—surely the process that the Minister has just outlined for clause 28 and schedule 11 should apply to companies there, if we find that they are simply paper organisations that may be designed as much to deceive as to actually carry out any business. Where they are engaged in activities that they should not be, they should be taken off the register, too, but that would of course imply a change in job description for Companies House. It has traditionally regarded itself more as a register and library rather than a real regulator or what might be called a partner in law enforcement. Therefore, can the Minister at least—he will hear this more than once today—talk to colleagues in BEIS to encourage a parallel approach with Companies House? It seems to me that what is being done in clause 28 is sensible, but it is only part of the picture of clamping down on illegal activity.
John Glen
The point here is that clearly a business could be registered at Companies House, could historically have done regulated activity under the FCA and that regulated activity could have ceased; it may have other business activities that are completely compliant with Companies House law, but it should not be registered for doing financial services regulated activity. The question would then be this: what would be the obligation on Companies House to make an interaction so that, as the right hon. Gentleman said, the definition of its activities would be amended?
Obviously, there are complex legal issues here. This is associated with the review that BEIS will be coming back to, responding to. I think it is important that we acknowledge that issue about not doing a regulated activity but continuing to trade legally in other realms. But the point that I hear and recognise needs to be clarified is this: what is the interaction between the two processes? I undertake to examine that and to make clear to my colleagues in BEIS what the risks are and what the view of this Committee is.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 28 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 11
Variation or cancellation of Part 4A permission on initiative of FCA: additional power
Question proposed, That the schedule be the Eleventh schedule to the Bill.
John Glen
I have already explained why we are acting to create a new process so that the FCA can more quickly cancel the authorisation of firms that it believes are no longer continuing regulated activity. Schedule 11 amends the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to give the FCA the necessary power to do that If it appears to the FCA that an FCA authorised person is no longer carrying out a regulated activity, it can vary or cancel that firm’s permissions. Examples of where the FCA might pursue this approach could be when the firm has failed to pay its fees or levies or provide information to the FCA as is required in the FCA handbook.
John Glen
Clause 29 makes two small technical changes to the market abuse regulation. The first concerns insider lists, which are lists of all persons who have access to inside information and are working for firms that issue financial instruments or those acting on their behalf. They are a crucial tool for regulators and for firms themselves in controlling the flow of inside information. Currently, the market abuse regulation requires issuers or any person acting on their behalf or on their account to maintain an insider list. This has created uncertainty as to whether third parties acting on behalf of an issuer should be holding their own list or sending it to the issuer to hold, leading to a risk that some of the parties are not maintaining insider lists. These lists are vital. In this clause, we are acting to remove this uncertainty by making it clear that both issuers and any person acting on their behalf or on their account are required to maintain an insider list.
The second part of the clause concerns the timetable within which issuers are required to disclose transactions by their senior managers in the issuers’ own financial instruments to the public. Under the market abuse regulation, senior managers—referred to as persons discharging managerial responsibilities, or PDMRs—need to notify the issuer and the FCA of any transaction undertaking in financial instruments related to the issuer. This notification must be made within three working days of the transaction and the issuer must also notify the public within the same three working days of the transaction. This means it is possible that an issuer may only receive the notification from the PDMR on the day that they are required to publish the transaction. We are changing this to require notification to the public within two working days after the issuer receives notification of a transaction. This introduces a more practical and sensible timetable for observing timely and transparent disclosure of PDMR transactions to the market. I therefore recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 29 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 30
Maximum sentences for insider dealing and financial services offences
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
John Glen
Clause 30 concerns the penalty for criminal market abuse. Market abuse undermines integrity, reduces public confidence and impairs the effectiveness of the financial markets. Market abuse is comparable to other types of economic crime, such as fraud, so it should carry an equivalent penalty.
The clause will increase the maximum prison sentence for such crimes from seven to 10 years, demonstrating that the Government take criminal market abuse offences just as seriously as other types of economic crime offences. In 2015, the findings of the fair and effective markets review were published jointly by the Treasury, the FCA and the Bank of England. This report assessed market standards in the financial services industry, looking for ways to improve fairness and effectiveness in fixed income, currencies and commodities markets. The report contained 21 recommendations to improve market standards assigned to a number of public bodies. The Government are committed to delivering the improvements to the body of financial services legislation that were recommended in the report, and the clause follows the recommendation of the report. I therefore recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr McFadden
The clause before us increases the penalty for insider dealing, and I do not think any Opposition members of the Committee will have a problem with that. The obvious point to make is that sentencing is effective only if there is a reasonable chance that someone will get caught, and if there is a proper and effective system of enforcement of the rules, as well as an overall regulatory system that properly polices such activity.
The Financial Times reported last year that the FCA had prosecuted only eight cases of insider dealing, securing just 12 convictions over a five-year period between 2013 and 2018. There is a big contrast between the prosecutions and the investigations, because the same newspaper, reporting on the figures ending in March this year, said that there were a relatively high number of ongoing investigations—more than 600. However, only 15 resulted in financial penalties or fines.
There are few prosecutions and few fines. Why does the Minister think so few of those 600-plus investigations lead to any kind of punishment? Can we conclude that, after all, there is little insider dealing and only a handful of people do it? Alternatively, would the conclusion be that there are flaws in the investigatory process or, perhaps, resource issues that make it difficult to pursue a case to an unquestionable conclusion?
We should acknowledge that the regulator’s task is difficult, because the people doing insider dealing will be clever, and will take every step they can to cover their tracks. For example, they might not trade in their own name. They might trade in a relative’s name. They might set up a company to trade, and register it either here or somewhere else, which would make the paper trail all the more difficult for the regulator to follow. They might try all sorts of things to blow the regulator off the scent.
There is no problem with increasing the sentence from seven to 10 years, but it strikes me the relevant provisions of the Bill might be too narrow in scope for the problem that we are dealing with. It would be a big mistake to think that approving the clause is job done on insider dealing, and we can tick the box, thinking it will make a big difference. The low rate of prosecutions suggests that there is a need for a much deeper look under the bonnet.
Does the Minister accept that general premise, and will he undertake to carry out that deeper look? Will he make sure that the increased sentences are matched by the resources that the regulators need and, probably more importantly, by other changes in their powers or the regulatory system or the legal basis? That will ensure that more cases are brought to some sort of action at the end and that we do not carry on with such a huge contrast between the number of investigations launched and the small number resulting in a fine or prosecution.
Alison Thewliss
I want to come in briefly, on the back of what the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East has said. What analysis have the Government done on whether the increase will be any more of a deterrent than the current seven-year maximum? I note that that is a maximum, and relatively speaking not a huge amount of time, given the severity of some of the crimes that may have been committed. What is the average sentence handed out at the moment? Is it closer to seven years, or is it closer to a couple of years and just a slap on the wrists?
As the right hon. Gentleman mentioned, few cases get to that stage anyway. To help increase the number of people who are prosecuted, what additional resourcing will be put into the policing of financial crime? It is clearly an area that needs significant expertise. If we are going to catch people who are looking to circumvent the system, we need to have people at least as good on the other side of the balance sheet to make sure that they are catching up with them. What recruitment schemes are being put in place to attract the kind of people who will be able to investigate, prosecute and see processes through to the end, to make sure that there is a proper deterrent and people feel that they are going to get caught, fined and locked away? There needs to be sufficient expertise to make sure that that really does happen.
Ms Eagle
My concerns mirror the comments that were made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South East and by the SNP spokesperson, the hon. Member for Glasgow Central. Financial crime and fraud are areas of crime that have been under-played and under-resourced for enforcement in recent years. We know about the effects of Action Fraud and its almost minuscule levels of successful prosecutions over the years. It is one of the areas that I feel most worried about as a constituency MP. When constituents come to me with issues of fraud, they have often been given the run-around for many years and I know that, realistically, justice for them is often very far away.
Financial crime is somehow regarded as less worrisome than other forms of crime. It seems always to be at the back of the queue in terms of enforcement resources. It is almost as if some people think, “If you can get away with it, more power to your elbow.” That introduces attitudes and approaches to the rules, regulations and law that are, at the very least, unfortunate and, probably more accurately, dangerous. It is particularly worrisome given the size of our financial services sector and the number of jobs associated with that sector, and the impact if it were to be destabilised by that kind of attitude getting a grip. It is extremely important that, as a jurisdiction, we clamp down on these crimes.
Is the Minister as worried as I am? Is he satisfied that this form of levy approach is the right one? It makes it look like the state does not worry so much about financial crime—that it does not worry enough to finance the prosecution and policing of it, and that the industry has to somehow pay for its own policing and prosecution. That is an issue.
We would all welcome the increase in sentencing from seven to 10 years that clause 30 contains, but is not the real deterrence to be found in much more rigorous enforcement and financing of enforcement, rather than simply increasing the likely sentences if someone is caught? If people feel that there is not much of a chance that they are going to be caught, an increase in sentencing from seven to 10 years is not really much of a deterrent to bad behaviour. The other thing that worries me is that the risks to those individuals who might be tempted are quite small, when we consider the number of prosecutions, but the rewards, should they get away with it, can be huge. Such a risk-reward assessment does not exactly imply the sort of the deterrence that we all want to protect the integrity of our markets.
John Glen
I thank Opposition Members for the last three speeches. I think that they expressed a broad understanding of and agreement with the measure, but more general concern about the capacity for implementation and the need to ensure that the issue is addressed more broadly. I am happy to try to respond to those points.
The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East started the conversation about enforcement and prosecution. The terms of the clause will help to ensure that market abuse is recognised as serious misconduct in the same way as fraud is currently judged, and that will send a clear message to individuals who break the law: they will be held to account.
The hon. Member for Glasgow Central spoke about the length of sentencing. Since 2009, there have been 36 successful prosecutions for market abuse offences—the average sentence is 1.7 years, and the longest sentence was 4.5 years. To date, no criminal market abuse case has been tried that resulted in a seven-year sentence. That does not preclude the possibility of convictions in future cases that require a longer sentence as a result of aggravating factors, such as a significant breach of trust by senior individuals or sophisticated criminality by organised criminal groups.
In the light of the comments of the hon. Member for Wallasey about the challenges faced, I also want to add that in last week’s spending review an additional £63 million was allocated to the Home Office to boost Action Fraud. I also mentioned the economic crime levy in an earlier response, although that is anti-money laundering specific, and will not cover fraud. But a number of other activities are relevant to the points raised by Opposition colleagues.
A significant amount of work is going into the reform of suspicious activity reporting, where banks highlight transactions that give reasons for concern. That reform will be integral to our response to economic crime, and it is vital in uncovering and combating wider criminal activity. The Home Office is leading on that work.
The hon. Member for Wallasey made a point about the £100 million levy and the outsourcing, essentially, of capacity. It is important that we have joint working between the Home Office, the Treasury and the private sector on this matter. Just last week, I had a conversation with the payments regulator and UK Finance about push payment scams and the need to increase the confidence in the way those matters are treated. They are complex and involve sophisticated fraud against many of our constituents. I completely empathise with the hon. Lady’s frustration regarding the apparent lower prioritisation of this area. Across my 12 broad areas of responsibility, it is this that I find most challenging to move forward on definitively because the nature of the challenge is evolving. However, the work going on there and the payments regulator’s imperative to act, which it will do following the consultation, is significant.
However, with respect to the questions on this particular clause, I hope that the value of that enhanced sentence, which reflects the 2015 report, is understood. We will not bring the broader measures to a conclusion now, but I hope that I have signalled some of the ongoing efforts to try to deal with what is a particularly challenging area.
Ms Eagle
To some extent, this is illustrated by the fact that the enhanced sentence was in a 2015 report but we are only just legislating for it now. Five years later, we are still only talking about a sentence that is highly unlikely ever to be used, based on the past record—the Minister just quoted it himself. I wonder whether he might increase the confidence that some of us have that this is being tackled in a coherent way—we will get on to some of this later—by talking about the fragmented supervisory system and what he is doing to help bring that together so that the fragmented regulation of this whole area can actually be done more coherently, so that we can get enforcement on abuse. We all know that, prior to the big bang in the City, this was all done informally anyway, by gentleman in their clubs. It seems to me that we never really got a grip, after the big bang, in dealing with that informal networking that goes on, where a lot of the gaps and a lot of the potential insider dealing actually lurks. Perhaps he could give me a little bit more confidence about that.
Mr McFadden
I want to double check something that the Minister said a minute ago. I think he said that there have been 36 prosecutions since 2009.
Mr McFadden
That might illustrate the point that we are making, because by my rudimentary maths, that would suggest—
Mr McFadden
Something between three and four a year, which is hardly the sign of a system that is working, unless we think that only three or four people a year are doing insider dealing. However, for those who do not believe that, and who believe that hundreds of investigations go on but only three or four people are prosecuted a year, that illustrates the point that increasing the sentencing alone will not deal with this problem.
John Glen
I would never say that the measure was a panacea for economic crime or the complexity of the evolving and changing nature of the risks that we face in financial services. It is obviously an interconnected world across different jurisdictions. I empathise with the frustration around which of the multiple agencies will get a grip on this. It is necessarily complex because of the sophisticated nature of the way that data flows are reported and the way that different specialist agencies of crime enforcement and regulators need to work together.
I do not think I will give satisfaction to the Committee on this matter. The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East makes a reasonable point about the implied annual number of successful prosecutions. It is impossible for me to comment on what is lost, because it is counter-factual; I cannot prove what is not there. However, I recognise that there is more work to be done and that this is one step, amid others in other Departments—particularly the Home Office—to move this forward.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 30 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 31
Application of money laundering regulations to overseas trustees
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 30—Application of money laundering regulations to overseas trustees: review of effect on tax revenues—
‘(1) The Chancellor of the Exchequer must review the effects on tax revenues of section 31 and lay a report of that review before the House of Commons within six months of the date on which this Act receives Royal Assent.
(2) The review under sub-paragraph (1) must consider—
(a) the expected change in corporation and income tax paid attributable to the provisions in this Schedule; and
(b) an estimate of any change attributable to the provisions of section 31 in the difference between the amount of tax required to be paid to the Commissioners and the amount paid.
(3) The review must under subparagraph (2)(b) consider taxes payable by the owners and employees of Scottish Limited Partnerships.’
This new clause would require the Chancellor of the Exchequer to review the effect on public finances, and on reducing the tax gap, of section 31, and in particular on the taxes payable by owners and employees of Scottish Limited Partnerships.
New clause 35—Money laundering and overseas trustees: review—
‘(1) The Treasury must, within six months of this Act being passed, prepare, publish and lay before Parliament a report on the effects on money laundering of the provisions in section 31 of this Act.
(2) The report must address—
(a) the anticipated change to the volume of money laundering attributable to the provisions of section 31; and
(b) alleged money laundering involving overseas trusts by the owners and employees of Scottish Limited Partnerships.’
This new clause would require the Treasury to review the effects on money laundering of the provisions in section 31 of this Act, and in particular on the use of overseas trusts for the purposes of money laundering by owners and employees of Scottish Limited Partnerships.
John Glen
This amendment to the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 ensures that the Government have the power to change, and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs has the power to enforce, elements of our anti-money laundering regime relating to extraterritorial trusts. Enacting this amendment will cement HMRC’s power to access information on who really owns and benefits from overseas trusts with links to the UK. This is part of our wider reform efforts to improve beneficial ownership transparency.
It is important to stress that this merely ensures the continuation of existing powers. After the end of the transition period, the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act will take over from the European Communities Act 1972 as the statutory framework for implementing sanctions and anti-money laundering policy in the UK. Changes introduced by the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 provide for the expansion of the HMRC trust registration service. Some non-UK express trusts with a connection to the UK, including those buying UK land or property, will need for the first time to register with HMRC’s trust registration service. The number of registered trusts is expected to increase from 120,000 to an estimated 3 to 6 million as a result of those changes made by the money laundering regulations.
The amendment made by the clause will confirm the Government’s ability, after the end of the EU exit transition period, to make regulations applying to trustees of overseas trusts with links to the UK, even where they are non-resident. It also confirms HMRC’s ability to take enforcement action against those trustees. I therefore recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Alison Thewliss
New clauses 30 and 35 are the result of long-standing concerns that I and my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen South have about money laundering in the UK. That was accentuated by what the Minister said about increasing the number of trusts. It goes some way to reflect the evidence we took during prelegislative scrutiny of the draft Registration of Overseas Entities Bill, where a witness suggested that if he were going to hide some money, trusts are pretty much where he would go to do so. The Government should be doing an awful lot more on this, because with this increase in trusts and the Government’s response, it feels as though the Government are pursuing a Whac-a-Mole strategy. However, Whac-a-Mole is not a mole-eradication strategy; it just makes them pop up somewhere else. The Government need to be wiser to that.
Our new clauses would require the Treasury to review the effects on money laundering of the provisions in clause 31, and in particular on the use of overseas trusts for the purposes of money laundering by owners and employees of Scottish limited partnerships. The Minister will be fed up with me talking about Scottish limited partnerships, because I and the colleagues who preceded me have never shut up about them, but they remain a problem. The number of people fined for misuse of SLPs remains pretty much at zero, as far I am aware. The Government need to do a huge amount more.
It beggars belief that the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act left an oligarch loophole, allowing money laundering by overseas trusts to buy UK property with impunity. That Act contains the framework that the UK will use to implement sanctions and anti-money laundering policy after leaving the European Union single market. However, as the Government have observed, it is not clear that under the current drafting anti-money laundering regulations can be made in relation to non-UK trustees of trusts based outside the UK. Even though a trust may be based outside the UK, and the trustee may be a non-UK corporate or individual, the trust may have links to the UK—for example, because it owns UK property. We start to see the very complexity of the web that exists here, and the difficulty in dealing with it and finding who is really in control. New clause 31 would amend schedule 2 to the 2018 Act to ensure that regulations can be made in respect of trustees with links. Without this, any powers HMRC sought to exercise to access information about such trusts are at risk of being held invalid under legal challenge.
The Government, for their part, believe that the change will reaffirm the UK’s global leadership in the use of public registers of beneficial ownership, as identified by the Financial Action Task Force mutual evaluation of the UK in 2018. They will further support public and private sectors sufficiently and effectively target resources towards potential criminal activity using trusts, maintaining the resilience of the UK’s defences against economic crime. That is quite a joke; it really is not good enough. Trusts are the largest gaping loophole that we have. We want the Government to accept our amendments and come clean on how little impact this measure, as with many others previously, has had on money laundering.
In June 2019, HMRC published revised estimates that put the tax gap at £35 billion for 2017-18, representing 5.6% of total tax liabilities. While welcome action has been taken and that gap has had some impact, no Government have yet created a comprehensive anti-avoidance rule, because at the moment people are allowed to move around in different ways and find different loopholes and different mechanisms to avoid paying their tax.
The Chair
Just a note of caution: these amendments have not been formally moved yet, but on Thursday, when we reach that point, the hon. Member can move them.
Mr McFadden
Sometimes, when I look at this Bill and all the different things it attempts to deal with, I have an image in my head of somebody cleaning out a cupboard in the Treasury, finding lots of policy things and looking for a legislative truck on which they can be loaded.
Mr McFadden
Otherwise known as a portmanteau Bill. It is a shame that they could not find more in the cupboard. A couple of small measures are not objectionable in themselves, but we have to ask whether they are up to the challenge. This measure deals with money laundering and trustees based overseas. I do not think that Opposition members of the Committee will object to that, but we must ask, given the scale of money laundering, whether the Government could not have done more.
The membership of this Bill Committee includes a few illustrious members of the Treasury Committee, which has looked into this issue. In fact, it reported on it last year. In compiling that report, it took evidence from witnesses who suggested that the scale of the problem could run to hundreds of billions of pounds. Of course, by definition, as the Minister said a few minutes ago, it is difficult to pin down the size of an unknown, and we cannot be certain, but these were credible witnesses. Even the Government’s then Security Minister, the right hon. Member for Wyre and Preston North (Mr Wallace), told the Committee in his evidence that the figure of £90 billion was probably “a conservative estimate”.
The Treasury Committee’s report highlighted that in a post-Brexit situation, new trading opportunities could also
“provide opportunities to those wishing to undertake economic crime in countries that are more vulnerable to corruption.”
That is why I am asking the Minister how these things will be monitored and how we will insulate ourselves against the temptation to strike trade deals here, there and everywhere and, in so doing, perhaps not always looking as deeply as we would into the regulatory systems and so on. The Committee pointed out in its report:
“There is a clearly identified risk that company formation may be used in money laundering.”
The Treasury Committee heard evidence that there had been no fines or criminal proceedings relating to the issue of beneficial ownership. As the hon. Member for Glasgow Central pointed out, the one Companies House-related prosecution that took place was simply intended to show how weak the system of scrutiny was. In discussing the role of Companies House, the report concluded that it represented “a weakness”. That is quite a damning conclusion for a very eminent Committee of this House to reach, and it painted a picture of an organisation that saw its role as keeping a register—being a librarian rather than a partner in law enforcement.
There is a history to this, of course. We have always prided ourselves on being a country where it is easy to set up a business—it is a fast process and there are not many barriers. That approach has a lot of strengths, but given that only a few individuals control literally thousands of companies on the register, we cannot afford to be so lax. The Government have to some degree recognised that. In September, just before this Bill was published, the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy in September made an announcement, in which it recognised the problem with the current structure of Companies House and proposed some changes.
The three most important proposals were compulsory identity verification, which has not been happening up until now, a greater power to query false information, and powers on data. The Minister for Security, the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (James Brokenshire), said that those changes would make it easier
“to crack down on dirty money and financial exploitation, to protect our security and prosperity.”
That is all good, but the Royal United Services Institute, a respected think-tank, had a look at the Government announcements and tested them against the problem, noting also that 3,000 potentially suspicious UK company structures were cited in what was leaked from the recent Financial Crimes Enforcement Network files.
Let us look at the proposals, starting with mandatory ID verification for the directors of companies or persons of significant control. It would be good if that is done, but there is a big, gaping loophole in it. The proposal will apply only to those incorporating companies directly with Companies House, rather than to the estimated 60% that choose to incorporate via third-party agents. It is a good measure, but it applies only to the minority of companies that register with Companies House.
The second proposal is to give the registrar and CEO of Companies House the power to query information. Up until now, the registrar has had no legal power to do that and has had to accept all information on trust. It is simply astonishing that that has been the case up until now, given that they hold a register of 4 million companies. The scope of the power and how it will be operationalised remain subject to future consultation, so we do not really know how far it will go in allowing the Companies House registrar to probe what they are being told when people come along to register a company.
Thirdly, the proposals about data sharing are welcome, including for bulk data sharing between Companies House and other public sector datasets. The reason that they are important relates to what I asked earlier about the job description of Companies House: is it a register, or is it an organisation that sees itself like any kind of regulator?
The Government proposals are stark. A big hole has been identified in them, but they are also a recognition of the scale of the problem and that we cannot adequately crack down on the big money laundering problem unless we do something about Companies House, too. Global Witness, a charity that the hon. Member for Glasgow Central referred to, estimates that more than 336,000 companies have not disclosed their beneficial owner. It also found that 2,000 company owners had been disqualified directors. The September proposals are a start, but what more can the Minister tell us about how they will be taken forward?
I have mentioned the Treasury Committee, but we also have the Intelligence and Security Committee’s report on Russia, which referred to “the London laundromat”. That report exposed the weaknesses in unexplained wealth orders and, in particular, their applicability to people who may have been here for some time and invested in property. Property is at the heart of clause 31, because it is through investment in property that those who may not have come by their money legitimately can cleanse their property and say that their wealth is explained, after all. In evidence to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s inquiry, the National Crime Agency called for amendments to the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, specifically using serious and organised crime as a justification for sanctions.
Reference has also been made to the draft Registration of Overseas Entities Bill, and I would be grateful if the Minister could update us on where we are with that, because that is another important piece of this jigsaw. As I said, since the Russia report, we have had the FinCEN files, which once again place a number of British financial institutions at the centre of further allegations of money laundering.
The Chair
A couple of boring things: first, I have been told that I am being too generous with interventions—I do not think there are any at the moment. Secondly, that last oration was good on the generalities of money laundering, but I think clause 31 focuses tightly on overseas investors, so if it happens too often, knuckles will be rapped. However, it was interesting and I learned a lot, so thank you, Pat McFadden.
Ms Eagle
I suspect you have just wiped out most of my speech, Dr Huq. We want to hear from the Minister about the adequacy of having just this clause, and not a lot else, to deal with the issue in this portmanteau Bill. In the debate on clause 30, we heard that it had taken the Treasury five years to increase from seven to 10 years the potential sentence for market abuse. The Treasury Committee’s 2019 report—I am now a member of that Committee—was excoriating about the scale of the problem, with between tens of billions and potentially £100 billion lost. As we have discussed in relation to other parts of the Bill, we know that small weaknesses in the defences can be ruthlessly targeted and become much bigger if they are not closed off.
We are reassured about the point that the Minister is trying to make with clause 31, but given that our country has been described as a laundromat for money laundering, perhaps the Government could have used this Bill as a suitable legislative opportunity to make other changes to the money laundering legislation that this clause amends. Perhaps the Minister could explain why that action has not been taken and give us an idea of what will follow. He has already referred to a reform of the suspicious activity reports regime. Why is that not included in this Bill, given that an analysis of it has found that over 80% of the reports are from banks, and very few from other places where there might be suspicious activity, such as property ownership in the UK? As we know, that is how money can be laundered.
We seem to have got ourselves into a situation where the banking structures just produce suspicious activity reports in massive numbers—three quarters of a million of them in a year, I think. Among those, the real ones are perhaps hidden, but the regulators are trying to get through them all and do very little. At the same time, we know that when the FinCEN papers were actually leaked, that involved, between 2000 and 2017, the transfer of close to $2 trillion of transactions, which were included in these suspicious activity reports.
Many transactions laundered money through our systems—many from overseas, in terms of what we are dealing with in clause 4. HSBC allowed fraudsters to move millions of dollars of stolen money around the world even though they knew it was a scam. J.P. Morgan allowed a company to move more than one billion through a London account without knowing who owned it. I could go on.
It seems that clause 31 is a tiny little attempt to stop an abuse, given that the abuse going on is of that scale. There is also the husband of a woman who donated £1.7 million to the UK’s Conservative party, secretly funded by a Russian oligarch with close ties to President Putin. Again, I could go on. I hope that the Minister is going to at least give us some view about what is going on here and whether clause 31 is the be-all and end-all of what the Government intend to put in place to deal with this issue.
On victims of fraud, criminals have successfully stolen £1.2 billion from individuals through banking fraud; in an earlier debate, the Minister was talking about his own frustrations with trying to get a grip of that issue. That figure on scams comes from 2018. It is also estimated that £5.9 billion a year is defrauded from businesses in the public sector.
The issue is not just about oligarchs running their money around the world and laundering it into property and other things. It is not just about mafiosi or corrupt political leaders doing the same, although all that is happening. This involves your constituents, Dr Huq, and my constituents, who are losing money through banking scams. Our public sector is losing money through other scams, which bleeds away the resources available to us to do the other things we need to, especially when these resources are scarce.
This issue can sometimes look very technical—it is about overseas investors and is only little clause 31. But it is not only about corrupt laundromats, Russian reports and corruption on a scale we can only think about. It is also about some of our well-known high street banks indulging in such activity and covering it up somehow, because having the business is so profitable for them—and, again, the risks of being caught and fined are outweighed by the profits that can be made by turning a blind eye. It involves all of the major banking and investment institutions. It involves estate agents, lawyers and accountants who are facilitators—wittingly or unwittingly—to all these activities.
We had better get a grip: the more this kind of money is present, the worse and dirtier it makes our structures and systems and the more cynical it makes our constituents. It makes all of us less likely to follow the rule of law and agree that the right thing should be done. It changes the balance that people calculate between the risks of doing something wrong and the rewards of not being caught. None of that helps the rule of law; none of it helps honesty; and none of it helps those of our constituents who strive their whole lives to do the right thing and yet see others profit massively from scams and reprehensible behaviour—criminal behaviour, in a lot of cases.
Dr Huq, I have ranged a bit wider than the terms of clause 31, but I think that it is the start of a fightback on money laundering regulations. Even though it represents a tiny, tiny little step, the Government have yet to persuade me that they want to get a grip of the situation and intend to do so through the Bill.
John Glen
I thank Members for their contributions, although at times as I listened I thought that I was in the wrong place, given the wider conversation about economic crime. However, I greatly respect the sentiments and points expressed and I will try to address the questions put.
The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East spoke of a mental image of a cupboard being cleared out. I will not deny that in my three years as Economic Secretary I needed to legislate on a number of matters, and the Bill necessarily brings together a number of them. However, there will be more legislation if I can persuade the authorities in this place to grant me that opportunity. I assure him that the Bill does not represent the end point on a number of matters. The clause, however, merely ensures the continuation of, and ability to vary in future, existing powers and requirements with respect to overseas trusts.
New clause 30, proposed by the hon. Member for Glasgow Central, would impose a requirement on the Treasury to report on the impact of the provisions of clause 31 on the expected change in corporation tax and income tax paid, and the expected change in the difference between the amount of tax required and the amount tax paid in relation to overseas trusts and Scottish limited partnerships. I reiterate that the Government are committed to ensuring that the UK’s corporate structures are not exploited by those seeking to avoid or evade tax. For reasons that I will outline, however, the Government cannot support the proposed new clause.
As I have said, the Government have introduced changes through amendments to the money laundering regulations that directly aim to improve the transparency of the ownership of trusts. In particular, those changes significantly expand the requirement for non-UK trusts to register with the HMRC trust registration service. Trusts will have to provide evidence that they are registered before entering into business arrangements with regulated firms under the money laundering regulations. HMRC needs clear powers to take enforcement action against those who do not comply with registration requirements, and the Government need to maintain the ability to amend those requirements in future.
The powers in the Sanctions and Anti-money Laundering Act 2018 will ensure that the UK Government can continue to make and amend their regulations. The proposed new clause would require the Treasury to publish a report on the effects of clause 31 on the amount of taxes paid, but it is not in line with effects of that clause, which does not make changes to taxes. The provision is not expected to bring about any changes in the amount of corporation tax and income tax paid nor any change to the tax gap in relation to Scottish limited partnerships or otherwise. Neither is it envisioned that it would be possible to attribute any variation in taxes paid, nor the tax gap, to clause 31.
New clause 35 imposes a requirement on the Treasury to report on the impact of the provisions in clause 31 on money laundering volumes involving overseas trusts and Scottish limited partnerships. I understand that it seeks to measure the impact of our efforts to prevent money laundering through trusts, but may I remind hon. Members that the current Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 and the 2017 regulations that they amended, namely, the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017, already require the Treasury to carry out a review of its regulatory provisions and publish a report setting out the conclusions of its review by June 2022? That wider review will provide a more meaningful evaluation than simply reporting on the narrow provision of the clause, and provide continuity in the Government’s powers to make changes in the UK’s anti-money laundering regime.
I also remind colleagues that Scottish limited partnerships are not specifically within the scope of the trust register, and point them towards separate legislation that deals with transparency for those vehicles. In June 2017, Scottish limited partnerships were brought into scope with the public register of beneficial ownership maintained by Companies House. Since the Government introduced new reporting requirements for Scottish limited partnerships in 2017, new registrations of Scottish limited partnerships have greatly reduced, with registrations falling from 4,932 in 2016-17 to 2,689 in 2017-18, and falling further to 657 in 2019-20.
I want to take this opportunity to address some of the broader points on the alleged failures, and the work in progress, with respect to anti-money laundering and trusts. I think it reasonable to say that the UK is recognised as having some of the strongest controls internationally for tackling money laundering and terrorist financing. In recent years, we have taken a number of steps, including creating a new National Economic Crime Centre, passing the Criminal Finances Act 2017, and establishing the Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision.
The hon. Member for Wallasey referred to the challenge of suspicious activity reports processing. The economic crime levy, in working with industry, is a direct attempt to invest in that reform. She asked specifically why legislation on that is not included in the Bill. That is continuing work that urgently needs to move forward, but provision for extra investment to process SARs more efficiently is being conducted at pace.
Last year, the Government published the landmark economic crime plan, which brought law enforcement and the private sector together in closer co-operation than ever before to deliver a whole-system response to economic crime. This year, we completed the transposition of the fifth anti-money laundering directive into domestic law. That remains comprehensive and responsive to emerging threats, in line with the evolving standards set out by the Financial Action Task Force—the international body that monitors such matters.
The expansion of the trusts registration service referenced today will bring millions more trusts in scope, including overseas trusts that purchase land or property in the UK. We will ensure that information on the register is made available in certain circumstances to those with a legitimate interest. We do recognise—I acknowledge the sentiments that have been expressed—that more needs to be done, and we are committed to making further progress, building on that made so far, to lead the global fight against illicit financial flows.
New clauses 30 and 35 make small amendments to clarify that the Government can enforce extraterritorial trust registration in relation to non-UK resident trustees and update those requirements in future. On why we are not doing more in the Bill, I have mentioned a number of the activities that the Government are undertaking, but I recognise that more needs to be done.
I should also mention the overseas entities Bill. In line with the ongoing commitment to combatting illicit finance, we intend to implement a register of beneficial owners of overseas entities that buy or own land in the UK as a measure of the economic crime plan 2019 to 2022. The register will be the first of its type in the world. The Government published a draft of that legislation, which accepted many of the subsequent recommendations by the Joint Committee that carried out that pre-legislative scrutiny. As the hon. Member for Glasgow Central knows, the Queen’s Speech last year committed to this Bill and to the continuing progress of that draft legislation. Lord Callanan’s written ministerial statement in July outlined the progress to date of that draft Bill.
On Companies House register reform—another matter mentioned by several colleagues—the Government are currently considering a broad package of reforms to Companies House to boost its potential as an enabler of business transactions and economic growth, but also giving it a bigger role in combatting economic crime. Following last year’s consultation, the Government issued our response to the corporate transparency and register reform on 18 September. The response summarises the views received and sets out how the Government will take forward those plans.
The Government will legislate when the parliamentary calendar allows and intend to deliver more reliable information on the companies register—reinforced by the verification of the identity of people who manage, control or set up companies, as has been referenced—and greater powers for those at Companies House to query and challenge information, so they are not just librarians, as I think they were described.
We will bring effective protection of personal information provided to Companies House and a more effective investigation and enforcement regime for non-disclosure and false-filing; the removal of technological and legal barriers to allow enhanced cross-checks on corporate data with other public and private sector bodies; continued investment in technology and in the skills of Companies House staff to make that register more efficient, effective and resilient; and broader reforms to clamp down on the misuse of entities I hope that my answers have done some justice to the questions asked, and I ask the hon. Member for Glasgow Central to withdraw the new clauses.
The Chair
Actually, new clauses 30 and 35 will not be decided until Thursday because of where they are on the amendment paper, so the hon. Member for Glasgow Central can decide then whether to press or withdraw them. For now, we are on clause 31 stand part.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 31 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(David Rutley.)
Financial Services Bill (Tenth sitting)
Tuesday 1st December 2020
(4 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Financial Services Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 1 December 2020 - (1 Dec 2020)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
Before I call Pat McFadden, it might be helpful if I give a bit of guidance so that we do not go off-piste from the scope of the clause.
To clarify, the scope of the clause takes in the debt respite scheme, similar schemes to assist individuals in debt, and measures to stop people getting into debt in the first place, where these are specifically connected to businesses regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority. Items outside the scope of the clause include: personal insolvency, including reforms to debt relief orders, and any other matter set out in the Insolvency Act 1986; the provision of advice to the public about personal finance decisions; corporate debt, and measures to stop people getting into debt in the first place that do not concern businesses regulated by the FCA. I hope that is helpful.
Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 29, in clause 32, page 38, line 22, leave out subsection (2) and insert—
“(2) Section 7 of that Act (debt respite scheme: regulations) is amended in accordance with subsections (2A), (3) and (4).
(2A) For subsection (2), substitute—
(2) After receiving advice from the single financial guidance body under section 6, the Secretary of State shall make regulations establishing a debt respite scheme within 12 months of this Act coming into force.”
This amendment would require the debt respite scheme to come into force within 12 months of this Act being passed.
I cannot think that anyone on this Committee would try to push the boundaries of what it is legitimate to include in our debates, Mr Davies. That would be a truly shocking thing for anybody on a Public Bill Committee to do, so I hope that we will not see any of that in the next few hours.
I will not push amendment 29, which I am sure is in scope even if it is not perfect, to a vote; rather, I will use it to ask the Minister a question. The purpose of tabling the amendment was to make the point that we want to get a move on with this debt respite scheme, which has support on both sides of the House, because of the current pandemic situation and the difficult economic impact it is having on the household finances of a large number of people. Unfortunately, this will lead to increased problems of debt and to more people looking for the kind of help that is envisaged in the clause. People should have access to thr debt respite scheme, so I would be grateful if the Minister set out a little more about the timetable for introducing the scheme after Royal Assent.
The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (John Glen)
Let me see if can get straight to the right hon. Gentleman’s point. The statutory debt repayment plan is an option that will be available to people who go into the breathing space scheme. That will be up and running on 4 May next year, and the SDRP is an option that we would move the regulations for as soon as possible after this Bill is passed. After Royal Assent, we will consult on those regulations. Given the challenges and complexity involved, we need to work very closely—as we did on the breathing space scheme—with the debt advice sector, creditors and regulators to ensure that we deliver the policy successfully.
The regulations that come from this work will need to be developed and consulted on over a longer timetable, and we will consult on those draft regulations as soon as possible after the Bill receives Royal Assent. In the meantime, we are pushing ahead with the implementation of the breathing space scheme, which will come into force on 4 May next year. Other voluntary and statutory debt schemes will continue to be available to debtors in the meantime. This is an option to add to the list of options available to those who go into the breathing space scheme.
Amendment 29 would require the Government to make regulations establishing a debt respite scheme within one year of the Financial Guidance and Claims Act 2018 coming into force. As that Act has been in force since 1 October 2018, that would make it a retrospective requirement and I do not think that is quite what is intended. The regulations establishing the first half of the Government’s debt respite scheme—the breathing space scheme—were made in November 2020, and the right hon. Gentleman participated in the debate on that statutory instrument. That part of the scheme will commence in May 21, as set out in those regulations.
Leaving aside the drafting issues, I understand that hon. Members are keen that the Government do not delay introducing the second part of the scheme, the statutory debt repayment plan. I assure the Committee that it is our intention to support those who are experiencing problem debt swiftly and effectively. The Government will consult on those regulations as soon as possible after the Bill receives Royal Assent. We set out our outline policy in the June 2019 consultation response, but there is significant ongoing work to be done. In the meantime, the breathing space scheme will be up and running from next May and all existing statutory and voluntary debt solutions remain available to those in problem debt. I respectfully ask that the amendment be withdrawn.
Mr McFadden
As I said, I do not intend to press the amendment today. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Stella Creasy (Walthamstow) (Lab/Co-op)
I beg to move amendment 34, in clause 32, page 38, line 23, at end insert—
“(2A) After subsection (3) insert—
(3A) Where, by virtue of subsection 2, the Secretary of State makes regulations establishing a debt respite scheme, the time period that the debtor protections provided for by virtue of section 6(2)(a) and section 6(2)(b) shall be no less than 120 days.”
This amendment would require the breathing space to provide debtors with a minimum of 120 days protection from the accrual of further interest and charges and enforcement action.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 11—Extension of the Breathing Space and Mental Health Crisis Moratorium—
“(1) The Debt Respite Scheme (Breathing Space Moratorium and Mental Health Crisis Moratorium) (England and Wales) Regulations 2020 shall be amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph 1(2), for ‘4th May 2021’ substitute ‘31st January 2021’.
(3) In paragraph 26(2), for ‘60 days’ substitute ‘12 months’.”
This new clause would bring forward the start date of the Debt Respite Scheme and extend the duration of the Breathing Space Moratorium from 60 days to 12 months.
Stella Creasy
It is, as ever, a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Davies, and a pleasure to have this debate. I see the Minister is already smiling. I know he has been looking forward to this debate, because he and I have talked for some time now about how best to help our constituents with debt.
As a nation, we find it easier to talk about anything other than money; even our intimate relations tend to get more coverage in our national press now than the state of our bank balances. Each of us, as representatives in this place, will know from our surgeries how critical this issue is for our country and how important it is to get right the measures to help people with their financial position, because the honest truth is that this is a country not waving but drowning. We all see it in our constituencies.
Mindful of what you said about scope, Mr Davies, in speaking to the amendments I will first set out why I agree with the Government absolutely that we need a breathing space scheme. The amendments come from a desire to work with the Minister to get that scheme right. I know he shares my concern to get these policies right, because we see in our communities the damage—the financial damage, the social damage and the mental health damage—caused by problem debt.
I do not think we can start to have the conversation about whether the Bill needs amending until we define what we mean by problem debt, which is a term that we use interchangeably in debates and discussions. We know that when people do not talk about their debts, they can get into all sorts of debt without thinking that it is a problem until it is too late. All of us, whether we have been an MP for a year, 10 years or 20 years, will have encountered the person who comes to a surgery and says, “I’m going to be evicted next week. Can you help me save my house?” We know it is too late, because they have got into a level of debt they cannot get out of, but they did not see it as a problem.
One of the things that we must do in this place is to make it as popular to talk about our debts and the problems that debt can create, how people can be good with money and how we can help people be good with money—and, when it comes to the Financial Conduct Authority, how we make sure it is a fair fight—as it is to talk about people’s intimate relations. Indeed, the sidebar of shame in the Daily Mail should be more about companies seeking to exploit our constituents by offering them poor levels of debt that we want the FCA to regulate than the size of Kim Kardashian’s derrière. I put that out there as something we should be more concerned about.
Problem debt has been an issue for generations, and over the past decade it has got a lot worse. It is important that the Government are proposing a breathing space, because we can layer on top of that debt the Monty Python foot that is covid and the disruption to people’s lives and livelihoods. I know that some Members would rather be in that debate today than in this one, but I hope I can convince them that this debate in Committee and getting these measures right is the most important place we can be.
As a country we do not talk about problem debt. We do not even see it as a problem, but the problems that will face our constituents and communities in the coming months will be horrific. Let us consider how almost half the UK adult population went into 2020 with debt already hanging over their head, with almost 5 million of our fellow citizens owing more than £10,000 in credit and loans alone. That is unsecured personal debt. This is not about mortgages and housing debt; it is about people having too much month at the end of their money, and people finding ways to deal with that that do not seem to them to be a problem because, if they can keep cycling things through the cards and keep borrowing and making repayments, they can probably keep going.
The nation went into coronavirus already in hock in ways that make people financially vulnerable, but without an awareness of what that might mean for their communities. When asked about their debts at the start of 2020, 40% of those polled said the debt was due to normal living expenses. One thing that we need to knock on the head is the fact in this country debt is not about people buying flash cars and tellies, much though that sidebar of shame might like to make us think it is. It is about people trying to put food on the table and keep the car going so they can get to work, and yes, there are people putting their mortgage on their credit cards.
When I talk about problem debt, I do not just mean the Wongas of this world. I mean the credit card companies that have a sort of respectability because they have helped to keep people going. I am not against borrowing or any form of credit at all, but when we know how the country and our constituents were leveraged at the start of this year, and we see what has happened this year, getting right our proposals to help them, because debt will be a problem, becomes all the more important.
Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)
Does the hon. Lady agree with me that there is a big problem around catalogues and debt for basics such as school clothes, trainers and jackets? People are building up debt for the essentials of life and are told they can pay it back in tiny amounts, but it is over a very long period, which means the debt is never really cleared.
Stella Creasy
I completely agree. Many a time have I had conversations with constituents about how they buy things, and they do not see it as a problem. They have no other option, so they use the catalogues and do not look at the interest rates. What they need is not more financial education, but more options. The brutal reality is that it is very expensive to be poor in this country. That is why it matters that the things we do to help them if they get into difficulty work.
Ms Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)
Does my hon. Friend agree that when it comes to debt and interest payments incurred—the price of having that debt—the concept of an unfair contract is far too lax on those who lend the money and far too harsh on those whose circumstances often, as the hon. Lady just mentioned, mean that they have to borrow?
Stella Creasy
My hon. Friend knows that I completely agree with her. She also knows that she is tempting me to discuss other amendments that I have tabled about that fair fight, and I do not want to disrespect you, Mr Davies, or the Clerk in trying to keep us to the issue at hand. My point is that when we talk about a respite scheme to help people with problem debt, we have to be clear about what we mean by problem debt and whether people recognise that they have a problem. The point of a breathing space is to be able to address that problem.
The hon. Member for Edinburgh West (Christine Jardine) and I tabled the amendments because we recognise that people do not necessarily see things as a problem until it is too late, so when we construct measures to help people in these difficult places, we have to be able to work with them and where they are at, and how people deal with debt. We might look at something and say, “That is an unsustainable financial situation that you have got yourself into,” but our constituents not see it that way.
I said at the start that it was worth thinking about where this country stood at the start of the year. There are conflicting figures, which I am sure the Minister has been looking at. I know he shares my concern about consumer debt and consumer credit. Bank of England data shows that during the coronavirus crisis people have actually been trying to pay down their debts—frankly, they have been stuck at home, so they have money and they think, “Well, I’ll try to pay down my debts.” Since March this year, £15.6 billion of household debt has been repaid, and credit card debt has fallen by 13% in the last year.
Mr McFadden
My hon. Friend has done a huge amount of work on this over the years. Amendment 34 seeks to extend the breathing space period to 120 days. Does she think that covid factors add to the case for having a longer period than was initially envisaged?
Stella Creasy
My right hon. Friend is right, and that was one of the points I was going to make. If we are dealing with a new group of people who have never been in financial difficulty before, one of the sources of help and support for them may well be our welfare system. Anybody who has ever dealt with people trying to make new claims in our welfare system knows that 60 days is an incredibly tight timeline for that to happen—to deal with any appeals and paperwork, and to even get a response to the claim that has been made. Yet experience tells us then when people do get into problem debt, sometimes they do not know what support they are entitled to.
The amendments speak both to the reality of people and to the practicality of making a breathing space work. I hope the Minister will see them in that way and recognise that that is why so many debt advice providers support the amendments and say, “Yes, actually, what’s proposed does feel too tight to get things right.” Some people’s situations can be resolved in 60 days; others’ will take longer. It is not right to close off the opportunity of a breathing space by setting a deadline or threshold that means that for some people who are waiting for information it will be too late. The amendments speak to how we can make the process work for everyone, giving debt advice providers the discretion to be able to work with people and to use the breathing space for its intended purpose, which is to give those who recognise they have a problem the chance to get it sorted before we go into some of the more serious options.
The brutal reality is that we know that, with jobs thin on the ground, debt already mounting up and the cost of living not reducing any time soon, not everybody who gets a breathing space is going to be able to breathe again. I know the Minister would be frustrated if, rather than the financial position of the people involved, it was that timing, that threshold, that meant the breathing space did not work in the way in which it is intended.
The Minister will have seen that I have tabled other amendments on we make this breathing space work. I know he cares about getting this right. In these Committees, there is always pressure on Ministers to say no to amendments, but I hope he will acknowledge that this is about making the policy work, recognising the evidence on the ground about what works with people who are in problem debt and how long it takes them to see that they have a problem. If he does not accept the timescales, if he does not accept the intentions of myself and the hon. Member for Edinburgh West in acknowledging the distress people feel when they have to front up and talk to a stranger about the financial position they are in and their fears in an environment where unemployment is widespread. Goodness knows, getting people to take debt advice at the start of this year, when there seemed to be jobs in our economy, was difficult—anybody who tried to refer a constituent to Citizens Advice knows that. Getting people to a point where they have the chance to breathe again means making this process work.
If the Minister does not think the extension is right, I am keen to hear what he thinks we should do to make sure that that threshold is not a cliff edge over which people fall and cannot come back from. We are all going to be seeing a lot of people in financial difficulty in the coming months in our surgeries—people who have nowhere else to turn, people who are very frightened, and people whose families, homes and mental welfare depend on us getting this right.
Ms Eagle
I wish to spend a short amount of time congratulating my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow on the focus and experience she brings to this very important topic. As she said, debt is one of those taboo subjects. People feel ashamed if they have got into debt and tend not to discuss it—sometimes within their own relationships, let alone with other people—because it is a source of shame.
To some extent, it is a bit like the people who fall for scams or fraud. It is a uniquely difficult thing because if someone has got themselves into that situation, it makes them feel ashamed of their behaviour or that they have fallen for something. They feel isolated and unable to discuss it and go to get assistance. To some extent, even getting to what my hon. Friend is suggesting in her amendment means someone has gone a considerable distance: first, admitting there is a problem, and secondly, seeking help and trying to see what can be done to alleviate the problem.
I also feel that when people get into debt in this manner, they are uniquely judged by those looking on. The taboo is reinforced by the judgmental nature of onlookers who think, “I would never get into debt like that,” or, “How on earth have they done that?” There are caricatures of how people who get into debt behave that are almost designed to blame them for their debts, suggesting that somehow they are incoherent with money, that they cannot manage, that they have inadequacies, or that they have gone on spending sprees all over the place and not thought about the future. I suppose in a minority of cases that might be true, but in the majority of cases, in my experience—certainly in my advice surgery—it is not. People get on a slippery slope.
We live in a consumer-oriented society where those who wish to sell us things, and the financial services companies that wish to provide us with the wherewithal to buy them immediately, are very sophisticated. We are in a culture very different from the one I grew up in. I will now reveal how old I am: when I was growing up, one had to put money away and pay for goods gradually before one could get them. Now there are all sorts of electronic currencies that can be used.
On Black Friday, I was shopping for deals from my room, but—uniquely—had no positive results because everything was out of stock. That demonstrates how easy it is to spend money to acquire things, and to get into debt. It is now instantaneous. With the shift to online, one does not even have to physically be in shops to buy things; one is two clicks away from having this kind of problem.
If ever there were something that made it easier for people to get into trouble, it is the speed and effectiveness with which they can click on things and spend money. We talk about that with regard to gambling, but buying goods can also be addictive. People are propagandised the whole time about how success comes with having goods, and that one has to have the right trainers and the right brands.
Alison Thewliss
The hon. Member makes an excellent point. In my constituency some years ago, a survey was carried out on how people felt in local communities about the pressure on them to have things. Does she agree that in many communities there is a huge amount of pressure put on people to fit in and to have those goods? Lots of shame is carried by families who feel they cannot afford things, which then puts pressure on them to go beyond their spending limits.
Ms Eagle
Absolutely. It is about success and belonging, and that is the kind of culture that the very sophisticated advertisers that push this kind of thing go for. They also advertise to children, so there is the pester element of it. Kids used to want the latest Cabbage Patch Kid; I do not know what it will be this year, but whatever it is will be extremely expensive and beyond the means of quite a lot of people.
The Chair
Can I gently interrupt the hon. Lady? I am happy to give a bit of latitude for people to set out the issue, but I do not want this to become a Second Reading debate on debt. If we could stick a bit more rigidly to the amendment, I would appreciate it.
Ms Eagle
Of course I will, Mr Davies. The amendment is about having breathing space when one has got into this situation. I accept your guidance, obviously; I was merely trying to set out how people can get into a situation of requiring breathing space, how judgmental people can be about debt, and how different the culture is now about getting into debt. It is so much easier to do it—just two clicks away.
To introduce breathing space and some of the issues that we will get on to in terms of trying to get people out of debt, we need to shed the taboos so that people can ask for help. We need to think about how we can put more warnings in between the two clicks it takes to spend. We also need, as a society, to stop being quite so judgmental about the situations that people find themselves in. If we can do that and foster more upfront and open discussions about how such situations happen, and if people can stop feeling so ashamed about it and so alone, we may find that there are better, more effective ways of tackling debt and preventing the necessity for the breathing space issue.
John Glen
Forgive me, Mr Davies; I did not acknowledge what a pleasure it is to serve under your chairmanship in my previous remarks, so I do so now. I will address amendment 34 and new clause 11, but first I feel that I should respond to the general context that colleagues have raised. The hon. Member for Walthamstow is right that I share many of her perspectives, if not always her solutions.
High-cost credit will always be with us; the question is about the terms on which it is made available and what we can do to make available better alternative provision of credit. As the hon. Lady acknowledged, we have had conversations and debates about the issue many times. It will be useful for the Committee to know that Chris Woolard, the former interim chief executive of the FCA, is currently conducting a review into high-cost credit, particularly looking at the explosion of new models of payment—“buy now, pay later” in particular.
I have also been very focused on making more of the alternatives, by supporting the credit unions to allow them to lend more easily and by looking with the Association of British Credit Unions, one of their trade bodies, at what legislation we can bring forward. That is something we have committed to. I have also committed to working on pilots for the no-interest loan scheme, because that could be really useful; if we can establish where that can be used, it would provide a meaningful alternative.
Some of my most compelling experiences as an MP have come from working on the all-party parliamentary group on hunger and food poverty with the hon. Member for South Shields (Mrs Lewell-Buck) and the former Member for Birkenhead. On a visit to South Shields in 2014, I remember seeing first hand some of the really challenging situations that people get into with debt. That has been echoed in my own constituency in Salisbury, where the Trussell Trust was founded. That is why it is really important we have invigorated the support that the debt advice sector can have. We have allocated an extra £37.8 million in May, so that it has £100 million this year.
The main objective of the breathing space mechanism is to get people to a place where they can evaluate their situation and find the right option. The effect of amendment 34 is to require the Government to provide protections that last at least 120 days when making future regulations concerning breathing space or the statutory debt repayment plan. The amendment does not amend the existing breathing space regulations, which, I believe, was probably the intention. The aim of breathing space is to provide temporary debt relief, and extending the duration by that amount of time does not align with the policy intent.
In the 2017 manifesto, we committed, as an aspiring Government, to a six-week moratorium breathing space period. That is what we consulted on and it was, I think, through my direction as the Minister two and a half years ago that we committed to extend that to 60 days. That was the expectation and consensus among those who contributed to that. The Government consider those 60 days to be an appropriate period for a breathing space moratorium. I have not received any direct representations from charities, although StepChange believes that 60 days is the right period, although that could be changed in exceptional circumstances. I recognise that that charity may consider that as being met, but I am told by my officials that I have not received direct representation about that.
Stella Creasy
Apologies; I just want to clarify. Some 80 debt advisers have written to the Committee to support the measure on precisely the grounds that I have set out. Is the Minister saying he has not seen those representations or that he does not see them as a voice of the sector? There is a difference and I do not know whether that is an absence we need to address.
John Glen
The difference is that, as a Minister, I have not been written to by them. I recognise that there is a range of views out there, but I also recognise that a significant piece of work was done to consult on and to establish these measures and to secure cross-party support for them.
We believe that the time period will allow individuals to identify and access a debt solution, while the fixed period will provide certainty to creditors. It is important to reflect on that: this is in the interests of both the debtors—the individuals who have significant debt—and also creditors, often small businesses, who are owed money. There is a judgment to be made about how that balance is achieved.
Given the current circumstances, I understand why Members believe that a stronger moratorium would benefit those in problem debt who are struggling with their finances during this difficult time. The Government have put in place an unprecedented package of support to help people with their finances during the covid-19 pandemic. We have worked with mortgage lenders, credit providers and the FCA from the outset to help people manage their finances. A lot of work has been done and is still being done by financial services firms to make those measures work.
During the consultation period, the Government explained their position on the duration of the scheme and were supported, as I said, by many stakeholders. The regulations were approved by Parliament in October and by the Welsh Senedd in November and have subsequently been made.
The amendment would also apply to any regulations made in the future on the statutory debt repayment plan—the second part of the debt respite scheme, which the clause is focused on. It would set a new minimum duration for an SDRP of 120 days. Of course, in practice, most SDRPs are likely to last for a period of years rather than months, allowing individuals to repay their debts to a manageable timetable. Introducing a minimum duration is not likely to be a necessary protection in this scheme.
New clause 11 would do two things. First, it would require the breathing space scheme to commence on 31 January 2021 instead of 4 May 2021, which was set out in regulations that we approved in October, as I said earlier. Secondly, the new clause would also extend the duration of a breathing space moratorium from 60 days to 12 months.
Increasing the duration of the scheme to 12 months would create much greater interference in creditor rights without increasing any of the corresponding safeguards. For example, the midway review process, which regulations stipulate must take place between days 25 and 35 of a breathing space moratorium, would need to be reconsidered and redesigned.
As the breathing space regulations have already been made and the proposed amendments would not achieve the policy intent, I ask, with some regret, the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.
Stella Creasy
I thank the Minister for his response. I am sorry to hear that he did not see the document, which I know was sent to his office yesterday by the debt advice workers, because I think we all recognise that we are dealing with unusual circumstances. Covid is that Monty Python foot coming down on any of the plans that might have made the policy intent 60 days prior to our current situation.
Unless the Minister thinks that the Office for Budget Responsibility is wrong about the levels of redundancies, unemployment and financial contraction—we have not even mentioned the B-word, Brexit, on top of that—that will face the economy that we want to provide the jobs that allow people to earn the money to pay off their debts, he is having a bit of a tin ear to what people are saying. In this circumstance, we need to extend the breathing space for it to be a breathing space.
This is not just about high-cost credit; this is about the people who are stuck on credit cards as well—the people who will end up spending 25 years to pay back the credit card average debt at minimum repayments. He talks about small businesses. This is about people who have mortgages, for example—
Stella Creasy
Well, but there are also major banks. If we push too quickly, problem debt will sink any possible financial recovery. We have never learned that lesson as a country. I really wish we would. With the greatest respect to the Minister and his talk about policy intent, he is in the wrong place on these measures at this point in time. I will press this to a vote because I think it is important that we set on the record the concern that we should listen to the debt advisers who say that we will need longer in the pandemic to sort the issues out.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Stella Creasy
I beg to move amendment 35, in page 38, line 23, at end insert—
‘( ) After subsection (3) insert—
( ) Where, by virtue of subsection 2, the Secretary of State makes regulations establishing a debt respite scheme, these regulations shall not extend to placing debt advice providers under any obligation to initiate a review of debtor eligibility for the protections provided by the scheme.””
This amendment would remove the requirement in the current draft regulations for debt advice providers to conduct a ‘mid-way review’ of eligibility for breathing space.
This amendment follows in a similar vein to amendment 34 in trying to make the Government’s policy work. It is about how we translate policy intent into the practical reality of dealing with people who are in problem debt. I said in the previous debate that problem debt might be when people realise that they have a problem with their debts and finally seek help. A breathing space in those circumstances would be useful.
Amendment 35 is about the midway review. I encourage the Minister to check his inbox because he will see the note from the 80 different debt advisers, who are the people we will be charging to deal with the debt respite scheme and make it work. They say that there are two very practical reasons why they would like the clause to be amended. Any good debt adviser will be in continual contact with their client and will try to make the breathing space a genuine one that leads somewhere rather than simply limbo. To those debt advisers, the requirement always to have a midway review does not work for two very simple, practical reasons. First and foremost, it moves them from being somebody who might be able, finally, to offer a helping hand and wise counsel to being someone who is policing their relationship with that debtor. We have all had someone come into our constituency surgery who is in financial difficulty and had them cry because they are embarrassed and ashamed. At that point, censure is not helpful; for someone in debt, practicality and kindness are the things that get them through. To ask debt advisers to police the breathing space could have a negative impact on the relationship with the debtor. We are simply suggesting that rather than making the midway review a requirement, we should give the debt advisers the discretion to decide.
The second reason that debt advisers support the amendment is entirely practical and refers again to the policy intent that the Minister set out. The brutal reality is that there will be a big increase in the numbers of people needing debt advice. The Minister has given more funding to the debt advice sector, but that is being done in an environment where millions of people are out of work, and millions already have debts and limited credit options. I wish that the expansion of the credit union movement could happen; as a Co-operative Member as well as a Labour Member, we have been talking about that since I was elected in 2010, but that has yet to materialise. The reality is that people will be looking for credit and it is likely to be had at an expensive price; we can all debate what expensive is, and I know that later amendments refer to that. The reality is that there will be a lot of people who will need debt advice and to include the mandatory requirement of a midway review will limit how debt advisers can manage their caseload.
To put it into context, and I wager that I am not the only Member in this situation, in the last seven months, 42% of my constituents have come to be dependent on some form of Government support. People are in a completely new scenario; they have suddenly found themselves without the income on which they have always relied.
Mr McFadden
Is my hon. Friend’s fear about the midway review that it is too onerous a burden on the debt advisers, or that it may exclude from the breathing space people who still need it, but who are pushed out halfway through?
Stella Creasy
My right hon. Friend raises a real concern. If we have a large influx of people needing to speak to a debt adviser, and there are no appointments, will they get access to help? One reason why they will not be able to get an appointment is because debt advisers will have to do a midway review with people. We should simply trust debt advisers. Anybody who has worked with them, as the Minister has, will know that they are part Martin Lewis, part Alison Hammond from “This Morning”—a kind person who makes jokes so that a person feels better about themselves. They are trying to help people in distress. Through the legislation, we are asking them to do a job; we should let them do it as they see fit.
I hope that the Minister will listen to the sector when it says, “Let us hold those reviews when we need to, rather than telling us that we have to hold them, because if we are overwhelmed by people, we can’t do the job that you are asking us to do.” I do not disagree on the policy intent, but the context is different, and if we do not react to the context, all this good work, and all the legislation, will be for nothing, because there will not be appointments. There will be a negative relationship between debt advisers and the people whom they are trying to help, which will affect whether people listen to what advisers are saying; debts will continue to rise; creditors will go unpaid; and for people, the breathing space will feel like holding their breath, rather than coming up for air.
Alison Thewliss
We should recognise the professionalism, expertise and qualifications of those giving debt advice to our constituents, and not try to put a provision in the Bill that prejudges what they do. Speaking from experience, they have worked incredibly well, over time, with my constituents, so I question whether the midway review is necessary.
Let me give a case from my constituency. A woman came to my office very upset, very much in the way that the hon. Member for Walthamstow described, because she was being evicted the next day. We had to swing into action and try to find ways around that, and spoke to the Glasgow Housing Association. It did take time to make that happen, but the GHA sat down with her, went through all her bills and outgoings and worked with her intensively over a period, to make sure it would get the rent money and that the other debts she had, that were also causing her problems, were taken care of.
I was struck by the professionalism of the GHA advisers and by the fact that they were experienced and were tough but compassionate with the woman. They made sure she could see a way through. If people see an arbitrary cut-off point halfway through, that will give them fear, not reassurance. There is a risk that the respite will be removed from people who are supposed to be helped by the midway review, if it is put at an arbitrary halfway point. The Minister should consider whether that is really the outcome that he wants to achieve. Yes, there should be some kind of review mechanism, but my experience is that it is done all the way through the process. There is no need for the midway review, because reviewing is already happening.
John Glen
Amendment 35, put forward by the hon. Member for Walthamstow, would restrict the Government’s ability to require debt advisers to complete any review of debtor eligibility in any future regulations made concerning breathing space or the SDRP. As the Committee will be aware, breathing space regulations were approved by the House in October, and they state that a debt adviser must complete a midway review after day 25 and before day 35 of the moratorium.
The amendment would not amend the existing breathing space regulations, which I believe was the intention. In addition, it would apply to any regulations made in the future on the SDRP and the second part of the debt respite scheme, which the clause is focused on. That would restrict the Government’s ability to require debt advisers to complete any review of debtor eligibility related to a plan. It is expected that SDRPs will be reviewed annually, or when requested by a debtor, to ensure that payments are set at the right level and the plan remains appropriate. If those reviews could not consider a debtor’s eligibility in any way, that could be a significant constraint on the design and effectiveness of the scheme in future, and would remove the safeguards put in place for creditors.
Stella Creasy
What the Minister has just said suggests he thinks there is a binary choice between debt advisers reviewing and being involved in seeing how the breathing space is working, and their being completely absent. Does he recognise that, in the words of a previous Prime Minister, there could be a third way? Debt advisers could be given the professional courtesy of having the responsibility of doing their job. As part of that there might, absolutely, be some people they would spend more time with, whereas they might know that others had got on the right course. It is not that debt advisers would be absent if not put under a requirement; sometimes red tape can be a burden, not a benefit.
John Glen
Absolutely; that is why we listened carefully to the sector in constructing the measure. For example, when we were designing the breathing space scheme, we worked with the Money and Mental Health charity to design a different pathway for different groups with chronic crisis in mental health, allowing them to re-enter the scheme on multiple occasions in a year, and giving an extra provision. It is not something where I am being prescriptive when, alongside the SDRP regulations, it is being consulted on. However, we are in danger of making arbitrary changes in a similar vein.
If I leave aside the question of drafting, which I think I have addressed, the Government consider that a midway review is necessary to the breathing space scheme, to assess whether the debtor continues to comply with the conditions of the moratorium. I see that not as a policing exercise but an appropriate step in reviewing the suitability of the mechanism. The breathing space mechanism will not work for everyone, and it is important for a review to take place.
During the consultation period the Government explained their position on the midway review and it was supported by many stakeholders. The regulations were approved by Parliament in October and by the Welsh Senedd in November, and were subsequently made. I respectfully ask the hon. Lady to withdraw the amendment.
Stella Creasy
Again, I am afraid that the Minister has a slightly tin ear to the reality of what people will be asked to do and what they are trying to do. We cannot have it both ways. It cannot be claimed that our amendments about how services should be run are too prescriptive but it is not prescriptive for the Government to specify that after 30 days there must be another meeting, something which puts at risk the ability of debt advice providers to manage their own diaries. That does feel like the dead cold hand of the state going overboard, and I am sure that many Conservative Members present who perhaps have pledged their lives to fighting such intervention would recognise that that requirement is rather prescriptive.
Above all, I am listening to the sector, and those debt advisers say that in the current environment, when they will be overwhelmed by so many people needing their help, they should be allowed to do it in the way that they know best. I do know that the Minister wants to get this right, but I think he is not listening, and I think it is important that Parliament does, so I will press the amendment to a vote. We can then say to the sector that we have tried to articulate its concerns about this particular prescriptive clause.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Stella Creasy
I beg to move amendment 33, in page 38, line 38, after “applies.” insert—
‘(4B) The regulations must include provision for an assessment, before the introduction of any debt repayment plan, of the debtor’s resources by a debt advice provider which must—
(a) disregard the value of the debtor’s main residence, provided that this does not exceed the median house price reported by the Land Registry for the local authority in which the debtor resides;
(b) make a recommendation about the timetable under which the individual can repay the debt whilst maintaining a living standard at least equivalent to that of households in the second quintile of income distribution.”
(4C) The regulations must require any debt repayment plan to take account of the assessment under subsection (4B) in determining the timetable over which the debt can be repaid.
(4D) The regulations must make provision for a revised assessment in the event that it is not possible for the debtor to repay their debts within three years and maintain the required living standard during this period, in which the debt advice provider must consider, and offer advice on, insolvency options available to the debtor.”
This amendment requires any regulations for the Statutory Debt Repayment Plan to make provision for an assessment of a debtor’s resources and, should the debtor be unable to pay their debts within three years, for a revised assessment to advise on insolvency options.
I am hoping for third time lucky in convincing the Minister that there are things that we need to address.
Amendment 33 is about maths. It is about how debts are calculated and how we understand whether someone is able to take advantage of the debt advice scheme—I am sure we always looked forward to double maths on a Tuesday afternoon at school. It is about how we make the scheme work while recognising that some of the guidelines and regulations on how to deal with those in problem debt have not kept pace with the times. I am not talking just about covid but about some of the calculations that have made been over a period of time.
I am incredibly mindful of what you said, Mr Davies, about insolvency and not straying into a discussion of the Insolvency Act 2020. When we are thinking about debt advisers and what work they can do with people, however, it is relevant to consider the options, as the Minister said. That is what we have the debt adviser for—they may push people towards different statutory formats. The reality is that the cost of those options and the cost of living will, I believe, artificially restrict debt advisers’ ability to give the best advice. The amendment is about giving clarity to how those calculations should be done, so that we do not see people pushed into further difficulties, or indeed fail to seek help because of those artificial thresholds.
What am I talking about? At the moment, it costs £680 to file for bankruptcy. If someone is broke, filing for bankruptcy is often beyond their reach. That means that they are stuck in limbo. The breathing space protections are designed to operate before someone reaches that point, so that they have space to sort out what they are able to do. If the calculations mean that none of the available options are open to someone, because they have no money, which is why they need a breathing space and why they turned up at a debt adviser, that is no choice at all. It is the Henry Ford choice—every option is the black car.
I started by talking about the average debt of £10,000—in those Tuesday afternoon maths lessons we will have studied the mean, the mode and the median. Households with the worst debt, who owe more than £20,000, will be excluded from some of the available options. The debt adviser will be unable to have that conversation with those people because those debts mean that they are too far gone. In fact, a debt relief order is open only to the very poorest because people have to be at the point where their monthly surplus income is less than £50 after accounting for their expenses. That £50 threshold was set in 2009. We all studied inflation in our Tuesday afternoon maths lesson, so we recognise that a £50 threshold in 2009 does not make any sense in 2020.
The amendment would help to set out the level of living expenses we should expect people to have before we start talking about their debts, so that we are not asking people to be in penury. That does matter, because we could be talking about people being in that financial position for a very long period of time.
John Glen
Amendment 33, tabled by the hon. Member for Walthamstow, would dictate specific eligibility criteria for a statutory debt repayment plan, which would involve requiring debt advice providers to carry out a complex assessment of a debtor’s resources against external data and benchmarks and, where a debtor is unable to repay their debts within three years, to conduct a revised assessment of the debtor’s circumstances and advise on insolvency solutions.
I reassure the Committee that the Government are keen for any eligibility criteria to strike the right balance between allowing suitable debtors to enter the protections of an SDRP and ensuring that creditors are repaid over a reasonable timeframe. The Government set out the proposed eligibility criteria in their consultation response of June 2019, and they expect the principles to remain the same.
Imposing an additional obligation on debt advice providers to conduct an assessment of a debtor’s living standards, fixed by reference to income distribution and local house prices, could lead to inflexibility and inconsistency in the way the SDRP is provided. In any case, the appropriate mechanism for setting out that level of detail is the regulations, on which, I absolutely reassure the Committee, the Government will consult.
I turn to the suggestion that debt advice providers be required to conduct an assessment of a debtor’s circumstances, and to consider insolvency solutions if the debtor is unable to repay the debt within three years. Again, let me reassure the Committee that it is absolutely the Government’s intention for debtors’ plans to be reviewed regularly. In fact, our consultation response proposes that debt advice providers complete an annual review to ensure that a debtor’s plan continues to be the most suitable solution for them. This review can propose changes to the planned payments if the debtor has experienced a rise or fall in surplus income.
In line with the consultation response, we expect to include in the SDRP regulations provision for a debtor to request a review, and provision for payment breaks in the case of an income shock. The ability for an individual’s plan to last longer than three years, and up to a maximum of 10 years in exceptional circumstances, is intended to support sustainable repayment plans over time. If, once the SDRP scheme is up and running, a debt adviser considered an insolvency solution more appropriate for an individual than their entering into an SDRP over a longer period, that option would remain available.
Stella Creasy
I thank the Minister for what he is saying, and I appreciate that he is setting out that he thinks the amendment is not needed because there will be earlier interventions. Does he understand that the £680 cost of going bankrupt can be a barrier to taking up the options that he is talking about? It could lead to people above these very low thresholds staying in the same position not for a couple of years, but for seven, eight, nine or 10 years—not because they want to live like that, but because they have not got enough money built up to take the alternative.
John Glen
I recognise that these are complex matters. There will sometimes be a need to pay fees over a much longer period, and that option exists. The consultation on how the regulations will work will engage very closely with the sector, and I anticipate that it would get to the right place. I do not think that I have reassured the hon. Lady, but I hope that I have reassured other members of the Committee about the Government’s intentions. I ask her to withdraw the amendment.
Stella Creasy
I thank the Minister for what he said. If he is saying that he is prepared to engage on the subject of debt advice—perhaps the debt advisers’ writings for the Committee on this point were lost in translation—I am happy to withdraw the amendment. It is about recognising that the thresholds have to change, and it sounds like the consultation is the right place to have that conversation. If the Minister nods and says that that is the sort of thing that the consultation will consider, that is perfect.
Stella Creasy
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 12—Impact of COVID-19 on the Debt Respite Scheme: Ministerial report—
“(1) The Treasury must prepare and publish a report on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the implementation of the Debt Respite Scheme.
(2) The report must include—
(a) a statement on the extent to which changes to levels of household debt caused by the COVID-19 pandemic will affect the usage and operation of the Debt Respite Scheme;
(b) a statement on the resilience of UK households to future pandemics and other financial shocks, and how these would affect the usage and operation of the Debt Respite Scheme; and
(c) consideration of proposals for the incorporation of a no-interest loan scheme into the Debt Respite Scheme for financially vulnerable individuals affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.
(3) The report must be laid before Parliament no later than 28 February 2021.”
This new clause would require the Treasury to publish a report on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the implementation of the Debt Respite Scheme, including consideration of a proposal for the incorporation of a no-interest loan scheme into the Debt Respite Scheme.
New clause 19—Report on functioning of debt respite scheme and compatibility with personal insolvency regime—
“(1) The Treasury must prepare a report on—
(a) the functioning of the debt respite scheme under section 32;
(b) the extent to which it is achieving its objectives;
(c) its compatibility with personal insolvency legislation and policy.
(2) That report must be laid before Parliament no later than one year after this Act is passed.”
New clause 25—Debt Respite Scheme: review—
“(1) The Chancellor of the Exchequer must review the impact on debt in parts of the United Kingdom and regions of England of the changes made by section 32 of this Act and lay a report of that review before the House of Commons within six months of the date on which this Act receives Royal Assent.
(2) A review under this section must consider the effects of the changes on debt held by—
(a) households,
(b) individuals with protected characteristic as defined by the Equality Act 2010,
(c) small companies as defined by the Companies Act 2006.
(3) In this section—
“parts of the United Kingdom” means—
(a) England,
(b) Scotland,
(c) Wales, and
(d) Northern Ireland; and
“regions of England” has the same meaning as that used by the Office for National Statistics.”
This new clause would require a review of the impact on debt of the changes made to the Financial Guidance and Claims Act 2018 in section 32.
John Glen
Clause 32 builds on existing legislation, and will allow us to implement a statutory debt repayment plan that will help people who are in problem debt. The Government want to incentivise more people to access professional debt advice, and to do it sooner. To this end, we are introducing a debt respite scheme.
The first part of the scheme is a breathing space, which commences on 4 May 2021. The second part is the SDRP, which will be a new debt solution for people in problem debt. It will provide a revised, long-term agreement between the debtor and their creditors on the amount owed, and a manageable timetable over which those debts are to be repaid. It is intended that during the agreement, debtors will be protected from most creditor enforcement action, and from certain interest and charges on debts in the plan.
The clause amends sections 6 and 7 of the Financial Guidance and Claims Act 2018 to allow the Government to implement the SDRP effectively, as set out in their policy consultations on the debt respite scheme. The amendments will allow the Government to make regulations that can compel creditors to accept amended repayment terms and provide for a charging mechanism where creditors will contribute to the running of the scheme, ensuring it is fair and sustainable.
The clause will also allow the SDRP to include debts owed to central Government, which is crucial to helping people in problem debt. In time, I hope that will encourage more people to access debt advice sooner and enable them to repay their debts within a more manageable timeframe.
We are debating a number of new clauses alongside the clause, and I will allow hon. Members to speak to those before I respond to them. I recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stella Creasy
I will speak to new clauses 12 and 19. New clause 12 appears in the name of my friend, the hon. Member for Edinburgh West, but I recognise that she and I share a similar concern about seeing these measures in the round. As the Minister has spoken this afternoon, he has made the case for doing that, because he has talked very strongly about the policy intent and all the work that has been going on, but he has said limited amounts about the Monty Python foot of covid coming down on those best intentions.
Both of these new clauses speak to that Monty Python foot and the very different circumstances people face in terms of having a stable income to be able to repay any debt, problem or not, over the coming years. We know that there is already a problem brewing on top of a problem—a double problem, as it were. I am sure I could think of a better analogy if it was not a Tuesday afternoon.
One in three of those people reporting a fall in income over the past seven months has already borrowed to try to make ends meet. They are already on that carousel, going round and round, putting a bit of money here, hoping they can put another bit there and wondering when it will stop—hoping that schemes will come through. I am sure we will have heard about the economic impact in the debate in the main Chamber today, so I simply say to colleagues on the Government Benches: “You cannot be concerned about the economic impact of the tier system if you turn a blind eye to the debts in our communities and what happens to them.” It is dangerous simply to presume that we can spend our way out of this, knowing that debt is not equally distributed in our country.
That is why the new clauses are about having that evidence in front of us. I am a big fan of evidence-based policy making—although it has not often been in vogue in the 10 years I have been an MP—particularly when it comes to debt. That is partly because the figures change. As I said in my first set of contributions, there is some evidence that people are paying down their debts and trying to be more financially resilient, but we know that a tsunami of unemployment and low incomes is coming our way, and we know it will hit people who have not had to deal with it before—people who have never had to budget in the way that they will have to budget in the coming months.
The new clauses are about having that information and understanding why people take up particular options. Again, I do not wish to prosecute the Insolvency Act 1986 and how it works, but I do wish to set out that, if people cannot access those mechanisms, the breathing space is no breathing space at all—it is just limbo. We will not know that unless we put those measures in the context that these new clauses create by asking to have that information and that detail. If we do not ask ourselves why it is that every six minutes a person is declared insolvent and bankrupt in the UK, is that going to change over the year ahead? If not, is the breathing space working, or is it that people are not able to access alternative support?
The Minister will need that information to be able to flex the policies, as he inevitably will have to because of the Monty Python foot of covid. The longer this place pretends that that is not going to be a problem—that debt is not going to be part of everyday life for millions of people who have never really had to deal with it before—the more the vultures will circle. I have tabled other amendments later on in the Bill, and I do not know whether we will get to them today, but I know we will get to them on Thursday. Those amendments are about how we protect consumers, but sunlight is the best disinfectant—knowing where the damage is being done.
These new clauses and this data are about recognising that we will not get everything right now. There may be all sorts of consequences. What happens if the implementation of the vaccine takes longer to do and more industries go bust? We have already seen Arcadia going into administration today. What happens if it comes in more quickly, but the jobs that are created or the jobs that are available to people pay a fraction of what they previously earned? There are huge uncertainties ahead in the policy context into which the policy intent is being put.
I hope the Minister will see the new clauses from myself and the hon. Member for Edinburgh West as they are intended, which is to be forewarned and forearmed so that we can take a muscular and proactive approach in this place to not just protecting consumers and our constituents, but preventing problem debt in the first place. We would then not have to have that conversation with people about whether it is a problem that they have put everything on the credit card, taken out a payday loan in one of its various forms, taken out an Amigo loan or gone to the buy-now-pay-later industry, which we are going to come on to.
Alison Thewliss
I rise to support new clause 25, which appears in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen South. I also want to speak in favour of new clause 12, because what it asks for would be quite useful.
Our new clause on the debt respite scheme review asks for the Government to take a wider look at the impact of debt and the effects of changes on debt held by households, individuals with protected characteristics and small companies, as defined by the Companies Act 2006. The Government should do so across different parts of the United Kingdom, because there may well be differential impacts in different parts of the country in terms of support schemes and what is happening on the ground. It is important to look at the matter in this wider context. It looks to the very complexity of people and their businesses, and how they organise their finances and their debt.
I will start by giving an example involving some of my constituents. They are a couple who live in socially rented accommodation. He is a taxi driver and she is a wedding and events planner. Covid has hit them incredibly hard because he cannot go out and earn the same way that he could. He was able to access some Government support, but she was not. She did not have a premises or a shopfront, but just a small unit where her wedding kit was kept. She has not been able to access any Government support at all. She was told to go on to universal credit, but the people at the Department for Work and Pensions did not understand what she did in her business and how that support ought to have worked for her, and she feared she would have to give up her business altogether.
The point of raising this example is the decision she made in the circumstances. She looked at the debts that she had and the bills she had to pay, and decided that the most pressing and dangerous debt was her credit card. She paid down the credit card because she knew if she did not paid that, the consequences would be financially much greater. However, when she went to the Glasgow Housing Association and said she was having trouble paying her rent, they said “Well, how did you pay your credit card?”. She said, “I think you’re not going to evict me.” That was her gamble and her choice.
My constituent thought that there would be some way of managing her housing debt better than her credit card debt. That was the decision she took. It might not be the decision she would have taken had she had financial advice, but she was looking at the different balances and debts, as well as looking to the months ahead and not knowing whether her business would be able to get up running. She was not able to access any Government grants for business support, and it was a difficult time for her husband as a taxi driver as well.
Families and businesses are often one and the same. My constituents are two individuals but also a business and a family together, and their debts are all wrapped up together. That is why I am asking the Government to look at these different things in a holistic way. She is a woman and she is disabled, so she would fall into that characteristic as well. She is doing a brilliant job trying to run her business and balance things, but it is important that the Government understand all these intersecting things that are going on for people right across the UK.
The hon. Member for Walthamstow talked about some people being able to pay back their debt. There is evidence to suggest that because some people have been able to keep working and have less outgoings—because in many cases there is nothing much to do and to spend money on—they have been able to pay back their debt and make quite a dent in it, or to put money towards a mortgage or other things. However, some are very much unable to do so. There is evidence of a growing division between those who have been able to keep working, and those who have had no support and are not able to work. It would be useful for the Government to do a wee bit more work on that and on how it affects people.
The Minister talked about Government debts and debt to Government Departments. I want to reflect a wee bit on how the Department for Work and Pensions often treats debts. I have constituents who are struggling to pay back overpayments of tax credits to the DWP, to the point where it is making it difficult for them to put food on the table or pay their other bills because so much is being wheeched off at the start and they have very little income coming in.
I have another constituent who had issues with HMRC wanting additional money. Again, they went through all his finances and started taking money back. He was fairly well off, having worked in a sector that was reasonably well paid, but HMRC was going through his finances pretty much the point where it was questioning whether he should be giving his children money for their school dinners. These are the kind of outgoings that are being questioned, and that makes it incredibly difficult for people to plan for the future.
The other aspect of Government debt that I will pick up on is the vast cost of people’s immigration status in this country. I have constituents who put their and their children’s leave to remain applications or citizenship applications on credit cards. That is a vastly expensive way to try to pay for status in this country. If they do not do that, they will not have all the freedoms that the rest of us enjoy, so they take that difficult choice of paying an absolute fortune for citizenship. Some of that was down to their child wanting to go on a school trip with their classmates, so they had to pay for citizenship and a passport for that child so that they can go on a school trip with their school pals. That is a horrible choice for families to have to make, but that is the expense of the immigration system and the impact that it has on the debts of many people who have a protected characteristic. The Government need to be aware of what the different parts of Government are doing in that regard.
The last point I will make on that is about people who have no recourse to public funds who end up going into huge debt, either on their housing or bills or other things. For many of my constituents, it is people who are out working every hour that they can, but because they have no recourse to public funds, they do not get the social security support that their next-door neighbour would get. Again, those protected characteristics come into play here. It is worth the Government looking at what they are doing to force people into debt, to force them into difficulties and to force them into situations that make it difficult to live a normal life and deal with the debt that the Government are causing through the costs of the DWP, Home Office and HMRC systems.
Lastly, I will speak to new clause 12. It is important that we look specifically, as the hon. Member for Edinburgh West (Christine Jardine) asks for, at the impact of covid- 19 on the debt respite scheme. It is important that the Government understand exactly what has happened to those people who I mentioned at the start, who do not have any income coming in, who have not been eligible for support schemes and who cannot work, perhaps because they or a member of their family are shielding, and plan for future pandemics and shocks in a similar way. While I think an awful lot of work was done on the public health aspects of pandemics, very little—nothing really—was done on the economic impact on households and individuals and on how people can get themselves back out of this.
It is worth considering the long-lasting effect of having or being affected by covid and on the impact on people’s ability to work in the future if they or a family member have had long covid, for example. That will completely change a family’s financial circumstances in a way that they could not possibly have anticipated. It may force that family into debt, and a long-term debt at that. It is worthwhile the Government doing a bit of extra work, as new clause 12 pretty much gets at, to see what the impact of that is, because we will need to understand that going forward. We should not be pushing people into a circumstance that they cannot easily get out of. The Government need to understand that better and to do some further the work on that, so I very much support new clause 12 and what it asks for.
Mr McFadden
I should begin by acknowledging that the Minister has put an awful lot of work into the debt respite scheme. He has encouraged it, consulted the sector widely and really tried to get it right. As I said at the beginning, the Opposition support it. It is a valuable addition and a source of help for people in debt.
The new clauses call for a review of the scheme at some point in different ways, which is the right thing to do with a new scheme. It makes sense to look at how it works and see if any changes need to be made to it. We have already had a debate about whether 60 days or 120 days is the best timescale, and a review could consider that sort of thing. Of course, there is also the covid impact, which new clause 12(2) specifically references. Covid will have an impact on household finances. We had an exchange in Treasury questions an hour or two ago about corporate debt and small business debt. I therefore do not think that the new clauses on review are in any way a threat to the basic integrity of the scheme. They simply ask for a look back at the scheme after a year or so of operation.
I could give the Committee a long and enthusiastic speech about the merits of the third way, but I suspect I will fall foul of your instructions about scope, Mr Davies. I award the prize for word of the day to my friend the hon. Member for Glasgow Central who has given Hansard the challenge of spelling “wheeched”, which I can roughly translate as forcibly or speedily removed. I think we would agree on that definition, but I look forward to seeing how that appears in our record.
John Glen
We are considering several amendments and I turn first to new clause 12. Its effect is to require a report to be published by 28 February 2021 on the impact of covid-19 on the debt respite scheme. That would include statements on the impact on levels of household debt and financial resilience, and what that might mean for how the scheme works, and consideration of the incorporation of a no interest loan scheme.
As the Committee knows, covid-19 poses many uncertainties. The Government have responded dynamically to the challenges posed and taken unprecedented action to support individuals and businesses during this time. With that in mind, teamed with the fact that both elements of the debt respite scheme are new policies, arriving at any sort of meaningful estimate of the impact of covid-19 on the scheme’s expected usage and operation will be very difficult.
Expected demand and take-up of both elements of the debt respite scheme have been quantified to the extent possible and published in the appropriate impact assessments, which have been approved by the Regulatory Policy Committee. A more detailed impact assessment will be developed alongside implementing regulations establishing the statutory debt repayment plan to a longer timetable, which will of course need to consider the full impact of covid. We will be more able to evaluate it over that period. The Government will of course closely monitor both schemes’ usage once they are up and running, and consider the impacts of covid-19 and the wider economic recovery.
Turning to the suggestion for the report to explore financial resilience more broadly, I point towards the Government’s annual financial inclusion report, which was published only last week. We also work closely with the Money and Pensions Service, which was established in the last two years, the FCA and other stakeholders to monitor personal finances, including financial resilience. Earlier, I mentioned some of the measures I have been engaged in as the Minister for this area with the Pensions and Financial Inclusion Minister.
Finally, the new clause also requires a report exploring the incorporation of a no-interest loan scheme into the debt respite scheme. The Committee will be pleased to hear that the Government are working closely with stakeholders towards a pilot of a no-interest loan scheme, building on the findings of a feasibility study published earlier this year. I am personally passionate about that. It will be an amazing breakthrough if we can institutionalise the scheme and establish its credibility. That will have to be on the basis of international comparisons, establishing which groups of people would benefit most from it, and how we can establish a protocol around the cost. Clearly, given the vulnerability of the people to whom we seek to apply it and make it available, it will be expensive to deliver, but I continue to persist with it.
Any pilot will take time. Of course, it is urgent, but I would rather ensure that it is credible and can be supported more broadly. Reporting by February 2021 on the viability of a no-interest loan scheme risks coming to a premature judgement based on inadequate evidence—I say that with some experience, given that I have been working closely on this for some while. I can assure the Committee, however, that I will keep Parliament updated on progress as we continue that work over the coming months.
Mr McFadden
I think there is some confusion about why the new clauses were not put. Can you clarify that, Mr Davies?
The Chair
The new clauses are determined at the end, so although we have debated them, I will put the question at the end of the process. The opportunity to divide the Committee on the new clauses has not been lost, should that be the wish of those who have tabled them—that applies to all new clauses. I hope that helps.
Clause 33
Successor accounts for Help-to-Save savers
Alison Thewliss
I beg to move amendment 36, in clause 33, page 39, line 30, at end insert—
“(c) the successor account must bear, in each financial year, at least the same level of bonus as the mature account before maturation.”
This amendment would ensure customers do not lose any bonus should their funds be moved from a matured account into a new one.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 37, in clause 33, page 39, line 30, at end insert—
“(7) Regulations under sub-paragraph (2) may only be made if the conditions in sub-paragraph (8) are met.
(8) The conditions referred to in sub-paragraph (7) are—
(a) there must be an account available to any affected customer which provides at least as generous a bonus structure as the matured account.
(b) the customer must have been successfully contacted by a relevant department or public body.
(c) the customer must have been given full and accessible information on the effects of changing account.”
This amendment would ensure customers are contacted and informed before their funds are transferred.
Alison Thewliss
Looking at the clause, we feel that it is important to protect customers who may have put money into help to save accounts but do not necessarily follow all the things that come in the post and risk losing their bonus or losing track of the funds. It is important to ensure that those people, who are the most vulnerable—the type of people who might turn up to my surgery with a plastic bag full of unopened letters—are protected, along with the savings that they have made, and do not risk losing anything as a result of the changes being made.
Help to save customers really have enough on their plate at the moment without having to navigate myriad savings products to transfer the funds over. We think it particularly important that their accounts continue to earn interest until this crisis is over. Amendment 36 ensures that customers will not be given a lower bonus should their funds be moved from a matured account to a new one.
In the Savings (Government Contributions) Act 2017, the Government introduced help to save accounts with the big purpose of encouraging working people with very low incomes and who were in receipt of certain benefits to save money. Since the launch of the scheme, more than 222,000 people have opened help to save accounts, with £85 million deposited. That is quite a significant number of people and a significant amount of money. My worry is that between opening the account and now, people may have moved house multiple times or may have been difficult to trace, and it is important the Government do all they can to ensure that people do not lose the money to which they are entitled.
I would be interested to hear from the Economic Secretary how the Government manage to keep in touch with those 222,000 people. How many of them do the Government expect to contact in advance of the Bill’s passage? What protections will be put in place? It seems important to ensure that those people, who are not the most financially literate people in the country, get as much advice as possible. StepChange, in its evidence to the Committee, was quite happy with the idea of accounts staying open just that wee bit longer, to give people extra time and reassurance so that they can transfer funds when they can. Many people up and down country have seen bank branches closing in their local communities, and it is now a lot more difficult to go and set up a new account than it was before.
The Government need to make the changes as easy and as simple as possible, to ensure that those who have money saved know where it is and can access it, and do not lose out in any way by changing from one scheme to another.
John Glen
The Government are committed to supporting people of all income levels to save, including those on low incomes, through the pioneering Help to Save scheme. To be clear, the scheme provides generous Government bonuses of 50% on up to £50 of monthly savings after two and four years—I say to all hon. Members that it is a great scheme to promote among all their constituents. This means that an individual could save £2,400 and receive £1,200 in bonuses over a four-year period. I hope the Committee will agree that this is an attractive incentive to encourage people to save and build up that resilience. In fact, as of September 2020, more than 47,200 account holders had benefited from their first bonus payment, with an average value of £375 two years after opening their accounts.
The effect of amendment 36 would be to extend Help to Save accounts beyond their intended four-year term. The aim of Help to Save is to kick-start a regular, long-term savings habit, and encourage people to continue to save via mainstream savings accounts. The Government’s view is that a four-year Help to Save period is sufficient to achieve this objective. Therefore, the Government do not consider it necessary to extend the bonus incentive beyond four years.
Clause 33 relates to what happens to the customer’s savings at the end of the four-year period. This clause provides the legislative basis for successor accounts, which is one of a number of options that the Government are considering for supporting those customers who have become disengaged from their Help to Save account. We expect that the majority of account holders will make an active decision about where they want to transfer their money. Indeed, HMRC and National Savings and Investments will communicate with account holders ahead of accounts maturing, to ensure that savers receive appropriate information and guidance on the range of retail options available to continue saving once their participation in the scheme ends.
On the specifics of amendment 37, if the Government decide to proceed with successor accounts, account holders will be contacted both before and after the transfer. Ideally, once customers have been contacted to highlight that their account is maturing, the vast majority will take an active decision to transfer the funds elsewhere. This policy is designed to support those who have disengaged from their account and failed to provide instructions for transferring their balance upon maturity. Hopefully, with those clarifications, the hon. Member for Glasgow Central will be willing to withdraw the amendment.
Alison Thewliss
I still have a wee bit of hesitation about how the Government intend to communicate with people. If the Minister wants to write to me with a wee bit more reassurance about that, I would welcome that, because I am particularly worried. I know how often people move about and how they might lose contact with their accounts, and it would be useful to have a bit more detail from the Government about how many of those accounts they deem to be active and have money put into them, how many are relatively dormant, and the extent to which people are contacted to let them know what their options are.
Like I say, if there is money out there and it belongs to people in my constituency, I want them to be able to get it and have that money in their hand, because people need it, particularly at this time. If they have put money away, it should be there for them when they need it, and I would like a bit more detail from the Government about precisely what their communications strategy is, and how they are going to follow up with people. If they do not get in touch with those people the first time, are they going to follow them up a second time, and what then happens if they cannot reach somebody? A bit more detail on how the mechanics of that would work would be very useful, because, as I said, the purpose of amendment 37 is to make sure that customers are contacted and informed before anything happens to the money that is rightfully theirs. I ask for additional reassurance that they are not going to lose this money they have scrimped, saved, and done their very best for.
John Glen
I am happy to give that reassurance. I would just say that since this scheme has been operating, the Government have been working hard to understand better ways of promoting it, and the most cost-effective way of doing that. I have had meetings at the University of Birmingham with academics and charities to try to establish the best way forward. Obviously, we have only got to the early stages of the first two-year bonus, but the hon. Lady makes a perfectly reasonable point about wanting to make sure that those who have saved and have become disengaged can get hold of that bonus money, which the Government are very happy to give.
Alison Thewliss
Specifically on the point about engaging with academics and people who understand how best to do this, I would gently say that it is not necessarily the academics that the Minister wants to be speaking to, but the guy who turns up on a rainy Friday morning with a Farmfoods bag full of bills and unopened envelopes. That is the guy who the Government need to reach. That is the person they need to understand, and who needs to get that money if it belongs to him.
John Glen
Absolutely. I am just trying to demonstrate my willingness to engage with creative ideas about it. Obviously, our comms strategy has not yet been defined because of the gap between the maturing of it, but I will undertake to keep in touch with the hon. Lady and Committee members on the evolution of this construct.
Alison Thewliss
I will press amendment 37 to a Division, but I beg to ask leave to withdraw amendment 36.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 37, in clause 33, page 39, line 30, at end insert—
“(7) Regulations under sub-paragraph (2) may only be made if the conditions in sub-paragraph (8) are met.
(8) The conditions referred to in sub-paragraph (7) are—
(a) there must be an account available to any affected customer which provides at least as generous a bonus structure as the matured account.
(b) the customer must have been successfully contacted by a relevant department or public body.
(c) the customer must have been given full and accessible information on the effects of changing account.”—(Alison Thewliss.)
This amendment would ensure customers are contacted and informed before their funds are transferred.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 3—Help to Save annual report—
“(1) The Treasury must prepare and publish an annual report on the Help to Save scheme for each financial year in which the scheme remains open to new accounts.
(2) The report must cover the following matters—
(a) the performance of the scheme;
(b) observations on take-up including, where applicable, reasons for take up being low;
(c) actions the Treasury proposes to take to increase take up of the scheme; and
(d) progress towards implementing successor accounts for the Help to Save savers.
(3) A report must be laid before both houses of Parliament no later than 31 October in the financial year following the financial year to which the report relates.
(4) The first annual report would be laid before both Houses of Parliament by 31 October 2021 and relate to the 2020-21 Financial year.”
This new clause would require the Treasury to publish an annual report on take up levels of the Help to Save scheme.
New clause 14—Help-to-Save accounts: report on effectiveness—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, and thereafter on an annual basis until 2027, lay before the House of Commons a report on the effectiveness of Help-to-Save accounts.
(2) The report in subsection (1) must cover—
(a) levels of take-up of Help-to-Save accounts;
(b) an analysis of the typical financial assets held by target users of the Help-to-Save scheme;
(c) an analysis of alternative forms of access to finance available to target users of the Help-to-Save scheme; and
(d) the effectiveness of the measures introduced by section 33.”
This new clause would gather the data required to enable policy makers to understand the effectiveness of the help to save scheme in addressing asset inequality amongst the UK population.
John Glen
The clause will insert new paragraph 13A into schedule 2 of the Savings (Government Contributions) Act 2017. The clause gives the Treasury a power to make regulations that provide for the transfer of funds from a mature Help to Save account to a new or existing savings account with NSNI in the National Savings Bank where the account holder has not provided instructions upon maturity for it to be transferred elsewhere. It will be known as the successor account. The clause also provides that any regulations made under it cannot override the account holder’s instructions for the transfer of the balance to an account of their choosing. Where a transfer is made to a successor account, no charge may be imposed on the account holder for the transfer.
The Help to Save scheme supports individuals on low incomes to build a savings fund over four years, providing a generous 50% bonus. More than 222,000 accounts have been opened as of July 2020, and more than 47,200 savers have benefited from their first bonus. At the end of the four-year term of the Help to Save account, savers will be encouraged to provide instructions on where they want their savings transferred—for example, to a new or an existing savings account. However, some savers might not provide instructions, and the Government are in the process of evaluating the best way to support such customers, who have become disengaged from their accounts, to continue to save. A successor account is one of a number of options that are being considered. I therefore recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Abena Oppong-Asare (Erith and Thamesmead) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to be under your chairmanship, Mr Davies. I would like to speak to new clause 3, which calls on the Government to prepare and publish an annual report on the Help to Save scheme for each financial year that it remains open to new accounts.
The Help to Save scheme is a form of savings account that allows eligible people to receive a bonus of 50p for every pound they save over four years. The scheme is particularly good, as it targets people who are entitled to working tax credits or who are in receipt of universal credit. Given the failure to support jobs during covid-19, the number of households currently receiving universal credit has risen from 1.8 million in May 2019 to almost 4.6 million as of October 2020. I am sure everybody on the Committee agrees that that is a very high figure, although I appreciate that we are going through really difficult times because of covid.
One of the things that I am seeing as a local MP in my constituency—I am sure it is the same for everybody on the Committee—is a huge increase in universal credit claimants. We are likely to see an even bigger increase as people are no longer able to rely on their personal savings, so the Help to Save scheme is more important than ever.
After a two-year delay, the Help to Save scheme was launched by the Government in September 2018, to much anticipation. However, the scheme to date cannot be considered a success, and I am eager to find out why. We tabled the new clause because we feel that an annual report would help us in uncovering that. Of the 2.8 million people eligible to take up the scheme, only 132,150 accounts had been opened by July 2019—just 4.6% of those eligible for the scheme. I am still struggling to understand those figures and to believe that the Government are truly committed to a savings scheme and to creating a culture of household saving.
Furthermore, in last year’s spring statement of March 2019, the Government’s Budget watchdog slashed by half its forecast of how much the taxman would have to spend on Help to Save by 2021, citing lower than expected take-up. However, as I mentioned, I am in favour of the scheme and want it to succeed. That is, after all, why the previous Labour Government spent time highlighting the scheme and planning to launch it in 2010 as a savings gateway, only for it to be scrapped in 2010 by the then Chancellor.
Members may agree that the information we have so far does not paint a picture of commitment from the Government to supporting people to save. When the savings gateway was created, Labour worked with banks, building societies and credit unions, which invested in software and promotional literature for the launch. Some potential savers had received letters informing them of their eligibility and telling them about local providers just hours before the scheme was scrapped by the incoming Conservative Government.
I am really interested to hear what measures the Government have implemented to promote take-up of the scheme. I could raise many issues about universal credit and working tax credits, but as you advised, Mr Davies, we need to keep to the new clause, so I will raise them another time. My primary concern is to ensure that those who are eligible can access the scheme, now and in the future.
The Government’s pilot scheme found that 45,000 individuals saved a total of £3 billion during the trial period. We know that the scheme works. Charities and debt support services are hopeful that it can directly tackle asset poverty. The Help to Save scheme is due to come to a close in three years’ time, in September 2023, which means that we still have time to support people to save over £800, if we act now to make the scheme more widely accessible.
Publishing an annual report on the scheme, as provided for by the new clause, would allow us to see in detail where take-up has been successful and what we can do to ensure that people are aware of the scheme and how to engage with it. We feel very strongly that a report would help us to capture what areas we need to improve. The Minister mentioned that the Government are committed to providing support. I hope that they are, but agreeing to have an annual report would show further commitment.
In the meantime, I believe that more can be done, particularly to integrate with credit unions and debt management services so that the scheme functions more effectively in the years it has left to run. I would also be really interested, in lieu of an annual report for 2020, given that at the end of last year it was estimated that only 4% of eligible people have signed up to the Government’s Help to Save scheme, if the Minister could tell the Committee whether he thinks it has been unsuccessful and what the Government are doing to promote take-up.
Stella Creasy
I rise to support what my Front-Bench colleague said on new clause 3 and to speak to new clause 14, which seeks to underline the question that she set. Given that this is a good scheme, why has it not been taken up more widely?
The Minister may have thought that I was just a one-trick pony, obsessed with debt. Let me tell him that my difficult second album is very much about savings. I know that he had concerns about the drafting of my previous amendments and I want to put on the record my thanks to the Clerks, who have been incredibly helpful and patient with me in seeking to get the wording right. We all appreciate the hard work that they do behind the scenes to ensure that our drafting is intelligible, even if it is not inevitably accepted by the Minister.
I hope that the Minister will accept this new clause and my difficult second album about savings. This is two sides of the same coin of how people make ends meet. I would wager that that is why he has put them together in this portmanteau or Christmas tree Bill––given that it is 1 December, we may as well call it that. It is about how we make sure that people have the money they need, whatever the weather or time of year and whether things are going well or badly for them. Just as we would want people to get help when they get into debt, we also want them to get help to have rainy day money, as it might quaintly be called now. I said that to a member of my staff who looked blank and probably tried to look it up on Instagram.
Clearly, helping people on low incomes to save is critical. One reason why I support the new clauses is that I do not think we can have a conversation about savings without talking about assets. There are increasing inequalities in our society. Indeed, the new inequality is not so much about income as assets. We are looking at why people do not take up the scheme, what we can do to make it work and whether it serves the purpose that we are trying to get at. While we come from different political traditions, I hope that the Minister would agree that income inequality is of itself a negative draw on our economy and social cohesion. Perhaps that is the best way I can put it to him. One day, I will tempt him towards the more radical socialism of egalitarianism.
When we have people who have plenty and people who have very little, or indeed no access to anything, our society suffers. The Help to Save scheme is about improving that situation. It is increasingly obvious that in constituencies and communities like mine that are riven by gentrification and inequality, it is assets that are the difference between success and failure. That is necessarily different from savings accounts, and it is right that when we are looking at what we are doing to help those on the poorest incomes succeed in life, we are cognisant of that fact and include it in our thinking.
What do I mean in layman’s––or perhaps laywoman’s––terms? One in five mortgages are issued with the help of the bank of mum and dad. People with the bank of mum and dad are always going to be more successful and stable than many of those constituents who do not have access to that. Those are the people at whom the scheme is targeted. The 10 million households that have no savings at all stand in a very different place from the one in 10 children born in the 1980s who will inherit more than half average lifetime earnings. Property is the divider within our society and that trend has got a lot worse over the last 30 years, yet very little Government policy on tax and savings begins to address that and the income inequalities that it creates.
When we are looking at a savings scheme and expecting people to have money to put aside––even what might seem very modest sums––we have to set it in the context of the other assets they have access to if we really want to get to grips with those inequalities in society. In looking at tax and benefit policies, and savings policies, the fact that someone can inherit £1 million in property without paying any tax at all stands against those families with £15,000 of debt who will never be able to put any money aside because they will always owe somebody else. All Governments of all colours have been burned before in trying to address some of these factors, and in taking a narrow view purely of income levels. I am old enough to remember TESSAs—not just the fantastic Dame Tessa Jowell who is sadly no longer with us, but tax-exempt special savings accounts, which drove income inequality in this country in terms of people’s ability to put money aside.
It is right that we ask ourselves whether this measure will get to the root of that problem—to the communities and people we represent who will not be able to save and whose lives will always be askew, because their counterparts have been able to benefit from that growing asset wealth, whether that is people who have inherited property or people who are now in communities such as mine, where housing costs and housing values have risen to such an extent that their children will be able to benefit from them, including from schemes such as remortgaging. In situations such as that with covid, which we know is an income shock, people might be expected to use their savings account, but they cannot because they do not have any money in it, so it is even more apposite to ask whether they have other assets that they might be able to draw on in comparison with their counterparts.
John Glen
Understandably, this topic brings out some very deeply held beliefs about the sort of society that we live in and the inequalities and challenges we face. I very much respect the points made by the hon. Member for Walthamstow and the hon. Member for Erith and Thamesmead.
I will try to respond to new clause 3 and new clause 14, but before I do, I think it would be helpful to clarify a few points about the Help-to-Save scheme. It is open to new entrants until September 2023 and those individuals will then be able to have it open for four years from that point. It is possible to save between £1 and £50 a month, so various modest savings can be made.
The hon. Member for Erith and Thamesmead asked about the schedule of promotion activities. Some of the full schedule was curtailed for this financial year because of covid, but we anticipate resuming our promotional activity early in 2021. We promoted Help-to-Save through Talk Money Week, we have engaged with Martin Lewis, who is also a key advocate of this scheme, and we will continue to work with the DWP to target those in receipt of universal credit and on working tax credits. The other point I would like to make clear to the Committee is that if somebody is in receipt of either of those benefits for just one week, they are eligible to open an account that is then valid for four years.
New clauses 3 and 14 require the Government to publish reports into the Help-to-Save scheme. Of course, the Government are prepared to inform Parliament on the progress of the scheme. Indeed, the Government committed to Parliament in 2018 to monitor and evaluate the scheme and has been publishing data every six months, in February and August. Therefore, we do not consider it necessary to enact these amendments as a statutory requirement. The latest statistics, published this August, show that by the end of July 2020 more than 222,000 accounts had been opened, with over £85 million in deposits between them. This has been a 37% increase in the total number of accounts opened by the end of January 2020, and a 57% increase in the total deposits into the scheme, compared with in the previous six-month period from August 2019 to January 2020. I am sure the Committee will agree that this is excellent progress, despite the difficult economic period.
The Government already work closely with stakeholders to monitor personal finances, including financial resilience; the Money and Pension Service monitor financial difficulty through an annual survey; and the Financial Conduct Authority undertake the biannual financial lives survey. It is not clear that this amendment would improve the data available to the Government in shaping policy. The Government are also working with stakeholders to raise awareness and encourage eligible individuals to open an account and benefit from the scheme, and I indicated some of the ways that is happening earlier. In fairness to the hon. Member for Walthamstow, who made a passionate and wide-ranging set of observations about these matters, I do not think I can fully do justice to them today. However, I share her belief that there are significant inequalities and certain obligations on people who have more to do more to support those who are more vulnerable in society. This measure is a good policy that we should all be able to promote and I am committed to promoting it further. I would ask the hon. Members to withdraw the new clauses.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 33 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 34
Amendments of the PRIIPs Regulation etc
Mr McFadden
I beg to move amendment 30, in clause 34, page 40, line 33, after “performance” insert
“including information relating to environmental, social and governance standards.”
This amendment would require that consumers are given information about the environmental, social and governance standards of PRIIPs.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 31, in clause 34, page 40, line 33, at end insert—
“(4A) The FCA shall ensure that in practice the amendment made as a result of subsection (4) does not result in consumers having a reduced understanding of the risks associated with a particular investment product.”
This amendment would require that consumers are not left with a reduced understanding of the levels of risk involved in buying products covered by this clause.
Mr McFadden
In this portfolio Bill we now move on to another different subject, that of PRIIPs—packaged retail and insurance-based investment products. Clause 34 amends the consumer information requirements for the sellers of these products. These requirements are also known as key information documents—or KIDs—and we heard in the oral and written evidence that the current information requirements can be misleading for consumers. It is said that this is because they imply that past performance can be too much of a guide to future performance, which we know is not the case. At the European level, where the regulation of these products has taken place, there has also been a big debate about these key information documents and their deficiencies, so this has been an ongoing issue for some time now. It is in no one’s interest to defend misleading or potentially misleading information for consumers.
Removing or substantially altering the requirements of the key information documents does prompt the question of what should be put in their place. It is important that the Government and the regulators take this seriously. In selling anything like this, there is always a major information mismatch between what the seller knows about the product and what the consumer knows. The products are sold and designed by professional staff working for financial services companies, and bought by retail investors. Unless those investors have a professional background in the industry, they are likely simply to be looking for somewhere safe for their money that can hopefully earn them a decent return. There is a major information mismatch in these situations. Who can the consumer look to, to redress that to some extent? It has to be the Government and the regulators, through legislation on the kind of information to which consumers are entitled before making a purchase.
How do the Government and the regulator equip the consumer to make a reasonably informed choice? That is where amendments 30 and 31 come in. Earlier, when talking about capital requirements and the regulator’s duties, we had a debate about environmental, social and governance criteria being part of the regulator’s remit. The Minister rejected the idea, and the Committee voted it down, but what about making this information available to consumers? More and more investors want to invest in a way that helps, rather than damages, the planet. People care about the working conditions under which goods and services are produced, and about good governance—about companies being well run. So why not make this information available to investors? That is what amendment 30 calls for.
If the argument against making that the regulator’s job is that investors are making these decisions for themselves, let us at least give investors the tools to do that job—the information to make those judgments. The Chancellor has spoken warmly about the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, which was set up by the Financial Stability Board a few years ago precisely to help companies inform investors about risks related to climate change in investments. The founding statement of that organisation says:
“Without reliable climate-related financial information, financial markets cannot price climate-related risks and opportunities correctly”.
The Financial Stability Board wants this to happen, and has set up the TCFD to advise companies and market regulators on how to do it. Why not take the opportunity in the Bill to ensure that consumers are provided with this kind of information? They can, of course, still make their own investment choices. They can ignore the information and say, “I don’t care about any of that; all I care about is the rate of return.” Investors are completely free to do that, but an increasing number of them do not want to, partly because they see the rate of return and the sustainability of their investments as being closely related. This is not about interfering with investor choice; it is about helping investors to make a choice, and giving them the information to do that.
Amendment 31 deals with the broader issue of the information balance that I spoke about between sellers and buyers. It is a no-detriment clause. It does not seek to prevent the abolition of the performance scenarios referred to in clause 34; it seeks to ensure that whatever replaces these scenarios does not result in consumers having less understanding than at present of the risks involved in a particular investment.
Both amendments are about the regulator taking seriously its duty on consumer information. They are about trying to make sure that public bodies are on the consumer’s side when it comes to making decisions about buying these kinds of products, and that the consumer has someone to look to for help with the information mismatch inherent in the sale of these kinds of products. They are modest and sensible amendments, and I commend them to the Committee.
John Glen
Amendment 30 seeks to require that information about the environmental, social and governance standards of PRIIPs products be included in the key information document, the KID. Now is not the time to address this, as I shall explain, but I have a lot of sympathy with the intent behind the amendment proposed by the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East. The reason I do not believe it is the right time to address this is that it would result in significant uncertainty for industry.
Clause 34 makes changes to the PRIIPs to address the potential for unintended consequences for consumers. The PRIIPs were created by the EU to improve the quality of financial information given to retail investors purchasing PRIIPs, by introducing a short, consumer-friendly and comparable disclosure document. The Government are committed to the original aim of the regulation and has proposed changes in this Bill to ensure it functions as intended.
In particular, there is not a fixed definition of environmental, social and governance standards and no standardised precedent for how such disclosures could be made in a comparable way for PRIIPs products. That is why I sincerely say that I agree with the sentiment, but I do not think we are yet at a level of maturity in definitional terms for such a measure to work. To put this in place, and ensure that the ensuing disclosures are appropriate and useful for consumers, significant policy development would be required.
As a result, the amendment would bring significant industry uncertainty, as they do not report in a standardised way on environmental, social and governance issues at a product level, which is what this would be, and have minimal guidance on how to do so. That would come at a time when the Government are intending, through the Financial Services Bill, to provide more certainty to industry on PRIIPs disclosures.
I recognise that high-quality sustainable finance disclosures that enable investors to take environmental impacts into account in their investment decisions will be crucial in facilitating the growth of green finance and supporting the transition to a lower-carbon economy. As I have previously stated, it would also be premature to adopt an environmental, social and governance amendment in the specific context of PRIIPs when the Government are considering the requirements for legislation relating to the sustainable finance disclosure regulation.
Amendment 31 also seeks to amend the PRIIPs disclosure regime, to require that changes to performance information that will be made by the FCA do not leave consumers with a reduced understanding of the levels of risk involved in buying PRIIPs products. I respectfully submit that the amendment would have little or no effect. The Bill is already intended to address concerns about the information provided to consumers in order to avoid the potential for consumer harm. The issues with the PRIIPs regulation, addressed by the Bill, include concern that the requirement to include performance scenarios in the key information documents may result in potentially misleading disclosures. That has been the key concern that has led to that measure being included.
Clause 34 will replace
“performance scenarios and the assumptions made to produce them”
with “information on performance”. That change will allow the FCA to amend the PRIIPs regulatory technical standards to clarify what information on performance should be provided. The FCA already has a statutory objective to secure an appropriate degree of protection for consumers and, as the expert regulator, is best placed to work with consumers and industry to understand issues and respond to them effectively. Moreover, changes the FCA makes to the information provided to consumers in the key information document are subject to a consultation, which it expects to publish next year. Requiring the regulator to ensure that changes to the KID do not reduce consumer understanding of risk would have no effect.
The changes we are making to the Bill address the potential for consumer harm and the FCA is best placed to ensure the appropriate degree of consumer protection. I hope that offers reassurance to the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East. I therefore ask that he withdraw the amendment.
Mr McFadden
At this stage in our proceedings we begin to recognise the debates that we are having, because we have had them more than once. I find the Minister’s answers on the subject of ESG slightly circular. He says—and I believe him—that he has great sympathy with the intent, but now is not the time or this is not the quite the way to do it, and so on. The reason I find that unconvincing is that I think the Government will do this, or something quite close to it, and will then claim credit, saying that doing it makes the UK a more friendly environment for environmentally sustainable investments. Because of that, I will press the amendment to a vote. Then, as is the way of these things, what we did when we had the chance to make a decision about this, both at the level of the regulator and at the level of the investment product, will be on the record.
John Glen
May I express my regret at the right hon. Gentleman’s decision? I acknowledge that this country is going on a journey, and it is very important that we make progress with regard to such disclosures, but this specific measure in this specific Bill at this time would not be in the interests of consumers or the regulation. I respectfully disagree, and I look forward to the vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
John Glen
Clause 34 makes changes to the packaged retail and insurance-based investment products—PRIIPs—regulation to address the potential for unintended consequences for consumers. PRIIPs are a category of financial assets regularly provided to retail investors, and the PRIIPs regulation will form part of retained EU law from the end of the transition period. The regulation sets the requirement for a standardised disclosure document known as the KID—key information document—which must be provided to retail investors when they purchase certain packaged investment products.
The regulation, while its aims are laudable, has arguably been less successful in its achievements. The clause demonstrates our balanced approach to remedying the issues with the regulation by addressing the most pressing concerns ahead of the further wholesale review of the disclosure regime for UK retail investors to which the Government are committed. This will limit any disruption to the disclosure of information to investors while seeking to improve the existing framework in this area.
To address uncertainty regarding the precise scope of the PRIIPs regulation, the clause will enable the Financial Conduct Authority to clarify the scope of the PRIIPs regulation through its rules, allowing it to address existing and potential future ambiguities. To address concerns that the methodology used to calculate performance scenarios misleads consumers, the clause will also replace performance scenarios and the assumptions made to produce them with information on performance. After the transition period, that change will allow the FCA, the expert regulator with a responsibility to protect consumers, to amend the PRIIPs regulatory technical standards to clarify what information on performance should be provided in the KID.
The final change allows the Government to extend the exemption currently in place for undertakings for the collective investment in transferable securities—UCITS, a type of investment fund—from December 2021 for a maximum of five years. That will allow the Government to consider the most appropriate timing for the transition of UCITS funds into any domestic successor that may result from the planned review of the UK framework for investment product disclosure.
We recognise that there is more to be done to improve the overall disclosure regime for UK retail investors. That is why we have committed to a wholesale review. In the meantime, these changes will provide greater certainty to PRIIPs manufacturers and address the potential for consumer harm. I therefore recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 34 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 35
Over the counter derivatives: clearing and procedures for reporting
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
John Glen
Clause 35 makes two small technical amendments to the UK’s version of the European market infrastructure regulation. This is important to help improve the overall functioning of the UK’s regulatory regime for derivatives.
The first amendment to UK EMIR will promote transparency and accessibility in the clearing of derivatives transactions, by ensuring that the clearing members of UK central counterparties and their clients offer clearing services on
“fair, reasonable, non-discriminatory and transparent”
commercial terms. Clearing contributes to the safety of the UK’s financial markets, especially our derivatives markets. It does this by ensuring that a trade will still be honoured if one party to a contract does not fulfil their side—for example, if a firm goes bust. This will reduce barriers to accessing clearing services, which will in turn make it easier for firms to fulfil their clearing obligations. It will strengthen incentives to clear centrally and reduce systemic risk in financial markets.
The second amendment to UK EMIR will increase transparency in derivatives markets. Such transparency is vital to ensure that regulators in the UK can monitor risks in financial markets and ensure financial stability. This amendment will also make the environment in which trade repositories operate more competitive. This is achieved through ensuring that trade repositories put in place procedures to improve the quality of the data they collect, and establish policies to transfer their data to other trade repositories in an orderly fashion when it is necessary to do so. Trade repositories collect and maintain records of derivatives trades with the aim of helping regulators to monitor the build-up of systemic risk.
Overall, these two sensible technical amendments to UK EMIR will bolster the UK’s regulation of derivatives markets, further delivering on the UK’s G20 commitments in this area. I therefore recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr McFadden
I have just one question. As the Minister said, this clause deals with the EMIR directive, which governs the sale of over-the-counter derivates. To add to our joys, we have EMIR and something called EMIR refit. The clause is about access to clearing for people dealing in these products. Over-the-counter derivates are perhaps among the more opaque financial services products on the market, but we learnt during the financial crisis that whatever their other qualities, these products exposed the interconnection between different companie, and the vulnerability of that interconnection. That is why clearing is important. It acts as what could be called a circuit breaker to ensure that if one party to the transaction gets into trouble, we do not have a domino effect right throughout the system, so the clause is designed to ensure that smaller traders have access to this circuit breaker or clearing activity. I ask the Minister: is what we are doing here mirroring what the EU have done through this EMIR refit process, or are the two measures in this clause—the data one, and the fair and transparent one—a departure in any way from that?
John Glen
The changes are almost identical to those made through EMIR refit in the EU. The UK played a pivotal role in the design of the EMIR refit and previously voted in favour of this legislation. Now that the UK has left the EU, we continue to believe that these measures are helpful to UK industry and will improve the financial stability of the UK. As I said, the FCA will design the implementation of the new frameworks in a way that works best for the UK. In making these observations, I underscore the comments I have made throughout that we will always seek to maintain the highest standards but to make them work optimally in the United Kingdom.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 35 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 36
Regulations about financial collateral arrangements
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
John Glen
Clause 36 serves to clarify existing legislation concerning financial collateral arrangements. This issue dates back to 2003, when the Treasury introduced the Financial Collateral Arrangements (No.2) Regulations 2003, or FCARs, to transpose the EU financial collateral arrangements directive, or FCAD, into UK law. The FCAD was introduced to simplify the process of taking financial collateral across the EU.
Subsequent litigation has questioned the UK’s implementation of the FCAD—specifically the extent to which the FCARs went beyond the scope of the FCAD. However, that litigation has not invalidated the FCARs, and they are extensively relied on by market participants entering into financial collateral arrangements. The clause removes any doubt about the validity of the FCARs. The clause has retrospective effect, confirming the legal effectiveness of the financial collateral arrangements made in reliance on the FCARs since their introduction in 2003. It also confirms the legal effectiveness of any future such arrangements.
By reaffirming the FCARs, the risk of legal doubt and any resulting financial instability is removed. This measure will therefore help to facilitate the Bill’s broader aims of promoting financial stability and maintaining the effectiveness of sound capital markets. I therefore recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 36 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 37
Appointment of chief executive of FCA
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
John Glen
The Government believe that the appointment of the FCA’s chief executive officer should be brought into line with similarly high-profile appointments in financial services, such as the deputy governor of the Bank of England or the CEO of the Prudential Regulation Authority. The clause will therefore set out in statute that the FCA CEO should be subject to a fixed five-year term, renewable once. This delivers on a commitment made to the Treasury Committee during the passage of the Bank of England and Financial Services Act 2016. I therefore recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 37 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 38 to 44 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(David Rutley.)
Financial Services Bill (Eleventh sitting)
Thursday 3rd December 2020
(4 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Financial Services Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 3 December 2020 - (3 Dec 2020)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
Before we begin, I have a few reminders. Please switch electronic devices to silent, tea and coffee are not allowed in sittings, and I thank everybody for your respect of social distancing. The Hansard reporters will be grateful if Members could email any electronic copies of their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk. If Members wish to press any of the new clauses that have already been debated to a Division, some prior indication would be helpful, although not compulsory.
Today, we continue line-by-line consideration of the Bill. New clause 1 has already been debated. Does Pat McFadden wish to press it to a Division?
Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)
No.
New Clause 2
European Union regulatory equivalence for UK-based financial services businesses
‘(1) The Treasury must prepare and publish a report on progress towards regulatory equivalence recognition for UK-based financial services firms operating within the European Union.
(2) This report should include—
(a) the status of negotiations towards the recognition of regulatory equivalence for UK financial services firms operating within the European Union;
(b) a statement on areas in where equivalence recognition has been granted to UK based businesses on the same basis as which the UK has granted equivalence recognition to EU based businesses; and
(c) a statement on where such equivalence recognition has not been granted.”—(Mr McFadden.)
This new clause would require a report to be published on progress towards, or completion of, the equivalence recognition for UK firms which the Government hopes to see following the Chancellor’s statement on EU-based firms operating in the UK.
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 28—Pre-commencement impact assessment of leaving the EU Customs Union—
‘(1) No Minister of the Crown or public authority may appoint a day for the commencement of any provision of this Act until a Minister of the Crown has laid before the House of Commons an impact assessment of—
(a) disapplying EU rules;
(b) applying rules different from those of the EU as a consequence of any provision of this Act.
(2) A review under this section must consider the effects of the changes on—
(a) business investment,
(b) employment,
(c) productivity,
(d) inflation,
(e) financial stability, and
(f) financial liquidity.
(3) A review under this section must consider the effects in the current and each of the subsequent ten financial years.
(4) The review must also estimate the effects on the changes in the event of each of the following—
(a) the UK leaves the EU withdrawal transition period without a negotiated comprehensive free trade agreement,
(b) the UK leaves the EU withdrawal transition period with a negotiated agreement, and remains in the single market and customs union, or
(c) the UK leaves the EU withdrawal transition period with a negotiated comprehensive free trade agreement, and does not remain in the single market and customs union.
(5) The review must also estimate the effects on the changes if the UK signs a free trade agreement with the United States.
(6) In this section—
“parts of the United Kingdom” means—
(a) England,
(b) Scotland,
(c) Wales, and
(d) Northern Ireland; and
“regions of England” has the same meaning as that used by the Office for National Statistics.”
This new clause would require the Government to produce an impact assessment before disapplying EU rules or applying those different to those of the EU; and comparing such with various scenarios of UK-EU relations.
New clause 36—Regulatory divergence from the EU in financial services: annual review—
‘(1) The Treasury must prepare, publish and lay before Parliament an annual review of the impact of regulatory divergence in financial services from the European Union.
(2) Each annual review must consider the estimated impact of regulatory divergence in financial services in the current financial year, and for the ten subsequent financial years, on the following matters—
(a) business investment,
(b) employment,
(c) productivity,
(d) inflation,
(e) financial stability, and
(f) financial liquidity,
in each English region, and in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
(3) Each report must compare the analysis in subsection (2) to an estimate based on the following hypothetical scenarios—
(a) that the UK leaves the EU withdrawal transition period without a negotiated comprehensive free trade agreement;
(b) that the UK leaves the EU withdrawal transition period with a negotiated agreement, and remains in the single market and customs union;
(c) that the UK leaves the EU withdrawal transition period with a negotiated comprehensive free trade agreement, and does not remain in the single market and customs union; and
(d) that the UK signs a comprehensive free trade agreement with the United States.
(4) The first annual report shall be published no later than 1 July 2021.”
This new clause requires a review of the impact of regulatory divergence from the European Union in financial services, which should make a comparison with various hypothetical trade deal scenarios.
Mr McFadden
Thank you for your chairmanship, Mr Davies. I rise to speak to new clause 2, in my name and the names of my hon. Friends. We discussed equivalence when we were debating clause 24 or 25, so it might relieve the Minister and the Committee to know that I will not repeat everything I said about how we got to this position, but let us look at what the current situation is.
First, we have withdrawn from the EU, and in so doing we have withdrawn from any joint decision-making process about mutual access to financial services. Secondly, a few weeks ago the Chancellor announced a unilateral move on the UK’s part to grant equivalence recognition to EU member states and their firms. Thirdly, there is a legislative mechanism to do that in the Bill. Fourthly, we now await decisions on equivalence from the EU. Finally, in terms of the regulatory picture, we have spent a lot of legislative time in this House—probably no one more than the Minister in the past two years or so—legislating to onshore various EU directives. That is where we are.
The aim of onshoring that vast body of legislation was to have a parallel position, or as near to one as we could reach, on day one of the end of the transition period. At the same time, though, we have given our regulators powers to diverge in various ways from the terms of these directives in future. We have discussed that quite a few times in Committee, and the Minister said that the Government are not interested in diverging for the sake of divergence, but of course there are many in the Government, and in his party, for whom divergence is the whole point of the exercise, because it is all about sovereignty. Although we may be almost totally in line on day one—new year’s day—what about day 100 or day 1,000?
Nothing in new clause 2 alters the power to diverge. If the package of onshoring and granting new powers to the regulators that the Minister is taking through is there, nothing in the new clause alters that, but it asks for a report on where we have reached in that process. We know that a positive outcome of this process could have a very significant bearing on the UK financial services industry. It would mean better access for our firms than without that process. It certainly would not give them what they have at the moment, but that is water under the bridge—we debated that earlier in Committee.
The converse is also true, of course: if we do not get equivalence recognition, it would have implications for jobs, tax revenue and how the UK is viewed as a home for inward investment in the financial services industries. All that the new clause does is to ask for a report on where we have got to in the process or, alternatively, a statement on who has refused to grant equivalence of recognition.
I hope the Economic Secretary does not mind if I point out that I cannot be the only one who is struck by the clamour, particularly on the Government Benches, for economic evidence to justify covid-protective measures. Everybody wants the exact detail of how that will affect their local economies. If that is the case, it is only right that the Government report on the economic consequences of the other major process that we are going through. That is the intention behind the new clause.
The sector is hugely important for the United Kingdom, as has been mentioned many times during our debates over the last couple of weeks. All that the new clause does is to ask for a report on where we are on market access. I very much hope that we have a positive outcome on that. Some of it may be about good will, and it might depend on what is agreed in the next week or two—we do not know. It is certainly in the interests of the sector to have a positive outcome. The least we can ask is that the Government report to the House on that.
Finally, if the outcome is positive, the Government will probably want to report back anyway. If the outcome is not positive, Parliament has a right to hear about that, too.
Stephen Flynn (Aberdeen South) (SNP)
Just to be clear, Mr Davies, do you wish me to speak to new clause 2 or to new clauses 28 and 36?
Stephen Flynn
Then I will do that—thank you. It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair once again, Mr Davies. It is probably accurate and correct that the new clauses are grouped together, because they are quite similar in scope, particularly when considering the wider issue of divergence. I will come back to that.
New clause 28 seeks to provide an impact assessment before disapplying European Union rules or applying rules different from those of the EU. That is incredibly important, because it goes to the core of what the Bill is about in relation to our leaving the European Union. Only a few day ago, the Governor of the Bank of England highlighted that a no-deal Brexit could of course lead to a worse economic situation than covid. We need to be in a position to assess the reality of what the Government seek to do. That should apply in the case of no-deal, a good deal—as far as the Government see it—a bad deal or a “Boris deal”.
We should compare what we could have had with what we get. We should be open and transparent with the public about that. The Government talk about wanting to take back control and parliamentary sovereignty; let us take that back to the people as well and show them that the Government are being open and transparent with everything that is put forward. That is particularly important in a Scottish context because—lest we forget—the people of Scotland did not vote for Brexit, and they do not want it to happen, so it is incumbent on the UK Government to provide that clarity to them, particularly on such important matters.
If the Government are proud of the actions that they are taking and seek to go down a different path, they should be willing to follow up on their actions and be open and transparent, not shy away from that.
That takes me on to new clause 36, which would do something very similar to new clause 28, but rather than looking at the potential impact of future decisions, it would provide for an annual review of the decisions that had been taken. That, as the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East said, is, in the context of equivalence, incredibly important, particularly if we are to see the UK diverge from the European Union in any way, shape or form. As we have heard, the Chancellor has guaranteed equivalence to the European Union, so it will have access to the UK markets, but of course there is not a similar agreement in place for us. Conservative Members would, understandably, argue that that is the EU’s fault and that the EU should be delivering that for us, but, as I said on Second Reading, who can blame it when this is a Government who simply cannot be trusted, a Government—lest we forget—who are willing to break international law?
Irrespective of that, we should all be concerned about the reality of not having equivalence in place and what that could lead to. We have made and heard suggestions that it could mean, ultimately, divergence in relation to MiFID—the markets in financial instruments directive. It could mean divergence in relation to the wider insurance regulatory framework. I appreciate that there are arguments both in favour and against in that regard, but we need always to be mindful of what we are seeking to diverge from in relation to our wider relationship with the European Union. I appreciate that it will ultimately be in the gift of the Government to do these things, but they should surely have some concerns about the actions that they will be taking.
I go back to the comments that I made about new clause 28. If the Government are proud of the actions that they take and have taken, they will be willing to accept both new clause 28 and new clause 36 and to put their money where their mouth is and be open and transparent with the people of Scotland and the people of the United Kingdom that their decisions have not been ones that have had disastrous consequences for the economy of the UK. I suggest that if they do not accept the new clauses, that is because they know the damage that they are going to do.
The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (John Glen)
What a pleasure it is to serve under your chairmanship once again, Mr Davies. These new clauses seek to place requirements on the Government to make various reports related to the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and the subsequent evolution of our financial services regulation.
New clause 2 deals with equivalence, which is an important mechanism for managing cross-border financial services activity. I can well understand hon. Members’ interest in that. However, the obligation that the new clause would impose on the Government—essentially, to report on the status of the EU’s considerations about UK equivalence—is beyond the Government’s power and therefore not something that the Government can agree to do.
The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East rightly referred to my right hon. Friend the Chancellor’s speech on 9 November, in which he made clear that we have made equivalence decisions—17 of the 30 that we have to make. We have co-operated very fully with the EU in terms of a timely response to the 17 questionnaires. Again, we cannot determine how it responds. Equivalence assessments are an autonomous process, managed separately from trade negotiations. That applies in the case of the EU, and where the EU chooses to grant the UK equivalence, that will be done in accordance with its own decision-making process. EU equivalence determinations are unilateral and do not require the UK’s agreement. Those decisions will be published and readily available to all, including UK parliamentarians.
I can reiterate today the Government’s commitment to operating an open and transparent approach to equivalence as the Chancellor explained in his speech on 9 November. Our overall approach is outlined in the recently published guidance document on the UK’s equivalence framework. That document makes it very clear that transparency will be one of the key principles of our equivalence framework.
As part of this, the Treasury will provide Parliament with appropriate information about the operation of the equivalence framework. After the end of the transition period, future equivalence decisions will be made by regulations laid before Parliament, giving Members the opportunity to consider and scrutinise the Treasury’s decisions as part of the UK’s normal legislative process.
As I said, the Chancellor recently announced a package of equivalence decisions following the completion of our assessment of the EU, where we took a thorough but proportionate outcomes-based assessment against the criteria in legislation. As the EU has confirmed publicly, there are many areas where it is not prepared to assess the UK at the current time. In the absence of clarity from the EU, we have made decisions to provide clarity and stability to industry, supporting the openness of the sector and to help to deliver our goal of open, well-regulated markets.
Mr McFadden
I want to respond to a couple of things that the Minister said. As I said when I moved the new clause, nothing in it stops divergence. There is no attempt to make sure that we are in lockstep with EU regulations for ever and a day. The new clause is completely silent on that.
Nor does the new clause pretend that the equivalence decisions that we seek can be within the gift of the Government. In fact, from the point of view of some of us, that is the problem. We would have a say over that at present, but we will no longer have a say in future. That is precisely why we are discussing this issue.
All that the new clause does is ask for a report on the outcome. What is the outcome for our financial services? It is like we are back on day one of our proceedings, when we talked about the different reasons for turning amendments down. The Minister has said that the Government will report regularly to Parliament, in which case the new clause would be entirely harmless. That is why we will press it to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Mr McFadden
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
We are by definition entering a new world for UK financial services. Whether it is a brave new world, I do not know, but it is a new world. The measures in the Bill are a small part of that. We are onshoring EU regulations and, although we will still be part of globally agreed standards such as the Basel regime, we will have to decide what future we want in this sector. As the Minister has advised us several times, we should not see the Bill as the totality of what the Government are doing in financial services. There will be a future regulatory review, and there might even be future Bills, so this is one part of the picture. That creates difficulty for the sector, and perhaps for us, in trying to divine where we are going.
That is important because the UK has possibly the most globally significant financial sector of any country in the world. We learned the hard way what the risks of that were in the financial crisis, when the sector ran into trouble. However, the converse is that if the sector is properly regulated, if it pays its way in terms of its taxation contribution, its contribution to innovation, its capacity to bring inward investment to the country and the employment it provides, and if it is properly run, it can also be a huge advantage for the UK. The new clause asks the Government to pull all of that together and take the pipeline of changes that they have in mind, together with the new context, and produce a strategy that gives clarity to the sector, the public and Parliament about where we are going.
That is not particularly unusual for the Government. They do that for other sectors. In the automotive sector, the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy has the Automotive Council UK, which brings together different players in the industry and looks at everything from supply chains and skills to inward investment. Over the years, it has played its part. The last couple of years have been pretty rocky, for reasons that we all know about, but up until then the UK had a growing, successful automotive industry. We were producing more and more cars each year, and we were very successful at winning inward investment.
If we take the parallel of financial services, there is plenty that such a strategy could cover. To name just a few obvious areas, we have a growing FinTech sector in the UK, which we want to succeed. It is doing more innovation, and we might hear more about that later. We have the development of cryptocurrencies, and it is in the public interest that we have a greater understanding of what that phenomenon is and what it means for investors, consumers and so on.
We have the green finance debate, which we have discussed a number of times over the past couple of weeks. If we really want the UK to be the leading force in green finance over the coming decades, what do we need to do to ensure that that is the case? We have also had an ongoing debate for some years about competition and about the challenges of getting new banking players into the UK market, which is, at the retail level, dominated by four or five high street names that account for the vast majority—90%-plus—of current accounts, deposits, savings and so on.
Then we have more difficult issues, which we have touched on, such as money laundering, fraud and so on. They are an ongoing challenge, and we will be talking more about them later this afternoon. There are probably a lot more, but those are the kinds of things that a financial services strategy might cover.
There is also the regulatory approach. Now that we are no longer going to be part of a common European rulebook, what is the philosophy behind the rulebook that we will have? What will it say to assure people that there will not be a race to the bottom? What will it say on capital to get the balance right between allowing innovation and protecting consumers from organisations that do not have enough resilience? Would there, for example, be a shift away from the traditional British strong focus on property investment to more investment in research, development, manufacturing technology and small business lending? That has been a constant theme. There is nothing partisan about it. There are many strong voices in the Conservative party as well as the Labour party speaking up for small businesses and raising the difficulties with lending and so on. That is also something that could be governed.
We spoke about the environmental, social and governance agenda. The Minister has been resistant to all our amendments on that. All the votes are on the record—we have had three or four of them. The Government do not want anything added to the Bill on environmental sustainability or anything like that. I have also said several times that the ESG agenda is really important for the UK, and the Government have said, at least in rhetorical terms, that they believe the same thing, so exactly how would it be advanced if not in the ways that we have tried to suggest—through the various amendments we have tabled to the Bill?
We have a lot of rebuilding to do as we recover from this pandemic. Many people have described it as a great acceleration in trends. There will be job losses, as the Chancellor tells us, and business closures. Many of the behavioural changes that we have seen in how people live, work and purchase things are likely to stay for a long time. A differently shaped day-to-day economy will emerge from this. Financial services will have a huge role to play in that, and Treasury Ministers will quite rightly want to say something about it.
Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)
I very much support what the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East says. It is important that we look at this in the round, and particularly at the newer technologies coming into force that we will need as part of our economy going forward.
John Glen
I very much appreciate the sentiment behind the new clause. The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East set out all the different areas of focus involved in financial services, taking me through all our different calls for evidence and ongoing pieces of work—there are a number of others, too. However, the new clause is unnecessary.
Only a few weeks ago, the Chancellor made a statement to Parliament on the future of the UK financial services sector. Indeed, Miles Celic from TheCityUK described it as an “ambitious vision” for financial services. Across the range of different elements that the right hon. Gentleman set out, a lot of activity is ongoing. Indeed, a number of consultations are out at the moment. As the Chancellor stated, we are at the start of a new chapter for the industry, and our having an open, green and technologically advanced industry that serves the consumers, communities and citizens of this country and builds on our existing strengths, including our world-leading regulatory system and standards, was the essence of that vision. The UK will remain the most open and competitive place for financial services in the world by prioritising stability, openness and transparency.
The Chancellor set out new proposals to extend our leadership in green finance, including by taking the key step of introducing mandatory requirements for firms to disclose their climate-related risks within five years, making the UK the first country to go beyond the “comply or explain” principle. He also announced plans to implement a green taxonomy and, subject to market conditions, to issue the UK’s first ever sovereign green bond next year. He set out his intention that the UK will remain at the forefront of technological innovation, to provide better outcomes for consumers and businesses.
The UK’s position as a global and open financial services centre will be underpinned by a first-class regulatory system that works for UK markets. The Government already have several reviews under way, including the future regulatory framework review and the call for evidence on Solvency II, to highlight two. We also have the FinTech review, which will report early in the new year. That is the Government’s strategy for financial services now that we have left the European Union.
I hope that I could not be accused, as the City Minister, of being unwilling to come before the House to provide updates on the Government’s work relating to financial services, whether in the Chamber, Select Committees—I think I have made about 12 appearances now—or in Westminster Hall, or of doing that infrequently. The Chancellor and I will continue to provide updates at the appropriate times in the normal way.
Having considered the issue carefully, I ask the right hon. Gentleman to withdraw the new clause.
Mr McFadden
The Minister is right to refer to the Chancellor’s statement on 9 November, which was called a vision. While it touched on the green finance things the Minister mentioned, it did not touch on many of the things that I mentioned. He is also right to say that lots of reviews are going on. While it may be unfair to say that that is the problem, there is nothing that really brings them together with clarity about where we are going. I will not press the new clause to a vote today, but we may return to it, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 5
Regulation of lead generators for debt advice and debt solution services
“(none) In section 22 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (regulated activities), after subsection 1A insert—
‘(1AA) An activity is also a regulated activity for the purposes of this Act if it is an activity of a specified kind which is carried on by way of business and relates to—
(a) effecting an introduction of an individual to a person carrying on debt advice and debt solution services, or
(b) effecting an introduction of an individual to a person who carries on an activity of the kind specified in paragraph (a) by way of business.’”—(Mr McFadden.)
This new clause would empower the FCA to regulate activities such as paid search and social media advertisements, including the impersonation of reputable debt management charities.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Mr McFadden
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
This new clause is directed at reducing harm to heavily indebted people by clamping down on imposter or clone websites that might direct people away from legitimate avenues of advice without their knowledge. It was suggested to us by the charity StepChange, which reports a serious, large-scale and ongoing problem with imposter or clone sites posing either as StepChange itself or as another reputable charity and preying on vulnerable people in debt. In fact, StepChange estimates that as many as one in 10 people searching for the organisation online are inadvertently led to someone else.
This is not just one of the traditional issues of having time-consuming and frustrating discussions with web providers to get them to take some responsibility for what is on their platforms; it is also a matter of regulation. The new clause proposes to close a regulatory loophole: the activity of introducing an individual to a credit provider is regulated by the FCA, but the activity of introducing an individual to a debt advice or debt solution service is not. That loophole represents a gap in the picture, and the new clause seeks to close that gap by bringing lead generators for debt advice and debt solution services clearly within the FCA’s remit.
The new clause is, perhaps, about quality control. It would protect consumers from clone sites and from unscrupulous operators who would prey on their financial problems. I argue that that becomes all the more important in the context of clause 32 and the establishment of statutory debt repayment plans, because the gateway to them will be through seeking advice from reputable debt advice and debt solution services. It would be entirely with the grain of the Bill, and the Government’s policy intent, to ensure that that gateway is properly regulated by the FCA.
The Minister has been consistent in resisting every amendment and new clause over the past couple of weeks, and I appreciate that he has probably come armed with advice not to accept any amendments, even if they look okay, because there may be a drafting issue or something. However, if there is some reason in his folder why he cannot accept this new clause today or—hopefully this is not the case—if the optics of doing so, because it has been suggested by the Opposition, are somehow too difficult to contemplate, will he at least take the matter away and consider introducing a provision either on Report or at a further stage in the Bill’s passage?
It is very much in the interests of the statutory debt repayment plans, for which he feels—I credit him for this—a big degree of personal ownership, that this regulatory loophole is closed, and that we do what we can to prevent people seeking that kind of help from being led away by unscrupulous operators on the internet. Instead, we must ensure that they are channelled to reputable advice organisations and solution providers—be it StepChange or somewhere else.
Alison Thewliss
I rise to support the new clause. It is typical of the eagle-eyed way that the right hon. Gentleman has approached this Bill that he found this particular loophole. I am not sure which of his pots he thinks the Government might think it falls into, but it is a sensible, minor change. The Government would do well to take it on now or bring it back at a later stage. We want to protect people who have fallen into that situation in every way we can. We all know that there are vultures on the internet who want to cut a share of that and exploit people. The new clause is a sensible and reasonable way of addressing that and I commend it to the Minister.
John Glen
I take this issue very seriously. I recognise the work of StepChange and I note the letter from Marlene Shiels, chief executive officer of the Capital Credit Union and her support for this. She makes a significant contribution to the Financial Inclusion Policy Forum that I chaired just last week.
The Government are taking strong steps to ensure that lead generators do not cause consumer harm. As the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East said, lead generators identify consumers in problem debt and refer them to debt advice firms and to insolvency practitioners. That can help consumers access appropriate debt solutions and support their recovery on to a stable financial footing. However, I readily recognise the risk that unscrupulous lead generators could act contrary to their clients’ interests. To mitigate that risk, debt advice firms and insolvency practitioners are already required to ensure that any lead generators they use are compliant with applicable rules to prevent consumer harm in the market.
Under Financial Conduct Authority rules, that includes ensuring that lead generators do not imitate charities or deliver unregulated debt advice, and that they are transparent with clients about their commercial interests. As such, the FCA, as the regulator of debt advice firms—and the Insolvency Service, as oversight regulator of insolvency practitioners—already influences lead generators’ impacts on consumers.
New clause 5 would not materially improve the FCA’s influence over lead generators. Its scope would be incomplete, applying only in respect of lead generators’ referrals to debt advice firms, not to insolvency practitioners. The Government have already issued a call for evidence on whether changes are needed to the regulatory framework for the insolvency profession and will publish a response next year. In the light of our recognition that the matter needs a focus and that work is being done on a response, I ask the right hon. Gentleman to withdraw the motion.
Mr McFadden
I am happy to do that. I just appeal to the Minister to try to find a way that he is comfortable with of closing the loophole. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 6
Duty of care for financial service providers
‘(1) The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 1C, after subsection 2(e) insert—
“(ea) the general principle that firms should not profit from exploiting a consumer’s vulnerability, behavioural biases or constrained choices;”
(3) After section 137C insert—
“137CA FCA general rules: duty of care
(1) The power of the FCA to make general rules includes the power to introduce a duty of care owed by authorised persons to consumers in carrying out regulated activities under this Act.
(2) The FCA must make rules in accordance with subsection (1) which come into force no later than six months after the day on which this Act is passed.””—(Mr McFadden.)
This new clause would introduce a duty of care for the FCA which would strengthen the FCA’s consumer protection objective and empower the FCA to introduce rules for financial services firms informed by that duty of care.
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 15—Financial Conduct Authority: regard to consumer detriment—
‘(1) The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 shall be amended as follows.
(2) In section 1C(2), after paragraph (h), insert—
“(i) the prevention of consumer detriment, including but not limited to the promotion of unaffordable debt.”
This new clause would require the FCA to have regard to consumer detriment, including the promotion of unaffordable debt, when exercising its powers.
New clause 18—Duty of FCA to investigate and report on possible regulatory failure—
‘(1) Section 73 of the Financial Services Act 2012 shall be amended as follows.
(2) In subsection 1(b)(ii), at end insert—
(iii) a failure of the FCA to intervene earlier or otherwise act effectively to protect consumers.”.”
This new clause would require the FCA to carry out an investigation into the events and circumstances surrounding any significant failure to secure an appropriate degree of protection for consumers and make a report to the Treasury on the result of the investigation.
New clause 21—Assessment of risks of consumer detriment—
‘(1) Schedule 6 of the Financial Services and Markets Act (2000) is amended as follows.
(2) After paragraph 2D(2)(c) insert—
(d) the risks of consumer detriment associated with the firm’s business model and the likelihood for compensation claims from consumers.”
(3) After paragraph 2D(3), insert—
“(3ZA) When assessing whether the firm has appropriate financial resources to meet the risks of consumer detriment and the likelihood of compensation claims from consumers, the Financial Conduct Authority must ensure that, at all times, firms hold sufficient financial resources to meet any likely compensation claims from customers in full.””
This new clause would ensure that the FCA considers the likelihood of consumer detriment arising from the firm’s business model prior to, and following, authorisation, and that firm’s hold sufficient financial resources to meet potential compensation claims from customers in full.
New clause 23—Consumer redress schemes: FCA reporting requirements—
‘(1) In section 404A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, at end insert—
“(10) Where the Financial Conduct Authority initiates a consumer redress scheme by virtue of the powers conferred in section 404 of this Act, and makes any provisions for its operation by virtue of this section, the Financial Conduct Authority must—
(a) provide an initial written report to the Secretary of State detailing its reasons for any of the provisions it has made for the redress scheme under section 404A;
(b) ensure that any instructions provided to an appointed ‘competent person’ under subsection (1)(k) are included in the above report; and
(c) provide a further written report to the Secretary of State detailing the outcomes from any consumer redress scheme, including copies of any “competent person” assessments relevant to the redress scheme.””
This new clause would require that the FCA provide written reports to the Secretary of State setting out the reasons for any decisions made regarding the parameters decided, and approaches taken, in designing, investigating, and implementing consumer redress schemes, and requires a report on the outcomes achieved for consumers to be made.
New clause 38—Duty of care specification—
‘(1) The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is amended as follows.
(2) After Section 1C insert—
“1CA Duty of care specification
(1) In securing an appropriate degree of protection for consumers, the FCA must ensure authorised persons carrying out regulated activities are acting with a Duty of Care to all consumers.
(2) Matters the FCA should consider when drafting Duty of Care rules include, but are not limited to—
(a) the duties of authorised persons to act honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the best interest of their consumers;
(b) the duties of authorised persons to manage conflicts of interest fairly, both between themselves and their clients, and between clients;
(c) the extent to which the duties of authorised persons entail an ethical commitment not merely compliance with rules;
(d) that the duties must be owned by senior managers who would be accountable for their individual firm’s approach.””
This new clause would mean that the FCA would need to ensure that financial services providers are acting with a duty of care to act in the best interests of all consumers.
New clause 39—Duty of care specification on all financial services providers—
‘(1) The Treasury must by regulations require all financial services providers to act within a duty of care overseen by the FCA.
(2) The FCA may make rules to ensure all financial services providers act within the duty of care.
(3) Matters the FCA should consider when making duty of care rules include but are not be limited to—
(a) the duties of authorised persons to act honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the best interest of their consumers;
(b) the duties of authorised persons to manage conflicts of interest fairly, both between themselves and their clients, and between clients;
(c) the extent to which the duties of authorised persons entail an ethical commitment not merely compliance with rules; and
(d) that the duties must be owned by senior managers who would be accountable for their individual firm’s approach.
(4) If before the end of December in any year the Secretary of State has not introduced a requirement for all financial services providers to act within a duty of care, the Treasury must—
(a) publish a report, by the end of December of that year, explaining why regulations have not been made and setting a timetable for making the regulations, and
(b) lay the report before each House of Parliament.”
New clause 40—Duty of care specification on all financial services providers (No. 2)—
‘(1) At least once a year, the Treasury must review the case for instructing the FCA by regulations to produce rules requiring all financial services providers to act within a duty of care.
(2) If, following the review, the Treasury decides not to introduce such regulations, the Treasury must publish and lay before Parliament a report setting out the reasons for its decision.”
New clause 41—Duty of care on all financial service providers—
‘(none) The Treasury must instruct the FCA to impose a duty of care on all authorised persons providing financial services activity regulated by the FCA by the end of 2021.”
New clause 42—Report on FCA’s progress on duty of care consultation—
‘(1) The Treasury must prepare and publish an annual report setting out the FCA’s assessment of the need for a duty of care and lay a copy of the report before Parliament.
(2) A Minister of the Crown must, not later than two months after the report has been laid before Parliament, make a motion in the House of Commons in relation to the report.”
Mr McFadden
New clause 6 is about a duty of care for financial service providers and several other new clauses push in the same direction. It is fair to say that this has been under discussion for some time. A private Member’s Bill was introduced on the subject in the other place about a year ago and the FCA has been involved in a long process of ongoing discussion about it for the past two or three years. The FCA produced a paper on it in 2018 and there was a response in April last year, although it did not reach a definitive conclusion.
Those who argue for a duty of care—I refer again to the charity StepChange—suggest that the current regulatory framework, even with the duty to treat customers fairly, which is part of the FCA’s current advice and regulations to providers, does not provide adequate protection for consumers. They seek to prompt the question from a financial service provider, “Is this right?” rather than just, “Is this legal?” That is a helpful way of considering what difference a duty of care might make.
The legal definition of a duty of care, as quoted in the FCA’s discussion document is,
“an obligation to exercise reasonable care and skill when providing a product or service.”
Those who favour it believe that it will help avoid conflicts of interest, too and oblige service providers to act in the customer’s best interests rather than, for example, putting the interests of the company above those of the customer it serves.
Stella Creasy (Walthamstow) (Lab/Co-op)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Davies, as ever, for the last time on this Bill. Let us make it a good one. I will try to keep it lively and maybe capture the attention of everybody on the Committee about the things we can do.
The new clauses provide the moment to finally talk about the big beast in this Bill: the Financial Conduct Authority. I say “big beast”, because, as someone who has tracked not only high-cost credit, but credit companies—as I know the Minister has for many years—I sometimes feel like Bob Peck in “Jurassic Park”, who played the warden, Robert Muldoon, who tried to warn people about the velociraptors, but was also supremely impressed by the way in which they evolved to be able to kill. In this case it is about evolving to be able to exploit.
It matters that we take a careful look at what the FCA is doing, because the FCA is our constituents’ best defence against the velociraptors of the credit industries in this country. I use “credit industries” widely, because for me this is not just about the high-cost credit industry. However, in supporting the new clauses, I want to share with the Committee the experiences around the high-cost credit industry and, in particular, the pay-day loan sector, because I think they speak to the challenges with the Financial Conduct Authority and why we need to amend the Bill, to ensure that as we give the FCA more powers, it truly has our constituents’ interests at the forefront of its mind.
I do not doubt the impact that the FCA has had. I want to put that on record, because the Minister and I have talked for a long time about my concerns about the FCA. I acknowledge that it has made progress. My point is about the pace at which it has made progress, about cutting through the stand-off that we sometimes see, whereby people recognise that this is a problematic type of credit or, as my right hon. Friend the shadow Minister has talked about, where issues arise for our constituents—the people who come into our constituency offices and tell us about their ongoing battles—and about ensuring that we do not just give them protection, which means avenues for redress, but actually prevent those problems. I believe that the FCA was set up to prevent problems, but if we look at its track record in some of those problem areas, we see where delays in dealing with them has led to our constituents paying the price.
Bear with me, Committee; I think it is worth sharing that example, because it explains why these amendments make sense. Indeed, I believe the Minister agrees with me on this. A bit like earlier, with the lead generators, I am sure he already has a folder full of examples of where the FCA has done brilliant work in tackling consumer detriment. In fact, I can see all the paper—goodness me, all the trees that have gone into that! However, I know that he wants the FCA to be more agile and does not want to have people like me continually coming to him and him knowing that there is a problem, but seeing this trade-off, as this aspect is overthought almost, with too much emphasis on the unintended consequences of acting and no emphasis on the unintended consequences of not acting on some of these issues. In order to cut through that, these amendments would give a clear direction to the FCA about what consumer detriment is, why and how it needs to act, and the particular issue it needs to take into account when it comes to debt.
On Tuesday, we talked a lot in this Committee about the debts already in our communities and the debts to come, which is why this is an urgent issue that cannot really be dealt with in another review or consultation, which will go on for 18 months, because by then, in every one of our constituencies, too many people will have lost their jobs and possibly their homes, and will be in what we are calling problem debt for decades to come. Indeed, I believe this Committee is already having a positive impact on that conversation, because on Tuesday we talked about the importance of making problem debt as much of an issue for the sidebar of shame in the Daily Mail as Kim Kardashian’s derrière, and last night I saw that the Daily Mail had started talking about the horror of middle-class people having to go to food banks.
Clearly we are starting that conversation in our country, but we need to do much more. Why do we need to do much more? Because it took too long to deal with the payday lending industry. In 2010, when I was first elected, I already knew many colleagues in this place were seeing these companies on their high streets and the problems with the eye-watering interest rates, where people thought they had missed where the decimal point was. Yet nothing was done for years, and those companies exploded, not just in our high streets but online, and our constituents got into huge amounts of debt. I know that the Minister agrees with me that it took too long. I know, too, that the Minister is not his predecessor, who, when I first went to see him about payday lending, literally patted me on the back, congratulated me on finding an issue that I could issue a press release to my local community about and sent me on my way. I know he is not like that; he recognises when there is a problem. However, if he looks at the regulatory history of the FSA on this issue, he will also see that there was a problem.
Let me set that out with companies that people will have heard of. They will have heard of Wonga, QuickQuid and BrightHouse, all of which operate in constituencies across the country. All these companies have collapsed or are in financial difficulty because of the debts they owe to their customers, our constituents, because of the way in which they lent them money on credit. They have not collapsed as a result of the work of the FCA, but because of the work of the ombudsman. In 2014, when Wonga was clearly a problem for so many of our constituents, the FCA agreed a redress scheme for 375 customers and announced that it had appointed a skilled person to monitor the new lending decisions that Wonga was going to make, to ensure that the issue was sorted. In November 2015, the FCA agreed a redress scheme for 4,000 QuickQuid customers worth £1.7 million, and in October 2017 it agreed a £14.8 million redress scheme for 250,000 BrightHouse customers in respect of 384 agreements for lending that may not have been affordable.
That is the critical issue here. At every point, the FCA has acted to look at the affordability of the loans. However—given it is that time of year—it does not take a rocket scientist to work out that if we ask turkeys to decide what is on the menu for Christmas, they will often say that a nut roast is better, and that is what happens when we ask these companies whether a loan is affordable. They would tell their clients that they could afford these loans, because the way they made their money was to re-lend. It was not for someone to borrow from them and pay it all back—it was for that person to borrow from them and get into a cycle of continually borrowing from them, because they would make a lot more money. Once a person was hooked, they would borrow and borrow. That was the decision about affordability.
At various points the FCA has been brought into these companies to determine whether they were making good affordability decisions—whether, in layman’s terms, they were ripping off our constituents. At every point, that affordability decision did not meet the needs of those customers. How do we know that? Because the ombudsman then had to interfere to help people who were in debt. The result was the same: the lenders all fell into administration, not because of the action of the FCA but because the ombudsman was making them repay our constituents, who had been ripped off by them.
Alison Thewliss
I am very pleased to follow the hon. Member for Walthamstow, because she has been a force of nature on this issue, and I do not disagree with a single word she has said about high-cost credit. The Government really should be listening to her, given her expertise.
I want to speak to new clauses 38 to 42, which stand in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen South and focus on duty of care. I pay tribute to Ceri Finnegan from Macmillan Cancer Support, who got in touch when the Bill received its Second Reading and suggested a duty of care. I also pay tribute to the people on the ground in Glasgow who are doing amazing work through Glasgow libraries to support those with cancer and their families, intervening and supporting them when they face financial issues, so that they do not end up getting into greater debt and greater financial difficulties. That prevention aspect is incredibly important.
It is clear to me and to many in the sector that the current situation with the FCA is not working. The StepChange briefing states:
“It is notable that after 20 years of FSMA, the FCA is still talking about culture and has recently consulted on substantial new guidance to ensure firms treat their customers who are particularly vulnerable to detriment fairly. We strongly support this guidance but note that the FCA states that ‘the guidance itself is not legally binding’.”
The fact that it is not legally binding is the problem here, because if no one is being forced to do these things, they are not going to do them in a lot of cases. Some will, but that cannot be relied on, and customers cannot rely on that either. It could well be that one financial services organisation treats people fairly and another one does not, which, again, causes greater stress and confusion.
John Glen
I thank the hon. Ladies and the right hon. Gentleman for their speeches, to which I have listened carefully. I will try to address fully the 10 new clauses that have been tabled. In essence, they relate to the effectiveness of the FCA’s oversight; that is the substantive point behind them.
The lead new clause is new clause 6, which has two functions. Subsection (2) requires the FCA to have explicit regard for vulnerable consumers when discharging its consumer protection objective, and subsection (3) introduces a statutory requirement for the FCA to make rules requiring authorised persons to adhere to a duty of care when providing a product or service.
UK financial services firms’ treatment of their customers is governed by the FCA in its principles of business, as well as specific requirements in its handbook. The FCA’s principles for businesses require firms to conduct their business with due skill, care and diligence, and to pay due regard to the interests of their customers and treat them fairly. The FCA already has recourse to disciplinary action against firms that breach the principles.
The FCA has already announced that it will undertake work to address potential deficiencies in consumer protection, in particular by reference to its principles for businesses. Although the coronavirus pandemic has caused the FCA to reprioritise its resources and delay certain pieces of work, including the next formal stage of this work, delaying these initiatives has ensured that firms are able to focus on supporting their customers, including the most vulnerable, during this difficult period.
I draw attention to the second purpose of new clause 6, alongside new clauses 38 and 39, which require the FCA to introduce a duty of care. A number of other amendments here also relate to the duty of care.
The Government believe that, as the FCA is already taking steps to ensure that consumers are treated fairly and financial services firms are obliged to exercise due care and regard when offering products, services and advice, a statutory duty of care requirement is not necessary. I have already set out a number of actions that the FCA is taking to ensure that customers are properly protected.
On new clause 39 in particular, the Government believe that the scope, which applies to all financial services providers, is inappropriately broad. For example, it is unclear whether that would include persons exempt under the exemptions order, which includes entities ranging from central banks to any employer offering a cycle-to-work scheme. Furthermore, there is no indication of the territorial scope of the financial services provider. Assuming that the duty of care would apply only to actions being done within the UK, the vagueness is still likely to lead to enforcement difficulties if a provider is based outside the UK.
Finally, it is inappropriate to apply the provisions to all financial services providers as no assessment has been made, in relation to unauthorised firms, of the extent to which the existing common law and other consumer protection legislation is or is not sufficient to achieve the right level of consumer protection. For example, where providers are subject to supervision or oversight by other professional bodies, as is the case with professional firms, it is unclear how this proposal would interact with the remit of those bodies who may be better placed to assess matters relevant to duties of care.
New clause 40 would require the Treasury to review at least once a year the case for instructing the FCA to introduce a duty of care for all financial services providers. The Treasury will of course keep this question under consideration. However, it is disproportionate to set this requirement in statute. I have already set out the actions that the FCA is taking to ensure that customers are properly protected.
I want to pause here and note that I have enormous respect for the perspectives of the hon. Member for Walthamstow on this issue. I do not have her encyclopaedic knowledge of dinosaur names, but I do respect her engagement on the issue. I have engaged very closely with the FCA. I recognise that she is still dissatisfied with where things have got to and she makes some reasonable points, on which I am happy to continue the dialogue, but there have been significant changes in recent months with respect to the work that is going on—that is live at present. I suspect she will not be satisfied, but let me carry on and then we can see where we get to at the end of this.
On new clause 41, the Government believe that the FCA, as the independent conduct regulator for the financial services industry, is best placed to judge the merits of a duty of care for the financial services industry. It would therefore be inappropriate for the Treasury to instruct it to impose a duty of care on authorised firms, although that dialogue is ongoing.
On new clause 42, the FCA has already published a feedback statement following its discussion paper on duty of care last year. The FCA will also publicise the findings of its upcoming work on how to address potential deficiencies in consumer protection. Therefore, the Government view is that it would be unnecessary at this point for the Treasury to report on the FCA’s position on the need for a duty of care.
The Government believe that there are sufficient protections in place without expanding the FCA’s statutory consumer protection objective or introducing a statutory duty of care, but I reassure members of the Committee that we will continue to work closely with the FCA to keep this issue under review—I am not saying “No, never.”
New clause 15 would require the FCA to have explicit regard to the prevention of consumer detriment, including the promotion of unaffordable debt, when discharging its consumer protection objective. The Government believe that the FCA, as the UK’s independent conduct regulator, is best placed to judge how to protect financial services consumers from detriment, including that which arises from the promotion of unaffordable debt. The existing legislation accounts for the prevention of consumer detriment as a result of section 1C(2)(e), which outlines
“the general principle that those providing regulated financial services should be expected to provide consumers with a level of care that is appropriate having regard to the degree of risk involved…and the capabilities of the consumers in question”.
Stella Creasy
I am conscious of time, but approximately 1 million households that could ill afford it have lost out on about £1 billion of compensation from Wonga and QuickQuid. Does the Minister really believe that under the existing regime that he is defending, there has been sufficient recognition of what it means to consumers when it goes wrong, and that there is no need for change?
John Glen
There is ongoing work and ongoing evolving action by the FCA. The Government have taken strong steps to prevent problem debt from occurring and to support those who fall into it. We want to make sure that people have the guidance, confidence and skills to manage their finances. That is why we established the Money and Pensions Service last year to simplify the financial guidance landscape, to provide more holistic support for consumers, and to give free support and guidance on all aspects of people’s financial lives. I welcome the publication of its UK strategy for financial wellbeing, which will help everyone to make the most of their money and pensions.
I have already mentioned the role played by the FCA’s principles of business. Further to that, the FCA has recently concluded a consultation on guidance for firms on the fair treatment of vulnerable customers. The protection of vulnerable customers and consumers is a key priority for the FCA. Although many firms have made significant progress in how they treat vulnerable consumers, the Treasury and the FCA want the fair treatment of vulnerable consumers to be taken seriously by all firms so that vulnerable consumers consistently receive fair treatment. I think that was the key point made by the hon. Member for Walthamstow.
Despite those preventive measures, I recognise that many people still fall into problem debt. Professional debt advice plays a vital role in helping people to return to a stable financial footing. That is why in June the Government announced £37.8 million of extra support, which brings the budget for free debt advice to more than £100 million this year. From May, the Government are delivering the first part of the new breathing space scheme, as discussed in Committee, for problem debt. That gives eligible people a 60-day period in which fees, charges and certain interest are frozen and enforcement action is paused.
We discussed on Tuesday the importance of the statutory debt repayment plan, as part of the debate on clause 32. The Government believe that sufficient protections are in place without expanding the FCA’s statutory consumer protection objective. However, I reassure the hon. Lady that the Government will continue to work closely with the FCA to keep that issue under review.
New clause 18 would introduce a duty on the FCA to launch investigations in situations where there is suspected regulatory failure as a result of inaction or a lack of effective action by the FCA, but that is already covered by section 73 of the Financial Services Act 2012. That section imposes a duty on the FCA to investigate where it appears to the FCA that events have occurred that, among other things, indicate
“a significant failure to secure an appropriate degree of protection for consumers”
either by the FCA or otherwise, and where those events might not have occurred but for a serious failure in the regulatory system, or operation thereof, established by FSMA 2000.
Further, section 77 of the 2012 Act enables the Treasury to require the regulators to conduct investigations in cases of suspected regulatory failure in circumstances where it does not appear to the Treasury that the regulators are already doing so, for example under section 73. The section 77 powers are broader than those set out in section 73, in that the Treasury can require the regulators to conduct an investigation into relevant events where it considers that it is in the public interest to investigate them. In addition, section 77 investigations can consider aspects outside the regulatory system as established by FSMA, which allows a comprehensive review to be undertaken in the public interest. Those existing powers ensure that, in cases where section 73 does not apply, a mechanism remains to ensure that investigations can be conducted in the public interest.
If I understand new clause 21 correctly, it reflects the ongoing concerns of the hon. Member for Walthamstow that she has raised in Parliament previously, specifically about circumstances where a firm fails but compensation is owed to a consumer. While I am sympathetic to these concerns, the Government believe that the FCA, as the independent regulator, is best placed to judge the resources that authorised firms need to maintain in order to carry out regulated activities.
I should explain that the FCA is already required by schedule 6 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to consider whether a firm’s resources are appropriate to the activities it carries out. It is obliged to take into account the nature and scale of a firm’s business, as well as the risk to the continuity of the services it provides to consumers, and must consider whether the business is to be carried on in a sound and prudent manner, with particular regard to the interests of consumers. The legislation also already requires the FCA to consider how a firm’s potential liabilities might impact the resources it should hold. The Government therefore believe that this new clause does not add anything further to the FCA’s requirements that already exist in legislation.
Once again, I would mention the FCA’s principles for businesses, which already require firms to maintain adequate financial resources and organise their affairs with adequate risk management. The FCA has recourse to take disciplinary action against firms that breach these principles. Therefore, the Government believe that there are sufficient provisions in place to ensure consumers can access compensation where they have suffered detriment.
Finally, I turn to new clause 23. I should first note that the launching of any consumer redress scheme is a significant undertaking, and it is right and proper that the process be open and transparent. The new clause proposes making amendments under section 404A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, referred to as FSMA, which provides the FCA with rule-making powers for consumer redress schemes.
However, the existing legislation already sets out a number of requirements governing the actions of the FCA, including provisions to ensure that its actions are transparent. Rules made under section 404 by the FCA are subject to a formal public consultation before a scheme is put in place. The FCA also publishes a policy statement explaining its decision and the rationale for the provisions in any proposed scheme. That consultation also includes any decision to appoint a competent person, and the scope of the competent person’s responsibilities, which are documented in the policy statement. Finally, it is right that any scheme is monitored and assessed, to ensure that it has delivered its intended outcomes. Given the importance and impact of consumer redress schemes as good regulatory practice, the FCA would as a matter of course monitor the progress of the scheme as it is implemented, which would include assessing the scheme against its stated objectives.
Introducing a statutory requirement for a process that the FCA already undertakes introduces an additional and unnecessary hurdle. I appreciate that there is a desire to ensure that the regulators are properly accountable to Parliament, and I reassure members of the Committee that such an accountability mechanism already exists. As part of the requirements under FSMA, the FCA must already provide an account of its activity to the Treasury on an annual basis, and that account is shared with Parliament.
I regret that I have spoken for some time, but this is an important set of questions, and some more will come up later this afternoon. I hope I have satisfied the Committee, and therefore I ask the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East to withdraw the new clause.
Mr McFadden
I want to press new clause 6 to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Financial Services Bill (Twelfth sitting)
Thursday 3rd December 2020
(4 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Financial Services Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 3 December 2020 - (3 Dec 2020)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
Just a word of warning—we are a little bit behind time. There are still 11 groups of amendment on the selection paper to debate. We have the room until 5 pm, but I think there were some murmurings about moving that forward a bit. Hint hint: if we make progress, that would help.
Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)
Forgive me, Dr Huq. I might have got this wrong, but I think there might be one more vote on the previous group before we move on.
The Chair
When we reach it on the amendment paper, so not quite yet.
New Clause 8
Money laundering: electronic money institutions
‘(1) The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 303Z1(1) after “bank” insert “, authorised electronic money institution”.
(3) In section 303Z1(6) after “Building Societies Act 1986;” insert—
““authorised electronic money institution” has the same meaning as in the Electronic Money Regulations 2011.”
(4) In section 340(14)(b) after “Bank” insert “, or
(c) a business which engages in the activity of issuing electronic money”.’—(Abena Oppong-Asare.)
This new clause would update definitions in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to reflect the growth of financial technology companies in the UK by equalising the treatment of fin tech companies with banks on money laundering and Account Freezing Orders.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Abena Oppong-Asare (Erith and Thamesmead) (Lab)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
It is a pleasure to have you chairing this sitting, Dr Huq. I rise to speak in favour of new clause 8, which would be good for consumers. [Interruption.] I see that the Minister is agreeing with me—or, at least, he is smiling with me—so I think we are almost getting there.
This new clause would be good for Britain’s world-leading FinTech sector. At the same time, it will improve the ability of our crime prevention agencies to do the job that we all want them to do—that is, to crack down on criminal activity and, in this case, money laundering. It would achieve those objectives by updating definitions in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to ensure that customers of FinTech are treated in the same way as customers of traditional banks with regard to anti-money laundering provisions and account freezing orders. These outcomes would help. We have tabled this new clause because this is an opportunity in the Bill to address the technical deficiencies in the anti-money laundering regime; it is not political in nature. We hope that the new clause will therefore receive cross-party support, as we believe that we are all united in our desire to clamp down on money laundering.
The need for this new clause has arisen because outdated definitions in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 are disadvantaging customers, placing unnecessary pressure on law enforcement, and could allow suspected criminals to avoid complying with law enforcement requirements to forfeit illicit funds. Simply put, this legislation was written before FinTechs existed, and we really need to look at updating the law now because so many people use them. I understand that there is considerable support from the sector and law enforcement for updating the relevant definitions in the Proceeds of Crime Act to reflect the growth of FinTechs, and the passage of the Bill provides the ideal opportunity to do so. We need to act now by amending the Bill, rather than waiting for dedicated legislation, because the problems for consumers, the sector and our crime agencies are getting worse due to the rapid growth of the FinTech sector. I hope that the Minister will therefore accept this simple, highly targeted and rather uncontroversial new clause.
Let me turn to the details. The new clause fixes two specific problems. First, it updates the legislation relating to the defence against money-laundering processes. The second problem relates to account-freezing orders. Under the existing legislation, when financial services firms suspect that someone is engaged in money laundering, it is normal practice for their account to be frozen and for an appropriate decision to be made as to what should be done with the funds, which might include, for example, returning them to source. However, in order legally to be able to return the funds to source, the regulated firm is required to request a legal defence from the National Crime Agency—the so-called defence against money laundering, or DAML—to carry out this activity. DAMLs take two weeks to process. During this period, firms cannot even communicate with customers or allow them to withdraw funds. As we know, the covid pandemic is a particularly difficult period for a lot of consumers.
For reasons of practicality, an exemption was introduced in 2005 such that banks do not request a DAML if the transaction they are to carry out is below £250, but the FinTech sector did not exist at that time so the exemption does not apply to it. Electronic money institutions—that is what most FinTechs are regulated as—are still required to request DAMLs for all transactions, even those of a low value. Low-value DAMLs do not provide useful intelligence to the NCA. I understand that when the UK Financial Intelligence Unit reviewed a sample of 2019-20 DAMLs, it found no refusals for requests under £250.
The rapid growth in the FinTech sector and its inability to use the £250 exemption means that the number of DAMLs has grown from 15,000 in 2015-16 to 34,000 in 2018-19 and 62,000 in 2019-20. According to the NCA’s recently published annual report, the most significant growth was seen from financial technology companies. The report says that such firms submitted 32,454 DAMLs and suspicious activity reports, which is up 247.36% from the previous year, when there were 9,343. The number of DAMLs will continue to grow rapidly until the threshold is extended to EMIs.
That rapid growth is placing significant pressures on FinTechs, customers and law enforcement. For example, a recent article in The Times showed that many customers have their accounts locked out for extended periods. More worryingly, the head of the UK Financial Intelligence Unit, Ian Mynot, told the Financial Times last week that unnecessary DAML reports are affecting the NCA’s ability to investigate criminals. I am sure the Committee will agree that that is really worrying. The article says:
“The…National Crime Agency has called for deeper reform of the system for flagging potential money laundering”
There are concerns out there; it is not just Opposition Members who are concerned.
I am concerned that FinTechs have to spend significant amounts of time and money sending requests to the NCA, which provides the agency with extra admin and work that it does not want to do. That time and money could be used to build new products and services that would benefit customers and businesses and therefore be more cost-effective.
Subsection (4) of the new clause would extend the DAML threshold eligibility to electronic money institutions. When the Minister replies, will he give his assessment of how many DAMLs have been submitted this year and, of those, how many have been for sums under £250? Are the numbers now in the tens of thousands? How many DAMLs for sums under £250 have been refused in the past year? Is it zero? If so, what was the associated cost to the economy of all that unnecessary paperwork, not to mention the diversion of law enforcement resources from proactive investigation to dealing with administration and the intangible costs and frustrations to customers who have had their accounts frozen with no reason given? What is the Minister’s estimate of the amount of time and money FinTechs have expended on submitting DAMLs that the NCA does not want? Does that put the UK FinTech sector at a competitive disadvantage? I realise I am asking a lot of questions, but I have just a few more. How many DAMLS does the Minister expect to be submitted in each of the next three years if the definition in POCA is not updated through the Bill?
Before moving on, Dr Huq, it is worth pointing out that the new clause does not affect the parallel requirement for regulated firms to submit suspicious activity reports to the NCA every time a firm knows or suspects that someone is engaged in money laundering, regardless of the sums involved. I reassure hon. Members that the new clause would not change the SAR process. Does the Minister think that DAMLs of under £250 provide any useful intelligence to the NCA, given that it already receives SARs and given the comments of Mr Mynot? Can the Minister address that in his response?
The second issue that the new clause addresses relates to account-freezing orders, or AFOs. The Proceeds of Crime Act includes provisions that enable law enforcement agencies to freeze and forfeit funds held in UK bank or building society accounts, where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that those funds are the proceeds of crime. In order to freeze funds in an account, a senior law enforcement officer has to apply to the courts for an account freezing order. Under POCA, AFOs can only be used to freeze funds held in bank or building society accounts.
The Minister may be able to correct me on this, but I understand that AFOs cannot be used to freeze funds held in accounts of FinTechs, which are regulated as electronic money institutions. It seems to me that there is clearly a significant risk that criminals will exploit that loophole and run illicit activities through FinTech accounts to avoid having their funds frozen.
Subsections (2) and (3) of the new clause would update the necessary definitions in POCA, meaning that law enforcement could use AFOs to freeze funds held in FinTech accounts in the same way that they can in standard current accounts. In his response, can the Minister let the Committee know if his Department is aware of any suspected money launderers exploiting this AFO loophole? That is important if we are to move forward. What are the sums involved? Have any police forces or law enforcement agencies made representations to the Minister urging him to adopt the measure? If so, does he agree with us that the loophole needs to be closed as a matter of urgency, and that the change in definitions cannot wait any longer?
Dr Huq, we all want to make progress on this issue. I will therefore be listening very carefully to the Minister’s response to my questions. As I said at the outset, I hope that we can use the opportunity today to obtain a cross-party consensus to fix these issues during the passage of the Bill. That would be good for consumers, it would support our crime prevention agencies and send a strong message of support to our fast-growing FinTechs. If the Minister is unable to commit to looking at this issue during the passage of the Bill, we would welcome his bringing it up at a later stage. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (John Glen)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Huq. Before I respond to the hon. Member for Erith and Thamesmead, I would like to recognise her award last night as newcomer of the year by the Patchwork Foundation; I congratulate her on that success.
The hon. Lady asked a number of specific questions about suspicious activity reports, or SARs, and I have those answers for her. Before I come on to them, it is important that we contextualise this new clause in the great success that is the UK’s FinTech sector, with 600 propositions, 76,500 people working in the industry and £4.1 billion of venture capital money put into it just last year. The Government remain committed to supporting the sector, trying to maintain the UK’s leadership position in this market and making it the best place to start and grow a FinTech firm.
I am pleased to say that assessments have cited the UK’s strong Government support, access to skills, robust domestic demand and flexible regulator as particular strengths. It is a priority for the Government to maintain the UK’s strength as a FinTech destination and continue fostering innovation. That is why the Chancellor asked Ron Kalifa OBE to carry out an independent review of the sector. The review will make practical recommendations for Government, industry and regulators on how to support future growth and adoption of FinTech services.
The Government are conscious of the challenges that face the FinTech sector under the current suspicious activity reporting regime, in particular with respect to defence against money laundering SARs, sometimes known as DAML SARs. The volume of DAML SARs received by the NCA has grown substantially, with more than 60,000 received in 2020. Electronic money institutions—EMIs—are the largest contributor to that increase, with such companies accounting for four fifths of the increase in these requests. As the hon. Lady rightly pointed out, that has resulted in increased pressure on limited law enforcement resources. This year, £172 million was denied to suspected criminals as a result of DAML requests, up 31% on the previous year’s £132 million and more than three times the £52 million from 2017-18. It would be useful for the Committee to know that the Government are working closely with law enforcement to further resolve the current anomaly with regard to account freezing orders.
The Government are supportive of the objective to equalise treatment of banks and FinTech firms in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. Of course, that legislation could not take account of FinTechs. Under the economic crime plan, the Treasury and Home Office, along with law enforcement, have been working with the FinTech sector to identify and implement solutions to the challenges that the provisions of the Proceeds of Crime Act create. Progressing those solutions remains a priority, and we are committed to reforming the suspicious activity reporting regime as part of the wider programme of economic crime reform. It is a significant area in which banks and financial institutions urgently need to see reform, and it requires a collaborative effort between the Treasury, the Home Office and private sector actors.
While the Government agree with the intent behind new clause 8, it is drafted in such a way as to create inconsistencies with definitions set out within the wider statute book. Specifically, the insertion of references to electronic money institutions into the definition of “deposit taking body” in the Proceeds of Crime Act introduces scope for confusion as to the status of electronic money institutions in wider financial services legislation, such as the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. Electronic money institutions are not classified as “authorised deposit takers” for the purposes of that Act.
The Government agree with the principle that the treatment of e-money institutions should be equalised with banks in those two specific areas. However, as the Committee will be aware, financial services legislation is complex, and it is important to work through these things carefully, to ensure that the legislation operates as intended and avoids any unintended outcomes. This new clause does not adequately consider interactions with other pieces of legislation. I recognise that that is a technical matter. The Government are aligned with the intent, so I have asked my officials to work—and, indeed, I have been working myself—with colleagues across Whitehall, particularly in the Home Office, to identify a way of addressing this issue that is consistent with the broader regulatory framework for these firms. I intend to provide the House with an update on Report. Given that commitment, I ask the hon. Lady to withdraw the new clause.
Abena Oppong-Asare
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 9
Public country-by-country reporting by financial services companies
‘(1) The Treasury must, every year, publish and lay before both Houses of Parliament a report on its progress in pursuit of international action on public country-by-country reporting by relevant bodies.
(2) The report must include an update on whether the Treasury intends to require the group tax strategies of relevant bodies to include a country-by-country report, pursuant to paragraph 17(6) of Schedule 19 to the Finance Act 2016.
(3) The first report must be laid before both Houses of Parliament within six months of this Act being passed.
(4) For the purposes of this section, a “relevant body” means a body authorised by or registered with the Financial Conduct Authority.’—(Abena Oppong-Asare.)
This new clause would require the Treasury to report on a regular basis to Parliament on its progress, for FCA-registered and authorised companies, towards international agreement on a model of public country-by-country reporting and whether it will use powers in the Finance Act 2016 to require public country-by-country reporting in the UK.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Abena Oppong-Asare
I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.
If agreed to, new clause 9 would be good for the country and at the same time would tackle widespread concerns about multinational enterprises exploiting the way national systems interact in order to minimise the total amount of corporation tax they pay. It would help create greater transparency around the taxation of multinational companies, achieving those objectives by requiring the Treasury to report on a regular basis to Parliament on its progress in pursuit of international action on public country-by-country reporting by relevant bodies.
Let me say at the outset that those outcomes are what we want to see. Labour’s aim in tabling new clause 9 is to use the Bill as an opportunity to help make the UK a world leader in financial transparency. I appreciate, as the Minister mentioned earlier, that financial legislation is complex, but we hope that on this occasion we will be able to receive cross-party support, as I believe we are all united in our desire to have far greater transparency.
The Government currently have the power to require multinational enterprises to publicly report their tax payments on a country-by-country basis, but so far they have resisted using that power. As I mentioned earlier, there is widespread concern about how multinational enterprises successfully exploit the way national systems interact in order to minimise the total amount of corporation tax they pay. New clause 9 is one way of tackling that. It is quite simple: it just requires public country-by-country reporting of the amount of tax multinational enterprises pay in each country where they have operations.
Schedule 19 of the Finance Act 2016 introduced a requirement for UK-headed multinational enterprises, or UK sub-groups of multinational enterprises, to publish a tax strategy. Paragraph 17(6) gives the Treasury the power to require those tax strategies to include country-by-country reports of tax paid. However, while the Government do not appear to disagree with the principle of country-by-country reporting, we still have not seen the full use of powers to require that. They say they want international agreement on public reporting first.
I am sure the Minister agrees that there has been recent pressure on the Government to use the power in the Finance Act 2016 to introduce public country-by-country reporting. It was most recently discussed during the passage of the Finance Bill this year. On Report, on 1 July, the right hon. Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge) tabled new clause 33, which would have required a tax strategy published by a group liable for the digital services tax to include any relevant country-by-country reports. At the time, new clause 33 received cross-party support, including from our own shadow Chief Secretary to the Treasury, my hon. Friend the Member for Houghton and Sunderland South (Bridget Phillipson), and Conservative Members such as the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis), the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake) and the right hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell). I echo the comments made by the shadow Chief Secretary to the Treasury, who said:
“For years, the Opposition have urged the Government to commit to country-by-country reporting on a public basis…the way in which they have held up progress at an international level, has been a source of deep frustration to those of us who want to see far greater transparency around the taxation of multinational companies.”—[Official Report, 1 July 2020; Vol. 678, c. 367.]
The right hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield said:
“The new clause would allow Parliament, journalists, campaigners and civil society to see clearly whether these businesses are paying their fair share of taxation. If the Government accept the new clause, that would, as the hon. Member for Houghton and Sunderland South suggested, make the UK a world leader in financial transparency.”—[Official Report, 1 July 2020; Vol. 678, c. 369.]
There are companies already undertaking voluntary country-by-country reporting. For example, SSE—one of the largest electricity network companies in the UK—has been awarded the fair tax mark for the fourth year in the row. It provides a shining example of how this could be done. We are seeing companies doing this on a voluntary basis, and the new clause would ensure that all companies do it and that it is not a difficult process.
The Government have made quite a big deal about wanting to be a global leader next year—it is not just me saying that; those are the Government’s words—particularly post Brexit and with our presidency of the G7. If the Government genuinely want to show global leadership, should they not be at the forefront of pushing these kinds of measures, rather than passively waiting for an international agreement to be reached? This is a perfect time to implement this provision. It would be great if we could get just one amendment through on this occasion.
The new clause would require the Government to publish an annual report to Parliament on their progress towards the international agreement, including whether they intend to use the power in the Finance Act 2016 to require public country-by-country reporting and publish tax strategies. We would welcome the Minister taking this opportunity to give us the latest update on progress towards the international agreements on public country-by-country reporting, including what specific discussions the Government have had with international partners and whether the Government anticipate any progress on this matter in 2021.
John Glen
New clause 9 would require the Treasury to publish and lay before both Houses of Parliament an annual report that outlines its progress towards international action on public country-by-country reporting, and provides an update as to whether it intends to expand the existing tax strategy reporting requirement to include country-by-country reports of financial services companies. As the hon. Lady has acknowledged, the Government have championed tax transparency through initiatives at the international level, including tax authority country-by-country reporting and global standards for exchange of information, and through domestic action such as the requirement for groups to publish tax strategies.
In relation to public country-by-country reporting, the Government continue to believe that only a multilateral approach would be effective in achieving transparency objectives, and avoiding disproportionate impacts on the UK’s competitors or distortions regarding group structures. Different global initiatives to increase tax transparency and to help protect against multinational avoidance continue to be discussed in the international forums, such as the OECD, in which the UK is an active and leading participant. However, although the Government will continue to be clear and transparent about our broad objectives in this area, it would not be appropriate for the Treasury to provide a detailed report each year assessing the status and evaluating the progress of fast-moving, complex discussions that typically take place between countries on a confidential basis, nor do we think it appropriate to approach that from the narrow focus of financial services as the new clause suggests.
Although the Bill makes specific amendments to the scope of country-by-country reporting required in order to reflect the changes to the prudential regimes, the question of whether corporates should be required to publish country-by-country reports as part of their tax disclosures is a wider question that is relevant to large multinationals operating in all industry sectors, not just those in regulated financial services sectors. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Lady to withdraw the new clause.
Abena Oppong-Asare
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 10
FCA recommendation to remove a self-regulatory organisation: Ministerial statement
“(1) When the FCA makes a recommendation that a self-regulatory organisation be removed from Schedule 1 to the MLR pursuant to Paragraph 17 of the Oversight of Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist Financing Supervision Regulations 2017, the Treasury must make a statement to Parliament.
(2) The statement must be made within four weeks of the recommendation being made.
(3) The statement to Parliament must set out—
(a) the Government’s response to the FCA’s recommendation;
(b) the likely impact on the sector of any action the Government is proposing to take, including—
(i) the impact of the organisation retaining its Anti-Money Laundering supervisory responsibilities if the Government decides not to remove the organisation from Schedule 1 to the MLR; and
(ii) where the Government intends to place an organisation’s Anti-Money Laundering supervisory responsibilities if it decides to remove the organisation from Schedule 1 to the MLR; and
(c) where applicable, a timescale for the removal of the self-regulatory organisation from Schedule 1 to the MLR.
(4) For the purposes of this section, “MLR” means the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017.”—(Abena Oppong-Asare.)
This new clause would require the Treasury to report to Parliament on its response to any recommendation by the FCA that an organisation have its anti-money laundering supervisory responsibilities removed, including the impact of either accepting or rejecting any such recommendation.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Abena Oppong-Asare
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 10 would be good for consumers. At the same time, it would improve the ability of our crime prevention agencies to do the job that we all want them to do—namely, to crack down on criminal activity and, in this case, money laundering. Our aim in tabling the new clause was to take the opportunity offered by the Bill to address technical deficiencies in the anti-money laundering regime. Again, I hope that we will receive cross-party support for our proposal, as I believe we are all united in a desire to clamp down on money laundering.
Tackling money laundering has a strong international aspect, but the Government need to ensure that we have clear and effective anti-money laundering measures within the UK. The intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force was founded by the G7 in 1989 to design and promote policies to combat money laundering around the world. In the EU, FATF standards are implemented by way of money laundering directives, which are designed to establish a consistent regulatory environment across member states. As I said, there is clearly a strong international aspect to the work, but it is the responsibility of the UK Government to implement effective measures in this country. Implementing new clause 10 would certainly help to address that.
There are concerns about fragmentation. Indeed, that is a long-standing concern about the UK’s anti-money laundering supervisory regime. In the UK, there are, in the accountancy and legal sectors, 22 different professional bodies with responsibility for monitoring compliance by their members with anti-money laundering measures. The EU’s fourth money laundering directive made it clear that bodies that represent members of a profession may have a role in supervising and monitoring them. As I said, however, the supervisory landscape in the UK has been criticised for being highly fragmented.
In 2015, that was recognised by the Government in the “UK national risk assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing”, the first such assessment, which highlighted the challenge of having a large number of supervisory organisations. Advocacy organisations such as Transparency International, which gave evidence to our Committee a few weeks ago, have long criticised the fragmented nature of the UK’s anti-money laundering supervisory regime.
In 2018, the Government created a new office within the Financial Conduct Authority to improve standards among professional supervisory bodies—the Minister will probably mention that—but concerns have been raised about its effectiveness. For example, the Oversight of Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist Financing Supervision Regulations 2017 gave the FCA the role of ensuring that the anti-money laundering work of the professional supervisory bodies was effective. That would be done through the new office within the FCA, the Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision. The 22 professional bodies that OPBAS regulates are named in schedule 1 to the 2017 regulations.
However, a Treasury Committee report from last year, entitled “Economic Crime - Anti-money laundering supervision and sanctions implementation”, concluded that it was not clear how the Treasury would respond to an OPBAS recommendation to remove a professional body’s supervisory role. In particular, the Treasury Committee said that there was not an adequate indication of where the Treasury would move a body’s supervisory responsibilities if it was stripped of them. It concluded that the lack of preparation created a risk that a supervisor might become “too important to fail”. That is quite concerning to me. The Committee recommended that the Treasury publish within six months a detailed consideration of how it would respond to a recommendation from OPBAS.
In their “Economic Crime Plan 2019-22”, which was published in July last year, the Government committed to meeting the Treasury Committee’s recommendation by publishing
“a detailed consideration of the process for responding to an OPBAS recommendation to remove a professional body supervisor’s status as an AML/CTF supervisor, including managing changes in supervisory responsibilities, by September 2019.”
In a letter to the Chair of the Treasury Committee dated 17 October last year, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury set out in a few paragraphs the Treasury’s response to an OPBAS recommendation. The letter provided little extra information and cannot be taken to constitute the
“detailed consideration of the process”
promised in the economic crime plan.
In September this year, the Royal United Services Institute noted:
“OPBAS are working with HM Treasury on designing a process in the event that a supervisor is removed from the Schedule 1 list of approved supervisors. This work is nearing completion, but has been delayed to autumn 2020 by the Covid-19 situation.”
In short, the Government committed to publishing a detailed consideration by September last year but still have not done so. It is now December 2020, so it has been more than a year.
Labour’s new clause seeks to underline the importance of the Treasury having a clear and credible response to OPBAS recommendations. For OPBAS’s role to be as effective as possible, it is crucial that its ultimate sanction must have credibility, so the Treasury must be clear of its response to a recommendation from OPBAS to remove a professional body’s supervisory responsibilities. Our new clause attempts to formalise the process of a Treasury response by committing the Government to publishing their response within four weeks of an OPBAS recommendation to remove an organisation from schedule 1. The response must make clear what the Government intend to do and, crucially, the impact of their decision either to leave an organisation on schedule 1 or to remove it.
We would welcome a commitment from the Minster today—this is my third time trying, with a third new clause—on when the Government will finally publish their
“detailed consideration of the process”
for responding to OPBAS recommendations to remove a professional body supervisor from schedule 1. This is also an opportunity for the Minister to set out the Government’s intended approach to complying with the FATF standards after the end of the transition period, and whether the Government intend to meet or exceed future EU money laundering directives. For that reason, the new clause really must be added to the Bill to help the Treasury finally to meet its obligations.
John Glen
The Government are committed to ensuring consistently high standards across the UK’s anti-money laundering supervision system, and the FCA’s Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision—known as OPBAS—is a key part of that. It works with the 22 professional body supervisors to address any weaknesses identified in their supervisory responsibilities. When OPBAS has identified deficiencies in professional body supervisor oversight arrangements or practices, it has taken robust action, including by using powers of direction. OPBAS will continue to take such action with supervisors when appropriate, to ensure that consistent high standards of supervision are achieved.
Regulation 17 of the regulations that establish the role of OPBAS ensures that there is a clear route to removal if OPBAS has significant concerns about a supervisor’s effectiveness. As the hon. Lady pointed out, following the Treasury Committee’s economic crime inquiry, I wrote to the Committee to set out the process by which the Treasury would respond to a recommendation from OPBAS for such a removal. That covers each of the points that have been included in subsection (3) of the proposed new clause.
The removal of a professional body supervisor would be a highly significant decision; the Treasury would carefully consider any recommendation and, if approved, would work with other professional body supervisors, OPBAS and the statutory supervisors to ensure the continuation of anti-money laundering supervision for the affected professional body supervisor’s members. That would also require the agreement of a transition period before the removal of the professional body supervisor from schedule 1 of the money laundering regulations. It could not just be done abruptly without due recourse to what interim measures or further successor measures would need to be put in place.
It is essential that any recommendation is given due consideration and planning before a decision is announced, and the introduction of a four-week statutory deadline from the issuance of a recommendation would place that at risk. If a decision has not been reached, any enactment or publication of details of the recommendation would be inconsistent with regulation 21(2) of the OPBAS regulations, which prohibits such publication.
While any recommendation for removal would be treated with urgency by the Treasury, the length of the process would be dependent on the circumstances. We therefore believe that it would be wrong for a statutory deadline to be placed on reaching an effective outcome. In the event of OPBAS’s recommending the removal of a professional body supervisor, a notice would be placed on gov.uk once a decision on removal had been reached and, if necessary, plans would be agreed for the transition of affected businesses. I therefore ask the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East and the hon. Members for Erith and Thamesmead and for Manchester, Withington not to press the new clause.
Abena Oppong-Asare
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 16
Consumer credit: extension of FCA rule-making duty
“(1) Section 137C of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 shall be amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1A), substitute
‘one or more specified descriptions of regulated’
for ‘all forms of consumer’.”—(Stella Creasy.)
This new clause would extend the responsibility of the FCA to make rules with a view to securing an appropriate degree of protection for borrowers against excessive charges to all forms of consumer credit.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Stella Creasy (Walthamstow) (Lab/Co-op)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 17—Regulation of buy-now-pay-later firms—
“The Treasury must by regulations make provision for—
(a) buy-now-pay-later credit services, and
(b) other lending services that have non interest-bearing elements
to be regulated by the FCA.”
This new clause would bring the non interest-bearing elements of bring buy-now-pay-later lending and similar services under the regulatory ambit of the FCA.
New clause 22—Cost of credit: FCA assessment—
“In Schedule 6 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 after paragraph 2F(3) insert—
‘(4) When considering the business model, the Financial Conduct Authority must have regard to the interests of consumers, in particular—
(a) the proportion of a firm’s revenues that are to be derived from re-lending, and
(b) whether customers are likely to be charged a total cost of credit in excess of one hundred percent of the amount borrowed both on the basis of the initial credit terms or following relending activities.
(5) Where the Financial Conduct Authority’s assessment concludes that a business model poses a significant risk that customers will be charged a total cost of credit in excess of one hundred percent of the amount borrowed, then the threshold condition will not be met.’”
This new clause would ensure that the Financial Conduct Authority assesses the business models of firms and does not allow excessive relending activity to take place, or for firms to be granted permission if there is a significant risk of customers paying more in interest, fees and charges, than the amount they have borrowed.
Stella Creasy
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Dr Huq—all of us who have one of those titles but never really use it probably ought to, not least with our bank managers on issues such as this.
The new clauses we discussed this morning were about when the FCA, having been involved with a company, has let down our constituents, and that is why we pushed new clause 21 to a vote: fundamentally, there are thousands of people in this country, many of them our constituents, who will be denied compensation because the companies that owe them compensation have gone into administration on the FCA’s watch.
These new clauses are about how we can get proper consumer protection so that we do not get into those positions at all, as well as taking on board what we have learned in the past seven years about what actually works to protect consumers, and the reality is that it is capping. Capping the costs of credit has been a very effective, cheap and clear form of regulation, which has benefited industry and consumer alike. These new clauses are about giving the FCA the power to use that evidence to help to protect our consumers, because, sadly, the detriment that made capping payday lending such an effective thing to do is now appearing in many other industries. That speaks to the whack-a-mole challenge that we have with credit in this country.
As I said this morning, the challenge is that the FCA moves very slowly, but this industry—credit in its broadest sense, not just high-cost credit—moves very quickly. We know that what has stopped consumer detriment is being able to cap what these companies can charge, and we know that most of all from the payday lending industry. The payday lending industry still exists in this country, but the reason we have not had people turning up to our surgeries, or seen these companies on our high streets or indeed in our inboxes, is that regulation has meant that people are not being exploited by them in the way that they were. The companies can still operate—those that want to lend to people in a short-term and effective way without exploiting them. However, the point at which people get into debt and cannot get out of it—that business model that was about hooking people in and keeping them paying—has ended, because of the cap.
In this country, if someone takes out a payday loan, they will never pay back more than double what they borrowed, including the interest fees and the charges. That is a really important point in these new clauses, because the whole point was capping not just interest rates, but the whole cost of a loan. As I said earlier, exploitation in the credit industry is like water: it finds the loopholes. These new clauses speak to other forms of loopholes.
Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)
The hon. Lady is making a very good point. Is she aware that the Young Women’s Trust has suggested that 1.5 million young women have lost income during the pandemic?
Stella Creasy
Absolutely. We know who such companies are targeting, and they are doing so deliberately. I hate to say this, as I do want to win over the Committee, but we might not be their target audience at this point in our lives, because we might not be actively reading the social influencer media posts. I might be completely wrong—I am sure some Government Members are regularly on their Instagram accounts looking at posts by ASOS.
Some 20% of those young people say they have missed a payment in the last year—the figure has doubled in the last year—because they thought that a purchase would cost a certain amount and that they had an income, but that income has gone. The companies will say that they are very good to their customers because they do not lend more than people need and they do not charge interest—the companies’ interest is in people paying back the money—but those companies go silent on what they do when people do not pay back. What happens to people’s credit references? How do they chase money? Do they use debt collection agencies?
Those companies are growing rapidly, just as the payday lending industry did. We watched that happen and, in that Cassandra-like way, all tried to warn of it, but it took too long for us to act. In 2019 Klarna was boasting that it had signed a partnership with a new merchant every eight minutes in this country. By the end of 2019, 6 million people had used its product, and it said that 55,000 were using it weekly. Imagine what it is like now, with people having been stuck at home and stuck on their phones.
The Money and Mental Health Policy Institute found that more than 3 million people with mental health problems have found it harder during the pandemic to control their online spending, and two in five said the BNPL industry has been “harder to resist”. Because it is not regulated, it does not have to follow any of the rules we might want to point to that protect consumers. That is why we see all those adverts saying, “No interest, no fees—don’t worry about it.” The industry does not have to provide the normal financial information we see in other forms of credit because it is not regulated in that way.
Just as with the payday loan industry, as soon as we started talking about these companies, along came the offers of dinners and discussions and talks, where the industry says it is in fact a misunderstood new technology. Those of us who are not regularly on the internet have obviously missed them.
Stella Creasy
I am sure the shadow Minister is about to tell us about his Instagram account.
Mr McFadden
No, I am not, but I am interested to hear that my hon. Friend got an offer of dinner. All I got was an email.
Stella Creasy
Sadly, during the pandemic, none of us has been able to take up any of those offers to explain our concerns to these companies directly, as opposed to on Zoom. It is a simple concern: the way in which these products are marketed encourages people to spend money as a way of dealing with the emotional and social impacts of the pandemic. The adverts, using those social influencers, say, “When you’re feeling low, sat at home by yourself with nowhere to go, there is something to make you feel better.” Essentially, the message is, “Get into debt. Don’t worry about it. You can spread the payments. Don’t worry about whether you can afford it.” They get away with saying and doing that because they are not covered by the regulations.
I know the Minister is looking at this issue—he said so—and that the FCA is doing so. I have made a series of complaints to organisations such as the Advertising Standards Authority about these issues, because, just as with payday lending, we have seen the rapid expansion of these companies. My worry is that if we take 18 months it could be too late in terms of consumer detriment. I do not doubt these companies when they say they want to have a sustainable business model, but it is for us in this place, in crafting the Bill, to decide what sustainability is and how they make their money. Otherwise, we are handing them our young consumers, in particular, on a plate to be exploited. The new clauses speak to those issues.
New clause 16 would ensure that all forms of consumer credit are covered by regulation, because the gap that Klarna and company have fallen into is arguing that they are not a form of consumer credit so they do not need to be regulated. We should always apply a sniff test: if somebody is giving us money to buy things on tick, that is a form of credit. If it walks like a duck and talks like a duck, it should be regulated like ducks should—see, we have moved on from the dinosaurs to ducks.
New clause 17 would make rules explicitly about the buy now, pay later industry. I do not believe we can wait another year or so before we do something. It makes sense to bring the industry under the FCA’s umbrella so that the FCA can act. The new clause would ensure that Ministers could act based on the industry’s actions, given the risks that come from them. Unlike customers of Amigo Loans or indeed the remaining payday loan industry—or even the credit card industry—nobody who uses buy now, pay later can go to the ombudsman for redress, so what do they do if they get into difficulty? I pay tribute to Alice Tapper from Go Fund Yourself, who has been collecting the evidence about young people getting into debt from unaffordable forms of spending with such companies and not knowing how to get out of it.
John Glen
I would like to sincerely thank the hon. Member for Walthamstow for her tireless work in this area—she does not look too happy that I have said that, but I sincerely mean it. I recognise the contributions she has made to cap the cost of payday lending. That has made a significant difference, and although we differ on some elements, my vigilance is seriously minded towards these problems, and I will try to respond in full to the points she has made.
As the hon. Lady knows, the Government have given the FCA the power to cap all forms of regulated credit, and the FCA can do so if it thinks it is necessary to protect consumers. I note that her new clause seeks to require the FCA to use this power for all forms of consumer credit and that the retained reference to “high-cost short-term credit” appears to limit its application, but I will proceed on the basis of the intention behind the new clause.
Government legislation has previously required the FCA to use this power, leading to the 2015 cap on the cost of payday loans, and Government will consider further action as circumstances require. However, the Government do not encourage regulatory intervention where there is no clear case for doing so. That can increase the costs to business, which are usually passed to consumers, or lead to products and services being commercially unviable, reducing consumer choice.
While the Government imposed a requirement on the FCA in legislation to use its capping powers for payday loans, the context for that intervention was very different from the current consumer credit market. The Government legislated only after agreement between the FCA and Government that the cap was necessary, in response to the well-evidenced harm that was occurring in the payday lending market, which the hon. Member for Walthamstow has done a massive amount of work to promote awareness of. Introducing this duty on the regulator ensured that its efforts were focused on implementing the cap quickly, rather than spending time and resources on making the case for a cap in the first place. Following this successful intervention, the FCA independently implemented a similar price cap on rent-to-own products in March 2019 in response to the FCA finding evidence of consumer detriment as a result of excessive charges.
The FCA keeps the issue of capping the cost of other types of credit under constant review. There is not an equivalent case today that necessitates this action. Therefore, we should not legislate to force the FCA, as the independent and expert regulator, to implement a cap. As can be seen from the payday and rent-to-own markets, in some cases price caps can be effective in protecting consumers from the most egregious harm. However, a blanket cap would not take into account the idiosyncrasies of the breadth of consumer credit products on the market and could give rise to unintended consequences.
Let me turn to new clause 17. This amendment speaks to the exemption under article 60F of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001. That exemption covers interest-free loans, repayable in no more than 12 instalments, within no more than 12 months, used for the financing of specific goods and services. It allows businesses such as gyms and sports season-tickets providers to avoid the burden of FCA regulation for offering deferred payment terms for the goods and services they provide. It also catches many everyday transactions, where the supplier of goods or services issues an invoice and affords a period of time to pay.
The exemption is important in allowing low-risk day-to-day business activity to be undertaken without firms needing to be authorised by the FCA or to comply with consumer credit regulation. However, the Government are alert to the specific concerns about buy now, pay later products that utilise this exemption. I know that the hon. Member for Walthamstow is concerned about the way in which those products are advertised, as she set out this afternoon, and the risk of borrowers unknowingly building up problem debt.
An interest-free credit, unregulated, buy now, pay later product, as it is inherently lower risk than other forms of borrowing, can provide a lower-cost alternative to help people buy the products they need and can be a useful part of the toolkit for managing personal finances and tackling financial exclusion. However, despite the potential benefits and the fact that we are yet to see substantive evidence of widespread consumer harm, the Government and the FCA are aware that risks are associated with those products, as with any type of borrowing. Therefore, the former interim chief executive officer of the FCA, Chris Woolard, is urgently undertaking a review into change and innovation in the unsecured credit market.
The Government welcome the review. I have spoken with Chris Woolard about it, and he attended the financial inclusion forum in the past few weeks. A key focus of the review is on areas of growth from non-traditional providers of credit, which includes unregulated, buy now, pay later products, which the hon. Lady described. It will assess both the supply and the demand sides of the market, cover the customer journey and engage with the main providers to better understand business models and how customers interact with such firms. The FCA has also commissioned consumer research to help inform its understanding. I recognise that particularly vulnerable groups of consumers seem to be using such products more.
The review is due to present its conclusions early next year, in a few months. If it concludes that there is the potential for significant harm occurring as a result of those exempt products, the Government will assess the options for how to address that best, and whether they would be proportionate to counter such harm.
I will now turn to new clause 22. As I noted previously, the Government have fundamentally reformed regulation of the consumer credit market, giving control of the area to the FCA in 2014. That more robust regulatory system is helping to deliver the Government’s vision for a well-functioning and sustainable consumer credit market that can meet consumers’ needs. The Government have given the FCA strong powers to protect consumers, and the FCA assesses whether a firm’s business model is in a consumer’s interest as part of the authorisation process.
In 2017, the FCA confirmed that, in its assessment of firms’ business models, it considers how each firm makes money. That allows the FCA to identify any economic incentives that a firm might have to cause harm to consumers and to take appropriate mitigating actions.
In its August report on re-lending by high-cost lenders, the FCA set out clearly the potential issues around re-lending. The report identified ongoing concerns about the business practices of some of those lenders, which it deemed to be breach of FCA rules and principles for business. More importantly, the report reiterated the FCA’s expectations that firms should treat their customers fairly. It made it clear that it expects firms to review their re-lending practices so that they can properly assess affordability; further, that any re-lending firms undertake is sustainable and will not give rise to borrowers entering into problem debt; and, finally, that the customer’s full financial position should be taken into consideration when making those re-lending decisions.
While the hon. Member for Walthamstow is right that re-lending can cause consumer harm, it is clear that the FCA understands the issues and is acting where necessary to protect consumers’ interests. As I have set out, the FCA will consider consumer interest in relation to a firm’s business model during the authorisation process, and will monitor the market through its supervision process, reminding firms of their obligations and intervening where necessary. I therefore ask that the hon. Member for Walthamstow withdraw the new clause.
Stella Creasy
As well as winner of a Titmuss prize, I think you will find, Dr Huq. My father got excited that I meant Abi, and my mother thought I meant Fred—it was neither.
I listened to the Minister, and was all eerily familiar. It was like the conversations that we had on payday lending, when everyone mentioned the then Office of Fair Trading. I appreciate that that conversation was not with the Minister, but the outcome for our constituents will be the same. It is Christmas; does he think that Klarna, Clearpay and Laybuy will not be heavily pressing their product on our constituents?
We could vote to send a message that change will come in the next couple of months. We could sound the alarm that we did not sound on payday lending until millions of people were in debt. The Minister knows that the FCA has been, and will continue to be, timid about using capping, because it is looking for political leadership to say that capping is the right to do.
I am happy to withdraw new clause 16, but I will press new clause 17 to a vote because I think we should send a message that we are listening to the consumers who are already in debt with those buy-now-pay-later companies. It is an incredibly reasonable clause that says that we will regulate and not leave people hanging. The Minister has not given any succour to that idea. He has talked about a review and the possibility of some consideration later, but that is just too late. Too many people are already in debt with those companies. I hope, if the Minister will not listen to me, that he will at least listen to Martin Lewis and Alice Tapper, who have been trying to help people in financial difficulty because they cannot go to the ombudsman. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 17
Regulation of buy-now-pay-later firms
“The Treasury must by regulations make provision for—
(a) buy-now-pay-later credit services, and
(b) other lending services that have non interest-bearing elements
to be regulated by the FCA.”—(Stella Creasy.)
This new clause would bring the non interest-bearing elements of bring buy-now-pay-later lending and similar services under the regulatory ambit of the FCA.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question proposed, That the clause be read a Second time.
Stella Creasy
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I do not intend to speak to this new clause for very long because my case has already been made. This is a simple clause about the powers of the FCA to do investigations and about who has the power to require it to do them—currently, that is the Treasury. The new clause suggests that a Select Committee should be able to do that. It would most likely be the Treasury Committee, but the clause says “a relevant Select Committee”, because the issues may concern the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee.
The Minister will understand my disappointment and frustration that he has not offered any opportunity to look at whether amendments or investigations are needed. Change is likely to come to our credit industry in the time that this Bill is before Parliament. If the Treasury will not act, it falls to all of us in Parliament to ask where else we can scrutinise how our constituents are being lent to and whether they are being ripped off.
John Glen
The change proposed under this new clause to allow Select Committees to require the FCA to launch investigations in situations where there is suspected regulatory failure would mirror powers that are already available to the Treasury. As I set out earlier, section 77 of the Financial Services Act 2012 enables the Treasury to require the regulators to conduct investigations in cases of suspected regulatory failure in circumstances where it does not appear to the Treasury that the regulators are already doing so under, for example, the regulators’ power in section 73 of that Act.
The Treasury has used those powers to require the PRA and FCA to launch investigations where it considers that appropriate. As Members are aware, the Treasury Committee had the opportunity to scrutinise the investigation that was carried out into the Co-operative Bank in 2018, and it made a number of recommendations that were accepted by the PRA.
I am therefore confident that investigations under existing section 77 powers are useful in holding regulators to account, ensuring proper scrutiny of them and conducting investigators in the public interest. In determining whether an investigation is in the public interest, the Treasury will also consider the views of the relevant Select Committee in reaching its decision.
The Government agree that Parliament should play an important strategic role in interrogating, debating and testing the overall direction of policy for financial services. The Treasury is confident that proper mechanisms exist to allow the Treasury Committee to scrutinise and comment on investigations, as is right and proper. Ultimately, there is nothing to stop a relevant Select Committee launching its own investigation into an issue, calling witnesses, gathering evidence and making recommendations. That is a decision for the Committee.
Stella Creasy
Earlier today, we talked about the fact that the Treasury instructed the FCA to get involved in the debate around payday lending. Indeed, it went into companies such as Wonga and QuickQuid and set out redress schemes. We know that they were ineffective because it ended up with the ombudsman getting involved, and it was only then that those companies went into administration because it was revealed how much they owed to our constituents. In circumstances such as that, where no doubt there would be difficult conversations about what role the Treasury and the FCA played in the process, who watches the watchmen? Who would instruct that inquiry? At the moment, that inquiry has not happened, so we do not know why that redress scheme did not work. There is no sign that the FCA wants that. Is the Minister saying that he would instruct that so that we can get to the bottom of why the redress scheme did not work? If it did not, it seems rather apposite to have an independent third party that could look at issues such as that on behalf of consumers.
John Glen
I am very happy to look at that particular case. The point I am making is that there is a mechanism to compel the FCA to investigate, and the Treasury does not do that in isolation from the its wider accountability to Parliament, individual Members of Parliament and the Treasury Committee. I am very happy to examine the point that the hon. Lady has made and I will look at it carefully, but that provision exists. Frankly, I cannot and would never expect to act in isolation and without accountability to Parliament. Given the powers available to the Treasury, which can be used in that context, and the opportunity for scrutiny by Select Committees, I ask that this new clause be withdrawn.
Stella Creasy
If the Minister is saying that he is going to instruct a redress investigation, I will happily withdraw the new clause. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 21
Assessment of risks of consumer detriment
“(1) Schedule 6 of the Financial Services and Markets Act (2000) is amended as follows.
(2) After paragraph 2D(2)(c) insert—
‘(d) the risks of consumer detriment associated with the firm’s business model and the likelihood for compensation claims from consumers.’
(3) After paragraph 2D(3), insert—
‘(3ZA) When assessing whether the firm has appropriate financial resources to meet the risks of consumer detriment and the likelihood of compensation claims from consumers, the Financial Conduct Authority must ensure that, at all times, firms hold sufficient financial resources to meet any likely compensation claims from customers in full.’”—(Stella Creasy.)
This new clause would ensure that the FCA considers the likelihood of consumer detriment arising from the firm’s business model prior to, and following, authorisation, and that firm’s hold sufficient financial resources to meet potential compensation claims from customers in full.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Mr McFadden
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Although it is late in our proceedings, this is the first chance I have had to say what a pleasure it is to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Huq. New clause 24 introduces an offence of failing to prevent economic crime. I should make it clear that it is a corporate offence for companies.
The Committee will know that we have received written evidence on this issue from Spotlight on Corruption. In previous debates, we have all agreed that money laundering and fraud are big problems for the UK, although they are difficult to quantify. As I have said, I appreciate that the Minister has very likely been advised not to accept any amendments to the Bill. When a party has been in power for 10 years, that tends to reinforce itself, because it can become more difficult to admit that things are wrong. I should say in all candour that I am not suggesting that fraud or money laundering only started in 2010.
These are big, difficult and long-term issues for all Governments, so this is not a game of gotcha. It has been a problem for a long time, and Governments and regulators have to adapt constantly to deal with it. As we have been discussing this afternoon, as the pattern of business, trade and company ownership changes, so must the law and the regulatory rulebook. There is no embarrassment in acknowledging that we have a problem with money laundering or fraud, or, indeed, in introducing changes. Doing so is a strength.
The problem that the new clause deals with is twofold. First, there is the straightforward issue of fraud or crime—positive acts of wrongdoing—being committed. Secondly, there is the situation where breaches of the law take place in a company and it is impossible to hold the company to account because there is no duty on the company to prevent such acts in the first place. We saw that kind of thing graphically during the LIBOR scandal, which we have discussed in our proceedings. One chief executive after another—some of the highest-paid people in the world, it should be said—professed their profound shock at what their traders were doing. They knew nothing about it until they read about it in the newspapers, and they were absolutely dumbfounded at what was going on several floors below them in the same company. It worked for them: there were no corporate prosecutions in the UK.
I have already spoken to the Committee about the incentive to look the other way that this situation entails. It is better for a senior director of a financial institution to appear to be a fool than a knave, because the defence that they did not know what was going on is usually better for them than saying that they did know what was going on, but they did nothing about it. Not only that, but further down the chain it creates a disincentive to report wrongdoing further up the hierarchy, because doing so may mean that the ignorance defence is not available to those at the top of the hierarchy. That creates a mismatch between how small companies and large companies are treated, because small companies are assumed to have a directing mind, so that, if wrongdoing is identified, professing ignorance is not a defence for senior managers.
What would creating an offence of failure to prevent economic crime do? It would create a level playing field between small and large companies; it would send out a strong signal about the kind of financial sector that we want as we come to the end of the transition period; and it would equalise how different kinds of economic crimes are treated, because such a liability—I stress that it would be a corporate liability—already exists when it comes to, for example, bribery or tax evasion. Why should the ignorance defence be available for some offences but not for bribery or tax evasion? The Treasury would never accept it if senior members of a company said, “Oh, we didn’t know we were supposed to pay those taxes.” That would not be a legitimate defence, and yet it can be used for some other kinds of wrongdoing.
Let me return to the point about the signal that we want to send. A lot of the Bill is about onshoring EU directives. The sixth anti-money laundering directive requires EU member states to have corporate criminal liability for money laundering. Under the directive, corporate liability must include an offence that occurs owing to a lack of supervision or control by a person in a leading position in a company. We do not have that at the moment. The Bill is an opportunity to correct that. Remember, we are waiting for an equivalence decision. Do we really want our first big signal on divergence to be a departure from the rules on money laundering? Is that really the message that we want to send?
However, we should not do this only because the EU is doing it. We should do it on its own merits. The Treasury Committee reported last year on how difficult it is to prosecute multinational companies, saying that
“multi-national firms appear beyond the scope of legislation designed to counter economic crime. That is wrong, potentially dangerous and weakens the deterrent effect a more stringent corporate liability regime may bring.”
I anticipate the Minister’s response—that he thinks there are a lot of strong points here, and that he is sympathetic to the argument, but that he wants to wait for the Law Commission consultation. I cannot remember which pot we would put that in. [Interruption.] If it is pot three, I will take his word for it.
The focus of the Law Commission’s consultation is what is known as the identification doctrine, or what we might call the question of a directing mind. However, nothing in that consultation should prevent the Government from introducing a “failure to prevent” offence that could apply to small and large companies alike. Indeed, it is already implicit in the way that small companies are treated. Why should larger companies continue to be able to wield an excuse that is not available to smaller firms? When it comes to the treatment of small firms, I suspect that the Minister will hear that argument in the Chamber, if not in the Committee, from Members on his side of the House as well as on ours.
Furthermore, the Law Commission may take some time. We heard oral evidence that the pace on this has been glacial. However, our transition period ends in less than a month. It is not as though we do not have an ongoing problem with money laundering and financial crime, so what are the advantages of waiting? Corporate liability is not a new or revolutionary idea; it already exists for bribery and tax evasion. HMRC has said that it
“does not radically alter what is criminal, it simply focuses on who is held to account for acts contrary to the current criminal law.”
The lack of such an offence was also pointed out in the Financial Action Task Force 2018 UK evaluation, which pointed out the difficulties in proving criminal intent.
There are a number of reasons to act: the size of the problem, the unfairness between small and large companies, consistency in the way we treat tax evasion, our desire for equivalence recognition, the signals that we want to send about the character of our post-Brexit financial regulatory system and, perhaps most of all, because it is a good thing to do. For those reasons, I hope the Minister will consider the proposals in the new clause.
John Glen
The new clause proposes to create a new criminal offence, for FCA-regulated persons only, of facilitating economic crime and of failing to prevent economic crime.
In recent years, the Government have taken significant action to improve corporate governance and culture in the financial services industry. Following the financial crisis we introduced the new senior managers and certification regime. The regime is now in place for all FCA-regulated firms, and it requires firms to allocate to a specific senior person a senior management function for overseeing the firm’s efforts to counter financial crime. If there is a failure in a firm’s financial crime systems and controls, the FCA can take action against the responsible senior manager where it is appropriate to do so. That enforcement action includes fines and prohibition from undertaking regulated activities.
As well as creating the senior managers regime, through the Money Laundering Regulations 2017 and subsequent amendments, the Government have recently strengthened the anti-money laundering requirements that financial services firms must adhere to. Failure to comply with these requirements can be sanctioned through either civil or criminal means. Recent FCA regulatory penalties related to firms’ anti-money laundering weaknesses include a £102 million fine for Standard Chartered in April 2019 and a £96.6 million fine for Goldman Sachs in October 2020.
I hope that recent action demonstrates to the Committee that the Government are committed to upholding a robust framework that deters and sanctions any corporate criminal activity in the financial services industry. It is only right that we challenge ourselves on whether we need to go further, and I listened very carefully to the right hon. Gentleman. Regardless of our tenure, the Government must always take that responsibility seriously.
In 2017, the Government issued a call for evidence on whether corporate liability law for economic crime needed to be reformed. It is fair to say that the findings of the call for evidence were inconclusive. As such, the Government’s response to the call for evidence determined that a more comprehensive understanding of the potential options and implications of reform was needed. As the right hon. Gentleman acknowledged, the Government have therefore tasked the Law Commission to conduct an expert review on this issue.
Through the Bribery Act 2010 and the Criminal Finances Act 2017, the Government have demonstrated we are open to new “failure to prevent” offences. These offences, however, were legislated for because there was clear evidence of gaps in the relevant legal frameworks, which were limiting the bringing of effective and dissuasive enforcement proceedings.
Before any broader new “failure to prevent” offence for economic crime is introduced, there needs to be strong evidence to support it. It will also be important that any new offence is designed rigorously, with specific consideration given to how it sits alongside associated criminal and regulatory regimes and to the potential impacts on business. The scope of who a new offence applies to must also be holistically worked through.
The Law Commission’s work will take some time, but it is clear that we are zoning in on that aspect of the problem. In the light of that response, I ask the right hon. Gentleman to withdraw the new clause.
Mr McFadden
I am happy to withdraw the new clause today, but I suspect the Minister might meet a very similar amendment later in proceedings on the Bill. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 26
Legal protections for retail clients against the mis-selling of financial services
‘(1) Regulation 3 (Private Person) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Rights of Action) Regulations 2001 is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph 1(a), after “individual”, insert “, partnership or body corporate that is or would be classified as a retail client”.
(3) In paragraph 1(b), leave out “who is not an individual”, and insert “not within the definition of paragraph 1(a)”.
(4) For the purposes of this regulation, a “retail client” means a client who is not a professional client within the meaning set out in Annex II of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU.’—(Stephen Flynn.)
This new clause seeks to give retail clients greater legal protections against the mis-selling of financial services products.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Stephen Flynn (Aberdeen South) (SNP)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 27—Legal protections for small businesses against the mis-selling of financial services—
‘(1) Regulation 3 (Private Person) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Rights of Action) Regulations 2001 is amended as follows.
(2) In sub-paragraph (1)(a), leave out “individual” and insert “relevant person”.
(3) In sub-paragraph (1)(b), leave out “individual” and insert “relevant person”.
(4) After paragraph 1, insert—
“(1A) For the purposes of this regulation, a “relevant person” means—
(a) any individual;
(b) any body corporate which meets the qualifying conditions for a small company under sections 382 and 383 Companies Act 2006 in the financial year in which the cause of action arises;
(c) any partnership which would, if it were a body corporate, meet the qualifying conditions for a small company under section 382 Companies Act 2006 in the financial year in which the cause of action arises.”’
This new clause seeks to give small businesses greater legal protections against the mis-selling of financial services products.
Stephen Flynn
New clause 26 seeks to give retail clients greater legal protection against the mis-selling of financial services products, and new clause 27 seeks to give small businesses greater legal protections against the mis-selling of financial services products. I want to make a couple of quick remarks on that matter.
I do not need to tell hon. Members how important small businesses are. They make up three fifths of employment, and half the turnover in the UK private sector goes through small businesses. Those are telling figures. What is more, just 36% of small businesses use external finance; indeed, seven in 10 would rather forgo any growth than take on external finance. That is an important point that the Government must reflect on.
As they deliberate on why that may be the case, I will provide some additional information. There is a history of mis-selling, which causes small businesses a great deal of concern. Although regulation has been tightened, gaps remain. For example, small businesses complained earlier this year about the mis-selling of interest rate swaps. The FCA found that 90% of those businesses did not have a clue what that meant in reality, and it went on to talk about the dialogue between sophisticated and unsophisticated businesses in that regard.
The ultimate issue is that small businesses did not know what they were getting themselves into, and I think that is telling. No one wants that situation to arise, now or in the future. I encourage the Government to take heed of that and, therefore, agree to both new clauses.
John Glen
The Government are committed to ensuring that the interests of individuals and businesses that use financial services are protected. With the creation of the conduct-focused Financial Conduct Authority in 2013, we have ensured that those interests continue to be placed at the heart of our regulatory system and given the priority that they deserve.
The Government have given the FCA a strong mandate to stop inappropriate behaviour in financial services, and it has a wide range of enforcement powers—criminal, civil and regulatory—to protect consumers and businesses alike. That means taking action against firms and individuals that do not meet appropriate standards.
These new clauses, which have been tabled by the hon. Members for Glasgow Central and for Aberdeen South, seek to broaden the scope of parties that can seek action for damages related to mis-selling of financial services. The changes are unnecessary, however, because businesses already have robust avenues for pursuing financial services complaints. The Government are committed to ensuring that we do not unnecessarily push up the cost of borrowing for small businesses by creating additional legislative burdens.
In April 2019, the remit of the Financial Ombudsman Service was expanded to allow more SMEs to put forward complaints, and that covers 97% of SMEs in the UK. An enterprise that employs fewer than 50 people and has a turnover that does not exceed £6.5 million is entitled to bring a complaint to the FOS. If that complaint is upheld, the FOS can make an award of up to £350,000 in relation to acts or omissions that took place on or after 1 April 2019.
Moreover, SMEs will also have access to the business banking resolution service, an independent non-governmental body, which will provide dispute resolution for businesses. It will serve two purposes. First, it will address historical cases from 2000, which would now be eligible for the FOS but which were not at the time, and which have not been through another independent redress scheme. Secondly, it will address future complaints from businesses with a turnover of between £6.5 million and £10 million.
Given the robust avenues that are available to businesses for pursuing financial services complaints, I hope the Committee will agree that the new clauses are not necessary, and I respectfully ask the hon. Members not to press them.
Stephen Flynn
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 29
Review of Impact of Scottish National Investment Bank Powers
“(1) The Chancellor of the Exchequer must review the effect of the use of the powers in this Act in Scotland and lay a report of that review before the House of Commons within six months of the date on which this Act receives Royal Assent.
(2) A review under this section must consider the effects of the changes on—
(a) business investment,
(b) employment,
(c) productivity,
(d) inflation,
(e) financial stability, and
(f) financial liquidity.
(3) The review must also estimate the effects on the changes in the event of each of the following—
(a) the Scottish Government is given no new financial powers with respect to carrying over reserves between financial years,
(b) the Scottish Government is able to carry over greater reserves between financial years for use by the Scottish National Investment Bank.
(4) The review must under subsection 3(b) consider the effect of raising the reserve limit by—
(a) £100 million,
(b) £250 million,
(c) £500 million, and
(d) £1,000 million.” —(Alison Thewliss.)
This new clause requires a review of the impact of providing Scottish Government powers to allow the SNIB to carry over reserves between financial years beyond its current £100m limit.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Alison Thewliss
I beg to move, That the Clause be read a Second time.
New clause 29 would require a review of the impact of providing the Scottish Government with powers to allow the Scottish National Investment Bank to carry over reserves between financial years beyond its current £100 million limit. As Members may know, the Scottish National Investment Bank has been firmly established as a public limited company and has a proposed mission to focus the bank’s activities on addressing key challenges and creating inclusive long-term growth, including
“supporting Scotland’s transition to net zero, extending equality of opportunity through improving places, and harnessing innovation to enable Scotland to flourish.
It will provide patient capital—a form of long-term investment—for businesses and projects in Scotland, and catalyse further private sector investment.”
The bank’s first investment, announced the other week, was £12.5 million to the Glasgow-based laser and quantum technology company, M Squared, to support the company’s further growth in Scotland, which speaks to the bank’s proposed core missions.
The Scottish National Investment Bank will help to tackle some of the biggest challenges we face in the years to come, delivering economic, social and environmental returns, but currently there is a slight barrier, in that the Scottish Government can only roll over £100 million of their annual reserves. We are asking for the UK to look at increasing that to allow the Scottish National Investment Bank to get on with the job that it is set up to do.
As the Committee can see, the new clause asks the Government to introduce an impact assessment—because that is what we can do in this Committee; we can ask for reports and impact assessments—looking at increasing the Scottish Government’s reserves by £100 million, £250 million, £500 million or £1 billion for business investment, employment, productivity, inflation, financial stability and financial liquidity. We need the Government to come on board with that and provide some help to us. It is a huge and important project, so much so that the UK Government seem to be copying it by having an investment bank.
We would like to have an infrastructure bank for Scotland that can meet Scotland’s needs and priorities. It is desperately important that we do that. The bank will learn from banks such as KfW in Germany, which was set up after the war by the UK, and then we learned nothing from it ourselves. We want to be able to get on and do this and invest in Scotland’s future, but unfortunately we need the Government’s co-operation at this point to do that.
John Glen
The UK Government are committed to supporting investment across the whole of the United Kingdom. Indeed, at the spending review, we confirmed our intention to establish a new infrastructure bank in the UK that will help to support infrastructure projects across the whole of the UK, including in Scotland. I was therefore pleased to see the Scottish Government launch their Scottish National Investment Bank on 23 November.
The new clause seeks to establish a review process for considering whether the Scottish Government’s reserve flexibility should be increased and expanded for use by the Scottish National Investment Bank. We have already agreed significant financial flexibilities with the Scottish Government as part of the Scotland Act 2016 and their fiscal framework, which provide unprecedented policy levers to shape Scotland’s economy, including a £700 million Scottish reserve. The Scottish Government are able to manage the Scottish National Investment Bank through those existing arrangements if they choose to prioritise that.
Furthermore, we have agreed to undertake a review of the Scottish Government’s fiscal framework. That will include an independent report, jointly commissioned with the Scottish Government, next year in 2021, followed by a renegotiation of the fiscal framework in 2022. I therefore think in light of that information that the hon. Member might consider withdrawing the new clause.
Alison Thewliss
I am not going to withdraw it. The Minister has an absolute cheek, and he knows it. We were working on the bank for quite some time, and it has opened its doors and is already lending money while the UK Government are still only talking about their bank. Help us do the job and help us make sure that we can make this work for Scotland’s future, because, frankly, we do not trust the UK Government to do that for us, and we have good grounds for that.
When the UK Government invested in things in Scotland before, we ended up with things such as the Skye bridge, for which we were paying well over the odds. When Scotland is able to invest in things, we build bridges such as the Forth replacement crossing—sorry, the Queensferry crossing—which is an excellent bridge for us all to use in the future. I will press the new clause to a vote.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss
New clause 32—Scrutiny of FCA Powers by committees—
“(1) No provision may be made by the Financial Conduct Authority under this Act unless the conditions in subsection (2) are satisfied.
(2) The conditions in are that—
(a) a new statutory committee comprising Members of the House of Commons has been established to scrutinise financial regulation, and
(b) a new statutory committee comprising Members of the House of Lords has been established to scrutinise financial regulation.
(3) The Treasury must, by regulations, make provision for and about those committees.
(4) Those regulations must provide that the committees have at least as much power as the relevant committees of the European Union.”
This new clause requires statutory financial regulation scrutiny committees to be established before the FCA can make provisions under this Bill.
Stephen Flynn
I will be incredibly brief. Again, both new clauses 31 and 32 are about oversight and scrutiny. I have absolutely no doubt that Conservative Members will want to take back parliamentary sovereignty and ensure that this place has oversight of the Government’s actions.
John Glen
I think I have previously detailed my response to new clauses 22 and 26 why it would not be appropriate for Parliament to scrutinise all regulator rules made in relation to those two specific measures. These new clauses go further, and would require all rules made by the Financial Conduct Authority in relation to anything within this Bill to be approved by Parliament before the rules can be made, and would prevent the FCA from exercising its powers effectively. New clause 31 would make the FCA’s rule making subject to parliamentary approval. New clause 32 prevents the FCA from making rules under the Bill until two new parliamentary Committees are established. The same arguments that I made previously are relevant here: new clause 31 would apply a higher level of parliamentary scrutiny—to the FCA only—when making rules in areas covered by the Bill. That would mean that those areas were inconsistent with other areas of financial services regulation not covered by this Bill or within the remit of the Prudential Regulation Authority, which will retain the existing scrutiny requirements.
Parliament would need routinely to scrutinise a large number of detailed new rules on an ongoing basis. That is very different from the model that Parliament has previously put in place for the regulators under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, where it has judged it appropriate for the regulators to take these detailed technical decisions where they hold expertise.
Turning briefly to new clause 32, although I note that Select Committees of both Houses already have the option to scrutinise the regulators as they see fit, it is naturally for Parliament to decide how best it wishes to scrutinise financial services regulation. However, I do not believe that it is appropriate to make the introduction of an investment firms prudential regime, or any of the other changes enabled by this Bill, subject to the establishment of new parliamentary Committees. Nor do I believe it is for the Treasury to make regulations related to the establishment or functioning of parliamentary Committees. As the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East pointed out in an earlier sitting, that is a matter for the House to decide.
I would like to reassure the Committee that I am committed to ensuring appropriate accountability and scrutiny around new rules for our financial sector. That is why I recently published a consultation document on the review of the future regulatory framework for financial services. This review seeks to achieve the right split of responsibilities between Parliament, Government, and the regulators now that we have left the EU. It seeks views, including those of all parliamentarians, on how we can best scrutinise and hold the regulators to account, while respecting and safeguarding their independence. I look forward to engaging with hon. Members on that subject but, given what I have said, I suggest that they might consider withdrawing the new clause.
Stephen Flynn
I am not surprised, but I am disappointed. I would like press new clause 31 to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 34—Review of impact of Act on UK meeting UN Sustainable Development Goals—
“The Chancellor of the Exchequer must conduct an assessment of the impact of this Act on the UK meeting the UN Sustainable Development Goals, and lay it before the House of Commons within six months of the day on which this Act receives Royal Assent.”
This new clause would require the Chancellor of the Exchequer to review the impact of the Bill on the UK meeting the UN Sustainable Development Goals.
Alison Thewliss
I will be brief. It is important that the Government take their obligations under the Paris climate change commitments and the UN sustainable development goals seriously. I did not know when we tabled these new clauses that my son would be studying the sustainable development goals at his school this week. It would be very good if the Government took the sustainable development goals quite as seriously as the primary 6 pupils I know.
John Glen
It is clear that this new clause is similar to other amendments. We have discussed the issues in relation to Basel and PRIIPs measures, and new clauses 33 and 34 would mean that they would apply to a Bill as a whole. As I have set out in previous responses, we are committed to meeting international obligations and strongly support the aims of the Paris agreement and the sustainable development goals. That will mean a combined effort across the whole economy, especially with the involvement of financial services. As the Chancellor set out in his statement, they will be at the heart of that effort. We are pursuing world-leading standards, and ahead of COP26 the Prime Minister’s COP26 finance adviser, Mark Carney, will advise the Government on embedding climate considerations into every financial decision.
These new clauses would require the provision of an assessment of the impact of the Bill, specifically on the UK’s ability to meet its commitments to the Paris agreement and sustainable development goals. We published in June 2019 a voluntary national review, setting out in detail our progress towards those goals, and a comprehensive account of the further action to be taken, and we remain committed to supporting the implementation of those goals. We therefore cannot support these new clauses, as we believe that we are held to account through other mechanisms. That is probably all I need to say. I suggest that the clause may be able to be withdrawn on that basis.
Alison Thewliss
I am happy to do so. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 35
Money laundering and overseas trustees: review
“(1) The Treasury must, within six months of this Act being passed, prepare, publish and lay before Parliament a report on the effects on money laundering of the provisions in section 31 of this Act.
(2) The report must address—
(a) the anticipated change to the volume of money laundering attributable to the provisions of section 31; and
(b) alleged money laundering involving overseas trusts by the owners and employees of Scottish Limited Partnerships.”—(Alison Thewliss.)
This new clause would require the Treasury to review the effects on money laundering of the provisions in section 31 of this Act, and in particular on the use of overseas trusts for the purposes of money laundering by owners and employees of Scottish Limited Partnerships.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Stella Creasy
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
This is the final new clause for the final bit of the Bill, so I am hoping that this time round, given the season, the Minister will withdraw his Scrooge-like refusal to amend the Bill, not least because I genuinely think that on this new clause and this area of policy he probably agrees and recognises that there has been an oversight in its consideration. I also hope that Government Members will support the new clause, because it is surely what they came into office to do—to remove the red tape and bureaucracy that holds back enterprising, entrepreneurial people in our local communities.
I speak as a proud Co-op as well as Labour MP, and this new clause is about co-operative banking—perhaps not what people might first think of when they talk about co-operative banking, but it is about how mutual banks are set up. Local mission-led mutual banks are common in other parts of the world, but not so much here in the UK. They are, however, something that people are increasingly looking at and trying to support, particularly around Greater Manchester and elsewhere, and local leaders in Liverpool and Preston have plans to establish such institutions as well.
As people would understand, is quite difficult to start a bank: there are often requirements, even for a standard for-profit shareholder-controlled model. Much of the difficulty boils down to the challenges involved in raising the amount of equity capital that regulators require for institutions before they will issue an operating licence. That is what we are talking about today. Frankly, someone would need to raise millions in equity to get a banking licence.
The problem for mutual banks is that many investors struggle to understand what a mutual is. Ultimately, the mutual might offer good long-term returns, but there are no opportunities for those bumper dividends or speculative gains that people might traditionally associate with banking. That is part of a model that invests in communities, supports people and has people as part of the process. People think about credit unions; this is about what the 21st century co-operative banking models might be.
One of the challenges holding back the co-op movement is an antiquated piece of legislation. Let me be clear: the passage of the Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies Act 2014 was very welcome and helped to level the playing field. The capital requirements regulations are a hangover from Disraeli’s time. Those provisions can be traced back to the Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1876. I am talking about simply removing them from the legislation, because the requirements that they make are already covered for co-operative banks by other forms of prudential regulation in the Bill. Their existence creates an artificial level of complexity for the setting up of co-operative banks.
I do not want to go into too much detail, but the law currently prevents co-operative societies from being banks if they have what is called withdrawable share capital. That restriction was imposed in 1876; things have moved on. First, we now separate and have strong regulation of banks’ capital adequacies, as we discussed earlier in the Bill process. Furthermore, we have clear and specific regulation setting out how co-operative withdrawable share capital can safely be used to help to capitalise banks. It is firmly established today that societies retain the absolute right to suspend share withdrawals, giving their capital the essential features of equity under international and UK accounting standards.
If mutual banks were able to add withdrawable share capital to their mix, that would help to enable them to diversify their offer to investors and therefore broaden the range of investors to whom they could be marketed. It would open up significant opportunities for co-operative banks to get off the ground, because they would have the ability to raise the equity that they need to get a banking licence. Surely, Members from all parties can agree, in good Christmas cheer, that such competition in our banking sector would be a good thing, so it would also be a good thing to remove this archaic piece of legislation on capital equity from the legislation book.
The Bill is about financial services, and the co-operatives throughout the country want to offer financial services. The Minister may still be drawing on pot 3, on the Ghosts of Christmas past and present, but on the Ghost of Christmas future, in the Lords or on Report, might he give us a glimmer of hope, Tiny Tim-style, that he will listen to the co-operative banking sector? They have written to him in support of this amendment and I know he has met representatives from the sector to look at what more he can do to support them. I hope he will remove these pieces of red tape and take back control of the mutual sector this Christmas.
John Glen
I am grateful for the enticement to be generous, but I was quite generous on new clause 8. I gave some positive indications about the intentions of the Government, and I look carefully at everything that is said by Members from across the Committee. I am very engaged with the mutual banks and with the co-operative sector generally, which I will say more about in a moment.
This amendment aims to remove the restriction which prevents co-operative societies holding withdrawable share capital from carrying out the business of banking. I share the interest of the hon. Member for Walthamstow in how the mutual model of financial services can add much-needed diversity and competition to the sector. Treasury officials and I have had constructive conversations with individuals seeking to set up regional mutual banks, and I look forward to continuing those. I will not mention their names, because they are going through different regulatory processes, and I am told that that is sensitive and so I should not do so. I try to help them.
Ensuring that banks hold the appropriate capital is critical to a stable and functioning financial system. It is therefore important that we consider any legislative changes in this area. I have thought about the amendment, and there are several immediate concerns about the potential risks to financial stability and consumer protection, which the Government have a duty to consider.
I will set out our most pressing concerns. As the global financial crisis highlighted, sufficient regulatory capital is needed by financial institutions as a source of resilience and to ensure losses can be effectively absorbed. To ensure capital fulfils this function, capital held by banks must always be readily available to absorb losses, which cannot be the case where investors can withdraw capital. Enabling co-operative banks to hold withdrawable share capital, as this amendment intends, could place consumer deposits at risk, create an inconsistent regulatory regime between co-operative and non-co-operative banks, and cause risks to the stability of the financial system, if it led to banks being inadequately or inappropriately capitalised.
I have had representations from the prospective regional mutual banks sector that they would seek to use this amendment to issue additional tier 1 capital instruments, or contingent convertible bonds. These are complex instruments that would need further thought to ensure they fulfilled their purpose within the legislative framework for co-operatives. It is also unlikely that the ability to raise additional tier 1 capital would be very beneficial to regional mutual banks currently, given they are at the early stages of their development where raising core equity capital is the priority.
I also note that the activity of deposit taking, in the form of withdrawable share capital that co-operatives and community benefit societies carry out under the present legislation, is subject to certain exemptions from regulatory requirements, which are applicable to other institutions carrying out business activities. These may no longer be appropriate if they were generally allowed to carry out the business of banking.
In conclusion, the Government believe that the fundamental issue is that it is not appropriate for deposit takers to rely on withdrawable share capital. In any case, certainly a measure like this would need further consideration of the legislative and regulatory implications rather than being introduced by way of amendment. I will continue to look carefully at these matters with the sector, but in the context of what I have said I ask the hon. Member for Walthamstow to withdraw her amendment.
Stella Creasy
I am so sorry to hear that the Minister is still listening to Marley rather than Bob Cratchit about the true spirit of Christmas. This is legislation from the 1800s. It is about £400 worth of share capital. It is outdated and needs a little more Christmas cheer. The Minister said that he would commit to working with the sector to get this amendment right, and if amended this Bill could be great. I think I will push the new clause to a vote—if nothing else, to put on the record that there are those of us who understand that co-ops want to move into the 21st century—and wish everyone a merry Christmas at the same time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Mr McFadden
On a point of order, Dr Huq, I would like to thank you and Mr Davies for your chairmanship during the proceedings, and the Clerks from the Public Bill Office for helping all of us with our amendments in recent weeks. I would like to thank my colleagues on the Opposition side of the Chamber; I believe we approached this in the right spirit. We set out at the beginning the way we would approach it and I think that is the way that we have carried through: trying to improve the Bill, to give it proper scrutiny and to try to point to some kind of future direction for UK financial services as we come to the end of the transition period. Some of us here are Front-Bench Members and this is part of our terms of appointment, so, with their indulgence, I would particularly like to thank my hon. Friends the Members for Wallasey and for Walthamstow, who I believe both brought considerable experience and value to our proceedings.
I would like to thank the Minister for his patience and forbearance. We did not set out to torture him, I promise, but I appreciate that for him, taking through a Bill like this is a substantial piece of work, and I am grateful to him for the spirit in which he responded to amendments, questions and so on as we went through. Finally, I thank the Back Benchers on the Government side. For the most part they took a rather passive approach to the proceedings. There is a mixture of experience and new MPs on that side. To the new MPs in particular I will say that I hope the last three weeks have been an important part of their learning about what it means to be a Government Back Bencher.
John Glen
Further to that point of order, Dr Huq, I thank the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East for the courteous and constructive way in which he led the Opposition scrutiny of the Bill. I thank all members of the Committee for their contributions. I looked carefully at all amendments, and I did not categorise them in buckets. I thank you, Dr Huq, and your colleague Philip Davies, and the team of Clerks, as well as my officials from the Treasury, who sit silently at the end and do a great deal to support me and the much wider team back in the Treasury who have helped to prepare the Bill. Clearly, we shall now move on to its further stages, and there is more work to do. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield for his support, in particular, as well as my hon. Friend the Member for Montgomeryshire, who has given me enormous support throughout.
Alison Thewliss
Further to that point of order, Dr Huq, I thank you for your time in the Chair, and Philip Davies as well. I want to thank colleagues for their contributions, the Clerks for all their assistance, and the Treasury officials, who were good about meeting us ahead of the proceedings. That was really useful. I thank our team of researchers, Scott Taylor and Linda Nagy, who have been great in providing support to us. I also thank those who sent evidence to the Committee. That was extremely useful for briefings, and we were grateful.
The Minister said earlier that he was not saying no or never; I live in hope that some time he will say mibbes aye. We might get there, yet. I said on Second Reading that we would bring forward constructive amendments and the Government would ignore them, and that turned out to be what happened, but we hope that on Report perhaps some of the good Opposition suggestions, made with the best intentions to make things better for all our constituents, will be taken on board. I thank the Minister for his work on the issue.
The Chair
Yes, it has been epic, and we have had the Oscar-type speeches that everyone makes at the end. I am sure that all right hon. and hon. Members were actively engaged in their own way, whether they were trying out the financial products on their screens, or whatever. A few letters are on their way, I believe, from the Minister about some points of detail raised by Members.
Bill, as amended, to be reported.
Financial Services Bill
Wednesday 13th January 2021
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Financial Services Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 13 January 2021 - (13 Jan 2021)
18:01 - The House divided: - Ayes: 265 / Noes: 355 - Question accordingly negatived.
18:12 - The House divided: - Ayes: 267 / Noes: 355 - Question accordingly negatived.
18:23 - The House divided: - Ayes: 263 / Noes: 359 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (John Glen)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new clause 28—Forfeiture of money: electronic money institutions and payment institutions.
New clause 1—Report into standards of conduct and ethics in the financial services industry—
“(1) The Treasury must prepare and publish a report into standards of conduct and ethics of businesses regulated or authorised by the Financial Conduct Authority.
(2) The report must include—
(a) an assessment of the prevalence of unlawful practices in the sector, including—
(i) tax evasion, and
(ii) money laundering;
(b) an assessment of the prevalence of other practices including—
(i) the charging of excessive fees,
(ii) the provision of inadequate advice to customers, and
(iii) tax avoidance;
(c) consideration of the case for the establishment of a public inquiry into standards of conduct and ethics within the UK financial services industry, under the Inquiries Act 2005; and
(d) an assessment of the present arrangements for the regulation of the financial services sector and the Government’s plans for further reform of the regulatory system.
(3) This report must be laid before Parliament within six months of this Act being passed.”
This new clause would require the Government to publish a report into the standards of conduct and ethics of businesses regulated or authorised by the Financial Conduct Authority, including consideration of the case for the establishment of a public inquiry.
New clause 2—Report into anticipated use of the Debt Respite Scheme—
“(1) The Treasury must prepare and publish a report into the anticipated use of the Debt Respite Scheme over the five years following the passing of this Act.
(2) The report must include an assessment of—
(a) the number of people likely to use the Breathing Space scheme
(b) the number of people likely to be offered a Statutory Debt Repayment Plan,
(c) the scale of personal and household debt within the UK economy and the impact of this on use of the Debt Respite Scheme,
(d) the effectiveness of current mechanisms to prevent people having recourse to the Debt Respite Scheme, and
(e) the potential for additional policies and mechanisms to complement the work of the Debt Respite Scheme.
(3) This report must be laid before Parliament within six months of this Act being passed.”
This new clause would require the Treasury to publish a report into the anticipated use of the Debt Respite Scheme, including the effectiveness of the current mechanisms to prevent people having recourse to the Debt Respite Scheme.
New clause 4—Facilitation of economic crime—
“(1) A relevant body commits an offence if it—
(a) facilitates an economic crime; or
(b) fails to take the necessary steps to prevent an economic crime from being committed by a person acting in the capacity of the relevant body.
(2) In subsection (1), a ‘relevant body’ is any person, including a body of persons corporate or unincorporated, authorised by or registered with the Financial Conduct Authority.
(3) In subsection (1), an ‘economic crime’ means—
(a) fraud, as defined in the Fraud Act 2006;
(b) false accounting, as defined in the Theft Act 1968; or
(c) an offence under the following sections of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002—
(i) section 327 (concealing etc criminal property);
(ii) section 328 (arrangements etc concerning the acquisition, retention, use or control of criminal property); and
(iii) section 329 (acquisition, use and possession of criminal property).
(4) In subsection (1), ‘facilitates an economic crime’ means—
(a) is knowingly concerned in or takes steps with a view to any of the offences in subsection (3); or
(b) aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission of an offence in subsection (3).
(5) In proceedings for an offence under subsection (1), it is a defence for the relevant body to show that—
(a) it had in place such prevention procedures as it was reasonable in all circumstances for it to have in place;
(b) it was not reasonable in the circumstances to expect it to have any prevention procedures in place.
(6) A relevant body guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable—
(a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine;
(b) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to a fine;
(c) on summary conviction in Scotland or Northern Ireland, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum.
(7) If the offence is proved to have been committed with the consent or connivance of—
(a) a director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the relevant body, or
(b) a person who was purporting to act in any such capacity,
this person (as well as the relevant body) is guilty of the offence and liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.”
This new clause would make it an offence for a relevant body authorised or registered by the Financial Conduct Authority to facilitate, or fail to prevent, specified economic crimes.
New clause 6—Money laundering: electronic money institutions—
‘(1) The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 303Z1 (Application for account freezing order)—
(a) In subsection (1) after “bank” insert “, electronic money institution”
(b) In subsection (6) after “Building Societies Act 1986;” insert—
“‘electronic money institution’ has the same meaning as in the Electronic Money Regulations 2011.”
(3) In section 303Z2 (Restrictions on making of application under section 303Z1), in subsection (3) after “bank” insert “, electronic money institution.”
(4) In section 303Z6 (Restriction on proceedings and remedies), in subsection (1) after “bank” insert “, electronic money institution.”
(5) In section 303Z8 (“The minimum amount”), in subsection (4) after “bank” insert “, electronic money institution.”
(6) In section 303Z9 (“Account forfeiture notice”), in subsection (6)(b) after “bank” insert “, electronic money institution.”
(7) In section 303Z11 (“Lapse of account forfeiture notice”)—
(a) in subsection (6) after “bank” insert “, electronic money institution”
(b) in subsection (7) after “If the bank” insert “, electronic money institution”
(c) in subsection (7) after “on the bank” insert “, electronic money institution.”
(8) In section 303Z14 (“Forfeiture order”), in subsection (7)(a) after “bank” insert “, electronic money institution.”
(9) In section 327 (Concealing etc), after subsection (2C) insert—
“(2D) An electronic money institution that does an act mentioned in paragraph (c) or (d) of subsection (1) does not commit an offence under that subsection if the value of the criminal property concerned is less than the threshold amount determined under section 339A for the act.”
(10) In section 328 (Arrangements), after subsection (5) insert—
“(6) An electronic money institution that does an act mentioned in subsection (1) does not commit an offence under that subsection if the arrangement facilitates the acquisition, retention, use or control of criminal property of a value that is less than the threshold amount determined under section 339A for the act.”
(11) In section 329 (Acquisition, use and possession), after subsection (2C) insert—
“(2D) An electronic money institution that does an act mentioned in subsection (1) does not commit an offence under that subsection if the value of the criminal property concerned is less than the threshold amount determined under section 339A for the act.”
(12) In section 339A (Threshold amounts)—
(a) in subsection (1) leave out “327(2C), 328(5) and 329(2C)” and insert “327(2C), 327(2D), 328(5), 328(6), 329(2C) and 329(2D)”
(b) in subsection (2) after “deposit-taking body” insert “or electronic money institution”
(c) in subsection (3) after “deposit-taking body” insert “or electronic money institution”
(d) in subsection (3)(a) after “deposit-taking body’s” insert “or electronic money institution’s”
(e) in subsection (3)(b) after “deposit-taking body” insert “or electronic money institution”
(f) in subsection (4) after “deposit-taking body” insert “or electronic money institution”
(g) in subsection (8) after “deposit-taking body” insert “or electronic money institution.
(13) In section 340 (Interpretation), after subsection (14) insert—
“(14A) “Electronic money institution” has the same meaning as in the Electronic Money Regulations 2011.”’
This new clause would update definitions in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to reflect the growth of financial technology companies in the UK by equalising the treatment of electronic money institutions with banks in regard to money laundering regulations.
New clause 7—Regulation of buy-now-pay-later firms—
“Within three months of this Act being passed, the Treasury must by statutory regulations make provision for the protection of consumers from unaffordable debt by requiring the FCA to regulate—
(a) buy-now-pay-later credit services, and
(b) other lending services that have non-interest-bearing elements.”
This new clause would bring the non-interest-bearing elements of buy-now-pay-later lending and similar services under the regulatory ambit of the FCA.
New clause 8—European Union regulatory equivalence for UK-based financial services businesses—
“(1) Within three months of this Act being passed, the Treasury must prepare and publish a report on progress towards regulatory equivalence recognition for UK-based financial services firms operating within the European Union.
(2) This report should include—
(a) the status of negotiations towards the recognition of regulatory equivalence for UK financial services firms operating within the European Union;
(b) a statement on areas in where equivalence recognition has been granted to UK based businesses on the same basis as which the UK has granted equivalence recognition to EU based businesses; and
(c) a statement on where such equivalence recognition has not been granted.”
This new clause would require a report to be published on progress towards, or completion of, the equivalence recognition for UK firms which the Government hopes to see following the Chancellor’s statement on EU-based firms operating in the UK.
New clause 9—Debt Respite Scheme: review—
“(1) The Chancellor of the Exchequer must review the impact on debt in parts of the United Kingdom and regions of England of the changes made by section 32 of this Act and lay a report of that review before the House of Commons within six months of the date on which this Act receives Royal Assent.
(2) A review under this section must consider the effects of the changes on debt held by—
(a) households,
(b) individuals with protected characteristic as defined by the Equality Act 2010,
(c) small companies as defined by the Companies Act 2006.
(3) In this section—
‘parts of the United Kingdom’ means—
(a) England,
(b) Scotland,
(c) Wales, and
(d) Northern Ireland; and
‘regions of England’ has the same meaning as that used by the Office for National Statistics.”
This new clause would require a review of the impact on debt of the changes made to the Financial Guidance and Claims Act 2018 in section 32.
New clause 10—Legal protections for retail clients against the mis-selling of financial services—
‘(1) Regulation 3 (Private Person) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Rights of Action) Regulations 2001 is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph 1(a), after “individual”, insert “, partnership or body corporate that is or would be classified as a retail client”.
(3) In paragraph 1(b), leave out “who is not an individual” and insert “not within the definition of paragraph 1(a)”.
(4) For the purposes of this regulation, a “retail client” means a client who is not a professional client within the meaning set out in Annex II of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU.’
This new clause seeks to give retail clients greater legal protections against the mis-selling of financial services products.
New clause 11—Legal protections for small businesses against the mis-selling of financial services—
‘(1) Regulation 3 (Private Person) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Rights of Action) Regulations 2001 is amended as follows.
(2) In sub-paragraph 1(a), leave out “individual” and insert “relevant person”.
(3) In sub-paragraph 1(b), leave out “individual” and insert “relevant person”.
(4) After paragraph 1, insert—
“(1A) For the purposes of this regulation, a ‘relevant person’ means—
(a) any individual;
(b) any body corporate which meets the qualifying conditions for a small company under sections 382 and 383 Companies Act 2006 in the financial year in which the cause of action arises;
(c) any partnership which would, if it were a body corporate, meet the qualifying conditions for a small company under section 382 Companies Act 2006 in the financial year in which the cause of action arises.”’
This new clause seeks to give small businesses greater legal protections against the mis-selling of financial services products.
New clause 12—Pre-commencement impact assessment of leaving the EU Customs Union—
“(1) No Minister of the Crown or public authority may appoint a day for the commencement of any provision of this Act until a Minister of the Crown has laid before the House of Commons an impact assessment of—
(a) disapplying EU rules; and
(b) applying rules different from those of the EU
as a consequence of any provision of this Act.
(2) A review under this section must consider the effects of the changes on—
(a) business investment,
(b) employment,
(c) productivity,
(d) inflation,
(e) financial stability, and
(f) financial liquidity.
(3) A review under this section must consider the effects in the current and each of the subsequent ten financial years.
(4) The review must also estimate whether these effects are likely to have been different in the following scenarios—
(a) if the UK had left the EU withdrawal transition period without a negotiated comprehensive free trade agreement, or
(b) if the UK had left the EU withdrawal transition period with a negotiated agreement, and remained in the single market and customs union.
(5) The review must also estimate the effects on the changes if the UK signs a free trade agreement with the United States.
(6) In this section—
‘parts of the United Kingdom’ means—
(a) England,
(b) Scotland,
(c) Wales, and
(d) Northern Ireland; and
‘regions of England’ has the same meaning as that used by the Office for National Statistics.”
This new clause would require the Government to produce an impact assessment before disapplying EU rules or applying those different to those of the EU; and comparing such with various scenarios of UK-EU relations.
New clause 13—Review of Impact of Scottish National Investment Bank Powers—
“(1) The Chancellor of the Exchequer must review the effect of the use of the powers in this Act in Scotland and lay a report of that review before the House of Commons within six months of the date on which this Act receives Royal Assent.
(2) A review under this section must consider the effects of the changes on—
(a) business investment,
(b) employment,
(c) productivity,
(d) inflation,
(e) financial stability, and
(f) financial liquidity.
(3) The review must also estimate the effects on the changes in the event of each of the following—
(a) the Scottish Government is given no new financial powers with respect to carrying over reserves between financial years,
(b) the Scottish Government is able to carry over greater reserves between financial years for use by the Scottish National Investment Bank.
(4) The review must under subparagraph 4(b) consider the effect of raising the reserve limit by—
(a) £100 million,
(b) £250 million,
(c) £500 million, and
(d) £1,000 million.”
This new clause requires a review of the impact of providing Scottish Government powers to allow the SNIB to carry over reserves between financial years beyond its current £100m limit.
New clause 14—Application of money laundering regulations to overseas trustees: review of effect on tax revenues—
“(1) The Chancellor of the Exchequer must review the effects on tax revenues of section 31 and lay a report of that review before the House of Commons within six months of the date on which this Act receives Royal Assent.
(2) The review under sub-paragraph (1) must consider—
(a) the expected change in corporation and income tax paid attributable to the provisions in this Schedule; and
(b) an estimate of any change attributable to the provisions of section 31 in the difference between the amount of tax required to be paid to the Commissioners and the amount paid.
(3) The review must under subparagraph (2)(b) consider taxes payable by the owners and employees of Scottish Limited Partnerships.”
This new clause would require the Chancellor of the Exchequer to review the effect on public finances, and on reducing the tax gap, of section 31, and in particular on the taxes payable by owners and employees of Scottish Limited Partnerships.
New clause 15—Parliamentary scrutiny of FCA provisions—
“Any provision made by the Financial Conduct Authority under this Act may not be made unless a draft of the provision has been laid before and approved by a resolution of the House of Commons.”
This new clause subjects FCA provisions under this Act to the affirmative scrutiny procedure in the House of Commons.
New clause 16—Scrutiny of FCA Powers by committees—
“(1) No provision may be made by the Financial Conduct Authority under this Act unless the conditions in subsection (2) are satisfied.
(2) The conditions are that—
(a) a new statutory committee comprising Members of the House of Commons has been established to scrutinise financial regulation, and
(b) a new statutory committee comprising Members of the House of Lords has been established to scrutinise financial regulation.
(3) The Treasury must, by regulations, make provision for and about those committees.
(4) Those regulations must provide that the committees have at least as much power as the relevant committees of the European Union.”
This new clause requires statutory financial regulation scrutiny committees to be established before the FCA can make provisions under this Bill.
New clause 17—Review of impact of Act on UK meeting Paris climate change commitments—
“The Chancellor of the Exchequer must conduct an assessment of the impact of this Act on the UK meeting its Paris climate change commitments, and lay it before the House of Commons within six months of the day on which this Act receives Royal Assent.”
This new clause would require the Chancellor of the Exchequer to review the impact of the Bill on the UK meeting its Paris climate change commitments.
New clause 18—Review of impact of Act on UK meeting UN Sustainable Development Goals—
“The Chancellor of the Exchequer must conduct an assessment of the impact of this Act on the UK meeting the UN Sustainable Development Goals, and lay it before the House of Commons within six months of the day on which this Act receives Royal Assent.”
This new clause would require the Chancellor of the Exchequer to review the impact of the Bill on the UK meeting the UN Sustainable Development Goals.
New clause 19—Money laundering and overseas trustees: review—
“(1) The Treasury must, within six months of this Act being passed, prepare, publish and lay before Parliament a report on the effects on money laundering of the provisions in section 31 of this Act.
(2) The report must address—
(a) the anticipated change to the volume of money laundering attributable to the provisions of section 31; and
(b) alleged money laundering involving overseas trusts by the owners and employees of Scottish Limited Partnerships.”
This new clause would require the Treasury to review the effects on money laundering of the provisions in section 31 of this Act, and in particular on the use of overseas trusts for the purposes of money laundering by owners and employees of Scottish Limited Partnerships.
New clause 20—Regulatory divergence from the EU in financial services: Annual review—
“(1) The Treasury must prepare, publish and lay before Parliament an annual review of the impact of regulatory divergence in financial services from the European Union.
(2) Each annual review must consider the estimated impact of regulatory divergence in financial services in the current financial year, and for the ten subsequent financial years, on the following matters—
(a) business investment,
(b) employment,
(c) productivity,
(d) inflation,
(e) financial stability, and
(f) financial liquidity.
in each English region, and in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
(3) Each report must compare the analysis in subsection (2) to an estimate based on the following hypothetical scenarios—
(a) that the UK leaves the EU withdrawal transition period without a negotiated comprehensive free trade agreement;
(b) that the UK leaves the EU withdrawal transition period with a negotiated agreement, and remains in the single market and customs union;
(c) that the UK leaves the EU withdrawal transition period with a negotiated comprehensive free trade agreement, and does not remain in the single market and customs union; and
(d) that the UK signs a comprehensive free trade agreement with the United States.
(4) The first annual report shall be published no later than 1 July 2021.”
This new clause requires a review of the impact of regulatory divergence from the European Union in financial services, which should make a comparison with various hypothetical trade deal scenarios.
New clause 21—Duty of care specification—
“(1) The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is amended as follows.
(2) After Section 1C insert—
‘1CA Duty of care specification
(1) In securing an appropriate degree of protection for consumers, the FCA must ensure authorised persons carrying out regulated activities are acting with a duty of care to all consumers.
(2) Matters the FCA should consider when drafting duty of care rules include, but are not limited to—
(a) the duties of authorised persons to act honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the best interest of their consumers;
(b) the duties of authorised persons to manage conflicts of interest fairly, both between themselves and their clients, and between clients;
(c) the extent to which the duties of authorised persons entail an ethical commitment not merely compliance with rules;
(d) that the duties must be owned by senior managers who would be accountable for their individual firm’s approach.’”
This new clause would mean that the FCA would need to ensure that financial services providers are acting with a duty of care to act in the best interests of all consumers.
New clause 22—Extension of the Breathing Space and Mental Health Crisis Moratorium—
‘(1) The Debt Respite Scheme (Breathing Space Moratorium and Mental Health Crisis Moratorium) (England and Wales) Regulations 2020 shall be amended as follows.
(2) In section 1(2), for “4th May 2021” substitute “31st January 2021”.
(3) In section 26(2), for “60 days” substitute “12 months”.’
This new clause would bring forward the start date of the Debt Respite Scheme and extend the duration of the Breathing Space Moratorium from 60 days to 12 months.
New clause 23—Impact of COVID-19 on the Debt Respite Scheme: Ministerial report—
“(1) The Treasury must prepare and publish a report on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the implementation of the Debt Respite Scheme.
(2) The report must include—
(a) a statement on the extent to which changes to levels of household debt caused by the COVID-19 pandemic will affect the usage and operation of the Debt Respite Scheme;
(b) a statement on the resilience of UK households to future pandemics and other financial shocks, and how these would affect the usage and operation of the Debt Respite Scheme; and
(c) consideration of proposals for the incorporation of a no-interest loan scheme into the Debt Respite Scheme for financially vulnerable individuals affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.
(3) The report must be laid before Parliament no later than 28 February 2021.”
This new clause would require the Treasury to publish a report on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the implementation of the Debt Respite Scheme, including consideration of a proposal for the incorporation of a no-interest loan scheme into the Debt Respite Scheme.
New clause 24—Mortgage contracts: regulation of management and ownership—
‘(1) Article 61 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 shall be amended as follows.
(2) After paragraph (2), insert—
“(2A) Managing a regulated mortgage contract is also a specified kind of activity.
(2B) Owning a regulated mortgage contract is also a specified kind of activity.”
(3) For sub-sub-paragraphs (3)(a)(ii) and (3)(a)(iii) substitute—
“(ii) the contract provides for the obligation of the borrower to repay to be secured by a legal mortgage of land (other than timeshare accommodation) in the United Kingdom;
(iii) at least 40% of that land is used, or is intended to be used, as or in connection with a dwelling.”
(4) After sub-paragraph (3)(c), insert—
“(d) ‘managing’ a regulated mortgage contract means having the power to exercise or to control the exercise of any of the rights of a lender under a regulated mortgage contract.
(e) ‘owning’ a regulated mortgage contract means holding the legal title to a regulated mortgage contract or to own beneficially the rights of the lender under a regulated mortgage contract.”
(5) For paragraph (4), substitute—
“(4) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (3)(a)—
(a) ‘mortgage’ includes charge and (in Scotland) a heritable security;
(b) the area of any land which comprises a building or other structure containing two or more storeys is to be taken to be the aggregate of the floor areas of each of those storeys; and
(c) ‘timeshare accommodation’ has the meaning given by section 1 of the Timeshare Act 1992(c).”’
This new clause would require the regulation of the ‘management’ and ‘ownership’ of a regulated mortgage contract.
New clause 25—Standard Variable Rates: Cap on charges for Mortgage Prisoners—
“(7) The FCA must make rules by virtue of subsection (1) in relation to introducing a cap on the interest rates charged to mortgage prisoners in relation to regulated mortgage contracts with a view to securing an appropriate degree of protection for consumers.
(8) In subsection (7) ‘mortgage prisoner’ means a consumer who cannot switch to a different lender because of their characteristics and has a regulated mortgage contract with one of the following type of firms—
(a) inactive lenders: firms authorised for mortgage lending that are no longer lending; and
(b) unregulated entities: firms not authorised for mortgage lending.
(9) The rules made by the FCA under subsection (7) must set the level of the cap on the ‘Standard Variable Rate’ at a level no more than 2 percentage points above the Bank of England base rate.
(10) In subsection (9) ‘Standard Variable Rate’ means the variable rate of interest charged under the regulated mortgage contract after the end of any initial introductory deal.
(11) The FCA must ensure any rules that it is required to make as a result of the amendment made by subsection (7) are made not later than 31st July 2021.”
This new clause would require the FCA to introduce a cap on the Standard Variable Rates charged to consumers who cannot switch to a different lender because of their characteristics and who have a regulated mortgage contract with either an inactive lender or an unregulated entity.
New clause 26—Conditions for the transfer of a regulated mortgage contract—
“(1) A regulated mortgage contract shall not be transferred without the written consent of the borrower.
(2) When seeking consent from either an existing or a new borrower the lender must provide a statement to the borrower containing sufficient information in order for them to make an informed decision.
(3) The statement provided pursuant to subsection (2) must be approved in advance by the Financial Conduct Authority and shall include—
(a) a clear explanation of the implications in terms of the interest rates which will be offered to the borrower including details of the policies and procedures which will apply for the setting of mortgage interest rates and for the making of repayments if the transfer takes place;
(b) how the transfer might affect the borrower;
(c) the name and address of the intended transferee, and of any holding company applicable;
(d) the relationship, if any, between the lender and the transferee;
(e) a description of the intended transferee and of its business, including how long it has been in operation, and details of its involvement in the management of mortgages; and
(f) confirmation that in the absence of a specific consent the existing arrangements will continue to apply.
(4) Each borrower shall be approached individually and shall be given a reasonable time within which to give or decline to give their consent.
(5) In this section, ‘regulated mortgage contract’ has the meaning given by article 61(3) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001.”
This new clause would require the written consent of the borrower for the transfer of a regulated mortgage contract and require lenders to provide specified information to borrowers when seeking this consent and for this statement to be approved in advance by the FCA.
New clause 30—Offence of facilitation of or failure to prevent financial crime (No. 2)—
“(1) A financial services company commits an offence if it—
(a) facilitates, aids or abets a relevant offence;
(b) does not take all reasonable steps to prevent the commissioning of a relevant offence.
(2) A financial services company guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable—
(a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine;
(b) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to a fine;
(c) on summary conviction in Scotland or Northern Ireland, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum.
(3) For the purposes of this section—
‘financial services company’ means any person, including a body of persons corporate or unincorporated, authorised by or registered with the Financial Conduct Authority’;
‘relevant offence’ means—
(a) fraud, as defined in the Fraud Act 2006;
(b) false accounting, as defined in the Theft Act 1968;
(c) any offence under the following sections of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002;
(d) tax evasion;
(e) an offence under Part 7 of the Financial Services Act 2012; and
(f) insider dealing, as defined in the Criminal Justice Act 1993.”
This new clause would create an offence in cases where financial services companies facilitate or fail to prevent financial crime.
Government amendment 15.
Amendment 13, in clause 33, page 39, line 37, at end insert—
“(c) the successor account must bear, in each financial year, at least the same level of bonus as the mature account before maturation.”
This amendment would ensure customers do not lose any bonus should their funds be moved from a matured account into a new one.
Amendment 14, in clause 33, page 39, line 37, at end insert—
“(7) Regulations under sub-paragraph (2) may only be made if the conditions in sub-paragraph (8) are met.
(8) The conditions referred to in sub-paragraph (7) are—
(a) There must be an account available to any affected customer which provides at least as generous a bonus structure as the matured account.
(b) The customer must have been successfully contacted by a relevant Department or public body.
(c) The customer must have been given full and accessible information on the effects of changing account.”
This amendment would ensure customers are contacted and informed before their funds are transferred.
Amendment 4, in clause 37, page 44, line 9, at end insert—
“(c) after subparagraph (2) insert—
(2A) A person may not be appointed as chief executive under paragraph 2(2)(b) unless they have the consent of the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons.”
This amendment would require a candidate for the position of chief executive of the FCA to receive the consent of the Treasury Committee for their appointment.
Amendment 3, in clause 37, page 44, line 14, at end insert—
“(2C) A person may not be appointed as chief executive under paragraph 2(2)(b) until the Treasury has prepared and published a report on the effectiveness of the FCA under the tenure of the previous chief executive.”
This amendment would require the Treasury to prepare and publish a report on the effectiveness of the previous chief executive in advance of the appointment of a new chief executive.
Government amendments 16 to 21.
Government new schedule 1—Forfeiture of money: electronic money institutions and payment institutions.
Government amendment 22.
Government amendment 23.
Amendment 5, in schedule 2, page 60, line 18, at end insert—
“(f) impose requirements relating to the publication of quarterly statements on portfolio holdings.”
This amendment would allow the FCA to impose requirements on investment firms to publish quarterly statements on their portfolio holdings.
Amendment 6, in schedule 2, page 60, line 18, at end insert—
“(3A) General rules made for the purpose of subsection (1) must impose requirements relating to the publication of quarterly statements on portfolio holdings.”
This amendment would require the FCA to impose requirements on investment firms to publish quarterly statements on their portfolio holdings.
Government amendments 24 to 26.
Amendment 1, in schedule 2, page 63, line 5, at end insert—
“(ba) the target for net UK emissions of greenhouse gases in 2050 as set out in the Climate Change Act 2008 as amended by the Climate Change Act (2050 Target Amendment) Order 2019, and”.
Amendment 7, in schedule 2, page 63, line 5, at end insert—
“(ba) the promotion of ethical investments with reference to the judgements of the International Court of Justice or the High Court of England and Wales concerning genocide under Article II of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and findings of genocide or ethnic cleansing by a United Nations-mandated investigation.”
This amendment would require the FCA, when making Part 9C rules for investment firms, to have regard to findings of genocide by the courts and UN-mandated investigations.
Amendment 8, in schedule 2, page 63, line 5, at end insert—
“(ba) the likely effect of the rules on trade frictions between the UK and EU, and”.
This amendment would ensure the likely effect of the rules on trade frictions between the UK and EU are considered before Part 9C rules are taken.
Amendment 9, in schedule 2, page 63, line 5, at end insert—
“(ba) the likely effect of the rules on the UK meeting its international and domestic commitments on tackling climate change, and”.
This amendment would ensure the likely effect of the rules on the UK meeting its international and domestic commitments on tackling climate change are considered before Part 9C rules are taken.
Amendment 10, in schedule 2, page 79, line 25, after “activities” insert
“in the UK and internationally”.
This amendment would ensure the likely effect of the rules on the relative standing of the United Kingdom as a place for internationally active credit institutions and investment firms to be based or to carry on activities are considered both in terms of their UK and international activities before Part CRR rules are taken.
Amendment 2, in schedule 3, page 79, line 29, at end insert—
“(ca) the target for net UK emissions of greenhouse gases in 2050 as set out in the Climate Change Act 2008 as amended by the Climate Change Act (2050 Target Amendment) Order 2019, and”.
Amendment 11, in schedule 3, page 79, line 29, at end insert—
“(ca) the likely effect of the rules on trade frictions between the UK and EU, and”.
This amendment would ensure the likely effect of the rules on trade frictions between the UK and EU are considered before CRR rules are taken.
Amendment 12, in schedule 3, page 79, line 29, at end insert—
“(ca) the likely effect of the rules on the UK meeting its international and domestic commitments on tackling climate change, and”.
This amendment would ensure the likely effect of the rules on the UK meeting its international and domestic commitments on tackling climate change are considered before CRR rules are taken.
Government amendments 27 to 31.
John Glen
Our financial services sector is critical to our national effort to recover from the impacts of covid-19 and move towards a resilient, open and sustainable future for the UK economy. The Bill is the next step in a process to take back control of our financial services legislation, having left the European Union and come to the end of the transition period.
There are a large number of amendments to address, so I will speak at some length, but hopefully as succinctly as possible. Let me start with the 20 new clauses and amendments tabled in my name, which do four things. I will first address new clauses 27 and 28, new schedule 1 and amendments 16 to 20. I hope that the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) will be pleased to see this set of new clauses and amendments, which have been tabled in response to an issue that he raised in Committee.
The Government remain committed to supporting the FinTech sector. The UK is widely considered to be a leading market—probably the leading market—for starting and growing a FinTech firm, and I am proud of that reputation. It has recently become clear that provisions in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 are creating challenges for some types of smaller firms known as e-money institutions and payment institutions. These institutions, which include industry leaders such as Revolut, Worldpay and TransferWise, have experienced significant growth over recent years. Currently, they need to submit a defence against money laundering request—which I shall refer to as a DAML from now on—to the National Crime Agency, to seek consent before proceeding with any transaction involving criminal property, however small.
John Glen
I will not on this occasion, if the hon. Gentleman does not mind, because I need to make progress.
In the context that I just outlined, e-money and payment institutions are subject to greater bureaucracy than banks and building societies, which benefit from a £250 threshold amount, under which, in certain circumstances, they do not need to submit a DAML and can proceed with the transaction. E-money and payment institutions must submit a large number of DAML requests for low-value transactions, which are generally of extremely limited use to law enforcement. Processing these requests consumes law enforcement resource, as well as placing a disproportionate burden on these firms, so the amendment equalises the treatment between banks and payment and e-money institutions.
Alongside this change, new clause 28 amends the scope of account freezing and forfeiture powers in the Proceeds of Crime Act and the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 to include accounts held at payment and e-money institutions. That will ensure that law enforcement are able quickly and effectively to freeze and forfeit the proceeds of crime and terrorist property when held in payment and e-money institution accounts. I hope that, given this, the Opposition will consider withdrawing new clause 6, which has a similar purpose. I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his co-operation on this matter.
Jim Shannon
I want to ask this question because it is very important. We have had tremendous difficulties in Northern Ireland with paramilitaries and money laundering. I am just wondering, in the context of the legislation to which the Minister has just referred and money laundering in particular—we have this in my constituency of Strangford and across the whole of Northern Ireland—what discussions has he had with the police and those in the Northern Ireland Assembly to ensure that loyalist paramilitaries and republican paramilitaries, who are really criminals at the end of the day, are stopped from using that money? Will that be able to be stopped in Northern Ireland if this legislation goes through?
John Glen
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his point. It really does stray beyond the provisions of this particular amendment. He makes an important point, but it is not one that I can address at this point. I would be very happy to write to him to answer his question more appropriately.
I shall now turn to the remaining amendments in my name, which ensure that the powers that the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority have over holding companies function as intended. Amendments 25, 26 and 27 enable the PRA and the FCA to make rules directly over holding companies to void employment contracts and require recovery of remuneration paid to individuals when rules prohibiting them from being paid in a certain way are breached. This is important because, as a result of the measures brought forward in this Bill, responsibility for ensuring compliance with a banking or investment group’s capital requirements is moving from its operating companies to its holding company. This amendment ensures that the regulator can enforce breaches of the rules at the level at which they are set.
Amendments 15, 28, 29, 30 and 31 are a set of relatively small amendments that ensure that the PRA has the full suite of enforcement tools at its disposal for the supervisory regime over holding companies. Amendment 24 is a technical drafting point. Amendments 22 and 23 are clarificatory amendments, which are necessary to ensure that the investment firm’s prudential regime applies to the correct set of firms and does not have extraterritorial effect. I know that this is an important point for my hon. Friend the Member for Hitchin and Harpenden (Bim Afolami). I thank him for his work on this and hope that he will welcome these amendments.
I shall now turn to the other amendments that have been tabled by Members of this House. First, there are a number of amendments that relate to criminality and money laundering. New clause 4 and new clause 30 would create a new criminal offence for FCA-regulated persons of facilitating and of failing to prevent economic crime. This is an important and complex topic, so I will seek to address it in detail.
The Government have taken significant action to improve corporate governance and culture in the financial services industry. We introduced the new senior managers and certification regime, which enables the FCA more easily to take action against the responsible senior manager where there has been a failure in a firm’s financial crime systems and controls. Separately, the Government have recently strengthened the anti-money laundering requirements on financial services firms.
In 2017, the Government issued a call for evidence on whether corporate liability law for economic crime needed to be reformed. Unfortunately, the findings were inconclusive and, as a result, the Government have tasked the Law Commission to conduct an expert review on this issue to report by the end of this year. That will ensure a more comprehensive understanding of any issues with current economic crime law, as well as the implications of any potential options if reform is considered necessary. Before any broader new “failure to prevent” defence for economic crime is introduced, there needs to be strong evidence to support it, as there was when similar bribery and tax evasion offences introduced in 2010 and 2017 respectively took place. A new offence will also need to be designed rigorously, with specific consideration given to how it sits alongside associated criminal and regulatory regimes and to the potential impacts on business.
The proposed new offences in this amendment would lead to a discrepancy in treatment between FCA-regulated businesses and other businesses under criminal law. The 2017 call for evidence did not provide any evidence to suggest financial services businesses should be specifically targeted with a new offence. Indeed, many of the examples provided related to businesses in other sectors.
Kevin Hollinrake (Thirsk and Malton) (Con)
In terms of the corporate offence of failing to prevent economic crime, the Minister asked for evidence on that, but there is a wealth of evidence that the FCA is not holding either corporations or individuals to account for some egregious behaviour, particularly in the banking system and many other parts of corporate life. We are seeing fraud, but £9 billion of fines in the US in a 10-year period and only £260 million in the UK. Is that not proof alone that we need legislation in this area?
John Glen
It is easy to point to headline differences in rates of fines, but it is quite different to intervene with a new piece of legislation that is fit for purpose. That is why I am absolutely clear that the call for evidence this year will gather that evidence—I am sure that my hon. Friend will be keen to submit his evidence to that—and, in due course, we will look at it and examine what the implications are. However, I am not suggesting from the Dispatch Box that everything is perfect with respect to regulation, and of course, there are regulatory failures from time to time and criminal activity. The question is what the most appropriate legislative response is.
I turn to new clause 14, which would add a requirement for the Government to report on the effect of clause 31 on tax revenues. This does not reflect the effect of the provision that we have included in the Bill. The Bill provision merely ensures the continuation of, and the ability to vary in future, the original powers assigned to Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs with respect to registration of overseas trusts. It does not make any change to taxes.
Similarly, it is not necessary to introduce a report on the impact on money laundering of clause 31, as proposed by new clause 19. Existing legislation already requires the Treasury to carry out a review of its existing provisions within money-laundering regulations and publish a report setting out the conclusions of its review by June 2022. This wider review will provide a more meaningful evaluation than the one envisaged in the amendment.
Amendment 7 raises a very important issue. This amendment would require the FCA to “have regard” to the promotion of ethical investments with reference to findings of genocide by the High Court and the International Court of Justice when making rules for the investment firm prudential regime. While I am extremely sympathetic to the issue raised by Members on both sides of the House, including the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Rushanara Ali) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), this Bill is not the right place to address the issue. This amendment would require the FCA to make political choices about whether to associate itself and its rules with countries that are guilty of genocide or ethnic cleansing. These important decisions on UK foreign policy are for Government to take and not an independent financial services regulator.
I will now address a number of amendments that seek to bring new activities—
Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)
Will the Minister give way?
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
I am glad he gave me time to get this awful mask off.
I understand fully my hon. Friend’s arguments, and I will come to that in a second when I have an opportunity to catch Madam Deputy Speaker’s eye, but on the point he is making, I simply ask him this question: can he conceive that any UK Government would ever authorise trade arrangements on a special basis with any country guilty of genocide?
John Glen
My right hon. Friend has raised this matter in the context of his raising it in a number of other regards with respect to the Trade Bill, and it would obviously be appropriate for my ministerial colleagues in that Department to address it in that context. Today, it is my responsibility to deal with it in the context of financial services regulation, as I think I have done, but I do not want to deny the grave significance of the matter that he is raising, and indeed, my right hon. Friend the Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell) has raised it with me, too. Obviously, these are complex matters on which others will respond in due course.
I will now address a number of amendments that seek to bring new activities into FCA regulation. New clause 7 relates to “buy now, pay later” products and would require the Treasury to bring those products and other interest-free credit products into the scope of financial services regulation. Those products can play an important role by providing a lower-cost alternative for people making purchases, especially larger items. As an interest-free credit product, “buy now, pay later” is inherently lower-risk than other forms of borrowing, and can be a useful part of the toolkit for managing personal finances and tackling financial exclusion.
Kevin Hollinrake
Yesterday I was looking at a document written by a former lead analyst in that very market—someone who used to work for PIMCO. He very clearly sets out that the proposed change would have a transformational effect on tens of thousands of mortgage prisoners who will not be helped by any other measure that could be put in place. He says quite clearly:
“Introducing an SVR cap on closed, non-lending books would not disrupt the residential mortgage-backed security market”.
That is a direct contradiction of my hon. Friend’s position.
John Glen
Indeed, Martin Lewis, who does some excellent work in this regard and whom I met on this topic recently, looked at this very matter—he commissioned some work from the London School of Economics to look into it—and recommended that we should not take this cap on the SVR. There will always be a variety of views, but I have set out very clearly why I think this is the right position.
Dame Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)
The Minister is full of reasons, as Treasury Ministers always are, for not accepting amendments or new clauses that people have tabled to solve problems. Does he appreciate the frustration that mortgage prisoners and those who are trying to do something about financial crime feel when they hear Ministers giving us all the technical reasons why things cannot be done but not really proceeding with much alacrity to solve the problems that we raise, albeit not necessarily in the correct format?
John Glen
I am very happy to respond to that. That is why, over the last three years, I have engaged with the problem and worked with the FCA to change the lending criteria so that an estimated 125,000 of the 250,000 mortgage prisoners have been able to switch to more affordable mortgages if they are not taking on lending and are not in arrears. This a complex problem. I am still focused on the 55,000 that we estimate are in that difficult position. I will continue to work with stakeholders and industry representatives to find solutions, working closely with the FCA, but that does not permit me simply to allow any intervention. I did start my remarks with a concession on something that I thought was constructive.
Let me move on to new clause 26, which would require a lender to seek a borrower’s permission before transferring their loan. That would give rise to significant financial stability concerns, especially if a firm was entering liquidation, since it would prevent the timely transfer of the mortgage book. Selling a mortgage book can also represent a sensible way for a lender to manage its balance sheet and does not change the terms or conditions of a borrower’s mortgage contract.
I turn to a number of amendments relating to EU exit and financial services. New clause 12 would require the Treasury to assess the impact of adopting different rules from those of the EU through the Bill. It is right that the UK is able to adopt rules that best suit our own markets. The Government have published an impact assessment alongside the Bill, so the new clause is unnecessary.
Sir Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)
There is one overseas territory that is intimately connected to the EU: Gibraltar, which values its financial independence. I would just like to use this opportunity—I am sure the Minister will not mind commenting—to reassure the people of Gibraltar that their financial services are absolutely safe under this Government and this Bill.
John Glen
I am very happy to do that. Indeed, the Bill makes provision to ensure that there is ongoing certainty for financial services—particularly the insurance industry, which is so significant to the Gibraltarian economy.
New clause 20 would require the Government to review the cost of divergence from EU rules. I just do not accept that characterisation. Regulatory regimes are not static. There are a lot of myths around this area of divergence. Rules evolve all the time. Where we make changes to our frameworks as they stand today, those will be guided by our continued commitment to the highest international standards and by what is right for the UK’s complex and highly developed markets, to support our world-class environment for doing business. The Bill is the first part of that journey.
New clause 8 would require the Government essentially to report on the status of the EU’s considerations about UK equivalence. That is an autonomous process for the EU, and therefore that is not something that the Government can agree to do. The Chancellor recently announced a package of equivalence decisions—17 decisions out of the 30 that we had to make for the EU—and I will keep the House updated on the UK’s approach to equivalence, just as I did throughout the transition period.
I turn to new clauses 15 and 16, and amendments 3 and 4, which relate to how the regulators’ actions under the Bill will be scrutinised by Parliament. The UK’s regulators are internationally renowned as leaders in financial services regulation, and the Government believe that it is right that powers to implement often highly complex rules are delegated to the bodies with the appropriate technical expertise.
The FCA is already accountable to the Treasury, Parliament and the public. There is a statutory requirement for the FCA’s annual report and accounts for the financial year to be laid before Parliament by the Treasury, and a requirement to hold an annual public meeting at which the annual report can be discussed. There is currently nothing preventing a Select Committee of either House from reviewing the activities of the FCA at an inquiry, taking evidence, calling witnesses and reporting with recommendations. The Treasury recently published a consultation document on the review into the future regulatory framework for financial services, which seeks to achieve the right split of responsibilities between Parliament, Government and the regulators, now that we have left the EU. That is a significant undertaking that we must get right, and I look forward to continuing to engage with Members as part of that review.
I have spoken at length about a number of topics that are not directly addressed in the Bill. I will now address amendments relating to some of the measures that make up the Bill itself. I have already said that the prudential measures contain accountability frameworks, and I will begin by addressing a number of amendments that seek to add additional elements to that framework. As I said to the Public Bill Committee, amendments 1 and 2, along with amendments 9 and 12, all add considerations relating to climate change to the accountability frameworks. They are not necessary, as the Bill grants the Treasury a power to specify further matters to the accountability framework at a later date. I can assure Members across the House that the Treasury will carefully consider adding climate change as an issue to which the regulator should have regard, in the future. However, any such addition needs careful consideration and consultation on how it can be best framed. Therefore, the Government cannot support these amendments.
Amendments 8 and 11 would require the FCA and the PRA to have regard to the impact of their prudential rules on frictionless trade with the EU. Similarly, amendment 10 would require the PRA to have regard to the UK’s relative standing when making rules on capital requirements. These amendments are unnecessary. The accountability framework introduced by the Bill already requires the regulators to consider the impact of their rules on financial services equivalence. That is the main mechanism for financial services relationships between the UK and all overseas jurisdictions, not only the EU, and the Bill already requires the PRA to consider the UK’s standing in relation to other countries and territories.
Amendments 13 and 14 relate to the Help to Save scheme. We expect the majority of account holders to make an active decision about where they want to transfer their money where their accounts mature. However, I recognise that some individuals will become disengaged from their accounts, and before I turn to the specific amendments, I want to update the House on the Government’s plans for supporting these disengaged customers. Successor accounts, which are enabled by this clause, are one of the options that have been under consideration. Having carefully assessed the options, the Government have decided not to use the power provided by this clause at this point. This is primarily because of the operational issues, which mean that we would not be able to guarantee that every customer would be able to have a successor account opened for them automatically. I was therefore unable to conclude that this approach represented value for money. Instead, the Government propose to support customers who do not provide specific instructions for the transfer of their money, by ensuring that they receive their funds into their nominated bank account—the account into which they already receive their bonus payments. If the bonus payments are paid into that account, the principal amount will revert to that account. This will ensure that disengaged customers will be reunited with their savings and bonus payments.
Amendments 13 and 14 would, in effect, extend the four-year term of the Help to Save scheme by providing a guaranteed bonus for the successor account. The aim of Help to Save is to kick-start a regular long-term savings habit and encourage people to continue to save via mainstream savings accounts. The Government’s view is that a four-year Help to Save period is sufficient to achieve this objective. Amendment 14 also seeks to mandate the contacting of customers regarding the transfer of balances to a successor account. This amendment is unnecessary, as all customers will be contacted ahead of their accounts maturing, to encourage them to engage with their accounts and to provide instructions on where to transfer their funds.
New clause 2 would require the Treasury to publish a report on the anticipated use of the debt respite scheme. The expected demand and take-up of both elements of the debt respite scheme have been quantified to the extent possible at this stage and published in the appropriate impact assessments. I share right hon. and hon. Members’ determination that these schemes should work for those who need them. The Government will of course closely monitor both schemes’ usage and consider the impacts of covid-19 and the wider economic recovery on them. I am afraid that producing a report within six months evaluating the impact of changes made by clause 32 on levels of debt across the UK, as proposed by new clause 9, is not possible, as the regulations establishing a statutory debt repayment plan are unlikely to have been made and implemented by that point. I can assure Members that the Government are committed to properly evaluating both the statutory debt repayment plan and the breathing space after their commencement.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
Before I call the shadow Minister, I should say that we have until 6 o’clock for this debate and a number of colleagues want to get in. I have introduced a five-minute time limit to start with, to try to accommodate some of the main people behind other amendments, but it is very likely that I will quickly have to take that down afterwards; I just warn colleagues that that may well happen.
I remind hon. Members that when a speaking limit is in effect for Back Benchers, a countdown clock will be visible on the screens of hon. Members participating virtually. For hon. Members participating physically in the Chamber, the usual clock in the Chamber will operate.
Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)
Madam Deputy Speaker, may I wish you, the Minister and the House a happy new year?
The Bill returns to the House at a very important moment for the country’s economy and our financial services industry. We have just come to the end of the transition period with the European Union, and we are of course in the teeth of the battle against the virus. Against a background like that, the business of legislating can seem even more prosaic than usual, and perhaps that is even more the case with a Bill such as this one. It is a mixed bag of measures dealing with everything from onshoring various EU directives to the length of the term of office for the chief executive of the Financial Conduct Authority. Some of it is a necessary consequence of our withdrawal from the European Union, and other parts look as though they have been sitting in the Treasury waiting for a legislative home, like policies hoping for a passing bus.
I want to focus on the amendments tabled in the name of the Leader of the Opposition and then turn to some of those tabled by my right hon. and hon. Friends. The first amendment I want to speak to is our amendment 1 on the UK’s net zero commitments. The Bill sets out, in schedules 2 and 3, a list of things that the regulators have to have regard to in the exercise of their new and expanded functions under the Bill. It talks of international standards and competitiveness, yet nowhere is there a mention of the overarching goal that will shape so much of our economy in the decades to come.
In this place, we have rows and arguments about all manner of issues, but sometimes the things that generate the most heat, if the Minister will pardon me the pun, are not always the biggest or most important issues. Conversely, just because an issue has bipartisan support does not make it less significant, and there is no doubt that the Climate Change Act 2008, as amended by the Climate Change Act (2050 Target Amendment) Order 2019, is one of the most significant pieces of economic legislation to pass in this country for many years.
To achieve our net zero goals will require wholesale change in many walks of life. The briefest of looks at the Committee on Climate Change’s report on how this should be done shows what the main areas will be. On energy, we need to find replacements for fossil fuels, we have to invest in the shift to hydrogen and we are still trying to make carbon capture and storage a practical reality. On transport, the transition to battery power will have to proceed at an ever-increasing pace. On housing, we need not only to build new zero-carbon homes, but to retrofit millions of existing homes with zero-carbon heating systems. Agriculture, food production and even the clothes we wear—all these things will undergo big change, and all of them will require significant financial investment.
The UK financial services sector has a huge role to play. In seeking a post-Brexit role, what better long-term mission could there be than empowering the change that we need to make to preserve the planet for future generations? This is not just my view—the Chancellor himself has said as much. In his statement on the future of financial services, given two months ago from the Government Dispatch Box, he not only announced the first green gilts, but said he wanted to see
“the full weight of…capital behind the critical global effort to tackle climate change”.—[Official Report, 9 November 2020; Vol. 683, c. 621.]
Yet this Bill, which empowers the regulators in so many other ways, is totally silent on that issue. The Minister says we might do it in the future. [Interruption.] He says from a sedentary position that we will do it in the future. He has an opportunity to do it today—he could just accept the amendment. What is the point of waiting until the future to do this, as he has indicated he will, when there is an amendment that does not seek to add any new commitments but simply to make this part of the remit of our financial services regulators?
There are many reasons, as my newly ennobled—if that is the correct word; newly honoured, perhaps—hon. Friend the Member for Wallasey (Dame Angela Eagle) said, to say no to amendments, but “not invented here” is one of the worst if the Government have indicated they are going to accept it.
The Government say they want the UK to be the centre for green finance globally, but their first legislative outing on this sector since we left the European Union says nothing about mandating the regulators of the industry to make that part of their mission. As I said, our amendment does not seek to add to the commitments on net zero that the UK has already made, which are already set out in legislation and enjoy the support of all sides of the House, but to make these part of the remit of the regulators that shape our financial services industry. There is already a move towards greater environmental investing from investment funds and from consumers who want to invest in this way, and there is a desire for these products, so why do the Government not back that up by making it part of the regulators’ remit?
We know that these commitments cannot be met without large-scale investment. To anyone who says to just leave it to the market if there is an investor desire, we also know that it cannot be done by the private sector alone. This will take both the private sector and the public sector working together and pulling in the same direction. It is in that spirit that we put forward the amendment. We ask for something that has bipartisan support, is in line with the post-Brexit goal for the sector as set out by the Chancellor himself and will make it easier for the country to achieve its commitments.
Further to that, we are also asking for something that the Minister said in recent minutes that the Government will do at some point anyway. We very much hope that, between now and six o’clock, the Government will reconsider and accept the amendment, which they said they agree with and will bring forward in some way themselves at some point.
Just two weeks ago, the House approved the post-Brexit trade and co-operation agreement, but for financial services this is basically a no deal agreement. The references within it do no more than repeat standard pledges of co-operation in every free trade agreement. The Prime Minister himself acknowledged that, for this sector, he did not achieve as much as he hoped. Indeed, within a few days of the agreement, £6 billion-worth of euro-denominated share trading shifted from London to European exchanges—an immediate response to the new situation.
Dame Angela Eagle
Does my right hon. Friend agree that the way the Government approached the Brexit negotiation means that there is literally no incentive for the EU to agree equivalence arrangements, because the lack of them means exactly what he just pointed out—jobs and trading formerly done in London migrating to the EU? Does he also agree that, in this new environment, any move by the Government to give the City a competitive edge is likely to lessen the chances of progress on equivalence in the EU, and the market access that comes with it? That is another threat to jobs in the City and to tax revenue for the Exchequer.
Mr McFadden
My hon. Friend is absolutely right that this throws into sharp relief the claim that we hold all the cards. It also throws into sharp relief the debate about divergence, as that remains undecided. The fact that the agreement approved by this House two weeks ago did not cover financial services in any meaningful way was not an accident; it was a choice that the Government made. Step by step, the Government abandoned any attempt to prioritise the market access that the financial services sector, and indeed services in general, had until the end of last year. I remind Conservative Members of the Chequers paper published in 2018, of which they may have more or less fond memories. It acknowledged that on this issue,
“there will be more barriers to the UK’s access to the EU market”
than there are today. On equivalence regimes, it said:
“These regimes are not sufficient to deal with a third country whose financial markets are as deeply interconnected with the EU’s as those of the UK are. In particular, the existing regimes”—
that is, the equivalence regimes—
“do not provide for…institutional dialogue…a mediated solution where equivalence is threatened by a divergence of rules or supervisory practices”.
That which was deemed insufficient by the Government two and a half years ago has now become the height of their ambitions, and even that has not yet been achieved. With each step back from what they aimed for before, the incentives to shift funds and people become bigger.
Kevin Hollinrake
The right hon. Gentleman is speaking to an important amendment that not only allows for corporate prosecution but allows for a person who is registered with the FCA to be prosecuted. Is that not a critical point? Unless we start holding individuals to account for these wrongdoings, we will never stamp out these corporate failures and this corporate abuse.
Mr McFadden
The hon. Gentleman makes a very strong point, and it is why we believe these are strong amendments. We should do this because it is right in itself, and it is an important signal to send about financial services in this post-Brexit world. We do not want to send a signal that we are going for relative weakness in anti-fraud and anti-money laundering laws. Instead, the signal should be that we insist on the strongest possible measures.
New clause 21 seeks to establish a duty of care. This is a long-running debate, and we tabled a similar amendment in Committee. The new clause is intended to make companies ask not just whether their products are legal but whether they are right and are in the consumer’s interest.
New clauses 25 and 26 seek to address the plight of mortgage prisoners. These are people who are stuck on very high standard variable rates and have no ability to switch. All I would ask is, if the Minister cannot accept these amendments, will he continue to work on this issue to try to help these people who are trapped, through no fault of their own, on very uncompetitive rates? He mentioned 3% or 4%, which is much higher than is available in a mortgage environment where the base rate is 0.1%. That can mean paying thousands of pounds more per year, depending on the size of the mortgage, so this is a real material difference for people.
We have a global financial sector in this country that, if properly regulated and paying its way, is a huge asset to the people of this country. We want it to be innovative and successful, but we also want to ensure the public are properly protected against risks if things go wrong. That is the spirit in which we tabled these amendments, and it is the spirit in which we have approached the Bill throughout. I hope the Minister will consider that when it comes to the votes in a couple of hours’ time.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)
I rise to support amendment 7, in the name of the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Rushanara Ali), myself and 41 other Members. The Minister knows well, because we have had this discussion before—just in case it was to be private, I want to make it public, not because I do not trust him, but I just think it is helpful for him to know that—that the amendment seeks to bind or hold those involved in financial trade and investment to a definition of who they should not trade with and why. To that extent, it introduces the concept of a genocide definition. This measure is also in the Trade Bill, which is coming back to the House, and I make no apology for supporting the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow in this. She will speak later, but as I understand it, she may not move the amendment. However, that is not the point. The point is that it is time to air this argument.
For too long, we have allowed ourselves to walk away from the issue of genocide without ever managing to hold any country guilty of this. Successive Governments have found it impossible to act because these issues are apparently referred to the International Criminal Court. The Government say to me, “It’s a matter for the international courts,” but they know full well that any reference to the ICC has to come from the Security Council, and it will never come from the Security Council because at least two of the nations there will always block it, particularly if it is to do with them or their allies. That is a distinct weakness, and I refer, of course, to the Chinese Communist party and Russia.
Let me give a couple of examples. We have discussed many times—the Foreign Secretary made a statement on it this week—the fact that many companies invest in, take trade from and take goods from areas of the world that are using slave labour. We know that this is happening in many places. For example, what is happening to the Rohingya is, in my view, likely to be defined as genocide. We can also look at what is happening to the Uyghurs in China. It is becoming more and more apparent every day that between 1 million and 3 million Uyghurs have been moved into labour camps. They are used as slave labour. They face forced sterilisation. There has been an 85% drop in their birth rate in that area. They have been moved out of their original area of work, and they are no longer allowed to speak their own language.
That is just one aspect, but a very brutal one, of what the amendment tries to deal with. After the Rwandan genocide in 1994, nothing happened. After the Bangladesh genocide in 1970, nothing ever happened. After the Cambodian genocide, nothing ever really happened. We still do not know what will happen, if it ever does, about Daesh’s genocide against Christians, Yazidis and so on, and companies will never be held to account for what they were involved in.
I realise that time is short, so I will conclude. Neither this amendment nor the one to the Trade Bill ties the Government’s hands. It does not give courts the right to proceed with investigations without reference. It does not give them the power to make criminal punishment, and it does not strike down trade deals or force criminal prosecutions. It would raise to the attention of the Government and the world that, at last, a domestic court here in the UK—the High Court or maybe the Court of Session—will be able to rule that, by all probability, genocide has taken place, and any financial institution, company or organisation involved with that area where genocide has taken place or with that country would no longer be allowed to do so. The Government would have to make that decision; that is the point.
I understand that, this week, the Board of Deputies is coming out in support of the amendment to not only this Bill but, importantly, the Trade Bill. I also understand that the US Senate, having seen what we have put forward, now plans to do the same. We have a chance here for leadership in the world. I thought we left the European Union to empower our courts and to give leadership. Again and again, I have been told by Ministers, “Not this, not now, not here.” The simple question I ask is, “Exactly when, what and how?” because that is never answered.
I finish by reading this:
“First they came for the socialists, and I did not speak out—
Because I was not a socialist.
Then they came for the trade unionists, and I did not speak out—
Because I was not a trade unionist.
Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out—
Because I was not a Jew.
Then they came for me—and there was no one left to speak for me.”
We need to speak out for all these oppressed peoples, whether it is in finance or in trade, and take the moral high ground.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
I emphasise that before too long I will have to take the time limit down to four minutes, and I know that the SNP spokesperson is aware of this. I call Alison Thewliss.
Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP) [V]
Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I will certainly do the best I can within the constraints of the technology that we have. I wish everybody a guid new year.
As colleagues will see, the SNP has tabled a range of amendments to this wide-ranging portfolio Bill. We have done so because we feel very strongly that the Bill was an opportunity to strengthen consumer protection; to take on the long-running and vexed issue of mortgage prisoners; to look at the wider responsibilities of financial services firms in areas of climate change, the sustainable development goals, ethics, money laundering and criminality; and to try our very best to mitigate the unfolding disaster that is Brexit.
On the first day of trading after the transition period ended, the City of London lost €6 billion in euro-denominated trading to venues in Amsterdam and Paris by companies such as London Stock Exchange Group, CBOE, and Aquis Exchange. Ernst & Young has said that £1.2 trillion of assets and 7,500 jobs had moved from the UK to the EU before 31 December. Trade frictions are apt to make this situation worse. Only last week, the Prime Minister was asking businesses what further divergence they would like to see. On the contrary, the message that we get when talking to City figures is that the only folk pushing for deregulation are Tory Back Benchers. Businesses see the importance of having open access to the EU market. It is vital that the UK authorities take into account the impact of frictions before taking us further away from the rules that the rest of Europe abides by.
SNP amendment 8 would ensure that the likely effects of the rules on trade frictions between the UK and EU are considered before part 9C rules are taken. Amendment 11 does the same for CRR—capital requirements regulation—rules. Our new clause 20 would force the Tories to come clean on the impact of financial services divergence from the EU. We feel very strongly that it is possible that if Scotland had been permitted to negotiate its own EU deal, taking into account our priorities, financial services operations could well have moved to Edinburgh, Glasgow and Aberdeen. It would certainly be better than how things are operating currently, with added layers of complexity. I have heard that a trader in London now cannot speak to an EU-based client without an EU-based trader also on the call to chaperone. The UK Government face a choice of two options: to try to achieve equivalence with the EU, which will essentially leave them a rule-taker with no seat at the decision-making table, or to forget about equivalence altogether and tear up the rulebook. It is expected that this latter option will encourage EU efforts to strip financial services businesses from the UK, losing well-paid jobs and skills not just in London but in Glasgow, Edinburgh, Aberdeen and other places too. We certainly did not vote for such an outcome.
Moving on to money laundering and financial crime, successive UK Governments have failed to tackle money laundering. The Minister gave this a hefty further kick into the long grass of a further call for evidence in his response to the amendments proposed by the right hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell). The hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake) also reiterated the need for action. Our new clause 14 would force Westminster to come clean on tax avoidance and the misuse of Scottish limited partnerships, about which the Minister knows I care a great deal. New clause 14 would show how little impact this Bill has on tax avoidance. With the Chancellor talking of a return to austerity, tax rises and public pay constraint, it is galling that there is no urgency by the UK Government in tackling tax avoidance and evasion on the other side of that balance sheet. It beggars belief, still, that the Tories’ 2018 Bill left an oligarch loophole allowing money laundering by overseas trusts to buy UK property with impunity—and they still have not acted on SLPs.
Clause 31 amends schedule 2 of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 to ensure that regulations can be made in respect of trustees with links to the UK. Without this, any powers that Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs sought to exercise to access information on such trusts are at risk of being held invalid under legal challenge. The UK Government must introduce a robust and transparent system of company registration in order to combat money launderers’ attempts to register entities for illicit purposes. The UK Government must also act to tackle the ongoing improper use of SLPs via proper, thorough reform of Companies House.
The UK Government really ought to accept cross-party amendment 7 to tackle financial crime and genocide, standing in the name of the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Rushanara Ali), my relentless colleague on the Treasury Committee. Failure to take action on this important human rights agenda will never be forgotten. This UK Government are forever keen to talk up their global Britain credentials, so this amendment is a significant opportunity to take that lead. It builds on the UK Government’s adoption of Magnitsky sanctions. I implore the Minister: we should never allow those who have had a hand in genocide to make their investments in the UK.
We also strongly support cross-party new clause 4, which would make it an offence for a relevant body registered by the FCA to facilitate, or fail to prevent, specified economic crimes. That is an area in desperate need of tightening, because too many are getting away with that at the moment.
I have previously given the Minister a wee bit of slagging for the Bill, and I made a pretty safe prediction that our diligent amendments would be dismissed in Committee. The Government’s U-turn on electronic payment legislation, which they dismissed in Committee, shows why our financial safety depends on parliamentary scrutiny, and the introduction of such a measure at this late stage gives me some concern. In Committee, the Government dismissed the need to cover electronic money institutions and the difficulties around DAMLs—defences against money laundering—despite the urgency of that issue, yet today we have a slew of Government amendments, new clauses, and even a whole new schedule.
Electronic money institutions expected to see something in the Bill. The Opposition tabled amendments to correct that. The Minister said that he would update Members on Report, but it is late in the day to bring such comprehensive amendments to the House. I would be grateful for clarity on whether Government amendments missed the boat in the first draft, or whether there is another reason. I am concerned that we have not been given the evidence to ascertain whether the drafting and content of the amendments provides what electronic money institutions are looking for. It would have been good to have such information, so that we could have taken evidence on it at the start of this process.
This issue goes to the heart of many of the concerns felt by me and my colleagues. Legislation is not done well here at the best of times, and financial services is a huge area that requires legislation, oversight and expertise. The Government say they are taking back control, but they are taking it from Brussels and giving it straight to unseen bureaucrats and regulators, with little role for this House. At the very least, MPs must be afforded the same level of power and influence that MEPs enjoyed. We know that little time and priority is given to SI Committees, and that Committees such as the European Scrutiny Committee have no real impact on regulation. Select Committee business is already incredibly busy, and scrutiny of these new powers must not be squeezed into already limited time and space, especially given the work that the Treasury and BEIS Committees now have, due to the covid fallout and the economic recovery.
With this place not having even a budget committee, SNP Members find it doubtful that the Treasury’s new powers will receive the scrutiny they deserve. That is why we want a specific committee to deal with the swathes of powers that are being handed back to the Treasury, the FCA and the PRA. We must ensure that the use of those powers is subject to the affirmative scrutiny procedure, and new clauses 15 and 16 seek to address that issue. Until the regulatory framework review has been published, and a new oversight structure agreed, such clauses are vital to ensure that Government and the FCA consult Parliament, before using the powers in the Bill in a way that would make Henry VIII blush.
On areas of consumer interest, I fully support new clause 7, tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy). Her speech in Committee was well-informed and passionate, and I suspect the Minister knows as well as the rest of us that she was correct to raise those concerns. There must be consumer protection for those using buy-now, pay-later schemes of all types. Clearpay and Klarna are on just about every retail website these days, and the lack of regulation around them exposes all our constituents to significant risk. Covid has led to approaching 1 million job losses, with implications for those who have outstanding debts. That toxic situation will only cause hardship in the long run, and the UK Government would do well to listen to the hon. Member for Walthamstow and act today, rather than wait for trouble to be heaped on our constituents in future.
I was glad to see the Minister make moves towards Help to Save accounts which I raised in Committee. I still have serious concerns that people who have managed to save some cash might lose access to it, although his assurances go some way to addressing those fears. It makes a degree of sense to transfer money into the same account that Help to Save bonuses were paid into, but the proportion of accounts where that is not possible must be closely monitored. I would like to know more about how National Savings and Investments will contact those who have poor literacy and may be disengaged, and I assure the Minister that I will be keeping a close eye on that. Saying that customers will be contacted could mean they get a letter in the post that they do not open and it goes into a pile with the rest of the unopened mail—we all have constituents who do that, and they have a right for their savings to be protected, along with those of everybody else.
I intend to press SNP new clause 21 on the financial services duty of care to a vote this afternoon. Macmillan Cancer Support was incredibly helpful in drafting the new clause, and I pay tribute to all those who are struggling not just through covid, but though cancer treatment as well. Under new clause 21, the FCA must ensure that financial services providers act with a duty of care and in the best interests of all consumers. It would amend the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 by inserting a “duty of care specification” and bringing that into the FCA’s general duties. There would be an explicit requirement on the FCA to secure an appropriate degree of protection for consumers, and to ensure that authorised persons carrying out regulated activities act with that duty of care.
Who would not want to see this? Macmillan has been clear that at present things are quite piecemeal and the current system is just not working for consumers. It has proposed this change for several reasons, not least because its research suggests that only 11% of people tell their bank about a cancer diagnosis. Macmillan suggests that it would be much better if the banks assumed that people may be vulnerable, rather than waiting for people to get into difficulties while going through cancer treatment, which will only add to their stress. One in three people with cancer experience a loss of income from employment following a diagnosis, losing an average of around £860 a month. That makes it more difficult for them to pay their bills, or to meet any other debts and obligations, which is why this proposal is so important and relevant.
Our new clauses 24, 25 and 26 would ensure that no more homeowners have their mortgages sold to vulture funds. As I said at the beginning, the Bill gives the UK Government an opportunity to deal with this long-standing injustice, and I urge them to give it further consideration. Some have argued that those who ended up as mortgage prisoners were somehow just bad borrowers who got into trouble when they lived beyond their means, but more often than not that is actually very far from the reality. As the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton pointed out, an expert analyst enlisted by the all-party parliamentary group on mortgage prisoners, has concluded that it is not the case, and it is not how markets and ratings agencies see the situation either.
The APPG’s analysis of the mortgage books has established that at the point of origination, Northern Rock loans were all prime mortgages with lower than average default rates, exhibiting good borrower behaviour; that if we adjusted for standard variable rate overpayments coming in line with other high street lenders, not only would these borrowers potentially be up to date with the payments, but their loan balances would also be around 10% lower; and that if we adjusted to competitive rates on the market, the difference would be even more substantial. The bond markets paid over the market value for the books, indicating that anyone in those books is, in fact, paying over the market value for the standard variable rates. People have been stuck in these mortgages for nine years and it is high time for the UK Government to act. I appreciate what the Minister says about other actions, but for those listening there is very little to justify further delay in doing the right thing, on top of the delays that they have already faced.
We will rely on SMEs for our economic recovery, and our new clause 11 would ensure that they are treated fairly by the big banks to avoid the mistakes of last crisis. Many conversations at the Treasury Committee have reflected that the banks and regulators do not want to repeat scandals such as RBS GRG, but we feel very strongly that we must take the opportunity of this Bill to go further. The Federation of Small Businesses has issued a stark warning that around a quarter of a million small businesses could be forced to close this year due to a lack of Government support. In a survey of 1,400 small firms, 5% stated that they expected to pull down the shutters this year. If replicated across the UK, these figures would mean 250,000 firms closing down if the Tory Government continue to sit on their hands.
The owners of these SMEs are often very heavily personally exposed if their business fails. Their family homes are at risk, just as if they were mis-sold a mortgage. The FCA has already recognised in its 2015 discussion paper, “Our approach to SMEs as users of financial services” that they are often no more financially sophisticated than everyday consumers, but are at risk of mis-selling because of product complexity, limited choice and poorly managed expectations. I could say an awful lot more about this, but I appreciate the time constraints. I would just point out that, as things stand, a sole trader with a property empire of £30 million can sue for breaches of the rules, whereas an ice cream van owner whose accountant tells him to incorporate for tax reasons cannot. It is a very illogical distinction between individuals who can take action and companies that cannot. I very much urge the Minister to look at that.
This Bill was an opportunity to do an awful lot more in a number of areas. As I and the Labour Front Benchers have set out, there is still much more that should be done to secure a future for financial services—a future that has been entirely undermined by Brexit, which will make things significantly more difficult. Huge questions on equivalence remain unanswered, and there is still no certainty of an agreement on a regulatory equivalence deal between the UK and the EU. For financial services, this deal is effectively a no-deal Brexit, which neither Scotland nor the City of London voted for. UK firms and their employees can no longer freely operate in the EU, and this has been a source of shockwaves across the sector. Worse still, there is no timescale for any kind of agreement.
Many companies are choosing to move their operations to the EU, rather than hang around for an indefinite period of time for an equivalence deal. The UK Government have given very little consideration to financial services in the negotiations, and there are far-reaching implications—far beyond those who work in the sector, but to each and every one of our constituents who needs that certainty and who needs interactions with financial services to be done properly for their own protection.
Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con) [V]
I refer to my entries in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I also wish briefly to thank the Leader of the House for eventually listening to sense and allowing virtual participation in debates of this sort; it has been a positive development.
Dame Margaret Hodge (Barking) (Lab) [V]
I will speak about new clause 4, which is in my name and those of others from across the House. I start by thanking Sue Hawley and Spotlight on Corruption for their support in our work.
Historically, Britain has prided itself on offering honesty and integrity, particularly in financial services, but, tragically, the Government’s actions and inactions have helped to breed an environment where fraud and corruption flourish. Today Britain is the jurisdiction of choice for too many villains and kleptocrats. The National Crime Agency estimates that £100 billion is laundered through Britain annually. The recent FinCEN leaks named 3,267 UK-incorporated shell companies and nearly £70 billion flowed from Russia into the UK’s overseas territories. The banks and those who run them often get away scot-free if they turn a blind eye to dirty money or engage in fraud.
New clause 4 would provide law enforcement agencies with a powerful tool in their fight against money laundering and fraud. A new criminal offence would hold individuals, corporations and their directors to account for either facilitating or failing to prevent economic crime. The argument is overwhelming; everyone agrees that the existing powers are weak and ineffectual. We need criminal as well as regulatory powers.
A new offence would provide both an effective deterrent and stronger consequences.
We are way behind our international competitors. We pursue small businesses and let the big banks and well-heeled bankers off the hook. The British public hate feeling that there is one law for the powerful institutions and their leaders and another for the rest of us. As we build Britain outside Europe, it is foolish and wrong to think that we can create a sustainable and strong finance sector on the back of dirty money and fraud. Losing our reputation for integrity will over time damage our prosperity, so we have to clean up our act, and clean it up now, not promise to do so some time in the future.
It is shameful to find that America is more effective at pursuing corporations and their directors than we are. Let us consider Standard Chartered, a British-headquartered bank. In 2019, it was fined for money laundering failures and breaching sanctions—£102 million in the UK, but £842 million in the USA. In both the LIBOR scandal and the subsequent rigging of foreign exchange rates, most of the outrageous behaviour took place here in the UK, but most of the fines were imposed in the US. In 2019, the US dished out £1.67 billion-worth of money laundering fines. We took less than £300 million. The Government may want to promote outsourcing, but does that really mean we want to outsource enforcement to the Americans?
That is why the director of the Serious Fraud Office has called for corporate liability reform. Last October, she said:
“So, what would be on my wish list for the SFO, if I had a magic wand?
Unsurprisingly, a ‘failure to prevent’ offence still tops it.”
I agree, and I agree with the Financial Times comment, after the Barclays fraud case failed, that,
“the bank could not be held accountable for the actions of the chief executive, but neither could the chief executive be accountable for the actions of Barclays.”
Is that really what the Government want? The right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Jeremy Wright) described the LIBOR scandal as demonstrating,
“weaknesses in our current law”,
and noted the
“clear implications for the reputation of our justice system.”
The Minister is wrong: when the Government called for evidence on a new corporate liability offence, three quarters of respondents urged the Government to toughen up the regime with criminal sanctions, and most of those were private companies and law firms. Why are the Government reluctant to act? They promised action in their 2015 manifesto. They took forever to complete a consultation and now they are parking the proposal with the Law Commission. Why? The House should not need to divide on this issue. Most people strongly agree with our proposal. If Ministers kick the proposal into the long grass, they will anger the public, damage the long-term integrity and reputation of our financial services sector, and fail to build a better Britain. I urge support for our new clause.
Nigel Mills (Amber Valley) (Con)
It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Lady. I want to speak in support of new clause 4, and I will start where she finished by reminding the House that this was a manifesto promise of the Conservative party back in 2015. We said that we would introduce criminal sanctions for failure to prevent economic crime. We got as far as introducing sanctions for bribery and tax evasion. What those two measures have shown is that these “failure to prevent” rules actually work: they do crackdown, they do change behaviours and they do stop businesses allowing their staff to carry out the activity or turning a blind eye to it. When the main counter-argument is that these regulations would be too expensive or too hard to implement, we have to understand that the world has carried on with those two powers in place; that is not a compelling argument for not extending them to the rest of the economic crimes as this clause would do. Most economic crime around bribery or tax evasion includes some money laundering as well, so all that we are really doing is tidying up the rules to make sure that they are consistent across the piece.
I think that it is probably fair to say that, since we made that manifesto promise, we have been a little busy on other matters, but now we are through most of those it is time to get back to delivering on that promise. I suspect that we will not convince most Members this evening to accept this new clause, but, hopefully, when we see the Law Commission review later in the year, we can then make some rapid progress on getting our law to the right place.
The Minister said at the start of this debate that the Bill was a part of our taking back control following Brexit, that we will try to make our regulations world-leading and that that was our aspiration. Surely as we embark on our vision of global Britain, we should make it very clear that our values are to be the cleanest financial services sector in the world—not the dirtiest, not a magnet for dirty money, and not one that tolerates any kind of bad behaviour. We need the powers in the new clause so that we can say clearly to the whole world that this behaviour is not tolerated here and that we will go after not only those who behave in that way, but those who allow it to happen: we will go after those businesses that seek to profit from allowing their staff to behave in such a way. That is the kind of vision that a global Britain should have—more beacon than buccaneer in this kind of situation.
Finally, if we are really after world-leading regulation in this area and setting an example, I personally would support more divergence. That is one reason why I supported Brexit, but I am not sure that the best place to start diverging is by not following the EU’s anti-money laundering rules. Last month, it introduced its sixth anti-money laundering directive, which included the requirement that member states take criminal sanctions for failure to prevent money laundering. We did not opt into that directive before the end of the transition period. I would have thought that, as a signal of goodwill when we want the EU to recognise our financial services regulation, it would be a good thing to adopt. It is the right thing to do. It is the right measure. It is one that, given the size of our financial services industry, we should be leading on, not following. Let us not make that our first divergence. Let us introduce these rules. Let us pass this new clause and have real powers in place which we need to tackle this awful economic crime.
Several hon. Members rose—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
Let me just say that after our next speaker, John McDonnell, the time limit will be cut to four minutes.
John McDonnell (Hayes and Harlington) (Lab)
From the speeches of the previous two speakers, we can see that there is a thread running through the bulk of the amendments. It is that no matter how significant the contribution of our financial services to our economy, the widespread concerns about the probity of their operations should not be ignored.
New clause 1 standing in my name and the names of other hon. Friends would require the Government to publish a report; to come clean about the standard, conduct and ethics of businesses in the financial services; and to assess publicly the prevalence of unlawful practices such as tax evasion and money laundering and the prevalence of charging excess fees, tax avoidance and providing inadequate advice to consumers. New clause 1 would require the Government to consider and report on the case for a public inquiry and any plans for further reform of regulation.
The FCA plays a core role in the regulatory structure, and in this Bill it is gaining even greater powers. The appointment of the FCA chief is critically important therefore in determining the effectiveness of our whole regulatory system. For that reason, amendment 3 in my name would ensure that before the appointment of a new chief executive, the Treasury would publish a report on the FCA’s effectiveness under the outgoing chief executive. That would allow lessons to be learned. Amendment 4 would give some teeth to parliamentary scrutiny of the FCA by making the appointment of the chief executive subject to approval by the Treasury Committee.
Paul Maynard (Blackpool North and Cleveleys) (Con) [V]
It is a pleasure to speak in this debate in support of new clause 7, which is in the name of the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy), who I gather will speak shortly. It is absolutely vital that we accelerate regulation of this newly emerging sector before we see the sort of problems that emerged in the rent-to-own sector in recent years.
I am glad to hear that the Government, the FCA and the sector recognise that regulation is necessary, but I also note that there is little consensus over what that regulation should consist of, nor what legislative vehicle it could be contained within. I further note that support from the sector is conditional on it being, in its view, in consumers’ interest. I am not sure it should be the judge of what is in consumers’ interest.
Clearly, it is far better for people who can afford to pay just once to do so, but I recognise that there is a legitimate market for a well-regulated “buy now, pay later” sector. However, it has to ensure that consumers are not taken advantage of. The sector likes to point out that the fastest rate of growth is in the over-40 market, thereby suggesting that its users are among the more financially responsible, but younger customers represent the majority of those missing payments and putting themselves at risk by having recourse to risky forms of lending. As innovative as “buy now, pay later” might be, that innovation is driven by competition—by a desire for market capture by the major players. So while one proposes a voluntary code of conduct, another chooses not to sign up to it. That makes me worried as to the willingness of the sector to co-operate with the regulators. What we do not want to see is regulatory capture by these major players.
I want to ensure that those who miss their payments are unable to make further purchases with not only one provider, but all providers of BNPL. If Klarna prevents a further purchase by a consumer because they have already missed a payment, they should not be able automatically to switch to Laybuy, Clearpay or one of the other providers. Moreover, these providers should not be a default purchasing option on a website when a consumer seeks to make a purchase; this is a clear example of the growing lockdown phenomenon of ‘emotional e-commerce’. I recognise that this Bill is not perhaps the right vehicle to manage how the websites are laid out, but this is a clear driver in the growing use of this form of payment.
I have already seen the problem debt my constituents have accrued in the rent-to-own sector, and those firms also sought to portray themselves as acting responsibly to protect consumer interests. I do not want to see those same constituents using BNPL schemes and getting into a similar situation, with a similar rhetoric from those providers. Regulation is now needed sooner rather than later, before these commercial models become ever more entrenched. With every week that passes, the influence of BNPL increases, the more we see the adverts on the TV and the more we see it appearing when we make online purchases. The lack of consumer protection in this regard puts more of those purchasing online at risk.
I very much welcome what the Minister has had to say to me, both in the House and privately. I look forward to seeing the Woolard review and hearing the next steps that will be taken to make practical progress on this very pressing matter.
Yvonne Fovargue (Makerfield) (Lab) [V]
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Blackpool North and Cleveleys (Paul Maynard). I, too, want to focus on new clause 7, but I also want to mention breathing space, which is addressed in new clauses 22 and 23, and the statutory debt repayment scheme, which is dealt with in clause 32. We all know that BNPL has exploded in the past year. More and more retail outlets, and even online gambling companies, are using it, and it is being sold to companies on the basis that, on average, customers spend 40% more. It is also being sold to customers as an easy way to spread the load, with the thought, “There are no credit checks so it is not debt.” But of course it is, because people are using someone else’s money to pay and it then has to be repaid. I looked into the business model for one company and found that 25% of its income is predicated on late fees and people being unable to pay on time. Surely that has to ring alarm bells, with the echoes of the high-cost lenders and their practices. The regulation is needed sooner rather than later and I look forward to a swift response to the Woolard review.
Breathing space is welcome, and I have long called for it; 60 days will often be enough, but there will be a need for flexibility in exceptional circumstances. The scheme was designed prior to the pandemic, where people are furloughed, have lost their job or have a period of illness, and 60 days is not long enough to give people time to recover from a temporary financial difficulty caused by the pandemic and set up a long-term solution. People affected by the pandemic simply need a bit more time to straighten themselves out. I also think that the midway review needs to be looked at again. It simply wastes time and resources, which are scarce in the debt field.
Breathing space alone is not enough, however, given the impact of coronavirus on household finances. Bailiffs’ visits should be suspended, as they were during the first national lockdown, and other enforcement action should be halted when a debt adviser alerts the creditor that a client has financial or other issues due to coronavirus. We should also be suspending the use of non-priority benefit deductions from universal credit and bringing forward plans to extend the repayments over a longer period.
Moving on to the statutory debt repayment plan, I am pleased that the intention is that people seeking debt advice should not be charged for any aspect of the plan. It has always seemed counterintuitive that people in debt should be charged to get out of the very same debt. However, there are areas that need to be tightened—for example, where creditors are objecting to the level of payments. That needs to be seen within the existing debt advice methodology and budget standards. We cannot have creditors objecting just because they do not like the level or they think that someone else has more. There is a common standard, and creditors need to accept that.
In general, the Bill is a welcome step forward in assisting people in debt, but the landscape of debt solutions is complicated and difficult to navigate. I believe that a full review of all debt solutions needs to be undertaken to clarify and simplify, and to ensure that people in debt are always able to access the solution that best suits their needs.
Mr Andrew Mitchell (Sutton Coldfield) (Con)
I draw the House’s attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I rise to say just a few words about new clause 4 and amendment 7, both of which I support. New clause 4, on the facilitation of economic crime, has been ably tabled by the right hon. Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge), who, together with me and many others across the House, has sought to drive forward this agenda. The agenda is driven forward by the Bill, which has been so ably handled by my hon. Friend the Minister. It goes with the grain of Government policy and builds on the changes already achieved. I do not think that the House should be divided on it today, but we should send a signal to the Government about the importance of pursuing this agenda.
We have, as I said, achieved considerable change. The right hon. Member for Barking and I managed to persuade the Government to introduce open registers of beneficial ownership, both for the overseas territories and now for the Crown dependencies. The Foreign Office was not in favour of that at the time, but it now strongly supports it, so progress can be made. We are building on the excellent G8, where these matters were first championed by David Cameron as Prime Minister, and also on the recent US legislation. The evidence of the Paradise and Panama papers showed without any doubt the sophistication of financial advisers and the fact that there is an inequality of arms in so much of this. They are ahead of the financial enforcement authorities, and we need to be aware of that. The Bill helps, but new clause 4 would drive the matter further forward in clamping down on the facilitation of economic crime. I hope that the Minister will send a clear message on that when he sums up. I would also say to him that the reforms to Companies House led the world, but the trouble is that Companies House has become a sort of library, rather than an investigator. What it needs is more resources, and I very much hope that he will make the point across Government that Companies House with more resources would be an extremely valuable tool in the fight against economic crime.
Amendment 7—the genocide clause, as it were—has been tabled so ably by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith). He makes the point that money cannot somehow be divorced from its provenance. We have had much focus on money laundering, on dirty money and on money stolen by corrupt dictators from Africa, by business people and by warlords. Shining the light of transparency on this is incredibly important, and this is a good amendment because it underlines our abhorrence of genocide. I have worked with much pleasure with the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Rushanara Ali) on what the UN Committee that visited Burma and Bangladesh referred to as the genocidal activities over the Rohingya, and with my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green on the human rights abuses in China. The House is right to take a very strong line on the issue of genocide. If global Britain means anything, it is driven by values. These values matter, and when regimes such as the Saudis, for example, butcher journalists in foreign consulates or imprison women campaigning for human rights, we should speak out.
Seema Malhotra (Feltham and Heston) (Lab/Co-op) [V]
I support amendments 1, 2 and 8 and the remarks made by our Front-Bench team to oppose any post-Brexit race to the bottom in regulation. It is also vital that we move towards a deal on equivalence in financial services with the EU.
Financial regulation has to adapt to market innovations to ensure that consumers are well protected, and it is under this call for consumer protection that I also speak in support of new clauses 24 to 26. These push for a fair deal for the 250,000 mortgage prisoners stuck for 10 years paying high interest rates. The all-party parliamentary group on mortgage prisoners, which I co-chair, has been contacted by hundreds of mortgage prisoners, who describe the worry and the stress that comes from being trapped as they are. The Minister suggested that the SVRs paid by mortgage prisoners are just 0.4% higher than SVRs at other lenders. Our case studies, which include nurses, teachers, members of the armed forces and small businesspeople, tell another story.
It is inappropriate to compare the rates that borrowers with inactive lenders are currently paying with those paid by SVR customers at other active lenders. If mortgage prisoners were with an active lender and up to date with payments, they would have access to a product transfer giving them a lower fixed rate. I will illustrate this through two constituents. The first is with an active lender. Last year, when she contacted my office, she was paying an SVR of 4.14%, but as she was with an active lender, we were able to help make representations. She is now on a two-year fixed rate of 1.79%, and saving over £5,000 a year in mortgage payments.
The second constituent’s Northern Rock mortgage was sold to Landmark and is ultimately owned by Cerberus—a mortgage with a fully regulated high street bank sold off to a vulture fund. The family are not being offered any new deals, costing them over £6,000 a year more than if they were with an active lender. I cannot put into words the stress that this has caused the family, who have nearly lost their home more than once.
When the Government sold these loans to Cerberus, UK Asset Resolution told Lord McFall that returning these mortgages to the private sector would result in their being offered fixed rates. In a “Panorama” investigation two years ago, a UKAR spokesperson said that Cerberus had the ability to lend to former Northern Rock customers and that they had believed they intended to do so. They said:
“The reply to Lord McFall sent on behalf of the UKAR board of directors was based on information presented to UKAR and the board had no reason to disbelieve this at that time.”
If UKAR was misled by Cerberus, to date there have been no consequences, and today we have Landmark refusing to offer my constituent any fixed rates. Capping SVRs for mortgage prisoners is an issue of consumer protection.
I turn briefly to new clauses 24 and 26. Expanding the regulatory perimeter to help mortgage prisoners is supported by the APPG and the UK Mortgage Prisoners campaign group, and there is support from the Building Societies Association, which has said:
“It is essential that the FCA and the Government take action urgently to ensure that consumers whose mortgage is sold to an unregulated lender have robust consumer protections extending to interest rates.”
An expansion of the regulatory perimeter would give the FCA all the power it needs, in the words of the Governor of the Bank of England to the Treasury Committee in his appointment hearing, to “conclusively address” the question of mortgage prisoners. New clause 26 says that consumers would need to consent before their mortgage is sold on to an inactive lender. Supporting these amendments provides immediate help to mortgage prisoners who have suffered far too long and are now hit harder by the pandemic.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
Before I call Andrew Jones, I should say that after Stella Creasy I will reduce the limit to three minutes.
Andrew Jones (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (Con)
The core purpose of the Bill is to ensure that the regulatory framework for financial services will continue to be effective now that we have left the EU. Of course, there are other measures in the Bill, on matters such as the open market arrangements with Gibraltar and debt advice; it is wide in scope.
In Committee, we considered the Bill in detail, and I commend my hon. Friend the Minister for his knowledge and vision. It would be fair to say that some of the measures that we looked at were in very specialist areas and were perhaps a little dry; I am thinking about the work to transition away from LIBOR and implement the Basel standards. That obviously had not been easy work; it had been detailed work, and the development had taken place over a significant period.
The Minister has placed certain underlying principles at the heart of his work, and we see them in the Bill. The first is ensuring that the UK will have world-leading prudential standards, and that those will be overseen by regulators with the powers they need. There is no doubt that the world, including the UK, has seen appalling financial scandals; I am thinking about insider dealing, money laundering and bank fraud. Our regulators must be equipped to deal with this fast-moving market. They must be careful that they are not so backward-looking that they are solving the last crisis, but they are also nimble enough to have proportionate regulations for the sector.
The second principle that my hon. Friend the Minister is operating under is the recognition that different types of activity, and different scales of company, require different approaches. The Bill enables the introduction of the tailored investment firms prudential regime. I believe that the whole Committee wanted to see a firmer approach taken to wrongdoing, alongside measures to ensure that the UK’s strong position in this critical sector is maintained. I think that the Bill does that—indeed, that is the bulk of the Bill—but it does, of course, require regulators to enforce that properly.
A further principle of my hon. Friend’s work is helping people with debt problems. We have already heard about clause 32, which introduces changes to the debt respite scheme. Those are of great significance to many of our constituents up and down the country. Essentially, there are two elements: a breathing space and a statutory debt repayment plan, the point being early intervention and recognition of the problem. That will help people escape the cycle of debt, which is sometimes very easy to get into and very hard to break out of.
In our evidence session, the Committee heard from Peter Tutton, head of policy at the debt charity StepChange. Mr Tutton described this as “a cracking scheme”—I wrote down the quote when he gave us his evidence. That is a significant endorsement of the Minister’s work. The Bill also contains a measure to provide a route for a successor account when the Help to Save term matures, so that the balance is transferred to an alternative savings account—again, practical support that will help many people.
There are many new clauses and amendments before us. I welcome Government new clauses 27 and 28 and new schedule 1, which basically broaden—update, really—the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to include e-money institutions. I am pleased to see that that is supported by the Labour party in its own new clause 6, which will not be moved. There is clearly a recognition on both sides of the House that the Act needed to be updated and tackled.
New clause 7, in the name of the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy) and many others, looks at the unregulated “buy now, pay later” market. It is easy to see how an interest-free product could help people spread payments for a sofa or other high-cost item, but it could also be a route into debt trouble. I am pleased that the Minister has commissioned a review, which is due to finish very shortly. May I just ask him to consider its recommendations very promptly?
Overall, this is a good Bill. I thought that the Committee scrutinised it well, and I will support it this evening.
Stella Creasy (Walthamstow) (Lab/Co-op) [V]
I shall speak to new clause 7 in my name and those of over 70 other Members from across the House.
This Christmas, one in four consumers used “buy now, pay later” credit to pay for their Christmas shopping. It is a simple premise: these companies allow people to spread payments for items over a series of weeks, breaking what seems a high cost up-front into chunks they can take out on their debit or credit card, with no interest charged. There is a place for this industry in the UK, just as there is a place for payday lenders like Wonga, but Wonga is no longer with us because it used technology to exploit an age-old problem that many face: too much month at the end of their money. In lending to who it did and in the way that it did, ultimately Wonga went bust, but not before it had plunged millions in the UK into debt.
The companies in question say that it is not fair to compare—that this is just how millennials want to buy. Well, as old as I am, I do know this: when it comes to credit, if the deal is too good to be true, it probably is. Compare the Market research shows that these forms of credit have been used 35% more during the pandemic as everybody shops online. Most UK retailers have Klarna, Clearpay or Laybuy now as a payment option—indeed, it is often the first one people are given. Retailers pay for their services because they know that if people use them, they will probably spend more than they are meant to—on average 30% to 40% more. Which? research shows that 24% of users spent more than they planned to because such an option was available at the checkout. As the Minister said, many then end up taking out debt to repay that debt. If it looks too good to be true, it is.
Increasingly, consumers are being caught out, committing to more spending than they can afford. Twenty-seven per cent. of users said that they used the option because they could not afford the product they were buying outright in the first place. Currently, this slips through a regulatory loophole because the companies do not charge interest and make you pay within—[Inaudible.] It means that they do not have to abide by the existing information offers that other forms of credit have to.
FCA rules require lenders, before they lend, to highlight the key costs and risks of the credit product. Contrast that with the behaviour of these companies. Shortly before Christmas, the Advertising Standards Authority upheld my complaint about adverts by Klarna that involved social media influencers encouraging followers to use Klarna to buy products to improve their mood during lockdown: if they had mental health issues, debt was the answer. On its Twitter, it tells its customers who ask about its product that it is the “smoother” way to shop. You can get
“what you want, when you want”—
with no mention of what happens if you do not pay or checking of whether you can afford to repay. And because it is not regulated, there is no redress through the Financial Ombudsman Service either.
Ministers say, “Let’s wait for the FCA report”, and that they are ready to take swift and proportionate action. That is exactly what new clause 7 does. It ensures that whatever comes out of that review will get the parliamentary time to be put into practice within three months of the Bill becoming law. If we leave it longer, waiting and waiting as we did with the payday lenders, our constituents will suffer. Even the companies themselves, just like turkeys who think Christmas is a good idea, say that regulation should happen.
So much of the history of credit regulation in this country has been one of delay and dither—and debt as a result for our constituents. Constituents are now living through a time when millions are furloughed and many more are facing redundancy, so their income will get lower, not higher. I know that the Minister recognises that there is a problem here. I brought forward new clause 7 so that we can put his words into practice and make sure that it is not our constituents who end up paying the price later.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
We come to Angela Richardson on a three-minute limit.
Angela Richardson (Guildford) (Con) [V]
It was an honour to serve on the Financial Services Bill Committee and it is a privilege to speak on Report today.
I will speak to specific amendments, but first I would like to say that last century—well before the global financial crisis of this century—I was cutting my teeth in this sector, settling trades, including derivatives, for a US investment bank in New Zealand. We watched in shock as the actions of a lone trader in Singapore caused the collapse of Barings bank. I worked through the subsequent insertion of Chinese walls between departments, saw the creation of compliance and risk management roles and the impact of a change in culture on the institution. I therefore understand the importance of proper regulation and confidence in our regulators. I was pleased to hear the Minister confirm in his opening statement that this corporate governance continues to be strengthened today.
It is only appropriate that the scope of the Bill extends to effectively tackling money laundering and providing clear, streamlined procedures for dealing with entities that engage in this type of activity. As more aspects of our lives, including financial activities, move online, so do illicit activities such as money laundering. Therefore, legislation aiming to prevent and deal with illegal financial activity must have as broad a scope as possible, bolster existing legal provisions and be as clear and as easy to enforce as possible.
New clause 6 rightly aims to broaden the scope of the Bill to prevent money laundering in the context of electronic money institutions. However, the language of the new clause is inconsistent with legislation already in place, potentially generating confusion that could result in diminished enforcement ability. The Government’s new clauses 27 and 28 and new schedule 1 better achieve the desired effect of a more robust and comprehensive enforcement regime, which is why I will support them today. I am pleased that the Opposition Front-Bench team will not move new clause 6.
Kenny MacAskill (East Lothian) (SNP) [V]
Obviously there is much in the Bill that deserves support, although some of it has come about through our self-inflicted wounds from Brexit. However, the greatest comment I will make is on the opportunities of what should be added and on what is currently missing. I endorse the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow Central (Alison Thewliss) and support points made by other Members, particularly those who spoke to amendments 4 and 30, which deal with economic and corporate crime.
We are in a difficult time at the present moment. People are suffering. They are making sacrifices. They welcome fixed penalties being given out to those who act rashly—sometimes stupidly, sometimes deliberately. Equally, they are aware that huge rip-offs are not being dealt with and remain unpunished, which causes a great deal of angst and upset, which needs to be addressed.
When I was Justice Secretary of Scotland, I recall that we set up a serious organised crime taskforce, with a model that has been replicated elsewhere and indeed has been extended to issues beyond serious organised crime. It had clear benefits, but there were also obstacles faced by law enforcement. It had the benefit of bringing together all the agencies, but they faced the same challenges. We had to recognise the extent of the challenge and bring in organisations that had previously been left out, from environmental protection through to local government. There were clear challenges in dealing with corporate crime. There is a lack of a legislative framework—there is insufficient legislation there—to allow Police Scotland, City of London police or police services elsewhere, or the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service in Scotland, or indeed the Crown Prosecution Service south of the border, to carry out a diligent, good job. They lack the powers.
I am always minded of the Woody Guthrie song, “The Ballad of Pretty Boy Floyd”:
“As through this world I’ve wandered, I've seen lots of funny men.
Some will rob you with a six-gun, and some with a fountain pen.”
The tragedy in this country is that it is usually quite easy to deal with those who rob you with a six-gun. Dealing with those who rob you with a fountain pen has proven far harder, which is why significant changes are required, because it is just not good enough that corporate criminals go unpunished, which we know happens. Anyone who has seen “The Inside Job”, which includes Matt Damon, will know the fraud that went on in the financial crash. We have seen LIBOR and forex. We have seen Serco.
Meanwhile, fixed penalty notices are issued for rash and stupid actions, and rightly so, but where is the responsibility being taken by the shareholders and corporate leaders? They have to be held to account. These amendments would help to address that, making sure that we have greater fairness between the small guy and the big guy, bringing us into line with the United States of America, where the wolf of Wall Street is being prosecuted, while ensuring that we keep up corporate standards, which sadly in some instances have slipped quite shamefully. It is only right and appropriate that we make sure that fraud and money laundering are dealt with every bit as strenuously and firmly as bribery and tax evasion.
These are hard times. People are making sacrifices, and it is about time that those who are abusing their powers in the corporate boardroom were held to account. We need to have the legislative framework.
Bim Afolami (Hitchin and Harpenden) (Con)
I rise to support the Bill and to focus my brief remarks on the wholesale market, rather than the retail market, which most Members have addressed so far. In particular, Government amendments 22 and 23, which the Minister mentioned in his opening speech, clarify beyond any doubt that non-UK firms—all firms that do not have the UK as their principal place of business—are not within the scope of the rules on the parent undertaking. That is particularly relevant to me. I brought the subject up in my Second Reading speech and it is something on which I have corresponded with the Minister and his team. I am very glad that he and the Treasury have engaged on the Bill in this way. It is a telling example of how good Ministers behave, and the Minister has been exemplary in taking on board comments on the Bill from a range of Members. I commend him for that.
I have a couple of short comments on what others have said. On new clause 16, tabled by the SNP, in my speech on Second Reading I gave my view that there is a need for increased scrutiny by this House of the regulators, but the Minister is right to say that we need to consider that in its entirety in the consultation on the future of the regulatory framework. That is the right way to do it. It is very important to get it right, and I look forward to sending in my remarks if I have not already, and seeing the Government’s response to those points.
I shall finish by addressing certain amendments that were introduced in Committee or that have been mentioned today, on the European Union—new clause 12, new clause 20 and many others—whereby, effectively, Opposition Members have tried to impose requirements on the FCA or the PRA to assess the impact of the differences between the EU and UK regulatory frameworks. The conceptual problem with that is—as I think that all hon. Members, and indeed the Government, need to see—that over the next five to 10 years we are going to be in a very different regulatory world. We need to think of attracting companies and investment on a global basis, not with a purely European focus as was the case in the past.
The Minister has already mentioned our success in relation to FinTech. The Chancellor has mentioned his focus on making sure that the London stock exchange is more attractive and effective for others coming from abroad. The European Union’s drivers and incentives are not the same as ours in this country, so it would be wrong for us to necessarily seek to follow the rules blindly. It is not a race to the bottom; it is a race for us in this country to win the global competition for safe, beneficial, productive capital and business. That is what the Bill helps set us up for.
Christine Jardine (Edinburgh West) (LD) [V]
It is an honour to follow the hon. Member for Hitchin and Harpenden (Bim Afolami) in this Report stage debate and to speak on a Bill that is of so much importance at this juncture for our economy and the circumstances that we face. The sector that it deals with is so important, and it cannot be overstated. The financial services sector is vital to our recovery, not just because of the jobs it provides and the tax that it contributes to the Exchequer, but because of the number of people, families and communities in this country whose future wellbeing depends on a well-regulated and successful financial services sector.
The Liberal Democrats, my own party, have tabled two amendments—new clauses 22 and 23, both of which address the issue of debt repayment and recovery, but at this stage we shall not be pressing them to a Division, so I prefer not to discuss them. Instead I shall discuss the amendments that we will be supporting, specifically new clause 7, tabled by the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy), of which I am one of the signatories. As I alluded to, our support is recognition of the need to act now to create an environment that enables our economy and the people at the heart of it to recover as quickly and as financially painlessly as possible. The scale of the potential problem that awaits us as we emerge from the current crisis is frightening for businesses and for households. The most recent research from StepChange estimates that more than 3 million people are in arrears and priority debts, and potentially 6 million people—more than the population of Scotland—are behind on household bills. For those people, that creates stress, financial hardship and sleepless nights worrying about how to feed their children.
We should have no truck with any company or organisation that in any way exploits the difficulties that covid has created. That is why I put my name forward as a co-sponsor of new clause 7, which would bring the non-interest-bearing elements of buy now, pay later lending and similar services under the regulatory ambit of the FCA. We need to act now, before we have another scandal. Such companies facilitate overspending online and costs appear lower than they actually are. One in four shoppers used such companies in the run-up to Christmas. More people are being furloughed and made redundant, so even if something seems affordable now, it might not be in future, either for the country or for individuals.
In the past year, we have heard much about the crossroads at which our economy, and indeed the country, stands. Our financial services sector was worth £132 billion to the UK economy in 2018 and had more than 1 million jobs. It has suffered. It is worth 7% of our economy. In my city of Edinburgh, we have the second-largest financial services sector in the UK and the global financial centres index ranks it as 13th in the world. The scale of what we are facing cannot be underestimated, which is why the Bill should be amended as I suggest.
Kevin Hollinrake
I very much appreciate the efforts that the Minister is making to try to tighten up in many areas. We are on the same page about many different aspects of the measures that we are talking about. Looking at the Bill from afar and taking a helicopter view, for decades, we have been willing to preside over a system that I would describe as financial feudalism. Some people live by a completely different set of rules and are not held to account properly by the rules that are in place. Unless we start to put measures in place that hold individuals to account for some of that egregious behaviour, we will not stamp it out.
That behaviour undermines the faith in the very system that we believe in—the free market system. We cannot simply hold our hands up and say, “It’s the bankers again,” or, “It’s the money launderers again.” We have to tackle those issues and put measures in place to do that. We did with the Bribery Act 2010, which was effective in giving individuals a corporate responsibility to stamp out bribery. Again, the Government acted on tax evasion in 2017.
There are still other areas, however, where we allow people to steal, defraud, launder and lie. That is not to say that there are not some good people in our financial institutions, and there are some very good bankers, but we need to hold individuals to account for things such as LIBOR, foreign exchange rigging, and the disgraceful scandal at HBOS and the Royal Bank of Scotland, where only one individual has been held to account with a directorial ban. As I have said before, over a similar period of time, between 2008 and 2018, there were £9 billion of criminal and corporate fines in the US, but £260 million in the UK.
I am glad that the Government support the principles behind new clause 4 and will bring their own measures forward. It is absolutely vital that that is not just kicking things into the long grass and that those measures are brought forward quickly so that we can hold individuals to account for failing to prevent corporate fraud and money laundering.
The key thing that I will talk about in my last 54 seconds is mortgage prisoners. Again, the fact that we let people’s mortgages be sold to vulture funds in the first place is because we do not have proper regulatory oversight and we do not lean on them as the FCA can on regulated firms. The promises that were made to Lord McFall and others were simply not carried through.
New clause 25 in particular is a nuclear option. I am not a person who would like to cap anything—the market should deliver those solutions—but we do not have a proper solution for the many people who are trapped on very expensive rates. The evidence that we have says that it would not affect the marketplace of residential mortgage-backed securities, about which the Minister is concerned; that it would be highly effective; that we could define it for a certain cohort; and that it would relieve hundreds of thousands of people from dire financial straits overnight. I ask him to look at that again.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
I am going to be very strict in making sure that Members stick to the three-minute limit from now on.
Rebecca Long Bailey (Salford and Eccles) (Lab) [V]
I speak in support of new clause 2. I must stress to the Minister that debt advisers in Salford have already warned me that the Government’s debt respite scheme is inadequate. First, debt advisers should be provided with the discretion to extend breathing space. Secondly, the midway review requirements will waste valuable resources and should be eliminated. Thirdly, there must be the option for debtors to access breathing space on more than one occasion in a 12-month period when needed.
Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con) [V]
There are a lot of good things in the Bill that I welcome, and I refer to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I welcome the assistance given to financial services in Gibraltar, and I welcome a number of the technical changes to the operation of retained European law in relation to markets. I particularly welcome new clause 6, on FinTech, which is a really important growth sector for this country. Added to the listing regime changes in the Bill, this gives us the opportunity to encourage the bringing forward of initial public offerings of FinTech companies in the UK and to build a critical mass.
I have sympathy for new clause 4, but I do not want to pre-empt the work of the Law Commission. That said, the Government do have to act more swiftly and with more urgency in relation to reform of corporate criminal liability. It has been kicking around for a long time. The Justice Committee has heard compelling evidence on the need for reform. I do not accept the contention that there is a balance on this. The balance of evidence is clearly in favour of reform. Both the current and former directors of the Serious Fraud Office have highlighted the deficiency in criminal liability in this field, as have at least two former Attorneys General. I hope that as soon as the Law Commission reports, we will move swiftly to enact this reform, because we lag behind other jurisdictions in this regard.
The other area where I do not think it is necessary to legislate is progress on equivalence. Although we may not need to legislate, it is really important that the Government address this with urgency. Of course, as we build our way forward outside the EU it will not always be appropriate to follow everything by way of regulatory equivalence, but there are many instances in which it will be very much in the interest of the City and the broader financial services sector to do so.
In the immediate term, is important that we acquire further equivalence agreements with our EU partners; that is in the interests of both sides. Currently, we have a commitment to a memorandum of understanding by the end of March, but the EU says that it has no immediate plans for further equivalence discussions. That needs to be resolved. Although it does not require legislation, we need from Ministers greater commitment to resolving the issue. There has sometimes been a feeling that financial services are being taken for granted in the Brexit negotiations; that needs to be put to bed. Financial services are the jewel in the economic crown of this country and need to be front and centre of our ongoing economic policy.
Florence Eshalomi (Vauxhall) (Lab/Co-op) [V]
I wish to focus my remarks on amendments 1 and 2, tabled in the name of the Leader of the Opposition. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) said, the amendments are desperately needed now to ensure that regulators must take into account the Government’s target of achieving net zero carbon emissions by 2050. I was therefore disappointed to hear from the Minister that the Government will not support the amendments but might “consider” the matter “in the future”. We cannot afford to wait. Climate emissions are cumulative, and a large part of the carbon that we produce today will stay in the atmosphere for hundreds, if not thousands, of years.
If we are serious about tackling the climate emergency and reaching our 2050 target, we must reduce our emissions as quickly as possible. The sensible and least-destructive way to do that is to start to adapt our economy now; the irresponsible thing would be to leave it too late, thereby making the inevitable economic adjustment more painful for everyone. Regulation is one of the most powerful tools in our box of options and will ensure that the whole financial sector is unified in its actions towards this really important goal and, most crucially, acts within a timeframe that reflects the climate emergency we face.
I do not want my two young children to ask me one day why I missed the opportunity to fight for a better, more sustainable future for them. That is why I will support amendments 1 and 2, and I urge all Members in the House to join me.
Jessica Morden (Newport East) (Lab) [V]
I wish to speak briefly in support of new clause 7, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy), to whom I pay tribute for her work with campaigners on the issue. Her new clause would require buy-now-pay-later operators to be regulated by the FCA.
As others have said, buy-now-pay-later is a new and growing industry, the popularity of which has rocketed in the pandemic, with one company reporting a 43% increase in sales. It is a form of credit that promotes impulse buying—one in four users spend more than they planned—and it is targeted at young consumers who are pursued by companies using celebrity influencers and targeted ads. StepChange, the debt charity, is seeing many more under-40s coming forward for advice with this type of debt. Let us protect consumers and properly regulate the sector, which is currently uncontrolled and operating with a social media-savvy face. Let us not wait for people to get into trouble with unsustainable levels of debt, particularly when we will see an increase in personal debt because of the pandemic.
Dame Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)
I wish to focus on two areas: equivalence with the European Union for our financial services sector and financial crime. I also support the efforts to provide more protection against abuses in the consumer credit market and the mortgage market.
As a result of the Government’s decision to pursue a very hard Brexit and the ending of the transition period, UK financial service companies have now lost their passporting rights to EU countries. The Government’s trade and co-operation agreement with the EU in effect sidestepped financial services, putting at risk many jobs in the sector and much tax revenue for the Exchequer. The deal means that there is an agreement for goods, in which the EU has a trade surplus with the UK, but nothing for services, in which the UK has a huge trade surplus with the EU. There is a feeble non-binding declaration to establish a framework for co-operation on financial regulation, but there is no sign of any rush from the EU to grant the UK equivalence so that the loss of passporting rights can be overcome and continued market access to our financial services sector can be achieved. Perhaps the fact that €6 billion of share trading formerly done in London migrated to Paris and Amsterdam on the first day of post-Brexit trading is encouraging Brussels to drag its feet and hope that much more will follow. Over time, I fear that this Government’s lack of interest in protecting equivalence for financial services is more likely to lose us jobs and revenue than inaugurate the big bang 2.0 that the Chancellor was fantasising about in the Commons earlier this week.
Financial and economic crime is a huge problem, and one that the Government have been far too slow to address. Their own estimates suggest that one in five people in the UK falls victim to fraud every year. There is £6 billion of organised fraud against business, and this is getting worse. The extent of economic crime in the UK, including money laundering, fraud and corruption, led the Intelligence and Security Committee in its report on Russia to note that London is now considered a “laundromat” for corrupt money. As the scale of global corrupt wealth enmeshed in the UK property market becomes visible, we need an urgent step change in the Government’s response, especially on transparency of overseas property ownership, and a tightening up of the company formation process in the UK. More needs to be done, and urgently, to crack down on this behaviour.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)
Apologies to those who failed to get in because of time constraint. I call the Minister.
John Glen
Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker; and I thank all Members who have tabled amendments and spoken to them today. The Bill deals with a number of important issues, and this has been reflected in the wide-ranging contributions that we have heard today and over the last couple of months at various stages. I will take this opportunity to add to my earlier remarks and respond to some of the points raised in the contributions this afternoon.
On economic crime, I have already set out a number of actions that the Government have taken. On the specific issue of whether corporate criminal liability law should be reformed, the Law Commission is undertaking an expert review and we should await its outcome, but I note the range of views expressed today. We have discussed amendments that would bring additional activities into FCA regulation, including “buy now, pay later” products. I have heard the points raised on this matter today, particularly by my hon. Friend the Member for Blackpool North and Cleveleys (Paul Maynard), who gave a sensible, thoughtful and constructive analysis, but I believe that it is right to wait for the Woolard review.
On the question of equivalence and divergence, I have said before that there are some areas where the UK will want to take a different approach from the EU to better suit the UK market, and some areas where we will not. I do not accept the characterisation of divergence. Regulatory regimes are not static—they evolve—and it is right that regulators should adapt to them. We have heard about the relationship between the regulators, the Treasury and Parliament. Again, I look forward to continuing these conversations through the future regulatory framework review, which will be ongoing in the coming weeks and months.
We have discussed several amendments that would require the regulators to have regard to different objectives when implementing the prudential regimes provided for in the Bill. It is right that the regulators set the detailed rules implementing these regimes, as they have the right technical expertise. That has long been a principle by which our regulators have worked over the past 20 years. These regimes are vital, but I do not believe that regulators should be required to have regard to broader questions that are not so closely related to prudential standards.
Several of today’s amendments relate to issues not included in the Bill. I emphasise to the House once again that the Bill is just one part of the wider long- term strategy for financial services that will ensure that the UK financial services industry continues to be a global leader.
As is traditional at this stage of the Bill’s passage, I would like to take this opportunity to thank those who have contributed to its development and scrutiny. In particular, I thank the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) and the hon. Member for Erith and Thamesmead (Abena Oppong-Asare) on the Opposition Front Bench, as well as the hon. Members for Glasgow Central (Alison Thewliss) and for Aberdeen South (Stephen Flynn), for the care and attention that they have brought to scrutinising the Bill and the constructive way in which they have approached it. I thank the Public Bill Committee for its detailed engagement with the legislation, particularly the Chairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Philip Davies) and the hon. Member for Ealing Central and Acton (Dr Huq).
The hon. Members for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy) and for Wallasey (Dame Angela Eagle) have provided thorough examination and important contributions on parts of the Bill, as has just been seen, and I congratulate the hon. Member for Wallasey on the recognition of her services to Parliament over nearly 29 years in the new year honours list. On this side of the House, my hon. Friends the Members for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron), for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill) and for Hitchin and Harpenden (Bim Afolami), and others, have provided characteristically thorough and thoughtful contributions.
I am grateful to the many experts who gave evidence to the Committee, and I thank the Commons staff and Clerks, Kevin and Nick, who have managed the process so smoothly. Not least, I thank the Treasury officials, Alex Patel, Liz Cronin, Fred Newman, Catherine McCloskey and Tim Garbutt. I hope the House has found my—
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)
Order. I am sorry to interrupt the Minister; I know he wanted to thank more people, but we will have to take that as read, because under the Order of the House of 9 November 2020 I must now put the Questions necessary to bring proceedings on consideration to a conclusion.
John Glen
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
I would like to build on what I was saying previously and thank all Members for their examination of this legislation since it was introduced in October. The thoroughness with which right hon. and hon. Members have undertaken this task only serves to underline the significance of the measures included within the Bill and the importance to the UK of the financial services industry.
As I set out on Second Reading, the financial services sector is fundamental to the UK’s economic strength. It contributed nearly £76 billion in tax receipts last year and it supports jobs across the country, two thirds of which are outside London, as well as providing vital services to people and businesses across the United Kingdom.
The Bill represents a key part of our wider approach to financial services regulation now that we have left the EU. Since its introduction, Members have clearly outlined their expectations that the UK maintains its position as a leading centre of global financial services, while also maintaining high regulatory standards and ensuring that the sector serves the needs of the people and businesses of the United Kingdom. I believe that this Bill will make an important contribution to that goal.
Let me briefly reiterate the three themes of the Bill. First, the Bill enhances the UK’s world-leading prudential standards and promotes financial stability through the implementation of a new tailored prudential regime for investment firms and through enabling the implementation of the Basel III standards. The Bill will also ensure that the FCA has appropriate powers to manage an orderly transition away from the LIBOR benchmark, providing stability and clarity to financial markets.
Secondly, the Bill promotes openness between the UK and international markets by simplifying the process for marketing overseas investment funds in the UK and by delivering on our commitment to provide long-term access between the UK and Gibraltar for financial services firms.
Finally, the Bill supports the maintenance of an effective financial services regulatory framework and sound capital markets. It does this through a range of measures, such as improving the functioning of the packaged retail and insurance-based investment products regulation and increasing penalties for market abuse.
As I said earlier, this is an important Bill. It is also a very technical one, so let me once more thank hon. Members for their valuable and insightful contributions to the scrutiny of this Bill at each stage of its passage. As I indicated earlier, it is important to note that this Bill marks the beginning of a process. It represents a necessary first step towards maintaining high standards and protecting financial stability now that we have left the European Union and the transition period has ended. The Bill is also a foundation for our wider vision for financial services in this country, as the Chancellor set out to this House in his speech on 9 November 2020.
Much of the future of UK financial services regulation will be the continuation of work we led while we were a member of the EU, and I reaffirm this Government’s commitment to the highest internationally agreed standards, which we recognise as a cornerstone of the industry’s reputation and success.
Although we remain committed to those standards, it is important to acknowledge that there are areas in which we will forge our own path and establish an approach better suited to the unique nature of the UK market. Having left and reached an agreement with the EU on the nature of our future relationship, the UK must now have the confidence to regulate our financial services sector in a way that works for us and best meets our needs and our constituents’ needs.
This Bill provides continuity and certainty to the UK financial services sector, demonstrating to it that the UK remains an attractive and stable environment for its global business.
Mr McFadden
I will not detain the House for very long. As this is my last contribution to the debate on this Bill, I begin by thanking the Minister and his Bill team for their patience and forbearance throughout our proceedings—it feels like we have been dealing with this for a few months now. I also thank the SNP spokesperson, the hon. Member for Glasgow Central (Alison Thewliss), who has gone through the Bill assiduously and tabled many amendments.
I thank the Clerks in the Public Bill Office, Kevin and Nick, for helping us. They play a particularly important role in helping Opposition Members to draft and discuss amendments. The ideas are our responsibility, but they give us very good and important technical advice.
I thank the Committee Chairs, the hon. Member for Shipley (Philip Davies) and my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing Central and Acton (Dr Huq), and all the Members who have taken part in the debates, tabled amendments or spoken in any way. I make particular mention of my hon. Friend the Member for Wallasey (Dame Angela Eagle), whom I congratulate on her recently awarded damehood. Finally, Mr Deputy Speaker, I thank you and your colleagues in the Chair.
We have not opposed the principle of the Bill, and we will not vote against Third Reading tonight, because we recognise the need for post-Brexit stability in regulation. We also recognise that this is possibly the first of a number of pieces of legislation of this type. We have sought to improve the Bill in various ways, either in Committee or today on Report.
With the exception of the FinTech and financial crime amendment, the Minister has been, for the most part, resistant to these amendments, but a number of key issues have been raised. I hope that he and the Treasury will consider the broad sweep of issues raised around things such as: crime and money laundering—there is a real desire in this Parliament not to see our financial sector being regarded as an easy place for those things to happen; consumer debt and protection—Members have voiced quite passionate concerns, particularly given the year that we have just been through and the impact on household finances, that consumers are given help with what for many is a growing debt burden, and protection against mis-selling or inappropriate treatment by financial services providers or companies; mortgage prisoners, who we have heard about tonight, many of whom are locked into very difficult and disadvantageous mortgage products; plus the broader issues that we have raised about post-Brexit financial services, equivalence, green finance and so on.
The Government made a big decision—a big choice—particularly in their reincarnation, or incarnation, since December 2019: to place the issue of sovereignty above considerations of market access. We might go further and say that they chose to place the issue of sovereignty above considerations of economic prosperity, although perhaps Ministers and Members abroad would contest that. None the less, a choice like that was certainly made and it has big implications, potentially, for a sector that contributes a significant proportion of our GDP, employs around one in 14 people in the country, earns a lot of export revenues for the country and is a very significant contributor to tax revenues that pay for public services. We all have a great deal of interest in how this sector will be run as we have come to the end of the transition period. As I said earlier, we want this sector to be successful, to be innovative, and also to be responsible.
We want to ensure that the sector does well, but also that the public is properly protected against the risks inherent in an economy like ours, having such a globally significant financial services sector, and the risks if things go wrong, which we saw in our recent history. We certainly do not want to see a slash-and-burn approach to regulation in order to compensate for the decision—I stress the word “decision”— to lose at least a proportion of the market on our doorstep. It is in that spirit that we have approached the Bill, that we have tabled the amendments, and that we have chosen the amendments that we have put to the vote. Thank you.
Alison Thewliss [V]
I just want to reflect on the Bill and on where we are. There was a lot of cross-party agreement in Committee and in the debate on actions that we want to see. We all agree on the importance of financial services to our economy. We all agree that there needs to be further action by Government on money laundering, fraud and economic crime. We all agree that we want to protect customers, businesses and our constituents from emerging threats and risks. I think that we are getting to a broader agreement on scrutiny as well and I urge the Minister to recognise that putting the scrutiny in place after the framework and the rules are made fails to meet the Government’s promise of taking back control and of giving powers to this House. If we are taking these powers back from Europe, they should be coming to the House of Commons rather than to bureaucrats elsewhere. We have less power in this House as Members of Parliament than the Members of the European Parliament have, and that is very difficult to understand and accept from a Government who made such a great play of this.
I want to take the opportunity also to thank everybody who has helped and supported me in these debates and in the Bill process generally. I want to thank the Minister and the shadow Minister for the spirit in which our debate has been conducted. I want to thank all the Members who have contributed their expertise to the debates we have had—there is significant expertise in the House, which should be lent to scrutiny.
I thank the Clerks, Nicholas Taylor and Kevin Maddison, for the significant advice they have given. I thank Scott Taylor, Linda Nagy and my member of staff Mhairi Love, all of whom supported us greatly in the research that went into this. I want to particularly thank Macmillan Cancer Support and all who gave evidence on the Bill. It was so good to be on a Bill Committee that was allowed to take evidence, which does not happen for the Finance Bill, and I urge the Minister to take that on board when we come back to the Finance Bill later this year. Lastly, I thank Heather Buchanan of the all-party parliamentary group on fair business banking for helping me understand some of the issues in the Bill.
There is a lot yet to be said and done on financial services; this is only the beginning. It is incumbent on the Government, in the areas where there is cross-party agreement, to take on the measures that have been suggested and to deal swiftly with the risks that we see coming, so that we can all ensure that our constituents and businesses have the protection they need to participate in financial services and the fairest possible deal in the years and months ahead.
Christine Jardine [V]
Like other Members, I would like to reiterate my and my party’s support for the financial services sector and its importance to our economy, making up about 7% of GDP. There has been a lot of cross-party agreement on this in Parliament. I hope the Government recognise that it is incumbent on them to take on board the comments from the Liberal Democrats, the Labour party and the Scottish National party. There is a great deal of work still to be done to protect consumers from unscrupulous operators, and this will be vital to not only our economic recovery but the future shape of the United Kingdom’s economy once we recover from covid-19.
Jim Shannon
Unfortunately I did not get the opportunity to speak on Report, but I want to put on record my thanks to the Minister for the prompt responses that he gives us on the matters that we bring to his attention. I believe that the Bill is a step in the right direction—it cements some of the issues that I would have liked to speak about earlier, which other Members have touched on—but there is still much to do. The Minister knows that, and we look forward to working with him.
The Minister talked about how imperative our financial services are and said that we can continue to be the core of financial services in Europe; I hope we can. As we leave the EU, I hope that the financial services industry can attain the highest standards and that we have protections for consumers individually and collectively. I am a person who uses a chequebook and has access to cash, because that is the way that the Northern Ireland man and woman did things over the years. I understand that the Bill puts in place protections for credit cards and so on, but sometimes credit cards do not work; sometimes the system breaks. Those of us of a different generation and a different way of doing things need reassurance that we can have access to cash if we need it and that chequebooks will be available.
The Bill provides protection for small and medium-sized businesses. I have expressed concern that the FCA rules do not protect small businesses in the way they should, and I hope the Bill can do that. Over the years, the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake) has been at the forefront of this issue. He and I have worked together, and with others, to make sure that small businesses are protected from any breach of FCA rules. I also understand his wanting to ensure that multinationals pay their fair share of tax to the UK, instead of hiving it off to tax havens. I hope that, through the Bill, in the future we will see more accountability in the process of ensuring that that takes place.
I am also very much for ensuring consumer protection by introducing ideas of fairness and legality, and I believe that the Minister is very keen to ensure that that happens. However, the individual consumer has no resources for court cases, whereas big business seems to have all the resources, so we probably need something in there for the small man and woman, who I always speak up for—we all do; I am not the only one.
I listened to the Minister earlier on money laundering, and particularly on his point about paramilitaries in Northern Ireland. He said he would come back and give me some details. I hope that, through the Bill, when we try to address money laundering, as the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) referred to, we do not miss another opportunity to ensure that gangsters, thugs and paramilitaries are put out of business, as they should be.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.
Financial Services Bill
Thursday 14th January 2021
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Financial Services Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 13 January 2021 - (13 Jan 2021)
Financial Services Bill
Thursday 28th January 2021
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Financial Services Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 13 January 2021 - (13 Jan 2021)
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office and the Treasury (Lord Agnew of Oulton) (Con)
My Lords, as set out in the register of interests, I declare shareholdings in Close Brothers, Hampden & Co and Ovington Investments—the last of which I have significant control over.
The financial services sector drives growth and generates millions of jobs in every corner of our country. It has secured our reputation as a dynamic and world-leading financial centre and it contributes vast sums to the public purse—money that has helped this Government support millions of individuals and business through the pandemic.
Now that we have left the European Union and begin our recovery from Covid-19, we commence a new chapter in the sector’s story. As the Chancellor set out in his wider vision for the UK’s financial services sector in November, we remain committed to ensuring that the UK maintains the highest regulatory standards and remains an open and dynamic global financial centre. This is even more important now that we have left the European Union. Having left, the UK must assume full responsibility for its financial services regulation. The Economic Secretary has assured the other place—as I can assure noble Lords—that this will be underpinned by an unwavering commitment to high-quality, agile and responsive regulation, with a focus on safe and stable markets.
There will inevitably be some areas where the UK will take an approach which better suits our markets. To capitalise on this opportunity, we will fundamentally review our financial services regulatory framework to ensure that it is fit for the future. A consultation on this is open as we speak. The Financial Services Bill should, therefore, be understood as a key part of a wider process—the important first step in taking back control of our financial services regulation. It does so in a way that delivers our international commitments, is consistent with the highest standards of regulation and provides certainty and clarity for this important sector.
The Bill has three overarching objectives: first, to enhance the UK’s world-leading prudential standards; secondly, to promote openness to international markets; and, thirdly, to maintain the effectiveness of the financial services regulatory framework and sound capital markets. I will briefly set out each of the Bill’s measures, and how they contribute to these objectives. Much of the content is highly technical. I will do my best to explain each measure, but we have provided detailed explanations of each measure in the Explanatory Notes.
The Bill intends to enhance the UK’s world-leading prudential standards and to protect financial stability. Clauses 1 and 2, together with Schedules 1 and 2, empower the Financial Conduct Authority—the FCA—to create a tailored prudential regime for investment firms. Investment firms are currently part of the same prudential regime as banks, even though they do not typically provide banking services and therefore do not pose the same risks to financial stability. This Bill will allow the FCA to set prudential requirements which are more appropriate for investment firms. The reforms are similar to changes being taken forward in the EU, which the UK strongly supported while we remained a member.
The UK’s financial services regulators have the technical expertise and market understanding necessary to set complex rules for firms. I thank the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee for its work in scrutinising the Bill’s approach to the delegation of powers and welcome its conclusion that there was nothing necessary to draw to the attention of the House.
The regulators will also be guided by the statutory objectives established in the Financial Services and Markets Act. Their independence ensures that they will not be swayed by political considerations. This Bill introduces a new accountability framework. It will require the FCA to consider the most significant public policy issues relevant to the regime, including the UK’s international competitiveness, and publicly report on how consideration of these factors has affected its rules. In addition to the existing accountability mechanisms in the Financial Services and Markets Act, this will allow Parliament to scrutinise the work of the regulators.
This approach aligns with suggestions made by the EU Financial Affairs Sub-Committee to the Chancellor in March last year, when it recommended giving the UK’s regulatory regime more flexibility. However, I can reassure noble Lords that systemically important investment firms and all banks will remain subject to internationally agreed prudential standards, namely the Basel banking standards. Clauses 3 to 7, along with Schedules 3 and 4, will enable the prudential regulatory regime for these firms to be updated in line with the latest Basel standards, endorsed by the G20. This will build on the existing regime and increase the UK’s resilience to economic shocks, meeting our international commitments to protect the global financial system. In a similar way to the prudential regime for investment firms, responsibility for making the detailed firm-facing rules will be delegated, in this case to the Prudential Regulation Authority. This will also be subject to a new accountability framework.
As noble Lords will be aware, promoting financial stability goes wider than prudential regulation. The Libor benchmark is referenced in upwards of $400 trillion-worth of contracts across the financial system and beyond—from complex derivatives to household mortgages. I am sure that noble Lords will recall the Libor scandal of 2012, which saw many banks attempt to manipulate the Libor benchmark for their own gain. Since then, significant improvements have been made to the administration of the Libor benchmark by its administrator, and to the regulation of benchmarks in the UK. This is in part due to the important work of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, which includes a number of Members of this House.
The Financial Stability Board—the international body that monitors the health of global financial markets—has made it clear that the continued use of certain interest rate benchmarks such as Libor represents a potentially serious source of systemic risk. The decline of the inter-bank lending market has meant that Libor and other similar benchmarks are increasingly reliant on the judgments of panel banks, rather than on actual transactions. The FCA’s voluntary agreement with the Libor panel banks, requiring them to continue contributing to the benchmark, so preventing the premature collapse of Libor, will expire at the end of this year. After this point, there is a risk that Libor will become unrepresentative, which may cause disruption. Clauses 8 to 19, and Clause 21, along with Schedule 5, give the FCA the powers it needs to oversee the orderly wind-down of critical benchmarks—including Libor—thereby reducing significant risks to market stability. This includes powers to provide for the continuity of Libor for those contracts which are unable to transition away from it. Alongside this, clause 20 will extend the transitional period for benchmarks with non-UK administrators from the end of 2022 to the end of 2025.
I turn to the Bill’s second objective: to promote openness to overseas markets. Clauses 22 and 23, together with Schedules 6 to 8, establish a framework to provide and effectively maintain long-term market access between the UK and Gibraltar for financial services firms, now that we have both left the EU. This delivers on a ministerial commitment made to Gibraltar and recognises our special, historic relationship. The arrangements will preserve Gibraltar’s regulatory autonomy and enable it to choose where it wishes to access the UK market, on a basis of alignment and co-operation.
Clauses 24 to 26, together with Schedule 9, simplify the process under which overseas investment funds obtain permission to be marketed in the UK. These changes will supplement the current regime, which requires the FCA to assess every individual fund. The changes will introduce a system under which the Treasury can determine whether a specific category of funds from another country has equivalent regulatory standards to those in the UK. This means that funds in this group wishing to market in the UK can undergo a simpler process, due to the confidence provided by the equivalent regulatory standards of their home country. This will increase choice for UK investors and maintain the UK’s position as a centre of asset management. The current regime will remain in place for overseas funds located in countries which have not been found equivalent. Clause 27 and Schedule 10 amend markets in financial instruments regulations to update the equivalence provisions for investment firms based outside the UK.
The Bill’s third objective is to maintain the effectiveness of the financial services regulatory framework and sound capital markets. Clause 28 introduces a streamlined process for the FCA to remove an inactive firm’s authorisation and position on the public register. This will improve the accuracy of the register and reduce the risk of fraud. Clause 29 will make small changes to market abuse regulations to make the regime more effective while reducing some of the administrative burden on firms. Clause 30 raises the maximum sentence for criminal market abuse from seven to 10 years, bringing it into line with other economic crimes.
I would like to pause at Clauses 31 and 32, along with Schedule 12. These clauses were added by the Government by amendment in the other place.
It has recently become clear that some provisions in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 are creating challenges for some e-money institutions and payment institutions, such as Revolut, Worldpay and TransferWise. They currently need to submit a defence against money laundering request to the National Crime Agency to seek consent before proceeding with any transaction where there is suspicion of money laundering, however small. Standard banks do not have this administrative burden. In certain circumstances they are exempt from submitting a request for transactions under £250.
The £250 threshold exemption was originally introduced to allow those with frozen accounts to pay for their day-to-day living expenses. While the transactions may be under suspicion, these low-value reports provide little useful information for law enforcement, so processing them is not a good use of resources. E-money and payment institutions must submit a large number of these requests for low-value transactions. This is burdensome and, again, a poor use of law enforcement’s time and resources. This Bill therefore equalises the treatment of banks and payment and e-money institutions in this respect. Importantly, e-money and payment institutions will still be required to submit reports of suspicious activity to law enforcement.
Similarly, we have expanded the scope of account freezing and forfeiture powers in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 to include accounts held at payment and e-money institutions. This will ensure that law enforcement agencies are able to quickly and effectively freeze, and activate forfeiture of, the proceeds of crime and terrorist property when held in payment and e-money institution accounts; this mirrors their existing powers with banks.
Clause 33 will ensure the continuation of existing powers assigned to HMRC to access information on who really owns and benefits from overseas trusts with links to the UK. The Government are also taking proportionate and effective action elsewhere to prevent the misuse of these trusts, including recent changes expanding the requirement for non-UK trusts to register with the HMRC trust registration service.
The Bill underlines the Government’s commitment to helping people in debt rebuild their finances. Clause 34 gives the Government the full range of powers they need to effectively implement statutory debt repayment plans, part of the Government’s breathing space debt respite scheme. These changes will mean creditors can be compelled to accept different repayment terms. They will also allow for the administration of the scheme and repayment plans to be funded by a charging mechanism and will allow debts owed to the Government to be included in a statutory debt repayment plan. This will support the Government’s work to ensure that those in problem debt can make repayments to a manageable timetable.
Clause 35 relates to the Help to Save scheme, which supports those on low incomes to build up savings. Help to Save accounts have a four-year term, during which the Government pay a bonus of 50% on up to £50 of monthly savings. At the end of the four years, customers will be asked to provide instructions about where they want their savings transferred to. This clause gives the Government the power to introduce successor accounts for Help to Save customers who do not provide instructions in future, where this is necessary. For now, the Government propose to support these disengaged customers by transferring their savings into the same account where the bonus has been paid, reuniting these customers with their savings.
Clause 36 makes amendments to the packaged retail and insurance-based investment products regulation, known as the PRIIPS regulation. This EU regulation has been widely criticised for its potential to mislead consumers. The Bill will allow the FCA to clarify the scope of the regulation, addressing significant uncertainty that exists now, along with some other helpful changes.
Clause 37 finalises reforms to the European market infrastructure regulation, which the UK supported as a member state. Clause 38 confirms the legal effectiveness of the financial collateral arrangements regulations and makes associated amendments to the Banking Act 2009. Finally, Clause 39 will make the appointment of the chief executive of the Financial Conduct Authority subject to a fixed five-year term, able to be renewed once. This is in line with other high-profile roles in the financial services regulation field.
In summary, this Bill is a necessary and important step in ensuring that our financial services regulatory framework delivers for the UK now that we have left the European Union and the transition period is over. It forms part of a wider programme of regulatory reform that will be guided by what is right for the UK’s financial services industry. It will support economic prosperity across the country, ensure financial stability, market integrity and consumer protection. It will ensure that the UK remains a world-class financial centre. I beg to move.
Lord Reid of Cardowan (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his remarks. I do not oppose the principle behind the Bill, because, like all noble Lords, no doubt, I recognise the need for post-Brexit stability in financial regulation. The Bill is a mass of detail and the Minister has gone to some lengths to go through it. I confess that it does remind me somewhat of a Christmas tree, with little packages all over the place, some of them no doubt previously stored in various government departments—particularly the Treasury —waiting for an appropriate legislative tree on which to hang them.
Leaving that aside, the Bill occurs, as the Minister said, at an important moment for the country’s economy and our financial services industry. As the Minister in the Commons said:
“Our financial services sector is critical to our national effort to recover from the impacts of Covid-19 and move towards a resilient, open and sustainable future for the UK economy.” [Official Report, Commons, 13/1/2; col. 357.]
I agree with that, but he stressed the pandemic and we all know that it is more than just a response to Covid. As the Minister said, the Bill is an essential part of the effort to improve the UK’s regulatory framework for financial services following the end of the Brexit transition period.
As regards our future post-Brexit development, only time will tell, but the early signs do not augur well. Only this month, we approved the post-Brexit trade and co-operation agreement, but, for financial services, this is basically a no-deal agreement. Within a few days of the agreement, £6 billion-worth of euro- denominated share trading shifted from London to European exchanges.
Of course, the express intention of the Government is to secure a memorandum of understanding on financial services by March, and the ambition for regulatory alignment where appropriate. We should have no illusions how difficult that might prove. Only this week, the noble Lord, Lord Hill, a former EU Financial Services Commissioner and a former Minister leading the Government’s review into the City, has confirmed what many of us have long known. He warned that Brussels is targeting London’s position as a global financial services centre and predicted that the EU will not grant British-based firms the highly prized access they are seeking to the European market. It was not in Brussels’ interests, he said, to allow London to continue to dominate the European financial market in the way it did before Brexit. He continued:
“Given that their strategy is to build up the EU, why on earth would they?”
Why, indeed? We should not be surprised then that, so far as we now know, Brussels has granted the UK time-limited equivalence on only two of the roughly 40 different financial areas where London is seeking market access. The EU has, of course, given no further indication on when it will take more equivalence decisions.
I am afraid that the way the Government approached the Brexit negotiations means that there is now no incentive for the EU to agree equivalence arrangements, because their absence means jobs and trading formerly done in London migrating to the EU. Why do I mention this? Herein lies the paradox: the Bill is part of a process aimed at increasing our competitive edge, including vis-à-vis the European Union, but in our present, post-Brexit circumstances any move by the UK to enhance the City’s competitive edge is likely to lessen the chances of progress on equivalence in the EU and the market access that comes with it.
There are, of course, aspects of the Bill that we welcome. I welcome the preliminary agreement between Gibraltar, the UK and Spain, which the Minister mentioned, and look forward to further detail following review by the European Commission. This is of importance to our whole financial sector, not least to our insurance industry.
I also welcome the moves that have been made to tighten up the fight against crime, money laundering and fraud, but equally I wonder, despite the passage of this legislation, how that struggle against criminality will have been affected by the loss of 400,000 records from our criminal database. That has been a disaster that will overrule many of the measures in this Bill.
There are some strange and disappointing omissions from the Bill. I will mention only one, but it is significant. The UK financial services sector has a key role to play in empowering the changes that we need to make to preserve the planet for future generations. But the Bill, which empowers the regulators in so many other ways, is totally silent on that critical issue. The Government say they want the UK to be the centre for green finance globally. Why then, in their first major piece of legislation on this sector since we left the EU, do they say nothing about instructing the regulators to make that a part of their objectives? I hope that the Minister can respond to this.
Of course, the private investment sector is making strong moves towards greater environmental investing, and there is growth in public demand for these products. But this cannot be done by the private sector alone. It will take both the private sector and the public sector working together and pulling in the same direction. I wish the Bill well in its intent, but I fear that it will fall far short of its aims.
Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]
My Lords, I shall focus my remarks chiefly on Clauses 3 and 5, and on Schedule 3. Before I do so, I should congratulate the Government on the speed with which they are addressing the matter of Gibraltar’s financial services industry. The Bill has 183 pages, and over 50 of them are devoted to Gibraltar.
With two important and welcome exceptions—debt respite and Help to Save—the rest of the Bill deals with technical and complex matters. In doing so, it raises profound questions about parliamentary scrutiny and the desirability of embodying an international competitive element in our financial services regimes.
Clauses 3 and 5 contain provisions to allow the PRA and the FCA effectively to make law by making rules without any parliamentary scrutiny. Clause 3 lists the provisions of the CRR that the Treasury may revoke by regulation. The list runs to 42 items, all of them significant. Clause 3(4) makes these revocations conditional on their being or having been adequately replaced by general rules made or to be made by the PRA, or to be replaced by nothing at all if the Treasury thinks that is okay. As things stand, it looks as though the Treasury is the sole judge of what may or may not be an adequate replacement. In any event, Parliament is bypassed. There is no provision for parliamentary scrutiny of these new rules, which have the force of law, but these rules can and will reshape critically important parts of our financial services regimes. Clause 5 takes the same lawmaking-by-rule approach to the regulation of credit institutions. Again, there will be no parliamentary scrutiny of these rules.
The Government have acknowledged the need for a discussion about the role of parliamentary scrutiny in the post-Brexit repatriation of powers previously exercised by the EU directly to our regulators without stopping en route at our Parliament. In March of last year, the EU Sub-Committee on financial services, of which I was chair, wrote to the Government about the issue, as the Minister has mentioned. In his response, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury noted that we had highlighted that
“delegating more powers to the financial regulators will require enhanced parliamentary oversight of their activities.”
There is now an open Treasury consultation on the future of financial services. The call for evidence in this consultation contains 17 key questions. Three of these relate to the issue of parliamentary scrutiny. They are: through what legislative mechanism should new financial regulations be made?; what role does Parliament have to play in influencing new financial services regulations?; how should new UK financial regulations be scrutinised? The consultation closes on 18 February. In practice, it means that the Bill will have left this House by the time the consultation results are available to us. In any case, HMT has indicated that the results will inform yet another consultation, later in 2021, in which the Government will set out a package of proposals. By that time, of course, the provisions in this Bill will have become law and there will no longer be an opportunity for real parliamentary scrutiny of the legally binding rules they will generate.
The Minister emphasised in his closing remarks on Report in the Commons that this Bill is
“just one part of the wider long-term strategy for financial services.”—[Official Report, Commons, 13/1/2021; col. 398.]
Given the narrow and technical scope of the current contents of this Bill, I was glad to hear that, and take it to mean that a second and more comprehensive financial services Bill is in prospect. But the fact is that, by the time we get round to that, the “making laws by rulemaking” procedure will have passed into law. Parliamentary scrutiny of the new rules as laws will have been avoided. We will want to return at later stages to the question of what we can do about this bypassing of Parliament in such critical areas.
I turn briefly to Schedule 3 and the insertion of new Part 9D into the already overloaded and much-amended FSMA 2000, and in particular to new subsection 1(b) of Clause 144C. This seemingly innocuous subsection could bring about radical change in our regulatory regimes. It introduces as a “have regard” in the PRA’s making of CRR rules the notion of international competitiveness for our regimes. This is a highly contested area and the idea has been opposed by many leading figures, including from the party opposite, as being likely to promote conflicts of interest. We will want to examine this in detail at later stages.
During the passage of the Bill through the Commons, there was some discussion of more directly consumer-facing measures. These included imposing a duty of care on the financial services industry and providing significantly more relief for those mortgage prisoners trapped by the Treasury’s dereliction and carelessness in selling on mortgage books to unregulated entities. We will want to return to these issues later in our consideration of the Bill.
We will also want to discuss extending the FCA’s perimeter to take in more of the SME lending market. This is particularly urgent given the terrible position that many SMEs find themselves in as a result of Brexit and Covid-19. We will also want to debate the issue of preserving access to cash in the Covid and post-Covid world. I look forward to the Minister’s reply and to our future debates.
Lord Hammond of Runnymede (Con) (Maiden Speech)
My Lords, I draw attention to my directorship of OakNorth International and my membership of the international advisory board of Nomura, both of them banks.
It is a privilege to address your Lordships’ House for the first time. It may be only 100 yards from the other place, but it is a very different place. I am extremely grateful to the officers and staff of the House and to my supporters, my noble friends Lord Moynihan and Lord Barwell, for their welcome and assistance as I navigate the customs and practices—and indeed the corridors—of this place. I am delighted to be making this speech from the Government Benches, having momentarily mislaid the Conservative whip during the last few weeks of my 22-year career in the Commons.
The title of Lord Hammond of Runnymede may speak to the wider world of the ancient roots of our democracy and of the origins of the rule of law, but, for me, it will always recall the privilege of representing the people of Runnymede and Weybridge, sharing their problems, challenges and triumphs over more than two decades.
My Back-Bench career in the other place was short. The year 1997 was rather like the day after the battle of the Somme in the parliamentary Conservative Party. The general staff was in disarray, the officer corps decimated and new recruits like myself were being promoted in the field; thus began my 12-year apprenticeship on the Opposition Front Bench, before entering the Government in 2010, where I had the privilege to lead four great departments of state, each remarkable in its own different way.
I arrived at the Department for Transport with a single clear instruction: get HS2 built. As an immediate former shadow Chief Secretary, I approached this task with a degree of scepticism, but quickly became a convert to the potential of high-speed rail to change the facts of economic geography, as the original railway had changed Victorian England, and to play a key role in rebalancing the UK economy.
I moved on to defence in the dying days of the Libya campaign of 2011. The MoD is an extraordinary place, a military headquarters as well as a department of state. It is shaped by its unique blend of civilian and uniformed staff and the ethos of the Armed Forces that pervades it. It was an enormous privilege to work with it through a period of managed withdrawal from Afghanistan and majoring restructuring at home as we reconfigured the department and delivered a balanced Budget for the first time in a decade.
In July 2014, my next move was across the road to the grandeur of the FCO and by far the best office in Whitehall. I say to noble Lords that it is not for nothing that successive Foreign Secretaries have gone to extraordinary lengths to ensure that Prime Ministers do not enter that room. In two years as Foreign Secretary, I made 104 overseas visits to 78 countries, gaining an invaluable insight into how others see us and our contribution to their histories—for better or for worse, there are remarkably few in whose histories we have not played a role of some kind. What I learned is how much importance our many friends attach to the characteristics, structures and institutions that define our nation and of which we sometimes appear to be so careless.
In July 2016, my final move was to No. 11. As the guardian of Britain’s economic and fiscal interests, it is hardly surprising that, whatever the political arguments, the Treasury saw Brexit primarily as a threat to the UK’s economic success story. With storm clouds gathering over the economy and uncertainty rife, I set myself a four-point plan: first, to complete the rebuilding of our public finances as a bulwark against the next crisis, little guessing that the next crisis would come so soon; secondly, to soften the economic blow of exiting the single market by securing a transition period, which is uncontroversial now but was a heretical notion in the Brexit-intoxicated days of autumn 2016; thirdly, to shift the balance of public spending, albeit gently, from consumption to investment as part of a plan to unlock the productivity riddle that has bedevilled the British economy since the Second World War; and, finally, to protect our vital financial services industry, which despite the Treasury’s sometimes expansive view of its role is actually the only sector for which it has direct responsibility. That brings me neatly to the Bill.
I strongly support all the objectives that the Government have set out for the Bill, making it an ideal vehicle for a maiden speech by someone who has so recently recovered the Whip. I want to take the opportunity to note the importance of financial services not just to London but to the whole UK economy—it provides 7% of our GDP, 11% of tax revenues and millions of jobs across the length and breadth of Britain—to plead, even at this late stage, for a greater focus on it in our ongoing discussions with the EU and to suggest the inclusion of a duty on our regulators to promote competitiveness as some other countries have done. I hope that it will be the first of many measures designed to reinforce the stability and competitiveness of UK financial services as they absorb the challenge of what, for them, is a no-deal Brexit and the inevitable, albeit gradual, loss of EU business.
I enjoyed every minute of my nine years in Cabinet and I learned much from the many extraordinary people I encountered on my journey. I hope that the experience that I have gained leading four great departments of state will qualify me to contribute to your Lordships’ debates over the years to come.
Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)
My Lords, I first draw attention to my interests as set out in the register and I congratulate my noble friend Lord Hammond of Runnymede on a maiden speech of great breadth and insight, which served to underline what a considerable asset he is going to be to these Benches in particular and to this House more widely. As my noble friend reminded us, he has served with distinction in a number of departments, culminating in his time as Chancellor of the Exchequer. How right he was to point out huge sectors of our economy, in particular financial services, where we are not in the business of finessing a new relationship with the European Union but are yet to ensure that there are any arrangements at all. When my noble friend speaks on economic matters, he does so with rare authority and I look forward to hearing much more from him.
There is one specific point that I would like to develop in my remarks today. The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000—FiSMA—set out four objectives for the Financial Services Authority, the FSA, as it then was: market confidence, public awareness, the protection of consumers and the reduction of financial crime. In addition, the FSA was required to have regard to a number of other factors, including efficiency, proportionality, innovation and
“the international character of financial services and markets and the desirability of maintaining the competitive position of the United Kingdom.”
The Financial Services Act 2012, in response to the 2008 banking crisis, removed that requirement because it was argued that it had served to dilute the robustness of regulation. This argument was founded on an entirely false dichotomy between effective regulation and international competitiveness, for the truth is that a robust, respected and proportionate regulatory regime is an intrinsic part of the UK’s competitive advantage in financial services. We now have the future regulatory framework review. In its phase 2 consultation paper, which I happen to have with me, the Government acknowledged this:
“A gap in the original FiSMA model is that, while it set high-level general objectives and principles, it did not provide for government and Parliament to set the policy approach for specific areas of financial services regulation.”
A partial move towards more activity-specific regulation is seemingly adumbrated in Schedule 3 to the Bill, which has been referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. This would require the PRA, when considering capital requirements regulation, to have regard to
“the likely effect of the rules on the relative standing of the United Kingdom as a place for internationally active credit institutions and investment firms to be based or to carry on activities.”
A similar obligation is to be imposed on the FCA when making Part 9C rules in relation to internationally active investment firms. So competitiveness is edging slowly and surely back into the picture sector by sector and it is a process that I believe many of us want to see accelerate in the months ahead. I also hope that the Government will now come forward with a clear action plan to establish the UK not only as the world centre for broking—that is to say, the selling of insurance and reinsurance—but as the natural home for insurers and reinsurers.
I warmly welcome the Bill because it suggests a direction of travel that will deliver the high-quality, agile and responsive regulation that we need, putting the UK at the forefront of the world market in terms of competitiveness, consumer protection and innovation.
Baroness Coussins (CB)
My Lords, I declare my interest as an ambassador and former president of the Money Advice Trust, the charity which runs National Debtline and Business Debtline. I, too, congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Hammond, on his excellent maiden speech, and look forward later on to the second maiden speech in this debate, from my noble friend Lady Shafik.
I comment first on Clause 34 in relation to the debt respite scheme and, in particular, statutory debt repayment plans. I am delighted that the first element of the debt respite scheme, Breathing Space, is coming into force on 4 May this year. This will give people in debt much needed protection while they seek debt advice. But it is vital now that the Government prioritise the introduction of the second element of the scheme, which is statutory debt repayment plans—SDRPs. They have never been more needed than now, in the wake of Covid-19, and I hope the Government will set out a clear timetable for their implementation.
After all, there is a great deal of agreement on their merits. They will ensure that people who are repaying their debts in full, but who need to do so in an affordable way over a manageable period, will receive binding, legal protection from creditor action and from having additional interest, fees and charges added to their debts. Crucially, public sector creditors—including local authorities and central government—are included in the scheme, and I commend the Government for taking this step. When the Government first consulted on introducing SDRPs in 2018, no one could have foreseen where we would be today, in 2021, facing the severe financial impact of a pandemic, but it is clear now that SDRPs can be a key part of helping households to recover from the financial impact of the outbreak.
I would like to illustrate with one very quick example. Imagine a couple, with two children—one of them furloughed, the other with their hours cut. They struggle to cover their bills and miss a few council tax payments. Being at home with the children more than usual means their energy bill is higher than expected, so arrears build up. They have a mortgage and some outstanding consumer credit debts too. Despite getting an initial payment break on these, this has now expired. Fast forward a few months and, promisingly, they have returned to work and their income has stabilised. They can afford to make some payments towards their debts every month, but not enough to meet their obligations in full. As a result, the council starts enforcement proceedings to recover the arrears, and the energy company wants paying too. This couple will be able to repay their debts in full, but they need time. They need an option to do so affordably without being chased for more than they can pay or having extra fees or charges added. This is exactly what a statutory debt repayment plan would offer them, and it would stop their temporary financial difficulty growing into a bigger debt problem.
Of course, it is understandable that some time will be needed to pass regulations and ensure the necessary infrastructure is in place to introduce these repayment plans, but I hope that the Minister can assure the House that this will be an absolute priority for the Treasury. I ask the Minister to ensure that the Government set out a firm timetable for introducing the new plans.
I turn very briefly now to another important issue that I hope the Government will consider as the Bill progresses through this House. The Bill considers future regulation and rightly highlights the importance of maintaining high consumer protection standards. One area of current concern is that of “imposter” or “clone” websites which pose as legitimate free debt advice charities. Of course, the National Debtline or StepChange actually are free debt advice charities, but these imposter websites can be highly convincing and can mean individuals end up thinking they are speaking to a free debt advice charity when they are not. They may end up in inappropriate debt solutions or being charged significant fees. Will the Government use the Bill to close the regulatory loophole that allows this to happen by bringing forward an amendment to bring the activity of introducing an individual to a debt advice or debt solution service within the FCA’s regulatory remit?
Given the financial impact of Covid-19, it is more important than ever that people are offered safe routes out of debt, and I hope the Government will continue to make this a priority, through this Bill and elsewhere.
The Lord Bishop of St Albans
My Lords, it is right to underline the importance of the financial services sector in our country and the huge contribution it makes. There are many laudable things in this Bill: the strengthening of money laundering regulations; encouraging saving; and the creation of parity between white collar crimes, such as market manipulation, and general fraud by extending the maximum sentence.
I was disappointed, however, to hear that the Commons amendment exploring the whole issue of ethical investment with reference to genocide did not make it into the Bill. I understand the Government’s reservation—they do not want to politicise the FCA. Nevertheless, I hope that “global Britain”, as laid out by the intentions of the Bill, will also be very much “ethical Britain” as we place ourselves in the world under the new freedoms that we have. I also note, with other noble Lords, the concern that there seems to be so little clarity on the question of parliamentary scrutiny. I am sure we will return to this as the Bill passes through your Lordships’ House. Of course, fundamental to this whole future is that the FCA is adequately resourced to fulfil its task.
I touch on just one major issue, which takes up a major part of the Bill: the Gibraltar authorisation regime. The issue of Gibraltar’s lower corporation tax rate of 10% was raised during the Commons Report stage as a significant issue, and it is one that warrants raising again. During his evidence session, the Minister said that corporation tax rate was not a factor in relocation to Gibraltar. While I recognise that relocation can be costly and that operating in London has many benefits not offered by Gibraltar, nevertheless there are significant tax advantages.
This has become all too clear in another area of work that I have raised repeatedly in your Lordships’ House—the issue of the tax avoidance of many companies, including gambling firms, which are a particular focus I have had. For example, in 2019, the Daily Mail revealed that 32Red, based in Gibraltar, paid just £812,000 in corporation tax over a 10-year period—an effective UK tax rate of 3%. William Hill, with its six subsidiaries in Gibraltar, is expected to pay 12% in corporation tax in 2020. Ladbrokes Coral is not required to disclose its tax rate, but one of its two licences to operate in the UK is registered in Gibraltar. While these relate particularly to a very focused area of my interests, of course this mechanism applies equally to financial firms.
These arrangements predate our departure from the EU and, given the likelihood that Gibraltar continues to be used in this matter, I am not placing the blame on this new Financial Services Bill. However, during the progress of this Bill, there will be an opportunity to examine again what the appropriate rules would be, particularly within the financial sector, to prevent Gibraltar being simply a place where firms and companies are reducing their tax bill. Will the UK Government commit to publishing an annual report assessing the consequences of the Gibraltar authorisation regime on tax receipts from the financial industry, as well as outlining how they intend to work with the Gibraltarian authorities to ensure there is a fair tax settlement for both territories?
Lord Bridges of Headley (Con)
My Lords, it is a great pleasure indeed to welcome my noble friend Lord Hammond of Runnymede to this House and to congratulate him on his excellent speech. Runnymede is, of course, a place where a bunch of irate barons got together, incensed by high levels of tax they were having to pay to fund the war with France. Disgruntled Peers, cross about the impact that relations with Europe were having on their nation—not much changes, does it?
I turn to the matter in hand and draw your Lordships’ attention to my entry in the register of interests. As has been said, the Bill arrives in this House at a key juncture for the UK’s financial services sector. In the post-Brexit world, it is more critical than ever that we keep our financial services competitive, as others have said, and remain a globally competitive financial centre. Some may think that the best way to do that is to ensure that our regulations remain, as far as possible, aligned to the EU’s. That approach overall would be unwise and unrealistic. It would be unwise because it is in our national interest to chart our own course for our financial services sector—a goose that lays so many of our golden eggs. The approach would be unrealistic because the EU wants to build up its own financial services and therefore, in the words of my noble friend Lord Hill, whom the noble Lord, Lord Reid, quoted a moment ago, the EU will not seek to do us any favours. We would soon find out that our interests and those of our EU friends would be at odds.
Instead, we need to have the confidence that comes from the City being—to quote Mark Carney—the EU’s investment banker and a global financial epicentre that existed well before the European Union was dreamt of. We need to look to a future that is green, a future that is digital and a future that is full of opportunities. We must strengthen our position in this new world. To achieve that, Ministers and regulators must focus on how our regulatory system can help to strengthen our competitiveness. As my noble friend Lord Hunt has just said, competitiveness was one of the regulator’s objectives but was removed after the financial crash and, as has been mentioned, the Government are now consulting on whether to reinsert competitiveness as an objective. It is a pity that that consultation is still underway, given its relevance to the Bill. I will be pressing the Minister on that point.
Of course—let me make this very clear—we should not forget the lessons that we learnt from 2008, nor should we race to the bottom in terms of regulations. Robust regulation is the bedrock of strong financial services but we must not get trapped in the past and regulate entirely via the rear-view mirror. Look overseas: regulators’ objectives have been adjusted since the financial crisis but without abandoning competitiveness altogether. Australia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan and Malaysia have competitiveness or growth as a regulatory objective or principle.
We need to look ahead and plan ahead. We must properly balance the need for stability with the need to be competitive so that the UK is innovative, dynamic and a great place to do business. I do not agree with the false choice contained in the Government’s consultation, which states that,
“a new competitiveness objective could distract from or dilute the key stability, market integrity and consumer protection objectives.”
We can and should strive to be both competitive and stable as a financial centre. Nor is the new so-called accountability framework sufficient. Requiring the PRA to consider the impact of its actions on competitiveness is no substitute for making competitiveness a core objective.
That brings me to the issue of accountability and scrutiny. Our regulators are getting more power and the Government are perfectly open about that. They have stated that they are,
“delegating a very substantial level of policy responsibility to the UK financial services regulators.”
If regulators are being given additional powers, there should surely be a commensurate increase in scrutiny. I therefore argue and agree with others that we need to look carefully at how regulators will be scrutinised by Parliament. Of course, getting the balance right is critical but we do not want Ministers or Parliament micromanaging regulators. There are questions as to whether enough is being done to hold unelected regulators to account.
That brings me back to where I began. The best way for Parliament to make regulators accountable is for elected MPs to set unelected regulators very clear objectives. At the moment, those objectives will not achieve our aim to strengthen our competitiveness. That needs to be addressed.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Hammond, on his maiden speech. I particularly welcome his entry to the House because I am also an unapologetic fan of spreadsheets. The Bill is necessary, of course, consequent on leaving the European Union. To a large extent, it is intended simply to replace what we had before but it provides the opportunity to go further, as we have been promised. I shall mention a couple of points that I hope we can pursue in more detail in Committee.
First, there is the Financial Conduct Authority. I do not have enough time at this stage to go into any detail but I want to put down a marker, that the FCA has failed too often in the past and simply has to do better in future. In the Bill, Clause 39 deals with the appointment of the chief executive. What is required here is clearer and greater accountability, and I would argue that Parliament has a crucial role there.
Secondly, Clause 34 relates to the debt respite scheme. I support debt respite, particularly given the situation in which we find ourselves, and I support the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins. However, the proposals in the Bill totally lack ambition, given the scale of the problems we face. We need to understand that while debt has a personal impact, ruining lives and leading to much misery, it also affects us all by acting as a drag on the economy and the recovery that is so desperately needed.
There should be a modern debt jubilee—that is, a comprehensive package of debt cancellations targeted at the household sector. We need, in effect, a debt write-off for households, broadly along the lines established for the financial sector 12 years ago. We were told then that some banks were too big to fail because of the harm that it would cause to the economy. I argue that the failure of individuals because of debt means as much, or even greater, harm for us all.
That is not such a radical proposal. The ancient kings, under the Mosaic law, would announce debt forgiveness for their people so that they could start anew. Traditionally, that would be every 50 years, hence the jubilee. It is crucial to understand that those rulers were not being idealistic or kind in forgiving debts; in fact, they were being very practical. If the economic imbalance was not reset, there was a danger that their kingdom would fall. The main argument for such a scheme, therefore, is that in addition to relieving much individual misery it would provide a direct and targeted macroeconomic boost to the economy, exactly where it is needed. Relieving household debt would generate economic growth in the same way as a tax cut would, but it would be better targeted, allowing people to keep more of their income as pounds in their pockets. The money would flow into consumption, savings or investment, rather than into debt repayment.
There will, of course, be concern that cancelling any debts, even those debts long-abandoned by the lender, will punish the prudent and reward the profligate. That is to misunderstand how the credit system functions and how retail financial markets operate. It is hard to believe that a debt write-off will cause greater harm to those who are unaffected by indebtedness than it will benefit those who are already struggling. The beneficial effects will come to us all. Abolishing household debt, starting with the most pernicious and harmful, will generate gains that are generalised and distributed across the people of the UK as a whole.
As noble Lords will be aware, plans are already being made to celebrate one jubilee next year. Let us also plan a jubilee that will assist not just those among us who are the hardest pressed in our society but all of us. How far we can go towards such an objective in the context of the Bill, I hope we can explore in Committee.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to take part in this Second Reading. I declare my interests as set out in the register. It is greater pleasure to congratulate my noble friend Lord Hammond of Runnymede on his exquisite maiden speech. In it, I think the whole House heard that he is so much more than the misnomic “Spreadsheet Phil”. We have a real heavyweight in our midst, and I very much look forward to his future contributions on economic matters and so much more.
I would like to cover the areas of financial technology, or fintech, financial inclusion, or fininc, and the international perspective. Fintech is a great British success story, but we are slipping. The FCA sandbox was world-leading in its time and its great success demonstrated in how it has been copied around the world. Does the Minister agree that we need to update the sandbox to enable it to be available to all comers at all times rather than just those who are first in class? Does he agree that, in a sense, we need to industrialise the sandbox? Does he also agree that we need, for want of a better phrase, a growth box to address the scale-up challenge facing our fintechs? Does he have some early learnings from the City of London and FCA’s proof of concept around the digibox? It is early, I know, but there may be learnings that we can take into Committee and Report of this Bill.
Similarly, I would like to touch on crypto. The UK could be a world leader in crypto assets. Are we going to look to emulate MICA, do more than MICA or do something different? Similarly, we could be a world leader in setting the taxonomy for global crypto assets. Is that part of the plan? We have a fintech industry ripe for solving so many problems and driving so much economic growth. Does the Minister agree?
Another example is a central bank digital currency. If we looked at a hybrid model, we would be a world leader in rolling that out. If we do not, what about the challenge from Libra, now Diem, with the private sector potentially taking a huge influence over our macroeconomic policy? Look at what has happened with social media. If even a fraction of that happened with a digital currency, it would have not just an economic but a social impact—an impact on our very polity.
I turn to financial inclusion. Macmillan Cancer Support, which has done so much in this area, is pushing for a duty of care. I agree. Does the Minister? Similarly, with the SDRP regime, what is the timetable for bringing it into being? When we are looking at the breathing-space clauses, which are welcome, do they need further review against the backdrop of the Covid crisis? Similarly, can the Minister say whether bailiffs are being stopped from doorstepping people during this lockdown, as they were during the first one? It is not clear right now whether that is the case.
I turn to the international perspective, like other noble Lords I welcome the action in relation to Gibraltar. Will there be moves to enable Gibraltar to be part of a free-trade area with the UK?
When we look at the Basel framework, how does that work in terms of some of the international contexts? I would like to see a lot more British involvement in the continent of Africa, but African assets and investments are currently highly weighted from a risk perspective. Is that prudential or protectionist?
Does the Minister agree that when we look at technology and financial technology across the piece it would seem to make sense that we need a unit, a centre within government, maybe within the Treasury—for want of a better expression, a “fourth industrial revolution delivery unit”—to bring policy problems to private and public sector practical solutions?
In the Bill I believe we have the opportunity to reflect and consider what financial services are for. If they are for anything, they must be about enabling, empowering and unleashing individuals, institutions, innovations, neighbourhoods and nation states in a connected, interoperable and economic globe.
In the other place the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, the right honourable John Glen, called the Bill a “portfolio”—right enough. I hope noble Lords will be able to persuade the Minister during the passage of this Bill through your Lordships’ House that we can turn it into a portmanteau—a portmanteau to carry us, our economy and our society better through 2021 and well beyond.
Baroness Hayman (CB) [V]
My Lords, I declare my interest as co-chair of Peers for the Planet. My contribution today will focus on what is not in the Bill —namely, any reference to climate change considerations in relation to financial services and their regulation. First, I have a couple of more general points, and of course a welcome for the impressive and engaging maiden speech by the noble Lord, Lord Hammond of Runnymede.
I was very sympathetic to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and others on the need for improving the arrangements for parliamentary scrutiny set out in the Bill. I shall be very interested to follow the arguments and discussions on competitiveness, particularly in the light of a powerful speech that I heard last week from David Miliband when he spoke about the sharp dividing line between cultures of accountability and cultures of impunity that apply not only to political systems but, as we have painfully learned, to financial systems as well.
I turn to my main point—a point that I was pleased was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Reid of Cardowan—which is the absence of any reference within the provisions of the Bill to climate change risk and the UK’s net-zero commitments. That the financial sector will be crucial for unlocking the private investment necessary for both green recovery and long-term economic security was made very clear by the Government in their 10-point plan for a green industrial revolution. Alok Sharma, then the BEIS Secretary of State, pledged:
“We will harness the international reputation of the UK’s world leading financial sector to encourage private investment into supporting innovation and manage climate financial risk.”
The Chancellor of the Exchequer wrote in his 9 November Statement of
“putting the full weight of private sector innovation, expertise and capital behind the critical global effort to tackle climate change and protect the environment.”
This strong rhetoric from the Government reflects what is happening in the financial sector in the UK and across the world. Only this week we have seen Black Rock adopt a climate alignment metric for its funds while many other financial institutions, from pension funds to banks, are announcing their commitments to net zero. However, to deliver systemic change at the speed required, we need increased action. Fine words and long-term aspirations will not be sufficient to tackle the scale of the challenge, and the Government need to take a lead in creating the environment and regulatory framework to encourage rapid progress.
The mismatch between rhetoric and activity can be seen across the sector. Lending to fossil fuels from 35 of the biggest banks continued to rise, up from $700 billion in 2018 to $736 billion in 2019. UK banks are currently the worst in Europe for high carbon lending. While the total value of assets held by financial institutions in the UK is around £20 billion, estimates put the value of global funds managed with explicit ESG criteria as, at most, 0.4%.
The Bill needs to reflect the urgency of the task and set the direction of travel through the future regulatory framework for financial services. We have to create a framework that supports our climate goals and explicitly provides for climate risk to be assessed and factored into decisions. The wider consultation on the future framework to which the Minister and others have referred provides no justification for neglecting the opportunity to put the appropriate markers and measures down in the Bill when the Government’s green finance policy and ambition has been so clearly set out already.
We need a concerted and urgent focus on actively aligning investment with the objectives of the Paris Agreement, so it is extremely concerning that the Bill does not even include the first step of addressing climate risks by ensuring that they are taken into account by the regulator when discharging its duties in making new regulations. I look forward to working with other noble Lords on amendments that would rectify these omissions and send a clear signal of a direction of travel to the sector and regulators.
In the year that the UK hosts COP 26, we must be meticulous in ensuring that we lead by example in every aspect of government policy. Mark Carney, the Prime Minister’s financial adviser at COP 26, wrote in November:
“The objective for the private finance work for COP26 is simple: ensure that every professional financial decision takes climate change into account.”
We must ensure that the Bill underpins that objective.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, I declare my interests as set out in the register.
I have been in this House for five years, wondering what happens about our most important industry. Diligently commenting on unamendable statutory instruments, or having yet another debate about regulators’ failure, does not really cut it for parliamentary scrutiny. In a similar length of time, I negotiated the 40 complex sets of post-financial crisis legislation in the EU. I do not expect to do that again, but it is good to see a Bill, and it is attracting two substantial maiden contributors. The problem is that to keep up on Basel 3.1 and separate out investment firm prudential regulation, it runs ahead of the consultation that is still open, implementing the division of powers in isolation from whatever comes from the consultation, deliberately fixing the path.
It did not have to be this way. The SIs revoking provisions when regulators’ replacements have been drafted could instead contain those changes, but the truth is that the Government have decided the future. Regulators are indulged, Parliament ignored. The excuse is made that the division of powers is just returning to the original FiSMA 2000, despite that being out to consultation. Apart from it not turning out well then, and the prioritisation of industry consultation over Parliament, financial services were not without EU involvement in 2000. There was already EU banking and insurance legislation. The Financial Services Action Plan was laid out in 1999 and broadly completed by 2004, with co-ordinating financial supervisory bodies well established.
It is true that the UK was on its own with the FSA’s supervisory mistakes, and cheer-led the Basel blundering, but since the financial crisis, there is so much more detailed and complex legislation than there was in 2000, so much more EU, public and parliamentary consultation and scrutiny. The FiSMA 2012 amendments were done in that setting. Now the light is switched off, and we fall back on arrogant, secretive policy-making, which is no way to be world-leading in the modern age.
It is not transparent what UK regulators and the Treasury get up to in the international standards bodies. Supervisory-led bodies have not always got it right. They got Basel II wrong. We do not know but just hope that they have got it right now. They suffer from groupthink, and then regulators implement and mark their own homework. That is why there must be big, public conversations involving Parliament.
Some legislatures, such as the EU and the US, get to scrutinise and confirm alignment with international standards once they have debated them. In the EU, regulators are regularly reviewed and peer-reviewed. In the US, the US Government Accountability Office conducts an independent annual study of financial regulations and the federal agencies. In this Bill, the Government tie our hands and legs before the scrutiny race starts.
The Explanatory Memorandum says that accountability measures have been included, meaning the scant “matters to consider” provisions for when the regulators are making rules. These “have regard” lists are too short—there are other matters of policy to consider—and there is no measure of how the regulators are accountable, other than by their own explanations and a bit of shouting by us if it has all gone wrong and still more Gloster, Connaught or GRG reports turn up. Heaven knows how anyone thinks that skeleton primary legislation can give certainty for other major jurisdictions to find us equivalent, when substantive policy can be changed in the blink of a regulator’s eye. No wonder they say that they do not know what is planned. They never will.
It is not easy being a regulator, but things have been missed too often, even when newspapers and Parliament have drawn it to attention, so we need regular independent reviews, rather like a Section 166 inquiry on regulators, with oversight on follow-through. Statutory regulator’s consultations are for industry, and there is nothing in the Bill that marks a position for Parliament. There is no access to data for industry or Parliament to independently check or challenge fair basis of the rules.
The Bill separates different types of financial institutions that have previously been swept together under banking legislation. The regulators should be given a specific direction to do more of that for small and non-systemic banks and for different categories of insurance, especially captives and reinsurance, as Ireland has. That would be useful for partial equivalences, too. The FCA’s financial system integrity objective needs backing with failure-to-prevent offences. We need duties of care, better treatment of small businesses in commercial contracts and to make the regulator’s statutory panels transparent, independent and able to consult, not secretive, selective and steered. I do not agree that FiSMA 2000 is the right model. It is arcane, it failed then and it is still secretive and shallow now, diminishing the UK. I will try to make it better.
Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Hammond, on his excellent speech. I welcome him to the House and look forward to his wise words on many issues.
The Bill has many deficiencies. I have sufficient time to speak on only two matters. In the post-Brexit world, the UK needs to compete to attract business. A key requirement is to ensure that the UK is a clean place with robust regulators. However, the Bill does not do that. It should have been preceded by an independent public inquiry into the finance industry and its regulation.
Regulatory failures continue to make headlines. For example, Dame Elizabeth Gloster’s report on the collapse of London Capital and Finance found that the FCA’s supervision was “wholly deficient” and that its staff
“had not been trained sufficiently to analyse a firm’s financial information to detect indicators of fraud or other serious irregularity.”
The report concluded that the FCA failed to fulfil its statutory objectives. The FCA has also been criticised in a report on the collapse of the Connaught Income Fund, and the long-running saga of frauds at the Royal Bank of Scotland and HBOS are further evidence of the FCA’s failures.
Anyone tackling corrupt practices in the finance industry faces obstacles. In February 2017, the Thames Valley police and crime commissioner, Anthony Stansfeld, prosecuted six financiers, including a senior ex-HBOS banker. They were jailed for a total of 47 and a half years. After being shamed, the FCA in June 2019 fined Lloyds Bank £45.5 million. Thames Valley Police force spent £7 million on the prosecutions, but it has not really been compensated by the Government and thus the force has been disabled from mounting any further investigations.
The Conservative police and crime commissioner for Thames Valley has also sought to tackle other cases of financial frauds but has met political and regulatory opposition. On 8 February 2019, he told the London Evening Standard:
“I am convinced the cover-up goes right up to Cabinet level. And to the top of the City.”
That is a strong condemnation of the current regulatory arrangements. The recurring problem is that the regulators are too close to the industry and like to bat for the industry rather than protect people from malpractices. The Bill does not cleanse the finance industry or enhance protections for the people.
My second point relates to the Basel III framework which is implemented by the Bill and affects the calculation of minimum capital requirements and leverage ratios for banks. However, many of the problems highlighted by the 2007-08 crash remain unaddressed. The Government want banks to have more equity, but they have incentivised debt and high leverage, as the interest payments attract tax relief and enable banks to report higher returns to shareholders. Why have the Government not addressed this contradiction at the heart of the calculations of capital for banks?
Financial statements of regulated financial enterprises are based on international financial reporting standards—IFRSs, as they are commonly known. Their use was heavily criticised in the 2013 report by the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. The IFRSs give management too much discretion and management has used that to massage financial statements, as was shown by Carillion, for example. The IFRSs have no clear concept of capital maintenance and therefore calculations of capital based upon accounting numbers are fundamentally flawed. On bank balance sheets, various transactions in historical costs, amortised costs, net realisable values, present values, fair values, market values and even internally generated numbers are all added up. The calculation does not yield any meaningful number for capital maintenance. Banks are currently neither maintaining money, nor real or physical capital, so why do the Government consider them to be a useful guide for regulators?
Neither the FCA nor the Prudential Regulation Authority sets accounting rules for financial enterprises, but they rely on whatever the Financial Reporting Council comes up with. They are storing trouble for the future. The bank financial statements are targeted at short-term shareholders, essentially speculators and capital markets. They do not tell the regulators anything about market interdependencies or systemic risks, all of which were the causes of the 2007-08 crash.
The UK regulators rely on external auditors, even though big accounting firms are unable to deliver honest and robust audits. All banks which crashed in the 2007-08 crash received unqualified audit reports. The Financial Reporting Council routinely laments that 25% to 50% of the audits conducted by the big four accounting firms are deficient. Yet, bizarrely, regulators rely upon auditors. Auditors owe a duty of care to the company but not to any regulator. Regulators do not have a statutory right of access to the auditors’ files or staff. That was one of the reasons why the Bank of England was unable to fully investigate audit failures at Barings, delivered by Deloitte and Coopers & Lybrand, a firm which is now part of PricewaterhouseCoopers. Yet no lessons have been learned. One must also ask whether the reliance on ex-post audits is wise in a world of instantaneous movement of money. Is it not time that the regulators took direct responsibility for auditing the financial statements of banks?
Baroness Penn (Con)
My Lords, perhaps this is an opportune moment to remind Back-Benchers of the advisory time limit of six minutes for speeches.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I draw attention to my entries in the register of interests. I join in the congratulations to my noble friend Lord Hammond on an excellent maiden speech. I will focus on his remarks about the regulator’s promotion of financial industry competitiveness, a theme expanded on most eloquently by my noble friends Lord Bridges and Lord Hunt. In order to achieve that, the regulatory framework must be robust, but the regulator must be nimble, agile, appropriately resourced and with carefully defined powers. It also needs to be accountable, as many noble Lords have noted. I look forward to the results of the current consultation into the wider framework for regulation and note that it is due to close by the end of next month.
Much of the current Bill before us is welcome and I support it, but I wish to raise some questions ahead of the Financial Conduct Authority having yet more powers delegated to it. I note that in the debate in the other place, which has been referred to a number of times, this theme was explored with reference to parliamentary scrutiny. That is a valid concern, but my concern is also to do with the FCA’s enormous existing remit and whether that is now simply too big to manage.
I will cite a couple of examples of where I think that perhaps this is the case. First is MiFID II, the market in financial instruments directive. Part of this dealt with the unbundling of commissions paid for stock market research. The FCA was the architect of these rules, but the French regulator recently noted that they have “profoundly changed” the research landscape and that this has had a negative effect on the quality of research available on smaller companies and therefore, by implication, the capital allocated to those companies. In the UK, the independent and not-for-profit CFA Institute has made similar points. The FCA has said that there is no evidence of this, but both the French and Germans have now changed the rules to exempt smaller companies from this part of the directive. There is no equivalence there, and I cannot recall a previous incidence of a French regulator changing rules to allow less regulation than our own.
Another example is that, last week, two opposition Members of the other House published a letter criticising the FCA’s customer protection skills with regards to the handling of advice given to British Steel pension holders. They alleged that the FCA lacks “sufficient vision” to tackle issues facing consumers and urge the regulator to use the full strength of its powers of enforcement to tackle rogue advisers. I am not particularly familiar with this case, if I am honest, but a swift Google would suggest that they have a point.
However, on the subject of enforcement, the most famous insider trading case launched by the FCA took eight years, cost in the order of £20 million, involved at least 40 investigators who pored over vast amounts of data and in the end secured two of five convictions, confiscation orders of £1.7 million and the longest custodial sentence that was handed down was four and a half years. It has been argued that regulators are discouraged from starting this type of investigation, because of the difficulty of winning, but the FCA has publicly regarded this as a success. It was a partial success perhaps, but at what cost, particularly to those acquitted individuals whose lives were on hold for eight years?
Other investigations that the FCA has conducted into funds management firms suggest that poor product knowledge, excessively high staff turnover and poor handover continuity make relatively straightforward investigations, which are launched perfectly legitimately, run for much longer than they need to. This has a deleterious impact on staff morale and massively increases compliance costs. Large firms can bear those costs with relative ease, but what of the SMEs that the sector relies on for competition and innovation?
I am sure that the FCA will argue that I have cherry picked a few instances which show them in a less than optimal light—perhaps I have. But I could have drawn on a number of other examples, for example, the Gloster report published in December referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, or the Parker report, also published in December. They were much more complex cases, so I have not used them here. They did not require much effort to find. These examples illustrate only a small part of the FCA’s incredibly wide remit, but the skills and knowledge required to investigate and appropriately regulate each of these examples is discrete and detailed.
So it is hard to escape the conclusion that the FCA is trying to do too much with too little. Yet we are debating delegating additional powers—for example, handing over the power to manage the orderly wind-down of Libor, which, as the briefing documents note, is used to benchmark an eye-watering $400 trillion-worth of contracts. There is no room here at all for mistakes of any kind, although I should note that the FCA is consulting the industry widely on this.
Many in the City believe that the FCA has the appropriate powers but does not use them often enough. On 21 December last year, the Times noted:
“The Financial Conduct Authority has fined only ten wrongdoers this year, its lowest scalp rating since its creation in 2013. It has meted out only £183.6 million in penalties, its third lowest total fines tally.”
I am quite sure that Covid will be cited as one reason for this, but the police carried on policing. Can that be a valid excuse, or is this because of the vast complexity of its role? Here, on complexity, I cite a June 2019 IEA report that claimed:
“The amount of data being collected under MiFID II is now beyond the ability of the UK regulators to assess in any meaningful way.”
I do not believe that the nuts and bolts of regulation, including enforcement, should be subject to political interference, but I think we should ask whether the FCA’s current remit is too broad. Is there a case to be made for smaller and more specialist regulators, particularly as financial markets become ever more complex? I am also concerned that regulated firms lack effective rights of appeal against the FCA’s decisions. As the Government themselves have noted in the past, such rights—and I quote from a BEIS consultation—are
“central to ensuring robust decision-making and holding regulators to account in the interests of justice”.
We have seen the results of failed or inadequate regulation before and they are recent and raw, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, noted. Post Brexit we have an opportunity to design and implement a system that does all the things the Government want, all the things that the industry needs, and all the things that the country deserves. We should do it properly and urgently, not least because we know where the blame for failure will land.
Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB) [V]
My Lords, I start by congratulating the noble Lord, Lord Hammond of Runnymede, on his maiden speech today, and I look forward to the maiden speech of my noble friend Lady Shafik. I have a tenuous connection to both speakers today. I chaired the EU Financial Affairs Sub-Committee in the period when the noble Lord was Chancellor, providing him with the odd unhelpful report on the UK exit fee, or the dangers of losing passporting rights, for his late-night reading. I should alert him to the fact that four of us from that committee are speaking in this debate today. My noble friend Lady Shafik is the first female appointed as director of the London School of Economics, my alma mater, and a former deputy governor at the Bank of England, where I am a member of the Enforcement Decision Making Committee, an independent panel under the PRA. Given my interests declared vis-à-vis the PRA, I will keep my contributions on this Bill high level, and restricted to certain areas only.
In early 2018, the EU Financial Affairs Sub-Committee published a report on the future of financial services regulation and supervision post Brexit. I believe that this was the most comprehensive survey of the options available to the UK if—and at that point it was an if—the UK left the EU. On examining the provisions of this Bill, I am pleased to say that our analysis was pertinent, and several of our recommendations will now see the light of day as this legislation becomes law.
One of our considerations is indeed at the heart of this Bill—that of where powers and standard setting by EU bodies rightly reside now that the UK is responsible for its own regulation. We concluded that our regulators were well regarded internationally and, despite some concerns expressed by noble Lords today, which I accept, the United Kingdom’s financial services sector is still regarded as number two globally, having been replaced in the number one slot by New York. It is leagues ahead of any other continental centre. This is relevant not out of some nationalistic hubris but because the real jobs and revenue that it provides are really important across the country.
Until last year the UK’s regime derived its legislative base from EU law, but we found out that in reality those standards were actually framed upstream through the Financial Stability Board, Basel, IOSCO and other standards setters. It is at that level that we need to focus our energies now, confident that our technical expertise is highly valued, but we also need to build new relationships. I note that the five largest financial sectors behind New York and the City are in east Asia, and Zurich is the only one in the top 10 globally from continental Europe. So we have opportunities upstream in co-operating with those jurisdictions to establish fair and proportionate frameworks.
While I have confidence in our regulators, I want to add my voice to the need for accountability. Standards setting and underpinning legislation that is now passing to our regulators is highly technical, but that does not mean that parliamentary scrutiny is redundant. So I urge the Minister, through the usual channels, seriously to consider setting up a joint committee of both Houses to carry out ongoing scrutiny of the effectiveness of this type of legislation. The City, as I know, is not keen to be a low-tax, low-regulation haven for dodgy dealing; it wants to preserve its hard-earned recent reputation. Oversight by Parliament at a more technical level can only enhance this. So when the Minister tells us that further legislation will build on this omnibus Bill, I urge him to suggest to his political masters that there will inevitably be a democratic deficit unless we have a parliamentary mechanism to do the relevant scrutiny, not least of HMT, when the Treasury Select Committee in the other place simply cannot carry out that technical work.
My final point is about competitiveness. The post-Brexit UK will inevitably need to rethink its competitiveness as business investment becomes more challenging to attract. So I also urge the Minister to explain what reservations the Government have, if any, about establishing an international competitiveness duty for the regulators. We recommended this in our report, and I think that the Treasury can usefully incorporate it into its thinking on the future regulatory framework. I know that some see competitiveness as a race to the bottom. I ask them to think of one very current example: the pharmaceutical sector. Would anyone today, looking at our vaccination strategy and successes, think that having a state of the art and competitive pharmaceutical sector represents a race to the bottom—or is it a necessary tool in the global challenge to remain in the lead where we have the relevant skills?
I look forward to the detailed scrutiny that we will undertake on this Bill in the months ahead but, in the meantime, I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
Lord Northbrook (Con) [V]
My Lords, putting the contribution of the UK’s financial services in context, according to a City/PwC paper in January 2020 they contributed £75.5 billion in tax revenue in 2019, employing about 1.1 million people. Overall, I support the Bill’s measures, which bolster the consistent use of international standards. This is crucial to reducing the unnecessary fragmentation of markets that impacts on consumers. I agree with the delegation of responsibility for financial firm requirements to the regulators, subject to an enhanced accountability framework and necessary parliamentary scrutiny.
The three main objectives stated in the Bill are entirely sensible. The Bill also amends existing laws on financial services in the 17 separate areas grouped by these three stated objectives.
My only criticism of the second objective is that, while it promotes openness to EU and overseas financial firms that come here, no attempt was made in the Brexit negotiations to obtain passporting rights from the EU as a quid pro quo. The Government seem to have believed that these should only now be negotiated—alas, when we have no bargaining tools left in other areas. The EU seems in no hurry to assist us. Can the Minister explain the logic in this?
I welcome the new regulatory regime proposed for non-systematically important investment firms. The Government rightly state that the existing regime for these institutions can be disproportionate, inappropriate and impose unnecessary burdens. The Bill would rightly allow the Financial Conduct Authority to introduce a tailored regime for such companies. The Government say that the UK regime will be flexible and is intended to achieve similar outcomes to the reform in the EU in 2021 but
“tailored to the specificities of the UK market.”—[Official Report, Commons, Financial Services Bill Committee, 17/11/20; col. 59.]
I welcome the Bill’s implementation of Basel III standards on banking supervision. Some member firms will have been working towards implementing the EU’s capital regulatory requirements, CRR II. How may the UK diverge from CRR II?
I also support the framework to wind down the Libor benchmark, as outlined in the Bill. Will the Minister urge the FCA to publish further detail on its replacement as soon as possible?
Can the Minister clarify how the Treasury intends to make equivalence decisions under the framework for the new overseas fund regime? Will the Government publish a regular report on the progress and results of negotiations for obtaining equivalence for UK firms in EU countries? I strongly support maintaining the effectiveness of the financial services framework and sound capital markets in Clauses 8 to 17.
During the rest of my contribution, I will focus on the unfortunate statistic of the rise in complaints to the FCA and cite two examples of regulatory failure. According to an FTAdviser article of February 2020, the number of complaints about the City watchdog jumped by more than 50% in 2019, primarily due to concern about the regulator’s supervision of the industry. The main driver behind the hike was the sharp increase in the number of complaints relating to the FCA’s advisory role—namely, failure to act on information and to spot a problem. In the same month, the FCA was reprimanded by the complaints commissioner, Antony Townsend. He wrote to the FCA board expressing serious concerns, branding the current situation at the watchdog “totally unacceptable”. This followed a previous report in 2019, where the complaints commissioner highlighted a
“lack of effective prompt action”
by the financial regulator, in a number of cases where advisers and consumers reported concerns about a fund.
The two individual examples of regulatory failure on which I will focus are London Capital & Finance and Beaufort Securities. In December 2020 an independent investigation into the FCA’s handling of the LCF mini-bond scandal rebuked the regulator for “significant gaps and weaknesses” in its policies and practices. The review found that the City watchdog had failed to properly regulate the now collapsed company. It warned that its handling of information about the business from third parties was “wholly deficient” and an
“egregious example of the FCA’s failure to fulfil its statutory objectives”
in regulating the company. The mini-bond provider collapsed in May 2019, owing more than £230 million and putting the funds of some 14,000 bondholders at risk.
The main highlights of the review were that, first, investors had not received enough protection from the regulatory regime, and, secondly, LCF had not been adequately supervised by the FCA. Most importantly, the review stated that the root causes of the FCA’s failure to regulate LCF were “significant gaps and weaknesses” in the policies and practices it implemented to analyse the business activities of regulated firms. It had allowed LCF to use its authorised status to promote
“risky, and potentially fraudulent, non-regulated investment products to unsophisticated retail investors”.
Although the regulator’s financial promotions team had raised concerns about LCF’s financial promotions on six occasions, the breaches did not result in a referral to the supervision or enforcement divisions. Lastly, the report said:
“FCA staff who reviewed materials submitted by LCF had not been trained sufficiently to analyse a firm’s financial information to detect indicators of fraud or other serious irregularity … Neither did the FCA appreciate the significance of an ever-growing number of red flags, which were indicative of serious irregularities in LCF’s business. This occurred at a time when LCF’s unregulated bond business was growing at a rapid pace and substantial funds were being invested by Bondholders.”
I do not have time to go through the case of Beaufort Securities with which there were many of the same problems, though in a number of cases, investors got their money back. Overall, I welcome the Bill.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I declare an interest as a former chair of StepChange Debt Charity.
I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Hammond of Runnymede, on his maiden speech. In your Lordships’ House we do a good line in former Chancellors of the Exchequer; in normal times, when the House is sitting on a regular basis, there is almost a full Bench of them. He joins an exalted group, and I am sure he will quickly make his mark, even among that competition.
I will focus on Parts 6 and 7. I echo the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, and the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Holmes, in welcoming these proposals. I want also to raise the specific issue of high-cost credit, which the Government should stamp out.
Clause 34 amends Sections 6 and 7 of the FGC Act. I participated in the debates on that Act a few years ago. We welcome the clause, which will, as the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, said, compel creditors—including all public sector creditors—to accept amended repayment terms, provide for a charging mechanism for debt advice, and underpin the instruction of the Statutory Debt Repayment Plan. But the Bill is short on detail. We hope to take this further in Committee. We assume and hope that the scheme will be modelled on the successful Scottish scheme.
More details will be needed in Committee about the timetable. Debt respite, which is being introduced in May, and debt repayment should go together. How are the powers to be framed and what role will Parliament have? What will be the arrangements for creditor agreements and the veto, if any, on the quantum of payments? Should there be a wider reform of debt collection practices, particularly the use of bailiffs by local government? The noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, raised this.
Clause 35 deals with successor accounts to Help to Save and inserts a new clause into the Savings (Government Contributions) Act 2017. This will provide regulation-making powers in respect of orphan funds or where no instructions have been provided to the director of savings. Although the Government sensibly propose to take powers for this eventuality, there are currently no plans to implement them. Why not? What circumstances would trigger action? We can return to this in Committee.
My other area of interest is in repealing the Victorian bills of sale legislation, which permits an egregious area of high-cost credit to continue and flourish. For those who are not aware of them, bills of sale are a way that individuals can use goods they already own as security for loans while retaining possession of them. The use of bills of sale has grown from fewer than 3,000 in 2001 to more than 30,000 in 2016. The numbers have dropped recently, but are probably in the order of 15,000 a year. They are mainly used for what are called “logbook loans”, where a borrower grants security over their vehicle. Borrowers may continue to use their vehicle while they keep up the repayments but, if they default, the vehicle can be repossessed without the protections that apply to hire purchase transactions and very few consumer credit concerns.
Bills of sale are currently governed by two Victorian statutes, the Bills of Sale Acts of 1878 and 1882. This legislation is archaic and wholly unsuited to the 21st century. In September 2014, HM Treasury asked the Law Commission to review the bills of sale legislation and to make recommendations for reform. A consultation paper was issued and a report was published in September 2016. In February 2017, the Government asked the Law Commission to draft legislation to implement its recommendations. These plans have now been shelved. Lenders and consumer groups agree that the law is in urgent need of reform. The current law creates hardship for borrowers and private purchasers. It imposes unnecessary burdens on lenders and restricts access to finance for unincorporated businesses and high net worth individuals.
The great majority of bills are issued for logbook loans, often taken out by borrowers who have difficulty in accessing other forms of credit. These borrowers are particularly vulnerable to inadequacies in the existing law. To make this clearer: the current APR in a recent advertisement for a car logbook loan was 450%.
The Law Commission says that the statutory form for a bill of sale, as set out in the 1882 Act, confuses borrowers rather than helps them to understand the consequences. The bills of sale Act provides only minimal protection to borrowers, and their goods can be repossessed if they default. The FCA has rules about this and logbook lenders must have policies to deal with default, but lenders differ radically in their approach to repossession. There have been complaints that some lenders use threats of repossession to demand unreasonable and unaffordable sums.
This is an area that should be cleaned up. Action should be taken. A simple way would be simply to repeal the Acts that I have mentioned and I will bring forward amendments in Committee to do that.
The Earl of Shrewsbury (Con)
My Lords, I, too, congratulate my noble friend Lord Hammond of Runnymede on an excellent maiden speech. I refer noble Lords to my entry in the register.
The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, which came into force on 1 January this year, is a free-trade agreement that does not facilitate the same access to the EU single market, for the UK’s financial services, as that which was available pre-Brexit. The EU passporting regime is founded on a 20-year history and there are nine different passports that cover financial services, from core banking services such as lending and deposit taking, through to asset management and more. Each passport is embedded in a particular EU directive or regulation, establishing the basic rules for that activity.
Your Lordships will be fully aware that, from 1 January, the passporting regime was no longer available to UK-based financial services firms. Consequently, the extent to which UK firms can continue to provide services to customers in the EEA or EU will depend on local law and local regulators’ expectations or a grant of equivalence from the European Commission. Conversely, EEA-based firms must now either have a UK-based operation, be able to rely on an exemption or exclusion or be acting in accordance with one of the UK’s temporary regimes in order to undertake regulated activity in the UK.
The removal of the passporting regime, together with the uncertainty duly generated, has resulted in financial firms operating in the UK relocating around 7,500 employees and more than £1.2 trillion-worth of assets from the UK to the EU. Over 40 financial firms have announced plans to make local hires for existing or newly created roles in Europe, equating to over 2,850 additional new jobs. There are alternatives to passporting, but they are complex and I do not have sufficient time available today to visit them in this debate. The European Commission can grant equivalence to a third country if it seems that the laws of that country have the same intention and produce more or less the same outcomes as the laws of the EU. However, the Commission can also unilaterally withdraw equivalence, should the situation change, within 30 days. It is my understanding that, in order to prevent the Commission from withdrawing equivalence at short notice on the grounds that the UK rules diverge materially from those of the EU, the UK is seeking a form of enhanced equivalence whereby both parties would regularly update each other on new regulations. Given that financial services were specifically excluded from the TCA, what efforts are the Government making to ensure that passporting rights—and, in the absence of those, equivalence rights—and access to the EU for the UK financial services industry are secured? Further, depending on the outcome of the discussions between the UK and the EU regarding equivalence, what additional measures are the Government proposing to take to support the UK financial services industry and reinforce its competitive advantage?
I am aware that the sector has a number of specific concerns, which include the temporary permissions regime and the capital markets union, with further concerns held by the UK funds industry and the UK insurance industry. My understanding is that, in November last, my right honourable friend the Chancellor announced that the UK proposed to recognise the equivalent status of EU financial services laws in a number of key areas, including those that I have just mentioned. By granting equivalence to EEA-member states in three of those areas, the UK acknowledged that insurers and reinsurers, established in the EEA, have the same capital and governance requirements as UK firms. This gesture of good will from the Government has, I believe, not yet been reciprocated by the European Commission, which has yet to take any action whatsoever towards granting similar rights. Are we surprised? Nothing changes.
This is a complex and substantial Bill, which aims to improve the UK regulatory framework for financial services following the end of the Brexit transition period and I support it. Doubtless it will receive much scrutiny during the stages to come, but we must remember that the other place gave it its support and we, too, should give it a fair wind.
Baroness Shafik (CB) (Maiden Speech) [V]
My Lords, it is a great honour to make my maiden speech today and I begin by thanking your Lordships and the staff of the House, who have been so welcoming. I am particularly grateful to my sponsors: the noble Lord, Lord O’Donnell—Gus O’Donnell—who was both my mentor and manager in the Civil Service, and the noble Lord, Lord Stern—Nick Stern—who was my teacher and is now my colleague at the London School of Economics and Political Science. It has been a strange time to join this great House, but my induction has proceeded very capably through digital means and I thank Black Rod, the Garter and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, for their guidance.
I was born in Alexandria in Egypt, although my connection to the UK began with my grandfather, who came on a scholarship to do his undergraduate and doctorate degrees at Imperial College in the 1920s. My father was born and raised in Notting Hill, before it was fashionable, and the family eventually returned to Egypt, where my grandfather retained a love of croquet and lawn bowling well into his 90s. My maternal grandfather studied in France and my mother was sent to a French Catholic school by her forward-thinking Muslim mother, who believed that everyone should learn about other people’s religions. I wish that they could all be here today.
My family’s prospects changed radically with the nationalisations in Egypt in the 1960s, when we lost most of our property and went from being well-off to being immigrants in the United States, where my father had studied. For my father, who had a PhD in Chemistry and little else, education was the only path to success. His mantra was, “They can take everything away from you except your education.” Those experiences —seeing how people’s fortunes could rise and fall because of economic shocks and the importance of education for social mobility—instilled in me a deep curiosity about the architecture of opportunity in a society. That curiosity led me to a career in economics that spanned the World Bank, the UK Department for International Development, the International Monetary Fund, the Bank of England and the London School of Economics.
While I spent 18 years in universities, most of my career has been in the trenches of policy-making in some of the poorest countries in the world and some of the richest. I have worked with politicians from across the political spectrum. In the UK I was a permanent secretary under both the Labour Government and the coalition between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats. In my years at the World Bank, DfID and the IMF, I travelled to over 100 countries, working with politicians of every imaginable political stripe. I saw clearly the benefits of sharing experience across countries.
I have had jobs that are primarily about making good things happen—lifting people out of poverty at the World Bank and DfID and spreading education at LSE. I have also had jobs that are primarily about preventing bad things from happening—fighting international financial crises at the IMF and maintaining monetary and financial stability at the Bank of England. Making good things happen is often more fun and one’s colleagues tend to be more optimistic. Organisations that prevent bad things tend to be populated by people whose job is to worry and look for risks, but their work is vital because, as the pandemic has shown us, bad events can swiftly destroy decades of progress.
These experiences are why I have chosen the Financial Services Bill for my maiden speech. It is first and foremost intended to prevent bad things from happening, as well as to create opportunities for new good things. It is the first important step in defining a distinct UK regulatory framework after leaving the EU and restoring the regulatory philosophy embedded in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, with improvements based on the lessons from the 2008 financial crisis. That philosophy is based on legislation setting out the policy objectives and operationally independent expert regulators translating that into technical regulation and supervision.
It is reassuring that the Government remain committed to the highest standards of regulation to avoid future bad events. Robust standards are essential for the stability and fairness which make our financial markets attractive to global investors and ensure consumers are protected. Chasing competitive advantage through lower regulatory standards and financial services is a chimera.
At the IMF, we used to describe the UK’s financial sector as a global public good because of its systemic importance to the world economy. The success of the UK’s regulatory framework has far-reaching consequences, and maintaining active engagement in global standard-setting, such as through the Basel Committee and the Financial Stability Board, is the best way of remaining the most global financial centre in the world. For example, when I was at the Bank of England it worked with central banks around the world to shape the first global standard for the foreign exchange market—the largest financial market in the world with a turnover of $6.6 trillion every day, over 40% of which occurs in London.
There is a huge opportunity, as many noble Lords have said today, for the UK to set global standards on green finance, from mandatory disclosure and the development of green investment products to defining regulatory approaches to climate-related stress-testing, which will be done for the first time this year. The return of full independence in setting the regulatory framework for financial services to the UK also provides an opportunity to rethink the framework for accountability and scrutiny in a system that relies heavily on experts. I have to confess, I like experts. I know Members of this House fall comfortably into that category, and the expertise in this House adds enormous value to the legislative process. But as the noble Lord, Lord King, has said, experts must resist the pressure for an illusion of certainty. It is best to listen to many views and subject expert judgment to challenge.
I hope that I can add my voice to the well-informed and lively debates in this House and bring an especially global perspective to our deliberations. Hopefully, we can prevent many bad things happening as well as enable many good things to progress. I look forward to working with all of your Lordships in the future.
Lord Butler of Brockwell (CB) [V]
My Lords, it is a privilege to be the first to congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Shafik, on her charming and hugely impressive maiden speech. This debate shows the House is fortunate to have the addition of not one but two real heavyweights to our number. I am sure I speak for the whole House when I welcome the noble Baroness and say that we look forward to her continuing to contribute her extensive expertise and experience—national and international—to the work of our House.
This is a large Bill and, in view of the significance of the financial services sector in the UK, a very important one. I declare my interests as set out in the register and as a former member of your Lordships’ EU Financial Affairs Sub-Committee—one who worked under the splendid leadership of the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner of Margravine.
Like the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, I want to direct my remarks to the part of the Bill relating to the regulation of investment firms, in particular, the EU markets in financial instruments directive, popularly known as MiFID. The current directive, MiFID II, came into force in the United Kingdom on 3 January 2018. Its provisions have been widely criticised, not only in the UK but throughout the EU, as excessively burdensome and not sufficiently distinguishing between market operators on grounds of size or function. Now the UK is responsible for its own regulation, which is welcome, but using the powers to be conferred by this Bill the Financial Conduct Authority will be able to introduce a more tailored approach under the title of an “investment firms prudential regime”. It is also welcome that the FCA has already circulated a discussion paper inviting comments on its approach.
One area in which MiFID II produced unforeseen adverse consequences—at least, unforeseen by its proponents, for it was foreseen by others—was the treatment of investment houses’ research costs. It was an aim of MiFID II to prevent the financing of research services from trading commissions, because it was believed that this would remove an incentive to unnecessary churning of investments as a means of providing funds for research. This was a laudable objective, but it was predicted during consultation on the directive that a complete ban on the commission-sharing regime would cause fund managers to cut their spending on research and benefit competitors outside the EU, who were not subject to similar restriction. It would also discourage new businesses seeking to establish themselves in the market. This has, indeed, been the result.
An alternative suggestion was that the aim of greater transparency could be achieved by disclosing to clients in advance fixed, budgeted amounts for research. This was adopted in MiFID but not considered sufficient in itself; further onerous reporting was required. This is but one example of the competitive burdens imposed by MiFID II. It is to be hoped that they will be mitigated in the UK’s new investment firms prudential regime, so as to combine transparency about costs with removing disadvantages suffered by UK firms in comparison with competitors in the United States and the Far East.
The FCA’s consultation on the new regime coincides with two other developments that are currently under way. One is the discussions being conducted with the EU, and due to be completed by April, about a new framework for equivalence between the UK and EU following Brexit. The second is that, like the UK, the EU is itself reviewing and preparing modifications to its regulatory regimes, covering not only MiFID but other matters covered by the Bill, such as the capital requirements directive implementing Basel III and the anti-money laundering directive. The UK’s discussions with the EU about equivalence are taking place on ground that is shifting beneath our feet. Such developments in regulation in the UK and the EU will, and inevitably should, continue as financial markets continue to develop.
If anything were needed to persuade both sides in the present UK-EU negotiations that it is in our mutual interest to work in close consultation with each other, it is a report last week that in the absence of UK trading platforms for derivatives being given EU market access, business in euro-denominated interest rate swaps fell sharply in London during the first fortnight in January. At the same time, it has doubled not in the EU financial hubs, where it also fell, but in New York. It is to be hoped that the EU can be persuaded that a restrictive approach to the UK is contrary to not only the UK’s interests but its own.
The United Kingdom has long been a leader in international financial regulation, as shown by our pivotal role in the 2007 financial crisis and its aftermath. We must see to it that this Bill and its implementation continues to allow that leadership, not only in the UK’s interests but, as the noble Baroness, Lady Shafik, said, in the world’s.
Lord Hendy (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I add my congratulations to the noble Lord, Lord Hammond of Runnymede, and the noble Baroness, Lady Shafik, on their excellent maiden speeches. I agree with my noble friend Lord Sikka and other noble Lords who have pointed out that the Bill does not go far enough to secure proper governance, financial integrity and measures against corruption. The current state of the law is a blot on the finance industry in the United Kingdom, which has seen outrageous criminal conduct on a massive scale go unpunished and sometimes uninvestigated. I am speaking of money laundering, fraud, false accounting and the like. I have in mind the collapse of BCCI, the Libor scandal, HSBC’s money laundering and other cases referred to by noble Lords. The case for a public inquiry into the finance industry is now incontrovertible.
A particular problem has been the current state of UK corporate liability law, the “directing mind” test, which effectively puts large companies and financial institutions beyond the reach of criminal prosecutors for many economic crimes other than bribery and tax evasion. The charities Finance Innovation Lab and Spotlight on Corruption have highlighted this in briefings, and I am grateful for their elucidation of the problem and their proposed solution.
This is a rule of law issue. An amendment to the Bill is needed to make it a criminal offence to facilitate an economic crime or to fail to take reasonable, necessary steps to prevent an economic crime. Individuals should be personally liable, and so should corporate entities in a sufficient relationship with a guilty individual to found vicarious liability under the ordinary principles of the common law. This would be a straightforward yet vital step to bring fraud, money laundering and false accounting into line with bribery and tax evasion. It would bring the UK into line with equivalent laws which exist and are used, sometimes with spectacular results, in the United States and the EU. Given the well-reported increase in fraud cases during the current pandemic, this is an urgent matter.
By the same token, since Brexit and the failure to secure any deal in relation to financial services, the need to restore the reputation of the finance industry and highlight its effective regulation by passing such an amendment is particularly pressing. It is understood that the Law Commission is currently reviewing corporate crime, but this Bill presents an unmissable opportunity now to create such an offence, and I hope the Minister will be able to tell us an amendment on these lines will be introduced.
Lord Oates (LD)
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Hammond of Runnymede, and the noble Baroness, Lady Shafik, on their excellent maiden speeches. I look forward to the important contributions they will both undoubtedly make to the House.
On Monday 9 November last, the Chancellor made a Statement to the House of Commons in which he set out the Government’s vision for financial services. He pledged, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, reminded us, to put
“the full weight of private sector innovation … behind the critical global effort to tackle climate change and protect the environment.”—[Official Report, Commons, 9/11/20; col. 621.]
Just two hours later, his colleague, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, John Glen, got to his feet to introduce the Second Reading of this Bill. In his opening speech, which lasted over 25 minutes, he did not refer to the climate and ecological emergency once. He made no mention of green finance, climate risk disclosure or the critical role the financial services industry will have to play if we are seriously to tackle climate change.
The omission of any reference to climate change, replicated by the Minister this afternoon, was not the result of an oversight on the Economic Secretary’s part. Far from it; it was simply a logical consequence of the fact that the Bill does absolutely nothing to address the climate emergency we face. The Economic Secretary had a number of answers for this failure when he got around to the matter in Committee. First, he argued that these issues were not relevant for discussion, as they were not directly related to the Bill—a strange and circular argument, as their absence from the Bill was precisely the complaint he was addressing. Secondly, he argued that the regulators were making progress on climate-related issues and we should let them get on with it. Finally, he said:
“The Bill grants the Treasury a power to specify further matters in the accountability framework at a later date, which could be used to add a requirement to explicitly have regard to green issues in the prudential framework, if appropriate … I can assure the Committee that the Treasury will carefully consider a green ‘have regard’ in the future.”—[Official Report, Commons, 24/11/20; col. 157.]
Essentially, he was telling Parliament, “It’s not for you to worry your little heads about these things, and to ensure that you don’t have to, the Bill will take the powers away from Parliament in this regard and vest them in the Treasury and the regulators, who know best.”
We on the Liberal Democrat Benches do not think that they know best. History does not cause us to put much faith in the willingness of the Treasury, or of unaccountable regulators, to act. Nor does it give us any faith in their ability to determine the appropriateness, or otherwise, of action on such critical matters for our planet. We agree with the Chancellor that financial services have a key role to play in tackling climate change, but we believe that it is for Parliament to determine that role. Accordingly, we will bring amendments forward in Committee to ensure that the Bill does exactly that. They will do this, first, by requiring the Prudential Regulation Authority to have regard to climate-related financial risk when setting capital adequacy requirements and, secondly, by ensuring that credit-rating agencies have to take climate risk into account in setting credit ratings. Thirdly, they would bring forward the date when the recommendations of the task force on climate-related disclosure will be mandatory from 2025 to 2023.
We will also seek amendments to ensure that, in setting general rules, the FCA has regard to the climate-related financial risks to which FCA investment firms are exposed and that the FCA, in setting Part 9C rules, and the PRA, in setting capital requirement regulation rules, have regard to the UK’s domestic and international climate obligations. I look forward to working on these issues with the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, and other members of Peers for the Planet, the excellent organisation which she chairs.
I welcome the lead that the Government have taken in setting the net-zero target. I applaud the Treasury for moving on the TCFD recommendations, so far as they have gone, and for their positive words on green finance. However, the awful truth is that action in every respect of our response to the climate emergency is glacially and catastrophically slow. We are way off line to meet the Climate Change Act’s original 80% reduction target, let alone the revised net-zero one. There is a time when the talk of distant targets for which none of us will be held accountable has to end and the activity and action to meet them has to start. That time is now. The climate crisis is not something that might happen in some distant future if we do not get our act together. It is happening right now. Just ask those on the front line of the crisis; ask the people of the small island states who live with the prospect of being literally wiped off the map. Ask the farmers facing ever more erratic weather patterns and deteriorating soil conditions in Africa or South Asia. Ask householders in the UK who are becoming ever more susceptible to flood risk; ask the firefighters in California or New South Wales.
As we speak, the world is on course for three degrees of warming. The devastation that would cause is beyond contemplation. We know the threat that we face, and what we have to do to mitigate it, but that does not guarantee that we will do it. A global pandemic was number one on the Cabinet Office’s risk register. We knew it would happen one day, yet it seemed so far off that, when it suddenly arrived, we met it almost completely unprepared. We cannot afford to do the same with climate change. So I urge the Government to use this Bill to start, however modestly, to match their fine rhetoric with action and to ensure that the financial services industry is able to play its full part in combating climate change.
Lord Jopling (Con) [V]
My Lords, I begin by drawing attention to my interests in the register. The House has heard two outstanding maiden speeches today. I doubt the House of Lords has seen the introduction of two individuals with such extraordinarily wide qualifications for many years, and we certainly welcome them very much.
The Government have told us that one objective of the Bill concerning financial services is to promote openness between the United Kingdom and internal markets. Obviously that is a laudable notion, which is important to the UK because our financial services are in many ways the golden nugget of the UK economy. I want to ask the Minister to give us an assessment of how such an aim is achievable and to report on progress over the past few years, and particularly recently, on achieving that greater openness. To what extent since Brexit are other countries also showing preparedness to negotiate towards that goal?
For a start, I cannot imagine that the European Union will resist the temptation to shift some of the pre-eminence of the City of London to Paris and Frankfurt. That point was made by the noble Lord, Lord Reid, and my noble friend Lord Bridges. So far as the EU is concerned, it will be a case of holding on to what we have got and trying to avoid the power of the City and British financial services ebbing away to the continent. However, that is not the main point that I want to raise.
I am concerned at the prospect of opening up the financial markets between the United Kingdom, the United States and others. Some years ago, when the European Union was negotiating the TTIP agreement with the United States, I went on a Select Committee visit to Washington as part of our inquiry into the progress of the TTIP negotiations. Of course, reflecting on the strength of the City and the United Kingdom’s powerful financial services sector, one of Britain’s main aims, while we were still members of the EU, was to enhance the prospects of the pre-eminence of the City within those negotiations with the United States. Indeed, one of our principal aims was to open up the financial sector between the US and the EU, as it was then. Now, after Brexit, that must obviously continue to be a major aim of the UK but all of us who went on that delegation to Washington, some years ago now, were seriously shocked, when meeting the United States Treasury at that time, to be told in the firmest possible way that there was no way at all that the United States was prepared to open up the financial services sector within the confines of the TTIP negotiations. In strident, almost offensive terms, we were told to forget it.
That is very concerning for the future. I have heard no evidence since then that the attitude of the United States has softened so far as financial services are concerned. I have two questions to the Minister, which I hope he will refer to in his wind-up; if he cannot do so, perhaps he will be good enough to write to me. First, has there been any softening in the attitude of the United States to protect its financial services sector and open it up to the UK or others? Secondly, does he see any prospect of fulfilling the Government’s aim of opening up these markets, especially within the United States?
Lord Rooker (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I pay a real and sincere tribute to the two maiden speakers, the noble Lord, Lord Hammond of Runnymede, and the noble Baroness, Lady Shafik. I found their speeches really useful and interesting, and they will make major contributions to the House in the future.
I shall be brief but I want to say a few words about three items. The first concerns Clause 34, on the debt respite scheme. This is much welcomed and we can leave the detail for Committee. It was useful to hear the Minister confirm that priority debts include council tax arrears, energy arrears and benefit overpayments—in other words, broadly speaking, public sector government debts.
Such debts can be a nightmare for people and get worse when, with the best of intentions, attempts are made to repay and are then frustrated because the odd creditor or two believes that more should be repaid quicker. I certainly had experience of that when I advised constituents in the 1970s and 1980s. I got their debt sorted out, but then either a creditor that I did not know about or one of the existing creditors decided that they wanted to speed things up. The Money Advice Trust has provided a really useful and supportive brief on Clause 34.
We now have Covid in play, which, by common consent, has affected poorer families financially more than others, besides the million self-employed people who have not received any help from the Government, many of whom will have taken on debts. Will such debts be covered by Clause 34?
An affordable timeframe is the one element that can give people hope, so this clause is a very big incentive for people to enter into agreements to repay debts in full and not simply ignore them, letting them build up and hoping that something will turn up. It can prevent an escalation of the problem, which of course is a worse nightmare. The key, according to the Money Advice Trust, is the timetable. The mental pressure on people with debts is enormous. Having a timetable which is affordable is key. My question is whether this is a priority for the Treasury, as it is needed as soon as possible.
Secondly, I would like to touch on the issue of economic crime. The Bill—I wrote my speech before my noble friend Lord Reid spoke—appears to be a parliamentary Christmas tree, on which we can hang new bits of legislation. The one I would cite is that regarding the prevention of economic crime. Spotlight on Corruption has made it clear that there is problem. The rules for holding large companies and financial institutions to account for economic crime are unfair and ineffective, and they undermine good corporate governance.
Prosecutors have requested that laws on fraud, false accounting and money laundering be strengthened in line with the laws on bribery and tax evasion. The Commons Treasury Select Committee is in favour of that, and over 70% of those responding to a consultation —last year, I think, or the year before—said that current rules inhibit holding companies to account. It is also in line with previous Conservative Party manifestos, and I am sure, although I have not gone back to check the text today, that it is consistent with the seminal speech that David Cameron made on the issue. I will leave it there, as it is a detail for Committee.
In a way, my final point follows what the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans said. I have never favoured Gibraltar becoming a brass-plate economy. It is true that we more or less passed it over to Spain after Brexit, so it might well now be a bigger income generator. I have no interest to declare—I had two private holidays there in 1977 and 1979 as a gesture of solidarity when the Spanish closed the border—but the fact is that there are some serious issues to debate given the amount of the Bill that relates to Gibraltar and the fact that it is becoming a bigger brass-plate economy than it has been in the past. This will need further exploration in Committee.
Viscount Trenchard (Con)
My Lords, I declare my interests as stated in the register. I too congratulate my noble friend Lord Hammond of Runnymede on his excellent and entertaining maiden speech, and the noble Baroness, Lady Shafik, on her most inspirational one. I thank my noble friend the Minister for introducing this important Bill, which will help to ensure that the City of London remains the pre-eminent global financial centre. For more than 100 years the City has rightly enjoyed a reputation as the safest centre in the world in which to conduct financial business, and the old maxim “My word is my bond” continues to reflect the high level of trust accorded to financial firms operating in this country.
Many commentators have lamented the fact that the financial services chapters of the trade and co-operation agreement with the EU are thin. This partly reflects the fact that the EU’s single market in financial services is only partially developed, although in recent years the European Commission has made progress in its drive to harmonise financial regulation across the bloc.
We have certainly influenced the development and formulation of this regulation, but we have had to work within the EU’s Napoleonic-style framework. We therefore have cumbersome and bureaucratic rulebooks, which explains why the fastest-growing departments of banks and other regulated companies have been compliance and legal departments, rather than those devoted to innovation and the development of new products, and those that actually conduct business and earn revenues.
Sometimes we have been overruled by excessively cautious Commission technocrats and by the European regulators, especially since the pendulum swung too far towards tighter regulation after the financial markets crash of 2008. I shall give just two examples of this: first, the whole of the AIFMD, which is disproportionate and expensive for many smaller asset management companies, driving some offshore and forcing others to merge or discontinue operations. The second example is Solvency II, which prescribes excessive capital requirements for UK insurers. The Treasury has said that it intends to change the rules to make them less prescriptive and less complex, and to increase the ability of regulators to apply supervisory judgment. Can the Minister confirm that this Bill will enable that to happen?
Miles Celic, of TheCityUK, told the EU Services Sub-Committee, on which I am privileged to serve under the excellent chairmanship of the noble Baroness, Lady Donaghy, that negotiations on post-Brexit financial services arrangements are being driven by political concerns rather than regulatory or legal issues, and that equivalence is becoming increasingly politicised. Does the Minister expect that the MoU will be completed by the end of March, and does he expect the EU to have made any further equivalence assessments by that time?
I am not surprised that the EU is unwilling to grant equivalence decisions in many areas, because we have rightly made it clear that we intend to diverge from the EU model. I would encourage the Government to be bold and to develop a plan to move in an orderly manner to a completely different regulatory system, based on principles rather than prescriptive statutory regulations.
I was privileged to serve on the Joint Committee on Financial Services and Markets, chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Burns, in 1999. We had much discussion on whether the FSA should have a competitiveness objective. It was ultimately decided that the need to minimise adverse effects on competition should be supported merely by a principle, listed fifth out of five. The PRA today has a secondary competition objective, which is subordinate to its two primary objectives—to promote the safety and soundness of the firms it regulates, and to protect holders of insurance policies.
The FCA has been charged, since 2015, as the third of three operational objectives, with the promotion of effective competition in the interests of consumers. Does my noble friend think that the promotion of competitiveness of financial markets is too low down the priority list? Ultimately, as Adam Smith argued, the invisible hand of competition, and the eradication of anti-competitive behaviour, will surely accord with consumers’ best interests.
The Treasury’s phase 2 consultation paper on the future regulatory framework review suggests that the Government are responding positively to powerful evidence from the coalface, but I question any acceptance of the argument that an excessive concern for competitiveness contributed to the financial crisis. I believe that both regulators should have a clear, unqualified objective to promote the international competitiveness of financial markets. This should be an important part of the Government’s agenda for global Britain. The Minister told your Lordships that the Bill has three objectives, but none of them is competitiveness. Does he not agree that the Bill’s second objective, which is described as
“openness between the UK and international markets”,
should be “the competitiveness of the UK’s international markets”? My noble friend Lord Hill of Oareford’s review of the Stock Exchange’s listing rules should also help in this regard.
Clause 36 is especially welcome in handing the damaging PRIIPs regulation and the troublesome KIDs to the regulators. They should also deal with the corresponding parts of MiFID II. I greatly welcome the direction of travel of the future regulatory framework. It is, however, necessary to make arrangements for the proper accountability to Parliament of the regulators before they start to exercise their new powers. Can the Minister tell the House how the Government intend that that should be done? I look forward to other noble Lords’ contributions and to my noble friend’s reply.
Lord Bruce of Bennachie (LD) [V]
My Lords, I join other noble Lords in congratulating both the noble Lord, Lord Hammond, and the noble Baroness, Lady Shafik, on their maiden speeches. The noble Lord, Lord Hammond, showed the insight and intelligence that has characterised his approach to the challenges of the past few years. I particularly welcome the noble Baroness, Lady Shafik, to our House and fondly remember working with her when she was Permanent Secretary at DfID and deputy managing director of IMF and I was chair of the International Development Committee. I look forward to hearing more from her in the future. I am sure her contributions will always be well received.
There is no doubt that as a member of the EU the UK provided the leadership in financial services regulation because of the leading role of the City of London, which was the main capital and euro exchange market for the EU and beyond. But how UK financial services will fare from now is debated. It is argued, I suggest with justification, that the concentration of expertise, innovation and flexibility that characterises UK financial services will ensure that it continues to play a leading role. However, it will be challenging, for how will it maintain its pre-eminence if EU business ebbs away? That means servicing the EU financial services market from the UK and enabling firms and individuals located outside the UK to access its services through the UK.
Scale and expertise have been key factors in the UK’s pre-eminence but, as many people have observed, other centres will seek to pick up business from London, and the scale of New York may enable it to consolidate top spot. I have no doubt that the larger players in the sector will look after themselves, and that will not necessarily be to the benefit of UK plc. It has been said that the feared exit of jobs has not happened on any scale—to which the answer has to be, “Yet”. Without equivalence in key sectors, businesses and jobs will migrate—not that thousands of UK-based personnel will necessarily leave, but jobs that would have been created here will be created in other EU centres, such as Dublin, Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Paris and Malta. It will take time and the key question is, during that time, how will the UK develop to maintain its world-leading role and will the Bill help or hinder that process?
Having served in former times on the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee, and until recently on the House’s Financial Services Sub-Committee, I am well aware of the importance of effective financial regulation and scrutiny. The light-touch approach of the Labour Government contributed directly to the financial crash of 2008 and the blurred separation, or lack of it, between retail and investment banking brought the economy to its knees and threatened the savings of millions. Let us hope that the Bill does not open the door to too light a touch or to cavalier regulation to promote competition and attract business.
Financial regulation is a matter of balance. If it is too tight, it may stifle innovation, but if it is too loose, it may lead to financial disaster and reputational destruction. In the EU, we not only had the benefit of the scrutiny committee of the UK Parliament, but the substantial resources of the European Parliament, in which British MPs played a key role, not least my noble friend Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted. So what assurance can the Minister give that under this Bill regulation will be transparent and subject to effective scrutiny? Will the Government support the creation of a dedicated financial services committee with the resources to staff it effectively? If they do not, any financial failings in future will lie squarely at the Government’s door.
Speaking as I do on Scottish affairs for the Liberal Democrats, I remind the House of the importance of the financial services sector to the economy in Scotland. It is valued at £13 billion—or 9.4% of Scotland’s gross value added—employing between 150,000 and 160,000 people in more than 2,000 businesses. Particularly, it accounts for 24% of UK jobs in life assurance and 13% of all UK banking jobs. While Edinburgh has the greatest concentration, Glasgow, Aberdeen and Perth also record substantial employment in this sector.
Scottish Financial Enterprise, which represents the sector, is bullish about the future, claiming that Scotland is a sought-after location for delivering financial services. Without Brexit, there would certainly seem no reason why the sector should not continue to grow, as much of it delivers cost effectively and reputationally to the domestic market. However, Betsy Williamson, the chief executive specialist recruiter for the sector’s Core-Asset Consulting, says recruitment to the sector has dropped and that key jobs are being relocated or created outside of the UK. Aberdeen Standard has opened an office in Dublin and transferred £17 billion of assets there, and no doubt others are considering or doing the same. Today’s FT shows how many goods-based businesses are struggling with red tape and either deciding to abandon exporting to the EU as uneconomic or planning to transfer some of their activities to the EU.
Financial services are evaluating what is going to happen to them. Some have already moved, and others will. If we get this wrong, the trickle could become a flood. So even if you were bullish about the UK’s prospects, we are going to have to run harder to replace the revenue and jobs that are leaving and then try to grow new opportunities. Will there be enough scope for new businesses to replace these jobs and then add net growth? Will this Bill help or hinder? Will our regulation be lighter or tighter than the EU? Either way, will it be transparent enough and subject to adequate scrutiny to maintain resilience and confidence in the system? A lot is riding on this Bill. When people say it is technical, they mean that most people do not understand it, and that is exactly when things can go wrong.
Baroness Altmann (Con) [V]
My Lords, first I congratulate my noble friend Lord Hammond of Runnymede on his brilliant maiden speech. I look forward very much to his future contributions to our debates. I am delighted that he has joined us and can bring us his tremendous expertise as a brilliant addition to your Lordships’ House—as indeed is the noble Baroness, Lady Shafik. I would also like to welcome her, particularly as a colleague from the London School of Economics, where I am currently visiting professor in practice and emeritus governor. We have been privileged to hear two such excellent maiden speeches this afternoon.
Like so many others, I warmly welcome the trade and co-operation agreement reached for goods a few weeks ago as we left the transition period. But this Bill is of significant importance for our economy, as no deal was agreed for financial services—which accounts for such a significant part of our economy. I appreciate the Government’s stated intention to secure a memorandum of understanding on financial services with the EU by, I believe, March 2021, and I ask my noble friend how this is progressing. Have any decisions been reached about areas in which it will be considered appropriate to retain regulatory alignment? What negotiations are ongoing with stakeholders in connection with this? I also believe that the Treasury has recently launched a review of Solvency II, so I ask my noble friend when this review and the wider review of financial services will publish findings and conclusions.
I am particularly interested in the potential for reforms of Solvency II rules, which could pose an attractive opportunity for UK firms which provide long-term savings, investment products and insurances to free them from the straitjacket imposed by Solvency II. It was always rather less appropriate for UK firms than for those on the continent, which has a much more bond-oriented traditional financial culture, rather than the UK approach, which has always more readily embraced and understood the benefits of equity investment, early stage in venture capital firms, and other diversified asset classes with higher expected return potential, and can have greater impact on supporting or boosting economic growth.
Freeing these financial firms to invest more in green assets, infrastructure and low-carbon housing projects will help, as we are aiming to move towards a net-zero economy. I support the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Cousins, and the noble Lord, Lord Reid, that financial services regulations and risk assessments should take account of environmental risks and means of mitigation.
Clearly, the Treasury would like to move towards a more principles-based approach from a rules-based approach. But, as other noble Lords have said, this opens many new challenges and risks. Could my noble friend, in support of the words of my noble friend Lord Sharpe, say what analysis has been done to assess whether our regulators are equipped to cope with the significant transfer of power this Bill’s measures would involve?
My noble friend, in his excellent introduction to this Bill, stated that the Government believe that regulators have the technical expertise and market understanding necessary to exercise the new powers and will be guided by the FSMA financial objectives. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, explained the serious shortcomings of the FSMA, and I share her concerns.
In addition, it has long seemed to me that the FCA has either insufficient powers or insufficient capacity to protect consumers against poor practice and products or services that have too often proved damaging to customers, who find themselves without protection and, in certain cases, without recourse to compensation. I urge the Government, for the future of financial services and consumer confidence in this industry, to require greater emphasis on proactive regulation, which anticipates problems, rather than try to clear up failures after the event.
Could my noble friend explain to the House whether he believes regulators will have enhanced accountability to Parliament, as called for by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, and others? To what extent does he believe they will have greater scrutiny to help legislators to assess whether financial services operate as safely as possible?
Of course, the aims of supporting financial providers, financial stability or firm competitiveness are important, as set out in this Bill. However, I have particular concerns about consumer protection, which is so directly important to ordinary individuals and families across the population. I echo the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, that we should take the opportunity to help those stuck with unmanageable debt, particularly in light of the Covid pandemic. I support the debt respite scheme rollout and continuation, as well as calls for this Bill to include measures that will impose far more effective controls on high-cost credit promotions. I was interested in the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, about bills of sale. I also support the aims of the help to save initiative.
Finally, I add my voice to those calling for much greater emphasis on green issues in financial services regulation and for proper parliamentary scrutiny of this critical issue to protect our planet and mitigate the impacts of climate change.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Hammond of Runnymede and the noble Baroness, Lady Shafik, on their excellent maiden speeches. I look forward to their future contributions in your Lordships’ House.
For the last nine years, I have largely sat on the sidelines on financial services legislation, as I was on the board of a major bank. Now liberated from that, I am enjoying putting my financial services legislation anorak back on. I remind the House of my financial interests, as declared in the register.
The Government have described this Bill as a portfolio Bill, which is a fancy name for what is not much more than a motley collection of topics that have little in common apart from fitting under a financial services umbrella. This Bill certainly gives us no strategic insights into the future of financial services. That said, I broadly welcome this Bill, as it deals with a number of items in a sensible, pragmatic way.
Financial services legislation is very complex. Since FiSMA was enacted over 20 years ago, there have been numerous revisions, some of which, such as the Financial Services Act 2012, were significant. Huge amounts of EU law have been imported and we can expect more changes as we embark upon our post-Brexit life. We are getting close to consolidation being essential if our financial services legislation is to be accessible. Can the Minister say whether the Government accept the need for consolidation?
My principal reservation about this Bill concerns the considerable new rule-making powers that are being conferred on the PRA and the FCA, and I agree with much of what other noble Lords have already said on this. I find it a bit odd that the Government have chosen to go down this route ahead of the outcome of the consultation on the future regulatory framework review, which is still open. This looks like another example of the Treasury mind being closed to challenge through consultation. We are somewhat used to this, but familiarity does not make it acceptable.
More substantively, the Government have made a good case for the rules to be set by the people with the best technical knowledge, but they have not, I am afraid, made a case for the quality or quantity of accountability alongside that. In particular, I am unpersuaded that adding a list of “have regards” against which the PRA or FCA must report when they consult on rules amounts to a significant addition to the accountability framework. The House will know that I have been steadfast in my commitment to our exit from the EU, but it was never my understanding that taking back control of our laws would mean less parliamentary control and oversight than before. The Bill proposes to hand significant rule-making powers to the PRA and the FCA without any noticeable Parliamentary oversight. Ad hoc scrutiny through the existing committees in both Houses is no substitute for regular and structured parliamentary involvement. I hope that the Government will engage with those of us who want to find a practical solution to this accountability deficit.
Before leaving this topic, I would say that we need to look carefully at the new “have regards” when we get to Committee. I share the exciting vision of the future prospects for financial services that my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer outlined in his November statement, but I do not see that fully reflected in the Bill. Like many noble Lords who have spoken today, I believe that international competitiveness needs to be firmly embedded into our regulatory arrangements and the statutes that govern that. I particularly welcome my noble friend Lord Hammond’s enthusiasm for this, which goes a long way, I have to say, towards offsetting his lack of enthusiasm for Brexit in his former life.
Finally, on tough legacy contracts that use Libor, I completely support the powers in Clauses 14 and 15 that allow the FCA to make arrangements for legacy contracts. It is good that the Government have accepted the very real practical issues involved in dealing with a relatively small number of debt instruments. There are, however, two outstanding issues relating to continuity of contract and safe harbour. I know the Treasury is well aware of these issues. I will save arguing the detail of them until we get to Committee, but I expect to table amendments aimed at giving the UK equivalent protections to those being drafted for the US market.
Financial services are a major part of our economy and we must allow this sector to flourish now that we are unshackled from the EU. Strong regulation will remain essential but we need all players, regulators and industry alike, to build the UK as the undisputed leading global financial centre. I hope that the House will remember that as we scrutinise the Bill through its remaining stages.
Baroness Sheehan (LD) [V]
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Hammond, and the noble Baroness, Lady Shafik, on two of the most enjoyable maiden speeches that I have heard. I look forward to their future contributions in the House.
My contribution to today’s debate will very much reflect the views of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, my noble friend Lord Oates and a couple of other noble Lords who have mentioned climate change. Just yesterday we heard of an ingenious global survey carried out by a UN agency, the UNDP, to gauge opinion from around the world on climate change. The findings were really quite fascinating. The first thing to note is that by placing polls in mobile gaming networks the UNDP was able to get over 500,000 youngsters under 18 to take part. They are the ones who will have to live with the consequences of our action—or indeed inaction—today, and therefore their voices and opinions must be heard, especially by us here in the UK, who, at this crucial juncture of make-or-break climate policy, hold the leadership of the biggest opportunity, in COP 26, to steer the global tanker towards a clearer, greener horizon.
In this biggest-ever climate poll, almost two-thirds of the over 1.2 million people surveyed worldwide said that climate change is a global emergency and urged our leaders to greater action to address the crisis in all sectors. For instance, in eight of the 10 surveyed countries with the highest emissions from the power sector, the majority backed more renewable energy; in four of the five countries with the highest emissions from land use change, the majority supported conserving forests and land; and nine out of 10 of the countries with the most urbanised populations backed more use of clean electric cars and buses and bicycles.
Britain, as it reshapes its investment and legislative landscape post Brexit, in the same year in which it hosts the seminal COP 26 climate summit, must embrace its mantle of climate leadership. Therefore every Act of Parliament dated 2021 must acknowledge somewhere within its makeup that we recognise the importance of our actions today for the generations that will follow us. Environmental, social and governance—ESG— considerations must be pervasive through all Bills, especially the one that underpins our economic and financial well-being and stability and which will define the big future investment decisions that will affect us all for decades to come.
The sad fact is that, despite an ever-increasing number of commitments from banks and other financial sector actors to align their activities with the Paris agreement, recent research has found that, for example, lending to fossil-fuel-linked investments by 35 of the biggest global banks continues to rise: $736 billion in 2019, up from $700 billion the year before. The movement is in the wrong direction.
Part of the reason why financial institutions are not moving fast enough to help to prevent catastrophic climate change is that regulators and policy-making departments do not sufficiently consider climate and environmental impacts. For example, in the Treasury’s impact assessment for the Bill before us today, greenhouse gas impacts are listed as “not applicable” even though significant changes to how investment funds behave, the centrepiece of the Bill, are bound to have such impacts. That is unacceptable.
I will be lending my support to amendments working towards ensuring that regulations and financial sector policy-makers take climate change, our natural capital and the UK’s international commitments on these issues into account when setting regulations and making policy. Of course a stronger indication of government policy intent towards meeting their net-zero target would be the imposition of a green capital requirement, a move that I would welcome, as I would a requirement for the Government to review the impact of the Bill on meeting the Paris agreement commitments. I look forward to seeing those amendments.
Lord Garnier (Con) (V)
My Lords, this is a lengthy Bill, and although in some respects it is politically uncontroversial, there are many points of technical detail that the House will want to scrutinise closely. I can think of no better people to assist in our deliberations on the Bill than the two maiden speakers. My noble friend Lord Hammond of Runnymede made a superb speech. I hope that, having briefly sipped from the glass of independence in 2019 after nine years in the Cabinet, he will not lose the habit of free thinking, even though he has retaken the Conservative Party Whip. The noble Baroness, Lady Shafik, also made her maiden speech today. Her contribution to the study and practice of economics in a whole host of financial and academic institutions is inspiring, so I look forward to learning a good deal from her, as well as from my noble friend, in the future.
I am intervening in this debate to highlight a matter that is not in the Bill, but it ought to be. It is a subject that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, and the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, have touched on, and I gather that my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbots may also speak about; namely, the need to expand the criminal law concept of failure to prevent crime, not least corporate financial crime. I have been thinking about the law on financial crime since the 2008 financial crash. I was the shadow Attorney-General for two years before the coalition Government came into office, and then the Solicitor-General in government. I developed the deferred prosecution agreement, or DPA regime. It was enacted through the Crime and Courts Act 2013. It is a regime that pragmatically and justly deals with corporate financial crime under the supervision of the courts. I will not go into the detail of the system now but, if I may say so, it works. I declare an interest not only as the Minister who introduced the system into this jurisdiction, but also as a practising barrister who, now long out of Government, appears in DPA cases.
DPAs are not, however, the end of the story. Financial crime is often thought of as the crime that does no real harm: no one gets killed, no bones are broken and there is no blood on the carpet. Equally, corporate offending is sometimes hard to visualise. But corporate crime and financial crime both cause great harm to people, to communities, to the economy and to our national reputation as a safe place to do business. Both are all too common and need to be investigated and dealt with effectively by the public authorities here and abroad. Financial crime is often, by the very nature of modern financial services, both international in its scope and committed electronically through corporate structures, albeit with a human mind and will behind it.
I hope, with other noble Lords, to expand on this theme in Committee, but for present purposes I shall say only this: Section 7 of the Bribery Act 2010 creates a corporate offence of failing to prevent bribery. It has been deployed successfully on several occasions and provides a model which can and should be replicated in other areas of financial crime. Furthermore, the Criminal Finances Act 2017 introduced corporate criminal offences of failure to prevent criminal facilitation of tax evasion. I suggest we should by this Bill expand the failure to prevent regime to cover at least some of the 50 or so financial or economic crimes that are available to be dealt with by DPAs listed in Schedule 17 to the Crime and Courts Act 2013.
Finally, we must reform the law relating to corporate criminal liability. The noble Lord, Lord Hendy, is right and I profoundly agree with him. I have been writing and speaking about the need to do this for years. The concept of the directing mind and will as the basis for corporate criminal liability, which the Americans abandoned before the First World War, worked for the small family businesses of the 19th century, but is now long outdated. Today, companies can operate in many different countries with national, regional and global boards and with hundreds of thousands of employees engaging in multi-jurisdictional trade in goods and services. Locating the directing mind and will of these vast conglomerates is difficult, if not impossible, and the current law does not reflect the reality of modern business life. It is an affront to common sense and justice. As in the United States, we need to introduce vicarious liability into our corporate criminal law.
Lord Desai (Non-Afl)
My Lords, first, I apologise for being slightly late when the noble Lord had started presenting the Bill. It is my good luck to be able to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Hammond. I briefly knew him when he was a Foreign Office Minister, and he gave me a very nice breakfast the day we unveiled the statue of Mahatma Gandhi in Parliament Square. I do remember that. Of course, I also congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Shafik, who is director of the London School of Economics. As I am an emeritus professor, she is my boss, so I welcome her.
I was also, as the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner of Margravine, said, a member of the EU Financial Affairs Sub-Committee, and I have been through some of this in an earlier phase. I remember saying to some City witnesses that the City should not think it is popular in the country. When push comes to shove, the Government will go for fishermen, not the City. I said fishermen, but there are others to which that would apply. And I think the Government did go for the fishermen, not the City, because the City is not popular in the country.
We may say proud things about the City, but what has struck me—I state this observation—is that in the Bill, we have missed the chance, as many other noble Lords have said, to tighten up regulatory structures in the City. I was alarmed when I saw how much power the FCA is going to have. The FCA is not a very efficient regulatory institution.
Many noble Lords have mentioned the LCF case, and I think what had happened at LCF was known, and it was a scandal because lots of ordinary people were deprived by that scheme. I am sorry to say this, but even when it was known that this had happened, the head of the FCA was promoted. I know he was printing money for the Government, but I still think it does not look good, especially if we are going to establish a global reputation. If we are going to be competitive in the world, we must have a much better reputation for our regulatory institutions than we have.
I have been in your Lordships’ House for a long time. We started with the Baring Brothers, the BCCI and all sorts of other scandals, and we do slip up. Now we are on our own and we have to compete globally, we will have to really tighten up and not be smug about it. I hope this Bill gets amended or something else happens to get a better regulatory structure, better rules for the FCA, better accountability to Parliament and proper punishment for people failing on the job.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con) [V]
My Lords, I am afraid the wonders of modern technology are such that I am confined to a landline today, but that has not prevented me hearing two distinguished maiden speeches from my noble friend Lord Hammond of Runnymede and the noble Baroness, Lady Shafik, and I congratulate both of them. I also add my congratulations to the Minister on his explanation that this Bill was the first step in creating a regulatory framework designed to reinforce the UK’s position as a leading world financial centre and enable the UK to take advantage of our post-Brexit freedom of action.
In addition, as the Association of British Insurers pointed out in its briefing on the Bill, it also provides a good foundation for positive future co-operation with our European neighbours. As such, it has my enthusiastic support, but as the noble Lord, Lord Reid of Cardowan, pointed out in his speech, it is a Christmas tree Bill, and there are, inevitably, some decorations about which I am less enthusiastic, and there is at least one decoration that seems to be missing from the tree altogether.
Before I go any further, I draw the House’s attention to my entry in the register of interests, in particular that I chair a company that is regulated by the FCA. My foremost point concerns the culture we are trying to create with this Bill. What do I mean by culture? When the regulators, the FCA and others come to see you in the firm, they are very interested in what the culture of the firm is and what the prevailing attitudes of the senior management are; for example, the balance being struck between innovation and conservatism, the level of acceptance of financial and operational risk, the treatment of staff and so on. Up to now, a large measure of this culture has been dictated by the institutions of the EU. This, of course, will no longer be the case. I ask my noble friend: who is going to be responsible for establishing this future culture? How do the Government plan to assess the culture? How, if at all, would they plan to achieve changes to that culture? Last, but by no means least, as many other noble Lords have remarked, what role will Parliament have in that process? At first glance, there seems to be a considerable democratic deficit, as many noble Lords have said.
A good part of the Bill is devoted to improvements in the tightening up of the regulatory regime. Having participated in the proceedings on the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, I understand and support such changes, particularly where they reflect changes in business practice and business behaviour. However, all these measures come with a cost. That cost is borne not by the Government or by financial institutions but by the consumers, clients and investors. There is a need, as we introduce new regulations to deal with new circumstances, to step back and see what old regulations can be amended, or be dispensed with completely as being no longer effective.
As we sail into this brave new world, an important issue will be the extent to which the Government are able to obtain reciprocity or equivalence from the EU. It will be a matter of great interest to Parliament, this House, and indeed the country as a whole. I chair the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. When the committee considered the various interim regulations for the financial services sector, it was far from clear what, if any, reciprocity had been achieved. I was asked by the committee to write to the Minister John Glen about this, and I am afraid that his response, dated 7 January, which I invite my noble friend to read, was hardly a model of clarity. The Government declined to accept new Clause 8 in the other place, which required the Government to report on equivalence. If this is still the Government’s considered position, they will need to do better than Mr Glen’s letter.
I turn finally to a decoration that I think is missing from the tree altogether. I served as a member of the post-legislative scrutiny committee on the Bribery Act. Our investigation revealed a number of concerns. The first was the difference in treatment of smaller companies as opposed to larger companies as a consequence of the application of the directing mind principle—this was referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, and my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier. The second concern was the often inordinate time taken over investigations, and, finally, the strange position that the failure to prevent offences applied only to bribery and tax cases and not to corporate crime generally.
I am aware that, in the other place, the Government declined to accept a widening amendment, but I think that the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier and I will wish to explore this anomaly and return to this question in Committee.
To conclude, this is an exciting time for this country and for our financial services sector. Getting the right foundations in place quickly will be of critical importance, which is why this Bill has my support in principle.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, I join the House in universally welcoming our two outstanding maiden speakers. Given that the noble Lord, Lord Hammond of Runnymede, discovered a long-hidden rebellious streak in the other place, and that his title has links to the Magna Carta, I hope that we will be seeing even more rebellion on the Benches opposite with his arrival. I also welcome the noble Baroness, Lady Shafik, who is clearly a powerful new voice on our Cross Benches. I was very glad to hear her mention green finance. I hope we will be hearing a lot more from her on that, as we just powerfully heard about those issues from the noble Baroness, Lady Sheehan. I will, as you might expect, be backing many of the amendments to which the noble Baroness, Lady Sheehan, referred.
However, on the Bill, I must begin by thanking Macmillan Cancer Support for its extremely useful briefing. I shall take its conclusions and extend them far more broadly than it ventured to do. Macmillan calls for an amendment to the Bill requiring organisations to have a statutory duty of care for customers. The charity suggests that that is the best way to ensure that financial service providers take a pre-emptive approach to ensure that they act in the best interests of their customers.
As you might expect, Macmillan focuses on the financial difficulties of people with cancer but also notes that the Financial Conduct Authority concludes that one in two people will become financially vulnerable at some point in their lives. I suggest that, in a complex and fast-changing world, overloaded with pressures on time and attention, with so many people stressed by the struggle for mere survival and the fear of rampant insecurity, the sensible approach would be for everyone to be treated as vulnerable and to acknowledge that our whole society is acutely vulnerable. If we created a system that works for the most vulnerable, it would be one that will work securely, resiliently and safely for everyone.
We know that our current system is not working for many at an individual level. Just look at the practical and topical example of the disastrous performance of the insurance sector when it came to business interruption insurance for small businesses in relation to Covid-19. The financial sector is utterly failing at a structural level to meet the collective needs of our whole society, acutely vulnerable as the Covid-19 pandemic has shown us to be. A system that works best for everyone would involve a financial sector that it a utility: a provision of essential services for the real economy—the economy that feeds us, builds our shelter, clothes us and provides the other essentials of life.
Instead, following decades of financialisation of everything from the care sector to the so-called water industry, we have a financial sector as parasite, sucking funds out of the real economy—all too often to tax havens—and loading essential provisions and services with unsustainable debt. If noble Lords think that I am being radical here, I invite them to read the extensive coverage in the Financial Times of the impact of financial engineering on the water companies.
We are more than a dozen years on from the 2008 financial crash, when the cash machines nearly stopped working. In the age of Covid-19, we are surely more aware now of the need for resilience and stability in this age of shocks. Yet I note that an Oxford University Faculty of Law conference held in 2018 on financial regulation concluded:
“We are safer, but not as safe as we should and could be.”
And that was just the thinking in the financial sector’s own terms.
I listened carefully to the Minister’s typically detailed and careful introduction and heard quite a bit about limiting risk. However, I did not hear the words “climate” or “nature” once. But we know that we need a financial sector that does not continue to fund the trashing of the planet and societies, supply funds to fossil fuel operations that are destroying the planet, pour money into the destruction of the rainforest, stuff the oceans with plastic or spread poverty and inequality through funding sweatshops and outright slave labour.
On 25 January, the US Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank simultaneously said that they would make climate considerations a central part of finance, the importance of which the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, highlighted. It appears that we are not world-leading but world-trailing, yet again.
We are, of course, world-leading in dirty money, as explained earlier in considerable forensic detail by the noble Lord, Sikka. The issue was also mentioned by a number of Members of the House in an earlier question session on our relationship with Russia. We are a major global centre of corruption. The City is an Augean stables and the Bill is clearly sparing in its distribution of shovels. I give the House notice that I intend to support a proposed amendment to create a new corporate criminal offence for companies or bodies regulated by the FCA of failing to prevent economic crime. I also look forward to working with the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, on the issues of liability that he raised.
In summary, we obviously need a Financial Services Act, but the Bill is nothing like what we need. We are seeing increasing numbers of communities around the world understand that the model of economy, society and finance needed is one that allows us to live within the doughnut, as the saying goes—in the essential space that respects planetary limits while meeting human needs, thereby ensuring that everyone is treated with respect and given dignity, as defined by the economist Kate Raworth in her book Doughnut Economics. We need a Financial Services Act that sets out how our financial sector can meet the need to do that—a very differently structured sector that takes care of all our needs, instead of risking our security and future. We are in an emergency state in 2021. Your Lordships’ House has a responsibility to act to transform our planet-trashing, poverty-creating financial sector, as the other place has very clearly failed to do.
Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con) [V]
My Lords, I refer your Lordships to my registered interests and extend a very warm welcome to my noble friend Lord Hammond of Runnymede. I have sat through many of his speeches, including the famous one in which he described why “Spreadsheet Phil” is inappropriate, but this was exemplary. His maiden speech and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Shafik, were excellent.
The final EU withdrawal agreement was a success, but, as has been discussed in this House and elsewhere, it was light on financial services. Mark Carney, the former Governor of the Bank of England, said this time last year that the City of London must not be a “rule-taker” after Brexit, effectively outsourcing the regulation and supervision of our global financial centre. Therefore, while adopting the EU rulebook in the first instance has delivered much-needed continuity and stability, we must now think about what comes next. That must surely be an approach that sees the UK continue to set global standards in prudential regulation and consumer protection, without losing sight of our broader objectives of innovation and competition.
There are three initiatives worthy of mention that can reinforce the initial steps taken in the Bill. The first is the future regulatory framework review. The Government’s response to this will give us the clearest indication yet of the vision for financial services post Brexit. I note the stress placed on equivalence of outcome. This should give us more room for interpretation, and indeed the opportunity to revisit many areas of law which were effectively gold-plated into UK law when we were EU members.
The second is the productive finance review. This concerns the means to unlock more capital to increase productive capacity in the real economy. I mention it here because it should also look at the impact of regulation on institutional capital flows into key areas such as infrastructure and technology. EU directives IORP and Solvency II limit such capital flows with prohibitive capital charges and should be looked at immediately. There is £6 trillion in UK private pensions alone that could be unlocked for more productive purposes.
The third is the Kalifa review into UK fintech. The Chancellor and my noble friend Lord Gadhia recently spoke of the need to see a second big bang in the City. Fintech is a key part of that. I hope the review proposes reforms as transformational as the first big bang was for the City.
Turning to the specifics of the Bill, there are commendable measures that will advance the competitiveness of financial services within our current regulatory envelope. Asset management remains our most globally significant subsector. Therefore, the measures to update the regime for third-country investment firms is to be commended. Similarly, introducing a more proportionate prudential approach to regulating investment firms will lower their costs of doing business, and better reflect underlying risk. On the other side of the coin, there are important measures on supervision and consumer protection. In particular, I commend the review that former FCA director Chris Woolard is leading on “buy now, pay later” lenders, where there is mounting evidence of bad debt, mis-selling and very bad practice. However, on FCA enforcement, there is a balance to be struck, and this Bill is, I am afraid, another opportunity missed to strike that balance. I am referring to the FSCS levy, FCA enforcement and the endless ex-post powers of the Financial Ombudsman Service.
The FSCS levy is due to soar by a third, to over £1 billion, with one of the reasons given being the cost of compensating SIPP consumers. However, there is mounting evidence that the FOS has been overreaching itself in its decisions against those very same SIPP providers. For example, many SIPP providers provide execution-only services on behalf of a client—the clue in the phrase “self-invested”—and yet claims of mis-selling are upheld, even where no financial advice is proffered and no advisory permissions are even held.
Frankly, this has the appearance of a racket. Blessed by the FCA, the FOS adjudicates, the FSCS is jacked up accordingly, the FS industry is forced to pay, driving some literally to bankruptcy, and the money flows seamlessly back to the FCA. It is a system with no accountability before the law, and no right of appeal. In short, it is unjust, and at a time when the broader powers of the FCA are being debated. Will the Minister consent to revisiting this important issue? It is a shame that the Bill does not seek to rebalance the relationship between the FCA and FOS and bring some common sense into how FOS operates.
Members of this House might recall that I have been banging on about FOS for some time, and I have had the pleasure of meeting the City Minister to discuss it. Well, something fell into my lap this summer. I received an unsolicited credit card from a company called NewDay. I had not asked for a credit card. A day or so later, a neighbour spotted someone rummaging in my outdoor letter box. It was a scam. Someone had ordered a card in my name and was seeking to retrieve the PIN subsequently sent in the post. A simple remedy would be to require credit card recipients to confirm that they had ordered one before it is sent to them. I suggested that to the company; it refused, so I complained to the FOS and it took six months for the FOS to tell me it could not fix the issue as the FCA handbook, which, as we know, governs FOS, states that as I was not yet a customer, I was not an eligible complainant under the FCA dispute resolution—rule 2.7.2, if you are interested—so it would take it no further and, as a result, others will now get scammed in this way.
That shows a dramatic shortage of common sense. Does the Minister agree that it is not clear that FOS is fit for purpose, and that the Bill provides us with an opportunity to ensure that FOS and the FCA do the job Parliament had envisaged, or to let us change the way FOS and the FCA operate?
Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Non-Afl) [V]
My Lords, I take this opportunity to congratulate the two new Members of your Lordships’ House, the noble Lord, Lord Hammond of Runnymede, and the noble Baroness, Lady Shafik, on their excellent and thought-provoking maiden speeches.
Undoubtedly, the financial services sector is important to the City of London and to the UK. It is very much the engine that drives our economy. In the post-Brexit situation—I hasten to add that I did not favour or want Brexit—we need economic and financial stability and a strong means of financial regulation. That must be accompanied by consumer protection. I note that the Bill contains a new regulatory regime for investment firms, and thus provides the Financial Conduct Authority with additional powers to set rules for such firms, while also containing measures to make the FCA much more accountable.
One area I want to concentrate on—other noble Lords have referred to it this evening—is economic crime. We have all heard stories about individuals who have been fleeced by investment companies that were not properly registered, and therefore could not get the money they invested returned to them when problems occurred. Will the Minister and his colleagues bring forward amendments containing retrospective powers to help such individuals and ensure that such effective financial scams, otherwise known as economic crime, cannot happen in the future? I shall also refer to two other issues about protecting individuals, in relation to credit services and our environment.
I have been advised about some individuals in the UK who have invested money—pension funds—in Dolphin Trust, now known as the German Property Group. This organisation had its UK office in Hanover. It was an unregulated property investment scheme. Apparently, this company was supposed to use investors’ money to revamp derelict buildings in Germany into apartment blocks. Then, after several years, investors would receive their money back with a hefty interest rate. They were told to invest in this company and that it was safe to do so because their money was aligned to a certain property so they would not lose out. I have talked to one family who did this and they have lost everything. There are over 1,300 individuals, throughout the UK, owed in excess of £165 million. Problems emerged when they found out that the properties did not exist, and the company was not even registered.
Will the Minister indicate whether the new regulatory regime for investment firms will prevent such actions happening? I doubt that it will. Will the new legislation have retrospective powers to ensure that companies such as the German Property Group are held legally and financially accountable to their investors for the malfeasances that have occurred? What protections can be offered by the FCA under the new provisions in terms of capital levels, liquidity, risk management processes and governance arrangements?
Other areas addressed in the other place included the need to ensure that buy now, pay later credit services are brought into the scope of the Financial Conduct Authority to protect people from spending more than they can afford. Many people in this net take out further debt to repay the initial credit. What legislative consumer protection can be afforded to these individuals? Will the Minister bring forward amendments in your Lordships’ House to that effect?
I am of the firm belief that the Financial Conduct Authority should have regard to the UK’s target of reaching net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, particularly in the year when the UK will chair COP 26. This would help to support the overarching goal of a green economy and financial sector. I note that the Minister in the other place stated that climate change is an issue to which the regulator should have regard. What, therefore, is the Government’s exact position and what is their timeframe for bringing forward legislative change in this regard? Will they do it now, through amendments? If not, I know that other noble Lords will do so, and I will support them.
Lord Blackwell (Con) [V]
My Lords, as well as adding my congratulations on the two excellent maiden speeches, it is customary to start by declaring my interests. Since I retired as chairman of Lloyds Banking Group at the beginning of the year, I am pleased to say that, for the first time in many years, I can address the House with no active interests other than as an ordinary shareholder. With that freedom, I welcome all the measures in the Bill, but I will comment on two that are particularly important.
First, it is essential to help provide more certainty on Libor contracts at this stage. In his opening remarks, my noble friend gave mortgages as an example. While I welcome the measures in the Bill, do the Government believe that the measures that enable the FCA to replace Libor in benchmark contracts are sufficient to apply to mortgages and commercial loans? Might my noble friend also consider some kind of safe harbour for banks if they suffer litigation from clients as a result of FCA instructions?
Secondly, I welcome the enabling legislation for the Statutory Debt Repayment Plan scheme, but note that, in developing the regulations later this year, it will be important to ensure that all the customer’s debts can be looked at holistically, and that the proposed plan is offered to customers only where it is the right and best solution for their particular needs.
More broadly, as the Minister made clear, many of the measures in the Bill are to establish UK-based regulations to replace those previously enacted through the European Union. I welcome the principle the Bill establishes that, unlike EU regulations, the UK should keep the primary legislation limited to the overall framework for regulation, with the Treasury providing necessary secondary legislation, with the regulators then given freedom to apply that in proportionate and flexible rules.
As the noble Lord, Lord Butler, pointed out in respect of MiFID, experience has shown that attempting to legislate in detail on the regulation of financial services can create unintended anomalies that the regulators are then powerless to address. It also inhibits their freedom to shape rules to reflect varied industry circumstances, or to adapt to market innovation, and those companies that seek to innovate. So, I also welcome the Government’s ongoing review and consultation on the future regulatory framework, which is looking at going much further in transferring responsibility for detailed rule-making back to the PRA and FCA.
While there will be debate on the initial measures covered in the Bill, the point I want to focus on, like other noble Lords, is what is missing from it on the effective governance of the regulators in exercising those increased powers. I recognise these are matters that have been subject to consultation, but they are nevertheless germane to many of the delegated powers in this current legislation. As I said, I believe it is right to give the PRA and FCA the responsibility and powers to make, adapt and apply regulations to promote the stability of our financial markets and protect the interests of consumers within the framework of laws passed by Parliament. Between them they have the expertise to do that and, as with the Bank of England, we should expect them to undertake their role with an objective independence—independent, that is, of short-term political pressures.
I welcome the fact that this Bill also introduces, for the first time, the obligation on the FCA and PRA to consider the international standing of the UK investment and credit institutions in making their rules. Like my noble friends Lord Hunt and Lord Bridges, I believe that, post Brexit, it should be part of their formal objectives to promote a healthy UK industry that can compete successfully on the global stage. To do that, there may also need to be a greater requirement for them to ensure that the two regulators have complementary rule-making and supervision without, at this stage, seeking to recreate the single FCA.
In delegating those powers to the FCA and PRA, Parliament needs to ensure that there is an effective way to scrutinise their work and hold them to account for their actions. I do not believe that the Treasury Select Committee, while it has an important and critical role, is the right or adequate forum to provide that detailed and apolitical oversight. By contrast, having served in the past on a Joint Committee on rewriting tax laws, I believe that Joint Committees of both Houses can bring greater experience and expertise to bear in a more considered and less political environment.
So, I join the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, in proposing, as a complement to this Bill, that Parliament establishes a new purpose-built Joint Committee that I would call the financial services regulatory oversight committee. It would be supported by appropriate technical experts whose role would be to provide detailed scrutiny of new regulations—I stress not to give ex ante approval, but simply to review them after the event. The committee could also take evidence from those in the industry on the implementation of financial regulations and any concerns that raised. If necessary, the committee could then have the power to propose statutory instruments to Parliament where amendments were required.
The Bill may or may not be the right place to introduce provision for this kind of oversight. I recognise that the Government’s consultation has only just closed, but I would welcome any early thoughts my noble friend can give on how the Government see this oversight issue being addressed and what their timetable is for doing so. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Lord Lucas (Con) [V]
My Lords, I very much welcome this Bill. As the chair of the cross-industry Enforcement Law Review Group, I will concentrate very much on Clause 34, which I and many others welcome. I anticipate that there will be a number of amendments trying to get to the bottom of exactly how the Government see it operating, and I should be enormously grateful if the Minister could circulate to me the current draft of the regulations, so that we shall be talking to each other off the same hymn sheet, as it were, in Committee.
I very much encourage the Government to bring forward these regulations swiftly, and I encourage the Opposition to support the Government. There will be an obvious need for them as we come out of Covid, and I do not believe that, given the state of the debt advice industry, there is any quick perfectibility on offer. It would be far better to get something up and running, to review it pretty swiftly—perhaps after six months—and to produce a better version then and a better version a year or two after that. This is something that the industry will learn to work with, and we should aim at the start not for perfection but for something practical and effective.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]
I welcome the Bill and congratulate my noble friend on bringing it forward. I add my warm congratulations to my noble friend Lord Hammond of Runnymede. Being elected on the same day, I am glad to see another from the class of 1997 joining our Benches. I also give a very warm welcome to the noble Baroness, Lady Shafik, and I look forward to hearing both their contributions going forward.
I support all the objectives of this Bill, and I entirely endorse the contributions that the financial sector makes to the UK economy, not just in London but also Leeds and Edinburgh in particular. I will focus on some aspects in the current Bill that I would like to see strengthened as well as aspects that are not in it, which I hope to pursue in Committee.
I warmly welcome Clause 35 and the “Successor accounts for Help-to-Save savers”. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, I have sympathy with the request and briefing from Macmillan, calling for support for cancer patients, who are a most vulnerable group in a particular time of need. When undergoing both diagnosis and subsequent treatment, they often enter a period where their financial circumstances are severely compromised. I believe that the FCA’s contention that the current principles are adequate needs to be qualified, and therefore I have some sympathy with the call for a statutory duty of care in this regard. I would very much welcome my noble friend’s response to that particular call.
I also hope that this Bill and its provisions will give the opportunity to review how the regulations, which came into force in 2012, on short selling are currently working. I believe that that is a particularly distasteful and immoral practice, and my noble friend may prefer to pursue this through international and global means. Therefore, I would be very interested to hear what discussions he and his colleagues at the Treasury have had within the context of the OECD and other international organisations. However, I believe that this would be a good opportunity to go back and revisit these regulations and see how they are operating. At worst, they can be very damaging to the economy and employment, leading to many people losing their businesses and livelihoods.
I turn to the question of green financing and the opportunity that this would give, in the context of the Bill, to benchmark all stocks against green credentials. For me, a particularly welcome recent move has been the ban on fracking in the United States.
I will quote the words of Mark Carney, who said when he launched his Green Horizon summit in November last year:
“Private finance will play a critical role in funding the initiatives and innovations of the private sector and helping companies realign their business models for net zero.”
I believe that the COP 26 climate change summit, which the UK is hosting in Glasgow in November, will be an ideal opportunity to ensure that the UK is at the forefront of green finance. I hope that, as the Bill before us today passes through its legislative stages, it will give us an opportunity to show that London, Edinburgh, Leeds and other financial centres in the UK are at the heart of green financing. I support the Bill and look forward to its passage through this House.
Lord Gadhia (Non-Afl) [V]
My Lords, I congratulate my noble friends Lord Hammond of Runnymede and Lady Shafik on their maiden speeches. Their choice of debate is especially appropriate, and the quality of their contributions demonstrates how much they will enrich your Lordships’ House. I look forward to their future active participation.
I turn to our main topic. I welcome this omnibus Financial Services Bill in the spirit in which it is intended: as an entrée to the main course that will follow once the Government have consulted on the future regulatory framework. We should therefore calibrate our expectations of the Bill accordingly and not attempt to boil the ocean. Instead we should keep our powder dry to tackle the more fundamental issue of the accountability framework between the Government, regulators and Parliament, with a potential role for an independent body, which I will come on to.
First, some personal context. I started my own career in financial services 30 years ago this year at a City merchant bank in the aftermath of the big bang. I have therefore seen my fair share of trials and tribulations over three decades. During this period the City—and financial services more broadly—has constantly reinvented itself, sometimes by choice and more often through necessity. So, if I bring a bias to this debate, it is as someone who has seen the financial services sector overcome its challenges to not just survive but thrive.
Apart perhaps from our life sciences sector, there are not many globally significant industries where the UK plays such a world-leading role. An effective regulatory framework is clearly one of the key ingredients to sustain this position. The financial crisis and now Brexit have forced us to re-evaluate the regulatory architecture in quick succession. The onshoring of powers from the EU has triggered an inevitable debate between those who would like to see the UK take full advantage of its new-found freedoms to simplify and reduce the burden of regulation and those who fear that we might embark on a race to the bottom, to the detriment of consumers and society. That debate is illusory. However much some of us might dream of radically streamlining regulation, we are simply not destined for a bonfire of rules. To quote Treasury Minister John Glen, speaking in the other place during its Second Reading debate,
“we have no intention of needlessly, ideologically or recklessly diverging from EU legislation. Instead, we will maintain existing regulations where they make sense for the financial services industry in this country.”—[Official Report, Commons, 9/11/20; col. 669.]
It is not surprising to hear that strong statement, since the UK has played an active role in shaping much of the EU legislation. It is therefore increasingly unbelievable for the EU to maintain that it is seeking assurances about our future intentions before making an equivalence decision. We should recognise that the equivalence process is being used as a political lever, not a technical determination. I therefore agree with Andrew Bailey’s sentiments, expressed in recent evidence to the Treasury Select Committee, that we should not hold our breath for a quick decision and should treat trade equivalence as a bonus if and when it comes.
We should also recognise that the EU is unusual in drawing up such detailed rules and incorporating them into legislation. This is not the norm around the world. Other jurisdictions rely more heavily on the expertise of independent regulators to translate legislative objectives into detailed rulebooks. Delegating responsibility for technical areas of financial regulation is necessary, but also brings important accountability and scrutiny issues.
This subject requires more than a six-minute speaking slot, so I shall make three brief points. First, we need to be strategic in the scope of powers we delegate and the risk of concentration—what Sir Paul Tucker, in his excellent and thoughtful book Unelected Power, calls an “over mighty citizen”. Another of his observations is the importance of having a clear objective that can be monitored. He warns against having three or four objectives in statute that are ranked equally and are vague, which is relevant to the new “have regard” clauses incorporated in the Bill. While I would hope we can manage primary and secondary objectives, we should consider this input from a respected former front-line practitioner.
Secondly, while we decide upon the new architecture, the show must go on and Parliament needs to have a role in the process. I suggest a relatively simple fix: the next set of remit letters from the Chancellor to the PRA and FCA should be published in draft form and offered for consultation and debate in both Houses, either in the Chamber or through Select Committees. It could also make sense to look at a Joint Committee of both Houses, drawing on the considerable expertise available across Parliament.
Thirdly, we need a more permanent body to help the Executive and Parliament scrutinise and streamline regulation more systematically. I suggest we look at creating an independent office for financial regulation, which draws on the examples of both the Office for Budget Responsibility and the Office of Tax Simplification and whose remit is a hybrid of the two. It would report annually on whether the statutory objectives of the financial regulators have been met and systematically review regulation to propose how it could be simplified. A continuous series of incremental improvements appear more feasible than a one-time reform package. The cumulative impact could be significant over time, and more enduring.
In conclusion, we must now deal with the world as it is, not as we would like it to be. If we can be as fleet of foot in financial regulation as we have been in vaccine procurement, then I am confident that the financial services sector can remain a strategic national asset, supporting jobs and prosperity. This Bill provides a start on that journey.
Lord Naseby (Con) [V]
My Lords, this is one of the key Bills of this Parliament. Thankfully it is in the hands of a team who we all respect, as does the country at large. I too welcome our two new colleagues, my noble friend Lord Hammond and the noble Baroness, Lady Shafik, and look forward to hearing them again.
Just by way of background, I have chaired two quoted companies and have chaired the Tunbridge Wells Equitable Friendly Society. I am a firm believer in mutuality and successfully piloted through the Private Member’s Bill that became the Mutuals’ Deferred Shares Act 2015. I also spent 12 years on the Public Accounts Committee in the other place.
Other speakers have covered a huge spectrum this afternoon and this evening, so I just want to mention, in the macro, three issues as regards the City. First, coming from the Public Accounts Committee, I think that scrutiny of regulation is absolutely vital. I have listened to a number of noble colleagues—my noble friend Lord Blackwell, in particular— and I agree on the need for a Joint Committee. I will not say any more than that; it seems to me absolutely fundamental.
Secondly, economic crime is an increasing market—if I may use that phrase. Thankfully, we have the City of London Corporation which has its own police authority; it is the national lead for economic crime and supports calls by industry bodies for increased funding to fight economic crime. Over a third of all crime is economic or cyber, but only 2% of total police resources are allocated to policing this type of crime. Frankly, we need to look at this very closely and find some increased resources.
Finally, on the macro side, I was talking to the remembrancer in the City, and the City of London Corporation is an enthusiastic supporter of the greening of the economy. The City of London Corporation supports work by the Green Finance Institute including, for example, the plan to launch the UK’s first sovereign green bond; work to identify and remove investment barriers to wide-scale decarbonisation of the UK’s heating; and work on the development of a market for financing net-zero carbon properties. As I said, colleagues have mentioned a great many other things about the City.
I also want to look at one macro challenge that I have known about for years: payday loans. Every family in the UK needs access to credit. Historically, the average working-class family has used what is called home-collected credit. This is not new; it has been used across the UK for well over a century. I first came across it in the 1960s, when I was a councillor and alderman in the London Borough of Islington, and more recently in Northampton. A customer takes out a small short-term cash loan and the repayments are collected by the company agents who visit the customer at home each week. One single charge for the credit covers everything: the interest, the home-collection service, the cost of bad debts, company overheads and so on. There are no additional or penalty charges. If a customer cannot pay, the term of the loan is simply extended and the customer does not pay a penny more. It is 100% flexible and forgiving. However, home-collected credit is now under threat and, if that threat materialises, society will lose something very important.
If that happens, it will simply be because we have regulatory indifference. The authorities—the FCA and the FOS—are currently flouting their statutory remit to decide each case on its own merits. Historically, the regulator had a sound understanding of the product and how it worked in harmony with the budgeting cycles of these customers. Customers who use this methodology borrow only three or four times a year to cover the usual family expenses—at Christmas, Easter, back-to-school times or whatever. Now, the FCA sees this annual pattern as problematic—as re-lending, rather than sensible budgeting. In doing so, it fails to differentiate between payday lending, which is extremely harmful, and home-collected credit, which is not. The FCA and Financial Ombudsman Service are targeting the exact same re-lending patterns on affordability grounds, and their judgments act as a magnet to dubious claims management companies, which are just piling in.
When we reach Committee, we need to look very long and hard at this area. We, as legislators, need to hold the FCA and the FOS to account, because millions of working-class consumers up and down the country will be badly affected if this system of home-collected credit, which has been running for decades—for over a century, as I said earlier—comes to an end. It works well and it must be protected. Somehow or other, we have to sort out the terrible payday lending organisations.
We have had a long day and I know that we are looking forward to hearing the Minister wind up.
Baroness Kramer (LD) [V]
My Lords, I declare my interests as set out in the register. I join in the very warm welcome extended to the noble Lord, Lord Hammond of Runnymede, and the noble Baroness, Lady Shafik, who introduced themselves so powerfully in their maiden speeches.
This Bill may look technical, but it deals with a number of crucial issues, including the stability of our financial institutions. The Bill incorporates Basel III by using skeleton clauses that lay out policy at a very high and general level. It then eliminates secondary legislation and hands to the PRA the power to develop policy through its use of rules. It gives the regulators almost unlimited rein to craft rules that could be at the weak end of international standards, or the strong end, without parliamentary interference. The PRA faces no meaningful accountability, only delayed and minimal transparency, and an occasional review by a Select Committee.
The Financial Conduct Authority expects to follow the same template for the activities it regulates, as it makes clear in the financial regulatory framework review now in consultation. I join others in being shocked that this Bill does not wait for that consultation to be completed, but I think it indicates that the Government have already made up their mind. The PRA will later this year expand the scope of this template to cover its remaining activities. This is not delegated powers; it is the permanent removal of Parliament’s powers in the area of financial regulation. It is not just temporary; it is permanent. Let me quote from the framework review, which states that
“this approach will result in greater policy responsibility and discretion for UK regulators than has existed at any time since the early operation of FSMA following its introduction 20 years ago.”
FSMA 2000 is the regime that underpinned the culture—the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, reminded us of the importance of culture—and the naive regulation that led to the 2008 collapse, failed us over Libor and failed us for years over PPI. I could go on with other examples, but quite a few noble Lords have already done so very usefully. I hope that the Minister will look back and examine their speeches.
I am shocked on three grounds. The first is the general contempt for Parliament. We so often today see the pattern of skeleton Bills with policy then enacted through statutory instruments. However, this is even more cynical: a skeleton Bill with policy then set by the regulator in its rulebook. There is not even a semblance of accountability. This is not designed for flexibility, because we have plenty of fast-track procedures; it is deliberately designed to ensure that no effective oversight or challenge can be made by Parliament.
Secondly, we are at a critical time following Brexit, as my noble friend Lord Bruce of Bennachie and others reminded us. There is no way that the EU is going to grant anything but limited and temporary equivalence to financial services if they are only governed by rules in a regulator’s rulebook and can be changed without any parliamentary process. Indeed, I suspect the United States—I am thinking particularly of Janet Yellen—will be nervous of any equivalence rulings in the absence of any significant legislative underpinning. My noble friend Lady Bowles and the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, raised real issues that remain unanswered and I hope that the Minister will address them.
Lastly, I am shocked because although I respect the integrity and intelligence of our regulators and recognise that they have more substantive powers than in 2008, I am still certain that this is not enough to discipline a sector where arrogance and greed have such a history of motivating bad behaviour. I sat on the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards for nearly two years. Senior managers who are respected figures, many with gongs and widely recognised, had rushed for short-term, false profits to boost their huge bonuses, and boards of directors were intimidated into silence over reckless behaviour. The regulators failed to speak out, obsessed with regulatory perimeters and constrained by a deep deference to the big institutions. That deference remains, and today the noble Lords, Lord Sikka, Lord Northbrook and Lord Desai, have given us some very powerful examples, which again I hope the Minister will examine.
The regulators also lack the resources to take on the industry, and I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, who took us through some examples of that. The reports from the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards and the legislation that followed changed the landscape, but many of us on the commission feared that the powerful financial institutions would bide patiently and, as memories of the 2008 crash faded, would carefully—we guessed in our conversations that it would take 10 years—persuade the Government to unwind the constraints that prevented the high-risk gambling and the crafting of loopholes to increase both power and bonuses. This Bill tells us that we guessed that timing pretty right, and I would remind the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, who advised after-the-event oversight but not before-the-event oversight, that that approach pretty nearly destroyed the economy of this country.
It is an irony that the Bill deals with the final end of Libor and the other IBORs, abused in one of the biggest stains on the reputation of the UK’s financial services sector and its regulators. If we want an example of deference in the Treasury and in the regulators, we should listen to these words in the Explanatory Notes to this Bill. The reason that the notes give for ending Libor and similar benchmarks is:
“in response to cases of attempted manipulation of IBORs”.
Attempted? Fake submissions were made by the major banks in London every day for at least a decade, and probably two, in order to get a Libor benchmark that would boost the bonuses of traders and senior managers. Every day for those one or two decades, more than $400 trillion in outstanding loans across the globe were corruptly priced. The knowledge among regulators was evident, partly because the banks in their arrogance made no attempt to hide it, but also because the Bank of England got in on the act, asking banks to manipulate their Libor submissions for the more public-spirited purpose of hiding the depth of the 2008 crash. The scale of the corruption was so large and pervasive that it cannot be unravelled.
I have two other quick comments on the contents of the Bill. Many in the financial services industry have pressed for an international competitiveness requirement for the regulators, and there is in the Bill a “have regard” for both the PRA and the FCA, at least for certain sectors. We heard about that again today from the noble Lords, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath and Lord Bridges of Headley, and others. The industry says constantly that it does not seek a reduction or dilution in regulatory standards, but I—and, I suspect, many others—am going to take some convincing that this competitiveness provision is not doing just that, and driving standards down.
Secondly, the clauses on statutory debt repayment plans and the debt respite scheme are good, but they fail to include a clear implementation timetable. I support those actions, but please may we have the timetable? With Covid, it is now exceedingly urgent.
The Bill is also noteworthy for everything that it does not include. This House will need to remedy that. I have quite a long list, but today the hour is late, and I shall mention only two. The first is a duty of care by financial institutions to all customers. My noble friend Lord Sharkey, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, the noble Baronesses, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle and Lady McIntosh of Pickering, and others, highlighted that need.
The second—although it is not second in terms of priority—is action to motivate and incentivise the financial services sector to support our goals on climate change. My noble friends Lord Oates and Lady Sheehan and the noble Baronesses, Lady Hayman and Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, all spoke about that, and so did many others. It is crucial that those additions be made to the Bill. There are also other priorities, such as financial inclusion, but I will not go through that list now.
If there has been one message in this debate, which the Minister must now address, I can cite what was said by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. She and I do not often see eye to eye on an issue, but she talked about the accountability deficit. If regulators are to be given such untrammelled powers as the Bill anticipates, will the Minister tell us now how they are to be held accountable to Parliament? He has heard the words of so many in this House, from all Benches and all political persuasions, who have made it clear that accountability is required.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I begin by thanking the Minister and his officials for their early engagement on this legislation, which is both wide-ranging and highly technical. I very much hope that this spirit of co-operation will continue throughout the Bill.
In recent times, our consideration of financial services matters has been restricted mainly to a raft of EU exit statutory instruments. As joyous as those debates were, this Bill provides a welcome shift in focus. It is a rare opportunity to review and revise the sector’s regulatory architecture, to ensure it is fit for purpose in the post-Brexit world.
As others have noted, financial services make a significant contribution to the UK economy in several respects: economic output, contribution to the Exchequer and the provision of skilled jobs. Despite recent capital movements to places such as Frankfurt, London remains one of the main global hubs of financial activity. The Chancellor has spoken of his wish to make London the world’s pre-eminent financial centre and, through our consideration of this Bill, we will be passing judgment on whether—and how—that ambition can be achieved.
While we often speak of London or the City, it is important to remember that financial services firms employ hundreds of thousands of staff across the country. Banking, insurance and other financial services have a significant impact—mostly positive, but sometimes negative—on the lives of consumers in every corner of the UK. A further task of ours is to make sure that this legislation works for them, as well as the firms themselves.
We may be more than a decade on from the global financial crisis, but this debate has highlighted that the events of that time remain at the forefront of our minds. Given the severe economic and social costs that came out of past regulatory failure, that is only right. It speaks to the points that I have just raised, that is, the importance of ensuring an appropriate balance between flexibility and responsibility.
Central to achieving this balance is the topic of oversight and scrutiny. As far as I can see, and as other noble Lords have observed, this Bill is severely lacking. Several fundamental regulatory changes are proposed in the Bill, yet, in many cases, there is no scope for formal parliamentary scrutiny. The Treasury has not always availed itself of the opportunity to attach scrutiny procedures to existing processes that could benefit from them.
I am sure that the Minister will assure us that the parliamentarians will be able to feed into and keep abreast of consultations and other policy exercises. To avoid any doubt, we clearly would not wish to unduly impinge on the independence of the Financial Conduct Authority, the Prudential Regulation Authority and other key actors. However, half of the delegated powers in this Bill go directly to regulators, and not even one of those has a formal parliamentary process attached to it.
I would not go so far as saying these proposals amount to deregulation, but I do believe that there is an absence of proper oversight and scrutiny mechanisms could lead us down a dangerous road in the future. As my noble friend Lord Eatwell, who will join us during later stages of the Bill, notes, the language used in the Bill’s supporting documents is, in places, worryingly reminiscent of the early 2000s.
It seems to me that, at the very least, regulators should be required to engage meaningfully with Parliament as a matter of course. It means more than periodically publishing reports or giving evidence to committees after important policy changes have been enacted. In the other place, arguments were put forward that Parliament should have a role in approving new rules before they take effect. I am sure we will explore this further.
Given the level of interest in this topic, I hope we can work collaboratively across your Lordships’ House to ensure improvements are made. In an ideal world, the Minister would work with us. However, if the Government remain unconvinced of our arguments, we reserve the right to ask MPs to think again. After all, we were told time and again that leaving the EU would see power returned to Parliament. Let us ensure the promise is upheld.
I am sure there are many of us who were hoping never to utter the word “Brexit” ever again. However, this Bill is inherently linked with the outcomes of the Brexit process. Therefore, as we progress to Committee, we will need to examine forensically the gap between the Government’s many commitments on financial services and the suboptimal reality the sector faces. Even if the Government seal a memorandum of understanding in March, access to EU markets will be well below what they have been. Why has the Prime Minister fallen so far short of his promises?
I am conscious that noble Lords are eager to hear from the Minister, so I will be brief in outlining other areas of concern. We expect important debates on the shift from LIBOR to SONIA and all that entails. Several noble Lords mentioned additional steps that could help to tackle money laundering and other forms of financial crime. It is important that we get this right. As I have mentioned, we need to ensure that consumers are properly protected from unscrupulous practices. On this last point, we will seek to table amendments that require proper regulation of the “buy now pay later” firms which appear to have grown exponentially during the Covid-19 pandemic. A review is under way in this area, but Labour believes that more urgency is required, especially if we are to avoid a repeat of the social problems that resulted from the past behaviour of certain payday lenders.
We look forward to working with colleagues on all Benches to hold the Chancellor to his word on greening finance. The Government have made a range of broader commitments, domestic and global, on climate change and it is vital that our legislation reflects the urgency of the situation.
This has been a very good debate, graced by two excellent maiden speeches. I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Hammond of Runnymede, and the noble Baroness, Lady Shafik, on their excellent contributions. It has been both a good debate and a surprising one. There has been a remarkable level of consensus running through the discussions, and I believe that that consensus means that the Bill is going to be much amended before it is sent back to the other place. I particularly think that the whole issue of accountability and scrutiny of the regulation-making powers is crucial and has to be further considered. I think the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, got it right—it is not often I agree with her—and the words “accountability deficit” are crucial.
I recommend that the Minister ponders carefully what he hears in the subsequent days of debate in Committee. The best way forward will almost certainly be through negotiated agreement to reintroduce a satisfactory level of accountability and scrutiny.
Lord Agnew of Oulton (Con)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their help in the thorough scrutiny of this Bill, both in this Chamber today and outside it. First, I offer my congratulations to my noble friend Lord Hammond of Runnymede, both on his speech and on the timing of his arrival at the beginning of this important piece of legislation. I also congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Shafik, whom I have had the pleasure of meeting on one occasion. I know she will bring great wisdom to this House.
As I have said, this Bill represents the first step in a wider programme of reform and work to deliver the ambitious vision for financial services that the Chancellor set out in November. My noble friends Lord Hammond, Lord Hunt and Lord Bridges, among others raised the issue of how to appropriately balance the UK’s competitiveness as a global financial centre with the need to ensure the safety and soundness of the market. It cannot be a race to the bottom, and I take the point of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, that we cannot be a first-class global financial centre if we try to race to the bottom, bearing in mind her comments about Janet Yellen. We need to show to the rest of the world that this will be a soundly regulated environment.
As the Chancellor stressed in his November speech, the Government are committed to maintaining and enhancing the UK’s position as a global hub for finance. We will continue to consider appropriate ways to further this ambition in the way we approach this legislation. This is demonstrated by the inclusion of a duty on the regulators, when making the prudential rules covered by the Bill, to have regard to the likely effect on the UK’s competitiveness.
The noble Lords, Lord Oates and Lord Naseby, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Hayman, Lady Sheehan, Lady McIntosh, Lady Ritchie and Lady Bennett, underlined the important role that the financial services sector must play in our efforts to tackle climate change and its impact. To reassure noble Lords, green finance will remain integral to financial services legislation in the UK. The Chancellor made a number of green commitments in his November speech. The noble Lord, Lord Reid, noted that net zero was not explicitly addressed in the Bill, but this Government can show a substantial track record in tackling carbon in our economy. I believe that we are one of the fastest reducers of carbon emissions of any G7 country. The regulators already consider climate change as a risk to the economy, including through climate change stress tests, which assess the impact of climate-related risks on the UK’s financial system.
My noble friends Lord Holmes and Lord Leigh of Hurley spoke on the importance of fintech. The UK is building on its existing strengths as a leading global destination to start, grow and invest in fintech. We will shortly have Ron Kalifa’s report on this important issue and I am sure that this House will debate it further once the report is available.
Constraints on time mean that I may not be able to address all the issues raised in detail, but I will write to any noble Lord to whom I am not able to respond today. I start with the first objective: to enhance the UK’s world-leading prudential standards and protect financial stability. It would be remiss of me not to acknowledge the strong views across the whole House on the issue of regulatory oversight and the delegation of powers to regulators. It will be the Government’s job over the next few weeks to try to reassure this House that we have got the right balance. We have heard much on this from the noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer, Lady Noakes, Lady Altmann and Lady Bowles, the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, the noble Lords, Lord Sharkey, Lord Blackwell, Lord Tunnicliffe, Lord Desai and Lord Sharpe, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans—quite a wide spectrum.
I do not, however, accept the suggestion that anything in the Bill undermines Parliament’s role in relation to financial services regulation. The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 creates the existing UK model for financial services legislation. It sets the objectives for the PRA and FCA and confers broad rule-making powers to give them the tools that they need to meet those objectives. It also specifies the mechanisms for Parliament to scrutinise the regulators’ success in meeting the objectives that are set for them. Through the FSMA, Parliament therefore establishes the appropriate architecture to guarantee that our financial services sector is well regulated. Parliament entrusts the detailed rule-making needed to deliver this to the UK’s independent and expert regulators. Our role is to give them the right objectives to ensure that they prioritise the safety and soundness of our financial system.
While the original FSMA model is 20 years old, following the financial crisis there was a thorough review of our approach to financial services legislation. We made significant changes to the regulatory architecture, splitting responsibility for prudential and conduct regulation and establishing a Financial Policy Committee with a remit to identify, monitor and take action to address systemic risks to the UK’s financial system. We also made regulatory changes, such as ring-fencing retail parts of banks from their investment and international banking activities. However, there was no change to the principle that independent and expert regulators are best placed to make detailed rules, albeit with the appropriate parliamentary scrutiny. The International Monetary Fund, the OECD and wider academic literature consider the FSMA model to be world leading. The Government likewise continue to believe that it forms the appropriate basis for our financial services regulation. However, they also recognise that it is important to balance the regulator’s role as a rule-maker with a greater level of democratic oversight and accountability.
The approach that the Bill seeks to take in relation to prudential measures builds on our respected FSMA model of regulation. We are consulting on the broader approach to regulation. This will close shortly on 19 February. However, it is necessary to act now on these elements of prudential regulation to ensure that we keep pace with international developments. In relation to these specific measures, having considered the issue, the other place reached the view that the Bill gets the balance right.
The approach taken here will ensure that our regime has the agility and flexibility needed to respond quickly and effectively to emerging challenges. There is a balance to be struck between the level of detail put down in legislation and regulators’ ability to respond to a changing environment. We are seeking to help UK firms seize new opportunities safely and responsibly. The accountability framework we have written into the Bill provides appropriate strategic policy input and democratic oversight from the Government and Parliament in these specific areas. Through this accountability framework and related provisions, Parliament will set the policy framework within which the regulators operate. For example, it will require the PRA to have regard to the effect of the Basel rules on the provision of finance to the real economy. The Bill places obligations on the regulators to report on how the matters specified in the Bill have influenced the rules that they make. Various mechanisms are available to Parliament for further scrutiny—for example, calling the regulators to appear before the relevant committees. As my honourable friend the Economic Secretary said in the other place, the make-up of these committees is primarily a matter for Parliament, and not the Government, to determine.
I hope these points have addressed some of the issues and concerns raised by my noble friends Lord Naseby and Lord Blackwell. I look forward to discussing this further in Committee, with my other government colleagues, to see what assurance we can provide for noble Lords that we have the right approach.
My noble friends Lord Northbrook and Lord Blackwell asked about the FCA’s use of Libor powers. The FCA published a consultation on 18 November, on the use of its power to provide for the continuity of Libor after panel banks withdraw their contributions. The Bill will mean that the FCA is required to publish, and have regard to, statements of policy when exercising its power to change the methodology of a benchmark. Industry respondents have noted that our legislation marks an important step in the wind down of Libor, but we also recognise their suggestions that it may be beneficial to provide additional legal protections to limit the potential for litigation associated with the application of a synthetic Libor. In Committee in the other place, my honourable friend the Economic Secretary stated that the Treasury was committed to looking into the issue further and providing industry with the reassurance that it needs.
The Bill’s second objective is to promote openness between the UK and international markets. The noble Lord, Lord Butler, spoke about the markets in financial instruments directive and the investment firm prudential regime measures. I can confirm that the FCA has already published its first consultation on the details of this regime. I will write to the noble Lord further on his wider questions, which extend beyond the Bill specifically. Likewise, I will respond to the question of the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, about our relationship with the USA, in writing. I reiterate the point I made at the beginning: we have a common interest in having a regulatory framework that is attractive to large markets such as the United States. Similarly, I will write to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans on his questions surrounding the access to Gibraltar.
The noble Earl, Lord Shrewsbury, the noble Lords, Lord Reid, Lord Gadhia, Lord Northbrook, Lord Holmes and Lord Hodgson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, spoke of equivalence, in our new relationship with the EU. In November, the Chancellor announced as many equivalence decisions as we could for the EU and EEA member states, in favour of openness and it made sense to do so. Equivalence is an autonomous, unilateral mechanism, and our preference has always been for a full set of mutual decisions for both the UK and the EU. We remain open for further discussions with the EU on the decisions. The UK and the EU have agreed to structured regulatory co-operation for financial service based on a shared commitment to preserve financial stability, market integrity and the protection of investors and consumers. A memorandum of understanding will be agreed in discussion between the EU and the UK in March, to establish a framework for this co-operation. However, I accept the realpolitik of the situation and that, as many noble Lords have said today, we must not put all our hopes in that particular expectation. We need to use our new-found independence to create a regime that can have a successful relationship with the EU, but if it is not prepared to reciprocate, we need to move on to deal with that.
I will say a little bit more to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, on delegated powers. Several other jurisdictions largely use regulator rules to regulate financial services; indeed, the EU is the outlier in this regard. This means that the EU is used to assessing regulator rules and practice as part of its equivalence assessments. There is no reason why it would not be able to assess the UK in the same way, if the will is there. There is no suggestion that the US would not accept this as a proper and responsible regulation.
I say to my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley that the Government are continuing to work together with the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, the PRA and the FCA on the issues he outlined. I will ask officials to write to him specifically on the example he gave about the scam to which he was subjected, and this strange anomaly about the regulator not being able to deal with it because he was not actually a customer. That deserves a detailed response.
The Bill’s third and final objective is to support the maintenance of an effective financial services regulatory framework and sound capital markets. I greatly appreciate the efforts of colleagues on the opposite Benches, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, in engaging with the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, and my noble friend Lady Altmann spoke about bills of sale and logbook loans. I am grateful to them for raising the issue. I will write to my noble friend Lord Naseby on the issues he raised regarding home-collected credit and the perhaps mistaken conflation with payday lending.
I restate my commitment, and that of all my government colleagues, to work constructively with the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe. I have found him to be a very constructive interlocutor and I want to try to maintain that dialogue over the next few weeks.
From economic crime to buy now, pay later, which the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, raised, it is important to stress that the Government are firmly committed to protecting consumers. Chris Woolard, the former interim CEO of the FCA, is undertaking a review of the unsecured credit market, including buy now, pay later. This report is due shortly. If it concludes that regulation is necessary, we are ready to take quick and proportionate action to implement it.
I can assure my noble friends Lord Jopling and Lord Naseby, my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier, the noble Lords, Lord Hendy and Lord Rooker, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Ritchie and Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, that the Government are committed to making the UK a hostile place for illicit finance. The UK is internationally recognised as having some of the strongest controls worldwide for tackling money laundering and terrorist financing. In 2019 the Government published the landmark economic crime plan, which brought together the Government, law enforcement and the private sector in closer co-operation than ever before, to deliver a whole-system response to economic crime.
I listened intently to the comments of the noble Lords, Lord Rooker and Lord Davies, and the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, regarding the statutory debt repayment scheme measure. I confirm that implementing this scheme remains a key priority of this Government. We will consult of draft regulations as soon as possible after the Financial Services Bill receives Royal Assent.
Now that we have left the EU, this comprehensive package of measures represents the UK assuming responsibility for making its own laws in this area. The Financial Services Bill is a first step towards achieving that goal. I beg to move.
Financial Services Bill
Monday 22nd February 2021
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Financial Services Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 162-II(Rev) Revised second marshalled list for Grand Committee - (22 Feb 2021)
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Healy of Primrose Hill) (Lab)
My Lords, the hybrid Grand Committee will now begin. Some Members are here in person, respecting social distancing, and others are participating remotely, but all Members will be treated equally. I must ask Members in the Room to wear a face covering except when seated at their desk, to speak sitting down and to wipe down their desk, chair and any other touch points before and after use. If the capacity of the Committee Room is exceeded, or other safety requirements are breached, I will immediately adjourn the Committee. If there is a Division in the House, the Committee will adjourn for five minutes.
I will call Members to speak in the order listed. During the debate on each group, I invite Members, including Members in the Grand Committee Room, to email the clerk if they wish to speak after the Minister, using the Grand Committee address. I will call Members to speak in order of request. The groupings are binding. Leave should be given to withdraw amendments. When putting the Question, I will collect voices in the Grand Committee Room only.
I remind Members that Divisions cannot take place in Grand Committee. It takes unanimity to amend the Bill, so if a single voice says “Not Content”, an amendment is negatived; if a single voice says “Content”, a clause stands part. If a Member taking part remotely wants their voice accounted for if the Question is put, they must make this clear when speaking on the group. We will now begin. I call the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey.
We cannot hear the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, so I will have to adjourn the Committee for a few minutes while we sort this out technically.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Healy of Primrose Hill) (Lab)
I call the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, again.
Amendment 1
Lord Sharkey
“Duty of the FCA to make rules introducing a duty of care
(1) The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is amended as follows.(2) After section 137C, insert the following new section—137CA FCA general rules: duty of care (1) The power of the FCA to make general rules includes the power to introduce a duty of care owed by authorised persons to consumers in carrying out regulated activities under this Act. (2) “Duty of care” means an obligation to exercise reasonable care and skill when providing a product or service.(3) “Consumer” has the meaning given in section 2(3) of the Consumer Rights Act 2015.”(3) The FCA must make rules in accordance with section 137CA (FCA general rules: duty of care) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 which come into force no later than six months after the day on which this Act is passed.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would impose on financial services providers a general duty of care to their clients.
Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]
Amendment 1 would require the FCA to
“make rules introducing a duty of care … owed by authorised persons to consumers in carrying out regulated activities”
under FSMA 2000. The Government understand the value of a duty of care; they are about to introduce exactly that in the forthcoming online harms Bill. They understand the immense harm that can be done to consumers without this duty, especially in complex and asymmetric environments.
We have already seen too many examples of the immense harm inflicted by our financial services industry on ordinary consumers—I am thinking here of PPI, which was a product sold to consumers at an 87% commission rate. The scandal ended up costing £53.8 billion in redress and administration costs. I am also thinking of mis-sold interest-rate hedging products and the general and widespread unfair treatment of small businesses in financial difficulty. There was also the long-running saga of overcharging for overdrafts and of leaving loyal customers languishing in poor-value products.
The existing rules did not prevent any of these things, which is not a surprise. There is no explicit requirement in FSMA or in the FCA’s principles for business for firms to prevent harms to customers. The FCA’s “treating customers fairly” business principle is substantially weakened by the legal principle in FSMA that consumers should
“take responsibility for their decisions”.
This fails to take into account the imbalance in power and information between firms and their customers.
Things are not getting any better. Recent examples of misbehaviour include the banks’ response to the authorised push payment fraud, inadequate assessment of affordability by payday lenders, the scandal in Woodford Investment Management, sales of risky investment products on the boundary of the FCA’s perimeter and the outrageous behaviour of some insurers during the pandemic trying to welsh on their business interruption policies.
The Minister will be aware of the Banking Standards Board’s annual survey of 29 member banks’ behaviour and competence. There was some welcome improvement in these areas between 2016 and 2017 but none since. In 2019, 13% of employees of these banks said that they had seen instances of unethical behaviour being rewarded and 14% felt that it was difficult to make career progression without flexing their ethical standards.
The FCA knows all this, of course, and has occasionally acted. However, within the existing legal framework it often takes many years for the FCA to respond to firms’ harmful practices. An example of this is the treatment of loyal general insurance customers, which the FCA is only just beginning to tackle.
Then there is the question of the high-cost short-term credit sector. Wonga may have gone, thanks largely to pressure from this House, and after intense pressure from Parliament there is now a price cap on rent to own. But problems persist with, for example, doorstep lending, guarantor loans and new, automated overdraft products.
The FCA tackles unacceptable practices slowly and piecemeal, allowing harm to persist for many years. It was particularly late in spotting the rapid growth of buy now pay later and its potential for harm. I believe that the Government have said that they intend to address this problem and I hope that they will use this Bill as an opportunity to do that. I would be pleased if that were to be the case, but the slow and cumbersome engine of primary legislation would not have been necessary had a duty of care extended over the sector.
The FCA has published eight papers in the last five years dealing wholly or in part with the question of duty of care, but it still has not developed a clear view or a recommendation. In its consultation feedback paper of April 2019, the FCA noted:
“Most respondents consider that levels of harm to consumers are high and there needs to be change to better protect them.”
It then sat on the fence about what this change should be, reporting that none of the financial service providers favoured a duty of care. Mandy Rice-Davies would have known what to say to that.
In any case, as the FCA’s consumer panel noted,
“Much of the debate on a duty of care has centred on legalistic arguments about whether there is a ‘gap’ in protection. What matters is whether consumers get the treatment they want and expect from their financial services providers.”
The consumer panel commissioned Populus to ask individual and small business customers about their experiences. The research showed that the customer is not at the heart of business decisions and that 92% of respondents were in favour of a duty of care in financial services.
While sitting on the fence, the FCA has also managed to hit the ball into the long grass. It promised to initiate yet another consultation on the issue, initially due last year but now postponed. In the meantime, levels of financial vulnerability grow. The FCA’s latest Financial Lives survey, published 11 days ago, makes grim reading. It notes that Covid-19 has reversed the previous positive trend in vulnerability. Between March and October last year, the number of adults with characteristics of vulnerability increased by 3.7 million to 27.7 million. That means that over half of all adults are financially vulnerable—a truly alarming figure.
The same survey also notes that unsolicited approaches have increased during the pandemic, increasing the risk of fraud and scams. Over a third of adults say that they have received at least one such approach and 1.4 million say that they have paid out money as a result of a possible Covid scam. Unsurprisingly but regrettably, people with characteristics of vulnerability have been the more susceptible: 12% paid out money, compared with 1% of the non-vulnerable. None of this will get any better when the furlough and business support arrangements come to an end. Financial pressures and desperation will inevitably increase; vulnerable people will be disadvantaged, treated unfairly and scammed.
Dealing with all this would be made significantly easier if the FCA were to impose a duty of care on service providers. The idea has widespread support. In May 2019, the Treasury Select Committee published its report on the inquiry into consumers’ access to financial services. Paragraph 210 of the report says:
“All retail financial services, no matter which sector of the industry they operate in, should be acting in their customers’ best interests at all times. If the FCA is unable to enforce such behaviour in firms under its current rule book and principles, the Committee would support a legal duty of care, analogous to that in the legal industry, creating a legal obligation for firms to act in their customers’ best interests.”
The FCA’s own financial services consumer panel, responding to the FCA’s discussion paper, said:
“A new duty is required to improve the position of all consumers … including those who need more support.”
The Money and Pensions Service said:
“MaPS remains convinced that a formal ‘duty of care’ on financial firms could provide a better balance between firm and consumer responsibilities and help deliver extra protection and better treatment to vulnerable consumers.”
StepChange is in favour, as is Fair by Design, and so are many organisations with direct and in-depth experience of the financial catastrophes that can be visited on the poor and the vulnerable. I am grateful for the explicit support and encouragement in pressing for a duty of care from Age UK and the Alzheimer’s Society and I am especially grateful to Macmillan Cancer Support for its unfailing help and advice. I am also indebted to the former chair of the FCA’s consumer panel, Sue Lewis, for her support.
Despite all this support, the Government will no doubt resist the idea of introducing a formal duty of care. When this issue was raised at Report in the Commons, John Glen addressed it by saying simply:
“As the FCA is already taking steps to ensure that financial services firms exercise due care and regard when offering products, services and advice, a statutory duty of care, as proposed by new clause 21, is not necessary.”—[Official Report, Commons, 13/1/21; col. 366.]
He did not say what these steps were or make any assessment of their actual or likely effectiveness. Today the Government may add to John Glen’s reasons for rejecting a duty of care and may advance the argument that they need to wait to give the SMCR time to work. Surely five years is long enough—five years in which there has been just one successful conviction. The FCA’s consumer panel points out that this is essentially a category error and notes:
“The SMCR is primarily a supervision tool—it will be a valuable mechanism to ensure that firms are complying with a new duty.”
The Minister may also pray in aid the reinforced, better-resourced and more active FOS. It is true that FOS dealt with around 250,000 cases in 2019-20. In these cases overall, one-third of judgments were in the consumers’ favour. This is evidence enough of large-scale misbehaviour, but the figures are much worse for products aimed at the financially vulnerable: 89% for guarantor loans, 84% for doorstep loans and 78% for logbook loans.
This is not—absolutely not—evidence of successful regulation. Every one of these judgments is evidence of a failure to sell the right product to the right individual or small business, to explain it clearly or to handle a complaint properly. The FCA’s current rules and principles are failing to stop this tidal wave of mis-selling, malfeasance and malpractice. We need a new approach that focuses on prevention of harm and delivers extra protection and better treatment for vulnerable customers. We need a duty of care and I beg to move.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, I declare my interests as in the register. I support all the amendments in this group and what has already been expertly said by my noble friend Lord Sharkey. I will comment on the duty of care later, but first I will introduce my Amendment 72, which calls for warnings relating to non-regulated activity.
The issue here is one where firms that are authorised in respect of regulated activity also conduct unregulated activity, and customers are misled by the fact that the firm is authorised for some activity into thinking that the authorisation is some kind of guarantee of quality. It is what Dame Elizabeth Gloster called in her report “the halo effect”, and about which she said again to the Treasury Select Committee a couple of weeks ago that something should be done.
One thing that is done by the Bill is enabling unused authorisations to be more easily cancelled, but that does not solve the problem when there are still used authorisations. This is a problem that has long been known about and does not affect only unscrupulous businesses. Therefore, the amendment aims to make it quite clear to consumers what the situation is in three ways.
First, authorisation must not be referenced in any communication, including on letterheads or websites, as a reputational guarantee regarding non-regulated activity. In practice that should mean the ending of straplines. Secondly, when non-regulated activity is being conducted, that must be made clear, together with an explanation that it means that access to the Financial Ombudsman Service and/or Financial Services Compensation Scheme is not available. Thirdly, it would be an offence to imply that a non-regulated activity is covered by an authorisation.
The first two provisions relate to authorised firms aiming to stop the halo effect in as far as that is possible. I do not expect firms to write to clients saying, “This is the rogue side of our business”, but I hope that clients will be more aware that that might be so. The third point is a general point and would apply beyond regulated firms, but my aim is to catch passive implications, so that active steps to inform have to be taken.
The amendment has been drafted to make the point clear, rather than as a perfect draft to weave in among other regulatory provisions, and I hope that the Minister will take up the idea and recognise that reducing a problem by eliminating surplus authorisations does not reduce the problem to its smallest possibilities.
Turning now to the duty of care, I want to add that a duty of care should apply to the regulators as well. Of course, they say that they act in the public interest, but they are every bit as aggressive about protecting themselves—of all things from the public and from liability—as the firms that they supervise. My view of this is simple: “If you don’t live by it, you don’t really understand it”.
If one examines the responses to the FCA’s discussion paper in July 2019, the majority were in favour, two of the main reasons being that it was critical to triggering a fundamental culture change away from asking “Is this within the regulations?” and into “Is this right?” Secondly, it would give a duty to avoid harm that would incentivise firms to evaluate consumer risk at every stage.
What is not to like in that? It seems that just a handful of respondents did not want any more than was already in those principles about treating customers fairly. But they were very much in the minority and, sadly, it seems that some of those in favour of a duty of care are not in favour of it being actionable. I am in favour of a duty of care, I am in favour of it being actionable and I am in favour of it applying to regulators as well, because something is going wrong all round and, frankly, I find the FCA’s hesitancy a matter of serious concern.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to take part in this first group of amendments, and I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, on the way he introduced it. There could barely be a better amendment to start Committee.
In 2017, during the passage of the Financial Guidance and Claims Bill, now enacted, there was much discussion of, and amendments tabled around, a duty of care, with support from all sides of the House. The response then was that the time was not right: we had to get through Brexit and then look at financial rules and regulators in the round. Four years on, with Brexit done, I think the time is more than now to consider duty of care in all its manifestations, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, set out.
In saying that, like other noble Lords I am extremely grateful for the briefings and unstinting hard work undertaken by many organisations in this area. It is invidious to single out two, but I will, not least the Money Advice Trust and Macmillan Cancer Support. Duty of care was an issue in 2017; it was an issue way before that. The Covid crisis has not brought about the need for a duty of care; it has merely shone the brightest and starkest of spotlights on the issues right across the financial services sector.
It is difficult to put it any clearer than this, from a client of Macmillan Cancer Support in one of her darkest moments: “It felt like I was fighting my bank as well as fighting cancer”. Fighting my bank as well as fighting cancer—that is a more than good enough reason to think extremely carefully about how to bring about a duty of care. That one individual speaks for hundreds of thousands.
My Amendment 129 in this group seeks to introduce rights of action for SMEs for breaches of the FCA handbook. I believe the amendment would bring clarity and consistency to how the handbook operates. These rights of action are currently available only to private persons but, when we consider this in the round, not least in the world of FS when we think of fintech founders, are the “Ss” of SMEs—micro-businesses—essentially that different from private persons? Of course I understand the concept of the corporate veil and limitation in all its forms but, in essence, when it comes to operating in a regulatory framework, as we currently have, are micro-businesses that different from private individuals, who currently have this right of action?
Imagine this: currently, a micro-business has only the letter of the contract to take action against the bank. This seems wholly unsatisfactory and more than a little asymmetric. The nature of the relationship between a small business and a bank should be much more effectively reflected in the rulebook. Need I suggest some of the ways this may have helped in the past, with Libor, forex, the GRG, and Lloyds/HBOS activities in Reading? In particular, RBS’s global restructuring group was one of the most shameful episodes in this country’s banking history.
Fundamentally, the amendment can be summed up in a simple line: in reality, how can an SME or micro-business take a bank to court? Amendment 129 offers the appropriate level of support and clarity to our SMEs, and consistency in the operation of the rulebook. Our SMEs are the beating heart of our economy. I suggest we use the amendment to put some head alongside that heart.
Lord McNicol of West Kilbride (Lab) [V]
My Lords, at this stage I have not put my name to any amendments, but I will speak in support of Amendment 4, tabled by my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe, and make a few relevant points. Before I start, I make the Grand Committee aware of my financial interests as set out in the Lords’ register and echo the point from the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, about the imbalance of power between the lender and the individual—a critical point that I am sure we will come back to in Committee.
Low financial resilience and overindebtedness are huge problems for individuals and the country. UK households have nearly £250 billion of outstanding consumer credit debt and more than 42.5 million people have used consumer credit. Those are the figures for 2019, pre Covid. In 2020 and into 2021 the problem has only worsened. The FCA recently found that the number of people suffering from low financial resilience increased by one-third to 14.2 million people in October 2021. That is nearly one-quarter of the UK adult population.
We know that low financial resilience is not just about overindebtedness. It can be caused by a combination of low savings and erratic family income. Erratic income and low levels of savings are not issues that the FCA can solve—government intervention and education are required to tackle those. However, overindebtedness is an issue that the FCA can help to address. Amendment 4 and a number of the other amendments in this group, as well as the later Amendment 8, would give the FCA some of the tools to do so.
As set out by the Government, the FCA has three key functions: protecting consumers, keeping the industry stable and promoting healthy competition between financial service providers. Of those three critical functions, I would like to concentrate on the first, of protecting consumers. Amendment 4 takes that current responsibility and would add to the Bill a clause which would give the Financial Conduct Authority a duty of care and, later, under Amendment 8,
“rules … to promote financial wellbeing”.
These would enhance the FCA’s powers to protect consumers—something which I am sure we all agree is necessary.
Christopher Woolard, chair of the recent Woolard review, said:
“Most of us will use credit at some point in our lives. So, it’s vital that we have a fair market that works for everyone. New ways of borrowing and the impact of the pandemic are changing the market, with billions of pounds now in unregulated transactions and millions of consumers at greater risk of financial difficulty”.
The Woolard report sets out 26 recommendations to the FCA, some on working with government and other bodies to make unsecured credit markets fit for the future. I hope that the Minister and Her Majesty’s Government will look at the amendments tabled and, where those issues and recommendations raised by Woolard align with them, we will see some government amendments or an acceptance of the amendments laid to the Bill.
This is specifically pertinent in relation to “buy now, pay later” products. On 13 January in the other place, Stella Creasy moved an amendment that would have required the BNPL industry to be regulated by the FCA. The proposal was defeated by the Government, by 355 votes to 265. The Woolard review makes the point, on the regulation of the unregulated “buy now, pay later” sector:
“BNPL products which are currently exempt from regulation should be brought within the regulatory perimeter as a matter of urgency. The use of BNPL products nearly quadrupled in 2020 and is now at £2.7 billion, with 5 million people using these products since the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic”.
The report continues by stating that
“more than one in ten customers of a major bank using BNPL were already in arrears. Regulation would protect people who use BNPL products and make the market sustainable.”
Seeing the light, the Minister, John Glen, agreed that Her Majesty’s Government need to act and bring BNPL into the scope of FCA regulation. I was hoping to see a government amendment to this effect, as the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, said earlier, but I am sure it will be forthcoming at later stages of the Bill.
I also bring to the Committee’s attention an article in the Observer yesterday, Sunday 21 February, entitled “High-cost lenders ‘exploit NHS workers on pandemic frontline’”. The article highlighted a number of individual cases, as well as the alarming and eye-watering interest rates of over 1,300% being charged by some high-cost credit providers.
The article is based on a University of Edinburgh Business School research report, which makes it evident that the signs of financial vulnerability within the NHS workforce are being ignored by high-cost lenders on an industry-wide basis. Overindebted NHS workers are now struggling with unaffordable loans. They did not receive them from unlicensed backstreet lenders: more often than not, they got them through FCA-licensed and regulated high-cost lenders. This is why Amendment 4 is so important in stating
“the general principle that firms should not profit from exploiting a consumer’s vulnerability, behavioural biases or constrained choices”.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]
My Lords, I am delighted to follow the noble Lord. I would like to support the case for introducing a duty of care and look forward to hearing from my noble friend as to why in the Government’s view it may not be needed.
I will focus my remarks on Amendment 72, so ably moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and in particular on subsection (2) of the proposed new clause. It concerns me greatly that there is still a huge area of unregulated provision of financial services here, in particular in the case of young people who, after they have graduated and are looking to pay off their student loans, will be relying on their banking facilities. It does seem that we need either a duty of care or, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, set out in subsection (2) of the proposed new clause, some means by which we indicate to potential consumers and customers exactly what the situation is. I find that this area is compellingly in need of greater regulation—or, if not that, then the pointing of actual customers or potential future customers towards acting in this regard.
I find it extraordinary what information is provided to any of us, and in particular to young people. The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, did a great service in setting out not just PPI but a number of other irregularities—at the very least—that have come to light in the last five or 10 years that need some form of redress in order to close this particular loophole.
We are in an extraordinary situation where there are a number of non-regulated financial services. In particular, Amendment 72 would seek to redress this. But also, Amendments 1 and 4 imposing a duty of care have many strengths to commend them. I look forward to my noble friend in summing up giving the reaction of the Government to the proposal for such a duty of care in the circumstances set out therein.
Lord Blunkett (Lab) [V]
I am very pleased indeed to join in this important debate. The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, set out the situation in the macro field extremely well and I am pleased to support the speeches that have already been made by a number of noble Lords.
I will concentrate on two things. The first is the issue of protection from exploitation with the development of cybercrime. I hope we will be able to come back to this in Committee and on Report with respect to the risks that people are put into because of the lack of care within the whole of the financial services sector. Secondly, very small businesses and partnerships are excluded from redress, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, mentioned. This is also is relevant to Amendment 129, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond.
On the first issue, in relation to cybersecurity, there is a growing trend that those who are affected keep quiet rather than reveal what has happened. This is a real danger. If, as I hope, we come out of the present dip in relation to financial services globally because of Brexit, we will be able to present to the world a marketplace which is both effective and forward looking—and is also secure. A duty of care to both individual customers and to small and medium-sized enterprises is a critical element in taking this Bill forward and strengthening the measures that exist there. I will not egg the measures that I think are necessary this afternoon, because there will an opportunity to come back to them. But I will just say that this is a growing area of real concern. An improved mandate for those operating in the financial services sector from the FCA would be very welcome indeed.
On the issue of small and medium-sized businesses and small partnerships, and the relationship between them and individual consumer, it is little known that access to the Financial Ombudsman is confined to individuals rather than small businesses and partnerships. What was said by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, and also the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, was highly relevant here. It backs up the need for clarity in terms of how we deal not only with prevention but with redress.
I give one small example, which I took up the with the noble Lord, Lord O’Shaughnessy, when he was at the Department of Health. To his credit, he saw the wisdom of trying to bring about change. As the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, has described, it was not received well at the time because of the struggle that was going on post the Brexit referendum and because of the difficulties the Government were facing. We have dealt with banks and financial services, but we need to concern ourselves with insurance as well. Perhaps now is an opportune moment to deal with the situation where an insurance company is taken over and the new provider offers a slightly revised agreement which is sent out without highlighting the key changes that have been made.
For instance, in cover for physical ailments and physical damage because of accident, there is no change, but in terms of absence from work and insurance by a partnership with more than 10 partners insuring together, the mental health clauses are changed to make any payment dependent on having to gain, within 12 weeks, the sign-off of a psychiatrist and a clinical psychologist. Anyone with any knowledge of this area will know that that is an impossible ask. Had it been highlighted to the partnership, it would have been able to look elsewhere for an insurer that was not going to exploit the market as this company did.
The partnership could not go to the ombudsman. It would have been entitled to if each individual partner had insured themselves, but because there were more than 10 of them signed up to the insurance contract, that was not possible. We need to put right nonsense of this kind and ensure that those making enormous amounts of money, which they will continue to do, do not do so at the expense of individuals or small and medium-sized enterprises.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett. I very much support his call for a financial sector that is secure, that does not threaten the security of all of us and that does not exploit people who are forced to use its services.
I speak chiefly to Amendment 1 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, also signed by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and me. It was ably introduced by the noble Lord. I speak to this amendment because it is a subject close to my heart and one that I referred to at length in my speech at Second Reading. This group fits together nicely when we look also at Amendments 72 and 129, which I also support. We are talking about a huge imbalance of power in the interactions between the financial sector and its customers. As the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, said in his introduction, when talking about this we often focus on banks, but we have seen some truly outrageous behaviour from insurance companies during the Covid-19 pandemic, something that I have referred to previously in the House.
When thinking about this amendment I reflected on being a 19 year-old in Australia, many years ago, buying a studio flat. It was cheaper then to have a mortgage than to pay rent. My father stood as guarantor and met the local bank manager—they knew each other personally. This was before the financial deregulation that allowed the massive boosting of prices, as the excellent 2016 New Economics Foundation report The Financialisaton of UK Homes laid out. That was what made it possible.
However, the banking sector then was no ideal model. It was undoubtedly paternalistic, patriarchal and discriminatory, against people from BAME and certain socioeconomic backgrounds and on the basis of gender. I am not sure whether my father was forced to be guarantor because I was a single female and a strange type of person to be taking out a loan, or just because of my youth, but there was in the local bank manager an individual knowledge and understanding, and the hope that if something went wrong, an individual would know your circumstances and do their best to help you.
That is not the situation that we have now. We have a “computer says no” approach. Anyone with a problem can expect to encounter an endlessly changing rota of call centre staff reading from scripts. We could hope for a locally based institution serving the needs of local communities, something that other parts of the world, such as Germany, still expect from their financial sector. That would be a financial sector that served as a utility, not as a generator of maximum profit. Care would then be built in and we might not need an amendment such as the duty of care amendment, but we have to start from where we are.
Lord Blackwell (Con) [V]
My Lords, I understand the motives of these amendments and sympathise with a lot of what has been said. However, I will be a dissenting voice on whether the form of the amendments is proportionate and practical in meeting the objectives set out.
As we all recognise, financial services have a social purpose. They play a critical role in society and in people’s lives and they have to recognise that in their responsibilities. There are clearly still failures in the way the industry operates, some unintended and some still involving bad behaviour, and, as many noble Lords have pointed out, there is a problem in the unregulated sector. However, most of the major institutions now exercise their responsibilities carefully, trying to do so in the best interests of their customers. I do not recognise in some of the comments made the tens of thousands—in fact, over 100,000—ordinary bank workers who go into their branches or call centres every day and try desperately to do their best for customers, motivated by the most genuine service obligations. In the way that the banks have operated in providing basic bank accounts and the responsibilities that they have shown in their lending practices, the industry is by and large showing how it can evolve and act responsibly.
There are, of course, failures, as there will always be in any industry, but these can be dealt with under the existing FCA principles, reinforced as they are now by the SMCR regime. There has to be a boundary on what is reasonable to expect of the duty of care. We cannot expect financial services to take on the duties of the state as a social service for those who need extended financial support. Yes, it has obligations, but there is a limit to what the financial services sector can do for those in financial need.
My issue with the general duty of care is that it has no clear boundaries setting out when a financial service company has reached the limits of what it is reasonable to do under that duty of care. We have to recognise the reality that any intervention to increase customer support or protection has a cost. The direct costs of subsidising support to customers in financial need are now covered, as in utilities, through cross-subsidies—higher charges on other customers to pay for the extended credit or basic bank accounts for those customers in need. It is accepted within the industry and within society that a measure of cross-subsidy within the financial services sector is part of being a universal provider.
However, the indirect costs of compliance are more damaging; they may disadvantage those that they are meant to help. The more questions you need to ask your customers, the more detailed information you have to ensure they have understood and the more you have to penetrate into their lives, the more banks and insurance companies are forced to rely on formulaic compliance bureaucracy that erects barriers to simply understanding and addressing customers’ issues. People spend more time ticking the boxes than they do just listening and trying to provide a genuine real-world answer to the issues in front of the customer.
The danger is that, despite the best intentions of helping to ensure that people get good advice, there is an increase in costs and risks to compliance to the point where, as happened with the retail distribution review that took place some years ago, financial services companies simply withdraw from offering any services to those customers because they cannot take the risks and costs and the compliance burden pushes customers out of access to financial services.
Not having boundaries around what that duty of care comprises opens up the risks to financial services companies of court judgments and CMC claims that continually push the obligations and costs of compliance far beyond what is reasonable for a financial services company to do—one doing its best to offer financial products and serve its customers—and what is reasonable for the customer to take on, in terms of their responsibilities in setting out their needs.
I believe that, despite the motives behind this, it is much better to be prescriptive about what obligations there are for reasonable behaviour, as set out in the current FCA principles, which include the obligation to treat customers fairly and fairly communicate the information they require. These considerations require a high level of care and compliance, not always correctly done—but there are penalties when they are not done correctly. The SMCR regime is reinforcing that. As such, despite my sympathy for the motives behind these amendments, I believe that the intent behind them, however good, would not result in a proportionate or practical improvement in regulation and carries many dangers and risks both to financial services companies and, more importantly, to the customers whom we seek to protect.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I agree with much of what has been said and it is not necessary to repeat it. I support the objective of the amendments—in particular, I support my noble friend’s Amendment 4—and I look forward to the Minister’s reply. It is difficult to see how the principle of these amendments can be refused.
However, it is necessary to make an overarching point, which I base on my experience over 50 years as a close observer of the financial services industry. The truth is that the industry has a systemic tendency to malfeasance. This is not an attack on the great many good people who work within the industry, as the last contribution mentioned, in banks and insurance companies, who only wish to do a good day’s work. However, the unremitting succession of scandals involving finance is not just a series of unfortunate one-offs; it is built into its very nature. This is a big issue, but I emphasise two simple reasons. First, there is an inevitable asymmetry of information. As Amendment 4 highlights, there are
“a consumer’s vulnerability, behavioural biases or constrained choices”.
This situation is bound to create the sort of problem that we have seen. The second, even simpler, reason, using the classic but apocryphal words of Willie Sutton, is because it is “where the money is”. People seek to gain money from where there is lots of it and there is lots of it in the finance industry.
There is much to be done to solve this problem. It is systemic but it still needs to be addressed because people need help. However, what is in these amendments seems to me simply a minimum of what might be done to address the problems that the industry so clearly incorporates.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I simply do not understand the resistance we find from the Government and the FCA to the duty of care amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Sharkey, and supported by my noble friend Lady Bowles and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and to the almost identical Amendment 4 proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, and again by my noble friend Lady Bowles. I am not going to repeat the saga of abuse that many noble Lords have described. That has been done incredibly well and is exceedingly powerful. I will say though that this issue keeps happening. I notice the headline in today’s Times:
“City regulator ‘slow to act’ against car leasing firm”.
Every time we think that we are perhaps past a period of abuse, another one comes along. To me, it is utterly unacceptable, as I hope it is to everyone in this House.
What makes me particularly angry is that the regulator has largely known, very early on thanks to whistleblowers, when the financial institutions that it regulates are treating customers badly. However, again and again, the regulator takes years to react, reacts minimally at first, initiates a lengthy review—often several—asks the organisation to review itself and then does too little, too late. I want to pick up one issue in illustration: the treatment of payday lenders.
Many people in this House will remember the experience of trying to pass legislation to get a cap on the interest rates that payday lenders could levy. I bring up this issue because it deals with the difference between treating customers fairly and a duty of care. The FCA took a very strong position that customers were being treated fairly so long as they knew the terms of the contract. There were, perhaps, some constraints such as a limited number of rollovers. The FCA did not look at the far deeper issue of the way that people were being abused by payday lenders and the extraordinary level of interest rates. That is why the duty of care is very much more powerful. As my noble friend Lord Sharkey said, treating customers fairly is undermined in the FiSMA legislation by the caveat emptor parts of the FCA’s rules.
I am not a bit surprised that the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, objects to these duty of care amendments. When I sat for nearly two years on the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, the industry objected to almost every measure that would have constrained the abuse which created the crisis in 2008, such as the Libor crisis and PPI. The saga was endless. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, that in a later group of amendments I will be referring to the HBOS Reading case, another example of fraud perpetrated between 2003 and 2007. A number of bankers went to prison but today, in 2021, victims of that fraud still have not received fair compensation.
Dame Elizabeth Gloster’s damning report of last November on the FCA’s regulation of London Capital & Finance Plc said:
“The root causes of the FCA’s failure to regulate LCF appropriately were significant gaps and weaknesses in the policies and practices”.
That is simply true across the board. It is piecemeal, as my noble friend Lord Sharkey described.
Misbehaviour keeps happening and delayed redress is the normal pattern. To quote Einstein:
“The definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.”
It is time to make a step change to protect consumers, and I hope very much that the Government do so in this Bill.
Lord Eatwell (Lab)
My Lords, in considering this Bill, we are all placed in a somewhat odd position. The Treasury is, right now, conducting a financial services future regulatory framework review. Indeed, phase 2 of consultation on that review concluded just last Friday. While I fully understand that some parts of the Bill before us are associated directly with the UK having left the European Union, other parts are not associated in that way. It is quite likely that we will be back here in a few months’ time debating the same issues all over again when the Treasury decides on its response to the consultation and brings forward legislation to implement the future regulatory framework.
It would be comforting if the Minister could assure us that we are not wasting our time but, of course, she cannot do that, because none of us knows what the final outcome of the regulatory framework review will be. None the less it would be helpful if, when she sums up, the Minister could assure the Grand Committee that the Treasury will treat debates on this Bill as, at the very least, an enhanced consultation to which the Treasury will have full regard when reaching its final conclusions.
Let us get down to business on the amendments in the names of my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe, the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and myself. Every first-year student of financial markets knows that markets in retail products—financial products sold to individuals, households and small businesses—are seriously inefficient. One important reason why they are inefficient is due to asymmetric information, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said just now. To put it simply, the seller of the product typically knows much more about the risks involved in making a particular investment or other financial transaction than does the hapless investor. An extreme example of this is to be found when the chief economist of the Bank of England, Andy Haldane, confessed that he did not understand the pension that had been sold to him.
As the Committee will be aware, if it is the FCA’s strategic objective to ensure that the relevant markets function well, to do so in the presence of asymmetric information it has two broad operational options. Either it should regulate each individual financial product to ensure that the investor is properly informed or it could adopt the principle of Amendment 4—and, indeed, Amendment 1—and make general rules, including the power to introduce a duty of care owed by the authorised persons to consumers. Up to now, the FCA has adopted the former option and dealt with each issue as it arises. By its own admission, this has not gone very well. From its consultation entitled Our Future Approach to Consumers in 2017 through to the feedback statement published in April 2019, the FCA has wrestled with the issue of duty of care, and is still wrestling today. Yet it still persists with its failing approach of regulating each product, and that simply cannot go on.
Action is really imperative, for two main reasons: first, because of the persistent appearance of new products, such as the buy-now, pay-later schemes, which we will discuss later—persistent innovation, which the FCA meets with persistent delay. It is always playing catch-up to introduce the new rules, after taking time for appropriate consultation and so on, to deal with the new threats to the consumer.
The second reason is the now-ubiquitous sale of financial products via the internet, as referred to by my noble friend Lord Blunkett. How many of the Committee have ticked the box verifying that they have read the terms and conditions of internet sales, without a thought of ever doing so? It is the dense and incomprehensible text of those terms and conditions that is so often the electronic embodiment of asymmetric information: the very factors ensuring that the relevant markets do not function well and that the FCA does not perform its strategic objective.
Amendment 4 provides the FCA with the means to end this failure to meet the strategic objective. The enactment of the power to introduce a duty of care would place the responsibility of ensuring that markets function well firmly on the shoulders of those who have the information required to attain that goal. As my right honourable friend Pat McFadden put it when discussing the Bill in another place, with the enactment of a duty of care, financial services providers would necessarily ask themselves the question, “Is this right?” rather than what they ask themselves today, which is, “Is this legal?” That would create a real shift in how business is done. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, that this has nothing to do with subsidies and subsidising. It is doing what is right. If the FCA had the power to introduce a duty of care, it could begin to live up to its strategic objective.
I am quite prepared to believe that our drafting of Amendment 4 contains petty infelicities. So what? What is important is the principle that the amendment embodies. I am confident that Treasury officials can always find the appropriate wording. But we are all aware that too many consumers are being treated inappropriately, whether by the mis-selling of products, denial of rights or obstructionist responses to complaints and so on. I am certain that Her Majesty’s Government wish to improve on the consumer protections previously enshrined in EU legislation. The introduction of a duty of care is a safe and sure way forward: a way to ensure that markets function well.
I regret that I cannot agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, that the duty of care should be extended to the regulator itself. That is unreasonable because it suggests that the regulator should be looking over the shoulder of the participants in every single transaction. That would require regulatory omniscience, and I think it is truly unreasonable. But I would like to say a few words in hearty support of the noble Baroness’s Amendment 72 in this group. Anyone who has laboured as a financial services regulator, as I have, will be well aware of the abuse addressed by this amendment: an abuse that has disfigured the promotion of financial products for far too long.
The failure to deal with this abuse was an important component of Dame Elizabeth Gloster’s investigation into the FCA’s regulation of London Capital & Finance plc. The abuse of promoting non-regulated activities while identifying the promoter—albeit correctly—as a regulated entity must also be addressed by the holistic evaluation of regulated entities, taking into account both regulated and unregulated activities, because, typically, the culture of a firm is not divisible. So, while I support Amendment 72 from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, I note that there is more to be done to implement Dame Elizabeth’s recommendations.
Baroness Penn (Con)
My Lords, I will start with a word of reassurance to the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, and others that the Government will consider all the contributions to the debates on the Bill carefully, and in terms of the work they are doing on the future regulatory framework review and the broader regulation of financial services. That is an important point when we discuss these amendments. As the noble Lord just set out, the amendment to introduce a duty of care could be interpreted as quite a different fundamental approach to financial services regulation, which, with that scale of change, might be better considered as part of the future regulatory framework review. However, much work has been done on this subject and I turn to it now.
I will speak first to Amendments 1 and 4, which seek to introduce a statutory requirement for the FCA to make rules requiring authorised persons to adhere to a duty of care when providing a product or service. Amendment 4 would also require the FCA to have explicit regard for vulnerable consumers when discharging its consumer protection objective.
I am grateful to the noble Lords who put forward these amendments, which give the Committee the opportunity to discuss this important issue. I know that it was also discussed during the passage of the Financial Guidance and Claims Act, and the Government pay tribute to the work undertaken by Macmillan, whose “Banking on Change” campaign includes the proposal for a statutory duty of care. I agree with the charity that
“Money worries should be the last thing”
on a person’s mind when they are dealing with cancer, but I emphasise that the FCA is already taking steps to ensure that financial services firms exercise due care and regard when offering products, services and advice to consumers. A statutory duty of care does not add to the FCA’s existing powers in this area, and there are likely to be difficulties in applying a single duty consistently and proportionately to the wide variety of products and relationships in financial services. The Government do not believe that an additional statutory duty of care, as proposed by these amendments, is necessary.
Financial services firms’ treatment of their customers is governed by the FCA through its principles for business, as well as specific requirements in the handbook. The principles for business require firms to conduct their business with due skill, care and diligence, and to pay due regard to the interests of their customers and treat them fairly. The FCA has recourse to disciplinary action against firms that breach these principles.
The FCA has also announced that it will undertake work to address any potential deficiencies in consumer protection, in particular by reviewing its principles for business. The coronavirus pandemic has caused the FCA to delay the next formal stage of this work to allow firms to focus on supporting their customers during this difficult period. However, it remains committed to progressing this work and has announced that it aims to consult in the first quarter of this year.
I reassure the Committee that the Government believe that the FCA already has the necessary powers to ensure that sufficient protections are in place for consumers, and has the will to act, without the need for a statutory duty of care or expansion of the consumer protection objective. The Government will continue to work closely with the FCA to keep the issue under review.
Before I turn to Amendment 72, I reiterate the Government’s sympathy for London Capital & Finance bondholders. In May 2019, the Government directed the FCA to launch an independent investigation into the events relating to the FCA’s regulation and supervision of LCF. Dame Elizabeth Gloster’s investigation was provided to the FCA on 23 November 2020. It concludes that the FCA did not effectively supervise and regulate LCF during the period. She makes nine recommendations for the FCA, focusing on how it should improve its internal authorisation and supervision processes. The Government laid the report, along with the FCA’s response, before Parliament on 17 December. In that Written Ministerial Statement, the Government welcomed the FCA’s apology to LCF bondholders and its commitment to implement all of Dame Elizabeth’s recommendations. Dame Elizabeth also made four recommendations for the Treasury, which the Government have accepted in full.
Turning to the specifics of the amendment, through its rules and guidance the FCA already requires financial promotions to be clear, fair and not misleading. As part of those rules, authorised firms are specifically required to ensure that if they refer to their authorised status in the context of any communications relating to unregulated activities, they make it clear that those specific activities are not regulated. Misleading statements by a firm may involve a breach of the FCA’s existing rules and the FCA has broad powers to enforce against such breaches. Depending on the severity of the breach, it may also be an offence under Part 7 of the Financial Services Act 2012.
The Treasury has committed to keeping the legislative framework underpinning the regulation of financial promotions under review. As part of this, the Treasury is actively working with the FCA to consider whether paid-for advertising on online platforms should be brought into the scope of the financial promotions regime.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Henig) (Lab)
I have received a request to speak after the Minister from the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard.
Viscount Trenchard (Con) [V]
My Lords, I declare my interests as stated in the register. I apologise to the Minister and the Committee for failing to get my name on the speakers’ list for this group on time and appreciate been given a chance to speak after the Minister. In the circumstances, I will confine my remarks to Amendment 1, introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, with whom I often agree. However, on this occasion I strongly agree with what my noble friend Lord Blackwell said.
On the duty of care, the FCA has itself, as other noble Lords said, consulted on this question and provided feedback in November 2019. Many respondents thought that, rather than further complicating the FCA’s responsibilities, with the commensurate risk of increased litigation, it would be better to let the newly introduced senior managers and certification regime settle down.
I suggest that there is already evidence of cultural change in many regulated companies as a result of this, and that those who think we should not at this time bring in changes likely to make the FCA more cautious in the exercise of its functions are correct. It surprised me that while many respondents thought that the FCA should be given a duty of care, most of them thought that the duty should not be enshrined in law because it would lead, inter alia, to duplication of existing obligations, the loss of regulatory agility, and costs, delay and the stress of litigation for consumers. Even the adoption of a non-statutory duty of care would have many of the same effects. Surely the thing we most want to avoid, to ensure that the City retains its position as one of the two leading global financial centres, is a loss of regulatory agility.
Baroness Penn (Con)
My Lords, I believe that contribution has put another side of the argument. It is the balance between these two perspectives that the Government seek to strike. We also think the FCA is in the right position to strike it, with its obligations to protect consumers and its detailed understanding of the markets that it regulates.
Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken on this group and I note a largely positive view of a duty of care. I thank the Minister for her response. Her counterpart in the Commons took 58 words to respond to a similar proposition; the noble Baroness took more than that, but notwithstanding the length of her response I was not convinced by any of her arguments. Many of them seemed much like medium to long grass.
The case for a duty of care still seems clear and urgent. Essentially there are, as we said, five key reasons for adopting the duty. The first is that FSMA does not protect consumers adequately; the second is that the FCA is always playing catch-up. The third reason is that poor behaviour by firms continues, as I set out in my opening remarks. The fourth is that getting redress after the event is time-consuming and very stressful, and the fifth is the incentive for real and lasting cultural change in our financial services industry. All these seem to be conclusive arguments in favour of a duty of care.
The Minister’s arguments against seem to have a strange Alice in Wonderland quality to them. They amount to saying that it is not in the consumer’s best interests that financial services firms should be obliged to act in the consumer’s best interests. That simply cannot be right. We will return to this issue on Report but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Blackwell
“Competitiveness as an FCA and PRA objective
(1) The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is amended as follows.(2) In section 1B (the FCA’s general duties), after subsection (1)(b) insert “and—(c) supports the standing and competitiveness of the United Kingdom as a leading global financial centre with high market standards.”(3) In section 2B (the PRA’s general objective), in subsection (1) at end insert “, while supporting the standing and competitiveness of the United Kingdom as a leading global financial centre with high market standards.”(4) In section 2C (insurance objective), after subsection (1)(b) insert—“(c) which supports the standing and competitiveness of the United Kingdom as a leading global financial centre with high market standards.””
Lord Blackwell (Con) [V]
My Lords, Amendment 2 is in the name of my noble friend Lord Bridges, who gives his apologies that he is unable to be present this afternoon and has asked me to move the amendment in his place. It seeks to introduce the international competitiveness of financial services as part of the general duties of the PRA and FCA. I would have thought that the amendment is unexceptional and uncontroversial, in the sense that it is difficult to imagine how one could sustain the opposite view: that it is not desirable for the UK to maintain its standing and competitiveness as a global financial centre, or for the regulators not to have regard to that. I am sure that this is already implicit in the approach to regulation taken by the Bank of England, as in that taken by Her Majesty’s Treasury, but it is not formalised in the remit of the PRA and the FCA. This amendment would remedy that deficiency.
I do not need to labour the Committee with facts and figures about the huge importance of financial services to the UK economy and the wealth created by its global trading activities. If this were any other industry of major economic importance, for example the automotive industry or telecommunications, the need for international competitiveness would be taken as given. For financial services, the nature of the industry means that the regulators have, of course, been tasked to oversee other important objectives: the maintenance of prudential standards to avoid financial collapse and, as we have just been talking about, the protection of consumers in complex and life-changing financial transactions.
The amendment does not seek to override those. It would simply add to the general duties of the PRA and the FCA the need to have regard to the aim of supporting the standing and competitiveness of the United Kingdom as a global financial centre in the way those regulators carry out their specific objectives. To avoid any suggestion that this would mandate a drive to lower standards as a way of becoming more competitive, the amendment is clear that the mandate is for a global financial centre with high market standards. I believe it is widely accepted in this House, and in the industry at large, that our standing and competitiveness as a global financial centre can be maintained in the long run only by maintaining confidence in the soundness and integrity of the UK’s financial markets.
In practice, the amendment would mean that the regulators, in considering the design and implementation of regulations and rules, would consciously have regard to ways of achieving the desired outcomes with minimum unnecessary overhead costs and market restrictions. For example, in implementing the measures in this Bill for the regulation of investment firms under the investment firms prudential regime, the implementation of remaining Basel III banking standards and, more generally, reviewing the imported EU MiFID regulations, the regulators would have an explicit concern to pursue the simplification and streamlining of those regulations, moving to the UK’s preferred model of regulating through principles and outcomes to achieve the required standards for a more efficient regulatory approach that improves our international competitiveness.
The Bill in fact goes part way there already in new Section 143G, as introduced by Schedule 2, in which the FCA is required, in applying regulations to investment firms, to have regard to the likely impact of the rules
“on the relative standing of the United Kingdom as a place for internationally active investment firms to be based”.
However, this is applied only to this one limited area of regulation, rather than as a general duty.
If there were seen to be a conflict between international competitiveness and other objectives on some specific measure, it is surely right that this should be identified and an explicit trade-off decision made on the most appropriate priority, which may of course override the competitiveness concern. However, in most cases, efficient regulation, high standards and international competitiveness go hand in hand, rather than conflict.
Take, for example, the current consultation on the Bank of England’s proposal to remove the capitalisation of software from the calculation of banks’ regulatory capital. This is contrary to the practice adopted in the EU and in the US. At first sight that could look like it would put UK banks at a competitive disadvantage. However, not only is that change a sensible way to maintain the integrity of the prudential standard, but doing so would reinforce the UK as a leading global financial centre with high market standards, and, therefore, its competitiveness. The notion that these would often lead to conflict is mistaken: competitiveness can complement high standards.
In proposing the amendment, alongside my noble friend Lord Bridges, I believe that the arguments, including support for international competitiveness in the regulators’ general duties, are important and incontrovertible. I hope my noble friend the Minister will find some way to accommodate this in the remaining stages of the Bill or, if not, give a clear indication of how it will be addressed in other measures that the Government intend to bring forward. I beg to move.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, Amendment 3 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Sharkey is an amendment to Amendment 2 and probes what is meant by “high market standards”. Could these mean, “no lower than current standards”, and what are they measured by? Are they just rules, which we hear a lot about, or do they also include enforcement? Regrettably, we also hear about that when it has all gone wrong, with the Gloster and Connaught reports being the latest examples of that. Like a taster menu, our amendment then leads on to the connection between standards and oversight of regulatory performance with respect to both rule-making and enforcement, and suggests that there should be regular independent reviews every three years. For clarification, that would not be instead of whatever Parliament decides it wants to do; it would be additional.
I will put my cards on the table and say that I am nervous about any introduction of competitiveness as a general duty, even with the qualification, or as a bidding, to consider ranking. If one thing was learned from the FSA’s demise and the financial crisis it is that giving a financial services regulator a competition duty can lead to disaster through creating incentives to balance industry profit against safety and consumer protection. It can potentially lead the regulator astray from its essential objective of safety and soundness. If there is such a remit it will inevitably lead to calls from parts of industry that do not want fetters, or even from shareholders that want profits. If competition appears as a duty there will be pressures to go just a little bit lighter touch, then just a little bit more, with arguments that this is all okay because it is among experienced market participants.
Unfortunately, light touch in one part of a market that may seem remote from retail consumers does not prevent contagion. Let us not forget the investment bank “slice and dice” of subprime mortgages, which fuelled the financial crisis by stimulating yet more subprime lending—what gets made gets sold and invested in. Later amendments deal with what happens nowadays with regulated mortgages that are sold on to unregulated entities, so let us not kid ourselves that different parts of the market are in self-isolation or lockdown.
However phrased, a competition mandate is different from a proportionality mandate, which the regulators already have. I am all for regulators making it much clearer how they categorise activity as part of proportionality and transparency. I wish they would do more of it—it can aid competitiveness too—but put in an additional competitiveness mandate and what does that mean, other than to go lighter than proportionality requires?
On the other hand, it is necessary to recognise that regulation is a good way to end up with a closed shop, preventing new entrants and new products, and there can be incentives on regulators to seek the stability of the graveyard. I can think of areas where I would lay that charge, such as fixation on gilts and sluggishness around approving new banking models. However, I do not see a primary competitiveness mandate solving that, even alongside a “high market standards” statement.
This takes us back to what is meant by high market standards. Who sets those? Whatever they are, I am sure they will be lauded as “world beating” even before the rest of the world has been looked at. However, I think that a regular, expert independent assessment can check and report on all aspects—the standard of rules, whether they are gold plated, how good enforcement and operational systems are and, yes, what can be learned by comparison with elsewhere. However, I do not think it is for the regulators to advise on whether they are better at doing things than elsewhere. I already know their answer.
The final part of my amendment suggests that the regulators pay for the reviews—so it is rather like a Section 77 review. Then it says that the review must be published without modification, because there was a certain amount of photoshopping of the Promontory report about GRG and it was made public only via the Treasury Select Committee publishing a leaked copy.
However, there are other ways that regular independent reviews could be done—more like an independent person FiSMA Section 1S review that the Treasury can require—or through an oversight body led by a handful of skilled individuals, as the Australians are now doing. It seems to me that, if you want assurance on high standards, which I do, that is the way to do it, in line with what looks like becoming the new best practice, and that is where the UK should be.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con) [V]
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 6 and 7 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Trenchard, who has a lifetime of experience in the financial services sector and understands the whole issue of competitiveness and UK influence from banking for many years in Japan. I am so sorry that because of procedural changes he is now unable to speak to these amendments.
I refer to my interests in the register, particularly as a non-executive director of Secure Trust Bank plc in Solihull and of Capita plc and as a member of this House’s EU Financial Affairs Sub-Committee. I was especially sorry to miss Second Reading of this very important Bill.
These amendments—like the one moved by my noble friend Lord Blackwell and those in the name of my noble friend Lord Bridges—introduce a competitiveness objective for the FCA and PRA. My Amendment 7 also applies to the Bank of England itself. My amendments differ because they spell out aspects of competitiveness that I know are important from a lifetime in business and from nearly three years as UK Minister attending the Competitiveness Council in Brussels.
Of course, consumer protection, stability and standards are important, but they are very well looked after in the structure of financial services regulation, even if the regulators do not always deliver or enforce properly, as we have heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. I come from a different perspective. Those of us with an understanding of economics know that needless red tape, inefficiency and lack of care for UK interests end up hurting UK consumers with prices that are higher than they need to be, delays that frustrate, and a failure to get things right first time. These also hamper innovation and productivity growth, two of the best ways to both benefit consumers—and I come from a consumer background—and stay ahead internationally.
This matters today even more than in the past. Financial services are the leading sector in the British economy, not only in London but in many other areas of the UK: Edinburgh, Cardiff, Newcastle and Birmingham, to name but a few. In the wake of coronavirus, Brexit and international competition, we need to treasure and enhance our leading position. France, the Netherlands, Germany, Ireland and Luxembourg are trying to steal our lead—but ineffectively, as this hurts their business and consumers and encourages investors and services to move to New York or Singapore. As Mr Barney Reynolds has argued, we must look again at the legacy of EU law, and I know my noble friend Lord Trenchard will have more to say on his ideas on another day.
We must not forget one point: small and entrepreneurial businesses are the backbone of this country. Everyone should remember that the big, powerful multinationals find it relatively easy to adapt to new regulations, rules and requirements, and to lobby for arrangements that suit their interests.
We must also create a benign climate for innovation, which is a vital part of improving efficiency. There is one great example: the Financial Conduct Authority’s so-called “sandbox”—clear, simple and easy regulation for fintech. Thanks for this are due to the current Governor of the Bank of England, but Mr Bailey and I were promoting this as good practice in India four years ago. It is dispiriting that there are not more such initiatives.
As my amendment states, we need “efficiency” and “competitiveness” in the interests of UK plc to feature in the purview of our regulators. A competition objective is not enough; indeed, it can sometimes harm smaller players, driving them bankrupt and causing problems for their customers, as bigger institutions mop up and take over their client base. Competitiveness is sometimes wrongly associated with bad aspects of globalisation. That is wrong: UK competitiveness is what this country now needs to strive for to support the UK base, rather than encouraging the sale of wonderful companies such as Arm to overseas interests. Alex Brummer has argued this forcefully in a series of books, and I agree with him.
While we come at the issue from different angles, I really do want my noble friend the Deputy Leader to listen to those of us who are seeking a change to the Bill to bring in considerations of “competitiveness”. So I will finish with the word’s dictionary definition:
“1. Possession of a strong desire to be more successful than others … 2. The quality of being as good as or better than others of a comparable nature.”
What could be better than that?
Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]
My Lords, Amendment 2, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Bridges and Lord Blackwell, and the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, provides an opportunity to reopen an issue that was settled in 2012 by Parliament deciding against adopting a version of what their Lordships now propose.
Their amendment does not come as a surprise, not just because this Bill provides an obvious vehicle for its proposals but because it fits into the usual timescale of loss of institutional memory. Prior to 2012, we had a “have regard” on competitiveness built into FiSMA 2000; it required the FSA to have regard to
“the international character of financial services and markets and the desirability of maintaining the competitive position of the United Kingdom”.
This “have regard” was widely seen as contributing to the financial crash of 2007-08, which is why FiSMA was amended in 2012 to remove it.
During the discussion around and preceding its removal, there were some very forceful observations; three deserve particular attention. The first was from the Treasury, which, in its 2010 report, A New Approach to Financial Regulation: Judgement, Focus and Stability, said that there was strong evidence that
“one of the reasons for regulatory failure leading up to the crisis was excessive concern for competitiveness leading to a generalised acceptance of a ‘light-touch’ orthodoxy, and that lack of sufficient consideration or understanding of … complex new financial transactions and products was facilitated by the view that financial innovation should be supported at all costs.”
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)
My Lords, this is the first time I have spoken in Committee, so I draw the Committee’s attention to my entry in the register. I will speak to my two amendments in this group. Amendment 87 is broadly drafted and follows on from the line of discussion and approach taken by my noble friend Lord Blackwell. By contrast, Amendment 106 is a highly specific focused proposal for improving the UK’s regulatory regime, on which I seek the Government’s response.
To take these in order, the purpose of Amendment 87 is to require the FCA and the PRA to take into account the impact on the UK’s competitiveness of any regulatory measures they seek to impose, and in particular, under proposed new subsection (2)(b), to assess the overall cost-benefit ratio of the UK’s compliance regime.
I know that even raising this issue risks one being labelled the money launderer’s or financial criminal’s friend. I plead not guilty to that, but I seek to ensure that our compliance regime is and remains cost effective. As evidence that I am not soft on financial crime, I draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that I have put my name to Amendment 84 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, which seeks to make failure to prevent financial crime a criminal offence, which we will discuss at a later date.
First, I want to consider culture. For too long it has tended to be argued that any money spent on compliance is money well spent. As business practices evolve so to, and quite rightly, should compliance practices, but no one has the responsibility to step back and consider whether some of the requirements of an earlier age remain effective and are still needed—so one has ever-increasing layers of regulation. Regulators are, by their very nature, risk averse. But somehow we have to create a climate in which we can find the right balance between a financial services industry which on the one hand might be seen as a system like the wild west, driving business away, and, on the other hand, a system so muscle-bound by regulation that the consequent time, expense and administrative hassle have an equally deterrent effect. It is to establish a formal mechanism to address this challenge that I have tabled Amendment 87.
We may well be told by my noble friend when he replies to this debate that the regulators are now well aware of this challenge. Of course, that is to be welcomed, but I question how far down that organisation this new mood or culture or approach has spread—and, no less importantly, how far it has spread into the compliance departments of the regulated firms. Too often, waving the regulatory stick has come to be seen as some sort of virility symbol.
The professional body, the Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision, or OPBAS, in its latest annual report in March last year pointed out, in terms of disapproval, that 41% of professional bodies being supervised did not take any kind of enforcement action. No attempt was made to suggest what target figure was the right one; there was just the impression that not enough was being done and efforts and money spent must be increased. However, if you look at the list of professional bodies being supervised, it is not clear why many of them would need to take enforcement action except on the rarest of occasions. For example, one body being supervised is the Faculty Office of the Archbishop of Canterbury. I doubt that enforcement by the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury needs to be a frequent event.
The second general point is that, too often, the attitude among regulators is, “What I have, I hold.” The House will have heard me before on several occasions speak about the poor cost-benefit ratio of the present suspicious activity report regimes, or SARs. Every year the number of SARs rises; in 2019, it reached 573,085, about 2,300 per working day. What use is made of these? The cost of all this to the regulated entities and so to consumers and clients is huge. Let us suggest that each SAR costs £250; that would create a total cost of £143 million for the sector, its customers and clients. Interestingly enough, that is almost exactly the same figure as the total money recovered by the National Crime Agency, cited in the same report, which was £150 million. Therefore, there is equality of cost, and there really seems little benefit at present.
However, to suggest that the system needs an overhaul and pandemonium breaks out. As the NCA report says,
“SARs intelligence has been instrumental”—
note the word “instrumental”—
“in locating sex offenders, tracing murder suspects, identifying subjects suspected of being involved in watching indecent images of children online and showing the movement of young women being trafficked into the UK to work in the sex industry.”
There is no mention at all of financial crime, but the clear inference is that if you wish to challenge the SARs regime, you are abetting these appalling crimes. No wonder that people are nervous about challenging the status quo.
Finally, all this feeds into the compliance departments of regulated firms. For the past 14 years, I have been the treasurer of the All-Party Group on Extraordinary Rendition. I remain extremely supportive of the group, but I would ask for a change, and I am pleased to say that the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, has kindly agreed to take over. Accordingly, she will take over the bank account of the group and will assume signing authority. The fact that we are both politically exposed persons—PEPs—is causing enormous difficulty. It could be argued that the noble Baroness and I could use the APPG’s bank account for money laundering and financial crime generally, but the fact that we have fewer than 20 transactions per annum would suggest a limited scale for what we are going to do. However, it is clear that the noble Baroness and I will be faced with a paper trail of considerable proportions. It is this sort of mindless form filling and box ticking that is being repeated millions of times over and somebody, somewhere, needs to be charged with addressing this problem.
I turn finally to Amendment 106. It has the specific purpose of trying to improve London’s competitive position by removing, wherever possible, the obvious inequities, unfairnesses and inappropriateness of a one-size-fits-all approach by the regulators and creating in its place a regulative framework that is appropriate and effective as regards those to be regulated.
This amendment concerns the insurance sector, which is a key part of the UK’s financial services industry, and I have been helped with the wording of this amendment by the London Market Group. The group brokers in the main deals of sophisticated corporate clients, who have professional advisers at their disposal. As the FCA’s own wholesale insurance broker market study in 2019 demonstrated, these clients seek the services of a London market broker not because they are want to manage issues caused by information asymmetry—something that we have heard about already this afternoon—but because they recognise that the advanced expertise housed within broking firms can assist them in reaching the optimal outcome for their risk-management programmes. They are not consumers, but they need protection in the way that individual or less sophisticated corporate customers may do.
However, the FCA makes almost no distinction between the way it supervises the London market broker, active in the specialty markets in London, and the way it supervises a retail insurance broker dealing with an individual’s domestic and motor insurance requirements. Amendment 106 is drafted to ensure that that there are no regulatory loopholes that the mal-intentioned can exploit by those with malefic intentions. Proposed new subsection (2)(c) makes clear the distinction between retail and professional clients, while subsection (2)(d) asks whether the client has professional advisers and whether they are PRA or SCR regulated; and importantly, subsection (2)(e) covers any potential impact on the UK’s financial stability.
This amendment does not break new ground because the concept of the experienced investor is already well established. Those who qualify in this category can be offered opportunities to participate in new issues and refinancings with the minimum of fuss. Such a minimalist approach would never be appropriate for the general public. That is the approach the amendment adopts as regards the insurance industry. It makes a clear distinction between the different requirements of the professional and the general client. I hope that my noble friend will be able to give this amendment a fair wind.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con) [V]
My Lords, in participating with pleasure in this group of amendments, I declare my interests as set out in the register. I congratulate my noble friend Lord Blackwell on how he introduced the group and I agree with everything that he said—and indeed what is contained in the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Bridges.
I also endorse what my noble friend Lord Blackwell said on our view of the Basel framework, not least in terms of the issue of software. This is an excellent example of our move towards standards which really deliver, rather than standards which are perceived to be but are not necessarily higher or greater than other regulatory frameworks.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, Amendments 2, 6, 7 and 87 seek variously to urge the FCA, the PRA and the Bank of England to take into account the competitiveness of the United Kingdom. This is a dangerous concept that can only harm Britain and our collective national security and well-being. Competition implies people winning and losing, trying to beat down others to push ahead of them, taking risks and cutting corners. We all know where that ended up in 2008.
Instead, we should aim for a more secure financial sector that provides more useful, effective and safe services to individuals and the real economy. That would have a global benefit. If we have a decent financial sector with good standards across the globe, everyone wins. If we treat this as a zero-sum game, we lose and the world loses.
The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, spoke—complained, it would be fair to say—about regulators being, by their nature, risk-averse. Well, I, like many other Britons seeking to avoid a replay of 2008, applaud that existing risk aversion and seek to strengthen, not weaken, it. Competitiveness has been, and continues to be in the calls of many, exactly comparable to downgrading. That includes relaxing capital requirements for financial institutions; reducing enforcement of criminal behaviour by financial actors, creating tax loopholes for billionaires or multinational corporations; and having weak competition policy that allows a small number of firms to dominate markets and exploit British consumers, workers and taxpayers. This all reflects the model of free ports that the Government seem so keen on.
The winners in this race are plutocrats and giant multinationals. This kind of competitiveness is fundamentally anti-democratic and profoundly destabilising in its contributions to inequality. Trickle-down economics have long been discredited; financial services that concentrate money in the hands of the few only harm the rest of us. I note that Amendment 3 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, tries to provide a form of insurance, as she outlined, but the best answer, as the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, said, is not to insert “competitive” into the Bill at all.
The last global financial crisis was substantially the fruit of competitive financial deregulation in Britain and elsewhere, as Britain and other countries increasingly relaxed rules to attract capital, thus allowing financial actors to take highly profitable risks at the great expense of the rest of us. Separately, Britain has abjectly failed to prosecute money laundering via the City of London. Non-enforcement is a deliberate competitive strategy used by many tax havens. This corrupts our institutions and gives potentially hostile secret actors leverage over our economy and politics.
In short, we need an upgraded financial system, with tighter controls and a demand that it meets the needs of individuals and the real economy, as our debate on the first group of amendments focused on. This would support the financial integrity of our systems and benefit the UK economy, particularly our security and ability to meet everyone’s basic needs. A system driven by competitiveness benefits a few at society’s expense—that is, at the expense of small and medium-sized enterprises, even larger enterprises, and the vast majority of individuals.
There is also an important regional aspect to this inequality. A competitive financial system will benefit wealthy parts of London while harming Britain’s struggling regions. A better, upgraded financial system, spread out around the country, with local banks meeting local needs securely and safely, would be a significant improvement indeed.
The idea of competitiveness ensures that costs are spread across the majority of the UK population, with lost tax revenues and financial crises, while the benefits are realised in corporate headquarters mostly in the wealthy parts of London, overseas and, very often, offshore. No strategy that seeks to level up the regions based on a “competitiveness of the financial sector” agenda can possibly succeed.
We will come later to my Amendment 123, which starts from an extensive analysis of the “finance curse” and calls for an impact report on the costs of the financial sector—something I do not believe the Government have any kind of handle on, despite the hard work of a small number of underfunded campaigners and academics. A large body of cross-country evidence from such radical organisations as the IMF and the Bank for International Settlements shows that there is an optimal size for a country’s financial sector, where it provides the services that an economy and population need. Expansion beyond this size causes damage, increases inequality, boosts criminal behaviour and creates many other ills. We need a safe, balanced financial sector that does not suck in skills, resources and capital, taking them away from the businesses that need our essential—and currently often badly served—needs, whether food security or construction, public transport or care.
We are not Tudor buccaneers, whatever some members of our governing party might think. We live in an unstable, insecure world buffeted by environmental, economic and social shocks. We are seeking a new place in the world—we have much talk of global Britain —so it is worth thinking for a second about what the world sees when it looks at the UK financial sector. I looked through a report from the Tax Justice Network in 2019, which noted:
“The UK with its ‘corporate tax haven network’ is by far the world’s greatest enabler of corporate tax avoidance”.
I note figures out just overnight from the Jubilee Debt Campaign, which show that of the debt owed by 73 countries eligible for debt relief under the G20 initiative, 30% is owed to private lenders in the UK. If we want a respected, admired place in the world—something that could be only to our benefit—then an outsized financial sector, one “competing hard”, will cost us dear.
I will speak briefly to Amendment 102 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, which importantly promotes transparency about how the Government seek to direct our international oversight and financial governance. I also express very strong support for Amendment 121 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, which refers to country-by-country reporting. We know that giant multinational companies shuffle money around like a fast-moving, shady casino dealer, making their profits in one place but seeking to shift them to places competing—we are back to that word again—on the basis of minimal regulation and taxation. Who then pays for the schools and hospitals their customers need? Who pays for the maintenance of roads, the police, the courts? They take their profits and run, and the rest of us pay.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Henig) (Lab)
The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, has scratched from this group so I now call the next speaker, the noble Lord, Lord Mountevans.
Lord Mountevans (CB) [V]
My Lords, I support Amendment 2. The strength and robustness of the UK’s regulatory regime is vital to the health of our financial services sector. High-quality regulation is part of the attractiveness of the UK for inward investment and is crucial for enabling access to other markets; it is a competitive strength. It would be helpful for the Bill to signal an ambition in line with the Chancellor’s Statement in the other place on 9 November 2020 for the UK to become more globally competitive and have a long-term, ambitious strategy for financial services. The Chancellor’s Statement was a welcome signal of the kind of direction the industry is seeking.
The Bill should not be considered in isolation. The UK is undergoing broad developments in regulation: the Treasury’s future regulatory framework review, for example, will shape the UK regulatory framework for financial services and indicate how the sector needs to adapt to the UK’s new position outside the EU. This review is an important stage in the redesign of the UK’s regulatory regime and will play a key part in making the UK more globally competitive and attractive to international firms.
Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)
My Lords, I draw attention to my interests as set out in the register. I recognise that these are probing amendments, but I exhort my noble friend the Minister not to underestimate either the strength of feeling on the question of international competitiveness or its importance to a sector vital to our economic recovery, as my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe stressed in her impressive speech earlier in this debate. The foundation stone for the regulation of financial services is still FiSMA—the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000—albeit in a form substantially amended by subsequent legislation. As the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, reminded us, the regulatory structure is currently subject to a fundamental review.
The financial services future regulatory framework review and phase 2 consultation closed at the end of last week. The early indications of a general direction of travel are welcome. The original version of FSMA set out those four clear objectives for the new Financial Services Authority, the FSA: market confidence; public awareness; the protection of consumers; and the reduction of financial crime. In addition, the FSA was required to have regard to a number of other considerations, which included such obvious factors as efficiency, proportionality and innovation. They also included, as the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, reminded us—and I quote verbatim
“the international character of financial services and markets and the desirability of maintaining the competitive position of the United Kingdom”
and
“the need to minimise the adverse effects on competition that may arise from anything done in the discharge of those functions”.
As other speakers have reminded us, after the crash of 2008, the incoming coalition Government inherited a severe recession and an unstable and untenable financial situation. They therefore undertook a deep consideration of regulation. In the debates in another place on what became the Financial Services Act 2012, concerns were repeatedly expressed to the effect that regulation under the FSMA had been not so much light touch as soft touch. Since 2012, the entire financial services sector, broad and diverse as it is, has effectively been punished—put into the naughty corner, as it were —almost entirely because of the alleged failures of the banks. The regulatory brush used was simply too broad and therefore not fit for purpose. The requirement to take account of international competitiveness was jettisoned because, it was argued, it might dilute the robustness of regulation.
I have also taken a close look at the Second Reading debate on the then Financial Services Bill, on 11 June 2012, in which one colleague after another raised this question of competitiveness, including my noble friends Lord Trenchard, Lord Hodgson and Lady Noakes. So this is a “Groundhog Day” debate, but I hope no less persuasive for that. My noble friend Lord Trenchard certainly wins a prize for consistency and constancy, because he eloquently argued that day:
“Some of us believed that competition and the competitiveness of our financial markets should have been made an objective of the FSA rather than merely one of the principles to which it had to have regard. I welcome the fact that the FCA is given a competition objective in the Bill, but it is inadequate in that it falls short of a responsibility to maintain or enhance the competitiveness of the UK’s financial markets”.—[Official Report, 11/6/12; col. 1245.]
As both the Association of British Insurers and the London Market Group have rightly pointed out, promoting the international competitiveness of the UK financial services sector to nurture its contribution to our economic strength must now be restored to the objectives of the regulators. This would bring our regulators into line with other, competitor jurisdictions, such as Hong Kong, the United States, Singapore and Australia. In its phase 2 consultation paper, the Government explicitly acknowledge:
“A gap in the original FSMA model is that, while it set high-level general objectives and principles, it did not provide for government and Parliament to set the policy approach for specific areas of financial services regulation.”
A move towards increasingly activity-specific regulatory principles is helpfully adumbrated, as my noble friend Lord Blackwell pointed out, ahead of the outcome of the FRF consultation, in Schedule 3 to the Bill. This would require the PRA, when considering capital requirements regulation, to have regard to
“the likely effect of the rules on the relative standing of the United Kingdom as a place for internationally active credit institutions and investment firms to be based or to carry on activities.”
This seems a welcome step back towards an old principle and, quite possibly, a Rubicon of significance crossed—or, more accurately, re-crossed. On that basis the Bill, while welcome in its own terms, is merely the beginning of a vital process which will determine the character of the post-Brexit UK financial services sector, potentially for a generation or more.
Once the results of the consultation have been digested, I hope to see far more acknowledgement in regulation of the great differences that exist between different elements of financial services, along with an explicit recognition that our international competitiveness matters. It is entirely spurious to claim that a regulator mindful of international competitiveness is likely to be a weak regulator. It could and should be a very effective one indeed.
As the noble Lord, Lord Mountevans, has just pointed out, our competitiveness relies on our strength. Our greatest strength is surely our reputation for providing the best advice and the best products at the best price, something no regulatory race to the bottom could ever deliver. If we really have the ambition to become the global centre for insurance and financial services—a realistic ambition, I argue, if we work together to deliver upon it—then we simply must get this right. I very much hope that the Bill does not go down as a missed opportunity.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, inevitably with so many amendments to one Bill, this group is something of an omnibus collection. I have some sympathy with some of them—for example, the country-by-country reporting amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe. While I disagree very much with the noble Lords, Lord Hodgson and Lord Holmes, on their overall support for an international competitiveness objective in other areas, they are pointing out a need for the regulator to look again at issues such as proportionality and how to adapt to the new digital world. However, that does not seem to need to be put into law. This is really advice to the regulator, and I hope that they will take a great deal of that good advice on board.
I want to reply to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, because he echoed an opinion raised by the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, but very effectively countered by my noble friend Lady Bowles. He talked about activity-specific regulation creating the opportunity for some significant divergence in the regulatory environment. The lesson of 2008 was that the financial services sector is linked systemically. As my noble friend Lady Bowles pointed out, the crash in 2008 started with largely fake and junk mortgages in the United States. It worked its way into various securities instruments that were sold to people in the UK who did not understand them, but should have.
The underpinning consequences of risk were also completely misunderstood. The way that derivatives were traded and structured created a potential risk of losing liquidity overnight. This is exactly what happened with the high street banks in the UK. They became competitive with others in the financial sector to develop the kinds of profits that they saw being made by rival companies, pushed their credit standards to the point where, frankly, they were no longer standards, and chose methods of funding themselves that made them vulnerable to any volatility in the overnight markets. This is not an industry in which we can separate the different pieces into silos. They are all interlinked and that must underpin any form of regulation that we have.
Lord Eatwell (Lab)
My Lords, I will begin by speaking to Amendment 102 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe. It is a probing amendment and seeks to persuade Her Majesty’s Government to spell out their priorities as a participant in international discussions on the direction and detail of financial services regulation. After all, at the very heart of the Bill is legislation covering a wide range of aspects of international financial regulation.
Her Majesty’s Government being clear about their priorities would greatly assist the Committee. After all, the Bill is about incorporating the conclusions of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision into UK legislation. What could be more international than that: submitting British law to the decisions of a committee of which Her Majesty’s Government are not a member? That is a rather exotic interpretation of taking back control. It is also about the travails of equivalence and, as amendments in the group testify, the relationship between financial regulation and international competitiveness.
Yet we lack a clear statement of Her Majesty’s Government’s approach to international financial regulation, particularly on its future now that the UK has left the European Union. What are the Government’s regulatory priorities? What are their future plans? In the documents associated with the regulatory framework review, we are given some insights into the Government’s goal for the institutional responsibilities for regulation, but what is the policy framework, not the institutional structure, that will guide their proposed reforms? This probing amendment provides Her Majesty’s Government with the opportunity to clear some of the fog. If noble Lords are to scrutinise satisfactorily the Bill and the outcome of the regulatory framework review when it comes before the House, they need this comprehensive insight into the Government’s thinking.
If we look for the core of Her Majesty’s Government’s international regulatory policy, it is obvious from the Bill that much is to be found in the analysis developed by the Basel Committee. Yet, as is well known, it is European Union directives that most closely follow Basel proposals—exactly those directives from which the Government declare independence and their desire to diverge. However, divergence from EU directives will inevitably involve divergence from Basel. So what is it to be: acceptance or divergence? It would be hugely helpful if the Minister, in summing up, could clarify the position.
Then there is the role of the G7. Ever since the G7 Halifax summit in 1995, following the Mexican financial crisis of the winter of 1994, financial regulation has been an ever-present item on the agendas of G7 meetings. By the way, it is Halifax, Nova Scotia, just in case the people of Yorkshire think they missed something. Given that the UK is to chair the G7 this year, how will Her Majesty’s Government approach questions of post-pandemic regulatory reform now that the UK has an independent voice in these matters? What lead will Her Majesty’s Government provide as chair to our G7 partners on financial regulation?
The issue of country-by-country reporting referred to in the amendment is primarily a question of the taxation of large multinational entities, but there is an important echo of the country-by-country issue in the section of this Bill that deals with insider dealing and money laundering. At the heart of the problem of financial crime is the question of beneficial ownership: an area of regulatory policy within which, as the noble Lord, Lord Callanan—the Minister for Climate Change and Corporate Responsibility—admitted, our framework is “attractive to exploitation”. He is right. Knowledge of beneficial ownership is as fundamental to the prevention of money laundering as it is to the prevention of tax avoidance and evasion. I will return to this issue later in our deliberations. The important point that arises at this time is that this is but one more example among many of the lack of clear policy perspective on behalf of Her Majesty’s Government. I hope that the Minister will be able to respond to the probing amendment and outline that policy perspective.
I now turn to Amendments 2, 3, 6, 7 and 8, all of which deal with the relationship between regulation and international competitiveness. I find myself somewhat out of sympathy with these amendments, primarily because the manner in which the issue of international competitiveness is addressed in the current version of FSMA is about right. In it, competitiveness is already an operational objective of the PRA and the FCA. Given the performance of the City of London over the past 20 years, this objective would seem to have been comprehensively achieved. It may be that the proposers of these amendments fear that the competitive position of our financial services industry will be undermined by the UK having left the European Union, and they are now desperately trying to repair the damage. Let us all hope that they are mistaken. Of course, the key point in FSMA is that competitiveness is subordinate to ensuring that markets function well, as in the case of the FCA, and subordinate to the promotion of the safety and soundness of PRA-authorised persons, as in the case of the PRA. That is surely right.
Similarly, with respect to the attempt by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, to insert by means of Amendment 7 a competitiveness objective into the Bank of England Act, I cannot agree that Her Majesty’s Government should be ready to rank competitiveness equally with the bank’s statutory objective: to protect and enhance the stability of the financial system of the United Kingdom. Should they be happy to pursue international competitiveness while putting family finances at risk? Should they be happy to pursue international competitiveness by putting the soundness of our financial institutions at risk? I believe not. The current hierarchy of regulatory objectives signals clearly where this country’s regulatory priorities lie.
Let us remember that one of the most overpowering advantages that can accrue to any international financial centre is the reputation that it is well and securely regulated. That is an accolade not to be sacrificed. As has been said already, the danger in these amendments is that of the lowest common denominator. For all the reference to high standards, it is international competitiveness that will be a primary statutory objective, equal to or even above the stable operations of the money markets or the financial risks to which the British people are exposed. That would be unwise.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who spoke in this debate, which has opened up an extremely important set of issues relating to the competitiveness of our financial services sector. I am sure we all recognise that the UK has long been a global leader in financial services; I am the first to agree that, as we adapt to our new position outside the EU and the opportunities that it brings, it is essential that we continue to provide the right environment to support a stable, innovative and world-leading financial services sector. That is why I embrace this opportunity to speak about this vital industry’s place in the world.
First, I remind the Committee of my right honourable friend the Chancellor’s speech last November. He was clear about the Government’s commitment to ensuring that the UK continues to be the most open, competitive and innovative place to conduct financial services anywhere in the world. I say in response to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, that the Chancellor could not have been clearer about the huge value of our financial services sector to the entire UK economy, including nearly £76 billion in tax receipts in the last financial year and more than 1 million jobs. At the very heart of this vision are the UK’s world-leading regulators: the Financial Conduct Authority, or FCA, and the Prudential Regulation Authority, or PRA. They are respected across the world for their expertise and thought leadership on the regulation of financial services.
I will now address the proposals that the amendments invite us to consider. Amendments 2 and 6 would introduce a statutory objective for the FCA and PRA to support the standing and competitiveness of the UK as a global financial centre. Amendment 7 would introduce a similar competitiveness objective for the Bank of England relating to financial conduct and prudential regulation. Amendment 87 has a similar purpose and would require the regulators to take international competitiveness issues into account when making rules, as well as reporting to Parliament on this and benchmarking the UK against other international financial hubs. The supplementary Amendment 3 seeks to explore what is meant by “high market standards” and to instigate a formal review of regulator activity every three years.
I listened with interest to the many good arguments from noble Lords in favour of including competitiveness as an element of the regulators’ statutory objectives. I have also listened to other contributions, including those from the noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer, Lady Bowles and Lady Bennett, and the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, which reminded us of the need to be cautious. They also reminded us of the paramount importance of protecting the safety and soundness of our financial system, the integrity of financial markets, and of protecting consumers, as reflected in the regulators’ existing objectives.
Those two facets of the debate point up the critical balance that needs to be struck and the arguments that are necessary to build a consensus on the right approach for the UK’s financial services sector. This is a delicate calibration that needs a great deal of thought, which is why I say to the Committee that these are not arguments for today. The Government’s future regulatory framework review is considering how the UK’s financial services regulatory framework must adapt to reflect our future outside of the EU. That has to be the right place to consider issues such as the regulators’ objectives.
The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, asked me for a few further details on the Government’s approach to an overall policy framework. Their proposed approach will involve putting new policy framework legislation in place for key areas of regulation and moving regulatory requirements from the UK statute book to regulator rulebooks. Parliament will have the final say on the approach adopted and how it is applied through legislation. The Government will bring forward further detail on our approach to implementation, and invite stakeholder views on this, in due course. We expect that applying the FRF approach to the full body of onshored EU legislation will take several years to deliver.
We are committed to full, timely and consistent implementation of the Basel regime. I refer the noble Lord to the Governor of the Bank of England’s recent speech, which I am sure that he has already read, which sets out examples of some departures from the EU approach that we are contemplating, one of which is to exclude the value of software assets in the valuation of bank capital.
In saying that, it is worth recognising that a competitiveness objective for the regulators would not be a silver bullet to maintain and enhance the UK’s competitiveness; it is also not necessary in order to develop it. A range of factors determine the attractiveness of our financial ecosystem and make the UK a leading financial hub. This includes access to highly skilled talent, access to a broad international investor base, and dynamism and innovation to give us a leading position in the markets of the future, including fintech and green finance.
In fact, I reassure the Committee that the Government are already taking action now to ensure that competitiveness is a core consideration in our approach to financial services, and a consideration of the regulators. In the prudential measures in this Bill, for example, the UK’s competitiveness is one of the issues that the regulators must have regard to when making rules in these areas. We really are not standing still in this space.
The Government have also kicked off a wide range of activity seeking to seize the opportunities presented by having left the EU. This includes the review of the noble Lord, Lord Hill, into listings to make the UK a more attractive location for companies to list and trade in, and the UK funds regime review, which is considering tax and regulatory opportunities to make the UK more attractive for funds. The long-term asset fund will encourage investment in long-term investment opportunities. The Solvency II review is seeking views on how to tailor the prudential regulatory regime to support the UK’s insurance sector. Ron Kalifa OBE is leading an independent strategic review to identify opportunities to support further growth in the UK fintech sector. The payments landscape review is seeking to ensure that the UK maintains its status as a country at the cutting edge of payments technology. The consultation on cryptoassets and stablecoins seeks to understand how the UK can harness the benefits of new technology and support innovation while mitigating risks to consumers and stability. The call for evidence on the current overseas framework seeks to ensure that our regime is coherent, fair and easy to navigate. I should also mention the independent ring-fencing review, which will consider the rules separating retail and investment banking activities and any impact that they may have on banking competition and competitiveness. I hope that this long list assures noble Lords that the Government are absolutely committed to protecting and promoting the competitiveness of our financial services sector as we seek to ensure that the UK continues to be the most open, competitive and innovative place to do financial services anywhere in the world.
Amendment 33 looks at this question from the other side of the debate. It seeks to probe the legal effect of the obligation placed on the PRA to “have regard” to the UK’s international competitiveness when making its CRR rules. I have already spoken about the UK’s status as a global financial services hub and the work that we are doing to maintain it. The Government want to ensure that the PRA has specific regard to those ambitions when implementing its Basel rules because, while the Government and the regulators remain committed to the full and timely implementation of Basel, now that we are outside the EU, we have the opportunity to implement these standards in a way that takes account of the specificities of the UK market.
That does not mean a regulatory race to the bottom. This requirement is entirely subordinate to the PRA’s existing primary and secondary objectives of promoting safety and soundness, and effective competition, respectively. Amendment 106 in the name of my noble friend Lord Hodgson would require the PRA and the FCA to consider when developing new rules the nature of a product or service being provided, the level of risk this entails for UK consumers and the level of sophistication of a client. This is a sentiment with which it is hard to disagree, but I do not agree that an amendment to this effect is necessary or would significantly alter our current approach to regulation.
When exercising their functions, both the FCA and the PRA are currently obliged to consider proportionality under their regulatory principles. For instance, one of the core measures in the Bill enables the introduction of a tailored prudential regime for investment firms. This regime—the IFPR—will account for differences in the size and business models of investment firms at its very heart. Only non-systemic investment firms will be put on this new FCA-regulated regime, while those that are of systemic importance will remain regulated by the PRA.
Given the size, complexity and global nature of our financial system, we must of course make sure that customers understand the risks of the financial services products that they use. Having left the EU, the Government believe that there may be opportunities for responsibly applying more proportionate regulation in some areas. For example, Sam Woods, CEO of the PRA, made the case last year for a “strong and simple” approach to the regulation of small banks.
I hope that noble Lords will take from these remarks that the Government are committed to exploring and embracing the opportunities we now have to enhance the UK’s competitiveness while remaining committed to the highest international standards of regulation.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
I have received requests to speak after the Minister from the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, and the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. I call first the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard.
Viscount Trenchard (Con) [V]
My Lords, I am grateful to the Committee for once again permitting me to speak after the Minister. Even though I have my name to two amendments in this group, I had not realised that the procedural change that the House is about to approve at 8 o’clock this evening—which I think is rather strange—now prevents one from doing so unless one takes an additional step, in a narrow window, of specifically putting one’s name down to individual groups as well.
I had wanted to speak in support of Amendment 2 in the name of my noble friend Lord Bridges of Headley, as moved so ably by my noble friend Lord Blackwell, and to Amendment 6, ably moved by my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe. I thank my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond for his kind words, and most heartily thank my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral both for what he said and for quoting from my 2012 speech on this subject.
Your Lordships may wonder why I have added my name to two different amendments which seek to achieve approximately the same result. This is because there are many ways to raise the importance of competition and the competitiveness of markets, and I have in my mind some further variations of the theme. In any case, I strongly believe that we must move quickly to maximise the attractiveness of London’s markets to be sure that the City, including our wider financial services industry, will remain one of the truly leading global financial centres, with all that that means for our prosperity as a nation.
I had wanted to speak properly and fully within this debate but am now hesitant to do so, as I am sure my noble friend the Minister will appreciate. I had wanted to make several points, and wished to explain why I think the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, and, indeed, the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, are so wrong in believing that the FSA’s having regard to competitiveness was a cause of the financial crisis, or that competitiveness, of itself, heightens inequality. Either Amendment 2 or Amendment 6 would be an improvement to this Bill. I would like to ask my noble friend the Minister which of the two he prefers, because they are not precisely the same. In any case, as my noble friends Lord Mountevans and Lord Hunt have said, there is strong expectation and hope that the Government will do more to secure the City’s future in relation to improving the competitiveness of the markets.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Trenchard, and sorry that he was not able to enter the main list of speakers for the reasons that he stated. I hope that we will hear more from him in later debates but I also hope that he will take some encouragement from the actions that the Government are already taking to promote the competitiveness of our financial services independently of any conclusions reached from the FRF review. Those are proof of the Government’s commitment and intent to put actions where our words have been. I very much look forward to debating his ideas further in the course of these Committee proceedings.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
I thank my noble friend the Deputy Leader for his full and courteous responses, which I shall read very carefully before returning to the issue at Report, as I think that there may be something missing in the Bill and that it would not be wise to defer the whole matter of the next set of financial services reforms. What in my noble friend’s long and helpful list assists smaller financial services businesses, which do not necessarily want to list on the stock exchange yet suffer the full cost and burden of FCA and PRA regulation as they struggle to do a good job for consumers and their clients?
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, I can probably expand this answer to advantage in writing. The Government fully understand the disproportionate effect of some of our regulation on small firms, which is why we are looking critically at whether a more proportionate approach is available to us. It is probably best if I spell out our thoughts in a letter, which I would be happy to copy to all Peers in this debate.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
I have received one additional request to speak after the Minister, and I call the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord the Deputy Leader for his full response in our previous discussion, but there was one figure that he raised in that response that I wanted to ask him about the source of and justification for. That was the claim that the financial sector contributed £76 billion in tax receipts. I am basing this question on work done by a fellow Member of your Lordships’ House, the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, who may not be joining us until later—so I wanted to raise this point now. I understand from his work that this figure comes from a report prepared by PricewaterhouseCoopers and includes £42 billion borne by customers in the form of VAT and paid by employees in the form of income tax and national insurance contributions. The remaining £33 billion is an estimate, and the report says that PwC
“has not verified, validated or audited the data and cannot therefore give any undertaking as to the accuracy”.
Could the Minister tell us what further justification the Government have for that figure?
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, this is clearly a detailed and analytical question, which is probably not appropriate for Grand Committee. I would be happy to write to the noble Baroness, giving her chapter and verse as far as I am able to do.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, I thank all who have spoken in this debate, and the Minister for the extensive replies. As he said, we have heard a lot of views, a lot of which I felt coincided with one another, at least in terms of what was said, more perhaps than appears in the amendments. Ultimately, a lot of the things that were complained against could be dealt with through proportionality. Yes, it is not competitive if the actions of the regulator are not proportionate—be that in rules or supervision. Therefore, I think there is less need to give a specific competitiveness mandate, because that confuses whether you are seeking something else on top. I refer to what the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, said in introducing his amendment, when he said that these things were probably taken into account but not formally, or they would be taken as given in any other industry.
Lord Blackwell (Con) [V]
My Lords, I thank my noble friend the Minister for his very fulsome responses and other noble Lords for their contributions. In many of the contributions there was agreement that competitiveness was important for the financial services industry. I cannot agree with the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, that because the House reached one view 10 years ago, we cannot learn the lessons and think again about this issue. Neither can I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, that a smaller financial services industry that created less wealth would be beneficial for the UK.
However, I was very struck by the contributions from my noble friend Lord Holmes and others about the importance of innovation in the area of payments, among others. I am reminded that you cannot have innovation without some element of risk. This is an example of where, if there were no consideration of international competitiveness, there might be no reason for the regulators to allow any risk into the system. They would play completely safe, whereas a measured management of risk to allow innovation is important. You cannot innovate without risk. Financial services is not about eliminating risk but about managing risk. If it were about eliminating risk, no bank would ever grant any loan and no insurance company would ever issue any insurance policy. I think that is a good example of how innovation is an important part of competitiveness.
I was grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for her amendment on the definition of “standards”, on which we had a constructive debate. This is not about the lowest common denominator; it is about high standards, and she challenged how we define that. It cannot be about keeping every rule exactly as it is now; it has to be about outcomes, and I think everyone would agree that high standards must mean maintaining or improving standards of outcomes.
However, if you take the example that was given on the impact of SARs regimes or, indeed, the way MiFID is implemented, there will be many opportunities to improve the effectiveness of regulation to produce better outcomes. This will not necessarily involve keeping exactly the same rules and regulations; it will involve improving them. This comes back to the point made by my noble friends Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lord Hodgson: this is about the efficiency of regulation and doing it better, which is, and should be, the driving force for a more competitive regulatory regime.
I was grateful for the Minister’s acknowledgement that the Government support promoting the competitiveness of financial services. I note his comments that this needs to be balanced against other objectives; I simply say that it is not balanced if the objective is completely missing—it has to be there so that it can be balanced. He made the point that, rather than introducing this measure now, he would like time to consider it in the policy framework. I and other noble Lords will need to reflect on that and what words of assurance he can give us, as the Bill passes, that there will be a commitment to do something about competitiveness as an objective. However, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 2.
Baroness Penn (Con)
My Lords, I suggest that we adjourn these proceedings for 10 minutes for a short break.
“Non-exploitation of consumers or small businesses
(1) The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is amended as follows.(2) In section 1C (the consumer protection objective), after subsection (2)(e) insert—“(ea) the general principle that firms should not exploit a consumer’s or small business’s vulnerability, behavioural biases or constrained choices;”.(3) After subsection (2) insert—“(3) Exploitation under subsection (2)(e) includes, but is not limited to, situations where—(a) there is a system of conduct, or pattern of behaviour, that relies upon unequal power between the parties to impose disadvantage on consumers or small businesses or gain advantage for the larger party;(b) notice or other compliance terms are imposed which make it impractical for consumers or small businesses to comply;(c) there is use of notice terms to coerce consumers or small businesses into unfavourable contracts;(d) conduct by a supplier causes a consumer or small business to comply with conditions that were not reasonably necessary for the protection of the legitimate interests of the supplier; or(e) there are risks that the supplier should have foreseen would not be apparent to the customer or small business.In this section, “small business” is as defined in Part 15 of the Companies Act 2006 (accounts and reports).””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is to protect consumers and small businesses from exploitation.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, Amendment 5 builds upon Amendment 4, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, which was discussed within the first group and in turn built upon Amendment 1, moved by my noble friend Lord Sharkey. I will not revisit the “duty of care” part of the amendment, as it has already been well discussed, but the point about Amendment 5 and the similar Amendment 73 is to bring small businesses within the non-exploitation principle—defined by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, in his amendment—and to highlight some things that regularly happen in contractual terms and which can be exploitative. Amendment 73 is more explicit and would allow the FCA to intervene where there is “Unconscionable conduct”, even if a consumer or small business has entered into a contract.
The issues that are highlighted as wrong behaviour, although within an exemplary list, are: patterns of conduct that rely “upon unequal power”; terms of notice
“or other compliance … which make it impractical … to comply”;
the use
“of notice terms to coerce … unfavourable contracts”;
compliance terms that are “not reasonably necessary”; and risks that the larger supplier should have realised would not have been
“apparent to the customer or small business”.
This is not a random list of points—there are rather more in my Private Member’s Bill on the same subject—but a key list of matters that were used by GRG in the exploitation of small businesses, and which the FCA said it could do nothing about because they were outside the regulatory perimeter.
Once more I must look to other countries to see how we compare, and once more I find that Australia has tried harder. It has a general law of unconscionable conduct in commerce that deals with all these issues and more, and which extends to not only consumers but business to business. I do not know how many noble Lords read the various detailed contracts that one is forced to sign as an individual or small business to access almost anything nowadays. In the earlier group, these were similarly referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell. I have seen barely one that is reasonable. It is only getting worse as everything becomes a leased service rather than a product.
With these amendments I make the point for small businesses as well as individuals, and in the context of financial services, which are among the most fundamental of services, that bullying contracts must stop. They must be within the regulatory perimeter and the FCA must be prepared to intervene. Excuses about GRG and what the FCA did not do there hold no power. We saw what happened; we need strong measures that mean it must not happen again and that imitations of it must not be tolerated in day-to-day operations. I beg to move.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]
My Lords, I find myself in some sympathy with the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, on Amendment 5 because this is a grey area where small businesses are perhaps not well served. My noble friend Lord Howe claimed, in his full and comprehensive response to the last debate, that this was not the right time or place to look at the regulatory objectives, as this would better take place under the Government’s future regulatory framework review. I would argue, in support of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, that small businesses are not well served by the current provisions. If you look at some of the work of the Financial Ombudsman Service, which the Committee has referred to, I would not hold out much hope for a small business claiming redress and a decision under that agreement. I would be delighted if my noble friend were to prove me wrong in summing up this debate.
Amendment 5, in particular, has strengths to commend it and I would very much like to lend it my support. I look forward very much indeed to hearing what my noble friend will say and whether the Government might look favourably on it, a lacuna having been identified in the regulatory framework.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
I call the next speaker, the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. Baroness Bennett? We appear to have lost the noble Baroness, so if—
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
Apologies, my Lords, but I have sorted the problem out now. I speak briefly in support of Amendments 5, 73 and 95, in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles, Lady Altmann and Lady Kramer. Although not a generalisation that is 100% true, the gender division of the people on various sides speaking on the Bill is interesting. It made me reflect back to the financial crash of 2007-08 and the role that the extreme gender imbalance in the financial sector was seen to have played within it.
When I thought to look at these issues about exploitation, unconscionable conduct, and legal protection against mis-selling, I went to the website moneysavingexpert.com. In a previous contribution, I referred to the role of such commentators who, using the power of public opinion, often seem to be a stronger check on the behaviour of the financial sector than the Government. But, of course, they are able to work only after the fact. Just looking down the list, we are talking about payment protection insurance, mis-sold ID fraud insurance, the mis-selling of package bank accounts and excessive charges on bank accounts—and that is just talking about individual consumers. A similar list would come up for small business. It is a long tale of woe that has caused a great deal of suffering and harm to individuals and small businesses, the operators of which have often put their whole heart and soul into the business.
What we seem to have now is a strategy of shutting the stable door sometime after the horse has bolted, and after a long delay for debate and inquiry. All three of these amendments are a very strong bolt that we should be sliding home now to protect consumers and small businesses from the overweening, immense power of the financial sector.
Baroness Kramer (LD) [V]
My goodness, this has moved fast. My Lords, let me start by addressing Amendment 95, because it is in my name. It would give SMEs the right to sue in respect of all regulated financial services, not just banking. It would—and this is an important example—entitle them to sue for breaches of the rules relating to insurance, otherwise known as COBS, in respect of business interruption insurance policies.
Another big practical implication relates to the cross-selling of regulated products or services as part of the add-ons to a loan. In the swaps mis-selling scandal—I believe my noble friend Lord Sharkey mentioned this in his earlier list, when talking about a duty of care—over 40,000 swaps were sold to SMEs. The banks had broken the regulatory requirements in over 90% of cases. It is almost impossible to imagine that having happened if the banks’ legal departments knew that the banks would be sued by their customers as a result.
None of the SMEs that have taken swaps cases all the way to court have won. Judges have repeatedly said that, had the customer been able to sue for breach of the COBS rules, that would have made all the difference. The evidence is there in Green & Rowley v RBS, Crestsign Ltd v NatWest, London Executive Aviation Ltd v RBS, and Fine Care Homes Ltd v NatWest. Those cases and the other swap cases that failed at trial show that—even where a judge is convinced that the customer did not understand the product they were buying and even where the bank salesperson knew that the customer was relying on them to explain the product—the common law fails to provide the customer with a remedy. I realise that the swaps scandal is, hopefully, in the past but, without the amendment proposed, there is nothing to stop banks from perpetrating similar behaviour in future.
My amendment addresses only part of the issue of the limitations of the regulatory perimeter, which both my noble friend Lady Bowles and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, have discussed, and it is why I support Amendments 5 and 73 in the name of my noble friend. I find it ridiculous that the regulatory perimeter treats small businesses as, in effect, akin to multinationals in their capacity to understand financial products and fight on an equal footing with big institutions.
My noble friend Lady Bowles has cited the case of RBS GRG. For those not familiar with this case, GRG was the turnaround unit of RBS. A number of firms were persuaded to allow themselves to go into the turnaround unit even though they were both viable and paying their loans on time; but RBS believed that under the terms of their loan agreement they were at risk because the value of their assets had declined, which created a covenant default. In a remarkable number of cases, those companies that were viable and paying on time were made bankrupt, their assets were stripped after having been assessed at very low market values and—surprise, surprise—the bank was able some time later to sell those assets for a much higher value, thereby generating profits. It was indeed not just a turnaround unit but a profit centre.
After great pressure from Vince Cable, the FCA initiated an investigation. It asked a group called Promontory to produce a two-stage report: one to look at the case and the other to make recommendations. However, after the first phase of the report was complete, the FCA explained that it could not publish it as it contained commercially sensitive information, and it therefore produced a summary. Miraculously, the original report made its way into the hands of the Treasury Select Committee. This, to me, is almost the worst part of the story: the summary that had been provided by the FCA and the report itself did not match. There was essentially a whitewash of the conclusions of Promontory. The FCA may have disagreed with the report that it received, but that would have been a very different declaration.
We have talked before about the senior management and certification regime; the FCA could have used that regime to try to deal with senior management who had been involved in this entire process, but it chose not to. That, I am afraid, is the history of the use of the senior management and certification regime. However, my noble friend Lady Bowles could equally well have cited the HBOS Reading fraud perpetrated between 2003 and 2007, which I mentioned earlier. Six bankers ended up in jail for that fraud, but we are now in 2021 and fair compensation has not yet been paid to the victims. This is now a Lloyds problem and has been for some time.
We have been through multiple reviews and are now awaiting the work of yet another review of compensation, the Foskett panel, which hopefully will make sure the compensation is appropriate—but, as I said, it is 2021. There have been issues; for example, a whistleblower who examined who knew what and when has been compensated twice by Lloyds for retaliation against her. There is currently a review by Dame Linda Dobbs into who in senior management knew or ought to have known what was going on.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, faced with speaking on this group, I looked at the Bill as a whole and, to a surprising extent, there is little reference to consumers or people who depend on the banking sector. The failure to contain these areas was brought out by the first group of amendments, where there was a very strong thrust to require the sector to exercise a duty of care.
This group, which I support, seeks to isolate a singular problem and address it directly. It is a problem that is not just unfair but evil, and one we find across many sectors—the problem of bullying. In many sectors, size is an advantage, and because of that, a small number of firms grow to a large size. The problem with size is that it enables bullying; you find it in many sectors, including airlines and supermarkets and with Amazon and Facebook. The problem with bullying is that, used skilfully and ruthlessly, it enhances profit and, because it enables profit, it is pursued, often covertly. It is the classic example of why benign regulation is so important in our economic and financial landscape.
These amendments are a bold move to add to that benign regulation by directly addressing the evil of bullying. This will be good for individuals but also—and this is a very important point—for SMEs. I was at the large end of the scale, and we were able to see off any attempt at bullying because we were big enough and ugly enough to be able to fight the problem with an equality of arms. The problem with an SME—and often we are talking about individuals—is that the concept of equality of arms in the courts is almost impossible; they can easily use up their revenue for a whole year on one court case. These amendments address the issue together.
I know the Government are likely to say, “Not now. We will do it later. We are looking at another area.” That just cannot go on, and I urge the Government to think about these ideas and work out some way to introduce this. The banking industry, in particular, has an appalling reputation. The evil things it has done over the years are frightening. It is difficult to believe, in a sense, that those evils were done by malice; but it is very easy to understand how the opportunities present themselves to behave in this way and generate more profit, more praise and more reward.
Baroness Penn (Con)
My Lords, Amendments 5, 73 and 95 relate to the protection of consumers and small businesses against misconduct. The Government are committed to ensuring that consumers and businesses can use financial services and products with confidence and that there are appropriate protections in place.
Before I comment on the specific amendments, I want to take a moment to set out the wider context. The Government have given the FCA a strong mandate to prevent and take action against inappropriate behaviour in financial services, and it has a wide range of enforcement powers to protect consumers and small business. Noble Lords will appreciate that the majority of business lending is unregulated—that is what the amendments test and probe—but the Government are committed to providing appropriate safeguards for SMEs in accessing financial services, while seeking to avoid driving up the costs of lending and unnecessarily reducing affordable credit options.
In the UK, loans of less than £25,000 to small businesses are treated as regulated consumer credit agreements for the purposes of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. This means that most small businesses already receive regulatory protection. In addition, in April 2019, the remit of the Financial Ombudsman Service was expanded to allow more SMEs to put forward a complaint. This covers 99% of small businesses in the UK. If a complaint is upheld, the FOS could make an award of up to £350,000 in relation to acts or omissions that took place on or after 1 April 2019, when its remit was expanded.
Small and medium-sized businesses also now have access to the Business Banking Resolution Service, an independent, non-governmental body which will provide dispute resolution for businesses which meet the eligibility criteria. The BBRS will address historic cases from 2000 which would now be eligible for FOS but were not at the time, and which have not been through another independent redress scheme. It will address future complaints from businesses with a turnover between £6.5 million and £10 million.
It is with that context in mind that I turn to the specific amendments. Amendment 5 seeks to protect consumers and small businesses from certain types of exploitation by financial services firms providing services to those groups. It proposes imposing new obligations on the FCA when it exercises its general functions. However, it risks putting up the cost of borrowing and limiting the availability of products and services. For example, it could require the FCA to make rules creating additional safeguards designed to ensure that exploitation, as defined by the amendment, does not occur. Given the different levels of financial sophistication of different small businesses, the rules may need to be designed to protect those with minimal levels of sophistication. Given the potential complexity of such new rules, financial institutions may be more reluctant to lend to small businesses.
Amendment 73 would duplicate similar existing protections that I have previously outlined, in a way that could be confusing to consumers, SMEs and lenders. On the issue of unconscionable conduct, in response to the banking crisis and significant conduct failings, Parliament passed legislation leading to the FCA and PRA applying the senior managers and certification regime. The regime aims to reduce harm to consumers and govern market integrity by making individuals more accountable for their actions.
Amendment 95 would broaden the scope of those parties who can seek action for damages related to mis-selling of financial services. However, I argue that these changes are unnecessary, as businesses already have robust avenues for pursuing financial services complaints, which I have already set out.
The Government are committed to regulating only where there is a clear case for doing so. This is to avoid putting additional costs on lenders that could ultimately lead to higher cost for businesses; these would likely be passed on to consumers and could restrict access to affordable finance—a key Government priority.
The Government’s view is that each of these amendments risks duplicating the existing protections that I have set out, while also making lending to SMEs more complex, which could make it harder for them to access affordable credit. Our view is that the existing protections get the balance right between protecting consumers and small businesses and not unduly restricting access to affordable credit options. For these reasons, I ask that these amendments be withdrawn.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
I have received one request to speak after the Minister from the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, who I now call.
Viscount Trenchard (Con) [V]
My Lords, again, I am grateful to the Committee for allowing me to speak after the Minister. I will speak only to Amendment 73 because it introduces another subjective concept: “unconscionable conduct”.
I searched for instances of “unconscionable” on the FCA’s website and found only one: John Griffith-Jones, the former chairman of the FCA, for whom I have the highest regard, said in a 2014 speech:
“In 1951 in the Money Lenders Act we described a 48% interest rate as ‘unconscionable’.”
It occurs to me that, as recently as 2018, the main banks were charging 1p per £7 borrowed per day for arranged overdrafts. This was about 50% per annum, but it was not disclosed; indeed, when the banks stopped telling people what their APR was and instead started telling them what the fee per £7 borrowed per day was, this was welcomed by the FSA, which thought that requiring to tell consumers the real interest rate was unhelpful because they would not understand it.
Now that the banks have reverted to informing customers of real annual interest rates, albeit in very small print, the cost of an arranged overdraft has gone down from around 50% to around 40%, which is possibly still unconscionable in today’s world of negative interest rates. As such, I certainly do not think that we should rely on the FCA to decide what is and is not unconscionable. Does the Minister agree that the banks should make clearer what real interest rates on overdrafts are?
Baroness Penn (Con)
My Lords, clarity around all terms and conditions is, of course, to be welcomed. I agree with my noble friend that one challenge with these amendments is potentially introducing new concepts, which might need to be defined through regulation, where we think that there are existing protections in place and the effect could be duplicative.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, I thank all those who have taken part in this debate; it has been short but interesting, and I thank those who have supported the concept that I am trying to elaborate. What the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, has just said is probably true to some extent—why should we rely upon the FCA for this? It is true that this probably should be more of a general legal offence of unconscionable conduct, which is what they have in Australia. So there is no point trying to argue that, in a common law country with a similar kind of legal system, you cannot work out how it happens and whether it is effective: I can tell you that it is.
As the Minister elaborated, the problem with having a subjective measure—as the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, called it—is that you then have to put a whole load of rules around it. That is exactly the problem with the FCA. It has done it with the senior managers regime, something that I always understood Parliament wanted to be a subjective measure—that is, if you behaved badly and something happened on your watch, you were responsible. That has now been tied up with contracts approved between the regulator and the employees in the businesses. Instead of capturing the people at the top, it has pushed responsibility down the chain. The same has happened with “fit and proper”. The FCA has chosen to redefine what that means so it will catch only very extreme cases rather than bad behaviour.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 8. I call the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara.
Amendment 8
“Duty of the FCA to make rules promoting financial wellbeing
(1) The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is amended as follows.(2) After section 137C, insert—“137CA FCA general rules: financial wellbeing(1) The power of the FCA to make general rules includes the power to require authorised persons to promote financial wellbeing of consumers in carrying out regulated activities under this Act.(2) The FCA must make rules in accordance with this power which come into force no later than 6 April 2022.””Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause would introduce a duty to promote financial wellbeing for the FCA which would strengthen the FCA’s consumer protection objective and empower the FCA to introduce rules for financial services firms informed by that duty.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab) [V]
My Lords, with this amendment, we come to the end of the group of amendments that precede the Bill. This is another slightly detached issue that I hope will get a response from the Government. Amendment 8 is supported by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond; I am very grateful to him for his support. His amendments on financial inclusion, which are also in this group, raise many similar issues. I look forward to hearing his comments and to the subsequent debate.
I declare my interest as a former chair of StepChange, the debt charity. Amendment 8 would place on the FCA
“a duty to promote financial wellbeing”—
a new term—
“which would strengthen the FCA’s consumer protection objective and empower the FCA to introduce rules for financial services firms informed by that duty.”
As I have already said, this is a probing amendment, seeking at this stage what I would describe as a high-level response from the Government. I am not looking for detail at this stage; it is really a question of whether there is merit in further work being done on this concept. If there is, I am looking for some pointers about how the Government would like it to go forward.
The background to this amendment is a suggestion from the Money and Pensions Service that there is a case for giving the FCA the power to nudge—its term, not mine—financial services firms to underpin their activities with regard to the financial well-being of their customers and to go beyond current considerations of consumer protection or vulnerability, which I think they have already adopted to some extent. The intention is to remove any asymmetry of knowledge, expertise and capacity between the service providers and their clients. It is a very ambitious goal and would take a lot of work across many sectors not normally involved in the consideration of financial competence.
During my time as the chair of StepChange, we used the term “financial inclusion” to cover the need to have a society where everyone felt that they were knowledgeable enough to be secure and in control of their financial affairs; indeed, we have used the term since then. However, if we change that to “financial well-being”, we go much further. We could say that the aim would be to have the knowledge, confidence and resilience for all in society to pay bills as they fall due, cope with unexpected shocks and plan across our assets and income over time for a healthy financial future right through to well after retirement.
It is a very ambitious and much wider term than “financial inclusion” or any amount of financial education. The importance of the term is that it better captures a life cycle approach to the modern needs for economic health, generating confidence and empowerment within the population at scale coupled with a financial services industry that goes well beyond just designing and delivering good products and excellent services—which we accept they do, of course. It all should be backed by a regulatory system with a holistic overview and the powers to match.
Is this just smoke and mirrors, or is it a realistic vision of the way that things might be? Whatever the case, it is a good time to ask the question. As we discussed earlier today, the FCA’s 2020 Financial Lives survey found that just over half of UK adults—24.1 million people, in its figures—display one or more of the characteristics of vulnerability to their financial situation: a health condition, negative life events, low financial capability or low resilience. Other surveys have already been mentioned. The Salad Projects’ report was mentioned by my noble friend Lord McNicol, and hopefully will be again when he comes to speak on this group. It shows the reality of coping with low incomes and why a shortage of low-cost credit is such a major issue for so many citizens who, even when in regular employment and often with blameless credit references, cannot find appropriate ways to cope with even the basic costs of living, let alone saving for a rainy day and retirement.
The Government are currently consulting on a phase 2 review that includes financial inclusion on the levelling-up agenda, but we also have some other material. As has been mentioned already, The Woolard Review: A Review of Change and Innovation in the Unsecured Credit Market is a major contribution to the understanding of this area; it will come up again in later amendments. There is a lot going on. With this probing amendment, I seek a sense from the Government of whether they accept the case for a broader approach to financial well-being being championed by the Money and Pensions Service and by some firms such as NatWest and Nationwide. In particular, do they accept that, whether or not a formal duty of care is placed on financial service firms—I would support this—the forms of regulation in this area need to be expanded to deliver what the FCA calls
“fairer outcomes for consumers, including support for customers with poor financial well-being that might extend well beyond simple commercial transactions”?
Thirdly, would they consider taking this one step further and seeing what would be required from other partners and agencies?
If we really want a system capable of helping consumers to develop the skills and confidence to interact with financial service providers, people must be secure in the expectation that, if they need help in managing their decisions on their finances, they will not be ripped off and that there will be quality support for them. We must also ensure that education, advice, debt counselling services and other things focus on helping all citizens to develop the skills and confidence to interact effectively with financial service providers—not only providing the products that they need over the life cycle but developing their skills and confidence about their financial well-being and empowering them to take control and plan what they want to maximise their resources.
This is a big agenda that probably also needs action on many other issues such as low-cost credit sources. However, at this stage, we need a clear signal from the Government about how far this issue can go and on what terms they would like to see further work done.
I beg to move.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to speak on this group of amendments. I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, on the excellent way in which he introduced the group. The concept of financial well-being is a growing area and there is a lot for us all to reflect on. I thank him for all that he has done in this whole area of financial well-being, not least during his excellent time at the helm of StepChange.
We should thank all the organisations involved in financial inclusion, not least Macmillan Cancer Support and the Money Advice Trust. They go to people who are at the sharpest end of financial exclusion, and their commitment and the briefings that they provide to parliamentarians are a credit to everybody involved in that space.
I turn to my Amendment 9 in this group, which would place a duty on the Financial Conduct Authority to work toward the objective of financial inclusion. In doing this, I seek to raise the whole level of financial inclusion across our regulators. The context has moved on significantly during the Covid crisis. People who, fortunately, have never had to think about financial inclusion or have never been at a loss as to where the next bill payment will come from find themselves very much at the sharp end of financial difficulty. Fortunately, in many of those instances, the Government have stepped in through the furlough scheme and the self-employed and business loan schemes.
The reality is that, in a broad sense, these are enablers of continued financial inclusion. I would argue that, in this new world, it is difficult to consider the concept of financial stability while we still have such issues around financial inclusion. Financial exclusion has dogged our society for decades. It ruins lives, paralyses potential and corrodes communities. This amendment would give the FCA the objective of considering the barriers, blockers and bias that continue to mean that people are shamefully excluded from mainstream financial products.
Similarly, in the second point in my amendment, I want to place a requirement on organisations
“to report on their use of financial technology to increase financial inclusion.”
Not for one minute do I believe that fintech is the silver bullet—I am well aware of the issues around financial and digital exclusion—but fintech must be part of the solution and must be turbocharged at all levels of financial services. It must be understood much better by HMT, as well as the role it can play in varying degrees across financial services. This was proven at the beginning of the Covid crisis when, in a matter of hours, various fintechs came up with innovative solutions to address some of the issues that then rolled out as the crisis developed.
Having a financially inclusive nation makes sense. Having a financial inclusion objective within the scope of the FCA makes complete sense. I hope that this amendment will add to all the extraordinarily good work that everybody involved in financial inclusion is currently undertaking.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, and my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond for tabling these amendments and for the important debate that they have initiated this evening. Both have considerable expertise in the field; I am only sorry that we are not all here together physically and able to debate the issues in our Pugin corridors.
I accept that financial inclusion is important, given the difficulties that a failure to understand finances can cause anyone, and indeed everyone. However, to my mind, this ought not to be a matter for the FCA, which should focus its efforts on providing a good, strong, unbureaucratic regulatory regime that allows those providing financial services to flourish and serves consumers well. Rather, a basic understanding of financial matters should, in my view, be inculcated first in school. We all need to understand the basics of loans, interest, probability and risk, how to manage budgets and pay our bills, the risk of fraud, what to watch out for, the value of a pension and many other things.
Lord McNicol of West Kilbride (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I will be brief, as I set out many of my concerns and issues when speaking earlier on the first group.
I support Amendment 8, proposed by my noble friend Lord Stevenson of Balmacara. Before I start, I would like to make the Grand Committee aware of my financial interests, as set out in the Lords register.
As touched on in Amendment 4 earlier, low financial resilience and overindebtedness are a huge problem for both individuals and the country at large. We should all do all that we can, especially under the current circumstances, to push back against those issues.
Either we are saying that there is a problem and we need to do something about it, or we are saying that there is not a problem and we just carry on as before. With the figures and the personal stories of overindebtedness and unaffordable, unsustainable financial predicaments, I believe that there is a problem that does need resolving.
The FCA recently found that the number of people suffering from low financial resilience had increased by one-third to 14.2 million people. That is one-quarter of the UK adult population. |In earlier amendments, we heard a number of noble Lords, and a little from the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, saying that any increase in regulations, bringing in a duty of care or a duty to promote financial well-being, was either not the responsibility of the FCA or, in some earlier comments, would put more costs on individuals in increased fees and on businesses with increased administration. I do not believe that that is the case with the amendment as laid out by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson. If you look at the text of it—and I understand it is a probing amendment—you see that the power of the FCA to make general rules includes a power to require authorised persons to promote the financial well-being of consumers in carrying out regulated activities under this Act.
I am very new to this sector and I may be a little naive, but I believe that one of the most significant drivers of costs to the industry is from non-repayment or defaulting on loans. We need financial well-being and literacy to be increased. The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, is right that it needs to start in schools and carry on through employment and employers, but that should not preclude the Financial Conduct Authority being able to step in and help. There is a benefit to businesses as well. If financial well-being can be increased, the number of defaults from people falling into indebtedness or failing to pay reduces, thus increasing profitability of a product, then in turn reducing the cost of that product to individuals and businesses. There is a lot in where the amendment proposed by my noble friend Lord Stevenson is trying to take us.
We touched a little on the Woolard review and its 26 proposals, and I hope that we will see a bit more of those. The noble Lord, Lord Holmes, touched on fintech. With the increase in open banking and the ability to look at individuals’ accounts, better and more detailed decisions can be made on how a product or a business moves on. My noble friend Lord Stevenson referred to the University of Edinburgh Business School report, which it carried out for Salad Projects, looking at the health and well-being of NHS workers who had applied for a loan. The report provides a unique insight into their financial lives, based on millions of individual transactions. What came out of that was information about their low financial resilience—the ability of those working in the NHS to deal with a financial shock to their lives. Often it was just a small shock, but they were unable to tap into the bank loans that many of us can take; they were forced into the high-cost credit loans market.
If we have the development and promotion of financial well-being, I hope we will see a reduction in those who are driven into that sector. This amendment will help to deliver that, but it does not preclude delivering that in schools or the workplace. The FCA is a powerful body that can help push it even further.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]
My Lords, I am delighted to support this group of amendments. I take this opportunity to pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, and my noble friend Lord Holmes for their huge contribution to this field of financial inclusion. I single out the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, not just for his role on the Front Bench but previously in chairing StepChange. He will be greatly missed from his Front-Bench responsibilities, and I am sure it will not be long before we see him return.
I also congratulate my noble friend Lord Holmes on being indefatigable in his campaigning for financial inclusion and bringing our attention to fintech. I join the authors of these amendments in identifying a need to address this issue, and I hope that my noble friend, in summing up, will answer this point. The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, has asked for a high-level response, and I shall use that expression later—I like it. Perhaps we might get something more from my noble friend.
No less of an authority than “You and Yours”, of which I am an avid listener—I think there are two compulsory programmes we should listen to, one is that and the other, I have momentarily forgotten what it is, is the one that gives us all the figures and responses—spent the best part of a programme looking at credit ratings. What struck me is that often it is through no fault of an individual that they find that their credit rating has been so badly affected that they can no longer qualify for any credit. It can take months, if not years, to redress this.
I am concerned that if my understanding is correct Expedia is no longer acting for the Government in this regard. Can my noble friend confirm that we are down to two credit rating agencies? Do the Government share my concern that we should address this area of financial inclusion, financial awareness and each of us being aware of what our credit worthiness and credit ratings are? Amendments 8, 9 and 134 have identified issues that are worthy of attention in this Bill and I look forward to the response from the Minister.
Lord Blackwell (Con) [V]
My Lords, I have a lot of sympathy for the importance of inclusion. Financial services are clearly important to everyone, and I endorse the comments from my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe about the critical importance of financial education in achieving that. However, I have some difficulties with Amendment 8 on the definition of and requirement to consider financial well-being. Those reservations are similar to the ones that I expressed on Amendment 1 on the general duty of care.
Of course, the objective of well-run financial services companies is, and should be, to promote financial well-being. That is what their business is. That is the purpose of financial products. Financial services firms lend in order to allow people to buy houses and cars and to spread the purchases out over time. They help people to save in order to cover emergencies and to provide pensions in old age. They support businesses to help them create wealth. Financial well-being is the business of financial services companies. However, to impose a regulatory requirement to promote financial well-being runs the risk of extending the boundaries of what a regulated individual might be expected to do beyond what is reasonable to expect.
Despite the comments from the noble Lord, Lord McNicol, I am afraid that the amendment would create huge compliance costs and complexity. Of course, we need rules and regulations that protect consumers from unscrupulous firms that seek to exploit customers, but we should do that—as we do—through penalties for improper behaviour rather than by extending a general obligation on financial well-being. Having said that, I understand the motive behind it and I certainly support the objective of improving financial well-being through the financial services industry.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I find the thrust of all three amendments in this group really interesting and worthy of thought. I would particularly have added my name, had I been fast enough, to Amendment 9 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes. I think that is a strong and very positive amendment. Parliament, financial institutions, regulators and civic society have been discussing financial inclusion for years, and all of us recognise that there has been some progress. The Government’s financial inclusion report of 2019 identified 1.23 million people without even a basic bank account. That is half of what it was about 15 years earlier, but I think we all know that it is still unacceptably high. I will say more about basic bank accounts in an amendment in my name in a later group, as I think there are some real issues there.
Debt management advice has significantly improved and much of our thanks is owed there to the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, as other noble Lords have said. We will discuss amendments that would strengthen that in another group. The FCA has made changes to the high-cost credit market. Many of those changes both in the debt advice arena and the high-cost credit arena were not actually initiated by the regulator. They were driven by this House, and I think that this House deserves to take credit for recognising that need and for driving through what has been real and effective action.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, mentioned that my noble friend Lord Stevenson has retired from the Front Bench, much to my personal disgust—because we are short of talent and he has a great deal of it. However, it is my duty to point out that the amendment he has proposed has the full support of the Labour Front Bench, although it touches on a subject that has terrified me for most of my life, although for no good reason.
The idea of poverty is very remote to most of us. When you think of the number of people who live in poverty, particularly in this crisis, in the areas where the support schemes have not worked properly, it is terrifying and difficult to understand how people survive. The problem with poverty is that the individuals involved lose their equity in society—they get to a point of having nothing to lose, and then we worry about the fact that they do not behave in the way we would like them to.
I was brought up in—how can I put it?—a low-income household, where we had probably the equivalent of the living wage, but it was not nearly as bad as today. First, I believe there is more financial inequality today. Secondly, employment among the working class in my youth and that of my parents was much more secure. Finally, it was a cash society. Whatever else you might say about cash, it is very easy to understand. In the non-cash society that we are drifting into—indeed, we are largely already in it—you can barely survive without a bank account. Creating basic bank accounts is very important but, whether we like it or not, many people will not understand the mechanisms. The situation of not working in cash means that it so much easier to spend money and to lose control of what your liabilities and payments are. Much as we may deride the jam-jar approach to running a domestic budget, it was easy to understand and, therefore, easy to manage.
Anyway, what can we do about inequality and security? That, of course, is the big issue in society; it has been in the past, it is particularly bad now, and it is something that we will probably be working on for the rest of our lives. However, we can do something about understanding society. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, that this should start in school. I am a great believer that the curriculum on what one might loosely call citizenship should be much wider in many ways, and there is no question but that financial literacy and understanding should be part of it. This curriculum cannot be completed in school because you only really learn when you come across real-life challenges; so, after school, a concept of financial well-being is needed that will be part of the future world. I believe that these amendments could lead us strongly towards that better future.
Baroness Penn (Con)
My Lords, I welcome the opportunity presented by this group of amendments to discuss the importance of financial well-being and inclusion. The Government are proud of our strong record, and I know that making progress on these issues is a personal priority for both the Economic Secretary to the Treasury and the Minister for Pensions and Financial Inclusion. However, I recognise, of course, that there will be people who are struggling with their finances and need further support, particularly at this challenging time.
Given that these are probing amendments and given the invitation, at least from some, for a high-level response, I thought it would be helpful to set out briefly the Government’s approach, working closely with the FCA as well as a wide range of stakeholders, to promote financial inclusion and financial well-being in the UK. The Government produce an annual financial inclusion report; the most recent of these was published in November 2020, outlining our response to the Covid-19 pandemic as well as the progress we have made on issues such as access to affordable credit, support for credit unions and enhancing the use of financial technology. Since 2018, the Government have convened the biannual Financial Inclusion Policy Forum, bringing together key leaders from industry, charities, consumer groups and the FCA, as well as government Ministers, including the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, who was responsible for the passage of this Bill through the other place.
The Government also work with a number of stakeholders to promote people’s financial well-being. This includes engaging closely with the Money and Pensions Service, an arm’s-length body of government, which published its national financial well-being strategy in January last year. The strategy sets out its five agendas for change to improve the UK’s financial well-being over the next 10 years. This includes goals to increase the number of children and young people receiving financial education, to encourage saving, to reduce the use of credit to pay for essentials, to enhance access to affordable credit, to increase the number of people receiving debt advice and to support people to plan for later in life. Delivery plans will be published by the Money and Pensions Service later in the spring and the Government are supportive of this work.
The Government also work with Fair4All Finance, an independent organisation funded by £96 million from the government-backed dormant assets scheme, which was founded to improve the financial well-being of vulnerable consumers through increased access to fair and affordable financial products. To date, Fair4All Finance has focused on affordable credit and developed an affordable credit scale-up programme to help the sector develop a sustainable model for serving people in vulnerable circumstances.
The Government also work closely with the FCA, and I reassure the noble Lord, Lord McNicol, that the FCA is committed to improving the way that regulated firms treat vulnerable consumers. It is one of the FCA’s key areas of focus in its current business plan. Its rules ensure that the fair treatment of vulnerable consumers is required by firms and embedded into its policies and processes. I will give a couple of practical examples, as mentioned in previous groups. First, the FCA’s consultation on the fair treatment of vulnerable consumers closed in September 2020 and the FCA intends to publish further guidance on this matter imminently. Secondly, as discussed in the context of the amendments on a proposed duty of care, the FCA has announced that it will undertake further work to address any potential deficiencies in consumer protection, particularly by reviewing its principles for business. While the FCA delayed this work because of the pandemic, it aims to consult in the first quarter of 2021. I also assure the noble Lord that a number of other matters that he raised, such as the issue of buy now, pay later, will be discussed in subsequent groups of amendments.
I understand that these are probing amendments. I hope that noble Lords will take reassurance, from the measures that I have set out so far, of the Government’s commitment to this area and the commitment by the FCA from the work under way. However, as my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe has argued, the Government do not believe that further statutory duties on the FCA in this area is the right approach.
On the challenge of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, the Government see the value of considering the broader concept of financial well-being to include access to affordable credit and consumer protection, as well as financial education, as an important area for future work by the Government, the FCA and associated stakeholders.
I hope that the Government have demonstrated their commitment to taking this work forward, working closely with the FCA and a wide range of stakeholders, and that this provides sufficient reassurance to noble Lords of the Government’s commitment on this topic for them to withdraw their amendments.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
I have received no requests to speak after the Minister, so I call the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. I am deeply embarrassed by all the personal comments and blushed to my roots, which I hope was not too obvious on screen. The noble Lord, Lord Holmes, rightly pointed out the excellent work being carried out by many other agencies and bodies in this area as well as StepChange. I completely endorse his comments; there is a lot of good work going on.
I normally find myself aligned very closely with the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe—sometimes rather embarrassingly, given our respective party positions—but this time I seem to have completely confused her, for which I apologise. The noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, was right that there are two quite separate tracks here, as my noble friend Lord McNicol picked up on. One is setting up a regulatory environment within which more good behaviour and activity by firms enhances the overall capacity of the system to work well in terms of financial capability and well-being. The other is hoping for the wider context that is necessary for all this to happen—particularly starting with education, which is always a hard nut to crack. As the noble Lord rightly said, this could be picked up by employers, trade unions, wider agencies, anybody with an interest in seeing a holistic society using the non-cash elements that my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe was so scared of but yet so sprightly embraced in his unique style.
We all must learn how to operate with new technologies and new operations. My children do not use cash; they have not used cash for 10 years. They are all flashing out ridiculously brightly coloured cards and seem to have a much better track on what they are spending and how well they are doing than I ever did. I completely admit that. However, that is no excuse for me—I must get up there and be part of that process. But there is a role for Government, there is definitely a role for the FCA and the regulator; there is a role for companies that want to go down that track and have the capacity to do so, but there is no fixed agenda for that yet.
I wanted to hear a high-level endorsement by the Minister that this was something worth exploring and working for. She has given that, and I am very grateful. We can see this as a burgeoning programme of work which might well surprise us all in terms of where it might reach and what it might do. We are all rightly trying to support it in a way that will be most appropriate. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
I remind Members to sanitise their desks and chairs before leaving the room.
Financial Services Bill
Wednesday 24th February 2021
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Financial Services Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 162-III Third marshalled list for Grand Committee - (24 Feb 2021)
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Healy of Primrose Hill) (Lab)
My Lords, the hybrid Grand Committee will now begin. Some Members are here in person, respecting social distancing, while others are participating remotely, but all Members will be treated equally. I must ask Members in the Room to wear a face covering except when seated at their desk, to speak sitting down and to wipe down their desk, chair and any other touch points before and after use. If the capacity of the Committee Room is exceeded or other safety requirements are breached, I will immediately adjourn the Committee. If there is a Division in the House, the Committee will adjourn for five minutes.
I will call Members to speak in the order listed. During the debate on each group, I invite Members, including Members in the Grand Committee Room, to email the clerk if they wish to speak after the Minister, using the Grand Committee address. I will call Members to speak in order of request. The groupings are binding.
Leave should be given to withdraw amendments. When putting the Question, I will collect voices in the Grand Committee Room only. I remind Members that Divisions cannot take place in Grand Committee. It takes unanimity to amend the Bill, so if a single voice says “Not Content” an amendment is negatived, and if a single voice says “Content” a clause stands part. If a Member taking part remotely wants their voice accounted for if the Question is put, they must make that clear when speaking on the group. We will now begin.
Clause 2: Prudential regulation of certain investment firms by FCA rules
Amendment 10
Baroness Noakes
“(2) Schedule 2 does not come into effect until each House of Parliament has approved accountability arrangements for the powers conferred on the FCA in that Schedule.(3) Accountability arrangements under subsection (2) include arrangements for—(a) draft rules to be laid before each House of Parliament;(b) final rules to be laid before each House of Parliament;(c) opportunities for each House of Parliament to take evidence on the draft or final rules and to express an opinion on them;(d) the consequences of an expression of opinion by either House of Parliament.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would mean that the rule making powers given to the FCA in Schedule 2 can be exercised only when Parliament has agreed how accountability for those powers will be exercised by Parliament.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, this is my first day in Committee and I place on record my interests as declared in the register, particularly my shareholdings in financial services companies.
I am very grateful to the Committee for going so slowly on Monday and not reaching Amendment 10. As I think noble Lords are aware, I was in the Chamber and could not have moved it myself. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, and my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond; not only have they added their names to my amendments in this group but they were standing by to deal with them without me on Monday. Normal service is resumed and I can move my amendment myself. I shall also speak to Amendment 26 in this group.
This is a fairly large group of amendments but its underlying theme is a search for the right balance between letting the specialist regulators get on with the job of regulatory rule-making and the role of Parliament in overseeing those regulators. My Amendment 10 to Clause 2 says that Schedule 2 to the Bill, which amends FiSMA to create rule-making powers for the FCA to undertake prudential regulation of investment firms, will not come into effect until each House of Parliament has approved accountability arrangements for those powers.
Amendment 26 is drafted in identical terms but relates to the rule-making powers conferred on the PRA by Schedule 3, which deals with the capital requirements regulation rules.
I make no attempt in these amendments to say what form of parliamentary accountability arrangements should be put in place, although the second part of my amendment says that accountability arrangements should include a number of things: arrangements for drafting the final rules being laid before Parliament; taking evidence on a draft of final rules and, importantly, Parliament expressing an opinion on them; and the consequences of any expression of opinion. On reflection, the drafting of my amendment is perhaps not clear enough as I was not intending to suggest that Parliament had to, for example, have the laying of draft rules as part of the accountability arrangements. I merely intended to indicate that it could have that as part of the arrangements.
My amendments are predicated on a belief that we should not grant significant new rule-making powers to the regulators without sufficient checks and balances in the system. Had the Government retained the rule-making powers repatriated from the EU, it would have been pretty clear that Parliament would have had an involvement. I am clear that passing these powers to the regulators should not allow the Government to write Parliament out of the picture. I am not, however, of a settled view as to what Parliament should do, which is why my amendment says that these new rule-making powers can go to the FCA and the PRA only when Parliament’s involvement is settled by Parliament itself. I am very conscious that it is not correct—or at least not normal—for legislation to cover the precise arrangements for parliamentary scrutiny. Those arrangements are for Parliament itself to determine, and I have tried to respect that.
Other amendments in this group seek to fill the void of what Parliament should do in practice, and I shall comment briefly on some of them. The noble Lords, Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord Eatwell, in their Amendments 20, 21, 40 and 41, have set out involvement, with time limits, for each House of Parliament reporting on draft rules, with the ability to report on them but no power of veto. I can certainly see the merits of these amendments, as they strike a balance, giving Parliament an opportunity to give its views on new regulations but without allowing it to overrule our independent regulators. They should allow Parliament to take evidence on the impact of proposed new regulations, for example, on different parts of the financial services sector. This could deal well with concerns about, for example, the impact of regulations on both small and large players in parts of the financial services sector, and whether regulations create new barriers to entry. I am not sure, however, that the amendments sit easily with a need to make new regulations rapidly, which I believe is necessary from time to time.
On the other hand, many in the financial services sector are fearful of regulators gold-plating regulations and imposing unnecessary costs on whole sectors. At the end of the day, costs get passed on to consumers, even though there is often no direct correlation between a rule or regulation and any particular increase in consumer costs. That would not necessarily be well dealt with by the amendments in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord Eatwell.
Some elements of Amendment 27 in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted and Lady Kramer, would allow more thematic or cumulative reviews. I particularly like the elevation of the statutory panels of the FCA and the PRA, though I do not believe that those panels should include Members of either House of Parliament. I know that these panels could be more effective voices for industry concerns. I have in mind, in particular, the PRA’s practitioner panel, which the PRA certainly did not want when it was set up by the Financial Services Act 2012, and has had no discernible impact since then. On the other hand, other elements of Amendment 27, for example Parliament’s involvement in the regulators’ meetings with the Basel Committee or IOSCO, seem to me to go beyond what it would be reasonable for Parliament to do.
My noble friend Lord Blackwell has an amendment with yet another variant with scrutiny of rules by parliamentary committees, but with any results being passed to the Secretary of State for action. My concern with that is that the only action that could in practice be taken, once the power to make rules has been passed to the FCA and the PRA, would be more primary legislation. That seems a sledgehammer to crack a nut and would, in practice, not really act as a restraint, a check or a balance on the undesirable use by the regulators of their powers.
The issue of the nature of parliamentary involvement is discussed in the Treasury’s future regulatory framework review. The consultation on part 2 of that process, started last October, has just closed—my noble friend the Minister may want to say something about where we are with that process. I thought the section on accountability in that consultation was not strong and that reliance on the existing committee structures of both Houses was the wrong direction of travel. Whatever our views on that, a longer-term overhaul of accountability structures will not help us; we will have to find a solution that works for this Bill and until any changes emerge from the framework review. That is the challenge before us. I beg to move.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, my name is on eight amendments in this enlarged group. They cover different aspects of parliamentary accountability, although a common thread is Parliament’s right to information. Whether Parliament chooses a regime that scrutinises everything in detail or one which picks points of contention, and however it may develop over time, timely access to background and information is relevant.
My Amendment 18 and its counterpart, Amendment 38, relate to keeping Parliament informed about the discussions between the Treasury and the regulator concerning equivalence. In Schedules 2 and 3 this Bill establishes that, when making rules, the FCA or PRA may consult the Treasury about the likely effect of the rules on relevant equivalence decisions.
Parliament should be sighted of these considerations because they may affect the content and strength of rules and, as explained in the Government’s consultation, equivalence decisions may result in requirements being embedded in statutory instruments. Just as we used to have EU requirements in regulations, we may end up having equivalence requirements. There is nothing complicated about my amendment; it just says, “keep Parliament informed”. Unless Parliament establishes that right now, it will not exist.
To illustrate this, I quote from the recent FCA consultation on investment firms which, like this Bill, front-runs the Treasury consultation. Paragraph 9.68 states:
“we have discussed with HM Treasury the rules’ likely effect on relevant equivalence decisions. We are not expected under our new public accountability requirements to provide further detail on this.”
I think we need to know something, and I hope the Minister will appreciate that too.
I turn to my Amendments 19 and 39, which specify the level of detail that regulators’ explanations concerning compliance with statutory requirements should contain. I was provoked into tabling these amendments on reading the FCA’s explanations in its consultation. Although they gave a reasonable but qualitative explanation of its general approach to the Financial Services Bill, the statutory accountability statements were poor, containing nothing quantitative or illustrative. They consisted of “trust and believe me” statements littered with phrases such as “proportionality”, “business specific”, “bespoke” and “flexible”; no attempt was made to identify or quantify how that was done. Information would have to be extracted from the rest of the consultation and rules, if it were there at all; or—and this is the nub—we have to swallow that, as paragraph 9.71 states, it is left up to the
“investment firms and supervisors to focus on the core business model indicators of financial resilience relevant to each firm”.
There are no examples given.
The statutory explanations are an important part of accountability. They should be elaborated on as a stand-alone justification, perhaps to spoon-feed the non-skilled reader, but not just through assertions. We need more than assertions that supervisors cosying up with firms can decide how to get it right. That is not accountability. These statements should be written more like justifying a case in court and less like how to pander to industry. They should inform on the toughness of the regime and capital calculations.
My amendment proposes that the explanations
“must include specific, detailed and quantitative elaboration, with worked examples”,
and that Parliament may reject rules that are accompanied by inadequate explanation. By way of comparison, when I checked the PRA’s front-running consultation which came out on 12 February, it seems to have done a rather better job and included examples.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab) [V]
My Lords, before getting to the substance of the debate, I must express some puzzlement; obviously, I have much to learn about this House’s mysterious ways. The specific issue that concerns me is the grouping of amendments. We are sternly told that groupings are not to be changed, but here we have a significant change: what was two groups on Monday is now a single group. The issues are not that disparate, but it makes a big difference to the time we have available.
The main point I wish to make relates particularly to Amendments 10 and 71. The latter was tabled by my noble friend Lord Sikka. If I had been a bit more alert, I would have added my name.
The issue here is to whom the FCA should be accountable, given the well-established phenomenon of regulatory capture, as the previous speaker mentioned. It is worth emphasising the point that regulatory capture is where an industry regulator such as the FCA comes to be dominated by the industry it is charged with regulating. The result is that the agency that is meant to be acting in the public interest instead works in ways that benefit the industry. The important point to understand is that this does not happen because inadequate or ineffective people are running the regulator. It is certainly not about corruption. It is an institutional, not individual, problem.
It is important to understand why it happens. The reasons are manifold but I will emphasise three. First, the regulated industry has a keen and immediate interest in influencing the regulator, whereas the customers are less motivated; they have their lives to live and are engaged only for relatively brief periods anyway. Secondly, we know that industries are prepared to devote substantial resources to influencing the regulator. Thirdly, there is the inevitable commonality of work and social life for the individuals on both sides of the process.
Given that the phenomenon of regulatory capture is acknowledged and widely understood, what do we do about it? The first step is acknowledging the issue and recognising and addressing the challenge. The next step is making the regulator as accountable as possible. There are many ways of doing this, but we can leave those for another day. What we have here are Amendments 10 and 71. Under Amendment 10, the involvement of both Houses in considering draft and final rules would be valuable in itself, given the expertise available. However, it is also valuable because of the additional exposure that it brings to the workings of the regulator, which will have to make its case. In the same way, Amendment 71 would bring greater exposure to the work of the FCA, forcing it to expound on its performance and its objectives in public and in an expert forum.
There is much more to do on making the FCA fully accountable, but these amendments are a start and have my support.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton. He addressed in useful detail the risks of industry capture of regulators, to which the financial sector is particularly prone and which is addressed by Amendment 71 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, I have attached my name to that amendment. I associate myself particularly with the remarks of the noble Baroness, who stressed that these amendments are about the rights of Parliament and access to data and detailed information—necessary for the kind of expert work at which your Lordships’ House excels.
As the noble Lord, Lord Davies, covered the need for Amendment 71 in some depth and its author—the noble Lord, Lord Sikka—is yet to speak, I will confine myself to general remarks about how all the amendments in this large group reflect the great degree of concern on all sides of the House about, given how the Bill is currently constituted, the lack of parliamentary oversight of the actions of both the regulators and the Treasury. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, explained this point in her highly informative introduction to the group.
This morning, thanks to their kind indulgence, I was able to join Cross-Benchers in a briefing on the Bill, where we heard how the formalisation of the relationship between regulators, Parliament and the Treasury is “on the way”. The future regulatory framework consultation closed on Friday. We heard that the Bill is not the final word on that, and that the responses to the consultation will not be ready in time for the Bill. So, yet again, we hear that democratic controls and the details of government plans will be included in future legislation and regulation. Your Lordships’ House has heard this so often on so many subjects; perhaps we could enlist the Lords spiritual in assisting us in putting it in some kind of musical form. It simply is not good enough.
We know that, despite the long run-in time, the Government were not ready for Brexit at the end of the transition period and that civil servants, through no fault of their own, are trapped in a huge scramble to catch up with the massive backlog of government inaction and indecision—the tsunami to which the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, referred. But what we have here are sensible proposals from experienced, expert Members of your Lordships’ House. I hope that the Government will acknowledge the urgency and importance of ensuring democratic oversight and that they will take at least some of these amendments on board at the next stage of the Bill, particularly, given the arguments already made, Amendment 71. There is no need to wait. Democratic oversight should be a given, not an extra, later addition.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to take part in day two in Committee on the Financial Services Bill. In doing so, I declare my interests as set out in the register.
I speak on this group to support my noble friend Lady Noakes’s Amendments 10 and 26. I shall not detain the Grand Committee too long. I have written an extensive article on this subject—if anyone is interested, it is at lordchrisholmes.com. All the amendments in this group seek to answer a straightforward question: who watches the financial watchdogs? If I had had a more expensive education, I could do the Latin for that, but fortunately I simply had an expansive education.
It seems to me that the start point is not whether we need more or less scrutiny and accountability but what the right level of accountability is. What are we seeking to achieve? In the EU/UK process, the debate has been characterised as being between principles and prescription. That seems a somewhat false characterisation. For me, the start point of purpose would make a lot more sense. What are we trying to achieve via our regulatory approach—to the FCA and the PRA—to enable it to be to that extent and no more? We also hear of proportionality. I support the two amendments in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes because they are elegant and leave space for detailed thinking to be done rather than for it needing to be rushed through in the Bill.
Some of that thinking needs to rest around the three Cs of capacity, consistency and co-ordination. Does any potential scrutiny have the right people, the right skills, the right experience and the right amount of time to undertake the task? On consistency, are the scrutinisers and the regulators there all the time, day in, day out, not merely when there is a significant regulatory failure or something that seems of particular political significance? Co-ordination speaks for itself, each regulator being a constituent part of a greater sector in terms of financial services and beyond that across the whole family of regulators, inspectors and ombudsmen.
In any solution that may come out of this, the greatest amount of energy seems to be around the Treasury Select Committee and a potential sub-committee. This has a great deal to recommend it, but even if we consider the first C of capacity, there would seem to be at least a challenge on this.
A similar argument, but with the addition of the right level of expertise, in my view, has been put forward in an excellent report from the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Financial Markets and Services, which was published on 18 February. It argues that a sub-committee of the Treasury Select Committee, supported by an expert panel, could be effective in this space. As has been said, it is not for the Government to prescribe what approach Parliament takes but, in this Financial Services Bill, the opportunity should be taken to provide that space and those options for such a scrutinising body to be constructed.
We have the opportunity to move a million miles away from part of the parliamentary scrutiny that we currently have—the annual report to Parliament via the Minister. We can move towards doing effective scrutiny in the 21st century in real time, rather than via the rear-view mirror: Parliament partnering with academia, the private sector and all the relevant expertise, deploying all the necessary elements of technology to enable effective and efficient scrutiny of our financial regulators for the benefit of us all.
Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]
My Lords, many of the amendments in this group share the aim of increasing or providing for the first time proper parliamentary scrutiny of some financial services regulatory regimes and of those who enforce them. Some amendments deal with the problem of absent or insufficient scrutiny on a grand scale and I strongly support their intent. This Government often seem to think that parliamentary scrutiny is best avoided or diluted. Our DPRRC, SLSC and Constitution Committee have regularly warned the Government against using skeleton Bills, against behaving as though consultation is a substitute for real parliamentary scrutiny and against using rule-making as camouflage legislation.
This Bill contains a particularly alarming example of the evasion of scrutiny in allowing the Treasury to revoke rules by SI by giving the regulator the power to make legally binding rules without any parliamentary involvement. That is completely unacceptable, as the Government must know. I strongly support Amendments 10 and 26, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, as a means of restoring some proper scrutiny. As the noble Baroness clearly explained, these amendments are not prescriptive as to the form of parliamentary scrutiny needed; they simply set out the principles that must guide construction of the scrutiny mechanisms. This is the equivalent of making an invitation to the Government that they should not refuse. It is an invitation to serious and substantive discussion about the way forward and it rightly, given the serious and far-reaching consequences, gives an appropriate incentive to resolve the issue quickly and collectively. I urge the Government to begin immediate cross-party talks on the issue.
By contrast with some of the amendments in this group, our Amendment 22 has modest and narrowly defined ambitions. As the Bill stands, Clause 3 lists the provisions of the CRR that the Treasury may revoke by regulation. There are 42 of these categories of provisions, all of them significant. Clause 3(4) makes these revocations conditional on their being or having been adequately replaced by general rules made, or to be made, by the PRA, or to be replaced by nothing at all if the Treasury thinks that that is okay. The Treasury appears to be the sole judge of what may or may not be an adequate replacement. In any event, Parliament is completely bypassed in this system. But all this means is that the Treasury can revoke provisions by SI before it has published the replacement rules or even decided what they will be. This sounds like a perfect recipe for disorderliness and uncertainty and it means that Parliament will have no opportunity to consider these new rules in a legislative setting. We get to see what has been dropped, but not necessarily what the replacement rules may be. This is another example of making law by making rules that Parliament has not been able to scrutinise.
Our amendment proposes a simple way round this. It would require any revoking SI to carry not only full details of what was being revoked but the full text of the replacing rules, except, of course, where no replacement was envisaged. These new rules can and will reshape important parts of our financial services regulatory regimes, and it is quite wrong that Parliament should be unable to scrutinise them.
I hope the Minister will be able to accept our amendment or to give us an assurance that revoking SIs will contain the full text of any replacement rules.
Lord Blackwell (Con) [V]
My Lords, in addressing this group of amendments, I want to speak also to Amendment 85 in my name. As I set out at Second Reading, I should draw attention to the fact that I was chairman of a regulated bank until the beginning of the year, although my interests now are solely as a shareholder.
I agree with other speakers that parliamentary accountability for the regulators is important now that the UK has its own regulatory agenda outside the European Union, and it is missing from this Bill. However, the regulators have been established by Parliament to enable independent expert bodies to exercise delegated powers, and we need to be careful that in providing for the necessary parliamentary oversight we do not create structures that impinge on the political independence of the regulators and their ability to take a considered, apolitical view, undermine their expertise or turn Parliament effectively into the day-to-day regulatory body if it is required to approve every rule in advance. That would make the regulators simply a working body for Parliament rather than independent regulators in their own right.
A number of speakers have talked about regulatory capture. From my experience over many years, it has not felt like the regulators have been captured by the industry, but neither have they always been right, so scrutiny is important. My amendment seeks to strike the right balance of delegation and oversight by suggesting parliamentary scrutiny of rules after the event—ex post—rather than it trying to second-guess the regulator ex ante by approving rules in advance. I therefore take a different view from my noble friend Lady Noakes on Amendment 10 and some of the other amendments. If Parliament sought to approve every rule in advance, the regulators would lose their independence, and we would lose the benefits of speed and expertise. We need to recognise that, often, rules need to be made to fix a problem, and if that problem needs fixing, the regulators need to act rapidly. They obviously need to consult as far as is possible, but to set in process a whole session of approvals by Parliament would handicap them in taking action when they needed to, and it would jeopardise their political independence.
Under my amendment, if a parliamentary committee felt that the rules were inappropriate or not working properly, it could make its views known to the regulator, and I suspect that in many cases the regulator would sensibly take note of that. Ultimately, it would be up to the Secretary of State to propose changes to regulations if the regulator was not acting in accordance with the framework that Parliament set out and intended. The point was made that that might need primary legislation; my understanding is that, under this Bill, Her Majesty’s Treasury can enact a lot of changes in regulations through secondary legislation, which can be done much more rapidly.
As my noble friend Lady Noakes said, what the amendment cannot signify is exactly what the form of parliamentary scrutiny will be and therefore that cannot be written into the Bill, but, since we are having this debate, I would advocate that the scrutiny function when Parliament comes to that is best carried out by a Joint Committee of both Houses, with appropriate technical support.
Experience suggests that a Joint Committee is the best way to avoid politicising the debate. It can draw on the experience in this House while enabling the elected Members in the other place to have their legitimate role in parliamentary oversight. As and when it is appropriate to decide on the form of parliamentary scrutiny, I hope that this can be taken into account.
I know that these matters are still under consultation. I look forward to my noble friend the Minister’s response, but I support the weight of the speakers so far that this is a matter that needs to be dealt with, if at all possible, during the course of this Bill.
Viscount Trenchard (Con)
My Lords, I declare my interests as stated in the register. I support both Amendments 10 and 26 in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes. They do not mean that Parliament would be seeking to usurp the role of the regulators, or to attempt to rewrite MiFID II which, according to Forbes Magazine, has required 30,000 pages to explain its regulations.
It is right that the Bill enables our regulators to act quickly and flexibly to respond to changes in the markets or the introduction of new financial products. However, without the scrutiny formerly carried out by the European Parliament of each and every detail of regulations and directives, it is necessary that Parliament should have oversight of the regulators’ work. My noble friend is right that we need to agree the optimum balance and how this will be done before the powers conferred upon the PRA and FCA are made available for them to use.
Amendments 18 and 19 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, are motivated by a desire to continue to align to EU regulation, even though there are no expectations that the EU will make any further significant equivalence declarations in the short term. Amendment 19 places a large, poorly defined burden on the FCA to show where and how its draft rules have been influenced. It is clear that the FCA will consider many external factors in drafting its rules. As your Lordships know, it is intended to agree a basis on which both regulators will be made accountable to your Lordships’ House and another place for the way in which they carry out their work. Accordingly, I think it would be too restrictive on the FCA if this amendment were supported. It would also create uncertainty over the Bank of England’s ability to act quickly as necessary in exercising its macroprudential responsibilities.
Similarly, Amendment 20 seeks to allow committees of your Lordships’ House and another place to publish a report on proposed Part 9C rules. It is not clear which committees these will be in the future. It would slow down changes that the FCA will want to make quickly, which could be damaging to the standing and competitiveness of the City. Perhaps my noble friend can tell the House how the Government intend to amend the Bill in order to provide for the necessary scrutiny of acts of the regulators. I am not sure that that would be the effect of Amendment 22, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. The Government’s intention, which I support, is that we should move away from the cumbersome, codified nature of rules. I would expect the PRA to try to make rules that are shorter and clearer than the regulations they replace. It would not always be appropriate for them to include the full text of the general rules to be replaced.
Amendment 27, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, seems to place a very heavy demand on Parliament to become closely involved in what our regulators do at international conferences, in a way that might be too restrictive on their freedom to participate fully at those conferences. This would be likely to weaken British influence on the outcomes of discussions and decisions made at such conferences.
In Amendment 38, the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, seeks to duplicate other arrangements which will be made to institute the necessary parliamentary accountability and again appears motivated by a desire to continue to align to EU rules. If the Government can bring forward an amendment to increase the attention that the PRA is required to give to the competitiveness of the markets, as strongly proposed by several noble Lords on Monday, I would suggest that Amendment 38 might be unnecessary.
While considering this matter, can the Minister confirm that it remains the Treasury’s intention to advise the Bank of England not to adopt a similar measure to the EBA to permit banks to capitalise software investments for the purpose of stress testing? This is one example of where, instead of equivalence, we will have higher standards than the EU, although regulatory standards are often not two-dimensional, high or low.
The effect of Amendment 39 is surely to transfer back to Parliament the detailed rule-making powers. Quite apart from the fact that neither your Lordships’ House nor another place is equipped to carry out such detailed, line-by-line scrutiny, the amendment would seriously slow down rule-changing, removing agility and flexibility from the regulators.
Amendment 40 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, does not remove the ultimate power to change rules from the regulator but introduces a cumbersome process involving the issuance of reports by committees of both Houses. Does the noble Lord intend these committees to be new standing committees, and how will they be resourced? I also note that in the case of a draft being laid, say, a week before Parliament rises in July, it might be three months before 20 sitting days of either House have elapsed.
I do not understand the intention of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, in introducing Amendment 71—a requirement separately for the Treasury Committee in another place to assess the FCA’s conduct prior to the appointment of a new chief executive.
My noble friend Lord Blackwell’s Amendment 85 makes an interesting proposal as to how the regulators should be made accountable to Parliament. Does my noble friend Lord Howe think that, as far as your Lordships’ House is concerned, scrutiny would come from an existing or soon to be established Select Committee, such as the strangely named Industry and Regulators Committee, or whether a new standing committee should be set up to exercise these functions?
The noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Bennachie, in his Amendment 137 seeks to place a statutory duty to consult the devolved Administrations over a reserved matter. We await with bated breath the publication of the Dunlop review, which should inform us of how the Government intend to manage relations with the devolved Administrations in the future, including on reserved matters. However, I cannot support the noble Lord’s amendment, which is unnecessary and provocative to certain elements within the devolved authorities.
I look forward to other noble Lords’ contributions and the Minister’s reply.
Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 71, which is in my name and supported by the noble Baronesses, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle and Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans.
The amendment seeks to strengthen the effectiveness of financial regulation and calls for scrutiny of the FCA’s conduct by the Treasury Committee prior to the appointment or reappointment of its chief executive. It effectively calls on the committee to act as a guide dog to the watchdog. We all know that effective regulation is a necessary condition for protecting people from malpractices, holding miscreants to account and promoting confidence in the finance industry.
The FCA has failed to deliver robust and effective enforcement and it needs to be helped. Its failures are documented everywhere. The recent report by Dame Elizabeth Gloster on the collapse of London Capital & Finance noted that the FCA did not discharge its functions in respect of LCF in a manner that enabled it to effectively fulfil its statutory objectives and that there were significant gaps and weaknesses in its practices. From my perspective, even more damning was the revelation that FCA staff were not even trained to read financial information to recognise unusual or suspicious transactions.
Another report on the scandal-ridden Connaught Income Fund concluded that the FCA’s regulation of the entities and individuals was not appropriate or effective. We are still awaiting the report on the Woodford Equity Income Fund, when thousands of investors are trapped. Regrettably that is not an independent investigation, but we await the outcome with considerable interest.
The FCA failed to act in the case of Carillion, a company that collapsed in January 2018. Carillion inflated its balance sheet and profits through aggressive accounting practices. These included the use of mark-to-market accounting, enabling the company to leave at least £1.1 billion-worth of worthless contracts on its balance sheet. It failed to amortise £1.57 billion of good will, which was effectively worthless. The company was disseminating that misleading information to the markets but the FCA took no action whatever. Curiously, on 18 September 2020, nearly 21 months after Carillion’s collapse, the FCA issued a warning notice saying that the company and some of its directors had recklessly misled markets and investors over the deteriorating state of its finances before the company collapsed. Where was the FCA for all the earlier years while Carillion was publishing that misleading information? It was nowhere to be seen.
There is now considerable public evidence that the banks have been forging customers’ signatures to alter key documents and repossess customers’ businesses and homes, and that evidence has been published in the mainstream media. I understand that there are over 500 documented cases and the FCA has not even started any investigation. A senior Metropolitan Police fraud officer wrote to the Treasury Select Committee in 2017, stating that the executive boards of some of the most prominent banks were “serious organised crime syndicates”, yet that has not resulted in any action by the FCA.
The bank RBS has systematically defrauded its customers but the FCA has been dragging its feet, often pushed by parliamentary committees and others to do its job. In November 2013 a 20-page report prepared by Lawrence Tomlinson summarised this abuse of bank customers and small businesses at RBS’s global restructuring group, or GRG. The Tomlinson report stated that rather than nurturing small businesses, the bank actually pulled the financial rug and sent them to premature bankruptcy. GRG operated from 2005 to 2013, and at its peak handled 16,000 companies with total assets of around £65 billion. A proportion of those companies were not viable but a great number were and had never defaulted on loans. The FCA’s approach was to bury its own Section 166 report on the RBS frauds. In February 2018, the Treasury Committee ignored the FCA’s reluctance and published the report. The committee said:
“The treatment of vast numbers of SME customers placed in RBS’s Global Restructuring Group was nothing short of scandalous.”
In June 2019 the FCA published what it described as its final report on the investigation into RBS’s treatment of small and medium-sized businesses. The co-chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Fair Business Banking and Finance said:
“This report is another complete whitewash and another demonstrable failure of the regulator to perform its role.”
The timidity of the FCA is also evident from the long-running HBOS frauds, which show no sign of resolution. In 2013, a report codenamed “Project Lord Turnbull” was published by Sally Masterton, Lloyds senior manager in credit risk oversight in the regulation and governance section of its risk division. It was prepared in response to inquiries made during Thames Valley Police’s investigation into the frauds at the Reading branch of HBOS, and also covered the period before the 2007-08 banking crash and bailouts and the subsequent takeover of HBOS by Lloyds Banking Group. The report noted that HBOS executives had “concealed” asset-stripping frauds at its Reading branch ahead of the bank’s takeover by Lloyds in 2008. The FCA did nothing to bring fraudsters to book.
Lord Bruce of Bennachie (LD) [V]
My Lords, that was a powerful speech by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, and clearly, a lot must be addressed. I served on the EU Financial Affairs Sub-Committee and the Treasury Select Committee, and currently serve on the EU Services Sub-Committee. Therefore, I am well aware of the contribution the sector makes across the UK.
The UK helped to shape the regulations and rules for the EU, but we have now left. The sector has consistently argued that a reputation for high standards and effective regulation is important to the confidence the world expresses in the UK’s financial institutions—notwithstanding the failures that have occurred. The combination of the European Parliament and the UK Parliament ensured that regulators have been accountable. I do not claim to be a technical expert on what is a complicated sector, but I recognise the dangers of regulation becoming an unaccountable closed book.
I support the case for a properly resourced specialist joint committee to ensure that regulators are held accountable, not so much on technical detail but in terms of a prudential framework and overall direction. That would be in the interests of the regulators and government Ministers as well as those who depend on a well-regulated and reliable sector. I share the concern that what the Government are trying to do will ultimately bite back if there has been no proper parliamentary oversight in a future scandal. The Government and the regulators will have nowhere to hide, but that will be very little comfort to people who may suffer from regulation failures.
Financial services are distributed throughout the economy. People often refer to the City of London, but we know that jobs and activities are distributed throughout the UK and have been growing in all the devolved Administrations. Edinburgh is the UK’s most important financial centre and one of the most important in Europe. According to TheCityUK, financial services contribute £13 billion, or 9.4% of GVA, to the Scottish economy. More than 160,000 people are employed in financial and related professional services, which is nearly 6% of Scotland’s national employment. The sector includes banking, fund management, insurance, life assurance and pensions, asset servicing and professional services.
Interestingly, Scotland accounts for 24% of all UK employment in life assurance and 13% of all banking employment. Given that Scotland has 8.5% of the population of the UK, this is clearly disproportionately important. According to Scottish Development International, there are more than 2,000 financial services businesses, supported by 3,650 professional services firms. Scotland’s financial and professional services exports account for 40% of all Scottish services exports.
Having said that about Scotland, tens of thousands are employed in the sector in Wales and thousands in Northern Ireland, and the number is growing in all the devolved areas. My Amendment 137 takes this into account and seeks to ensure that the devolved Administrations are consulted about any proposed changes in financial services regulations. It is clearly in the interest of the sector to have clear and common regulations across the United Kingdom, which is why this amendment looks for consultation only. It merely seeks to ensure that any factors of particular importance to a devolved Administration are, as far as possible, accommodated. I can see no conceivable advantage to financial services companies to diverge from UK regulation. After all, as the figures I cited show, a significant part of the financial services sector in Scotland is serving the whole UK market. The last thing it needs is a distracting push separating it from its customers, either by erecting barriers at the border or by promoting an alternative Scottish currency, which would undermine the raison d’être of serving the UK from Scotland, or a “sterlingisation” agenda that would put huge pressure on the public finances in Scotland.
My amendment seeks to avoid any unintended negative consequences. It is not intended to cause delay or to encourage special pleading. Given the particular importance of Scotland’s role in delivering life assurance and banking, it is surely right that any changes being considered to regulations affecting these sectors are not proceeded with until appropriate consultation has taken place.
That said, it is also important to recognise the role of professional support services, given Scotland’s distinctive legal system and, for example, accounting qualifications. The expertise that exists in Scotland should in any case surely be drawn on to inform regulations if and when changes are being considered. I share concerns that the Government are proceeding to build an architecture that lacks an adequate parliamentary dimension. It is perfectly reasonable to ask the legislatures of the devolved Administrations to be involved in contributing to the shaping of regulations, at least in their broad prudential thrust.
I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say. I hope he will recognise the force of the arguments put by noble Lords about the need for a significant and effective parliamentary dimension and a recognition that the devolved Administrations, especially Scotland, should be able to contribute constructively and positively to that outcome.
Lord McNicol of West Kilbride (Lab) [V]
My Lords, one of the joys of being at the end of such a large group of amendments and a long speakers’ list is that very much of what needs to be said has already been said, so I will be brief.
The contributions from across your Lordships’ Committee, from the noble Baronesses, Lady Noakes and Lady Bowles, and my noble friend Lord Davies, outlined the importance of parliamentary and democratic oversight and the different levels and ways of delivering it. The contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, on the right levels of oversight also helped move the debate on.
The balance between regulatory authorities’ powers and those of Parliament is critical. My noble friend Lord Sikka clearly outlined in detail many of the failures of the regulators and of the FCA, so getting the levels right is critical. I add my support for those amendments that I am pushing forward. I look forward to the Minister’s response and to how we move this forward to Report and Third Reading.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Healy of Primrose Hill) (Lab)
The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans has withdrawn, so I call the next speaker, the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, we have, sadly, become used to skeleton primary legislation, with policy embedded in statutory instruments that cannot be amended and cannot be voted down without threats of a constitutional crisis. But at least statutory instruments can be brought before Parliament, and Ministers must then make the case.
This Bill is a new low—skeleton primary legislation, elimination of secondary legislation and policy set in regulators’ rules with no meaningful accountability to Parliament. The accountability set out in the Bill, which largely mirrors proposals in the future regulatory framework review, provides, in essence, just for a bit more explanation by the regulator, the existing right of a parliamentarian to submit evidence to any consultation, and the existing right for committees such as the Treasury Select Committee and the Economic Affairs Committee to question the regulator from time to time. This will be the policy framework shaping a sector of the economy that will fundamentally impact our national prosperity, jobs and public spending.
The Minister was kind enough to meet us, so I can perhaps anticipate some of the arguments that the Government are likely to make. They will argue that the Bill is just a stopgap while consultation takes place, but the consultation under way has multiple stages and will stretch the whole process out for 18 months or two years. By then the horse will have long bolted and procedures will largely have been set in stone. Perhaps the Minister would spell out the timetable—because the Bill looks to me like a template, not a stopgap.
Secondly, the Minister will say that only part of financial regulation is covered by the Bill. But, since it includes all of Basel III, the Bill actually covers almost everything that matters in prudential regulation. I have also heard from parts of industry that a second financial services Bill is on its way. I do not know that; I have not heard it from the Government—but if so, it will have come and gone before the new framework legislation is finalised. Perhaps the Minister would comment on that. It is absolutely clear that what happens with this Bill genuinely matters.
I value consultation—real consultation—but I am saddened because consultation has become a cynical tool to sideline Parliament. “Just give us a free hand now, because we’re doing a consultation.” Colleagues who cover other areas of policy tell me that this is a pattern, and are now concluding that it is cynically being used with a wide range of legislation, to make sure that Parliament is sidestepped.
I suspect that the Minister will argue that the powers being given to the regulators in this Bill, with minimal accountability, are necessary so that the UK can respond to changing events. After all, we have left the European Union and times are going to change. I regard that as nonsense. We are in changing times, but we have proved in the last year that fast-track procedures exist when they are genuinely needed.
I very much welcome the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, also signed by my noble friend Lady Bowles, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. They are tough: they would prevent Schedules 2 and 3 coming into effect before the accountability deficit is sorted. That, I suggest, is what the circumstance warrants.
This group of amendments was revised from Monday, so it now includes proposals detailing how accountability can be structured. We have heard a whole series of brilliant speeches in this debate, so I want to make only some limited comments.
The noble Lords, Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord Eatwell, have tabled a number of amendments laying out process and timetable. I find that extremely constructive. By contrast, the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, has tabled an amendment that covers similar territory, but with such a light touch that—I hope he does not take this wrongly—I think it will be read as cosmetic. The industry needs to recognise the importance of proper scrutiny and understand that scrutiny in name only will, in the end, do the industry itself no long-term good.
In addition to the procedural amendments, my noble friend Lady Bowles has tackled an equally crucial but often overlooked element of oversight—one that goes to the heart of the matter. It is the need for the regulator to provide the detailed information to Parliament to fully understand and evaluate the evidence, reasoning and consequences of changes to rules. For years this has been done for us within the oversight process of the European Parliament, which has expert resources in depth. My noble friend, in her role in that Parliament, was able to use the information to improve proposals for rules and make them more effective. We have now lost that capacity, and nothing in the Bill or the framework consultation replaces it.
My noble friend Lady Bowles has also proposed amendments that would put this oversight on a regular basis, not just an ad hoc one, and would bring in an independent expert panel to do some of the heavy lifting. As the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, referred to, recently the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Financial Markets and Services addressed similar concerns. I quote from its February report, The Role of Parliament in the Future Regulatory Framework for Financial Services:
“Regardless of the format, the level of technical support available to Parliamentarians in this policy area will be key.”
The APPG goes on to propose secondments from the Treasury to the relevant parliamentary committees to bolster institutional capacity. I personally regard that as the wrong approach—that would be letting foxes into the henhouse—but it makes the point that proper parliamentary oversight requires new expert capability to replace that lost with Brexit. We have expertise within the regulator but we must have it for oversight of the regulator.
Before I finish, I want to refer to Amendment 137, tabled by my noble friend Lord Bruce, which would require the Government to consult on rule changes with the devolved Administrations. It is quite shocking to me that the devolved Administrations are overlooked in the Bill. Scotland is a major player in financial services and that needs to be recognised.
I will listen to the Minister’s response. I hope he will not repeat the airy dismissal that the Economic Secretary in the Commons deigned to give as his response. Voices on all Benches in this House are capable of coalescing around a set of viable amendments on Report that would at least remedy the worst in the Bill. The Government ought to be coming forward with the best.
Lord Eatwell (Lab)
My Lords, in due course I will speak to the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe and myself, which, as many noble Lords have commented, would introduce operational proposals that would address the problem of adequate parliamentary scrutiny.
Before I turn to those practicalities, though, I wish to speak to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, which deal with the principles at stake. As we might expect from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, her amendments are precise and direct and go to the heart of the matter: the inadequacy of parliamentary scrutiny.
I regret that I was unable to attend the Second Reading debate on the Bill. On reading the report of that debate, it is evident that an overwhelming sentiment in your Lordships’ House was that the procedures suggested by Her Majesty’s Government for the future development of the regulatory powers display a serious lack of appropriate parliamentary scrutiny. The fears expressed at Second Reading can only have been further reinforced by the note entitled “Meeting between the Economic Secretary, Peers, the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulatory Authority: Background Briefing for Peers”, and by the document Financial Services Future Regulatory Framework Review Phase II Consultation, published by Her Majesty’s Treasury in October last year. Both documents advocate a degree of parliamentary scrutiny that may at very best be described as minimalist. Seldom can two documents have made the case so eloquently for the adoption of a policy entirely at odds with that which they propose.
The central thrust of government thinking is spelt out in the phase 2 consultation document to which I have just referred. It may help if I quote the relevant passage:
“The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA), and the model of regulation introduced by that Act, continue to sit at the centre of the UK’s regulatory framework. The government believes that this model, which delegates the setting of regulatory standards to expert, independent regulators that work within an overall policy framework set by government and Parliament, continues to be the most effective way of delivering a stable, fair and prosperous financial services sector. The model maximises the use of expertise in the policy-making process by allowing regulators with day-to-day experience of supervising financial services firms to bring that real-world experience into the design of regulatory standards. It also allows regulators to flex and update those standards efficiently in order to respond quickly to changing market conditions and emerging risks. The FSMA model was readily adapted to address the regulatory failings of the 2007-08 financial crisis.”
Commenting further on the manner in which this model was readily adapted to address the regulatory failings of the 2007-08 financial crisis, the authors of this document declare:
“The financial crisis of 2007-08 revealed serious flaws in the UK’s system of regulation, particularly in the allocation and co-ordination of responsibilities across the ‘tripartite’ institutions – HM Treasury, the Bank of England and the FSA … The post-crisis framework reforms were therefore focused primarily on institutional design and allocation of responsibilities.”
So the problem that led to massive regulatory failure and to a regulatory system that failed to protect UK citizens and firms from a near-existential breakdown in the financial system, that heralded a sharp downturn in real income and higher unemployment, and that led inexorably to the disastrous austerity policy was a problem of
“institutional design and allocation of responsibilities”.
There is no mention of the failed analysis, no mention of the pernicious groupthink that infected the analysis of the FCA and the Bank of England, no mention of the fact that warnings from distinguished commentators in academia and in the financial services industry were airily dismissed, and no acknowledgement that our regulators participated in the creation of a procyclical regulatory model that actually made the crisis worse than it otherwise might have been.
If anyone has any doubt that allowing regulators to bring that real-world experience into design of regulatory standards was the foundation of that massive failure, they should consider the words of Alan Greenspan, then head of the US Federal Reserve system—essentially, the western world’s senior regulator—speaking to the banking committee of the US House of Representatives in October 2008. He said:
“This modern risk-management paradigm held sway for decades. The whole intellectual edifice, however, collapsed in the summer of last year.”
Where in this document is the recognition that the intellectual edifice collapsed? Where is the acknowledgement that those with real-world expertise did not understand the systemic risks in the industry that they were supposed to be regulating?
All this was clearly set out in the Turner review, published by the FSA in 2009 and seemingly unread by the authors of this document. The review advocated a shift from microprudential regulation that focuses attention on the risks facing individual firms to macroprudential regulation focusing on the risks inherent in the operation of the system as a whole. It is entirely true that implementing that change has proved more difficult than the noble Lord, Lord Turner, could have anticipated. Basel III, the regulatory system lauded in this Bill, was supposed to do the job, but as Professor Hyun Shin, chief economist of the Bank for International Settlements, the home of Basel III, has commented:
“Under its current … form, Basel III is almost exclusively micro-prudential in its focus, concerned with the solvency of individual banks, rather than being macro-prudential, concerned with the resilience of the financial system as a whole. The language of Basel III is revealing in this regard, with repeated references to greater ‘loss absorbency’ of bank capital.”
When we turn to the impact assessment published by Her Majesty’s Treasury to accompany the Bill, we again find many references to the virtues of bank capital, its loss absorbency and the resilience of individual firms. There is, however, absolutely nothing about the attempt to deal with systemic risk using liquidity rules, resolution regimes and comprehensive supervisions. The authors of this document have been rewriting history. They have also failed to learn from history.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, parliamentary accountability is a subject that has clearly brought out considerable strength of feeling across the Committee; the Government agree that it is vital.
Parliament, particularly this House, has had a central role in shaping critical financial services legislation over recent decades. In many cases, that legislation has served as a blueprint for global reforms. First and most fundamentally, there was the passage of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, or FiSMA, which endures as the framework around which all other financial services legislation is based. Following the financial crisis, Parliament led a number of important reforms to make our regulatory framework stronger and, of course, there is the important work of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, which spearheaded important reforms such as the creation of the senior managers and certification regime.
I assure noble Lords that this Government recognise the important role that Parliament must continue to have in shaping the financial services regulatory landscape. I say that because I cannot agree with the suggestions I have heard of late that there is simply no parliamentary accountability for the UK regulators and that the Bill somehow seeks to sidestep Parliament.
I listened carefully to what the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, said about the order-making powers contained in the Bill. I refer her to the report of your Lordships’ Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which, perhaps unusually for the committee, raised no concerns about the inclusion of those powers.
The FCA, as I shall go on to explain, is accountable to the Treasury, to Parliament and to the public, including for the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which it uses resources. There are a number of features in the legislation which support this accountability, as I shall explain.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, argued that the Bill’s scope is too wide. I say to her that the Bill is designed to resolve immediate outstanding policy issues resulting from our exit from the European Union and to meet the UK’s international obligations in the short term. Its scope is limited to ensuring that we uphold our international commitments.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, asked me whether there will be another financial services Bill before the FRF is complete. The Government have not made decisions about legislation in future Sessions. The FRF review is a high priority and essential for establishing the model for all future legislation.
The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, asked me where in the Bill is there any focus on macroprudential issues. The Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England is, as he knows, the UK body responsible for identifying and managing systemic risks to financial stability. Its remit is not affected by the Bill. It publishes a Financial Stability Report twice a year. This work compliments the Basel reforms and neither, clearly, is a replacement for the other.
I will set out where the Government stand on this important issue. I begin by focusing on the prudential measures: the investment firms prudential regime and the Basel framework. Implementing these rules in a timely manner is critical to the UK’s reputation as a responsible and responsive global financial centre. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is the primary global standard setter for the prudential regulation of banks. In response to the financial crisis the Basel committee significantly overhauled and strengthened its standards, in a package now known as Basel III. Since that time, the Basel committee has continued to refine that framework to ensure that it is robust and to guard against the serious failures that led to the financial crisis.
Due to the interconnectedness of the global financial system and the fact that large financial institutions operate across the globe, the UK Government remain committed to the development and implementation of a common set of standards on prudential regulation and supervision. With regard to Basel III, the UK is committed to implementing those standards for 1 January 2022, and firms have been planning on this basis.
My noble friend Lord Trenchard asked whether I could confirm the treatment of software assets in the implementation of Basel by the PRA. The PRA is currently consulting on a proposal to disallow software assets from counting as regulatory capital, which is contrary to the approach being taken in the EU.
For the investment firms prudential regime, any delay would put the UK at a significant disadvantage compared to the EU. Investment firms in the EU will be subject to a more proportionate prudential regime from the end of June 2021.
I will set out the accountability arrangements relating to these measures. The first thing to remember is that these measures in the Bill sit within the existing framework of FiSMA. As my noble friend Lord Agnew stated at Second Reading, the FiSMA model as updated after the financial crisis is considered world leading. Through it, Parliament has established the appropriate split of responsibilities between the different regulators and has ensured that those regulators have the appropriate statutory objectives to guide their work. It also ensures that Parliament and other interested parties have the information needed to scrutinise the work of the regulators and hold them to account.
FiSMA confers broad rule-making powers on the regulators to ensure that they are able to fulfil their statutory objectives, recognising that it is appropriate for expert and independent regulators to make the detailed technical judgments about how financial services firms should be regulated in a way that delivers the outcomes that Parliament wants. I appreciate this is different from the European model we have been operating under, but it is a return to the UK model. It is evolutionary, not revolutionary. It brings us more into line with other key international peers whose regulators take the lead in the detailed firm requirements.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)
I have received a single request to speak after the Minister; I call the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con) [V]
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his very clear and thoughtful response. I have three brief questions for clarification. First, what plans, if any, are there for a Financial Services (No. 2) Bill? Any information on that would be helpful to the deliberations of the Committee today, and to the approaches noble Lords may choose to take as we move through further stages of the Bill.
Secondly, will he say what the Government’s position is on the timeliness of such scrutiny? Does it err more towards rear-view rather than real-time? Thirdly, in the light of the debate that we have just had, will he consider discussions potentially to lead to government amendments coming forward on Report? I think that noble Lords would agree that, on scrutiny and accountability, if the Bill is passed as currently drafted that would be at least somewhat unfortunate.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, I intended the Committee to take some reassurance from the final sentences in my winding up when I said that I was very happy to continue the conversation with noble Lords on this theme between now and Report. I hope that noble Lords will take that as a signal that the door is not closed as regards a potential tweak to this part of the Bill.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate and those who have supported my amendments. It has been a very thoughtful debate with contributions from all parts of the Committee, which sees this as a real issue that needs to be solved. On a personal basis, I welcome back the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, to our consideration of financial services matters. We should remember that he has unique experience among noble Lords, having been a financial services regulator, so we must listen very carefully to what he has to say on many of these things.
One overriding theme has come out of our debate this afternoon. There is unanimity on the need for good parliamentary involvement in financial services. My noble friend Lord Howe affirmed the Government’s commitment to parliamentary accountability. The difference comes in how we define what form that accountability could take. The Minister made a case for going back to the FiSMA model, which he seemed to forget was brought in in the context of the existing EU arrangements for scrutiny and did not exist pre-EU scrutiny, so going back to that is not saying anything at all. Now that we are out of the EU, we are trying to see what can be done to deal with the changes that we need to accommodate within our system and to ensure that there is proper accountability for that. FiSMA may, or may not, provide an adequate basis for that, and I suspect not.
My noble friend also talked about the need for timeliness. I am sure that the Basel III implementation needs to be done on a timely basis, and it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that we could get that right with parliamentary scrutiny in this Bill. However, the implementation of Basel III does not need to be done by the PRA; it could as easily be done by a statutory instrument introducing it. I am not afraid of 300 pages of detail. I have seen the formulae on risk rating. I do not relish the opportunity to do it again, but one could do so if one needed to, so it is not necessary for us.
I get the impression that this is a rubber-stamp Bill. The Government have made up their mind. The PRA and the FCA will be roaring ahead as if they have all the powers and we are now just being invited to rubber -stamp it. I think we are saying back to the Government that we do not find that a satisfactory state of affairs.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, rightly said that this is not a party-political issue, and there is a commonality of views across the Committee on this. The fact that there is different detail in our amendments today does not rule out the possibility that we can coalesce around a good solution to this. I was pleased to hear my noble friend the Minister say that he was keen to maintain a dialogue with noble Lords after Committee. That would be extremely helpful; obviously, we would prefer to move in step with the Government and not against them.
I think the Minister needs to recognise that we do not find convincing the narrative that the existing framework with a few tweaks in the Bill gives an adequate accountability framework for the additional powers that are being transferred to the regulators under the Bill. I look forward to continuing the dialogue outside Committee and I hope that that will be fruitful before we get to Report. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Oates
“(ca) the climate-related financial risks to which FCA investment firms are exposed,”Member’s explanatory statement
The purpose of this amendment is to require the FCA, in exercising its power to make general rules, to have specific regard to the climate related financial risks to which FCA investment firms are exposed.
Lord Oates (LD)
My Lords, I declare my interests as chair of the advisory committee of Weber Shandwick UK, as set out in the register. In moving Amendment 11 in my name and the names of my noble friend Lady Kramer and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, I will also speak to the other amendments in this group. Before doing so, I put on record my thanks to a number of organisations for their briefing and patient answers to the many and often ignorant questions that I have posed to them in preparing for the Bill, particularly Finance Watch, Positive Money and Carbon Tracker.
I am also grateful to the City Corporation and the APPG for Financial Markets and Services for the helpful information they provided, and, of course, to the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and his ministerial colleagues for meeting to discuss the Bill and, if not immediately signing up to all our climate amendments, at least recognising the seriousness of the issues that they raise. I hope that over the course of Committee we will be able to convince the noble Earl and his colleagues of the urgency of acting through this legislation.
There are essentially three categories of amendment in this group. The first addresses the rule-making powers of the regulators, requiring them when making the rules to take account of the climate-related financial risks to which the entities they regulate are exposed. This issue is dealt with in Amendments 11 and 12.
The second category requires regulators when making rules to have regard to the UK’s national and international climate change objectives and obligations. Amendments 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 23, 34, 35, 36 and 37 address this issue in a number of different ways.
Finally, Amendments 48, 75, 76, 89 and 98 fall into a third category, which tackles disclosure and governance issues as they relate to climate change.
Turning to the first category, the objective of Amendments 11 and 12 is simply to ensure that the prudential regulation of FCA investment firms under Schedule 2 is fit for purpose; that is, that it properly takes account of and seeks to manage and control the risk exposure of the firms it regulates. It is hard to understand on any accepted definition of prudential regulation how it can be regarded as such if it fails to take account of exposure to climate risks, given the potential threat they pose, not only to individual firms but to the financial system as a whole.
There are those who argue that it is premature to take this approach, because the sector is in the process of working out how to measure climate risk, which is undoubtedly a complex matter, given the myriad interrelationships that exist and the fact that there is no precedent for measuring such dynamic risks. While I acknowledge that we do not have a perfect understanding of climate risk, we cannot wait for a perfect solution. We cannot accept that a potentially enormous risk exists for FCA investment firms, but, because it is difficult to measure its exact scale, we are going to act as if it does not exist at all. That is not prudential regulation; it is wantonly reckless negligence.
I hope that the Government will look at this matter very carefully and that the Minister will be able to give us some comfort that, if they will not accept our amendments, they will at least bring forward proposals to ensure that prudential regulation of FCA investment firms does not continue to ignore what is likely to be the most significant risk to which they are exposed over the coming decades.
The second set of amendments seek in different ways to ensure that the FCA and the PRA must have regard in rule-making to our net-zero target and our wider international obligations on climate change and biodiversity. Amendment 23 in my name, with the support of my noble friend Lady Kramer and the noble Baronesses, Lady Hayman and Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, would prevent the Treasury from using its power under Clause 3 to evoke capital requirement regulations unless the effect of the new regulation was compliant with the UK’s net-zero target.
Amendment 13 to Schedule 2 and Amendment 34 to Schedule 3 require the FCA and PRA, when making rules, to have regard to the
“the likely effect of the rules on the relative standing of the United Kingdom as an international leader in combatting climate change”.
Amendments 16 and 37 to Schedules 2 and 3 respectively require that, in considering that likely effect on the UK’s standing, the FCA and PRA have regard to our commitments under the Paris Agreement. This includes our nationally determined contribution of a 68% reduction in emissions from 1990 levels by 2030 and the UK’s net-zero target under the Climate Change Act 2008, as amended in 2019. Amendment 17 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, adds the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity to that list of “have regards”.
In these amendments, I have deliberately replicated existing language in the Bill’s rule-making clauses, which require the FCA and PRA to have regard to
“the likely effect of the rules on the relative standing of the United Kingdom as a place for internationally active investment firms to be based”.
That is an undoubtedly an important consideration, but it needs to be specifically supplemented by a requirement that takes into account the UK’s standing as a leader on climate change. This will force the regulators to raise their sights and ensure that we have the rules in place to cement the UK’s position as the leading financial centre in tackling climate change and providing green finance.
On an earlier group on Monday, my noble friend Lord Sharkey quoted the Barclays CEO Jes Staley, who said when asked which amendment he would like to burn now we had left the EU:
“I wouldn’t burn one piece of regulation.”
He went on to say:
“I would continue pushing the climate agenda, trying to make London a centre of innovation around financing climate and transitioning to a net zero economy by 2050”.
That might be a pretty brilliant idea and we agree with him, but we need an adequate system in place to allow it to happen. In the last 15 years, Governments in which all the main parties have been represented have ensured that the UK has established and retained international standing as a leader on climate issues. We need to ensure that leadership is reflected not just in our politics and Government, but across industry and society as a whole. Nowhere will this be more important than in the most significant sector of our economy.
If our financial services industry and its regulators show leadership on climate, the industry will not only have the opportunity to gain a clear market advantage in the years ahead but will help to address the current climate emergency. If they do not, instead of playing a key role in averting climate catastrophe, that same industry will be a key contributor to it. That is what is at stake here.
Amendments 14 and 35 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, have a similar objective although I must admit that they are a little more concise than my version. They would require the FCA and PRA, in making rules, to have regard to
“the likely effect of the rules on the United Kingdom meeting its international and domestic commitments on tackling climate change”.
Amendments 15 and 36 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch, have a similar objective again but focus specifically on the net-zero target under the Climate Change Act, as amended. I put my name to both these sets of amendments because the purpose of all our amendments is a common one: the essential task of ensuring that our regulators take account of the most significant threat that faces the financial services industry, and indeed every one of us on this planet—the climate emergency. The intent of these amendments has support across the Committee, so I hope that the Minister will recognise the need to act and the Government will either accept a version of these amendments or bring forward one of their own. If they are unwilling to do so, I think the spirit of the House will be to come together on a joint amendment on these matters on Report.
Baroness Hayman (CB) [V]
My Lords, I declare my interests as set out in the register. It is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Oates, who, both at Second Reading and today, has argued passionately and cogently about the need to remedy the absence from the Bill of any reference to the risks and opportunities that climate change presents to the financial services industry. I have tabled Amendments 14, 35, 75, 76 and 98 and added my name to Amendments 11, 12, 23, 48 and 89 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Oates, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch.
As the noble Lord, Lord Oates, said, all the amendments in this group seek to put a climate change lens on the provisions of the Bill. There are various approaches, but the amendments focus, as he said, on ensuring that the regulators take into account climate-related risks when they are making the new rules and regulations proposed in the Bill. They seek to address the remit of the regulators and thus ensure that climate risk is considered at a systemic level.
The increase in firms reporting on such risks at an individual level is both necessary and welcome; however, there is a widely recognised and existential threat to our entire financial system from climate change. Last year, the Governor of the Bank of England, Andrew Bailey, said:
“Compared to the financial crisis and the pandemic, the risks from climate change are even bigger and more complex to manage.”
We need to ensure that those with the responsibility for financial stability at a macro level are assessing and reporting systemic climate risk as a core function.
On numerous occasions, the Government have recognised the integral role of our financial services industry in driving the change to a green economy, with an urgent focus on aligning investment with the objectives of the Paris Agreement and the Climate Change Act. Our amendments would put that into reality. The Chancellor spoke on 9 November about
“putting the full weight of private sector innovation, expertise and capital behind the critical global effort to tackle climate change and protect the environment”.—[Official Report, Commons, 9/11/20; col. 621.]
Yet, as has been said, this crucial piece of financial industry legislation remains totally silent, hence the importance of our debate on this group of amendments and the urgency, in this year of COP26 when our own domestic performance will be integral to the success of our global leadership, of making progress before the Bill leaves this House.
Turning to individual amendments, I have tabled Amendment 14, which, as the noble Lord, Lord Oates, says, addresses the same issues as his Amendments 11 and 12, but in a slightly less detailed way. The intention of Amendments 14 and 35 is to ensure that the FCA makes new prudential regulations for investment firms and that, before the PRA makes any new rules in relation to the capital requirements regulations, these regulators must have regard to the likely effect of those rules on the UK meeting its net-zero commitments. “Having regard” is an important issue and one to which, when this was debated in the other place, I sensed that the Government were not completely antagonistic, but took rather a St Augustine view—being happy to be made green, “but not yet”.
I see no reason whatever for awaiting the consultation on this issue, especially because when one reads the consultation document, apart from a few words in the foreword by the Minister, there is no reference to climate change and no request for views on it. Given the importance of the issue, this is something on which we should be making progress straightaway.
I am grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Oates, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Altmann and Lady Bennett, for Amendment 75, which focuses on the current remit and governance provisions of the regulator. It proposes amending Schedule 1ZA to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which deals with the constitution of the governing body of the FCA, and provides for the appointment of a board member with direct responsibility for climate change issues. This would enable a focused and strategic approach to be taken to climate change across the sector at the highest level of the regulator.
Essentially, the amendment requires the regulators to do what they have asked of the sector itself, because those are the same provisions that they now require financial institutions to comply with, and they replicate the senior management regime, which requires those institutions to appoint a board member responsible for identifying and managing financial risk from climate change, and reporting on it.
As part of the process to embed climate risk and the net-zero transition into investment and supervisory decisions, institutions are asked to
“embed the consideration of the financial risks from climate change in their governance arrangements”
and
“demonstrate an understanding of the distinctive elements of the financial risk from climate change and a sufficiently long-term view of the financial risks that can arise, beyond standard business planning horizons.”
That long-term view is particularly important, and there is no reason for the FCA not to take on this responsibility. The Bank of England itself has appointed an executive sponsor for climate-related risks, who is responsible for recommending to the governors the Bank’s strategy for addressing the risks that climate change poses to its objectives, and overseeing the implementation of that strategy. So I hope that, when he winds up, the Minister will be able to respond positively to this very limited but still important amendment.
Amendment 76 deals with the need to ensure that the regular mandatory reporting mechanisms for a sector-wide climate risk assessment provide for FSMA to be amended; the need for the PRA to provide a regular report on how it has evaluated exposure to climate risk; and the impacts that it would have on the stability of the United Kingdom financial system. That could form part of the annual reporting that the regulators are required to provide to the Treasury, and to Parliament via the Treasury Select Committee.
The amendment also provides that, as part of the reporting process, the PRA must seek advice from the climate change committee. It is important that we join the dots between the different bits of government, and ensure that a statutory body such as the climate change committee is integrated into the advice received by regulators and those responsible for economic stability.
My final amendment in this group is Amendment 98, which seeks to amend the Financial Services and Markets Act to insert a new FCA climate-related financial risk objective. While the regulators are moving forward with approaches necessary to address climate-related financial risks, such as through the UK Climate Financial Risk Forum, their statutory remit does not currently include a duty to consider the impact of climate change on the stability of the financial sector overall.
The theme running through this group of amendments is to seek to embed climate risk and the net-zero obligation into the financial system. This is one critical step towards doing that, by ensuring that they are embedded within the scope and remit of the regulators at every level.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, who is such a champion of climate and other environmental issues in your Lordships’ House. As she said, it is astonishing that the Bill, in the year 2021, presented by the Government with the responsibility of chairing COP 26, who talk so often about being “world-leading” on climate, could have got so far without any mention of the climate emergency.
The noble Baroness and, in introducing the amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Oates, have set out extensively the detail of the range of climate amendments and the need for their incorporation in the Bill, so I shall focus the bulk of my words on Amendment 17 in my name. It is distinct in that, while all the others address the climate emergency, this is the only amendment that also brings in the crucial issue of our nature crisis, and the collapse in biodiversity and bio-abundance that is obviously of concern to the Treasury given its commissioning of the recently-released Dasgupta Review.
I doubt that many noble Lords taking part in the debate on this group need an outline of it, but it is important to highlight that the Dasgupta Review identifies nature as “our most precious asset”. It says that we need vastly more protection for our scant remaining natural world—on this, one of the planet’s most nature-depleted lands—which means making sure that money is not going into destructive actions. That should be of concern to the Financial Conduct Authority. It says too that we should begin to implement large-scale and widespread investments that address biodiversity loss—again, a matter for the Financial Conduct Authority.
While it is great to see in the Dasgupta Review these critical issues to all of our futures expressed in terms that even mainstream economics can understand, being comfortable for those whose philosophy is embedded in growth-orientated, 19th-century politics, it falls down in trying to apply the same unrealistic, abstract mathematical models, driven by financial calculations, to provide tools to guide what to do. We have so little left of biodiversity and bio-abundance, with 50% of our species in decline and 15% at imminent risk of extinction, that we cannot be calculating what we can afford to destroy or write off in this land. We have to preserve everything that is left, while acknowledging that the destruction that we have wrought has given us an insecure, poverty-stricken society that is frighteningly short on resilience, as the Covid-19 pandemic has demonstrated and, as we have just seen on the global scale in Texas, precious little ability to endure the climate shocks inevitably coming our way.
I point noble Lords and the Government to the recent, crucial United Nations Environment Programme report, Making Peace with Nature. In his foreword to it, the UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, says that
“our war on nature has left the planet broken”.
That is where we are. The often piecemeal response to the climate crisis, biodiversity loss and pollution is
“not going to get us to where we want”,
according to Inger Andersen, executive director of the United Nations Environment Programme.
Just considering the remit of our international climate obligations as a central part of the FCA’s responsibilities is not nearly enough, as crucial as that is. Adding our equally binding and important obligations through the Convention on Biological Diversity is a significant improvement, and I give notice to your Lordships’ House that this is an issue that I intend to pursue strongly at the next stage of the Bill. I will listen carefully to today’s debate, and any responses we get from the Government, and consider where best to place this amendment among the range of amendments, although I hope that the Government will pre-empt any need for me to do that.
Yet this is still not nearly enough, as the UNEP is highlighting. We also need to consider pollution as a key concern, and a circular economy, on which the European Union is leading. We need a systems thinking approach—a complete view of how we stop treating this planet as a mine and a dumping ground and treasure its immensely complex systems of life, of which we still have so little understanding. Of course, we also have to consider the billions of people—millions in the UK alone—whose basic needs are not being met while we trash our planet. As a species we are using the resources of 1.6 planets every year; in the UK, our share is three planets.
This morning I was present at a briefing about New Zealand’s modern, 21st-century living standards framework, on which there has been wide public and expert consultation. It provides a guide for Treasury decision-making on all government spending. That is truly world-leading, and I hope that the UK Treasury is looking urgently at developing a similar system. In the meantime, however, the inclusion in this Bill of our climate emergency and nature crisis—the understanding that our financial sector is 100% contained within it—is at least progress.
The other place has before it the Climate and Ecological Emergency Bill, which could help to create a framework for such a structure. Given that it is “oven-ready”—to quote a once-familiar phrase—and the continuing delays to the Environment Bill, the Government should be looking at a rapid delivery of whatever emergency steps could be taken—as many as have been taken over Covid.
I revert to the Bill before us. I was told that the 2020 Pension Schemes Bill was the first financial legislation in British history to contain a reference to climate change—no doubt the first to refer to the natural world. Listening closely to the briefing that I referred to earlier, I sense that the Government are at least prepared not to step backwards in this 2021 Bill, and to include some reference to climate change. But if it is to progress it also needs to include biodiversity.
In concluding this section of my comments, I ask the Committee to listen to a short quote:
“Obviously it is right to focus on climate change, obviously it is right to cut CO2 emissions, but we will not achieve a real balance with our planet unless we protect nature as well”.
That was a quote from Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s speech of 11 January as he announced that £3 billion of UK climate finance was to be spent on supporting nature. I ask the Minister how, given the Prime Minister’s words, he could not have included an amendment such as Amendment 17, in addition to one or more climate change amendments.
Allowing money to pump the systems that are wrecking the natural world is, to put it mildly, not a good idea. It is something that should be considered in every action and every regulation of every government body, particularly the Financial Conduct Authority, given the extreme financialisation of our economy, whereby almost every element is now regarded as a potential profit source. Those profits, which go to the few, must not be at the expense of the living future of all of us.
I turn briefly to the other amendments to which I have attached my name, the first of which is Amendment 23, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Oates, also signed by the noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Lady Hayman. This amendment simply ensures that regulation is compliant with the amended Climate Change Act and the Government’s much-trumpeted 2050 net-zero target. That is a bare, indeed inadequate, minimum, because it fails to acknowledge the need for urgent action now to achieve major cuts in emissions in the 2020s. Not waiting but acting now should be at the forefront of every government action.
I backed Amendment 75, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, because of the need for expertise in these issues within the FCA. Its many failings in traditional areas were powerfully outlined earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka. It certainly needs a specialist, expert voice at its heart to address environmental issues.
I also attached my name to Amendment 98, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, and also signed by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch, which focuses particularly on climate risk. I would suggest that this falls, in the terms of the Paris climate agreement, in the areas of both climate mitigation and adaptation. The need for mitigation is a risk in itself. We heard the astonishing news this week that local government pension funds still hold £10 billion in fossil fuel investments, despite large numbers of local councils having declared climate emergencies. That is astonishing in terms of money being invested in trashing the climate in ways already hitting close to home—flooding, heatwaves and biodiversity damage—but it is also as though the term “carbon bubble” had never been invented. Perhaps we cannot blame local government for the oversight when our current Government have continued to put money into fossil fuel assets and to subsidise the operation of existing ones to the tune of billions. These are issues that certainly need to be considered.
However, there is also adaptation. I do not feel like I need to stress so much—as the Green Party has for years—that the climate emergency is a current reality, not a problem for future generations. I think, finally, the Government and even parts of industry and finance have got that fact. I note that, today, Fitch Ratings warned that the rising cost of natural catastrophes arising from climate change could mean that insurers withdraw from the market, leaving it to Governments to pick up the pieces. Amendment 98 would be a modest step towards ensuring that the FCA has rules fit for operating in such an environment.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]
My Lords, I am delighted to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, and pay tribute to her green credentials and the work that she and her colleague, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb—both my friends—have done, as have so many others who have contributed to this debate so far today. I look forward to the other contributions.
This group of amendments has much to commend itself, as do many of the individual amendments. It helps to green-proof, if I may say that, the provisions of the Bill. I am sure that my noble friend Lord Howe will tell me if I am wrong when he comes to reply, but I cannot find anything else in the Bill that covers the provisions set out in these amendments. I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Oates—I celebrate, again, the fact that we joined the House together; I always look forward to debates in which he and I contribute—and to the noble Baronesses, Lady Hayman and Lady Bennett. My slight concern with this group is that while the focus and main thrust of their amendments is on climate change I am slightly confused that they have chosen that form of words—as they also have in other amendments—because so much progress has been made in investment generally. I personally believe that that should extend to banking and financial services as well as other investments, but there is general recognition now of ESG investments. The Wikipedia encyclopaedia tells us that:
“Environmental, Social, and Corporate Governance”
are generally recognised as measuring
“the sustainability and societal impact of an investment in a company or business.”
It goes on to say that:
“Threat of climate change and the depletion of resources has grown, so investors may choose to factor sustainability issues into their investment choices.”
We are increasingly seeing a move in general investments towards individual small shareholders buying very small, limited shareholdings in a company precisely for the purpose of raising these issues at the AGM. I think we will see this trend continue. This must extend, as I said earlier, to banking and financial services as well. I believe that there should be a place for ESG provisions and regulation by the FSA in the Bill, and these amendments identify where they should go.
However, I am mindful of the fact that ESG covers all sorts of possibilities, such as climate change, greenhouse gas emissions, biodiversity, waste management and water management, so I put to the authors and to my noble friend the Minister that ESG provisions would encapsulate this and would perhaps be a neater—and recognised—way of introducing this into the Bill.
In many instances, particularly in all the work that we have done on rural affairs, we rural-proof legislation as it goes through and I am very keen that we green-proof new legislation as it comes online. I therefore welcome the main thrust of these amendments. I repeat to my noble friend the Minister that if this is an omission, these amendments, or something along the lines of ESG terminology, should find a place in the Bill and a role for the regulators specified in it to follow. If these amendments do not fit the Government’s thinking or should we follow more of an ESG terminology, will he consider coming forward with amendments of his own at the next stage?
Baroness Sheehan (LD) [V]
My Lords, it is always a pleasure to speak after the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh. We are often in agreement. The point that she raises about ESG is pertinent and, sadly, it is not mandatory. We are seeing a continued increase in the billions of pounds and dollars being spent on fossil fuel infrastructure.
The young people whose futures will be mostly affected by what we do today are increasingly calling for action across all sectors, as demonstrated by the worldwide UNDP poll of 1.2 million people that I cited at Second Reading. I should also put on record that the poll carried out by YouGov last October at the behest of Global Witness showed that two-thirds of the British public want the UK to be a world leader on climate change. In fact, the highest percentage of those was recorded in Scotland at 69%.
The Bill depicts the landscape that will drive the investment of billions of pounds at a crucial juncture in our country’s history to reshape our future financial services post Brexit. The legislation will form the basis of how investment decisions will be regulated as we spend massive amounts of taxpayer money to build back better post Covid. Serendipitously, the Bill also comes at a time when we will be in pole position to provide global leadership through COP 26 and the G7. Italy, our co-host for COP 26, will then host the G20. We have an opportunity to showcase the route map presented to us by the Climate Change Committee’s recent report to get us to net zero by 2050, while steering a course to meeting the Paris goals. What an opportunity.
The Covid-19 pandemic has focused minds on what can happen when we push natural ecosystems too far, and I agree with every word of the contributions of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. However, the timeframes to get innovative technological solutions engineered to scale to tackle climate change are substantially longer than those needed for vaccines—and they were long enough and overturned by human endeavour, hopefully just in time. Decisions have to be taken now if we are to reach net zero by 2050, and we have to get it right because we are in the last chance saloon.
Governments do not have the sums that will be needed, so we need private sector money too, and pots of it. However, business needs certainty and absolute clarity about which way the wind is blowing politically.
It is getting clarity from one quarter. Here is an extract from the letter sent by BlackRock CEO Larry Fink in 2021 to client CEOs. I remind the Committee that BlackRock’s assets under management come to, give or take, $7 trillion. This is what he said:
“BlackRock is a fiduciary to our clients … This is why I write to you each year, seeking to highlight issues that are pivotal to creating durable value—issues such as capital management, long-term strategy, purpose, and climate change.”
He went on to remind client CEOs:
“In January of last year, I wrote that climate risk is investment risk.”
I repeat: climate risk is investment risk, says the CEO of BlackRock. He went on to issue what can only amount to a stark warning: if you risk saddling your investors with stranded assets, with no demonstration of how you are moving to de-climate risk your operations, there will be consequences.
The writing is on the wall. The Prime Minister knows this. Here are his words from last November:
“This 10-point plan will turn the UK into the world’s number one centre for green technology and finance, creating the foundations for decades of economic growth.”
He went on to describe his 10-point plan as
“a global template for delivering net zero emissions”,
ahead of the UK hosting the COP 26 climate summit in Glasgow this year. Someone should tell the Prime Minister that his Government are attempting to put through a Financial Services Bill, in 2021, which is devoid of the words “green”, “net zero” or “climate”.
I was delighted last December when the Prime Minister announced that the UK will end all support to overseas fossil fuels projects. How could I not be, when it is one of the asks in my Private Member’s Bill, the Petroleum (Amendment) Bill? The Prime Minister should know that then to allow 17 fossil fuel projects to be railroaded through to beat an arbitrary deadline before COP 26 is not really showing that he gets it. For example, there was a headline in the Telegraph on 6 February this year:
“Major Brazilian oil and gas project could get UK backing despite promised end to fossil fuel funding”.
Are we really going to allow UK Export Finance support for the east Africa crude oil pipeline? These investments, using UK taxpayers’ money today to fund what will amount to stranded assets tomorrow, are nothing short of immoral.
As if those examples of the abuse of UK taxpayers’ money on fossil fuel projects abroad were not bad enough, we still have the threat of the go-ahead for the first deep coal mine in the UK for 30 years, in Cumbria. How is that “powering past coal”? These examples alone, if they are allowed to go ahead, show a deplorable lack of fiduciary duty on the part of our Government. These amendments, which refer to climate risk, are sorely needed.
A good number of them are about mandating the FCA and the PRA, and strengthening their structures to ensure that all investment organisations that fall under their jurisdiction have regard to climate-related financial risk and protect Britain’s international reputation by having regard to her international and domestic commitments. I support the intent behind them and look forward to the movers bringing them back on Report, in amalgamated form. There is cross-party support for many of these amendments.
I single out Amendment 48, in the name of my noble friend Lord Oates and the noble Baronesses, Lady Hayman, Lady Jones of Whitchurch and Lady Altmann, as important. Bringing forward by two years the date by when the recommendations of the final report of the task force on climate-related financial disclosures come into force, to 2023, will send the right signals.
Amendment 17 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, amends Amendment 16 to include the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity. I have every sympathy with the intent behind the amendment, especially in light of the recent excellent Dasgupta review, The Economics of Biodiversity, but I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, that this is such an important issue that it might be better tabled as a stand-alone amendment.
In conclusion, if one looks at the first page of NASA’s “Vital Signs of the Planet” fact page—and I urge noble Lords to have a look at it—it tells us that we are hurtling towards disaster unless we transition away from burning fossil fuels to power our way of life. Vulnerable communities and developing nations, many of them already exposed to the worst physical impacts of climate change, can least afford the economic shocks of a poorly implemented transition. We must implement the changes we need in a way that delivers the urgent change that these communities need without worsening their dual burden. We have alternatives proven to deliver at scale, so let us use the opportunity presented by the Bill to address the urgent need to unlock private sector finance and give the actors therein the confidence to accelerate the investment needed to deliver net zero by 2050.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I draw attention to my interests in the register, specifically the directorship of a research company that has published extensively on environmental, social and governance matters. I am also chairman of the Conservative Party’s investment committee. We are currently shortlisting fund managers for our long-term funds, and I reassure noble Lords that ESG rigour will be a key factor in our decision-making.
This is my first outing in Grand Committee, so I crave a little forbearance. I will make a few general points before turning to the specific. First, as regards climate change and full disclosure, the industry is moving in the right direction anyway, and I think that that needs to be acknowledged. For example, I read that the Investment Association, which represents 250 members managing £8.5 trillion, intends to quiz companies at their AGMs on the quality of their climate-related reporting and will relate any of those inadequacies to their members. This is partly a commercial imperative: customer attitudes have shifted materially and will no doubt continue to do so. For example, assets under management at ESG ETFs—that is, exchange traded funds—rose from $54 billion in November 2019 to $174 billion a year later. Those are not large amounts of money in the broad investment sphere, but they show the direction of travel.
Therefore, I was very pleased that this Government have committed to the highest of standards. On 9 November last year, the Chancellor of the Exchequer was unequivocal on this. He said that he wants
“an open, attractive and well-regulated market”
which will continue
“to lead the world in pioneering new technologies and shifting finance towards a net zero future.”
I welcome that and, referring back to some of the work that my company has done in areas such as fast fashion and marshalling scarce water resources—and here I echo the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh—I believe that these standards should be applied not just to carbon emissions but across the ESG piece.
I also agree with the noble Lord, Lord Oates, and his quote from Jes Staley that the industry absolutely should push the climate agenda. However, in order to build the open, attractive and well-regulated market that the Chancellor described, I believe that we need to be very careful with some of the proposed climate change-related amendments at this stage. I have considerable sympathy with the argument of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, about embedding the principles into the Bill, particularly those amendments that the noble Lord, Lord Oates, grouped together in his second group, including Amendment 14. A series of well-meaning amendments at the margin perhaps do not seem individually onerous, but they may end up being counterproductive, and I would like to try to explain why.
The worry we should have is that, if we overcomplicate this at this stage, the rules are more likely to be honoured in the breach than in the observance and/or work to the benefit of other regulatory regimes. I would not like to see the difficult issues we are debating here shifted into other jurisdictions. As always, the main beneficiaries of that would be compliance departments; it would naturally favour larger players and ultimately, as I said earlier, end up being counterproductive, partly by stifling innovation. This is also an important consideration in the context of equivalent discussions with the EU.
Baroness Altmann (Con) [V]
My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group. It is a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lord Sharpe, but we may have slightly different views on some of the issues he has mentioned. I also support the wide-ranging aims of the amendments in this group to ensure that our financial services sector and its regulation faces stronger requirements to take responsibility for, and consider its role in addressing, and hopefully managing and mitigating, climate change risks.
I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Oates, on his excellent introduction to the amendments in this group and his comprehensive summary of the issues. These amendments, or a version of them, are in my view essential to the success of our financial services sector and its role as a global leader. This is not a party-political matter. It straddles the role of our country and its financial system in saving the planet from the clear and catastrophic risks faced by humanity across the globe. I declare an interest in this issue as a member of the cross-party group, Peers for the Planet, and the Conservative Environment Network.
I share the view of the noble Lord, Lord Oates, and other noble Lords that it is astonishing to see that this Financial Services Bill makes no mention of assessing, encompassing and managing the risks from climate change that have the potential to undermine the financial system. Failing to require any regulatory oversight or demands on such existential risks is surely a failing in this legislation. The noble Lord is correct that difficulties in measuring these risks cannot justify simply ignoring them. The risks are real and rising.
I understand the point just made that we cannot anticipate the weather or other climate matters before the fact, but the financial industry is surely well used to anticipating risks that have not yet arisen. I argue that the regulators can indeed require firms to conduct scenario analysis with reasonable assumptions about the risks of certain rises in temperature or other activities that are threats to the planet, just as financial firms are already required to do for interest rate or demographic and other risks.
I have added my name alongside that of the noble Lord, Lord Oates, to Amendments 14 and 35 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, and I thank her for all the excellent work that she has been doing in this area as well. The amendments seek to ensure that the FCA and the PRA must have regard to both our international and domestic climate change commitments. I also support Amendments 11, 12 and 13 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Oates, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and I have added my name to Amendment 75, which seeks to have a board member of the FCA with responsibility for climate change by amending FiSMA 2000. As other noble Lords have said, that is already required by the SMCR, with firms having to have board members taking long-term views of risks such as climate change, so it seems eminently sensible to propose that the FCA itself has that too.
I have also added my name to Amendment 48 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Oates, which seeks to bring forward the 2017 TFCD recommendations to 2023, accelerating the climate-related disclosures rather than waiting until 2025. Again, I accept that the industry needs certainty, and this would be a change. However, I hope that having a bolder ambition can still be justified. This is of course a probing amendment, but I hope my noble friend will consider the issue. Indeed, I believe that the Covid-19 global pandemic, along with leaving the EU, offers an opportunity and potentially an obligation to take climate risks more seriously and recognise that there are issues that can be more important than short-term profit and quarterly reporting.
Businesses have been asked to forgo their operations and invest massive amounts in changing their practices at short notice, and have been forced to accept that they cannot continue as they have done in the past. This shows that previously unimaginable changes can be thrust on the global economy and on industries, sectors and individual firms to which they simply must adjust. I hope we can build on that to realise that forcing financial firms to live up to expectations on climate change, planetary temperature rise and associated biodiversity risks, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, mentioned, is possible, even if painful. The asset management, pensions and banking industries can be encouraged to take more responsibility for driving climate-friendly operations, and regulatory oversight surely can—indeed, in my view, must—direct firms to improve their operations in these areas. So do the Government indeed intend to introduce the issue of climate change into the legislation to ensure that financial services are asked to operate more in the interests of long-term economic and climate sustainability?
Climate risk is inevitably investment risk, both to markets globally and to human beings, who are, after all, the customers of firms across the planet. Surely we have a responsibility to override the externalities that have hitherto prevented individual countries taking direct actions. So will my noble friend comment on some of these issues and the Government’s appetite to address what is clearly a view from across the House that these issues are important?
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I will not speak on the substance of most of the amendments in this group. In general terms I do not believe that alterations are required to legislation governing the PRA and the FCA, in view of the enthusiastic work that they have already commenced to embed climate-related financial risks in their work and in the work of the institutions that they regulate. Neither the FCA nor the PRA needed any alteration to their statutory powers and duties to start this process, and I do not believe they need anything in statute to carry on their work.
My noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom said that he was worried about the meaning of “climate-related financial risk”. In practical terms, the sectors of the financial services industry have an understanding of what is meant by climate-related financial risk in relation to them, and that will inevitably evolve over time. If you take banks, it is fundamentally a credit risk problem; you can track almost all the issues back to credit risk. If you take an investment company, it is an investment risk problem, as I think the noble Baroness, Lady Sheehan, said in an earlier contribution. With insurance, we are talking about something like the shifting nature and scale of conventionally insured risks in that sector. I am sure that other parts of the financial services sector will have an understanding of climate-related financial risk. So I am not concerned about the definition of that; I am just not sure that it is necessary to find its way into legislation, because it is already being done.
I would also caution people who want change overnight in this area that a huge amount of work is needed to implement, for example, measuring the carbon intensity of a bank’s balance sheet, or indeed an investment company’s balance sheet. These are not simple things to do but require huge amounts of new data and new ways of manipulating it, and the industries need to work out how efficiently to do that. I know a little about insurance companies and I am sure that there are similar challenges to overcome there too. I make a plea to leave it to the regulators to determine the pace of change that is required and not to impose additional duties on them. They must judge themselves how best to achieve the aims which I believe they share with the people who have tabled and moved this amendment.
I have a couple of comments on two of the amendments. Amendment 48 would bring forward the timing of the disclosures from the task force on climate-related disclosure to the end of next year, with the draconian penalty of not allowing companies to continue to operate in the UK if they have not made the disclosures. Are the proposers of this amendment seriously saying that they will stop a FTSE 100 company from doing business in the UK if its disclosures are not quite in line with the recommendations? Are they prepared for UK employees to lose their jobs because of technical disclosures? I do not believe that the amendment does anything to advance substantive climate change measures, only disclosures in annual reports which, at the end of the day, very few people actually read. This is not a real-world amendment, in my view, and it seems to be drafted in a disproportionate way.
My main reason for putting my name down to speak on this group is Amendment 75, which provides for the appointment of a member of the FCA board to have responsibility for climate change. This contains a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of boards, whether of public bodies such as the FCA or of private sector companies. Boards are there for governance purposes. They set strategy and hold chief executives to account for delivering against that strategy. They should review performance against what is required of them by statute and what they themselves set. They do not make operational decisions and should not get involved in day-to-day activities. That is why the FCA, like most major organisations, has to have a majority of non-executives on its board.
The amendment is silent as to whether this board member is to be an executive or a non-executive but I believe that either would be wrong. A non-executive should not have responsibility for particular activities within an organisation. This distracts from the core function of a non-executive which is around strategy, oversight and accountability. If the amendment is intended to create an executive board member with responsibility for climate change, that is misconceived as it implies that climate change is not the responsibility of the chief executive. The only way for any policy—whether it is climate change, diversity, social purpose or whatever—to gain traction in an organisation is through its leadership and that is sourced in the chief executive. I believe that the amendment is wrong, likely to be counterproductive or both.
I want to pick up on something that the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, said. She said that this would bring it in line with the requirements of the senior managers and certification regime, which requires—I think she said—a board member to be responsible for climate change. That is not what the SMCR requires. It requires only the identification of a senior manager, as defined within the SMCR, who has to have identified responsibility. It is absolutely not required that it is a member at board level, so that is not an appropriate precedent to cite in aid of this amendment.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, listening to today’s really outstanding speeches, I think most of us can agree that tackling climate change is not an optional extra. It is necessary to the survival of a liveable and civilised world, and it is urgent. The noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, seemed rather the stand-out among the speeches. If I understand him correctly, he shares the general principles but would like them parked in some very long grass for a very long time. That fails to recognise the real urgency that we face. We are past the point where long grass is an appropriate place to put concerns.
This is a substantial group of amendments. It looks to the financial regulators, influencing the financial sector as they do, to become part of the solution. The amendments break roughly into three parts—a cluster of “have regards” and “considerations” that would influence the FCA and the PRA in shaping the rules to support the net-zero target; disclosure and reporting requirements; and the setting of a climate change objective for the FCA, together with appointment to the governing board of an individual responsible for climate change. Here, I disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. I think there should be an individual with particular responsibility at the highest level to make sure that things happen in organisations.
I almost wonder that we are having to discuss disclosure, because, in American terminology, it seems to me a slam dunk. Andrew Bailey, in his Mansion House speech last November, called for “data and disclosure”, and repeated that time-honoured but real truism:
“What we cannot measure we cannot manage”.
The other measures proposed are equally straightforward —it is a very straightforward set of amendments. I have my name to many of them, but the range of names on various amendments underscores the cross-party nature of the concern and the determination of this House to use the Bill to leverage change. I join others in saying, that if you cannot tackle the issue of climate change in a financial services Bill, it is going to be hard to tackle it at all.
The hour moves on, so I do not want to repeat the brilliant discussion, except to say that speaker after speaker detailed the urgency of acting on climate change and the necessity that it become a priority for this sector. My message to the Government is carpe diem, because this House will if the Government will not. If the UK is to be a leader—and of all the years in which we wish to show leadership, it must be this one—it must break new ground.
There will be more to say on the next group of climate change amendments, which I consider more powerful and radical. They deal with risk and capital requirements. I very much hope that we receive a strong response from the Minister. I can understand that someone looking at the Bill and a template of previous financial services Bills may not have thought that climate change had a place. By now, Ministers surely must. Included among this group of amendments are so many that are exceedingly reasonable and, frankly, quite uncontroversial. I hope that the Government will begin to shape some amendments of their own, drawing on the content so very firmly placed before them.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I am pleased to respond to this substantial group of amendments, several of which are in my name and all of which address the need for better regulation to ensure financial services meet their climate change obligations and the associated financial risk. These amendments correct a fundamental failure of the Bill to address those obligations.
As was pointed out at Second Reading, we find ourselves entangled in an argument from the Minister that these issues are not covered in the Bill, and therefore amendments inserting climate change obligations are inappropriate for it. We reject that argument; it makes nonsense of the scrutiny and revising process that we are here to enact. If we find an omission, it is perfectly proper that we seek to correct it by tabling amendments to the Bill.
That is why we regret that the Government did not bring forward their own amendments, following the excellent arguments put forward by my shadow Minister colleague, Pat McFadden, and others in the Commons. As he pointed out there, and as others have pointed out today, the Chancellor set out green goals for the UK financial services industry back in November. Therefore, the Bill was an ideal vehicle to set out an accountability framework to underpin those goals. Every sector of our economy will have to play its part in delivering the climate change net-zero target—whether it is in energy, transport, housing or agriculture—and all these changes will require large-scale financial investment. Financial institutions will thus have to play a central role in delivering it, and it is right that we use this opportunity to spell out how it should be done in practice.
During the Commons debate, the Minister, John Glen, also argued that this issue would be dealt with elsewhere as part of a separate review—again, reference was made to this today. This cannot wait for another review or consultation. We are already falling dangerously behind, and as the climate change committee has made clear, we are not on track to meet the net-zero 2050 target. We need action now to galvanise both public and private finance to step up to the mark and to be accountable for the promises made. The noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, said that we were in danger of complicating regulation, but I do not think our asks do anything like that. Our asks are simple: they set out core principles that we expect the regulators to embrace, but we leave them to sort out the detail of how to follow that through and enact it. That is the right way to go about it.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, I have indeed listened, and I welcome the opportunity to talk about the crucial role played by the financial services sector in supporting the Government’s climate change objectives. Given the strong levels of interest in this topic and the number of amendments we are considering, I hope noble Lords will forgive me if I speak at some length.
Green finance was one of the cornerstones of my right honourable friend the Chancellor’s vision for financial services, as he set out in November in the other place. The Government want to put the full weight of private sector innovation, expertise and capital towards tackling climate change and protecting the environment. Real change requires embedding our climate change goals across all sectors of the economy, including the financial services sector. As my noble friend Lady Noakes has pointed out, the regulators are able to do this already under their current statutory objectives.
I would like to set out a small amount of detail about how the Government are delivering on this agenda. In 2019, the Government set out our vision in the Green Finance Strategy. This strategy also set out the Government’s commitment to use “remit letters” to set ambitious recommendations relating to climate change for the PRA and FCA. These letters will be issued at the next opportunity.
Late last year, the Chancellor announced our intention to make disclosures aligned with the Taskforce on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, or the TCFD, mandatory in the UK across the economy by 2025, with a significant portion of mandatory requirements to be in place by 2023. The Government also published the UK TCFD’s interim report and road map, which set out a clear pathway to achieving that ambition. As my noble friend Lord Sharpe highlighted, the UK expects to be the first country to make TCFD-aligned disclosures mandatory across the economy. The UK is also planning to issue a green gilt, subject to market conditions, to help fund projects to tackle climate change, finance much-needed infrastructure investment and create green jobs across this country.
I understand noble Lords’ appetite to go further and faster, and this is the motive behind many of the amendments we are debating. We are all in agreement that the financial services sector plays a role in meeting our commitments, but the thinking on how this should be factored into legislation and regulations in specific areas such as capital requirements and other prudential standards is still in its infancy. While we are certainly committed to remaining world leaders in this area, it is important that we act carefully and rationally, consult appropriately with interested parties and therefore make progress in the right way.
Before I cover the amendments, I hope my noble friend Lady Altmann will allow me to write to her on the Government’s approach to cryptocurrencies. I shall also write to the noble Baroness, Lady Sheehan, on government funding for fossil fuel projects overseas.
Amendment 23 seeks to prevent the Treasury revoking provisions of the retained UK capital requirements regulation, or CRR, where the rules made by the PRA are not aligned with the UK’s target to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050. Lest we forget, the changes the Bill enables serve to implement a number of vital reforms following the financial crisis. These reforms reinforce the safety and soundness of the UK financial system. This amendment would prevent us giving effect to updated prudential rules and thereby undermine our ability to uphold our G20 commitment to the full, timely and consistent implementation of the Basel standards. There is no evidence that “greener” means “prudentially safer”, at least not yet, and therefore it is not clear that a regulator whose primary objective is the safety and soundness of financial institutions could meet such a requirement now.
Amendments 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 34, 35, 36 and 37 are all similar in nature. Specifically, they would insert an additional consideration into the accountability frameworks of the FCA and the PRA. In essence, their intention is to require the regulators to take climate change, biodiversity and related issues into consideration when implementing the prudential regimes. Amendments 11 and 12 are also similar, but arguably go further and would impose a duty, rather than a “have regard”, on the FCA to make prudential rules for FCA investment firms and their parent undertakings to manage the climate-related financial risk to which they are exposed.
I agree with the principle that the regulators should have regard to our climate change commitments. I believe that the goal—if I am interpreting the amendments correctly—is to make the regulators consider how to channel private financing towards greener investments. I agree with this goal, but there are some very real challenges to note. First, to hold the regulators to account and achieve what we want, we need to be able to define what we mean by “green”. A programme of work is under way domestically and internationally to achieve that through a green taxonomy; that is, agreeing how we classify what is “green” and ensure consistent standards on that. There is also the important matter of understanding the financial risk of such green investments and the extent to which changing prudential requirements according to the greenness of the investment is justified. Again, work is ongoing on how to capture climate change risks in prudential regulation, both within the Bank of England and by the Basel committee task force, which is leading work to understand how climate risk is transmitted, assessed and measured. This is a significant undertaking and the evidence will take some time to examine. I note the excellent points made by my noble friend Lord Sharpe on some of the complexities in this area.
While the UK is committed to being a world leader in this area, given the global nature of the climate change threat and the interconnectedness of financial markets, this means bringing other jurisdictions with us and, while being bold, it also requires careful thought and robust evidence. These are global discussions and global consensus takes time. Any amendment or “have regard” introduced now would therefore naturally be a stopgap until fuller definitions have been established. In the short-to-medium term, there could well be minimal changes to the prudential framework as a result of this have-regard until the appropriate capital treatment is established.
Secondly, there is a time constraint. We are committed to implementing these Basel standards, the first batch of which the Government aim to implement by the end of this year, lest we risk damaging our international reputation. Further, if we do not implement the investment funds prudential regime by the end of the year, we will have a more burdensome regime than the EU.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)
I have received one request to speak after the Minister from the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, who I now call.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his comprehensive answer, although I ask again, how can the Government justify having included climate change considerations in the then Pension Schemes Bill last year, but not in this far larger, more significant Bill in 2021?
I want to respond to what the Minister said: that there is no evidence that greener means prudentially safer. I hope I am quoting him accurately. I refer specifically to the fossil fuel companies that the noble Baroness, Lady Sheehan, mentioned earlier, as well as to mining companies with a substantial role in environmental destruction. As the UNEP report to which I referred earlier said, this is unlikely to continue to be tolerated on the international stage. Surely the Government are aware and are taking account of the Carbon Tracker Initiative, which is responsible for popularising the term carbon bubble, if not for inventing it. The excess of carbon beyond climate limits is termed unburnable carbon, some of which is owned by listed companies. This has the financial implication of potentially creating stranded assets and destroying significant shareholder value.
The Carbon Tracker Initiative says that valuations tend to be based on near-term cash flows, which are less likely to be affected by climate-related factors. However, exposure varies, and some companies will be in a far worse position than others, as the demand for fossil fuels and the ability to burn them reduces. Surely, this is a potential concern and a risk that the greening of companies can tackle.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, I failed to cover the Pension Schemes Act. I apologise to the noble Baroness. The Act provides a power to bring forward regulations, placing various obligations on pension schemes relating to climate change risks. The provisions in the prudential package of the Financial Services Bill do something slightly different. They place a duty on the regulators to have regard to certain matters and to explain how they have been considered, given that the Bill imposes duties on the regulators to make rules relating to Basel and the IFPR. I reassure the noble Baroness that my officials and I have considered these provisions carefully, as we have the other amendments discussed today.
As regards her main question, my point was simple. As yet, there is no international agreement on what the term “green” means. Therefore, we cannot say with certainty that greener means prudentially safer. I do not say that we will never be able to, but it is not possible at present.
Lord Oates (LD)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their thoughtful contributions to the debate. I thank and pay particular tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, for her important leadership on these issues through Peers for the Planet which is recognised across the Committee. I also thank all noble Lords who signed or spoke in favour of amendments for their co-operative, cross-party approach.
In quoting the Government’s approach, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, paraphrased St Augustine: “Lord, make me greener, but not yet”. I thank the Minister for his comprehensive response and characteristic courtesy, but it felt a little complacent. One could also quote from St Paul—that it was about “the good that I would I do not”. There is no doubt about the Government’s intentions, ambitions and targets. We welcome and are impressed by them, but it is now reaching the point where we have to act.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 24.
Amendment 24
Lord Tunnicliffe
Member’s explanatory statement
This probing amendment aims to understand the degree of flexibility that the Treasury will allow the PRA when it replaces provisions of the CRR via general rules.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 25. This is a Christmas tree Bill with many attractive decorations, to which the Committee has tried to add. They have all been important issues, but in my view Clause 3 is the most important clause in the Bill.
Clause 3 takes away a system of regulation without a clear replacement and, if we get it wrong, it could create another crisis. We have all started to forget the crisis of 2008-09 and we do not recall, I fear, just how close that crisis came to being a catastrophic worldwide crisis. We were saved by a number of very small margins, and I think many Members of the Committee have sensed this. That is why we spent the first part of the day addressing what, at Second Reading, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, called “the accountability deficit”. I hope the Government heard the debate and we can come to a satisfactory consensus. I draw some comfort from the Minister’s closing remarks that that is, indeed, his intention.
Amendments 24 and 25 address the Clause 3 problem from a different direction. What should replace what Clause 3 takes out? This particularly relates to the “have regard” provisions. If we look at the history of legislation in this area, it starts with the now unrecognisable FSMA 2000. That was the original Act, but 2012 brought significant change and created the FCA and the PRA. The model was supposed to be that the Government and Parliament would create a framework and the regulators would invent the rules. However, in many ways, that was overtaken by the European Union capital requirements regulation. It is worth noting that, while we were a rule-taker in that regard, the EU regulation went through a significant democratic scrutiny process in the EU Commission and, particularly, the EU Parliament. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, may be able to assure us of that, since she took a considerable part in that scrutiny.
Then came 1 January 2021, and the effect of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 was effectively to translate the regulation into UK primary legislation. Clause 3 revokes the regulation, so the real question is, what is to replace it? One has to delve quite deeply into the Bill to find out.
The Bill inserts new Section 144C,
“Matters to consider when making CRR rules”
into the now-famous FSMA 2000. Subsection (1) states:
“When making CRR rules, the PRA must, among other things, have regard to … (a) relevant standards recommended by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision from time to time.”
As far as I know, there is no democratic input to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. I believe that UK interests are represented not by a politician or by government but by the Governor of the Bank of England. It seems that we are to be a rule-taker yet again.
Subsection (1) has three other paragraphs: paragraphs (b) and (c)—which I did not understand when I read them; I gather from a reference during an earlier debate that they are probably something to do with competition—and (d), which refers to
“any other matter specified by the Treasury by regulations”.
About the only good thing that can be said about that is that it has a parliamentary process and is subject to an affirmative statutory instrument. At first sight, it is the only democratic control in the regulations.
What has all this got to with Amendments 24 and 25? They are an attempt to prescribe what goes into the “have regard” section. Clause 3(4) of the Bill states:
“The Treasury may only make regulations under subsection (1) or (3) revoking a provision if they consider that … (a) the provision has been, or will be, adequately replaced by general rules made, or to be made, by the Prudential Regulation Authority.”
The weakness of this provision is that it is not at all clear what “adequately replaced” means, hence we propose that it be substituted by
“replicated or otherwise reflected in”.
That would mean that every provision in Clause 3(2) would have to be considered and replaced. The exception is in subsection (4)(b), which states
“consider that … it is appropriate for the provision not to be replaced”.
We cover that in Amendment 25, which would insert:
“Where the Treasury makes regulations in reliance on subsection (4)(b), the Treasury must, when laying a draft of the regulations before Parliament, also lay before Parliament a statement explaining why, in the Treasury’s opinion, there are good reasons for revoking the provision.”
The constraints which our amendments propose would mean that the initial, “have regard” rules would be at least as comprehensive as those they replace. I hope that the Government will consider with care these two modest amendments and accept them or incorporate their essence into their own proposals to achieve consensus on Clause 3. I beg to move.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, for his clear and incisive introduction to this group, and the identification of the problem of Clause 3, which I am proposing in a probing amendment should not stand part of the Bill. Amendments 24 and 25 seek to improve Clause 3 and appear to do so, but this group is crucial for debating the very issues that the noble Lord has raised. He reflected some of the concerns that I expressed in the first day of the debate: namely, that the language we are hearing from the Government and some Members of this Committee closely resembles that of 2006, most notably in the then Chancellor Gordon Brown’s infamous Mansion House speech.
Clause 3 transfers certain prudential regulation matters into PRA rules. The Treasury may by regulation revoke provisions of capital requirement regulations relating to the matters listed—a list that then amounts to a couple of pages. This Bill is often presented as primarily simply a matter of transferring and translating technical regulations from Basel and the EU into UK statute. Many of us have spent much of the last year in this Room working on just such statutory instruments. However, when considered more deeply, vesting such powers in the Treasury would seem to be a kind of discretionary deregulatory charter. It has been described to me as potentially a clause allowing Singapore-on-Thames to run riot.
I would not care to take an examination on the detail of what Clause 3 does, but I am being advised by someone who could set that exam, and I take great heart from the earlier expression of support from the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, for this probing amendment—for Clause 3 potentially hands quite substantial discretionary powers to the Treasury to get more involved in PRA matters. It could be used to soften up or undermine the PRA. I can already predict some of the answer that I may hear from the Minister, that “Our intentions are good”. But, as we go around this merry-go-round again and again, what matters is what is written on the face of the Bill, not whatever the current Minister or Government’s intention might be.
My question, to which I would appreciate an answer now and perhaps in more detail later, is: does the Bill as currently written—perhaps improved by Amendments 24 and 25, but certainly without them—hand too much discretionary power to the Treasury and should the wording not be tightened to specify more precisely the circumstances in which the Treasury would involve itself in these matters of the PRA?
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, intimated when he introduced his amendments, Clause 3 is very important to prudential regulation and the banks and financial institutions concerned. However, we must make progress with this Bill, so I will speak briefly. I look forward to the Minister’s explanation of what is intended here and why, and what the safeguards will be for those entities regulated by the PRA in terms of purpose, consultation, impact, cost benefit and so on. I do not read it in the same way as the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle.
I would like to understand the competitive position. My son works in London for a French investment bank regulated primarily in Paris rather than London, under the equivalence arrangements that we have granted. I suspect that the local branch here may be part of a legal entity based in Paris. How would such an EU bank be affected by the proposed changes in Clause 3 and whatever replaces the revoked regulations? Is there a level playing field?
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, has reminded us that this is the clause where the legislation on the CRR gets waived away into rules without any legislative replacement. This follows the pattern that the Government proposed in their consultation: once there are rules from the regulators, the statutory instruments are revoked.
Paragraph 2.25 of the Financial Services Future Regulatory Framework Review states:
“The default approach would be for any retained EU law provision that is in scope of the regulators’ FSMA rule-making powers to be taken off the statute book to become the responsibility of the appropriate regulator.”
Therefore, although there may be consultations on replacement rules at the point of revoking the SIs, there are no checks further down the track, so at some time further on all the rules could be revoked too. As a practical matter, that will not happen, but it is possible that for some things big changes could happen. It is probably more of a worry when it is happening to the wider generality of financial services legislation than with standards that are underpinned by Basel provisions, but I make this point because the Minister said on Monday at the start of Committee that everything is being listened to in the context of the consultation, although I must say that his replies so far do not inspire too much confidence.
It may seem convenient to have a more flexible arrangement of having regulators doing everything and not bothering Parliament with statutory instruments, and the view being pushed by the Government seems to be that Parliament should not become too bothered by rules because they contain frightening Greek letters such as Σ that really just indicate some very simple sums that could easily be explained in a sentence. Underlying that is that there should not really be challenge, only fig leaves and what the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, called the rear-view mirror.
Even though I have no great love of statutory instruments as a measure for showing parliamentary consent, there is a qualitative difference compared with rules, and I want to flag up that this clause is where the notion that we will no longer have any firm policy against which to hold the regulator accountable is endorsed. From here on, the regulator makes the policy, and there is no policy guidance between the regulator’s rules and the simple objectives, have-regards clauses and perhaps a few generalised statements, such as supporting UK economic growth. I do not like this sparseness, and it is ridiculous to suggest that rules are constantly, rapidly needing change. That is not true and not internationally sustainable.
To some extent the Government acknowledge this, otherwise there would not be the statement in the consultation that some things may have to be put into SIs as a consequence of equivalence decisions. So other countries can measure our standards, but not Parliament. How embarrassing. I heard what the Minister said in reply to my equivalence information point in the first group today. He said that such things may have to stay out of the public domain—at least until they become a statutory instrument—but I never suggested that they be public, just that there should be some sharing with Parliament about the policy direction. I am pretty sure that the EU will take the view that regulator rules alone are not enough and are potentially too transient when it comes to such a large financial centre as London, not least when it comes to looking at the lavish use of “bespoke”, which was always one of Brussel’s most hated words because it thought, and I tend to agree, that it was tailoring cut to flatter and trick the eye. That is fine for clothes, but not so good for financial services rules.
As I want to mark resistance to this passing of all policy to the regulators so they end up held accountable only to their own rules, I support the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, in the suggestion that Clause 3 does not stand part.
Viscount Trenchard (Con)
My Lords, I understand the purpose of Amendments 24 and 25, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, but do they suggest that he would like to stick with the enormously detailed and prescriptive provisions of the CRR as they are in retained EU law? The Government’s intention to transfer most of the provisions of the CRR into more flexible rules is right. The PRA will be able to react more quickly if it needs to change particular rules, and this should reduce the risk of failure of banks in the future.
The Government have been clear that the UK’s regulators are the right people to set the detailed, firm-level rules to implement the remaining Basel standards. Of course, as discussed in previous debates, and supported by noble Lords on all sides of the Committee, we need proper parliamentary oversight of the PRA before it starts to use its new powers. The wording in the noble Lord’s amendments suggests that he wishes to reduce the degree of flexibility that the Treasury will grant the PRA, but I think that that might be counterproductive. Does he not accept that, as we move to a simpler, more flexible, outcomes-based regulatory framework, there should be less detailed prescriptive rules?
The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, wants to retain all the CRR rules in legislation. I cannot agree with her approach, which might damage the attractiveness of the City as a financial centre. She referred to Singapore-on-Thames, which is becoming a fashionable way to describe a light-touch regulatory regime, but is she not aware that Singapore is one of the best and most strictly regulated centres in the world? It is strict, yes, but much simpler and less cumbersome and bureaucratic. Does the Minister agree that we need to return to a simpler, different, more flexible and agile regulatory style?
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I do not have a great deal to say but there are a couple of points that I would like to make. First, the two probing amendments from the noble Lords, Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord Eatwell, make a great deal of sense to me, so I hope that the Government will pay attention to them and provide some substantial answers.
However, what struck me more than anything else was that this was an opportunity to comment on Clause 3. That suddenly dawned on me as I looked at the language both in the Bill and in two amendments which appear in later groups. One I have added my name to and the other is in my name only at this point in time. The first, in the name of my noble friend Lord Oates, looks at capital adequacy ratios for investments in fossil fuel relating to exploitation and exploration. The other amendment, which stands in my name and is in what could loosely be called a regulatory group, deals with MREL thresholds for medium-sized banks.
It occurred to me that this is the last time that we will be able to raise issues such as these in government time in this House if the Bill passes with Clause 3 in it. All the rules issues detailed in Clause 3, which are in effect fundamental to policy, will be transferred to the book of the regulator. Were I to look for an opportunity to raise these issues, which I shall follow up on in later debates on the Bill, the Government would say to me either, “You’re out of scope”, or, “Those are dealt with by the regulator, so wait a year or two and the regulator might do a consultation on one of these issues, then you can make your opinions heard.” They might say to me, “Write a letter to the Treasury Select Committee and see whether it considers the issue important enough to take up its very precious time, in dealing with its very heavy workload, by picking up your issue as part of one of its broader consultations.”
If ever we needed a graphic illustration of the loss of authority of Parliament and the loss of accountability to it, this is the time to illustrate and say it. I am really curious to hear from the Minister how he feels that that is justified and why he will explain to me that the amendments we have tabled are such an irritant to him that he is quite determined that never again will they fall into the scope of a debate on government time.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, perhaps it will be helpful if I take as my starting point Clause 3, which enables the Treasury to revoke provisions in retained EU law to enable the PRA to implement the remaining Basel standards. As I discussed in an earlier debate, the UK Government are committed to the Basel prudential standards as a member of the G20. While a member of the EU, our adoption of the latest Basel standards was achieved through EU legislation. The capital requirements regulation implemented the previous set of Basel reforms in the EU and, therefore, in the UK. However, regulation is not static: it must continually evolve to mitigate emerging threats and respond to developments in the financial markets.
As I set out in earlier remarks, the most recent set of internationally agreed Basel standards now needs to be implemented in the UK. The capital requirements regulation, or CRR, forms part of retained EU law in the UK and therefore continues to form the basis of the UK’s prudential framework for credit institutions. In order to comply with the latest Basel standards, the CRR needs to be updated. The EU is updating its own standards through the second capital requirements regulation, CRR2. Rather than implementing the new provisions through detailed primary legislation to amend the retained CRR, Clause 3 gives the Treasury a power to revoke relevant provisions of the CRR that need to be updated in order to comply with the latest Basel standards. This then allows the PRA to make rules implementing the latest standards.
As I have already set out, the Government stand by the delegation of the responsibility for implementing those standards to the PRA but with an enhanced accountability framework. In that general context, and in response to the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, and for that matter the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, I might usefully repeat something that I said in an earlier debate: the rules that will replace the EU legislation being deleted are already available in draft form. The regulators and the Treasury are working to make sure that the final rules are published ahead of the debate on the relevant statutory instruments, which have also been published in draft.
It is the PRA that has the technical expertise to implement these essential post-crisis reforms. This is a novel approach, so the Bill ensures that there are checks and balances in place. First, Clause 3 ensures that we transfer only some elements of the CRR to the PRA. The extent of the Treasury’s powers to delete will be confined to those areas of the CRR that are necessary to ensure that the UK upholds its international commitments. It is for the PRA to write the rules. The Treasury’s involvement is merely to enable the rules to be updated by deleting old rules that no longer meet international standards.
Secondly, the clause ensures that the deletions the Treasury makes take place only when it is clear that adequate provision has been made by the PRA to fill the space. Deletions will be subject to the draft affirmative procedure, providing the proper opportunity for scrutiny. The clause also allows the Treasury to make consequential, supplementary and incidental deletions to parts of the CRR. This is to ensure a coherent regime across the CRR and PRA rules, which are critical to industry.
Furthermore, Clause 3 gives the Treasury power to make transitional and savings provisions to prevent firms facing cliff edges from the deletion of a provision in the UK CRR. This will allow the Treasury to save, for example, permissions to modify capital requirements that have already been granted to firms under the CRR and avoids the need for firms to reapply for those permissions under the new PRA rules.
Amendment 24 would remove the requirement on the Treasury to ensure the PRA’s rules “adequately replace” revoked parts of the CRR. It would replace this requirement with ensuring that the rules “replicate or otherwise reflect” them. I understand that the intention of this amendment is to probe the degree of flexibility allowed by the current drafting. The intention is not for the new PRA rules to completely mirror the CRR provisions that they will replace. The PRA rules will update the CRR provisions they replace to achieve compliance with the revised Basel standards, and the language of “adequately replaced by” is intended to allow for this.
The wording in the Bill— “adequately replaced”—is also phrased to ensure that the rules are written in a language appropriately tailored to the PRA’s rulebook, which is specifically for the UK sector, and that the regime remains coherent. The amendment replaces this with the word “replicated”, which suggests that the language of the EU CRR is copied over exactly into the rulebook. This may not be the most suitable language for the UK’s rulebook and may prevent the PRA making the necessary changes to ensure compliance with the latest Basel standards.
In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, the EU—as I am sure she will recognise with her immense experience—is an outlier in the extent to which it specifies these matters in the equivalent of primary legislation. The approach taken in the Bill will bring us more into line with other major financial centres. This means that the EU is used to assessing rules set in the equivalent of regulator rules.
Amendment 25 would bind the Treasury into setting out why it thinks it is appropriate for the rules not to be replaced before laying the relevant regulations before Parliament. Clause 5 already provides for the PRA to prepare a document setting out whether its rules correspond to the revoked provision and, if so, how. The Government’s view is that that should be the primary document to explain why a CRR provision is not being replaced to provide a coherent explanation. If that document does not reflect a revocation where the CRR rule is not being replaced, this can be explained by the Treasury in the Explanatory Notes accompanying the statutory instrument revoking the rules. The amendment is therefore unnecessary, and I hope noble Lords will feel able not to press it.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)
I have received no requests to speak after the Minister, so I call the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I thank all Members who have taken part in this debate. The statement of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, that Clause 3 waives away a whole series of rules, without any clarity about how they are replaced, is very prescient. She rightly made the point that it may not be helpful in our aspiration to achieve EU equivalence.
The noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, asked if I want the old. No—I want the old to be used to test whether the new is equally as comprehensive. He also spoke about simplicity. As someone who has been involved in rules in all sorts of environments, I know that they are not usually complex because people want them to be but rather because, in the operation of simple rules, questions come up and teach you that you need more complex ones. What impact will that have in this situation? The probability is that the apparent rules will be simple and the complex ones will be hidden from us in a series of rules that we do not see, which the PRA will inevitably have to create to make its supervision practical.
Furthermore, we had the comment that we are looking for light-touch regulation. In 2008 and 2009, we discovered light-touch regulation. This was not solely a British mistake but one made almost throughout the western world. However, the consequence was very close to disastrous. I find it interesting that, in his response, the noble Earl said that we have the Basel standards and already know what they are. This suggests that they are a system of rules ready-made for this purpose; if that is true, where is this flexibility that everyone praises so much?
Finally, we were told to rely on the checks and balances. We had a long debate at the beginning of today’s session, in which many people around this table, to a greater or lesser degree, were not at all convinced that the processes we are being asked to adopt have sufficient checks and balances. I will have to consider whether I want to bring this further forward on Report but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 24.
Baroness Penn (Con)
My Lords, I suggest that this is a convenient moment to conclude our debate in Grand Committee today.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)
That concludes the work of the Committee this afternoon. The Committee stands adjourned, and I remind Members to sanitise their desks and chairs before leaving the Room.
Financial Services Bill
Monday 1st March 2021
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Financial Services Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 162-IV(Rev) Revised fourth marshalled list for Grand Committee - (1 Mar 2021)
Lord Oates
“Considerations in setting capital adequacy requirements
In setting the capital adequacy requirements of a credit institution, the Prudential Regulation Authority shall have regard to—(a) the level of exposure of an institution to climate-related financial risk;(b) the level of compliance of the institution with the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosure; and(c) the objectives of the Climate Change Act 2008 as amended by the Climate Change Act 2008 (2050 Target Amendment) Order 2019 (S.I. 2019/1056).”Member’s explanatory statement
The purpose of this amendment is to place a requirement on the PRA in setting capital adequacy requirements of a credit institution to have regard to its exposure to climate-related financial risk.
Lord Oates (LD)
My Lords, I declare my interests as the chair of the advisory board of Weber Shandwick UK, as set out in the register. In moving Amendment 28 in my name and those of my noble friend Lady Kramer and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, I will speak also to the other amendments in this group. I once again express my thanks, in particular to Finance Watch, Positive Money and Carbon Tracker for their helpful briefing, and indeed to all organisations that have taken the trouble to provide me with information on this subject.
The context of our discussion of these amendments is one in which, at current levels of carbon emissions, the world will have exhausted within 10 to 15 years the carbon budget it must stick to if we are to meet the Paris objective of keeping warming well below 2 degrees. This is not the alarmist prediction of some fringe organisation or, indeed, even of a Liberal Democrat politician; it is the sober warning of experts in the field, including the United Nations special envoy for climate action and finance and former Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, who spoke in his Reith Lecture at the end of last year of the struggle between urgency and complacency in tackling climate change, highlighting the contrast between the
“urgency of carbon budgets that could be consumed within a decade and the complacency of continuing to add new committed carbon … The urgency to reorient the financial system for the massive investment needed to create a sustainable economy, yet the complacency of many in finance”.
Mr Carney went on to warn that the tensions that exist in our desire to tackle climate change reflect the common challenge of values, including human frailties and market failures. Nowhere could market failures be more evident than in the failure to price climate risk appropriately within the financial system. That is what the amendments we are debating are all about. In the previous group of amendments related to climate, which we discussed last week, we talked about the purpose of prudential regulation, which is surely to manage and control risk. We spoke also about the fact that our system of prudential regulation is clearly not performing that function in respect of the greatest risk facing the financial system and, indeed, the planet as a whole: climate change.
Amendment 28 seeks to take the first steps in addressing this issue. It requires the Prudential Regulation Authority, in setting capital adequacy regulations, to have regard to climate issues, including the level of exposure of an institution to climate-related financial risk and the level of compliance of that institution with the recommendations of the task force on climate-related disclosure and the net-zero objective of the Climate Change Act, as amended.
Amendment 42 requires the Treasury to amend the credit rating agencies regulations to require such ratings to explicitly take account of the level of exposure of an institution to climate-related financial risk.
Both amendments aim to act as a wake-up call to regulators and the City so that, when setting capital adequacy requirements and issuing credit ratings, they take account of and act on the risks that climate change poses to individual institutions and the financial system as a whole.
Amendments 31 and 32 in my name and those of my noble friend Lady Kramer and the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, focus specifically on fossil fuel exploration, exploitation and production. I am particularly grateful to Finance Watch for its advice and recommendations in this regard. Amendment 31 sets out the risk weight the PRA must apply to the funding of existing fossil fuel production and exploitation; Amendment 32 does the same in respect of new fossil fuel exploration, production and exploitation. They both seek to do so within the existing framework of the Capital Requirements Regulation, which sets capital requirements on a risk-based approach.
The two amendments apply different risk weights to the different activities addressed in each because the financial risks associated with the two activities are different: exploiting existing reserves runs a high risk that some fossil fuel assets will become stranded during their lifetime, whereas exploring and exploiting new reserves comes with a much higher risk—indeed, a near certainty—that they will become entirely stranded.
Amendment 31, dealing with the risk weighting for existing fossil fuel investment, is tailored around Article 128 of CRR as amended in CRR2. This deals with what it describes as:
“Items associated with particular high risk”.
Paragraph 1 of Article 128 states:
“Institutions shall assign a 150% risk weight to exposures … that are associated with particularly high risks”
and that for the purposes of the article, institutions should treat any of the following as exposures with particularly high risks:
“investments in venture capital firms, except where those investments are treated in accordance with Article 132 … investments in private equity, except where those investments are treated in accordance with Article 132 … speculative immovable property financing.”
Paragraph 3 of Article 128 goes on to state:
“When assessing whether an exposure … is associated with particularly high risks, institutions shall take into account the following risk characteristics: (a) there is a high risk of loss as a result of a default of the obligor; (b) it is impossible to assess adequately whether the exposure falls under point (a).”
As Finance Watch points out in its excellent report Breaking the Climate-Finance Doom Loop, paragraph 3 of Article 128 almost appears to have been written specifically to deal with stranded fossil fuel assets: first, because, if we manage to meet net-zero targets, a large proportion of existing reserves will have to remain in the ground, leading to the probability of default of the obligor, the issue addressed in Article 128(3)(a); and, secondly, because assessing the scale of the stranded asset risk is impossible given that it relates to a unique situation for which we have no historical precedent but in which we know that the future economic performance of the assets must be downward—the situation exactly envisaged and provided for in Article 128(3)(b).
Accordingly, Amendment 31 would apply an approach consistent with Article 128 of the CRR to make it explicit that the PRA must apply the 150% high risk weight in calculating capital requirements for existing fossil fuel funding. This risk weight is already applied to venture capital firms, private equity and speculative immovable property, and it is hard to understand how fossil fuel operations can be regarded as posing less risk. The fact is that the existing 100% risk weight is an incentive to the financial markets to continue to act as if nothing has changed. A 150% risk weight, by contrast, would provide a clear price signal reflecting the risk to assets but would not prevent the continued financing of existing fossil fuel operations, allowing an orderly and just transition for those industries and the communities that rely on them.
Amendment 32 addresses the much bigger threat to the climate and to the financial system that arises from new fossil fuel exploration, production and exploitation. It would require such investments to be funded entirely by capital by applying a 1,250% risk weight to this activity. This risk weight is calculated with reference to Article 92 of the CRR on own funds requirements, which obliges institutions to maintain at all times a total capital ratio of 8%. This provides the basis to determine the risk weighting to apply to ensure that new fossil fuel activities are funded entirely from equity.
The 8% total capital requirement is multiplied by the risk weight of 1,250% in accordance with the standardised approach, resulting in a 100% capital requirement for these activities. This risk weight is not some wild or punitive sanction; it is the considered application of the real risk such investments pose to the institutions themselves, to the financial system as a whole and to our ability to stabilise the temperature of the planet. It is also consistent with the existing risk weight applied under the capital requirements regulation for holding companies, as defined in Article 89.
Requiring any fossil fuel investment to be entirely equity funded is surely appropriate, given that these activities will either become non-viable because we have succeeded in stabilising the climate by reaching our net zero targets, or, if we have not, they will be fuelling runaway climate change which will threaten the viability of the whole financial system, not to mention our entire way of life.
The truth is that we have no chance of meeting the objective of the Paris Agreement to keep warming to well below 2 degrees, and ideally to 1.5 degrees, if we burn all the carbon in existing reserves, let alone exploit new ones. The regulatory system has to take account of that, and it has to adequately price risk for those institutions that wish to invest in activities which must become non-viable if we are to prevent catastrophic climate change. In doing so, it will help ensure an orderly and just transition away from fossil fuels.
I want to be very clear that these amendments are not driven by any animus against the fossil fuel industries, whose products have been critical to the development of human society, whether by keeping us warm or driving industry and prosperity. Indeed, my own title in this place is taken from Denby Grange colliery, where my uncles and my grandfather were miners, engaged in the critical but dangerous job of mining the fuel that provided heat and power for the nation.
As we know, coal mining as a major industry in the UK came to an abrupt end in the 1990s. The way it did so, driven by political malice and with no transition planning at all, devastated the mining communities which had fuelled the country’s prosperity over a period of more than 200 years. Abandoned by government, these communities were beset by huge economic and social problems, many of which exist to this day. We cannot allow that to happen in the oil and gas industry.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to take part in day three of our Committee deliberations on the Financial Services Bill. In doing so, I declare my interests as set out in the register. I will speak to Amendment 136A in my name, concerning environmental, social and governance—ESG—factors.
The rationale behind my amendment is quite simple: what is the point of profit if there is no planet to spend it on? In this amendment I am seeking to look at the funds’ billions of pounds of assets, under fund managers. It would probably be helpful for institutional investors and individuals to know a lot more about those funds and where their assets are invested. It is a very simple amendment, requiring the Secretary of State to make regulations to have fund managers report on how their funds—and, indeed, all the constituent parts of their funds—stack up against agreed ESG considerations.
The reason I stated it like that in the amendment is so that there can, I hope, be a public discourse around what all parties believe should be measurable and helpful when considering the operations and activities of these funds. The SDGs are obviously important—there is a reasonable level of global agreement around them—but there are other factors specifically relevant to certain sectors or regions of the UK. There could be a public debate, whereby the Secretary of State could consider what would form the particularities of the ESG for fund managers to report on.
I do not believe that the amendment would in any way fetter the market or overstep into the market—it certainly does not seek to—and nor does it seek to direct funds in one particular direction or another. What I hope it would do is throw light on the funds to enable far greater clarity of decision-making by investors, institutional or individual, into those funds. It is in no sense seeking to control or direct activity.
I hope the Minister will accept the amendment in the spirit in which it is being offered. It would aid a greater debate and understanding of funds and their operations. In some small way, it would indicate how we can move forward and have real-time analysis of these funds’ investments using many of the new technologies available to us, not least distributed ledger technology and elements of artificial intelligence, which can instantly adopt, analyse and report on the ESG performance of any fund and constituent part of it. The power that these new technologies affords us would not have been available three or five years ago, never mind a decade ago.
I ask my noble friend the Minister to consider both the positive impact that such a requirement could have and the deployment of new technologies to achieve the objectives set out in Amendment 136A.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, most of the amendments in this group are about bank capital. I believe strongly that the setting of the capital requirements of individual banks should be about prudential risk to the capital of the banks and the resilience of the financial system as whole. The setting of bank capital should not get caught up in wider policy issues.
On Amendment 28, the level of exposure to climate-related financial risk should indirectly already be taken into account in the conventional capital-setting process. Climate-related financial risk is very unlikely to be a separate risk category for a bank. It is primarily a credit risk—the risk that borrowers will not repay loans—and it does not need to be separately considered. There may need to be adjustments made to banks’ evaluation of how credit risk will crystallise due to climate change but the essential elements—calculating the exposure at default and the loss that would arise if default occurred—are already in the system.
The impact of climate change on banks is very much an emerging area. I am sure noble Lords will have heard of the so-called biennial exploratory stress test, which the major banks need to submit to the Bank of England later this year. It will focus on how these risks will evolve under various scenarios, which have not yet been published by the Bank of England.
It is pretty unlikely that climate-related financial risk would have a major impact on current bank capital because the determination of bank capital contains buffers which are derived from stress tests that focus on the next five years. Therefore, the impact of risks from climate change working their way through credit risk is unlikely to find its way into bank capital in the short term. That is why the Bank of England’s exploratory stress test seeks to understand how this will evolve over a longer period. In addition to credit risk, there may be an element of operational risk, but that too should be capable of being captured by the existing rules for the calculation of operational risk.
These points are also relevant to Amendment 42, which tries to get climate-related financial risk into credit ratings. I am sure that the credit rating agencies need no reminders about any kind of risk and I would expect the biennial exploratory stress test to be an important input to their thinking on how their ratings will evolve. But, again, this will be over time and not something that is done immediately.
Amendment 28 seeks to ensure that disclosure requirements are also taken account of in setting bank capital. It would be wholly inappropriate to include compliance with disclosure requirements in the calculation of bank capital requirements because disclosure can never have an impact on the amount of capital that a bank needs to keep. It is an extraneous consideration that should not feature in the determination of prudential capital. I have absolutely no idea on what rational basis capital requirements for individual banks could be adjusted for the climate change objectives of the Government, which also features in Amendment 28.
As the noble Lord, Lord Oates, has explained, Amendments 31 and 32 would require mandatory risk weights for exposures related to fossil fuel; namely, 150% for existing exposures and 1,250% for new funding. These are both penal and unrelated to the underlying credit risk. I accept that funding fossil fuel exploration might well carry higher risks in the future than it does currently, but that will be reflected in banks’ evolving lending policies, including pricing for risk, and in the risks that are reflected in how they calculate credit risk-weighted assets.
Risk weighting is about loss at default and these amendments are suggesting that there could be a total loss at default; that is the particular implication of the 1,250% risk weight for new exploration. Neither assumption is realistic. Banks do not lend in situations where default is likely or total losses will occur, and I did not understand the reference to 100% equity funding in the explanatory statement: banks lend money; they do not make equity investments in the companies with which they deal.
In general, corporate borrowing is not linked to specific activities. At the weekend, when I was at home thinking about what I was going to say on these amendments, I found a copy of Shell’s most recent accounts, which I looked at to see how its balance sheet was made up. Most of Shell’s debt is in generic corporate bonds, rather than for specific activities within Shell. Like other major oil and gas companies, Shell has a mix of activities, including those which the green lobby will approve of.
As drafted, by reference to
“exposures associated with the funding of existing fossil fuel production and exploitation”,
the amendments are probably ineffective because lending is not likely to be hypothecated in the way the amendments assume. I should also say that Shell, as a corporate borrower, currently has long-term credit ratings of A+ and Aa2, which imply a low risk of default and therefore a relatively low likelihood of loss needing to be taken account of in the way that assets are risk weighted.
Even if these amendments were drafted in a way that was effective and made sense, I suspect that the only real-world impact would be that debt financing for oil and gas companies would be driven out of the London market. Why on earth would we want to deprive the City of London of relatively low-risk, profitable business?
Baroness Hayman (CB) [V]
My Lords, it is always fascinating to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. I certainly do not have her level of expertise in financial institutions but, listening to her, I worried that the phrase that the noble Lord, Lord Oates, used about the battle between urgency and complacency was actually rather relevant. We have a very short period of time in which to change the dynamics of what is happening to our world through climate change. I am sure that these amendments could be better drafted, and we may need her technical knowledge and experience to help us find the correct levers to do what Amendments 28, 31 and 32 set out to do, but, frankly, we cannot afford simply to say that this will not work. We have to find ways that will work, which is why I am interested in, and listened carefully to, the powerful and compelling case made by the noble Lord, Lord Oates, in introducing these amendments.
We have to find a way in which to make explicit and transparent the risks contained in continuing investment in existing fossil fuel projects or new ones, and that funding new fossil fuel projects is essentially of the highest risk and should be funded out of equity if it is to go ahead. The risks relate not only to continuing investment contributing to climate change, which itself creates systemic risk through increasing emissions, but to the certainty of these assets becoming stranded, as the noble Lord, Lord Oates, said. That is not in the long term—we are talking about the reasonably predictable future.
A recent report by Finance Watch, Breaking the Climate-finance Doom Loop, highlighted that to limit warming to 1.5 degrees we can emit only a further 500 gigatonnes of CO2. There are currently fossil fuel reserves which, if all were extracted, would emit 3,000 gigatonnes. If we are to have any hope to meet what are not just the aspirations of what the noble Baroness calls the “green lobby” but are actually our national and international treaty obligations, we have to change. Despite the fine words that have been spoken since Paris, $2.7 trillion in funding has been provided since that agreement to the oil and gas industry, with UK banks contributing significantly.
Financial institutions are in the process of quantifying climate-related financial risks, but it is widely recognised that this will take considerable time. Rather than waiting until the middle of the decade when we have made progress in quantifying the risks via the TCFD and climate-related financial risk disclosures, we could start to make changes to the existing capital requirements regulation now, to reflect what we all know are risky investments, even if we do not know the exact quantified risk. Prudential regulations are designed for just such a situation, to regulate markets and ensure long-term stability.
We have to make it very clear what the risks are, because there is danger of interpretation of risk from the transition from brown to green being considered in the light of it being a sudden cut-off of one and a change to the other, so that people avoid any change. We need a measured and adjusted transition. To do that, we need to be aware of risks on all levels.
Finally, I will say a word or two on taxonomy: how we actually define green and brown. In previous Committee debates, the noble Earl the Minister said
“we need to be able to define what we mean by ‘green’.”—[Official Report, 24/2/21; col. GC 225.]
He commented that it will take time to analyse the risks and produce the taxonomy. It is important that we recognise that that taxonomy needs to include a definition of what is a brown asset as well as what is green. We need to look at how we drive investment away from brown, as well as directing it to green.
The New Economics Foundation recently wrote to the Chancellor, saying that
“limiting the taxonomy to green activities will not necessarily encourage a move away from financing activities that undermine climate goals. We equally need the taxonomy to classify carbon-intensive and other unsustainable activities. Importantly, the taxonomy design should not be decided behind closed doors. There must be transparency and public consultation to ensure that a wide range of expertise and perspectives from across civil society and academia feed into the UK’s Green Technical Advisory Group.”
It would be very good to understand government thinking on this issue and on the timing of the work of the green technical advisory group, and I hope that the noble Earl will comment on this when he winds up or, if that is not possible, write to me in the future.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I refer to my interests in the register. It is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, and my noble friend Lady Noakes, who spoke eloquently on the capital requirements. I was planning to do the same, but she has said much of what I was planning to say, so I shall confine myself to a brief question about Amendment 31.
Amendment 31 refers to
“existing fossil fuel production and exploitation.”
I wonder whether all the possible consequences have been considered. The noble Lord, Lord Oates, spoke eloquently on mining, and I, too, claim mining ancestors: my great-grandfather was a coal miner in Seaton Burn in Northumberland. The noble Lord also mentioned stranded and abandoned communities. I wonder whether the amendment, as drafted, would also apply to companies that are actively engaged in the complex process of decommissioning existing facilities, particularly those in the North Sea. In many cases, those are the same companies that are involved in exploitation and exploration. Again, my noble friend Lady Noakes spoke very eloquently about hypothecation when it comes to lending to some of these types of companies. With that in mind, were the potential regional effects of rationing capital to these businesses considered, because that is the likely net effect of the amendments? I suppose that that would have particular reference to and relevance in Scotland.
I am sure we all hope for a world free from fossil fuels, but I am 100% confident that, regrettably, we will need them for a while yet—although it is probably worth stating that they have other uses apart from just being burned. As my noble friend Lady Noakes also pointed out, it is fair to say that financial institutions have a refined—no pun intended—approach to assessing fossil fuel-related risk and are perfectly capable of valuing stranded assets. The proof of that is to be found in the valuation of companies such as BP and Royal Dutch. If, as the amendments imply, we would prefer no lending at all to fossil fuel companies—which is a perfectly legitimate point of view—should we not just say that and agitate for a multinational agreement to that effect, perhaps at COP 26, rather than introduce it via the back door through amendments such as these?
Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Non-Afl) [V]
My Lords, I am not a financial expert, nor was that my academic background, nor do I have family involved in the fossil fuel industry, because Northern Ireland did not have a mining base. However, it is quite clear to me that the Financial Services Bill is silent on the climate emergency and carbon issues. Therefore, I favour the amendments in this group in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Oates, and other colleagues.
A recent Bank of England publication states:
“Climate change poses different risks to the stability of the financial system, particularly for the insurance and banking sectors.”
It states that there are physical, transition and liability risks from climate change. Climate change means that we may face more frequent or severe weather events, such as flooding, droughts and storms. Examples of those recent weather events that have been linked to human-driven climate change include the heatwave and droughts in China in the summer of 2013 and the more recent flood events in the UK. Such events bring physical risks that impact on our society and have the potential to affect the economy, and our financial services sector. If these events happen more frequently, people will become more reliant on insurance to cover the costs of damage to their houses and cars.
Transition risks can occur when moving towards a less polluting, greener economy. Such transitions could mean that some sectors of the economy face big shifts in asset values or higher costs of doing business. One example is energy companies. If government policies were to change in line with the Paris Agreement, two-thirds of the world’s known fossil fuel reserves could not be burned. This could lead to changes in the value of investments held by banks and insurance companies in sectors such as coal, oil and gas.
Liability risks come from people or businesses seeking compensation for losses that they may have suffered from the physical or transition risks from climate change.
It is important to tackle climate change and protect the environment. This is very important in the financial services sector; I think the Chancellor of the Exchequer referred to that in the recent past. As I said, there is no reference in the Bill to climate or the ecological emergency, notwithstanding that the UK Government have the chair of COP 26 this year. There is no mention of green finance, climate risk disclosure or the critical role that the financial services industry will have to play if we are to tackle climate change.
How do the Government intend to deal with this matter from a legislative point of view? It is recognised as a clear priority by the Chancellor, although the Minister who took the Bill through the other place did not see any direct correlation between financial services regulation and the impact and risk of climate change. Parliament should determine that role and ensure that these amendments are made to this legislation. The amendments, which I support, would require the Prudential Regulation Authority to have regard to climate-related financial risk when setting capital adequacy requirements, and would ensure that credit rating agencies have to take climate risk into account in setting credit ratings, with particular relevance to fossil fuel exposures. I think of the fact that the Government wish to pursue a new coal mine in Cumbria.
Do the Government not see the benefit in these amendments to have regard to climate-related financial risk when setting capital adequacy requirements? If not, could they specify what their position is? Will they not admit that there is a direct correlation between the climate change emergency, fossil fuels and financial services regulation? Perhaps the noble Earl could provide us with answers when he winds up.
Baroness Sheehan (LD) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick. I found myself nodding at her every point. I pay wholesome tribute to my noble friend Lord Oates for the manner in which he introduced this series of amendments and the comprehensive nature of his speech. These amendments get to the nub of the issue.
In 1989, I left a comfortable job in advertising and went back to university, to bolster my chemistry degree and get a better understanding of the scientific evidence and facts behind the litany of dreadful things that seemed to be happening to the planet. The main issues of concern in those days were acid rain, the ozone hole, species loss and radiation in the environment, especially following the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. Another issue causing grave concern was what was then referred to as global warming. I wanted the facts. Specifically, I wanted to know to what extent climate change was anthropogenic.
When I left Imperial, I was in no doubt that the warming planet was due to the accumulation in the upper atmosphere of greenhouse gases, caused by the burning of fossil fuels since the start of the industrial age. The science was incontrovertible then, 30 years ago, and the ball was firmly in the political court. Over three decades later, to my utter frustration, when push comes to shove—and actions not words are needed—the political will appears lacking. I therefore welcome these amendments, especially Amendments 31 and 32, for their clarity of purpose.
I will say a few words about Amendment 28 in the names of my noble friends Lord Oates and Lady Kramer, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, the purpose of which is to place a requirement on the PRA, when setting the capital adequacy requirements of a credit institution, to have regard to its exposure to climate-related financial risk. It invokes the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosure and our domestic commitments through the Climate Change Act 2008, as amended in 2019. In my view, the amendment is pretty uncontroversial if you think that we are facing a climate emergency and I hope that the Minister will sympathise with its aims.
In Committee last Wednesday, the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, took me to task when I welcomed Amendment 48’s aim to bring forward the TCFD’s implementation by two years. He rightly said that the methodology to quantify the metrics was complicated and not yet in place. However, a huge amount of work is being done on the issue by UN agencies, EU agencies and the OECD, to name but a few.
I am heartened by the way that we met the challenge of developing and deploying not one but myriad vaccines in the space of a year. It is not much short of a miracle. That was made possible by global collaboration and working at speed, putting aside some artificial barriers to manufacturing by paying upfront to cover the risk of failure. In short, huge challenges were overcome because we faced a global crisis of mammoth proportions. Of course, the issue of scaling up manufacturing capacity to meet global demand remains, not least in developing countries, but that is now an issue of political will. With climate change, we are dealing with a global emergency that has the potential to dwarf the pandemic, so I say to the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, that necessity is the mother of invention. We can do this if there is a will.
I welcome the intentions of Amendment 136A, but it is a little broad and detracts from the central theme of tackling the climate crisis. ESGs are now pretty well established and cover a range of factors that move companies in the right direction, which is to be welcomed. But it is a slow process—it is not compulsory—and they do not explicitly signal climate-related financial risk, which I would like to see.
In conclusion I will say a few words about Amendments 31 and 32. The question to which I would like an answer is: who will pay the cost to society of climate change? The answer is that we as society will pay these costs. But such social costs are not built into the price of oil, gas, coal, gas fires, electricity, natural gas heating, petrol or diesel. As a result, the corporations most responsible do not pay directly for their pollution. That also leaves few incentives to limit greenhouse gas emissions, so problems such as climate change go unabated. I support these amendments as they not only are a shorthand way of building the massive social cost of carbon into investment decisions but also recognise climate-related investment risk.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Sheehan, who has made powerful points. A little more than a year ago, we faced the Covid emergency and the Government moved very fast with multiple rules and regulations. The world has moved very fast and science has moved very fast. That is a demonstration of how fast the world can change in an emergency—and we are all in agreement that we are in a climate emergency.
Given that I agree with many of the comments already made on this group of amendments, I aim not to repeat them all but perhaps to take us a little bit forward. To briefly outline, I am speaking on Amendments 28 and 42 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Oates, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, as well as my name. I also express my support for the principles and direction of Amendments 31 and 32 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Oates. In his expansive and effective introduction, the noble Lord presented a strong case for the detail contained in these amendments.
With Amendment 136A, the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, is heading in the direction of an amendment of mine discussed last week. I spoke about introducing acknowledgment of our international obligations on biodiversity. This amendment heads in the direction of thinking in terms of the sustainable development goals, and that kind of system thinking is very much what we need. It goes a lot further than simply looking at the climate emergency. I would like to see us go further than where we are at. The full SDGs are a big step that we need to take at some point very soon.
The noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, noted that there are other uses for fossil fuels than energy generation or transport. Many of those uses are, of course, the production of plastics, which are creating a whole different set of crises in our plastic-choked world: a pollution crisis and a crisis in the impact on animal life and quite possibly on human health.
It is pretty clear that we are already in a carbon bubble. We know from an organisation as radical as the International Energy Agency that we have to leave at least three-quarters of our known fossil fuel reserves in the ground to avoid catastrophic runaway climate change. Yet we still see money being lent, sometimes by the UK Government—the chair of COP 26—to develop and even explore new reserves. This clearly is not the way forward.
To build on what others have said, rather than simply repeat it, I refer noble Lords to an article by Semieniuk et al in volume 12, issue 1 of the journal WIREs Climate Change, published in January/February 2021, entitled “Low-carbon Transition Risks for Finance”. In the conclusion of that article, the authors say:
“Asset stranding combines with other transition costs, notably unemployment, losses in profits, and reductions in real incomes from price changes that generate significant risks for portfolio losses and debt default. Financial actors might become unable to service their own debt and obligations, creating loss propagation within the financial network. The adverse impacts of credit tightening and lack of confidence as well as the direct impact of transition costs to the macroeconomy, could lead to a general economic crisis with further risks for finance.”
They continue:
“Targeted financial policies, however, can dampen some transition risks by direct regulation of the financial sector.”
This element of the conclusion relates in some ways very closely to the debate we will be having tomorrow on the National Security and Investment Bill, but it is worth noting that, with a different cause at its base, it could be taken as a pretty fair description of what happened in the 2007-08 global financial crash.
I referred to that article, at least initially, not primarily for its conclusion but for the detailed calculations and models in its body. I suspect that one answer that we might hear from the Minister in responding to this group is that something needs to be done, but not quite yet—the Augustinian approach mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, in our debates last week. However, the article demonstrates that thorough work has been done and is available to the department to act now. As the noble Lord, Lord Oates, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Hayman and Lady Sheehan, all referenced, we are in a state of extreme urgency—a climate emergency.
However, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, gave me a further reason to draw on that conclusion. She said that she relies on the banks in calculating and pricing risk. She said, “Banks do not lend in situations where default is likely.” Well, we all know how that worked out in 2007 and 2008. The noble Baroness also said, “Carbon debt financing could be driven out of the City of London.” If we look at the costs we bore from risky lending and risky actions by the financial sector in 2007 and 2008, we see that that could indeed be a very good thing for our financial security. I do not believe that we would see a direct migration of financing shifting out of the City of London and going to other places. If the British Government were to take this action and become world-leading, as they so often tell us they want to be, that would have an impact on other financial markets around the world. Other people would say, “Well, if London is doing that, perhaps we should have a look at it, too.”
Let us look at the best possible outcome: we entirely prevent a carbon bubble financial crash. One problem, of course, is that you do not get credit for stopping things that never happened, but perhaps we would know that we had done the right thing. Even if we managed only to significantly reduce the size of that carbon bubble crash, we would indeed be world-leading. We are ready to take action: this is an emergency and so we have to take action. I commend these amendments to the Committee.
Baroness Altmann (Con) [V]
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Oates, for his excellent introduction to this group of amendments and his work to try to ensure that the Bill rises to the challenge of ensuring that our financial services institutions, regulations and activities are properly concerned with the dangers of climate change. I am happy to add my support to Amendments 28 and 42 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Oates, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Lady Bennett—who it is a pleasure to follow—which seek to ensure that capital adequacy and credit rating agencies take account of climate risk.
I also have sympathy with Amendment 136A, in the name of my noble friend Lord Holmes, which seeks to require that fund management firms should report on their ESG compliance. My only thought on that is that it may not go far enough. Such a requirement could become just a tick-box exercise and I believe we need to go much further than that if we are to meet our obligations to today’s younger people.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I begin by welcoming Amendment 136A from the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, which is the only amendment in the group that does not have my name attached to it. The amendment is useful. In a sense, it belongs with the group of amendments on climate change that we discussed last week, in that it is focused on disclosure and other such issues, which is helpful. The reason why we have this group of amendments is that we require more powerful levers, we need to recognise urgency and we need the financial system to recognise both the risks that it faces as a sector from the implications of climate change and the positive role that it can play.
Mark Carney and Andrew Bailey have both accepted that climate change is the greatest risk that we face to financial stability. That surely should be reflected in the way that the industry is regulated. I was therefore taken aback when Andrew Bailey, in his speech to the Green Horizon Summit in November, laid out a strategy that seemed to depend, essentially, on better data, disclosure and guidance. At the macro level, Mr Bailey confirmed that a climate stress exercise, postponed because of Covid, would launch in June 2021, but then he said:
“We will not use the results to size firms’ capital buffers.”
I found that quite shocking, but, having listened to the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, I realise the kind of pressures that Andrew Bailey must be facing from the industry. Surely capital buffers are a crucial tool of the regulator. If climate change is the most important risk to financial stability, surely the Bank of England must be prepared to reflect that in its capital adequacy requirements.
The noble Lord, Lord Oates, explained the complexity of some of the calculations. I understand that the numbers look really large when they are written down, but of course they are a weighting. The consequence for existing assets is not that a bank will have to hold 150% equivalent to its exposure but rather a percentage of that—around 12% of the exposure, I think. The number is not quite as alarming as it looks. When we look at future exploitation, we see that essentially what is being said is that it is so risky that 100% of capital needs to be held against any loan made—in effect, it is an equity investment because of the nature of its risk and not a risk that can accept the additional risk that is attached to leverage.
When I listened to the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, a couple of things particularly struck me. One is that I have far less faith than she does in the ability of the banks to assess credit risk. Sometimes they are pretty good at looking at an individual company—though, my goodness, a lot of that was flawed, if we look at the period before 2008. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, was on the board of RBS and must have looked back at its credit—not at the time of its troubles being created but afterwards—and probably was in shock at some of the credit practices that were in place. That is similarly true at HBOS, Northern Rock and a wide range of banking institutions.
We should not fool ourselves that banks are all-seeing, even when it comes to looking at an individual company’s credit risk. But where they are really poor is in identifying change and looking at systemic and holistic risk. That is why we ran into that incredible crisis in 2008. The industry struggles to look beyond the small and narrow to understand the broader picture and then apply it to its whole range of credit decisions. I say that as someone who spent most of their banking career in the United States as a commercial banker, looking extensively at credit risk; I very much understand the weakness of the system.
Banking is, almost by definition, a short-term activity, so decisions are made over relatively short horizons. Despite the many changes that we have introduced at governance level to try to inculcate a longer-term culture, it will always be true—partly because of the way that remuneration and promotions are structured, and partly because it is just inherent in the culture of most of these institutions—that the way that banks look is inherently short term. They are particularly bad at assessing long-term risk and understanding how the implications of that should be applied on any given day.
The noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, said that if we do not want to see lending to future fossil fuel exploitation, we should deal with it globally at the COP meeting later in the year. I say to him that we take this same attitude to junk mortgages; I do not remember us saying that we must not do anything to increase the risk of those while we wait for a global agreement. We do the same thing with a wide range of high-risk derivatives and I do not remember us saying we should not act on those until we get a global agreement. When the financial regulator sees risk and recognises it, it has a responsibility to act. I remain, as I said, rather shaken at the idea that we have a financial regulator that will be identifying that risk but then not using it in its power to adapt capital buffers. As I have said, this is almost the last point at which we as parliamentarians will collectively be able to have an impact on the banks’ thinking and it strikes me that we need to seize that opportunity now.
Holding capital is a powerful tool to force a banking institution to face up to the risk that it is undertaking. That is why it is particularly true that the capital adequacy requirements are some of the most powerful leverages to change. In that same conversation, we must also make it clear to banks that they are not too big to fail and that if they undertake high-risk transactions there are consequences—in the past there have not been, as we as a country have bailed them out.
Finally, I will talk to Amendment 42, which deals with credit rating agencies. As the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, pointed out, an organisation such as Shell has a very high credit rating and who would not lend to an organisation with a credit rating on that scale? We always—I would say this to any individual Minister—have to be somewhat cynical when we look at the product of credit rating agencies. I know that they try to behave with integrity, but the companies pay their fees and their wages and that tends to incline them to think in very narrow terms. None of the credit rating agencies got right the crisis that we saw in 2008-09, even though it developed over quite a period of years leading up to 2008-09. This was not an overnight event; it was a crisis that built over a decade and, in that way, it is very similar to the climate change crisis.
We have an opportunity to put down a particularly important marker to the regulator and say, “You have a tool that matters, a tool that you can use to protect the financial system from risk, which you yourself acknowledge and recognise and which you say you find frankly somewhat frightening. So use those tools.” In these amendments, we have the leverage to make the regulator do so.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Oates and Lord Holmes, for tabling these amendments and for their helpful contributions. They provided a welcome extra clarity as to how we can deliver the UK’s climate change obligations across the financial services sector.
In an earlier debate, we identified the important principles which should underpin the application of climate change principles by the regulators and how they should be reported. A number of noble Lords then made strong and compelling cases for changes to the regulatory regime in advance of the Government’s consultation and implementation of the Basel standards because of the urgency of the climate change threat that we all acknowledged in that debate.
These amendments go one step further. Amendment 28 would add a specific requirement on the PRA to take the level of exposure to climate-related financial risk into account in setting capital adequacy requirements. We believe this is right, given the increasing evidence that institutions with overexposure to carbon-intensive investments are not acting prudentially.
In the debate last week, the Minister said:
“There is no evidence that ‘greener’ means ‘prudentially safer’, at least not yet”.—[Official Report, 24/2/21; col. GC 224.]
Although we accept that evidence in this field is still being collected, we believe that there is already a sufficiently strong evidence base on which to act. This has been confirmed by the Bank of England, which is already planning to tighten the supervisory expectations on climate-related risk for banks and insurers. As the Governor of the Bank of England said—and we all seem to be quoting the governors or the bank in different guises in this debate, but all roads lead to the same conclusion—in a recent speech:
“Investments that look safe on a backward look may be existentially risky given climate change. And investments that might have looked speculative in the past could look much safer in the context of a transition to net zero.”
Therefore, let us face it: high-level thinking is changing fast, whether it is by the Chancellor or the Governor of the Bank of England or, indeed, in the quotes from BlackRock that we looked at in the previous debate. There are big changes and big thinking going on. We now need to turn that recognition by all those leadership characters into practical policies for the future, and that is what we are attempting to do. We identify the urgent need to revisit investment assumptions and near-term capital requirements, and that is what Amendment 28 is trying to do.
Amendments 31 and 32 focus on the specific risk weight of investment in fossil fuels, which remain a major contributor to carbon emissions and are inevitably high-risk. We welcome the debate on these amendments and the specific risk weights that are proposed. I listened carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Oates, and other noble Lords, had to say on this. We feel that the noble Lord was making a very valid point. As other noble Lords have said, the wording of these amendments might not be perfect, but they are certainly worthy of further exploration. On that basis, I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Oates, for his clear and succinct introduction to these amendments, and to other noble Lords who have spoken in his support, as well as to those who have sounded a more critical note.
I have already spoken about some of the broader questions relating to climate change and financial services in a previous debate and, in response to the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, in particular, I set out last Wednesday the significant action the Government are taking in this area. I also indicated that I have heard and understand the well-argued concerns of noble Lords about the manifold risks arising from climate change. I stand ready to discuss those concerns in the context of this Bill as constructively as I can between now and Report.
To add one more assurance in reply to the noble Lord, Lord Oates, who spoke about the risk of stranded assets and asked specifically about a transition plan, the Government are committed to a managed transition that puts new jobs in the clean energy sector at the heart of our strategy. My right honourable friend the Prime Minister set out details of this in his 10-point plan; further detail will be included in the forthcoming net zero review.
If I may, I will focus my remarks more narrowly on the specific issues raised by these amendments. Noble Lords reflected in earlier debates on the importance of prudential regulation, which aims to ensure the safety and soundness of the financial system. Much of the UK’s existing prudential regulation was introduced as a result of the 2008 financial crisis, to protect our economy by ensuring that financial services firms are adequately capitalised and properly managed to limit the risk of failure and the impact that would have on the economy. We must therefore be careful when considering the use of prudential tools to deliver other policy objectives; my noble friend Lady Noakes was absolutely right to emphasise this.
Indeed, one of the key advantages of the approach taken in the Bill is that it allows the UK’s prudential regulator, the PRA, to react where necessary to changing market conditions and to developments in international work and research on climate risk, particularly the development of a global consensus on what role the financial sector should play in tackling climate change. I believe this is a better solution than the amendments we are discussing here.
Amendment 28 would require the PRA to set capital adequacy requirements of a credit institution while having regard to its exposure to climate-related financial risk. As I have said, I appreciate all the concerns around climate change—there is no question of the Government being complacent about them—but I cannot see how this amendment would deliver more than the PRA’s existing obligations under the Financial Services and Markets Act, which by definition requires it to consider risks to the safety and soundness of financial institutions. I say to my noble friend Lady Altmann in particular that this includes climate risks in the same way as any other risks. The regulators are very alive to climate-related risks and are already acting to make sure they are understood and addressed in the financial system. To prove the point, the PRA will undertake climate-related stress tests in June to ensure that the financial system remains resilient to climate-related risks.
Amendments 31 and 32 would require the PRA to set punitively high risk weights against exposure to existing and new fossil fuel production and exploitation. These risk weights would, in effect, make it more expensive to finance such activities, and thereby make them less attractive. However, the point of the Bill is to support a flexible regulatory system that can respond to changing circumstances and developments as they arise. This framework puts financial stability at its heart through the PRA’s primary objective of safety and soundness. Other relevant public policy considerations are dealt with through the system of “have regard” set out in the Bill. None of these is prescriptive in the way that these amendments are, and they are, quite importantly, subordinate to the PRA’s primary objective. I maintain that this is the most effective way in which to ensure appropriate prudential treatment for all assets. Putting other public policy issues on a par with safety and soundness could lead to decisions being taken that are not sufficiently focused on the core purpose of prudential regulation.
Amendment 42 would require the Treasury to make regulations requiring credit rating agencies to give due consideration in their ratings to the level of exposure of a credit institution to climate-related financial risk. The credit rating agencies regulation sets out the UK’s regulatory regime for credit rating agencies, which are supervised by the FCA. A key principle of the regulation is that the agencies are independent, and the credit ratings they produce are independent, objective and of adequate quality. In producing these ratings, credit rating agencies are required to use methodologies that are rigorous, systematic, continuous and subject to validation based on historical experience. However, the credit rating agencies regulation does not stipulate factors that must be included within the methodologies used by credit rating agencies. In line with this principle of independence, the regulation prohibits interference of public authorities in the content of credit ratings or methodologies when performing their supervisory functions. This is an important principle designed to ensure that ratings have not been unduly influenced.
However, the regulation places requirements on credit rating agencies clearly to disclose their methodologies and the key elements underlying the credit rating or the rating outlook. That ensures that those using the ratings can make an informed choice as to whether a rating gives due regard to the impact of a type of risk on the creditworthiness of the institution in question, including climate-related financial risk. In addition, EU guidance published in 2019 provides that, when a credit rating agency changes a rating, it must disclose whether environment, social and governance factors played a part in that decision. The FCA has publicly communicated that it considers all guidance published by European authorities before 31 December 2020 to be relevant to UK firms and, therefore, UK agencies are expected to continue to apply this principle. More generally, the Government have committed to implementing the requirements of the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures in the UK, with a significant portion of mandatory requirements in place by 2023, and all relevant firms reporting in line with the requirements by 2025.
On the topic of disclosures, Amendment 136A would require the Government to introduce an obligation on fund managers to report to the FCA on how their funds are satisfying environmental, social and governance requirements. I have already spoken about the Government’s commitment to implementing the requirements of the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures—TCFD—in the UK. Becoming the first major economy to commit to fully mandatory and public climate disclosures is even more ambitious than the proposed amendment, which requires FCA-regulated fund managers only to make disclosures to the FCA. But fund managers do not yet have sufficient information on environmental factors from the wider economy in which they invest. The mandatory TCFD road map set out by the Government will apply to funds and the wider economy in a co-ordinated timeline.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
I understand that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch, may not have completed her remarks before the Minister began. Does she have anything that she wishes to say?
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab) [V]
Obviously the Minister has now responded. I think I made the point in conclusion that the high-level leadership and thinking, including from the Chancellor and the Governor of the Bank of England, are moving in the same direction. Something more urgent is needed, and the Bill is the ideal mechanism for delivering these changes on the ground; otherwise, we are in danger of this becoming aspirational, when the urgency is more immediate.
I apologise to the Minister. I have just been trying to find out what happened, so I did not hear everything he said. Underpinning all this, I feel that the amendments are worth while and deserve further consideration, and that we need a mechanism to have more targets and better data, assumptions and methodology. We need the regulators to set that; otherwise, if we are not careful, we will end up with annual reports that, as we have said in the past, are just greenwashed and are not in any way held to account. I will finish there and I apologise to noble Lords if they did not hear all the things that I had to say.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
Does the Minister wish to respond? No? In that case, I call the noble Lord, Lord Oates.
Lord Oates (LD)
I thank noble Lords from all sides of the Committee for their contributions. I am particularly grateful to those noble Lords who signed the amendments and spoke in the debate. I am grateful also to the Minister for his courteous response and for agreeing to continue to discuss these issues.
The noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, made the point that we are going to need fossil fuels for some time to come. That is precisely the point I covered in my opening remarks. That is why we need to risk existing fossil fuel operations properly and effectively so that they can continue as we transition.
The noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, questioned which companies Amendments 31 and 32 might apply to. The intention was for them to apply to activities as opposed to specific companies, and specifically to fossil fuel activities to try to avoid capturing some companies’ non-fossil fuel activities. I am perfectly happy to accept that the amendments’ wording might be improved, but that was the intention. The issue we have to deal with is the threat of continued fossil fuel activities beyond what we have the carbon budgets for.
Overall, however, I was struck by the absolute complacency from the Government Benches—the lack of realisation of the issue that we are facing and of the urgency of dealing with it and of trying to use whatever tools we can to address it. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, appeared to question the very concept of using prudential regulation to achieve the objective of averting climate change. She said that the impacts of climate change were unlikely to find their way into credit risks in the short term. She also said, as the noble Baroness Lady Bennett, reminded us, that banks do not lend in situations where there is a high risk of default. History explicitly and categorically refutes that. The noble Baroness also informed us that credit agencies did not need any help in assessing credit risk—the same agencies which gave their highest ratings to complex securities associated with the subprime mortgage crisis.
Prudential regulation is a tool through which we can, necessarily and legitimately, regulate the sector and ensure its financial stability. My noble friend Lady Kramer quoted the current Bank governor’s rather extraordinary statement that we were not going to use the results of the stress tests of different climate scenarios to inform the size of firms’ capital buffers. But he did say that that does not mean firms should not be thinking about near-term capital requirements. He set out that firms must assess how climate risk could impact their business and review whether additional capital needed to be held against this. He expressly recognised the legitimacy of using capital requirements to tackle climate change.
The IPCC has warned us that if we do not act decisively to mitigate climate change, we are on a global warming path of between 3.8 and 4.8 degrees centigrade by the end of the century, with a range of median values between 2.5 and 7.8 degrees centigrade. That is the seriousness of the situation we face. Central bankers are clear about the huge risk that climate change poses to the financial system. But what is the reaction of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe? It is to say: “We don’t need to do anything now. Let’s wait and see.” We do not have time to wait and see.
We know the risks we face. If we do not act, we are culpable. Is our excuse to our children and grandchildren, nieces and nephews, and grand-nieces and grand-nephews going to be: “Oh, sorry, it was all too difficult. We were busy trying to measure everything and we thought the banks were quite good at predicting risk anyway, and they all let us down”? The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, asked: why would we deny the City the opportunities of a relatively low-risk, profitable business? There is a simple answer to that: if those activities continue unabated, they will threaten the very future of human society. That is a reality. That is why we have to act.
In view of the Minister’s willingness to continue to discuss these issues, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 29.
Amendment 29
“Further matters for regulators to take into account
When making rules using their powers under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, the Prudential Regulation Authority and Financial Conduct Authority must—(a) have regard to competition within the contexts of—(i) the availability of consumer choice and fair pricing;(ii) the development and encouragement of new products and new industry;(iii) the desirability of supporting the international reputation of the United Kingdom for good governance;(b) structure the rules to establish clear categories for different types and sizes of financial service businesses including—(i) in banking, for small co-operative, mutual and community banks;(ii) in insurance, for captives and reinsurance.”Member’s explanatory statement
This is a non-exhaustive example of additional high level policy that could be embedded in the remit for the Regulators.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group and will speak to my Amendment 29, which suggests further measures for regulators to have regard to. I also remind the Grand Committee of my financial services interests, as in the register.
“Have regard” clauses are the only things that the Government are proposing as additional accountability measures in this Bill, or as the “activity-specific regulatory principles”, in the language of the HMT consultation. Indeed, views were sought in question 2 of the consultation concerning more “have regards”.
The first part of my amendment seeks to give the PRA, as well as the FCA, a set of competition considerations relating to consumer choice and fair pricing, the development and encouragement of new products and new industry, and the desirability of supporting the international reputation of the United Kingdom for good governance. These are self-explanatory, but giving encouragement to new products and new industry is something that is important for both regulators. There is overlap here with issues that were discussed in the competition group on the first day of Committee. This is the kind of measure on which it seemed there was more consensus, but I will not repeat that debate.
The second part of the amendment, also under the umbrella of competition, in proposed new subsection (b), suggests that rules establish clear categories for different types or sizes of business, and two examples are given for banking and insurance. The regulators frequently inform us that they apply proportionality, but it is often within an overall regime that does not allow specific or easy identification of a stand-alone category and may not always take advantage of all legitimate considerations.
In banking, I have highlighted regimes for small co-operative, mutual and community banks. I have the impression that these banks have been at best tolerated by the PRA, rather than encouraged; perhaps it is awkward for the PRA to have more banks to deal with, perhaps there is no promotion from working with the small guys, or perhaps it is like it was with the old FSA and everybody wants the big glamour jobs. It seems to me that, for quite a long time, the public and parliamentarians have been saying that they want banks in the community, understanding the community and with purpose linked to the community, but the atmosphere in the PRA still seems to be one of reticence and suspicion.
For insurance, there has also long been a call to have better-elaborated categories that deal with different types of risk transfer. This is something that other countries have done, notably carving out specific regimes for captives and reinsurance, which has given them a competitive advantage. I should like to be able to see what the UK is doing in this regard and compare it much more easily with Ireland, Luxembourg or the Netherlands—or, indeed, Bermuda. It has always been possible; it is nothing to do with being in the EU or not—it is our regulators.
Recital 21 of Solvency II states:
“This Directive should also take account of the specific nature of captive insurance and reinsurance undertakings. As those undertakings only cover risks associated with the industrial or commercial group to which they belong, appropriate approaches should thus be provided in line with the principle of proportionality to reflect the nature, scale and complexity of their business.”
Of course, the attitude of HMT and UK regulators to recitals in European legislation is that they are not binding and so they are not interested, but other countries have taken notice. It is all very disheartening, as it was British MEPs who worked hard to get those words in there. Therefore, I would quite like to have another go with a “have regard”, where at least the regulators would have to explain why they have disregarded it.
The Central Bank of Ireland took the recital to heart and, taking the definition of a captive from Solvency II, has defined a “direct writing captive insurer” for which there is a specific “differentiated supervisory approach” under which the solvency, capital and governance requirements are less onerous. That approach is justified by the narrower risk referenced in recital 21. Are these the sort of more flexible, tailored kinds of rules that the Minister would like to see put to good use in the UK? If so, then maybe, over a decade on, we can get to where we should have been. Even if we do not, this illustrates a significant example where having the regulator’s justification for not “having regard” would at least be useful. I beg to move.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to take part in this debate on the second group of amendments and I declare my interests as in the register. I will speak to Amendment 126 in my name and, before I do so, say it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted. I congratulate her on the way that she introduced the group.
My Amendment 126 offers a structure of regional mutual banks, which are successful in other nations but not so present in the UK. With the current situation apropos Covid and the current economic outlook, it seems timely to reconsider the whole concept of mutuality via the structure, as set out in this amendment, of regional mutual banks. If we get this right, it would seem to play very much to the levelling-up agenda, to the regional agenda and to a more collaborative, connected and closer relationship between lender and lendee—with both sharing a part of the journey in whatever endeavour, be that individual or SME.
Elsewhere in Committee I have raised, and will raise later, issues around financial inclusion which are a stain on so many of our institutions and lives. But this is not a question just for individuals shut out of our financial services system; it is a question for the underbanked as well as the unbanked. It is also a question for SMEs, unable to get the lines of credit they require to do what SMEs do best: grow the economy for the benefit of their employees and communities—for the benefit of them all. In Amendment 126, the consideration of regional mutual banks goes to all these points.
Similarly, it could be the basis for a rebirth in this country of true patient capital, which is much in existence in other nations but not, perhaps, so much in recent years in the UK. We may also wish to consider changes to the rules around pension fund investments, which could come through such vehicles as regional mutual banks. We are all aware of the names of some famous and successful international pension funds—Ontario Teachers, to give one example. Why do we know about it, when most people perhaps do not necessarily know about our large pension schemes? It is because of the current rules and approach when it comes to where all that potential investment can be deployed.
Again, the amendment suggests that the whole question of capital adequacy should be considered. If we have a structure with a different funding model, leaning more towards patient capital, should we consider whether the current capital adequacy rules are indeed adequate for such institutions? Are they in fact acting as a barrier, a blocker, to the development of regional mutual banks? With such structures, the amendment seeks to probe a reconsideration of risk and risk profiling when it comes to these kinds of banking operations. The amendment also seeks to look at other social, economic or political limiting factors which may be out there.
Finally, I hope my noble friend the Minister will agree that Amendment 126 offers a helpful suggestion in terms of the seeding of such regional mutual banks. Public finances have rarely been as tight as they are right now; everybody understands that. Perhaps dormant assets could be used to act as some seeding to see where we could take the whole concept of regional mutual banks.
As we come out of Covid, it seems an opportune moment to reconsider, reimagine and potentially reignite the whole concept of mutuality throughout our society, which was so successful and so beloved in previous generations. I hope my noble friend the Minister will agree that Amendment 126 offers a positive, creative structure worth considering for the future. Regional mutual banks could play a key part in the Covid rebuild and in future, as yet unwritten, success stories.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I declare my interest as a former chair of StepChange, the debt charity. I put my name down to speak in this group of amendments because they give me an opportunity to raise a wider concern about the access we need to low-cost credit. In fact, this fits in very closely with points already made by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, on Amendment 29 and the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, on Amendment 126, and his important point about financial inclusion and the need to make sure that we do not forget that. I am looking forward to the comments to be made by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer; she will also touch on these issues when she comes to speak.
When responding to a group in an earlier debate, my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe mentioned that he grew up in a household where poverty was a constant worry. He mentioned the “jam jar economy”, which often characterised low-income households. It was cash-based: putting small amounts of coin away for future expenditure. Indeed, research a few years ago showed the surprising conclusion that the lowest paid in our society were often the heaviest savers on many measures, mainly because they had to be. It was done outwith traditional credit sources and topped up where necessary by house-to-house lenders, which were often a vital lifeline.
A key problem I want to highlight is the need to solve the problem of how to expand low-cost credit. My noble friend Lord McNicol, when he was speaking in an earlier group, mentioned the problems revealed by a very interesting report by the University of Edinburgh Business School on the financial health of NHS workers—people who were in employment but receiving low wages. It was based on real-time open banking figures. It showed across the 20,000 or so NHS workers who were surveyed that far too many were heavily reliant on a regular basis on persistent overdrafts and high-cost credit, often borrowing to meet the emergency needs they had from time to time, at APRs of well over 1,000%. The report makes for very interesting reading, and I hope that the Government will have access to it when they come to consider these issues further.
I know that the Government are concerned about this and that their financial inclusion work recognises, as previous Governments have, that the availability of low-cost credit is a major blockage to financial well-being. As the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, said, it also affects the ability of SMEs and sole traders to operate successfully in a difficult economy.
I hope that the Minister can say a bit more about the plans the Government have when she comes to respond. I know that the Government will pray in aid the idea that credit unions will often be the solution; they have been mooted so often in the past but do not seem to grow. Other countries have other models—Germany has its particular banks focused on the local economy and America has the Community Reinvestment Act—which have solved the problems. Is there not time to consider things that might operate more successfully here in the UK?
None of the individual measures outlined in the amendments in this group, welcome though they are, will solve low-cost credit and the drought that we are suffering from. But they make the point well that the regulatory measures in the Bill should not restrict much-needed support from institutions, banks and other organisations such as credit unions to help those who need to borrow but who cannot do so at the rates or in the period of time which are often required by our major institutions. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, has withdrawn from this group, so I call the next speaker, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, various amendments in this group address different aspects of small and medium-sized banks and other financial institutions, and I am not opposed to having more and different banks in the financial system. Indeed, anyone who has had a bad customer experience with one of the major banks, as I have in the past year, supports more competition and choice. However, I sound a note of caution: we have to be very careful not to send the regulators down a path that could lead to poorer outcomes for consumers.
I am always reminded of the history of building societies, the number of which has shrunk dramatically over the past 100 years or so. These were often small and regionally based, and the numbers have reduced for two main reasons. One reason for this was obviously the liberalisation measures which allowed a number of them to demutualise—one of the more recent trends—but, over time, the other reason was that these were small organisations which were often not managed particularly well and had insufficient financial resilience, and they often had to effectively sell themselves to other building societies in order to protect members when things went wrong.
Against that background, regional banks, as suggested in Amendment 126 in the name of my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond, are, in my view, unlikely to be a panacea. It is less than clear that the failure of a regional bank could easily be prevented in the current regulatory environment. I do not oppose the report that he suggests but I am a bit of a cynic when it comes to seeing that as a useful way forward.
I particularly want to speak to Amendment 91 in this group, in which the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, has suggested restricting access to the term funding scheme if it is not then available for onlending to other banks and providers of finance. I accept that there may be an element of protectionism in the large banks that have access to the term funding scheme not wanting to share that advantage source of finance with other lending institutions. But the scheme suggested by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, would require the major banks to accept the credit risk of dealing with these smaller organisations without any ability to price for that risk. These organisations often struggle to raise equity capital, for good reason: they carry higher risk, they are often not profitable, and they do not all survive.
It seems to me that if the Government think it is a good idea to fund more lenders at preferential rates in order to fund the various lending schemes that have been introduced, they should instruct the Bank of England to vary its lending criteria for the term funding scheme. At the moment, it is restricted to those with access to the discount window facility. It would not take too much to get that changed, without trying to distort the lending decisions of the major banks. If the Bank of England were unwilling to assume that risk itself, it would be open to the Treasury to underwrite it for the Bank, without distorting the decisions made by the banks that do take term funding scheme finance.
Lord Naseby (Con) [V]
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 29 and 126. Amendment 29 adds a hugely important new clause, clearly positioned by the mover, the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, to whom I pay tribute.
By way of background, I have been involved in the mutual movement nearly all my life. My parents were active members of a co-operative. I bank with the Co-operative Bank. I have been politically involved since the days when I was leader of the London Borough of Islington, for some three years from 1968. I entered the Commons in 1974 and took an interest in debates from then onwards, becoming a non-executive director of the Tunbridge Wells Equitable Friendly Society in the 1980s. When I left the Commons in 1997, I became chairman of this society, the trading name of which was the Children’s Mutual. We built up a leading position for the child trust fund; to my deep regret, the Government of the day decided to end that fund. Finally, I had a Private Member’s Bill in your Lordships’ House, which became the Mutuals’ Deferred Shares Act 2015. So, I reckon to know a little bit about the mutual movement.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
My Lords, we will stop for a minute while we sort out the problem with the sound.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, has been muted, I am glad to say, so we will now return to the noble Lord, Lord Naseby.
Lord Naseby (Con) [V]
I thank the Lord Chairman. As I was just saying, in both the United States and Canada there has been a change in young people’s attitudes to debt. This is one reason why the credit union movement there is seeing better times and beginning to come strongly back to life. However, two other things have happened here. First, during the pandemic, people have had a chance to look in great depth at their own financial situation; many are responding to approaches by building societies, credit unions and the other mutuals by having interactions, on the basis that they know somebody. They do not know anybody in the banks. I do not have a clue who looks after an account that I have at RBS; all I can do is act on the telephone. Secondly, and in addition, what do we see on the ground? Bank after bank are closing branches. Whereas in the old days I could go to the RBS in Biggleswade, and then to Bedford, now they have all gone. There is an opportunity here that should be encouraged.
Secondly, I will look not at cheap credit—I hasten to say—but what is called “home-collected credit”, which I covered to some extent at Second Reading. That is all about consumer choice and a fair price. Home-collected credit has been around for 150 years. It is highly successful: it is the credit of choice for the working classes, if I may use that phrase in today’s world. People who use home-collected credit take out small, short-term loans perhaps three or four times a year, probably around Christmas, Easter, birthdays and days such as that. They know what the terms are; the terms do not change, and if they run over in terms of repayment, there is not some swingeing increase in the rate charged. They get a single credit charge.
On the other side, there are payday loans. Every one of us in politics knows exactly what those loans are about: they compound interest and offer high-frequency, weekly loans that people get hooked on. When they go a bit wrong, the claims management companies—CMCs—leap in with a huge volume of complaints, most of which are manufactured. The problem is that today the FCA appears to be treating all high-cost credit models in the same way. The regulator is taking a singular sector-wide approach to affordability and repeat lending and pays less or no attention to the crucial differences between these two products. Whereas officials once differentiated between the responsible and the harmful models, now they treat them all the same. There is therefore a real danger of the HCCs being driven out of business.
In 2018 no less a man than Andrew Bailey said that people viewed home-collected credit differently from rent-to-own and payday ones, and that this was the model he thought about because the difference with home-collected credit is that the borrower knows the lender. The agent is the lender; that is, it is a different, almost social relationship that goes on and creates different attitudes. I ask the Minister to have a close look at this, and perhaps a discussion with the FCA and the Financial Ombudsman Service, to ensure that there is a clear differentiation in any investigations that they might want to undertake between these two very different models.
Thirdly, with the permission of the Committee, I would like to go back to the Mutuals’ Deferred Shares Bill, which I took through your Lordships’ House in 2015. I was motivated to do so by my interest in the mutual movement and by the financial crash of 2008. It seemed to me that there was a need for mutual insurers and friendly societies to have a means of raising capital. That is what I set about doing and it became law in 2015. That was, for me, a high day for the mutual movement. Today, there are not hundreds of mutual insurers and friendly societies: in fact, the active ones are the 52 that are members of the Association of Financial Mutuals.
What that Bill—which is now an Act—did was important, first, because it gave access to new capital, particularly for the friendly societies and mutual insurers. Secondly, without that new capital, many mutuals would have been driven into inappropriate corporate forms through demutualisation. Thirdly, a lack of capital limits mutuals’ growth and their ability to develop new services, which is what this amendment is all about. Fourthly, like all businesses, mutuals need to be able to benefit from economies of scale. Fifthly, it is important to learn lessons from that financial crisis I mentioned; if financial services businesses are to build up stronger capital bases, they require the legislated regulatory agility with which to do so. Sixthly and lastly, there are direct benefits of being able to issue new shares; debt—the alternative—is of lower quality than equity for firms wishing to build their capital base.
One dimension of the then Bill had two elements to it. I am afraid the Government of the day decided they would not accept the second arm that I put in the Bill originally, which was the proposal to have redeemable share instruments for co-operative and community benefit societies. At the time, the Government said they were
“unpersuaded about the merit of a redeemable share instrument as these societies already have a means of issuing redeemable shares. The Government do not see a clear need and demand for such an instrument”.—[Official Report, 24/10/14; col. 923.]
I think the world has not changed. The Government need to have another long, hard look at the second element of that Bill. Obviously, I withdrew that section, because I was happy to have what I could get.
The mutual world is dynamic. If we have learned nothing else from Covid—I was in isolation for my 10 days because I caught it at the beginning of January—it is that people work very hard on a local level. We need to capitalise on that. Society wants it. The wind is in the right direction. I hope very much that the amendments that both the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and my very good and noble friend Lord Holmes are putting forward find a following wind—not necessarily in the format they have produced them but certainly in some other format—and come to fruition.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I will speak very quickly to Amendments 29 and 126. Like the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, I welcome both. We need to keep putting pressure on the regulator to be far more granular in regulation. There has been significant improvement on predecessor regulators, but there is a lot more work to be done. I will speak in a later group about roles which could encourage the regulator to gap-fill, which is very much related to how it regulates a much more varied set of financial organisations, particularly relatively small ones.
Unlike the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, I am a very strong fan of the idea of regional banks, so I appreciate the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes. You have only to look at the Landesbanken in Germany and their capacity to focus on local issues and people; they are there for them during times of crisis when, frankly, big banks tend to flee. Being regional does not guarantee that you are good, but it certainly creates a different dynamic, which we ought to explore—particularly in an era when we are talking much more about the importance of devolution and recognising its significance, and dealing with a levelling-up agenda. I hope all those will generate some thought in the Treasury and Government.
My three amendments—I am sorry there are three and that I have to talk to all of them—are probing amendments into problems that the Government need to get down and fix promptly.
Amendment 43 deals with the proportionality issue, which really is urgent. The level of loss-absorbing capital which medium-sized banks must hold in the UK is decided by the Bank of England. The Bank has been clear in declaring that these banks are not systemic, so we are not looking at systemic risk, but it treats them as if they were major banks, systemically risky, for the purposes of setting the requirement for loss-absorbing capital, and sets what is known as MREL—the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities—at 200% of their minimum capital requirements.
This is not an international norm. In the UK, the threshold at which MREL kicks in is a £15 billion balance sheet, or 40,000 transactional accounts—that really is a medium-sized bank. In the eurozone, the threshold is a €100 billion balance sheet, and in the US it is $250 billion before MREL kicks in. I really think that the Bank of England needs to go back and look at this.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, despite various initiatives to encourage the emergence of challenger banks and local and regional institutions, barriers to entry remain high and the UK does not have a very positive story to tell. If they were provided with the right regulatory framework, an expansion in the number of local and regional banks could play an important role in addressing local inequalities, building financial inclusion and increasing the proportion of lending going to the real economy SMEs. It is important not to look at this as a zero-sum game; it is not, or at least should not be, a choice between supporting either big corporates or small banks, but rather about creating a financial services ecosystem that covers everybody’s needs.
These amendments seem benign. Nevertheless, banking is a risky activity. It is a funny business: it goes out of its way to look respectable and sound, but, as we know, it is extremely frail. In the financial crisis of 2008, the country almost came to a position of collapse—much closer than we seem to remember. Only through decisive action by the Government of the time, and by other overseas Governments, were we saved from a serious financial crisis that could have crippled the world.
When looking at a bunch of amendments like this, one might be tempted to say that the PRA’s general objective will look after us, and one should remember that its general objective is promoting the safety and soundness of PRA-authorised persons. However, if these amendments were to become a trade-off between the amendments and the PRA’s general objective, that would be a step too far in the safety of the banking structure. Accordingly, I hope that the Government will have listened to the suite of sensible ideas expressed today but judge it as an overall package of goods and bring forward some proposals that capture the best without endangering the banking system. My noble friend Lord Stevenson brought up the fact that individuals desperately need a safe and orderly form of low-cost credit, and that is equally true of SMEs.
Baroness Penn (Con)
My Lords, as has been set out, this grouping considers issues relating to competition and proportionate regulation in support of increased competition. Increasing competition in banking has been a priority for government under successive Prime Ministers; this can be traced back to the immediate period following the financial crisis and, indeed, the work of the Independent Commission on Banking and the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, of which I know noble Lords in this Committee were members.
Amendment 29 seeks to ensure that the FCA and PRA give due consideration to competition in exercising their duties and apply their rules and regulations proportionately to different-sized firms. It is important to note that the FCA and PRA are already required to consider competition as part of their statutory objectives. It was essential to put competition at the heart of the post-2007 financial crisis regulatory reforms. For the FCA, this is one of the three operational objectives and, for the PRA, it is a secondary objective—secondary to its safety and soundness objective. Since being given their competition objectives, both the FCA and PRA have taken significant actions to improve competition in UK financial services.
I shall give some examples. First, the new bank start-up unit was set up in 2016 as a joint initiative of the PRA and FCA to make the process of setting up a new bank in the UK more straightforward. Since it was launched, 20 new banks have been authorised, and the PRA continues to ensure that steps are taken to ensure that it is acting on its competition objective. For example, it consulted in summer 2020 on its approach to new and growing banks and, in November 2020, announced its intention to consider a more proportionate prudential regime for smaller banks, which promotes growth. Secondly, the FCA launched its regulatory sandbox in 2015, the first of its kind globally. This sandbox enables businesses to test innovative propositions with customers, improving the range of services and products available to UK customers. The FCA also recently launched a new digital sandbox to allow early stage firms access to data, which enables them further to develop their innovative ideas.
To give some more examples, the current account switch service, or CASS, was introduced in 2013 to allow customers easily to switch account provider when they see a better deal. As of September 2020, customers have switched over 6.8 million times using the service. The Payment Systems Regulator has been created to ensure fair and competitive access to central payment systems so that payment systems work in the interests of the businesses and customers that use them, and an SME credit data-sharing scheme has been introduced to make it easier for challenger banks and alternative finance providers to check the creditworthiness of businesses, improving their ability to lend to SMEs. I hope that reassures noble Lords that competition is already a key priority for this Government and is being properly considered by regulators.
Amendment 43, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, would remove existing capital requirements for banks with assets below £100 billion. As she has already explained, the intention of this amendment is to ensure that the rules on capital requirements for these smaller banks would be replaced by PRA rules with more proportionate requirements. The Government are committed to supporting more proportionate regulation for small and medium-sized banks and enhancing competition in financial services. The delegation of the relevant prudential requirements in this Bill will allow the PRA to introduce proportionality in its implementation, where appropriate.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
I have received no requests to speak after the Minister so I now call the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, I thank all those who have participated in what has turned out to be quite an interesting debate. It seems that most or all noble Lords have managed to put their fingers on one or two points. It would be useful if the regulators could look through this debate, and maybe the Government could also look through it a little bit more when we get offline.
The noble Lords, Lord Holmes, Lord Naseby, Lord Stevenson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, all linked together the fact that, post-Covid, changes will be going on. Younger people in particular are looking to bank in different ways; they want to use their local services. Although I listened to what the Minister said about this Bill enabling the PRA to act in more proportionate ways, I know for a fact that they can already do that but do not. So there needs to be a little bit more encouragement. To go back to my first amendment, if things were more transparent in terms of having a category and saying, “This is how it is for a bank of small or medium size, or mutual,” we would be able to see how that proportionality works. At the moment, we are told that it is there, or “You can’t do it because of the EU”, and that is simply not true. Let us take the example given by my noble friend Lady Kramer about the MREL. You do not have to have the MREL kicking in at such a level for the medium-sized banks; that was very much introduced as something for the larger and more systemic banks.
My plea is: look at what this is asking. My basic “have regards” provisions were asking for us to have something that shows us the categorisations, layers, tiers and the strata—whatever you want to call them—so that it is clear for everybody. As the Minister herself said, there can be lots of places where things are too complex; it is not just for MREL. That is exactly the point I was trying to address: you have to go across the whole suite of regulations and bring together what is relevant for the different categories, not have the smaller banks having to fight their way through and find out that there is no consistent set of proportionality requirements.
We have started an interesting conversation here; there may well be some point that it is worth us pursuing when we get to Report on categorisation as a “have regard”. I see nothing wrong with that: we are not telling the regulators what to do but asking them to have regard because we think there has not been enough of it already. I am interested in carrying that forward, but, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“Skilled person review of supervisory bodies
(1) At least once every five years, an independent skilled person review must be conducted of—(a) the Financial Conduct Authority and(b) the Prudential Regulation Authority.(2) The body set up to conduct the independent skilled person review must include a person nominated by resolutions of the House of Commons and House of Lords.(3) The independent skilled person review must include a review of— (a) internal operations and controls;(b) systems for responding to whistleblowers, Parliamentary correspondence and reports, and public concerns;(c) regulatory perimeters;(d) the effectiveness of relevant legislation and rules and the regulatory burden;(e) whether all statutory and public policy objectives have been met;(f) the operation and effectiveness of engagement practices before and during rule making;(g) the skills base of the Authority’s staff;(h) any other matter the skilled person considers relevant;(i) any other matter requested by a relevant Committee of the House of Commons or House of Lords.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment suggests a generalised review, not linked to specific fault or failure, of a kind that exists in other jurisdictions.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, I have already trailed the notion of regular independent reviews of regulators in an earlier amendment, but this amendment gives an opportunity to investigate it at greater depth.
In the Government’s consultation and in the context of the Bill, we are told that we are returning to basic FiSMA, getting rid of the statutory instrument layer containing EU-made legislation and going back to what was devised by the UK for the UK. However, it is worth noting that FiSMA never really stood alone, because the EU’s financial services action plan, laid out in 1999 and broadly completed by 2004, meant that the extensive consultation, public transparency and policy co-ordination of the EU was there and growing from the start of FiSMA and, by the time of the 2012 reforms, the EU’s rigorous regulatory and supervisory architecture was in place. Although those things were viewed as annoying by some—perhaps by many—in the UK, changes are now happening by going standalone, including loss of peer-reviewed rules and loss of peer-reviewed supervisory practices. That is especially problematic for the conduct and markets side, given the less developed international co-ordination.
After the financial crisis, the missing element of supervisory quality control was a primary driver behind the EU regulatory architecture reform, its absence being considered part of the reason for the financial crisis—a view much reinforced by the admissions of the FSA in the Turner report. Unwillingness of regulators to see the writing on the wall had certainly been a flaw in the UK. The fundamental gap of supervisory quality control has not been routinely addressed domestically; we just get reviews after failure happens. This gap will be more critically exposed in a standalone system where the regulators make all the detailed policy and all the rules as well as supervising.
Our immediate history, especially with regard to the FCA, is of repeated supervisory failures, already elaborated last week by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka—the latest being the Gloster report showing operational failures. In the news last week was the FCA being too slow on buy-to-let cars, and many more cases are bubbling on. In every case, warnings have been ignored. Private Eye often gives a good summary of what is going on, as do the broadsheets.
Viscount Trenchard (Con) [V]
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, makes a good case for introducing skilled person reviews of the regulators in addition to the parliamentary oversight arrangements that I hope will be agreed satisfactorily. This transfers the boot to the other foot; the difficulty would be in deciding who could be skilled enough to assess the regulators. Would the costs ultimately be borne by the regulated firms?
In the first three years after the introduction of skilled person reviews by the regulators in 2014, fees paid for skilled person reviews, generally confined to a number of issues on parts of a firm’s business, or only one, amounted to more than £500 million. The cost of a review may amount to several hundred thousand pounds. The real cost in terms of diverted management time, legal costs and remediation activities is often much greater than the simple cost.
It is interesting that only some 8% of skilled person reviews have led to enforcement actions, even though many reviews at the time of launch were feared by firms as likely precursors to enforcement. The number of skilled person reviews commissioned by the PRA and FCA increased from 44 in 2017-18 to 51—or nearly one a week—in 2018-19. I worry that regular reviews of the regulators would be very expensive, in terms of money and time. As my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe often suggests, is this not a clear example of a case where an impact assessment should be undertaken before introducing a statutory requirement? I look forward to the views of other noble Lords and the Minister on this matter.
Lord Desai (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I very much welcome the amendment. I have been a Member of your Lordships’ House for 30 years. Throughout that time we have had one crisis after another in the financial markets. I have the impression that most of the time they have been due to ignorance by top people of how the market is changing and of the new products and challenges. When I first got here in 1991 we had the Baring Brothers crisis. There was no doubt that the people sitting in London had no idea what a derivatives market was, and nor did the Bank of England. Nobody knew that Nick Leeson was operating on the Yokohama stock exchange. Public information was available, but nobody in London knew where it was. Therefore, they completely missed it. We also had the BCCI crisis, but that was a pure, untechnical fraud. That is another matter.
Most importantly, I remember debating the legislation that set up the FSA. At that time we thought the problem was that self-regulation had failed in various sectors, and that these sectors were interdependent, so we had to have an overarching framework. We set it all up, but it did not help when the crisis occurred in 2008. I remember reading the report by Adair Turner—now the noble Lord, Lord Turner. He said that they had been told by the experts not to disturb the markets and to trust them. We were very impressed by that and trusted the markets, but they were wrong.
Obviously, the interesting point is that by then the market had so many new products, with fairly sophisticated probability models behind them, that it would have been necessary for the regulators to be constantly aware of new developments in this field to be one step ahead of where the market was. I will give a slightly technical example. Adair Turner said that they were told that the markets were efficient, and therefore we should try not to correct what the markets were doing. We now know that the people who believed the market efficiency hypothesis and all that—and who convinced the world—were using very simple normal or bell-shaped distribution to model movements in the stock market. While normal distribution is very easy and frequently used, it is not suitable for every occasion in the market. What we call fat-tailed distribution would have been better and predicted the crisis much sooner. But this is a technical matter.
The regulator might not know what is happening out there in the financial, economics field. It ought to be informed periodically where the knowledge has got to and where the products are. This is not something where the skilled person can necessarily come from the banking sector of one country or another. We might have to find a skilled person who knows how rapidly the market is changing, how new products are being developed, and how the nature of uncertainty itself is changing.
I believe that the amendment is very welcome. I will add one more thing. When I first read the Bill I was appalled that so much weight is being put on the FCA. I really feel that the FCA is not up to the task. I hope that after all this legislation, the Treasury review and so on we might get a better FCA, but I have grave doubts. If we are to have the FCA as it is right now, we urgently need a skilled person review, maybe not every five years but more frequently than that.
The noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, referred to the cost. I can tell noble Lords that the cost of not doing this will be much more horrendous than the cost of doing it.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, having been a director of a regulated bank for most of the last decade and therefore on the receiving end of regulation, the idea of a skilled person review of the regulators is immensely attractive.
The concept of a skilled person review appears in FiSMA as one of the regulators’ tools to be used when investigating the organisations they regulate. It was not used a great deal by the FSA, but over recent years skilled person reviews have become the weapon of choice for the PRA and the FCA, as the statistics given by my noble friend Lord Trenchard bore out. They can be effective tools for the regulators to get to the bottom of issues in individual institutions, but they are also very expensive and usually incentivise the skilled person to extend the work into later stages and wider remits. They can also be highly contentious, especially when the selected “skilled person” turns out to be less skilled than is needed for the task.
If there are to be skilled person reviews of the regulators, one thing that should have been included in subsection (3) of the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, is the use by regulators of their powers under Section 166 of FiSMA and more generally the provisions under Part XI. That could usefully be added to the list of items she has set out in proposed new subsection (3).
I was concerned that “skilled person” is not defined in the amendment—it is in FiSMA, but not in a way that would read across to this amendment. There also seems to be some confusion over whether a skilled person is involved or a body set up for the purpose, as seems to be suggested in subsection (2).
More substantively, I do not believe that a person nominated by your Lordships’ House and the other place should have any part in the conduct of such a review. I am not suggesting that there are no Members of either House who would have the skill to contribute to such a review; rather, I do not believe that Parliament should get involved in carrying out a review. Parliament should concentrate on its outcome, not its execution. I am also concerned that such a review could end up being a political football, given that proposed new subsection (3)(i) allows Parliament to request the inclusion of any matter in the review. The amendment is also silent on whom any report is to be made to and how it would interface with Parliament and its processes; for example, whether it is to be laid before Parliament or considered in any particular way.
I am sure my noble friend the Minister will not accept this amendment. However, if he does not, I invite him to explain to the Committee how the Government are satisfied that the PRA and the FCA are effective and fit for purpose, as it is not obvious that they are. If they are not, this makes a bigger case for bringing in some mechanism for an external review of the regulators to inform Parliament’s understanding of how well they discharge their responsibilities.
Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted and Lady Kramer. I am delighted to support their suggestion for reform.
Last week, a number of proposals for arresting regulatory failures were put forward, each offering to help the regulator—what I call “acting as a guide dog for the watchdog”. This is another proposal which has considerable merit. It builds on the notion of an independent skilled person review, a practice that is already well established to some extent. However, in the details of the amendment, it differs from the conventional notion of a skilled person review in focusing on systemic factors rather than individual cases. These include matters relating to internal controls and operations, regulatory parameters, effectiveness, treatment of whistleblowers, public policy objectives and, more importantly, matters of public concern.
Although the amendment does not explicitly say so, I am sure that the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles and Lady Kramer, would not be opposed to the independent skilled person review being conducted by a panel of retired judges; that could be feasible. The review in any case should be in the open, take evidence on oath and require the production of key documents from producers, consumers, intermediaries and other key parties in the finance industry. The panel could travel to different parts of the UK to take evidence and report within a specified period, like the Australian royal commission that we heard about earlier.
The main aim of the inquiry would be to focus on systemic problems, get to the bottom of the recurring and unresolved scandals in the industry, enable consumers to share their experiences with the industry and its regulators, and facilitate the legislative changes needed to secure confidence in the industry. The proposed review would be a necessary step to bring about a much-needed change in organisational culture and a sense of personal responsibility and accountability in the regulatory bodies, as well as the industry.
The proposed review and its specified headings of “regulatory perimeters”, “public concerns” and “effectiveness of relevant legislation” can also focus on neglected and emerging issues. A good example of issues totally neglected in the Bill, and by the FCA and PRA, are those about the impact of shadow banking. The shadow banking sector is intertwined with retail and investment banks, insurance companies, pension funds and others, and any crisis there is bound to have a huge impact on the rest of the economy. The sector could be worth nearly $117 trillion, far bigger than the world’s GDP; it is lightly regulated, and normal prudential rules do not apply to it. I remind the Committee that the 2007-08 financial crash was triggered not by mass withdrawals of bank deposits by savers but by the inability of Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns, key players in the shadow banking system, to meet their contractual obligations arising out of speculative gambles. So there is an urgent need for an independent review; that is what we should be aiming for.
I want to reply to a couple of comments made earlier. The noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, referred to the issue of costs. As the noble Lord, Lord Desai, pointed out, the biggest cost is associated with the status quo, which has never been cost free. Over the months and years I have spoken to many victims of bank frauds who have lost their homes, businesses, savings, investments and pensions. All that any review panel or committee has to do is talk to them, and they will soon understand that there is a cost associated with the status quo.
The second point was the question of where on earth we would find these skilled persons. It is a sobering thought that it is not the skilled persons who told the world about any of the frauds or scandals. Journalists and ordinary people have been far more aware of what is wrong, and I am quite happy to trust their judgment to tell us what is wrong with the system, rather than having a very legalistic explanation.
I hope that in his response the Minister will now tell us how the Government have weighed up the evidence of systemic failures of the FCA and what assessment they have made of the impact of such failures on people’s lives. So far, Ministers have not supported any proposals for assisting the regulators or put forward any suggestions. Maybe the Government plan to appoint a royal commission or an independent public inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005, or something else. It would be very helpful to know whether the Government are content or not content with the current state of affairs in the finance industry.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)
I understand that the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, has withdrawn, so I now call the noble Lord, Lord Naseby.
Lord Naseby (Con) [V]
My Lords, I would like to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for the second time this afternoon for an interesting new clause. I have in the back of my mind the concluding words of the Minister of State, my noble friend Lord Agnew, when he introduced this Bill. Colleagues will remember that he said the Bill
“will support economic prosperity across the country, ensure financial stability, market integrity and consumer protection. It will ensure that the UK remains a world-class financial centre.”—[Official Report, 28/1/21; col. 1814.]
So we all know that the Bill is absolutely key. This particular amendment is about the enhanced role of the FCA and the PRA and, in particular, those who lead them. It means, frankly, that they are ever more powerful and important.
The amendment calls for a review after five years, although the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, made it clear that, according to her contacts in Australia, a shorter period would have been better. I am quite clear in my own mind that five years is far too long. A great many changes are happening all the time, and I am quite sure that the market will remain dynamic and there will be many opportunities; personally, I would suggest a period of three years. You could argue for two, and I understand why you might, but I think that three years is about right, because it is quite a challenge for those who are running these two organisations to be reviewed after two years, which in effect means 18 months.
Should it be just one person? No, it is far too big a challenge for just one person. I believe there should be a team of three, and it should be the responsibility of one of them to be the chairman of the review, with a casting vote if necessary. In my experience of 12 years on the Public Accounts Committee, quite often a small working group would be set up of just three of us to look at the spread and success or otherwise of our work, and it seems to me that that was a good test market. Secondly, I had the privilege of being chairman of a quoted investment trust for some 10 years on a fixed-term basis. We had a limited number of non-executives and we decided that there should be a review every two to three years of the strategy that the operational company was following.
I say to the noble Baroness: well done for putting this forward. In principle, it ought to find favour from Her Majesty’s Government, although I am sure that the review period should be shorter than five years.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, come another Monday, come another financial regulator story—this time in the Times. There are concerns that the FCA is going too slowly in its investigation of the Woodford scandal, to the point that Neil Woodford has felt confident about announcing plans to stage a comeback. It is just one story after another, and it very sadly makes the point. I think it is necessary to say that there are many—plenty—of good people at the FCA and the PRA, but clearly something is not working when we have regulatory scandal after regulatory scandal.
Financial services are notoriously difficult to police. The FCA is knee-deep in reviews that it has carried out after a failure, but the internal remedies that are promised every time perhaps help with the problem but do not seem to really cure it. Any financial services firm with a track record like the FCA would have been required by the regulator to bring in outside expertise to give an objective overview but then also to oversee change.
Lord Eatwell (Lab)
My Lords, one of the most important elements in this amendment is set out in the explanatory statement provided earlier by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, which says that the proposed general review is
“not linked to specific fault or failure”.
When we consider the history of the development of both international and domestic financial regulation, it has almost always been reactive: a model of crisis, then response. As a result, regulatory reform has typically been made in an atmosphere of crisis rather than an environment of thorough, calm consideration. So a periodic report by a skilled group might enable our regulatory system to get ahead of change in financial markets rather than persistently lag—and change, as we know, is persistent and indeed accelerating.
Another important factor that favours the proposals by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, is the extraordinary complacency evident in the documents issued with the Bill and in those issued so far that are associated with regulatory framework review. Organisations that in the past displayed a total lack of understanding of systemic risk in the markets they were supposed to be regulating should not resist external scrutiny and advice from well-informed parties; indeed, such external scrutiny would be in the national interest.
However—I am afraid I now come to that word—given the assurances of the Minister in summing up the debate we had on parliamentary scrutiny, I wonder whether we are at risk of creating too many committees and too many reviews. A well-resourced parliamentary scrutiny committee, which I trust the Minister has in mind, would recruit expert, experienced advisers to help them in the discharge of their responsibilities and would conduct periodic reviews. I must say that I was struck by the comment by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, that the buck stops with Parliament; indeed it does. I therefore suggest that it would be more fruitful for this Committee to concentrate on ensuring that well-resourced parliamentary scrutiny is indeed introduced, rather than taking the path suggested by the noble Baroness.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, this amendment would require an independent review of both the FCA and the PRA every five years, and it sets out a number of things that the review would have to cover. The FCA was created to ensure that relevant markets work well. In practice, that means regulating the conduct of firms to make sure that the financial services sector is serving the interests of individuals, businesses and the economy as a whole. It has a broad remit and is responsible for regulating nearly 60,000 firms.
I accept the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles: the recent investigations by Dame Elizabeth Gloster and Raj Parker have shown that the FCA does not always get this completely right. However, the FCA is wholly committed to learning from past mistakes. It is addressing the recommendations in both these reports and we can see that commitment being translated into action.
The FCA has set out how it will accelerate its ongoing process of reform, including through its transformation programme led by the new CEO, Nikhil Rathi. It has committed to provide public updates on progress every six months, and it is right that the Government and Parliament hold it to account on delivering these important changes. The FCA absolutely knows what it needs to do, and that it needs to do it under a spotlight, both from the Treasury and from Parliament.
That is one part of my answer to my noble friend Lady Noakes, who asked me how the Government assure themselves that the regulators are fit for purpose. But the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, spoke about the need for assurance and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, similarly, on the need for accountability. I reassure all three noble Baronesses that there already exist a number of mechanisms to hold regulators to account, both to Parliament to the Treasury. I believe that these existing mechanisms are sufficient to achieve the outcomes that this amendment is aiming at. I touched on some of these points in my previous remarks to this Committee, but I will attempt to provide a short summary here.
First of all, the regulators are required to produce annual reports and accounts, which are laid before Parliament by the Treasury and certified by the National Audit Office. The regulators are subject to full audit by the National Audit Office, and the NAO has the associated ability to launch value-for-money studies on the FCA and PRA. The FCA is subject to scrutiny via departmental Select Committee hearings, including the Public Accounts Committee and the Treasury Select Committee, which holds regular six-monthly meetings with the FCA CEO and Chair. The Treasury Select Committee scrutinises the appointments of the FCA Chair and CEO posts, and the Treasury has direct control over appointments to the FCA board and powers under the Financial Services Act 2012 to commission reviews and investigations.
The Treasury is also able to launch investigations under Section 77 of the Financial Services Act 2012 where it suspects there may have been regulatory failure. There are a number of informal mechanisms as well: there is nothing to prevent a Select Committee of either House launching inquiries, taking evidence on them, and reporting with recommendations; that is a decision for them. In speaking to Parliament about this Bill, both the PRA and FCA have stressed that they are committed to appropriate parliamentary scrutiny and will always respond to requests for engagement. Combined, these measures ensure that there is sufficient independent scrutiny of our regulators.
I am the first to agree that this is particularly important in light of Dame Elizabeth Gloster’s findings, but I reassure the Committee that, in addition to these measures, the Economic Secretary meets frequently with the FCA CEO to monitor progress on these critical reforms and ensure that the FCA remains focused on effectively delivering against its objectives. Of course, however, as we have discussed, the future regulatory framework review is considering the appropriate accountability mechanisms for the regulators, so this will provide an opportunity to consider these issues further. I hope that these remarks are helpful and sufficiently reassuring to the noble Baroness to enable her to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, I thank everybody who has spoken in what has turned out to be quite an interesting debate, the majority of whom have supported the general notion of my probing amendment, if not exactly all the specifics that I put into it, which perhaps tried to do too much. To clarify my intention, it was exactly as my noble friend Lady Kramer summarised: it was for a regular review that gave oversight to the regulator’s activities. As the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, said, the systemic factors also had oversight of that change.
I am sure that it is possible for this to come from other quarters. The Minister has suggested that it comes from the Treasury. Perhaps it could come from a parliamentary committee, although what I had in mind was not so much a body that solely took evidence but a few people who could get inside and examine procedures and find out how the operations worked.
Like others, I would like to clarify my concerns here. I know how difficult it is to be a regulator, especially to be the conduct and markets regulator, where things are less tangible than in some of the prudential regulation work, but it is about giving a helping hand. Although a lot of good thought and planning goes into how to address the problems that are exposed every time there is a review, if it is done from the inside, that is never the same as having eyes that come from outside. The thing about having an independent regulator is that, if you want independence, ultimately, the review should be independent. Having those reviews monitored through the Treasury is not necessarily the sort of independence that is satisfactory if you want to say that it is independent, and I question whether it is possible to do it through a parliamentary committee.
Baroness Noakes
“Continuity of contract
If the FCA exercises one or more of the powers under Article 23D of the Benchmarks Regulation in respect of a benchmark, any reference to or description of that benchmark in a contract, security or instrument must be, with effect from the date of such exercise, interpreted as a reference to or description of the benchmark as modified by the FCA under its powers under Article 23D.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would ensure that if the FCA revised a benchmark under Article 23D (inserted by Clause 15) there would be continuity of contract by replacing references to the earlier benchmark with the revised one.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 44 I shall speak to Amendment 45 in this group. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, and my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond for adding their names, especially as I had not expected to have any companions at all for these amendments, which are pretty technical and lack the sex appeal of some of the other groups of amendments.
These amendments concern what are known as tough legacy contracts in the context of the transition from Libor, which is expected to complete by the end of this year. The cessation of the use of Libor was first announced in 2017, and banks and other financial services firms have been working on transition since then. A principal focus for financial services firms has been on ensuring that new loans and other transactions do not reference Libor or, if they do, that there is legally watertight fallback language allowing the use of alternative rates once Libor is no longer available. This may sound easy, but I can assure the Committee that it has not been easy, and work is still ongoing. However, that is not the focus of these amendments, which are targeted at past contracts that reference Libor.
Despite considerable efforts, which will continue throughout this year, the industry has been clear from the outset that it is highly likely that there will be contracts at the end of 2021 which either have no fallback provisions or where the fallback provisions are effectively inoperable or would result in an uneconomic or unintended outcome. The regulators have been clear that the industry should solve this problem itself through bilateral or multilateral negotiations, and very considerable progress has been made. In particular, there is a revised ISDA protocol that will deal with the vast majority of derivative contracts. However, it is the case that not all contracts can be dealt with before the end of the year and possibly not at all, because there will be cases where there is no realistic means of proactive restructuring or where restructuring attempts fail.
The contracts in this legacy bucket are very varied. At one extreme, there are complex bonds which have multiple parties in many different jurisdictions, which range from hedge funds to Japanese retail investors. Getting agreement from all parties, which some bond documentation requires, is not feasible. At the other end of the spectrum are individual or SME borrowers who, for various reasons, such as default or dispute, may refuse to engage with the banks or lenders. The banks are particularly sensitised to the conduct issues that can arise if individuals or SMEs are unduly pressured to engage, especially in the context of the economic and health stresses of Covid-19.
The good news is that the regulators and the Treasury have accepted that there is a problem that needs to be solved, and this Bill contains some changes to the benchmarks regulation which will allow some legacy use of Libor, together with the ability for the FCA to set out how the benchmark is to be determined—the so-called “synthetic Libor”. These provisions have been widely welcomed by the financial services industry. However, the new provisions leave some legal loose ends, which I seek to address with my amendments.
Amendment 44 seeks to ensure that there is continuity of contract, so that any contracts transferred to synthetic Libor under the new provisions of the benchmark regulations are treated as if references to Libor were to the synthetic Libor. This is important, because a counterparty could well argue that the terms of the contract meant that, if Libor became unavailable, the contractual fallback provisions should be used instead of synthetic Libor. In the bond markets, I understand that this will in effect result in a floating rate bond becoming a fixed rate bond. In other commercial lending, the fallback will in many instances be some form of “cost of own funds”, the exact meaning of which is likely itself to be the subject of litigation. I understand that derivative contracts that cannot be restructured have no effective fallback language. I believe that a continuity of contract provision such as that provided in my Amendment 44 is essential to provide legal certainty for these situations.
Amendment 45 is a companion amendment, designed to give safe harbour from any legal claims. The opportunities for litigation could be significant, whether vexatious or not. In the retail and SME space there could even be a new opening for the dreadful claims management companies.
I should say that I claim no particular merit for the drafting of the amendments; I know that parliamentary counsel have their own ways of doing things, were the Government minded to accept the principle of these amendments. I have been assisted in the drafting by the International Capital Market Association and specialist City lawyers involved in its working groups. This has in turn drawn on the drafting of similar provisions by ARCC, the American Alternative Reference Rates Committee, for New York law. Given the international nature of some of the markets affected by tough legacy contracts, I believe the UK would be wise to act in a similar manner.
Since I tabled my amendments, the Treasury has issued a consultation paper on continuity of contract and safe harbour, which is a bit behind the pace but none the less very welcome. I know that the consultation period will run until 15 March; I hope my noble friend the Minister will update the Committee on how the Government now see this progressing.
The problems of continuity of contract and safe harbour cannot be dealt with by the FCA or the PRA because that is beyond their powers. The solution needs to reach beyond “supervised entities”, as it is not just banks and the like that need to be covered. The problems can be solved only by primary legislation. If we lose the opportunity of this Bill, I fail to see how the Government will be able to act, given that the deadline of the end of this year will be rushing up on us. Financial Services Bills are not an everyday occurrence —thank goodness—and it is important to understand how the Government will progress this important issue. I will be especially interested in my noble friend’s comments on how the Government see this. I beg to move.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to speak on this group; I declare my interests as set out in the register. It is an even greater pleasure to follow my noble friend Lady Noakes. She declared that she thought she would be a solitary performer on Amendments 44 and 45 because of their technical nature; they are certainly technical, but none the worse for it. They are absolutely necessary, as she set out. Almost irrespective of what happens beyond this point—much needs to happen—she has done a great service in throwing such a spotlight on this issue for everyone involved in this phase.
Like my noble friend, I was concerned about the seeming inoperability of many fallback positions in which various entities will find themselves. Like her, I ask my noble friend the Minister to look at that point. Similarly, can my noble friend the Minister say where the thinking is on synthetic Libor? Does she think that it is complete and that all reasonable eventualities have been considered within that construction? Alongside that, what representations has Her Majesty’s Treasury received, not least from the City and in relation to derivatives, which my noble friend Lady Noakes pointed out are a particularly sticky part of this issue?
On a previous group, my noble friend Lady Noakes described herself as a cynic—not a bit of it. She is certainly a healthy sceptic, and all the better for it.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, I am pleased to support the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, which, as she explained, was tabled before the benchmarks consultation was launched. I share her thoughts that something nevertheless has to be done quite quickly if there is to be an opportunity to ensure that one can look forward to stability of contracts, knowing that something will be done before the end of the year. Maybe we are again in the territory of Parliament giving a consultation response through the debate.
Switching from Libor reminds me just a little—it is complicated—of the problem that we had with gilts being indexed to RPI rather than CPI, when RPI was both wrong and not being maintained by the ONS. The Economic Affairs Committee covered this in a report; indeed, we were tempted by Mark Carney to try to get it sorted out. Though I paraphrase, I think the report’s message was to grasp the nettle. That is certainly where I stood. That is really what the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, is saying with the amendments: there needs to be continuity of contract. We do not want lots of litigation, so there needs to be a safe harbour. It makes one reflect on how wise some of the fallback positions possibly were, but we are where we are; in many instances, nobody really expected them to be activated. They are sometimes maybe not fair between the parties.
The explanations given already are very good. It would be useful to have something in the Bill. It might even be crafted in such a way that it could apply as the general precedent if one came across such circumstances again, heaven forbid. Benchmarks do change from time to time: one discovers that something is flawed, therefore one has to correct it. That should not disturb what could be made into something that can operate with continuity, certainty and without disadvantaging either side. I would therefore like the Government to take something up, if that is possible in the timeframe they have given themselves now that they have launched a consultation.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)
The next speaker is the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard.
I believe the noble Viscount is muted. Would he be kind enough to unmute?
Viscount Trenchard (Con) [V]
[Inaudible]—Amendment 45 in the names of my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Holmes of Richmond, and of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted. We are midway through the process of transitioning from the familiar Libor benchmarks, the replacements for which have become more necessary since banks’ funding patterns have changed following the financial crisis. My noble friend Lord Holmes already asked the Minister what he thinks about synthetic Libor. I would also be most interested to hear his reply on that.
The Investment Association welcomes the additional powers for the FCA in the Bill as it will be better able to manage the transition, which should help to mitigate the uncertainty for holders of derivative contracts. There is the additional uncertainty caused by the existence of only temporary equivalence between UK and EU benchmark regulations. It is to be hoped that the EU will soon adopt the European Council’s recommendation to extend the transitioning period for third-country benchmark administrators to the end of 2025.
My noble friend’s Amendments 44 and 45 would be helpful improvements to the Bill, by making it clear that changes to benchmarks made by the FCA will apply to contracts made under benchmarks being revised. Rightly, they offer a safe harbour protecting parties to such contracts from legal actions resulting from benchmark changes. It is encouraging, as I mentioned, that the Investment Association supports this part of the Bill and I welcome these powers being handed to the FCA. My noble friend’s amendments would improve and reduce the risks inherent in exercising these powers and I support them.
Lord Desai (Non-Afl)
My Lords, this is a technical matter and I have nothing to add to what was said by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. I am merely an academic but, when these things were going on, I wondered how people who swore by the free market could have had a cartel sitting in a little room, generating a rate of interest on which billions were based. Someday, somebody ought to explain to us how anybody could trust a cartel and hope that it will not be dishonest.
Lord Blackwell (Con) [V]
My Lords, I too support these amendments and welcome the fact that the Bill addresses these issues. While Libor may have been effective in the past, we all know that it was becoming an unviable way of setting rates and was subject to manipulation, in the way mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Desai. It is therefore important that the regulators have taken a firm line in moving us on from Libor to other benchmarks. But, as my noble friend Lady Noakes set out, in doing that, there are lots of problems with continuity of contracts. The legislation is necessary to help address those issues and ensure that partners in contracts move together to a new common contract based on a synthetic Libor.
We have to recognise that no substitute for Libor will have exactly the same characteristics. There is no perfect substitute. Most contracts will be based on SONIA, the sterling overnight index average rate, but getting SONIA terms that have the same characteristics over time is not perfect, so there will be winners and losers. That is one reason why it is important that, to give certainty, the legislation requires the regulator to ensure that synthetic Libor interest rates are taken in the contracts as substituting for Libor for both parties.
As my noble friend Lady Noakes set out, however, some parties will not accept that. They will take the change in the contract as the basis to believe, argue or litigate that the contract has been abrogated. Some parties will be out of the money in a contract and it will simply serve their convenience to choose this method to abrogate the contract. Safe harbour is therefore an important secondary requirement. If banks are following the requirement of the regulator to stop using Libor, and following its instructions in substituting synthetic Libor, they cannot then be subject to litigation from counterparties claiming that, by following the instructions of the regulator, they have abrogated their contracts. This is an important thing for those contracts, which could, in particularly vulnerable contracts, involve vast sums of money.
The Government have launched a consultation on this, but I do not think that is a reason not to legislate in the timescale of this Bill. The problem has been known about for many months—indeed, years—and has been discussed. I do not believe the Government need a consultation to understand that there is a problem or that it must be dealt with. During the passage of this Bill, if not in these amendments then in the Government’s amendments, it is important for this to be incorporated into the Bill. Otherwise, the uncertainty will go on far too long. Libor will come to an end and these issues will present themselves. This Bill is the opportunity to address them.
In taking this issue seriously, can my noble friend the Minister commit that the Government will bring back amendments, or accept these amendments, during the passage of this Bill through the House?
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I know we have to accept the safe harbour provisions in Amendment 45, but it would be slightly less galling if we had not had to drag the FCA kicking and screaming to investigate the Libor scandal. As noble Lords know, it was finally revealed after a series of American journalists published an investigation into Libor; it then took parliamentarians months to actually get the FCA to do anything about investigating. It first did so because, by that point, the Bank of England was involved in manipulating Libor as well, although, as I think I said in my Second Reading speech, it intervened to try to provide some element of financial stability for the more honourable purpose of disguising to the world how badly the banks had been hit by the 2008 crisis. However, all of them had been aware for years that Libor was being manipulated.
I say to the noble Lord, Lord Desai, that this was no secret cartel; traders were shouting their required Libor benchmarks—the ones that would assist their bonuses—openly across the trading floors of various banks. There was nothing secret in this. At the time, under the UK approach—which is that anything not forbidden is permitted; since there was nothing to say, you could not lie in contributing to a financial benchmark —it was apparently not a criminal act or fraud. I do not think it ever even invoked the senior managers regime which came in later, but many of the players who were deeply involved in all this were obviously still around. It is a real stain on London.
I accept the safe harbour, but one of the things that saddens me is that some of those who will be hardest hit by the transition are small companies. Loans with spreads over Libor were not restricted to large, sophisticated companies; those companies will manage to work their way through this and make sure, if they are moving to a particular benchmark or negotiating a contract with the financial organisation they are set up with, that they do not come out damaged. However, many small businesses are exceedingly worried and have no idea which way to turn—do they get shifted to a new benchmark or stay with synthetic Libor? I hate to say this, but I think the assumption will turn out to be justified that, whatever happens, the amount they will pay in interest will be ratcheted up compared to the interest they would have paid had Libor remained. I find it very hard to conceive of banks saying, “We will move you to Sonia and you will pay less than you would have”. I am afraid there will be rounding up involved in all this. I am not sure how we provide any kind of fairness and justice, but maybe the Minister can talk about that.
Lord Eatwell (Lab)
My Lords, the Libor scandal has precipitated a regulatory nightmare. How is the FCA to fulfil its statutory responsibility to ensure that markets function well when one of the foundation stones of those markets, the Libor benchmarks, are to be discontinued and replaced by untried underpinning?
The change in benchmarks is not only a problem for individual contracts, it is a systemic risk that the measures in the Bill do not—the FCA itself admits—entirely mitigate. To quote the FCA:
“Where parties to contracts referencing LIBOR cannot reach agreement on how those contracts would operate in the event of LIBOR’s cessation, discontinuation could cause uncertainty, litigation or loss of value because contracts no longer function as intended. If this problem affects large volumes of contracts it could pose risks to wider market integrity of contracts/financial instruments.”
The section in the Bill dealing with benchmarks attempts to limit the potential damage. The FCA describes one area of potential damage in these terms:
“This is to cater for a scenario where either a benchmark administrator informs the FCA of its intention to cease publication of a critical benchmark, or where contributors to the benchmark have notified the administrator of their intention to withdraw submissions to the benchmark before the relevant provisions in this Bill are commenced.”
Note that this is a plausible scenario in the FCA’s view.
How is it to be met? Among other measures there is the totally unrealistic proposal in Clause 9(3) that the FCA
“compel the administrator to continue publishing the benchmark”.
I cannot think of anything more likely to precipitate the systemic events that the FCA wishes to avoid. Then, remarkably, it amends Article 22(b) so that the FCA must provide
“a written notice stating that it considers that the benchmark is not representative of the market or economic reality that it is intended to measure or that the representativeness of the benchmark is at risk”.
What do we think that would do to the markets?
Despite the attempts in the Bill to deal with the cessation of the publication of a benchmark, there is, as the House of Commons Library notes suggest,
“risk of legal challenge and prolonged market uncertainty”.
That is the core of the problem that the Libor scandal has precipitated. I admit that the clauses in the Bill do their best to mitigate the risk, but even the authors of this section know that there is no entirely satisfactory solution. All they can do is cross their fingers and hope for the best.
The greatest risks are in retail markets: the ordinary family investor or, more pertinently, the ordinary family’s pension fund and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, said, small companies. They are the ones who are really at risk. There is nothing in this Bill to protect retail customers from that risk. When the Minister replies to this debate, perhaps she could reflect on the protection that should be provided for retail customers should the worst fears of the FCA be realised.
Amendment 44 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, seeks further to strengthen the defences against the plausible scenario by introducing continuity of contract when a benchmark is changed. This is an undoubtedly worthwhile addition to the armoury. It does not prevent adverse market reaction and loss of value—that problem remains—but at least continuity of contract will be there.
As I see it, Amendment 45 removes protection from the retail customer by preventing
“claim or cause … or liability in damages”.
This may well be unfortunate. The noble Baroness referred to claims companies. Pernicious though they may be, they were often the only recourse of the retail customer. As I understand it, the administrators of benchmarks could implement these changes themselves because powers that are given to them under Article 23D, where they are granted discretion, allow them to implement changes themselves, without concern for any consequent damages inflicted on holders of particular financial instruments. While I understand the thinking behind this safe harbour, I fear that it stands in stark contrast to the lack of protection for retail customers. Having read this section of the Bill carefully, I feel that the benchmark consultation is clearly necessary. The problems have not as yet been solved.
Baroness Penn (Con)
My Lords, as this debate has illustrated, when you hear about Libor it is hard not to think about the benchmark’s manipulation in the wake of the financial crisis. However, since then there has been substantial reform to the regulation of benchmarks and significant improvements have been made to the governance and controls around the submission and administration of Libor itself.
As a result of declining activity in the wholesale lending market that Libor seeks to measure, in 2015 the Financial Stability Board recommended a transition away from certain interest rate benchmarks including Libor to alternative rates based on active and liquid underlying markets. As Andrew Bailey remarked in his speech on Libor wind-down last summer,
“Public authorities and market participants … have … been working together to transition away from reliance on Libor for a number of years.”
It remains of the utmost importance that firms continue to prioritise the move away from the use of the Libor benchmark where possible. We need to reduce the number of contracts that refer to the Libor benchmark as much as possible before the agreement between the FCA and panel banks to continue submissions to Libor to facilitate this transition ends. For most Libor currencies, that is the end of this year.
However, it has been clear for some time that there will be certain tough legacy contracts that will not be able to transition away from Libor in time. In May 2020, the Working Group on Sterling Risk-Free Reference Rates highlighted the need for legislation to support these contracts. Without government intervention, parties to these contracts would be left without a means of determining contractual obligations when panel bank submissions cease, resulting in significant disruption.
Shortly after that, the Government announced their plans to give the FCA the powers to manage an orderly Libor wind-down through this Bill in a manner that protects consumers and market integrity. This includes legislation to deal with these tough legacy contracts. The UK was the first country to set out an appropriate regulatory framework to manage the wind-down of critical benchmarks, and this legislation has been very well received by industry.
My noble friend Lord Holmes and the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, asked about synthetic Libor. The proposed legislation does not prescribe what a synthetic benchmark might look like but allows the FCA flexibility and discretion as to what methodology change it might choose to impose. For example, the FCA could use this power to direct a change to Libor’s methodology so it is no longer reliant on panel bank submissions. The FCA has recently consulted the market on its proposed policy approach to using this power.
Turning to the amendments, Amendment 44 would require that where the FCA has used the powers given to it in this Bill to impose a change in the methodology of the benchmark, that new benchmark must be interpreted as the same benchmark in any contracts which reference the original benchmark. Amendment 45 seeks to reduce the scope for litigation where the FCA has exercised this power.
Since the introduction of this Bill, the Government have received representations from some key industry participants, highlighting a residual risk of disruption and potential litigation that they are concerned would remain even once the FCA has exercised its powers under this Bill. This risk is separate from the wider risks and impacts on markets that would materialise if the Government had not introduced legislation under this Bill, and it is this potential residual risk that these amendments seek to address. I appreciate noble Lords’ interest in this important issue and I reassure them that the Government are committed to looking at it and, if necessary, providing industry with any reassurance it needs. But I will now turn to the two fundamental reasons why we are unable to accept these amendments.
First, critical benchmarks such as Libor are widely used in a diverse range of products and contracts across the economy, so any action of the kind proposed in this amendment would affect a wide range of individuals and businesses. This must be taken into account before determining whether and how to act. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, have described, this would impact people outside the financial services industry.
Secondly, these amendments would intervene directly in private contracts, restricting the ability of contractual parties to seek legal redress were they to disagree with the imposition of synthetic Libor. I am sure that noble Lords agree that any such interference would need to be carefully considered and designed to be as narrow and targeted as possible while achieving the intended effect. It is therefore critical that the Government consider to the greatest extent reasonably possible the full range of Libor-referencing contracts and the impact any legal provisions, such as the ones proposed in these amendments, would have on parties to these contracts before deciding how to proceed on this issue.
For example, I am concerned that Amendment 45 would provide wide legal protection to parties using the revised benchmark against all forms of claim or causes of legal action associated with the exercise of the FCA’s Article 23D(2) power, as opposed to a more targeted form of legal protection. I have not yet been convinced that such a wide-ranging legal protection is appropriate, and it could have serious and significant unintended consequences.
For these reasons, the Treasury published a consultation specifically on this matter on 15 February, which is currently open for responses. This will allow us to properly consider these issues with the benefit of feedback from a broad range of Libor users. As the consultation is still open, I cannot say at this stage whether the responses provide evidence that a provision of this nature is necessary, or how such a provision should be structured, but I reassure noble Lords that the Government take this matter very seriously. Guided by the evidence gathered through this consultation, the Government will be well placed to decide if an intervention along the lines that these amendments intend is appropriate. I therefore ask that these amendments be withdrawn.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I start by thanking all noble Lords for taking part in this debate; I think all have supported my Amendment 44 on continuity of contract, and I think the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, expressed some concerns in relation to Amendment 45, which dealt with safe harbour.
It is worth re-emphasising a point made by my noble friend the Minister: we should not confuse what happened with the Libor manipulation scandal—which was dreadful and affected not just the London market but the New York and other markets—with the reasons for withdrawal of Libor. As my noble friend has said, these were much more technical reasons regarding the suitability, durability and stability of Libor as a benchmark going forward. It is a more technical issue than harking back to the fact that it had been manipulated prior to the very significant improvements in benchmark administration that came about as a result of the benchmarks regulation.
“32B Gibraltar-based persons: taxation reporting(1) A Gibraltar-based person carrying on an activity approved under Schedule 2A, or which has permission by virtue of relevant Gibraltar provision to carry on an activity, in the United Kingdom must, as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of each financial year, submit to the Treasury a statement in respect of that year of the gross profit made from carrying on that activity or, where it is carrying on more than one such activity, from carrying on each activity.(2) The report under section 32A must specify—(a) the number of Gibraltar-based persons who submitted a statement under subsection (1) in the reporting period concerned,(b) the number of persons referred to in paragraph (a) who, at any time in that reporting period, were also authorised persons on some other basis under section 31,(c) the total of the amounts of gross profit in each statement submitted under subsection (1) in that reporting period, and(d) the total of the amount of tax chargeable in the United Kingdom on the amounts specified under paragraph (c) and, where tax is chargeable on a different basis for different amounts, the amount chargeable on each basis.(3) The report under section 32A must include an analysis of the difference between the taxation regime in the United Kingdom on profits made from carrying on activities of the kind referred to in subsection (1) and the equivalent regime in Gibraltar.(4) The report under section 32A must, in the light of the analysis under subsection (3), include such recommendations as the Treasury considers appropriate for improving transparency in the processes in the United Kingdom, and in the processes in Gibraltar, for levying and collecting tax on activities of the kind referred to in subsection (1).(5) A failure to submit a statement under subsection (1), or a failure to submit a statement under that subsection which is complete and accurate, is to be treated as a breach of the general prohibition.(6) A reference to a relevant Gibraltar provision is to be read with section 23 of the Financial Services Act 2021.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would require any Gibraltar-based person carrying on activities in the UK to provide an annual statement to the Treasury of the profits it has made from those activities. The Treasury would then report to Parliament on the amount of tax chargeable on those profits and make any recommendations it thinks appropriate for improving transparency.
The Lord Bishop of St Albans
My Lords, Amendment 46, in my name and those of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, probes whether the reporting requirements on financial firms operating from Gibraltar in the UK market are sufficiently robust, and it questions whether we might find a way to make them more transparent. The Gibraltar authorisation regime continues the established practice of companies operating from Gibraltar in the UK, which is why it is important to review whether the UK taxpayer receives a fair deal from this arrangement. The Companies Act 2006 already mandates foreign companies to register and file accounts to Companies House, yet some Gibraltar-based companies with registered subsidiaries in the UK have successfully used this system to reduce their tax bill.
Transfer pricing plays a major role in switching money between jurisdictions so that the costs are burdened on the area with the highest tax rates, with the profits channelled to the areas with the lowest tax. This is of course a global issue that requires global tax co-operation, but that does not mean that where possible we as a nation should not take measures to remedy the situation where we can. Financial services are one of Gibraltar’s primary industries, which is why I have tabled the amendment. Ideally, through stricter and more thorough reporting standards between Gibraltar and the UK, these should apply to all sectors. For example, in the online services and gaming industry, transactions are often placed in the UK by customers but processed by servers in Gibraltar, a technicality that allows what in reality is taxable income in the UK to be taxed in Gibraltar.
If such practices are well documented among the online gambling sector, I do not doubt that they extend to the financial sector as well. Without public country-by-country reporting, identifying dubious transfer pricing will continue to remain difficult. However, that should not deter us from strengthening reporting between Gibraltar and the UK, particularly given our official links. Surely it simply cannot be right that some of the major UK gambling firms pay an actual corporation tax in the UK of between 3% and 13% by either headquartering or using subsidiaries based in Gibraltar. Incidentally, we only know this because the size of these firms has brought them under the scrutiny of journalists who have investigated them. Given the commonality of these methods among larger corporations, financial firms of the SME variety could, and possibly do, engage in similar methods.
The fact that companies have been able to rather openly reduce their corporation tax bill by incorporating some of their operations in Gibraltar calls into question the current mechanisms for the effective and proper exchange of information between the two jurisdictions in relation to profits subject to tax. During his evidence session, the Minister said that corporation tax rate was not a factor in relocation to Gibraltar. No doubt, the Mediterranean climate and lifestyle make it a very attractive place to reside. Indeed, I have thought of little else over the recent cold days. However, for the purposes of reducing your corporation tax bill, only a partial relocation is required. Furthermore, Gibraltar provides a unique service in the “non-resident company”, a simple and cheap offshore corporate tax entity that even the most cursory search online will see marketed as an international investment and tax-planning vehicle, with all the usual connotations that this implies.
I do not want the many good people of Gibraltar to confuse my concerns as an attack on their territory, but the continuation of access to UK financial markets by permitted Gibraltar-based persons without a review into the effectiveness of the information exchange and the transparency of reporting requirements between the two jurisdictions will leave open avenues and incentives for businesses to reduce their actual UK tax obligations through Gibraltar-based tax planning. I hope that the Minister will be able to reflect on some of these issues and perhaps help me understand what we can do to improve the situation because we might need to revisit this later on. I beg to move.
Lord Eatwell (Lab)
My Lords, the provisions in the Bill dealing with relations with Gibraltar raise a number of intriguing questions. The probing amendment in the names of my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe and myself is really seeking some answers. The Bill in effect creates a single financial market with Gibraltar, even to the extent of offering customers of Gibraltarian entities access to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. In doing so, it forges a single market with a different jurisdiction, a jurisdiction that includes a different regulatory authority and notably—as the wording of the amendment in the name of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans suggests—a fiscal jurisdiction that diverges significantly from that of the UK. I welcome the right reverend Prelate’s amendment.
When this country was a member of the European single market, there was, in essence, a single regulatory regime in the UK and Gibraltar, although the implementation of EU directives was not entirely uniform. In the Bill, the provisions on Gibraltar have been presented as a continuity measure. However, the UK’s new-found ability and declared intention to deviate from EU rules signals a substantial shift in our regulatory framework and potentially in its interplay with that of Gibraltar. The first part of Amendment 47 asks the Treasury to present in detail its assessment of how compatible the regulatory systems in the UK and Gibraltar actually are. It is important that people have confidence in the firms that will be allowed to operate in the UK. The Gibraltar authorisation regime, as it is called, being introduced by the Bill seeks alignment of law and practice in the UK and Gibraltar, but it does not prohibit Gibraltarian divergence.
I turn to the impact assessment. It is pointed out that the Gibraltarian authorisation regime will be established by a mix of primary legislation, secondary legislation, regulators’ rules, MOUs, policy statements and guidance. Given the unique nature of the creation of the single financial market, it is important that Parliament has the opportunity to assess this plethora of measures; hence the need for a Treasury statement in 12 months’ time.
It is further noted in the impact assessment that about 20% of motor insurance policies in the UK are written with Gibraltar-based insurers. When replying to the debate, will the Minister tell the Committee why he thinks that might be? What are the peculiar advantages of Gibraltar that have attracted such an extraordinarily high proportion of this UK business, and will those peculiar advantages continue as a result of the Bill?
At a time when the entire regulatory framework is under review, the Government might consider this to be the time to reassess the financial services relationships with the Crown dependencies as well. I am aware of the very different legal status of the Crown dependencies from that of Gibraltar and the fact that, given that the Crown dependencies were never members of the European Union, the UK’s exit does not pose the same range of new problems. However, the Minister will be aware that the financial services provided in the Crown dependencies are a vital part of the financial infrastructure of the UK, in particular with respect to the flow of liquidity into the London markets. Will the regulatory framework review cover the issue of the financial market relationships between the UK and the Crown dependencies? The regulatory framework review could take note, for example, of the fact that many regulatory practices in some Crown dependencies, such as the registration of beneficial ownership, are significantly superior to current practice in the UK. Given that the UK Government happily promote financial relations with Gibraltar, even though the Gibraltarian fiscal regime is significantly different from that in the UK, are they considering some enhancement of financial relationships with the Crown dependencies by, say, extending access to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme?
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, we have been making slow progress, so I will be brief. I rise to question the appropriateness of these amendments on Gibraltar and the Crown dependencies. I appreciate that the second amendment in the group, Amendment 47, tabled in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, is probing in nature and I look forward to the Minister’s reply.
Amendment 46 is extraordinary. It targets Gibraltar with new and additional requirements at a time when it is facing particular challenges following Brexit and with a new treaty with the European Union still under negotiation. It seems that there are three arguments against these proposals. First, Gibraltar is autonomous and has its own democratically elected Government, setting their own regulations and taxes. Secondly, reporting regimes on businesses and the individuals who run them are burdensome and costly, and divert management effort from serving customers and building for the future. Thirdly, in the case of Gibraltar we are talking about our good friends. Many British people love and support Gibraltar. Its Government is well led, as I know from taking evidence from the First Minister to the EU Committee of this House and visiting him and his Government with the committee. I know that they have demonstrated their commitment to meeting international standards on issues such as illicit finance, tax transparency and anti-money laundering. I do not believe that there is a case for making things more difficult for Gibraltar’s businesses or those involved with proposals of the kind in this group.
Lord Rooker (Lab) [V]
My Lords, unlike the noble Baroness, I consider both the amendments to be probing in nature. As I said at Second Reading, I have no expertise or knowledge. I visited Gibraltar privately on holiday in 1977 and 1979, both times quite deliberately to give support because at that time the border with Spain was closed. As I had talked to the Foreign Office beforehand, I had the opportunity to speak with the Governor and members of the Government and the then trade union leader who later became First Minister. The dockyards were winding down, but one thing those people told me they did not want was Gibraltar to be dependent on being a brass-plate economy, and in effect that is what we are talking about. The right reverend Prelate gave some good examples. Transparency is crucial. It is a global issue. Identification of what is going on is required. The gambling figures the right reverend Prelate gave are a concern. My noble friend Lord Eatwell gave the figure of 20% of UK motoring. It is not for no reason that the biggest single donor to the Brexit campaign for exiting the EU has his insurance companies working out of Gibraltar, so there must be some reason that you can make a lot of extra money working through Gibraltar than you can in the UK.
The danger is that if we leave it as it is and build on it, Gibraltar will become the UK’s state of Delaware, the backstreet way to money laundering and other issues. Frankly, the EU will not stand for it. The financial structures of the services of the EU will be working closely and looking in detail at what is happening following Brexit. They are not going to stand for, effectively, a state of Delaware that has been inserted into Europe by the UK. Therefore we have to find a better way of doing this. One way of dealing with it is by openness and transparency. As the right reverend Prelate said, this is in no way an attack on the people of Gibraltar or, indeed, on the structures of Gibraltar. I have always been a strong supporter of Gibraltar having the right to choose, and 96% of Gibraltarians voted not to leave the EU. It was right at the time we did it that we incorporated Gibraltar into one of European UK constituencies. It is different from the other overseas territories of the UK, and because it is different, we must not allow the undermining of the financial system, so we have to find a better way of dealing with it. I look forward to the Minister giving some assurance on this and perhaps explaining, in answer to my noble friend’s question, why such a large proportion of the UK motor insurance system is worked out of Gibraltar. What is the reason for that? It cannot be the sunshine. The only reason can be money and profit—profit where less tax is paid. That is the basic reason that we have these probing amendments today. I look forward to the Minister’s answer.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Rooker. What we might label in shorthand “the Delaware danger” is very real. It was my pleasure to attach my name, as has the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, to Amendment 46 in the name of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans. I also welcome Amendment 47 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord Eatwell. We heard from the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, a clear and welcome outline of the peculiarities of the Gibraltar authorisation regime and the reason why we need to hear a lot more from the Minister about the justification for it and an explanation for some of the peculiarities that the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, just outlined.
I do not regard Amendment 46 as a probing amendment; I suggest that it is a modest amendment for improvement. It builds on an amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, debated last week, which made broader country-by-country reporting proposals. Given that we have just seen the Government’s welcome incorporation into the Domestic Abuse Bill of a significant number of amendments proposed by noble Lords in that debate, we might hopefully see the same thing here before we get to the next stage of this Bill.
The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, suggested that this might be extraordinary, or be targeting Gibraltar in some way. As the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, outlined, we are incorporating it in a truly extraordinary way within our system, so it is surely important that we have full transparency about what is happening. The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, said that we should not make it more difficult for Gibraltarian businesses. Whether it is motor insurance or the gambling industry, we are not talking here about the issue for Gibraltarian businesses; we are talking about businesses operating and making their profits in the UK, which should be paying their tax in the UK. On the Tax Justice Network corporate tax haven index—what might be called the ranking of infamy—I note that Gibraltar is ranked 28 on a scale where number 1 is the worst. While it is not the worst, given that there are scores of tax havens around the world, it is pretty well right up there.
It is estimated by the Tax Justice Network that the tax loss that Gibraltarian arrangements inflict on other nations is about US$4 billion. I do not have a breakdown of figures of where those losses are inflicted but, given what we have heard about both the motor insurance and the gambling industries, it is clear that a very significant portion of them will be in the UK. We also have to think about the nature of those industries; the gambling industry, in particular, inflicts significant major damage on individuals and communities in the UK and I believe that even the Government are looking to tighten controls on it.
Certainly, Amendment 46 offers a modest measure towards transparency, honesty and openness. If that should mean that certain industries pay tax on their profits in the UK, I do not see how that could be opposed. I ask the Government to comment on that.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)
My Lords, I understand that the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, has withdrawn, so I now call the noble Lord, Lord Sikka.
Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I draw attention to my interests as set out in the register: I am an unpaid adviser to the Tax Justice Network. I strongly support Amendment 46 and congratulate the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans for providing the moral lead in securing tax justice and transparency.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, just pointed out, Gibraltar is one of the most secretive jurisdictions on this planet; indeed, it is among the top 30 most secretive, and inflicts tax losses on many nations including the UK. We all know that secrecy is an essential ingredient for tax avoidance and illicit financial flows. Over the years, Transparency International has reported that Gibraltar-based companies have been used to purchase properties in the UK, possibly with dirty money. Gibraltar has a population of around 33,000 but it has over 60,000 registered companies: that is, nearly two for every person living on the Rock. Many of these are just shell companies and little is really known about their authentic beneficial owners.
Gibraltar-based companies pop up in smuggling and bribery scandals all over the world. Unsurprisingly, a headline in the Guardian on 9 April 2017 said:
“Defend Gibraltar? Better Condemn it as a Dodgy Tax Haven”.
Little has changed. In February 2020, a report by the Council of Europe’s anti-money laundering body, MONEYVAL, called on Gibraltar to improve its efforts to combat, money-laundering and financing for terrorism.
The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans has already drawn attention to the tax haven aspects of Gibraltar. Unsurprisingly, many UK insurance and gambling companies are headquartered there because it is considerably more profitable to run UK operations from there by dodging UK taxes and increasing profit-related executive pay.
Research by TaxWatch shows that Gibraltar is indeed a hub for tax-avoidance: some 55% of the remote gambling services provided to UK-based customers are provided by companies based in Gibraltar. Most of the big companies, including William Hill, Ladbrokes and Bet365, have links to the Rock. Unibet’s website states that its servers are based in Malta, Alderney and Gibraltar and that it is registered and licensed in Gibraltar. The company is also listed on the New York Stock Exchange. This organisational maze provides opacity and tax avoidance and obfuscates accountability and the regulators’ ability to investigate.
William Hill has six subsidiaries in Gibraltar and is expected to pay around 12% in corporation tax for 2020, compared with the headline rate of just 19%. One of Ladbrokes Coral’s two licences to operate in the UK is registered in Gibraltar. On 9 August 2019, the Daily Mail reported that 32Red, which is based in Gibraltar,
“paid just £812,000 in corporation tax over ten years—an effective tax rate of just three per cent.”
The company is obviously not in Gibraltar just for the sunshine and the good climate. On 7 August 2020, the Daily Mail reported:
“Over the past two years, Bet 365 paid an effective tax rate of 12.7 percent on profits of £1.4 billion.”
Bet365’s accounts for the period 2015-19 show that the company’s corporation tax bill was £176 million lower because it has various operations in tax havens, including Gibraltar. Adjusting for inflation, Bet365 avoided around £182 million of UK corporation tax for the period 2015-19.
Ministers continue to tell us that companies should be taxed where sales and profits are made, but then we have this Bill, which will enable companies to book their profits in Gibraltar, even though they will have their sales and profits in the UK. The Government’s briefings on the Bill have not stated how much of the profits made in the UK are booked in Gibraltar and what the effect the Financial Services Bill will have on that.
The Government have a legal and moral duty for the good governance of Gibraltar and other jurisdictions to ensure that they do not continue to be what I call the world’s fiddle factories. Through this Bill, the Government are showering more gifts upon Gibraltar but without any quid pro quo; what exactly is it that we are getting in return? Can the Minister explain how these gifts aid tax justice in the UK? I strongly support Amendment 46 because it provides the basis for tax justice and transparency.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I will be very brief—this is not my area of expertise. I do not know if this is a required declaration, but my family have a small apartment in Andalusia; we do not rent it out, so there is no income involved—but it means that we have many neighbours who seem to run their financial affairs through Gibraltar, much to their general advantage.
Gibraltar suffers from a perception that it is something of a tax haven, and, indeed, most of the normal taxes that are levied in the UK or Spain are not levied there. However, I think we all feel great sympathy for Gibraltar; it has absolutely been caught in the Brexit conundrum and has seen many of its sources of income from the Navy and the military disappear over a number of years.
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Lord True) (Con)
My Lords, this has been a very interesting brief debate. I will not follow the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, into speculating about Delaware because I am acutely conscious that the new President of the United States represented Delaware in the US Senate for 36 years. However, I appreciate what my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe and indeed the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, said: I think that the people of Gibraltar merit sympathy and understanding.
Before I turn to the specific amendments tabled, it might be beneficial in the light of a number of the questions and comments to set out some of the intentions behind the introduction of the Gibraltar authorisation regime. As the right reverend Prelate said, the financial services industry plays an important role in Gibraltar’s economy, and Gibraltar-based firms have made extensive use of the existing market access arrangements between the UK and Gibraltar. It is true, as has been pointed out in this debate, that currently firms based in Gibraltar service a large retail consumer base in the United Kingdom, particularly in the insurance sector, where, as has been said, more than 20% of motor policies in the UK are written by Gibraltar-based insurers. The reasons for the concentration of motor insurance in Gibraltar are complex and obviously of a commercial nature, but it is natural that growth in a sector can lead to an agglomeration effect. Business attracts business, and that attracts people and talent.
I note the remarks that have been made in the debate on a range of companies. However, I remind noble Lords that the Bill is limited to financial services firms only. It will establish a new legal and institutional framework that provides for mutual market access and aligned standards in financial services between both jurisdictions. The United Kingdom and Gibraltar have a historic and unique relationship in financial services, and the UK has not had the same level of market access arrangements with any other jurisdiction. This regime will enable Gibraltar-based firms operating in the UK to continue to do so provided they meet certain standards. That way, the regime respects Gibraltar’s regulatory autonomy while ensuring high standards of supervision and consumer protection for UK customers.
On the amendments themselves, Amendment 46 would require any Gibraltar-based person carrying on authorised financial services activity in the UK to provide an annual statement to the Treasury of the profits it has made from those activities, and for the Treasury to report on this. This proposal cannot be supported by the Government because it does not reflect Gibraltar’s autonomy. As an overseas territory, Gibraltar is fiscally autonomous, and it has the right to set its own policy to support its economy within international standards and to determine its own tax rates. The scope of the GAR is focused on ensuring continued market access for Gibraltarian firms to the UK market based on the alignment of relevant law and practice. The GAR does not extend to taxation.
As my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe said, Gibraltar is already committed to meeting international standards on illicit finance, tax transparency and anti-money laundering, including those set by the OECD and the Financial Action Task Force. Gibraltar shares confidential information on company beneficial ownership and tax information with UK law enforcement bodies in real time and has agreed to introduce publicly accessible registers of company beneficial ownership. The Government were satisfied that the Gibraltar authorisation regime is rigorous and includes the right safeguards to ensure consistent standards of law and supervisory practice. I therefore ask that the amendment is withdrawn.
Amendment 47, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord Eatwell, would require the Treasury to report on the regime, the current position regarding financial services market access enjoyed by the Crown dependencies and the case for extending the regime to the Crown dependencies. I suggest to noble Lords that the first part of this amendment would replicate provisions that already exist in the Bill. Clause 22(3) of the Bill, which inserts a new Section 32A into the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, already imposes a duty on HM Treasury to lay a report to Parliament on the operation of the regime. This report will be presented to both Houses within two years of the regime coming into force, and every two years from then on. It will specifically include an assessment of whether the alignment condition between the UK and Gibraltar is satisfied before market access is granted for an approved activity.
Noble Lords have alluded to the frequency of reporting. It has been chosen considering a range of relevant factors, including the length of time required to undertake a meaningful assessment. In this context, the amendment would simply duplicate this requirement within 12 months of the Bill receiving Royal Assent, potentially demanding a statement before this is appropriate and before any assessment has been completed.
Turning to the second point raised in this amendment, it is important to note—and the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, acknowledged this—that no other overseas territory or Crown dependency has the same market access arrangements with the UK as Gibraltar has today. The Gibraltar authorisation regime has been designed to deliver the Government’s commitment to Gibraltar in 2018 to maintain long-term market access for financial services between our jurisdictions, based on shared high standards of regulation and modern arrangements for information-sharing, transparency and co-operation. This commitment and the framework reflect the unique historic position of Gibraltar and the UK, specifically the passporting arrangements that were in place when we were both members of the EU single market, as has been said.
In our judgment, it would not be appropriate to extend the operation of the regime to other jurisdictions that do not have the same starting point of close alignment between our rules and supervisory practice. The Treasury remains committed to working with the Crown dependencies, and there are existing tools, including equivalence, that enable different degrees of access to the UK market and are more appropriate for the circumstances of the Crown dependencies. Having considered those points, I therefore ask noble Lords not to press this amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)
I have not received a request from anyone wishing to speak after the Minister, so I call the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans.
The Lord Bishop of St Albans
My Lords, I am most grateful to the Minister for the points that he has made. I too want to underline my support for Gibraltar. In this new post-Brexit world, I want us as a nation and our neighbouring countries, as well as Gibraltar, to flourish. However, we are also in a time of huge financial stringency, and there are very important issues here about tax justice. As so often when I sit in a debate in your Lordships’ House, I find myself realising that I am in a seminar and learning far more than I am giving. I am grateful to my noble colleagues and friends here for some of their explanations.
I am still unclear how the GAR will be reciprocated in terms of why we are giving these extraordinary benefits. I need time to go away and think about what the Minister has said. I certainly still look at the situation with puzzlement. I was struck by the comment by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, that there are two registered companies for every citizen on the Rock. It sounds as if there are some extraordinary benefits which to some of us do not look to be reciprocated justly.
I will probably return to this on Report, but in the light of the comments and some of the limitations of the amendment as it is currently drawn up, I beg leave to withdraw it.
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
My Lords, this may be a convenient moment for the Committee to adjourn.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)
The Committee stands adjourned, but in so doing I remind everyone to sanitise desks and everything else within sight.
Financial Services Bill
Wednesday 3rd March 2021
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Financial Services Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 162-V Fifth marshalled list for Grand Committee - (3 Mar 2021)
Lord Eatwell
“Review of penalties for insider dealing and financial services offences
(1) Within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Treasury must commission a review of penalties for insider dealing and financial services offences (“market abuse”).(2) The review under subsection (1) must include statistics relating to—(a) the perceived level of market abuse,(b) the number of arrests for market abuse, and(c) the number of successful convictions for market abusein each of the last five financial years.(3) The review under subsection (1) must also contain a summary of steps being taken by Her Majesty’s Government to ensure market abuse offences are identified and punished. (4) Within one month of the review under subsection (1) being completed, the Treasury must—(a) lay the document before both Houses of Parliament, and(b) make a statement responding to the review, including a declaration of whether and how the Treasury will act to—(i) increase the resources available to those charged with investigating market abuse,(ii) modernise and reform the United Kingdom’s suspicious activity reporting regime, and(iii) ensure greater consistency in the intensity of supervision across different parts of the financial services sector.(5) After the requirements under subsection (4) have been met, the Treasury may by regulations enact such reforms of market abuse provisions that are identified in the review.(6) Regulations under this section are subject to the affirmative procedure.”Member’s explanatory statement
This probing amendment seeks to understand what steps the Government is taking to improve identification and punishment of market abuse. It asks for the Treasury to outline proposals for enacting recommendations from a 2018 evaluation by the Financial Action Task Force, the global money laundering and terrorist financing watchdog.
Lord Eatwell (Lab)
My Lords, we now come to the section of the Bill that introduces measures to deter financial crime, whether insider dealing or money laundering. None of us in this Grand Committee can be content with this country’s attempts to limit financial crime. Headlines that cry that London is the “money laundering capital of the world” may embody journalistic exaggeration, but, sadly, they are not that exaggerated.
I will first speak to Amendment 50 in my name and then turn to Amendment 49 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, and myself. I admit that Amendment 50 is constructed in a rather peculiar way, and I am grateful to the clerks for that ingenuity and for allowing me to make what I believe to be an important point concerning money laundering legislation.
The measures in Clause 31, to which Amendment 50 refers, derive from the EU fifth money laundering directive and the UK response to the examination of UK anti-money laundering measures by the Financial Action Task Force. An important outcome of the FATF examination was Her Majesty’s Government at last announcing measures to deal with the scandal of Companies House.
One of the political puzzles of the past 10 years is that Conservative Prime Ministers have regularly referred to the register maintained by Companies House as a gold standard, a beacon of openness and an example to the rest of the world. In fact, the manner in which the register is constructed is the key element in those headlines that describe London as the money laundering capital of the world.
The scandal derives from the fact that Companies House does not verify the beneficial ownership of companies registered there. Companies House is a library in which any shameful book can be deposited. There are so many shameful books that have been deposited, and that is a matter of record. Just to take a couple of the more colourful examples, the Mafia managed to set up one UK firm with a director named as Ottavio Il Ladro di Galline—Ottavio the chicken thief. His occupation was listed in Companies House as truffatore—fraudster. Another company had an address that translated as “Street of the 40 Thieves”. At the moment, the Companies House register includes almost 4.5 million UK businesses, but it operates in much the same way as it did 150 years ago. That means that criminals have been able to set up seemingly legitimate shell companies without even the most basic identity checks.
Consider the case of Mr Kevin Brewer. A few years ago, he launched a campaign to expose how easy it is to fake British company records. He decided in 2013 to register government Ministers, including Vince Cable—the then Business Secretary—and the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, as the directors and shareholders of fictitious companies. The idea was to prove how anyone could form a company in the UK in any name or address that they wished. He used an online service offered by—you guessed it—Companies House. He then owned up. As a result, he was prosecuted by Companies House and fined £12,000. The Government issued a triumphant press release, which is still available on the government website, headlined:
“UK’s ‘first ever’ successful prosecution for false company information”.
It is the only prosecution in 150 years.
A study published by Transparency International in November reported that British shell companies were implicated in nearly £80 billion of money laundering scandals. On top of that, the anti-corruption group Global Witness reported in 2019 that more than 336,000 companies did not disclose their beneficial owner. It also found that more than 2,000 company owners were actually disqualified directors—people who had previously failed to meet their legal responsibilities and were banned from directorships in the future. A further study by, among others, my colleague, Professor Sharman of Cambridge University, found that it was impossible to establish a shell company in the Cayman Islands, the Bahamas or Jersey but it was easy to do it in London.
It should be clear that an open register, as we have in the UK, is no protection against financial crooks. Protection is provided only by verification and regular reverification of beneficial ownership by skilled forensic accountants. At last, in September of last year, under continuing pressure from the Financial Action Task Force, the Government published a document entitled Corporate Transparency and Register Reform. The Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, wrote in his foreword to the document that Companies House procedures, or lack of them, resulted in,
“Shell companies … set up for no other purpose than to launder the proceeds of crime – committed both here and overseas.”
The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, recommended verification of company data. However, the document contained an ominous sentence:
“This document sets out the actions the Government intends to take in response, subject to funding being agreed”.
Amendment 50 would simply require the Government to keep Parliament up to date with what is happening. After all, this is the biggest money laundering scandal to which the UK has been subject. When will this country acquire an honest register? How much funding has been agreed? Is it enough? When will the entire Companies House register—the whole register—be fully verified? I hope that the Minister will be able to tell the Grand Committee that initial funding has already been agreed, that future funding will be forthcoming and, to ensure that the momentum is sustained, that the Government will be happy to accept this amendment and report regularly to Parliament on the progress towards a fully verified register of beneficial ownership. The Government owe that to everyone who has been betrayed by the lax approach to money laundering.
I now turn to Amendment 49, which takes a wider perspective, seeking a thorough review of Her Majesty’s Government’s efforts to limit insider trading and market abuse, so providing a firm foundation for the measures outlined in Clauses 29 and 30 of the Bill. The rationale for such a review can be stated in brief as this: what is the point of Clause 30; what is the point of increasing the penalties if there are almost no convictions? Hundreds are prosecuted every year for fiddling a few quid from social security; you can count the annual number of prosecutions for crimes in high finance on the fingers of one hand. Consider this comment, published in the Financial Times on 3 November 2019:
“The FCA has previously been accused of taking a light touch approach to white collar crime. A freedom of information request showed the regulator prosecuted just eight cases of insider dealing, securing 12 convictions, between 2013 and 2018.”
There were 12 convictions in five years.
It is not as if there is no financial crime about. Consider this further story, published in the Financial Times on 10 September last year:
“Britain’s financial regulator”—
the FCA—
“is still working on a high volume of investigations into potential wrongdoing by firms and individuals, but delivering a relatively low proportion of clear outcomes at an increasing cost, according to new data.”
The Financial Times continues:
“the Financial Conduct Authority’s annual report provided details of its enforcement actions in the year to March 31 2020, and showed 185 cases were concluded in that period, leaving another 646 ongoing. In the previous year, 189 cases had been closed, leaving 647 open. However, despite this persistently high caseload, only 15 investigations resulted in financial penalties being handed down in the latest 2019-20 period — down on the 16 cases that led to fines in the two previous years.”
So what is going wrong? An important clue is to be found in the section of the 2018 report of the Financial Action Task Force dealing with the substance of UK measures to deal with money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The report states that, with respect to the UK Financial Intelligence Unit, which is the financial division of the National Crime Agency:
“The UK has pursued a deliberate policy decision to limit the role of the UKFIU in undertaking operational and strategic analysis. The UKFIU suffers from a lack of available resources (human and IT) and analytical capability which is a serious concern considering similar issues were raised over a decade ago in the UK’s previous FATF mutual evaluation. The limited role of the UKFIU calls into question the quality of financial intelligence available to investigators.”
Is it not the case that the surest way to deter criminal behaviour is to increase the likelihood that the criminal will be caught? I ask again: what is the point of increasing sentences while, at the same time, reducing the capacity to catch the criminals? When the Minister replies to this debate, will she explain why:
“The UK has pursued a deliberate … decision to limit the role of the UKFIU in undertaking operational and strategic analysis”?
Surely now is the time for a thorough investigation into the Government’s persistent failure to prosecute crime in our financial services industry. Accepting Amendment 49 will be a start. I beg to move.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to speak on day four of proceedings in Committee on the Financial Services Bill. In doing so, I declare my interests as set out in the register.
I want to speak to Amendment 51, standing in my name. The purpose of this new clause can be simply stated: what is the purpose of the KYC—“know your customer”—requirements? It is one of the top TLAs—three-letter acronyms—in financial services, but is it fit for purpose? Does it achieve what we would want? Does it feel modern in outlook? Does it feel inclusive? It not only goes to the heart of a number of other amendments in this group; it really is a key underpin, and the adoption of this amendment would transform our KYC system and approach in this country. We have to ask those questions: what do want KYC for; what does it need to contain; when do we need it, and in what form?
Amendment 51 seeks, on passage of the Bill, a review of KYC requirements that considers a number of elements in order to seek to transform our approach to KYC. My first point concerns the question of inclusion, and I draw this broadly. Whom do we want to come within, in what form and through what means? For example, asking for paper documentation seems not only outmoded but somewhat exclusionary. Where is the level of efficiency in the current provisions? We have the ability to have “atomic settlement”. The current KYC feels a million miles away from a settlement in a millionth of a second. My final point addresses exactly that question of outdatedness. We have one of the greatest financial services sectors in the world. The big bang in the 1980s revolutionised the City of London, but it goes much beyond that when we consider our role in fintech, not just in London but across the UK, and the Kalifa review on that very subject, published only last week. We are leading-edge in so many ways when it comes to our financial services. KYC in no sense reflects, represents or leads that technological position.
If this amendment were to be seriously considered, if not adopted, we could look at different means of ensuring KYC. We could look at attributes and elements that would assist and give real-time assurance, giving elements to those who need them—things which operate absolutely in real time and are to be relied on, rather than bits of paper, bits of supposed identification, which hark not from a 20th-century but a 15th-century approach to identification. That brings me, finally, to the whole question of digital-distributed ID, which I will speak on later in Committee. That goes to the heart of so much of solving the KYC puzzle. If we could deliver an effective and efficient distributed ID system for individuals and corporate entities, we would transform the position regarding KYC.
I look forward to hearing the comments of my noble friend the Minister on Amendment 51.
Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I speak to Amendment 51A, which invites the Government to reduce the number of anti-money laundering supervisors so that we can have consistent application of standards and effective regulators.
Dirty money is a huge danger to every country on this planet. The full extent of dirty money sloshing around in the UK is not known, although some authorities estimate that around £100 billion a year may be laundered through our banking and financial system. Transparency International’s report, Hiding in Plain Sight, examined 52 cases of global corruption and noted that despite a plethora of form-filling and regulators, some 766 UK-registered business entities were involved in laundering stolen money.
The threat of money laundering to national security is well documented in the Intelligence and Security Committee’s July 2020 report, Russia, which stated that
“the arrival of Russian money resulted in a growth industry of enablers—individuals and organisations who manage and lobby for the Russian elite in the UK. Lawyers, accountants, estate agents and PR professionals have played a role, wittingly or unwittingly, in the extension of Russian influence, which is often linked to promoting the nefarious interests of the Russian state.”
Large sums of dirty money cannot be moved or concealed without the active involvement of accountants, lawyers, and financial experts. These enablers must be tackled, and without effective regulation that is not possible.
However, the UK’s fragmented regulatory system for dealing with money laundering is highly deficient. There are 25 anti-money-laundering supervisors. These include the Financial Conduct Authority, HMRC, the Gambling Commission and 22 other bodies, mainly trade associations connected with accountancy, audit, bookkeeping and legal and notarial services. The list of 22 includes bodies such as the Association of Accounting Technicians, the Association of International Accountants, the Institute of Certified Bookkeepers, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, the Law Society and sundry other trade associations. Having twenty-five supervisors results in duplication, waste, inefficiency, poor co-ordination, inconsistency and obfuscation.
In September 2016, the Committee on Standards in Public Life, in its report, Striking the Balance: Upholding the Seven Principles of Public Life in Regulation, stated that the seven principles of public life apply to all regulatory bodies, and the Government agreed. These include independence and public accountability, but for some reason the Government do not apply these principles to anti-money laundering supervisors. Accountancy and law trade associations have no independence from their members. In any regulatory system, there is a concern that regulators would be captured by those who are to be regulated, but that is the starting point in AML supervision by trade associations.
In October 2011, the Government announced that they would make quangos more democratically accountable, but they have failed on that front too. Of the 25 AML supervisors, 22 are not subject to the freedom of information law, even though they are an explicit arm of the state. Perhaps the Minister will be able to explain this anomaly. Their exclusion from FOI means that the public have no opportunity to scrutinise their practices.
The Government’s faith in regulation by trade associations is routinely punctured by the Government’s own reports. In October 2017, a joint report by the Treasury and the Home Office, entitled National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 2017, summed up key risks around the accountancy sector:
“complicit accountancy professionals facilitating money laundering; collusion with other parts of the regulated sector; coerced professionals targeted by criminals; creation of structures and vehicles that enable money laundering; provision of false accounts; failure to identify suspicion and submit SARs; and mixed standards of regulatory compliance with relatively low barriers to entry for some parts of the sector.”
The report went on:
“Accountancy services have also been exploited to provide a veneer of legitimacy to falsified accounts or documents used to conceal the source of funds. For example, law enforcement agencies have observed accountants reviewing and signing off accounts for businesses engaged in criminality, thereby facilitating the laundering of the proceeds. In many cases accounts have been falsified by criminals and unwittingly signed off by accountants, while in others accountants have been assessed to be complicit”.
That is the state of money laundering and the world of accounting.
However, rather than consolidating the number of regulators and thereby securing consistent application of standards and law, in January 2018 the Government created a new body called the Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision, better known by the acronym OPBAS. At considerable cost, it became a “supervisor of the supervisors” and oversees the 22 trade associations. The formation of OPBAS is an acknowledgement that all was not well with the regulatory role of trade associations.
A year later, on 12 March 2019, the OPBAS director of specialist supervision said:
“the accountancy sector and many smaller professional bodies focus more on representing their members rather than robustly supervising standards. Partly because they don’t believe – or don’t want to believe – that there is any money laundering in their sector. Partly because they believe that their memberships will walk if they come under scrutiny.”
The OPBAS Director went on:
“We found that some did not fully understand their role as an anti-money laundering supervisor. 23% had no form of supervision. 18% had not even identified who they needed to supervise. Over 90% hadn’t fully developed a risk based approach and had not collected all the data they needed to form a view about their riskiest members and their services. Supervision was often under resourced – and in some cases, there were no resources.
We found that for many supervision wasn’t important. It was only an add-on. This means it often wasn’t on the agenda and for around half, there was insufficient senior management focus. For 20%, it wasn’t overseen by the governing bodies. In some of the professional bodies, where supervision had been outsourced to another provider, there was minimal oversight of the work being done.”
The director also said:
“We also found that in all but 2 professional bodies, processes for handling whistleblowing were inadequate. We found that 56% of professional body supervisors had no whistleblowing policy in place at the time of our assessments.”
There you have it—a powerful indictment of the folly of relying upon trade associations for regulatory purposes. They do not want to be robust regulators because of the concern that “their memberships will walk”.
Lord Garnier (Con) [V]
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friends and other noble Lords who signed Amendments 81, 82 and 83, which, with Amendment 84, take our debate in a slightly different direction from the other amendments in this group. I also thank my noble friend Lady Penn and the Economic Secretary, John Glen, for meeting me last week to discuss my amendments and for his letter received at 11 am. As can be seen from the names of those noble Lords who signed these amendments, they are driven not by party-political motives but by a desire to make the law of corporate criminal responsibility fit for the modern age.
Reform of this aspect of the criminal law is overdue. The Government accept that. I will raise the salience of this question and remind this Government, as I reminded their predecessors, that the current state of the law does not take account of modern company practice. The difference between us in substance is not that there should be reform but what sort of reform and when. I am glad to have this opportunity to explain my concerns and I apologise in advance to noble Lords if, in speaking for too long, I try the patience of the Grand Committee.
This is not the first time that I have tried to encourage reform of corporate criminal liability. I was persuaded more than 10 years ago when studying American law that the way we deal with corporate criminal liability is outdated. I was then trying to work out how best to introduce deferred prosecution agreements, or DPAs, into this jurisdiction—they were enacted via the Crime and Courts Act 2013—and I became convinced that, in an era of large, international companies with hundreds of thousands of employees, with main, local and regional boards in many different geographical locations and with turnovers sometimes larger than the GDPs of some small countries, what had worked in the 19th century was no longer suitable in the 21st.
A company, although a separate legal personality, is an artificial construct and can commit a criminal offence that requires, for example, proof of dishonesty only through the agency of a human. In 1915, the then Lord Chancellor, Viscount Haldane, giving judgment in the case of Lennard’s Carrying Co., said that a corporation is
“an abstraction. It has no mind of its own any more than it has a body of its own”.
Our law required a human directing mind and will to fill that vacancy. Equally, whereas a human being convicted of bribery can be sent to prison, a company cannot.
At present our law requires prosecutors to satisfy the identification principle, which essentially asks whether a person can be identified as the directing mind and will of the company and is thus capable of fixing the company with criminal liability for the act or omission of that identified individual. The difficulty in satisfying the identification principle has led to cases where only individuals, but not their employers, have been charged. A recent example is the phone-hacking scandal. Another example of the difficulties caused by the identification principle were the cases involving Barclays Bank and some of its senior staff in 2018.
One hundred and fifty years ago, companies were mostly small concerns that traded locally. Of course, many businesses were not incorporated at all, but there were exceptions to that general rule. As British maritime power and commercial reach became increasingly global during the 18th century, and developed yet further through the 19th century, company structures became more sophisticated. Financial services, be it in banking, capital raising or insurance in the City of London, kept pace to enable these advances. That said, leaving aside mechanical advances, a milling business of 1900 was not all that different from a milling business of 1800; had the managing director of that milling company bribed someone in the late Victorian age, it would not have been difficult to determine whether he could be identified as the directing mind and will of the company so as to fix it with criminal liability for the corruption, in addition to any that attached to the director.
Although the identification principle received its then-highest judicial approval in the Lennard’s Carrying Co. case in 1915, that principle had been developed during the 19th century, when most English companies were run by fewer than half a dozen people. It is now plainly an inhibiting factor when prosecutors are considering cases involving large, complex companies with international and country boards, operating around the world. In 1912, the US courts recognised that the identification principle was not suitable in a modern industrial economy, whereas three years later our highest court affirmed it. It is time that we caught up.
Since 1912, an American company can be liable for a criminal offence committed by an employee in the course of his employment for the benefit of the company. The offence may also benefit the employee, but if it benefits the company it, too, is criminally liable. It is the criminal law equivalent of the concept of vicarious liability that we have in English civil law. It is not complicated but, plainly, each case of suspected corporate offending will be highly fact specific. I would like to have that system here, but it is not going to happen. I therefore look to the failure to prevent model, not least because it is now well established in our own criminal law.
In 2011, US federal prosecutors told me that they greatly admired the failure to prevent bribery offence in Section 7 of the Bribery Act 2010. They said that the United Kingdom led the world in countering corporate crime because of that new offence. More recently, the Criminal Finances Act 2017 introduced a corporate offence of failure to prevent facilitation of tax evasion. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, may talk about that in support of her Amendment 84.
In the case of Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass in 1971, Lord Reid held that, in order for liability to attach to the actions of a person, it must be the case that
“the person who acts is not speaking or acting for the company. He is acting as the company and his mind which directs his acts is the mind of the company … If it is a guilty mind then that guilt is the guilt of the company.”
That case turned on whether a store manager who broke the Trade Descriptions Act was the directing mind and will of the company. He plainly was not, but Lord Reid’s words are relied on in pretty well every case where a company is charged with an offence because of what an employee is alleged to have done. As Lord Justice Davis said in the 2018 Barclays Bank case, large modern companies are complex organisations not so that they can avoid criminal responsibility but to facilitate their business operations. They cannot be expected to have a detailed knowledge of what every manager throughout the world is doing, or to be held criminally liable for everything that they do. I agree.
That will not happen under these amendments but, under the current directing mind and will test, corporations involved in wrongdoing face little prospect of prosecution. As a result, corporate compliance procedures in the UK could slip. One of the reasons why Section 7 was introduced into the Bribery Act was to improve corporate behaviour. It has had an important preventive effect. When companies face little consequence for failing to maintain procedures to prevent financial crime, the business case for putting resources into implementing these procedures becomes harder to make.
If the failure to prevent regime were to be introduced for other economic crimes, such as those in my amendments, the impact on corporate standards would be significant because it would focus companies’ attention on having the right measures in place to prevent the commission of these crimes. It would also help us to maintain our reputation for the highest standards of business integrity, as we refocus our attention on building trade links around the world and on a future outside the EU.
The failure to prevent offence carries strict liability for a commercial organisation: a bribe paid anywhere in the world by an “associated person” with the intention of benefiting the company will cause it to commit an offence, and the only defence is that it had in place “adequate procedures” to prevent bribery. An “associated person” is defined under the Bribery Act as a “person who performs services” for or on behalf of the organisation; this may include employees, subsidiaries and agents. This was intended to embrace the whole range of persons connected to an organisation that might be capable of committing bribery on its behalf. It may include joint venture partners or entities, depending on the circumstances.
Under the law as it is now, companies can be prosecuted for not having in place systems to prevent a predictable crime here or abroad. This approach has proved effective. There have been prosecutions under Sections 1 and 7 of the Bribery Act, but Section 7 has been used to greatest effect in deferred prosecution agreements. I declare my interest as a barrister in private practice who has acted for both the Serious Fraud Office and companies accused of offences under the Act, but my experience of cases where companies have failed to prevent bribery by their associates tells me that the Act is not just necessary but works both to catch and deter corporate criminal conduct. I suggest that it would work as well with the offences in these amendments.
On proper analysis, my amendments are not a radical departure from the current state of the law but a small extension of it. Government and Parliament created the failure to prevent regime a decade ago. I am doing no more than increasing its ambit beyond bribery and tax offences to a few more financial and economic crimes. My amendments are limited to the UK financial system.
Amendment 81 says that a “relevant body”—in essence, a commercial organisation—commits an offence if a person associated with it commits an “economic criminal offence” in the course of using or providing financial services
“that might affect the integrity of the UK financial system.”
The expressions “relevant body” and
“the integrity of the UK financial system”
have the same meanings as in the Criminal Finances Act 2017 and the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. For the purposes of this amendment, an economic criminal offence is defined by a list in paragraphs (a) to (g) of subsection (2) and includes, for example, conspiracy to defraud, theft and false accounting. As in the Bribery Act, there is a reasonable prevention procedures defence. “Reasonable” does not mean “perfect” so it is not a meaningless defence.
Amendment 82, which also has the same reasonable prevention procedures defence, defines an economic criminal offence as any of the approximately 50 offences
“listed in Part 2 of Schedule 17 to the Crime and Courts Act 2013”.
Those are offences that can be the subject of a DPA. Again, there is nothing radical there. Amendment 83 is in similar terms to Amendments 81 and 82, save that it relates to the failure to prevent a “criminal financial offence”, which is defined by the same list in the Crime and Courts Act used in Amendment 82 and a similar, but not identical, list of offences to that in Amendment 81. There is, again, a reasonable prevention procedures defence.
Clearly, we need laws that will make a real difference and deter crime. The approach taken in the Bribery Act and the Criminal Finances Act has proved its worth. Surely, it is now time to extend the tried-and-tested failure to prevent regime to the offences referred to in these amendments. Of course, I expect that they will be met by departments from the “Ministry of Paperclips” through to the “Department of Circumlocution”, as non-government amendments often are, with much sucking of teeth and earnest furrowing of brows. We have all heard the reasons why an amendment cannot be accepted, be it its drafting, its being in the wrong Bill, its public expenditure implications or its timing—and anyway, the Law Commission is about to look at this aspect of the law. I promise noble Lords that I wrote those words before I received the Economic Secretary’s letter this morning.
All Governments suffer from an aversion to ideas that they did not invent. That is not a criticism directed at my noble friend the Minister, I assure her, but of course this is an idea invented not by me but by government. Gordon Brown’s Labour Government introduced the Bribery Act, and David Cameron’s coalition Government took it on and ensured that it received Royal Assent. It had all-party support. Theresa May’s Government brought in the Criminal Finances Act 2017, to widespread acclaim. These amendments obediently follow those statutes. If the Financial Services Bill is not the right Bill for these financial offences, what on earth is? Surely, the Treasury can make a good case for adding these provisions, on financial and economic crime connected to financial services, to the Financial Services Bill. They will not cost money but, like DPAs, enhance our national economic reputation and, in the right case, see large fines flow into the Treasury.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, I remind the Committee of my interests as in the register. I have two amendments in this group, one on facilitation of financial crime, which is also signed by the noble Lords, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Rooker, and my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, and a second amendment relating to whistleblowers.
There is much else of merit in this group. In particular I support the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, concerning catching, and willing the means and money to catch, perpetrators of financial crime. While I have hounded the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, on this issue, I do see the point of pressing the Treasury on funding.
My amendment on the facilitation of financial crime is also about the Treasury willing the means. It is similar to the amendment tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. We are not in competition; there are more noble Lords wishing to show interest in this topic than can fit on a single amendment. Unfortunately, we did not get to this amendment on Monday and my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford is unable to speak today. He was deeply engaged in the Bribery Act provisions, so his contribution will be missed.
In addition to the measures outlined by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, my amendment, Amendment 84, has a final paragraph that deals expressly with the conviction of a director or other manager who is proved to be responsible for the systems failure of the corporate body. A facilitation or failure to prevent amendment has a particular resonance in this Bill for two reasons: first, because the FCA has a specific remit to prevent the use of the financial system in financial crime; and secondly, because the Treasury, the sponsor of this Bill, has already availed itself of the mechanism with regard to tax evasion. As a believer in the mechanism, it seems appropriate for Treasury to avail itself of it again in relation to the financial system.
The tightening up of corporate systems against bribery following the Bribery Act is well documented, and what better way is there to enhance the reputation of the UK’s financial system at the point when it must protect and enhance its credibility than forcing similar tightening against financial crime? We already know well the reason for needing such offences. It is the old-fashioned way that criminal law works. Having to establish a directing mind is increasingly impossible given the complex board structures of large firms. Indeed, the principle of requiring a directing mind encourages what has been called “organised irresponsibility” by Pinto and Evans in Corporate Criminal Liability.
I know there is some reluctance in the Ministry of Justice, which sat on its hands for ages after its call for evidence on corporate liability, to which I made a submission, and then said there is no new evidence. That was really a bit rich, given that the call for evidence background document itself gave a good exposition of how bad matters are and of many of the reasons why evidence of failures in prosecutions is relatively scant. That is exactly why there is no new evidence—because prosecutors know they cannot succeed against large companies and give up.
Nevertheless, the issue has been sent off to the Law Commission, which has already said in its 2010 paper, Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts, that
“the identification doctrine can make it impossibly difficult for prosecutors to find companies guilty of some … crimes, especially large companies”.
In its 2019 paper on suspicious activity reports, it said:
“The identification doctrine can provide an incentive for companies to operate with devolved structures in order to protect directors and senior management from liability.”
The current common law “directing mind” principle is also unfairly discriminating to small businesses. The Crown Prosecution Service’s legal guidance, under “Further Evidential Considerations”, states:
“The smaller the corporation, the more likely it will be that guilty knowledge can be attributed to the controlling officer and therefore to the company itself.”
Given the general guidance for prosecution that there must be a “realistic prospect of conviction”, it is no wonder that prosecution evidence is scant and statistics show a preponderance of prosecutions against small companies. In its response to the MoJ call for evidence, the SFO said:
“In its current form, the law relating to corporate misconduct is both unjust and unfair and in need of urgent reform.”
Note the use of “urgent”, not “kick down the road”.
It is time for the Treasury to be less selfish and to help those other than the Revenue who are defrauded by expanding the use of this mechanism beyond tax collection, and to catch those threatening the integrity of the financial system by using it to commit financial crime.
My whilstleblower amendment suggests that regulators be obliged to give evidence when it is relevant to a whistleblower seeking redress in an employment tribunal. I have tabled it to probe the present state of play, which I understand is that they do not give evidence, indeed decline to do so, even when the whistleblowing has been important and valuable to them. This gives entirely the wrong message and looks like the regulators again being too cosy with the companies they regulate. If they are too frightened to be seen to disturb that cosiness, perhaps it should be made mandatory so that they cannot shy away.
The second part of the amendment suggests making it a behaviour that is not fit and proper for a person in authority to seek to identify, dismiss or penalise a whistleblower. We all know the case of Barclays CEO Jes Staley trying to identify a whistleblower and being let off with a fine that was insignificant for him, while the industry had thought it was an action bad enough to merit removal under the new senior managers regime. The net consequence is that the senior managers regime has been undermined and the regulator has again shown its fear of regulating behaviour in large banks. It would be interesting to know what special pleading went on to achieve that result. Was the PRA involved, rather like its special pleading to US regulators on HSBC? Was the Treasury involved? Whether it was or not, it was certainly a disaster. It is now time to make amends and show that the balance of protection lies with the whistleblower and not with bank executives.
The Lord Bishop of St Albans [V]
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 136, which is in my name. I tabled the amendment because of concerns about the lower levels of responsibility placed on appointed representatives and the increased risk of poor financial advice that this poses.
The objective of the senior managers and certification regime to influence an individual’s behaviour by making them personally accountable to the regulator is one that I agree with and it was the correct response to the culture that had arisen in the City of London prior to the financial crash in 2008. I know that some Members of this House have criticised the application of the senior managers and certification regime, or lack of it, by the FCA, and I agree that it is worrying. However, I do not want to comment on the effectiveness of the SMCR but to remedy an anomaly that exists within the current framework.
The SMCR currently applies to directly regulated financial advisers, yet it does not extend to those who are appointed representatives. This anomaly means that, while a directly regulated adviser carries a personal responsibility for the quality of the advice they provide to their customer, no such responsibility is incumbent upon the adviser who is an appointed representative. This is despite the reality that a customer seeking financial advice is unlikely to know the difference between the two types of adviser and the possible effects that this might have on the quality of the advice they receive.
The requirements of the SMCR mean that a directly regulated adviser faces higher costs and carries greater personal responsibility for their actions than they would if they were an appointed representative, despite doing the same job. I want to be clear that this is not to say that those advisers who are appointed fail to provide sound advice. As with most instances of malpractice within the financial advisory sector, the activity of a minority will, by virtue of their actions, tarnish the reputations of the majority of diligent advisers—whether directly regulated or appointed representatives. However, it is self-evident that lower levels of regulatory responsibility increase the risk of poor advice.
This amendment corrects that anomaly by giving the FCA the power to extend the SMCR requirements and responsibilities to appointed representatives. Currently, an appointed representative is regulated through a principal firm which carries the relevant responsibilities and is directly regulated by the FCA. Transferring responsibility from the principal firm to the appointed representative extends the current framework to this overlooked anomaly and places responsibility on the appointed representative. Rather than adding an additional regulatory burden on to the principal firms, this change would be to their benefit. Extending the SMCR to appointed representatives and making them personally responsible for their actions will significantly reduce the principal firm’s own regulatory risk.
Furthermore, it will reduce the risk of poor or reckless advice being given to consumers within the appointed representative regime and level the playing field between directly regulated advisers and those who are operating as appointed representatives. This amendment would remove the distinction—largely invisible to customers—in the regulations that oversee directly regulated advisers and appointed representatives and increase regulatory confidence in the diligence of financial advice given by all advisers.
From my conversations with individuals within the financial services, it is understood that the current regulator—the FCA—would welcome the ability to extend the SMCR to appointed representatives but currently lacks the power to do so. Although I obviously cannot speak for the FCA on this matter, or on the validity of the conversations I have had, similarly I have no reason to doubt the sincerity of its comments or concerns about the increased risk that the current anomaly poses.
This amendment would be a small but positive change to the Financial Services Bill by ensuring that robust and responsible regulation applies to all those who provide consumers with financial advice. Extending the SMCR to appointed representatives would directly benefit customers, by ensuring that all advisers have a personal responsibility for the advice provided, level the playing field between all financial advisers and reduce the risk to the customers and the relevant principal firms.
Finally—I have to confess that I am not quite sure of the proper process here—I had hoped to explore the possibility of tabling an amendment for this stage that would mandate the providers of deposit or credit accounts to provide voluntary debit card and credit gambling blockers. Unfortunately, I have simply not been able to get it ready for Committee, and I apologise for that, but I would be glad to speak with the authorities and the Minister on this amendment that I hope to bring later on.
Baroness Altmann (Con) [V]
My Lords, I apologise for the inadvertent interruption to the Committee’s proceedings on Monday. I declare my interests, as shown in the register.
I have sympathy with the intentions of all the amendments in this group. I have added my name to Amendment 51, in the name of my noble friend Lord Holmes. I also support Amendment 84, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. I have added my name to Amendments 82 and 83 in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier. All these amendments relate to confidence in our financial system, whether of customers using financial services or of corporates—both domestic and overseas—engaging with British firms in our financial services sector. Both of these are important.
In his introduction to Amendment 51, my noble friend Lord Holmes clearly explained the need for a review of the “know your customer” regulations, and I agree with him. That, hopefully, could help to improve customers’ confidence in the suitability of products sold to them. One example would be the sale of annuities by firms without having previously asked what state of health the customer was in and whether the annuity they were being quoted was at all suitable for them. Another would be credit companies extending credit without necessarily knowing the credit position of the customer. I do hope that the Government may agree to a review, whether in the context of the Bill or not.
Amendments 82 and 83, so comprehensively and expertly spoken to by my noble and learned friend Lord Garner, would strengthen corporate criminal law to ensure that companies do not profit from criminal acts committed by their employees. These companies need to have much stronger reasons and incentives to ensure that crimes are avoided, rather than blind eyes being turned, so that we have a zero-tolerance approach for corporates. These amendments, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, supported by the noble Lords, Lord Rooker and Lord Faulks, demonstrate this. A change to corporate practice is long overdue, so that senior managers in financial services firms will themselves change their procedures to try to prevent employees committing financial crimes and will install adequate processes to demonstrate that they have taken this issue seriously. I am grateful to my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier for raising this issue.
The pre-emptive nature of financial services processes that can avoid problems needs to be encouraged. These amendments could do this and would be a welcome addition to our financial landscape. All too often, firms and, indeed, regulators, seem to be taken by surprise when offences occur and then have to react to them, rather than doing more to prevent the wrongdoing occurring in the first place. I hope that my noble friend the Minister will consider these amendments sympathetically and that the Government will accept them or bring forward their own version. They would be a useful addition to this legislation. I will now mute myself.
Lord Rooker (Lab) [V]
My Lords, this has been a fascinating debate on a fascinating part of the Bill. I know that progress has been slow in Committee and I certainly do not intend to speak for too long. In fact, most of what I was going to say has been covered. I will make a few comments in support of Amendment 84, but first, I point out that I certainly support the speeches of my noble friends Lord Eatwell and Lord Sikka. My noble friend Lord Eatwell made the point about the history of dealing with this in Companies House. I remember reading about Kevin Brewer.
I also remember the remarkable speech in, I think, September 2015 in Singapore by David Cameron when he was Prime Minister; it foreshadowed a lot of change in this area regarding access to beneficial ownership, which seems to have been buried. It was absolutely solid, but obviously it was not supported by those who followed him. It is certainly worth looking back on.
The other issue is the reluctance regarding the financial intelligence unit. It is almost the same as the Home Office’s reluctance to institute an inquest when we had the murder by polonium in London. We had an inquest in that case only after the family had been to court. The Home Office’s defence for having no inquest was the effect on international relations. The reluctance to operate on money laundering is exactly the same. I am sure that the Minister will not admit that—he probably has not been given the evidence for it—but the suspicion has to be that the effect on international relations is slowing matters down.
My noble friend Lord Sikka made the point on his Amendment 51A, which I much support, about the trade bodies and the anti-money laundering organisations. It is exactly the same in property transactions. I remember a Bill from a couple of years ago, when a dozen or more organisations were involved in checking money laundering property transactions and they were all trade bodies. Trade bodies will not operate that way. They exist only because of income from their members. It is exactly the same situation. Now we have regulation in secret. That is the real danger: it is regulation in secret by bodies that cannot be checked on.
Amendment 84 was admirably spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, so I do not intend to go over the detail, but I will add a few points based on the briefing I received before Second Reading from Spotlight on Corruption, which was incredibly helpful. As has been said, bribery and tax evasion are already on the statute book in terms of failing to prevent crime, so what is the difference in including false accounting, fraud and money laundering? By the way, I might say something about the Chancellor’s very last point in his Budget, about free ports. I read the report yesterday from UK in a Changing Europe. The scope for money laundering via free ports is enormous. That will certainly have to be added to the list.
The amendment would widen the scope of the existing statute book: this is not reinventing the wheel. It is supported by the Treasury Select Committee and the prosecutors. In the consultation that took place—I know that it was some ago—it was supported by more than 70% of those who responded. The list of examples given by Spotlight on Corruption of companies that could not be prosecuted or brought to book for corporate wrong- doing in recent times—whether it was Serco, Olympus or Barclays—is enormous. I do not see why they should be allowed to get away it, but there are gaps in the law.
I am not an avid reader, but it is always worthwhile reading the manifestos of the various parties. I do not read too many of my party, by the way, but the 2015 Tory manifesto made this commitment, which resulted in the consultation. But the consultation closed three and a half years ago. It has just been one delay after another. It shows a lack of commitment and a lack of drive from the top. If the drive from the top is there, things happen in government—that is the key that I picked up during my 12 years.
The key benefit of the amendment is greater fairness for how large and small companies are held to account. It is dead easy. The small companies are the ones that are gone after by the prosecutors: they are low-hanging fruit and it is easy. That can make the numbers look good, but it is not fair.
Of course, bringing the UK into line with international standards of corporate crime is where we come up against our friends in the European Union. This is a situation where UK companies operating in the European Union are going to operate to a higher standard than they do at home. It is preposterous. It is going to make the UK top of the list for those who want to engage in money laundering. It puts the UK’s reputation in tatters.
The charge that my noble friend Lord Eatwell made about London being the money-laundering capital is true. There are so many different allegations and they are tied up with the operation of many of our blue-chip accountancy firms and blue-chip corporate lawyers and legal firms, because these actions cannot take place without the acquiescence of these home-based enablers.
My final point is the obvious one. The amendment would bring these offences into line with bribery and tax evasion. Why leave a big gap? Bribery and tax evasion can and do involve money laundering and fraud on a grand scale. It is absolutely inconsistent to have different models operating for different economic crimes, where the crimes are linked. I look forward to listening to the Minister get out of this one.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, and I very much agree with his view on freeports. These are entirely the wrong direction of travel, opening up the UK even further to corruption and fraud. I also agree with him about the need to help small companies. They face an extremely un-level playing field of heavy enforcement, while they do not have the same options—happily—for tax dodging, fraud and corruption as the large ones have and, all too often, exercise.
I commend the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, for his hugely powerful speech. I will use social media to ensure that it gets as wide a circulation as possible. I offer the Green group’s support for Amendments 49 and 50. I disagree with the words of the noble Lord on only one point. He asks what is going wrong. I would say that this is not a failure of design; it is not things going wrong from intention. This is what our financial sector has been designed to do and has refined its practices for over centuries. We have been robbing the world blind for centuries.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, this is a large group of amendments and I shall not comment on all of them. I had not intended to speak about Amendment 51A, to which the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, spoke a while ago, but the way in which he framed his comments has prompted me to do so. The noble Lord persistently used the term “trade associations” to describe the professional bodies that are involved in supervisory activities in relation to money laundering. I declare an interest as a member, and former president, of the largest of the professional bodies to which he referred, namely the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales.
The ICAEW does act as a regulatory body for its members in relation to money laundering, as it does in relation to other activities, but its members carry out as professionals. This activity is overseen by an independent regulatory board, which is chaired by a QC and has lay members on it. I fear that the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, has not presented the whole story on this—perhaps he did not know it; those who listened to his contribution ought to be aware that it is not the whole picture by any means.
My noble and learned friend Lord Garnier made a strong case for his new offence of failing to prevent an economic crime. He will know that there is considerable concern about the practical impacts of such an offence on the commercial world and that there was only a small majority in favour of a new offence when the Government consulted on it. I have no idea what is in the Economic Secretary’s letter, to which he referred, but I believe that the Government made a wise decision last year in referring the matter to the Law Commission for further study. We should await its findings. I understand that it is due to report by the end of this year; that is not a huge delay for something that could have significant consequences for a large part of the commercial world.
I support the idea behind Amendment 51 in the name of my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond, namely a review of the “know your customer” regulations. All noble Lords taking part in this Committee are PEPs—politically exposed persons—and I am sure that we have all bumped up against the ludicrous way in which some banks and other financial institutions act under the guise of their customer due diligence obligations. Looking again at this whole territory is definitely worth while.
Further, the UK’s money laundering rules were made in the EU. Now that we have left it, we have the opportunity to see whether the money laundering directives and regulations now embedded in our law are fit for purpose. The UK must remain committed to high standards in the fight against financial crime, but looking at the efficiency and effectiveness of the rules is entirely consistent with maintaining high standards.
The KYC rules are just one part of the money laundering rule set, and I would urge any review to go beyond KYC and look at the whole range of rules. For example, the SARs regime for suspicious activity reports is very burdensome for all involved, both the firms that make the reports and the regulators that receive them. In addition, there are restrictions on banks’ ability to communicate with each other about customers or potential customers, which increases costs and certainly reduces effectiveness. So, I urge my noble friend Lord Holmes to be even more ambitious in the review that he seeks.
Lastly, Amendment 96 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, seeks the establishment of a financial services whistleblower office. I wonder whether she has taken account of the changes made by the regulators to whistleblowing arrangements in regulated firms. Since early 2016, firms have had to have a nominated non-executive director as a whistleblowers champion—not responsible for whistleblowing but, effectively, for its oversight. Most firms align that specific required responsibility with the responsibilities of the audit committee chairman. In addition, the whistleblowing rules themselves were overhauled at the same time. I have not yet heard the noble Baroness speak to her amendment but I wonder whether the evidence base that she relied on as a background to her amendments pre-dates those new arrangements, and whether it would be wise to review how well the new arrangements are working in practice before creating yet another quango.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)
My Lords, I have put my name to Amendment 84, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, so I am afraid I am going to disappoint my noble friend Lady Noakes. We are normally on the same side but I am afraid that, on this issue, we are not. Perhaps I can turn away her wrath somewhat by saying that I much supported her views on Amendment 51A, which is a worthy amendment but does not go nearly far enough. We need to look at the whole regime; looking at one part of it is not sufficient, a point I was trying to make on an amendment we debated on the first day in Committee.
Like my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, and to the Economic Secretary to the Treasury for their briefing and correspondence. I apologise that the briefing was cut short for me because I had a power cut. My computer therefore went down, but I am grateful for the letter that was received earlier today.
The issue of failure to prevent has been pretty widely forked over in the speeches on this group, so I want to make two pretty quick points. The first flows from my membership of the Committee in your Lordships’ House which undertook the post-legislative scrutiny of the Bribery Act. We reported in March 2019 and our report found that the Act was:
“an excellent piece of legislation which creates offences which are clear and all-embracing.”
We went on to say that
“the new offence of corporate failure to prevent bribery is regarded as particularly effective, enabling those in a position to influence a company’s manner of conducting business to ensure that it is ethical, and to take steps to remedy matters where it is not.”
In our report, we noted, as did the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, that it was as long ago as May 2016 that the then Prime Minister, David Cameron, called for a consultation on a new offence of failure to prevent economic crime. We also noted that when Ministers gave evidence to the bribery committee on 4 December 2018, now over two years ago,
“Mr Argar said: ‘We intend to publish our response to it [the consultation] next year,’ and Ben Wallace MP added: ‘The Solicitor-General and I are pretty keen that we explore further the failure to prevent in broader economic crime … We raised it at the last inter-ministerial government meeting’”.
He added that John Penrose, the Government’s anticorruption champion,
“and I are keen to see this.”
The responses to the government consultation, although unpublished, and those suggested by Mr Glen to be inconclusive, are not as inconclusive as all that. The staff of our committee were able to find a lot of the submissions, which were available on the websites of the respondents, and none that we could find opposed the extension of the failure to prevent offence. Indeed, many supported it.
That takes me to my second point: the road to hell is paved with good intentions. The Government said in May 2019 that the call for evidence had closed in March 2017 and a response “will be issued shortly”. So, what are we waiting for? The Government have been standing on the edge of the pool for over two years. Each time they seem ready to jump in, inertia overcomes them and another round of consultation begins—now with the Law Commission, for which I have the highest regard. When my noble friend comes to reply, it would be helpful if she could let the Committee know what angles the Law Commission is supposed to focus on in this latest review and, in particular, what angles it will examine that have not been extensively looked over during the past four years.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I have listened with great interest to some excellent contributions on this group of amendments. I refer to my own entry in the register of interests, although my comments stem from my experience over a lifetime of support for regulatory common sense as a witness of the perverse effects of well-intentioned but sometimes ill-judged regulation, sometimes added at the last minute to Bills such as this. I support proper standards and the use of whistleblowing, which is the subject of Amendments 96 and 97, in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Lady Bowles. But my conclusion is that nearly all the harms articulated in the Committee today reflect a failure of enforcement by our regulators, and/or the failure of prosecuting authorities.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, this is such a fascinating group of amendments. I think I have rarely seen a group that includes such powerful and important amendments one after the other ranging from the relatively narrow, such as Amendment 136, tabled by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, which would be a valuable extension of the senior managers certification regime, to the fundamental, in the form of the “failure to prevent” amendments in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and my noble friend Lady Bowles. Those amendments cover similar territory, and I notice that by splitting the amendments they have succeeded in garnering a wide range of signatures, thereby demonstrating that this is not a party-political issue but has extraordinary breadth across many political views in this House, so they have done that rather well.
I find these changes absolutely fundamental and, frankly, fail to understand why the Government resist them. I would argue that they are particularly important in the absence of a duty of care because of the way in which they change the locus of responsibility, if you like, or enhance it as it falls on a company in dealing with its customers and its products. I am cautious when an issue is sent to the Law Commission. I hold it in very high regard, but I notice that it is at its best when an issue is considered very narrow and limited. I am afraid that the Government may view “failure to prevent” as a narrow and limited concerned, whereas in fact it deals with the fundamental culture and sense of responsibility of major financial institutions for the behaviour of their staff and their various departments, and for the outcome for or impact on their customers.
I also support the various reviews sought by the noble Lords, Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord Eatwell. I smile at Amendment 50 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell; he has had to craft it very carefully to make it fit into this Bill. Of course, he is absolutely right: we have a public register of beneficial ownership of companies in the UK, but it is not verified. I know how that rankles with the noble Lord, as we have discussed it in the past and I have a great deal of sympathy for his position. We rely on transparency to keep the register clean, but it is an imperfect system. Frankly, I would say to anybody that no one should rely fully on the information in the register; it is only a starting point. Making it verifiable would be a huge improvement. One of the things that bothers me the most is that many people who look at the register do not understand that it is unverified. That creates false impressions and leads people, particularly those who are less sophisticated, into making decisions that put them in financial danger.
I can see where the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, is going with Amendment 51A, but I am in the same camp as other noble Lords; I pick up the comments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, which were also made by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, and others. We have absolutely inadequate resources for enforcement in the whole area of financial crime; that applies to the regulators and the Serious Fraud Office. Just a couple of weeks ago, I spoke to a former police commissioner and asked why, in a particular instance, he had not turned to the National Crime Agency’s Financial Intelligence Unit. The reply was, “It’s one man and a dog.” It is hideously underresourced. Also, our local police forces, which so often end up bearing the brunt of enforcement, are not resourced to deal with crime of this specialist nature and reach; neither are they sufficiently resourced when they come across companies with vast resources. The inequality of arms is exceedingly questionable.
On other days, we have spoken extensively of the HBOS Reading fraud—to the point where I think everyone is now familiar with it—but I wonder whether people realise that the case was pursued by Thames Valley Police only after the regulators, the Serious Fraud Office and two other police forces refused to pursue it. They did so not because they thought that there was insufficient evidence but because they did not have the resources to do it: it cost Thames Valley Police £7 million to prosecute. The fraud itself amounted to some £800 million, of which only £250 million was placed in evidence in court because that was sufficient to get the necessary convictions. It quickly became evident that this was a very serious fraud case. Many of us are concerned that similar fraud cases are simply ignored by police forces that cannot step up to the plate. I note that the entire financial penalty paid by HBOS was commuted for good behaviour so it was only £45 million, but every penny went to the Treasury and nothing went back into enforcement. We must tackle this issue, which will only get worse as we move into the era of cryptocurrencies and more digital financial transactions; for example, FATF identified crypto-thefts, hacks and frauds totalling $1.3 billion in the first five months of 2020.
I will focus most of my remarks on my amendment, which proposes to create an office of the financial services whistleblower. It is a probing amendment; noble Lords will understand why in a moment. Very many of the people who speak out to expose wrongdoing find that they become the target of retaliation and lose their livelihoods and careers. They are most often employees—that is not always true; they can be clients as well—and this is very much true in financial services.
When I was an MP and therefore a prescribed person, I assisted colleagues with two whistleblower cases. Both individuals had their lives shattered by retaliation from the financial institution that had misbehaved, despite their passing absolutely critical information to the financial regulators. Confidentiality was on paper only because, being good employees in one case and a good client in the other, they had raised the issues inside the organisation first. Their information also made it pretty obvious who had spoken out. I am no longer a prescribed person, but I work with the APPG for Whistleblowing and I have heard from numerous MPs about today’s cases, not cases that predate changes in rules, legislation and regulation. I have talked to regulators and civil society groups and they have all confirmed that there has been relatively little effective, real-world change.
If whistleblowers are employees they are typically fired—not for whistleblowing of course; there is always another coincidental reason—so they spend their savings in the long process of going to an employment tribunal, which can take years. Three years is nothing to go through an employment tribunal, given appeal processes. In the employment tribunal, the regulators to which they provided information refuse to give evidence in their support. My noble friend Lady Bowles raised this issue; it is a shocker and most people do not realise it. The regulator says that the tribunal is not about whistleblowing, so there is no reason for them to give evidence that the person happened coincidentally to be involved in these various cases. Frankly, I find it shocking that they do not believe that their responsibility to a whistleblower extends to that role.
Whistleblowers often face expert counsel paid by the employer. They know that if they lose the case they will have to pick up that legal counsel’s fees. That is a huge inequality of arms. In the end, most accept a modest settlement out of sheer fear and exhaustion. Whistleblowers desperately want wrongdoing stopped and put right. Where neither the regulator nor the law enforcement agency decides to act on their evidence they cannot turn to the public or the press because the settlement agreements invariably include draconian non-disclosure clauses.
The existing legislation, the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, was once ground-breaking. Now it is inadequate and out of date. Even the EU, which has never been a leader in this field, is about to overtake it with much more effective directives.
I am, among others, campaigning for an office of the whistleblower. One reason why I will not press the amendment is that we actually need an overarching office covering all sectors, public and private. Whistleblowers need one place to go to find out where they stand, get support and advice, source the financial means to fight retaliation and, if necessary, get appropriate compensation for their damaged careers—for most whistleblowers, whistleblowing is career ending. The amendment covers a wide range of needs. I also see an office as one that can work with regulators to design a much better system that means that whistleblowers come forward and are taken seriously, stopping bad behaviour in its tracks.
The US is extraordinarily effective in this area, and it aggressively protects and rewards whistleblowers because they both expose and deter abuse and crime. Since the Dodd-Frank Act—the key whistleblowing legislation—was passed in 2010 and set up their own Office of the Whistleblower inside the Securities and Exchange Commission, that commission has collected $2.7 billion in fines and penalties on wrongdoers in financial services whose conviction depended on whistleblowers. One federal prosecutor I spoke to just a couple of weeks ago described whistleblowers as “a citizens’ army” with a deterrent effect without which the regulators and law enforcement could not succeed. The United States takes this so seriously that the first conversation with a financial whistleblower or their legal representative is with an experienced investigator of at least five years standing versed in financial practice and law.
Baroness Penn (Con)
My Lords, the Committee has heard about a range of issues relating to the importance of tackling economic crime. This is an area that the Government have taken significant action to address in recent years. As the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, noted, improved enforcement is crucial. That is why the Government have created a new National Economic Crime Centre, established the Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision and, in 2019, launched the economic crime plan, which brings together government and the private sector to tackle this issue.
Amendment 49 would require the Treasury to commission a review of the penalties for market abuse offences. Market abuse undermines integrity and reduces public confidence in the financial system. That is why, in the Bill, the Government are increasing the maximum sentence for such crimes, to bring them into line with other types of economic crime offences. However, the Government recognise that, in other respects, the criminal market abuse regime has not been materially updated since these offences were introduced. That is why the Treasury and the FCA have committed to reviewing the criminal market abuse regime by July 2021, as part of the 2019-2022 economic crime plan. The review will consider whether updates are required to ensure that the UK’s regime for combating market abuse continues to work effectively in an evolving market.
Amendment 50 seeks to offer an additional defence to a bank that relies on information from a publicly accessible verified register of the beneficial ownership of companies. This Government are committed to ensuring that our anti-money laundering regulations support the identification of criminal and terrorist financing activity, without placing disproportionate burdens on the regulated sector. The UK was the first G20 nation to introduce a public beneficial ownership register. There are over 3.5 million companies registered in the UK, and over 5 million beneficial owners listed on the register at Companies House. In answer to the challenge from the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, I want to be clear on the Government’s intention to introduce a package of reforms to limit the risk of misuse of companies, including by verifying the identity of people managing or controlling companies; providing the registrar with new powers to query and remove information; and investing in investigation and enforcement capabilities. This was set out in September 2020 in our response to a consultation on Companies House reform. We will legislate for this reform programme when parliamentary time allows. On the question of resources, the Chancellor made a further £20 million available to support these reforms in the spending review last year.
In answer to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, the Government are bolstering the UK Financial Intelligence Unit with an uplift of over 70 additional staff, enabling more feedback to reporters and better analysis of SARs. However, the UK does not consolidate all resources and activity relating to suspicious activity reports in the FIU. The intelligence collected is also distributed to regional and local law enforcement.
Returning to Companies House, this information alone would neither represent sufficient customer due diligence, nor provide sufficient confidence that a transaction did not relate to the proceeds of crime. Central registers are not a “silver bullet”. Effective anti-money laundering regulation will still rely on the private sector playing its part. The regulated industry has significantly more exposure to, and interaction with, its clients and individual transactions than can be captured on a public register, and it is therefore well placed to identify and prevent suspicious activity by carrying out sufficient client due diligence. While I hope that I have reassured the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, on his first two points—on the Government’s commitment to implement reforms to the Companies House register—I do not agree that we should remove the obligation on deposit-taking bodies to identify abuses by allowing them to simply rely on a beneficial ownership register. The Government cannot, therefore, accept the amendment.
I turn to Amendment 51. The “know your customer” or customer due diligence provisions are part of the money laundering regulations, which the Treasury is already required to review the effectiveness of at least every five years and to publish a report on its findings each time. This review will measure the impact of the existing regulations, assess the proportionality of duties and powers, the effectiveness of enforcement actions, and the interaction of the money laundering regulations with other pieces of legislation.
I also agree with my noble friend on the importance of financial inclusion. The Government are committed to working with a range of stakeholders to ensure that all consumers are able to access the financial services they need and that identification and verification are not a barrier to this, including by using innovations in technology to support this work.
Amendment 51A would replicate a power to amend the money laundering regulations 2017 under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. That means that through statutory instrument the Treasury can, if it chooses, already amend the list of professional body supervisors, or PBSs, in Schedule 1 to the regulations. The remit of the UK’s anti-money laundering supervisory authorities set out in Regulation 7 can also be amended in this way.
On professional body supervision, the Treasury already works closely with the Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision, known as OPBAS, to ensure high standards of effectiveness and consistency among PBSs. The noble Lords, Lord Rooker and Lord Sikka, spoke about transparency. The Government have introduced a requirement for the 22 professional body supervisors mentioned to publish annual reports on their AML supervision activity. This will support transparency and accountability and ensure consistency.
A report setting out the findings of the first review of the money laundering regulations to which I have referred will be published no later than 26 June 2022, with a call for evidence planned for this summer. That review will consider the effectiveness of the UK’s AML supervision and whether any reform is needed. It will also cover the OPBAS regulations.
Amendments 81, 82, 83 and 84 all propose to create a new criminal offence for corporate bodies or partnerships of facilitating, and of failing to prevent, economic crime or financial crime. First, I thank my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier for his focus on this important issue, echoed by other noble Lords who have signed the various amendments. The Government are committed to ensuring that under UK law corporate bodies and partnerships are properly held to account for criminal activity that takes place within them or is conducted by others on their behalf. The Government take these proposals seriously and are committed to considering whether there is a need to introduce such an offence. However, this is a complex area that requires careful consideration before acting. As noble Lords have noted, the principle of a “failure to prevent” offence is not opposed by the Government, as long as it is supported by a strong evidence base and addresses perceived gaps in the legal and regulatory framework. That is why in 2017 the Government issued a call for evidence on whether corporate liability law for economic crime needed to be reformed. Those findings were inconclusive and, subsequently, the Government commissioned the ongoing Law Commission review of this issue. That is expected to report by the end of this year.
I appreciate that this is a long-running issue, but before any broader, new “failure to prevent” or facilitation offence for economic crime is introduced, there needs to be strong evidence to support it. A new offence will also need to be designed rigorously with specific consideration given to how it sits alongside associated criminal and regulatory regimes and to the potential impact on business. Unlike with bribery and tax evasion, there are already extensive regimes, both criminal and regulatory, to hold both individuals and corporates to account for money laundering. Further, the “failure to prevent” offences introduced in respect of bribery and facilitation of tax evasion are both formulated to tackle very specific and precise circumstances. Wider economic crime offences present more complications. Fraud, for example, covers a much wider range of activity and business areas. The complexity of a broader economic crime offence is why the Government want to await the conclusions of the Law Commission’s review.
I also note briefly that the proposed new offences would only apply to activity undertaken,
“in the course of using or providing financial services”,
in keeping with the scope of the Bill. However, the 2017 call for evidence did not provide any evidence to suggest that financial services businesses should be specifically targeted with a new offence. Therefore, I believe it is best that this issue continues to be considered within the broader context, rather than focusing on financial services firms.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Caine) (Con)
My Lords, I have received a request to speak after the Minister from the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted. I call the noble Lord, Lord Sikka.
Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]
The group of amendments which we just discussed focused primarily on economic crime. Matters such as tax avoidance and tax evasion have also been mentioned, which are often the domain of the accounting law firms, banks and others. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, is absolutely right in that accountancy trade associations, such as the Institute of Chartered Accountants, also carry out a variety of other regulatory functions; but the question is how well such functions are actually carried out. There have been a number of court cases brought, by HMRC, where the judges have held that the tax avoidance schemes were unlawful. I hope the Minister can help us by telling us whether, after those court judgments, even one big accountancy firm has been investigated, fined or disciplined by the Institute of Chartered Accountants or any other accountancy trade association. Even one example from the past 10, 20, 30, 40, 50 or 100 years will do.
Baroness Penn (Con)
My Lords, I would be happy to write to the noble Lord on his question. The debate focused on the role of these organisations in respect of their anti-money laundering supervisory functions. As I said to the noble Lord in my response, a review of the AML regulations will be published no later than 26 June 2022, with a call for evidence this summer. If he feels the need to input to that review, that would be very welcome.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
I want only to point out to the Minister that I believe she said in her reply that the “failure to prevent” offences were targeting financial services firms. That is not the case. They were targeting use of financial services. The difference is quite important because it is much more generic, and I would not like anybody to think that I was targeting only financial services firms. The point is that it is quite difficult to do a lot of the things that are economic fraud without touching financial services. That is why it falls so full-square within what the Treasury is responsible for and why, as I said previously, it is particularly relevant to the Bill. I know the Minister has to have a “Hands off, do nothing and do not amend this Bill” attitude, but I hope that this issue will be taken to heart and that reasons to do something, rather than reasons not to, will be looked at. I was generic about the use of financial services, not financial services firms.
Baroness Penn (Con)
My Lords, I happily acknowledge that point. The point I was trying to make is that even with that slightly broader definition of the use of financial services, a “failure to prevent” offence for broader economic crime is one that people would want to apply in a broader context. I appreciate that the scope of the Bill defines how amendments may be written, and that takes me back to one of the reasons that my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier predicted I might give for resisting this amendment: that this is not the right Bill for it.
Lord Eatwell (Lab)
My Lords, this debate has evidenced considerable concern from all sides of the Grand Committee at the level of financial crime and the apparent inability to tackle it in this country in a consistent manner. I am afraid that the Minister’s reply did not provide any reassurance. Indeed, there seemed to be an enormous amount of long grass in evidence into which various reviews and considerations were being kicked.
Before commenting on the Minister’s reply to my amendment, I shall comment on the amendment by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, on KYC. I entirely sympathise with his point about a modernised means of identification, but I am afraid he will come up against what seems to be a most peculiar British national aversion to any comprehensive means of identification. Therefore in KYC we rely on documents such as utility bills that were never designed for this purpose. The debate over a vaccine passport is running into the same national aversion. However, I wish him well because he is on the right track in what he is attempting to do.
I was also enormously impressed by the amendments in the name of and the speech made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. I cannot understand why the notion of failure to prevent, which he described so clearly that even a non-lawyer such as myself could understand it, can apply to bribery and tax evasion but not to other financial crimes. The Minister did not really address that lacuna in her reply.
Turning to my two amendments, first, the UK’s approach to measures against financial crime is underresourced, scatter-gun and generally ill directed. The evidence is clear in the extraordinarily low number of prosecutions. I therefore feel that there is an urgent need for a major reconsideration of this matter. I hope that the review referred to by the Minister, to be conducted by Her Majesty’s Treasury and the FCA, will produce something concrete and effective—for a change, I must say.
On beneficial ownership, I was amused by the point made by the Minister that, because of the peculiar structure of my amendment, I was somehow letting the private sector off the hook. That was not my intention, of course; it was about the necessity of getting the argument in the Bill. However, I was really disappointed to hear her repeat the discredited support for Britain’s so-called wonderful public beneficial ownership open register. This public register is inaccurate, misleading and shelters criminals, and I am surprised that she is so enthusiastic in her support for it. I hope that the committee that scrutinises financial matters, which we discussed earlier in this Committee, will be able to keep an eye on developments in the prosecution of financial crime and the provision of a proper, verified beneficial ownership register. I hope that it will push these matters forward and not let them disappear into further reviews.
In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 49.
Baroness Coussins
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, and the amendment to page 40, line 32 in the name of Baroness Coussins, would require that the Statutory Debt Repayment Plan element of the debt respite scheme would have to come into force before 1 May 2024.
Baroness Coussins (CB)
My Lords, I am very glad to open the debate on this group, although I fear that we may be interrupted at least twice if votes are called in the Chamber; I see that the Minister is on his feet there now.
I declare my interest as an ambassador and former president of the Money Advice Trust, the charity that runs National Debtline and Business Debtline. In moving Amendment 52, I will also speak to Amendment 67 in my name, to which the noble Baronesses, Lady Morgan of Cotes and Lady Kramer, and the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, have added their names. I warmly welcome their support.
Before dealing with my own amendments, though, I want to say a brief word about the probing Amendment 54 in this group, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, who has done so much to secure the introduction of both the Breathing Space scheme and Statutory Debt Repayment Plans. I hope the Minister will be able to provide clarity today on universal credit advances and third-party deductions, and I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, will set out further details on those issues. At Second Reading, I also mentioned the problem of lead generator firms or imposter websites, so I also welcome Amendment 111 in this group, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, and others. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response on what action the Government intend to take on this issue.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to take part in the debate on this second group of amendments. I declare my interests as set out in the register. It is also more than a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, and the elegant way in which she introduced the amendments. I would certainly have added my name to her Amendment 67 had I had any ink left in my pen. I can only express regret that my name is not on it, as it elegantly and excellently expresses her intention, as she has done on her feet today.
In many ways, this is the most important group of amendments that we are considering in Committee. It takes me back to 2017, when we debated the Financial Guidance and Claims Bill, as it was then, and our discussions about duty of care and financial inclusion. It all rings true in these amendments and in our earlier discussions in Committee on financial inclusion objectives, not least for the Financial Conduct Authority.
I am grateful to the Money Advice Trust, Macmillan and StepChange not just for their briefing, advice and commentary for these amendments but for the work that they and all the organisations involved in the debt space do day in, day out—often unsung—dealing with people who find themselves in some of the starkest situations. Those organisations step in, and they deserve our thanks, praise and recognition.
I shall cover Amendments 53, 68, 69 and 111 in my name. I shall also touch briefly on Amendments 54 and 70 in the name of my friend, the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, but I shall be mindful not to eat his tea. I feel somewhat nervous speaking before him, with all the expertise he has in this area and in view of his excellent chairmanship of StepChange. This Committee and our nation owe him a tremendous debt for the work that he has done in the area of debt.
Amendment 53 is relatively straightforward. It focuses on the provision of debt advice for those who would fall within the scheme. It hints at the wider point of financial education, not just in schools, as we have discussed in the past, but broadly, throughout life. It was not possible to craft an amendment to the Bill on financial education the way I would have intended. However, I believe that Amendment 53 speaks to that specific intention while having general applicability, broader than just those within the scheme.
Amendment 54, in the name of my friend the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, is an excellent probing amendment, and I shall leave him to walk us through it. Amendment 68 has elements of Amendment 67, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins. It sets out the provisions of the SD scheme and a timetable for its implementation. I am not entirely sure why I opted for December 2024 as the end date for when people would have to have been taken up into the scheme. I may have had the view that the Johnson Administration would go the full five-year distance. On balance, I am probably minded to go with the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins. May is probably a better date; it is certainly reasonable and achievable and gives the right amount of space, with the right amount of road, to enable this scheme to get up and running.
Amendment 69 seeks a consultation on how funding for advice will operate under the scheme and is relatively straightforward. Amendment 70 is, without question, one of the key amendments in this group. It was handsomely set out and I will not eat my friend’s lunch in doing so again. By setting out particular groups, not least SMEs, those with protected characteristics and charities, the noble Lord has done an excellent job in focusing on the key groups and on how such a review should be structured.
Amendment 111, my final one in this group, is concerned with so-called lead generators. In many ways, it goes to the essence of the human condition: the ebb and flow; the give and the take. What we witness with lead generators is, all too often, those taking from those who have the least. The aim of the amendment is straightforward: to end the misery and mental stress that the practice of lead generation, as currently conducted, causes to tens of thousands across the UK. What are lead generators? In essence, they use online tools to crawl the online world in search of those who have entered that environment to try and find solutions to their current debt difficulties. They then serve up the individuals they have captured, if you will, to organisations which seek to “advise” and “help” them. This area is riddled with misleading statements, misrepresentation—
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Caine) (Con)
The Committee will now adjourn for five minutes.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Caine) (Con)
My Lords, before I invite the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, to complete his comments, I point out that I completely omitted to put the question when the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, moved her amendment. For clarity, the question before the Committee is that Amendment 52 be agreed to. I call the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con) [V]
As I was saying, lead generators are involved in misleading and misrepresentation by holding themselves out as organisations such as the Money Advice Trust or StepChange, or representing themselves as government to pull in for financial gain those who sought help for their debt difficulties. It is a pernicious practice, preying on those who are, without doubt, extremely vulnerable as a result of debt. It is unfortunate that the arena for their taking is the world wide web—one of the greatest gifts to humanity from one of the greatest of great Britons, Tim Berners-Lee. It is such a tragedy that his world is populated by these tawdry takers.
Amendment 111 would amend the FSMA to bring lead generators into the world of regulation to end this pernicious practice and to address the current asymmetry in FCA regulation: if you are introducing creditors that is a regulated activity; if you are introducing a debt advice service or the like, that is currently unregulated. The problem is large: StepChange and the Money Advice Trust estimate that at least 10% of those in need who seek their help and that of other debt advice services are caught up in and misdirected by such lead generating practice. That is an extraordinarily high figure.
We often see the world in a grain of sand when we consider personal testimony. One man said: “I am caught up in this world of these people. I am called, if not once, five times a day. Fortunately, I’ve managed to sort out my debt problems, but this harassment from these organisations is almost as bad as the debt itself. It’s having a detrimental effect on my life; it’s having a detrimental effect on my mental well-being.” That is the outcome of this mendacious practice, of this fakery and falsehood, from these tricksters and takers.
When my noble friend the Minister considers Amendment 111, would he agree that when individuals look for support in their hour of need as a result of a debt situation, they should find help, not harm? I am delighted that the amendment has the number 111; it is a single Nelson of an amendment. It is a single amendment with a single intention: for it to pass to make one single, simple change that will help hundreds of thousands. Will my noble friend the Minister channel his inner Nelson and give Amendment 111 its victory?
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I declare my interest as a former chair of StepChange Debt Charity. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, and the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, for their kind words about the work we have done with StepChange and all the other groups involved in supporting the repayment of debt and the management of unmanageable debt. It has been a pleasure to work with them and I have listened to their words very carefully, but it has also been wonderful, over the years I have been working on this issue in your Lordships’ House, to see the number of people who have become interested in it and who are prepared to join in and support it grow. It is now a very solid group with very firm views about how things should move forward, as we just heard.
I was very struck by what the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, said about the way people prey on those who have problems with debt. When I was working at StepChange we decided to change the name from the rather uncomfortable Foundation for Credit Counselling, which no one ever used. It was not a foundation, we did not deal with credit, and we did not counsel. It was a problem to get across what we did do, but we decided to be bold, as one is when coming to a new organisation and thinking about how you might change it. We decided to go for a name that took us away from any descriptive elements, and came up with StepChange.
One thing that we did not expect, which plays back to what the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, said, was that within 24 hours of our name being announced to the world there were between 15 and 20 groups preying on the same group of people we were trying to help, in exactly the way that the noble Lord described: they had changed their names to variations on StepChange. They also changed their colour coding, the whole look of their websites and the whole way that they approached potential customers. It was a wonderful example of the difficult area in which we operated. Here we were, trying to help people who were desperate to repay the debt that they had got themselves into. They were, by and large, decent, ordinary people for whom something had gone wrong with their lives and as a result they were spiralling into unmanageable debt. Yet here were these other companies trying to make money out of them, as the noble Lord explained. It was just awful, and to do so in a way that showed that they were watching how we operated in the market and were prepared to copy our techniques to get people to pay them money which they could not afford in order to get out of debt, was an extraordinary basis.
That leads into the amendments in this group, which are largely about trying to work with the Government in their good and well-thought-through plans, which are slowly coming to fruition. Perhaps they could go a little faster, but that is part of this discussion. My principal point is that I want us to support what the Government are doing because they are on the right track. We would like to do anything that we can to help them.
I have two amendments in this group and would have signed others, but I did not need to because they have a lot of support in other areas. Amendment 54 probes the nature and content of the regulations that will establish the statutory debt management scheme, which is complementary to and foreshadowed by the debt respite scheme mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, and the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond. Amendment 70 calls for a formal review of the debt respite and statutory debt management schemes within a two-year period after Royal Assent. It looks very straightforward on the surface but when the Minister responds I am sure that he will realise where the amendment is trying to take him. It has the same impact as the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, and the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, which is that we are a bit worried about the time that it has taken to get this scheme going. The idea was—
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Caine) (Con)
My Lords, as there is a Division in the Chamber, the Committee will adjourn for five minutes.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Caine) (Con)
My Lords, the Committee will now resume.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I will move on to the first of my amendments: Amendment 54. Clause 34 as drafted, is quite short, and it is hard to reconcile it with what I understand to be the Government’s ambition. I would be grateful if, when he comes to respond, the Minister could confirm whether plans remain to replicate the Scottish statutory debt management plan, which has worked well for debtors and creditors. The reason for Clause 34, at its heart, is to take the necessary powers to ensure both that creditors participate in the scheme and that they contribute towards the funding so that the full range of advice and support for the SDMP is available.
The experience of the scheme in Scotland is that the Government are on the right track. Recent discussions with Ministers have been very reassuring, and I thank them for their time. However, it would be helpful if we had a little more detail put on the record; whether he is able to do this in response to the points I am about to make, or whether he would like to write to me, I should be grateful to hear further from the Minister in relation to some of my points.
One point is that the breathing space regulations—SI 2020/1311—define a debt advisor as having FCA permission for debt counselling or a local authority. That is quite a wide group: when he comes to respond, can he make that a little bit narrower? Presumably, this is a local authority which is currently offering a full debt advice system. Of course, that has been badly affected by cuts in recent years, so I hope that more detail will be provided on that. Can he confirm that this definition used in relation to debt advice will also be available for the debt-advice component of the statutory debt-management plan?
Secondly, the Minister will also be aware of the concern that debt advice should continue to be available for free. There is considerable evidence that many people do not get access to the debt advice that they need. The pandemic is obviously a worry that may yet crystalise into concern about, interest in, and need for debt advice. We have not seen the numbers increase very significantly recently, but that is because the Government have been effective in getting the funding necessary to maintain people’s continuing existence at the moment. However, when those schemes wind up—and it will be some time before they do, but they will wind up—then there will, of course, be some concern about the amount of debt advice available and whether it will be fundable on a continuing and sustainable basis.
In this context, my third point is that the Government have said that they wish to restrict the funding of the SDRP providers to 9% of the effective debts. This sounds like a reasonable proportion, and there might be a lot of support for it, but it exposes a gap in the current arrangements, which are based on a fair share plan of 13%, so it is a reduction of about 4%, including the costs that are currently absorbed within the structure being made explicit and being met by the overall system. This is a detailed point and I am sure that the Minister will be pleased to hear that I do not expect a very detailed answer at this point, but it would be helpful if more detail could be provided in a letter. We need to know the basis on which the direct cost of the statutory debt management scheme will be operated and that there will be funding available for debt advice, which is the other part of the equation that needs to be funded.
My final point on this list is the question of timing, which has already been addressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, and the noble Lord, Lord Holmes. I do not think it is sensible to set an artificial time limit for the Government on this. It should come through as and when the Government can get it right and get it out, but I hope that my Amendment 70, which is couched in the form of an amendment asking for a report, is a sufficient stick to suggest that a little more effort on this would be very welcome all round.
We have already touched on my next point in relation to those who seek to benefit from people who are suffering from unmanageable debt by offering them commercial services. A number of companies offer this, and a number of other amendments deal with this, but it is important to establish that the scheme that the Government are supporting is entirely on a non-profit basis. Clearly, if there were to be profit-seeking FCA-authorised debt advice providers also included in this group, it could mean additional costs for the scheme or else a reduced service for those participating. I cannot believe that it would be in the public interest to have a situation where people were obtaining commercial returns from what should be a free service. I accept that the original policy statement by the Government said that debt advice providers would not be able to charge fees in addition to the FairShare scheme, but I should be grateful if, when he comes to respond, the Minister can confirm that that will be set out properly in the regulations.
I have two final points. Can the Minister confirm that the reference to the Crown in Clause 34(4) means that all public body debts will be included in the scope of the statutory debt management plans? It is important to get that confirmation. It is really good that the Government have accepted that Crown debts will be included but, obviously, a significant number of debts are also owed to public services, which are not officially within the Crown, unless I am unaware of a definitional point here; that particularly applies to local authorities.
In that respect, it is also important that we can get confirmation that while individuals are in the debt respite scheme or the SDMP, they will be protected from enforcement action—particularly bailiff action. This has been one of the most welcome measures in the pandemic moratorium affecting those people in unmanageable debt. The suspension has released a great deal of concern that people had about this. It seems unlikely that the Government would want to see a scheme that, on the one hand, protects those who are attempting to repay their debts by obtaining breathing space and then entering a plan to do so but, at the same time, does not seek to restrict the possible bailiff action that would have such a deleterious effect on them.
We will come back to this issue in a later group because there is now an amendment around it—that may well be a better time to discuss it—but I would be interested to have an initial response from the Minister when he comes to respond.
Lord Lucas (Con) [V]
My Lords, my amendments in this group are all a result of my chairmanship of the Enforcement Law Review Group. They reflect the concerns of members of that group—it has representatives from all sides of the debt management business, from creditors to debtors and others—about the breathing space regulations. I would be quite content if my noble friend wrote to me or discussed these matters afterwards, but I am grateful for the opportunity that the Bill affords to pick them up before the arrangements themselves go live.
Amendment 56 asks whether the 60 days of the breathing space moratorium can be extended. There is concern, particularly from the debt management side, that the whole business of processing a benefit claim can run beyond 60 days and make it necessary that the period should be longer. They want to see either that there is flexibility or that there will be some way of managing situations where a longer period is needed.
Similarly, Amendment 57 looks at the need to report in the middle of the 60 days and, if there has been no change, to ask whether the requirement of the report might be omitted.
Amendment 58 looks at situations where the debts owed include those where it would be really difficult to inform the creditor of what was going on, in terms of obtaining a breathing space, because the creditor is in a position to upset the debtor’s life substantially. Examples might be having children in a nursery, a car in to be repaired or a landlord who is in a position to evict the debtor from their house. It would allow debt management agencies the flexibility to manage a debtor’s life in a way, at the same time as they are helping them with their debts, and not push them into trouble because they have involved more commercial creditors in a breathing space scheme.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)
I call the next speaker, the noble Lord, Lord Rooker.
Lord Lucas (Con) [V]
My Lords, I am still going—I have a number of other amendments. Is the Committee not hearing me?
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)
Please continue—sorry. It was a pregnant pause.
Lord Lucas (Con) [V]
Amendment 62 looks at joint debt situations, for instance between a wealthy husband and an impoverished wife where it is the wife who has the breathing space moratorium. Under those circumstances, it is not obvious that the wealthy husband should have the benefit. The amendment therefore asks whether, under some circumstances, the moratorium should not apply to all parties to a debt.
Amendments 63 and 64 are really just opportunities to ask the Government whether this scheme is ready to go. A lot of pressure has been placed on the Insolvency Service and the courts in the course of Covid. Are we actually in a position to launch a working system? If not, should there not be some arrangement to allow delay to ensure that, when the launch comes, it is successful?
Amendment 65 looks at situations where a debtor gets the benefit of a breathing space but then just does nothing and does not engage with the breathing space process in any way. It asks: should there not, under those circumstances, be some incentive—something that the debtor loses by not engaging with the process?
Amendment 66 looks at the situation of a creditor that has taken its debt to the point of commencing legal action and then faces a breathing space process. That is fine, but should not the position that the creditor has got into be finalised so that things can be picked up again afterwards if they need to be, rather than having to be started again at considerable expense to the creditor? Should not the system recognise—[Inaudible.]
I appreciate that these are complicated and detailed amendments. As I said, I would entirely accept written correspondence, and I shall be grateful for anything the Minister says today. However, they reflect an industry that is looking to make a success of both sides of the breathing space initiative but is concerned that some details are not provided for in the regulations as they exist at the moment.
Now I have finished.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)
Thank you for the clarification. I call the next speaker, the noble Lord, Lord Rooker.
Lord Rooker (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I counted at least three occasions when I thought that the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, had finished his incredibly thoughtful speech as he moved from one group to another. That is not a criticism by any stretch of the imagination, by the way. I will be extremely brief.
My name is on only a couple of amendments: Amendments 52 and 67. I have nothing new to say from what I said at Second Reading. I simply wanted to get my name on the amendments to show the widespread support for the issue raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins. The key amendment in her name—Amendment 67—might be thought to be far too reasonable. If I were the Minister—and I have been in that position—I would accept it, I must say. I would go back and tell the boss that I had to accept it because it would have been made worse on Report—it may well do with another amendment with another date on it—and it would save everybody a lot of time. I did that more than once as a Minister, and it usually turned out okay.
I am very grateful for the work of the Money Advice Trust. This amendment affects what could be millions of people. We are talking about some really serious problems. I was taken by the examples given earlier in the debate on this group by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond. I fully support the amendment and cannot see why it cannot be accepted now just to tidy everything up so that we do not have to spend more time on it on Report. I am not saying that it is not important but it is likely that, on Report, Ministers will be faced with a different date. I would accept this amendment and run with it. Everyone will be grateful if the Minister does so.
Finally, the Government deserve great thanks for Clause 34. I want to give credit where it is due. I have finished.
Baroness Morgan of Cotes (Con) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to speak in this debate and follow the noble Lord, Lord Rooker. Like him, I will speak to Amendments 52 and 67, as well as to Amendment 54. I have added my name to all of them. I will also speak in support of Amendment 111. I declare my interest as a pro bono adviser to the board of StepChange, the debt advice charity, which has already been mentioned—quite deservedly—in the course of the debate. I am sorry that I could not speak at Second Reading.
We have heard some excellent speeches. I do not want to detain your Lordships for too long. As we have already heard, even before the pandemic, tens of thousands of households faced personal debt situations requiring debt advice. A recent report by Pro Bono Economics said that, because of the pandemic, an extra 480,000 households are likely to be pushed into debt. In the worst-case scenario, that would mean the overall number would rise to 1.5 million by the middle of this year. Of course, the cost to society of problem debt is likely to exceed £1 billion this year through things such as extra mental health support and housing provision.
Like the noble Lords, Lord Rooker and Lord Stevenson, I also recognise the Government’s work to address this issue through introducing the Breathing Space scheme and the forthcoming Statutory Debt Repayment Plan. I added my name to Amendments 52 and 67. I pay tribute to the way they were introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, and I thank the Minister for the conversation we have had about them. Like other noble Lords, I think that we need a firm timetable for the introduction of the SDRP so that debt agencies and advisers can plan for that introduction. I understand that 1 May 2024 basically fits in with the Treasury’s timetable, so I hope my noble friend can take the Committee’s advice. I wait to hear what he will say about whether that timetable can be accepted.
The noble Lord, Lord Stephenson, introduced his Amendment 54, which he said is a probing amendment. It asks some good questions about the new Statutory Debt Repayment Plan. I will listen to what the Minister has to say in response. I echo in particular the points he made about the fair share funding, which will obviously be very important for organisations such as StepChange. There is a concern that, without the clarifications the noble Lord has been seeking, the SDRP statutory fair share will not be successful in increasing access to free debt advice and might actually reduce access for clients who are not suitable for an SDRP. Clarification on that funding model would be extremely welcome.
The other subsection of the amendment that I particularly want to pick up relates to bailiffs. There is currently a confusing landscape in this third national lockdown where bailiffs are permitted to appear on doorsteps but not, for example, enter premises. However, they can seize goods such as cars sitting on the highway. I know that Amendment 36F, which has recently been tabled, is in a different group, but having bailiffs clearly bound by the terms of the SDRP and, as suggested in that amendment, by a regulator would help to ensure compliance with the SDRP scheme. I hope the Minister will confirm that bailiffs will absolutely be bound by the terms of the Statutory Debt Repayment Scheme that has been agreed.
I also offer my support to my noble friend Lord Holmes’s Amendment 111, which he so graciously introduced. It seeks government action to regulate lead generators for debt advice and debt solutions. We have already heard how easy it is for people, who are often extremely vulnerable at the point that they seek debt advice, to think that they are contacting StepChange or National Debtline and instead find that they are speaking to other people who then, as my noble friend said, harass them thereafter. Even when they have got themselves into a better position, they are harassed for continued work and debt advice. I also know that StepChange has to spend a significant amount of time monitoring and reporting misleading advertisements and, obviously, that time could be better spent helping more clients with their debt advice. I hope the Minister will be able to indicate whether the Government will now require FCA authorisation.
As I said, the Government have shown a very welcome intention to act in this space. I thank and pay tribute to Treasury Ministers for that. However, as we heard in the Chancellor’s Budget Statement today, it is not just the public finances that are being thrown into disarray by Covid. Sadly, more households’ and individuals’ personal debt situations will have been created or exacerbated by the past 12 months. They will really need these schemes to help them get back on their feet. Therefore, I very much hope that the Minister will be able to confirm that the Government are minded to accept the 1 May 2024 dead- line and also to answer the points raised by other noble Lords in these amendments to help to confirm exactly how the Statutory Debt Repayment Plan will operate.
Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Non-Afl) [V]
My Lords, I am delighted to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, in this debate on this group of amendments. I shall make particular reference to Amendments 52 and 67, introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, and spoken to already by various noble Lords.
Clause 34 gives the Government powers to introduce a statutory debt repayment plan scheme, which is very welcome and which other noble Lords have already endorsed. It will significantly improve the protections offered to people in debt, who will be able to repay what they owe but over a longer timeframe. Like many noble Lords, I have received a briefing from the Money Advice Trust, which would like the Government to commit to a firm timetable for the scheme’s introduction. Hence, I support Amendment 52, which is a tidying-up amendment, and Amendment 67, which provides a timetable.
Amendment 52 and 67, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Coussins and Lady Morgan, and the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, and spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, would put a timetable for the introduction of statutory debt repayment plans in the Bill. The pandemic will have accentuated debt problems faced by businesses in the small to medium-sized sectors as well as by many individuals who are facing unemployment, the true number of whom will not be revealed until furlough ends. The noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, referred to the number of people—3.8 million, I think—who have missed payments during the pandemic. In fact, 3.2 million people struggle to make ends meet. Those are unacceptable, but realistic, figures that all of us must address, particularly the Government. It is vital that a scheme is put in place with a definitive timetable to enable debt repayment plans.
It is important that the Minister demonstrates support for these amendments and other amendments in this group which would add a requirement to the Bill that statutory debt repayment plans come into force, as per Amendment 67, by 1 May 2024 at the latest. That would provide time to develop and pass regulations and to set up the required systems and infrastructure to deliver the scheme while ensuring that introducing it remained a clear priority for the Treasury. I urge the Minister to set out a clear timetable today and to indicate that the Government will accept these amendments. Will he now commit to adding a timeframe for their introduction to the Bill, with the Covid-19 crisis producing so many financial challenges for people? As we heard earlier, many of those people have been subjected to sharks, moneylenders and tricksters, as the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, referred to. Ordinary people who find themselves in debt and find it difficult to repay it must be protected, and the best way to do that is to provide that date in the legislation. I know many people have faced financial challenges, so I ask the Minister to assure the Committee that introducing statutory debt repayment plans will remain an absolute priority for the Treasury, accompanied by the date of 1 May 2024.
Baroness Meacher (CB) [V]
My Lords, along with StepChange and many others working in the debt field, I welcome Clause 34, which I hope will provide some support and protection for vulnerable people with problem debts. I also very much welcome the amendments in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Coussins and Lady Morgan. I will not speak to those amendments, because all the main points have been extremely well made by the two Baronesses. However, I have the permission of the Government Whips Office—
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)
Baroness Meacher, forgive me, we are about to go into a Division, so if you will allow us to have an Adjournment for five minutes then we will return to your speech.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)
Get your finger ready for button pressing.
Baroness Meacher (CB) [V]
My Lords, I will start my sentence again. I have the permission of the Government Whips’ Office to speak to Amendment 136F in my name, which should be in this group but appears elsewhere. I have only just managed to table this amendment, and therefore other noble Lords have not had time to put their names to it, but I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, for expressing her support.
Amendment 136F seeks to introduce independent regulation for bailiffs and bailiff companies. The amendment builds on a Ministry of Justice review of bailiff issues that began in 2018, although we still await the report. The amendment does not specify who should regulate the industry, other than it should be subject to statutory regulation. It seems to us that is the job of the Treasury and the MoJ to work together to establish an appropriate framework. I want to give the Minister the opportunity to commit to meaningful reform, and I hope that he will be able to respond to that.
As noble Lords will know, bailiffs’ powers are quite extraordinary: to enter a person’s home, in some circumstances forcibly; to take possession of belongings as security against debt repayments; and, in extremis, to seize those goods. Of course, it is important that the law supports creditors to recover money owed to them, but it is equally important that the law should regulate debt recovery action, with controls to protect people who are vulnerable and those in financial difficulty from further hardship and harm. At the moment, there is a tremendous amount of further hardship and harm.
The Government recognise the importance of this in numerous places. We have debated Clause 34 concerning a debt respite scheme to protect the financially vulnerable. The Government have equipped the Financial Conduct Authority with the resources and powers to supervise firms’ conduct and ensure that key consumer protection issues, such as affordability and vulnerability, are taken into account. There are binding rules and standards on debt recovery action, a toolkit of sanctions and an accessible consumer redress scheme. All these factors prove strong incentives for firms to abide by the rules. However, despite bailiffs having the most intrusive and potentially harmful powers, there is no similar effective framework of oversight for bailiff enforcement. This is surely a glaring anomaly, which should be rectified in the Bill.
Bailiff enforcement is not a small matter. It is very common, particularly among public sector creditors. Research for the Money Advice Trust found that local authorities alone had referred 2.6 million debts to bailiffs in 2018-19. As Citizens Advice has shown, the number of people facing bailiff enforcements for small amounts of unpaid council tax debt is likely to double as a result of the pandemic to more than 3 million households. A significant proportion of those people will be in very vulnerable situations. Some 40% of people with bailiff issues helped by Citizens Advice have a disability or a long-term health condition, and 58% of StepChange clients with an additional vulnerability were subject to bailiff action on their council tax arrears.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I spoke at length on the previous group, so I am going to pay penance and try to be much briefer on this one, even though this is an issue that I also care about passionately. I do not think I can start without acknowledging all the incredible work done by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, in this arena. He has genuinely moved the issue on by sheer determination, a baton now picked up by the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins.
The statutory debt repayment plan element of the debt respite scheme needs to come into effect as soon as possible. I suspect that we all acknowledge that, but the impact of Covid makes it more important than ever. When we talk about a timetable—I am thinking of the speeches by the noble Baronesses, Lady Morgan and Lady Ritchie—we know that a group of people who will probably never have experienced financial difficulties will now be drawn into a system where they are overwhelmed by their debts. One can see that this is an opportunity for the less scrupulous to take advantage. Even those who regard themselves as perfectly professional and ethical will look for weaknesses in the system in order to get paid. There is pressure on both sides. I have therefore added my name to Amendments 52 and 67.
The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, raised a number of interesting issues but he can probably take comfort in the fact that there is a sort of Scottish template, if you like, in that experience in Scotland will help to make sure that the programmes in England—I assume this covers Wales as well—will benefit and learn any necessary lessons. That should remove a lot of the anxiety and some of the teething problems.
The amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, is completely new to me. It seems entirely logical that we should have a proper framework of oversight for bailiff enforcement.
I also strongly support Amendment 111, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, to bring lead generators for debt advice and debt solution services under FCA regulation. I have worked on many financial services Bills over the years, particularly on the consumer side, and it is almost breathtaking how many people and groups are totally unscrupulous and use any opportunity to gouge people when they are anxious and worried. One can just see the exploitation that could happen here. I ask that the issue be taken more broadly, that the FCA go on the front foot and anticipate where unscrupulous individuals might try to exploit the situation, and that we see if we can to some extent head it off at the pass. We are quite good at doing something when thousands of people are complaining that they have been taken advantage of; it might be very useful if we turn that around and try to anticipate where trouble could come from and see whether we can deal with it.
The issues have been so well laid out by others that I will not repeat them, but I join in asking the Government to respond to these amendments, particularly those on the timetable, with some very strong assurances at the very least.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, we have spent an hour and a quarter debating a clause that is two thirds of a page long in a 182-page Bill. This, at first sight, might seem unreasonable, but when you look at the clause from the point of the view of the individual citizen, it is probably one of the most important in the Bill, so it is right that we have done so. There are an amazing 19 amendments to this clause, which would normally imply concerted opposition. In fact, that has not been the mood of the debate at all.
To sum the clause up, it has dealt well with one of the concepts, but we have too little detail. My noble friend Lord Stevenson of Balmacara seems in many ways to have been the father of this concept, and I congratulate him. We have adjacent desks, and I have seen him busily dealing with issues such as this. His two amendments seek to flesh out how the clause would bring in proper regulation, a degree of reasonableness and recognition of the role of bodies related to national and local government; they also address the importance of protection from bailiffs, and funding.
The noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, brought in the idea that we must have a hard deadline, and the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, introduced the concept that we need advice for individuals. A timetable of December 2024 was gazumped by the noble Baroness, who suggested instead May 2024. It is important that the funding issues be addressed, especially if this fine concept is improved, because it could always go wrong if they are not faced up to. Again, this brings home the importance of regulation.
Finally, we have the 11 amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Lucas. I hope he will not mind me saying that they are very “Lord Lucas-like”, with each small detail adding value to this legislation. I say that in order to illustrate that most of the amendments are complementary.
I ask the Minister to recognise the degree of clear, cross-party consensus on this important clause. Many people have urged him to make concessions. My experience is that Ministers making concessions on the hoof is considered rather dangerous; hence, this is unlikely. But I do strongly urge him not to reject too many of these ideas. His brief probably says that the wording will not work. Wording never works when it is from the Back Benches, but the ideas work, and these ideas are powerful and need to be taken account of. I hope there will be a further round of conversations before Report, and that the Government will come back with a composite proposal that improves this important clause. I fear that if that does not happen, we will spend a lot of time on Report, and there will be a more muscular approach from those who tabled and who support these amendments.
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Lord True) (Con)
My Lords, this has been an extremely detailed and thoughtful debate. I will try to answer as many points as I can in the time available, which I fear will be quite Parkinsonian and extend in line with the notes I have received. I am grateful for the general tenor of the debate; I think all of us in this House agree that there are profound problems here which we collectively, across parties, are seeking to address. I am grateful for that.
I will briefly explain the Government’s position before turning to the amendments. Obviously, the Government want to incentivise more of the people who could benefit from it to access professional debt advice, and access it sooner. To this end, we are introducing a debt respite scheme, as many noble Lords have said. The first part is the breathing space, which begins on 4 May, and the second part is the statutory debt repayment plan. The SDRP will be a new debt solution for people in problem debt and will provide a revised long-term agreement between the debtor and their creditors on the amount owed and a manageable timetable over which it has to be repaid. It is intended that during their plan, debtors will be protected from most credit enforcement action and from certain interest and charges on debts in the plan.
My noble friend Lady Morgan asked whether bailiffs can be sent in during a moratorium or SDRP. During a moratorium, a court or tribunal must not instruct a bailiff to take action. It is intended that, during an SDRP, enforcement action would also be paused.
These amendments seek to require the Government to include certain features in the debt respite scheme, including specific requirements relating to breathing space. Amendments 52 and 67, which many noble Lords have spoken to, seek to set a deadline of 1 May 2024 for the SDRP to be implemented. Similarly, Amendment 68 would require the Government to publish a timetable, with a requirement for the scheme to take on clients before the end of 2024.
I am sympathetic to the intention behind these amendments and am grateful for the chance to address the timing of the SDRP and for the discussions we have been able to have and the genuine and positive engagement with noble Lords prior to this stage and—who knows?—afterwards. The consultation response published in June 2019 set out areas that required further policy work and consultation. Given the challenges and complexity involved, the Government continue to work closely with the debt advice sector, creditors and regulators to make sure that the policy can be implemented successfully and that everyone involved has time to prepare. Setting a hard deadline for the SDRP risks tying all our stakeholders’ hands unnecessarily and arbitrarily limiting the time they have available to prepare properly.
I can nevertheless assure noble Lords that the Government are committed to implementing the SDRP in a timely manner. To that end, detailed regulations establishing the SDRP are currently being drafted and will be consulted on as soon as possible after this Bill receives Royal Assent. This process will ensure that the SDRP is not rushed and is developed to a high standard that can effectively support the individuals who will use it, as well as those who will operate it.
As my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond said, the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, put her case most elegantly. Although a bad dancer myself, my wife would tell the Committee that it is much more congenial to dance to elegant music. I can say that the May 2024 date is consistent with the Government’s planning assumptions, although, for the reasons I have given, they do not agree that setting a specific date in primary legislation is an appropriate or practical way of ensuring this. The amendments as drafted would prevent the Government making further regulations on the whole of the debt respite scheme after that date; this would be undesirable, as it would prevent the Government acting to amend the scheme in future—for example, in response to feedback.
The noble Baroness also asked when universal credit debt will be brought in to the scheme. UC overpayments will be included in the breathing space scheme from day one. UC advances, which the noble Baroness asked about, will be included in the scheme, on a phased basis, as soon as possible, as will third-party deductions. This does, however, require significant IT changes, but I assure the noble Baroness that the Government recognise the importance of including all UC debts as soon as possible. I hope that, having heard the debate, noble Lords will accept that we will reflect on what further clarity might be offered on a timetable, short of a statutory tie, and that what I have said on this will be reassuring.
Amendment 53 would expressly enable the regulations to cover the provision of debt advice. I assure my noble friend Lord Holmes that this is possible under the existing powers. It is already built in to the breathing space and is intended to be built in to the SDRP parts of the scheme. Indeed, the scheme cannot work without professional debt advice provision and the Government are aware of its importance. Amendments 56, 57 and 58, in the name of my noble friend Lord Lucas, affect the debt advice provider in breathing space, including extending the 60-day period of respite in breathing space, varying the time in which the debt adviser must conduct a midway review, or allowing the debt adviser to exclude certain debts from the scheme.
Amendments 61, 62 and 65 focus on the creditor, including the possibility of regulations being made which vary the time creditors have to comply with notifications, among other implications. The Financial Guidance and Claims Act 2018 delegated the detail of the debt respite scheme to secondary regulations, thus providing the Government with broad powers to design the scheme and implement it, rather than specifying implementation decisions in primary legislation. The Government have already set out their approach to the debt respite scheme as a whole in their response in June 2019, following the consultation they carried out. The policy aims to strike a fine balance between the interests of the debtor, debt advice provider and creditor. That was recognised in the speech by my noble friend Lord Lucas. My noble friend asked if joint debts would be included. Joint debts can be included in a moratorium, even if only one party seeks it. However, the other party’s other debts are unaffected. A moratorium applies to a debt, not a debtor.
Many of the aspects covered by these amendments are already factored in to the scheme design and, should the Government wish to make further changes to the breathing space regulations in future, they would not require these amendments to be made in order to do it. We will be glad to exchange further information with my noble friend Lord Lucas to reassure him further. He may ask whether, if the Government can already do these things, they will commit to do them. I assure noble Lords that the Government listen with respect and intend this scheme to be successful and useful. As I have already set out, there is still significant policy work to do on the SDRP, which is why the Government have committed to publishing draft regulations and consulting on them as soon as possible. With less than three months to go until the start of the breathing space scheme, it is important to have certainty and stability in the requirements to allow everyone affected to make the appropriate preparations. The matters which noble Lords have raised in their amendments will be kept under very close review.
Amendments 54 and 59 suggest changes to the Financial Guidance and Claims Act that would allow the Government to include specific provisions to the debt respite scheme. I assure noble Lords that Section 7 of that Act, as amended by Clause 34 of this Bill, will contain powers to allow the Government to include such measures as are suggested in this amendment. I recognise that Amendment 54, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, is intended to suggest certain design features for the SDRP. I will attempt to reassure noble Lords on the points raised, but not exclusively. As with my response to my noble friend Lord Lucas, we would certainly accept the noble Lord’s invitation to write to clarify further.
Amendment 54 seeks to require that debt advice providers be authorised by the FCA. It is envisaged, as set out in our response, that only debt advice providers with appropriate FCA authorisation will be able to offer an SDRP, unless they are a local authority which offers money advice and is exempt from FCA authorisation. This would mirror what has been legislated for in the Breathing Space scheme in secondary legislation. The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, asked for further clarity on this point—on which local authorities will be able to start Breathing Space. It applies only to those local authorities that offer debt counselling to residents. It is intended that those same debt advisers will be able to offer SDRPs when they are implemented.
Amendment 54 also suggests that only authorised charities or not-for-profit organisations should be allowed to become payment distributors. The 2019 consultation response explained that either debt advice agencies with FCA permissions for handling client money or the Insolvency Service should act as payment distributors. If commercial debt advice agencies do this, it is intended that they will be entitled only to the same percentage of monthly payments available to other types of payment distributor in the scheme. It is intended that they will not be able to charge debtors any fees for delivering any other aspect of the SDRP. Powers to determine a reasonable level for the charges in the scheme, to require debts owed to the Government and other public bodies and service providers to be included, and to protect against enforcement action by court-appointed enforcement agents, are already provided for in the clause we are debating.
Amendment 59 suggests the introduction of penalties for creditor non-compliance. Section 7 of the Financial Guidance and Claims Act already provides powers to impose consequences on creditors, so this amendment is unnecessary. I repeat that the Government have committed to publishing draft regulations and consulting on them as soon as possible after the Bill receives Royal Assent. That consultation will offer all those who are interested in the SDRP, including noble Lords, to consider the proposals and offer their feedback on the Government’s design for the scheme, ensuring that it is fit for purpose.
My noble friend Lady Morgan asked how the scheme would be funded. The Government intend for the administrative costs of the scheme to be funded by deducting an amount from debtors’ repayments. The funding model aims to ensure that it remains sustainable to operate for debt advice agencies while providing fairness to creditors—but I acknowledge that the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, probed a little further on that.
Turning to reviews, which are the subject of Amendments 60, 69 and 70, I can confirm that the Government are already committed to carrying out full and proper evaluations of both the Breathing Space scheme and SDRP after their commencement and will keep the matters raised by noble Lords under review. The Government are already required by law to carry out a review of Breathing Space within five years of its commencement. I can confirm that the Government are happy to continue to engage with my noble friend Lord Lucas on this issue to ensure that the views of stakeholders are heard. On Amendment 60 in particular, the Government continue to work closely with the Money and Pensions Service, the Financial Conduct Authority and other stakeholders to monitor personal finances, including financial resilience and the impact of debt on individuals.
On Amendments 63 and 64, my noble friend Lord Lucas asked whether the scheme was ready to go. His amendments would not permit regulations to commence until certain aspects of the Insolvency Service and court system’s IT services had been delivered. The Treasury understands that the Insolvency Service and Courts Service are on track to deliver the necessary functionality for debt advisers and creditors to comply with Breathing Space. Officials have engaged extensively with a broad range of creditors to ensure that they understand their obligations under the scheme and are making any necessary IT systems changes. Guidance for debt advisers and creditors was published in December 2020 to assist with that process, and the Money and Pensions Service is delivering training for debt advisers this month.
The start date for this scheme—4 May 2021—was set in regulations and agreed by both Houses last year, and the Government consider that implementing the Breathing Space scheme on time is a priority. Delaying implementation of a scheme that is due to start in less than three months would be unnecessary, unhelpful and harmful to debtors, who desperately need the relief this scheme offers, as all noble Lords have agreed.
Baroness Coussins (CB)
I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to the debate on this important group of amendments, especially those who supported my own two amendments on the introduction of SDRPs.
I am extremely grateful to the Minister for such an encouraging and sympathetic response. I will say only that the inclusion of the date of 1 May 2024 is there not as a fixed date but as a “no later than” date. Nevertheless, he has given me enough hope that we might meet again between now and Report to have a further discussion on this issue to see if any further progress can be made. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)
We now come to the group consisting of Amendment 55.
Amendment 55
“(4B) The regulations must also include the following as part of the scheme—(a) provision to ensure that any debts appearing on a repayment plan, which have either—(i) been sold by originating lenders to debt purchasing companies prior to the debtor entering the scheme, or(ii) been sold by originating lenders to debt purchasing companies whilst the debtor is in the scheme,are subject to what is to be known as a “fair debt write-down”; (b) that the level of the fair debt write-down must be calculated by the amount paid by the debt purchasing company for the debt plus no more than twenty per cent of the value of the debt;(c) that no more than the amount calculated under paragraph (b) may be collected in respect of any debts to which a fair debt write-down applies throughout the course of the debt repayment plan; and(d) that at the end of an individual’s debt repayment plan, any outstanding amount in respect of debts to which a fair debt write-down has applied is unenforceable against the debtor and must be treated as if fully discharged by virtue of section 251I of the Insolvency Act 1986 (discharge from qualifying debts).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to ensure that debts which have been sold by originating lenders on the secondary debt market are written down to a fair level.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 55, which appears in my name and has attracted the most welcome support of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans. I thank all noble Lords who have put their names down to speak in this group.
The amendment is modest in scope but highly practical in action. It addresses actions that could greatly improve the lives of people who desperately need that boost, as the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, said in summing up the previous debate. It also relates to Clause 34, but I think it makes a large enough difference to the plans that it needs to be considered alone, as useful and helpful as many proposals in the previous group were. It brings in a concept of debt write-off or debt write-down—something that I suspect will become part of many debates in your Lordships’ House in the coming years.
We were talking in the first group of amendments about flows of billions of pounds, Russian moguls and massive lumps of cash. Here we are talking about the lives of people for whom a 50p cup of tea in the local café is a luxury, for whom the disintegration of a long-nursed pair of shoes is a crisis. In the previous group many speakers referred to how Covid has made millions of debtors’ lives much harder, but this is not —or at least not just—an emergency pandemic measure.
If we look back a decade ago, debt often arose because of a sudden crisis, such as a car breaking down or a washing machine failing to start, or sometimes because the siren call of the payday lender or predatory credit card provider had proved irresistible. However, over the past decade, for hundreds of thousands of households, the persistent inadequacy of income, in most cases income coming through work with added benefits, has still not been enough, week after week, month after month, year after year, to meet basic needs. Debts have built up: essential debts such as council tax, and gas and electricity bills, even when resort to a food bank provided some brief moment of relief. For millions of Britons, finance—we are taking about the Financial Services Bill—means being trapped and overindebted. That is the situation of one in five adults, more than 8 million people, according to the Financial Conduct Authority. Even if we were to suddenly miraculously snap our fingers and lift the minimum wage to the real living wage and ensure that benefits met the level needed to pay essential bills—a very loud snap indeed—there would still be a huge mound of debt remaining.
I pay tribute to the Centre for Responsible Credit, which has done extensive work on this amendment and from which I think noble Lords will have received a briefing. This is not a political amendment but very much a practical one to address an issue that I hope the Committee will allow me to explain at a little length. In the debate on the last amendment, we were introduced to the Government’s debt respite scheme, which is intended to provide people who seek debt advice respite from enforcement proceedings for 60 days. Clause 34 creates an additional statutory debt repayment plan, a formal plan with creditors to repay all debts over a manageable period with protection from the bailiffs in the meantime. Crucially, that timeframe will generally be seven years, although it may be up to 10.
To set the scene for why we need this amendment, why we need a fair debt write-down, I will explain the other three means by which unpayable debt can be dealt with. Perhaps the best known is bankruptcy, which is reserved for debtors with significant assets that need to be liquidated and the proceeds distributed among creditors. Generally, the debts are discharged in full after one year. Next in terms of debt scale are individual voluntary arrangements, which were originally intended to allow home owners with significant levels of surplus income, after taking account of essential outgoings, to retain their home and secure a partial debt write-off. Resolution is generally achieved over five to six years. Remember, the idea is that people will still stay in their home. At the bottom of the income scale are debt relief orders. These were brought in 2009 for low-income, low-asset debtors, who see their debt discharged after one year. Access is by approved debt advisers but, to be eligible, conditions are tight.
However, many people fall in the middle, between IVAs and debt relief orders, and increasing numbers of IVAs are failing. There is a significant number of reports of them being mis-sold. Changes to debt orders are planned to enable them to encompass more people, but many will still fall in the gap between these two groups. Significant numbers of people are likely to be taking out statutory debt repayment plans, but as currently constituted there are problems. People are being assessed to see if they can repay the entirety of their debts over up to 10 years, based on a calculation of surplus income using the standard financial statement spending guidelines provided by the Money and Pensions Service. During the period of the plan, any increased income will be directed towards repayment of creditors, trapping people and actively discouraging them from taking up any opportunities that might, with a different plan, improve their circumstances. I also note that we have a transparency problem here with the standard financial statement not being in the public domain due to the Money and Pensions Service licensing terms. In summary, though, the key issue is that people under SDRPs are being trapped for up to 10 years, and certainly seven years, and locked into circumstances for at least double—and, potentially, 10 times—the length of other schemes.
I turn now to question of the debts and the companies that hold them. A large portion of these debts have already been written off by the originating lenders and sold on the secondary debt market. In 2018, the Financial Times reported that more than half the money being collected through debt management plans had been sold on in the secondary market. A presentation by the chair of the Credit Services Association in 2019 indicated that, in the preceding year, the total value of debt purchased by such firms was more than £55 billion. According to the 2019 annual report of one of the main debt purchasing firms, Cabot Credit Management Group Ltd, the average long-term purchase price for the debt averages 9p in the pound. So we have a potential 10-year debt repayment period, with 10 years of dragging fear, worry and poverty, and an industry that has purchased the right to impose that weight for less than 10% of the cost of the face value of the debts.
The Lord Bishop of St Albans
My Lords, I am glad to speak to Amendment 55 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. I placed my name to this amendment because of my concerns over indebtedness and particularly over the huge growth of household debt that has occurred during the Covid pandemic. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, I thank the Centre for Responsible Credit for the work it has undertaken on this amendment.
Last year, four Christian denominations and Church Action on Poverty published Reset the Debt. It documented the astonishing growth in indebtedness that occurred during the first lockdown and the summer. At that time, there was a hope that the economy would begin to reopen and bounce back, bringing a return to normality which would allow many people to get a handle on their growing debts. Unfortunately, the second spike in infections and increases in death meant that that economic reopening failed to materialise in the way we had hoped, causing conditions to worsen for many of those in debt. Furlough has been a lifesaver for many, and I congratulate Her Majesty’s Government on that policy, but there is a well-placed fear that once the economy opens redundancies will increase further, creating extra pressures on those who are already struggling. To quote the report:
“The lockdown continues to have profoundly unequal and poverty-increasing effects”.
At the time when the report was published, 6 million people had fallen behind on rent, council tax and other household bills because of coronavirus, with low-income families particularly turning to credit cards and overdrafts simply to survive. Covid debts, although particularly damaging for the poor, have significantly affected a variety of lower to middle-income households. This is on top of the existing debt that some of these households had incurred.
Over these past months, I have been struck by the many reports that I have received from churches, chaplaincies and charities across Hertfordshire and Bedfordshire in my diocese. They all describe the huge increase in demand from foodbanks and parish pantries, along with many more people seeking advice and relief from our of services and charities. In most cases, debt is not the consequence of a single factor but has slowly built up. However, Covid has speeded things up in a terrifying way. For the absolute poorest, debt relief orders may provide a lasting reprieve after a one-year period but many other households will be much less fortunate. Those households with a disposable income level of more than £100 per month, when compared with the lowest-income quintile, face difficult decisions and may end up being placed on a statutory debt-repayment plan and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, pointed out, may endure 10 years of full debt repayment. This can be egregious when that debt has been partially or even substantially written off and sold on to the secondary market.
Debt financing plays an important role in our economy and, despite my reservations about debt recovery practices, allows firms to profit from debt, which remains an unfortunate but perhaps necessary part of our economy. However, at the same time, there needs to be a balance. When debt has been partially written off, discounted and sold on to the secondary market, there is a strong moral case to pass on some of this discount to the debtor. It would be wrong to force an individual into misery and penury for the purpose of a full debt repayment when the original creditor readily discounted the debt to shift it on to a secondary buyer.
The amendment does not bar the purchaser of secondary debt from making a profit but merely places a limitation on how much can be reclaimed, and rightfully passes on a portion of the discount to the debtor. Limiting the potential return to more than 20% could even reduce the financial risk associated with purchasing secondary debt and may produce a more co-operative and less fearful environment for debtors and the recovery of debt.
Finally, it is worth reiterating the positive financial impacts that this would have on the Treasury. Allowing the full amount to be reclaimed may enrich the owners of the debt but will certainly cost the Treasury. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, points out, debt leads to horrifying social consequences, all of which cost the taxpayer. In not allowing the discounts from partially written-off debts to be given to the debtor, we would, in effect, be partially subsidising the social cost of debt, potentially to the tune of millions or perhaps even billions of pounds per annum. Given the increased debt resulting from the Covid crisis, morally it makes sense—there is also a strong economic case—to pass on the discounted price of the debt to people in severe financial difficulties and provide them with a fair debt write-down.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]
My Lords, I am delighted to follow the right reverend Prelate. We both sit on the rural action group of the Church of England. I should also declare that as a Bar apprentice in Edinburgh, one of my first duties was as a debt collector. I cannot claim that I had any particular training in that regard, and I was probably the least sympathetic at the time, given my youth and inexperience. I therefore congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, on the research that she has carried out in preparing for the amendment and bringing it forward. I also thank the Reset The Debt campaign for what they have achieved, as well as the Church Action on Poverty campaign in bringing these issues to the fore.
It may be that my noble friend the Minister is not minded to look sympathetically on the amendment but, at the very least, I ask him whether he accepts that there is a problem that needs to be addressed in this regard, for the simple reason that there will be an uplift in council tax of some 5% in some areas. It would also seem that, as yet, we have failed to address the issue of zero-hour contracts, which remains vexatious.
In moving the amendment, the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, referred to food banks. My experience is not that recent but occurred between 2010 and 2015, when I had cause to visit them in my area. What impressed me most is that it was often not people on benefits who used them but those in work but who did not work sufficient hours to make ends meet. This is a category of people to whom we owe something, and is an issue that should be addressed.
In particular, I ask my noble friend what instruction is given to IVAs and others that administer debt relief orders on the power they have to be more sympathetic to and imaginative about the circumstances in which debtors find themselves. Given the rather modest remit set out in Amendment 55, I hope that my noble friend might look at it fairly sympathetically. If he feels unable to support it, perhaps he will bring forward something along these lines at the next stage.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab) [V]
I want to say a few words at this late hour strongly in favour of Amendment 55 and mention the possibility of a wider-ranging debt jubilee. There is clearly a case for this amendment, and the same case can be made for a wider-ranging approach to relieving the burden that debt places on us all, not just on the individuals. Clearly it ruins lives and leads to much misery, but it also affects the rest of us: it acts as a drag on the economy and the recovery that we now so desperately need. Anything that we as a society can do to relieve the absolute burden of debt, the better.
The proposal in the amendment for a fair debt write-down is a welcome development to the debt relief scheme. The moral case for passing on some of the discount that currently goes to debt collection agencies is clear, and there is an advantage to the Treasury. The same case fundamentally applies to us as a whole. We need a more comprehensive package of debt cancellations, targeted at the household sector. We want a way of writing off debts, just as so many debts were written off in the financial sector 12 or 13 years ago. We were told then that some banks were too big to fail, because of the harm it would cause the economy. I argue that the challenges facing individuals, because of their debt, mean as much or even greater harm for us all.
The main argument today is that such a scheme, as well as relieving much individual misery, would provide a direct, targeted macroeconomic boost to the economy, exactly where it is needed, helping some of the most hard-up in our society. It will boost economic growth, and help those who have fallen into the misery of debt—and all of us.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I will offer a slightly different perspective on this. I understand the problems of overindebtedness among poor people, but I do not believe that Amendment 55 makes sense. If I understand the proposed scheme correctly and if a debt under a debt respite scheme is sold for less than its face value, the original borrower has to pay back only that lower amount plus 20%. Let us say that I buy a debt with a face value of £100, for which I pay £80. I can recoup £96, which is £80 plus 20% of £80. That might seem reasonable on a loan-by-loan basis but, in practice, loans are sold in groups or books.
To the extent that there is a market for debt respite scheme debts, the amount that a purchaser pays will take account of two main things—first, the likelihood that the debt will be repaid; and, secondly, the difference between the income receivable on the debt, if any, and the purchaser’s cost of funds.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab) [V]
My Lords, that was a very interesting intervention from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, which enhances her reputation as a banker of some repute. I am sure her figures are absolutely right; I was still writing them down as she finished. She has made the case that you need to be able to do these sorts of sums and mathematics if you are dealing with the sorts of debts we have been talking about for most of the afternoon.
I put my name down to speak on this debate, but not because I have a particular view on the merits of the amendment, which I thought was extremely well argued by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. She raised issues on the wider context of how debts are managed in society, which I think the Committee will be very grateful for having on its mind as we focus on the issues. She gave us a tour d’horizon of the various ways in which those who run into unmanageable debt have to deal with the process of repaying, absent a debt respite scheme and absent a scheme under which statutory repayments are organised. They are extremely tough and, to go through an IVA, a debt relief order or full bankruptcy is not something that one would recommend to people if there was another way of doing it.
Indeed, part of the debates we have been having are about how wide we should take this discussion. As my noble friend Lord Davies of Brixton mentioned, the way debt impacts on society is something that is worthy of wider consideration in a more general sense rather than in relation to the particularity of the processes that we are involved in.
That said, it is good that we are having this debate about the wider context within which debt operates in society. It is not a debate that you hear very often, and it is an area of policy that could be afforded a lot more consideration. As such, I will join with the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, in suggesting that the amendment should not progress at this stage, but for completely different reasons. I think there is a better way of dealing with this relating to the way debts are sold.
The argument that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, made, which is that this is how financial institutions obtain the liquidity necessary to maintain the cycle of lending on which we all depend, means that we need to have a better understanding of what happens when debts go wrong and when big institutions of the type that she talked about have to deal with the consequences. I do not mean to go through that in any real detail, but perhaps when the Minister responds he could take into account some of the thinking on this for when we look in detail at the regulations that he has promised us sight of on the statutory debt management plan, and in relation to what I think will be necessary at some point in the not-too-distant future: a reconsideration of the role of the debt relief order and the IVA’s structure, which is part and parcel of the process of dealing with this.
The essential point here is about how, and on what basis, those who have decisions to make about debt make them about individuals who have repayments to make. My understanding, picked up over the time that I was at StepChange, was that, by and large, we are not dealing with a very large proportion of society who are feckless about incurring debts. What tended to come across to me from looking at StepChange’s clients, listening in to the calls that were made to it and observing some of the emails and discussions around electronic systems was that most people—the huge majority—were appalled to be in unmanageable debt situations and were desperate to make a repayment. However, they did not have the financial knowledge and understanding of the system and the world in which they were operating to deal with it themselves. They needed help, which led to the debt advice and the subsequent process of repayment that we have been talking about.
However, at the heart of this is the same calculation that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, made: if someone in a credit card organisation or bank is lending money to someone and learns that that debt is going wrong, then there is an immediate calculation of the likely return from it. While we in this country stick to the idea that the creditor must always be repaid in full—or as close to it as possible—the reality is, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, explained it, that a decision has to be reached about what proportion of that debt will be repaid and over what timescale.
My impression is that we are talking about a very large difference in perception. I return to the noble Baroness’s example of a £100 debt that goes bad—she says that one in five will not repay. In a sense, that is the start of the conversation that the person who made the loan has to have with their boss to assess what rate of recovery the loan will have. I believe that we need to have further understanding—not necessarily today or on this Bill—about how that process needs to work better for society. I agree with my noble friend Lord Davies of Brixton: a social issue needs to be addressed at some point, not necessarily today.
If it is true that a loan of £100 has a default rate of at least one in five—I suspect it is higher than that—then we should not be thinking in terms of trying to get a 100% return; we should set in our minds a figure that society could accept and which would be more reasonable in relation to the overall quantum of debt, better afforded by those who need to make repayments and more acceptable to those who do the lending. We are not yet there, and I do not have a solution to this; we are probably too early in the process of discussion and debate. I look forward to the Minister’s comments. This is a conversation that we should have more generally, away from a Bill, on a broader understanding of debt in society.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and I very rarely seem to agree on the types of issues covered in this amendment, but on this one we are totally of one mind. I am very grateful because I tried to write an explanation of how this process would work and it was so inferior. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, not only explained it very clearly, step by step, but included numbers, which makes it much more evident.
I think there must be some misunderstanding. As the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, explained, it is perfectly normal for an originating company to sell off the loans it has, sometimes because it can sell them to someone who has a different funding profile or a different tolerance for the average duration of the book of loans being sold, or because somebody may take a different view on how many of the loans will pay in full, pay in part or default. It is a perfectly standard process and provides liquidity to the market. As the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, said, if an organisation had to keep all the loans it generated on its books and could not sell them off, it would find very quickly that it was constrained in doing any new business. That would be hugely damaging to many of the people who go out and borrow. It tends to be a completely different business that will buy loans in the secondary market.
The question that underpins this is: is the Statutory Debt Repayment Plan right and fair when it is put in place? If that is true, it should not matter if the money is paid to the originating company or to the secondary buyer. Within the portfolio, there will be some people who can and do meet the full obligations of the Statutory Debt Repayment Plan, and surely that is appropriate. There will be others who fail and end up in bankruptcy, and whoever is holding the loan will lose out.
My question is whether there is any read-over from the kind of issues we have had with mortgage prisoners. It is important that where there are expectations about how the original lender will behave, they are carried over to the secondary lender. For example, if the original lender is quite likely to offer an alternative loan or new terms and conditions or whatever else, you would expect to see that reflected in the secondary lender. I would not want a situation where the secondary lender was able to levy additional charges or put additional costs on the borrower that would not have been expected by the original lender but perhaps are not covered in the minutiae of the contract.
Otherwise, the honest truth is that I just do not understand this amendment. I am absolutely certain that it completely seizes up any possibility of having a secondary market, and the people who will pay the greatest consequence for that are those who need to go out and borrow from time to time and are at the margins of being appropriate borrowers.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I think this debate brings out the fact that we do not fully understand this area. There is obviously a case for a great debate. We are, sadly, going to see many more people in heavy, chronic debt and we will see people—to use a colloquial term—fall apart. When people have debt and cannot see how they are going to cope, they lose their equity in society.
Perhaps I am being unfair, but I see a conflict here between people—human beings—and loan books and technocrats. That is not a very useful comment. I cannot argue that this particular amendment should be pressed, but the debate about it brings out that we almost certainly do not have all the mechanisms, and the understanding of the human beings involved, to face the many more people who will be in chronic debt when we, who are not in that situation, are talking about the Covid crisis being over. Those people need society’s help, and for them to have that, we need a much better understanding of the impacts on those people and how we can make sure that the excesses of the people who hold the books are restrained.
Lord True (Con)
My Lords, we have already spoken at some length about the statutory debt repayment plan, so I will restrict my remarks to the amendment in front of us. Amendment 55 would require regulations to include a provision that would mean debts that have been sold by one creditor to another are subject to a fair debt write-down when they are included within an individual’s SDRP. Both my noble friend Lady Noakes and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, illustrated, from their position of great experience in these areas, some of the important issues that would need to be considered in an intervention of the kind proposed. The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, made the same point from a slightly different perspective.
As its name suggests, the SDRP is intended to support the repayment of debts in full, over a manageable timeframe. The policy is not intended to provide debt relief, but a fair and sustainable way to improve debtors’ finances and returns to creditors. Other statutory debt solutions, such as debt relief orders, offer debt relief to people for whom repayment is not a realistic prospect. The Government recently launched a consultation on raising the financial threshold criteria for individuals entering a debt relief order.
The noble Baroness’s amendment would apply to debts which have been sold on, and not to other qualifying debts. The Government do not agree that it is necessary or desirable to treat these debts, or the people who owe them, differently from other debts and debtors in the scheme whose debts have not been sold on. People entering an SDRP will be in financial difficulties regardless of who the debts are owed to, and they all deserve fair and equitable treatment. I can, however, reassure the noble Baroness that, as per the 2019 consultation response, accrual of most interest, fees and charges will be prevented during a SDRP, so the amount of a person’s debt should not increase while they are repaying, regardless of who the debt is owned by or sold to in that period.
This amendment would also require any outstanding amounts owed in respect of sold-on debts to be treated as if fully discharged at the end of an SDRP. As the SDRP supports debtors to repay debts in full, it is not envisaged that there will be any outstanding amount left to pay at the end of a completed SDRP. Including such provision would be contrary to the policy intent of the Bill and to the broader arguments put forward by noble Lords in the course of this brief discussion, so I hope that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate, particularly those who have supported Amendment 55. I particularly thank the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, who painted a powerful picture of the impact of what we now know was the early stages of the pandemic, as set out in the churches’ Reset the Debt report. He spoke movingly about the increase in demand at food banks and church food pantries, which have been essential in helping so many households through. However, the food bank does not pay the gas bill or the council tax demand.
The right reverend Prelate stressed, as we would expect, the strong moral case for this fair debt write-off—who better to do so? The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, highlighted the pressure of council tax being felt by so many households. Of course, council tax is funding essential services as budgets are being squeezed by slashed funding from Westminster. I should perhaps declare at this point that I am a vice-president of the Local Government Association. I also thank the noble Baroness for stressing the issue of zero-hours contracts, which affect so many households.
I strongly thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, for making a powerful argument for something much larger than this, as I said at the start, modest proposal; for making the parallel with the bank write-offs of 2007-08; and for calling for consideration of a more wide-ranging debt jubilee. That is why I went to a number of NGOs and campaign groups with a proposal; they came back to me with this, saying that it could and should be practically delivered right now. The noble Lord also made a useful point about the macroeconomic impacts and the sheer drag of debt.
As for the contribution of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, I am sure that we will find something to agree on one day, but I thank her for her thoughtful exploration and exposition of the detail. I am not sure, looking at the clock on my computer, that this is the ideal time in the evening to go through her worked example in detail, but I will point out that what is proposed here is not retrospective. In fact, I do not think we even have the power to do such a thing. The price of the debt purchased in the future would reflect the legal change and so would still allow a profit to be made. I also think, given that the secondary debt market is currently paying less than 10 pence in the pound, that her example reflects little understanding of the practical reality of the lives of many in society and in many communities. Perhaps she is thinking more in the range of the market of Greensill Bank, which we have seen collapse today.
I very much agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, said on the need for a broader debate on debt, reflecting also what the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said. I do not agree that we should not act now: we are in an emergency situation and, as the discussion on the previous group highlighted, we need to give some certainty and hope. Given the noble Lord’s reflections on how people are appalled and horrified to find themselves in this situation, I thank him for sharing those experiences.
On the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer —I will take a look at them in Hansard to ensure that I understood them clearly—there may be some misunderstanding at their heart. Being in debt in the secondary market is not about creating a situation where extra charges can be laid. We are not talking about people going out to borrow money. We are talking about council tax bills, and gas and electricity charges.
The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, said that we really need broader debates on these issues. Indeed, I said in my introduction that I expect to come back to them many times in the coming years. At the moment, we have had a useful debate; I take on board the noble Lord’s suggestion of a general debate. Perhaps those on the Front Benches, who have much more access to such occasions, would consider originating such a debate. My action at the moment is obvious.
Again, I thank everyone who has contributed here today and everyone who has contributed to this discussion outside this Committee. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment, but I reserve the right to consider bringing it back. I invite any noble Lords who are interested in working with me on this matter to approach me.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)
That concludes the work of the Committee this evening. The Committee stands adjourned. I remind Members to sanitise their desks and chairs before leaving the Room.
Financial Services Bill
Monday 8th March 2021
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Financial Services Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 162-VI(Rev) Revised sixth marshalled list for Grand Committee - (8 Mar 2021)
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Healy of Primrose Hill) (Lab)
My Lords, the hybrid Grand Committee will now begin. Some Members are here in person, respecting social distancing, others are participating remotely, but all Members will be treated equally. I must ask Members in the Room to wear a face covering, except when seated at their desk, to speak sitting down, and to wipe down their desk, chair and any other touch points before and after use. If the capacity of the Committee Room is exceeded or other safety requirements are breached, I will immediately adjourn the Committee. If there is a Division in the House, the Committee will adjourn for five minutes.
I will call Members to speak in the order listed. During the debate on each group, I invite Members, including Members in the Grand Committee Room, to email the clerk using the Grand Committee address if they wish to speak after the Minister. I will call Members to speak in order of request.
The groupings are binding. Leave should be given to withdraw amendments. When putting the question, I will collect voices in the Grand Committee Room only. I remind Members that Divisions cannot take place in Grand Committee. It takes unanimity to amend the Bill, so if a single voice says “Not Content”, an amendment is negatived and if a single voice says “Content” a clause stands part. If a Member taking part remotely wants their voice accounted for if the question is put, they must make this clear when speaking on the group.
Amendment 74
“Alignment of accounting to prudential standards
Where the prudential capital and profit or losses for a banking company are lower than the accounting numbers for that banking company where International Accounting Standards have been used, then the accounting numbers must have an adjustment to the balance sheet and profit and loss account in order to—(a) align the accounting numbers with the regulatory capital of the banking company which constrains the growth of a banking company and its ability to lend,(b) align the regulatory capital for going concern purposes with the accounting capital for going concern purposes,(c) align the regulatory capital and profits for remuneration purposes with the accounting capital and profits in accordance with the regulations for shareholder approval of director remuneration, and(d) align the regulatory capital and profits for distribution purposes with the accounting capital and profits for distribution purposes.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that when there are prudential filters discounting capital these should be carried through to accounting capital figures.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, I declare my financial services interests as in the register. The two amendments in this group concern the use of international financial reporting standards, particularly with regard to banks. Their aim is to permit a very abbreviated explanation of some of the problems with and lack of transparency of IFRS and to probe the return of a role for the Bank of England concerning the endorsement of accounting standards now that the approval of IFRS is repatriated to the UK and their approval under UK legislation involves an economic interest test. I thank my noble friend Lady Kramer and the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, for signing my amendments.
It is undeniable that IFRS played a part in the financial crisis and, even though they have been amended since in recognition of that role, they are still not fit for purpose for calculating prudential capital. As far as banks are concerned, they have two sets of numbers: statutory accounts for Companies Act going concern, on which there is an auditor’s opinion, and numbers for the prudential regulator which—if I may put it this way—really show the going concern situation, because that is what prudential regulators want to know.
It is worth looking at a couple of points to see the sort of thing that regulators discount for prudential purposes. Good will is taken out, because obviously it is not loss-absorbing and is not much good when a company is running out of money. It is also the case that a bank’s debt can be shown merely at the junk bond debt value in a bank’s IFRS accounts rather than the sum actually owed, which again is not the real money situation. For a bank that is going bust, or just not doing so well, the published accounts can show a rosier picture than the prudential numbers. I do not know any serious analysts who use the IFRS accounts rather than regulators’ numbers.
Regrettably, there are many other anomalies affecting other businesses. IFRS 15, for example, can introduce a smoothing effect, changing some sales into an income spread over future years and therefore providing exactly the kind of disguising of downturns that has caused problems in the past.
Given that a bank’s ability to trade is determined by its prudential solvency and banking licence rather than its IFRS accounts disclosed to the market, it is actually a bit absurd to say that a set of accounts can fit the Companies Act going-concern requirements and be signed off for the market when a bank might be a gone concern as far as the regulator is concerned and no longer able to trade. That may be the theoretical end-game problem, but it would seem more sensible for the banks to have to disclose to the markets the accounts that they have to live by for their licence. That is probably a better set of numbers on which to reward executives as well.
Many other countries recognise such anomalies and do not allow IFRS to be used without modification. Australia has its guidance note AGN 220.2, Impairment, Provisioning and the General Reserve for Credit Losses, and fared better in the financial crisis as a result. EU countries do not allow IFRS or IFRS-like calculations at the company level for determining going concern. The US will have nothing to do with it and only very grudgingly allows it to be used by non-US companies. I know that because I helped to negotiate it. The UK is really the outlier here.
Amendment 74 suggests that where the prudential capital and profit or loss for a banking company are less than the accounting numbers, the accounting numbers should be adjusted to the prudential numbers in the balance sheet and the profit-and-loss account because it is the regulatory capital that is the true amount for limiting growth, the real going-concern number, the safe distribution calculation and the fair director remuneration assessment. Yes, I am being provocative because I want some thinking on this, not the usual bland leave-us-alone acceptance.
I turn to Amendment 77. The PRA is the body closest to dealing with the unrealities still existent in IFRS that affect banks and recognising the effects that they have on the safety and stability of companies. The Bank of England is surely the pre-eminent body for analysing economic effects in the UK. Therefore, my Amendment 77 proposes to give the Bank of England a role in determining whether there is an adverse effect on the economy of the UK—the test set in the relevant statutory instrument for endorsing IFRS—and whether the standard is suitable for use in prudential regulation and, if not, to require that it not be used for the purpose of prudential regulation. Of course, some of this overlaps with what it is already doing.
I am sure that the Minister and other Members of the Committee realise that I am using this opportunity to highlight a matter that should be looked at more carefully, rather than just letting the IFRS juggernaut trundle on, whether that be for another HBOS or another Carillion. There are significant issues that affect the economy as well as many other issues with IFRS that depart from the normal logic of what accounts should mean and that are hard, if not impossible, to reconcile with the various requirements of company law. They have been swept under the carpet for far too long. I beg to move.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I am struggling with Amendment 74 because I think that it is aiming at a target that does not really exist, and it confuses capital and profits and losses.
The amendment would require what are quaintly called the “accounting numbers” to be adjusted to align with regulatory capital. Apart from anything else, that would result in accounts that do not comply with the Companies Act 2006, which requires, under Section 393, that accounts show
“a true and fair view of the assets, liabilities, financial position and profit or loss”.
The amendment seems to suggest that adjustments would be made to the accounts other than for the purposes of compliance with international accounting standards or to show a “true and fair view”, and, in that case, I believe that the resulting accounts would not comply with the Companies Act. We have to emphasise that these are international accounting standards, to which all countries that sign up follow, so this would be a major departure for accounting by banks and other institutions in this country.
I also note that, in proposed new paragraph (d), this is to apply to “profits for distribution purposes”, but that seems to misunderstand the fact that distributable profits are determined at the level of the parent entity solo accounts, whereas the adjustments that I believe are being targeted would be found in the accounts of subsidiary regulated entities or in the consolidated accounts, rather than those of the parent itself.
Regulatory capital already operates as a constraint on lending, so I fail to see what real-world impact any adjustments in the statutory accounts would have. While I understand the concept of regulatory capital, I do not understand the concept of “prudential” or “regulatory” profits or losses. I do not believe that “regulatory profits or losses” is a term that really exists, except to the extent that accumulated profits or losses form part of regulatory capital. It is difficult to see how proposed new paragraph (c) in Amendment 74 would work in relation to remuneration.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, has explained the sorts of adjustments that are made for regulatory purposes and that, under her amendment, would be taken into the statutory accounts—for example, the treatment of intangible assets. It is not clear to me why the prudential treatment of these items should be imported into true and fair accounts. The treatment for regulatory capital is linked to loss absorbency, which is not an underlying principle of financial accounting, and it therefore cannot readily be accommodated within the structure of accounting standards.
Pillar 3 statements, which are required to be produced by all regulatory banks, set out the information required in much detail. If the noble Baroness is correct—I am not sure that she is—that analysts use and rely on Pillar 3 statements, not statutory accounts, they already have that information: all of it is in the public domain.
Amendment 77 is unnecessary. It is already open to the PRA to base regulatory capital on different numbers from those in the annual accounts. I have already mentioned intangible assets. It also ignores gains or losses or known liabilities, a very arcane bit of the accounting standards that makes companies recognise gains when their credit ratings reduce the fair value of their outstanding liabilities. The PRA has not needed any special statutory cover to eliminate that from regulatory capital.
Furthermore, it is unsound for the Bank of England to approach accounting for individual institutions on the basis of the impact that a standard may have on the economy of the UK, as if accounting were a mere plaything of policymakers. I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, will not press these amendments.
Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted and Lady Noakes. I will speak to Amendments 74 and 77 because they both raise some real, important and fundamental issues.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, indicated, vastly different numbers for bank capital and profits are communicated through conventional financial statements and by the regulators—because they are prepared on different assumptions, for different audiences and for different purposes. I hope that the Minister will tell us which of those numbers can considered true and fair. Can he also say whether the regulators are justified in relying on something that does not pass that test?
Viscount Trenchard (Con) [V]
My Lords, these amendments, which are technical in nature, require banks that prepare their accounts in accordance with international accounting standards to apply prudential filters discounting capital to the banks’ statutory accounts. Having read the amendment, I am not clear which is the tail and which is the dog. Amendment 74 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, requires a bank to align its accounts with its regulatory capital or prudential capital, and at the same time requires the bank to align its regulatory capital with its accounting capital, for three separate purposes.
I agree with my noble friend Lady Noakes’s forensic criticism of the amendment. I am not a chartered accountant, but I have worked in corporate finance and mergers and acquisitions for many years, and I find the amendment confusing. Does
“then the accounting numbers must have an adjustment to the … profit and loss account”
mean that the bank concerned must alter its accounting principles and adjust its accounts to use the prescriptive and conservative accounting principles used by the PRA for the monitoring of banks? If so, would a bank be required to restate past years’ published accounts for consistency’s sake? Proposed new paragraph (a) suggests that the PRA’s measurement of capital must be carried through to the bank’s accounts, but proposed new paragraphs (b) to (d) suggest that the bank’s regulatory accounts should be adjusted to conform with the PRA’s measurements. I am not clear how that can be done and what the PRA would have to say about it.
The amendment refers to international accounting standards, which were standards issued by the International Accounting Standards Board, based in London. EU legislation has continued to use the term “international accounting standards”, but they were replaced in 2001 by international financial reporting standards—IFRS. The noble Baroness confirmed that she meant IFRS rather than IAS in her amendment, but how does she intend that her amendment should affect banks that apply other accounting standards, such as American banks, which still prepare their accounts according to GAAP? Concepts in the amendment such as accounting numbers and regulatory capital need proper definition.
I have rather more sympathy with Amendment 77. The International Accounting Standards Board develops and issues IFRS for use internationally. In the EU, things are then at the discretion of the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group—EFRAG—which advises the European Commission on whether and how the IFRS should be adopted for businesses in the EU. EFRAG will consult the relevant national bodies as part of that process; for example, if a new or revised IFRS is issued by the IASB that impacts the banking industry, EFRAG will consult the European Central Bank on the impact of that standard before making a decision on its adoption.
Now that the UK is able to establish an independent endorsement process, it seems sensible that that process should similarly involve the Bank of England in matters relating to IFRS that may impact the institutions over which the PRA has regulatory authority. I am not sure whether the amendment as drafted is satisfactory, but I would support the introduction here of an endorsement role for the Bank. I look forward to hearing my noble friend the Minister’s views on that.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, in this area I cannot pretend to have the scope of knowledge or the expertise of my noble friend Lady Bowles or the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, but I have a great deal of sympathy with their amendments which comes from long frustration with trying to deal with banking standards. I probably had some small part to play in the focus that the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards applied to looking at IFRS and other banking frameworks. I would defy almost anybody looking at the published accounts of Northern Rock, HBOS or RBS to have identified how fragile those institutions were and how easily they would crack the moment any pressure was applied to the very fragile arrangements they had in place. It is no wonder that it was missed by the regulators if they were looking at the disclosures that came from those institutions. They were not falsified; it is just that working your way through the disclosures very often discloses very little.
I spent a good part of my banking career trying to extract real and consistent information from accounting statements. That was largely in the States, so we were using GAAP, which I think many people will acknowledge tells one a lot more than IRFS ever does, but a bank has the resource to do that kind of deconstruction for a potential or existing credit client. Investment firms have the resources to do that kind of deconstruction, and so do regulators, but for any normal investor, and certainly for any smaller creditor such as a trade creditor, it is impossible to have those resources, as it is for any normal politician, even if in the end we carry the buck, in a sense, for whether or not we have a system that works. Over many years, the only clients who ever handed me a straightforward deconstructed set of accounts were Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger, who headed up the GEICO insurance subsidiary. They did it simply because they felt that bankers should know what was going on. That is a good enough recommendation for any company or regulator.
Lord Eatwell (Lab)
My Lords, I have sympathy with the concerns behind these amendments. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and my noble friend Lord Sikka have spelled out so clearly, there is an intimate link between accounting standards and effective prudential regulation. It is probably true that nothing has a greater impact on policy than the manner in which relevant variables are measured.
That relationship between accounting standards and prudential regulation has been exposed just this last week with the collapse of Greensill Capital, a supply chain financing firm. Its business model was based on flaws in UK accounting—that was how it worked. As the Financial Times reports:
“While a company that uses supply-chain finance owes money to a financial institution, accountants do not class these facilities as debt. Instead a company typically books the money owed in the ‘trade payable’ or ‘accounts payable’ line of its balance sheet, mingled in with all the other bills owed to suppliers. While a footnote to the accounts might explain how much of this line is made up of money actually owed to financial institutions, rather than suppliers, there is no requirement to disclose it.”
Lack of disclosure means that the supply chain has proved popular with struggling companies looking to mask their mounting borrowings. When nervous lenders remove these facilities from heavily indebted companies, it can create an effect similar to a bank run on their working capital position, whereby that quasi bank run then escalates into risk to the financial services sector. Who really suffers? Typically, it is the SMEs at the origins of the supply chain. Greensill is not an isolated example. Parliamentary investigations into the collapse of the Carillion group, already mentioned, found that it made heavy use of the Government’s supply chain finance programme. MPs investigating the outsourcer’s demise said that the scheme allowed it to “prop up” its failing business model.
This is a major concern in the prudential management of the financial services sector in the UK. If accounting standards and methods do not accurately represent the fragility or strength of an institution, especially a financial institution, they severely compromise our efforts at prudential regulation.
A quite different prudential and market conduct risk created by accounting standards arises from the fact—again already mentioned—that while the UK’s accounting standards apply IFRS, the US maintains its own GAAP different standard. Are the UK Government pursuing negotiations with the US Administration to encourage the adoption of a common standard, perhaps one that accurately represents the risks present in financial institutions?
The issues raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, require urgent consideration, not just by the accounting profession but by Her Majesty’s Treasury and by the prudential regulators.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, as we have heard, Amendments 74 and 77 concern accounting standards. I have listened carefully to what the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and other Members of the Committee have said. It is perhaps best to begin by making a key distinction: the objective of accounting numbers is to show a true and fair financial position of a company; the objective of regulatory capital numbers is to provide information to the regulators in meeting their supervisory objectives. These are different numbers used for different purposes.
Amendment 74 proposes a kind of conflation of those purposes by requiring UK banks to align their accounts prepared under international accounting standards with their regulatory capital equivalent where the regulatory capital number is lower. My noble friend Lady Noakes rightly made the point that I have just made: these accounting standards are international. It is in the UK’s interests to maintain convergence with international accounting standards—IFRS—set by the International Financial Reporting Standards Foundation. The IFRS bring consistency to financial statements and allow investors easily to compare the financial statements of companies across the world. It is therefore consistent with the Government’s aim of ensuring that the UK retains its reputation as a global hub for business for the UK to continue to adopt these standards.
The amendment would result in financial statements of UK banks not being prepared in accordance with those international accounting standards. UK banks wishing to maintain listings abroad would however still need to prepare a second set of financial statements. The UK prudential regime for banks is supported by detailed regulatory reporting. It is these reports and other data gathered from firms that are the basis for prudential regulation, and not financial statements and annual reports.
A subset of the information contained in the regulatory reporting is published in the form of what is referred to as Pillar 3 reports. These reports include details of the regulatory capital held by banks. Therefore, while Pillar 3 reports are not identical in form to financial statements prepared for accounting purposes, they already provide a significant amount of the information sought by this amendment.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for having taken part in this debate and for enabling me to find some way in a busy parliamentary schedule to enable airing of a few of the problems with IFRS. I regret that IFRS has not been picked for a study by a Select Committee; I have tried but it is a rather dry subject that gets few votes when set against competing topics.
I have to admit that Amendment 74 was not only probing but perhaps a little impetuous in trying to provoke some thought about what was actually going on. My main point is that accounting has made it very difficult to get a genuine view of what is true and fair. If anybody wants to look at the RBS preliminary hearings that went to the courts, it was said there that the law was not for experts but for ordinary people. The fact is that we have got to a stage where there is such a departure between accounting standards and what the normal person would understand that I seriously challenge whether they really do give a true and fair view.
Things that can be done with supply chain financing, as the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, expressed, have undermined several significant businesses, yet still it is there and going on. I accept that one needs something like IFRS for international comparisons, but the UK is still the outlier in having copied a lot of the flaws of IFRS into the national accounting, so it appears again at the company level beneath. It is that which can therefore cause some of the crashes, whereas, in other countries, because they do not apply it at their national accounting standard level and to company-level accounts, they manage to escape.
Amendment 77 is not as impetuous, perhaps, as Amendment 74. Once upon a time the Bank of England used to jointly appoint the head of the FRC, so it had some say in it, but that now seems to have disappeared and it is left just to the Minister and BEIS. But I did not invent the bit that I pointed out about the economic analysis; that is what the endorsement board has to do to endorse IFRS and what is present in the International Accounting Standards and European Public Limited-Liability Company (Amendment Etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, one of the 100 or so SIs that I diligently scrutinised with other noble Lords. So I have not invented the test; a test is there and is going to be conducted by a subset of the FRC, a board established under the auspices of the FRC, or the ARGA, when we get round to doing it. Will it really be the right body for that economic interest test? As the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, explained, taking an opinion from the Bank of England would seem appropriate.
The Minister’s argument is that we should not rock the boat on anything. We can let the deceptions and failures keep on coming but, underlying this, if we do nothing and leave it with the accountants to do their fancy footwork on the figures, which might suit them but nobody else, we can record now that the Treasury did not go poking around to find out what was going on and has done nothing to help. For now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
“Short selling review
(1) Within the period of six months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must commission a review of legislation relating to short selling.(2) Following the conclusion of the review, the Secretary of State must lay a report before Parliament.”
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]
My Lords, I am delighted to have this opportunity to speak to and move Amendment 78, and to thank my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond for his support and for co-signing the amendment.
Clause 40 deals with subordinate legislation made under retained direct EU legislation. This is a probing amendment to look at what I consider to be a timely review of the practice of short selling. The background to this is that short selling is regulated now by the Short Selling (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018, based on the earlier EU regulation 236 from 2012, also amended by the Technical Standards (Short Selling Regulation) (EU Exit) Instrument 2019. Clearly, there are powers for the UK to prohibit or restrict short selling or limit transactions when the price of various instruments admitted to trading on a UK trading venue, which includes shares, sovereign and corporate bonds and ETFs, has fallen more than the appropriate percentage threshold from the previous day’s closing price. In exceptional market conditions, there are also powers under these regulations to address adverse events or developments that pose a serious threat to financial stability or market confidence in the UK.
The powers are set out and include extending the scope of the notification disclosure regime to include additional financial instruments admitted to trading on a UK trading venue and requiring lenders of financial instruments admitted to trading on a UK trading venue to notify any significant change in their fees. There are other powers as well.
Most recently in the UK, the Bank for International Settlements conducted a study suggesting that fund providers offered lower-quality paper to fill redemption markets, as reported in the Financial Times, and that it was felt and alleged that bond ETFs might have short-changed market-makers during the 2020 panic—as if there was not enough going on with the Covid-19 pandemic. It is obviously deeply worrying that this happened in 2020, as confirmed by the Bank for International Settlements. This is a good opportunity to revisit this, as this is not supposed to happen. Obviously, this is a timely moment to look at this, after the collapse and then the surge in the US of the GameStop share fiasco in January and February.
I take this opportunity to ask my noble friend whether he is convinced that an event such as GameStop would not happen in the UK and that we have robust regulations, as I have set out. I am slightly concerned that they have not been tested enough and I believe that we should revisit them. If the ETFs performed in the way that was alleged and concluded by the Bank for International Settlements in 2020, that was deeply unhelpful at a very difficult time. Therefore, does my noble friend agree that this would be a good opportunity for the Government to look at this and undertake to conduct a review to ensure that the regulations, as I set out this afternoon, are fit for purpose? Are they robust enough in terms of Covid, as we saw in March 2020 in the UK, to prevent something like GameStop happening here?
I realise that anybody making an investment is taking a risk, and that we are always told that share prices can go down as well as up, but this is a very modest amendment, ensuring that, within six months of the Bill being enacted and coming into force, the Secretary of State will commission a review of the legislation relating to short selling and, at the conclusion of the review, lay a report before Parliament. I personally have deep misgivings about short selling and question whether the regulations in place are sufficient. As we have left the European Union, and were told that the United Kingdom Government would take every opportunity to revisit those regulations that we have now adopted as part of UK law, it would be a good opportunity to review them within six months of the Bill’s enactment. It gives me great pleasure to move this amendment today and look forward to the Minister’s response. I beg to move.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, I was not sure where the debate on short selling would go. I am broadly satisfied with the present rules that prohibit naked short selling and require that a short seller has identified where they will obtain the shares when delivery is required. There is a little bit of wriggle room in the identifying, which was very hard fought for by the UK when the EU regulation was being negotiated. Some would like it more relaxed so that there is a looser understanding of how the shares will be found; others would like to ban short selling altogether. I am not convinced that any significant change is needed in that area but, having negotiated the current compromise, I am both biased and happy for someone else to gather the scars on their back.
As the noble Baroness said, there has been additional interest in short selling because of the developments around GameStop and AMC shares, with some retail investors deliberately seeking to put a short squeeze on to hedge funds with large short positions. The shares became heavily promoted on internet sites and social media, and no doubt there are individuals who made poor decisions about investing as a consequence. Eventually, brokers took steps to curtail retail access, and therefore activity, which stopped extreme movements, but that also calls into question rights of retail access and whether there will be discouragement of things such as commission-free retail trading.
In the UK—and, indeed, the EU—we do not have such large net short positions as tend to be found in the US. That may well be due in part to the more restrictive requirements on the identification of where one is going to get the shares from, and stricter disclosure requirements. Retail access is not so well developed here, either.
I do not know whether the Treasury Select Committee has taken any evidence on this—it seems taken up by the Gloster review—but the chair of ESMA appeared before the corresponding committee in the European Parliament on 23 February. In that appearance, there was a suggestion that other things around the subject may need looking at—such as market abuse and best execution, which would be under MiFID II—rather than short selling.
The FCA website has a six-line generic statement, put up on 29 January, about “recent share trading issues”, warning about potential loss of money, that losses are unlikely to be covered by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, and that broking firms are not obliged to offer trading facilities to clients, which covers the point about withdrawal of service. It tweeted a similar warning.
Here I should probably draw attention to my specific interest as a director of the London Stock Exchange. I know that a close eye has been kept on the situation, looking at additional analysis, possible additional monitoring and scenarios that could arise within our markets, and having discussions with the FCA, but that is all work in progress.
A lot of people seem to consider short selling fundamentally evil, but it is really just like ordering a book from a bookseller, paying for it, and getting it later when the seller has purchased it from the publisher. That is okay if you know there is a book and a publisher and you have not already been told that it is sold out. It is not okay when there is no book, and so on. That is the distinction between naked short selling, when you do not know whether the book is there, and having identified that you can actually get your hands on the book to fulfil the order. Broadly speaking, I am not sure that a huge overhaul of short selling needs to be looked at. If all these things are to be looked at, it probably needs to go beyond what is in the short selling regulation and look at how execution has to happen as well.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to take part in day five of Committee of the Financial Services Bill. In doing so, I declare my interests as set out in the register.
I was keen to speak to the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering—and have put my name to it—mainly because of the reasons set out by my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. That is, given the position we are now in with financial services, it seems opportune to review this practice. In saying that, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, that it makes sense to see this as part of a wider review of a number of other market practices. Indeed, it reflects an earlier amendment that I put forward on day one on the opportune moment to review all our financial services regulations and regulators’ rules, given that our situation is so fundamentally different from what it was a matter of weeks ago.
On short selling, it is important to understand the difference between different markets, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, eloquently set out. It is important for that to be understood, not least as a number of people’s understanding of short selling will have been informed by the earlier situation with GameStop on the exchange in the United States and the excellent film “The Big Short”—excellent unless you happen to be on the wrong end of that practice. However, it is different in different jurisdictions. Which jurisdictions would the Minister look at in considering potential better practices around the world? Would she also see this as a positive, opportune step to take as part of a wider review of all financial services regulations and the rules of our regulators?
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I support the call of my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering for a review of short-selling legislation, although I start from a very different position to her. As she explained, our short-selling rules were acquired via the EU, which is how they found their way on to our statute book. I believe that all EU-derived legislation should be reviewed at some stage; I am not sure this is the most pressing area, but it should certainly be reviewed.
When the EU introduced its short-selling rules in 2012, we had to follow, but it is far from clear that, left to our own devices, the UK would have introduced such rules. The FCA has been clear that the existing powers to trigger a ban on short selling would not be exercised lightly and the bar must be set very high. That must call into question whether we actually need the powers. The trouble with regulators is that, once they have powers, they never give them up voluntarily, even if they can never envisage when they would be used. A review would allow us to look at this again. We ought not to allow regulators to keep draconian powers to intervene in markets without very strong justification.
Against that background, I was particularly disappointed to see that the EU’s temporary—though extended several times—reduction of the threshold for notification of short selling, which expired when we left the EU, was almost immediately reinstated into UK law. That is not a good direction of travel.
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with short selling. It can provide liquidity to markets, improve bid-ask spreads and assist in price discovery; it also offers a route to hedging long-only exposures. There are, of course, downsides, including the potential for unlimited losses, so the risks have to be well understood and managed. We recently saw in the US that some hedge funds got their fingers burned on short selling GameStop shares due to action taken by amateur investors; but that merely highlights the need for sound risk management—it does not speak to short-selling itself being a problem or suggest that powers are needed for market intervention.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I refer to my interests in the register. It is always a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes; it is also something of a challenge as she speaks so authoritatively on matters such as these and I often find myself agreeing with her.
The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, spoke compellingly in her introduction to this amendment. She made the point that she has misgivings about the practice. Clearly, for a practice that dates back to the first days of stock markets, short selling retains its ability to attract controversy. Indeed, a short seller was accused of manipulating the share price of the Dutch East India Company in Amsterdam as long ago as 1609. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, suggested that it is sometimes regarded as an evil practice, so I felt that it deserved a defender today.
The goals and effects of short selling are often misunderstood and, when markets enter a downturn, many are quick to call for short selling to be banned. While such bans are unfortunate, they have left us with a wealth of data on the effects of short selling and how the practice contributes to the proper functioning of markets. The practice of selling a stock short is always the same but the intention behind it varies considerably. At its most common and passive, short selling is a conservative investment technique used to hedge against risk, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has just highlighted, but obviously at the cost of forgoing some returns. On the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, about the volatile first quarter of 2020, the Alternative Investment Management Association, which represents 2,000 corporate members in 60 countries, reported that funds which had hedged in this way outperformed the broader market by 20%.
To be sold short, a stock has to be borrowed, and it will usually be borrowed from an asset owner for a fee. The fee helps the returns to the holders of that stock—in practice, anyone who participates in a long-term equity fund and, therefore, probably everybody involved in this debate. The fact of selling the stock helps create valuable liquidity, which is often essential to ensure the smooth functioning particularly of smaller markets, but it also works in reverse during periods of market turbulence. In practice, short sellers are often the buyers of last resort when markets are under pressure; they take profits in their short positions and therefore help to provide stability to markets.
The more controversial end of the short-selling spectrum is that populated by activist short sellers. They are often characterised as predators who create and exploit misery, but that is simply not the case. These investors act as the canaries in the coal mine. Short selling does not directly undermine the health of a company any more than buying its shares improves its fundamentals. Companies are not deprived of funds when investors sell shares, nor do they become financially stronger when investors buy shares in public markets. Short sellers cannot send a good business under. What they can do is expose bad business models, bad management, dodgy accounting, fraud and other bad behaviour. At a more mundane level, they can expose unjustifiable valuations.
There are plenty of recent examples but one will suffice as the regulatory reaction was instructive; here I am very grateful to Jack Inglis, the CEO of the Alternative Investment Management Association, who provided me with some detailed facts. In 2019, Wirecard in Germany famously went bust. It was at the time a member of the main German index, the DAX 30. The first queries into the company’s accounting practices date back to 2014, when short positions began to be initiated. However, when the pressure mounted on the company to explain itself, the German regulator instead went after journalists at the Financial Times who had published a deep dive into the company—and, of course, the short sellers. They filed a criminal complaint against them, accusing them of market manipulation, and, in February 2019, initiated a two-month ban on short selling the shares, citing the need to curb
“a serious threat to market confidence”.
As we all know, the company subsequently went bust, the subject of a multiyear fraud involving €1.9 billion going missing and the CEO being arrested, among other things.
Since then, Germany has become much more circumspect about joining other European states in banning the practice. Indeed, the regulator’s president apologised and paid tribute to those
“journalists, analysts or yes, let it be short sellers, who have been digging out inconsistencies persistently and rigorously.”
In saying this, he was following a long historical tradition—such bans are inevitably repealed.
Viscount Trenchard (Con) [V]
My Lords, Amendment 78, in the names of my noble friends Lady McIntosh of Pickering and Lord Holmes of Richmond, seeks to commission a review of legislation relating to short selling. It is a pleasure to follow my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Sharpe of Epsom; I must say, I agree with everything they said.
From time to time in the UK and in other countries, financial regulators have sought to restrict short selling, as the British Government did to stabilise the market after the bursting of the South Sea bubble in 1720. While short selling has been blamed for market crashes and is considered unethical by some as it is a bet against positive growth, many economists and financial practitioners now recognise short selling as a key component of a well-functioning and efficient market, providing liquidity to buyers and promoting a greater degree of price discovery.
I note that, under the statutory instrument transposing the European regulation into UK law, the minimum threshold for the notification of short positions has been set permanently at 0.1% of the issued share capital of a listed company, whereas in the EU, the threshold will revert to the less onerous 0.2% of issued share capital on 19 March. I consider both thresholds unnecessarily restrictive and wonder why the Government have adopted a rule that will be even more cumbersome and bureaucratic than the EU’s, when the Prime Minister and the Governor of the Bank of England have said that we will get rid of red tape. The EU will relax its red tape on short selling reporting on 19 March but we will not. That is disappointing, is it not? What does my noble friend the Minister have to say about that?
In any case, the competitiveness of the market would be best served by removing the current restrictions on short selling. However, I do not think it would be helpful to place in the Bill this kind of requirement, which will add to uncertainty over the freedom to sell short in future and send the wrong message about the kind of regulatory framework the Government intend to adopt.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, once again, I am moving outside of any area where I can claim expertise. Essentially, I have no problem with short selling in the right place and time and under the right regulations, but I am concerned that, in the current environment, any move to look at the regulations again would listen more closely to the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes—in other words, look for opportunities to reduce the restrictions on short selling.
We have had a number of exchanges on short selling in the Chamber. The noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, is particularly vocal, and I do not think that I represent him unfairly by saying that he believes that the restrictions on short selling that were set in place in 2012, which severely limited naked short selling on AIM, are too onerous and that relaxation would be a good thing. He would argue for bringing more liquidity into AIM. I remember that campaign, which was strong and led by companies that were either listed on AIM or wished to be so but that were concerned about becoming the target of speculators who were not interested in supporting sustainable growth but were very interested in bubbles. Of course, this is a risk that goes alongside naked short selling in particular.
I suspect that this issue will be reviewed; I am sure my noble friend Lady Bowles is right that it should be done in a much wider context—I think the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, agreed with that. But I would not work on the assumption that this comes from a concern that rules need to be tightened and safeguards increased; this will very quickly become a process of trying to see whether we can return to the old animal spirits and largely casino-like speculation that once fired London so powerfully and which many of us think largely contributed to the financial crash in 2007-8. While I understand the concerns of the City of London that it needs to make itself more of an exception in order to gather increasing amounts of business, I am rather disturbed if that mode of exception is to allow a great deal more risk to be taken in ways that then impact on the real economy.
Lord Eatwell (Lab)
My Lords, this request for a review of short selling is essentially a request to focus on just one of the aspects of the financial markets today that may contribute to enhanced instability in times of stress. It is not just short selling that involves the sale of borrowed assets—this is what the repo market, for example, is all about. The repo market was central to the dangerously short-term funding of the banking sector in the run-up to the financial crisis of 2007-9.
Of course, short selling is prominent because it is a factor in falling markets, when money is being lost, as opposed to similar practices in rising market bubbles, when money is being made. Of course, the short sellers sometimes get their comeuppance, as has been mentioned by several noble Lords in reference to the case of GameStop. The fundamental question is not whether short selling is a process that can be abused—of course it can. What is important is whether the very existence of the practice contributes to market instability and risk or, as has also been argued, to price discovery and greater liquidity.
Those questions may be asked of many practices in our financial markets today, and, at a time when the UK is rethinking its economic and financial future after leaving the European Union, perhaps the time is right for such a wider review of permitted practices. This could begin with consideration of the impact of trading in borrowed assets—as well as, of course, naked transactions—in forward markets.
Since the liberalising years of the 1970s and 1980s, a wide range of these market practices have developed, with potentially serious destabilising consequences—indeed, we have seen these. As such, does the Minister agree with the many noble Lords who have argued that it is time to stand back and think through whether matters have gone too far, are just right or have not gone far enough? Perhaps such a review is too specific for the regulatory framework review that is going on at the moment because, after all, that is about the framework. However, it is necessary to consider, from time to time, practices that will inevitably have downsides but may also have upsides. That sort of consideration should not be delayed at a time when market regulation is changing significantly, with the exit from the European Union.
Baroness Penn (Con)
My Lords, it is important to stress, as a number of noble Lords have done, that short selling is a legitimate investment technique that can contribute to orderly and open markets supporting many consumers. Taking short and long positions can ensure that investors are able to manage risk and volatility in their portfolio, particularly during uncertain times; for example, if a firm has purchased a large number of shares, that firm might want to short some of those shares if they have a volatile price.
As my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering ably set out, the UK’s regulatory regime for short selling is predominantly set out in the short selling regulations, which were introduced in 2012 to regulate short selling practices while safeguarding companies and the financial system. Among other things, it requires persons to notify the FCA of the size of their short positions in shares traded on a UK trading venue. It also gives the FCA various powers to intervene in response to exceptional circumstances that pose a serious threat to financial stability or market confidence in the UK. These include requiring the notification or disclosure of short positions, as well as restricting short selling to periods of up to three months. Furthermore, the FCA can temporarily prohibit or restrict short selling when the price has fallen significantly during a single trading day relative to the closing price of that instrument on the previous trading day. This regime is working as intended, providing the necessary safeguards to allow the operation of a fair and effective market. The Government continue to work closely with the regulators and market participants to monitor the effectiveness of the entire regulatory regime to ensure that legislation continues to be fit for purpose and delivers on its objectives, in particular to support economic growth and maintain financial stability.
As my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering noted on the example of GameStop, the UK short selling regime was not breached because it does not apply to shares admitted to trading on US trading venues. Furthermore, the regime that I have just set out that applies to short selling would mean that in such a scenario in the UK the FCA would have been able to identify short positions building up and would have been able effectively to engage with the firms holding the short positions in that case.
I am not sure that I recognise the characterisation of the Bank for International Settlements’ report set out by my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering, but I will happily write to her on that matter.
A number of noble Lords have spoken, from different perspectives, in favour of a review of short selling. In response to a number of direct questions about what jurisdictions such a review would look at or whether it would look at relaxing or shoring up such regulations, at this point the Government do not see this issue as the most pressing area of financial services regulation to look at. We see no need to conduct a review of this legislation at this time, so I ask my noble friend Lady McIntosh to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]
I am grateful to the Minister and to all those who have contributed. I recognise the role that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, played in the adoption of the current EU regulation. I am grateful to my noble friend and others who set out the arguments on one side or the other. I have a great deal of sympathy with my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond and his earlier amendment calling for a review of all financial regulations and regulators’ rules, and I note that my noble friend Lady Penn does not see the need for this at present.
This is something that I will personally continue to monitor. I have no doubt that my noble friend Lady Noakes, who speaks with great authority and expertise on these issues, and my noble friends Lord Sharpe and Lord Trenchard would prefer that many of the regulations would just go away, but I am rather pleased that they are not going away for the moment. My concerns have been addressed to a great extent. I will continue to support my noble friend Lord Holmes’s call for a further review of all these practices. I am grateful to have had the opportunity to debate these issues and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment at this stage.
Lord Tunnicliffe
“FCA duty to regulate buy now, pay later firms
(1) Within 3 months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament regulations which confer a duty on the FCA to regulate—(a) buy now, pay later credit services, and(b) other lending services that have non-interest-bearing elements.(2) The duty conferred in regulations under subsection (1) must take effect no later than 6 April 2022.(3) Regulations under this section are subject to the affirmative procedure.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause would require the Chancellor to confer responsibility for regulation of the non-interest-bearing elements of buy-now-pay-later lending to the FCA, with such a duty to come into force no later than the beginning of the 2022/23 tax year.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, many colleagues will recognise Amendment 79 as a response to the recent publication of the Woolard Review into change and innovation in the unsecured credit market.
The Government have been on something of a journey on buy now, pay later products. In December 2020, the Economic Secretary resisted a similar amendment tabled by long-standing personal debt campaigner and MP for Walthamstow Stella Creasy. He said that while the Government were aware of potential risks resulting from a boom in the use of buy now, pay later products,
“we are yet to see substantive evidence of widespread consumer harm”,—[Official Report, Commons, Financial Services Bill Committee, 3/12/20; col. 398.]
and it would therefore be inappropriate to act.
To be fair to the Government, they did not want to pre-empt the findings of the Woolard Review, which was published a month ago and is a very strong piece of work. It warned of “significant potential customer harm” if there was not a role for the FCA. By bringing certain unregulated credit products under the FCA’s watchful eye, we could see requirements around affordability checks, as well as the introduction of proper protocols for individuals who find themselves struggling to repay the loans they have taken out.
The review also stressed the importance of ensuring a well-functioning debt advice sector, and the need for both government and regulators to take a more holistic approach to a range of issues around personal finance and debt. I know that this piqued the interest of my noble friend Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, who has already dealt with the concept of financial well-being and will turn his attention to Victorian log-book loans shortly. We support his endeavours and hope that at the very least the Government will commit to a review of the antiquated legislation whose repeal was recommended by the Law Commission several years ago.
We strongly welcome the Government’s acceptance of the Woolard Review’s recommendations, as well as their commitment to implement the necessary changes as soon as practicable. It is in some ways a curious change of position, as the review’s discussion of theoretical risks does not appear to meet the evidence test set by the Treasury just three months ago. However, this is a policy change that we can support and, luckily for the Minister, this legislation provides a means of delivering on the Government’s promises.
No doubt we will hear later that this is a very complicated matter and the Treasury needs time to think through the consequences—intended and unintended. Mr Glen hinted at this back in December, talking about the need for the Government to “assess the options” and to weigh up whether they “would be proportionate” in responding to potential harm.
One worry previously cited by the Government related to the potential restricting of flexible payment options for such things as gym memberships or sport season tickets. Nobody would wish to restrict access to such options, in part because they have shown themselves over many years to be low risk. We therefore welcome the distinction made in the review, which talks of “certain new credit products” being brought under the FCA. Our Amendment 79 is more wide-ranging but is, as so often in Committee, a vehicle for debate.
Another worry of those who oppose regulation relates to the potential stifling of innovation in the sector. Of course we welcome new entrants and new services, but on the basis that they operate in a responsible manner. These products are booming in part because of Covid-19 and changes to peoples’ shopping habits. Buy now, pay later grew exponentially during 2020, with an estimated 5 million people using products from firms such as Klarna and Clearpay. The value of these transactions is in the billions, and that figure is likely to grow.
We do not oppose Klarna, Clearpay or other providers of these services. They offer a product which many shoppers wish to avail themselves of, and I am confident that such companies will continue to grow once subject to FCA regulation. All we are asking is that these players, as with others across the financial services sector, are subject to the correct balance of rights and responsibilities, including duties to those who may have problems with debt.
I have no doubt that the brilliant minds at the Treasury and the FCA can come up with a solution, and do so while the Bill remains under consideration. Our amendment mentions the 2022-23 tax year, and if we are to learn lessons from the past, including the failure to properly regulate payday lenders, surely we must keep this target at the forefront of our minds.
I know from previous discussions with the Minister and officials that they are working very hard on this. Therefore, I am hopeful of seeing a government text on Report, if not establishing the detail then committing to the principle and providing the powers that will be needed to implement changes in the coming months.
Other noble Lords with amendments in this group will be very keen to make their speeches, so I will not detain the Committee for too much longer. However, I want to voice support for the other amendments, including that from my noble friend Lord Stevenson referred to earlier in my remarks. I also look forward to the Minister’s response to the amendment on access to bank accounts and cash. Sadly, we continue to see the withdrawal of bank branches and cash machines from towns and villages across the country, suggesting that previous initiatives have not had the desired effects. I beg to move.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I start by expressing support for Amendment 79, introduced by my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe. As the Woolard Review pointed out, the buy now, pay later issue is a hotspot at the moment and in need of urgent action. My noble friend’s amendment would require that the non-interest-bearing elements of lending under that regime should be regulated by the FCA, and we support that. I thank the Economic Secretary for the time given to us recently on this issue and I appreciate that this is not easy to regulate for. However, as my noble friend pointed out, there is time to get this right by the next financial year.
At heart, this looks like a consumer-friendly initiative—something we could all support. Credit-financed purchases have been with us for a long time, and there are some examples of activity in this field that could be damaged if the regulations to be brought forward are too aggressive. My noble friend mentioned employees, advances of salary and season tickets, and similar arrangements. However, the real profit motive which drives these schemes lies in the small print. Like so many similar schemes, these buy now, pay later schemes put pressure on customers to make unnecessary purchases, do not make effective credit checks, and there is evidence that they can cause mental health difficulties for those who sign up. I am sure that it would be possible to get this side of things properly regulated. However, what is less easy to regulate—although in fact it is far more damaging to hard-pressed consumers—are the penalties that get applied to missed payments and the excess interest that is loaded when payments are missed. In addition, compulsory insurance is often levied against default, links to loyalty follow-up purchases are imposed, and no real comparator APRs are somewhere available for those who wish to shop around before purchasing.
The focus placed on the FCA’s duty to promote competition rather than on a duty of care is an issue in play here. When the FCA was asked to regulate payday lenders, this House made it clear that its concern was the usurious rates of interest being charged, often many thousands of percentage points measured by APR. The solution favoured by the House was banning the products, which was why many of us were mystified by the FCA’s proposed solution of reducing the number of players in this market to a smaller number of well-capitalised companies—which indeed got the interest rates down, but only to around 1,000% APR, so consumers were left facing usurious rates. I hope the Minister will be able to reassure us that the approach that the Government are thinking of taking to buy now, pay later will not fall into the same trap as the payday lender regulations. The aim is consumer care and stamping out egregious behaviour, and not just promoting competition by allowing companies to rip off vulnerable consumers.
My Amendment 101, which I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, for signing, is also about high-cost credit. As I said at Second Reading, it is high time we repealed the Victorian bills of sale legislation, which permits an egregious area of high-cost credit to continue and flourish outwith current consumer protection rules. Harm is being done.
Bills of sale are an early form of mortgage, aimed at goods and chattels and not property, which allow individuals to use goods they already own as security for loans while retaining possession of them. The use of bills of sale grew from fewer than 3,000 cases in 2001 to more than 30,000 in 2016. The number has dropped recently, but it is probably still in the order of 15,000 a year and it is going up. Ironically, bills of sale were legislated for before cars were invented, but they are used today mainly for what are called log-book loans, where a borrower raises cash on the security of his or her vehicle. Borrowers may continue to use their vehicle while they keep up the repayments, but if they default, the vehicle can be repossessed, sometimes from outside their front door, without the protections that apply to hire-purchase transactions or other consumer credit. It is also difficult to discover, when a car is being sold, whether it has a log-book loan attached. The register is kept by the High Court and it is not easily searchable. The new owner has no protection against losing the car if that loan has been defaulted on by the previous owner. This is just not fair.
Bills of sale are currently governed by two Victorian statutes, the Bills of Sale Act 1878 and the amendment Act of 1882—the statute was apparently so obscure in 1878 that it had to be re-regulated for in 1882. The legislation is described by the Law Commission as “archaic” and “wholly unsuited” to the 21st century. The current law creates hardship for borrowers and for private purchasers. The Law Commission argues that it imposes unnecessary burdens on lenders, and the lack of a proper chattels mortgage system restricts access to finance for unincorporated businesses and high-net worth individuals.
The great majority of bills of sale are taken out by borrowers who have difficulty in accessing other forms of credit. The current APR in a recent advert that I saw was 450%. The Law Commission says that the statutory form of a bill of sale as set out in the 1882 Act, which has to be followed absolutely to the letter, confuses borrowers rather than helps them to understand the consequences. It is clearly an area that should be cleaned up. A simple way, which is what I propose in my amendment, would be to repeal the Acts. While I accept that some people currently using log-book loans would be adversely affected by such a radical change, the greater harm lies in continuing the status quo.
I currently have a Private Member’s Bill on this issue, drafted by the Law Commission, which includes provision also for a goods mortgages scheme. Perhaps a way forward on this would be for the Government to agree to take on all or part of this Bill in the next Session using the special scheme for approving uncontentious Law Commission Bills. I would be happy to meet the Minister on this issue, if he could find the time, to see whether this would turn out to be a way forward.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to speak to this group of amendments. In doing so, I declare my interests as set out in the register. It is also a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson. Before I speak to Amendments 127, 131 and 136C in my name, I shall speak to Amendment 101, so eloquently introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara; Amendment 135, in the name of my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley, who is speaking after me so I shall not eat too much of his afternoon tea; and, briefly, Amendment 136F.
Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con) [V]
My Lords, I shall speak on Amendment 135 in my name, although I find myself in agreement, as is so frequently the case, with the noble Lords, Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, on their amendments, and, of course, with my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond, who very kindly served as my warm-up act for my amendment. With such unanimity, let me explain what this is about.
At Second Reading, the Minister might have read that I raised two issues of concern. The first was that FOS and the FCA had been overzealous and overreached themselves. As a result, they had destroyed a segment of the financial services industry, namely the SIPP industry. I was disappointed that there did not seem to be anything in this Bill dealing with that, but I am pleased to say that I have had constructive meetings with the City Minister, John Glen, and representatives of the FCA and FOS and there are further meetings ahead. I accept that this matter will not be in this Bill, but perhaps it will be dealt with at a later stage elsewhere.
The second matter that I raised was about a situation in which FOS and the FCA were not doing enough to protect consumer interests, and I had an idea that might enable them so to do. As the Minister here today was not at Second Reading, I will just remind him of the reason why I have raised this. In the summer, I received a letter in the post with a credit card in my name, which was very nice except that I had not applied for it. It arrived unsolicited. I did not think too much of it, but a few days later—in those halcyon days of last summer when one could go outdoors and talk to one’s neighbours—a neighbour mentioned to me that they had seen some slightly unsavoury-looking individual rummaging through my letterbox at the front gate. I managed to put two and two together and worked out what had happened. Someone had found my home address and date of birth—which is not difficult, I am sorry to say, because they are available at Companies House; I have since changed that, but it is generally true. Then clearly he applied for a credit card in my name and was rummaging around in the letterbox to find it and to find the PIN, which followed in the post a few days later. It was clearly an unsatisfactory situation.
I contacted people in the company concerned, which I shall not name on this occasion, and complained that it was odd that they had sent me a credit card that I had not requested. I invited them to explain why and perhaps to change their procedures. They replied that they were sorry to hear it, but as I had not lost any money, there was nothing that they could do, or chose to do. Eventually, after a few letters and emails, they sent me a form to use to complain to FOS. I could not resist, of course, so I put a complaint into FOS—and it took FOS six months to reply to the complaint. After six months, a very well-crafted letter arrived from FOS, explaining to me that it could not help me because I was not actually a customer of the credit card company concerned. I was a potential customer of the credit card company concerned, and under the FCA handbook—the FCA instructs FOS—it has no power to deal with situations in respect of potential customers.
There were audible gasps of horror at Second Reading when I explained the situation, and my noble friend Lord Agnew agreed to write to me because he, too, was surprised. He wrote to me on 9 February and said:
“As you set out in your speech, the FCA is responsible for setting the rules for what complaints the FOS are able to consider. These rules do not allow FOS to consider a complaint from someone who is not a customer or potential customer of a firm. Extending eligibility to make a complaint to the FOS about a firm that they are not a customer or a potential customer of would be a very significant expansion of the FOS’s remit, which could result in delays to other complaints being resolved. However, the FOS are able to consider complaints from people who are being pursued for a debt that is not theirs following an identity theft. Therefore, had the attempted identity theft you experienced resulted in losses, then the FOS would have been able to consider a complaint from you.”
Lord Naseby (Con) [V]
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, for putting down Amendment 79; I will address that first and then move on to Amendment 93.
I spoke earlier about the difference between home credit companies and payday firms, so I shall not go down that route again. Buy now, pay later reminds me of the old days of hire purchase and some of the challenges that arose then. In many ways, this is almost equivalent to gambling: it plays on people’s weaknesses, who then build up a cycle of debt, as so many noble Lords have said—and lingering in the shadows, ready to swoop, are the claims management companies. Frankly, I do not see why, in this scenario that we all know is happening and will get worse, not least with the huge temptation that will come after furlough is lifted, we cannot act earlier than the next financial year. I do not know the answer to this, but I begin to wonder whether all these payday loans are registered. If they are not, something should certainly be done about that. Finally in this area, we need to ensure that the FCA and the Financial Ombudsman Service are really watchful of the action of the claims management companies when it gets to that state.
Turning to Amendment 93 on access to cash, I thank my friend the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. As has already been said, 1.3 million people have no access to a bank account. Cash is vital, particularly to the elderly in our society. Covid has made the whole thing even more difficult; the impression has been left that those who carry any notes in their wallet could be carrying Covid. It took some weeks for Her Majesty’s Government to put out clear statements that that cannot happen—it cannot transmit Covid; nevertheless, the rumour was out there and has stuck. The problem then comes down to the many outlets with a sign up in the door or on the cash till basically saying “Cards only”. Indeed, our own refreshment department is card only. The question in my mind is whether it is legal to trade and offer card only. I would have thought the very fact of being given a licence to trade ought to mean they can trade but must accept legal tender in whatever form it is offered.
The Post Office provides a really good service, and I pay full tribute to what it has done in these months of turmoil that we have faced. However, from the little work that I have done, I understand that the people behind the cash machines—those promoting them and the companies involved—state that they are becoming increasingly unviable. If that is the situation, it is very worrying, and I hope that Her Majesty’s Government will take this very seriously and make sure that, one way or another, cash machines are still available to the more than 1.3 million people who do not have bank accounts.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]
My Lords, this group of amendments has an underlying theme of identifying the need for greater consumer protection in this area. I support the noble Lords, Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord Eatwell, in the aims of the much-needed—it would appear—Amendment 79. If he is minded to say that there is no need for such an amendment, could the Minister, in responding to this debate, point to the consumer protection regulations for those using buy now, pay later services? Many of us have seen how the level of personal and household indebtedness has greatly increased due to the lack of regulation in the area identified by Amendment 79.
I will turn to Amendment 101 before coming back to the others. I entirely support the thrust of this amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, supported by my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond. It seems extraordinary that when consumer protections apply to hire purchase of a vehicle, they do not apply to the circumstances that have been set out and so eloquently identified by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, so the time has come for these two Victorian statutes to be replaced. I would like the Minister to give a very good reason why this could not happen and why we cannot simply rely on hire purchase schemes, which give greater protections to the owner and the existing user of a vehicle, for this form of purchase.
Amendments 92 and 93 from the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer and Amendment 136C from my noble friend Lord Holmes identify the need for access to cash. I find cashless societies highly regrettable, particularly for elderly and other vulnerable people; I know there are some in Europe; Sweden is well down this path and Denmark is going down it. On continuing access to cash, the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, has set out, and my noble friend Lord Holmes set out in his Amendment 136C, why it is extremely important to have proper protections in these areas.
My noble friend Lord Holmes pointed out the role of cash in Covid and why it goes to the heart of financial inclusion. Without wishing to put words in his mouth, I will take his thoughts one step further: I am deeply concerned that the Government propose that the amount available in a contactless transaction will imminently be increased to a maximum of £100. This will possibly enable many people to lose control of their finances, and it will open the door to greater fraud, even where a debit or credit card has not left your possession.
I have been the victim of such fraud. I am delighted to say that the credit card company I was with at the time reimbursed me almost immediately for the loss. What that means is that we are all paying for that loss as credit card or debit card users. The existing limit of £45 is right at the moment; I would hesitate to increase it to £100. I do not know whether there is a bottomless pit for endless frauds or what it means if the limit goes up to £100 on a contactless transaction. Are there limitless reserves? Who pays for the fraud in this regard?
In Amendment 136F, the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, has identified an area that is timely for review: the regulation of bailiffs and bailiff firms for the purpose of taking control of goods. I would be delighted to hear from the Minister that, even if the Government are not minded to accept this amendment, he will come forward with similar provisions as set out therein and recognise that there is a need for this to take place.
On Amendment 135 in the name of my noble friend Lord Leigh, I think all of us say, “There but for the grace of God go I”. Identity theft is a compelling crime. He set out some modest requirements that the Government would do well to follow.
I find that the amendments in this group have an underlying theme of the need for greater consumer protection. Although they are disparate in what they seek to achieve, each of them has merits to commend it. I very much look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to the excellent case that has been made for each amendment in this group.
Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Non-Afl) [V]
My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering.
I wish to speak in support of Amendment 79 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Eatwell and Lord Tunnicliffe. It seeks to protect people from buy now, pay later firms that, in many instances, financially abuse people. It is important that people who find themselves in this position are financially protected. In many ways, the amendments in this group seek to do what the noble Baroness said: they are all about consumer protection.
In his introduction, the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, referred to the Woolard review, part of which clearly states the need for customer harm to be minimised and to come under the purview of the Financial Conduct Authority. From doing some background reading, I thought I learned that the Government were receptive to the review’s findings. In this regard, I wonder whether the Government, through the Minister, will bring forward on Report amendments to deal with this issue if they are not prepared to accept Amendment 79 today. However, it may be that they will accept it in view of their acceptance of the Woolard review.
At Second Reading, I highlighted this area and asked whether the Government would bring forward in Committee amendments to ensure that buy now, pay later credit services are brought into the scope of the Financial Conduct Authority to protect people from spending more than they can afford. Indeed, many people in this net take out further debt to repay initial credit, then end up with their debt spiralling out of control.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I read all the amendments in this group, and I found myself in support of every one of them. It is an excellent group. We all realise now that Amendment 136F, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, is in the wrong group, which I suspect is why she is not speaking on this group under the heading that I loosely call offences.
Picking up on that theme, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, that he was the victim of an attempted fraud. It is astonishing that action did not follow. When we discuss that group of offences, one of my underlying concerns is about the lack of resources to pursue offences of any kind within the financial services spectrum, so I suspect that that is probably where the resistance has been coming from. It is an area that we need to resource properly, and we need to make sure that when a red flag is raised by an experience such as his there is follow-up, knowing that that will have been one of many attempts to defraud and that some of them will have succeeded. I hope that the Government will look at resourcing.
When I look at quite a number of the amendments in this group, whether on buy now, pay later, bills of sale or mortgage prisoners—which I think we will deal with in more detail later—it strikes me that all of them could have been headed off at the pass as problems if we had had an underlying duty of care. That takes me back to the first group of amendments that we dealt with, because with that in place we would not have had a regulator hanging back to see what the competitive implications were, whether or not various tests were reached and so on. It would have shaped very early the framework within which these activities sat. It really is a very strong argument for that duty of care.
On the excellent Amendment 79, I understand, following Chris Woolard’s report, that we are to expect action. The Woolard report raises the issues in detail; I will not repeat them here today but I will say this: if the FCA does nothing more than introduce an affordability test, which is how it tried to manage the payday lenders, we can guarantee that this House will intervene. We will expect stronger action than that, to make sure this problem is grasped—and not allowed to encourage people to fall into debt which frankly they cannot handle—and to put a proper framework around what is essentially a form of lending. I note in that context that Klarna is described today as the most valuable new start-up in Europe; its rate of growth and the appetite for buy now, pay later should set alarm bells ringing.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, for supporting my Amendment 92. It is a probing amendment that deals with a crucial aspect of financial inclusion—I find echoes of this in some of the words of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes. The inadequacy of basic bank accounts and the reluctance of many of the banks that offer them to engage with the needs of basic bank account customers is an underlying problem. It certainly means that basic bank accounts do not lead to appropriate vehicles for people in the most disadvantaged end to borrow or save, or to engage much more broadly with financial service products. In this day and age, that is a serious issue.
The situation is better today than it was a few years ago; I remember listening to high-street banks who would encourage those coming in to open a basic bank account to go down the street to Nationwide, where they would receive a friendlier reception. Basic bank accounts were regarded just as cost; this was not only inappropriate but meant that those who were welcoming ended up with the greatest share of the burden. I have always taken the view that trying to make an institution provide a service to a customer that they do not want will mean a failed product. We have about 7.5 million people with basic bank accounts and some 1.2 million people completely unbanked. We have to grasp this nettle.
In the United States, intended or not, the approach to people who have been shut out of the financial services system has been different and rather more effective. I would like the Government as well as the regulators to go away and look at it. Under the Community Reinvestment Act 1977, any bank that sought permission to acquire or merge with another bank—something almost every bank was doing at the time—was required to demonstrate that it fully served the disadvantaged communities in its service area. As a civil rights measure, banks were basically red-lining African American, Latin American or Central American communities. They were allowed to serve those communities by supporting local institutions identified as much better fitted to the purpose. This gave a new lease of life to community development financial institutions—CDFIs—of all kinds, including credit unions and community banks. The major banks invested in them to pass that threshold and be able to do acquisitions and mergers, and supported them with expertise in marketing and technology.
I would very much like to see that model here; that is the purpose of my amendment. The DWP’s 2019 report on financial inclusion states:
“Social and community lenders such as credit unions and … CDFIs … provide a lower cost alternative to high-cost lenders, they are small in comparison and lack the visibility and capability to compete at scale. The UK needs a much larger, more vibrant social lending sector”.
CDFIs know the needs of their clients—that is where their work is targeted. They often work with local charities and civil society groups to provide money advice, business advice and a wide range of additional support to make people financially capable.
Some investors in the UK are developing new entities in this space. I am aware of two potential new mutuals, one in the south-west and one in London, targeted at this group of people. The recent report by Ron Kalifa on fintechs identified that new fintechs have the capability to provide a tailored, low-cost offering. But the reality is that very few new players have emerged to serve the excluded sector, which tells me that the system that we have at present is not working. I want all major UK banks to engage with this sector and for the regulator to make it a requirement, not just an act of charity or public relations. That could be done within the banking licence or through regulation, but that would change it from being a passive set of actions to an active way in which to make sure that this gap in the market is filled by people capable of doing it well.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, and others who supported Amendment 93, which deals with the current and accelerating crisis of access to cash. The Government promised legislation at last year’s Budget, but there is no sign of it yet. Covid has driven a sharp drop in cash usage from three in 10 people before the crisis to just one in 10 people. That is a huge drop, but it still leaves about 5 million people who rely on using cash. Of course poverty and age are often a characteristic, but for many people it is a strong cultural preference; they want to use cash, and it is really their right.
As I understand it, the Government are going to follow the direction recommended by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes; they will be able to confirm whether that is correct. That would permit retailers to provide cash without a purchase, which would help, but it is still very hit and miss. The Access to Cash Review done by Natalie Ceeney in 2019 highlighted the fact that retailers’ reluctance to accept cash is driving a lot of the change. Bank branches are closing across the country, especially in rural and disadvantaged communities. LINK, the largest cash machine network, has a contract with the Post Office, but it has about 18 months or so to run. Free-to-use ATMs are disappearing fast; when I talked to the industry, the estimate that I was given was that, if we do not do something quickly, half the ATMs in the country will be pay to use within 18 months.
We will need intervention by the FCA. Lots of commercial companies are involved in the system and any change or rationalisation throws up competition issues. The banks, for example, could be given an obligation to provide free access to cash but then allowed to use a utility model whereby they combine to provide free, shared smart machines capable of a range of services, perhaps with an assistant present to help users to navigate the machines. That changes how we think about this issue quite dramatically—and normally we would have time to do that, but we are now faced with an urgent situation.
I quote one final phrase of Natalie Ceeney’s report, because to me it says it all:
“It is … critical that action is taken now, so that no-one is left behind.”
I recommend that the Government take urgent action to deal with access to cash.
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Lord True) (Con)
My Lords, I thank all those who have spoken very genuinely, because we are considering an important group of amendments on consumer access to credit. I am very grateful for the continued and thoughtful interest of noble Lords in this area. I assure all those who have spoken that we are listening carefully and will read this debate.
Amendment 79 would require the Treasury to introduce legislation to bring buy now, pay later products into FCA regulation, to which all speakers referred. The Government are committed to protecting the interests of consumers and, since Second Reading, as the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, said in moving his amendment so ably, the Woolard Review has recommended that these products should be brought into the scope of FCA regulation. The Government are acting swiftly, following the outcome to this review, just as the Economic Secretary committed to do during this Bill’s passage through the other place. That is why, on 2 February, we announced our intention to legislate to bring them into regulation. However, it is important to know that these products are interest free and, therefore, inherently lower risk than most other forms of borrowing, so it is essential that regulation protects customers in a way that ensures that they can continue to use these products to manage their finances, rather than more expensive forms of credit on which they might otherwise rely. The Government therefore intend to consult stakeholders to ensure that a proportionate approach to regulation is achieved.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I did not study this group with the care I should have, otherwise I would have realised what an extraordinarily rich group of amendments it is. They seek to address individual areas of customer concern and equalise the balance between customer and firm. It is interesting that, as I think the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, said, each has its merits.
I thank the Minister for his response and note the little chinks of optimism that he has allowed us to go away and, hopefully, talk. I hope he will also extend that invitation to many of the movers of amendments in this group, perhaps working together to see whether there are areas where more progress can be made. While normally we would not be happy with bits of legislation leaving most of it to happen via regulation, in comparison with the possibility of no finance legislation for a year or so, we must have an open mind about mechanisms going forward. Furthermore, I and my fellow noble Lords in this in no way seek that he accepts our wording. We know that the chances of our wording being acceptable to the Government are negligible, and therefore have an entirely open mind about his wording, provided that it leads to the same result.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, mentioned en passant the concept of duty of care. I know that terrifies Governments; they will have to come to terms with it sooner or later, but for the moment I recognise that we cannot get there. Sadly, in many areas of retail finance, products and services, sectors of the industry at least seem to have a duty to exploit. The problem is that this exploitation frequently leads to real harm to real individuals. These amendments are about real individuals and preventing real harm. The problem is that there is an asymmetry of power in the sector, certainly at the level of the individual, between the firms and your typical consumer.
Purists will argue that this asymmetry will be held back by competition. I am not that enamoured with competition. To me, competition is when, on a Friday morning, I drive out to do the shopping for the week and can turn left for Waitrose, straight ahead for Tesco or right for Sainsbury’s. That is real competition. Every week I make that decision—it is not like the bother and fear of moving one’s service providers in the financial world, if you are an unskilled typical consumer. Possibly nowhere in our modern society is the concept of intelligent regulation more necessary than in the financial services sector. The complexity on the one hand and the opportunity and possibility of getting into serious harm on the other are so significant that we must accept that intelligent regulation, of which the amendments in this group are all examples, must be part of the financial services landscape of activity. All we seek to do in this group is introduce intelligent pieces of regulation to make the whole thing fairer for the customer.
I look forward to further discussions with the Minister and his colleagues. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Sharkey
“Sharia-compliant financial services
Within one year of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must publish an assessment of the availability of Sharia-compliant financial services in the United Kingdom, including financial services to support students.”
Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]
My Lords, Amendments 80 and 88 are probing amendments. Their purpose is to allow the Committee to debate access to Sharia-compliant student finance. I raise this issue because there is no such access.
Noble Lords will know that Islam forbids interest-bearing loans. This prohibition can be and is a barrier to Muslim students going on to attend our universities. I first became aware of this when I visited the Preston Muslim Girls High School as part of the Lord Speaker’s Peers in Schools programme. I talked about the work of the House and tried to answer the girls’ questions. There was one question I could not answer: why was there no Sharia-compliant system of student finance?
Many of the girls came from deeply religious backgrounds and would not be able to accept interest-bearing loans. This meant that they could not go on to university, which they were certainly qualified to do. Ofsted rated their school as outstanding on every measure. The headteacher explained to me that, when tuition fees were low, many Muslim students were able to attend university financed by family and friends, but, since 2012, this had become much more difficult because of the very large increase in fees and the real rate of interest now payable on student loans. The situation became even worse when maintenance grants were replaced by interest-bearing loans.
The Government have known about all this since 2012. In early 2014, the then Department for Business, Innovation and Skills consulted on the issue. The consultation generated an astonishing 20,000 responses. The Government’s report on the consultation noted:
“It is clear from the large number of responses … that the lack of an Alternative Finance product as an alternative to conventional student loans is a matter of major concern to many Muslims.”
This same report also identified the solution: a Takaful, a well-known and frequently used non-interest-bearing Muslim financial product. The Government explicitly supported
“the introduction of a Sharia-compliant Takaful Alternative Finance product available to everyone”.
That was six years ago, and nearly four years ago we passed enabling legislation in the Higher Education and Research Act 2017, but there is still no Sharia-compliant student product available. Over the past five years, I have repeatedly pressed the Government to act. I have spoken in debates in the Chamber; I have asked Questions, oral and written, and I have written directly to the Minister. I last spoke about the issue at length in the Queen’s Speech debate in October 2019. Soon after that, the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, wrote to me saying:
“The position remains the same as when the Government responded to your PQ in July. We will set out plans for implementation as we conclude the Post 18 Review. This will ensure that students in receipt of an Alternative Student Finance package are not disadvantaged compared to other students in receipt of mainstream student support.”
As I had heard nothing further, I emailed the Minister on 4 January this year. I pointed out that, since her letter to me, one more student cohort had entered higher education, and another was now preparing to do so, but there was still no available Sharia-compliant student finance. I asked her for an update on implementation. I asked whether we were still waiting for a formal response to the Augur review and suggested that we should not. I pointed out that the Government had recognised the problem more than six years previously and had had the power to deal with it for four years. I sent this email on 4 January and I have had no reply.
We are having this debate as students are considering their university choices for next September. Once more, there will be devout Muslim students who, though qualified, will not be going to university because of the lack of a sharia-compliant student finance product. It is very hard to understand or excuse the Government’s behaviour over this issue. They know the problem, acknowledge the need to act and have taken the powers to introduce the remedy, yet nothing has happened. It is shameful that the Government have allowed so much time to elapse and that they display such a casual neglect of and disregard for our Muslim community.
At the World Islamic Economic Forum in 2013, David Cameron promised to introduce a sharia-compliant student finance scheme, saying:
“Never again should a Muslim in Britain feel unable to go to university because they cannot get a student loan—simply because of their religion.”
When will the Government finally make good on this eight year-old promise? I beg to move.
Lord Naseby (Con) [V]
My Lords, I am absolutely delighted to support my friend, the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, who has clearly positioned the problem. I have had the privilege of working in Pakistan—which is almost totally Muslim—and India, which has a very significant Muslim population, as well as Sri Lanka, where a big majority of the minorities are Muslim. Locally, they do not seem to have a problem in dealing with this issue; can we not learn from them, particularly Pakistan? We have high commissioners here, so why do we not at least find out from them what the problem is in relation to the UK—and get their help?
This issue is increasing. The sharia families who are really strong in their faith increasingly want to send their children to university—that is part of the philosophy of that faith—and here we are, years down the track, making it very difficult for them. We must do something about it. In towns and cities such as Luton, Leicester and some of the other major ones in the north of England—let alone London—there are students and families who do not know what to do about it. We have to take some action.
It goes further than that, does it not? We want students from overseas; we are seeking them. There are sharia-compliant students from the Muslim fraternity overseas who want to come. I really do not see why this is so difficult to do, so I say to my noble friend on the Front Bench: Her Majesty’s Government need to solve this problem; sit down with the sharia-compliant banks and, if necessary, with the high commissioners to seek their support and help; and solve this problem.
Frankly, it is an embarrassment for any of us who have good friends in that community—as I do and I guess most of your Lordships may well do—to find that potential students are not able to pay their tuition fees and receive student maintenance grants without being penalised or having to find some method to go around the scheme, where the senior mothers and fathers are doing that at all.
As such, I make a plea to my noble friend on the Front Bench: this is not a party-political issue or anything like that—this is just good and straightforward. The problem is known about and has taken years to be solved; can we please take a significant step forward?
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I believe the House owes a great debt of gratitude to the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, for the work he has been doing on this issue over the last nine years. I have been involved in part of the process, which is why I put my name down to speak: like him, I feel rather confused and not a little embarrassed that no action has been taken in recent years.
Like the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, I first got involved in this when policy changed in the early part of the coalition Government and new arrangements were introduced for interest-bearing loans and, eventually, maintenance loans. I recall that in about 2014 there was the consultation process described by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. As I was then the Labour spokesperson on higher education in your Lordships’ House, I got a lot of correspondence, exactly as he described, from potential students and some existing students. Potential students wanted to know whether at the time they applied and went to higher education there would be a real chance of there being loans that they could take out that would not be a problem in terms of sharia compliance. More worryingly, students who were already at university in the middle of their course found that they could not continue without a guarantee in some form that finance would be available to allow them to see out their course.
In a sense, we were all trying to do the same thing. Indeed, I sat in on meetings with the Higher Education Minister at the time, Jo Johnson, and other colleagues in the House. We had meetings with representatives of Muslim students and the community at which a lot of these issues were explored. When the Government took powers in the 2018 Act, as described by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, to ensure that they could facilitate the production of loans of this type, we thought the matter was over. Indeed, I wrote to a number of people I had been working with saying that we thought that the process had reached its natural conclusion and that it was just a matter of time before the Government brought forward the necessary proposals.
As we have discovered, that has not happened, and although there have been promises and suggestions that it was coming, it has not. The Government have got themselves into a very bad position here. I cannot believe that it is impossible to go forward—as the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, said, just to do it—and I am looking forward to hearing the Minister’s response. If there is anything we can do to help, he should be sure that there is, as the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, said, no politics in this. We simply want a good job done to make sure that all people who contribute and wish to contribute to higher education in this country can do so and are not in any sense disadvantaged simply because of their religion.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, any one of us can go on to our smartphone and find an app for halal financing for someone who wants to buy a car or a house—they are called “halal mortgages”—or who needs money to support a small business. It is incredible and quite incomprehensible that we do not have a sharia-compliant version of student loans. It is not as though we do not know how to do it or the institutions do not exist in the UK. I suspect that many noble Lords have been, like I have, at general meetings of the financial services industry where, as well as talking about being world leading in terms of green finance, we have talked about London as a very important centre for sharia-compliant finance as we attempt to expand and have a much greater global reach. Six years is an incredible time to wait. It has been four years since enabling legislation was put in place.
I was looking at a Metro article on the web about students who were interviewed in 2019. Some had managed to put together a way to pay their student fees. One said:
“I was constantly broke as a student and never, ever did anything remotely fun. I always felt too guilty if I spent any money on myself.”
Students who started out and found that they just could not keep going left and went to work, but then found that, as this lady said,
“to progress further I need that degree so the plan is to go back.”
However, this young woman has no idea how to finance it. Another youngster talked about the stress of
“having to live scrupulously and scrape up enough to pay each instalment in time.”
We really should not be putting any student into this situation. I do not understand the delay. There does not seem to be an obstacle in terms of designing the appropriate facility or the appropriate legislation. I hope that the Ministers who are here, all of whom are people of understanding and sympathy, will go and put pressure on the Government to take this from the bottom of the in-tray and put it at the top. It could be a minor amendment that we make on Report.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, the last Labour Government were supportive of facilitating access to sharia-compliant financial services, and we understand—and welcome—that Her Majesty’s Government have made similarly helpful noises during their time in office. This is an interesting time for financial services as some firms prioritise divesting from fossil fuel projects, and so on. If such moves are possible, surely we can make progress on services that do not have involvement in industries such as gambling or alcohol?
Amendment 88 raises the issue of sharia-compliant student finance, which was subject to a recent e-petition on the Parliament website. In their response, the Government recalled their consultation on the matter back in 2014 and said that they intend to publish an update on progress later this year. While we appreciate that it takes time to engage with communities to understand their needs, evaluate feedback, devise new schemes and ultimately make them operational, there has been a significant wait for new products, and we need evidence from the Minister that we will soon turn a corner.
Lord True (Con)
My Lords, as has been eloquently expressed, these amendments relate to sharia-compliant finance and specifically to the availability of sharia-compliant student finance products. This is an area where the Treasury and the Department for Education are in close contact. The Government are committed to ensuring that all students in England with the potential to benefit from further and higher education are able to access it. I know from this debate and from others that many noble Lords of all parties are keen to see action on this.
On the specific amendments, which the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, stated are probing, Amendment 80 seeks to require the Treasury to publish an assessment of the availability of sharia-compliant financial services, I can assure noble Lords that the Government are committed to ensuring that no UK customer is denied access to competitive financial products because of their faith. As referred to in the debate, the United Kingdom is indeed the leading western hub for Islamic finance, a position we have maintained for several years now. Treasury Ministers and officials conduct regular engagement with key stakeholders in the Islamic finance sector to inform our policies.
Amendment 88 seeks to add access to sharia-compliant student finance to the FCA’s objectives within Section 1B of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. It would be ineffective to add this objective because student loans are exempt from FCA regulation, meaning that the FCA would not have the powers to fulfil this duty. Additionally, student finance provision is a devolved matter while the FCA is our UK-wide regulator. Finally, as I have explained, work is under way in government to ensure that all eligible students are able to access student finance.
A number of noble Lords commented on the pace of this work. As the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, said, the Government published a consultation in September 2014 into a potential model that could form the basis of a new student finance product. The Government signalled in the consultation response that they would need to take new primary powers to enable the Secretary of State for Education to make alternative payments in addition to grants and loans. These were secured in the Higher Education and Research Act 2017. The Government have also carried out work with the Islamic Finance Council UK on an alternative student finance product for tuition fee and living cost support compatible with Islamic finance principles.
As has been stated, the implementation of alternative student finance is currently being considered alongside the review of post-18 education and funding. The interim report of that review was published on 21 January and the review is due to conclude alongside the next multi-year spending review. The Government will therefore provide an update on alternative student finance in due course. We should not underestimate the scale of complexity here. The Department for Education is trying to replicate a system of student finance that delivers the same results as now where students do not receive any advantage nor suffer any disadvantage through applying for alternative student finance.
I am sure that our colleagues in the departments concerned have heard the concerns expressed by noble Lords. I hope that, for these reasons, the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]
I thank everybody who has spoken in the debate on this group. I confess that I should have said clearly at the beginning that my amendments and their text were not the issue; the amendments were simply the fossilised remains of my scope negotiations with the Public Bill Office and a means of introducing the subject of sharia-complaint student finance.
I must say that I am, as usual, extremely disappointed by the Minister’s evasive and unconvincing response. It is a great pity. I still do not understand why there has been such a long delay in addressing this serious problem. The Minister has not offered a reason for the delay except to point at various complications. Perhaps I should remind him that the takaful version of the Help to Buy mortgage system was introduced from a standing start in six months. This has taken nearly seven years, and we have not got there yet. I simply do not understand why this is going to be prolonged and why the Minister cannot give us any assurance about a firm date for the introduction of a sharia-compliant student product.
I also do not understand—I never did—why the Augar review is at all relevant; perhaps the Minister can explain why at some other point. However, I understand that the Muslim community continues to suffer a direct disadvantage without any good reason or plausible excuse. The Government are acting in a completely mean-spirited and heartless way. They are failing in their moral duty, failing to fulfil their explicit promises and failing to provide any real comfort that they might eventually do what they should have done long ago. They are behaving neglectfully and really rather disgracefully. We will return to this issue later.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)
Does the Minister wish to speak further? No? Does the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, wish to withdraw his amendment?
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)
We now come to the group consisting of Amendment 86.
Amendment 86
Lord Blackwell
“PRA and FCA joint coordination committee
(1) The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is amended as follows.(2) After section 3F (with-profits insurance policies) insert—3FA PRA and FCA joint coordination committee(1) In exercising their general duties and their duty to exercise coordinated exercise of functions, the PRA and FCA must establish and maintain a joint regulatory coordination committee to ensure their activities are consistent and proportionate in meeting their respective general duties and objectives.(2) The committee membership shall be—(a) the Governor of the Bank of England as Chair,(b) the Chief Executives of the PRA and FCA, and(c) two independent non-executive directors of each of the PRA and FCA.(3) The committee must review—(a) how their combined exercise of functions accords with each organisation’s individual duties and objectives, and with the memorandum of understanding between the FCA and the Bank of England; (b) their combined supervisory agenda for each of the five largest banks and five largest insurance companies they regulate; and(c) their combined supervisory agenda for any other dual-regulated entities they identify as systemically important;in order to ensure consistent priorities and proportionate impact.(4) Where the committee concludes that the combined exercise of functions by the PRA and FCA is not consistent and proportionate it must report that to the PRA and FCA boards, which must consider what changes might be made to address the concern.(5) The committee shall meet at least once every year.””
Lord Blackwell (Con) [V]
My Lords, once again I draw the Committee’s attention to my current and recent interests as set out in the register.
The purpose of this amendment is to place an obligation on the two regulators—the PRA and the FCA —to co-ordinate their agendas and priorities to ensure that their combined activities are consistent and proportionate in meeting their respective duties and objectives in terms of the burden of regulation on the industry in general and, in particular, the regulatory burden that they place on major financial institutions.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, I have some sympathy with the motivation for this amendment concerning co-ordination of regulators and combined regulatory agendas. Of course, there is already an MoU between the PRA and the FCA about modes of co-operation, who leads on which issues, and how to escalate to the two CEOs to resolve. I took the opportunity to remind myself of it; it is only an agreement to consult on deliberations that are equally relevant to both regulators’ objectives or which might have a material effect on the others’ objectives. Senior executives have discussions every quarter and report to their respective boards. It is perhaps disappointing that it does not contain more. It reminded me that it can be hard to force independent regulators to co-operate, especially at the moment that they are created. They fiercely guard their independence, not just wanting to do things their own way but vehement that they are obliged to do so.
In the EU, my committee insisted that there be a joint committee of the three regulators; we got it into legislation, albeit in a very sketchy form, with the intention that they got together to thrash out different positions. However, in that, they stayed as equals and there was no overarching power, rather as it is in the MoU between the PRA and the FCA. I can tell you that the regulators did not like the idea. When they came to committee hearings, we had to keep asking whether they had met yet. The answer was that they were concentrating on their own set-up and procedures first. Eventually, there came to be a few problems and, as happened back then in the EU, the Parliament was seen as part of the solution. So, they came to me, discovered that I knew all about this since industry had alerted me as well, and, after a chat and—perhaps—a bit of pressure, I remember saying that that was why we had invented the joint committee and kept asking about it. Slowly, they started to use it, then decided it was quite a good thing and, finally, wondered how they could ever have done without it; maybe they were also a little afraid of what Parliament might say if they did not make it work.
I have thought about that experience and whether the UK is better off with the MoU—which actually has more definition in it—or worse off because, in the end, it reinforces territories rather than being a less formal get-together. There is a problem with the proposal by the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, in that it is formalised with the Governor of the Bank of England as chair. I am not sure that establishing a pecking order as it does is the right thing, even if it does end up going back to the two CEOs, which, of course, is where the MoU takes it all to anyway. I certainly do not like it as a step towards abandoning the “twin peaks” idea.
The present Governor also has FCA experience but, in the circumstances, that might complicate matters. One thing the amendment proposes is for the joint committee to check that the MoU is working. That check is important; it will surprise nobody that, in my view, if the MoU is not working, that is just the sort of matter that Parliament should get involved with to see if it can catalyse some action. The rest of the amendment also seems to be on things Parliament should be asking about and could ask to have reports about. Although I do not think that the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, has directed attention towards the right body, he highlights some issues on which the regulators should be quizzed.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Blackwell’s Amendment 86 identifies a very real problem that has existed since the Government decided to abolish the Financial Services Authority and split responsibility for conduct and prudential regulation.
I was never in favour of splitting the FSA. It had certainly failed as a regulator, as the financial crisis laid bare, although it must be said that other regulators around the world, whether combined or separate, fared no better. The FSA had not managed to get the balance right between conduct and prudential regulation; it had an obsession with conduct matters and treating customers fairly, which often dominated its thinking, while banks in particular were allowed to run on wafer-thin capital ratios. It needed reform rather than a wrecking ball.
When they were separated by the Financial Services Act 2012, many concerns were expressed about the possibility of a lack of co-operation. As has been said, a number of mechanisms were put in place, including the statutory duty to co-operate, the memorandum of understanding and cross-membership of the boards of the PRA and the FCA. However, as my noble friend Lord Blackwell explained, it has not always worked well in practice. There are problems of overlap and overload. Some issues, such as cybersecurity, are of interest to both the PRA and the FCA. Such an overlap comes with the split between the two regulatory peaks, but often they focus on the issues in different ways, on different timescales and with different objectives. This is often inefficient from the perspective of regulated firms.
The cumulative impact of the requirements of the PRA and the FCA can lead to significant overload. There is no real prioritisation mechanism. Regulated firms can be bombarded by each regulator and, even if the individual regulator prioritises its own demands, which is not always the case, there is no real mechanism for the competing demands of the FCA and the PRA. For example, I recall in the middle of stress testing, which is led by the PRA and tends to absorb the resources of subject matter experts specialising in credit risk, the FCA produced big data demands in exactly the same area and requiring exactly the same subject matter experts. It would not have occurred to either regulator to see regulatory demands from the other regulator as more important than its own.
I support the aims of this amendment. Whether another committee would have any impact is another matter, especially if it met only once a year. We must remember that the tripartite arrangements that failed during the financial crisis looked good on paper. It was just that they were never taken seriously and were allowed to fall into disuse. The same could happen to a committee.
My noble friend might want to look at how his amendment could be improved by incorporating an element of reporting to Parliament. On the first day of Committee, we debated parliamentary accountability more widely in the context of the new rule-making powers that are being transferred to the FCA and the PRA. The new accountability arrangements, which some of us advocated, could include examining how well the regulators are working together and co-ordinating their activities; that should be strongly considered if my noble friend chooses to bring this issue back on Report.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]
My Lords, I am looking closely at Amendment 86, introduced so eloquently by my noble friend Lord Blackwell, and asking myself why it would be needed in view of the comments made by my noble friend Lady Noakes and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles.
These are both deemed to be independent bodies. While my noble friend Lord Blackwell has rightly identified a number of shortcomings, I do not really understand why a joint co-ordinating committee, as my noble friend Lady Noakes pointed out and as it says in proposed new subsection (5), would meet only at least once every year—I presume it could meet more often.
In any event, I imagine that these issues are dealt with to some degree by the Treasury Select Committee in the other place. My noble friend Lord Blackwell probably has identified issues but there are very good reasons—he set out the background to this—why the PRA and the FCA replaced the FSA. Each should be able to enjoy a degree of independence in its operation. My noble friend Lady Noakes rightly identified a number of areas of overlap and overload, but I think that this can be addressed through the functioning of the memorandum of understanding. I struggle to see why this amendment is required.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, it is always a great pleasure to follow my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering, who is sitting today in front of a superb backdrop of the Houses of Parliament—in my opinion, one of the best views in Europe. I await my noble friend the Deputy Leader’s comments with great interest.
I have great respect for my noble friend Lord Blackwell and for all he has achieved. However, I have some doubts about this proposal, not least the amendment’s apparent focus on bigger operators. For me, the second-class treatment of small operators in the financial services sector as a result of regulation by two regulators is the bigger issue. It is there that the pressure on investment funds and on capital, the prioritisation of IT resources and the lack of management capacity—described so well by my noble friend Lord Blackwell—is at its most apparent. Smaller firms also suffer from the overlap and overload mentioned by my very experienced and expert noble friend Lady Noakes. I should say that I speak as a non-executive director of Secure Trust Bank, which is a smaller bank.
I was pleased to see the Chancellor focus on smaller businesses in last week’s Budget—for the first time, I felt—although I am not sure how much that will help in the financial services context.
In conclusion, is this amendment necessary, or can we tackle the issues rightly raised by my noble friend in another way?
Viscount Trenchard (Con) [V]
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Blackwell’s amendment is an interesting idea and deserves serious consideration. It requires the establishment of a new joint co-ordination committee, comprising delegates of both regulators under the chairmanship of the Governor of the Bank of England. As long as we retain a “twin peaks” regulatory structure, it is clearly right that both regulators carry out their duties in a co-ordinated manner, ensuring that their activities are consistent and proportionate in meeting their respective general duties and objectives.
At the time of the introduction of the “twin peaks” system, we were told that it was necessary because there was a conflict between the interests of the consumer and those of the Government in maintaining financial stability. However, the FCA is responsible for both consumer protection and the prudential regulation of all regulated companies except very large ones that are considered systemically important. Might not the best way to be sure that the regulators’ actions are consistent and proportionate be to merge them into a single regulator—the FSA—but leave the Bank responsible for macroprudential regulation?
As I failed to add my name to the speakers’ list for the group of amendments beginning with Amendment 2, debated on 22 February, I was able to speak only briefly after the Minister. My noble friend’s amendment deals with much the same ground, which gives me an opportunity, with the Committee’s leave, to make some of the points that I had wanted to make on the first day.
My noble friend’s amendment seeks to ensure consistent priorities between the two regulators. This is hard to do if the objectives confer conflicting priorities on the two regulators. Indeed, it can be argued that being dual regulated at all is time-consuming, expensive and unattractive. However, I strongly believe that we must move quickly to maximise the attractiveness of London’s markets in order to be assured that the City, including our wider financial services industry, will remain one of the two truly leading global financial centres, with all that that means for our prosperity as a nation.
In 1999, I was privileged to serve on the Joint Committee on Financial Services and Markets under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Burns, during my first incarnation in your Lordships’ House. At that time, we considered arguments that the FSA should be given a competition objective as a fifth objective. This was supported by the BBA and the ABI, but the Government argued, and the committee ultimately decided, to put competition and competitiveness among the principles rather than the statutory objectives. Two arguments that led us so to decide were that ensuring competition was the primary task of the OFT, not the FSA, and that making competitiveness of UK financial services an objective could damage the FSA’s relations with overseas regulators. Our report at that time noted that some members of the committee would have preferred competition and competitiveness to feature among the FSA’s statutory objectives.
Much water has flowed under the bridge since 1999. Following the financial crisis of 2008, the FSA was split into two regulators, and we adopted the “twin peaks” model that had first been introduced by Australia. On 22 February, my noble friend Lord Howe said that discussions about the balance of the regulator’s objectives
“are not arguments for today. The Government’s future regulatory framework review is considering how the UK’s financial services regulatory framework must adapt to reflect our future outside of the EU. That has to be the right place to consider issues such as the regulators’ objectives”.—[Official Report, 22/2/21; col. GC 142.]
The Minister’s response was disappointing. Does he not agree that our departure from the EU and freedom to adopt an entirely different, principles-based, outcomes-oriented regulatory model suggests that the Government should look seriously at this question as soon as possible?
Some encouraging proposals are included in the phase 2 framework consultation, such as the introduction of “activity-specific regulatory principles”, described in section 2.38. However, it seems that the Government do not plan wholesale changes. They conclude in section 2.46 that these regulatory principles could bring about
“enhanced regulator focus on … competitiveness, without needing to change the regulators’ overarching objectives”.
Such an approach is dangerously complacent. Can the Minister confirm that the Government agree with Andrew Bailey that it would be unrealistic and dangerous to stick to EU banking rules in the future? Surely, in financial services, where we enjoy the advantages of scale and can influence the emergence of global consensus around principles-based regulations that support innovation, we should move quickly to establish the right regulatory framework to do that.
Co-ordination between our two regulators has served us fairly well to date, but it is likely that the regulators will continue to face difficulties inherent in a multi-agency regulatory structure where the performance of one regulator is often dependent on that of the other. There is also a challenge in establishing the borders of financial regulation for allocating functions between the FCA and the PRA. In particular, the increased focus on systemic stability and macroprudential regulations has resulted in overlap between the two regulators. The FCA has responsibility for the prudential regulation of more than 24,000 firms in the UK, whereas the PRA is responsible only for the prudential regulation of some 1,500 systemically important banks and investment firms. Further, the “twin peaks” system is inherently anti-competitive for dual-regulated banks and investment companies, which have to report a large amount of monthly data in two different formats to two different regulators.
The PRA’s secondary competition objective is, by definition, subordinate to its other two objectives. In effect, it is simply a principle to which the PRA should have regard. Many countries have financial regulators that incorporate some kind of competition objective among their statutory objectives, and I do not think that there is any evidence that this has damaged their relationships with either the PRA or the FCA.
Furthermore, in his recent report on competition and markets, John Penrose found that
“our independent competition and consumer regulation regime currently has a good reputation, but not a great one. International rankings put our major competition institutions behind USA, France, Germany, EU and Australia. We have stopped making progress on cutting the costs of red tape and, in recent years, have gone backwards”.
This is largely as a result of a constantly increasing number of sectors, including many in financial services, being caught by the tentacles of the very cumbersome, expensive and complicated system of regulation that has been increasingly pushed by the Commission in the interests of harmonisation.
We have prospered and succeeded as a global financial centre not because of our EU regulatory framework but in spite of it. We may have devised much of the financial regulation ourselves and may even have gold-plated some of it, but we did not choose to work within the codified structures on which European law is based. Besides, our regulators are not that different from anyone else’s: they like to make rules, and gold-plating has been the only way that they could do that in recent years.
As Barnabas Reynolds explains well in his recent paper, published by Politeia and entitled Restoring UK Law: Freeing the UK’s Global Financial Market, common law is
“pivotal to the success of a global financial centre … A key element of London's attractiveness to investors is its legal framework, which underpins a flourishing commercial environment with the rule of law”.
I worry that the Government do not yet recognise that we have to replace the entire directives-based, cumbersome, EU-derived financial services rulebook and go back to something more like how we used to regulate: based on common law principles and outcomes. There is huge resistance to change among trade associations and larger financial services groups because the present system helps the strong incumbent against the innovator and the challenger—and is, in fact, a form of protectionism.
I look forward to hearing what my noble friend the Minister intends to do to move in the direction in which we need to go. I believe that my noble friend’s amendment may provide a first step on that journey.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I will respond to the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard. I for one would be very reluctant to go back to the pre-2008 principles-based approach to regulation that led us into a long, slow crash that, frankly, seriously undermined the financial stability of the UK and caused years of austerity. I do not think that is a good example to hold up of the world that we want to return to.
When the FCA and PRA were created—at that point the latter had a degree of independence from the Bank of England, although I think the Governor was always going to be its chair—one of the reasons that it was important to keep some distinct separation was to prevent the groupthink that had been fundamental to the failures that led to 2007-08. Those were failures to identify systemic risk, to ask questions, to create challenge and to recognise that conduct and prudential regulation are equally important in keeping a system as complex and difficult to regulate as the financial services industry on some kind of transparent and rational platform.
Lord Eatwell (Lab)
My Lords, those of us who were involved in the discussions on the Financial Services Act 2012 will no doubt remember the debate in which the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, then speaking for the Government, revealed that the principals of the tripartite committee—the noble Lord, Lord King, Gordon Brown and Howard Davies—had never met. He then revealed that the committee had slowly moved down in terms of the seniority of the officials who attended, and it was basically steadily downgraded into complete irrelevance. It was a co-ordinating committee between the Bank of England, the Financial Services Authority and the Treasury, and it did not meet. What this suggests to me is that an effective committee to deal with some of the issues of co-ordination, which have been referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, in moving his amendment, must have an organic purpose identified and shared by the participants. There must be, if you like, some enthusiasm about the operations of the committee which encourages everyone to participate fully.
In the discussion we have had on this amendment, I have been struck by the nostalgia for the FSA. I shared with the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, the feeling that breaking up the FSA was unnecessary. Indeed, I think it was mainly done to show that something was being done rather than having to face up to the intellectual, analytical and groupthink failures to which the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, referred. However, if there is the problem which the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, has identified, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has once again come up with the right answer, which is that there would be an organic interest of both to work together if they had to report to a suitably well-resourced and tough parliamentary committee which then ensured not only that the conditions of the MoU were being followed but that other identified overlaps were being dealt with in a productive way. So I think we come back once again to the debate we had concerning parliamentary scrutiny and identify, yet again, a positive role for Parliament in this respect.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, this debate has taken us back to a number of the issues that were brought sharply into focus during the passage of the Financial Services Act 2012. It has been useful. I therefore begin by assuring the Committee that the Government agree that we now have an important opportunity, not least in the wake of our exit from the EU, to review our regulatory framework and ensure that it is high-quality, agile and fit for the future. I assure my noble friend Lord Trenchard in particular that we will progress the future regulatory framework review as a priority and take specific action in high-priority areas, as I have set out in previous debates. I hope noble Lords will forgive me if I do not rehearse the remarks that I made in our earlier debate on competitiveness—a subject to which we will return, I am sure.
Amendment 86 seeks to establish a new joint co-ordination committee for the PRA and FCA to ensure that their activities are consistent and proportionate. Of course, the Government agree that it is important that the PRA and FCA work closely together and take a co-ordinated approach to the regulation and supervision of firms. However, I respectfully submit that this amendment is not necessary to ensure that that is the case. As my noble friend Lord Blackwell noted, the PRA and the FCA have different statutory objectives, which will naturally—and, on occasion, rightly—lead to differing priorities as these objectives are pursued.
I note the reservations expressed by my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Trenchard. However, this model was agreed by Parliament in the Financial Services Act 2012 as part of the post-crisis reforms, and the Government and regulators have taken a number of actions to support and improve co-ordination between the institutions while they carry out their different objectives. I believe that this addresses in a very real way the issue that my noble friend Lord Blackwell seeks to highlight through his amendment.
As mentioned in the amendment itself, there is already a memorandum of understanding between the FCA and the PRA, as set out in the Financial Services and Markets Act as amended. The MoU sets the framework for co-operation on a number of issues, particularly dual-regulated entities. In April 2020, the regulators introduced the new Regulatory Initiatives Grid, supported by a senior co-ordinating forum. The grid’s purpose is to increase co-ordination across the regulatory landscape. It provides a user-friendly overview of upcoming changes to allow the sector to plan for the future more effectively.
The senior co-ordinating forum is chaired jointly by the chief executive of the FCA and the chief executive of the PRA. It discusses the combined impact of regulatory initiatives across the financial services sector, and seeks to allow the Government and regulators to identify and address any peaks in regulatory demands on firms. The forum also provides a clearer picture of upcoming initiatives so that firms are better placed to plan for them, supporting the regulatory principles of proportionality and transparency.
I hope that those remarks are helpful in providing the background to the co-ordination that we have seen put in place and that, therefore, my noble friend Lord Blackwell will feel sufficiently reassured to be able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Blackwell (Con) [V]
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to what has been a very helpful discussion. In moving this amendment, I was not advocating recreating the FSA; there may be a debate about that at some point in time. My point was that, having split out these separate objectives, there are points at which there are conflicts and that does not remove the need to resolve those conflicts or to have a mechanism to do that.
I listened with great interest to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. Her experience with the EU is clearly very relevant. I have, of course, studied the memorandum of understanding between the two regulators, but my reading is that it is much more about setting out the clarity of their individual roles and their rules of engagement, including such things as exchange of information. It does not require them to resolve issues of conflict or set priorities. It is a much lower-level setting out of the boundaries and how they should operate across them. The simple fact is that I think practitioners would say that it has not led to those issues being dealt with.
My noble friend Lady Noakes and the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, talked about reporting to Parliament. Clearly, that is a major area, which we have discussed and will discuss further, and it may be helpful here. However, I find it difficult to believe that a parliamentary committee—particularly the Treasury Select Committee but maybe we can move to some other form of committee —would get into the level of detail of the regulatory load on institutions and those priorities. It may be able to check whether meetings are happening and the agenda is being followed, but I do not think that it can resolve the issues.
As the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, says, if there is such a committee, there has to be a purpose. One of my reasons for specifying looking at the load on the major institutions is that it is only when you get down to the granularity of how the different agendas are loading up on specific institutions that you can have a meaningful discussion about where the conflicts arise. I am not wedded to this particular mechanism or this particular committee. I am not even sure that legislation is needed. As the Minister said, it is an issue I have raised with the chief executives of the PRA and the FCA. There is nothing to stop them doing this of their own volition. I would perhaps encourage the Minister to sound out with those chief executives how they view this and what they might consider doing to help ensure that the priorities are properly addressed. There is a consultation he has under way. He may take a view on whether this kind of legislation or some amendment along these lines would be helpful. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
“Equivalence
The Treasury may not make an equivalence decision unless it has determined that a third country has equivalent legal and supervisory standards, and it may not make a determination based only on agreement to make reciprocal determinations.”Member’s explanatory statement
This is a probing amendment in order to discuss equivalence determinations and processes and the role of reciprocity.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, in moving this amendment, I shall make comments that reflect in part on EU relations and therefore on the other two amendments in this group.
As the explanatory statement says, this is a probing amendment in order to discuss equivalence determinations and processes and the role of reciprocity. The amendment states:
“The Treasury may not make an equivalence decision unless it has determined that a third country has equivalent legal and supervisory standards, and it may not make a determination based only on agreement to make reciprocal determinations.”
Broadly speaking, the first part of the amendment restates the usual equivalence requirement, and in the second part I am hoping that the Minister can explain how equivalence through trade agreements or reciprocal equivalence agreements will work. Will those mechanisms be allowed to dilute the standard set through the usual requirement?
We have heard a lot about trying to get equivalence with the EU. My position has always been that it was a remote possibility without rule taking, or dynamic alignment as it has become called. It also seems to me that the way in which the UK wants to operate, with the regulator making rules that can be flexible, makes it more difficult, or even impossible, for the EU, and maybe some other jurisdictions, to agree equivalence. That is because it ends up not being about rules—because in the UK they will be able to flex and vary—but about supervisory equivalence, or, as the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, called it, the outcomes. That is more subjective, a matter of opinion and confidence in supervisors rather than an objective analysis of rules.
This reasoning also lies behind what some noble Lords may see as my obsession with getting more information out of supervisors and for regular independent reviews. How else are we, let alone another jurisdiction, going to know what really goes on? Even less demanding jurisdictions than the EU, such as Australia, once they have set up independent scrutiny of their own regulators, may begin to wonder what they know about ours.
Our regulators will say that they have good and friendly relationships with other regulators and that they are respected and so on—all the presentations that they have repeatedly given to committees about why there would be equivalence with the EU in the end. They have been wrong so far, and I am not holding my breath. The statutory instruments currently underpinning legislation will be progressively taken away. I am sure that the EU will read these debates where the Minister has repeatedly stated how FSMA will enable rules to change quickly and be made bespoke and that is why Parliament cannot be let in too much. One hopes that means that rules will change to close gaps and adapt to new types of business, but there is nothing anywhere that says that. It can easily be interpreted as an intention to ease here and there, just like the tailor if we eat a little too much.
I am not trying to be awkward. I have sat in discussions with the European Commission at a time when my committee was concerned that the EU was being too rigid on equivalence. I have had to explain that equivalence was sometimes—in fact, quite often—of mutual benefit. That instinct to have things fixed and controlled between member states ran through every piece of legislation in one never-ending grind, as elaborated correctly by the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, on the previous amendment, although we may come from opposite positions. Such an instinct is stronger in financial services than in any other sector because of the philosophical commitment to the euro, whether or not that is relevant. Yet, somehow, it is still hoped that the EU can work out how to deal with this squidgy balloon that defines UK financial services rules. All I am saying is that we have to recognise that if we want the squidgy balloon way and the outcomes way, there are consequences when it comes to equivalence decisions.
That is looking at it from the outside. The other side of it is the inside. What are our rules and supervisory standards that other countries will have to be equivalent to? How is that judgment to be made? Will it be a rule book by rule book comparison or will it really be mutual recognition of supervisors, and if so, based on what? How will that assessment be done? Will HMT agree reciprocal equivalence with anyone when it sees an opportunity for export of financial services and assumes that not much will be incoming back to the UK, or will UK standards be lowered to match those of incoming equivalent businesses from the third country? Will UK firms be allowed to drop standards when operating overseas? To come back to my amendment, will the Government allow weaker standards, through trade agreements and reciprocal equivalence agreements, and how will consumers and financial stability be protected?
The example of software being allowed for capital is a convenient one, although there are probably bigger things. I kept that out of EU legislation but the UK could not hold the line on that this time round. The US has also allowed it. Where does that put banking equivalence for us in relation to the US and, should it ever be on offer, the EU? What top-up supervision or other requirements will go on?
It will be clear that I am less obsessed by getting reports on the EU situation as required by Amendments 100 and 105—although I will happily read them and wonder what is new. I am more obsessed with what standard is really being required by the UK of other jurisdictions to permit equivalence by any route and, in turn, how that will reflect back into our own supervisory standards. I beg to move.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con) [V]
My Lords, I have Amendment 105 in this group, which is also a probing amendment, and seeks to insert a new clause in the Bill about regulatory co-operation with the EU. In her Amendment 90 the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, called for actions. Amendment 105, as the explanatory statement makes clear, is a reporting mechanism to report on progress towards or completion of an MoU with the EU on regular co-operation measures, which were envisaged under the trade and co-operation agreement between the UK and EU as regards financial services. The amendment flows from my chairmanship of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee of your Lordships’ House.
Last autumn, the committee considered a number of statutory instruments, which have granted equivalence to oversight and regulatory arrangements in the EU in the area of financial services. Mostly they were laid by the Treasury but some were laid by another departments. It was not clear to our committee whether the SIs were all part of a potential agreement with the EU or whether they were unilateral individual decisions. We wrote to John Glen, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, as follows:
“Equivalence in relation to the regulation of financial services is an important aspect of our future relationship with the EU. In several of the instruments that we have considered, the UK appears to have granted equivalence indefinitely, while the EU has not yet completed its assessment of the UK’s equivalence (for example in relation to the regulatory regime for auditors) or has granted only time-limited equivalence (for example limited to 18 months in the case of the supervisory arrangements for central counterparties).”
Against this background, we asked for further and better particulars on three points:
“A list of the equivalence decisions made by the UK Government in the different areas of financial services regulation. Whether the EU has reciprocated and granted equivalence to the UK and its regulatory arrangements in these areas. Whether equivalence by the UK and EU has been granted indefinitely or is time limited.”
The reply on 7 January, which I referred to in my speech at Second Reading, was not a model of clarity and precision. Phrases like
“a package of equivalence decisions”
and “the majority of decisions” do not help critical analysis. The correspondence between the noble Lord, Lord Butler, and my noble friend Lord Agnew at Second Reading, which followed this and circulated among all who participated in that debate, seemed to follow the same generalist approach.
However, John Glen’s letter did make one thing clear, that
“there are no decisions made by the EU that have not been reciprocated by the UK.”
As such, to date, it has been a one-way street. That is not necessarily a bad thing, but Parliament and the country are entitled to, and should, know about the development of our relationship with this most significant and geographically proximate market in a sector of particular importance to the United Kingdom—hence my tabling this amendment.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]
My Lords, I am delighted to follow my noble friend, and I thank him and the other authors of the amendments in this group.
This is a particularly appropriate moment to state that “taking back control” has possibly worked less successfully in the financial services sector than in any other since we left the European Union, with Amsterdam having overtaken us as the largest share-trading centre. There are generally understood to be four options for trade in financial services with the EU. First, there is passporting, which we enjoyed and was very beneficial not just to the London Stock Exchange but, I venture to add, other centres, such as Edinburgh, Leeds and other financial centres in the United Kingdom; it was the most seamless form of trade in financial services. Secondly, there is trade on World Trade Organization terms and, thirdly, free trade agreements, such as that agreed between the EU and Canada, although I am not convinced that it covers financial services or services as a whole. Finally, there is equivalence. If we are not able to revert to passporting, and I understand that we are not, that would be a good way forward. My understanding is that equivalence is where a decision is made by one state to recognise another state’s legal requirements for regulating a service, even though they may not be the same—so, clearly, it is not as good as passporting.
I very much enjoyed the introductory remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and I support each of the amendments in this group for differing reasons. Obviously we will not have the chance to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, until he speaks to his amendment, but all three of the amendments in this group would, I believe, further the case for equivalence with the European Union.
Time marches on, and we obviously realise that the trade and co-operation agreement with the European Union left out this major sector of financial services. So I take this opportunity to ask my noble friend the Minister to say, in summing up this debate, precisely where we are with the negotiations and whether we have any chance of reaching an agreement on equivalence under the circumstances and the further particulars as set out by my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts. I find it deeply regrettable when our own Minister cannot answer three very simple questions in a letter so that our understanding is better. However, with those few remarks, I am minded to support Amendments 90, 100 and 105 for the reasons given.
Viscount Trenchard (Con) [V]
My Lords, all three amendments in this group would increase the importance of equivalence determinations, which might ultimately be counterproductive.
Amendment 90 seeks to prevent the Treasury making equivalence decisions for reciprocal reasons alone. I cannot see a shred of evidence that the Treasury might do that. When my right honourable friend the Chief Secretary to the Treasury and Katharine Braddick, director-general for financial services, gave evidence to the EU Services Sub-Committee, they made it very clear that, although they would have preferred a comprehensive set of equivalence determinations, the EU declined to grant any, besides two time-limited determinations for the central counterparties, such as LCH, which clear derivatives transactions. It is good news that the Government decided to make their equivalence determinations unilaterally, based on economics and efficiency of markets, and have no intention of making equivalence determinations for political or reciprocal reasons. I suggest that the noble Baroness’s amendment is unnecessary.
Amendment 100 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord Eatwell, is clearly fighting yesterday’s battle. It presumes that the memorandum of understanding now under negotiation with the EU on future regulatory co-operation is likely to lead to the granting by the EU of a number of positive equivalence determinations. This would indeed provide much-needed clarity in the short term but would also make divergence more difficult. Furthermore, the EU has been unwilling to make equivalence determinations on the basis of equivalence of outcomes. Rather, it has made it clear that it expects the UK to copy its rules exactly, line by line, as the price for equivalence determinations.
The Governor of the Bank of England, Andrew Bailey, has said we will not become a “rule-taker” from the EU. He said that, just as we will not diverge for divergence’s sake, we will not align for alignment’s sake. It is unrealistic to think the EU will grant any significant equivalence assessments to the UK in areas where it thinks we may diverge from its cumbersome and expensive regulations. The majority of the financial services industry, rather than looking for equivalence determinations, which can be withdrawn unilaterally on 30 days’ notice, is now looking to the Government to adopt a new and different pro-innovation, pro-competition, common law-based regulatory regime. That is the way to retain and further enhance the position of our financial services industry and our leadership role in developing proportionate, sound regulation at the global level.
Furthermore, the explanatory notes prepared by the noble Lord are puzzling. The decision of the EU not to grant equivalence determinations to the UK has no effect on UK retail investors, because we have granted equivalence to EU firms in many areas to continue to offer their services and products in the UK. I can see that it may well disadvantage EU retail investors, who will be denied access to products and services produced by UK financial services firms, so I do not think this amendment is helpful under any circumstances.
Amendment 105 in the name of my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts would require a report on the progress towards agreeing the MoU with the EU on regulatory co-operation. This report will be due within two months of the passage of this Bill. However, the TCA requires this MoU to be entered into by the end of March. It seems unlikely that this Bill will even be enacted by then.
Can the Minister tell the Committee when he expects the MoU to be agreed, when a draft will be available and the Government’s expectations as to its content? I usually find common cause with my noble friend but, in relation to his amendment, I believe the retention of freedom to diverge from EU regulations in order to adopt a better regulatory regime in a particular area, ensuring or enhancing the city’s continuing leading role in that area, is more important than slavish alignment to EU rules to beg or ask for the grant of equivalence determinations which could be unilaterally withdrawn at any time. I therefore doubt whether his amendment is necessary but I am interested to hear what the Minister has to say about it.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lord Trenchard who, as usual, speaks good sense on this matter. While these are clearly probing amendments designed to get the Government to say how they see the future of various aspects of financial services, it seems to me that, as regards equivalence with the EU, they are rooted in the language of the past. It has been clear for a long time that the EU sees equivalence either as a route to dictate how the UK’s financial services sector is regulated or as a weapon to be used against the UK as a competitor. The Governor of the Bank of England has spoken strongly against the EU’s apparent positioning on equivalence. He said that either it was trying to say that our rules should never change, which he described as dangerous, or that our rules should change whenever the EU changed its rules, which was “not acceptable”.
There is no doubt that the EU sees the UK as a threat to its way of doing things. It no longer has a leading financial centre within the EU and will struggle to create one, especially if its only weapon is protectionism. We have long been one of the leading financial markets in the world and I hope that we get our number one slot back now that we are unshackled from the EU. That may well take us into new areas of financial services; it should certainly lead to the dismantling of some elements of the EU’s rules that we never liked. The alternative investment funds directive is one clear example; Solvency II and MiFID are others. They never reflected what we regarded as important, and introduced rules which we regarded as unnecessary and cumbersome.
It would have been very easy for the EU to have granted us equivalence at the end of the transition period; we were completely aligned. However, there is a misguided belief in the EU that they can create a rival to the UK and that the best way of doing that is to make it difficult for UK firms to operate in the EU. My own view is that we should abandon any interest in equivalence. Even if we were to get a favourable decision, the EU has retained the right to remove any such decision at short notice. We know that decisions on granting or removing equivalence will not be made on technical merit. They will be political decisions designed to advance the EU’s financial services industry at the expense of the UK. I do not believe that a UK-based financial services operator could ever build a viable business model on the shifting sands of equivalence as determined by a body—the EU—which does not wish us well.
In addition, I do not think that it matters very much. We may find that some areas of our financial services as currently operated will become less profitable—for example, if the EU cuts off its nose to spite its face and denies Euro-denominated derivatives the advantages of London’s liquidity via UK clearing exchanges. Many UK banks and other financial institutions have already set up EU-based subsidiaries to carry out the business that was previously carried out under passporting. That is now water under the bridge—those subsidiary structures will carry on while the business is profitable and cease if it is not.
For these reasons, I believe that the amendments in this group are looking in the rear-view mirror. Of much greater importance is what plans the Government have to support and promote the future—
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)
My Lords, there is a Division in the Chamber. The Committee stands adjourned for five minutes.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
As I was saying, my Lords, of much greater importance are the plans that the Government have to support and promote the future growth of our financial services sector. The amendments on international competitiveness debated on our first day in Committee are far more important than EU equivalence.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I am delighted to follow my noble friend Lady Noakes. Like her, I was struck by the comments of the Governor of the Bank of England, and I feel she has given us a welcome dose of reality this evening.
I speak as a member of the EU Committee and its Services Sub-Committee. We have wrestled long and hard on the vexed question of the granting of equivalence by the EU, including the important issue of reciprocity, highlighted by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. I want to make three points and ask one question.
First, once one has decided to leave the EU, it makes little sense to be tied to its rules and regulations—in effect, as the Governor of the Bank of England has said recently, thereby becoming a rule taker without being able to make any input to the new rules. So we will have to plough our own furrow on financial services. But that does not stop us agreeing equivalence arrangements in areas where there is strong mutual interest such as central counterparties, known as CCPs, already temporarily approved, and perhaps insurance. We have granted equivalence to European banks and other bodies, as has been said, and the prospect of maintaining that equivalence gives us some leverage.
Secondly, I do not see why we should necessarily refuse equivalence to third countries which do not have similar legal and supervisory standards. Flexibility is important if we are to welcome investors here, and they may have different yet adequate regimes, bringing in innovation and diversity of offer, which could be valuable in the UK. Trade in services is absolutely vital to the future of this country.
Thirdly, I can see the value of some form of reporting to Parliament, as proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, in Amendment 100 and my noble friend Lord Hodgson in Amendment 105—although in different ways. Even on the EU Committee, we have had the greatest difficulty extracting information on the progress of negotiations on financial services, partly because this is in the hands of the Treasury and its officials, while the main spokesman has been my noble friend Lord Frost, who has led our negotiations across the board with such tenacity.
My question is this. How does my noble friend the Deputy Leader feel about the balance between UK-owned banks and financial service operators and their EU competitors now that we have granted equivalence and the EU, in the main, has not? Am I right in thinking that a German bank such as Deutsche Bank, a Dutch bank such as Rabobank or a French asset management firm such as Amundi is regulated in its own country and less subject to UK regulator bureaucracy and aggressive enforcement of something like MiFID than its UK counterparts? Is there any sense in which it is privileged, and is this true also of smaller operators? Does this matter to UK plc?
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I shall begin by addressing Amendments 100 and 105, which would require reports that would be both useful and interesting. However, I want to pick up the point that was made by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, who essentially took the position—I understand its logic—“Why bother to seek equivalence from the EU?” I think she said, “They wish us ill and see a competitive advantage in not offering equivalence.” However, I do not think she listened carefully to my noble friend Lady Bowles, who comes with a great deal of experience from the EU. The point my noble friend made is that in the EU, which is a rules-based organisation —that is its absolutely core fundamental structure—it is quite hard to offer equivalence to a financial centre where those who are regulating it make it very clear that they want great flexibility to be able to make change very easily and with very little process. That is what we are doing with this Bill.
Essentially, we are removing the normal parliamentary processes that would have been engaged in the process of changing regulation and leaving it in the hands of the regulator, with, as we have all discussed, virtually no accountability to Parliament. It seems from what we read that a 12-week consultation would be about all that is required for a regulator to change the rules, compared with the process in the EU, which people may regard as cumbersome but which has with it extensive consultation, engagement and oversight, and which flushes out exactly what is associated with, what is involved with and what the consequences are of that rule change. We will now have light-touch rule change—that would be an accurate way to describe it. In an atmosphere where there is very little trust—the language certainly has not been that which would develop and promote trust—I can certainly see why the EU would be uncomfortable with the idea of offering equivalence in those circumstances. Therefore, it is not a determination to do us ill but, to a significant degree, some shock that change will happen so often that it will have very little idea of the rule base that applies in the UK and certainly will not understand its various ramifications.
However, in a sense it really does not matter. I find it quite shattering that we have a Government—the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, seems to be aligned with them—who say, “We are really not interested in being able to sell our services into the second-largest economy on the globe”—whether measured by population or in terms of GDP. That is a huge and significant market. We have never been successful at selling financial services into the United States, partly because it has its own, very stalwart financial services sector. I suggest that selling financial services into China will be exceedingly difficult over many years. China will wish to develop its own financial centre; it has Hong Kong. We begin then to look at countries across Asia and in South America. However, I think we will find very shortly that they intend to develop their own financial centres. When I have talked to people in India, they would be willing to do some work here with people in the UK but they want to develop Mumbai. We are seeing a regionalisation of economic blocs, which will lead to a rise of significant financial centres in other locations across the globe. There is a real danger in dismissing with a wave of the hand the customers who sit on our doorstep, who have traditionally been our core customers, and saying, in essence, “It really doesn’t matter whether we are able to sell them services. Let’s look elsewhere.” I am not sure that “elsewhere” looks quite so promising.
What I found most interesting in this whole debate was a very different set of questions raised by my noble friend Lady Bowles. To me they were, if you like, the financial services equivalent of the chlorinated chicken question. As we go out and seek to sell our financial services more broadly, presumably, many of those locations will turn to us and say, “You can sell to us provided we can sell to you. We’re developing our financial sector and we would like to have access to your markets.” My noble friend was asking: what standards will we be using to determine that reciprocity? As I say, it is the chlorinated chicken question. We have not heard much—or anything, frankly—from the Government about what standards we will apply under those circumstances.
It seems to me that, when we assert that we can find markets all over the globe that will take the place of the EU—and that this can be done rapidly and very easily—we have to answer that question. Are we going to have to pay the price of providing reciprocity to financial centres whose standards do not meet our own? What are the consequences of that if those entities are then freely able to enter the UK market? We have a long history of concern about money laundering and market abuse. There are very serious questions associated with that; I would like to begin to hear some answers.
Lord Eatwell (Lab)
My Lords, I have been very struck by this particular debate and the positions taken by Members of the Grand Committee. I approach this question of our future financial services relationship with the European Union with a sort of historical perspective. In a way, the financial services industry in this country is unique in the history of financial centres in that it is a financial centre without any significant savings or economic hinterland. The great financial centres of history—be it Venice, Amsterdam, 19th-century London or 20th/21st-century New York—have thrived on a powerful flow of domestic and imperial savings, and have tended to fade when that flow has dried up.
The fact that the City of London has continued to thrive even as Britain has lost its Empire and the UK economy has lost its dominant position is no doubt due to a remarkable concentration of talent and entrepreneurship; to the remarkable luck of widespread access to financial markets around the world; and to becoming, as the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, pointed out, the financial centre of the European Union. The international liberalisation of the 1980s and the creation of the European single market gave the City access to that economic hinterland and the opportunity to provide financial services throughout an open market.
As we know, the openness of the European market for financial services to the UK is now in question. As this Bill makes clear, access that was previously open is now potentially closed and hanging on this delicate thread of equivalence. It is interesting to see that the Bill is nervous about equivalence. On page 65, we read that
“the FCA must consider, and consult the Treasury about, the likely effect of the rules on relevant equivalence decisions.”
On page 82, we read that
“the PRA must consider, and consult the Treasury about, the likely effect of the rules on relevant equivalence decisions.”
That nervousness is well founded. I agree with the noble Lords who have been critical of the European Union that the likelihood of equivalence being the foundation of successful financial activities for the City’s continuing growth in Europe is at least in great doubt. Indeed, just imagine the chief executive of a big international bank or an asset manager with a large number of employees in London telling the board of directors that they are planning their long-term investments on the shaky foundations of a political equivalence ruling by Brussels.
At the moment, the only thread that seems to be at least holding and maintaining the potential of access to a market of 500 million people is the memorandum of understanding, which was due in June but is still apparently debated. However, a draft that was leaked to the Politico website
“states categorically that equivalence findings remain unilateral decisions, meaning the U.K. would have no recourse if the EU opted to withdraw it.”
The draft does propose the creation of an EU-UK financial regulatory forum but this resembles the arrangement with the United States that is defined as “strictly informal”. I think that access will be diminished, perhaps significantly. That is the only certain conclusion we can make. Perhaps the Minister will tell us more about the progress of the memorandum of understanding when he sums up.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has taken us into an interesting topic area: regulatory equivalence.
The UK has long been a global leader in financial services. As we adapt to our new position outside the EU, it is essential that we continue to support a stable, innovative and world-leading sector. We have already considered the UK’s international standing in another debate. With these amendments, we are considering equivalence and the UK’s relationship with the EU in relation to financial services. I know that there is a lot of interest in this issue, so I will take this opportunity to provide an update on where we are, to the extent that I am able to do so at this point in time. Perhaps, though, I could begin by saying something about our approach to making these decisions.
Amendment 90 seeks to impose an obligation on the Government to make an equivalence determination only where they have determined that the relevant overseas jurisdiction has legal and supervisory standards equivalent to those of the UK. It also seeks to prohibit the Government granting an equivalence determination based only on an agreement to make determinations on a reciprocal basis.
I am happy to confirm that the Government are already committed to conducting their equivalence assessments of overseas jurisdictions on the basis that the relevant legal and supervisory framework of that jurisdiction provides equivalent outcomes to the UK’s. This is outlined in the guidance document on the UK’s equivalence framework which was published in November 2020.
In addition, an example of the legislative requirement for granting equivalence can be seen on page 35 of the Bill. It amends the money market funds regulation to allow the Treasury to make equivalence determinations and states:
“The Treasury may not make regulations under paragraph 1 unless satisfied that the law and practice of the country or territory imposes requirements on MMFs which have equivalent effect to the requirements imposed by this Regulation.”
There is a key point for me to make here. This is not a so-called “line-by-line approach”, where we require a country to have identical rules. We believe that compliance with internationally agreed standards and equivalent regulatory outcomes in different countries can be achieved in different ways and through different legal frameworks.
In that context, there is a further important point that I invite noble Lords to note: granting equivalence is a decision we make independently with no reciprocity requirement. The UK would not grant equivalence just on the basis of reciprocity but would always carry out an assessment to ensure that the other jurisdiction is equivalent. The Government must lay a statutory instrument in Parliament to make an equivalence decision. This will give all noble Lords the opportunity to consider and scrutinise Her Majesty’s Treasury’s decisions as part of the normal legislative process.
I turn to consider our relationship with the EU. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, that there is no question of us dismissing this relationship with a wave of the hand or otherwise. Amendments 100 and 105 seek to impose obligations on the Government to report on the status of the EU’s considerations about UK equivalence and on the status of negotiations on the regulatory co-operation memorandum of understanding between the UK and EU. I have already said that the granting of equivalence is an autonomous matter for the UK, and this is equally true for the EU, so the Government are not in a position to report on what the EU may or may not be thinking at a given point in time, even if we wanted to.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, characterised the UK regulatory system as a squidgy balloon and hence difficult for the EU to grapple with but, as I have previously set out, the EU is well used to assessing regulator rules and practice as part of its equivalence assessments, and we see no reason why it would not be able to assess the UK in the same way if the will is there.
However, I can provide an update on our own actions. In November, the Chancellor announced a package of equivalence decisions for the EU and EEA member states. We did this to provide clarity and stability for industry. My noble friend Lord Hodgson asked me a number of factual questions about the existing equivalence decisions between the UK and the EU. If he will allow, to ensure a full and accurate response, I am happy to write to him on those questions.
We are not ruling out further equivalence decisions for the EU in the future, and we continue to believe that comprehensive mutual findings of equivalence between the UK and EU are in the best interests of both parties. The Government remain ready and willing to work with the EU to achieve this. For their part, the EU has granted only minimal decisions for the UK. As per our joint declaration with the EU on financial services, which was agreed alongside the trade and co-operation agreement, we have agreed to establish structured regulatory co-operation on financial services by the end of this month. My noble friend Lord Trenchard will be glad to note that we believe we are on track to do that.
This co-operation will support engagement on issues of mutual interest, including facilitating transparency and dialogue around the process of adopting, suspending and withdrawing equivalence decisions, but I should be clear that it is not envisaged, in the joint statement or elsewhere, that the agreement of the MoU on regulatory co-operation will directly entail any new equivalence decisions. This MoU will be publicly available to Parliament after the conclusion of negotiations. I reiterate that the Government are committed to operating an open and transparent approach to equivalence with the EU, but I am afraid that the Government cannot provide updates on this discussion in real time.
My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe expressed concerns that we may have given EU firms some kind of advantage over UK firms. In the absence of clarity from the EU, the UK has acted to provide clarity and stability to industry, supporting the openness of the sector, and to deliver our goal of open, well-regulated markets, but these decisions should not be seen simply as altruistic. They will allow firms to pool and manage their risks effectively and to support clients on both sides of the channel in accessing our world-leading financial services and highly liquid markets, so there are benefits for the UK as well as for the EU.
Finally, Amendment 100 also seeks to impose a legal obligation on the Government to publish a strategy to provide security to UK retail investors in the event of equivalence being withdrawn. I reassure noble Lords that, as set out in the guidance document on the UK’s equivalence framework, the Treasury will seek to ensure that withdrawal of equivalence is undertaken in line with the principle of transparency. That means that the Treasury will endeavour to engage with interested parties as part of the process and will seek to provide Parliament with appropriate scrutiny. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, that I recognise the importance of clarity and stability regarding the potential withdrawal of equivalence. When withdrawing an equivalence determination, it will be undertaken in an orderly and controlled manner to ensure that investors are protected.
The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, made clear a similar concern in relation to the overseas funds regime, given that the provisions of the Bill also create a new equivalence regime there. I assure him that we do not envisage that in the event of equivalence being withdrawn investors would be forced to divest their investments in the fund, but instead that the fund should continue to service them. The Bill also includes a power so that the Treasury may take steps to smooth the transition for funds if equivalence has been withdrawn.
I realise that noble Lords might have wished for a slightly fuller account of our discussions with the EU on the MoU and equivalence issues, but I trust that the reasons for me being constrained on those matters are clear. I hope nevertheless that I have provided the Committee with a sufficient update on this topic and ask that the amendment be withdrawn.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)
I have received a request to speak after the Minister from the noble Lord, Lord Northbrook.
Lord Northbrook (Con) [V]
My Lords, since we are already diverging from the EU—for instance, with regard to lightening new share-listing rules—does the Minister believe that equivalence does not really matter because Her Majesty’s Government believe that the UK will make up the lost revenue from the passporting system in this and other financial areas?
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, I hope that my response to this debate has indicated that, of course, we regard mutual determinations of equivalence as desirable. However, I have also made it clear that there is advantage to both the UK and the EU in our adopting an autonomous position to take decisions for ourselves in this area. Of course, I am hopeful that our discussions with the EU will progress in a helpful way, and I assure my noble friend that, as soon as I have news that I can vouchsafe to him and other noble Lords, I shall certainly do so.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for what has turned out to be a very interesting debate. For once, the crafting of my probing amendment produced exactly the responses that I was hoping to obtain. Here is the thing: in many respects, I can agree with everybody, even though noble Lords were obviously coming from different positions.
The noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Noakes and Lady Neville-Rolfe, think that we just have to get on and plough our own furrow. The Minister has said that that is essentially what we are doing, but we are maintaining the hope or ambition that the EU will, one day, come round and finally realise that there is mutual advantage in equivalence decisions or whatever one wants to call them. In my opening speech, I said that I had sometimes failed to persuade it of that, and, ultimately, we already see the pattern: once it realises it needs it, we will get it, but not before. It will not concede a general mutual benefit, which is one of the big differences between the UK and the EU. I fully support the line that the UK is taking, which is to be open and to show that openness works. There lies the power of London—and common law has a hand in it as well.
The Minister has been clear. On the adoption of the squidgy balloon, as I termed it, I did not mean that in a disrespectful way; I was just trying to say that the EU looks for something concrete, and we have a squidgy balloon, although the outcome might end up being around the same. It has difficulty with that, but we are proceeding with the squidgy balloon, and, therefore, we will have to take in our stride whether we get equivalence or not. I think that that is what the Minister has said, quite fairly and clearly.
However, he has confirmed that standards will be maintained. I knew that I was broadly quoting from guidelines in the first part of my amendment; that was not a happy accident. However, there was confirmation that there will always be this looking at the outcomes and what is supporting that, which applies no matter the route we take to equivalence or whatever else it is called—as the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, explained, there are various routes to achieving the mutual recognition, however it comes about.
From my perspective, this has ended up being quite a satisfactory debate—probably nobody is happy, but we are where we are. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Penn (Con)
My Lords, this may be a convenient moment for the Committee to adjourn.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)
That concludes the work of the Committee this afternoon. As always, I remind Members to sanitise desks and chairs.
Financial Services Bill
Wednesday 10th March 2021
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Financial Services Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 162-VI(Rev) Revised sixth marshalled list for Grand Committee - (8 Mar 2021)
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord McNicol of West Kilbride) (Lab)
My Lords, the hybrid Grand Committee will now begin. Some Members are here in person, respecting social distancing, others are participating remotely, but all Members will be treated equally. I must ask Members in the Room to wear face coverings except when seated at their desks, to speak sitting down and to wipe down their desks, chairs and any other touch points before and after use. If the capacity of the Committee Room is exceeded, or other safety requirements are breached, I will immediately adjourn the Committee. If there is a Division in the House, the Committee will adjourn for five minutes.
I will call Members to speak in the order listed. During the debate on each group I will invite Members, including Members in the Grand Committee Room, to email the clerk if they wish to speak after the Minister, using the Grand Committee address. I will call Members to speak in order of request.
The groupings are binding. Leave should be given to withdraw amendments. When putting the question, I will collect voices in the Grand Committee Room only. I remind Members that Divisions cannot take place in Grand Committee. It takes unanimity to amend the Bill, so if a single voice says “Not Content” an amendment is negatived, and if a single voice says “Content” the clause stands part. If a Member taking part remotely wants their voice accounted for if the question is put, they must make this clear when speaking on a group.
Amendment 99
“Standard Variable Rates: cap on charges for mortgage prisoners
In section 137A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (the FCA’s general rules), at end insert—“(7) The FCA must make rules by virtue of subsection (1) in relation to introducing a cap on the interest rates charged to mortgage prisoners in relation to regulated mortgage contracts, with a view to securing an appropriate degree of protection for consumers.(8) In subsection (7) “mortgage prisoner” means a consumer who cannot switch to a different lender because of their characteristics and has a regulated mortgage contract with one of the following type of firms—(a) inactive lenders, or firms authorised for mortgage lending that are no longer lending; and(b) unregulated entities, or firms not authorised for mortgage lending.(9) The rules made by the FCA under subsection (7) must set the level of the cap on the Standard Variable Rate at a level no more than 2 percentage points above the Bank of England base rate. (10) In subsection (9) “Standard Variable Rate” means the variable rate of interest charged under the regulated mortgage contract after the end of any initial introductory deal.(11) The FCA must ensure any rules that it is required to make as a result of the amendment made by subsection (7) are made not later than 31 July 2021.””Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause would require the FCA to introduce a cap on the Standard Variable Rates charged to consumers who cannot switch to a different lender because of their characteristics and who have a regulated mortgage contract with either an inactive lender or an unregulated entity.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab) [V]
My Lords, financial regulation has to ensure that consumers are well protected. It is with this principle in mind that I move the amendment in my name. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Sharkey and Lord Holmes of Richmond, for their support. We have also had an aperitif, in the sense that Amendment 127 in the name of the noble Lord has already been debated in an earlier group, although its main focus is aligned with the amendments in this group and I look forward to his comments.
The recent report of the UK Mortgage Prisoners group referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, when he spoke on the earlier group of amendments, is graphic and shocking. It makes the case that the Government need to come forward promptly with a fair deal for the 250,000 or so mortgage prisoners who have been stuck for some 10 years paying higher interest rates than they needed to. The All-Party Parliamentary Group on Mortgage Prisoners has kept this issue alive, having been contacted by hundreds of mortgage prisoners who describe the worry and stress that comes from being trapped as they are. This is a shameful episode.
I am grateful to the Economic Secretary to the Treasury for meeting my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe, myself and others last month. The Economic Secretary told us that he has a keen interest in settling this matter. He explained that there are difficulties including moral hazard, which means that it is not easy to sort. However, while the issue continues, considerable injustice is occurring. The Government may well be right to say that the SVRs currently paid by mortgage prisoners are only a little higher on average than the SVRs of other lenders but, particularly during the pandemic, small differences matter. In any case, the assertion that the Government make that the differences are rather minor does not ring true in the light of the report from the all-party group. Its case studies, which include nurses, teachers, members of the Armed Forces and small business people, suggest that, for all those who are trapped and struggling with the consequences of the Government’s decisions when money is tight and margins matter, these things need to be sorted.
Surely the true comparison is that if mortgage prisoners were with an active lender and of course up to date with their payments, they would have access to a range of products to transfer to, which would give them a lower fixed rate for their mortgages. In the other place when this issue was discussed, the savings available were said to be in the order of £5,000 a year. That is not an inconsiderable sum. Why are these people being singled out for this penalty?
The problem also seems to be the inability to access the best market-matching deals, compounded by the fact that the prison effect is reinforced by the inability to prevent mortgages being sold off to so-called vulture funds, which are often unregulated. This matter has been left unresolved for far too long. The inability to seek out new deals and to limit costs is causing stress, and in some cases has caused families to lose their homes. As the Government have been involved throughout this process, is it too much to ask them to explain what the plan is, and what the timetable for resolving the incarceration of these prisoners will be?
In its recent report, UK Mortgage Prisoners says that it has put the record straight on what it calls a “Government made scandal”. It is for the Government to defend themselves on that charge. UK Mortgage Prisoners complains that the Government have “effectively ignored the issue” and that, where the FCA has intervened, it has done so in a limited and ineffective manner. Its asks seem very simple: an immediate cap on SVRs for closed mortgages; introducing a tailored mortgage product for those affected; giving credit to prisoners who have for a decade or more made overpayments; stopping penalty charges for any excess arrears; and adjusting credit ratings going forward. Those are five simple steps for 250,000 people whose lives have quite simply been blighted.
Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]
My Lords, I declare an interest as co-chair of the APPG on Mortgage Prisoners. Mortgage prisoners exist almost entirely because the Treasury made a terrible mistake when it sold the first tranche of former Northern Rock and B&B mortgages to an unregulated American vulture fund called Cerberus. Cerberus is the name of the multi-headed dog that in Greek mythology sits at the entrance to the gates of hell. That is not an inappropriate name, in view of what happened next.
Three things are needed to rescue mortgage prisoners. The first is to reduce immediately to comparable market rates the SVRs that they pay. The second is to make sure that transfers to much less expensive fixed-rate deals are properly available to them. The third is to make sure that new classes of mortgage prisoners cannot be created in the future.
Amendment 99, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, to which I have added my name, deals with the first of those things. My Amendments 116 and 117 deal with the second and third. Amendment 99, as he has so clearly and forcefully explained, would protect the thousands of mortgage prisoners stuck paying high standard variable rates. It would introduce a cap on the standard variable rates paid by customers of inactive lenders and unregulated entities. That would provide immediate relief for thousands of mortgage prisoners, and could give space for longer-term solutions to be found. It would help mortgage prisoners who took out loans with a fully FCA-regulated high-street bank which were then sold on to vulture funds.
Money-saving expert and consumer champion Martin Lewis supports this proposal, and on Monday he released a statement saying:
“While the government chose to bail out the banks in the financial crisis, it has never bailed out the banks’ customers who were victims of that collapse. Mortgage prisoners have been left paying obscene interest rates for over a decade through no fault of their own. They have been completely trapped in their mortgages and unable to escape the financial misery it causes … Coupled with the devastating impact of the pandemic on people’s finances, urgent action is needed to prevent the situation from becoming catastrophic. The independent LSE report I funded has a cogent argument as to why an SVR cap isn’t a balanced long-term solution. Yet in lieu of anything else, I believe for those on closed-book mortgages it is a good stopgap while other detailed solutions are worked up, and I’m very happy the All-Party Parliamentary Group on mortgage prisoners is pushing it. This would provide immediate emergency relief for those most at risk of financial ruin. No one should underestimate the threat to wellbeing and even lives if this doesn’t happen, and happen soon.”
The Government will no doubt say that some mortgage prisoners are already paying rates lower than 3.5%, so rates do not need to be capped. But those sold on by the Government to vulture funds like Cerberus are paying high rates. In the package sold by the Government containing more than 66,000 mortgage loans, 52% were paying rates between 4.5% and 5%, and 37% were paying rates of over 5%, when the mortgages were securitised.
The Government could have set strict conditions when selling the mortgages on the interest rates which could be charged. But when they sold £16 billion of mortgages to Tulip and Cerberus, they imposed only a 12-month restriction on increases to the standard variable rate. These have long since expired and the chief executive of Tulip Mortgages told the Treasury Select Committee that the firm now had
“complete discretion to set the interest rate policy.”
On the sale to Heliodor, the Government claimed that the organisation which bought the loans would be required to set their standard variable rates by reference to the SVR charged by a
“basket of 15 active lenders”.
But when you read the details of the securitisation agreements for the mortgage loans sold, you will find that, actually, the Government have required the SVR to be set only at the level of the third highest of the 15 active lenders. This is absolutely critical, as the third highest SVR is actually 4.49%. The lowest SVR among those 15 active lenders is 3.35%, and the average SVR weighted by market share is 3.72%.
The latest and final sale of the Treasury-held mortgages was announced in February. The book was sold to Davidson Kempner Partners and Citibank, with funding by PIMCO. The Government said that the SVR was going to be charged by reference, again, to a basket of 15 active lenders, but there are no details about how this will work in practice. If it reflects the practice in earlier sales, it will not actually provide any protection to customers. The Government will also say that the FCA has changed the affordability test to enable mortgage prisoners to switch to a different lender. But the progress has been very slow, with only a very small number of lenders willing to use these new flexibilities.
The cap on the SVR proposed by this amendment would provide immediate relief to mortgage prisoners who have been overpaying for the past 13 years. It would protect all mortgage prisoners, including those who are unable to switch. It would give time for other solutions to help mortgage prisoners to be developed. The SVR cap would apply only to mortgages owned by inactive lenders and unregulated entities. It would have no impact on active lenders competing to attract customers.
The cap is supported by the campaign group UK Mortgage Prisoners, as the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, said. Members of the group have stated that this amendment is the difference between feeding their children and themselves or continuing to rely on food banks. The Government created the problem of mortgage prisoners and it is their moral responsibility to rescue them from the significant detriment that many still face. I urge the Government to accept the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson.
I now turn to Amendment 116, which would extend access to fixed interest rates to all mortgage prisoners, enabling them to gain control and certainty over their monthly mortgage payments. When the time came for the nationalised Northern Rock and B&B mortgages to be sold by the Government back to the private sector, they could have pursued an approach which ensured that these customers were in fact protected. They could have sold them to active lenders or secured a commitment from purchasers to offer these new customers new deals.
The risk to these customers was identified. In January 2016, the noble Lord, Lord McFall, wrote to the Treasury, UK Asset Resolution and the FCA to say that the customers affected by these sales should be protected, offered a fair deal and given access to fixed rates. UKAR responded that, by returning these mortgages to the private sector,
“the option to be offered new deals, extra lending and fixed rates should become available”.
But this requirement was not written into the contract when mortgages were sold to funds such as Cerberus, with the BBC reporting that UKAR is now claiming to have been “misled” by Cerberus.
A UKAR spokesman told BBC “Panorama” that Cerberus had the ability to lend to the former Northern Rock customers and that UKAR believed that it intended to do so. They said:
“The reply to Lord McFall sent on behalf of the UKAR board of directors was based on information presented to UKAR and the board had no reason to disbelieve this at that time.”
At the very best, this is evidence of catastrophic incompetence. At worst, it is evidence that UKAR heartlessly pursued profit over care for mortgage customers.
Consumer champion Martin Lewis lays responsibility for the treatment of mortgage prisoners squarely with the Government. He said that the Government
“have sold these loans to professional debt buyers who do not offer mortgages and left these people in these types of mortgages, which have been too expensive, crippled their finances and destroyed their wellbeing.”
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, Amendments 99 and 116 deal with the difficult area of mortgage prisoners. Both amendments seek to go beyond what has already been achieved for mortgage prisoners by the relaxation of affordability rules by the FCA.
I have much sympathy for mortgage prisoners, but we should not lose sight of the fact that these borrowers do not have sufficient financial credentials to qualify for new mortgage lending under current regulatory rules and hence cannot remortgage. They are a hangover from the period when lending criteria were much less strict than they are now and include interest-only borrowers who lack a credible way of repaying capital.
We should be wary of going beyond what the FCA has already done. In particular, making the FCA specify maximum interest rates is an unwarranted market intervention. The FCA is best placed to judge whether any further solutions can be found for these problem borrowers. We should not try to solve the problems of a relatively small number of people with blunderbuss legislation.
My main reason for speaking on this group is Amendment 117, which is fundamentally misconceived. My noble friend Lord True, when he spoke to the large group of amendments headed by Amendment 79 on our previous Committee day, talked about the importance of the securitisation market for mortgage providers. Securitisation ensures that lenders can carry on originating new debt by freeing up capital and liquidity. This is especially important in the mortgage market.
Amendment 117, which requires written consent for every mortgage sold, is not practical. It is likely to mean that lenders will be shut out of the securitisation market. Mortgages are not sold individually: they are parcelled up into books. Requiring consent will make this very much harder to do and will significantly add to the costs of the procedure. Anyone who has tried to get responses from individual account holders where there is no incentive for the account holder to respond will tell you that this is mission impossible.
Mortgage securitisation is a normal balance sheet financing strategy for both retail and commercial lenders. Making it more difficult or expensive for mortgages will have consequences for consumers, whether by restricting the availability of credit or increasing its cost, or both. I cannot support any of the amendments in this group.
Lord Griffiths of Burry Port (Lab)
My Lords, I will not detain the Committee long. I would not normally be seen near a finance Bill, largely because I do not have and do not ever expect to have any finance to bother me. Nor would I presume to discuss mortgage payments, since I do not have and never will have a mortgage to worry about. However, what I do have is some experience of people in all kinds of situations, good and bad, from the cradle to the grave.
It was a conversation with someone whom I knew well that made me aware of the truly dreadful situation that we are debating and that they found themselves in. Here was someone who was in a bad—a very bad —situation: they and 250,000 others. My noble friend Lord Stevenson of Balmacara and the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, have done us a great service in highlighting the plight of these people and have worked out a reasonable way to help them. I am happy to leave the heavy lifting on the matter to them and, no doubt, other Members of the Committee who will chip in on the same side of the argument. They have made a compelling case in detail and with passion, all of which will help to disguise the extent of my own ignorance.
I simply must express my bewilderment at the way, when this subject was debated in the House of Commons, no less a person than the Economic Secretary to the Treasury gave voice to some rather misleading statements. He said, for example, that “mortgage prisoners” were paying a mere 0.4% higher than average mortgages. That figure has been mentioned more than once and is simply not true, according to the picture that I have seen painted in reliable reports from various quarters. He also suggested that when the mortgages in question were sold to “vulture funds” and other non-regulated bodies, the borrowers retained all the same conditions stipulated in their original agreements. From the conversation that I had and other cases that I have subsequently read about, that just is not the case.
The Government seem to have treated mortgage prisoners as cash cows, a means of paying down Treasury debt, after the decision to rescue the banks after the crisis of 2008. On the day that conversation arose, I thought that it would be a friendly interchange on the streets of my home town, with perhaps a mention of the unexpected good fortune of the Welsh rugby team—but it actually opened a can of worms. The person I was speaking to is considered to be a “problem borrower”, one of the people referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. But my friend is a problem borrower largely because of the depredation of resources due to the fact that she has been paying mortgages over the odds for 10 years now. Even someone whose only qualification for speaking in this debate is an O-level in economics found himself smelling a rat as he spotted an egregious injustice being done to mortgage prisoners.
The amendments seek to correct this situation. They are balanced and sensible. Martin Lewis, who was quoted more than once by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and is a true expert in this field, writes this:
“Mortgage prisoners are the forgotten victims of the 2008 financial crash. The Government at the time chose to bail out the banks, but unfairly—immorally—hundreds of thousands of their victims were left without adequate help, trapped in their mortgages and the financial misery caused by it.”
No wonder they are problem borrowers. He continued:
“And they have been forgotten ever since.”
The Bill and the amendments give us an opportunity to unforget them, to make good on past failures, and to bring justice to a situation yearning for it. The Minister is a decent and fair man but will of course be bound by the usual conventions in a debate of this kind. It would be good to hear him promise to go back to his department to try to find a way of bringing a little hope and cheer to those who suffer in this way.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to take part in the debate on this first group of amendments. In doing so, I declare my interests as set out in the register. I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, on the manner in which he introduced the amendment. I also thank him for giving a wave to my Amendment 127 on this subject, which found itself a prisoner in a different group of amendments but was very much to the purpose of this group. Simply put, it would prohibit any more individuals becoming mortgage prisoners in this way.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I have taken a vow to try to be brief in all my responses today, recognising the time pressures of the day. I also listened carefully to my noble friend Lord Sharkey and the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, and I am not sure that the case could be better made.
However, I must follow the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths of Burry Port, in picking up an issue raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, who described mortgage prisoners essentially as problem debtors. These are people the overwhelming majority of whom would not have any problem with their debt if they had been allowed to take advantage of the changes in interest rates and mortgage terms that have been available much more widely. The case to act for their protection is simply overwhelming. If we had not had the financial crash and they had remained with regulated lenders, the vast majority of them would not be facing any issue. They would have had their mortgages restructured to lower rates and they would not be facing stresses and strains today.
I have been sent information from a significant number of people who find themselves to be mortgage prisoners and, frankly, the stories are often heart-breaking. I heard this morning from someone who is desperately ill in hospital, but the stress of the financial challenges that he faces makes every day far worse and far more difficult to deal with. To me, it is inhuman that action is not taken. The Government recognise that action must be taken, given the circumstances and the stress that so many people face and the corners that they have been pinned into. Surely such action should be taken now and not be kicked down the road yet again.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, the case for reform in this area has been overwhelmingly made by my noble friends Lord Stevenson and Lord Griffiths, the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. I wish not to delay the Committee any longer, but simply to advise that the Labour Front Bench supports my noble friend Lord Stevenson’s amendment and the generality of those proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey.
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Lord True) (Con)
My Lords, I acknowledge that the Government have a great deal of sympathy for borrowers who are unable to switch their mortgage, and we are committed to finding practical ways to help them. That is why we have been working closely with the FCA, and I will set out the action that it has taken.
In 2019, the FCA introduced a modified affordability assessment, which allows active mortgage lenders to waive the normal affordability checks for borrowers with inactive lenders who meet certain criteria—for example, not being in arrears and not wishing to borrow more. As a result of this, inactive lenders have been contacting borrowers who have had difficulty with switching, setting out new options that may be available for them on the active market. I am pleased that a number of lenders, including Halifax, NatWest and Santander, have already come forward with options specifically for these borrowers.
More widely, we have taken steps to support those unable to make mortgage payments during the pandemic. Payment holidays have provided vital support for consumers, including those with inactive lenders, with over 2.75 million mortgage holidays granted since March 2020.
However, policy should be based on clear evidence. The FCA’s analysis found that customers with inactive lenders paid, on average, just 0.4% more than customers in the active market with similar characteristics. There has been comment in Committee on that figure. The FCA’s analysis also found that, of the 250,000 borrowers with inactive lenders, half were in a position to switch to a new mortgage even before any action from the Government. That illustrates one aspect of the diversity of this group.
On the 0.4%, I am aware that there are other estimates out there, including in a recent report, which has been referred to, published by the UK Mortgage Prisoners action group on 8 March, just a few days ago. Treasury officials have reviewed this analysis and noted that these figures seem to be based on surveys with small sample sizes. The comparisons are often inappropriate—for example, contrasting rates that many borrowers with active lenders would not even be offered. I hope that noble Lords will appreciate that this is a complex topic. We are, as I have said, committed to finding practical ways to help.
Amendment 99 seeks to cap standard variable rate mortgages for some customers. Data from the FCA suggest that the majority of borrowers with inactive lenders pay less than 3.5% interest. As I have already said, compared to those with similar lending characteristics, consumers with inactive lenders pay on average only 0.4% more than those with an active lender. This was also backed by the London School of Economics recent report on mortgage prisoners, noting that it does not recommend capping standard variable rates at a low rate. Capping mortgages with inactive lenders could have an impact on their financial stability, as it would restrict lenders’ ability to vary rates in line with market conditions. That would also be unfair to borrowers in the active lending sector, particularly those in arrears, who are paying a higher standard variable rate.
Amendment 116 seeks to provide new fixed interest rate deals for certain mortgage customers with inactive lenders. I have already set out the FCA’s work in introducing a modified affordability assessment and that a number of active lenders—household names—have come forward with offers. The FCA estimates that up to 55,000 borrowers could be eligible to benefit from the new modified affordability assessments. The Government will continue to monitor the situation and hope to see even more options available over the coming months. Enabling people to switch into the active market is the best way to help consumers secure new deals, and that is what we have been doing.
Amendment 117 would require active lenders to seek a borrower’s permission before transferring their regulated mortgage contract to an inactive lender. There are already a number of protections in place for borrowers, meaning that their mortgage cannot be sold on to an unregulated servicer and their terms and conditions cannot change as a result of the sale, so the benefit of explicitly seeking permission from the borrower is unlikely to help them any further.
It is required that all loans within the UK must be administered by a regulated entity, meaning that all customers will be able to benefit from consumer protections —for example, access to the FOS. The terms and conditions of a loan do not change upon sale, meaning that consumers will be treated in line with their original agreement even if their loan was sold to an unregulated entity.
As my noble friend Lady Noakes pointed out, the amendment would also risk disrupting the residential mortgage-backed securities market as it may prevent the effective securitisation of mortgages, where beneficial ownership of a portfolio of mortgages is transferred to a special purpose vehicle. Securitisation is a common way for active lenders to fund themselves, and disrupting the securitisation market would likely have a negative impact on the availability and cost of mortgage credit in the United Kingdom. For those reasons, I ask that the amendment be withdrawn.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I thank those who have contributed to this debate for the various points they have raised. The noble Lord, Lord Griffiths, has it right: this is a complex and detailed issue and it delves down way beyond most people’s experience of how markets of this type operate. In those circumstances, we have a difficult choice as a Committee on how one might want to take this forward.
On the one hand, my noble friend Lord Griffiths is right that the end of the story is what is happening on the ground to people who have ended up in this situation through no fault of their own but as a result of government action. The Government therefore have to explain to the people of this country why, having created this problem, they do not feel that they have more than just a moral responsibility to see it resolved. On the other hand, I take absolutely the Minister’s point that, it being a complex issue and the Government having seen some action already happening, they remain committed to what he called finding a practical plan forward; I hold on to that. However, the complexity and the fact that this affects a relatively small number of people—although 250,000 people is not a small number in my terms—do not mean that we should simply allow the market to find the right balance between the commercial pressures of offering loans and the ability to service those loans and make a profit out of them from those who have limited resource. There is no doubt at all that, having said all that, there is obviously a pandemic issue as well.
Where does that leave us? I take hope from the fact that the Minister said that there is work on the way to try to take this forward. I recognise that it is a complex issue—indeed, I said so in my opening remarks. However, he must accept that the arguments made by myself but made in much more detail and with a much wider range of evidence by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, suggest that this is more than just a complicated problem which needs to be bottomed out by working with the market. We need convincing that there is work going on that will result in a workable solution of benefit to those affected by this within a reasonable timescale, otherwise we will come back on Report with a better-drafted amendment—perhaps covering some of the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, but not all of them—in a way that makes it clear that the Government cannot continue to let this settle itself. It has to be taken forward in policy terms otherwise too much damage will be caused. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe
“Impact assessments
(1) Regulations made under this Act, and under any regulation-making powers inserted by this Act into any other Act, may not come into force until the Secretary of State has laid an impact assessment of each regulation before each House of Parliament.(2) Rules made by the FCA or the PRA under rule-making powers given to the FCA or the PRA by this Act, and under any rule-making powers inserted by this Act into any other Act, must be published on the website of the FCA or PRA (as appropriate) at least 30 days before they are due to take effect, together with an impact assessment of the rules.(3) In this section, “impact assessment” means an analysis of the costs and benefits of the proposed change, compared to the existing position and other options considered, including the expected impact on UK businesses and the UK economy.”
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I rise to speak to my Amendments 103 on impact assessments and 104 on reporting. I have been like a long-playing record on the importance of cost-benefit analysis of legislation, regulations and new rules in the form of an impact assessment. I return to the charge today with renewed vigour, as we are transferring very substantial powers from Brussels to Britain. I know that the process of preparing a cost benefit and the sunlight of transparency help enormously in avoiding difficulties and disasters. By the way, I thank my noble friend the Minister for producing an impact assessment on this Bill—always one of the most useful Bill documents, even if in this case it is shortish on numbers.
Amendment 103 is in two parts. First, it requires the Secretary of State—in this case, usually Treasury Ministers—to lay an impact assessment of each SI or regulation that they make before it comes into force. I know from my time as a Minister that having to put my own name to such an impact assessment made me look much more effectively at any instrument I was signing and thus avoid cock-ups—which do unfortunately happen from time to time, even in the Treasury! Secondly, as so much of EU power is being transferred to the FCA and PRA, it requires them to publish their proposed new rules on their respective websites for public scrutiny and to add an impact assessment of the rules. By impact assessment I mean an analysis of the costs and benefits of the proposed change, compared with the existing position and other policy options, including the expected impact on UK businesses and the economy. All I seek is a simple way of ensuring that the authors of new rules always consider the economic impact of their proposals in the interests of good government.
So far, so good. But—and I accept it is a big but —in part these provisions seem to be required already by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, as subsequently amended. I have been through the relevant explanations and websites and am still not completely sure whether that is the case. Perhaps the Minister can kindly explain the position and give us some encouraging words as to the present and future position on this important matter. If my proposed provision is genuinely unnecessary, I am of course happy to withdraw it.
Amendment 104 follows on from Amendment 103. However, it is distinct and could be adopted alone. It requires the Secretary of State to publish an annual report on the impact of measures taken by the FCA, the PRA or the Government to regulate financial services with a particular focus on small business, innovation and competitiveness. While there has been a great deal of excellent discussion in this Committee on holding financial service operators to account and improving enforcement, we can lose sight of the value of smaller operators, including those based outside London. Moreover, innovation can bring huge value to consumers—online banking, easy money transfer overseas and share trading on mobile phones are good examples—and our strained economy will benefit from the competitiveness and attractiveness of the UK’s financial sector.
I know from my experience in the intellectual property area, which I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, will remember as well, how valuable an annual report of this type can be in focusing staff attention. Writing the report is a complement to the usual in-tray—the focus on risk and the avoidance of banana skins that exercises public servants, sometimes to the detriment of more strategic thinking. I look forward to hearing from my noble friend the Minister on how we might best take some of these matters forward. I believe that they could encourage the intelligent scrutiny of new rules and their early dissemination and publication, and that a strategic look once a year will help the sector to stay ahead in the new world. I beg to move.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, for the purposes of today’s debates I again remind Grand Committee of my financial services interests as in the register.
I have signed Amendments 103 and 104 and agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, so I will not repeat what has already been said. It is a subject that the noble Baroness pursues with diligence, and it is right to do so, even if at times—at least as far as I am concerned—the scope and content of impact assessments are a little disappointing. The amendment relates to the final impact assessments as rules are coming into effect, although, of course, to be useful, impact assessments are needed at each stage. Indeed, if proportionality is to be properly taken into account, that is surely a prerequisite for the regulator.
But returning again to the FiSMA theme, where much of the proportionality, flexibility—call it what you will—will be done on an institution-by-institution basis, so the rules will enable that but not demonstrate how it is to be carried out, I am not sure how that will be properly assessed in an impact assessment based only on the rules. Therefore, it will also be important to be able to capture what actually happens after the rules have come into operation. That might be by way of a retrospective impact assessment after a period of time, and would seem to be another matter that Parliament will need to investigate.
Included in that, it should be relevant to capture the effects of frequency of rule change, which is presently greatly emphasised by regulators and the Government as part of the reasoning behind the Bill, yet somehow I doubt that rule churning was what industry felt it was signing up for by supporting FiSMA. It will be important to understand the scale and nature of that rule tweaking. Amendment 104 gets in part to that with the Government producing a report, but perhaps it should be part of the annual report or an annual impact assessment from the regulators, so that it can be further queried and those regulated can be interviewed by the relevant parliamentary committee. So perhaps the Minister can confirm how this frequency of tweaking will be tracked, what is the Government’s planned part in it and would they support Amendment 104 in particular as part of the way to do that?
Viscount Trenchard (Con)
My Lords, I declare again my interests as stated in the register in respect of financial services companies. I am delighted to support Amendments 103 and 104 in the name of my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe. My noble friend is a champion of impact assessments and she speaks from experience. The impact of many financial services regulations on smaller firms has been very damaging. I mention just two examples. The unbundling provisions contained within the MiFID II directive, requiring asset management companies to pay separately for research, have been disastrous in their effect on smaller companies with interesting strategies, which have either been forced out of business or forced into mergers where their innovative strategies have not been taken forward. The effects have been less choice for customers and less coverage as a result of the significant reduction in the number of securities analysts, particularly those covering smaller and growth companies.
The effects were predictable, but ESMA ploughed ahead and the FCA acquiesced. It is small comfort now that ESMA itself realises that the unbundling provisions were a mistake, and may move to make changes, but much damage has been done. An impact assessment, such as recommended by my noble friend, would have avoided this.
I also mention the alternative investment fund managers directive. When I worked in Brussels as director-general of the European Fund and Asset Management Association —EFAMA—my French and German colleagues said that they did not think that the EU should move to regulate alternative funds; that was London’s market, and largely London’s alone. Furthermore, it was of interest only to professional investors, who did not need protection from investment risks. They thought that it would be wrong for the EU to try to regulate it. However, three years later, Michel Barnier, as Commissioner for the Internal Market, moved to introduce the AIFMD. Again we were overruled and reluctantly went along with it. An impact assessment might have encouraged the FSA to fight harder against it than it did.
For the reasons so well explained by my noble friend, I support her amendments and look forward to hearing the Minister’s reply.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I am pleased to be part of this debate, which is narrow in some senses but has the capacity to reach quite widely. It is narrow in the sense that it has been framed through Amendments 103 and 104, which I broadly support, about the need to try and get more of an impact assessment model into the way in which we review the changes that may come through as a result of the return to the UK of powers previously exercised at EU level. It also raises much wider issues, which I will come to before I end my short contribution to this debate.
I am sure that the case made by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, is about good government. Better regulation was always part of the argument she used when she was a Minister. I well remember the discussions we had across the Dispatch Box about intellectual property, in both primary and subsequently secondary legislation. The material on this was much enhanced by the good work done by her civil servants in bringing forward some of the issues raised and trying to give them a quantitative—not just qualitative—feel when the debates were organised. A lot of the work that they do on better regulation does not get properly recognised, and this is a good opportunity to pay tribute to it. As an example, I particularly enjoyed the annual work that I was often asked to do in relation to the setting of the national minimum wage, now the national living wage. It was always accompanied by a formidable document, created mainly I think by the Low Pay Commission but endorsed by civil servants. It went into every conceivable aspect of the way in which the setting of a minimum threshold for wages would, or could, affect the labour market, with particular reference to women and other low-paid groups in society. It was always a red-letter day in my diary when I saw that coming up; I knew that I was going to be given a very meaty topic to research, read up on and debate. I enjoyed the debates that we had on that.
While I say yes to the thrust of what is being said here, and recognise the benefits that will come from good impact assessments, properly debated, particularly in relation to the regulatory framework in the Bill, I wonder whether there is a slight irony here. The substance of what the noble Baroness is saying in her amendment is that better scrutiny of proposals brought forward for legislation—and, of course, for secondary legislation —would happen if there were better impact assessments. I say in passing, and in reverse order, that a secondary instrument is very much a creature of the primary legislation that has preceded it. It is not uncommon to find in SI impact assessments binary choices, usually not very helpful in detailed essence. The proposition set up in the impact assessment is often, “What would happen if this legislation did not go through?” and then “What will happen when it does go through?” In other words, if there is a change in regulations, you impact; no change and you impact the change. You do not get a range of options.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, as many Members of the Committee have already noted, my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe is well known in your Lordships’ House for her pursuit of impact assessments and is a stern critic of government departments that hide behind the exact wording of Cabinet Office guidance. Recently, many of us have joined her in being appalled by the complete lack of impact statements published to support the Government’s coronavirus policies, involving—I remind the Committee—the greatest ever peacetime infringement of civil liberties. The Department of Health and Social Care used the flimsy excuse that the Cabinet Office does not require impact assessments for policies intended to have a temporary effect.
I am particularly interested in my noble friend’s Amendment 104, which requires an annual report to Parliament. I am not wholly in favour of annual reports, because they can degenerate into boiler plate and have a very short-term horizon; I prefer the concept of periodic reports that can look at impacts over a longer time span. However, whether such reviews are annual or less frequent, I suggest to my noble friend that the report could also usefully concentrate on the quality of consultation carried out by the regulators, and that would include the quality of impact statements.
Consultations by the PRA and the FCA often feel like not much more than going through the motions. They are not alone in the public sector in seeming to exaggerate the benefits and underestimate the costs. HMRC, for example, is a particular case in point, having been criticised more than once by the Economic Affairs Committee of your Lordships’ House for the use of cost assumptions that seem to bear little relationship to reality. Similarly, the PRA’s consultation on ring-fencing rules was widely regarded as a massive underestimate of the cost of compliance, as was borne out by subsequent cost experience. A superficial impact assessment, or one that overstates the benefits or systematically underestimates the costs, is worse than useless and can lead to poor policy-making. It would be wise to ensure that the regulator’s performance in this regard is kept under review.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, in many of the groups of amendments to the Bill we have discussed the issue of accountability, and it has been a very important discussion. However, we have also discussed the necessity to have proper evidence and information to make that accountability worthwhile, valid and effective. These amendments follow exactly that direction.
One of the pleas that I will put in is that an impact assessment should be studied and then reviewed. The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, is not speaking in this group of amendments but I can think of numerous occasions when he has spoken on a financial services Bill and pointed out that the information in the assessment did not seem to answer any of the obvious questions that a sensible person would ask in order to understand the regulations involved. I would join him in that. We seem to have narrow definitions of what an impact assessment is, and it seems to me that it should do what it says on the tin. It ought actually to assess the impact in a way that is meaningful to the regulation or piece of legislation in front of us.
This push for evidence and information, and quality in both, is an important thrust of the conversations and debates that we have had around the Bill. I very much hope that Ministers take that on board, because this is starting a pressure that will not go away. In fact, for the Government, if they want to produce the highest-quality legislation possible, the discussion created by developing a high-quality impact assessment will lead in the end to far better legislation.
Lord Eatwell (Lab)
My Lords, my initial reaction to the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, was to puzzle over exactly what sort of impact assessment she had in mind. Was she perhaps thinking of the famous remark by the noble Lord, Lord Turner, that the banking sector in the UK does much that is not socially useful? After all, the ultimate rationale for regulatory activity is the enhancement of the common good—the goal of good government.
However, this debate has clarified the issue before us, which is that an effective impact assessment requires not just thorough analysis but a definition of an objective or, perhaps, objectives. The lack of clear objectives is the key weakness of Amendment 103. Amendment 104, therefore, is much stronger in that it lays out a number of objectives against which an impact assessment might be calibrated. The key to resolving the dilemma—I apologise for sounding a bit like a broken record—is to take the parliamentary role referred to in Amendment 103 and combine it with the sense of Amendment 104. An effective parliamentary process and, dare I say, a parliamentary committee, could define the objectives to be addressed in any impact assessment of the type referred to in Amendment 103—“We want to know the impact of this regulation on problem x, y or z”—and then seek annual reviews focusing on matters that are deemed to be important at any given time, thereby avoiding the template issue referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes.
That is what is missing from the amendment—a means of making the impact assessment an effective means of acquiring information and an insight into the thinking of regulators, which can then be scrutinised in a coherent and consistent manner.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, as my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe has explained, these amendments bring us to the question of how we report on the impact that regulation has on firms. Every noble Lord who has spoken today has referred to the value of impact assessments for Parliament and the Government in particular, and I do not dissent from that general proposition. My noble friend Lord Trenchard in particular spoke about the value of measuring the burden imposed by certain EU rules when we were an EU member. I hope that it is of comfort to him if I remind him that the Chancellor has said that decisions about financial services regulation after the end of the transition period—we have of course now passed through it—would be based on what was right for the UK, taking account of what is necessary to ensure financial stability, market integrity and consumer protection.
Amendment 103 would require the Government to lay impact assessments for each of the regulations made under the Bill. It would also require the PRA and the FCA to publish any rules made using the powers in the Bill in draft, alongside an impact assessment. I do not believe that the amendment is necessary, as the Government and the regulators are already committed to identifying and publishing the expected impacts of subsequent rules and regulations made under the Bill.
The Government have of course published an impact assessment alongside the Bill. In line with the guidance set out in the Government’s Better Regulation Framework, the impact assessment sets out HM Treasury’s current understanding of the costs and benefits of the measures. Where appropriate, further details will be set out in the impact assessments that will accompany the secondary legislation made under the Bill. I remind my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe that the regulators are required by FSMA 2000, with some very limited exceptions, to undertake a cost-benefit analysis for proposed new rules, and to publish those alongside their draft rules as part of their consultation. The PRA and FCA have already published their first consultations on the draft rules that they intend to make in relation to the prudential measures in the Bill, and they include comprehensive cost-benefit analyses.
Amendment 104 would require the Secretary of State to report on the impact on business that measures taken by the regulators and the Government to regulate financial services may have, and particularly to report on the impact on small businesses, innovation and competitiveness. We have spoken at length in this Committee about competitiveness, and I hope that I have demonstrated how importantly the Government take this issue. Additionally, my noble friend Lady Penn recently wrote to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe about how the Government support smaller financial services firms.
I am sure that my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe does not need to hear me say that the Government are committed to ensuring that the financial services sector supports competition and innovation, allowing new firms to compete and grow. Of course, both the FCA and the PRA have a statutory objective to promote effective competition.
In earlier debates, we have talked about the new accountability frameworks that the Bill puts in place for the prudential measures. Those require the PRA and the FCA to have regard to UK competitiveness, among other things, when making rules to implement Basel or the investment firms prudential regime. They are required to report on how having regard to that has affected their proposed rules. The FCA and PRA are of course already required to prepare annual reports, which are laid before Parliament for scrutiny. These reports cover the extent to which the regulators’ objectives, which include promoting effective competition, have been advanced, and how they have considered existing regulatory principles in discharging their objectives.
On this basis, I hope that my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe agrees that I have said enough to make her feel comfortable in withdrawing her amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord McNicol of West Kilbride) (Lab)
I have received one request so far to speak after the Minister. I call the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
I am sorry to intervene again, but I feel I must correct what the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, said—or at least remind him that the unbundling of the analysts’ report was an invention of the FSA that the UK then sold to the EU, and now the EU is blamed for what the UK did through the EU. There are many other examples of that, although I can confirm that AIFMD was definitely not one of those. It would be nice if sometimes the Minister could intervene to at least have the record straight.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate, and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, for her thoughts and for raising the ante to talk about a slightly more dynamic form of impact assessment.
I thank my noble friend Lord Trenchard for the very example that is now the subject of debate. I think the point that he was making, which I would support, is that impact assessments can reduce the perverse effects of such measures. We know—it is a matter of record, I think—that the number of analysts, especially small analysts, has gone down as a result of the MiFID legislation. An impact assessment on how it was enforced, whether its origin was in the brain of the UK or of the EU, could have been helpful. Of course, that is what my amendment is all about.
I was glad to have the support of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, for working up a decent impact assessment model. I share his tribute to public servants, having been one a long time ago, and the work of bodies that produce evidence for things, such as the Low Pay Commission and social trends, and the MPC in our own sector of financial services. Better scrutiny would take place with better impact assessment. It is why, regarding proposed new subsection (3) which Amendment 103 would insert, I talked about both the existing position and other options, because I agree with the noble Lord that it is much better if you can look at several options when developing difficult policies. I agree that pre-legislative scrutiny can sometimes be very useful.
My noble friend Lady Noakes reminded us, rightly, of the lack of impact assessment on the various Covid measures. I thank her particularly for the suggestion that the quality of consultation by the FCA, the PRA or the Government and of impact assessment should be added to any review.
I was glad to hear noble Lords build on what an impact assessment system should look like, including the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer—I echo her concerns about accountability—and the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell. There is a feeling that it is important to have a decent system.
My noble friend the Deputy Leader explained, as I had already anticipated in my own remarks, that a system does exist: both for government regulation and regulation by the two regulators, and for cost-benefit analysis to be produced. What I am not clear about is whether that is fit for purpose. It is very difficult to find out what the requirements are and to read all the various bits of paper. This is why I tabled the amendment, so that we could have an intelligent debate. Even if noble Lords do not want to go along with Amendment 103, we should make an effort, with the dissemination of the Bill, to ensure that the requirements are better understood.
That means that Amendment 104 is perhaps more important, because it asks that we review regularly what is being done in the way of cost-benefit and impact assessment, and how the objectives set out are achieved. I suggested some objectives in Amendment 104; others will no doubt be concerned about other objectives of the regulators. As we have said on earlier amendments, competition is not really the same as competitiveness. I was also keen to throw in small business—for reasons that my noble friend knows very well—and innovation, because of their value.
With this Bill, we need to satisfy ourselves that the new framework satisfactorily replaces, indeed, improves on, what went before. I take the point—the Chancellor is right—that we now have the chance to do the right thing in the UK, and to do it better than was done under the auspices of the EU. I may come back to this on Report, because a simple well-understood system of impact assessment, and of annual review in some form, would boost scrutiny and transparency, which has been a key theme of the Bill, as well as the governance of our largest and most important economic sector. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Sikka
“FCA duty to make a statement about ministerial directions on investigations
(1) The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is amended as follows.(2) After section 1T (right to obtain documents and information) insert—“1U Duty to make a statement about ministerial directions on investigationsWhere a Minister directs, comments on, or intervenes with an FCA investigation into wrongdoing or malpractice by a company, the FCA must make a public statement about the nature of any such intervention.””
Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]
My Lords, Amendment 107 seeks transparency about ministerial interventions in regulatory investigations, by requiring the FCA to make a statement. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, for her support. Currently, ministerial interventions are made in secret, and neither Parliament nor the people are able to call Ministers to account. Ministers intervene to stymie investigations, and the trail is often carefully concealed. Some years later, a few interventions do become visible.
Consider the case of HSBC, a bank supervised by UK regulators, implicated in global money laundering and protected by UK Ministers and regulators. In July 2012, the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations published a report entitled U.S. Vulnerabilities to Money Laundering, Drugs, and Terrorist Financing: HSBC Case History, which documented the fact that, despite evidence, HSBC staff knowingly laundered money for criminals and engaged in sanctions-busting.
In December 2012, HSBC was fined $1.9 billion by the US authorities—the biggest fine at that time. The US Department of Justice said that HSBC permitted
“narcotics traffickers and others to launder hundreds of millions of dollars through HSBC subsidiaries, and to facilitate hundreds of millions more in transactions with sanctioned countries”.
It added that HSBC had
“accepted responsibility for its criminal conduct and that of its employees.”
However, HSBC was not prosecuted, and instead entered into a deferred prosecution agreement until 2017. The levying of the largest ever fine on a UK bank and admission of “criminal conduct” did not prompt an investigation of HSBC’s practices in the UK. Did the bank engage in similar practices here?
In March 2013, the US House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services began a review of the US Department of Justice’s decision not to prosecute HSBC or any of its employees or executives for criminal activities. The committee’s July 2016 report, Too Big to Jail, showed that the Governor of the Bank of England, the chief executive of the Financial Services Authority and Chancellor George Osborne intervened to protect HSBC. The report contained a two-page letter, dated 10 September 2012, from the Chancellor to Ben Bernanke, chairman of the US Federal Reserve. It urged the US to go easy on HSBC, as it was too big to fail. The US report reproduced some correspondence showing the determination of the UK Government and regulators to protect a bank that had, by its own admission, engaged in “criminal conduct”.
The FSA, Bank of England and Chancellor also urged the US to go easy on Standard Chartered Bank, which was fined $670 million for money laundering, sanctions busting and falsification of records. Its deception was aided by Deloitte. The US Treasury court documents referred to the bank as a “rogue institution”. No statement was made at that time to the UK Parliament to explain regulatory silence or the Chancellor’s interventions. How do we improve banking regulation or hold anyone to account for nefarious practices when Ministers and regulators collude to protect wrongdoers?
I shall return to some questions after my next illustration. It relates to the July 1991 closure of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International. It was the site of the biggest banking fraud of the 20th century. BCCI was supervised by the Bank of England and was closed only after investigations in the US. The UK closure was followed by a few prosecutions and some parliamentary committee hearings. However, unlike previous bank collapses in the 1970s and 1980s, or even subsequent ones such as Barings in the 1990s, there has been no independent forensic investigation and key documents continue to be suppressed to this day.
On 19 July 1991, the Government appointed Lord Justice Bingham to examine some aspects of the Bank of England’s supervision of BCCI. The Prime Minister John Major told Parliament:
“The conclusions of the inquiry will be made public.”—[Official Report, Commons, 22/7/1991; col. 755.]
The Bingham report was published on 22 October 1992 and was highly critical of the Bank of England’s failures. However, it was published without the supporting appendices containing extracts from a document codenamed the “Sandstorm report”, which provided information about some of the frauds and named some of the parties involved in them.
Meanwhile, the US Senate Foreign Affairs Committee investigated BCCI frauds and, in December 1992, published a report titled The BCCI Affair, which said that
“BCCI’s British auditors, Abu Dhabi owners, and British regulators, had now become BCCI’s partners, not in crime, but in cover-up.”
The US Senate committee secured a censored version of the Sandstorm report from the Federal Reserve, which had obtained it from the Bank of England. The committee also secured an uncensored version and said that it
“revealed criminality on an even wider scale than that set forth in the censored version.”
The committee also had access to CIA files on BCCI, which have been made public. Despite this, the Sandstorm report remains suppressed in the UK.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, as the amendment suggests, I think it is necessary to know when there have been interventions and why. I do not say that from a wish to create political opportunity to complain—in fact, rather the opposite. When matters are transparent, there is generally less to complain about and more understanding. If there is a wish to keep everything private, that in itself is a problem. The amendment does not ask for chapter and verse on everything, just the nature of the intervention.
I recall the instances of HSBC and Standard Chartered. I was aware of them at the time, not from any information from the Government but because the size of US fines and the impact that it had on European banks were spoken about in Brussels. It is fair to say that there were concerns from other European countries. I do not think that the UK was the first to write. The financial stability point on fines for things that we also thought were pretty shocking was openly discussed in Brussels, including in my committee. Indeed, I recall having conversations around financial stability implications with the president of the ECB and with the Fed and US Treasury, although I do not think that one needs to advise people like Ben Bernanke about the relative sizes of UK banks and the UK economy and the problems that that will create; you would get pretty short shrift in return.
It is actually quite humiliating either to make or know about such interventions or to sit there while people say to you, “I’ve had a letter from your Minister.” I certainly felt humiliated about the need for such information by my country and humiliated by the behaviour of important financial institutions from my country. A normal response would be to try to make sure that it does not happen again, and I fear that progress has not been as good as it should have been. Maybe one reason for that, I now realise, was that there was no such discussion about these occurrences in the UK in the same way as there was in Brussels, which I find quite shocking. But too big to fail should not mean too big to jail. We have been around that debate already, in the sense of needing fairly to prevent offences, the construction of large companies, which create organised irresponsibility, and the FCA failing us at a critical moment in the SMCR, so it has been undermined.
To get back to the point about disclosure—yes, it should be shared, and any humiliation should be shared, so that those responsible at the time get more heat and there is greater resolve to make corrections. Everything is all so much more diluted and dismissible when it is looked at only as history.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, for tabling the amendment, to which I was delighted to attach my name. It is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, and I welcome her support.
I do not think I need to add to the noble Lord’s detailed, forensic presentation of the clear, obvious and systemic problem: that Ministers intervene to end or direct investigations into fraud, corruption and malpractice. As he clearly documented, they do that on what appears to be a semi-regular basis. This amendment seeks to stop that, or at least make it illegal. Noble Lords might argue that it should not be; I certainly look forward to examining any contributions that seek to do that.
We have an institutional culture of cover-up, as the noble Lord said. We cannot be sure that every case has been exposed—indeed, it would be very surprising if they had been—despite the often extraordinary efforts of investigative journalists and academics such as the noble Lord. We are most likely seeing the tip of an iceberg. That what has been done emerges only later, dragged into the light of day despite considerable resistance, is of considerable detriment to public and international trust in both the financial sector and the British Government, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, just highlighted.
The most useful contribution that I can make to this debate is to the politics and the sociology—and I mean politics with a small “p” for, as the noble Lord demonstrated, this behaviour is not contained to Governments of any particular political hue. He said that ministerial coverups had emboldened banks. Behaviour that tolerates, supports and enables dishonest and corrupt practices encourages the spread of those practices. If there are indeed only a few rotten apples, which I am sure many from the financial sector will claim, the rot will spread if they remain in the barrel. Those people will still be in place in institutions—in many cases, in very senior places within those institutions —and be sharing, passing down and directing others to continue their practices, approaches and morals. I have an agricultural sciences degree; I can promise you that the rot will spread through the barrel.
We are now without the protective umbrella of EU regulation and what was once seen as a force independent of one particular financial centre that enforced some degree of cleanliness among all of them—albeit that the UK had an inordinate, often baleful influence on attempts to tighten regulation and prevent fraud and corruption. With the UK making its own rules, the behaviour of both the UK Government and the UK financial sector will come under greater scrutiny.
The EU is—not coincidentally after the UK’s departure—looking in the coming years to significantly tighten regulations on tackling fraud and corruption, on stopping tax dodging, on preventing greenwashing and on reining in the inordinate economic power of the internet giants. What happens in the UK will be weighed against that, which is why tightening up this Bill with this measure and others is crucial. What we need is not a more “competitive” financial sector but an upgraded one, one that is honest, straightforward and trustworthy.
There is also the politics in the broadest sense: the issue of how the Government are regarded, which is a long-running, serious issue for the UK. The place of politicians at the bottom of trustworthiness rankings is a source of jokes and bitterness but a serious and significant problem for our body politic. It has to be tackled. This amendment, a legal commitment to honesty and transparency, would be a significant step.
We are seen, from many sides of politics, to have a Government of the few, a Government for the money, a Government for the City of London, to the detriment of the country. This has to change if we are as a country to go forward.
I shall finish with a quote. The
“trend toward globalized corruption has been enabled in crucial part by regulatory asymmetries among key international economic actors and a lack of resources and political will in law enforcement.”
That comes not from the Tax Justice Network or Transparency International. It comes from a foreword to a report from the Center for American Progress entitled Turning the Tide on Dirty Money, signed by Senator Robert Menendez, chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Tom Tugendhat MP, chairman of the UK Foreign Affairs Committee and David McAllister MEP, chairman of the EU Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs. The authors say that corruption
“threatens the resilience and cohesion of democratic governments around the globe and undermines the relationship between the state and its citizens.”
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)
I call the next speaker, the Lord Bishop of St Albans, but I cannot hear anything. I wonder whether he might be on mute.
The Lord Bishop of St Albans [V]
My Lords, I apologise; I am so sorry.
I am glad to speak in support of Amendment 107 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. Throughout the course of this debate, there have been a number of comments on the current functioning of the FCA, the scope of its remit and whether it is properly undertaking its duties.
As the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, pointed out, there have been occasions when financial misconduct has not been fully disclosed, and it is worrying that this may have been due to interventions from those within government. As we establish our new position in the world following Brexit and seek to build on our financial services sector, it is vital that we are known for our honesty and transparency throughout the world. Our future will depend on this. So surely the amendment is entirely uncontroversial. The FCA is meant to be an independent regulator, not a direct arm of the Government. Hence, if Ministers have sought to intervene in any sort of FCA work or investigation, it should be a matter of transparency and disclosed.
Recently, the FCA dropped its investigation into Lookers, arguing it had instead made its concerns clear relating to the
“historic culture, systems and controls”
of the group. Why the investigation was not carried out to the full remains unclear—certainly to me, despite trying to find out. I imagine that many, including me, find the FCA’s answer unsatisfactory. It does not give us the assurances that we would hope an independent regulator would give.
Some commentators have noted that the dropping of this investigation seemed to coincide rather conveniently with the FCA’s new rules relating to car finance, brought in at the end of January 2021. Yet even these changes fell short of a mis-sell, which would undoubtedly have cost the providers of finance billions—strongly hinted at by the FCA’s 2019 report into car finance.
How the FCA came to its decision was in-house, even if it was sometimes perplexing to those of us outside. Nevertheless, in this instance, for example—and in many others—what we do not know is whether there has been any direct ministerial intervention to steer the FCA into any specific course of action. Many people would like reassurances that any intervention should be made in the interests of all and for the common good, particularly in customers’ best interests.
The amendment, in shining a light on what happens behind the FCA’s closed doors, would be a valuable addition to the Financial Services Bill. It would help in a mission that I know many in this House share to create a more transparent, robust and, dare I even say, moral financial system that in the long run will benefit all of us. I hope that the Government will look closely at either the amendment or something similar as we return to the matter later during the passage of the Bill through your Lordships’ House.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I need to spend more time, frankly, trying to understand the amendment. I would be genuinely shocked if Ministers interfered with an investigation of any of the regulators—certainly the FCA, the body at the centre of the amendment. I am not sufficiently familiar, I confess, with the Ministerial Code, but if the code does not make that clear, it would seem absolutely necessary that it does.
I perfectly understand concerns about the effectiveness of the FCA as a regulator in dealing with wrongful behaviour. It needs to be much more aggressive and transparent. We have talked earlier in Grand Committee about the HBOS Reading fraud scandal. The FCA was finally pressured into commissioning a report from Promontory, then did not publish it—only a summary that did not reflect in any significant way the actual conclusions of the report. That was extremely disturbing. We have also talked about the FCA’s actions under the senior managers and certification regime against Jes Staley, chief executive of Barclays—
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)
My Lords, there is a Division, so we shall adjourn for five minutes and reconvene thereafter.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
I was in the middle of saying that we need the FCA to be much more aggressive and transparent in its pursuit of wrongdoing within the financial services industry. I gave the example of what I considered to be real weakness in the way that it handled the HBOS Reading fraud and in its treatment of Jes Staley, chief executive of Barclays. As we discussed earlier, he was fined by the PRA and FCA, under the senior managers and certification regime, something in excess of £600,000 for, among other things, hiring private detectives to try to hunt down the identity of an internal whistleblower.
I note that it was the US authorities—one of the New York regulators, I think—that fined Barclays $15 million for the same behaviour, not the UK authorities. Some Members of your Lordships’ House may be aware that the US regulators visit the UK—I have certainly met with the CFTC when they have been doing this—in order to get the message over to bankers here that, if they come across any wrongdoing that potentially has an impact on the United States, as well as informing the UK regulators they should also make immediate contact with US regulators, who start from a position that they will be far more aggressive in hunting down wrongdoing.
I am afraid that the reputation of the UK for hunting down wrongdoers is not good. I wish we did not see ourselves in that position. That is one of the reasons why I am hopeful for an office of the whistle- blower. If there is any suspicion that a Minister had intervened inappropriately, it is through a whistleblower that that information would be exposed. We need an absolute safe haven for such a whistleblower to make contact, in order for that exposure to happen. Again, I look forward to hearing from the Minister how the Ministerial Code impacts on a situation such as this. If it does not, or is ineffective, the answer seems to me to be: strengthen the Ministerial Code.
Lord Eatwell (Lab)
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Sikka has made a powerful case for greater transparency in regulatory matters. I think it is clear to everybody that nothing undermines confidence in the regulatory system so much as the sort of cases to which my noble friend referred. What is often evident is that these matters eventually come out, and so the traditional rule that the cover-up is worse than the original transgression exerts itself once again.
The Government have made a virtue of transparency and openness in several aspects of the regulatory system. Not least, for example, we have discussed in this Committee the case of beneficial ownership, and we heard the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, make the argument for transparency of the beneficial ownership record of Companies House as a great virtue at an earlier stage of our considerations. Surely that commitment to transparency should be quite general, covering all regulatory matters, and not limited just to selected parts of the regulatory system.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 107 would require the FCA to make a public statement on the nature of any intervention a Minister may make into an FCA investigation into an individual firm.
The current legislative framework established the FCA as an independent, non-governmental body responsible for regulating and supervising the financial services industry. I listened with great care to the noble Lord, Lord Sikka but, with respect to him, and without belittling the value of lessons from history, the examples of investigations that he cited are ones that are unrelated to investigations carried out by the Financial Conduct Authority. That is a key point because, although the Treasury sets the legal framework for the regulation of financial services, it has strictly limited powers in relation to the FCA.
The Treasury is the FCA’s sponsor in government but, in view of the regulator’s independence, it is not appropriate for the Treasury or Ministers to seek to intervene in individual cases. In particular, the Treasury has no general power of direction over the FCA. I will write to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, on the content of the Ministerial Code, but I am not aware of any loopholes in the code that would permit the kind of conduct that has been talked about.
We are talking here about an independent organisation. The independence of the FCA is vital to its role. Its credibility, authority and value to consumers would be undermined if it were possible for the Government to intervene in its decision-making. I realise that the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, has some mistrust of Government Ministers, but I hope that that fact is of at least some reassurance to her.
That is not to say that the FCA is not accountable for its actions when investigating potential wrongdoing or malpractice by firms because, equally, the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, should be reassured that the FCA is governed by the framework of duties set out in legislation by Parliament. It would be unlawful for it to act outside this framework in order to further vested interests. The decisions of the FCA can be subject to judicial review and, under legislation, the FCA must maintain arrangements for the investigation of complaints.
In the event of a significant failure to secure an appropriate degree of protection for consumers, where those events might not have occurred but for a serious failure in the regulatory system, Section 73 of the Financial Services Act 2012 imposes a duty on the FCA to investigate. Situations can arise in which the Government determine that it is appropriate to intervene. In such situations, the relevant legislation—Section 77 of FSMA —provides a mechanism for the Treasury to direct the FCA to conduct an investigation where it suspects that there may have been regulatory failure.
Under Section 77, the Treasury can require the regulators to conduct an investigation into relevant events where the Treasury considers there to be a public interest. In addition, Section 77 investigations can consider aspects outside the regulatory system as established by FSMA, allowing a comprehensive review to be undertaken in the public interest. However, it is important to note that a Minister cannot use a Section 77 direction to do anything else at all, or to stop the FCA doing anything else.
The most recent example of Section 77 in action was in relation to the regulation of London Capital & Finance, when the Economic Secretary to the Treasury laid a direction before Parliament on 23 May 2019, and formally directed the FCA to launch an independent investigation. The direction was public and transparent, as we would always expect to be the case. The report was laid before Parliament on 17 December 2020.
I hope that this has clarified the legal underpinning of the FCA’s independence, and the very limited powers that Ministers and the Treasury have in this area. I hope that what I have said has reassured the noble Lord that appropriate legislation is in place, and that he is content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]
I am grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions, but somewhat disappointed by the Minister’s response. The examples I gave—if I had time, I could add another dozen—all inevitably relate to the past, when, despite government efforts, things have come to public attention. At no point have Ministers ever volunteered information or made statements that they have stymied investigations.
In the parliamentary debate on the Banking Act 1987, which formally made the Bank of England the supervisor of banks, Ministers claimed that the Bank would be an independent regulator. Then we discovered that there was a whole process of cover-up—the BCCI case, for example. When the Bank of England ceased to be an independent regulator, the next one, the Financial Services Authority, came in. Again, it was claimed that that was independent. Well, under ministerial pressure, it did not intervene. It did not investigate HSBC’s misdemeanours in the UK, and indeed it was a party to cover-up in the US. The US House of Representatives committee report contains some correspondence showing how the Bank of England, the FSA and the Chancellor were pressuring the officials there to go easy on HSBC. The idea that somehow the FCA is some brand new version of independence which we ought to believe simply neglects what has happened in the past, and that is not really very helpful. Of course, Ministers can allay all public fears by simply saying, “Yes, we will embrace independence.” What is wrong with that?
I have visited the US on many occasions. I have met many academics, regulators and businesspeople, and I always ask them two questions when I deliver a seminar or after a meeting. The first question I ask is, “If you could commit financial crime, where would you like to commit it?” The response is always, “The US, because there is a lot of money to be made.” The next question I ask is, “If you are caught, where would you like to be prosecuted?” At that point, laughter sets in and they all say, “The UK.” Indeed, this country has become kind of a standing joke in regulatory circles. If I were referring to any other country and explaining how Ministers and regulators have colluded to protect organisations which, by their own admission, engage in criminal conduct, many Members of the House would say, “Well, that country is corrupt” or “It is a banana republic”. But I find it surprising that the ministerial response is basically “Well, we are good, and we don’t really need to take account of any of these events.” That is really the tip of a corrosive iceberg, because this corruption goes very deep.
I have asked Ministers a number of times to comment on the public statement of Anthony Stansfeld—the Thames Valley police and crime commissioner—that there is a “cover-up” at Cabinet level of the HBOS and RBS frauds. It is interesting that no Minister has denied it, and no Minister has confirmed it. I have quoted a statement from a very senior law enforcement officer—what could be a greater indictment of the UK’s regulation?
Finally, could the Minister please tell us why the Sandstorm report, which is sitting in 1,300 US libraries, is still a state secret in this country after 30 years? I do not know if it is appropriate for him to reply but I would not be opposed to that.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)
Does the Minister wish to respond?
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, the noble Lord has the advantage over me, because I am not personally privy to the case history that he cited, which is now 30 years or so old. However, I will consult my officials and write to him with an answer to his question.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)
Can I confirm with the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, that he does not wish to press his amendment?
“Duty to take account of impacts on sustainable good work
(1) When undertaking duties and using powers under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, the FCA must take into account—(a) the impacts or potential impacts on sustainable good work in the United Kingdom as a consequence of the provision of financial services with particular regard to the evaluation of—(i) net gains in total employment;(ii) quality of work available;(iii) terms and conditions of work available;(iv) opportunities for training and reskilling;(b) the desirability of providing financial services and investment supporting the creation of sustainable good work across the United Kingdom; and(c) the desirability of advancing the international reputation of the United Kingdom for promoting inclusive and sustainable economic growth and decent work for all pursuant to the United Nationals Sustainable Development Goals.(2) The FCA must publish guidance to organisations providing financial services about fulfilment of the requirements specified in subsection (1)(a)(i) to (iv).(3) In this Act, “good work” means work which provides and promotes—(a) fair pay;(b) fair conditions;(c) equality and freedom from discrimination;(d) dignity;(e) autonomy of workers;(f) physical and mental wellbeing; (g) access to institutions and people who can represent workers’ interests;(h) participation of workers in determining and improving working conditions;(i) access to facilities for career guidance and training.”
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con) [V]
My Lords, I move Amendment 108 and speak to Amendments 109, 110 and 122, which, collectively, take us into a fresh policy area. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Knight of Weymouth, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, for their support. Support is always welcome and cross-party support is doubly so when, as I say, we enter a new policy area.
I draw the attention of the Committee to my entry in the register of interests, which shows that I am the chairman of the Founder Circle of the Institute for the Future of Work. It is the research that I have seen undertaken by the IFOW that provides much of the background to and reasons for my tabling these amendments.
It is widely argued that there is a high and perhaps growing level of dissatisfaction with how our system of government operates—or perhaps some would say how it fails to deliver a fair distribution of economic and other advances. The result has been a series of what one might call “uprisings” against what is seen by many as the conventional establishment view; the Brexit vote in the UK and the election of President Trump in the US are but two examples. Although both those events are behind us, there will surely be aftershocks that will shape our society over the next decade or so.
Lord Knight of Weymouth (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I am happy to put my name to and support Amendments 108 to 110. I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, for introducing the amendments.
From President Biden, to the OECD, to the UK Government, everyone around the world wants to “build back better”. The amendment is squarely in that vein. As we all start to see a path out of this pandemic, the economic consequences loom ever larger. The same people most likely to have lost their lives due to Covid are now losing their livelihoods. In this country, our challenge of rebuilding also must address our new life outside the European Union. We must account for the threats and opportunities of new trading arrangements and a new regulatory environment, and the Bill is a part of that. I see opportunities here to move to more intelligent regulation of the financial sector as we move into this new reality.
The financial sector is a strategically important part of the UK economy, as the Committee knows, employing up to 2.2 million people. The sector will play a critical role in financing the country’s recovery from the Covid-19 crisis. There is therefore an opportunity for the Government to deploy strategic regulation to steer the sector towards a greater consideration of the importance of good work.
As has been said, these amendments would ensure that financial regulators understand and give due weight to the importance of creating sustainable good work across the United Kingdom. The amendments have been designed to build on the great work of the Institute for the Future of Work, which was established following the Future of Work Commission, of which I was a member. We found that good work builds resilience, prosperity and well-being. I commend the institute’s Good Work Charter and Good Work Monitor to the Committee; as the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, said, it found that the availability of good work is an important determinant of health and social outcomes. This is reinforced by the findings of the Carnegie Trust. Conversely, when good work is not available it places a strain on government finances through the higher cost of health and welfare services, and depleted tax revenues.
On Budget day last week, those of us on the National Plan for Sport and Recreation Committee, whose meeting I am missing at the moment and to which I send my apologies, were lucky enough to hear from the Deputy Prime Minister of New Zealand, Grant Robertson. He is currently the Finance Minister and the Sports and Recreation Minister for his country. I was struck by what he said when he launched New Zealand’s first “well-being Budget” in 2019:
“In the election that led to the formation of this Government, New Zealanders were asking a core question: If we have declared success because we have a relatively high rate of GDP growth, why are the things that we value going backwards like child wellbeing, a warm, dry home for all, mental health services or rivers and lakes that we can swim in?”
He went on to say that the Treasury should be responsible for,
“measuring and focussing on what New Zealanders value—the health of our people and our environment, the strengths of our communities and the prosperity of our nation.”
I argue to the Committee that we need a similar mindset shift. We need to start by accepting that not all that we value can be measured by EBITDA, a balance sheet or shareholder value. Then we need to think about what we value and how to incentivise and regulate for that.
I have worked in the public, voluntary and private sectors. I run my own business, have started co-ops and charities, and worked at chief officer level for private equity-owned businesses. My current commercial clients include a US B corp, and one heavily financed by US venture capital. In my range of work, I too often see an increasing values imbalance the more that the enterprise is engaged with financial services businesses. Good business balances shareholder value with customer value, staff value and societal value. Too often, values are sacrificed for shareholder value. If one thinks only of the value of financial services in financial measures such as share price, one is missing the rounded value of the sector. This is like thinking that all the value of a school is in test scores, or all the value of a job candidate is in their qualifications. A growing number of investors do not see business in that way. Between 2016 and 2018, the proportion of UK investors integrating environmental, social and governance guidelines into their investment decisions grew by 76%. Up to $2 trillion of UK assets are now managed according to those ESG principles.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, I have signed these amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, and I agree with what he and the noble Lord, Lord Knight, have said. I am aware that the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, has a long record of engagement in these matters, because from time to time I discover that I am following in his footsteps. The “good work” amendments recognise that we need structural changes in how companies operate to ensure that they provide good work in the face of technological and societal changes. With the financial services sector both supporting all businesses and being our largest industry, it has a special, strategic leadership role to play, and ways that this can be brought about are contained in Amendments 108, 109 and 110. This would be in line with the principles of Section 3B(1)(c) of FSMA, which states that there is role for ensuring
“the desirability of sustainable growth in the economy of the United Kingdom in the medium or long term”.
In my book, sustainable growth must encompass technological and societal changes as well as the environment, but I fear there is a long way to go to live up to that.
In the interests of time, I shall concentrate on Amendment 122. There has been all-party support for employee share ownership in all its forms for a long time. Such schemes provide rewards and motivations in ways that wages cannot. At its best, an employee share plan will also give employees a say in how a business is run and can help to achieve many of the aims of the Good Work Charter, such as dignity, fair rewards, participation and learning.
Employee share ownership and employee ownership have many positive effects, and I want to highlight research on how well employee-owned companies deal with financial adversity.
Research published by the Cass Business School after the 2008 financial crisis established that employee-owned companies create jobs faster than non-employee-owned counterparts and withstood the recession better as it deepened. They recruited when non-employee-owned companies were laying off staff, and had motivation where others found it hard to motivate staff.
More recently, I chaired an inquiry into the effects of employee ownership and the report, entitled Ownership Dividend, found evidence that showed that employee-owned businesses performed better, were more resilient and more rooted in local economies—hence why the term “ownership dividend” was coined. Therefore, as has been said, such companies have a strong part to play in the UK’s plans to build back better and restart the economy.
Amendment 122 suggests an emphasis on analysing impact of sustainable growth provided by employees share schemes. As I mentioned previously, it should already be covered in the principles, but the urgency around “sustainable” in all its forms does not seem to be present. Therefore, I commend Amendment 122, as well as the good work amendment.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendments 108, 109 and 110 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Hodgson Ashley Abbotts and Lord Knight of Weymouth. I broadly agree with everything they said.
The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, in his introduction, referred to the level of dissatisfaction in our society: the threats from poverty, inequality and insecurity. I would say that these amendments are digging here into some of the depth of the problems that I referred to in my speech on a previous group and seek to provide some remedies. As he was speaking, I thought of meeting an USDAW representative in Sheffield referring to one of her members who had just come to her to seek a voucher for a food bank. The member was not, as you would expect as an USDAW member, unemployed; in fact, that member had seven jobs, but they were all zero-hours contract jobs and that particular week they had not delivered enough money for that person to feed themselves and their family.
However, it is important that we do not just focus—the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, did not—on those who are in desperate poverty and inequality, as awful as that is. As he was speaking, I could not help but think of what the late, great David Graeber called—here I may be about to use what is unparliamentary language here, but it is a direct quote—“bullshit jobs”. The noble Lord referred to people’s desire to get meaning, to feel that what they are doing, how they are using their time and talents, is worthwhile and contributing to society. Indeed, a failure to acknowledge and understand that—a focus purely on the pounds, shillings and pence—is at the root of a lot of our problems: the financialisation, to which the noble Lord, Lord Knight, referred, of our entire economy—not just the financial parts but the real economy, the care economy, the public service economy.
The noble Lord, Lord Knight, referred to managing things in a different way. I point again to New Zealand’s living standards framework, that guides its Treasury—based on a system not that dissimilar to our own—where they judge the quality of work, people’s security, the quality of the environment and the economy all together and seek to manage them to a stable, secure, decent whole.
These are important amendments and crucial principles, so I wanted to speak briefly in favour of them.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to speak to this group of amendments. In doing so, I declare my interests as set out in the register. I shall speak particularly to Amendment 122. It is evident that employee share ownership is a positive force within our economy, and speaks so much to the current Covid environment and what kind of economic sector, work and business basis we can have to our economy as we built out of Covid.
It is no surprise that Sir Nicholas Goodisson, after taking the London Stock Exchange through the big bang and seeing some of the early privatisations, then moved on to a role heading up the Wider Share Ownership Council. He saw the benefits and the positive impact that it had for people to have a stake in something, and there could be no better example of that than employees having a stake—a share—in the company for which they work on a daily basis.
I believe we will see more innovative models of employee ownership coming through. The EOT, for example, is still very much in its embryonic phase but it is a very positive concept and construct. There will be further developments in this area and I believe Amendment 122 sets out the case very well that when employees have a share, a stake and a say in the business for which they work, it benefits all concerned.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, first, I have to correct an error I made in the last group of amendments. I referred to the HBOS Reading scandal when I was talking about the Promontory report, and of course I should have been talking about the RBS GRG scandal; I am afraid I got my scandals wrong. My apologies for that—there really are too many to choose from. I hope that one day I find there are no choices; that would be a very good situation to be in.
I find this group of amendments wonderfully refreshing and a very important change of direction. Amendments 108, 109 and 110 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, build on the concepts that we already have in the UK Stewardship Code but take that further. In many ways, one can see a relationship with the duty of care amendments that we talked about earlier in this debate. That duty of care was focused on customers but in many ways that is now extending that perspective to employees. I find that exciting and worthwhile.
I and my colleagues in the Liberal Democrats have long talked about the need for a very different social contract between employers and the workforce. Very often that workforce may not be an official workforce in the formal sense; it may be people who are self-employed and working freelance but who in effect are working very closely with an organisation. The whole of that workforce needs a very different social contract as we go forward into a different era.
I think we both have different standards about how we treat each other and different expectations. However, we are also about to go into a period of transition to the digital age. That will be disruptive. It creates real issues for a large swathe of people and we cannot passively step back and look at a group of people just as collateral damage as we make that transition. The obligations to the workforce have become far more significant than they might have been in a fairly steady and static era when everything was expected and was not changing very significantly.
I have long been a fan of what is loosely called triple bottom line accounting—and have probably talked about it too often in this House—whereby issues such as the environment and the social impact along with the financial impact are measured when we look at both individual accounts and when we look globally at a nation’s accounts. We had earlier amendments around the issue of well-being, which are well related to all that.
I was excited to hear the example of New Zealand that the noble Lord, Lord Knight, detailed to a fairly significant degree. Nearly 20 years ago I spoke to a conference in Auckland around these issues as New Zealand was making its decision to revisit the way in which it managed its national accounts and looked at corporate accounts. I notice that very often, when we look at an English-speaking country with close ties to the UK, we find it much easier to absorb the examples and to treat them in a sense as a pilot from which we can learn. I therefore hope very much that the principles in these amendments will be enhanced.
Like the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, and my noble friend Lady Bowles, I am a great believer in employee share schemes. There is always a downside to be aware of. If something goes wrong in a company, you want to make sure that employees have also built other pension resources, have diversification and all those kinds of opportunities. A principle that is held as very important for senior management ought to be extended down throughout the employee base. Where you have ownership, you have a voice, and having a voice is important both in empowering people in their everyday life as a workforce and in making sure that they drive the direction of the company they are working for. We all know that the old-fashioned view that all that matters is the shareholder is essentially part of the past, and I very much welcome all these amendments as part of the future.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, has tabled a number of interesting amendments relating to the quality of work, as well as on the topic of employee share schemes. As I am sure the Minister will mention, the latter topic is the subject of a call for evidence issued alongside last week’s Budget. However, as that exercise only covers the operation of one specific scheme, I do hope that we will hear about the Government’s wider plans to promote employee ownership and employee share ownership. With an eye to the next group, I suspect that many fintech start-ups would be interested in taking up such options to help attract the talent they need.
In studying the first three amendments in this group, I was reminded of a remark I made at Second Reading, where I praised the financial services sector for the many well-paid and relatively secure jobs it provides, not just in the City of London but across the whole of the United Kingdom. While I stand by that generalisation, I must acknowledge that, as in any other sector, exceptions do exist. For example, as tranche after tranche of local bank branches reduce their opening hours or close their doors for good, we cannot possibly pretend that the job security of those workers is as high as it was, say, two decades ago. While working practices are rapidly changing across the financial services sector, certain strands of it retain a reputation for featuring long, unsociable hours or a cut-throat working environment that many would struggle with.
The proposals put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, are intriguing. The amendments raise several questions about access to talent and the treatment of it. As we have said on a number of occasions, we very much hope that the sector will go from strength to strength, bringing a steady stream of quality new jobs. The noble Lord is right to probe the Government on how they will create the ecosystem that makes this hope a reality. However, these considerations are not unique to financial services. As the economy recovers from Covid-19, we will want to see gains in employment across the board. If we are to build back better, as the Government claim they want to do, we will need to ensure that workers have good terms and conditions, as well as opportunities to undertake training or reskilling.
Therefore, for me the real question raised by these amendments is when we can expect to see the long-awaited employment Bill. The 2019 Conservative manifesto made a range of commitments on employment rights, and the last Queen’s Speech promised legislation to enact them. Regrettably, despite a longer than normal parliamentary Session, we have yet to see any concrete proposals. So, while the Minister may not be responsible for the forthcoming legislation, I hope that, during his response to these amendments, we will get a firm commitment that the employment Bill will appear soon.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Hodgson for directing the Committee’s attention to a set of issues that lie at the heart of the agenda for workers’ rights and social justice in the workplace. Let me begin by saying to him that the Government are committed to making the UK the best place in the world to work, and I found myself in considerable sympathy with a great deal of what he said about the connection between employee well-being, high-quality work and national prosperity.
The Government certainly have a role in furthering those ends, and I hope that my noble friend will agree that we have already made good progress in bringing forward measures that support our flexible labour market, while also ensuring the protection of workers’ rights, such as: banning the use of exclusivity clauses in zero-hours contracts; extending the right to a written statement of core terms of employment to all workers; closing a loophole whereby agency workers are employed on cheaper rates than permanent workers; introducing a right for agency workers to receive a key facts page when signing to a company; and quadrupling the maximum fine for employers who treat their workers badly.
The Government are committed to bringing forward measures to establish an employment framework that is fit for purpose and keeps pace with the needs of modern work practices, in due course. We are also committed to building back better from Covid-19. Alongside the Budget, we published our wider economic plan for significant investment in skills, infrastructure and innovation, in Build Back Better: Our Plan for Growth.
During the pandemic we have taken unprecedented action to protect jobs, most notably through the coronavirus job retention scheme—one of the most generous such schemes in the world. And from April 2021, the national living wage will increase by 2.2%, from £8.72 to £8.91, and will be extended to 23 and 24 year-olds for the first time. Taken together, these increases are likely to benefit around 2 million workers.
I fully appreciate that if we are to build back better, progress should be measured by more than just dry economic trends. However, most people would agree that a large part of human and civic well-being lies in people’s livelihoods, and I remind the Committee that in last week’s Budget the Chancellor set out his plan to protect the jobs and livelihoods of the British people.
Amendments 108, 109, and 110 would essentially require the FCA to have regard to “sustainable good work” when conducting their functions, and to embed this principle in the financial system as a whole. Financial services firms would then be required to apply the principle in all their activities, including investment decisions.
The FCA is responsible for a large number of firms and has been given three operational objectives: to protect consumers; to protect and enhance the integrity of the UK financial system; and to promote competition. So I am afraid I do not believe that the FCA is the right body for this function, given its current role, particularly as the issues go far beyond the subject of financial services.
Amendment 122 would require the FCA and the PRA to consider the impact of employee share schemes on sustainable economic growth. The Government want to support hard-working people to share in the success of the businesses for which they work. To encourage this, we offer several tax-advantaged employee share schemes. These provide a range of tax benefits to participating employees and businesses. We keep all employee share schemes under review, to ensure that they remain effective in these ways.
However, once again I do not believe that the UK’s financial services regulators are best placed to carry any changes forward. It is important that they remain focused on their core objectives. Giving them a diffuse set of objectives could undermine focus on consumer protection, financial stability and the sound functioning of financial markets. The body best placed to keep employee share schemes under review is the Government, and we see no need to impose this additional condition on the FCA and the PRA. So, while I am the first to acknowledge the importance of the matters that my noble friend has raised in this debate, I hope he will understand why I do not think it appropriate to amend the Bill in the way that he proposes.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con) [V]
My Lords, I am exceptionally grateful to everybody who has taken part in this debate, including the noble Lord, Lord Knight of Weymouth, who was the first to raise the concept of building back better, which was later picked up by everybody, including my noble friend the Minister.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, who always brings a degree of detailed and forensic expertise to these areas. Of course, I am well aware of her work with the employee share ownership association, as I am of the work of my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond on employee ownership trusts, which are critical. I share the interest of the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, in finding out the results of the consultation that is under way in this general area. It is not often that I find myself supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, but I am glad to have her along for the ride. The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, was certainly right to remind us all how fast everything is changing and that we need to make sure that we are not trying to tackle yesterday’s problems and failing to tackle tomorrow’s.
I am not surprised that my noble friend the Minister could not accept these amendments. He rightly emphasised the work that the Government have done both in employment generally and as a result of the pandemic. If he had accepted the amendments, I probably would have fainted with surprise and been unable to reply to the debate. However, this issue is not going to go away. The weakness of our present regulatory system is that it merely catches and tries to prosecute the bad. In this part of the century, given all the challenges we face, the system should be doing more than that; it should be encouraging the good. This is an area where good could be encouraged, and that would have a huge trickle- down effect on our society as a whole.
Perhaps I may leave noble Lords with a quote from Robert Kennedy, who said that GDP measures
“everything … except that which makes life worthwhile”.
I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 112.
Amendment 112
Lord Holmes of Richmond
“Designated artificial intelligence officer
(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations made by statutory instrument provide that companies operating in the financial services sector who use artificial intelligence (“AI”) must have a designated AI officer.(2) The AI officer under subsection (1) has responsibility for ensuring the—(a) safe,(b) fair,(c) unbiased, and(d) non-discriminatory,use of AI.(3) The AI officer under subsection (1) also has responsibility to ensure that data used in any AI technology is unbiased.”
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con) [V]
My Lords, in moving Amendment 112 I shall speak also to the following 10 amendments in the group, through to Amendment 136E, which is also in my name. I declare my interests as set out in the register and thank other noble Lords who have signed up to speak.
There are 11 amendments in the group and I should like to begin by making some broad comments about the overall theme. The group’s headline is fintech, financial technology, which covers a number of areas in and around that subject and demonstrates the connectivity between all the elements of 4IR, the fourth industrial revolution, including new technologies, and how they interact with one another in the context of financial services. They include AI—artificial intelligence —DLT or distributed ledger technology and blockchain, just to mention some that I will be coming on to discuss as we reach the amendments.
The Government have had a good story to tell on fintech since 2010—and indeed before: the Blair Administration were very positive around the UK’s opportunity and the potential that we have in this area of fintech. Perhaps the best example to date is the FCA’s sandbox, the measure of its success being its replication in more than 50 jurisdictions around the world. It was ground-breaking in its time; certainly, we find ourselves now, if not at a crossroads, certainly at a point where we need to consider everything across the fintech landscape and truly reflect on whether we are doing enough, or anywhere near enough, to ensure that the benefits are maximised for individuals, companies, all corporate entities and the UK as a whole.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond. He is, without a doubt, the House’s expert, and indeed enthusiast, on all these issues. In this large group of amendments, he has covered a broad range of issues of what is a huge area of the future of finance. He and I might differ somewhat in our balance between enthusiasm and concern about the risks, but it is really important that we are able to debate this. It is disappointing, however, to see the very small number of participants on this group, which brings up an issue that I will raise later, about the capacity of this Committee of your Lordships’ House to fulfil the role laid on us to scrutinise such large, complex, new and fast-moving areas.
Given the pressure of time, I will restrict myself to commenting on three amendments in this group. I start with Amendment 112, to which the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, has also added her name. It calls for an artificial intelligence officer in companies—someone such as, I should imagine, a chief financial officer. I did a master’s thesis partly on artificial intelligence 20 years ago; I was then and remain an AI sceptic. After 20 years, we seem to be at the same point that we were then, which is “We are about to get to AI really soon, now, yes, it’s going to work”. In those 20 years, however, there has been massive progress in what is known in shorthand as “big data”, or the ability to crunch truly astonishing quantities of data and to manipulate and use it. So I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, that perhaps what is needed is some kind of title or combination of roles that takes in both data and AI together.
On Amendment 118, the ethical use of artificial intelligence, the noble Lord has already covered this quite well, but it is important to stress that, in recent years, we have seen huge exposure of the difficulties of a sector that is profoundly unrepresentative of people whose lives it increasingly impacts. The noble Lord gave the example of soap dispensers which, in these days of Covid-19, is a potential matter of life and death; but we also need to think about access to your finances and being able to manage your finances, and even simply being able to manage them without having to take vastly more time and effort than some other person just because the AI mechanisms are discriminatory. These are all issues that need to be engaged with. I note, for example, that some of the events that have been happening recently at Google do not fill one with confidence about the ways in which the culture of the entire artificial intelligence community is moving—certainly in some areas.
I will comment finally on Amendment 119, about digital resilience. This is one of the most important factors of all. We increasingly hear talk of the internet of things, and of tying together the internet of things and fintech. I think particularly of the recent opening of a store in which there are no checkout people and no scanning and where lots of cameras watch and monitor everything that happens in that store and then a bill appears in your email later. This relates to an earlier group and our discussion on the nature of work and good work, but it also relates very much to the issues of discrimination and resilience.
I was in Lancaster a few years ago, after it had suffered an enormous flood. For several days, the city was without power and it was clear that things very nearly fell apart, due in large part to our reliance already on technology and fintech—that was how people paid for things. We need to think hard about issues of resilience in our age of shocks and how we build systems that will not be at risk of profoundly falling apart—not just the cash machines falling apart, but an inability to even obtain food.
I also need to mention the issues around bitcoin and other digital currencies. There are huge and growing concerns about their environmental impacts and indeed the sustainability of those impacts. Bitcoin and other such currencies are extremely energy-hungry by design. A single bitcoin transaction uses 707 kilowatt hours of electricity, which is the equivalent of 24 days of use by a single average US household. On an annual basis, were bitcoin alone to be a country, it would be 39th in the world in its energy consumption. These are massive changes that need to be considered in the round—the kind of triple accounting that the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, talked about before. They are issues that deserve far more time and focus than we can give them today, but they really do need to be tackled.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]
I am delighted to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and find myself in agreement with much of what she said, especially on finding a balance between regulations and introducing more fintech into financial services. I am delighted to speak to this group of amendments and must apologise from dropping out of the previous group, which goes to the question that the noble Baroness raised about the number of participants. I was participating in the Domestic Abuse Bill in the Chamber; I am sure many will be in that position, because we cannot be in two places at once, unfortunately.
I say at the outset that I yield to no one in my admiration for my noble friend Lord Holmes’s knowledge, expertise, passion and commitment in the area of artificial intelligence and fintech. I pay tribute to the work he has done in bringing forward this wide-ranging group of amendments. I am delighted to have co-signed and to support Amendments 112 and 115 and, rather than go through all the points that my noble friend raised, I shall just put a question to the Minister, when she comes to wind up this small debate. If we accept that there is a role for fintech and artificial intelligence in financial services, and accepting the competitive market, the nature of which my noble friend Lord Holmes explained, will the Minister support the amendments, or will she be able to set out today in what regard she accepts that we would like to promote the wider use of technology and artificial intelligence in the financial services sector? Given that, as my noble friend said, we have a good story to tell and do not wish to fall behind, does the Minister accept that, given the increasing number of graduates in the field of artificial intelligence, we owe it to them and to the universities that set them on this path to ensure that they have opportunities in this country to put their academic knowledge to good use? Are we not missing a trick in this regard by not ensuring that we enhance those opportunities? With those few comments, I shall be delighted to hear the Minister’s response to the amendments when she sums up.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, was inadvertently left off the list of speakers, and I call her now.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friends Lord Holmes of Richmond and Lady McIntosh of Pickering for tabling these amendments and I very much agree with my noble friend Lord Holmes on the scale of the transformation that will be driven by fintech. It is more important to the sector, in my view, than Brexit, and my noble friend Lady McIntosh’s question is therefore a good one.
I rise to speak on Amendment 115 on digital identification. I have taken a substantial interest in facilitating the provision of digital ID for several years. It is the sort of thing where the UK, with its early digital adoption and its skill in matters of security, should be ahead of the curve. Some good systems exist and have been rolled out in other European countries, but not here. This is probably because we have been waiting for the banking sector to make a decisive move.
I tabled amendments on digital identification during the passage of the Covid legislation, with support from some noble Lords here today. I did not press the matter because I was promised progress, and I had good meetings with my noble friend Lady Williams and the Digital Minister, Matt Warman MP, who published proposals for the UK digital identity and attributes trust framework on 11 February, with comments on it due from us all by tomorrow.
I thought that I would get another chance to press my case when our Covid laws were renewed but there is no sign of any such opportunity. I noted, however, that on 4 March my noble friend Lord Bethell, the Health Minister, told us that digital certificates, not physical ones, are being used for vaccines to avoid fraud, underlining the need to make progress in the financial area. The fraudulent attempt to trick my noble friend Lord Holmes in relation to his driving licence underlines exactly the scale of fraud in everyday life, an issue that is calling for digital ID.
I am disappointed about the pace of change on digital ID and although I support Amendment 115, it needs to be stronger. Waiting yet another six months for a plan is too slow. Why can we not get a grip of this important area, as we have done in the much greater challenge of vaccines? Give the job to Matt Warman with a remit to bring in digital ID for those who need it by 1 September. That would be novel provision but we need to accelerate this change.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, after all those excellent speeches, I shall try to be brief but I need to declare my interests in the register because they apply to this group of amendments.
Fintech is an extraordinary success story in the UK. In 2011, shortly after having the privilege of being appointed to this House, I sought out and invited the chief executive of every fintech in the UK that I could find to come to a meeting. We needed only a small conference room over in Millbank House. Today, the QEII Centre would not be adequate. That alone speaks to the extraordinary success of the industry, much helped by an enlightened view from the Financial Conduct Authority, which had to be dragged kicking and screaming into looking benevolently upon the industry and understanding that it required appropriate regulation to grow. However, once it got there, the FCA has been incredibly positive and powerful.
I want to plead against complacency, which is a rather British weakness. In the days before Brexit, many of our fintechs chose to expand into continental Europe, using passporting and the e-commerce directive. They also attempted to go into the United States but few have been successful, partly because of the competition there and the difference in structure. The European market is incredibly important for expansion. We also know that it has been important for recruitment, which raises many issues around visas. A single person is perhaps not so hard to attract but someone whose wife or husband is unable to work may not be so cheered in taking up a visa to come to the UK. That is an underlying problem that we face for entrepreneurs and skills.
Many issues have been raised in this debate, including AI and fintech: the two merge over some significant territory. The issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, are important and will, I hope, be a prod to make sure that we continue to deal with them at pace and to understand that there is no easy time. Berlin has, frankly, become a centre for tech within Europe and it would not be so very difficult to swivel that around and begin to absorb fintech. We do not want to put ourselves into that situation.
I wanted quickly to make two other points, picking up on points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes. Digital fiat currency is now the issue of the moment. We have a relatively small window in which to decide whether we want to play in that area in such a way as to make us a significant player. One could say that sterling is not a natural global currency and we therefore need to be first mover. Picking up on the noble Lord’s point, I hope that we will look more at that area.
AI obviously brings with it extraordinary complexities and question marks but they are issues that can all be worked through if we focus on them. They will not become easier over time; they are just as difficult now as in the future, so one might as well deal with them as is. The issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, deserve a proper debate on the Floor of the House and I am sure will draw in many more people than those who focus on financial services issues alone. I very much look forward to that opportunity as well as listening to the Minister’s response.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, for tabling this group of amendments, which deal with various aspects of fintech. His contributions on this Bill have been thoughtful, and nobody should be surprised by him pushing this agenda today, given his role as co-chair of the relevant APPG. As other noble Lords have mentioned, this debate is a topical one, following the publication of the Kalifa review on fintech last month. We welcome that review and hope that the Government will support our world-leading fintech sector to continue innovating and do so in a way that spreads opportunity to all parts of the country.
When we refer to things being life changing, we often do so in a hyperbolic manner. However, it is no exaggeration to say that technological innovation in the financial services sector has fundamentally altered our understanding of and everyday experiences with money. The pace and scope of change has been incredible; the journey from cheques to mobile phone payments, for example, has been a swift one. Many young people conduct virtually all their banking activity online through the apps of high-street banks or using entirely digital services such as Monzo. Elsewhere, terms such as crowdfunding and crypto currency have become common parlance, with the emergence and increasing use of new technologies, including artificial intelligence and blockchain. The possibilities are almost beyond comprehension.
Taken collectively, the noble Lord’s amendments point to the crux of the issue: how can we maximise the opportunities that undoubtedly exist in the sector while guarding against the risk inherent in the use of new technologies and working practices? Artificial intelligence is an interesting case in point. AI tools, which are regularly deployed in a number of sectors, have the potential to assist with a variety of issues which we have covered in previous debates, such as identifying fraudulent or otherwise suspicious transactions. However, Amendments 112 and 118 refer to some of the ethical considerations that arise from automated decision-making.
In a recent piece for the House magazine, and again in his opening remarks, the noble Lord issued a challenge to the Government that they should take steps now to foster the potential for our fintech sector or risk losing talent to our competitors, falling behind in the global tech arms race and, ultimately, having to play catch-up. I am not necessarily convinced of the case for legislative requirements for reports and reviews on these issues. The noble Lord is right to seek more information on the Government’s intentions. If London is to be the world-leading financial centre that the Chancellor and many others would like it to be, how do the Government plan to strike the balance that I spoke of previously? In striking that balance, how do Ministers plan to ensure that consumers and citizens are placed at the heart of a digital finance package? With technology touching all our lives, it is only right that we should all reap the benefits of change. However, as I mentioned previously, we must also take steps to identify and mitigate the risks.
There is probably far more that could be said than time allows. I look forward to seeing how much ground the Minister is able to cover.
Baroness Penn (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful for this opportunity to discuss the important issue of the use of technology in financial services and how technological developments will continue to impact the sector. The UK has been independently ranked as one of the best places in the world to start and grow a financial technology, or fintech, firm. I reassure my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering that, as the Chancellor set out in his November speech on the future of financial services, we are not complacent. We want to build on this strength and use technology to deliver better outcomes for consumers and businesses and make the most of the job opportunities that this sector presents.
Many of the questions raised by the adoption of cutting-edge technology apply across the whole economy, not just to financial services, so although I am sympathetic to the purpose behind a number of the amendments—ensuring that the UK embraces the opportunities that new technology can bring—I am not convinced that they are the best route forward at this time.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con) [V]
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate.
I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, that her point on bitcoin was well made but, for the record, it is probably worth clarifying that that is a construction only of that particular cryptocurrency rather than an inevitability of a blockchain-based system.
I thank my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering for her comments and for signing two of the amendments in the group. Similarly, I thank my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for her comments on digital ID. I very much take her putting some more lead in my pencil to underscore the urgency of the issue; I am in complete lockstep with her on that point. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, for their constructive and positive comments, and indeed the Minister for her response. With that, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 112.
Lord Sikka
“Supervisory Board
(1) There is to be a Supervisory Board to perform the function of monitoring the FCA and PRA.(2) The Supervisory Board must consist entirely of stakeholders.(3) Recruitment for the membership of the Supervisory Board is to be conducted through open competition and the appointments are to be confirmed by the House of Commons Treasury Committee, or another relevant House of Commons Select Committee. (4) The Chancellor of the Exchequer may nominate individuals to the Supervisory Board.(5) The following are ineligible for appointment to the Supervisory Board—(a) current and past employees of the FCA and the PRA, and(b) current employees of organisations supervised by the FCA and the PRA.(6) A member’s membership of the Supervisory Board cannot exceed a period of five years beginning with the day the member’s appointment is confirmed under subsection (3).(7) The Supervisory Board has no responsibility for—(a) the day-to-day operations of the FCA or the PRA, and(b) investigations and enforcement of the rules devised by the FCA and the PRA.(8) The Supervisory Board’s functions are to—(a) provide strategic oversight of the Executive Boards of the FCA and PRA responsible for day-to-day operations;(b) inquire into the adequacy of resources used and available to the FCA and the PRA;(c) seek explanations from the Executive Board for reasons for the delay in launching and completing investigations; and(d) seek explanations from the Executive Board in relation to the efficiency and effectiveness of the FCA and the PRA in discharging their statutory duties.(9) The Supervisory Board shall have powers to—(a) demand explanations from the Executive Board on any matter affecting the protection of consumers from harmful practices;(b) secure information from the Executive Board about their transparency and accountability to the public; and(c) liaise with whistle-blowers and examine FCA and PRA policies for protecting and rewarding whistle-blowers.(10) The Supervisory Board must hold open meetings with the Executive Boards of the FCA and the PRA at least once every three months.(11) The working and background papers of the Supervisory Board must be made publicly available.(12) The Supervisory Board must lay before each House of Parliament an annual report highlighting matters of concern relating to the operation of the FCA and PRA which it has discovered in exercising its powers and functions.(13) The Supervisory Board must be consulted on appointment and reappointment of the Chief Executives of the FCA and the PRA.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause would create a Supervisory Board to monitor the Executive Boards of the FCA and PRA and provide a diversity of views on the conduct of the FCA and the PRA.
Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]
My Lords, Amendment 120 seeks to strengthen regulation by empowering stakeholders to watch over the conduct of the executive boards of the FCA and the PRA, so that stakeholder interests do not continue to be marginalised.
Throughout the passage of the Bill in this House and the other place, considerable concern has been expressed about regulatory failures. In particular, the noble Baronesses, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle and Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, drew attention to the well-known problem of regulatory capture.
Regulatory bodies such as the FCA and the PRA are too close to the interests of the finance industry, often at the expense of broader social interests. The revolving doors swing both ways as regulators come from the industry and, after a stint, they return to the industry. The regulatory capture has inflicted misery on millions, as shown by numerous scandals. There is no resolution of the HBOS and RBS frauds, there is dithering on mini-bonds, the London Capital & Finance and Connaught scandals testify to regulatory failures, the FCA was absent in the Carillion scandal, puny sanctions for mis-selling numerous financial products have not really changed corporate culture, and there has been little success in curbing tax avoidance, money laundering, and interest rate and exchange rate rigging. Indeed, there is a long history of regulators doing the bidding of the industry; my earlier interventions referred to the regulatory sympathies for HSBC, Standard Chartered bank and BCCI even though they were involved in anti-social and criminal activities.
Regulatory capture is built into the system as individuals close to the industry occupy senior decision-making positions as executive and non-executive directors. Ministers and others often argue that individuals of particular experience are needed. The focus on technical expertise inevitably privileges industry insiders and marginalises the experience of the people who are actually practised upon, who remain relatively invisible. These experienced people rarely blow the whistle on corrupt practices or check the groupthink that has become all too prevalent in regulatory bodies.
In theory, non-executive directors are expected to provide some oversight of executives of regulatory bodies, but they, too, have little independence from the industry. The non-questioning of the regulatory practices inside the regulatory boards only deepens the crisis. Even when whistleblowers give executive and non-executive directors hard evidence, their concerns are often ignored. Who can forget the heroic efforts of the late Paul Moore, who alerted regulators of problems at HBOS before the financial crash? But he was ignored. Corporate grandees at regulatory bodies all too often see the issues through the industry’s lenses. Regulatory bodies have become echo chambers of the vested interests. We are talking here not just about simple regulatory capture but cognitive capture, which standardises subjectivities and has naturalised the interests of the finance industry within the regulatory bodies.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)
I am sorry to interrupt. A Division is taking place in the House. We will return in five minutes and the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, will be able to finish then. I do apologise to him.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)
My Lords, I think all of us who were going to vote have now done so, so I invite the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, to finish his speech and move his amendment.
Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I wanted to provide some examples of the kind of questions which the supervisory board might raise. For example, it could ask the FCA/PRA executive board to explain the delay in securing compensation for the victims of the HBOS and RBS frauds—that could be one question; I shall give a few more examples. It could ask why no one at the board level of HBOS and RBS has so far been prosecuted or why HSBC took 20 hours to respond to calls on its fraud helpline—which is of concern to many people. It could ask whether it was appropriate for the FCA to commission Section 166 reports from organisations involved in antisocial practices, or what progress the FCA had made in dealing with the issues relating to banks forging customers’ signatures. It could ask what policies were being developed to deal with global warming—which, again, is of interest to many people. It could ask what the regulators were doing to protect people from predatory lending practices—payday lending problems have not gone away, as we all know—or to protect businesses, especially small businesses, from excessive charges by credit card companies. It could ask what the PRA was doing to address the shortcomings of the Basel III recommendations. Lastly, as we all know that a remit of the FCA is to promote competition in respect of financial services, the supervisory board could ask how the FCA would do that given that many towns now lack bank branches.
These kinds of probing questions do not interfere with the day-to-day running, but they provide oversight and they push back against regulatory silence and capture. A supervisory board will erode the space for regulators to sweep things under their dusty carpets. It can transform our country and ensure that regulators work to protect the people and address their concerns.
Ministers often say that regulators are there to serve the people, so what objections can there be to empowering people to sit on the supervisory boards and democratise the regulatory structures and our society? Empowering people has a much lower cost than that associated with scandals and financial crisis.
I beg to move the amendment.
Viscount Trenchard (Con)
My Lords, I understand that Amendment 120 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, seeks to establish a supervisory board for the two regulators. My first thought was that the noble Lord intended that this board should function in the same way as a joint co-ordination committee, as proposed in Amendment 86 in the name of my noble friend Lord Blackwell, which we debated on Monday. The explanatory statement, however, does not suggest that the board would co-ordinate the activities of the two regulators; rather, it would simply monitor the executive boards of the regulators and provide a diversity of views on their conduct.
From his opening remarks, I understand that the noble Lord’s intention is very different. While there have inevitably been some mistakes, I do not recognise the picture that he paints. The regulators have always been willing to learn from what has not gone as well as it might have. As long as the PRA and FCA remain separate organisations with different functions and objectives, it seems to me that this supervisory board would, in effect, have two separate personae or incarnations. It would have to function separately as a supervisory board of the FCA and as one of the PRA. I think it cannot be a part of the legal structure of either regulator or of both regulators. It would seem to duplicate the arrangements for parliamentary oversight which we have discussed and on which I would ask my noble friend the Minister to tell the Committee how his thinking is developing.
The amendment refers to the executive board of the PRA, although the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, should be aware that the board of the PRA was replaced by the Prudential Regulation Committee of the Bank of England in 2017. I do not think that such a supervisory board would replace the need for parliamentary scrutiny of the regulators, which will in itself provide appropriate transparency and accountability, rather than the completely crushing, destructive oversight that I believe the noble Lord’s new board would cause. It would be a cumbersome, expensive and bureaucratic body that would have a negative effect on the future attractiveness and competitiveness of the City of London as a global financial centre, so I cannot support his amendment.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, for introducing this amendment. I will be brief, because it concerns accountability, which has already been much discussed; and, like the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, I have really only just found out the intentions of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, regarding the amendment—I was a little blindsided about the formal structure. The accountability debate, as we have progressed through this Bill, has shown more appetite to enhance Parliament’s oversight than to create other bodies. My personal view is well known, that ultimately I think more than Parliament will be needed, but if the route of just Parliament is followed, at least to start, then it is true that some of the functions—or challenges—listed in this amendment for the supervisory board could be pursued that way.
However, the other intention of this amendment is to find a way to prevent regulatory capture from within, which I understand. The mechanism to ensure that the supervisory board itself is not captured includes having public meetings and public documents—bringing in the sunshine, as the noble Lord said. This has some merit as a way to reflect the public interest that supervisors seemingly could not define and to democratise in some way—although I am not sure whether it has been correctly formulated yet. I also share the noble Lord’s concern that press releases, annual reports and even appearances before Select Committees do not give penetration beyond the regulators making assertions. That has to be so, because there is a mismatch between reports and assertions and then what we discover further down the track about what was actually going on at the same time as we received those assertions. We have obtained penetration only through reports such as the Gloucester review.
Some stronger powers would be needed to compel better information than is currently provided by regulators and made public. That will apply to all the ideas about oversight that we have been probing. I am not sure that we have found a perfect solution or combination of solutions yet, and I suspect that we will need more than one stage to do that. However, having a mechanism to prevent regulatory capture and groupthink is necessary—never mind the revolving door between the regulators and industry and the representation of industries within the regulators’ structure. The obligation to consult the public about rules is predominantly served through responses from industry. One thing that we know about consultations is that, broadly, they run on the weighing of the responses. At least that is certainly the way when it comes to government. When you have the weight of responses from industry, the relatively few that go in from public interest bodies do not necessarily hold the weight that they should.
The noble Lord, Lord Sikka, has brought forward some issues that we have to recognise and address. We need to put them into the pot of the matters that we think about as we move forward on accountability. I maintain my view that we probably will not achieve what we want simply by saying “enhance Parliament”. We will find over time that we need something else as well.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I very much agree with the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, that regulatory capture is a real risk. We certainly saw that prior to the 2008-09 crash, and many people would say that the soft hand of the regulator has ever since reflected an ongoing degree of regulatory capture. I am less focused on the revolving door issue but am much more concerned that the regulator says, “Wait a minute. If we go hard after whichever institution has done wrong, particularly if it is a major one and would involve going after senior people, we will disrupt financial stability. For that greater good, we must go softly and gently”. That approach has not served the industry or the country well.
We have talked extensively about accountability. I see this matter as an extension of that conversation. We have talked about the importance of accountability being extremely well informed in a way in which it is not today, and about the importance of transparency. Numerous ideas have come forward during the process of this Grand Committee. This is another, different approach that essentially tries to get to the same place —a regulator that has to be transparent and which provides genuine, sufficient and high-quality information that can be assessed by people of a relevant skills base, and that is accountable to Parliament. It should not be a regulator that just meets with Parliament and gives it an explanation once or twice a year but one that is actually accountable.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, the interesting amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Sikka is another demonstration of the considerable unease felt on all sides of the Grand Committee about the governance of the FCA and the PRA, and their relationship with one another. The amendments moved on Monday by the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, addressed similar concerns. The question still to be answered is: what would be the composition and terms of reference of such a supervisory board? Is the Treasury not deemed to be performing that role? How can we be confident that the supervisory board would have the authority and expertise to perform a task that my noble friend Lord Sikka rightly identified as being necessary?
I am sorry to sound like a broken record. Are not my noble friend Lord Sikka’s concerns another example of the lack of an effective mechanism of parliamentary scrutiny? Whether an effective parliamentary mechanism can be created is a question that we do not hear or have the ability to address but it must be addressed. I am sure that the Minister will agree.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, the Government agree that effective oversight of the FCA and PRA is a crucial component of our regulatory framework. Indeed, noble Lords will remember that in earlier debates we discussed the existing mechanisms to ensure effective independent oversight of the regulators by a diverse range of stakeholders. For example, both the FCA and PRA are required under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to consult independent panels on the impact of their work.
I should say that in general I do not recognise the picture of regulatory capture that the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, painted in relation to our two financial regulators, although I shall of course read his comments in Hansard and make sure that I understand all that he said.
For the PRA, this involves consulting an independent practitioner panel of industry representatives, while the FCA must consult four different statutory panels, representing consumers as well as the financial services industry. Furthermore, the regulators are already under a statutory obligation to publish the results of their public consultations, including on proposed new rules.
The amendment proposes that the FCA and PRA should attend hearings in front of a supervisory board. I simply observe that both bodies must already attend such hearings before parliamentary committees, and those committees may also hear evidence from stakeholders about the performance of the regulators. The FCA, for example, must attend general accountability hearings before the Treasury Select Committee twice a year, while the PRA must appear before that committee after the publication of its annual report. Parliamentary committees of both Houses are also able to summon the regulators to give evidence whenever they may choose. For example, the CEO and chairman of the FCA appeared before the Treasury Select Committee on 1 March to answer questions on their regulation of London Capital & Finance.
The amendment proposes that a supervisory board should have the power to inquire into the adequacy of resources used and available to the FCA and the PRA. However, as we have discussed in previous debates, the Treasury already has the capacity to order independent reviews into the regulators’ economy, efficiency and effectiveness. Therefore, all told, the amendment would result in a duplication of existing opportunities for scrutiny and oversight of the regulators’ resourcing.
I realise that the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, has a close interest in the issue of supervision, but I hope I have convinced him that the PRA and FCA are already accountable in meaningful and tangible ways, and that a diverse range of stakeholders has opportunities to participate in scrutiny of their actions.
Finally, let me say that the Government are not closing down debate on these issues. As I have set out during other debates, the future regulatory framework review is already exploring how our framework needs to adapt to reflect our new position outside the EU. It would be premature to make changes to these arrangements before we consider stakeholder responses to the ongoing consultation. However, I have noted the contributions from the Committee on what form that may take. Against that background, I ask that the amendment be withdrawn.
Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]
I am grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions to the debate, and it would be helpful if I could respond to a few points. First, under my amendment both the FCA and the PRA would need a supervisory board. Indeed, if I were redesigning the entire regulatory architecture in the UK, every regulatory body would have a supervisory board, because that is the only way of putting ordinary people, who are practised upon, inside the organisation, to check the conduct of executive boards and reshape the organisational culture, which has given us such problems.
The amendment does not duplicate in any way whatever what any parliamentary committee or review board might do. The supervisory board would simply be engaged in day-to-day strategic oversight. Those people would be in the organisation on a permanent basis, observing, requiring reports, making recommendations and in many ways hoping to prevent the major scandals that we read about later—often some years later. It has been suggested that such regulatory architecture would be cumbersome and expensive. My response, as always, is, “What do you think the cost of the status quo is?” How many more banking crashes can we afford? How many more London Capital & Finances, how many more Connaughts, and other scandals, can we afford? We simply cannot afford them.
“Country-by-country reporting requirements
(1) The PRA must include country-by-country reporting requirements in reporting requirements for banks.(2) The FCA must include country-by-country reporting requirements in reporting requirements for investment firms.”
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, this amendment was not intended newly to introduce country-by-country reporting but to maintain the country-by-country reporting requirements that exist through CRD IV and retained EU law. In retrospect, looking at my amendment now, perhaps that is not quite clear.
Once again, as the statutory instrument layer is removed, it is within the purview of our financial regulators to decide that some things are inconvenient or not part of their main remit and to dispense with them. Article 89 of CRD IV requires institutions to report annually, specifying by country in which they have an establishment, information on a consolidated basis including: name, nature of activity and geographical location; turnover; number of employees on a full-time basis; profit or loss before tax; tax on profit or loss; and public subsidies received. Since then, there has been a little more general progress in country-by-country reporting, but I wanted to ensure there were no backward steps as the PRA and FCA start to write the rules.
There was much coverage at the time about the late insertion by the European Parliament of country-by-country reporting that nobody expected, but I can tell the story—which can actually be seen if we look at whole article in the directive. As was the way in trialogues that I chaired in the European Parliament, we shared out speaking. I am sure that the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, will be pleased to hear that the Greens were leading on country-by-country reporting, but all that had been conceded to the Parliament in the trialogue was an assessment, maybe followed by legislation if appropriate.
I got a note from the Greens’ adviser saying that they were out of arguments and asking whether I could help. Maybe I should have framed that, because a Green being out of arguments is quite an astonishing thing. They knew that at that stage we had nothing to trade in return to get country-by-country reporting in. So I asked the Council and Commission to confirm that the only reason why they objected was that industry was saying that economic damage would be caused by country-by-country reporting. They both swore that that was the only reason why they were objecting to the insertion of such a clause: that they were afraid of what might happen if these really rather mild provisions were introduced.
I then proposed that the information be submitted in confidence to the Commission and that, in consultation with the regulators, there be then a general assessment of potential negative economic consequences of public disclosure, including the impact on competitiveness, investment, credit availability and the stability of the financial system. It sounds incredible, but those were the scare stories that the other institutions had bought into.
In the event that the report, including analysis based on actual data, identified significant effects, then the provision of public disclosures could be deferred or removed, but otherwise the provision would come into force in 2015. Having sworn that the only nervousness was about all these effects, they then had to concede that proposal. All that explains the content that you can clearly see in article 89 and the report in its paragraph 3. Of course, no damage was found, and the article is in force and transposed into UK law. I quote from a 2014 PWC document on compliance:
“HMT sought to adopt a pragmatic approach to provide rules that are practical and which provide some options designed to ease the compliance burden faced by businesses. This optionality has allowed HMT to implement rules that comply with CRD IV, but which, in line with broader Government policy, do not mandate reporting beyond the requirements of CRD IV.”
There are some activities that would trigger investment firms falling within scope, so it therefore seems relevant to raise this matter in the Bill, as the investment firm provisions are about to be rewritten. Of course, small and UK-only investment firms may not fall within the definitions, because I am proposing carry-over of the existing ones, but where they are larger organisations then they should continue to comply. Against that background, I hope that the Government will not say that they want to allow closing down of transparency and that the Minister will understand why I do not believe any of the scare stories about damage. I beg to move.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, not just because she highlighted the role of the Greens in pushing country-by-country reporting at the European level, and the value of having a Green in the room. A great way of bringing people on board and into the debate is to ask them for help. I will briefly quote the chair of European Parliament’s sub-committee on taxation, MEP Paul Tang:
“I think transparency is a powerful tool for change because many of the current tax policies can’t stand the light of day. Just shine the light on it.”
That was from an interview with Forbes, showing how so many of the defenders of the status quo are increasingly isolated and clearly out of touch, not just with the public but with much of the establishment who realise that things cannot go on as they are.
I have been asked at public meetings over many years how we get multinationals, rich individuals and the financial sector to pay their taxes. My first answer is simple: you need a Government who want to make them pay their taxes. My second, more detailed and technical, answer is, simply, country-by-country reporting. This is something that the UK can impose without needing international agreements. I back the noble Baroness’s amendment to the hilt.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I am going to be very brief again on this issue, because I cannot pretend that it is my area of expertise. I remember the period when George Osborne was very proud of saying that not only would he make country-by-country a requirement but that it would be published. My understanding is that that was reversed in 2016. Perhaps the Minister will correct me, but that information is no longer published at a national level and the UK has been fairly instrumental in blocking the OECD from publishing the data at an international level. I apologise if I have got that wrong: I am reading from a Tax Justice Network report. Its calculation is that, as a consequence of not publishing, and therefore not having the cleansing impact of transparency, the UK misses out on collecting something in the range of £2.5 billion in corporate taxes a year.
Again, this is not my area of expertise, but I shall wish to hear from the Minister. We as a country have always said the answer is transparency. We have insisted that publication is the mechanism for cleaning up abuse. I would be extremely troubled if the regulators felt they were now in a position to weaken in any way country-by-country reporting requirements.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, the provision of country-by-country data by banks and investment firms will be an important step forward both in combating financial crime and in addressing the vexed question of the fair taxation of international entities. These problems will be solved only by international negotiation and agreement. It is important that we are seen as an exemplar, and satisfactory country-by-country reporting is surely part of that.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 121 aims to ensure that banks and investment firms engage in country-by-country reporting related to the provision of tax information. I am happy to assure the noble Baroness that there is no need for this amendment, because such requirements already exist for these firms in legislation.
Banks and most investment firms are already subject to country-by-country reporting requirements as a result of the fourth capital requirements directive, or CRD IV, which we implemented in the UK while we were an EU member state. This was done through a statutory instrument in 2013, and it requires firms to report relevant information on tax and revenue in each country where they have operations. This statutory instrument remains in place today. In order to implement the investment firms prudential regime, this Bill removes investment firms from the prudential requirements for banks in the capital requirements regulation—in order to allow the FCA to implement the new regime. But Schedule 1 to the Bill ensures that country-by-country reporting requirements will continue to apply to FCA investment firms.
There is an exception for small and non-interconnected investment firms. This is because this new regime aims to ensure proportional requirements for investment firms consistent with their size and activities. These firms are, by definition, small and non-interconnected with the wider financial system, and it would be disproportionate for these requirements to apply to them. This is the same approach that the EU took in the investment firms directive.
Amendment 121 would have the effect of preventing small and non-interconnected firms from being carved out in this way. For the reasons just mentioned, I do not think that this is appropriate. Therefore, when it comes to banks and investment firms, I am confident that the existing country-by-country reporting requirements for these firms are appropriate, and I ask the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
I thank everybody who has spoken. The Minister has answered the question and I do not need to make any comments so, in the interests of time, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)
We now come to the final group, beginning with Amendment 123.
Amendment 123
“Regular impact assessments on the UK financial services sector
(1) Within 12 months of the passing of this Act, and every subsequent five years, the responsible Treasury Minister, Chairs and Chief Executive Officers of the Prudential Regulation Authority and Financial Conduct Authority must each separately provide reports to relevant Committees of the House of Commons and House of Lords.(2) The reports under subsection (1) must include an assessment and critical analysis of the following—(a) the costs and benefits of the financial services sector in the United Kingdom;(b) the impact of the financial services sector on inequality and economic development;(c) the impact of capital allocation decisions on real economic activity;(d) net gains or losses to the real economy caused by mergers and acquisitions;(e) risks to the real economy of write downs in the value of financial assets;(f) risks inherent in “shadow banking”;(g) the impacts of money and financial activities being moved to offshore jurisdictions.(3) In preparing the reports under subsection (1), the responsible person must consult with, and publish any submissions from, the Financial Scrutiny and Oversight Network.(4) In this section—“shadow banking” means financial services which are not subject to regulatory oversight, including but not limited to unregulated activities by regulated entities;“real economy” means the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services.”
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, I beg to move my Amendment 123 and speak also to Amendment 124. They are quite large amendments, and I would say significant proposals, and I have cut down what I shall say given the time. This is based in large part on the work of the Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute, known as SPERI, and particularly Professor Andrew Baker there, and the Tax Justice Network, particularly Nicholas Shaxson.
I begin with Amendment 123, as it flows on from an earlier exchange between the noble Earl and me, which he kindly continued by letter, confirming my assumption that the source of his claim for the annual tax revenue for the financial sector of £76 billion came from a PricewaterhouseCoopers report. That is, of course, a gross figure, one that reflects income but not costs. It is in no way an impact assessment. It is a pity that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, is not with us now.
This amendment proposes that within 12 months of the passing of this Bill and every subsequent five years the responsible bodies must separately provide reports to the relevant committee of the Commons and Lords and consult the financial scrutiny and oversight network, which I shall get to shortly. Behind this is the fact that there is now a large body of academic literature, known as the “too much finance” literature, which supports the idea that some countries, including most certainly the United Kingdom, suffer from the finance curse: too much finance makes us poorer. It seems that the City of London passed the point of optimal finance sometime in the 1980s and has grown massively since then, harming the UK economy. The only study of which I am aware that has attempted to quantify the damage, from SPERI, estimated in 2019 that excess finance reduced economic growth by a cumulative £4.5 trillion from 1995 to 2015. That is the finance curse.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I think I understand where the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, is coming from. I am not sure that I personally would want to let the Treasury get its hands on an assessment of the UK financial services sector, because it seems that so much depends on the lens through which you look. But what I would like to be sure of is that the relevant information and statistics—those kinds of metrics that would enable you to assess impacts on the real economy—would be available, because we have quite a number of institutions, including think tanks and academic institutions, that could do really good work on all these areas which would then inform Parliament. I would very much like that to happen.
Perhaps this all feeds back into the issue that we have looked at over and over again, which is that, absent some significant change, the necessary information is just not available, whether one is trying to look at the macro level or the micro level. That information has to be available, or else accountability in any proper sense just cannot exist.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I think the whole subject of supervision and the presentation of information for decision-making is very important. I do not think that it could be shoehorned into this Bill. I hope that the Government will note the concerns about this and meet it where we can in parts of the Bill, but perhaps there has to be an ongoing debate, which will hopefully come to some consensus about how we improve the supervision and accountability of the financial services sector.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, I listened carefully to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, in her clear introduction to these amendments, and I thank her for the background briefing papers that she kindly sent me this morning. Having said that, I hope she will forgive me if I do not turn the end of these Committee proceedings into an off-the-cuff economics seminar. Indeed, she will not be surprised if, on behalf of the Government, I adopt an orthodox stance on the role of our financial services sector.
It is the Government’s firm contention that the financial services sector is a vital part of our economy. It employs more than a million people, and two-thirds of the people employed in financial and professional services work outside London. It has been a critical source of tax revenue, whatever the exact figure, especially in these difficult times.
The IMF has described the UK’s financial system as a global public good, so the Treasury is not persuaded by the arguments of the Tax Justice Network around “too much finance” or that finance is inherently a bad thing for the real economy. The financial services sector supports British businesses to expand, manage cash flow, invest in themselves and create jobs. The sector is also one of our leading industries in its own right, driven by a concentration of international, and therefore internationally mobile, firms.
Amendment 123 would require regular reports on the impact of the financial services sector on a range of topics including growth, inequality and risk. Amendment 124 would establish a new oversight body which would consider the impact of this sector on the “real economy”.
I have already set out some of the positive impacts that the sector has in its own right on growth, jobs and tax revenue in the UK. But let us not forget that it is also a sector on which all other parts of our economy rely. This means that the sector is a vital source of funding and services for other sectors of the economy. But, of course, it can also mean that if there are problems in the financial services sector, they can affect other parts of our economy. That is why the sector is so vital, and it is why I am able to assure noble Lords that the Government are absolutely committed to transparency around financial risks and welcome independent scrutiny of risk exposure.
The Bank of England’s Financial Policy Committee also has a responsibility to identify, monitor and take action to remove or reduce systemic risks. The committee was established under the Financial Services Act 2012 and must publish and lay before Parliament a financial stability report twice a year. As part of its assessment of financial stability risks, the Financial Policy Committee already considers and reports on risks arising from shadow banking, also referred to as “non-banks”. Given the rapid growth of non-banks, the Treasury has asked the Financial Policy Committee to publish a detailed assessment of the risk oversight and mitigation systems in place for non-banks. That is expected in the first half of this year.
The Office for Budget Responsibility produces and presents a fiscal risks report to Parliament every two years, and it has previously explored risks posed by and to the financial sector. More generally, the FCA and PRA are required to prepare and lay annual reports before Parliament, assessing how effectively their objectives have been advanced. These objectives are set by Parliament, as noble Lords are well aware.
Of course, as I said, one key role of the financial services sector is to provide funding to the so-called real economy. The Government have recognised that, in this Bill, the provisions on the implementation of Basel require the PRA to have regard to the likely effect of its rules on the ability of the firms affected to continue to provide finance to businesses and consumers in the UK, on a sustainable basis in the medium and long term.
The amendment refers to inequality. On that issue, I can reassure the Committee that the Treasury, the FCA and the PRA are all bound by the public sector equality duty. As part of that duty, all three are required by the Equality Act 2010 to have due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination and to promote equality of opportunity in carrying out their policies, services and functions. The FCA publishes a diversity annual report to set specific measurable equality objectives and publish relevant, proportionate information demonstrating its compliance with the public sector equality duty.
Amendment 124 mentions the impact of the financial services sector on climate change and biodiversity. The Committee will I hope forgive me if I do not repeat what I said in earlier debates on that topic, as I have already set out the actions that the regulators are taking in that space.
I turn briefly to the composition of the oversight network that the noble Baroness proposes. I am completely with her in believing that the regulators should take on board a variety of different views; it is important that they do so. In fact, the FCA already has a statutory requirement to consult independent panels representing consumers and practitioners, and the Bank of England has strong links with many academics. Of course, all the groups mentioned are able to respond to consultations, which the regulators are required to undertake, and where their responses must be considered.
As a general comment, I just say that the topics raised by the noble Baroness are those which the Treasury and the regulators consider every day when making financial services policy. I assure her that the Government are committed to ensuring that the sector has a positive impact for consumers and for the economy as a whole. No Government could do otherwise.
Given all that I have said, which I hope has provided some useful perspectives on this topic, I hope that the noble Baroness will feel comfortable in withdrawing her amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)
My Lords, I have had a request to speak after the Minister from the noble Lord, Lord Sikka. I point out to him that we are almost out of time for this Committee tonight, and I ask him please to be as brief as possible.
Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]
My Lords, as we are pressed for time, I withdraw my intervention. I hope that I will make it another day.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)
We are grateful to you, Lord Sikka.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his answer. He focused on the positive impacts of the financial sector and, when he came to addressing negative impacts, he talked a lot about risk. There is of course a lot of focus on risk at the moment with what is happening with Greensill and the shadow banking sector, but I do not believe that he really addressed the other negative impacts such as the diversion of human resources and capital. Indeed, when he was talking about the tax revenue, I thought that my PhD graduate from Newcastle would surely be working in some sector contributing in different ways.
The Minister perhaps misunderstood the issue of equality, so maybe I need to look at redrafting that. I referred to regional inequality and looked at socioeconomic and other areas of inequality.
I will speak briefly on the responses from others. The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, pretty well said that she thought we should have exactly what I was proposing. She said that there were a great deal of resources in think tanks, academics and NGOs and that we needed to bring them together. That is exactly what is proposed in FSON—a network, not reinventing the wheel, not creating a whole new institution, but just making sure that those things are joined up and have a structure to work together to identify the crucial points.
The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, said that there were consultations on the way so we would have to wait but, with the risks—as the Minister acknowledged—and the costs of the financial sector, we really cannot wait. We have to act now. I have cited some very traditional, mainstream sources expressing great concern about the problems that the financial sector presents. We cannot have business as usual. As the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, said earlier, the cost of doing nothing is enormous. However, given where we are and the time of the evening—I have cut short my planned remarks significantly—I beg leave to withdraw my amendment, though I suspect I will bring this back on Report.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)
My Lords, that concludes the Committee’s proceedings on the Bill. I remind Members to sanitise their desks and chairs before leaving the Room.
Financial Services Bill
Wednesday 24th March 2021
(3 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Financial Services Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 162-R-I(a) Amendment for Report - (22 Mar 2021)
15:26 - Division conducted remotely on Amendment 1 - Ayes: 296 / Noes: 255 - Amendment 1 agreed.
18:24 - Division conducted remotely on Amendment 3 - Ayes: 276 / Noes: 276 -
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
My Lords, I shall call Members to speak in the order listed. Short questions for elucidation after the Minister’s response are discouraged. Any Member wishing to ask such a question must email the clerk. The groups are binding. A participant who might wish to press an amendment other than the lead amendment in a group to a Division must give notice in debate, or by emailing the clerk. Leave should be given to withdraw amendments. When putting the Question, I will collect voices in the Chamber only. If a Member taking part, remotely wants their voice accounted for if the Question is put, they must make this clear when speaking on the group.
Amendment 1
“Duty of care for financial service providers
(1) The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is amended as follows.(2) In section 1C, after subsection (2)(e) insert—“(ea) the general principle that firms should not profit from exploiting a consumer’s vulnerability, behavioural biases or constrained choices;”.(3) After section 137C insert—“137CA FCA general rules: duty of care (1) The power of the FCA to make general rules includes power to introduce a duty of care owed by authorised persons to consumers in carrying out regulated activities under this Act.(2) The FCA must make rules in accordance with subsection (1) which come into force no later than 6 April 2022.””Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause would strengthen the FCA’s consumer protection objective and introduce requirements for the FCA to make rules for financial services firms that amount to a statutory duty of care.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab) [V]
My Lords, Amendment 1 is in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Eatwell. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, for adding their cross-party support on this important issue and look forward to their contributions to the debate. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, the Deputy Leader of the House, the noble Earl, Lord Howe, the noble Lord, Lord True, and their officials for making time to discuss this issue after Committee, which has helped us considerably and shed some light on the complex set of consultations that the FCA and the Treasury itself are conducting over the next few months, all of which are happening, of course, during the pandemic and at a time of significant change in duties and responsibilities in all quarters.
In his excellent speech in Committee, my noble friend Lord Eatwell set out the case for the introduction of a duty of consumer care to be placed on financial services providers, which he argued would strengthen the FCA’s consumer protection objective and introduce requirements to ensure that firms operating in the financial sector should not profit from exploiting a consumer’s vulnerability, behavioural biases or constrained choices. I can do little better than rehearse his main points again. Markets in financial products sold to individuals, households and small businesses are seriously inefficient, mainly because of asymmetric information, as the seller of the product typically knows much more about the risks involved in making a particular investment or other financial transaction than does the consumer.
Secondly, given that the FCA’s strategic objective is about promoting competition in the market, thereby improving consumer outcomes, it can either regulate each individual financial product to ensure that the consumer is probably informed, or it could adopt the principle enshrined in Amendment 1 and make general rules, including the power to introduce a duty of care owed by authorised persons to their consumers. The case for a duty of care for consumers was argued very strongly at the time the current regulatory structure was set up; indeed, I was present in many of those debates. But, absent primary legislation or changes to it, the FCA has, perforce, adopted the first option and attempted to deal with each consumer detriment issue as it arises. However, by its own admission, this has not gone very well. From its consultation entitled, Our Future Approach to Consumers in 2017, through to the feedback statement published in April 2019, the FCA has wrestled with the issue of duty of care and is still wrestling today, with a review scheduled to start, we understand, in May 2021.
My noble friend’s case was that the status quo is failing and a new approach is urgently required for two main reasons. First, new products are always coming on to the market, which means that the FCA is always playing catch-up to introduce new rules and has to take time for appropriate consultation and so on to deal with the new threats to consumers. The rush to get a handle on “buy now, pay later” products in this legislation speaks volumes about that approach. Secondly, financial products are now available with one click via the internet, with all that that implies about the failure of the conventional approaches of “know your customer” and the need for careful concern about going through the paperwork and understanding the terms and conditions of what you may be signing up to. In short, fintech, with all the benefits it can bring—well argued by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes— signals the end of the current FCA regulation as we know it. The case for a duty of care approach is unanswerable.
Amendment 1 provides the FCA with the means to end its failure to meet its consumer protection duty through dogged adherence to a failing competition objective. The enactment of the power to introduce a duty of care for consumers would rightly place responsibility for ensuring that markets function well firmly on the shoulders of those who have the information required to attain that goal. If the FCA has the power to introduce a duty of care for consumers, it could finally begin to live up to its strategic objective.
Far too many consumers are being treated inappropriately, whether by the mis-selling of products, by the denial of rights or by obstruction of responses to complaints and so on. If the Government wish to improve on the consumer protections previously enshrined in EU legislation, the introduction of a duty of care on consumers is a safe and sure way forward. It is a way to ensure that markets function well for the benefit of the consumer, as it should be.
I am sure that, in responding to this debate, the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, will try to persuade us that there is no need for this amendment, as future consultations to be carried out by the FCA and the Treasury will cover all these points in detail and so all will be well. Indeed, either or both of these exercises may require primary legislation—that is quite likely—and we will be back again in a few months’ time debating the same issues all over again, when the Treasury has decided on its responses to the consultations and brings forward legislation to implement another generation of regulatory frameworks. I put it to the Government that, while the wording of the amendment may not be perfect, the intent—particularly the wording of subsection (2),
“that firms should not be profiting from exploiting a consumer’s vulnerability, behavioural biases or constrained choices”—
is worth holding on to and action should be taken now. I give notice that, in the absence of a positive response today, I am minded to test the opinion of the House on the amendment. However, if the Minister is prepared to commit to bring this back at Third Reading, with an agreed wording, we could work with her to settle this issue. I beg to move.
Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]
It is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, and to support this amendment. The noble Lord has made a strong and compelling case for both parts of the amendment. The case for and against a duty of care was discussed extensively in Grand Committee and I do not propose to revisit the arguments in detail.
In his speech in Grand Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, made a simple but important point:
“The truth is that the industry has a systemic tendency to malfeasance.”—[Official Report, 22/2/21; col. GC 112.]
I listed in Committee some of the many serious instances of malfeasance over the last couple of decades—I am sure that they are familiar to us all—which amply demonstrate the truth of the observation made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies. There can be no doubt that the temptation to malfeasance and the opportunities for malfeasance grow, and are deeply rooted, in the huge inequality of arms. The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, emphasised that in Committee, as the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, has just noted. There can be no doubt either that the culture within parts of the financial services industry is, to say the least, not oriented to serving the best interests of consumers. John Lanchester has graphically described the industry as treating its customers as “an extractive resource”. All this is true in an industry that is highly regulated. This inevitably leads to the conclusion that the regulatory regime is obviously and severely deficient.
The FCA has consulted on the duty of care at least eight times in the last five years and is about to do so again, starting in May, apparently. It is not clear, given the Treasury’s current consultation on the FSFRF, why we need two consultations covering the same ground. I know that some respondents to the HMT consultation have already proposed a new duty of best interest or duty of care. There is no reason to suppose that this new, and much delayed, FCA consultation will come up with anything more than equivocation, fence-sitting or long grass, if its previous efforts are anything to go by. Last time round, the FCA found that most respondents considered levels of consumer harm to be high and that change was needed to protect consumers. None of the financial services respondents wanted a duty of care, but 92% of consumers did, in a popular survey commissioned by the FCA’s own consumer panel.
The industry resists a duty of care for obvious reasons of self-interest, sometimes presented as a concern that such a duty would increase costs ultimately to the consumer. This does not say much for our financial services’ belief in competition, nor does it acknowledge the fact that, for example, PPI was sold at a commission rate of 87% or that the industry has had to find the funds to pay over £50 billion in redress for PPI alone.
Baroness Altmann (Con) [V]
My Lords, I am pleased to speak to this amendment. I have worked in this industry for many years. The numerous scams, frauds and scandals that have plagued consumers are ongoing. It seems clear, as the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, said, that the Financial Services and Markets Acts 2000 does not protect consumers. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, for his clear explanation of why the amendment, in all its parts, is required.
A duty of care on providers to make sure that they are considering the interests of their customers would certainly help to address the asymmetry of information between the providers and the consumers. It might also assist customers in the manner that the products that are developed are offered. Too often, providers develop new products with new complexities that are clearly not user-friendly. The FCA requirements are that the risks and details of the products must be disclosed, but the disclosure documents are impenetrable to the ordinary person. Those working at the FCA and those working for the providers understand the language used—it is natural to them—but the vast majority of the public do not understand the specific product literature which the FCA has been relying on to offer this kind of protection. It is clearly not helping consumers to be faced with bamboozling jargon and many pages of legalese in the product descriptions and the terms and conditions.
The FCA consulted on this in 2017 and it released a statement in 2019, and other consultations have covered this as well. I congratulate the Government for having engaged on this issue, and my noble friends Lord True, Lady Penn and Lord Howe; I know they have all worked on this issue. But, from a practical perspective, and as someone who has worked in this industry, developed product for consumers and worked with consumers on the other side who have suffered detriment, I believe that the fears about competition are somewhat overdone. All firms, if they have a duty of care, will then have to look after customers, so the issue of competition should not really pose so much of an impediment. Markets currently function in the interests of providers rather than consumers, and regulators are reactive to problems rather than trying to pre-empt problems that have been highlighted and pointed out for two or three years before anything is actually done—by which time so many consumers have lost out.
Of course I believe that firms should not profit from exploiting the public’s lack of understanding and education when it comes to retail financial services. Successive Governments have talked about improving financial literacy, but they have not managed to achieve this. In practice, providers do not know their customers, the customers do not understand the product literature and, indeed, it seems that there is very often no requirement for the provider to even ask basic questions of the consumer before the consumer buys a particular product. There are countless examples of areas where just a basic question could have prevented a consumer buying an inappropriate product.
So I urge my noble friend on the Front Bench to take up the offer of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, and work with him and other interested Peers to come up with a form of words for Third Reading that can prevent a vote on this issue and can also help accelerate the important duty of care that is required. Waiting for a consultation later this year is simply not good enough when it comes to the kinds of scandals and scams that we know are going on day in and day out.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and her powerful plea, which I hope the Government will listen to. I also speak to Amendment 1 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, Lord Sharkey and Lord Eatwell, to which I was pleased to attach my name, as I did to a very similar amendment in Committee.
Any noble Lords who have read the Second Reading debate will note that I majored on a “duty of care” in my speech. I used what you might call an expanded definition of “duty of care” to suggest that it might not be too much to put on the face of the Bill a demand that the financial sector should not engage in reckless, fraudulent, corrupt, obviously damaging systemic behaviour, including shipping off tranches of cash into tax havens, deploying complex financial instruments that they clearly do not understand and handing over control of markets to automated systems without adequate controls—things that threaten the security of all of us. But while I believe that principle remains sound, the lawyers convinced me that, in narrow legal terms, “duty of care” could not be stretched that far.
What the amendment here clearly introduces is a duty of care to individual customers. As proposed new subsection (2)(ea) says, their
“vulnerability, behavioural biases or constrained choices”
should not be exploited. Once, perhaps, such a clause was not necessary. There was a not ideal, but certainly useful, constraining paternalism: your local bank manager would look after you, both in limiting borrowing and in making allowances for unexpected disasters, personal and business. That has long gone—as of course has, almost universally, the local bank manager and, all too often, the local bank branch—so we need the law to step in to protect people to constrain the behaviour of financial institutions. As noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, said, we are in a situation where malfeasance has just continued to grow, with technical developments being one cause of that and, as noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, said, scandals and fraud have plagued consumers.
So that is the institutional side of where we are, but we also have to think about the state that people and our society are in today and make the law fit for our modern times, for these are times of massive insecurity. The idea of saving, or of even making the incoming funds match the essential outgoings each month, was an impossible dream for millions of people even before the arrival of the SARS-CoV-2 virus.
No one can know when sudden illness might strike—this Bill has been championed by Macmillan Cancer Support, to whose work I give credit—or it could be a redundancy or a pandemic that strikes people unexpectedly. That is one side of vulnerability and care that financial institutions should acknowledge. As Macmillan highlights, almost one in three of those severely financially impacted by their cancer diagnosis had to take out a loan or credit card debt. That is a public health issue. What we have are institutions that have been making profit from customers, sometimes for decades, and they have a duty to act compassionately and fairly in such circumstances.
But I think we also need to pay a bit of attention to the elements of the proposed new clause referring to “behavioural biases” and “constrained choices”. The noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, has been a rather isolated champion in this Bill on issues around the use of artificial intelligence algorithms and issues such as their potential bias, but he has also highlighted the way in which financial companies now have a historically uniquely detailed understanding of customer behaviour and the chance to exploit that through complex, opaque mechanisms.
As the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, said in introducing an amendment, there has always been asymmetrical access to information between financial sector companies and their clients, but this has been massively magnified by technology—something that is only likely to grow. To create an assumption that this inequality of arms should not be misused should, we hope, constrain the behaviour of the financial sector—or at least, if it does not do that, provide a potential route for redress should it occur. There are already many who have need to seek redress for the behaviour of financial sector companies. I spent time with some of them this morning at a meeting of the Transparency Task Force.
As noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, said, the Government are likely now to say “Wait”—but why? We know that there is already an existing massive problem and a huge risk. If the Government do not acknowledge the need to act now, I offer the Green group’s strong support for the intention of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, to test the view of the House.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
The noble Lord, Lord McNicol of West Kilbride, has withdrawn from the debate, so I call the next speaker, the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler of Enfield.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD) [V]
My Lords, I am pleased to speak in support of Amendment 1. First, I must apologise to the House that I have been unable to participate in earlier stages of the Bill—a matter of real regret to me—but I have been following proceedings closely. I declare an interest as a member of the Financial Inclusion Commission and president of the Money Advice Trust.
I am very keen to support this amendment, which takes forward a very important recommendation from the report of the Financial Exclusion Select Committee, which I chaired, in 2017. That report recommended an expansion of the remit of the Financial Conduct Authority to include both a statutory duty to promote financial inclusion, and a statutory duty of care. In my view, the two are closely linked, but I will obviously focus now on this very important duty of care amendment.
At the Liaison Committee’s follow-up inquiry on financial exclusion, held only last week, powerful evidence was received from charities and others active in the sector that the commercial model only goes so far, and that legislation is required to put an obligation on banks and other financial service providers to provide appropriate services to customers and have proper regard to inclusion.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to take part in this debate on the first group of amendments on the first day of Report on the Financial Services Bill. I declare my interests as set out in the register.
I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, on tabling this amendment and on the way in which he introduced it. These arguments have been put since at least 2017, when we debated the Financial Guidance and Claims Bill. What has happened in the interim has merely strengthened those arguments on the need for a duty of care. During the last year, as in so many other areas of life, we have seen exactly why something in this space would assist. Now that we have the excellent vaccine rollout and inoculation programme, such a duty would put a capital “B” into the “build back better” approach. It would be a real example of “better”.
I will not rehearse the arguments that I made at Second Reading and in Committee. I want to take this opportunity again to thank Macmillan Cancer Support and congratulate it for everything that it continues to do in this area. According to the testimony of a cancer patient,
“I felt I was battling my bank as well as cancer.”
Will the Minister consider what can be done between Report and Third Reading? With the Easter break in between, there is time, so this is more than timely. Can she reassure noble Lords of the potential for movement on this specific point of a duty of care?
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I shall be very brief. I spoke on this issue at length in Committee. The Government may take note that every single speaker today from across the House has supported the concept of a duty of care and non-exploitation and has urged the Government to act.
In all the speeches, both before today and referenced again today, we have heard about this chain of malfeasance, whether it has been described as scandal or fraud or an abuse of customers. Clearly, the existing legislation does not work, or we would not have this kind of history with new scandals cropping up, sadly, on a regular basis. Like it or not, treating customers fairly is interpreted by both the industry and the regulator as exceedingly light touch, to be offset by the “caveat emptor” principle—the taking of personal responsibility—to which the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, referred. This is unacceptable. This Government often say that they focus on outcomes. The outcomes have been unacceptable. Look at the outcomes and the chain of scandals. Here is the opportunity to act.
In response, the Minister might say that there are effective tools, such as the senior managers and certification regime. Anyone who has followed the progress of this Bill and the amendments through Committee will have heard how that has broken down. It has, in effect, become something of a busted flush. The Minister might say that scandals have been picked up very early because we have working whistleblowing channels. Again, from listening to the discussion throughout Committee stage, it is clear that this scheme is not working. The analysis in the Gloster report reinforces that.
We do not need a ninth consultation. Every time there is another major scandal, the FCA’s response is to have another consultation. In the end, there is something like a freckle of movement. This issue needs to be seized by the scruff of the neck and resolved before more people suffer injury. The regulator needs to be put on the front foot. By supporting this concept and this amendment or something equivalent to it, the regulator will finally be put on the front foot and the industry will recognise that it has been duly warned and must reconsider the way in which it behaves.
I hope that we shall hear from the Minister that we shall see an equivalent proposal at Third Reading because, if not, I will not hesitate to ask all my colleagues and every Member of your Lordships’ House to support any decision by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, to move this to a Division.
Lord Eatwell (Lab)
My Lords, during our debates on this Bill, we have referred several times to the success of principles-based regulation in this country. We have contrasted it with the more prescriptive regulatory structures introduced within the European Union. The idea of a duty of care is a prime example of principles-based regulation because it presents a principle from which particular actions can be derived. It is now very important, given the financial stresses created by the pandemic to which several noble Lords have referred in their contributions to this debate. This is but one example of the unexpected pressures in the financial system that arise on a regular basis, not least because of the fintech innovations referred to earlier which require a flexible, principles-based approach. The strength of this approach is that is encompasses financial innovation—the changes to which many noble Lords have referred.
I understand that later in the consideration of this Bill the Government will bring forward measures to regulate the “buy now, pay later” market. This would already have been encompassed in a duty of care. It would not have slipped through the gap. If there had been a general duty of care in place, consumers would have received some degree of protection already.
One of the striking things about the issue of a duty of care and the FCA rulebook is that a number of measures that amount to a duty of care exist in the rulebook already. There are “know your customer”, “treating customers fairly” and the consumer credit rules, which require assessment of creditworthiness. What is striking is that this specific list has gaps in it.
Many noble Lords referred to the examples of malfeasance; it is this structure that creates the environment for and encourages malfeasance. It encourages testing of boundaries and of gaps. If there were instead a broad principle it would significantly discourage that persistent, competitive drive to test the gaps that exist in the current list of consumer protection measures in the FCA rulebook.
It is not simply that the lack of a duty of care creates the inability to deal with malfeasance; it actually creates it by the structure it presents for a very competitive market. We all know that this particular structure—having a specific list of something in a legal document—always raises the question of what has been left out. That is exactly the case in the FCA rulebook. It lacks the firm foundation of principle.
In Grand Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, was quite right to argue in summing up that
“the FCA is already taking steps to ensure that financial services firms exercise due care and regard when offering products, services and advice to consumers.”
She was right that there is a list, but she was quite wrong to then argue that a statutory duty of care
“does not add to the FCA’s existing powers in this area.”—[Official Report, 22/2/21; col. GC 116.]
Of course it does. It must do, in one of the most dynamic industries in the United Kingdom, associated with innovation, change and competition. It is the very nature of successful principles-based regulation that actions should derive from general principles.
The FCA lacks this statutory declaration of general principle. This is why Macmillan Cancer Support’s campaign Banking on Change was necessary, and why it is so important to place a general principle of duty of care on the statute book. My noble friend Lord Stevenson has made a very specific offer to the Minister with respect to Third Reading. I strongly urge her to accept it.
Baroness Penn (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lords who have put forward this amendment, and I appreciate the strength of feeling that exists around this important issue. I also pay tribute to the arguments made in previous stages of this Bill, including in Grand Committee. Noble Lords have spoken passionately about the need to tackle issues of consumer harm that exist in the financial services industry, and I agree that it is essential that this issue is addressed effectively.
The Government are committed to ensuring that financial services consumers are protected and that steps are taken quickly to address issues when they are identified. The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, argued for a principles-based approach to financial services regulation. That is what is contained in the FCA’s principles for business, which govern financial services firms’ treatment of their customers, as well as the specific requirements in the FCA’s handbook.
I hope noble Lords will not mind if I set out the principles of business, because that will help us in considering the amendment. The principles include:
“A firm must conduct its business with integrity … A firm must conduct its business with due skill, care, and diligence … A firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly … A firm must pay due regard to the information needs of its clients, and communicate information to them in a way which is clear, fair, and not misleading … A firm must manage conflicts of interest fairly, both between itself and its customers and between a customer and another client … A firm must take reasonable care to ensure the suitability of its advice and discretionary decisions for any customer who is entitled to rely upon its judgment.”
These fundamental principles aim to protect consumers who often have less knowledge and expertise than the firms providing them services.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab) [V]
My Lords, thank you for a very good debate. It has been a fine example of the way in which Report brings together the arguments made in Committee and allows the House to come to a collective view about the issue in question.
In her customary way, the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, gave a full and considered response, and I thank her for that. She focused more on what she called the strength of feeling in the House and did not really engage with the strength of the argument. I hope that when she reflects on that, she may recognise that that is a bit of a weakness. The arguments are not to be ignored simply because they are expressed strongly. They are to be looked at seriously, because they are trying to attack a pernicious problem that is causing huge consumer detriment, as exemplified in the many speeches we have heard today, particularly from those who have worked in the industry for a number of years. The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and others gave examples that were redolent of the experience of trying to make the system work.
I think the Minister also accepted in her speech that the Government want regulatory structure to protect consumers and said that the level of harm was perhaps too high. In explaining how the FCA’s three objectives are expected to operate—which must be a logical mess, when you analyse them—she illustrated why my noble friend Lord Eatwell and others wish that we had a better, principle-based and less list-based structure for the way in which the regulators carry out their work. As the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, put it—he could not have put it more simply—FiSMA does not protect consumers, malfeasance is flourishing and may even be encouraged by the current structure, and redress is patchy, lengthy and not really available to those who need it most.
The issue before the House, therefore, is whether the existing process and procedures, the existing wording which sets them out and the existing objectives, which are constraining what the FCA can and cannot do, are the best we can get to. The arguments that have been made, particularly the devastating figures from the ombudsman’s service, suggest that we are not in a good place on this. This was picked up by many speakers, including the noble Baronesses, Lady Tyler and Lady Kramer.
In the context of the need for better financial well-being as we recover from the pandemic and the chance to do things better, are we really saying that the best we can come up with is to wait for another consultation, which will probably just be another exercise in playing catch-up and result in a longer list of rules and requirements? Why do we not just set a very high tide mark for what we expect our regulators to do and, if the consultation proves the case, reduce the requirements where that is proportionate and appropriate?
I do not understand why the Minister felt unable to take the issue away, talk about it and come back at Third Reading. She challenged us to put our views to the House. I would therefore like to test the opinion of the House in this matter.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Watkins of Tavistock) (CB)
I shall now put the Question. We have heard a Member taking part remotely say that they wish to divide the House in support of this amendment, and I will take that into account. The Question is that Amendment 1 be agreed to.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Watkins of Tavistock) (CB)
We now move to the group consisting of Amendment 2. Anyone wishing to press this amendment to a Division must make that clear in debate.
Amendment 2
“Periodic independent review of regulators
(1) The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is amended as follows.(2) After section 1S (reviews) insert—“1SA Periodic independent review of regulators(1) The Treasury must appoint a group of at least three independent persons to conduct a periodic general review of the effectiveness of—(a) the Financial Conduct Authority,(b) the Prudential Regulation Authority, (c) the Bank of England in respect of its functions under Parts 1 and 5 of the Banking Act 2009 (bank resolution and payment systems) and Part 2 of the Financial Services Act 2012 (recognised clearing houses), and(d) the Payment Systems Regulator.(2) The general review must take place every two to three years and must include a review of—(a) internal operations and controls;(b) systems for responding to whistleblowers, parliamentary correspondence and reports, and public concerns;(c) regulatory perimeters;(d) the effectiveness of rules and the regulatory burden;(e) whether all statutory and public policy objectives have been met;(f) the operation and effectiveness of engagement practices before and during rule making;(g) the skills base of staff;(h) any other matter the independent persons consider relevant;(i) follow up from the previous review and any other intervening review under this Act;(j) any other matter requested by the Treasury or a relevant Committee of the House of Commons or House of Lords.(3) On completion of the review, the persons conducting it must make a written report to the Treasury—(a) setting out the result of the review, and(b) making such recommendations (if any) as the persons consider appropriate.(4) A copy of the report must be—(a) laid before Parliament, and(b) published in such manner as the Treasury considers appropriate.”(3) In section 1T (right to obtain documents and information) after “1S” insert “or 1SA”.”
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, this amendment is an evolution of the amendment I tabled in Committee and called the “Skilled person review of the regulators”. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, for adding his name on Report.
Since Committee, I have received growing expressions of interest in the concept as an important process for improving financial services regulation—indeed, one that could be replicated for other systemic regulators. My purpose in tabling the amendment here is further exploration. I have reframed the amendment to be an independent person’s review via a new Section 1S(a) in FSMA that broadly follows the format and definitions already contained in Section 1S. Under the section, the Treasury can establish an independent person review of the FCA. However, it has not been deployed as a routine matter, but rather to deal ad hoc with specific instances, as have reviews under Section 77. My proposed new Section 1S(a) would provide for general review by at least three independent persons and would take place after every two to three years. That period has been chosen so that it can reflect when there are changes in appointments of the regulators. It also broadly reflects the two-year cycle envisaged in Australia for its financial regulator oversight board and the EU’s three-yearly reviews of the ESAs. Today, the ABI circulated a note supporting the idea, but it thinks that a longer period might be better, as indeed I first proposed.
I have also added to the list of regulators which are to be subject to the review to cover not only the PRA and the FCA, but the Bank of England for its other regulatory functions and the Payment Systems Regulator. I did that on the suggestion of UK Finance, which has also taken an interest in my amendment as potentially filling in a gap in accountability. It has argued in response to the Treasury’s framework review consultation that covering all banking and finance regulators is needed for a coherent and consistent approach to the whole sector while structural changes are breaking down the distinctions within it. I thought that a fair point and have included it as food for thought.
The list of issues for review are largely taken from the matters found to be at fault in the Gloster report, such as internal operations and controls, responding to whistleblowers, regulatory perimeter and the skills of staff. It also covers the effectiveness of rules and regulatory burdens, which it is important to study periodically as a check. But it is important to note that I do not propose some kind of routine second-guessing on rules as they are made, but more like an impact assessment after they have bedded in.
A long list may not be needed and could perhaps be left to the independent person to prioritise, but one other addition I have made is to follow up on any other intervening review. The amendment also provides a similar right to information and documents, as a Section 1S review would have, by adding proposed new Section 1S(a) to the existing provision in Section 1T of FSMA.
In the clauses that immediately precede this amendment, the PRA and FCA are each given the power to make all the policy and rules for financial services save for the broad public interest objectives and “have regard to” measures defined in FSMA. The way that that is done front-runs the conclusion of the future regulatory framework consultations, and I see two consequences. One, which is conceded in the Government’s consultation, is that Parliament will want to undertake additional scrutiny. We will deal with that in later amendments and it is urgent. A second consequence is that we are conferring a lot more power on our regulators, one of which has been the subject of a flow of negative findings. This amendment is not intended to address the first consequence or to diminish in any way the constitutional position of Parliament regarding scrutiny—far from it: it is meant to address the second consequence. It also replaces some of the scrutiny of the EU which included three-yearly reviews of the European supervisory authorities.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab) [V]
My Lords, the issue I want to highlight, as I did at earlier stages, is how to make regulators more accountable, given the well-established phenomenon of regulatory capture. Regulatory capture is where an industry regulator like the FCA and the other bodies mentioned in the amendment comes to be dominated by the industry that it is charged with regulating. The result is that the agency, which is meant to act in the public interest, works instead in ways that benefit the industry.
I do not think that there is any doubt that this happens, and the question is: what do we do about it? The important point to understand is that this does not happen because of inadequate, ineffective or corrupt individuals—rather, it happens because it is systemic. It is an institutional rather than an individual problem. There are various reasons for why it happens. First, a regulated industry has a keen and immediate interest in influencing the regulator, whereas customers are less motivated. They have normal lives to lead and they engage with the industry only for brief periods. However, participants in the industry are there all the time. Secondly, industries tend to devote large budgets to influencing the regulator, which inevitably has an impact. Lastly, there is the aspect of the whole industry community. People tend to move from the regulator to the industry and back to the regulator. That is bound to have some impact on the personal relationships that are established.
There is therefore no question that the phenomenon exists. How bad it gets and what we do about it is what we need to address. The first step is to acknowledge the problem and to recognise and address the challenge. The next step is to make the regulators as accountable as possible, which poses the question: who regulates the regulators? There are many ways to do that but we have before us in Amendment 2 a proposal for a periodic, independent review of the regulators.
What I have in mind is something akin to a school inspection, which does not happen because a school has demonstrated problems but is just part and parcel of a regular process that focuses the minds of all those involved. At the moment, regulating the regulators is effectively left to the Government whenever they care to turn their minds to the issue. The problem is that Governments have many other things to think about and the result is that addressing the problem tends to happen only after it has arisen. The public become aware that there is some deficiency in the regulator and therefore action has to be taken. How much better it would be to pose questions as to how the system can be improved before we encounter the problems. That happens only under a regular, independent review, as proposed under the terms of the amendment.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, this is the first time that I have spoken on the Bill on Report and I draw the attention of the House to my interests as set out in the register—in particular, shares that I hold in listed financial services companies.
I have considerable sympathy for the amendment because the financial regulators are not very accountable. At the moment, there are set-piece appearances before the Treasury Select Committee in the other place and occasional appearances before committees of your Lordships’ House but these do not amount to a systematic and comprehensive examination. The Government often rely on the fact that annual reports are laid before Parliament but the annual reports of regulators get no more attention paid to them than the annual reports of companies. With rare exceptions, they provide few insights of value. By their very nature, annual reports accentuate the positive and shy away from the negative.
The problem of the accountability of regulators is not confined to financial services regulators. I could say much the same about Ofcom, Ofgem and other regulators, but we cannot solve the problems of the world in this Bill. The accountability of the PRA and the FCA is covered in the future regulatory framework, the consultation that has recently been completed. We discussed this a little on our first day in Committee and I hope that my noble friend the Minister will provide some information on the next steps when he responds to the amendment. The consultation closed over a month ago and the Treasury must have some idea on what it will be doing next and when.
If the outcome of that review, so far as accountability is concerned, is a well-developed form of parliamentary scrutiny, either jointly between both Houses of Parliament or within each House, the need for an independent review clause such as that contained in Amendment 2 would recede. Parliamentary committees can look at issues in depth but only if they are properly focused and well resourced. On that basis, the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, might want to await the legislation implementing the outcome of that review rather than tackle the issue in this legislation, because action could be set in a broader, more holistic context regarding how the regulators will operate overall in due course.
If the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, wishes to pursue her amendment—I thought I heard her say that it was more of a probing amendment for today—it would be wise to look again at its drafting because it calls for one review covering four regulators, but they are all different in what they do and how they do it. I am not convinced that there would be sufficient focus if one review tried to cover all the regulators—the two major ones and the two smaller units with regulatory responsibilities, one in the Bank of England and the other being the Payment Systems Regulator in the FCA.
In addition, I, like the ABI, wonder whether a review every two or three years is too frequent for the kind of in-depth review that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has in mind. A rolling series of reviews, perhaps carried out over five years but concentrating on individual regulators, would provide more information of value to those seeking to hold them to account. However, the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has the right ideas in the amendment, although it may not be right for this Bill.
Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to support Amendment 2. Throughout the earlier stages of the Bill, a number of noble Lords have drawn attention to the failures of financial regulators. Essentially, it was argued that they are captured by the finance industry and therefore advance its interests. They are too slow to protect people from malpractices. Over the years, numerous financial products have been fraudulently sold, including pensions, endowment mortgages, precipice bonds, split capital investment trusts, interest rate swaps, payment protection insurance and much more. The names of the products change from the aforementioned to mini-bonds and supply chain finance, but the basic problems are still the same and the regulators have failed to secure positive change in the culture of financial services enterprises.
During debates, Ministers have emphasised the tax contribution of the finance industry but have been silent on the costs imposed by that industry on society. Scholarly research shows that between 1995 and 2015 the oversized and scandal-ridden finance industry made a negative contribution of £4,500 billion to the UK economy, equivalent to around £67,500 for every woman, man and child in the UK. Of the £4,500 billion, £2,700 billion is accounted for by misallocation, whereby resources, skills and investments are diverted away from productive non-financial activities to the financial sector. The other £1,800 billion arises from the 2007-08 banking crisis that ushered in never-ending austerity. The economy and most people are yet to recover from that. That £4,500 billion is a massive cost and we simply cannot afford it. The status quo is not tenable and it is too expensive. The cost of the financial curse for the UK cannot be reduced by carrying on the regulatory business as usual, which is what the Government seemed to indicate in Committee.
Our regulators need to be effective and proactive but they seem to neglect their duty to the people. This is well documented in the reports on London Capital & Finance and the Connaught Income Fund. The FCA knew that mini-bonds were a problem but was slow to act at London Capital & Finance, and the same pattern has now been repeated at Blackmore Bond. The FCA does not welcome public scrutiny. Just look at the excuses it concocted to conceal the report on frauds at HBOS. The saga is still not resolved and same goes for frauds at RBS.
It is well documented that thousands of people are trapped in the £3.7 billion collapse of Woodford Investment Management. The Woodford Equity Income Fund was first authorised by the FCA in 2014. In 2015, the FCA was informed about the fund’s precarious existence as it was investing excessively in unlisted securities that affected its liquidity, but the FCA ignored the information until at least 2017.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Bowles has already indicated that she does not intend to call a Division on this amendment, which I think is right. However, this is probably one of the most important amendments that we have discussed under the umbrella of the Bill. It opens up a new area to consider: how we make our regulators accountable and whether the committee system and traditional structures of Parliament can do the whole job or whether support is needed from some additional bodies. What the noble Lord, Lord Davies, called an outside pair of eyes on this issue could be extremely useful to Parliament by bringing a particular expertise. There could be periodic reviews, looking, for example, not at the decisions made by the regulator but at its capacity and mode of operation—those core issues which determine whether a regulator is effective. The noble Lord compared it to a visit from Ofsted, which is probably a little light-touch and simple but it takes the conversation in the right direction.
I have a strong suspicion that three or four years from now, we will be back to this discussion and looking much at an independent arrangement to look at our various regulators in order to provide information when appropriate to Parliament, so that it can get on with the areas of scrutiny in which it has most capacity, which is to ensure that the rules fit with the mandate that Parliament has given it in primary legislation. This is an extremely important area with some very interesting thinking.
I hope that the Treasury takes note. It would be lovely if it was picked up in the financial framework review, but that might be hoping for too much. That review has gone on a very limited and very traditional route. It would be good to challenge it with some new thinking, and to open its process to break through and work out how effective accountability can be put in place. This affects our fundamental economy and the capacity of a Government to deliver on public services, so the consequences are significant. Real attention paid to this area would be exceedingly welcome.
I will not pick up the other scrutiny issues because we will deal with those on the second day on Report. I will discuss some of the letters we have had from the regulators then. However, I want to put down a marker that this is an area and a thought process that must be taken seriously. I hope that the Government see that as an opportunity.
Lord Eatwell (Lab)
My Lords, I was tempted to start my speech with the famous quotation from Juvenal, “Who guards the guardians?”. But, given the strictures by the Leader of another place against speaking in foreign languages—although he was referring to Welsh—I will instead begin with a different quotation, from the late Lord Keynes. In the introduction to The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, he says:
“It is astonishing what foolish things one can temporarily believe if one thinks too long alone, particularly in economics.”
Well, we have certainly had many examples of regulators believing foolish things. The sorry history of the regulatory response to the role of credit derivatives in the expansion of credit in the run-up to the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 is a clear example of the folly of thinking alone. Hence, a periodic review of the thinking of regulators—whether the prudential regulator or the conduct of business regulator—would certainly be worthwhile; it would be a useful challenge to groupthink.
However, this particular aspect is not best achieved by three independent persons, because there would be a grave temptation to appoint three expert regulators—just the sort of people who would think in the same way. However, they would, no doubt, come up with recommendations that deal with the operational objectives in this amendment, so I see the review activity as falling into two parts: the operational assessment; and the core policy issues, about which I would have less confidence in the approach of the three independent persons. Peer reviews are all very well, but I assure you that any academic economist will tell you that they not only tend to embody the status quo but often stifle innovation and can perpetuate error.
That is why I and others in the House have argued that the intention of the amendment with respect to policy would be best met by a parliamentary scrutiny committee. It is the nature of parliamentarians to be sceptical, to pose without embarrassment the naive question, to entertain the views of mavericks and free-thinkers, and to relate the performance of any organisation to its statutory objectives—after all, they are responsible for the statutes. So we have two tasks before us: a review, as proposed in the amendment, which would be a valuable check and assessment of operational matters; and the review of policy and thinking, which could be the regular component of the work programme of a scrutiny committee.
But first, of course, we need the acknowledgement from Her Majesty’s Government that they would support the foundation of such a scrutiny committee, giving it appropriate powers to work with the regulators in an effective and constructive manner and to commission regular reviews of policy issues of the sort sought by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. We will discuss this matter later; so much hangs on the issue of the general scrutiny of the activities of regulators, voiced by Members on all sides of the House, that we will certainly return to this matter later in consideration of the Bill.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has helpfully explained, the amendment seeks to introduce a statutory obligation for the Treasury to launch an independent review of the financial services regulators every two or three years, and sets out the topics that such a review would need to cover.
I will begin by saying that I absolutely understand where the noble Baroness is coming from in tabling the amendment; indeed, having yesterday reread the two very eloquent speeches she made on the subject in Grand Committee, and having listened today to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, my mind, like that of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, also turned to the Roman poet Juvenal’s famous question. The noble Baroness is concerned about the need for oversight of those who oversee, and I entirely appreciate her reasons for wanting reassurance on that issue. However, where she and I differ is over her contention—express or implicit—that there is currently a deficiency of mechanisms to provide meaningful oversight of the regulators and to ensure that they are working effectively. I set out a number of these mechanisms in Grand Committee; they include tools both for examining detailed operational or policy matters and for scrutinising more general, overarching issues. This I think was part of the distinction made by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)
My Lords, I have received no requests to speak after the Minister, so we will go straight back to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, for the purposes of Report, I must remind the House of my interests in the register, which I omitted to do when I first spoke today.
I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this interesting debate. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, reminded us of the effects of regulatory capture and the way in which that is just something that is endemic within the system, not least because of the overwhelming volume of meetings that take place and contacts that are made with the industries, both in policy terms and as they are regulated. As my noble friend Lady Kramer observed, he drew a slight parallel with Ofsted—there is a point that somebody from outside has to come in. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that at the moment this does not seem to be something to which the Government are turning their minds often enough, because otherwise we would not keep having to have reviews about failure.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, for thinking that I got the right ideas. Some of my drafting might have been a bit adrift; I meant that each regulator had its own review and certainly the concept of a rolling review was what I would have had in mind. I agree with her that set pieces make it difficult to get into the systematic operational review that lies at the heart of my amendment, even if I, perhaps accidentally, strayed too widely. I also agree that annual reports concentrate on the good. Responses to the report and parliamentary engagement with the report are, in fact, intended to be via the Treasury, but that indirect link is not satisfactory as far as Parliament is concerned.
The noble Lord, Lord Sikka, reminded us of the cost of failures in regulations. He asked whether, because of the history and where we are at, it can be business as usual. We have had examples of the FCA making excuses for slowness and failures. As the Minister said, there is a new CEO, whom I know extremely well. He made some good points when he appeared before the Treasury Select Committee about having brought in some outside people to bolster the system, using exactly what I said is the understood way of doing things in business: you need outside eyes. He has done his best in that sense by bringing some fresh blood into the FCA.
When it comes to parliamentary reports, as the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, reminded us, the one about Carillion, for example, did not trigger action. If they do not trigger action, something is missing. My noble friend Lady Kramer explained exactly where I think we are. I am testing the water and exploring; I am asking whether our traditional roles are sufficient. We will have a little time to see. Like my noble friend, I think that we will be back here in due course. The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, put his finger on the distinctions between operational and policy and what would belong with Parliament and what would belong with independent review. That is a useful distinction, which, going forward with these ideas, I can take to heart.
The Minister again said that there is plenty of opportunity for reviews to be done. The point is that they are not being done; they are only being done in default. They are not being done in a systematic way that is quality controlled. I do not disagree that there might be, within legislation, sufficient scope to do some that are more like quality control. If the Minister is saying, “Well, right, we will have a look to see whether that can be done,” I might agree. At the moment, however, there is a hole. The Minister says that it might be expensive but, as the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, pointed out, it is very expensive on the industry that has to cough up compensation if needed and if it comes from the central compensation funds. When things go wrong, it is expensive and probably more expensive than if one had done the proper quality-control monitoring.
The IMF and the Basel reviews are not UK-based reviews and are not debated in the public forum within the UK. They are also reviews done by regulators of regulators, which is absolutely one of the things that I am trying to get away from. Again, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell: yes, they have to be skilled people but, no, they jolly well should not be regulators or recent regulators, and maybe not even former regulators, because otherwise you do not get away from the groupthink. I am sorry, but IMF and Basel are part of the groupthink.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 3. Anyone wishing to press this or anything else in this group to a Division must make that clear in the debate.
Amendment 3
Lord Oates
“Review of capital adequacy requirements risk weights
(1) Within six months of the day on which this Act is passed the Prudential Regulation Authority must complete a review of the risk weighting applied to investments in—(a) existing fossil fuel exploitation and production, and(b) new fossil fuel exploration, exploitation and production.(2) In conducting this review, the Prudential Regulation Authority must have regard to—(a) the need to prevent the misallocation of investment to global warming accelerating activities as a result of artificially low risk weights; (b) the full implications of climate change for the risk of investments including physical climate risks, transitional climate risks and climate liability risks;(c) the likelihood of assets becoming wholly or partially stranded before the end of their normal exploitation cycle;(d) the impact of global warming accelerating activities on financial stability, in particular as a result of climate change related disruption of the economy; and(e) the advice of the Climate Change Committee.(3) The Treasury must lay before Parliament the outcome of this review within one month of the completion of the review.”Member’s explanatory statement
The purpose of this amendment is to place a requirement on the PRA to review the adequacy of risk weights applied to fossil fuel exposures in capital requirements having regard to the implications of climate change.
Lord Oates (LD)
My Lords, I declare my interest as the chairman of the advisory committee of Weber Shandwick UK. Amendment 3 is in my name and the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Hayman, Lady Jones of Whitchurch and Lady Altmann. I thank all the organisations who provided me with briefing, in particular Finance Watch for its helpful advice and recommendations.
Before I speak to Amendment 3, I also want to express support for other amendments in this group, particularly Amendments 22 and 23 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, which deal respectively with climate risk reporting and the appointment of a senior FCA manager responsible for climate change. I have been pleased to put my name to both.
In Committee we had an excellent and productive debate about the impact of climate risk on the financial system and the wider economy. I am grateful to the Minister for his careful consideration of the arguments, and to noble friends and colleagues across the House for the excellent cross-party co-operation we have achieved on these issues. I thank the Minister for listening to the arguments on the need for the FCA and PRA to have regard to the UK’s 2050 net zero obligations and for introducing government amendments to achieve this end. That is a great step forward.
If we are effectively to respond to the existential threat climate change poses to our financial system—indeed, to our whole human society—finance will be critical in allocating the huge amounts of capital required to decarbonise the global economy. Today, however, finance is the principal enabler of climate change by financing the global warming-accelerating activities of the fossil fuel industries at an artificially low cost as a result of the inadequate pricing of climate risk within the financial system.
As long as capital adequacy risk weights are inconsistently applied within the capital requirement rules so that fossil fuel activities are under-risked, capital will flow towards them because the equity that has to be held on the bank’s balance sheet will be less than it should be and the return on equity consequently better than it should be. As a result, capital which could be better employed in the new technologies we will need to counter climate change will continue to be misallocated to the old industries that drive it.
Amendment 3 attempts to address this problem by requiring the PRA to complete a review of capital adequacy risk weightings in relation to existing and new fossil fuel investments within six months of the Bill being passed. That review would aim to ensure that risk weights for fossil fuel investments adequately take into account the impact of global warming-accelerating activities on financial stability, in particular as a result of climate change-related disruption to the economy.
This amendment is an attempt to meet the concerns of the Minister over my more direct amendment in Committee, which called for specific risk weights to be applied to fossil fuel investments in line with the existing capital adequacy rules of the capital requirement regulations, or CRR. The amendment in Committee required the application of a 150% risk weight to existing fossil fuel investment, in line with Article 128 of the CRR. That requires such a risk weight to be applied to
“items associated with particular high risk”,
for example, hedge funds or investments in immovable property.
It is clearly hard to argue that fossil fuel investments are less risky than either immovable property or hedge funds investments, given the likelihood of fossil fuel assets becoming partially or wholly stranded. The logic of CRR is, therefore, that such investments must be included under Article 128. That they are not indicates that the regulatory system is struggling to respond to the complex and interrelated risks posed by climate change to the financial system.
The original amendment also proposed that, for new fossil exploration and production, the risk weight should be applied such that investment in these activities would have to be backed by 100% equity on the lender’s balance sheet. Such a risk weight is merited by the fact that new fossil fuel investments are likely to become entirely stranded and that exploitation of new fossil fuel investments would push us far beyond the level of two degrees of warming that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change warns us would have enormous and unpredictable consequences for human society, not to mention the banks and the financial system as a whole. It is right in those circumstances that the resulting loss of capital should be effectively ring-fenced so that the problem is confined to the bank equity holders and not allowed to spread to depositors and the wider financial system—adding a financial crisis to a climate crisis.
It is fair to say that the Minister and a minority of other Peers were resistant to the direct approach to risk weights I proposed. The Minister was concerned, as was the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, that we were seeking to use prudential regulation to achieve policy objectives that they felt were better pursued elsewhere. The noble Baroness stressed that the system of prudential regulation should be about the
“risk to the capital of the banks and the resilience of the financial system as whole.”—[Official Report, 1/3/21; col. GC 244.]
To this, I can say only that I agree; that is the precise purpose of the amendments that my noble friends and colleagues across the House and I have been pursuing.
Last week, the deputy governor for prudential regulation and CEO of the PRA Sam Woods stated in a speech to the Association of British Insurers that
“it is a fundamental pillar of the prudential regime that it be risk-based: disregarding the risk in individual investments is a recipe for an under-capitalized financial system that would not be a robust or sustainable source of investment.”
I agree with the deputy governor, just as I agree with the Minister. My only difficulty is that the disregarding of risk in individual investments, which the deputy governor warns us against, is exactly what is happening in respect of fossil fuel investment because prudential regulation has not worked out how to adequately assess the impacts of climate change on the financial system.
The scale of the problem was highlighted by Mark Carney in his “Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon” speech some years ago. He said:
“Take, for example, the IPCC’s estimate of a carbon budget that would likely limit global temperature rises to 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels. That budget amounts to between 1/5th and 1/3rd world’s proven reserves of oil, gas and coal. If that estimate is even approximately correct it would render the vast majority of reserves “stranded”—oil, gas and coal that will be literally unburnable without expensive carbon capture technology, which itself alters fossil fuel economics. The exposure of UK investors, including insurance companies, to these shifts is potentially huge.”
Is anyone seriously suggesting that these risks are currently being properly taken into account in the capital adequacy risk weights? If they were, it is inconceivable that existing fossil fuel investments would not be ranked under Article 128 of CRR as items associated with particular high risk. Of course, investments in new fossil fuel exploitation pose not only micro-prudential risks to banks arising from stranded assets, but the huge macro-prudential risks due to the acceleration of climate change which they will cause.
The Minister sought to assure us in the debate in Committee that the regulators have these matters under control. He prayed in aid, as did the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, the climate scenario tests that the Bank will be conducting later in the year. These are no doubt worthwhile exercises and it is good to see that the Bank is setting the international pace. But these scenario tests will not fix the issue.
Although the Governor of the Bank implicitly recognises the role that capital adequacy requirements need to play in addressing climate-associated risks when he says that supervisory expectations will require firms to assess how climate risks could impact their businesses and to review whether additional capital needs to be held against this, he also states that, in relation to climate scenario tests, the Bank will not use them to size firms’ capital buffers. The reason the Bank is reluctant to do so is the difficulty of using such tests to measure hard-to-quantify future risk. So we have a dangerous scenario when regulators say that they cannot act until they can adequately measure risk, and on the other hand that the risk is too difficult to measure. The route through this is to apply the existing capital adequacy risk weights in an internally consistent manner, as proposed by the amendment that we put at Committee.
Although I stand by that position because I believe it is the only logically coherent and feasible way of dealing with risk in respect of fossil fuel activities, I have listened to the Minister’s arguments and those of the noble Baroness, and consequently I have put forward this revised amendment to require the PRA instead to conduct a review of the issue of risk weights and climate change and report back to the House. This will provide an opportunity to consider carefully the issues raised and also to inform the debate on risk weights at international level. I hope the Minister will see merit in this proposal.
I made it clear in Committee, and I stress again on Report, that neither my amendment then, nor the revised version before your Lordships today, is driven by any animus against the fossil fuel industries—quite the contrary. I have a huge respect for the people working in those industries and a huge determination that there should be a just transition for those employees as we decarbonise our economy. We will be able to achieve that much more easily if the financial system shepherds an orderly transition away from fossil fuel industries through the appropriate application of risk in the system.
I understand the reluctance of the Government to intervene in prudential regulation, but Ministers cannot abdicate responsibility. They must not cling to the idea that the technicians have got this under control, because it is an illusion—and it is an illusion that will have disastrous consequences if it is not corrected. When the system of prudential regulation is so evidently failing in its primary task of managing and controlling risk in the financial system, at least in respect of climate risks, there is an obligation to act. So I am hopeful that, having listened to the arguments during the debate, the Minister will accept the case for the review and provide sufficient assurance that this will be taken forward in a timely manner. However, if he is not able to do so, I give notice of my intention to test the opinion of the House. I beg to move.
Baroness Hayman (CB) [V]
My Lords, I remind the House of my interests as co-chair of Peers for the Planet. I have Amendments 22 and 23 in this group and will speak also to the government amendments and Amendment 44, from the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. I have added my name to Amendment 3, to which the noble Lord, Lord Oates, has just spoken so powerfully.
Before I speak to any of the amendments, I will thank colleagues, the noble Lord, Lord Oates, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones, Lady Altmann and Lady Bennett, who have added their names to my amendments. I thank very particularly the Minister and his team for their very approachable actions in relation to discussions since Committee. They have been engaged in a sensitive and constructive way, and the noble Earl, as we have come to expect, has always been extremely courteous, endlessly patient and generous with his time. I think we have made real progress because of that.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, who is taking such a brilliant lead on these issues in your Lordships’ House. I thank her for her concentration on the biodiversity crisis as well as the climate emergency. Reflecting on her comments, I too hope that this is the last time it will be up to this House to add the missing element of climate to a financial Bill. Maybe for biodiversity we can proceed even faster. I too welcome the news about the FCA appointments—although putting that into the Bill, as Amendment 23 would do, would be better, because it would provide a statutory guarantee that such an appointment would continue.
I shall speak to Amendments 3, 22, 23 and 44. Amendment 44 is in my name, and Amendment 3 is in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Oates, and others. Amendments 22 and 23, to which I have attached my name, are in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman. I shall speak to Amendments 3, 22 and 23 together.
I had cause this morning to reflect back on the work of your Lordships’ house, by a similarly small and dedicated band, on the Medicines and Medical Devices Bill. At that team’s heart was the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege, author of the recent review often referred to by her name, but actually entitled First Do No Harm. Would that we could see the financial sector adopting that principle. Instead, it continues to pump funds into destroying the planet at breakneck speed.
An independent report by a coalition of NGOs, out this morning, shows that the world’s biggest 60 banks have provided $3.8 trillion-worth of financing for fossil fuel companies since the Paris climate deal in 2015. In our home sector, UK bank Barclays provides the most fossil fuel financing of all European banks—and the finance provided in 2020 was more than in 2016 or 2017.
The report notes that a commitment to be net zero by 2050 has been made by 17 of the 60 banks, but the report describes the pledges as “dangerously weak, half-baked, or vague”. It is clear that self-regulation—however much the Government may be wedded ideologically to the idea—has not worked. And we are in an emergency: we cannot wait.
Johan Frijns, at BankTrack, part of the coalition behind the report, says:
“there exists no pathway towards this laudable goal”—
net zero—
“that does not require dealing with bank finance for the fossil fuel industry right here and now.”
These amendments do not go that far, but they least set us on the right track—a track to transparency that does not require little-funded NGOs to dig well-buried data out of dark corners.
None the less, as others have noted, we have made some progress since Committee stage, and I welcome the government amendments in this group, which reverse the Government’s claim, made to me in Committee, that we did not need a reference to the climate emergency in the Bill. This will be, I believe, after the Pension Schemes Act, the second financial Bill to start to acknowledge the truth of doughnut economics—that the economy, and all human life, has to live within planetary limits.
That brings me to my Amendment 44, which addresses biodiversity. It is an addition to the government amendment requiring the FCA to “have regard to” the carbon target for 2050 when making Part 9C rules. My amendment simply adds another “with regard to”—in this case to the UK commitments under the UN Convention on Biological Diversity.
I referred to planetary limits. We are not yet focused nearly enough on the fact that the atmospheric carbon dioxide levels, at 417 parts per million today, is only one way in which we are outside the doughnut of sustainability. There is also the collapse of the natural world, as the globe’s Governments have acknowledged with the Convention on Biological Diversity, to which the UK is of course a signatory.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]
My Lords, I am delighted to follow the noble Baroness and to contribute to this debate. I very much welcome the amendments in the name of the Minister, my noble friend Lord Howe, in this group, particularly Amendments 43, 46 and 47 onwards, requiring the FCA to have regard to the carbon target for 2050 when making part 9C rules, as set out.
I always listen to what the noble Lord, Lord Oates, says—we entered the House on the same day and are of the same vintage, so to speak—but I welcome the fact that the Government recognise the risks arising from climate change. The Minister addressed the issue of stranded assets, an issue on which I share his concern, and the transition plan out of them. I think that was addressed in Committee in so far as my noble friend said then that
“the point of the Bill is to support a flexible regulatory system that can respond to changing circumstances and developments as they arise.”— [Official Report, 1/3/21; col. 258GC.]
The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, spoke about those technologies and forms of energy that can do harm. I am personally concerned that in Amendments 3, 22, 23 and 44, spoken to so eloquently by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hayman and Baroness Bennett, the focus is still very much on moving at the earliest possible opportunity and timetable away from fossil fuels. What worries me increasingly is our fixation on renewables, which on the face of it seem to be performing extremely well both onshore and offshore.
We on the EU Environment Sub-Committee have just completed our last piece of work, looking at the ecology of the North Sea. It is apparent from the evidence that we took that there is a lack of research on the impact of renewable energy offshore facilities on North Sea ecology, particularly marine life—dolphins, porpoises and whales—bird life and the whole sea biodiversity. A plea was made that the cumulative impact should be considered and that we should assess and value all the natural capital, not just the ability to create wind but what we are losing. In particular, it was put to us that we should consider the impact of these renewables, particularly offshore wind, on other users, such as, as in this case, fisheries and shipping.
Mention has also been made of the work going on in the Basel framework. I hope the Minister will give us an update on that. I am concerned that some of the amendments here, particularly Amendment 3, but others as well, may pre-empt and not have regard to the international work that will help us to understand how climate risk should be considered through the Basel framework and working with our international partners.
I pay very close regard to what those such as Mark Carney and the current deputy governor of the Bank of England say, but equally I was struck by the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord King of Lothbury, in the debate on the Budget Statement, where he expressed concern about the new remit requiring the Bank of England to
“reflect the importance of environmental sustainability and the transition to net zero”.—[Official Report, 12/3/21; col 1914.]
In the context of the Financial Services Bill we are seeking, as I understand it, to have a flexible regulatory system, as my noble friend explained, that will be able to respond to circumstances as they develop. I imagine that it is the role of the Government rather than the regulators to set the policy, but I stand to be corrected by my noble friend.
I welcome the opportunity to have this debate. When it comes to net zero, climate change and environmental sustainability, obviously there will be a move away from fossil fuels, but no one has yet explained to me how we are going to attempt to fulfil all our energy requirements in what will be virtually all electricity supplied to the market.
With those few remarks, I look forward to the Minister bringing together all the themes of this debate.
Baroness Sheehan (LD) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh. I thank the Minister for some movement on this issue. His courtesy throughout has been an example to all of us. I thank him for his correspondence on the issues that I raised in Committee, some of which I will return to later in my contribution.
I congratulate the noble Lords who moved amendments on climate risk in Committee, without which we would not be where we are today. The amendments were cogently argued and evidently persuasive, if only partially so, which is why a number of them have been brought back, albeit slightly amended, on Report.
I support Amendment 3 in the name of my noble friend Lord Oates and the noble Baronesses, Lady Altmann, Lady Hayman and Lady Jones of Whitchurch. It makes a strong case, with support from across your Lordships’ House, for a PRA review of the risk weighting applied to investments in existing and new fossil fuel exploration, exploitation and production. Amendment 22, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, seeks to embed evaluation of climate-related financial risks, and consideration of the impact of such risks on the stability of the UK financial system, in the modus operandi of the FCA and the PRA. Amendment 23, also in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, provides for the appointment of a senior manager within the FCA with responsibility for climate change—and movement on this by the regulator, as she outlined in her earlier contribution, is welcome. Amendment 44, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, makes huge sense in the context of the recent Dasgupta review. I hope that the Minister will give it sympathetic consideration.
I need say no more about the content of these amendments, as I would only be repeating the excellent contributions of those who tabled them. Suffice to say that, if adopted, all three would send the right policy signals that the Government mean what they say when they speak of a climate emergency. Those signals are sorely needed because the signals presently being received by investors and, indeed, by all sectors of society, are confusing and misleading. We have a Government leading on ending the use of coal for power generation—the Powering Past Coal Alliance—who then toy with the idea of granting a licence to a new deep coal mine in Cumbria. The Government announced in December last year that they would end UK support for fossil-fuel projects overseas. Will the Minister say whether UK Export Finance’s support for the controversial east African crude oil pipeline—EACOP—which extends from Uganda to Tanzania, will be a done deal before the new March deadline just announced?
Just today, we have a garbled press release on supporting vulnerable communities in the north-east and Scotland, which will be affected by the transition away from fossil fuels. This is justified in the press release by an unexplained decrease in emissions by the oil and gas sector. These communities deserve better. In the same press release, we are told that this decrease in emissions will be achieved by a new regime to hand out new licences to explore for and exploit as yet undiscovered fields. I am confused. Can the Minister shed some light?
Is the Minister also able to shed any light on whether the Government will bring forward legislation to align the Oil and Gas Authority’s remit to our net-zero target, thus drawing a line under the current policy of maximising economic revenue, or MER? That might serve to remove some of the confusion. How can new licences be justified when extraction of the oil and gas in our existing fields will take us over our share of emissions under the Paris agreement? Surely the Government, in a climate emergency which they themselves declared, are not relying on reducing emissions via carbon capture, usage and storage, a technology which is unproven at scale?
Meanwhile, back in the real world, the NASA website tells us that 2020 was the hottest year since records began, while the World Meteorological Organization states that 2011-20 was the warmest decade on record. The warmest six years have all been since 2015—2016, 2019 and 2020 being the top three. The World Meteorological Organization’s secretary-general, Professor Taalas, said:
“It is remarkable that temperatures in 2020 were virtually on a par with 2016, when we saw one of the strongest El Niño warming events on record. This is a clear indication that the global signal from human-induced climate change is now as powerful as the force of nature.”
That is a chilling thought.
I will end with one last thought: temperature is just one of the indicators of climate change. The others are greenhouse gas concentrations, ocean heat content, ocean pH, global mean sea level, glacial mass, sea ice extent and extreme events. All are moving in the wrong direction. I hope that the Minister will be able to give a satisfactory commitment that climate risk in the financial sector will be satisfactorily legislated for. In the absence of such assurances, I will support amendments on the issue that are put to a Division.
Viscount Trenchard (Con)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Oates, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, eloquently introduced Amendment 3. There was much discussion on this matter in Committee but I still consider that such a review would place too heavy a burden, and a disproportionate one at that, on the PRA. I thank my noble friend the Minister for the diligent manner in which he has responded to noble Lords’ concerns about raising the importance of climate-change issues in the list of factors to which our regulators must have regard in making rules.
The Government’s credentials as global leaders in the movement away from reliance on fossil fuels are well established and will, I hope, be further enhanced by the G7 meetings and the COP 26 conference later this year. However, this should be kept in perspective and balanced against the need for economic recovery and the needs of industry. There is no point in pricing what remains of our steel industry out of the market if the result would be an increase in imports from countries which have not adopted energy policies as green as ours, especially if the impact on global emissions is negligible.
When I first read my noble friend Earl Howe’s amendments I was puzzled, because it seemed that he was giving with one hand and taking away with the other. I look forward to his clarification of how Amendments 43, 46, 47 and 49 net off against each other.
I am loath to saddle the regulators with increased obligations which go beyond the practices that they have already adopted. The letter from Sam Woods makes it clear that climate change is already an important consideration in the PRA’s supervision and regulation of banks and insurers, under its existing statutory objectives. Similarly, the letter from Nikhil Rathi makes it clear that the FCA is committed to helping market participants manage the risks in moving to a low-carbon economy and supports the commitment to match, at least, the ambition of the EU sustainable finance action plan in the UK. Since the FCA has already decided to recruit a director with specific responsibility for ESG matters, I do not think that Amendment 23, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, is necessary. The remit of the senior manager whom she suggests should be appointed would clash with that of the new director who is already in the process of being recruited.
Amendment 22, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, also goes too far and is too prescriptive. My noble friend the Minister was right when he said to the Committee, on 24 February, that
“it is important that we act carefully and rationally, consult appropriately with interested parties and therefore make progress in the right way.”
He was also right in stating that
“the changes the Bill enables serve to implement a number of vital reforms following the financial crisis. These reforms reinforce the safety and soundness of the UK financial system.”—[Official Report, 24/2/21; col. GC 224.]
Surely we should not amend the Bill in any way that might prevent us giving effect to updated prudential rules. I also agree that there is no evidence that greener means prudentially safer, at least not yet. Therefore, it is not clear that a regulator, whose primary objective is the safety and soundness of financial institutions, should be burdened with disproportionate climate obligations now, especially at a time when it is essential to maintain and enhance the competitiveness and attractiveness of the UK’s financial markets. With regard to individual regulators’ objectives and rule-making powers on climate change-related risks, the ABI recommends the need for holistic debate across stakeholders before adding new objectives to the remit of regulators, given the need to balance the various priorities. I believe that my noble friend’s amendments strike the right balance, and I will support them.
While I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, that biodiversity is important, I believe she wants to go a step too far in her Amendment 44 in adding this to the FCA’s “have regard to.” There are countless other policies that could be added, but too many will muddy the waters and distract the FCA from its efficient operation in performing its core duties and objectives.
Lord Judd (Lab) [V]
My Lords, these amendments, and this Bill, are crucial to the future of the United Kingdom. We have heard repeatedly in the arguments deployed of an interaction. There is the need for financial services to be successful and effective because they play such an important part in ensuring the well-being on which the rest of our society depends. That is beyond question. However, we know that they have implications, socially and beyond, for which they need regulation, and this has been well spelled out.
I shall focus on Amendments 3, 22, 23 and 44 in particular. Fossil fuels inevitably have considerable and extensive risks for the climate. There can be no argument about that. They have great implications in terms of climate change, and I am glad to see that Amendment 3 is grappling with this.
Amendment 22 deals with the point I have just made in that climate change poses risks to financial services. Therefore, it is essential to have the right arrangements in place to ensure that those risks are, if not eliminated, minimised.
Amendment 23 makes the point I have often felt strongly about in legislation: it is sometimes crucial to have a specific person carrying a specific responsibility for bringing together the various threads in the policy for which we are aiming and ensure their delivery. It is a good amendment.
I do not share the rather dismissive approach of the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, to Amendment 44. My view is that the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, deserves considerable commendation for having tabled this amendment. We have happily joined these UN conventions, and our diplomats have usually played a large part in bringing them about, but we sometimes lack the discipline to follow through with what they require of us. At this point in our consideration of the Bill, it is appropriate to talk about the convention and the undertakings we have thereby committed ourselves to on biodiversity. On that issue, I find myself dismayed by the position of the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, because we are surrounded by a major crisis. The biodiversity of the world is in danger of collapse, and the consequences have direct implications for the survival of humanity itself. There is urgency about this situation.
In conclusion, I simply make this point: I said that we wanted the financial services sector to be successful and effective, because we recognise its indispensability, but we also must recognise that on climate change, we are long past the age of rhetorical language and theoretical commitment. We have to demonstrate that we have the leverage and the arrangements in place to ensure delivery; if we do not ensure delivery on the measures we want to see to protect the climate, we will be party to a cruise towards catastrophe for the global community. It is vital to have these disciplines, and these amendments spell out how we can bring those disciplines to bear.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I shall speak mainly to Amendments 3 and 23 in this group.
On Amendment 3, I should say I am not generally in favour of littering legislation with reviews, though I confess to having tabled a few amendments of that nature myself in the past. More substantively, I think this particular amendment as drafted is a waste of time.
I can predict the outcome of the review if this amendment is passed. The PRA will find that banks do not hold any significant “investments”—the wording used in the amendment—in fossil fuel assets, whether linked to existing exploitation and production or to new exploration. So all the things mentioned in proposed subsection (2) of the amendment will be irrelevant.
Risk weighting applies to the assets that banks hold. Banks’ assets will largely be loans of various kinds. Banks do not normally invest in physical assets used by other companies, nor do they invest in shares in the companies that own the assets. Banking is fundamentally about lending and not investing.
The noble Lord, Lord Oates, cited the recent speech by the deputy governor talking about prudential regulation being risk-based, which indeed it is, but he failed to understand that he was talking to insurers at the time. They do have investments. This is a fundamental difference between banks and insurers—they have completely different balance sheets.
As I said in Committee, most borrowing by oil and gas companies will be generic—for example, by way of bond issuance or commercial paper—and by one of the companies in a group. It will not be hypothecated to individual assets or groups of assets. Money is fungible and cannot be linked to any specific use. Bank balance sheets might have some leasing arrangements that might be caught by this amendment, but my main point is that the amendment is fundamentally aimed at the wrong target and, therefore, amounts to not much more than virtue signalling.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lady Noakes. In essence, since we are on Report on a Financial Services Bill, these amendments can, I hope, be rightly summed up as, “What point profit if no planet to spend it on?” But, as the term “global warming” clearly sets out, it is collectively a global issue, not a national one. In this context, I give more than a nod towards our involvement with the whole Basel process and the letter from Mr Sam Woods on this issue.
I support the amendments tabled by my noble friend the Minister. They strike the right balance on the need for transition—not in any sense slow or fast, but a transition—to get to where we need to get to across financial services and the wider economy. As noble Lords commented, there is no benefit—quite the opposite—in taking an approach to a particular industry in a particular region of United Kingdom only to have a more catastrophic climate impact by having to shore up resource from other parts of the globe.
In short, the PRA has a role to play, as do all elements in the financial services sector. More can probably be done on the use of new technologies and the measurement of how funds and various assets are performing in this sense. That is certainly in our grasp; it is not a matter for this group of amendments, but it could well provide much of the solution, and certainly the clarity and accountability that would come through in the course of business.
I fundamentally agree with my noble friend Lady Noakes’s commentary on how large corporates go about their funding—[Connection lost.]
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
We appear to have lost contact with the noble Lord, Lord Holmes. Perhaps we should move on to the next contributor, the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann.
Baroness Altmann (Con) [V]
My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 3, moved so excellently by the noble Lord, Lord Oates. I congratulate him on his work on the issues relevant to this group of amendments.
I also commend my noble friend the Minister and his department for listening to the concerns expressed in Committee and for laying his own amendments to the Bill, which previously made no mention of climate change at all. I believe that the Government are committed to making a real difference on climate change and environmental issues, and have recognised the dangers that our precious planet faces due to climate change and biodiversity risks, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, mentioned and as is in her amendment. I welcome the Government’s Amendments 43, 46, 47 and 49, and hope that the issue of climate risk will continue to move up the agenda in financial services.
I have enormous respect for my noble friend Lady Noakes and her experience in banking. She makes relevant distinctions between assets held by insurance companies, regulated by the FCA, which hold investments directly in fossil fuel or environmentally damaging firms and activities, whereas banks’ main assets are loans rather than more direct investments. Their balance sheets, as she noted, have some leasing, but, should the worst predictions of climate catastrophe materialise in a shorter timeframe than currently anticipated, there could be unexpected defaults on a number of the loans on the loan books, which also needs to be considered, I would hope, in terms of risk weightings.
In Committee, I supported the noble Lord, Lord Oates, in seeking to update the existing capital risk weightings to reflect climate change risk. Having listened carefully to the Committee’s arguments, he has taken care to adjust his amendment for Report. As we have all discussed in this group, climate change is now recognised widely as posing a significant risk to the entire global financial system and, in fact, to our expected and hoped-for way of life. Current central bank policy risks reinforcing a carbon lock-in through a systemic bias to fossil fuel investments—indeed, insurance arrangements and pension funds also have significant investments in this area. I believe we need a twin-track approach that both reports on and quantifies climate-related financial risks and, at the same time, amends prudential risk tools to reflect the risk of loss or stranding in relation to fossil fuel investments or, indeed, loan books.
Such an approach would reflect the urgency of the challenge we face and, as Andrew Bailey said in a speech last year:
“Investments that look safe on a backward look may be existentially risky given climate risks.”
The Minister’s response in Committee was that the proposed amendments would require the PRA to set punitively high risk weights against exposure to existing and new fossil fuel production and exploitation, and that these risk weights would, in effect, make it more expensive to finance such activities and thereby make them less attractive. Loans would be more expensive, potentially, to companies involved in this area. Is this not the very point that we should be seeking to achieve—to reflect the risks of carbon-intensive investments quantitatively, through higher risk weightings, and potentially through the issuing of loans to such companies?
Amendment 3 recognises the Government’s concerns and now proposes only that the PRA carry out a review of the current risk weightings applied to existing and new fossil fuel activities. In this regard, such a review may indeed confirm what my noble friend Lady Noakes suggested would be the outcome but, without such a review, I feel that we will not necessarily be taking this sufficiently seriously. I hope my noble friend can agree that this is a reasonable and prudent way to recognise the urgency of the climate change challenges we face, and that it would provide evidence to inform any necessary future changes to existing prudential rules around capital weightings, should that be found to be required.
In addition, two reports have just been published highlighting the systemic nature of climate risks. The LSE’s Grantham Research Institute report—I declare an interest as a visiting professor—Net-Zero Central Banking stated:
“Central banks and supervisors will need to take a systemic perspective, addressing both micro- and macroprudential risks over a much longer time horizon than they do now, and work to ensure that financial flows become aligned with net-zero.”
Policy Exchange’s report Capital Shift recently stated:
“Whereas international banking codes require banks to include emerging risks such as cybersecurity in capital adequacy compliance … climate change barely features.”
It recommended:
“Central banks and supervisors should introduce higher capital charges for assets at greater risk from climate and nature-related financial risks.”
I hope my noble friend the Minister can provide assurances that an urgent review of this vital area is possible and will be considered.
I speak briefly in support of the aims of Amendment 22 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, on climate-related financial risk reporting. I commend her for her work in this area and declare a further interest as a member of the Peers for the Planet group, which she so ably leads. Amendment 22 would require adjustments to reflect the systemic risk in the whole financial system. I hope my noble friend will commit to a future consultation, at least, on the FCA and PRA objectives having regard to net zero targets.
Finally, I have added my name to Amendment 23, also in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, whose work on environmental protection has been so powerful. I congratulate the new chief executive of the FCA, Nikhil Rathi, on the latest announcement that he is recruiting a senior role focused specifically on environmental and other ESG matters, so I suspect that this amendment may no longer be required.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
My Lords, we have not as yet been able to restore contact with the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond. Should he reappear before the Minister speaks, I will try to call him, but for the time being he is not with us, so I call the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I will follow my practice of trying to be brief and selective on Report. We have had absolutely brilliant speeches and I do not intend to repeat them.
Perhaps I can start by being helpful to the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and I speak as a fairly weather-worn commercial banker who dealt extensively with loans and risk. She will understand, therefore, that the PRA, as the regulator, in dealing with capital adequacy issues, looks at the loans that sit as assets on the bank’s books, but of course it does not stop there. It looks through that to the operational activities—to the activities and investment of the company to which the loan is made. That is why the terminology “investment” pins exactly what this amendment is intended to do, which is to make sure that the PRA does that look-through to investment. I do not think that any member of the PRA would have the slightest difficulty in understanding what this amendment is guiding them to carry out. They would see that it has genuine precision in it. I do not have a problem with the wording; the wording says what it should, it says what it means and it says what the PRA would understand and follow through.
Very briefly, I thank the Minister for the two “have regard” amendments that he has embedded in this group. To “have regard” to the climate change target of 2050 is a step forward, but we have to recognise that it is very light-touch and will not scare the horses. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, captured that rather well when she said that the two “have regard” amendments will do no harm. I do not think they change the landscape, but they give a little hint of a change in direction and I welcome that change in direction.
Like others, I am very frustrated that we have a PRA that is going to do stress tests to test the sufficiency of banks’ capital buffers to deal with the financial instability caused by climate change, but then seems to have taken almost the equivalent of a vow of passivity and will not then follow through and implement the consequential adjustments to capital adequacy ratios that would come from that exploration and examination of the buffers. I really do not understand going through the process and then saying, “But we will not learn from or implement the consequences of that work”.
I sometimes think, as I listen to the speeches, that there is a sense that this requirement to look at capital adequacy ratios is somehow novel or revolutionary. I sit on the Economic Affairs Committee and last week, we were privileged to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Turner of Ecchinswell. I hope I have pronounced that correctly. We were looking at quantitative easing issues and therefore it was a discussion of central banks, but the issue of climate change came up. I thought what he said was quite helpful in understanding how normalised the approach of challenging this issue through capital adequacy ratios is now becoming. He said that any role of central banks in relation to climate change is very much secondary to the fiscal and regulatory authorities—the same issue that I think was raised with reference to quotes from the noble Lord, Lord King—but that is an important statement. It is secondary to the fiscal and regulatory authorities because, of course, the relevant regulatory authority is the PRA. He went on to give an illustration by referring to coal:
“If banks go on lending to coal companies, they may end up with stranded assets on which they will make a loss. That will be bad for their capital ratio. I think that it is reasonable for the PRA to set higher capital ratios for anybody who is still lending to coal.”
I do not want to suggest that he was willing to go further than coal, but he was using it as an illustration. I think most of this House would very happily accept that that language needs to be extended across the full range of fossil fuels, certainly in requiring the PRA to do a review. So, I wanted to underscore that this is a normalised approach; this is where we will go, and where we will end up. Given that we have described climate change, absolutely correctly, as an emergency, a delay in getting to that appropriate application of capital adequacy is really serious.
I wanted to pick up the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes—that most loans are short or medium term. They are, but they are supporting longer-term projects. Of course, the duration of financing the project itself—the project they enable, the project they empower, the project they drive—has a much longer-term application. So, the fact that the loan itself is short term does not mean that it can be set aside as though it had no longer-term implications. It is merely the first step in an ongoing process, and once the process is started it is almost impossible to stop. Loans might be short term because people think they might get better terms and conditions or pricing in the future. The short-term issue is not applicable here; the urgency issue is.
We know that we face an emergency and that how we act in the future will have to be more draconian and dramatic, and have far greater collateral damage, than if we act early. It is crucial that the issues raised in Amendment 3—getting in place the plan, pattern and process for using capital adequacy ratios to tackle the financial instability that will come from allowing climate change-related activities to continue and grow—be dealt with now, and rapidly. If the Government do not recognise what we have been describing here and commit to this review of the whole issue of capital adequacy and climate change, I very much hope that my noble friend Lord Oates will press his amendment. The message is absolutely critical.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Oates, for leading this debate this afternoon, and to all noble Lords who have spoken. We had a detailed debate in Committee on the need for the regulators to take a more systematic and urgent approach to their climate change obligations. I do not intend to repeat the general arguments, not least because the Minister accepted the need to embed our climate change goals in the financial services sector. The point of difference remained, how deep and how fast. Since that time, we have had a useful meeting with the Minister and we were pleased to hear that he had accepted our arguments concerning the need for the regulators to have regard to the Climate Change Act. The Government’s amendments, tabled today, reflect that concession and we consider this to be a considerable step forward. I thank him for his work in making that happen.
Since then, the Minister has also facilitated the sending of two letters from the PRA and FCA setting out their work on sustainable finance, to which a number of noble Lords have referred. It is useful to have their current commitments restated in this way and we are pleased that they have engaged with us on the subject. It is also helpful that they have set their work in an international context, as we know that we cannot solve this issue alone. However, I would say to the regulators, and indeed to the Treasury, that what is lacking in these letters is the urgency and reprioritisation that the climate change emergency demands. As we discussed in Committee, many individual financial institutions are already ahead of the game and are implementing dynamic green initiatives. We have heard great speeches from the Chancellor and others on the importance of the issue, but why are the regulators not being more ambitious, to ensure that everybody meets the standard of the best? As a result, today we have tabled further amendments to spell out in more detail how systemic finance-related climate risks should be embedded in the policy agenda going forward.
I have added my name to Amendment 3 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Oates. It addresses the need for the PRA to review the risk weighting applied to investments in existing and new fossil fuel exploitation and production. The noble Lord has explained the case for that amendment extremely well today. We agree that the current regime does not adequately reflect the high-risk exposure of such investments. Clearly, institutions with over-exposure to carbon-intensive investments are not acting prudentially and their capital requirements should reflect this. As we discussed before, as the policy agenda moves rapidly away from fossil fuels and towards renewables, there is a considerable risk of the assets being stranded. The capital adequacy requirements need to reflect this risk more accurately.
The Minister will know that the Basel Committee conducted a survey of regulators in April of last year to stocktake their supervisory initiatives on climate change financial risk. This seems to run counter to the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, was making—I listened carefully to what she was saying about the comparative responsibilities of regulators and banks—because the Bank of England and the PRA were both respondents to the survey. In fact, only six out of the 27 replies factored the mitigation of climate-related risk in to their prudential capital requirements so far, but there was some criticism in the conclusions of the survey as a result of that. So, were the UK regulators in the good minority or the bad majority in the outcome of that survey, and are their responses to it in the public domain? Does he also accept that, without the necessary adjustments made in Amendment 3, investments will continue to focus disproportionately on outdated oil and gas activities that run counter not only to investments but to the interests of the UK economy as a whole? This point was well illustrated by the noble Baroness, Lady Sheehan. This is why we would particularly welcome the involvement of the Climate Change Committee, in order to provide the wider perspective of the longer-term UK interests, rather than the narrow short-term interests on which investment decisions are too often made. I therefore hope that the Minister will be able to give us the assurances we seek in this regard.
I have also added my name to Amendment 22, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, for which she made a very powerful case. We believe it essential that the Government set out how they will actively ensure that climate change considerations are reflected in the regulators’ statutory objectives. This amendment would provide a framework for systematically assessing and reporting on climate change financial risk. It would ensure that all government guidance is linked in order to provide a coherent and entire picture on managing climate change—an improvement on the current piecemeal reporting structure. I therefore hope that the Minister will be able to give us the assurances we seek on this issue. It would also be helpful if he could spell out what future formal reporting mechanisms would be put in place to achieve this.
Moving on to Amendment 23, at Committee and again today, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, has made a compelling case that the FCA needs a senior executive to oversee and deliver the climate change agenda. Like her, we were pleased to see in the FCA’s letter that a dedicated director of environmental and social governance standards is being recruited to lead on this work. We welcome this appointment and believe it represents a real step forward.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Henig) (Lab)
I understand we now have the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, back to finish his speech, so I call him at this point.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con) [V]
My Lords, I shall not detain the House for long at this stage. I fear I got cut off just as I was extolling the virtues of how new technologies could help in this endeavour. I support the amendments in the name of my noble friend the Minister and look forward to his explanation of them.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, let me begin by saying that I have listened carefully to the debate today, as well as the important contributions made in earlier debates on this Bill. As a result of those earlier debates and subsequent discussions held with a number of your Lordships, the Government have tabled the four amendments included in this group, which I shall speak to in a moment. Before I do, I want to leave the House in no doubt as to the context in which we are now operating.
In November, my right honourable friend the Chancellor set out a vision for the financial services sector to put the full weight of private sector innovation, expertise and capital behind the critical global effort to tackle climate change and protect the environment. That is why the Government are taking a number of actions, such as making climate-related financial disclosures mandatory across the economy by 2025, with a significant portion of mandatory requirements in place by 2023, and issuing our first-ever green gilt later this year. At Budget this month, we augmented the Government’s economic objectives and the remit of the Monetary Policy Committee and Financial Policy Committee to support environmental sustainability and the transition to net zero. We also established the UK infrastructure bank with a mandate that includes tackling climate change. The Government have ambitious plans to ensure that the financial services sector as a whole plays its role in supporting our climate change commitments. However, we heard loud and clear the strong views from members of this House that they wanted to see that ambition reflected in this Bill.
Amendments 43 and 47 in my name will require the PRA and the FCA to consider the 2050 carbon target in relation to the Climate Change Act 2008 when making prudential rules under the accountability framework set out in this Bill. The Government are showing, very publicly, how the financial services sector and our regulators can take a lead role in delivering on our climate commitments. They are also showing the rest of the world that the UK is taking a cross-sector approach. I have greatly welcomed the way in which noble Lords have engaged with me on this issue. We have picked the 2050 carbon target, as it benefits from being both legally defined and substantively focused. This makes it clear to both regulators exactly what they must have regard to in making their rules and how they can be held to account.
As I explained in earlier debates, the Government and the regulators are committed to implementing the first wave of Basel reforms and the initial introduction of the investment firms prudential regime on 1 January 2022. These reforms are important for our international standing as a country that upholds its international commitments, for financial stability, and for our competitiveness relative to the EU. As I said in Committee, there is a great deal of work happening at the moment at the international standard-setting level to determine exactly how climate change should be factored into prudential policy globally. This is why Amendments 46 and 49 delay the application of mandatory climate change considerations to 1 January 2022. This will ensure there is sufficient time for this work to progress, and that there is no unnecessary and impractical delay in implementing these vital regimes. Otherwise, we would be in the unfortunate position where the regulators would have to reopen or restart their consultations.
When and how will the amendments bite, if not on the first wave of Basel and the IFPR? I can assure noble Lords, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, that the PRA will still need to make rules to implement substantive reforms contained in Basel 3.1, which will be implemented in 2023. These rules will be within the scope of the amendments in my name. I fully expect the regulators to use the powers again in future to update their rules—for example, to take account of new international standards or developments in the market. I hope the House will agree that these amendments strike the right balance between acting quickly on climate change and taking swift action to reform our prudential regimes which aims to prevent a future crisis. I therefore see this as a significant action which very visibly demonstrates the Government’s commitment to furthering this important agenda.
The Government are also acting to ensure that the regulators take account of our climate commitments more broadly. At Budget, the Treasury published remit letters for the Monetary Policy Committee and the Financial Policy Committee, requiring both these committees to consider the Government’s commitments on climate change. Today, I can confirm that the Chancellor has set new remits for the FCA and the PRA that will also require them to consider these commitments across the whole of their remit. As has been mentioned in this debate, the CEOs of the PRA and the FCA have both written to me to set out the significant amount of work they have under way. I will provide some further details on this in a moment. They have also demonstrated their clear commitment to acting to address climate change. I have placed copies of their letters in the Library and in the Royal Gallery.
Lastly, and importantly, there is the future regulatory framework review. This is the means by which the Government are exploring how the regulators focus more broadly on important public policy issues, such as climate. I hope this meets one of the concerns expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman. I can add to it because, as part of that review, the Government recently consulted on a proposal to allow Parliament and Ministers to specify new regulatory principles for specific areas of activity—for example, setting out how the regulators must consider sustainability or green issues when making rules. The Government are considering the responses to the consultation ahead of a second consultation later this year, and recognise the need to address this crucial issue across the whole regulatory framework. I hope I have shown that the Government understand the issue, that we are taking the appropriate actions and that the regulators are ready and willing to support such actions.
I now turn to the other amendments in this group, though not in numerical order. I begin with Amendment 44, which would amend one of my own amendments. Amendment 44 would require the FCA also to take into consideration the UK’s commitments under the UN convention on biodiversity when making rules to implement the investment firms prudential regime.
This Government are committed to being the first to leave the natural environment in a better state than they found it, with our long-term agenda laid out in the 25-year environment plan. As the Dasgupta review highlights, and as the noble Baroness recognises, the global financial system will play a critical role in enhancing our stock of natural assets and encourage sustainable consumption and production activities. We will reflect on the conclusions and recommendations of the Dasgupta review and consider the most appropriate way to take them forward. However, unlike the 2050 carbon target in the Climate Change Act 2008, which my own amendment targets, the commitments under the UN convention are extensive, varied and more challenging to deliver through financial services regulation. Work on how the financial sector can support our transition towards net zero is more developed than work on how the sector can support biodiversity goals.
However, work to develop our understanding is under way. For example, just last year we saw the launch of the Task Force on Nature-related Financial Disclosures. This task force will provide a framework for businesses to assess, manage and report on their dependencies and impacts on nature. This will support the appraisal of nature-related risk and will continue to realign incentives which support our biodiversity goals.
The Convention on Biological Diversity—COP 15—will also be an important milestone for international action on biodiversity. We will work with countries to agree long-term, realistic, measurable and fit-for-purpose targets to set nature on the path to recovery. Nature will also feature as one of five policy themes for COP 26, which has been agreed by the Prime Minister. The nature campaign is focused on catalysing action to protect and restore the natural habitats and ecosystems on which our climate, air, water and way of life depend, which includes increasing the volume of finance for nature-based solutions. I listened with interest to the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Judd, in that context.
Amendment 3 would place a legal obligation on the PRA to review the risk weights applied to certain fossil fuel exposures and thereby the amount of capital held against them. The purpose of risk weighting is to preserve the safety and soundness of our financial system and to prevent banks failing as a result of not covering themselves appropriately against the risks they are taking. I was grateful for the remarks of my noble friend Lady Noakes on these issues.
In its letter to me, the PRA recognises the threat posed by climate change to the UK economy and the financial system and sets out the steps it is taking to mitigate this threat. This includes setting out specific and detailed supervisory expectations for both banks and insurers on their approach to managing financial risks from climate change. The PRA has also written to firms setting out its expectations that firms should have fully embedded their approaches to managing climate-related financial risks by the end of 2021.
The noble Lord, Lord Oates, questioned why a lower risk rating should be applied to fossil fuel funding than some other asset classes. As I am sure he is aware, the risk weighting of assets is decided internationally through a set of agreed standards set by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, and this is based on analysis of how risk is transmitted and how it can be quantified. These post-crisis reforms have also been endorsed by the G20 and ensure that risk weights are applied consistently across the globe. The flexible approach taken in the Bill ensures that, where considerations around the risk weighting of assets change, the PRA can respond to developing circumstances as they arise.
Lord Oates (LD)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this interesting and engaging debate and I give particular thanks to the noble Baronesses, Lady Hayman, Lady Jones of Whitchurch, and Lady Altmann, for signing Amendment 3, and to my noble friend Lady Kramer, as well as to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. I am also grateful to the Minister for his engagement at all times.
I am sorry if the wording of the amendment caused any confusion to the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, but I hope that the clear explanation made by my noble friend Lady Kramer has lifted it. I do not have anything to add to that, except to say that I have no doubt that the PRA will understand very clearly what it is being asked to do. The noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, said that he felt that a review would be disproportionate. I am not sure what he is measuring the proportions against but, if anything, the amendment seems to be a disproportionately modest response to a desperately urgent issue that will impact on us all.
I am pleased that the Minister and the FCA have reacted to a number of the amendments, in particular Amendment 23 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, on the senior manager of the FCA, and obviously I welcome the movement on the Government’s “have-regard” amendments.
I reiterate my thanks to the Minister for his engagement during this process, although I am disappointed that he has not been able to provide the reassurance I had hoped for that risk weights would be properly addressed. He said that we had to move not with undue haste but with due speed—but I am not sure that we are doing either.
I am afraid that I do not accept that the issues are covered sufficiently by the existing work that he has taken the trouble to set out, not least because the approach being followed does not take into account sufficiently the specific issues set out for the review in my amendment, in particular the climate-related disruption of the economy. It is very important that this review should take place and that the PRA can use it to look properly into these issues. As I said in my opening speech, it should feed into discussions at international level. It is very important that it is looked at in terms of the remit of my amendment. So, on that basis, I would like to test the opinion of the House.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Henig) (Lab)
My Lords, there being an equality of votes, in accordance with Standing Order 55, I declare the amendment disagreed to.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Henig) (Lab)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 4. Anyone wishing to press this or anything else in this group to a Division must make that clear in debate.
Amendment 4
Baroness Noakes
“Continuity of contract
If the FCA exercises one or more of the powers under Article 23D of the Benchmarks Regulation in respect of a benchmark, any reference to or description of that benchmark in a contract, security or instrument must be, with effect from the date of such exercise, interpreted as a reference to or description of the benchmark as modified by the FCA under its powers under Article 23D.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would ensure that if the FCA revised a benchmark under Article 23D (inserted by Clause 15) there would be continuity of contract by replacing references to the earlier benchmark with the revised one.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 4, I shall speak to the other two amendments in this group in my name. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, and the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, for adding their names to Amendment 6.
I spoke at length in Committee about the problems of tough legacy contracts, and I shall not repeat all of that. To summarise, when Libor ceases to be available at the end of this year there will be a number of contracts which reference Libor but which have not been renegotiated to substitute an alternative rate. We do not know exactly how many contracts are involved, but it is thought to be a significant number. It is not a niche problem; it arises in both the capital market and retail markets and in many different kinds of contract. While sustained efforts by financial services providers have reduced the scale of the problem, it cannot be fully resolved for various reasons, and I think that that has been accepted by all parties.
The Bill helpfully provides for the FCA to ensure that what is known as synthetic Libor will be available for use in those contracts which have not been renegotiated, but two problems remain. First, while the FCA has made synthetic Libor available for use, the FCA cannot change the contracts itself; it requires separate provision in law. Amendment 4 would provide for continuity of contract so that any contract, loan or security referencing Libor will be taken to reference synthetic Libor instead. Secondly, even if references to Libor are regarded as meaning synthetic Libor, there remains a risk of litigation if one or more parties object to the substitution of synthetic Libor and believes that some other fallback is more appropriate. Amendment 5 says that no claim or cause of action can arise due to the use of synthetic Libor. This is a safe harbour provision.
I recognise that the exact drafting of continuity of contract and safe harbour is not straightforward, though I emphasise that my amendments have been drafted with the help of lawyers who are specialists in capital markets, and that they mirror the draft legislation which has been drawn up for New York law by the Alternative Reference Rates Committee. Nevertheless, I have also tabled Amendment 6, which takes a slightly different approach by giving the Treasury the power to make regulations dealing with contract continuity and/ or safe harbour. It does not require the Treasury to do either or both of those things but offers a straightforward method of dealing with the problem in secondary legislation if, for some reason, the Government feel unable to legislate directly at this stage.
I tabled Amendments 4 and 5 in Committee and was met with the expected response that the Government had recently issued a consultation on contract continuity and safe harbour, and that the consultation period had not concluded. The Government would decide what to do once they had considered the consultation responses. The consultation has now concluded, so it is time for the Government to decide what to do. As I understand it, there were only a relatively small number of responses to the consultation, and they are overwhelmingly in favour of proceeding with continuity of contract and safe harbour. I hope that my noble friend the Minster will confirm that.
I had hoped that the Government would table amendments of their own on Report, but life is full of disappointments. The clock is counting down to 31 December this year and those areas of the financial services market which are impacted by tough legacy contracts desperately need some certainty about the way forward. I therefore call on the Government to either accept one of my amendment variants—Amendments 4 and 5 or, alternatively, Amendment 6—or commit to bringing their own amendment forward at Third Reading. If the opportunity of this Bill is missed, it is by no means clear whether there will be a later opportunity in time for the cessation of Libor, which is only nine months from now. I hope that the Government will want to avoid creating a long period of uncertainty and will not let this Bill pass into law without fully dealing with tough legacy contracts. I beg to move.
Viscount Trenchard (Con)
My Lords, I apologise for forgetting to declare my interest as a director of two financial services regulated companies.
I support Amendments 4, 5 and 6, ably moved by my noble friend Lady Noakes, whose long experience and mastery of the detail of financial markets and regulation is an invaluable asset to your Lordships’ House. As far as Amendments 4 and 5 are concerned, she presented the arguments very well in Committee and today. I was also impressed by the arguments deployed by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, who quoted the FCA’s view that in cases where parties to contracts referencing Libor cannot reach agreement on how those contracts would operate in the event of Libor’s cessation, discontinuation could cause uncertainty, litigation, or loss of value because contracts no longer function as intended.
The Minister recognised that we must reduce contracts referencing Libor as much as possible by the end of this year. Given the vast number of outstanding contracts, clearly that will not be possible, and rightly the Government have initiated a consultation process on this subject. However, does he not agree that the risk of uncertainty and litigation is significant and that there is unlikely to be a better opportunity to legislate in time to mitigate such risks than that which this Bill provides?
In Amendment 6, my noble friend Lady Noakes, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, and the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, has offered an alternative method of mitigating these risks. As a rule, I do not like the trend towards taking excessive Henry VIII powers, which greatly reduce the transparency and accountability of the Government. However, if my noble friend the Minister cannot accept Amendments 4 and 5, the alternative—Amendment 6—would in that case be acceptable as being much better than the situation that will otherwise quite possibly evolve with great damage to market integrity and much expensive litigation.
I hope that the Minister has thought more about these issues since our last debate and I look forward to hearing how her thinking has evolved to meet the very sensible points that my noble friend’s amendments would address.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, in Committee, I supported the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, as something that had to be done. It seemed to be a reasonable, if simple, concept that a flawed benchmark reference in a contract, if changed to a closely corresponding but not flawed benchmark—a change required by the regulator—should not give rise to litigation, not least because the contracts should still largely perform as originally intended.
Some contracts may have had termination clauses in the event of no benchmark, which could give rise to premature terminations and winners and losers. However, this is not really a no-benchmark situation. While not everyone has sympathy with banks and industry should they be the losers, this is not a matter on which they would be at fault. I am sure that everyone would have sympathy if consumers were losers but what if it goes the other way and banks want to pursue consumers if they are the winners? I am sure that that would be seen as unacceptable.
This is not mis-selling but, as far as contracts are concerned, it is a blameless matter and it seems to me that continuity is the closest to honouring original intents. If there were a way in which to make simple compensatory adjustments, we would not be facing these problems. I therefore still feel that something has to be done and doing the same as the US also seems to be good in terms of the UK’s reputation for giving certainty to markets.
However, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has now come up with a third amendment, Amendment 6, which empowers the Treasury to address matters further down the track and gives more flexibility in what may be determined. It is a bit of kicking the can down the road and a bit of Henry VIII, but one hopes that it will encourage more solutions to be found. I have therefore added my name to that amendment and hope that at least, if the Minister cannot accept the other amendments, it can be accepted as a way forward.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con) [V]
My Lords, I am delighted to speak to this group of amendments and declare my interests as set out in the register.
I congratulate my noble friend Lady Noakes not just on the eloquence that she demonstrated in introducing these three amendments but on the quality of their drafting. As an ex-City solicitor, I look on that with awe. I also congratulate my noble friend on offering options. We had a thorough and in-depth debate in Committee on these issues. My noble friend has done the House a great service in bringing a buffet approach for the Government to consider. If they are not partial to Amendments 4 or 5, Amendment 6 will work just as satisfactorily.
These amendments need to be seriously considered. For the want of certainty and for ensuring that litigation does not result if we do nothing, I ask my noble friend the Minister on Amendments 4, 5 or 6, as I have in the past and will do on forthcoming amendments: if not this Financial Services Bill, which financial services Bill? If not now, when?
Lord Blackwell (Con) [V]
My Lords, I declare my interests as set out in the register. I support these amendments, which have been so well explained by my noble friend Lady Noakes. In Grand Committee, the Minister accepted that there were concerns that a residual risk of disruption and potential litigation would remain even once the FCA had exercised its powers under the Bill. This is really important, given the amount of money and the number of contracts at stake, and the timescale of the changes in the benchmark at the end of 2021.
My noble friend the Minister said that the Government would prefer to wait for the results of the consultation, but these are not new issues. The Treasury and regulators have been aware of them for many months. The argument was made that the reason for waiting for the consultation is that there might be areas where there was legitimate reason for civil litigation and that those legitimate legal claims might be blocked. I am not persuaded that there are legitimate legal claims where the benchmark is being replaced with a synthetic benchmark at the direction of the regulator. There has to be a change and I cannot think of situations where those claims might be appropriate and fair. I would welcome it if the Minister can explain where those concerns come from and what situations might be blocked unfairly by these amendments.
Other than that, we should move to deal with these concerns now, as noble Lords have said. If the Minister does not like the specificity of Amendments 4 and 5, I would certainly be prepared to accept Amendment 6. I hope my noble friend the Minister will come back at Third Reading with government amendments to address these issues. If she does not feel able to do that and my noble friend Lady Noakes were to bring back her amendments at Third Reading, I would be compelled to support her.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, for bringing forward these amendments. I have to confess that I am not keen on Amendment 5 because it seems that it would create an opportunity for various institutions to use the change in the benchmark in a way that would be abusive to a customer, who would then have no redress.
Amendment 5 goes too far, but Amendment 6 makes perfect sense to me. Frankly, I find it extraordinary to think that the Government have not seized it and put “government” in front of it. We will face tough legacy contracts and there needs to be a sensible and appropriate way to deal with them. Amendment 6 captures that exactly as it should. I hope very much that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, will get a positive reply on Amendment 6 from the Government, otherwise there will be litigation and a mess, and I am not sure that that helps anybody.
Lord Eatwell (Lab)
My Lords, we should all be grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, for her persistence in this vital area. She is quite right that the clock is ticking: with nine months to go, we really need to do something about this issue; to do otherwise would be irresponsible.
Amendment 4 is valuable in defining continuity of contract, but there remains a problem that it does not and cannot solve: if the foundation of a contract is changed, its value can change. That leads on to Amendment 5. Here, I regret to say that I differ with the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and with the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. It is surely the responsibility of Parliament in this case primarily to protect the retail investor, as it is the retail investor who is not the professional, who typically does not have the same information as the professional and who is likely to be more financially vulnerable, not least because retail investment is dominated by pension savings. I therefore conclude that the provision of a safe harbour is inappropriate in this case and would be looking instead for some mechanism of reconciliation rather than prevention of claim.
However, I am delighted to express my support for Amendment 6—which is not surprising as my name is on it. Here the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has actually saved the Government from considerable embarrassment by presenting an amendment which succinctly encapsulates, without being prescriptive, the issues the FCA must address in facing the difficulties created by the replacement of Libor: continuity of contract and reconciling the damages. Unlike Amendments 4 and 5, Amendment 6 incorporates those. I express strong support for Amendment 6 and recommend it wholeheartedly to the Government. In terms of the buffet approach, it is the healthy option.
Baroness Penn (Con)
Noble Lords will remember from previous stages that the Bill provides the FCA with the powers to manage an orderly wind-down of a critical benchmark such as the Libor benchmark.
In 2015, the Financial Stability Board recommended a transition away from certain interest rate benchmarks, including Libor, to alternative rates based on active and liquid underlying markets. In 2017, the FCA secured agreement from the panel banks that contribute to Libor that they would continue submissions until the end of 2021, providing time for firms to move away from use of the Libor wherever possible.
However, it has been clear for some time that there will be certain “tough legacy” contracts that will be unable to transition away from Libor in time. It is for the benefit of these contracts that the Bill grants the FCA the power under Article 23D of the Benchmarks Regulation to direct a change in how a benchmark is calculated, so that the benchmark can continue for a limited time after banks stop providing their contributions. The Bill therefore represents a critical step in providing for a smooth transition away from Libor, mitigating the risk of the financial instability and market disruption that could be caused by a disorderly transition or end to Libor. It has been widely welcomed by the financial services industry and internationally.
The proposed amendments seek to supplement the Bill’s provisions, reducing further the scope for uncertainty, contractual disputes or litigation between parties over the reference to a benchmark within a contract where the FCA has directed a change in the methodology on which the benchmark is calculated. Amendment 4 seeks to provide for contract continuity where the FCA uses its Article 23D power to impose a change in the methodology of a critical benchmark, providing that parties must interpret references to that benchmark in their contracts as references to the revised benchmark. Amendment 5 seeks to reduce the scope for litigation where the FCA has exercised its Article 23D power on a critical benchmark, providing a safe harbour for the use of that benchmark.
As stated in Committee and in the other place, the Government are committed to ensuring that an appropriate framework is in place for the orderly wind-down of Libor. We take this matter very seriously. As my noble friend Lady Noakes noted, the Government’s consultation on this issue has only recently closed, on 15 March. The consultation responses have underscored that there are complex and wide-ranging policy and legal considerations that must be fully understood before taking any further action on this issue. That range of considerations and views has been illustrated by the range of views expressed in this evening’s debate, but my noble friend Lady Noakes is correct to say that the industry has indicated, including through its responses to the consultation, that it is supportive of the approach set by the Government in the consultation.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this short debate. I even include my noble friend the Minister, although she will know that much of what she said was very disappointing—not only to noble Lords who have taken part in this debate but to the financial services industry, which was hoping for a more definitive outcome.
Letting the opportunity for legislating in this Bill go by, even if only by way of a regulation-making power, is a major loss. I am struggling to understand how the Treasury could have got itself into this position. The need to deal with tough legacy contracts is most certainly not a new issue. The fact that both contract continuity and safe-harbour provisions were an issue for the financial services sector has been known for more than a year. In the US, there is already draft legislation for New York law, and even the EU has brought forward a partial solution. But the Treasury seems like a rabbit staring into the headlights, too frightened to move. This does not auger well for the UK’s ability to build and maintain our financial services sector as world-leading, which I thought was one of the aims of my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
We cannot blame the suffocating bureaucracy of the EU any more if our financial services sector is held back or harmed. Taking back control requires that the Government take responsibility for their role in making the UK a good place for financial services firms. Their inability to deal with the issue of tough legacy Libor contracts in the Bill is not a good look.
The Government and, in particular, the Treasury need to take a long, hard look at themselves and work out if they are yet up to the task of supporting this sector, which is so important to the UK as a whole. Their ability to act at pace and decisively is important; I do not yet detect that they are showing those characteristics. Having said that, I was grateful that my noble friend confirmed that the Government remained committed to a framework for an orderly transition from Libor next year, and that they are taking this seriously and will find a way forward. She did not, however, indicate what timeframe it would be decided in. She ought to be aware that the financial services sector is watching and expects the Government to take this forward.
I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss progress with the Economic Secretary in due course, but discussion with me is not the most important thing. I think it is telling Parliament what is to be done, when and how it is to be done, and telling the financial services sector, which needs certainty for the way forward. It is with considerable regret that I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Lexden) (Con)
My Lords, we move to the group consisting of—
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
We have Amendments 5 and 6 to dispose of.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Lexden) (Con)
Yes, I needed the correction. I am so sorry.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Lexden) (Con)
We now move, after my error, to the group consisting of Amendment 7. Anyone wishing to press this amendment to a Division must make that clear in debate. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans has withdrawn, so I call on the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, who has added his name to the amendment, to move it.
Clause 22: Regulated activities and Gibraltar
Amendment 7
Lord Sikka
“32B Gibraltar-based persons: reporting requirements(1) A Gibraltar-based person carrying on an activity approved under Schedule 2A, or which has permission by virtue of relevant Gibraltar provision to carry on an activity, in the United Kingdom must be registered under section 1046 of the Companies Act 2006.(2) A company of the type referred to in subsection (1) is to be regulated in respect of activities that it undertakes in the United Kingdom by a relevant person as defined by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.(3) A reference to a relevant Gibraltar provision is to be read with section 23 of the Financial Services Act 2021.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would require any Gibraltar-based person carrying on activities in the UK to file their accounts at Companies House and to be regulated in the UK with regard to their UK activities.
Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]
My Lords, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans sends his apologies. Due to unforeseen circumstances, he is unable to speak to Amendment 7. At very short notice, he has asked me to speak for him.
Amendment 7, in the name of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, and myself, would require companies operating under the Gibraltar authorisation regime, or GAR, to be registered and to file their accounts in the UK at Companies House. It would also ensure that GAR companies are regulated in respect of their UK activities, in accordance with UK regulations.
I beg your Lordships’ indulgence. In order to minimise any disservice to the right reverend Prelate, my speech will be in two parts. First, I will relay what the right reverend Prelate would have said. Secondly, I will briefly add my own comments.
In the words of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans: I have placed this amendment because I did not feel that my concerns about Gibraltar were adequately satisfied in Committee when I tabled a similar amendment. I will be frank: I got the impression that because Gibraltar was an associated territory, there was a reluctance to ensure that it could not be used by companies to reduce their tax obligations. I understand that the Gibraltar authorisation regime allows for continuity of the financial services that existed when we were a member of the EU. But this should not discount the fact that a single market in financial services is being created here. Gibraltar is not necessarily a serial, global tax haven. According to the Tax Justice Network, Gibraltar ranks 30th in the corporate tax haven index, whereas the UK is ranked 13th. In no way do I want this to be an attack on the territory of Gibraltar, particularly having highlighted that the UK is ranked as a worse tax haven.
This amendment attempts to speak to a specific UK-Gibraltar issue on tax avoidance. The current relationship allows a Gibraltar-based company to operate, conduct its business and receive what would be taxable income in the UK, but then to pay corporation tax in Gibraltar. There is a corporation tax disparity between the UK and Gibraltar. Our corporation tax is 19% whereas Gibraltar’s is 10%.
During his evidence session to the Commons Committee, the Minister from Gibraltar said that the corporation tax rate was not a factor in companies relocating to Gibraltar. No doubt the Mediterranean climate and lifestyle make it a very attractive place to reside, but I would not presume that the warm climate is responsible for 20% of the UK’s private insurance market being underwritten from Gibraltar, despite the territory holding not even 0.1% of the UK’s population.
Financial services are one of Gibraltar’s primary industries, hence the tabling of this amendment. One might assume that greater transparency would apply to the finance and other sectors, ideally through stricter and more thorough reporting standards between Gibraltar and the UK. It is common practice in many industries for transactions placed in the UK to be processed via servers in Gibraltar—a technicality that allows what is, in reality, taxable income in the UK to be taxed in Gibraltar.
Obtaining evidence on the cost of the system to the UK Treasury is difficult. However, we have reliable data for the online gaming and gambling sector. Research and private investigations have shown that some of the UK’s major gambling firms actually pay corporation tax in the UK of between 3% and 13% by either headquartering in Gibraltar or using subsidiaries based there. We know of this only because the size of these firms brought them under journalistic scrutiny. If these practices were well documented for one sector, it would be illogical if other sectors did not follow the same incentives. After all, the purpose of reducing corporation tax is only one major reason for relocation to Gibraltar.
This amendment does not deal with the issue of taxation. In fact, even if the Government adopted the amendment, these practices would still continue. It would ensure that companies operating under the GAR regime abide by the Companies Act 2006, which mandates foreign countries to register and file accounts at Companies House.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, who has presented the amendment so clearly and effectively, while I also regret the absence of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, who has been doing such sterling work in focusing on the practical real-world impacts of the Bill on people’s lives and welfare, to which, as we have discussed in other groups, a lack of effective regulation in the financial sector has done such damage.
In Committee, during a debate on a similar amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, referred to brass-plate economies and the damage that they do to societies if they become dominant. Indeed, much of our debate in Committee focused on the well-being of the people of Gibraltar. I have no objection to that; indeed, I welcome it. I wish them well in their difficult post-Brexit position, which they were put into despite 96% of them voting in 2016 to remain in the EU. However, we have to ask why 20% of the UK insurance sector and a large amount of our out-of-control, seriously damaging gambling sector is going through Gibraltar’s servers, with very little benefit to the people of the UK. I doubt whether ending it will make any great difference to the people of Gibraltar either; as the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, has just outlined—and he is one of your Lordships’ House’s experts in this area—very little of that money is likely to be seen in Gibraltar in any meaningful sense.
I note that the Minister said in Committee:
“This proposal cannot be supported by the Government because it does not reflect Gibraltar’s autonomy”,
but I am not sure that I understand that. If we are talking about regulating activities in the UK, which is what the amendment is explicitly about, surely that is a matter of sovereignty—the issue to which the Government are so attached. Perhaps the Minister can explain that further in his answer.
In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord True, said:
“The Government were satisfied that the Gibraltar authorisation regime is rigorous”,—[Official Report, 1/3/21; col. GC 308.]
but we have to ask why so much business is whizzing through Gibraltar, at least in electronic form, for no obvious reason.
The noble Lord, Lord Sikka, pointed out in Committee that Gibraltar has a population of around 33,000 but more than 60,000 registered companies, nearly two for every person living on the Rock. We know that Gibraltar as a society must need people to fulfil many roles, from childcare to garbage collection, food preparation and, probably now much more than before, customs officials. The regulators of those 60,000 companies must be kept very busy keeping a tight and careful eye on their activities. Perhaps the reason is simply the comparative corporation tax rates. As the right reverend Prelate intended to say, our corporation tax rate is 19% whereas Gibraltar’s is 10%. Of course, the Government promise that our corporation tax rates will rise to become somewhat closer to international norms—if not just yet—so the disparity and the potential attraction are likely only to increase.
I referred in Committee to the Tax Justice Network estimate that the Gibraltarian arrangements inflict costs of $4 billion on other nations, predominantly the UK. That figure could grow significantly with tax rises, so I would argue that the case for this amendment has become even stronger, and I remain, with many others, doubtful about the level of transparency and scrutiny.
Ultimately, this amendment is about activities in the UK. It is not about Gibraltar at all. It is about transparency, honesty and ensuring that profits made in the UK are properly taxed in the UK.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I am cautious about any further disruption for Gibraltar post Brexit. The challenge that Gibraltarians face is going to be an exceedingly difficult one and, since the UK put Gibraltar into that situation, we ought to be sympathetic and supportive.
I understand the motives of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans and others to increase transparency, but we are talking about what is best described as legal tax avoidance, not tax evasion. I hear nothing but widespread respect for the Gibraltarian tax authorities and the way they manage the business that falls under their supervision.
This is a dangerous time to deny another party equivalence when we ourselves are seeking equivalence from the European Union. I would point out, as others have done, that we have rather a low corporate tax rate at the moment. It is due to rise in the future, but we will still be at the low end of the G7. At the moment, we are exceedingly low compared to most of our EU competitors. We have also granted equivalence to the EU, and that includes locations such as Luxembourg and Ireland, which have low corporate taxes much more akin to those of Gibraltar.
So I do not think we have a major problem here. I am always glad to see an opportunity for transparency but, in this case, we are not looking at shutting down criminal activities, which is the area where I would like to see us work very hard on transparency. I think we need to be responsible to the people of Gibraltar, who sit in a position that is not of their choosing.
Lord Eatwell (Lab)
My Lords, the measures in this Bill that refer to Gibraltar essentially create a single financial market, and an essential component of a single financial market should be a single registry standard. So I want to ask the Government about their approach to this. When they decided to promote the measures in the Bill in support of Gibraltar, did Her Majesty’s Treasury conduct a review of the Gibraltar registry, and could the Minister tell us the result of that review? For example, could he tell us whether the Gibraltar registry is as transparent as that of Companies House?
Noble Lords will be well aware, after Committee, that my opinion of the Companies House registry is pretty low, in particular regarding its inability to provide a verified register of beneficial ownership, which is at the foundation of the right reverend Prelate’s concern with tax issues. So could the Minister assure us that the Gibraltar registry has a verified register of beneficial ownership, as well as being transparent?
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Lord True) (Con)
My Lords, I certainly regret, along with others, that the right reverend Prelate was unable to be here to speak to his amendment, but we fully understand the reasons for that. Obviously, the House has great respect for his expertise in these financial matters. We are grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, for delivering aspects of his speech.
In response to the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, who raised an issue relating to state aid, I should say for the record that the issue he raised is a legacy state aid issue, relating entirely to the period when the UK was a member of the European Union. The Government of Gibraltar have already recovered some of the aid and continue to work to recover the outstanding aid, in compliance with the European Commission’s decision to bring this case to a satisfactory conclusion as fast as possible.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Lexden) (Con)
My Lords, I have received no requests to speak after the Minister, so I call the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, to conclude the debate on the right reverend Prelate’s amendment.
Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]
I thank all the contributors to this debate, which has been very informative and helpful. Given that roughly 25% of UK motor insurance is written from Gibraltar, it is clear that large amounts of profit made in the UK are being booked in Gibraltar and that the public purse here is being deprived of large amounts of tax revenue.
Of course, we might take the view that Gibraltar has been hit hard by Brexit and therefore deserves some support, but, as I pointed out, the beneficiaries of those profits are not necessarily people in Gibraltar but are actually corporations using Gibraltar to extract revenue from the UK. The ultimate destination of those profits is not really known because there is no transparency at all. Whether somebody is engaging in tax evasion or tax avoidance, the effect on the UK public purse is the same: the loss of revenue.
We still need greater transparency but at the moment, we do not have it. I hope that, when we have a public form of country-by-country reporting, perhaps that will provide some form of transparency, but at the moment the Government are not committed to that.
Nevertheless, I thank everybody for their contributions to the debate, and with the permission of the House and on behalf of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, I beg leave to withdraw this amendment.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Lexden) (Con)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 8. Anyone wishing to press this or anything else in this group to a Division must make that clear in debate.
Clause 34: Debt respite scheme
Amendment 8
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment and the Minister’s amendments at page 40, lines 16 and 31 make drafting changes in connection with the Minister’s first amendment at page 47, line 34.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, I will speak also to the other amendments in this group. The Sewel convention states that normally, the UK Parliament will legislate in areas that are devolved only with the permission of the relevant legislature, obtained through the legislative consent Motion process.
In recent weeks, despite the best efforts of Ministers and officials from HM Treasury and the Northern Ireland Executive, it has become clear that the legislative consent Motions for relevant parts of the Bill would not be completed before Report in this House. It is therefore necessary to ensure that certain elements of the Bill do not apply in Northern Ireland, in line with the Sewel convention.
I assure the House that the great majority of the Bill will have effect in Northern Ireland, as financial services is a reserved matter. However, it is necessary for Northern Ireland to be removed from the relevant parts of the Statutory Debt Repayment Plan and account freezing and forfeiture measures in Clause 34 and Schedule 12, with connected changes to Clause 44 on extent and Clause 45 on commencement in addition.
These are technical amendments which the Government have tabled to avoid legislating without consent. Our understanding is that the absence of a consent Motion is due to current timing constraints rather than any concern about the substance of the measures. Legislative consent was not denied—the process was simply not completed.
Amendments 50 and 51 will amend Schedule 12 so that certain provisions in that schedule will have different effects in Northern Ireland from those in England and Wales and Scotland. Amendments 38, 40, 41 and 42 amend Clauses 44 and 45 to help give effect to the changes to Schedule 12. The amendments retain the status quo in Northern Ireland regarding the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, and the changes which Schedule 12 makes to that Act will have effect only in England, Wales and Scotland. It is important to be clear that these amendments will not affect Schedule 12 as it relates to the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. Anti-terrorism is an excepted matter and the changes which Schedule 12 makes to that Act will have effect across the UK.
Amendments 8, 9, 10, 13 and 39 prevent most of the changes made in Clause 34 extending to Northern Ireland. These are the provisions relating to the Statutory Debt Repayment Plan measure.
Clause 34(4), which provides an express power to bind the Crown, will continue to apply to Northern Ireland. This is done so as not to disturb the position on Crown application that the Government consider originally applied in the Financial Guidance and Claims Act 2018 in relation to Northern Ireland.
I would like to reassure noble Lords that Northern Ireland will still be able to make its own legislation providing for a debt respite scheme of its own design, including similar provisions to those in Clause 34, if these are desired. UK Government officials will of course continue to work closely with and support their opposite numbers on the design and implementation of a debt respite scheme for Northern Ireland if this is pursued.
I urge the House to accept these amendments, which are necessary to avoid legislating for Northern Ireland without the appropriate consent. I beg to move.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Lexden) (Con)
The name of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, does not appear on the list, but he should have been included, so I call him next.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab) [V]
I am grateful to the House for allowing me to speak at this point. I put in a request, but it got omitted. The Deputy Speaker has expressed the situation well.
The substance of the issues raised by the noble Earl in his introduction are incontestable. We respect the devolution settlement and we need to make sure that everything we do is in accordance with that. He slightly misspoke in the sense that the Sewel convention now has statutory force, rather than being just a convention. Indeed, it is often now called the Sewel principle. When we were dealing with matters arising from the internal market Bill, which came to your Lordships’ House about six months ago, that was certainly the way in which we addressed this issue.
I understand the logic behind the Government’s current position and their concern that they should not take steps which would in any sense mitigate the Sewel principle, as discussed. However, I was left a little confused by the noble Earl’s remarks, despite the usual clarity with which he expressed himself.
As I understood it, the debt respite scheme was being progressed under regulations made under the Financial Guidance and Claims Act 2018, to which he referred. It therefore seems a little odd that we are still concerned that that might not go ahead or that, if it did, it would do so under regulations made in Northern Ireland rather than those which will apply in England and Wales. From memory, this will be in place from May 2021, which is not very far away. I would be grateful if the noble Earl could be a little clearer about that when he comes to respond, or perhaps he could write to me and we could discuss this. The issue is where that authority will vest going forward. Will it relate to the UK financial guidance Act or to local legislation put through by the Northern Ireland Assembly? Matters may arise regarding how that is decided, but I would like to know the answer.
The other question is how we make progress in relation to the statutory debt repayment plans. The issue here is again whether the necessary legislative consent order would have come through, when it has not, in relation to that. If that is the case, perhaps the Minister will confirm whether that is happening. If it is not happening, is not the situation a little different this time? Because, as we are going to discuss in the next group, we are now being told that the timeframe for the delivery of the SDRP is going to be the end of 2024, which is, after all, three and a bit years away. It seems unlikely that there will still be a problem if we are waiting for the Northern Ireland Assembly to consider that: we should be able to get through that in three and a half years’ time.
I would be grateful if the Minister would let us know a bit more about the Government’s plans and again, it that is not in his notes, he can write to me and we can discuss it offline.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, the minute I saw this group of amendments, I knew they were above my pay grade. I am in awe of the understanding of the noble Lords, Lord True and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara. I forwarded all the amendments to those of my colleagues who deal specifically with Northern Ireland, and I think they travelled over to Northern Ireland, as well, for review there. The message I got back was that the timing—I will not repeat the word that followed—problem, let us say, was not a problem.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing these amendments and for the explanation that was shared ahead of this debate. We will not oppose them today, as it is right that changes should not be made without legislative consent. It is, however, very troubling that these provisions will go forward without Northern Ireland’s inclusion. and that time has not been offered to allow the Northern Ireland Executive to pass a consent Motion. It is my understanding that there were also difficulties on timing for a legislative consent Motion during the passage of the Medicines and Medical Devices Bill. It cannot become a habit for this Government to carve Northern Ireland out of legislation at the last minute or treat legislative consent as an afterthought. What conversations were had with the Northern Ireland Executive on the problem of timing? Were any measures considered to allow them extra time as needed?
Have the Government identified ways to prevent this happening again? On the substantive issues, the result is that the Bill will be passed without offering the same powers and protections for communities and law enforcement in Northern Ireland as in other areas of the UK. This is of particular concern for the statutory debt repayment plans at a time when the impact of the Covid pandemic has placed extreme stress on people’s personal finances.
Finally, what options are the Government considering, with the Northern Ireland Executive, to ensure that Northern Ireland is given an opportunity to enact these provisions and that communities in Northern Ireland are able to benefit from the planned support on debt and personal finance?
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their remarks, and I stress again that UK government officials will of course continue to work closely with and support their opposite numbers in Northern Ireland. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, will accept that that is as far as I can go as regards our support for our Northern Ireland colleagues, because the ball is very much in their court as to how they wish to proceed and when. As and when they decide to proceed, they will of course get full co-operation from the UK Government.
I would like to touch on a question that the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked me relating to the Medicines and Medical Devices Bill. That also gave rise to an issue over a legislative consent Motion from Northern Ireland. The context for securing legislative consent for the Medicines and Medical Devices Act 2021—as it now is—was quite distinct from that for this Bill. Northern Ireland Executive Ministers were asked to consider promoting a supplementary legislative consent Motion on a second occasion as a result of amendments added to the Medicines and Medical Devices Bill during its House of Lords Committee stage. The Northern Ireland Assembly had sufficient time to consider and pass a supplementary LCM before the Bill’s Report stage in the second House—in this case, the Lords. Report is considered to be the last substantive amending stage of a Bill in the House of Lords and, consequently, the last opportunity for the Government to avoid legislating for Northern Ireland had consent been denied or not achieved in time.
Unfortunately for this Bill, it has not been possible to secure legislative consent in time, in spite of the efforts of our officials and those in the Northern Ireland Executive. The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked whether we can prevent this situation happening again. I respectfully say to him that it really is not within the control of the Government here to influence the order of business and the work conducted by the Northern Ireland Executive. It is largely in their domain, but I hope my earlier reassurances will have been helpful on this topic.
The background to this, to come to his earlier point and the issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, is that breathing space regulations, which are the second half of the SDRP measures, that come into force on 4 May this year, do not apply in Northern Ireland, largely due to there being no sitting Assembly during the policy formulation and drafting of regulations. As I have said, we have been advised by officials in Northern Ireland that it will not be possible to pass the LCM agreeing that Parliament should legislate on their behalf until mid- to late April, which is too late for the Lords’ Report stage. The amendment carves out Northern Ireland from Clause 34 as I have described, with the exception of Clause 34(4). The Government understand that the relevant departments in Northern Ireland intend to take forward their own legislation for a debt respite scheme in due course.
I am afraid that the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, has the better of me in his detailed questions. I will need to write to him, if he will forgive my not answering him now, on where the precise authority vests in relation to a Northern Ireland debt respite scheme, and indeed how the Government’s plan for the debt respite scheme will pan out prior to the end of 2024.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Lexden) (Con)
My Lords, we now come to the group beginning with Amendment 11. Anyone wishing to press this or anything else in this group to a Division must make that clear in debate.
Amendment 11
“(4B) The regulations may also include the following as part of the scheme—(a) provision to ensure that debt advisers that are responsible for the delivery of debt advice in support of a plan for the repayment of some, or all, of an individual’s debts have been properly authorised by the FCA;(b) provision to ensure that when an individual is deemed suitable to enter into a plan for the repayment of some or all of their outstanding debts, the organisation holding funds on behalf of the individual and making the agreed repayments to creditors must be a charity or other not-for-profit organisation properly authorised by the FCA;(c) provision to ensure that the aggregate provision payable in respect of the costs of operating the repayment plan, other repayment plans, the debt respite scheme and the wider debt advice services being provided meets the reasonable annual costs of the organisations involved; (d) provision that the debts that are dealt with under a plan for repayment include those owed to Her Majesty’s Government and those owed to other UK public bodies and service providers;(e) provision that when an individual has entered into a plan for the repayment of some or all of their outstanding debts, they will receive protection from any warrant or action from bailiffs appointed by a UK court.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment allows further probing of the Government's plans to establish the Statutory Debt Management Scheme.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I declare an interest as a former chair of StepChange, the debt charity. Amendment 11 has exactly the same wording as the amendment to Clause 34 that I moved in Committee. The purpose is to give the Government a further opportunity to set out in more detail their plans for the introduction of the statutory debt management plans in England and Wales—not, sadly, in Northern Ireland, yet—to complement that which is already working as a very successful scheme in Scotland. We are getting there by patchwork, even if we are unable to do so from top down, as we might wish.
I am very grateful to the Minister and officials for facilitating discussions about the detailed SDMP proposals, and for his very full letter of yesterday, which sets out the Government’s position very clearly. It is a very good letter to have, and we got a lot of reassurance from it.
I also touch on Amendment 12 in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, which introduces an interesting and important aspect of debt management plans—a bit of detail, in fact. It is about the concept of negotiated debt settlements on behalf of debtors, which are already part of the current debt management plan process in operation in Scotland, and in England in an informal way—not statutorily backed. A realistic quantum for the outstanding debt is clearly a key metric when plans have been drawn up for what should constitute an affordable repayment schedule, so it makes sense to both sides if the final figures reduce the outstanding debt in as short a time as possible. I look forward to hearing further from the noble Baroness and the right reverend Prelate, if he is able to join us, about how they see this working in practice. I think they are probably more suited to regulatory action than statutory action in the Bill, but we will wait to see how the case comes out when it is argued.
Yesterday’s letter from the noble Lord, Lord True, is extremely helpful, and I thank him for it. In it, he explains that secondary legislation will spell out matters of detailed policy and implementation for the SDRP and confirms that, as these will be introduced by the affirmative resolution procedure, Parliament will be given adequate opportunity to debate and scrutinise the regulations. I welcome that. In Committee, my main concern was timing, and the letter says that the Treasury intends to consult on the draft regulations as soon as possible after the Bill receives Royal Assent. We will keep an eye out for them and hope that it will not be too late after Royal Assent comes through.
On implementation, the letter makes it clear that, understandably, there needs to be time for IT changes and preparing the scheme guidance. It suggests that 18 months would give adequate time for stakeholders to prepare after regulations have been laid. I have no reason to question that timing but, given that the letter goes on to suggest that the SDRP may not actually be in use until the end of 2024, it seems to me that we are talking about a delay of perhaps three and a half years once work has started. I wonder whether the Government might want to look at that timetable again. We need to get this right, clearly, and time must be given for that, but Ministers are aware that the SDMP is complementary to the debt relief scheme, which we were just talking about in relation to Northern Ireland, which is due to operate on a much tighter timetable—to be introduced, I think the Minister said, in early May. To be honest, I do not think I would be alone if I said that the Minister’s hope, as expressed in his letter, that this timetable reassures noble Lords that the Government’s work will proceed at pace is not altogether convincing. Perhaps the Minister will respond at the end of the debate.
The letter also contains some very helpful reassurance on other policy matters. Debtors are to be protected from most creditor enforcement during an SDRP, including enforcement by bailiffs. That is a great relief to hear. We will come back to that in a later amendment. It might be helpful if the Government could clarify what creditor enforcement would not be protected under an SDRP. That would be useful to have on record. The letter confirms that the widest range of personal and business debt should be eligible for inclusion in an SDRP. It is good to have that confirmation and to know that, in particular, that includes local government as well as Crown debts. Again, it is useful to have that clarification on the record.
Only those with appropriate authorisations from the FCA will be able to offer SDRPs, unless they are a local authority that offers money advice and is therefore exempt from FCA authorisation. Again, that clarification is helpful and welcome. Debt advice providers will not be able to charge a fee to debtors for accessing an SDRP. Again, that clarification is extremely welcome.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord McNicol of West Kilbride) (Lab)
My Lords, the next speaker is the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. The speaker after her, the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, has withdrawn, so the speaker after the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, will be the noble Lord, Lord Davies.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, and I offer my thanks for his support for the concept of Amendment 12, to which I shall speak. It appears in my name and is kindly supported by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans.
Amendment 12 seeks to secure a discounting of debt for people entering proposed statutory debt repayment plans—something that the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, noted has already occurred in Scotland. I set out in Committee that that is a large group of people with incomes above those eligible for debt relief orders, but with assets and income generally below those covered by voluntary agreements on bankruptcy. All those other agreements operate in ways that can result in debt being cleared in a relatively short period, much shorter than those to be covered by statutory debt repayment plans. I will not repeat all that detail again.
However, this amendment represents a development of an amendment presented in Committee to secure a fair debt write-down in respect of debts sold on the secondary market. For that initial amendment and this amended one, I pay tribute to the large amount of work done by the Centre for Responsible Credit, from which noble Lords will have received a briefing. While a strong argument exists to support this proposal, entirely legitimate concerns were raised in the debate that the impact of such a move on the operation of the secondary market would need to be properly considered. The noble Lord, Lord True, also raised a concern about the need for equitable treatment of debtors in the scheme. Taking those concerns on board, this new amendment, rather than being prescriptive, is permissive in nature and seeks to ensure that discounts on debt are secured, where appropriate, with the full agreement of creditors.
Amendment 12 recognises that many creditors listed on debt repayment plans, regardless of whether the debt originated with them or they bought it on the secondary market, will often prefer to receive a lump sum as full and final payment as opposed to low levels of instalments spread out over many years. As a result, many creditors already offer a significant discount on the total level of debt if a lump-sum settlement can be made. While the StepChange debt charity has a dedicated team to provide advice to debtors concerning possible full and final settlements, not all debt management plan providers do so. There arises a potential conflict of interest, as SDRP providers are likely to be reimbursed on a percentage basis of the total debt collected. Securing discounts for big debtors would reduce their revenues.
This amendment would therefore ensure that the Government are provided with a power to instruct SDRP providers, where appropriate, to enter into debt settlement negotiations on behalf of debtors entering the scheme. Hopefully this is not needed, but it is important that such a power exists.
In addition, it ought to be possible for SDRP providers to go further. With appropriate funding and regulation, business models could be encouraged that would allow SDRP providers to themselves buy out, and therefore discount, debts registered on their plans. For example, in recent months we have seen instances of debt of £10,000 being discounted by as much as 40% in return for full and final settlement. Enabling such debts to be bought out and subsequently collected by SDRP providers would mean the debtor would have to repay only £6,900, even after taking into account a 15% fee for the provider. It should be possible to achieve a result that is beneficial to creditor and debtor alike. I stress that building this negotiated settlement approach into the SDRP is likely to be welcomed by creditors, who in many cases are already prepared to discount heavily for lump sums in full and final settlement.
It is not my intention to push this amendment to a vote at this stage, but I seek a commitment from the Minister to continue to explore and work on this issue. I hope he can commit to a meeting between the department and interested noble Lords to see how we can take this forward, possibly in regulation.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I speak in support of Amendments 11 and 12. I do not intend to delay us particularly long at this time of night, but I want to take the opportunity to pursue an issue.
My involvement in the Financial Services Bill has been a learning experience for me, as a new Member, in the way in which we are able to progress issues through the course of a Bill and the opportunities arising at different stages to make points and develop what it is possible to achieve, as opposed to what we would like in a perfect world. I have made plain my support for a more fundamental debt jubilee, but that is clearly a discussion—a fight—for another day. The amendments before us today clearly provide a useful step forward—a small step, but one that is still worth while.
I want to say a word on behalf of the debtors, those people who have taken on debts for all sorts of reasons—some good, some bad. You cannot just look at the debtors in this situation and say, “That is where the problem arose.” Quite clearly, bad debts are part of the business plan of people who lend money. We have learnt to an extent during these debates that there are issues in how you develop a plan so that, when debts are discounted, it is not just commercial organisations that benefit and there is also the opportunity for those who have unwisely or mistakenly taken on debts to gain some advantage from the discounting of debts. That is really what we are trying to work towards here.
I support these amendments and hope the Government will be able to take on board the issues raised. The underlying issue—this is the point I have pursued before—is that there is a public interest in dealing with debt and relieving people of the debts they have taken on; it does not help just the individuals concerned. Lowering the level of debt and removing onerous debts help us all generally, and particularly at the moment when we are looking for an economic revival. I hope the Government take on board the ideas behind these amendments and work towards a scheme that helps not just the debtors but all of us.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord McNicol of West Kilbride) (Lab)
The next speaker after the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, will be the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con) [V]
It is a pleasure to speak to this group of amendments, and I declare my interests as set out in the register. I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, on the way in which he introduced this group, and on all the work that he has done in this area, not least with StepChange. More than a step change, he has done more than many marathons around this subject. Not just your Lordships’ House, but the nation, is in his debt for the work he has done on debt.
I also thank the Minister for his engagement throughout the Bill. I know that he is completely committed to this area, and I congratulate him on the engagement and the time he has spent with me and other noble Lords. It is safe to say that this is an issue that will run longer than this Bill. As with so many other issues, Covid puts a new lens on debt, and enables more people to understand that it is not necessarily just for others. Potentially, with a slight twist of circumstance, we are but a heartbeat, or a breath, away from being in tough financial straits. I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, and I look forward to hearing the response from the Minister.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]
My Lords, like my noble friend Lord Holmes, who I am delighted to follow, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, for giving us the opportunity, with what I consider to be probing amendments, to explore in more detail how the statutory debt management plans will work. I must say to my noble friend the Minister that I am deeply uneasy, because there is very little detail in the Bill about how these provisions will work.
I am a Scot by birth, and a non-practising member of the Faculty of Advocates. Noble Lords will recall that I started my legal career as a humble Bar apprentice, working in a rather Dickensian attic along Heriot Row in Edinburgh, looking at debt collection as part of my role.
I am grateful to the Centre for Responsible Credit for its impressive briefing. What concerns me is a lack of urgency on the part of the Government. According to the Financial Conduct Authority, the pandemic has negatively impacted the finances of 20 million people. Problems are, I understand, concentrated among the self-employed, who obviously have been particularly hard hit, especially those who became self-employed in the year before the lockdown restrictions came into effect. Also heavily impacted are those on incomes of less than £15,000 a year, and BAME communities. The FCA estimates that just under one in five adults is overindebted, with 8.5 million potentially needing debt advice. According to the previous National Audit Office methodology, we can, sadly, expect the knock-on impacts of overindebtedness, such as increased mental health problems and unemployment, to cost the taxpayer in the region of £9 billion a year.
I shall ask my noble friend a question about what we could do, rather than playing for time and our not seeing any detail, with no scheme in place beforehand. As the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, said in moving his Amendment 11 so effectively, the scheme will not be in place in England until 2024. The question must be: if there is a tried and tested scheme in Scotland, which is working, could we not therefore adapt that scheme to operate in England in the next two years? That would be a great help, and would go to the heart of how we in the United Kingdom approach the issue of debt.
Amendment 12, too, has much to commend it, and I very much look forward to hearing what my noble friend will say in summing up this little debate.
Baroness Coussins (CB) [V]
My Lords, I support Amendment 11 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, and I remind the House of my interest as an ambassador and former president of the Money Advice Trust.
Although Clause 34 may be seen as a relatively small part of the Bill, we have had a great deal of discussion on it during the passage of the Bill—a sign of how important SDRPs are. Throughout the process, I and other noble Lords have been keen to secure clarity over the timetable for introducing SDRPs.
I thank the Minister for his positive and constructive engagement on this issue and for meeting me and the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, to discuss the timings for the introduction of SDRPs. Like the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, I am also grateful to the Minister for his letter yesterday, which provided further clarity on this timetable.
In Committee, the Government did not accept my amendment to include a specific date by which SDRPs should be implemented. I was pleased nevertheless to hear the Minister confirm that the complex and detailed process to prepare for implementation seemed to be entirely compatible with the end date I was proposing—albeit pretty tightly.
So I hope the Minister will be able to confirm that on the record this evening, by specifying the various stages of the Treasury’s intended timetable for laying the regulations and reassuring the House that SDRPs are genuinely intended to have a commencement date before May 2024. I look forward to the Minister’s reply.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I join in congratulating the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, on his amendments in Committee and again here on Report. He has clearly found a mechanism for engaging very fruitfully with the Government, and therefore we all have the benefit of a letter that lays out some of the important and significant elements of statutory debt repayment plans; for that, I am grateful.
I join with the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, in being rather perturbed—I think the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, was as well—that the implementation date is 2024. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, said that it was towards the end of 2024. I advise the Government not then to use terms such as “at pace”, which they use extensively in the Financial Services Bill—usually to argue that there is no time for a statutory instrument to be approved by Parliament, which takes a matter of weeks.
I am rather troubled and it suggests that the Government might want to think of some kind of stopgap to deal with the very significant number of people who will find themselves with debt problems as we come to the end of furlough. People will find that they have been moved into permanent redundancy and that other jobs are hard to obtain, and a lot of young people coming out of university courses will not find the usual opportunities.
We are going to go through a very rough period where quite a number of people will find themselves loaded down with private debt, not because they have behaved inappropriately in any way but because the way events have hit them. They will need some additional support and rescue, rather than just the schemes that are in place. The SDRPs would almost certainly have been ideal for many of them. So I hope the Government will look at the events that are going to force a lot of people into a very difficult position.
Amendment 12, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, would do what I think Amendment 55 in Committee was intended to do. This time I think it would do it. It is designed to enhance opportunities for people who have signed up to SDRPs to pay off their debts early at a discount. It will need some structure and engagement from social enterprise groups and perhaps even the Government providing some measure of support, because seed funding will be needed to get a scheme such as this off the ground. I hope that the Government will think some of that through. It seems the kind of scheme that would enable people to get back into the financial mainstream more quickly, which is surely something we want to achieve. Again, the need for that will be more acute because of the extraordinary number of people who will find themselves in debt as a consequence of Covid. I do not think it actually requires legislation, so I am glad that the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, will choose not to move it.
These two amendments highlight the need for some serious thinking on how the Government can best support people who will come out of Covid and find themselves in fairly difficult circumstances. When we work with people who have debt problems, a fundamental issue usually has to be dealt with that has led them into that corner. Sometimes it is to do with lifestyle choices, but very often it might be mental health issues or family breakdown. The group who will find themselves in problems because of the impact of Covid do not fall into that category. Therefore, with a proper helping hand at the right time, they could quickly and easily be returned to a position where they are no longer financially excluded or in financial difficulties. That is absolutely necessary if we are to see the recovery that we all hope for. I hope the Government will look at these amendments and continue to build on them, rather than consider them concluded because Report has passed.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, we welcome the re-tabling of Amendment 11 by my noble friend Lord Stevenson, which provides the Minister with an opportunity to give more detail on the intention behind the Government’s introduction of the statutory debt management scheme. We are grateful to the Minister and his officials for the various meetings that have taken place in recent weeks. We hope that, even once the Bill has passed, there will be opportunities for further cross-party dialogue on issues relating to personal debt, financial resilience and so on.
There was a lively debate on this issue in Grand Committee, and various amendments were tabled by colleagues from across the Committee. Despite the number of amendments, almost all noble Lords were united in saying that the Government must get on with introducing the scheme. Amendment 12 from the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, co-signed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, deals with some slightly broader issues relating to problem debt. We hope that the Minister can provide a full response to those points, either now or in writing.
Looking at these amendments and the next group on BNPL and financial exclusion, I am struck by just how important it is to adopt a more holistic approach to personal finance, as proposed by my noble friend Lord Stevenson in his previous amendment on the concept of financial well-being. Helping people with debt has to be important. I have trouble understanding how people cope with that situation. It is the role of the state to provide structures to allow people to take on their debt problems in a managed way. I look forward to the Minister’s response to my noble friend’s amendment.
Lord True (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity to respond to the debate. I genuinely thank all noble Lords who spoke in Committee and who have spoken today and, indeed, those with whom I have had the privilege of meeting and discussing these matters of engagement. All the discussions have been useful, and the Government have certainly listened to them. I hope that in my letter which I have placed in the Library of the House and my remarks this evening, I will be able to assure noble Lords that that is the position.
What I have found most pleasing is a sense of unanimity, which is rare in this House, that we are on the right track as regards seeking a scheme of this kind. The SDRP is a new solution for those who are in problem debt. It will provide a revised, long-term agreement between the debtor and creditors. Debtors will be protected from most credit enforcement action and from certain interests and charges on debts in the plan. Following the Committee stage and the valuable discussions I have referred to, I wrote to the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, and my noble friend Lord Lucas with further details. The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, referred to aspects of that letter. However, the Library of your Lordships’ House is not open to everyone, particularly at this time. Given its importance to today’s debate, I hope that your Lordships will indulge me if I take some time to place on public record some of the key commitments set out in it because they are commitments which have been made on behalf of the Government. I also want to ensure that all noble Lords understand the timings the Government are working to.
I spoke in Committee in response to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, about the range of support being given by the Government to people at this difficult time, and she is quite right to refer to those difficulties. In the meantime, as we work on the SDRP, the Government are pushing ahead with the implementation of a breathing space scheme that will come into force on 4 May this year. Other voluntary and statutory debt solutions will continue to be available to debtors to consider in the meantime.
I return to the process which has been of interest to many noble Lords. The Treasury is currently drafting regulations for the SDRP and intends to consult on them as soon as possible after the Financial Services Bill receives Royal Assent. As well as preparing the regulations, the Treasury will also need to work with the Insolvency Service and others to implement new IT systems and develop scheme guidance to aid stakeholders in implementing the policy. It is also important, obviously, to give stakeholders adequate time to prepare so that the regime can be implemented properly. Given that, I can confirm that the Government expect the SDRP to be implemented in 2024. In order to achieve that, they will aim to lay the necessary regulations by the end of 2022.
I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, is disappointed at the specifics of my letter on the timing and, indeed, that has been alluded to by others. However, I will repeat that it is the Government’s clear aim and intent, as the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, was kind enough to say, to operate on that timetable with the most appropriate dispatch.
As to why the SDRP regulations might not be able to be laid until the end of 2022, the reality is that the Treasury is currently working on their drafting. I have explained that this is a complex undertaking and will require input from stakeholders both inside and outside the Government to finalise before a consultation on regulations can be published. That consultation will in turn need to give a reasonable length of time—we are often criticised for providing insufficient time for consultation—for stakeholders and members of the public to reflect and respond. We must allow sufficient time beyond that to consider the responses properly. Those views, as appropriate, will need to be reflected in the draft regulations before they are laid. The timetable will also need to accommodate the necessary clearances within Government and Parliament for publications and legislation. However, I know that noble Lords on all sides of the House, including on these Benches, wish for the SDRP to be progressed in a timely manner. The Government have certainly understood the strength of feeling among noble Lords on this matter.
I know that the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, wished also to further understand some of the details of the regime; as he has made clear, that is what his probing Amendment 11 seeks to explore. So I repeat on the public record that the details of the SDRP regime will be set out in affirmative secondary legislation, so Parliament will be able to consider the exact details close to the time. I also reassure noble Lords that Section 7 of the Financial Guidance and Claims Act 2018, as amended by Clause 34 of the Bill, will contain powers to allow the Government to include such features in the SDRP as suggested in the amendment. However, in response to the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, I will set out further detail on how the Government expect the regime to function.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I thank all those who have participated in this short debate. It was unfortunate that, because of timing and other pressures, we have lost the contributions from the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, and indeed from the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, both of whom had interesting points that they wanted to make. Despite that, we have touched just about every issue that needed to be looked at. Indeed, we have gone a bit further. I am very pleased that the debate has taken place, even though we have just passed our closing time.
I will take a few minutes to wind up by touching on a couple of points. Of course, I am deeply embarrassed by the idea that this initiative is all my responsibility and that I should get all the credit for it. That is certainly not the case. This has been a team effort by many groups and bodies, many of which were referred to by the Minister in his remarks. We should give credit to the not-for-profit and charitable bodies that have been working tirelessly over many years to get unmanageable debt sorted out in our society, for all the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, said. It is a cost to the public good. We did a calculation when I was at StepChange which suggested it was probably costing about £9 billion a year. I was interested that the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, also came up with a figure very close to that.
It is important that we have a mature and sensible debate about debt: how it happens, how it arises, and how it gets resolved. The great thing about today, and what I take away from it, is that we are able to do that in your Lordships’ House in a way that reflects the very best of our ability to contribute to these debates, and also with a listening Government who are prepared to take it back and see if there is a way in which legislation and regulation can be adjusted. If we can understand a little bit more about why debt happens and what people want to do about it, I think we will all benefit.
My experience at StepChange was rather unexpected. When I first went there, I thought it would be largely a collection of feckless people who had got themselves into overspending and debt. In fact, the truth was that our median client was probably in their 50s, had led a blameless life and done everything to make sure that their outgoings and income matched and that there was not a debt problem for them. They had done the best for themselves and for their families, and it was always, as someone said in the debate, an unexpected issue: somebody had got ill, somebody had lost their job unexpectedly, or there was some other crisis that occurred that tipped them over into a situation for which—and this was a message that came over time and time again—they really did not have the tools in their own personal skillset to be able to deal with. They did not understand the financial system very well, they could not understand where they could get help from, there was a confusing number of people who were trying to make money out of the problems that they were in, and they struggled.
It was only because of StepChange, Money Advice Trust, Citizens Advice, Christians Against Poverty and others who have done fantastic work over the years that we have got ourselves to a point where we can see a way forward on this. This legislation will help tremendously. There is no doubt about that at all. I am very grateful to the Government for having listened, having thought through the issues, and come forward with sensible plans, even though like others I regret the timescale that we are on. Nevertheless, I am sure we can get it right.
The Minister echoed a lot of the good will and support around the House that I have been reaching out to. But if he thinks this is the end of the line, he has another thing coming. I have a long list of things that I would still like to get done, things that have got away so far but which I shall try to ensure I do before I stop. If we get people off unmanageable debt and back into society, they often have terrible problems getting a credit rating. We must attack that. Even getting a credit card after you have been through a debt process is very difficult. A whole series of issues could come under the process that we talked about on an earlier amendment regarding financial well-being. We could look at that, with advantage, to build on where we are today.
If we can, as the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, said, have a sensible discussion about who is affected, why it happens and how we can do best by them, we will all benefit. With that, I again thank noble Lords for their contributions and beg leave to withdraw this amendment.
Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for the Minister's amendment at page 40, line 14.
Financial Services Bill
Wednesday 14th April 2021
(3 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Financial Services Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 162-R-III Third marshalled list for Report - (14 Apr 2021)
15:52 - Division conducted remotely on Amendment 15 - Ayes: 249 / Noes: 279 - Amendment 15 disagreed.
21:18 - Division conducted remotely on Amendment 21 - Ayes: 273 / Noes: 235 - Amendment 21 agreed.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)
My Lords, I will call Members to speak in the order listed. Short questions of elucidation after the Minister’s response are discouraged, but any Member wishing to ask such a question must email the clerk. The groupings are binding. A participant who might wish to press an amendment other than the lead amendment in a group to a Division must give notice in debate or by emailing the clerk. Leave should be given to withdraw amendments. When putting the question, I will collect voices in the Chamber only. If a Member taking part remotely wants their voice accounted for if the question is put, they must make that clear when speaking on the group.
Amendment 14
“Regulated activities and application of Consumer Credit Act 1974
(1) This section applies on or at any time after the making of an order under section 22 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, after this section comes into force, which has the effect that a relevant credit activity becomes a regulated activity for the purposes of that Act.(2) Section 107(6) of the Financial Services Act 2012 (power to make provision about the application of the Consumer Credit Act 1974) has effect as if—(a) the reference to an order of the kind mentioned in subsection (1) of that section included an order of the kind mentioned in subsection (1) of this section, and(b) the references to a transferred activity included a relevant credit activity which is the subject of an order of the kind mentioned in subsection (1) of this section.(3) “Relevant credit activity” means the activity of—(a) entering into an agreement described in article 60F(2) or (3) of the Regulated Activities Order (certain borrower-lender-supplier agreements for fixed-sum credit or running-account credit) as lender, or(b) exercising, or having the right to exercise, the lender’s rights and duties under such an agreement,so far as the activity is not a transferred activity (as defined in section 107(1) of the Financial Services Act 2012).(4) “The Regulated Activities Order” means the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 (S.I. 2001/544) as it has effect on the passing of this Act.”Member’s explanatory statement
Section 107(6) of the Financial Services Act 2012 provides that the Treasury may disapply provisions of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 in relation to an activity previously licensed under the 1974 Act, or exempted under specified provisions of that Act, where the activity has become a regulated activity for the purposes of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. This amendment extends that power to certain other activities of lenders.
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Lord True) (Con)
My Lords, the Government have brought forward Amendment 14 to ensure that buy now, pay later products can be brought into scope of regulation in a way that is proportionate to the risks that they pose to consumers. As noble Lords will recall from previous debates, to which the Government listened carefully, on 2 February following the publication of the Woolard Review into the unsecured credit market, the Government announced their intention to regulate interest-free buy now, pay later products. Following that announcement, the Government have been working at pace to ensure that this can be done in a proportionate and timely manner. Amendment 14 is the next step in this process. Many noble Lords were keen to see progress on the issue, so I hope that they will welcome the amendment today.
The Government recognise the concerns that exist with these products as the market continues to grow in the United Kingdom. We are therefore acting decisively to address the risk of detriment to consumers. The Government intend to bring buy now, pay later products within the scope of the regulatory framework, which includes the application of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. However, as noble Lords have previously heard, it is important to note that those products are interest-free, and thus are inherently lower-risk than most other forms of borrowing. Used properly, they can provide a lower-cost alternative to mainstream or high-cost credit. The Government’s view is that they can therefore be a useful part of the toolkit for managing personal finances and tackling financial exclusion, a topic that I will return to later in the debate. It is therefore essential that when buy now, pay later products are brought into regulation, it is done in a way that provides robust consumer protection, while ensuring that it is viable for firms to continue to offer these products. Amendment 14 will ensure that that can be done.
Some of the provisions of the Consumer Credit Act could be disproportionate, given the short term, interest-free nature of buy now, pay later products. They could also materially impact the way in which consumers are able to access these products. As a result, this amendment seeks to provide the Government with the power to ensure that the provisions of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 that will apply to buy now, pay later products are proportionate to the risks that the products present. This will allow the Government to apply only the provisions of the Act that have been determined to be proportionate to the risks posed by buy now, pay later products.
The Government intend to publish a consultation later this spring where the views of consumers, buy now, pay later providers and the retailers that offer these products will be sought on this matter. We will carefully consider these views to inform our approach to creating a proportionate regime, including decisions on which provisions in the Consumer Credit Act should apply to buy now, pay later agreements. Following this, we will take forward the necessary secondary legislation to bring buy now, pay later agreements into regulation. That secondary legislation will be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, meaning that noble Lords will have the opportunity to further scrutinise and comment on the Government’s proposals. I therefore ask that your Lordships support this amendment to ensure that the regulation of buy now, pay later can proceed both at pace and in a proportionate manner. I beg to move.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the Minister. In doing so, I declare my financial services interests as set out in the register. I would like to be the first to offer my support for Amendment 14 and what it seeks to achieve. I congratulate my noble friend on the decision to use the affirmative procedure to bring these powers into force.
I will now speak to Amendment 35 in my name. The thinking behind it is quite straightforward: financial exclusion has dogged our nation for decades, ruining individual lives and putting down potential. Solutions exist and thousands of people are working so hard in this area, but we need to do more and we need more innovation: hence the two elements in Amendment 35. It seeks to give the Bank of England—our central bank—a more significant role when it comes to financial exclusion. The Bank has an enviable brand, respected right across the UK and revered around the world. This brand could be well put towards solving the problem of financial exclusion.
The first part of Amendment 35 seeks to give the Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England an objective to monitor financial exclusion. As noble Lords know, the FPC is responsible for financial stability in the UK. I believe there are 407 billion new reasons to take this opportunity to reconsider financial stability and include financial exclusion within the remit of the FPC.
The second limb of the amendment seeks to suggest the opportunity for the Bank to offer basic bank accounts to those who find themselves financially excluded. The take-up of bank accounts for those financially excluded is not just a measure of what is currently available from retail providers. The history of those individuals also plays a key part, so, again, the brand and the central place of the Bank could play a critical role here. If we considered some of those accounts potentially being digital accounts—perhaps central bank digital currency accounts or digital pound accounts—the Bank might play a critical role in addressing digital as well as financial exclusion.
The Old Lady of Threadneedle Street could be not just lender of last resort but potentially, through Amendment 35, provider of first support for those individuals en route to financial inclusion. Provider of first support is certainly worth a thought. Does the Minister agree?
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I shall speak only in respect of Amendment 35. My noble friend’s amendment is very well intentioned, covering financial exclusion and basic bank accounts. Despite basic bank accounts having been in existence for nearly 20 years now, there remain problems with take-up. The know-your-customer rules, about which my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond raised concerns in Committee on this Bill, also make life difficult for individuals trying to access them. It is no secret that the banks regard basic bank accounts as a costly burden that they have to bear, which is probably at the heart of some of the issues.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)
The noble Baroness, Lady Tyler of Enfield, has withdrawn, as she is speaking in Grand Committee, so I now call the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, I welcome the government amendment in this group. We are seeing regulations catching up with financial innovation. As ever, it seems that the regulator is being forced to chase after advances that are screaming into the future with potentially very disturbing results.
However, I chiefly wish to speak to Amendment 35, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, and to offer my support for it, or at least for its principles. As the noble Lord said, we are talking about innovation, but innovation that is actually for the common good—innovation that works for people, and particularly, innovation that works for the most vulnerable in our society. The figures really are deeply shocking: estimates of 1 million unbanked people; 8 million people with debt problems; 9 million people with no access to mainstream credit. One thing that is not adequately recognised is the poverty premium: the fact that not having a bank account or access to mainstream credit means much higher costs for everything from utility bills to borrowing and very well documented impacts on health and wellbeing.
This seems like an apt time to ask the Government whether they have given further consideration to the recommendation from the Select Committee on Financial Exclusion, which reported in March 2017. It called for a Minister responsible for financial exclusion. Is this something that the Government are really going to focus on by means of this Bill? The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, may have concerns about the structure of this, but the intentions of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, are very clear. Are the Government going to take action?
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I offer a few words of caution on the subject matter of Amendment 35 in the name of my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond, who has done so much to promote financial and digital skills since we joined the House together in 2013. The amendment is concerned with the very real problem of the “financially excluded”, in today’s jargon. This problem is of long standing. Under the description of the poor, the New Testament informs us that “they will always be with us”, and similar quotations can be made from the Old Testament. More recently, as just mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, we have had good reports on the subject from our own committees.
Experience shows that another ancient saying is also relevant and helpful. I refer to the injunction on doctors when seeking to treat disease—“first do no harm”. Unfortunately, this latter injunction was not followed when the United States authorities sought to improve the lot of the financially excluded, which arguably led to the subprime crisis of 2008 in the United States, or at least made that crisis much worse than it would otherwise have been. Noble Lords will recall that, when it came to the attention of the federal authorities in the United States, some communities, called marginalised groups, received fewer house loans per head than others. The lenders concerned were threatened with prosecution under federal laws on discrimination. That was a major factor behind many subprime loans being made, which those receiving them had no real likelihood of being able to repay. Such loans were included in bundles sold to investors, which in many cases inevitably defaulted. The end result was a crisis in which some of the worst affected were those who had received the subprime loans in the first place—namely, the financially excluded, whom we are trying to help.
None of this argues against the amendment before us proposed by my noble friend Lord Holmes, although I note that my noble friend Lady Noakes has some reservations. We always need to listen to her because of her great expertise in this area. However, it shows that, in efforts to improve the lot of the financially excluded, we need to proceed with as much prudence and attention to the risks to them and more broadly, as we do in pursuing other wider objectives.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
My Lords, I am delighted to support government Amendment 14, and congratulate my noble friend and the ministerial team on listening to concerns expressed across the House, and in particular, in echoing my noble friend Lord Holmes, for introducing the follow-up provisions under the affirmative procedure. I will also address, perhaps more supportively than other noble Lords, my noble friend’s Amendment 35. I must say that I am increasingly envious of my noble friend Lady Noakes and, in particular, the rather splendid account that she had previously with the Bank of England. She must be torn, not wanting to destroy her rather splendid cheque book. For security purposes, she might err on the side of caution and do so.
My noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond has done the House a great service by raising this issue. Yes, we can debate whether it should be a Bank of England account, which I understand no longer exists; perhaps this is not the right time to revisit that. I have become increasingly concerned—as, I know, have many in consumer circles with much greater knowledge than I about this—by the way in which one’s credit score can be disadvantaged. All sorts of extraordinary things seem to be happening at the moment, without us even knowing. We are apparently encouraged to do regular credit checks; I did, and was delighted to see that on one, the Experian account, my credit score was sound. But apparently the Government have discontinued Experian, so I do not know to whom to address that in future.
This raises the issue of those who have a poor credit score and are having trouble finding a bank account. My noble friend Lord Holmes has identified the difficulties in doing so. If it is not the wish of the Government to support the terms of Amendment 35, I hope that the Minister responding to this debate will nevertheless look carefully at the circumstances by which it is becoming increasingly difficult for those with poor credit scores to access even the most basic banking services.
I understand what my noble friend Lady Noakes said about how we are coming under increasing commercial pressure to make banks’ retail services financially viable. This is causing great concern for those of us in rural areas, because it is increasingly difficult to keep small rural branches open. To me, they perform a social function as much as anything, particularly for local shops, in banking their cash, allowing them to access bank accounts and, for example, banking their money when there has been a local mart. My noble friend has identified these very real concerns and I hope that the Government look on them sympathetically.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I will speak briefly on government Amendment 14 and say a few words in support of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, because of his ongoing campaigns and successes in making us think harder about financial inclusion and the use that could and should be made of fintech, in reaching out to those who are not provided for by the financial system. Government Amendment 14 has our support because, as seems obvious from the Woolard review and other comments, there is an issue around this new-technology approach to purchasing.
Buy now, pay later has all the ring of a scam around it although, having talked to some providers and looked at their business plans in more detail, it seems to be a well worked-through and carefully crafted approach to the process of trying to buy goods, mainly. It may also apply to other services. Those on reasonable budgets who are unable to pay, with confidence, the amount for the goods that they are purchasing get the benefit of the opportunity to spread the payment over more than one month—the majority are for three months—largely at the expense of the retailer. The amounts are small and the sanctions applied by the providers are severe: you get dropped if you miss a payment or two.
There does not seem to be a sense of some of the fringe approaches that were available in other schemes that the House has looked at and which we have read about in the papers. In a sense, this may not be quite the scam and worry that we thought it was when the Woolard review came out, but the Government are right to ensure that the regulatory book is in order and that there is an opportunity to keep a close watch on this, and to act, as and when required.
Therefore, although it is unusual for the Opposition to offer powers to the Government in this way, we are reassured by the way that they have approached this, having brought us into the discussion and debate. We are aware that any regulations brought forward will, in practice, be under the affirmative basis and therefore open to scrutiny within your Lordships’ House and elsewhere in Parliament. We support this approach, even though to do so is slightly unusual. We think that doing it this way is a good move by the Government and hope that it will not be necessary, in the sense of some of the scare stories that we have read about. But if it is, at least the powers are banked.
Lord Naseby (Con) [V]
This is an important Bill and I record my formal thanks to my noble friends on the Front Bench for the way that they listened to the earlier debates. Here, we have evidence in this first set of amendments, certainly Amendment 14, that not only have they listened but we are getting a positive response.
Amendment 14 is good and I support it. I am delighted to hear that we will have a consultation with stakeholders. I wonder whether Her Majesty’s Government could produce a list of those whom they think they are going to consult, because a number of us know a fair amount about the fringes of the financial world and there may be a section missing.
On buy now, pay later, I remember that when I started buying things that I could not afford there was a technique called hire purchase. That was very similar and there were all sorts of arguments when I got into politics, while HP was still active, on the nuances of the HP world. The same applies now, so I say well done on Amendment 14. I look forward to seeing the consultation and hope to take part myself. As someone who has sat in the chair, I will welcome enormously having an affirmative resolution when it comes back. I also ask my noble friend the Minister to make sure that the Financial Ombudsman Service and claims management companies fall within the circumference of this consultation, because they are important to this large market. It is buy now, pay later, in a sense, but not the modern version; it was historically called home-collected credit.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, the two amendments in this group are significantly different from each other, so I am afraid that I will have to address each one separately, starting with government Amendment 14. We obviously support this step, but some comments need to be made. First, the very fact that legislation has to be passed for these financial transactions to be captured by the regulator demonstrates some of the flaws in the whole approach of using a regulatory perimeter as the mechanism for deciding which activities are regulated or not.
The buy now, pay later industry has been growing at an astonishing rate over the last several years. The largest player is Klarna, which I think was valued in its last funding round at $31 billion—three times its value six months earlier. That gives noble Lords the idea of the pace. Anybody who wants to look up buy now, pay later on the internet will find company after company. This issue has galloped away without the regulator becoming involved. It suggests to the Government that some real rethinking needs to happen, given the pace of innovation that we now see generally in finance.
Secondly, I was concerned by some of the language the Minister used when talking about this as a relatively low risk and rather benign form of financing. There is no free lunch. There is no such thing as a delayed payment that does not have an interest cost embedded in it. I understand that with buy now, pay later, it is the retailer that pays fees to the intermediary providing the advance payment. Those costs then fall on everybody buying products from that particular company. We get to the point where you are a fool if you pay up front, because within the cost of the product is embedded an element of financing that is falling on you. If you are a bit like me, you see the price and you pay it, but I know that I am paying more than I should because I am picking up the cost of financing that has been given to other people using the buy now, pay later product. There certainly is cost embedded in all of this; it is not a free lunch.
Martin Lewis gave evidence to MPs in December, pointing out that this is a product very much targeted at the under-30s, although I know that Klarna disputes this. It is having the impact of getting them into debt. Again, I looked to a quote from Jane Clack, a money adviser at the debt advice firm PayPlan. She was talking about what had happened over the two-year period. She said:
“This form of introduction to credit … supports the ‘I want it now’ purchases of items people may not be able to afford. We have seen a worrying increase in the number of young people contacting us for free debt advice. It now makes up more than a fifth of our total client base.”
This is a mechanism that is getting a lot of young people into overpurchasing and consequently into debt. Indeed, the advertising on websites directed at retailers, encouraging them to sign up to buy now, pay later firms, tells them that the average spend will go up by 20% if they sign up to a buy now, pay later scheme because individuals feel, “My goodness, if that’s all it costs I can spend even more.” Noble Lords can see the pattern that is developing. Frankly, there is a lot of risk associated with all this, and I hope it is with that perspective that the whole consultation will go forward and regulation will be structured.
I say this because we went through the same process in this House of saying “it is largely benign” when we looked at payday lending. That was the argument made by the regulator. If this House remembers, the regulator had the power to take action in a serious way against abusive payday lenders. It showed a light touch because it saw payday lending as relatively benign. It was only when this House forced the regulator’s hand by passing regulation that required it to start using interest rate caps that that industry was brought under control. Indeed, most of the players instantly disappeared, because without the abusive part of their activities the other part could not be sustained. This issue should be taken very seriously by the regulator, which should not get caught up in the idea that this is low risk or in some way benign. I am always troubled when I hear that something is interest free. No, it is not; the interest is differently packaged.
On Amendment 35, I continue with apologies from my noble friend Lady Tyler, who is the former chair of the Lords Select Committee on Financial Exclusion. As the Deputy Speaker said, she is speaking in Grand Committee and has had to scratch here. She very much appreciates the spirit of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, but I will quote a sentence from the speech she wrote that I think captures the fundamental issue: “What is still missing is an overarching strategy and responsibility across government, regulators and industry proactively to promote financial inclusion.” In a way, that is the issue that the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, is picking up and addressing and that I hear echoed in the words my noble friend would have used.
The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, made the case that the Bank of England is really not the place to have a basic bank account, and I want to pick up on this important issue. The current high street banks that provide basic bank accounts do so, as the noble Baroness said, reluctantly. It does not make any sense in the context of their business plan, their overheads or the clientele that they want to build.
There is an important strategy that could be addressed, certainly by the PRA, along the lines of, “As a condition of your banking licence, perhaps you don’t have to provide a basic bank account, but you do need to support the civil society groups that can service this excluded community”—because that is a community that often needs a detailed helping hand. That is one of the reasons why opening a basic bank account at the Bank of England would not get people in that community very far. Typically, they are people who need particular services and particular kinds of support to become financially included, and to get the advantages that come with being financially included in our modern society.
That takes me to the issue raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe; it is a canard that needs to be captured very quickly. The Community Reinvestment Act in the United States, to which she referred, was passed in 1977. It was not a play into the sub-prime mortgage crisis. I lived in Chicago in those years, so I know that it came about as a civil rights Act, because disadvantaged communities—primarily black ethnic communities—had been literally red-lined by all the major banking players, which would take deposits from them but would never lend back to support mortgages or businesses. It was a crucial Act that completely changed the nature of financial inclusion in the United States, and it was probably one of the most important pieces of legislation there. I have always regretted that we have not picked up its themes and extended them here, because it created a layer of community banks and credit unions that serviced this community, and did so very well throughout the years of recession.
The sub-prime crisis was, on the one hand, sheer fraud—as I think the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, knows—and, on the other, the packaging up of fraudulent loans into portfolios against which securities were then issued on the grounds that diversification within the portfolio removed the risk. This was not a case of lending into communities in the responsible way driven forward by the Community Reinvestment Act. I hope that we will pick up the lessons of that Act, because in the United States people are not unbanked and excluded to the extent and breadth that they are here in the UK.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, the Government’s response to the Woolard Review was swift and positive. As doubts remained over exactly when and how Ministers’ promises on buy now, pay later products would be delivered, this Bill appeared to us to be the perfect vehicle—although, sadly, the Treasury initially disagreed with that view. In Grand Committee the Minister stressed the complexity of the issue, and the need to work with the industry to get the scope of future regulation right.
Of course we agreed on the necessity for the Treasury and the FCA to get this correct, and we are realistic about the difficulty of striking the right balance. As I have said before, we would not wish forthcoming regulatory changes to impact on the availability of certain short-term payment agreements, such as for gym membership or sports season tickets, which have proved to be relatively low risk. We also recognise that there is a growing market for buy now, pay later, and that many of the people using such services experience no problems with them. Indeed, we are grateful to the providers that have engaged with us in recent weeks and shared their ideas on next steps.
In March the boss of Klarna expressed disappointment about the concerns voiced about buy now, pay later products. He said he was “emotionally upset” by comparisons with the former payday lender Wonga. I am sure that this was not aimed at your Lordships’ House, but let me be clear that we recognise the differences. However, just because two business models vary, that does not mean that we cannot and should not learn lessons from past regulatory failure. These products may not have interest charges attached to them, but that does not mean they are risk free. That was recognised by Chris Woolard in his review when he warned that there was significant risk of consumer detriment if the market continued to grow at pace without the implementation of appropriate consumer protections.
In his recent comments, Klarna’s boss acknowledged that his firm had made mistakes, particularly in relation to how it had advertised its products in the past. Such self-reflection is hugely important, and I am sure that advertising is one of the areas that will feature in the future regulatory framework.
Lord True (Con)
My Lords, nearly 190 years ago, the great Duke of Wellington came into a new House and famously commented, “I never saw so many shocking bad hats in my life.” Looking round today, I have to say that I never saw so many magnificent new haircuts in my life—and I look forward to seeing many more in the next days and weeks.
I thank all those who have contributed to the debate, on a subject that I assure noble Lords we shall continue to consider very carefully, as the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked. I am grateful for the general support that has been given, and the generous remarks made by the noble Lord. I am sure I speak for my noble friends the noble Earl and Lady Penn when I say how much we have appreciated the constructive engagement of Peers on all sides with this legislation. I assure the noble Lord that, through the consultation and leading forward to the affirmative instrument we have promised, we will continue to give the most careful consideration to all ideas.
For my noble friend Lord Naseby, I can again confirm that there will be a full public consultation as soon as possible after Royal Assent. That will allow input from all interested parties, as my noble friend asked.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, for her broad support. She criticised the product, albeit that it is a lower risk than some other types of credit. We certainly agree that a proportionate approach to regulation is the right goal, and that is what I set out. The Government are engaging with stakeholders and will, as I say, consult in the spring to ensure that regulation provides the appropriate degree of consumer protection. I assure the noble Baroness that the Government are not complacent. Indeed, that is why we are taking action and are open to continuing consideration and discussion on this matter. All in all, I am very grateful for the response from your Lordships to government Amendment 14.
I will now address the second amendment in the group, Amendment 35, from my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond. I join others in paying tribute to his indefatigable work in this regard, which we all so much admire. His amendment similarly deals with products that aim at increasing financial inclusion.
Amendment 35 would make the Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England responsible for monitoring financial exclusion and reporting on progress on offering basic bank accounts to financially excluded individuals. The Financial Policy Committee has responsibility for addressing systemic risks and protecting and enhancing the resilience of the UK financial system. As my noble friend Lady Noakes has argued, I am afraid the Government do not believe it is an appropriate body for this task. By the way, I hope no one listening to our debates will draw from the fact that the Bank took away my noble friend’s cheque book any conclusion about her creditworthiness, nor indeed start a run on the Bank of England. It is a question of principle, and we do not believe the body is appropriate.
However, I reiterate that reducing financial exclusion remains a key priority for the Government and one we continue to drive forward. I think we in this debate are all agreed on that, albeit with due caution, as expressed by my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe and others. We are committed to ensuring that everyone can have access to useful and affordable financial products and services. This has also been a particularly important part of our work during the pandemic.
Noble Lords asked for examples. One way we are doing this is through the biannual Financial Inclusion Policy Forum, of which the Economic Secretary is co-chair. Just a few months ago, in November, the Treasury published its latest annual Financial Inclusion Report for 2019-20. It sets out all the recent work on financial inclusion. Not only this, but the Treasury’s Basic Bank Accounts report came out in January this year.
Access to a bank account is the first step on the path to financial inclusion and capability. Basic bank accounts are an important product and allow those who are financially excluded in the United Kingdom to access mainstream banking services, providing people with a way to receive their income and manage their money securely and confidently. To my noble friend Lady McIntosh, I can say that this includes those with low credit scores.
In 2014 the Government negotiated a voluntary agreement with the banking industry on the establishment of basic bank accounts, in which industry agreed to the publication of basic bank account data. Indeed, since 2016 the Treasury has published data on basic bank accounts annually, including data on firms’ basic bank account market shares. We have made progress on this issue. The most recent report shows that, as of June 2020, there were 7.2 million basic bank accounts open in the United Kingdom.
I do not in any way underestimate the importance of the points put forward by my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond, but the Government are confident that Amendment 35 as drafted would not do more than what the Government are already doing to tackle financial exclusion or to monitor financial inclusion and report progress on basic bank accounts. Though we admire its intent, it bears a significant risk of duplication of effort, and the Government therefore cannot accept it. Having listened carefully and undertaken to continue to listen carefully to my noble friend, I ask him not to press his amendment.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Fookes) (Con)
We now come to the group consisting of Amendment 14A. Anyone wishing to press this amendment to a Division must make that clear in debate.
Amendment 14A
Baroness Penn
“Retention of personal data under the Market Abuse Regulation
In Article 28 of Regulation (EU) No. 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse (data protection), omit “Personal data is to be retained for a maximum period of five years.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes the prohibition, under the Market Abuse Regulation, on retaining personal data for more than five years.
Baroness Penn (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 14A makes a minor change to the market abuse regulation to ensure that the Financial Conduct Authority is able to continue to effectively identify, investigate and prosecute complex cases of market abuse.
The market abuse regulation, commonly known as MAR, aims to increase market integrity and investor protection, which enhances the attractiveness of the UK market for investors. It contains prohibitions on insider dealing, unlawful disclosure of inside information and market manipulation, and provisions to enable the FCA to identify, investigate and take action against such market abuse.
Article 28 of MAR provides that personal data collected for the purposes of MAR is to be retained for a maximum period of five years. The market abuse regulation was introduced as an EU regulation in 2014 and so forms part of retained EU law in the UK following our withdrawal. Article 28 applied from July 2016 and so, without this amendment, from July 2021 the FCA would be obliged to begin deleting five year-old personal data collected under the regulation.
This requirement in MAR is inconsistent with other references to data protection in EU financial services regulation and the approach to personal data retention in data protection regulation, particularly the general data protection regulation, or GDPR. An obligation to delete personal data after five years would cause problems for the FCA when carrying out its market monitoring and enforcement duties.
The FCA needs to retain personal data for longer than five years for three reasons: first, to investigate complex market abuse such as that carried out by organised criminal groups, which can typically occur over a prolonged period of time; secondly, to prosecute those complex cases—prosecutions will draw on evidence from longer than five years ago; and, finally, to enable the FCA to discharge its disclosure duties in prosecution cases by providing relevant information to the defendants that may support their case.
In some cases, the obligation to delete personal data after five years could obstruct the FCA and prevent it carrying out investigations and commencing prosecutions. This is of particular concern when it comes to preventing, investigating and prosecuting complex market abuse undertaken by organised crime groups, which can often take place over five years. For example, in a well-publicised recent case a conviction of insider dealing was confirmed on appeal in December 2020, resulting in custodial sentences and £3.9 million in confiscation. During the 2020 appellate proceedings, the FCA had to disclose information from 2013. The conviction may not have been secured if the FCA had been forced to delete the personal data relating to the case.
The Government therefore consider that it is appropriate to remove the requirement in MAR to delete personal data after five years. If it is removed, the FCA will be required to adopt a GDPR-compliant retention policy for data collected under MAR, consistent with its treatment of personal data collected for other regulatory, compliance and operational purposes. This will enable the FCA to keep personal data so long as it is necessary for the enforcement of MAR, including identifying, investigating and then prosecuting these cases of complex market abuse.
I recognise that this amendment has been tabled at a late stage of the Bill, and it would have been preferable to include it earlier. After such a large body of EU legislation was transferred to the UK statute book at the end of the transition period, the Government have been working closely with the FCA to identify any issues. This issue was identified as one that requires urgent attention to ensure the FCA is able to effectively pursue its investigations into potentially criminal conduct.
I know that the importance of investigation and addressing potential market abuse was raised by many noble Lords during debates in Grand Committee. I therefore ask that noble Lords support this amendment to ensure that the FCA is not prevented from using personal data that would support it in identifying, investigating and prosecuting cases of market abuse. I beg to move.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Fookes) (Con)
I understand that the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, has withdrawn, so I call the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, we do not oppose this amendment, particularly as we have the safeguard of the GDPR in place. However, I want to make one comment. One of our major frustrations with the regulator is how slow it has been to pick up on issues—how much information seems to have come its way that there is wrongdoing, yet all its actions seem to be delayed. We went through example after example of that in Grand Committee, Blackmore and London Capital being just two of the latest examples, and I think I have even missed two more scandals that have occurred in the last couple of weeks. I hope there are some other ways in which we can put pressure on the regulator to act and to do so in a more timely manner, and that it will not see this extension as an opportunity to relax and allow more time to pass before it begins to take action when it is needed.
Lord Eatwell (Lab)
My Lords, this seems to be an entirely sensible modification of an overly restrictive time limit on prosecutions for market abuse, and the Minister has certainly made a strong case.
I have one question associated with the Government’s note that accompanied the amendment. The Government stated that they had not found any clear rationale for the five-year limit applying in EU law and could see no reason for maintaining it in UK law. They said they understood that it had also been raised as an issue by EU regulators and they were considering a change to their law. Given that the EU is also considering a change, why have the UK Government not co-ordinated the change in our law with theirs? Is it not the Government’s “go it alone” approach that has been so damaging in the quest for equivalence? Could the Minister outline how the Government’s current stance on this change fits with the Memoranda of Understanding on trade in financial services with the EU?
Baroness Penn (Con)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their remarks in support of the amendment. As I have said, I recognise that the amendment has been tabled at a late stage of the Bill and that it would have been preferable to have included it earlier. However, as it seems the House agrees it is important that the FCA is able to effectively pursue its investigations into potentially criminal conduct, it is right that we make this minor change to ensure that it can continue to effectively identify, investigate and prosecute complex cases of market abuse. I reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, that this will not be seen as an opportunity by the FCA to take its foot off the pedal in such cases, but where it is undertaking this work it is essential that it is able to continue if the case spans a period of longer than five years.
To the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, the Government are committed to co-operation with the EU but it is now responsible for its own law and is aware of this issue and we are responsible for ours. As I set out in my opening remarks, without action now in this Bill the time limit would come to bite in July this year, and there is therefore an urgency with which we need to act. While we will continue to co-operate with the EU, it is right that we take this opportunity to address what we view as an unnecessary restriction on the retention of data.
Lord Sharkey
“Access to Sharia-compliant financial services including student finance
(1) Within six months of the passing of this Act, the Treasury must make provision by regulations to facilitate the availability of Sharia-compliant financial services in the United Kingdom, including availability to students who are eligible for the Government’s student finance provision of Sharia-compliant finance products for paying tuition fees and for student maintenance on equitable terms with students accessing the Government’s student finance provision.(2) Regulations under this section are subject to the negative procedure.”
Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]
My Lords, Amendment 15 is in my name and those of my noble friends Lady Sheehan and Lady Kramer, and I am grateful for their support.
The amendment addresses the issue of the provision of sharia-compliant student finance, of which there is none. Because Islam forbids interest-bearing loans, that prohibition is a barrier to our Muslim students going on to attend our universities. We debated this extensively in Grand Committee so I will not rehearse the arguments in detail, but I will remind the House of the timescale involved.
The problem became clear in 2012 when tuition fees were significantly increased, and it became worse when maintenance grants were replaced by maintenance loans. In 2014, the Government published their report on the consultation that they had undertaken. That consultation had attracted 20,000 respondents, a record at the time. The Government acknowledged that the lack of an alternative financial product to conventional student loans was a matter of major concern to many Muslims. The report also identified a solution: a takaful, a well-known and frequently used non-interest-bearing Muslim financial product. The Government explicitly supported the introduction of such a product.
That was seven years ago. There is still no sharia-compliant student finance available, nor have the Government ever offered a detailed reason for this long delay or indicated when it might come to an end. As I mentioned in Grand Committee, I have repeatedly asked the Government the reasons for this lack of action. I have never had a substantive response. There was no substantive response from the Minister in Grand Committee a month ago and no explanation for the delay nor any indication of a date by which the takaful would be available. There was absolutely no sense of urgency. It was as though the plight of these Muslim students was not really important or worth taking seriously.
I made the point that I had written to the Minister on 4 January this year asking for a report on progress and making some suggestions. There had been no response by then, and there was no response until 5.15 pm yesterday evening, 14 weeks after my email. The Minister of State for Universities apologised for the three-month delay without offering an excuse or an explanation and her reply was completely formulaic, containing no substantive answers. It contained no indication of when sharia-compliant student finance would be available. I was struck by the casual contempt for our Muslim community that this response so clearly signalled—an absurdly unfriendly and unfeeling response with no attempt to reassure or comfort the Muslim community. In fact, if you look at the Government’s record on all this, it is very hard to see it as anything other than discrimination against our Muslim community—not just discrimination but a failure to engage and to explain.
Our amendment would oblige the Government at last to fulfil the promise they made to the Muslim community in 2013. It would oblige the Secretary of State to facilitate the availability of Sharia-compliant financial services for students who are eligible for conventional student finance on equitable terms with students accessing these conventional products, and to do so within six months of the passing of this Act so that the next Muslim student cohort did not have to face a conflict between faith and education.
I very much hope that when the Minister responds he will be able to do better than Minister Donelan. I hope he will be able to tell the House when the Government will introduce the sharia-compliant student financial product. I hope he will set a date that will allow the next cohort of devout young Muslims to go on to university. If the Minister cannot do that—if he cannot say when he will fulfil his Government’s 8 year-old promise to our Muslim community—I will seek to test the opinion of the House. I beg to move.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Fookes) (Con)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, has withdrawn so I call the noble Baroness, Lady Sheehan.
Baroness Sheehan (LD)
My Lords, I rise to speak in support of Amendment 15 in my name and those of my noble friends Lord Sharkey and Lady Kramer. I felt it only right and the very least that I could do, as the only Muslim speaking in debates on this Bill, to thank my noble friend Lord Sharkey for his determined resolve to ensure that all students, including devout Muslims, can access finance in order to go to university.
Parents who think that it is haram—forbidden—to take out an interest-bearing loan will try to save money to pay for their children to go to university. This has become inordinately expensive and, in many cases, unachievable now, in these financially straitened times. An important point to raise here is that boys will be favoured over girls when money is tight. Access to sharia-compliant student finance will make it easier for all bright boys, and girls, to access higher education.
I note the 2014 BIS consultation—which, as my noble friend Lord Sharkey said, had a remarkable 20,000 responses—and the subsequent report, which identified takaful as a suitable, frequently used non-interest-bearing sharia-compliant financial product. In its response to the report, the Government accepted its findings and put forward an alternative finance product based on the takaful model, which would, in the interests of equity, be available to everyone. It was designed so that repayment after graduation and debt levels must be identical to those of a traditional loan, with all repayments to be made directly through the UK tax system. In addition, the alternative finance product must be applied for in the same way as a traditional loan, through the Student Loans Company.
That was six and a half years ago. The enabling legislation has been implemented in the Higher Education and Research Act 2017, but, since then, there has been no further action. In the meantime, a sharia-compliant version of Help to Buy took only five or six months to launch, from start to finish—so the delay in offering a similar scheme to students is quite inexplicable. I hope that the Minister will be able to give categoric assurance that there will be no further delay. In the absence of such assurance, I would be pleased to support my noble friend Lord Sharkey, should he seek a Division.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I will be very brief. In Grand Committee I gave a precis of some of the experiences of would-be students who had been deterred from going on to higher education or who had done so but then had to limit their life and activities as students because every single penny was hard to come by. As a consequence, they really did not benefit from so much of what is on offer in higher education.
I do not think that I can add anything to the incredibly powerful words of my colleagues, my noble friends Lord Sharkey and Lady Sheehan. I completely support the action that they contemplate but do so in the great hope that the Government will now make a statement that will make it unnecessary for the House to divide.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, for moving this amendment, with support from my noble friends. As I noted in Grand Committee, the Labour Party has long supported facilitating access to sharia-compliant financial services, and we therefore backed previous powers for the Government to act on the provision of appropriate forms of student finance.
As outlined both in Grand Committee and again today, the wait for the introduction of sharia-compliant finance products has been lengthy. I will not repeat the timeline cited by others but will say that we were unconvinced by the Minister’s response to the earlier amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. Of course, we accept that there is complexity involved, but, in my experience, such challenges can be overcome when there is genuine ambition to find a solution.
The Minister previously said that the Department for Education is faced with designing a system in which students
“do not receive any advantage nor suffer any disadvantage through applying for alternative student finance.”—[Official Report, 8/3/21; col. 558GC.]
That is indeed a challenge, but it is one that I am sure can be met.
Lord True (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all those who have spoken in this short debate. As has been said, Amendment 15 seeks to require the Government to make regulations to facilitate the availability of sharia-compliant financial services in the UK, including a sharia-compliant student finance product, within six months of the passing of the Bill.
Institutions across the United Kingdom have been providing sharia-compliant financial services for nearly 40 years, and the United Kingdom is the leading western centre for Islamic finance. I do not believe that anyone would dispute that the United Kingdom is a world leader in this area. This Government continue to promote the growth of this sector, supporting domestic financial inclusion and our connections with key markets abroad. With respect, I think that, in this context, the charges from the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, of “casual contempt” for the Muslim community and of discrimination were a little misplaced.
Student finance is not regulated by the FCA. I did, however, listen very carefully and respectfully to the noble Baroness, Lady Sheehan, who spoke from a position of personal commitment. I can assure the noble Baroness and the noble Lords that the Government wish to extend the reach of the student finance system so that everyone with the ability to benefit from higher education can do so. That is why we have legislated to make a system of alternative payments that is compatible with Islamic finance principles possible.
As I said in my remarks in Committee, a range of complex policy, legal and systemic issues need to be resolved before a Sharia-compatible product can be launched. Despite these challenges, the Department for Education has been working with specialist advisers to establish an appropriate product specification that meets the requirements of Islamic finance.
I also heard the concerns raised in Committee, and by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, again today, that it is not clear enough when the Government will take the next step. Since Committee, when I was concerned to hear those criticisms, I have discussed the matter with the relevant Minister in the Department for Education. Based on this, I can report that this matter is being considered as part of the wider review of post-18 education and funding.
I hope, therefore, that noble Lords will appreciate that it is not the right time to act until the wider strategy on post-18 education has been settled. I appreciate that some noble Lords, including those who have spoken, would like to see faster progress here—the question of when was put. I am able to reassure the House that there will be an update on this work as part of the review of post-18 education and funding when it is published, which will be at the next multi-year spending review. The Government will conduct the next spending review later this year. Further details on the nature of that spending review will be set out in due course.
On that basis, and with the commitment to progress as part of the review, I hope that the noble Lord will accept the assurance that the Government are committed to making progress on this very important issue and feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]
I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this brief debate and I thank the Minister for his response. I point out, however, that we legislated to take powers to do this four years ago. Nothing has happened since. I remind the Minister, too, that the Help to Buy system was up and running within five or six months—and that was Islamic finance.
I also note that references to the post-18 education review seem to me—and have always seemed to me, as I said in my letter to the Minister, to which I did not get a response—completely irrelevant. We want students, Muslim or not, to be treated equally. If there is a change, after the post-18 Augar review, to the way that student finance happens, it should apply to Muslim and non-Muslim students equally: there should be no need to wait to establish the principle that Muslim and non-Muslim students should have equal access to finance. There is no need to wait.
I note, finally, that the promise of an update is not a promise to do anything at all, and does not even come close to setting a date by which these cohorts of Muslim students can gain access to finance and go on to university. In the Minister’s response there was no promise and no clarity, just talk of commitment. But after 13 years of this promise, talk of commitment is not enough, and I wish to test the opinion of the House.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
My Lords, we come now to the group beginning with Amendment 16. Anyone wishing to press this or anything else in the group to a Division must make that clear during the debate.
Amendment 16
Baroness Meacher
“Regulation of bailiffs and bailiff firms for the purpose of taking control of goods
In section 22 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (regulated activities), after subsection (1B) insert—“(1C) An activity is a regulated activity for the purposes of this Act if it is an activity described by Part 3 of the Tribunal, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (enforcement by taking control of goods) performed as a service by way of business specified in an order that may include provisions in respect of—(a) defining the people, organisations and activities under Part 3 of the Tribunal, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 which may or may not be regulated under this section;(b) delegating some or all of the functions of the FCA in respect of this regulated activity to another person or body, either existing or established by an order under this section;(c) setting out which parts of this Act may or may not apply in respect of activities regulated by this section;(d) making such supplemental provisions as necessary to carry out the functions of the regulator.(1D) If an order under subsection (1C) has not commenced within 2 years of the passing of the Financial Services Act 2021, an activity of the type described in subsection (1C) is to be a regulated activity notwithstanding the lack of an order under subsection (1C).””
Baroness Meacher (CB)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans and the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, for putting their names to this amendment and for their tremendous support throughout the discussions we have had since.
Perhaps, I should begin by reminding the House what this amendment is all about, although I do not intend to repeat what I said in Committee. For many years, I have been aware of grave concerns about the operations of some bailiffs and certain bailiff companies, and the appalling experiences of some vulnerable individuals when they find themselves in debt and need help to solve their problems. I recognise that the law must support creditors in order to recover money owed; however, there has been inadequate protection of vulnerable people in financial difficulty.
I think the Government recognise that the 2014 regulations have failed to incentivise affordable repayment and to ensure consistently fair treatment of people in vulnerable situations. The MoJ review of the bailiff issue, set up in 2018, was most welcome but we are now in 2021 and, sadly, the review has not yet reported. Amendment 16 seeks to break the impasse on this issue, and I pay tribute to the Centre for Social Justice and the enforcement oversight working group for the support they have provided.
It is a remarkable first that the leaders of the enforcement and debt advice sectors have come together as part of this group, with the CSJ, to design a new oversight body for the enforcement industry. This cross-sector initiative is an important and historic breakthrough, and the group has made significant progress in developing the principles, objectives and functions of the new body, the enforcement conduct authority.
Crucial to the effect of an enforcement industry regulator is some statutory underpinning, as I know the Minister knows we feel strongly. Our amendment is designed to focus minds and take forward that vital element. All sides agree on the importance of giving the body real authority and teeth. I want to thank the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, his colleagues and the noble Lord, Lord True, for our helpful meetings, the second meeting in particular. I also thank the Treasury and the Ministry of Justice for their constructive response to this amendment, and their commitment to build on the good faith of the industry and the advice sector and to work with the group on independent regulation.
I know that Ministers welcome the EOWG’s initiative; however, we accept the Treasury’s view that the Financial Services Bill is not the ideal vehicle for this amendment. We have also heard concerns from Ministers about putting this body on a statutory footing. I want to address that important point in a moment, but first, I want to assure Ministers that I will not be taking the amendment forward at Third Reading. We have listened to concerns about the FCA backstop, and I would be very happy to for the Government to come forward with an alternative amendment, maybe to another Bill, that removes the offending article.
I would also like to reflect briefly on how this initiative fits with the progress the Government have made in Clause 34—on the debt respite scheme—in improving protections for people in financial difficulty. This House strongly welcomed the Government’s initiative in 2018 to lay the powers for breathing space in statute through the Financial Guidance and Claims Act. It will not have passed Ministers by that they were pleased to do this before the policy framework was fully worked out, which is what we want to happen in relation to the regulator.
Let me now turn to the vital need for statutory underpinning for a new regulator. We are now two and a half years into the Government’s review of bailiff regulation, and my hope is that our amendment will have helped to focus minds on an idea whose time has come. Colleagues from across the House and across the sector are strongly united in the view that the current situation is unacceptable. We also believe that the establishment of an enforcement industry regulator without any statutory underpinning would be totally inadequate. I want to set out the reasons why statutory underpinning is so important for this industry. The enforcement industry itself is saying that statutory underpinning is essential, which should surely be sufficient proof of the veracity of this crucial point. The whole point of this initiative is to constrain the activity of offending bailiffs and bailiff companies and improve practices to a universally high standard. The EOWG has recognised that this will be much hindered without statutory oversight. Any new regulator will lack the necessary powers to achieve effective regulation without this statutory support.
I appreciate that time has been short for Ministers to consider the initiative for this Bill, but I urge the Government to reflect on what industry leaders are saying and think again. The powers to enforce firms’ compliance with regulatory standards and to sanction firms and agents who are in breach of the standards—or prohibit them from operating—are essential to protect the public from the inappropriate practices we still see. Without statutory underpinning, the independent authority of any new enforcement industry regulator threatens to be undermined. Funding for the body; access to intelligence; acceptance of standards and decisions: these all continue to be heavily dependent on voluntary consent and compliance, which is very difficult to achieve in this industry. Ministers may say, “Let’s see how voluntary regulation works”—in fact, I think that is what they are saying. I am afraid that argument does not hold water, for the reasons I have set out.
Finally, it is worth noting the strong precedent for statutory underpinning in the Ministry of Justice and Treasury spheres. To take one example, the Legal Services Act 2007 provided for the Legal Services Board to oversee approved regulators and established an independent complaints body. Given the extraordinary and necessarily intrusive powers of the enforcement sector, there is an overwhelming case for a regulator backed by statute.
To conclude, this amendment would put in place the necessary framework for the Government to make a real breakthrough to resolve a long-standing issue. The amendment has cross-sector, cross-party support; this has nothing to do with politics. All sides agree that any new body requires statutory underpinning to be effective. It is crucial that this moment of opportunity is not squandered, and I really mean a moment of opportunity. Leaders of the industry may change in a few years and we would have lost that opportunity.
I have no wish to test the will of the House on my amendment. We have listened to Ministers about having a more palliative legislative option. The Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill is coming down the track and we believe that it may offer a more suitable vehicle for reform of the enforcement industry regulatory system. However, I hope that the Minister, in winding up, will assure the House that the Treasury and the Ministry of Justice will work together with the EOWG on the necessary statutory underpinning for an enforcement industry regulator. I ask Ministers to commit now to using the PCSC Bill to build on the talks we have had on this Bill and returning to the House with their own amendment on this issue. I know colleagues will listen to the remarks of the Minister very carefully before deciding whether any further Back-Bench parliamentary involvement is needed. I beg to move.
Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con) [V]
My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend the Minister on Amendment 14, as I raised that issue at Second Reading and it was very good to see it today. It shows that the Government are listening, which is very welcome. I thank him for his kind opening remarks on a number of Peers’ appearances: it was very perceptive of him. I will not repeat the sorry tale that he heard last time around, which is the reason for this amendment. He will recall that it was in response to an attempt to commit a fraud by sending me a credit card I had not requested, and that I was unable to progress matters with FOS because I was not a customer of the credit card company concerned. I had a letter from FOS, which says the following:
“The Financial Ombudsman Service must follow the rules stipulated by the Financial Conduct Authority handbook. The relevant section concerns dispute resolution—DISP—and DISP states that there are limitations to when FOS may investigate a complaint.”
This is the rule that stipulates that FOS may look at complaints only from “an eligible complainant”, and DISP 2.7.3 states:
“An eligible complainant must be a person that is … a consumer”.
The regulations go on to say that FOS may investigate a complaint from a consumer or “a potential consumer”, and that this consumer or potential consumer must have a relationship with the regulated busines. There is a full explanation set out in DISP 2.7.3 and 2.7.6 of the FCA handbook. As I did not genuinely attempt to make a credit application, I did not fit the description of consumer or potential consumer in the handbook. In his reply to me at Second Reading, the Minister said that
“it is already the case that potential customers of a firm can seek redress through the FOS scheme under the FCA’s existing rules, notably the FCA dispute resolution handbook rule. The relevant rule states that, to be an eligible complainant, a consumer must be, or have previously been, a potential customer, payment service user or electronic money holder of the firm that they are raising a complaint against”.—[Official Report, 8/3/21; col. GC 552.]
This is completely contrary to the email sent by FOS, and there is clearly misunderstanding and confusion.
My noble friend the Minister was kind enough to suggest that I could report this matter to Action Fraud, and reports received by Action Fraud are then considered by the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau. Frankly, none of that need have been necessary or would be necessary in future if my Amendment 26, the only amendment I will speak to, were adopted. I seek for it to be adopted so that, from here on in, FOS can take action against credit card companies which do not seek to verify recipients of credit cards before they are sent out. At the moment, there is no redress for anyone who receives a credit card and no one for them to complain to. I do not think they can complain to Action Fraud because the fraud was never consummated, as it were. I very much look forward to listening to his remarks at the Dispatch Box later this afternoon, given that the Government are in listening and action mode.
The Lord Bishop of St Albans [V]
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 16 and then address my own Amendment 27. The introduction of a regulatory body to oversee the rules governing the behaviour of bailiffs would greatly strengthen complaints handling for the victims of practices that fall outside the national guidelines. The FCA reported in its Financial Lives 2020 Survey that 3.8 million people in the UK are currently experiencing “financial difficulty”. It is a terrible situation that takes a significant toll on people’s health and relationships. This amendment seeks to address an important concern: the fair treatment of people by enforcement agents who collect debts, often from vulnerable people who are in grave financial distress.
The absence of an independent regulator means that, when breaches of national standards occur, any complaints will be dealt with through the company or a trade association, before possibly being passed on to an ombudsman. This is an arduous process that prevents complaints from being adequately actioned. Furthermore, these national standards are not legally binding, which obscures the extent to which an individual can seek redress. No industry is exempt from poor practice. While most enforcement agents will probably abide by national standards, nevertheless we need to make sure that they are properly regulated.
Breaches do occur, and I will quote one example provided by the charity Christians Against Poverty of a single mother of two children. This woman was living under police protection and was a regular at a food bank, and her abusive former partner had taken out £20,000-worth of debt in her name. All of this was compounded by the fact that she was caring for her critically ill mother. When visited by a bailiff on account of a parking fine that had escalated, she attempted to contact CAP so that it could explain the situation to the bailiff. At this point the bailiff became intimidating, aggressive and threatening. That is a breach of rule 21 of the national guidelines, which states:
“Enforcement agents must not act in a threatening manner when visiting the debtor”.
We need to get a balance of powers that allows enforcement officers to undertake their tasks while also protecting debtors and ensuring they have significant mechanisms to air complaints impartially and without fear.
Debt charities are already reporting rising numbers of people in financial crisis and behind on household bills such as rent and council tax because of the Covid pandemic. Given the possible upturn in the number of individuals being referred to bailiffs in the near future, now is a suitable time to explore how we can introduce a regulatory body. I hope the Government will look closely at the content of this amendment and work to correct the current imbalance.
I now turn to Amendment 27 in my name. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, who have also signed it. I tabled this amendment because I believe in the positive difference that gambling blockers can make in reducing gambling harms and empowering individuals to control their own addictions. The amendment would mandate the providers of debit and credit accounts to offer opt-in gambling blockers to block gambling transactions.
As things stand, gambling blockers have widened coverage over the past three years, currently reaching around 90% of current accounts and 40% of credit card accounts. This is an achievement in its own right and should be welcomed as a positive technological aid to reduce problem gambling. While there is a still a need to close that 10% in debit card coverage, the majority of which will come from smaller banks and building societies, it is of secondary concern to the far larger gap that exists in the credit account market, where 60% of accounts are not covered by blocking options.
In April 2020, the Gambling Commission banned the use of credit cards for gambling purposes, but this is only enforceable on licensed operators. The lack of gambling blockers on credit accounts is particularly problematic as it can provide a back door for individuals suffering from gambling-related harms to use credit cards on unlicensed sites. This undermines the Gambling Commission’s own rules and unfairly benefits unlicensed operators. Even more worryingly, this blind spot provides a direct avenue for the expansion of harmful and addictive behaviour, and the accumulation of gambling debt that would not ordinarily be allowed.
With the Government’s gambling review ongoing, the emphasis should be on preventing harm, and provisions for gambling blockers would be a welcome aid in achieving this goal. Admittedly, they are not perfect; they rely on accurate merchant categorisation codes to identify gambling transactions. But this should not discount the positive part they can play. Furthermore, through greater co-operation between account providers and payment processors, a robust and data-driven system of reporting could be developed to identify unlicensed operators hiding behind incorrect merchant categorisation codes to block future transactions. With no legal requirement to provide blockers and no obligation on payment processors to diligently review the merchant categorisation codes of unlicensed operators, gambling blockers will suffer from pitfalls that could be effectively remedied through either a legislative or regulatory approach.
There are also issues this amendment does not directly deal with but deserve highlighting. Due to the entirely optional provision of blockers, there are currently no minimum standards for functionality. This is an issue when it comes to the so-called “cooling-off” or “friction” period—the time between deactivating the blocker and once again being allowed to transact for gambling purposes. As a tool that assists those suffering from gambling addiction, the ability to activate and deactivate at will renders a blocker redundant.
Of the gambling blockers currently on offer, friction periods range from instant reactivation to 48 hours. The results offered by Monzo highlight the success of stricter cooling-off periods. Its blocker, with a 48-hour cooling-off period, block around 585,000 gambling transactions per month and is active on nearly 300,000 accounts. According to its data, once it is activated, fewer than 10% of customers deactivate it. Monzo, driven by its own success, has called upon the Government to mandate that banks provide blockers and would no doubt support this amendment. However, as I have shown, it is not merely their provision that renders them successful but their architecture. A minimum cooling-off period of 24 hours would make them far more effective tools to deal with addictions.
Finally, I will add that, in a data-driven world fuelled by digital payment systems rather than the cash we used in the past, individuals should have more autonomy over how they spend their money. Aside from their benefits in combating addiction and containing the unlicensed market, gambling blockers are an example of giving customers control over their own transactions. Actions and decisions are increasingly dictated by data that is controlled, analysed and dissected by global corporations and increasingly removed from the individual. Optional transaction blockers such as those related to gambling re-empower individuals and give them a stake in this new data-driven environment.
I thank the Government for their helpful work in encouraging the major banks to introduce gambling blockers—an endeavour that has been very successful in relation to debit cards. I know from discussions I have had with the Government that they see the benefits of blockers and continue to support a voluntary rollout. This is very encouraging and I hope that as they move forward with these efforts they will take on board some of the comments made here and find ways to promote greater data sharing between payment service providers and processors to tackle the unlicensed market. However, I remain of the opinion that for products as potentially harmful as gambling there should be not only a statutory obligation to provide opt-in blockers, as stated in this amendment, but minimum design requirements so that the positive results provided by Monzo can be emulated by other account providers.
Lord Young of Cookham (Con)
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley made a powerful case for his amendment, as did the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans for the two amendments to which he spoke.
I will speak to amendment 37C, in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett. It seeks to release child trust funds worth less than £5,000 held by children with learning disabilities, without the need to go through the daunting, lengthy and at times cumbersome Court of Protection process, while at the same time offering strict safeguards to prevent abuse.
Child trust funds were launched in January 2005, and 6.3 million children in the UK born between September 2002 and January 2011 were eligible to receive vouchers from the Government to invest in the scheme. Families with children who had a disability were offered additional payments to make it more attractive for them to join the scheme and to compensate them for the additional costs that they would face.
Lord Foster of Bath (LD)
My Lords, I refer to my interests as set out in the register. We have heard some very powerful cases for other amendments in this group, but I will confine my remarks to supporting Amendment 27. I am grateful to the right reverend Prelate for tabling it.
As the chair of Peers for Gambling Reform and a previous member of your Lordships’ Select Committee on gambling, I have spoken to dozens of people who have been affected by problem gambling. We know that there are at least a third of a million problem gamblers in the UK—probably far more. We know that, on average, very sadly, there is one gambling-related suicide every single day. We know that for every problem gambler, six other people are adversely affected by gambling-related harm, which causes huge problems for families, individuals and society, as well as huge costs to society through lost tax receipts, welfare and benefit claims and costs to the NHS and the criminal justice system. With the growth of online gambling, unless action is taken, the problems will get even worse.
I am therefore enormously supportive of the Government’s decision to conduct a review into the Gambling Act 2005, but we should never forget that, while gambling companies have no incentive to drive customers to financial ruin, they have every incentive to keep them gambling even when problems are looming. The greater the problem, the greater the profit to the gambling company.
Baroness Altmann (Con) [V]
My Lords, I should like to speak first to Amendment 26, to which I have added my name, which was so excellently and comprehensively spoken to by my noble friend Lord Leigh. I support its aims and thank the Minister, my noble friend Lord True, who has spent time engaging with us on this matter. I urge the Minister to look carefully at the arguments laid before your Lordships this afternoon so well by my noble friend Lord Leigh.
There perhaps seems to be some confusion in the interpretation of “potential consumer”, because it would appear that in the FCA handbook there is a definition of that term. It gives the impression that potential consumers are covered and can complain to the Financial Ombudsman Service. However, as always, looking a little further along at the so-called small print, those potential customers must already have a relationship with the provider under complaint. In the case that was explained by my noble friend Lord Leigh, a speculative offer of a credit card does not constitute any relationship between, in this case, my noble friend and the consumer credit card company.
Nevertheless, we need to protect the consumer here, and the Financial Ombudsman Service is designed to be able to look into such matters. The aim is not to give redress to someone who did not lose out because they managed to spot the problem but to ensure that redress is available to prevent other consumers falling for the same problem and that action can be taken against a firm in anticipation of future problems that will inevitably arise—because not everybody will be able to spot the problem that my noble friend discovered in advance of any issues arising.
The idea of reporting to Action Fraud sounds, in theory, attractive. However, Action Fraud tends to be an information-gathering service; it cannot introduce any reforms. If one were to say, “I am calling you about something but have not suffered any loss”, it is unlikely, given the number of scams going on and the scale of complaints often received, that the matter would get any further, and certainly not in any timely manner. I therefore hope that my noble friend Lord True might satisfy us with some promises on looking further into this matter and taking it seriously. The Financial Ombudsman Service clearly recognises that it does not have the required powers, and there may well need to be some changes to the FCA handbook or the regulations behind it.
I was very much impressed with the arguments made on two other amendments in this group by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, who clearly explained the importance of Amendment 16 on bailiffs treating customers fairly, not being quite as aggressive and having some controls, and Amendment 27 on introducing gambling blockers to help people avoid the terrible problems of losses accrued by gambling and the impact that it has on society. I hope that my noble friend Lord True will listen sympathetically on those issues. Interestingly, they revolve around trying to redress the balance between financial services providers and consumers. All too often, the provider may have more power than the ordinary consumer, who may unwittingly or sometimes innocently be caught up in problems that providers have been too heavy-handed with.
Finally, I should like to speak strongly in support of Amendment 37C, again so excellently and comprehensively explained by my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham, which addresses an issue that is the opposite way round. In this instance, providers would like to help their customers—in particular, parents of children with disabilities—to access money that otherwise would stay with that provider. The law is preventing that from happening in any timely fashion. We have an opportunity in this Bill to redress that problem, which has only just arisen and which, as my noble friend explained, was an oversight in the original legislation.
I was involved in some of the discussions on the introduction of the child trust fund, which aimed to help children have a capital sum by the time they reached age 18. All children born after 1 September 2002 received either £250 or £500 from the Government to be paid into a fund for maturity on their 18th birthday. Therefore, from September 2020, those first funds reached maturity. Many children up and down the country have been able to take that money. Unfortunately, we have a situation where, if the child is judged not to be sufficiently competent to manage their own money, their parent, who handles thousands of pounds for them in other ways, is unable to release that money.
Perhaps I may add a further example to that which was given by my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham. It is from a father called Andrew, whose son Mikey turned 18 last September and has a life-limiting condition. Andrew explains:
“We started saving money in his Child Trust Fund before we were aware that accessing it in the future would be a problem. We were encouraged and incentivised by the government to invest in a Child Trust Fund.”
The parents wanted,
“to use the money in the Child Trust Fund to purchase equipment and fund life experiences for Mikey, however, we cannot access the funds…Our time with Mikey is precious and we should not be having to spend time on this type of legal activity just to access money that ultimately belongs to Mikey.”
That sums up the problem we face.
I understand that we must be careful not to allow children with learning disabilities and disabled children to have money taken away from them under false pretences—there needs to be some protection. However, I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Young, who has relentlessly pursued this issue time and again in your Lordships’ House through Oral and Written Questions, meetings and briefings. Perhaps my noble friend the Minister can give us some comfort that we might be able to introduce measures in the Bill such as those outlined in Amendment 37C—whether at Third Reading or in another place when the Bill goes back.
This would potentially be considered a financial application, and there are significant delays at the Court of Protection, which has understandably prioritised applications in favour of health and welfare. The problems facing the parents of these children need to be urgently addressed. Sadly, many of them have little time left with their children. This Financial Services Bill also has the support of the providers of these child trust funds. My noble friend is concerned about this issue and has generously given his time and expertise to try to help us understand the particular problems. He has suggested that the issue revolves around a legislative roadblock. If we can free up the roadblock within the Bill, we will be doing a great service to many disabled children.
Baroness Coussins (CB)
My Lords, I support Amendment 16, in the name of my noble friend Lady Meacher and others, and I remind the House of my association with the debt advice charity the Money Advice Trust.
Anyone who has been involved with debt policy knows that the issue of bailiff regulation is a long-standing concern. Bailiffs have significant powers, including being able to enter people’s homes and take possession of their goods. Unfortunately, despite plenty of good intentions and existing voluntary national standards and codes of practice intended to govern bailiff behaviour, widespread problems remain in practice. These include bailiffs misrepresenting their powers, the failure to offer affordable repayment plans, and unfair treatment of vulnerable people or people in vulnerable circumstances. As my noble friend Lady Meacher has outlined, independent oversight would be an enormous step forward in helping people in debt to cope with, manage and overcome their predicament without unnecessary and unjustifiable additional pressures.
Noble Lords will be aware of the promising discussions currently taking place between representatives of the debt advice sector and the enforcement industry, facilitated by the Centre for Social Justice, to explore the potential for an independent oversight body. The aim of such a body—which would be funded by the bailiff industry—would be to address these problems and to raise standards. For the first time, both the bailiff industry and the debt advice sector are agreed that, for such an oversight body to be effective in raising standards, it must have statutory underpinning.
The amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Meacher and others provides an opportunity to do just this. Of course, there are challenges to the parliamentary timetable, and relevant Bills in which to include issues such as this can be few and far between. The perverse and worst-case scenario would be to have a fully developed and agreed proposal for an independent oversight body which could not be put in place because the Government did not have the necessary powers. If the Government miss the opportunity to take action in this Bill, meaningful change is likely to be delayed much longer, with harsh consequences for people in debt.
So would it not be better for the Government to be proactive now and to accept this amendment—or, at the very least, come back with a similar version of their own at Third Reading? We cannot escape the fact that, despite the welcome support that has been put in place, debt problems will increase as a result of the pandemic. More people may face the prospect of bailiffs at their door and it is only right that the industry is properly governed and regulated, as other debt collection companies are. The Government have previously stated that they want to see practice in this sector improved and regulation strengthened. This amendment gives them the opportunity to do so. I hope that the Minister will accept it, or commit to coming back at Third Reading with something just as good or better.
Lord Blunkett (Lab)
My Lords, this group of amendments contains issues of profound importance. It is not surprising, therefore, that our progress this afternoon has somewhat slowed. I can be blissfully short, because the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, spelled out in his usual eloquent and detailed fashion why Amendment 37C should be taken very seriously and that a solution must be found to the challenge that he laid out. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, I pay tribute to the noble Lord for his dedication and commitment. I have been proud to work alongside him. One of the great pleasures of this House is that it is possible to work effectively—I hope effectively—across party. The case that he made this afternoon, which he has been making for the last few months, is in my view unanswerable. The issue, therefore, is what progress can be made and what can be done.
The noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, has taken this issue seriously and to heart since he joined the House and took up his present position. Forgive me if I call the noble Lord, Lord Young, my noble friend. As he has spelled out, it is surely not beyond the wit of woman or man—working groups that do not meet or address issues aside—to be able to unlock funds that are essential, albeit small, for those for whom they were intended. My noble friend kindly indicated my history in this area. It was blighted by not having spotted that the Mental Capacity Act, which succeeded the decision to introduce child trust funds, would inadvertently lead to those funds being blocked for the most vulnerable.
I still regret very strongly that the early part of the coalition Government abolished child trust funds—driven, it has to be said, by the then Chief Secretary and not by the leading party in the coalition. But that is water under the bridge. The paradox of course is that, had the child trust funds continued and been delivered in the way originally intended—including continuous top-up funding—we would have been in a more difficult position in releasing these funds for those with learning disabilities, because the funds would have been much greater. Sometimes there are twists in life which you do not see and sometimes there are those you wish you had not.
This is a simple issue here, whether it is about Holly who was highlighted by my noble friend Lord Young, or Mikey, highlighted by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. I originally heard Mikey’s father outlining these issues on “Money Box”. He was also mentioned by the now leader of the Liberal Democrats in the other place. Those young people demonstrate the wider issue of access to modest but important funding that can help them at a crucial time of transition into adulthood, as was originally intended. There is also the profound issue of the growing capital asset divide in our country. With house prices accelerating as they are now, this divide will increase still further.
So I will make a very simple appeal. The noble Lord who is leading on this amendment will not press it to a vote. However, I think that the feeling of this House—both on the numerous previous occasions on which the issue has been raised and again this afternoon by noble Lords both online and present in this Chamber —is that a solution must be found, and found quickly. My experience during eight years in the Cabinet was that there were very good civil servants who explained, quite rightly, why something could not be done. I always valued them because they prevented me putting my foot in it more often than I did. But the best civil servants were the ones who highlighted the problem and then came up with a solution.
Viscount Trenchard (Con)
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, spoke powerfully in favour of her similar Amendment 136F in Committee on 3 March. The noble Baroness has now brought forward Amendment 16 with the same purpose. It is supported by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, my noble friend Lady Morgan of Cotes and my friend the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans. I support all their arguments.
There is a weight of evidence of unreasonably aggressive behaviour by enforcement agents even before the onset of the pandemic. Your Lordships should be pleased that the Ministry of Justice launched a call for evidence as part of its second review of the reforms introduced by the Taking Control of Goods (Fees) Regulations 2014. It is understandable that that review is taking longer than expected in current circumstances. My noble friend Lord True explained that resources had to be moved to bring about the passage of the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act, which was intended to help businesses survive the lockdowns. I would be interested to hear from my noble friend the Minister whether the Act is working as the Government intended, and how many companies have successfully applied for moratoria under the Act.
As the noble Baroness explained, her amendment allows the FCA to outsource the powers it would assume under this amendment to another unspecified person or body. I think this is far from satisfactory, and that the FCA should not be burdened with responsibilities in this area. The FCA is going to be busy enough with its new regulatory responsibilities and with what will rightly be an onerous system of oversight by your Lordships’ House and another place.
The FCA is not the right regulator to become involved with issues relating to non-payment of utility bills, for example. I am surprised that the noble Baroness is apparently unwilling to accept the assurance of my noble friend that the Government’s response to the review of bailiff regulation will be issued within this year. I expect that the Government will recognise that something needs to be done to control overaggressive behaviour by bailiffs, balancing such control against the need to retain an effective enforcement process. In view of my noble friend’s assurance, I am unable to support this amendment.
However, the FCA is the right regulator to protect potential customers of regulated financial services firms as well as contracted customers. Every contracted customer is a potential customer before entering into a contract to purchase supplies from a supplier, or to purchase services from a supplier, and thereby becoming an actual customer. I therefore support Amendment 26 in the name my noble friends Lord Leigh of Hurley and Lady Altmann.
The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans has made a powerful case for his Amendment 27, requiring debit and credit card providers to offer an opt-in option for gambling blockers. Research by GambleAware published in July 2020 found that only eight financial services firms offered blockers on certain products and ranges, estimated to cover 60% of personal current accounts. The research also examined the effectiveness of blockers currently available and found that they needed to be improved. Of the eight banks that offered blockers, three banks’ blockers could be immediately turned on and off, meaning that they functioned more like a light switch than a lock. I would like to ask my noble friend the Minister whether he agrees with GambleAware’s recommendation that the FCA, in its guidance, should require banks to include gambling blockers as standard on debit and credit cards.
The FCA already recognises that all banks’ customers are capable of becoming vulnerable, but it does not recognise that those with a gambling addiction are included in the categories it already recognises, such as those who have a cognitive impairment, low resilience to financial shocks or poor numeracy skills. It is of course very difficult to define what is a gambling addiction, and it also begs the question of how far we want the state to go in protecting us from all the risks we may encounter in our lives. However, the right reverend Prelate’s amendment calls for an opt-in option and therefore has some merit. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s views.
Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to participate in this Bill. I strongly support Amendment 27. In view of the passionate speeches by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans and the noble Lord, Lord Foster, my contribution will be relatively short, as they have said almost everything that I wanted to say.
In this technological age, it cannot be very difficult for any provider of bank accounts, credit cards, debit cards, store cards and other electronic payment systems to offer customers an opportunity to block payments to certain providers of services. As has already been said, the blockers actually increase consumer choice. The blockers would be of enormous help, as has been said, to those addicted to gambling or other ruinous addictions—of course, gambling is not the only one. It would certainly help their families too, because it would safeguard the family budget, which then cannot simply disappear by the swipe of a card or the click of a computer key.
I would urge that such blockers should be a necessary condition of the authorisation to trade in financial services in the UK. Other regulators, such as the Gambling Commission, should also insist that anybody who is licensed provides such facilities. The blockers obviously would not prevent people from indulging in gambling and other ruinous addictions. Nevertheless, they would really help vulnerable people in our society and I completely support this amendment.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to take part in this group of amendments and I declare my interests as set out in the register. I will speak to a trio of amendments and I will endeavour to do it in a trice.
First, I very much support the intention behind Amendment 16. I ask my noble friend the Minister, over and above what is set out in the amendment, what reports the Government have received of bailiffs entering properties during the Covid period, both in breach of their guidance and the Covid regulations, and what action all relevant authorities will be taking in this respect.
Secondly, on Amendment 26, I very much support my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley, who set out the arguments perfectly and succinctly. Would my noble friend the Minister agree that there is clearly a loophole, and what will the Government do effectively to close said loophole?
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, I give full-throated support to Amendment 37C, so perfectly introduced by my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham. It seems one of those amendments where, for want of a small legislative change, a huge material difference could be made to so many people’s lives. It is a funds-releasing, anxiety-relieving amendment. I ask my noble friend the Minister: if not this amendment, will the Government bring forward one of their own at Third Reading? If not this Bill, what Bill?
Lord Addington (LD)
My Lords, while sitting here listening to this debate, I could not help but get the feeling that there had been a drawing of lots in the Government Whips’ Office when they were preparing to take on these amendments and the noble Lord, Lord True, lost. All of the issues here are good and real issues. If these amendments were accepted and brought forward, they would probably make our lives that little bit better.
Before I bring my full attention to the amendment brought forward by the noble Lord, Lord Young, I will say that we deserve to hear at least about a plan of action to deal with all these issues. If the Minister cannot provide that now, giving some idea of when they will be considered is very important. They are real issues; please deal with them. That is what we are here for. The only justification for us being in this Chamber is to deal with them, so can we hear about that?
When the noble Lord, Lord Young, first raised the issue in his amendment, I said that he had put his finger on an absurdity. I have not changed my mind. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, basically said that the cock-up school of history is alive and functioning. The rest of us who were in Parliament at the time and involved in those Bills take our share of the blame because we did not spot it either. Can we change this?
The noble Lord, Lord Young, made about half a dozen arguments in his speech for why the amendment should be accepted or acted on. The most convincing one was that, for a comparatively modest sum of, say, £3,000, you have about four or five days-worth of paperwork. That is paperwork that you might not be very good at and which you might have to repeat, over and again, to get the money out—and usually the person doing the paperwork to get the money to support the child put that money in the bank in the first place. This is beyond belief; it is Kafkaesque. Will the Minister make sure that the people who put the money in to support a child can take it out to do so? What method are the Government taking? The law does not allow it at the moment, but we change the law all the time—we are doing it now. Please can he give us a plan of action on this?
The noble Lord, Lord Young, said that he did not expect to vote on this. The ball is of course firmly in his court on this one, but, dependent on what the Minister says, I hope the noble Lord will decide whether that is the correct approach here. I know it will annoy the Whips if we have a vote on this, but if the Minister cannot give him something that is at least in some way positive, I will certainly herd my colleagues through to support it.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB) [V]
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 37C in this group. I declare that I chair the National Mental Capacity Forum. I hold the noble Lords, Lord Young of Cookham and Lord Blunkett, in the highest esteem, and I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Young, for the time he spent talking through my reservations about this amendment as drafted.
The discussions relating to child trust funds have come about through the best of motives: trying to ensure that money can be accessed easily when a fund matures if the person for whom the fund was established lacks the mental capacity to access it and manage their money. Around 55,000 funds matured monthly since last September. To date, about 7,000 of these are held by young adults aged 18 who lack mental capacity. Some 80% of these funds are for amounts of under £2,000. The Court of Protection processes may seem daunting to many parents and so, in trying to resolve this, a process has been developed by some but not all providers.
As the noble Lord, Lord Young, said, the amendment is modelled on the 1997 Law Commission report that was behind the original Mental Incapacity Bill—a Bill which did not proceed. That report suggested a small payment scheme, which was not progressed because there were concerns that it could be stretched more widely to cover other financial products and that it would not respect the requirement that there should be proper judicial authority to act on behalf of another person in handling their affairs if they have not been able to designate that authority themselves.
Following the important work of noble Lords on child trust funds, the Court of Protection has been looking at its rules processes and is due to meet shortly, on 20 April, to explore ways to simplify the application forms. It is important to note that the application fee has already been waived and that any form marked for urgent business goes before the urgent business judge on the same day. There is no need for a solicitor to be involved, and there have been seven applicants to date whose applications have gone through successfully without using a solicitor, so there is no need for any costs for the applicant, nor should there be delays. I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, will assist Mikey’s parents to apply under the urgent provision, as it should be processed very rapidly as he is terminally ill.
However, there is a fundamental principle here. One person cannot access another adult’s money or possessions without their permission, or, if the person lacks capacity, can access funds only with legal authority. Although this money is called a child trust fund it is not accessible to the person until they turn 18—in other words, when they become in law an adult. That means that we are talking about somebody else accessing an adult’s money. The role of the Court of Protection is to ensure that the money accessed is limited to this fund and possibly other clearly identified funds that are the property of the 18 year-old, and to guard against misappropriation of the money.
Let us take the case of a child who has been hit by a car and sustained catastrophic head injuries. On turning 18, the trust fund money is there and there may also be a settlement for very large sums in compensation to provide for their future care. I do not see how this amendment, as drafted, would prevent larger sums than the trust fund being drawn in, and therefore how it could prevent larger sums of money being misappropriated and used by others for purposes other than the care of the person. The amendment would not restrict who can apply for this money as it does not specify that only parents or responsible carers can apply under the proposed scheme. Could cousins, siblings or others who pretend to have the person’s interests at heart access money?
Another difficulty is what happens if the person later regains some capacity. Take, for example, a person with a catastrophic head injury acquired at the age of 16 and who, with rehabilitation, may have regained enough mental capacity by the time they are 20 or 21 to be able to be involved in their own financial decisions, particularly over smaller sums of money.
Sadly, these instances that we have heard about and that have received press coverage should never have happened in the first place. In my role as chair of the National Mental Capacity Forum I have been working to raise issues around transition, highlighting the need for planning to happen when a young person is in their mid-teens, so that when they have reached the legal age of majority at 18, everything is in place to allow future decision-making to happen, with the oversight of the Court of Protection through a court-appointed deputy.
This amendment would affect Scotland and Northern Ireland, as well as England and Wales. Therefore, I wonder what discussions have happened with the devolved Governments over this amendment. Across the UK, young people, on turning 18, rightfully have access to their trust fund, currently under judicial oversight it they lack capacity.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, and her—as always—expert contribution, which has made me think again about that amendment. I put my name down for this group chiefly to speak to Amendment 27, in the name of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, also signed by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, and me. The reasons for this amendment have been broadly canvassed, notably by the noble Lord, Lord Foster of Bath, well known for Peers for Gambling Reform, which I was recently pleased to join. I do not feel that I need to make this case again, but there is a useful reflection to make—drawing also on what the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, just said, and sharing the frustration of the noble Lord, Lord Addington—about how, in this group of apparently disparate amendments, we see a real problem in the nature of our lawmaking in the difficulty of making progress. What we have here, as we had earlier with the sharia-compliant student loan, are apparently small, easily fixed issues, on which some very expert, knowledgeable, extremely capable people have spent years working, without progress being made. This particularly applies to Amendment 16 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher. Something clearly needs to be tackled and dealt with, and it looks simple; we need to see regulation, oversight and protection, but it is not happening.
In the interstices of what has been a rather hectic day for me, I was looking at the Law Society briefing for the National Security and Investment Bill, which is coming tomorrow. The Law Society does not have any party-political issues to raise on that, but it has looked at the Bill and has seen that we are creating huge problems. Somehow, our legislative process is not identifying issues. With commendable frankness, the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, earlier identified his role on the issue that arises in Amendment 37C. Somehow, things are not coming together and delivering us workable laws. We need to think, as a House and as a society, about how we can end up getting more workable laws. I suggest that we need more co-operation, listening and input at the early stages, rather than a sudden decision by the Government to do something, which then results in a Bill.
We are not sure that there will be any votes on any of these amendments, but we clearly need action and I commend to your Lordships’ House the need for action on all of these, particularly Amendment 27, to protect vulnerable people.
Lord Naseby (Con) [V]
My Lords, Amendment 37C is an issue of fundamental importance to young people who are disabled and have taken up child trust funds. The amendment before us is key. We had a thorough and competent speech from my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham, but I have just listened to another speech from the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, and we have to find common ground between the two.
I declare a past interest as, when I joined the Commons in February 1974, I took an interest in the friendly society movement, which I continued until I left in 1997. I was then asked to become chairman, which I was from 1998 to 2005, of the Tunbridge Wells Equitable Friendly Society. That interest was declared at that point. In the days of the child trust fund, the Tunbridge Wells Equitable Friendly Society traded under the brand of the Children’s Mutual. It is my recollection that the Children’s Mutual was a brand leader, and we put a huge amount of effort into it. We liaised with the authorities involved at the time—not just the Government of the day but others. I am saddened and disappointed that, somehow or other, this issue got through the net. Unfortunately, the coalition Government tragically decided—George Osborne was one of the key players, of course—to wind it up. That was a great error, in my judgment.
We come to the current position, and I am pleased to hear the industry’s concerns, but I am disappointed that there has been no mention of the Association of Friendly Societies. I am sure that the majority of child trust funds were sold by the friendly societies, and I would advise those involved to make sure that the Association of Friendly Societies is involved now. On my own initiative, I will contact the Tunbridge Wells Equitable Friendly Society to suggest that it helps and is involved.
I am not sure why we have the same problem with junior ISAs. I declare an interest here, because I contribute to the junior ISAs of my four grandchildren, who are eligible. I am disappointed, although I was not involved in the legislation on junior ISAs in depth, that the same problem appears. I do not want to add to the concerns of my noble friend on the Front Bench, but, until recently, a large number of grandparents had been buying National Savings certificates, and I wonder whether the same problem is lying there and has not been raised by anybody else.
This is a serious problem. I have faith in my noble friend on the Front Bench, and I hope that he and those involved will look at it seriously. If there is anything that I can do to help resolve this issue, I will do my best to, because it is important.
Lord Lucas (Con) [V]
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 16 and I thoroughly support its intent. I have been chair of the Enforcement Law Reform Group for more years than I care to remember, and for all that time I have been aware that every side of the industry wants statutory regulation. It is not a suitable case for voluntary regulation. You need the powers that go with being set up by statute to deal with all the difficulties and conflicts that are inherent in the business of getting money out of people who do not want to give it to you.
I fully understand the Government’s caution about the drafting of the amendment, but I very much hope that everyone involved in it will hold their feet to the fire to get a suitable alternative through as soon as possible. I have one piece of advice for the Government on the amendment as drafted. It is important that whatever we create can bite on creditors. A lot of the problems in this industry have their roots in the delinquency and bad behaviour of creditors and in the disorganisation of the systems that they operate. The privilege of being able to use a bailiff should be granted only to creditors who are well set up, who have done their preparatory work, who know who is vulnerable, who have found out the right addresses, who have properly offered payment holidays or plans before involving the very expensive, onerous and sometimes distressing option of a bailiff.
When we come to have this in statute, we need some way in which a local authority, for instance, which is trying to recover debt due on council tax must demonstrate that it has done what it should in order to be allowed to use the bailiff system. There may be some other way of doing it—but not to have that connection through to creditors and think that you can regulate just by putting pressure on bailiffs would be a considerable mistake and would, in the end, result in the system not working.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I think my noble friend Lord Addington put his finger exactly on the problem here. These are a series of amendments, all of them good and strong, that tackle really significant issues that seem to affect a particular selection of our population who find themselves constantly recognised but pushed into the long grass, so that we do not get regulation of the underlying problem. I hope that today we can collectively as a House ginger up the Government to say that this really must be dealt with—not just given to working groups or consulted on yet again but put on a track to get resolution quickly.
On Amendment 16 in Grand Committee we discussed bailiffs and the need to improve their behaviour and get it within the right statutory context, so I will not add more, other than to say that with Covid and the consequences for so many people who will find themselves out of work or in debt, this becomes more urgent than ever. The noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, should know that, if she finds an appropriate vehicle, we would be very willing to support on this. It must be dealt with. It would be lovely if it were in the form of a government amendment, but somebody will have to move on this very quickly or a lot of people will be paying a sad price.
On Amendment 26, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, sometimes a personal experience leads to identifying a real problem, and he has put his finger on another problem. If I were a regulator, I must say that anyone who could get my attention and show me that we are getting abuse and misbehaviour within the financial services sector ought to be welcomed. If the definition of eligible customers makes it difficult or impossible to use as broadly as it should be, a look at that definition is urgent. If I were the ombudsman or the FCA, I would certainly want to know that someone was out there attempting to scam the public. I can assure the Government that the scammers know all the loopholes and weaknesses in the definitions, so plugging them as rapidly as possible makes obvious sense.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, the issues covered by this group are wide-ranging in nature but all important. Amendments 16 and 25 return to issues that we explored in Grand Committee, while the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans and the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, have found interesting ways to bring important issues to our attention.
The noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, made a convincing case for the need to reform how bailiff activity is regulated. One interesting thing about the Covid-19 pandemic has been its ability to make us look at long-standing issues in a new light, and issues of personal debt are no exception to that. It is promising that both sides of the argument—bailiffs themselves and charities providing advice to those with problem debt—seem to agree on the need for change. This is not a common occurrence, and it provides an opportunity that I hope the Government will seize in the weeks and months ahead.
I know that my noble friend Lord Stevenson, working alongside the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, has been pushing on this in the background in the hope that the Ministry of Justice can provide a more meaningful response than we had in Grand Committee. What we really need is for the department to identify an appropriate legislative vehicle for this matter. We very much hope that this will be signposted in the document promised for later this year.
Amendment 26 seeks to broaden the scope of the Financial Ombudsman Service to allow potential customers to submit complaints against financial services firms. This is a fair question to ask: clearly the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, is not satisfied with the previous answer to it. On day 1 of Report, we passed an amendment that would enable the FCA to impose on regulated financial services entities a statutory duty of care towards customers. We hope that, despite their misgivings, the Government take this forward, as we believe that new consumer-centric working practices could negate the need for a proportion of complaints to the ombudsman.
Amendment 27, tabled by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, is not only an impressive interpretation of scope, but raises important questions in relation to the tools available to those experiencing issues with problem gambling. Labour has previously been critical of the Government’s lack of urgency in launching reviews and introducing legislation and regulation. That process is now under way—indeed, I believe that the initial call for evidence has now closed. It is clear to all colleagues that the current regulatory regime has serious shortcomings. Without seeking to pre-empt the outcomes of the DCMS-led review, I hope that the Minister can demonstrate that the Government will take the right reverend Prelate’s suggestions on board.
Finally, Amendment 37C raises what looks to be an important issue in relation to certain payments made from child trust funds or junior ISAs on behalf of children with learning difficulties. I do not believe that we have touched on this issue previously, so I hope that the Minister will commit to a future discussion with the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, and my noble friend Lord Blunkett.
Lord True (Con)
My Lords, this has been a long and important debate, which I found to be of great interest. As many will know, I am not responsible for the grouping of amendments. That is not a matter for the Executive; it is a matter for the House. However, following on from the noble Lord, Lord Addington, I feel a little like the “MasterChef” hopeful who presents his dish to the judges and is told that there are too many things on the plate. There are different issues conjoined here: the important issue of the behaviour of bailiffs—as, being an old boy, I still call them—credit card applications, gambling protection and child trust funds in the case of incapacity. It is a diverse group of amendments, but they all relate to the protection and fair treatment of consumers and, as we have heard today, of the most vulnerable people in society. I will try to respond to each of them, but I am not certain that I will be able to satisfy every hope of everyone who has spoken. I hope, however, because I am confident from the discussions that I have had with colleagues in different departments—I come as an outsider to this—that I can assure your Lordships that my perception is that the Government are positively engaged on all these fronts and are listening, have listened and will listen.
Amendment 16, from the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and others, would commit the Government to making the activities of enforcement agents—also known as bailiffs—in relation to taking control of goods a regulated activity under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. The Government understand the importance of debts being enforced in a fair and proportionate manner. Since Committee, I have had the great advantage of speaking directly to the noble Baroness and others, including the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, and the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, along with my colleague, my noble friend Lord Wolfson from the Ministry of Justice, which is the department with responsibility for the regulation of enforcement agents. I know that my noble friend Lord Wolfson and the Minister of Justice have heard the arguments of noble Lords. I can reassure the House that the Ministry of Justice is currently reviewing the case for strengthening the regulation of the enforcement sector. As we have heard, that would be widely welcomed, as representatives from the enforcement and debt advice sectors have united to form a working group, led by the Centre for Social Justice, to consider how an independent oversight body could raise standards in the sector. The Government welcome this.
The Ministry of Justice recognises the important momentum of this development and looks forward to continuing to engage with the working group on its proposals for an enforcement conduct authority. The Ministry of Justice has also assured me that it would want to work closely with the working group to monitor the operation of the enforcement conduct authority and will review its operation within two years. At that point, it will consider whether there is a case for legislation to provide statutory underpinning to the body if necessary, as some noble Lords have argued. I stress that the Ministry of Justice will look to work with the enforcement authority as soon as it is established to assess what can be done to improve standards on the ground. It does not see the two years as a target: it would be willing to review the authority operation and consider legislation before the two years if necessary. I hope that that has reassured noble Lords that the Government take this offer from industry very seriously.
On the amendment itself, it would by default require the FCA to act as the regulator of enforcement agents unless its functions were delegated to another body within two years following the passage of this Bill. As I set out in Committee and in the valued exchanges that I have had with noble Lords involved, I think that there is now agreement—indeed, that has been expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and others—that the FCA would not be the right body for such a function. I must underline that the Government’s view on this will not change between now and Third Reading. We do not believe this Bill to be the right legislative vehicle for any changes to the regulation of enforcement agents. I hope that, having heard the assurances that I and my noble friend Lord Wolfson have given, noble Lords will withdraw the amendment and continue to engage with the Government as we go forward.
My noble friend Lord Trenchard asked about the use of the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act moratorium to give UK companies a formal breathing place in which to pursue a restructuring plan in case of indebtedness. The power is working as intended. A handful of firms have already successfully applied to use the moratorium under the Act. As government support and regulatory easements come to an end, we expect the number of firms using the moratorium to increase. The new restructuring plan is also being used to good effect with Virgin Atlantic and other large firms using the new tool to recapitalise balance sheets.
Amendment 26 from my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley seeks to expand the jurisdiction of the Financial Ombudsman Service to include potential customers. I am grateful to my noble friend for his characteristic persistence on this important issue and I know that he is keen to make sure that the regulatory system ensures that others are not faced with the same potential risk of fraud that he experienced. As I sought to reassure noble Lords in Committee, it is already the case that both customers and potential customers of a firm can seek redress through the FOS scheme under the FCA’s existing rules, notably rules in the FCA dispute resolution handbook.
If we have understood the specific case correctly, my noble friend was the unfortunate victim of attempted fraud and did not intend to be a customer of the firm. He was therefore not a potential customer as defined by the relevant rules that cover people seeking to be a customer. As I said in Committee, I assure the House that had this incident led to financial loss or to my noble friend being pursued for a debt that was not his, he would have had recourse to the FOS and been supported by the current regulatory framework.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
My Lords, I have received one request to speak after the Minister from the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham.
Lord Young of Cookham (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for stretching the constraints that we understand are forced on him as far as we could reasonably expect. I ask him, without trampling on the independence of the judiciary, to convey to the Court of Protection before the next meeting the strength of feeling on all sides of the House about the need to streamline, accelerate and simplify the process.
In not ruling out legislation, does he understand that, in the next Session, if I, and others who have been good enough to speak, believe that progress has not been sufficiently speedy, we will be back with the first possible legislative vehicle to press the issue again, having taken on board some of the reservations expressed during the course of this debate?
Lord True (Con)
My Lords, I am confident that your Lordships’ Official Report is breakfast-time reading for every member of the Court of Protection, as indeed for every other citizen in this kingdom. I assure my noble friend that we will make sure that all those interested are made aware of the arguments that he and others have put before the upcoming meetings that have been referred to.
On going forward, I assure my noble friend that the Government will be happy to provide updates on progress on this matter to Parliament. We are very happy to continue the conversation with him, particularly on the issues that he has just raised.
Baroness Meacher (CB)
My Lords, I thank the many noble Lords who spoke so powerfully in support of Amendment 16. I also note the powerful speeches in support of the other significant amendments in this group, as has been pointed out. I reassure the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, that, in fact, we are very clear that the Financial Services Authority is not the right vehicle to become the regulator for the enforcement industry—we made that very clear to Ministers in our meeting, as the Minister knows, and I tried to make that clear in my speech. I am also very grateful for his response to Amendment 16 and the other amendments in the group.
Of course, the Minister will not be surprised that the many people involved in Amendment 16 will continue to work with the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, and others to try to achieve statutory underpinning for the enforcement regulator from the start because the industry regards this as absolutely essential. We will look to the PCSC Bill as a possible vehicle for that. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
We come now to the group consisting of Amendment 17. Anyone wishing to press this amendment to a Division should make that clear in the debate.
Amendment 17
“Bills of Sale Act 1878 and Bills of Sale Act (1878) Amendment Act 1882
(1) The Bills of Sale Act 1878 and the Bills of Sale Act (1878) Amendment Act 1882 are repealed.(2) In consequence of the repeals made by subsection (1), the following are also repealed—(a) the Bills of Sale Act 1890;(b) the Bills of Sale Act 1891;(c) section 23 of the Administration of Justice Act 1925;(d) in Schedule 11 to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, in paragraph 4(3), the entry relating to the Bills of Sale Act 1878;(e) in Schedule 13 to the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, paragraphs 17 to 19;(f) in Schedule 9 to the Crime and Courts Act 2013, paragraph 15.”Member’s explanatory statement
Bills of Sale are mainly used for “log book loans”, one of the last sources of high cost credit. They are governed by two Victorian statutes which the Law Commission recommended in 2017 should be repealed. This amendment is to further probe the Government's plans to review that recommendation.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I am speaking to Amendment 17, which has been retabled in the same form in which it appeared in Committee. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, for her support, and I look forward to her contribution and that of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, in due course. I also thank other noble Lords who have spoken on various amendments we have considered over the passage of this Bill that all relate to the devastating impact that high-cost credit can have on those who borrow from such providers. We are gradually reducing the number of these providers, which is a good thing, but we still need initiatives for the growth of low-cost credit sources, which are urgently needed to replace them.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
It gives me great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, and lend my support, with my co-signing, to an important follow-through from the Law Commission’s conclusions and recommendations. I echo the remarks I made in my support in Committee, and I believe the contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, has been modest today. We are seeking reassurances, and I echo his concern about a definitive timescale.
It is interesting to note, as a non-practising Scottish advocate, that bills of sale do not apply in Scotland, so the Act does not extend to Scotland, and the provisions only really apply to England and Wales in this regard. Bills of sale, being mainly used for logbook loans, relate mostly to vehicles. But this is an opportunity, in supporting the amendment before us this afternoon, to probe my noble friend and the Government a bit further about what their plans are to review the recommendation.
Law Commission reports do not come along that often, and they come along often at the invitation of the Government. I would like to ask my noble friend about his intentions to give effect to the recommendations of the Law Commission report of 2017. In the consultation paper, it was proposed that the Bills of Sale Acts should be repealed in their entirety and replaced with new legislation to regulate how individuals may use their existing goods as security while retaining possession of them. Out of the 32 consultees who expressed their views, 24—75%—agreed to that.
I entirely endorse the Law Commission’s opinion that:
“The Bills of Sale Acts are written in obscure, archaic language, using words such as ‘witnesseth’ and ‘doth’.”
That sounds a bit like “the Leith police dismisseth us”. In the interests of modernising the legislation and making it more transparent, the purpose of Amendment 17 is entirely clear, and I take this opportunity simply to nudge and press my noble friend on what the Government’s intentions are now, four years on from the Law Commission’s recommendations.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lady McIntosh, and to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, on all his efforts in this respect. The Law Commission’s recommendations seemed pertinent and on point in 2017; four years on, they seem similarly pertinent and on point. Will my noble friend the Minister set out the pathway and the timetable for consideration of those arcane statutes, and tell us what issues and other legislation, which he alluded to, may also be under consideration along that pathway?
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I shall be extremely brief. It is absolutely clear that bills of sale legislation is fraught with problems both legally and practically, including allowing goods to be repossessed on a single default, and giving no protection to purchasers who unwittingly buy goods subject to bills of default. The Government promised us reform, and they had a draft Bill from the Law Commission in 2017, but then they changed their mind and decided not to legislate. If they can change their mind once they can change it twice, so I hope they will now change their mind again, and take action.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I shall be brief in responding to the amendment, which was ably introduced by my noble friend Lord Stevenson of Balmacara. We are grateful to the Minister and officials for their time discussing this and other consumer issues during the passage of the Bill. Those meetings have been useful, particularly for better understanding the numbers of people affected by financial agreements enabled by the antiquated bills of sale Acts referenced in the amendment. We understand that the Government cannot simply accept the amendment, because of the complexity of the issue and the scope for unintended consequences. Normally we would roll our eyes on hearing that phrase, but, as my noble friend noted, this amendment was tabled as a means of starting a conversation. We hope the Minister can give a strong commitment from the Dispatch Box that the Treasury will undertake a proper review of this part of the credit market, and will have regard to the earlier Law Commission recommendations when deciding on a policy response.
Lord True (Con)
My Lords, again I thank all those who have spoken in this slightly shorter debate. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, very much for his continued engagement with all aspects of the Bill and with the underlying issues of credit—on which he has long been such a distinguished advocate—and for his interest in this issue. I hope I will be able to give him an assurance that he will find satisfactory.
First, however, I must respond to my noble friends Lady McIntosh of Pickering and Lord Holmes, who asked about the Law Commission report. The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, also alluded to it. I set out in Committee the reasoning behind the Government’s decision not to take forward their proposed goods mortgages Bill, which had followed from the Law Commission report, in 2018. That Bill would have repealed the bills of sale Acts and replaced them with a new goods mortgages Act, and it was the result of the Law Commission’s report on bills of sale, to which my noble friends referred.
However, when the Government consulted on the proposed goods mortgages Bill, the consultation responses—not all of them, I confess, but the serious responses—showed that while there was broad support for the proposed approach set out in the Bill, some stakeholders raised significant concerns about the degree of consumer protection afforded by the proposed regime. Furthermore, there was a risk that a more modernised, streamlined regime for consumers could lead to more consumers using goods that they already owned as security for a loan, which is inherently a higher-risk form of borrowing. Given the concerns raised in the consultation and the shrinking size of the market, the Government decided not to take forward the goods mortgages Bill. Still, I highlight again that the use of logbook loans has fallen substantially and continues to decline: the number of bills of sale registered at the High Court has fallen from 52,000 in 2014 to just 3,758 in 2020—and a little higher the previous year. Obviously, we will watch this figure.
A number of other points were also raised in Committee. The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, raised the cost of logbook loans. It has been suggested that some of these loans have very high interest rates. There is already a power for the FCA to cap the cost of all forms of credit, including logbook loans. It will use that power where it thinks it is necessary to protect consumers. Most recently, it capped the cost of rent-to-own products in March 2019.
My noble friend Lady McIntosh questioned in Committee why a model that used hire purchase could not be used for logbook loans. Hire purchase is a financing option that allows borrowers to hire a car and then gives them the option to buy it by the end of the contract. This model would be inappropriate for borrowers who already own their vehicle, as ownership of a vehicle should automatically revert to the borrower when they have repaid their loan.
I turn to the amendment itself. As I explained in Committee, it is likely to have unintended consequences that could lead to a greater risk of detriment, particularly to borrowers. The repeal of the bills of sale Acts would not necessarily prevent this type of credit being offered. Rather, it would remove the statutory framework that governs this type of credit, which could inadvertently lead to a greater use of such lending through the removal of some of the frictions to which some who have spoken have alluded—“frictions” is a polite Treasury word—that the bills of sale Acts impose. Given that, the Government do not believe that repealing the bills of sale Acts would be an effective way of increasing protection for borrowers. Furthermore, the Government do not believe that it would be proportionate to introduce new legislation to specifically implement a replacement for the bills of sale Acts, given the continued decline in their use.
However, I recognise the strength of the feelings of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, on the subject of logbook loans, and I have heard the echoes that his resounding voice has provoked. I understand that he wants to know what plans the Government have to review the regulatory treatment of logbook loans. I have had the opportunity to discuss this issue with the noble Lord. As we look beyond the Covid-19 crisis, the Government are keen that work should progress to consider reform of the broader consumer credit regulatory framework to ensure that it remains fit for purpose. That is a substantial piece of work. As part of it, I can give the noble Lord the specific assurance that he asked for: the Government will consider the extent to which that regulatory framework can provide robust protections for logbook-loan borrowers and third parties who may unknowingly buy a car subject to a logbook loan. On that basis, I hope the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment. I have every confidence that, even if he does, he will continue to knock at the Government’s door.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I thank all those who have spoken on this amendment and those who spoke in Committee on this issue. It must be obvious that I think the case for reform here is unanswerable and that we need to move forward as soon as we can. The Minister made a kind reference to my assiduous pursuance of this over the last four years; I can assure him I have only just warmed up. I have plenty more capacity now that I have stepped back from the Front Bench and this remains one of my main targets—so I will be calling again in the near future.
I was slightly struck by the rather defensive notes in the early part of his speech, because I do not honestly think there is much you can say about bills of sale other than that, ironically, when they were first introduced—although not in Scotland—they were in essence an early form of consumer protection. What has gone wrong, of course, as he mentioned, is that the considerable collateral damage to subsequent purchasers of goods subject to bills of sale has been devastating for many people. Yes, it is true that the numbers are down, but I do not buy the argument that it is okay to let this egregious behaviour carry on simply because there are not very many. Every single person affected by this is affected in a most extraordinary way, and it should not happen.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
We come now to the group beginning with Amendment 18. Anyone wishing to press this or anything else in the group to a Division must make that clear in debate.
Amendment 18
“Undertakings from regulators
The FCA and the PRA must each give and publish the modes and timing of the provision of information and responses to Parliament concerning their activities and rule-making.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would require the FCA and PRA to give undertakings about liaising with Parliament.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, I have tabled three similar amendments in this group, with increasing levels of requirements. Although they were drafted before we had the letters from the regulators, the correspondence from the Minister and today’s letter from the Economic Secretary, the amendments still have currency. Along with other amendments in this group, they allow us to explore current provisions and the adequacy of assurances regarding Parliament’s rights. I remain concerned that there is not even the slightest recognition on the face of the Bill that increased scrutiny must come with wider powers for the regulators. It requires very substantial on the record commitments to make up, even temporarily, for that absence.
In Grand Committee we debated amendments that covered wider aspects of Parliamentary scrutiny than just rule making, as we did on day one of Report, but the heavy focus on rule-making powers is because they are changing right now. EU democratic scrutiny is gone, and the middle statutory instrument layer and formal parliamentary scrutiny are being diminished or removed. Therefore, Parliament’s role needs shoring up. The Minister can be in no doubt about the consensus on that matter, not just in this House but in industry, from replies to the consultation. However, he and the Economic Secretary seem to be maintaining the fiction that, despite the front running in this Bill, change is not actually happening until the end of the consultation.
In the recent reply to the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, which Labour colleagues have shared with us, the Minister states the caveat that the primary purpose of consultations is to consult industry, practitioners and consumers. That caveat further demonstrates why it is very necessary to have Parliament’s role explicitly reserved.
My family of Amendments 18, 19 and 20 is aimed at finding whether there is something that the Government can accept or modify. Failing that, it is a progressive list around which I ask the Minister to specify whether Parliament, including relevant committees of this House, has these rights already, and whether the regulators must co-operate even if it takes more time, effort, appearances and resource than they are used to at present. That is needed because of the significant change that is already happening—and now, not at a future date.
It did occur to me that perhaps it was necessary for there to be at least a line in legislation giving authorisation for regulators to use more resources, or to remove excuses based on resources, and that the Minister might perhaps be tempted by what is the baby of my amendments, or something similar, which requires merely an undertaking from regulators about timing, provision of information and responses to Parliament concerning their activities and rule making. The resources point is not just my concern. A former regulator, albeit not of financial services, has also wondered, in conversation with me, whether there is authorisation to expend additional resource. That concern is further heightened by the Minister’s caveat on the primary purpose of consultation.
So my question to the Minister is: will he categorically say that there is no reason, including that of resources, for the regulators to ration their appearances before committees and other engagements with Parliament? Can he assure us that, even if there is a lot going on, busyness is not an excuse for regulators to delay appearances before committees or to delay provision of information? Indeed, does he agree that it may well be the opposite, and a lot going on can be a reason for additional engagement?
If we look at what is already being front-run, in terms of Basel and investment firms and then, starting in a week or so, an abbreviated consultation on matters relating to the Hill review, with plenty more to follow, it looks as if many, even most, important changes are going to happen well before we get to the end of the review on the future regulatory framework and that moment when it is suggested that legislation concerning Parliament may be appropriate to fit the anointed changes.
If I were a cynic, I would say the Government have conveniently timed all the front running so that the big work is all done before Parliament’s role has been modified to fit—and that is an insult to parliamentary democracy. Therefore, will the Minister confirm that the regulators must provide high-level witnesses and evidence when requested, and not just to committees but also to APPGs and other parliamentary activity that is all part of wider scrutiny? Speakers are provided to industry conferences: why not to parliamentary ones? Is not engagement with Parliament an important part of communication with the public, including in the context of consultations that the Minister has said are aimed primarily at the public, as well as industry?
The second of the amendments adds a list of documents that must be provided to Parliament no later than they are provided to the public. It might seem trivial, but this is saying that Parliament is not just another consultee. The Minister’s caveat says Parliament is not the primary purpose of the consultation: in that case, there is all the more reason why separate engagement must be assured. I am very disappointed that the Economic Secretary has taken a different view by saying that the response could just be in the general consultation response.
My second amendment would also add in that there must be
“due regard to recommendations made by … Parliament.”
This “due regard” is important. It is explicitly said in the letter from the PRA, but it is not explicit in the FCA letter and it is a key commitment sought in the cross-party Amendments 45 and 48. In this matter we all await confirmation from the Minister that the regulators must—I say “must” rather than a conditional “should”—have regard to Parliament’s views. The Economic Secretary seems to agree with this, even if not specifying a dedicated response.
I turn now to my third amendment. This is definitely daddy bear porridge and no doubt too hot for the Government, but it is based on real life and is just a small part of what is in the interinstitutional agreement that I negotiated between the European Parliament and the European Central Bank concerning eurozone bank supervision. Maybe the Minister can confirm whether most of what I suggest does or can already happen, but I want to run through the thinking and culture behind the additional elements.
First, there is
“a principle of openness and sincere co-operation.”
By that I mean not being defensive and saying the minimum that can be said. We all know that there is a great deal of coaching of officials, whether from departments or regulators, before appearing at committees about how to deal with awkward questions and not to say too much. We have all suffered the “talk long, say little and use up all the available time” strategy. That is not openness and sincere co-operation, and there is a culture issue here that needs to change. I am not so naive as to think that it can be changed by a legislative amendment, but I want to make the point for the record that it is an issue.
My third amendment would also add in “regular updates” on principles and the kinds of information and indicators used in developing rules and policies. This would, of course, include policy on supervision and enforcement, as well as rule-making. Here, I want to pick up on another point that the Minister put in his reply to the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe. I will read it because not everyone has seen it. The Minister says:
“And we would be comfortable about agreeing that Parliament has the principal role in terms of the broader matter of scrutiny and oversight of the regulators’ activities”.
The Economic Secretary also states a unique and special role, but we can scrutinise only what we are allowed to access. It is necessary to see the ingredients, not just the baked cake.
During the years that I was immersed in EU legislation, one of the refrains that I constantly heard from HMT and regulators was how the EU Commission and the ESAs were so reliant on information from the UK in order to calibrate rules, and that was why the UK regulators could do a better job on their own for the UK. This information, so it was claimed, was fundamental to rules and therefore it should be sufficiently available to show how the case is made, and confidentially when appropriate. So, do we, Parliament and Parliament’s committees, have access to it?
Confidentiality of data is sometimes used by regulators as a reason to be very approximate in public answers in committee. It has been my experience that, once that excuse is removed because a private briefing can be requested, it tends to be used less as an excuse during the public stage. Will the Minister therefore confirm whether all this kind of information is within the rights of Select Committees in this House, as well as the Treasury Select Committee, to require, and if not, why not?
Finally, although it is not in the amendment, can the Minister confirm that Ministers must attend committees when requested? Much is made in the future regulatory framework consultation about regular accountability of Ministers; it is at the top of page 27, for example. My recent experience on the Economic Affairs Committee has been of difficulty in getting timely—sometimes any—attendance from Ministers.
Everyone is trying to do a good job; that is what these and other amendments in this group are trying to ensure. But if Parliament is restricted from doing a proper job on all the front-run legislation, responsibility for that from this Bill forward lies clearly at the feet of the Minister and the Government. I beg to move.
Lord Blackwell (Con) [V]
My Lords, I should like to speak to Amendment 37A in my name and remind the House of my former interest as chairman of a regulated bank until the beginning of the year.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, set out, within the group there is a range of amendments that seek to serve the same purpose and there is a lot of common ground, as indeed there is in the letter of the Economic Secretary that was circulated today. All the amendments reflect a broad consensus, as expressed in previous stages of the Bill, that with the new rule-making powers post Brexit, there is a need to establish more formal parliamentary scrutiny. There has been consensus in the debate that scrutiny requires a committee charged with that role and appropriate technical support. I and others have made the case that that should involve a joint committee of both Houses, although that is not for this legislative stage.
There is also agreement in all these amendments that where regulators precede their regulation with a public consultation, the information should be provided to Parliament at the same time to allow time for it to comment and its views to be taken into account before the rules are finalised. There is also common ground that regulators should take note of Parliament’s views and respond in some form.
I therefore have some sympathy with the amendment, and Amendments 19 and 20, moved and spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, but I prefer mine because those amendments, particularly Amendment 20, are overly prescriptive on the nature of the information and the interaction between the regulator and a parliamentary committee. It should be up to the committee charged with this responsibility to set out exactly the information it wants and how it should interact, as a parliamentary, rather than legislative, matter.
My amendment also adds the requirement for Her Majesty’s Treasury to set the regulations through secondary legislation, to take note of the parliamentary scrutiny and to bring forward statutory instruments to change the secondary legislation that provides the legal framework for rule-making, which may be a necessary response to the comments made. That is also fully consistent with the Economic Secretary’s letter.
The big divide is between my amendment and Amendments 45 and 48, which introduce a requirement for parliamentary approval of rules before their introduction, other than in exceptional circumstances. Such a requirement would fundamentally change the relationship and role of regulators, originally established as independent, apolitical experts acting under parliamentary laws. Of course, regulators should be subject to scrutiny in their role but for Parliament to approve rules before they are enacted removes the independence of the regulators, effectively thereby making Parliament the operational rule-maker and those rules more subject to political views and intervention. We do not impose that ex-ante approval of rules on any other regulator in any other sector, so far as I know. I cannot imagine that our expert regulators in the financial services sector would be comfortable operating under those straits, whereby anything they did had to be pre-approved by Parliament.
The case for parliamentary oversight is unanswerable, but the proper regime is for Parliament to charge the regulators with independently operating the legal framework that it sets up, and then for Parliament to scrutinise how they operate those responsibilities and to change the legal framework if it wants to change the outcome, rather than Parliament seeking to supervise and approve the detailed rule-making on a day-to-day basis. Rather than wait for future legislation, I hope my noble friend the Minister will find it possible to support my amendment. Failing that, I hope the House will clearly reject Amendments 45 and 48 and the huge —and, in my view, undesirable—shift in the relationship between regulators and Parliament that they would represent. I look forward to my noble friend’s response.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I have added my name to Amendments 45 and 48 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell. I also support the intent behind the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, and I know that she too supports his amendments. As has been said, these amendments concern one of the key issues that emerged during scrutiny of the Bill: the parliamentary accountability of regulators and the scrutiny of their actions. As already noted, there was widespread agreement around the House at Second Reading and in Committee that Parliament should have a role in scrutinising the rules that the FCA and PRA may make under the new rule-making powers created by the Bill.
Of much greater importance will be what happens when the Government expand the rule-making powers of the FCA and the PRA, as they have outlined in their consultation document on the review of the financial regulation framework. What we do in the context of the Bill is clearly important in signalling what we expect in the context of a larger shift in rule-making powers, if that is what the Government decide to do following consultation. This is particularly important because the Government’s analysis of parliamentary scrutiny in their consultation document was not encouraging; it was largely a defence of the existing committee activities in each House, with no regard to the new circumstances created by the extensive new rule-making powers. The Government—somewhat surprisingly, given their excellent Brexit credentials—seem not to have taken on board that the scrutiny context has changed significantly with the repatriation of financial services regulatory powers from the EU. That context should drive how we see the way forward.
Since our debate in Committee, my noble friend Lord Howe has made available to us the texts of letters from the PRA and the FCA which broadly say that they will do whatever Parliament decides, which is only right and proper. I do not think the letters add much to the analysis of the issues we debated in Committee, but they nevertheless demonstrate a constructive willingness to co-operate with parliamentary scrutiny. When my noble friend responded to our debate in Committee, I was not filled with confidence that the Government really understand the dimensions of the issues around scrutiny and accountability in the context of these additional rule-making powers. I have seen the rather late-in-the-day letter from the Economic Secretary which landed in our email boxes this afternoon. I shall be kind and say that the direction of travel is positive, but we have not yet reached a satisfactory landing point for this debate. I expect we will continue to pursue this issue well beyond the passage of the Bill.
As my noble friend Lord Blackwell knows, I do not support his Amendment 37A because it is a rear-view mirror amendment. I strongly believe that Parliament should have the opportunity to get involved with the rules made by the FCA and the PRA in time to influence their final shape. It is not satisfactory to think that ex-post scrutiny is an effective mechanism for parliamentary involvement. I do not believe the independence of the PRA and the FCA is threatened by this intervention in how rules are made, given the context of the very significant new regulatory rule-making powers expected to be devolved to them. That is why I support the amendments in this group in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, which provide a much better basis for Parliament’s future involvement in additional rule-making powers.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab) [V]
My Lords, these amendments are all on the same broad theme. As the previous speaker mentioned, there is a broad consensus that something needs to be done to provide a formal role for parliamentary scrutiny in the work of financial regulators. I do not want to detain the House, but I will take the opportunity to emphasise points that I have made at earlier stages. The basic question, to me, is: who regulates the regulators? The question is why we should trust the regulators; the answer is openness and engagement. Clearly, we have a particular interest here but can, I believe, contribute massively to the work of the regulator.
For us to raise these issues is not to question the expertise or good will of the people who serve on the regulators’ boards or work in their offices. It is simply wrong to assume that, once appointed, they can be left to get on with the job. As is apparent in the debate, there is clear consensus about the need for scrutiny. That is not contested. Obviously, there are clear reasons why they would benefit—the expertise of this House is a factor—but my particular concern is to establish systems that minimise the risk of regulatory capture. This is the experience, widely found, whereby regulators tend to become dominated by the interests they regulate and not by public interest.
I emphasise that this is not about corruption; it is more, in my mind, a social and cultural problem. I do not think the concept, in theory, is contested. The answer is to strengthen and develop the widest possible involvement of all sorts of bodies in the work of the regulators. Clearly, Parliament has a particular role and these amendments explore possible approaches to it. I hope the Minister can say a bit more than what was in the letter. Does the Minister consider regulatory capture to be something that occurs, and where the systems that are established address it and minimise the risk?
Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 18, 19 and 20 in this group. I support them all but prefer the more prescriptive Amendment 20. In these matters, it seems to me that ambiguity is not our friend. Wide latitude in interpretation can easily frustrate intent. As my noble friend Lady Bowles has so forcefully explained, that intent here is to ensure that Parliament has some effective scrutiny role in the activities and rule-making of the PRA and the FCA, by requiring that the information Parliament may need to do this is properly supplied. At present, this is absent or insufficient or likely to be post hoc and ineffective.
This is a specific example of a much larger problem in the relations between the Executive and the legislature. There is an increasing tendency for the Executive to bypass, or try to bypass, Parliament or to reduce scrutiny to formulaic rituals with no real influence on outcomes, such as our SI procedures. The seriousness of this tendency has been commented on fairly widely and frequently in the past few years.
Lord Naseby (Con) [V]
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for raising these issues. All three of the amendments that she has tabled are important. They are to do with the FCA and PRA regulators, and I agree with them. However, I am particularly concerned about the FCA and its linkage to the Financial Ombudsman Service, the FOS, and how that is reported to Parliament. There seems to me a particular concern in this area.
I will take just one key case history. The leading company in the home-collected credit market has been around for 150 years. It has basically produced a credit product of choice for working-class communities for all that time. It is small-scale. It is now suffering from regulatory indifference. There is a model here for home-collected credit that works. It is flexible and forgiving and is the right design for consumers on a low income. The FCA has traditionally supported it and given it a tick all along the line. To put what has happened bluntly, the Financial Ombudsman Service has ignored the understanding of this market, which is part of the consumer credit loan market, and lumped it all together.
The net result is that the FOS is basically taking a summary judgment approach to complaints involving all HCC firms. It is therefore faced with a huge volume of complaints manufactured by the claims management companies. To get round this huge volume, instead of playing its statutory role and looking at each claim on its merits, it is taking a short cut. It is saying, “Okay, we’ll look at 25 properly; anything above that, we won’t”—and so it goes on. That is quite wrong—so wrong that there must be some parliamentary means of ensuring that the FCA carries out its role in relation to what the FOS should be doing, in the knowledge, of course, that the FOS is an independent body. So there is a lack of linkage somewhere in this, which should be another area for parliamentary scrutiny.
That was only a shorthand case history, but it demonstrates that what is behind the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has great value. I shall think very seriously about supporting them, depending on what my noble friend on the Front Bench chooses to say in his closing words.
Lord Bruce of Bennachie (LD) [V]
My Lords, I am happy to speak briefly to the amendments moved by my noble friend Lady Bowles. I am grateful to her and to my noble friend Lord Sharkey for their expertise both in drafting the amendments and in explaining in detail why it is important for the Government to consider the points behind them.
As a member of the EU Financial Affairs Sub-Committee and, until last month, of the EU Services Sub-Committee, for the last four years, I have been involved with scrutinising the financial services sector. Nobody should doubt the importance of this sector to the UK economy; it is worth reminding people of that, even though this is a technical amendment. I will not rehearse the statistics on the share of the economy, jobs, tax revenues, the balance of payments and so on. Apart from that, it is also the lubricant of the whole economy, and when it goes wrong, a few people make a fortune but most people suffer—some severely.
The regulation of the sector has been subject to the scrutiny of this House and, importantly, as has already been mentioned, the resources of the European Parliament, with British MEPs taking the lead in many instances. My noble friend Lady Bowles was one of the most distinguished of them in that department. Yet the financial crash was the consequence of light-touch regulation and there are concerns that this Bill may be creating a framework for similar mistakes. Certainly, without effective accountability to Parliament there is a danger that regulators might—intentionally, but more likely otherwise—allow financial services to be regulated in ways that could put individuals’ pensions and savings at risk and prejudice the viability of businesses, especially SMEs.
Outside the European Union, it is more important than ever that financial services regulation is effectively scrutinised. Without the resources of the European Parliament, we need a dedicated committee, with the necessary resources and expert support, to ensure that regulation is understood and fit for purpose. We all know that the Government want flexibility in the post-Brexit age in order to compete globally. Of course, that is not wrong in principle, and the sector repeatedly argues that its ability to do so will depend on transparent and effective regulation, because that is what gives confidence to the users of financial services. Get it wrong and, as we stand alone, it could have disastrous consequences.
I also support the argument that requiring financial regulators to engage with Parliament as part of the process of implementing regulation is not obstructive. It actually serves the regulators’ and the Government’s interests much better, because it ensures a better understanding of their purpose and helps highlight whether or not there may be consequences which had not been thought through and which could have negative implications for the sector.
By positive contrast, if the Government, regulators and Parliament can work together as partners, we can consolidate and enhance our world lead. We have been one of the most important financial sectors in the world and we all want that to remain the case, but we have created a challenging and difficult circumstance for ourselves. If we get this wrong, we could suffer a great deal. We need to get it right and it is important that the Government acknowledge that these amendments are designed to support the regulators and the Government in ensuring that our financial sector still has the confidence of the world market it seeks to serve, and is not subject to a closed, unconsulted, unscrutinised form of regulation that, without intention—or maybe with intention, if some Ministers wish to push it—could compromise the integrity of the sector. That will serve nobody’s interests, and I hope the Government recognise that.
The Deputy Speaker (The Earl of Kinnoull) (Non-Afl)
I call the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. We are having difficulties with the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. We shall move to the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard.
Viscount Trenchard (Con)
My Lords, Amendments 18, 19 and 20 seek to create obligations for the regulators to report to Parliament on what their policies are and what rules they intend to introduce or change. Amendment 18 is the simplest, Amendment 20 is the most prescriptive and Amendment 19 is somewhere in the middle.
These three amendments are all rather strangely worded as undertakings from regulators. Amendment 20 almost implies that it is not taken as a given that there will be a principle of openness and sincere co-operation in assisting a relevant select committee in the conduct of any inquiry. As a member of the EU Financial Services Sub-Committee, and later the EU Services Sub-Committee, I can say that we have often examined senior officers of the two regulators and it has never even crossed my mind that they would not apply a principle of openness and sincere co-operation in giving their evidence.
These three amendments refer to the provision of undertakings from regulators and cover the whole of their activities and rule-making, which is rather too broad and gives the impression that Parliament will act in a direct supervisory role. They do not specify, moreover, how and in what form the undertakings will be given to Parliament.
Contrary to the experience of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, the Economics Secretary has been willing on, I think, two occasions in the past year to speak to the EU Services Sub-Committee and has, as far as I know, been very willing to accept the committee’s invitation. Under the excellent chairmanship of the noble Baroness, Lady Donaghy, my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe, who is in her place, the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Bennachie, and I have struggled with these issues and put in a considerable number of hours thinking about them. That experience has certainly informed my remarks today.
Amendments 37A, 45 and 48 seek, similarly, to establish a formal basis for parliamentary scrutiny of the regulators in the exercise of their new rule-making powers under the Bill. I rather prefer Amendment 37A, in the name of my noble friend Lord Blackwell, because that does not require prior parliamentary approval, which would tend to undermine the independence and authority of the regulators.
Amendments 45 and 48, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, and others, are much more prescriptive and beg the question as to precisely how a “relevant” committee of each House, or indeed a joint committee of both Houses, is to be charged with scrutinising proposals. These amendments compromise too much the regulators’ ability to exercise their powers, and there are at present no parliamentary committees that could effectively perform these duties with sufficient resources.
I very much hope the Minister will tell your Lordships the Government’s proposals as to how parliamentary scrutiny of the regulators’ exercise of the delegated powers should be carried out and how they think the present committee structure will be able to cope with that.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
I find I have a great deal of sympathy with the amendments in this group. Before I address them, what has concentrated my mind as to how I will vote is that I understand there is a business Motion to be considered tomorrow that Standing Order 44, that no two stages of a Bill be taken on one day, be dispensed with on Monday 19 April to allow the Financial Services Bill to be taken through its remaining stages that day, and that therefore under Standing Order 47 we will not have the opportunity to amend on Third Reading. If that is the case, we have to decide today how we are going to deal with this group of amendments and will not have the opportunity to return to them at Third Reading. I wonder whether my noble friend the Minister, in summing up, can confirm that my understanding is correct in that regard.
I am always full of admiration for the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and support the main thrust of her Amendments 18, 19 and 20. For once, I find myself in good company with my noble friend Lady Noakes; I hope this trend will continue. As yet I have not persuaded my noble friend Lord Trenchard to join us in this venture, but I believe the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has identified reasons for us to support this proposal. Of course it is right that the Government should consult industry, practitioners and consumers, but what is missing—it is the major omission addressed particularly by those amendments I am minded to support in this group—is any opportunity for Parliament to scrutinise what will be major changes to our law in this Bill.
I was most interested to hear the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, ask at the end whether Ministers would attend committees when required. I always thought it was the case that they had to have a very good reason not to attend parliamentary committees, but I stand to be corrected when we hear the summing up.
I could not put it any better than my noble friend Lady Noakes as to why I cannot support my noble friend Lord Blackwell’s amendment: it appears to be looking through the rear-view mirror. If anything, we need the opportunity to look at these regulations and provisions before they come into effect. There was a full complement of signatures so I was not able to sign Amendment 45, but I have lent my signature to Amendment 48.
I believe that, whether we adopt Amendment 45 or 48, or Amendments 18 to 20, they have a great deal of merit. As I said earlier, it is an extraordinary omission for the Bill not to provide for advance parliamentary scrutiny and, in the words of my noble friend Lady Noakes, parliamentary accountability of very important regulators in this field. We need only to look back at the financial crisis and subsequent moves to see how important the role of financial services is in the whole economy.
I conclude by responding to my noble friend Lord Trenchard. I do not believe that it is a very good argument to say that we cannot scrutinise the role of regulators because committees do not have sufficient resources. If anything, that is an argument to have more members. Many of us are not able to serve on committees at this time because they do not have enough places, so, if anything, I would support his call for more resources for these committees to ensure that we can. Whichever amendment we adopt—I am sure that this a subject close to the heart of the Deputy Speaker—we must provide the resources and the time to perform a proper scrutiny role in this House. With those few remarks, I am tempted to support Amendments 45 and 48 or Amendments 18 to 20 this afternoon.
Baroness Shafik (CB) [V]
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, and all the previous speakers, who have added a great deal of expertise and judgment to the debate so far. I am grateful for the opportunity to speak on this important group of amendments, which would make sure that there is sufficient parliamentary scrutiny of the regulators, who are the ultimate referees in determining whether financial markets are fair, effective and serve the public interest.
The key question is how to make sure the referees are doing a good job, and there were many excellent proposals put forward today on how to enhance scrutiny, including Amendments 18, 19 and 20 from the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles and Lady Kramer, Amendment 37A from the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, and Amendments 45 and 48 from the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles, Lady Noakes and Lady McIntosh, and the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell. Those amendments all focus on putting in place reporting requirements to Parliament. I want to focus on who is best placed to receive this reporting, given its highly specialised nature.
I realise that this is an issue not of legislation but of how Parliament chooses to organise its affairs. But what we put in legislation also depends on the institutional structures that are in place, and meaningful scrutiny needs to be adequately supported. I support the recommendations of the All-Party Group on Financial Markets and Services, which argues that to enable effective scrutiny of regulators there needs to be a new Joint Committee of parliamentarians from both Houses with a specific remit for financial services, supported by expert advice—something to which the noble Lords, Lord Blackwell and Lord Bruce, have also referred, as well as the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh.
I know from my time as Deputy Governor of the Bank of England how technical some of these regulatory issues are. A dedicated joint committee would be able to draw on independent advice and respond flexibly to issues that arise to ensure the public interest is well served. Such an institutional structure would be in the spirit of a principles-based regulatory regime, rather than relying on more detailed legislative approaches. It would also be consistent with the welcome letter sent today by the Economic Secretary to the Treasury to the chief executives of both the FCA and the PRA seeking to have proper parliamentary oversight of financial services regulation in future.
One area where potential parliamentary scrutiny of the FCA and the PRA could be useful is around how their work supports UK competitiveness. I know this is an issue that has already been covered at some length and with great expertise by this House, and I know that many have argued for strengthening the competitiveness objectives for the FCA and the PRA.
I would prefer to stick to the current language for four reasons. First, in my many years of doing surveys of investors at the World Bank, I have never seen easier regulatory standards featuring as a factor that makes a country more competitive. Instead, macroeconomic and financial stability, a skilled workforce and good infrastructure were what mattered most across the world. Secondly, just as you do not want a weak referee in order to have a good game, markets operate best when they are fair to all players. Thirdly, we have been able to support innovation in areas such as fintech through the use of things such as regulatory sandboxes, which allow experimentation while containing risk. Finally, there are many others who do a very good job of promoting financial services in the UK, including Her Majesty’s Treasury, the lord mayor and the many industry associations.
I also suggest that, for the moment, climate change is an area where parliamentary scrutiny, rather than legislation, might be useful. Central banks and regulators around the world are moving quickly to address climate risks. We are in a moment of great innovation, with climate stress testing, improved disclosure requirements, scenario planning, looking at climate exposures on both sides of the balance sheet and enhancing accountability for senior managers. All of this is wonderful, and I especially welcome the move to setting regulatory requirements for all market participants based on agreed definitions and rules, rather than relying on voluntary approaches and inconsistent criteria.
For now, I am comfortable with requiring regulators to have regard to climate issues—the recent remit letters are a good example of this—with appropriate parliamentary scrutiny of how that is happening. However, we should definitely return to this issue as part of the future financial framework once we have more evidence and experience from current innovations, so that we can codify in legislation the best possible approaches to addressing climate risks. Here as well, having a Joint Committee with access to relevant expertise would only enhance the quality of scrutiny around issues of climate change.
In conclusion, I very much hope that the Minister will be able to further reassure the House of how expert parliamentary scrutiny will enable Parliament to play a key role in future oversight of the regulators.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I will pick up some of the comments that have been made during the course of this absolutely outstanding debate on this series of amendments.
The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, said that she had never heard of Ministers not attending or coming before committees. I was on the Finance Bill Sub-Committee of the Economic Affairs Committee when we dealt with the loan charge, and, on several occasions, the Economic Secretary, Mel Stride, refused point blank to come and speak to the committee. We were then informed that committees have absolutely no power to summon Ministers; they come only at their own discretion. Mel Stride’s successor, John Glen, took a very different view and came before a combined committee of the Economic Affairs Committee and the Finance Bill Sub-Committee. I make it clear that there certainly are Ministers who very strongly take the view that they can be asked to come before the House but are not required in any way to say yes.
I also pick up a concern that the noble Baroness raised about whether we have to make an absolute decision today. If she looks at the Marshalled List, she may notice Amendment 37F, in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Bowles, which will come up on Monday. In fact, it is deliberately placed to give us the opportunity to listen in full to the Minister and consider this issue but still have an opportunity to make a decision on it if we decide that the Minister’s contribution does not meet the needs of the House. As such, there is an opportunity, should we decide to do so; some may wish to act today, and others may decide that they are satisfied by what the Minister says.
I also pick up the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, and the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, on the advance parliamentary scrutiny of rules. I very much challenge what they said because, for many years, in the European Parliament and the European Council, parliamentarians had the opportunity to scrutinise both directives and the rules that would flow from them in a very thorough and extensive manner and with the support of a great deal of specialised expertise in the form of specialised and experienced staff.
Lord Eatwell (Lab)
My Lords, I would like to begin by acknowledging the considerable efforts that have been made by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, to provide greater insight and information in the form of letters from the CEOs of the FCA and PRA, and to encourage the Economic Secretary to the Treasury to provide his letter today, all of which have enhanced and coloured this debate. These letters have been quoted by many speakers. I am most grateful to the noble Earl for his strenuous efforts and commitment to making this legislation useful.
In Committee, we had some valuable debates on parliamentary scrutiny and the activities of the financial services regulators that dealt with the important point that those activities are now entirely repatriated from the European Union. It is clear, as Sam Woods, the CEO of PRA, states in his letter to the noble Earl, Lord Howe, that
“it would seem natural to us that, if some rulemaking responsibilities previously conducted at EU level move to us, Parliament might choose to evolve the way it scrutinises that activity.”
Mr Woods is entirely correct, as the debate this evening has demonstrated.
The role the European Parliament has in the development of financial regulation reflects the EU’s preference for embedding high levels of technical detail in EU primary law. It has been made clear by the Treasury, notably in the consultation document on the regulatory framework review, that the approach to be developed in the UK is to be quite different. It is to be a principles-based approach, in which
“the setting of regulatory standards is delegated to expert, independent regulators that work within an overall policy framework set by Government and Parliament.”
However, it is also evident from that consultation document that in respect of parliamentary scrutiny, there has been an important—shall I say—oversight or error. As was made clear in that document, the FCA and the model of regulation introduced by that legislation continue to sit at the centre of the UK’s regulatory framework. However, it is FiSMA that sits at the centre. FiSMA is the model of regulation that was introduced, but it was produced in 2000, when the UK was a long-standing member of the European Union and UK politicians participated in the scrutiny of financial regulation at EU level. The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, has emphasised this point.
The Treasury has failed to take into account the need for a different domestic approach to democratic scrutiny now we have left the European Union. Simply reproducing the structures that have worked for the past 20 years, as is done in chapter 3 of the consultation document, is just not good enough. This was the key issue debated on Second Reading and in Committee.
Powers returned from Brussels need to be redistributed between Parliament and the regulators. The nature of that redistribution is at the heart of our discussion. In the regulatory model adopted by the UK, an increase in the powers of the independent regulators is inevitable and necessary, as I agree they are best placed to take on the many technical functions previously handled at the EU level. But the inescapable conclusion is that this increase in regulators’ powers will need to be accompanied by new checks and balances. The role of Parliament in this new setting is what is at issue in these amendments.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to turn once again to the issue of parliamentary accountability of the financial services regulators, and I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this good debate. This is an issue of considerable importance to many in this House and, indeed, has been a central topic of debate during the passage of the Bill.
Each amendment in the group proposes different things but I know that at the heart of them all is a desire for reassurance from me, as Minister, that the Government agree with the regulators that Parliament has a unique and special role in relation to the scrutiny and oversight of the financial services regulators. I therefore take this opportunity to give the House that assurance. It is Parliament that ultimately sets the regulators’ objectives and, of course, right that it has the appropriate opportunity to scrutinise the work of the regulators and their effectiveness in delivering the objectives that Parliament has set them. This most certainly includes the way in which the regulators exercise their rule-making powers but also encompasses their wider work on supervision and enforcement across the financial services sector.
Noble Lords will, I hope, have had a chance to read the letters of 19 March from Nikhil Rathi, the CEO of the FCA, and Sam Woods, the CEO of the PRA, that I have deposited in the House Library and the Royal Gallery. Those letters can properly be interpreted as a commitment to the openness and sincere co-operation which the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, said she sought. I do not in the least detect the complacency that the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, said she detected in the letter from Nikhil Rathi. Perhaps I may quote the sentence that she cited. He said:
“We are committed to ensuring that Parliamentarians have the information they need to scrutinise our policy and rule proposals, particularly during consultation”.
I do not detect any shadow of qualification to that commitment. Sam Woods, chief executive of the PRA, wrote:
“When we publish consultations, we always stand ready to engage with Parliament.”
So the regulators have clearly demonstrated that they have heard the views expressed by noble Lords during the passage of the Bill. Despite the reservations of my noble friend Lady Noakes, I hope noble Lords accept that these letters take us forward in a meaningful and material way.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]
My Lords, we have had a long and interesting debate, showing unanimous appetite for scrutiny by Parliament, recognising at least from Parliament’s side that there are changes happening now and that therefore this enhanced scrutiny also has to happen now. As the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has said—echoed by my noble friend Lady Kramer—this is still a work in progress and, yes, perhaps the direction of travel is going in the right direction.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, for giving us the new vocabulary of the “New Scrutiny”, which certainly makes it easier to identify what we are talking about. I agree with the noble Lord that it is up to Parliament to decide the mechanisms of its own scrutiny. To some extent, that is why I phrased my amendment as I did in the context of undertakings from the regulator. I think I gave the game away in the sense that I said it was to induce discussion about the points I had put in. That we have had.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Henig) (Lab)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 21. Anyone wishing to press this or anything else in the group to a Division must make that clear in the debate.
Amendment 21
Lord Sharkey
“Interest rates for mortgage prisoners
(1) The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is amended as follows.(2) After section 137FD insert—“137FE FCA general rules: interest rate for mortgage prisoners(1) The FCA must make general rules requiring authorised persons involved in regulated mortgage lending and regulated mortgage administration to introduce a cap on the Standard Variable Rates charged to mortgage prisoners and to ensure that mortgage prisoners can access new fixed interest rate deals at an interest rate equal to or lower than an interest rate specified by the FCA.(2) In subsection (1)— “mortgage prisoner” means a consumer who cannot switch to a different lender because of their characteristics and has a regulated mortgage contract with one of the following types of firms—(a) inactive lenders, or firms authorised for mortgage lending that are no longer lending; and(b) unregulated entities, or firms not authorised for mortgage lending and which contract with a regulated firm to undertake the regulated activity of mortgage administration;“new fixed interest rate deals” means the ability for the consumer to fix the rate of interest payable on a regulated mortgage contract for periods of 2 years and 5 years;“Standard Variable Rate” means the reversion rate which is a variable rate of interest charged under the regulated mortgage contract after the end of any initial introductory deal.(3) The general rules made under subsection (1) must set the level of the cap on the Standard Variable Rate at a level no more than 2 percentage points above the Bank of England base rate.(4) The general rules made under subsection (1) should make new fixed interest rate deals available to mortgage prisoners who meet the following criteria—(a) are up to date with payments or have aggregate arrears of no more than one monthly payment in the past 12 months,(b) have a remaining term of 2 years or more,(c) have an outstanding loan amount of at least £10,000, and(d) have not received consent to let the property.(5) When specifying the interest rates for new fixed interest rate deals required by subsection (1) the FCA should specify rates for a range of Loan-To-Valuation (LTV) ratios taking into account the average 2-year and 5-year fixed rates available to existing customers of active lenders through product transfers.(6) The FCA must ensure any rules that it is required to make as a result of subsection (1) are made not later than 31 July 2021.””Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause would require the FCA to introduce a cap on the Standard Variable Rates charged to mortgage prisoners and, under specified circumstances, ensure their access to fixed rate interest deals.
Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]
My Lords, Amendments 21 and 37B are in my name and those of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, and my noble friend Lady Kramer, and I am very grateful for their support. I declare an interest as co-chair of the APPG on Mortgage Prisoners. The plight of these mortgage prisoners was discussed extensively—
Baroness Penn (Con)
My Lords, due to the technical issues that the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, is having, I suggest that we adjourn for five minutes until a convenient moment after 8.28 pm.
Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]
I was saying that we have made no progress in Committee on the mortgage prisoners problem, and the situation seems frozen. On the one hand, there are 250,000 mortgage prisoners, subject to real, undeserved and unwarranted financial pressure, which is likely to increase when Covid concessions lapse or are withdrawn. On the other hand, the Government and the FCA seem intent on minimizing the problem and are engaged in what seem to me to be futile and unproductive arguments with the mortgage prisoners over exact figures.
The alleged 0.4% premium paid by mortgage prisoners above the average SVR illustrates the point. We do not only believe the figure to be wrong for the reasons that I set out in Committee, which were not refuted by government; we also believe that such discussions are very largely a distraction and lead nowhere. SVRs are not the norm in mortgage lending but are the literally inescapable norm for most mortgage prisoners. Only around 10% of customers with active lenders pay these high SVRs, and more than 75% of those who do switch to new and much lower fixed rate deals within six months of moving to an SVR. Mortgage prisoners have been stuck with usurious SVRs for over 10 years.
Solving the mortgage prisoner problem certainly requires reducing this usurious SVR, but it also requires giving the mortgage prisoners access to normal fixed-rate mortgage deals. I regret to say that there has been no real progress in either of these areas. In all the discussions about the problem, I have never heard the Government admit responsibility for causing it in the first place. I have heard repeated assertions that the Government are trying to find a solution. I have heard John Glen, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, say that he remains open to considering practical solutions, and I know that the Chancellor told Martin Lewis that he would keep working on the issue and was committed to finding a workable solution.
However, I have heard no admission from the Government that they caused the problem in the first place—and no admission of moral responsibility for devising a proper, just and timely solution. Certainly, nothing so far proposed or actioned has delivered effective relief to the 250,000 prisoners. I again make the point that these people are not the authors of their own misfortunes: the Government are.
Baroness Penn (Con)
My Lords, once more we will need a brief adjournment due to technical issues. I beg to move that we adjourn until 8.30 pm. Or do we have the noble Lord?
Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]
Thank you. I think I was talking about Amendment 21 being prescriptive; it sets out exactly what must be done and by whom.
It has two sections. The first reduces the currently usurious SVR paid by mortgage prisoners by capping it at two percentage points above the bank rate. This is what, in the end, Martin Lewis thought was necessary. He said:
“Yet in lieu of anything else, I believe for those on closed-book mortgages it is a good stopgap while other detailed solutions are worked up, and I’m very happy the All-Party Parliamentary Group on mortgage prisoners is pushing it.”
He also said:
“This would provide immediate emergency relief to those most at risk of financial ruin … No one should underestimate the threat to wellbeing and even lives if this doesn’t happen, and happen soon.”
This is all necessary, but not sufficient. SVRs are not the normal basis for mortgages, as I have already mentioned. What is needed is access to fixed-rate mortgages, as provided by normal active lenders to 90% of mortgagees. The second part of Amendment 21 sets out how that is to be done.
This is, of course, all very prescriptive, and we understand the Government’s reluctance to write such details into the Bill. That is why we have also tabled Amendment 37B. This amendment takes a simpler and non-prescriptive approach. It places the obligation to fix the problem squarely on those who caused it—the Treasury. It is explicitly fuelled by the overwhelming and undeniable moral responsibility that the Treasury has for the terrible situation in which mortgage prisoners have long found themselves. The amendment sets out what must be achieved to relieve mortgage prisoners, by whom and by when, but it does not say how. It leaves that entirely for the Government to work out.
Amendments 21 and 37B give the Government a clear choice. Amendment 21 prescribes a detailed method of solution; Amendment 37B says what the Government must achieve but leaves the mechanism to them. The Government caused the mortgage prisoner problem, which has caused and continues to cause much suffering to many families. I hope that the Government will recognise their moral responsibility and adopt Amendment 21 or Amendment 37B.
This has all gone on much too long, and it has caused, and continues to cause, far too much misery and desperation. If the Minister is not able to adopt either amendment, or give equivalent assurances, I will test the opinion of the House. I beg to move Amendment 21.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I speak in support of the amendments just proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, which I have signed. One’s heart goes out to him—it must be very difficult to make a speech of this complexity and passion with all these breaks. Despite the technical difficulties, however, he has made the case for action very well, and as co-chair of the all-party parliamentary group on these issues he is very well briefed on the situation faced by these fellow citizens of ours, and the extra costs that they face. It is indeed a very difficult situation, and one hears a lot of despair when one talks to these people.
I am sure that when he responds the Minister will, as the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, hinted, dwell at length on the numbers of this group in various categories. There is of course a debate on how the prisoners can be split up—I think that the only thing that we agree on is that the total is probably about 250,000. As with the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, however, my argument is not about the numbers. Simply put, it is clear that a significant number of people, through no fault of their own, cannot exercise the choices about their mortgage that the rest of us can. While some would argue that this is the direct fault of the Government, I think that someone needs to take responsibility for providing a fair outcome for those who are in a position to take advantage of it.
As the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, says, this group of amendments offers two options: one that focuses on what the FCA might do within the parameters set by the Bill and another—37B, a late amendment that we drafted for Report—that suggests that the Treasury might wish to take powers to act in the way that is most suitable for it. Both have merits, in their ways. As the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, said, they have detailed implications that need to be followed through carefully. My preference would be for Amendment 37B, for the very good reasons set out by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. If, as he said he might, the noble Lord decides to test the opinion of the House, we will support him.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, the amendments in this group are misconceived, for a number of reasons that I shall explain. I have much sympathy with the plight of mortgage prisoners, who find themselves in a difficult position as a result of taking on debt when market conditions and regulation allowed mortgage lending in ways that are not generally possible now. We have to remember that many of the borrowers we are talking about would not qualify for a mortgage in today’s environment, either because of the type of mortgage that they have or their own financial circumstances. This is not to blame them, but it is a relevant fact.
Mortgage prisoners are not the only groups who are facing financial problems. Covid-19 has brought financial stress for many individuals and families, and indeed the problems of mortgage prisoners may have increased during the pandemic. Any solutions for mortgage prisoners need to be put in the context of all who are facing debt problems, and we must be careful that solutions for one category of financial distress are fair and proportionate.
Covid-19 has also caused delays in the implementation of the FCA’s initial solution, which relaxed the regulatory affordability rules. We do not, therefore, know how effective those will be in solving the problems of mortgage prisoners, and we should be wary of leaping to further solutions until existing remedies have had time to take effect.
Although a number of statistics have been cited by the supporters of the amendments, hard data on the mortgage prisoner population are not readily available. This was underlined in last year’s report by the London School of Economics, and the FCA has never claimed to have a perfect picture. Although the report by the group UK Mortgage Prisoners purports to offer a definitive analysis, its membership is only a fraction of the number potentially within the mortgage prisoner net, so its report should be treated with appropriate caution. It is hard to make policy in this environment.
The amendments include a cap on standard variable rates—SVRs—for all mortgage prisoners with inactive or unregulated lenders, plus two approaches for making new fixed-rate deals available to those who are basically good payers. The proposal to cap SVRs responds to a fairly vociferous demand from lobby groups. Amendment 21 would cap SVR rates at 2 percentage points above base rate. The result would be a rate broadly aligned with the competitive rates available in the active mortgage market, but those rates are available only to low loan-to-value ratios, and to borrowers with the most robust financial profiles. The market rates for riskier high LTVs are probably twice that level, even if the personal financial profile of the borrower is resilient. In addition, there is not an unlimited supply of fixed-rate deals. Many lenders simply do not offer fixed-rate deals on high LTV loans, especially when combined with weaker personal financial profiles.
The amendment says that mortgage prisoners with inactive or unregulated lenders should have rates that are available only to other mortgage borrowers who have completely different loan and borrower characteristics, and it would apply to them even if they did have opportunities to switch mortgages, which the FCA estimates is roughly half the total population. It is unsurprising that the LSE did not recommend this, and noted that it could create market harm. The FCA’s own analysis, comparing the rates paid by mortgage prisoners who are stuck on SVRs and cannot switch, indicates that the real problem is only about 40 basis points, if the correct comparator is used. I do not accept the assertion of the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, that that is an incorrect calculation. Those 40 basis points are no proper foundation for market intervention.
As the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, explained, the proposals for the availability of fixed-rate mortgages for good payers in Amendments 21 and 37B take slightly different approaches. Amendment 21 says that FCA rules should
“make new fixed interest rate deals available to mortgage prisoners”,
while under Amendment 37B the Treasury must provide for them to be offered fixed-rate mortgages. Neither amendment says how this can be achieved.
In the case of Amendment 21, it would be a startling new direction for regulation if the FCA could tell regulated lenders that they were obliged to offer particular deals to people who by definition are not their own customers. As for Amendment 37B, clearly the Treasury will not itself be providing loans, as it is not in the business of retail lending. The Treasury also has no power to tell banks or building societies to make any particular loans. If either of the amendments resulted in regulated mortgage providers being told that they had to lend to certain groups of non-customers, the impact on the financial services industry would be chilling.
It might be possible for the Treasury to procure that regulated lenders offered fixed-rate deals if the Treasury itself guaranteed all or part of the debt, as it does for some first-time buyers. But that is not what Amendment 37B says, and it would not be a plain reading of the proposed new clause to cover such an intervention.
As if telling lenders what products they should offer and to whom were not bad enough, both amendments go on to try to cap the price of these fixed-rate deals. Amendment 21 would do this at a rate to be fixed by the FCA, using LTV ratios and average rates available to customers of active lenders. This ignores the basic fact of life that mortgage prisoners who have not remortgaged are not like other borrowers, and do not satisfy the lending criteria of most mortgage lenders—whether that is because the LTVs are too high or because the other financial characteristics of those borrowers place them outside the risk appetite of active lenders. For some borrower circumstances there is no market rate at all, and it is not right to assume otherwise.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to take part on this group of amendments. I declare my financial services interests and say just this: the borrowers are not to blame, but they bear the burden. Does my noble friend the Minister agree?
In agreeing to a large extent with my noble friend Lady Noakes, with regret I am not convinced that these are necessarily the amendments to resolve the issue. Can the Minister set out what action he believes the Treasury and FCA are taking in this area? There clearly is an issue even if we accept that the numbers may be disputed, or that there are different categories and specific circumstances. These are all important points to be considered, but they still leave issues to be addressed. Will the Minister set out anything he can about what actions the Treasury will take and what the approach of the FCA will be to address these points?
Baroness Bryan of Partick (Lab) [V]
My Lords, it is a great honour to participate in this group of amendments, and particularly to support the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, who has worked tirelessly to support mortgage prisoners. I feel I am in a similar place to my noble friend Lord Griffiths of Burry Port when he spoke in Committee. I will speak as someone inexperienced in high finance but who understands the importance of having a home—not as a financial asset or investment, but as somewhere safe and secure to live. To make this most basic need a pawn in the machinations of greed-driven financial transactions, as demonstrated by the financial crash of 2008, is an absolutely unacceptable face of capitalism.
Every Government since 1979 have encouraged people to see home ownership as a sign of virtue. When the noble Lord, Lord Heseltine, was Secretary of State for the Environment, he said:
“Home ownership stimulates the attitudes of independence and self-reliance that are the bedrock of a free society.”
But for many people, the period of their mortgage is a rollercoaster ride of anxiety, always dependent on matters far outside their control. The day the mortgage is paid off must rank among the best days of people’s lives. Many mortgage prisoners fear they will never see that day.
The FCA reported in July 2020 that around a quarter of a million people have their mortgages held by inactive firms. The majority of these people were up to date with their payments and, in any other circumstances, would have been able to adjust their mortgages and repayment patterns to suit their individual needs. No one would choose to remain on the SVR for years on end, so to compare their entrapment on that rate to those who may be on it temporarily, while they seek an alternative, is disingenuous. These people have been denied that opportunity, not through any decision they made or any fault on their part, but because of the way the Government chose to sell off mortgage loan books. It was not just people’s mortgages that changed hands, it was people’s lives—they were being bought and sold.
This Bill was viewed with real optimism among some mortgage prisoners. They thought amendments relating to SVR would help transform their lives, but how often have they been here before? Last year, there was hope that the FCA’s more lenient affordability checks would help some escape, but very few succeeded. For many more, their lives were made even more difficult by the impact of Covid-19. The report from the LSE in November 2020 makes the point that the FCA has now reached the limit of its powers. This means that only the Government can help to free mortgage prisoners. Instead, while Parliament was considering amendments aimed at protecting mortgage prisoners, the auctions continued. All the warm words and expressions of concern from Ministers meant nothing. The Treasury’s sole concern was that these people must deliver value for money for the Government.
These amendments are considered and cautious. Their implementation would not undermine capitalism or fundamentally damage the whole system of mortgage delivery, but would give some safeguards to a specific group of mortgage prisoners who have struggled for more than 10 years as victims of the failure of the very system the Government are defending. If it is not to be these amendments, what help will the Minister offer? Unless there is a clear alternative, I hope we will be given the opportunity to vote on at least one of them. I would be very pleased to give my support.
Lord Lucas (Con) [V]
My Lords, it is clearly acknowledged that there is a problem. It is evident to me that this is exactly the sort of problem that the Government ought to sort out because, as my noble friend Lady Noakes said, we have no business landing this on the lending community. It is our responsibility. The Bill is an opportunity to make sure that something is done, and I very much hope that we take it.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I think the case has been extremely well made. I usually really respect the opinions that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, puts forward, but it seems to me that she completely fails to understand the circumstances that led these people into being mortgage prisoners. They took out loans under credit checks and it was entirely appropriate, but the banks from whom they borrowed the money crashed in the 2008 financial crisis, largely through poor regulation, which lies at the Government’s door, not the door of those who took out mortgages. People with absolutely identical credit profiles who took out their mortgages with a bank which did not crash have had many opportunities to refinance, which is normal in the life of the mortgage. A standard, typical bank knows that it will vary the characteristics of its mortgage over the life if that option is sought by the mortgagee.
The group of people who took out their mortgages with banks that crashed in many cases found that those mortgages were stripped out as part of the asset rescue process that the Government went through, and the Government then sold those mortgages to completely inappropriate buyers under inappropriate terms in order to get the maximum return. I understand their motivation—maximum return for taxpayers—but they removed all of the normal relationships and embedded rights in those relationships that a mortgagee has when they take out a mortgage with a viable financial institution.
The noble Baroness treats many of those mortgage prisoners as people who are now of poor credit. These are people who have aged—we all do that. The mortgage that we take out at the age of 30 is not the same one that we would be able to take out at the age of 55, because we have got older and our career profile is different. Some of them have become ill, and therefore had reduced earning capacity. Any standard bank dealing with a mortgagee in those circumstances makes adjustments. Mortgage prisoners are not able to seek such adjustments and they have been left in dire circumstances.
The fault lay with the Government when they sold mortgages under inappropriate terms to inappropriate buyers to manage them. It treated them as though they were abstract assets, rather than a special category which has a lot of convention embedded in it, in order to maximise their sale. I very much hope that the Government will realise that they have a responsibility. They took those additional revenues, they took the benefit of selling off those mortgages under terms and conditions that they should never have permitted, and they now need to offset that by stepping forward and making sure that those mortgage prisoners can have the same access to flexibility that would have been theirs had they taken that loan out with a financial institution that did not collapse in 2007-08.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, this is an emotive issue for a lot of people. Although we recognise that the Government have taken steps to help a proportion of so-called mortgage prisoners to access alternative products, so far, we have not been satisfied with either public or private assurances received on this matter. We are familiar with the Government’s view of the importance of market freedoms and the need to keep interventions to a minimum. However, despite the initiatives that we will hear about from the Minister shortly, the fact is that the market is failing a substantial number of people.
Lord True (Con)
My Lords, I thank those who have spoken. I have to say to many of them that, with great respect, I will disagree that these amendments are appropriate or effective. I must make absolutely clear that there is no prospect of the Government changing their position between now and Third Reading.
I want to start by emphasising, however, that the Government take this issue extremely seriously. I believed that that was understood in the private conversations that I felt privileged to have with Peers from all around the House and that the earnestness of Ministers in this area was understood and respected. I hope that that is the case, even if we disagree today.
We have a great deal of sympathy for mortgage borrowers who are unable to switch to new deals, which is why we and the FCA have carried out so much work and analysis in this area. The FCA has determined that there are around 250,000 people whose mortgages are currently held by inactive firms. That figure has been used by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and others. The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, said that I might detail different categories of people within that number and implied that that would not change the position. However, as my noble friend Lady Noakes observed, Parliament must surely legislate on the basis of actual numbers and evidence of the reality of the problem overall. While that figure is the total number of customers whose mortgages are held by inactive firms, not all those people are “prisoners”. Half of them, 125,000 mortgage holders, could switch to an active lender if they chose to. They could do so right now, without any action or intervention from government at all.
The Government have sought to make it as straightforward as possible for customers with inactive firms to switch. Whenever we have sold loans back to the private sector, we have included protections to ensure that customers’ ability to remortgage is unaffected. For example, the customer protections in previous sales of Bradford & Bingley and NRAM loans have included restrictions on the ability of lenders to impose financial barriers to remortgaging such as early repayment charges.
This means that there are around 125,000 borrowers with inactive firms who cannot switch, and the Government fully accept that that remains a significant number. Within that number, every household is a household of people. However, around 70,000 of those borrowers are currently in arrears. The Government do not underestimate how stressful it can be to be in arrears, but it is important to note that borrowers in arrears with inactive firms are in a similar situation to borrowers in arrears with active lenders. In both cases, it is not possible to move to a new fixed rate deal and it is not possible to switch lender. Customers in arrears with either inactive firms or active lenders have the same protection under the FCA’s conduct rules, whereby firms are required to make all reasonable efforts to explore arrangements to resolve the situation.
Around 55,000 customers are up to date with their payments but are also unable to switch. These consumers are constrained from switching because they do not meet the risk appetite of lenders in the active market. This is not to blame or accuse people in this position—of course, the Government do not do that, and I repudiate any such implication—but it is a simple point of fact that these borrowers have risk characteristics meaning they are unable switch to the active market. However, FCA analysis has found that, despite this, on average the 55,000 borrowers with inactive firms who have characteristics that would make it difficult for them to switch but are up to date with payments are paying around 0.4 percentage points more than similar borrowers with active lenders who are now on a reversion rate, which will normally be their lender’s standard variable rate.
There has been considerable scrutiny of this figure, and the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, simply claimed it was wrong, so I will take a moment to explain the analysis that underpins it. The FCA used its regulatory data returns, information from the third-party administrators who service these mortgages, and credit reference agencies to compare the interest rates paid by borrowers with inactive lenders to borrowers with similar characteristics in the active market. As my noble friend Lady Noakes stated, consumers with these kinds of risk characteristics would not be able to easily access new fixed rate deals in the active market. It is not the case that borrowers with similar high credit risk characteristics can access the lowest rates in the active market. Where they can access new fixed rate deals with active lenders, these will tend to be specialist lenders who will charge much higher rates than the major lenders.
My noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond reasonably asked what the Government are seeking to do. Importantly, the Government, working with the FCA, have created additional options for some of these 55,000 borrowers who are with inactive firms but are not in arrears. This involves a new process, for which I believe time should be allowed, that permits active mortgage lenders to waive the normal affordability checks for borrowers with inactive lenders who meet certain criteria, for example not being in arrears and not wishing to borrow more. This is called the modified affordability assessment.
Inactive firms have been contacting borrowers who have been struggling to switch, setting out that new options may be available for them in the active market. I am pleased to tell the House that a number of lenders, including major lenders like Halifax, NatWest and Santander, have also come forward with options specifically for these borrowers. I encourage all borrowers with inactive firms to consider whether they may be able to take advantage of this new switching process. While this may not be a silver bullet for all borrowers with inactive firms, it represents a significant change for borrowers with inactive firms who may previously not have been able to switch.
The Government have taken other action in the period of Covid to help and support borrowers. In October, the FCA confirmed additional options to support borrowers, including guidance to allow borrowers who are up to date with their payments with a recently matured or soon-to-mature interest-only or part and part mortgage to delay repaying the capital on their mortgage while continuing to make interest payments. This guidance is in place until October 2021. The FCA also confirmed, as I have explained, that it is making intra-group switching easier for borrowers with an inactive firm; that is, the same lending group as an active lender. Furthermore, in September the Money and Pensions Service launched online information and a dedicated phone service for borrowers.
We have also considered the regulation of customers with inactive firms. It is important to be clear that all borrowers with regulated mortgages must always have their mortgages administered by a regulated firm—this is the case for both inactive firms and active lenders. Some inactive firms, such as Landmark Mortgages and Heliodor Mortgages, are also regulated by the FCA already.
As the Economic Secretary to the Treasury and we have explained, the Government are always open-minded about whether further regulation would deliver greater protection, but we are yet to see evidence to suggest that there are borrowers who are currently being harmed by the current regulatory regime in relation to borrowers in the active market, and who would therefore be helped by extending the FCA’s remit.
Amendments 21 and 37B seek to provide additional protections for borrowers with inactive firms through direct price intervention by the FCA and the Treasury. Amendment 21 seeks to cap standard variable interest rates for borrowers with inactive firms. My noble friend Lady Noakes spoke powerfully on the implications of this policy. As I have discussed, borrowers with similar characteristics in the active market are unlikely to be able to secure new fixed-rate deals in the active market. As my noble friend argued, a cap for borrowers in the inactive market would be deeply unfair to higher-risk borrowers or those in arrears with active lenders, who would continue to pay normal reversion rates, which would be higher than the cap proposed.
Capping SVRs on mortgages with inactive firms would also have an impact on their financial stability because it would restrict lenders’ ability to vary rates in line with the market conditions. I know that some in the House found my noble friend’s speech uncongenial, but this is a fact. This concern was supported by the London School of Economics’ recent report on mortgage prisoners, which stated:
“Capping SVRs at a level close to the best rate for new loans could create harm in other parts of the market, and we do not recommend it.”
Both Amendments 21 and 37B would also require inactive firms and unregulated entities to offer new fixed-rate deals. On Amendment 21, it is not clear how the FCA should take account of the range of features and characteristics that inform interest rates in the active market—for example, product fees or borrower characteristics. Amendment 37B seeks to require the Treasury to implement regulations that provide fixed-rate deals to customers with inactive firms that are in line with deals available to borrowers in the active market with broadly similar creditworthiness characteristics.
As I have noted already, FCA analysis has made clear that borrowers with inactive firms who are up to date with their payments but unable to switch on average pay just 0.4 percentage points more than customers in the active market with similar characteristics who are now on the reversion rate. Therefore, it is not clear that this amendment would lead to materially lower rates for most consumers with inactive firms.
Being with an inactive firm does not stop a consumer from applying for mortgages in the active market. Consumers in the inactive and active market applying for new credit are assessed in the same way. Consumers in the inactive market are already able to access mortgage products available to consumers in the active market with broadly similar creditworthy characteristics.
Finally, both Amendments 21 and 37B would require firms that do not currently have the expertise, systems or regulatory permissions necessary to offer new mortgage products to do so.
I reiterate that the Government do not underestimate the stress that being unable to switch your mortgage can cause. I also reiterate that the Economic Secretary has stated the Government’s concern and interest in seeking ongoing solutions to this problem. However, in making policy we must be guided by the evidence, which demonstrates that consumers with inactive firms are not in fact significantly disadvantaged versus their peers in the active market, and we must be fair to those borrowers—to all borrowers—in any steps we take. In view of this and the proportionate range of interventions that the FCA has already taken, some of which I set out in the earlier part of my speech, I ask that the amendment be withdrawn.
Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]
I thank everybody who has taken part in this extensive debate. I particularly thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bryan, for her powerful contribution and her clear understanding of the problems that mortgage prisoners suffer, and have suffered for so very long.
I was sorry to hear the Minister again talk about the 0.4 percentage points and assert that it was a meaningful figure. At this point in the debate and at this time of the night, all I can do is say that we disagree fundamentally with his analysis. We think it is completely wrong and we think we have the evidence to show it is.
In some ways, more important than all that is that the tenor of the debate, or the tenor of the contributions made by the Minister and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, was notable for the fact that they do not assume any kind of responsibility on the part of the Government for the situation these people find themselves in. There is no hint of moral responsibility and no sense that, really, it is up to government to find the solution. As it happens, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, finished her speech, I think, by recommending that we leave all this to the FCA and the Treasury to find a solution. The fact is that we have left it to the Treasury and the FCA to find a solution, and they have not found a solution at all.
Nothing in the Minister’s speech suggests that a solution is on the horizon. He talked about the loosening of the affordability checks, but I repeat what I said in my speech: so far, the loosening of those affordability checks has helped 40 households. He had the opportunity to try to correct that figure; he did not take it. It is 40 households so far. This is not the solution, and nothing else is proposed by the FCA or the Treasury to solve the problem that still exists.
I conclude by saying that it is the Government who have caused this problem; it is the Treasury. There is a moral responsibility. People’s lives are ruined, have been ruined and will be ruined if this situation continues. It may be that the proposals we have put forward are not perfect—although I certainly dispute that they amount to significant market distortion, if any—but, nevertheless, they would bring relief to these people. There are a lot of them, they are in bad shape and their lives are difficult, and it is no fault of their own. I would like to test the opinion of the House.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Fookes) (Con)
My Lords, we now come to the group beginning with Amendment 24. Anyone wishing to press this or anything else in this group to a Division must make that clear in the debate.
Amendment 24
Baroness Neville-Rolfe
“Requirement to report to Parliament on impact on businesses
The Treasury must publish an annual report on the impact of measures taken by the FCA, PRA and the Government to regulate financial services, particularly on small business, innovation and competitiveness.”
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I shall speak to my Amendment 24 on reporting. I remind the House of my interests as a director of Secure Trust Bank and Capita plc.
The amendment would require the Treasury to publish an annual report on the impact of measures taken by the FCA, the PRA or the Government to regulate financial services, with a particular focus on small business, innovation and competitiveness. While there has been a great deal of excellent discussion during the passage of the Bill on holding financial services operators to account, we can lose sight of the value of smaller operators, including those based outside London. Moreover, innovation can bring huge value to consumers: just think, in our own lives, of online banking, money transfer overseas and customer share trading. Moreover, our strained economy will not recover without a proper focus on the competitiveness of the UK’s financial sector, which provides the veins and arteries of our economy.
I know from my experience in intellectual property how valuable an annual report to Parliament of this type can be in focusing ministerial and staff attention. Writing the report is a complement to the usual in-tray, the relentless focus on short-term risk and the avoidance of political banana skins; I am afraid these often exercise public servants to the detriment of more strategic thinking, and I speak as someone who used to be one. I believe that a strategic look once a year would raise thinking above the proverbial parapet and help the financial services sector to stay ahead in the new world, but can I persuade the Minister?
I will leave others to speak to their Amendments 25 and 37, but I will say that I took some comfort from the Minister’s reply to me on impact assessments in Committee, which is why I did not retable my amendment. He confirmed that both regulators, the FCA and the PRA, have a disciplined routine and a proper approach to impact assessment, and they understand that the sunlight of transparency must shine through. What is less clear is how easy it is to access those assessments, those nuggets of judgment and estimation. Could the Minister reassure us that there will be a decent system of signalling new proposals and that PRA and FCA impact assessments will be available to Parliament, perhaps through the public websites? We need to see and understand their proposals, and we need to do that routinely if we are to exercise our parliamentary scrutiny function properly, which has been an issue of great debate throughout the passage of the Bill. I beg to move.
Amendment 25 (to Amendment 24)
Lord Sharkey
Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]
I will be brief. Amendment 24 continues the themes underlying Amendments 18, 19 and 20, proposed by my noble friend Lady Bowles. The amendment concerns the provision of vital information, as did those amendments. The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, has explained the purpose of her amendment with her usual force and clarity, and I agree with every word she said.
The assessment of impact is essential to proper scrutiny, but it seems to me that there is an omission in the noble Baroness’s amendment. Amendment 24 requires the Treasury to
“publish an annual report on the impact of measures taken by the FCA, PRA and the Government … particularly on small business, innovation and competitiveness.”
The amendment does not include consumer protection in this list. My Amendment 25 simply inserts this alongside the other particularised areas.
Consumer protection is already an objective of the FCA. The Financial Services Act 2012 inserted new Section 1C, which sets out that the “consumer protection objective is”, rather unsurprisingly,
“securing an appropriate degree of protection for consumers.”
The same Act also imposes an obligation on the FCA to promote competitiveness, one of the specified categories in Amendment 24 of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. This obligation is qualified and, in some ways, secondary to the consumer protection objective. The Act says that the promoting competitiveness requirement has to be “compatible with the advancement” of consumer protection. Both are important and seem to me to merit the same standing in Amendment 24.
I recognise that the PRA has no such direct obligation to consumer protection. However, its general objective is set out in Section 2B inserted by the 2012 Act, and it clearly implies an element of consumer protection. The Government themselves have a clear interest and involvement in consumer protection directly, if they consider it necessary.
Consumers need protection, perhaps now more than ever: scams multiply, malfeasance grows and people lose their pensions and life savings. The resourcefulness and inventiveness of the dishonest seems to know no bounds. Just as it is important to know the impact of measures taken to regulate financial services in general, and on small businesses, innovation and competitiveness in particular, so it is important to know the impact of measures taken to protect consumers. There are already many of these measures and there will be more as new ways of fleecing consumers are devised. We need to know what we are doing in combating them all—what works and what does not. Amendment 25 would enable this in the way proposed by Amendment 24. I beg to move.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, I apologise for the need to withdraw from the previous two groups, but I return to speak to Amendment 37 in my name, which was also kindly signed by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka. I look forward to his contribution to this debate.
I hope noble Lords recall that I had a similar amendment in Committee, in a debate rather truncated by the pressure of time. At that stage, I circulated an associated briefing addressing what is commonly called the finance curse or the problem of too much finance—the subject of growing and now extensive academic and policy commentary, which prompted this amendment. That briefing discussed, as I canvassed then at some length, the cost of too much finance, which was calculated for the UK between 1995 and 2015 as £4,500 billion, or 2.5 years of average GDP across the period, by Professor Andrew Baker and colleagues at the Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute.
I will not go through all that again, but I will go back to the exchange that I had with the noble Earl the Minister through Committee about the source of the Government’s figure, stated as the value of the financial sector to the UK and set at £76 billion in tax receipts. As was acknowledged, that includes £42 billion borne by customers in the form of VAT and by employees in the form of income tax and national insurance contributions.
The noble Earl kindly acknowledged to me by letter, after my initial question, that the source was PricewaterhouseCoopers, clearly not an independent source without an individual interest in playing up the financial sector of which it is part; although, to be fair to PwC, it does not claim, in that figure, to count costs. It is looking at only one side of the equation and adds the rider that it has
“not verified, validated or audited the data and cannot therefore give any undertaking as to its accuracy.”
I wonder, given that I raised this question in Committee, whether the Minister has given any more thought to, or asked any more of his officials about, how they might look at the complete equation—the costs and benefits of the financial sector. Perhaps if the Government are not prepared to accept this amendment, or write one along their own lines, they could look into this in other ways. That is the key question I put to the Minister tonight.
I provided Members last time with that one calculation —one massive cost—but surely, if the Government are making decisions that will impact on the size of the financial sector and, in consequence, other areas of the economy, they have, or at least plan to have, a methodology for doing that. As your maths teacher might have said, you need to be able to show your working and have a result you arrived at yourself—or at least that you can source to an independent, respected reference.
When we talk about finance, people often feel daunted and concerned about apparently technical matters, so I shall draw a parallel with something many people in communities around the land are well familiar with: the planned arrival of a new out-of-town supermarket that promises 100 or so new jobs and growth for the town—a calculated economic benefit. Permission is given, the supermarket is built and then the residents notice, a bit later, that one week the greengrocer closes down. A few weeks later, the butcher’s goes. Then the stationery shop that supplied lots of small businesses also closes down. Spending has not increased but shifted. There is a limited market, a limited amount of resources, and they have been shifted to one central location.
That analogy works rather well for the financial sector, not just because, as I talked about last time, a maths PhD graduate going into finance is not going into manufacturing, agricultural research or considering education statistics, but because the financial sector, particularly the most lucrative parts of it, is overwhelmingly concentrated in London—indeed, within the City of London that is often used synonymously with the financial sector, even if a huge percentage of the actual money is held offshore in tax havens. I am sure that some Members of your Lordships’ House will leap up to point out that there are jobs in cities around the land. That is true, but that is not where the real money is.
It was clear that from the noble Earl’s answer in Committee that the drafting of my amendment then was unclear, so I have attempted to tidy it up somewhat. I have clarified the reference here to inequality, to explain that I am talking, at least chiefly, of regional inequality: that is something, of course, that, with the Government’s levelling-up agenda, I would expect them to be greatly concerned about. After Committee, I also honed the reporting areas, taking out references to risks that were not the major aim of the amendment.
I hope that the meaning is clear now, for in his answer in Committee I am not sure the Minister, although I acknowledge that the pressure of time undoubtedly truncated his answer, grasped a major point of the “too much finance” argument. He referred to the Bank of England’s Financial Policy Committee having the responsibility to identify, monitor and take action to remove or reduce systemic risks, and the Office for Budget Responsibility producing and presenting a fiscal risks report to Parliament every two years. In his answer in Committee, the noble Earl said that
“the FCA and PRA are required to prepare and lay annual reports before Parliament, assessing how effectively their objectives have been advanced. These objectives are set by Parliament”.—[Official Report, 10/3/21; col. GC 733.]
However, what this amendment aims to do is to produce the information that could inform those objectives, to see whether the finance sector, as the SPERI report suggests, and as I would contend, is too large. How can those objectives be set in a fog, relying only on a clearly partisan source of data not presenting a complete picture?
The Buddhist text Udāna, dating back to about 500BC on the Indian subcontinent, refers to a group of blind men each touching part of an elephant. That produces a great deal of disagreement, as they debate what it actually is. I have my own view of the financial sector—I doubt that Members of your Lordships’ House have much doubt about what that is—but I am not asking your Lordships’ House, or the Government, to take my view, but just to have a complete, full view of the costs and benefits.
For the avoidance of doubt, I am not planning to push this amendment to a vote this evening. This is, as I think my speech has made clear, a continuing discussion which I plan to continue to push the Government on, which I also invite opposition parties to do—and, indeed, Members from the Government’s side, including the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, who in her Amendment 24, as she often does, calls for a cost-benefit analysis or impact assessment, an approach that would be improved and strengthened by Amendment 25 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. Both speakers thus far have stressed the need for information for proper scrutiny. I ask them to join me in thinking about the need for a full and complete view of what is undoubtedly the financial sector elephant stomping across the British economy.
Viscount Trenchard (Con)
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe is a tireless advocate of impact assessments. I support her proposal to require the Treasury to provide an annual impact assessment of the regulators’ activities. Some of our existing financial services regulation, such as AIFMD, Solvency II and parts of MiFID II, has already had a devastating effect on small business, innovation and the competitiveness of our financial markets. My noble friend’s Amendment 24 will mitigate further damage that might otherwise be done by the application of disproportionate or unduly burdensome rules.
The FCA’s first operational objective is consumer protection, so I do not understand the purpose of the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, in Amendment 25, which I think would make my noble friend’s amendment read rather strangely. It is a pity that the Minister is not willing to raise the importance of competitiveness of the markets as an objective of the FCA, but, in any event, I hope he will agree that the consumers’ interests are not assisted by measures that damage competitiveness, innovation and small businesses.
Amendment 37, in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, and the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, also refers to impact assessments in its heading. But it is too wide in its coverage. It is not reasonable to make the regulators responsible for matters such as poverty, regional inequality and economic development. Market distortions such as those which would be created by the adoption of this amendment would have an adverse effect on prosperity and economic development across the country, creating more poverty and reducing the scope for the alleviation of regional inequality such as the Government are championing through their levelling-up campaign.
Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, on her amendment and her speech. I would like to speak to Amendment 37. The amendment requires the FCA and the PRA to embrace social responsibility by considering the impact and costs/benefits of the financial services industry. Currently, that receives little attention. There are such obligations on companies—in other words, they have to embrace social responsibility—so why not on regulators?
The noble Baroness has drawn attention to the finance curse upon the UK, which has inflicted at least £4,500 billion-worth of damage to the UK economy. It would be helpful to hear from the Minister about the limits of this negative impact on the UK and whether there are any limits to the growth of the finance industry, which can drive out other industries. After all, other industries also have to compete for resources.
For far too long, the social effects of the finance industry have been dismissed as externalities, and little weight is attached to them in any annual report of the FCA or the PRA. Under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000—FSMA—the FCA is required to
“promote effective competition in the interests of consumers in the markets for regulated financial services and services provided by a recognised investment exchange”
in carrying out certain regulated activities.
The FCA website states that one of its duties is to
“make markets work well—for individuals, for business, large and small, and for the economy as a whole.”
What analysis supports the claim that the FCA actually does this? It is hard to see how any of its statutory objectives can be met or demonstrated to have been met in the absence of any cost-benefit analysis, especially relating to the disappearance of bank branches or the very restricted access to financial services by the masses. This point was raised earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Naseby; I reuse it as an example to illustrate the failures of the FCA.
The absence of bank branches has a direct impact on poverty, regional inequality, economic development, production, distribution and the consumption of goods and services. The FCA acknowledges that 27.7 million adults at the moment are experiencing vulnerability to poor health, low financial resilience or recent negative life events. This is an increase of 15% since February 2020, when 24 million people were considered vulnerable. Yet no formal assessment is offered by the FCA as to why this is, what the role of the finance industry is and how these negative impacts can be alleviated.
I return to the issue of bank branches. Bank branch networks are a vital part of the financial infrastructure, but they have been shrinking at an accelerating rate, with many town centres and districts having no bank branches at all. Some banking services began to be provided by post offices—or bank branches moved into them—but they are closing too. Cash machines are also vanishing and increasingly require a fee, especially those located in the poorest areas. I have seen cash machines charging up to £4.99 for a withdrawal in a relatively poor area of London.
Branch closures result in exclusion from access to financial services. Many citizens, especially the elderly and those in low-income groups, do not have access to fast broadband connections or a computer. Computers in local libraries and homes are not necessarily secure and online fraud is a major risk. Strong signals for smartphones are not available throughout the country and there are too many blackspots. People without computers and smartphones cannot easily access any financial service. This cannot easily be reconciled with the government policy of reducing exclusion from financial services, and the FCA has not really said much about it.
The closure of bank branches means that the banking market is not working well, as many individuals and businesses are unable to access timely and effective financial services. Maybe the FCA interprets the “competition objective” given to it in very narrow economic terms and neglects the social dimension of making markets “work well”. It has done little to address the consequences of branch closures.
The closure of bank branches has severe consequences for financial services, local economies and the erosion of local competition. Bank branch closures impose costs on people, such as going to the next town for your banking: that is, the money spent on transport, the time taken up, extra pollution emanating from travel to the next town, road congestion and searching for the nearest suitable financial services facility—and, of course, there are cyber risks as well.
Some people may well trek to another town with a bank branch, but affordable and efficient transport from many locations, especially in rural areas, is not necessarily available. Trekking to another town is not an easy task for the elderly, the infirm, women with small children, or local entrepreneurs just keeping their head above water. A trader cannot afford to close business for a day, or half a day, to visit a bank branch in another town. In any case, the additional travel generates extra pollution and damages the environment. When people visit another town for their banking services, they end up doing their shopping there, which means that the local economy in the place where they live is also damaged.
Without local bank branches, local shopkeepers, traders and the self-employed cannot easily bank cash takings and cheques. This then increases the risks that they face. Without a local branch, banks cannot easily build an intelligent picture of local businesses, risks and opportunities, and thus cannot provide required financial support for local economies. One study has estimated that bank branch closures dampen SME lending by 63% on average in postcodes that lose a bank branch. This figure grows to 104% for postcodes that lose their last bank branch in town.
The closure of local bank branches increases commercial decline, as I indicated earlier, because people end up shopping in the town where they go for their banking. This accelerates economic decline and has effects on the local housing market, as well as on the provision already made for schools, healthcare and other facilities.
In the absence of local banking facilities, many people, especially the low-paid, may become victims of the payday lenders who charge exorbitant interest rates.
The amendment tabled asks the regulators to discharge their duties because, currently, it is one-way traffic: traffic from the state, taxpayers and people to the banks, and very little in return. On behalf of citizens and taxpayers, the state has bailed out banks; provided quantitative easing to lubricate their liquidity; acts as a lender of the last resort; provides almost free raw material—that is, cash with very low interest rates; protects bank deposits of up to £85,000; and bolsters the bank customer base, and thus the ability of banks to sell services to newer customers, because the state insists that social security payments are made through banks. What exactly is it that the banks offer the public in return? It is hard to see what we are getting in return. We are not getting competition in financial services; we are not getting bank branches that are open and accessible to the masses. There appears to be no quid pro quo from the finance industry. All that people are getting is shrinking access to financial services.
The FCA, as a regulator, has a duty to see that the markets work well for everybody. It has not done so. How can it deliver that duty when people simply do not have access to financial services or have very restricted access?
It is quite likely that, in meeting the objectives of the proposed amendment, the regulators might actually talk to normal people and ask how they are affected by changes in the financial services industry. If this amendment was to be enacted one day, I hope that it would make the regulators more people-friendly.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, at this late stage of the evening I shall not try to emulate the previous speaker’s length of contribution—indeed, I shall deliver a slightly shorter version of what I had originally intended to say. I speak in favour of Amendment 24, in the name of my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe.
Amendment 24 focuses on ex post analysis of the impact of changes introduced by the regulators or the Government. It therefore gives us a different lens on the impact that interventions have had in practice. My noble friend normally focuses on impact statements, which are ex ante evaluations and often suffer from highly questionable assumptions and confirmation bias. When we deal with ex post analysis, however, we can rely on outcomes and facts. That kind of analysis is really important when helping to shape policy going forward or correcting any mistakes in policy already introduced, so I support this amendment. I personally would not have gone for an annual report, because the ability to see the cumulative impact of changes is quite important but difficult to track in an annual report. However, a report is an extremely good idea.
The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, has tried to add a consumer focus to the report that my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe has proposed. I think it is better focused on small business, innovation and competitiveness; to add consumer matters would dilute the focus of that report. I am not against a report on consumer protection but it would not help to stick it in the middle of something focusing on issues such as competitiveness.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, will not expect me to support her Amendment 37. The analysis we got from her and the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, seemed to be of a world I do not really recognise. I believe the financial services sector is a great success story for this country and makes a big contribution to our economy. A number of the things that noble Lords cited seemed to be clinging to an outdated bricks-and-mortar vision of what banking is really about; frankly, that is not the world we live in today. Just as we have seen that bricks-and-mortar retail is not the way forward, it will not be for banking either. We must not keep tying ourselves to the way things were in the past.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, given the hour I shall also be very brief, but I have to say I rather like the amendments in this group. I like Amendment 24, as amended by Amendment 25—I do not care if it is a separate chapter. But it is quite dangerous to get tangled into issues around competitiveness without making sure there is a lens on consumer protection at the same time. Many small businesses fall into the consumer category in reality, certainly the micro end of small businesses.
What I like about this amendment is: what you measure, you manage. We are so constantly focused on change, new regulation and new rules, without ever going back and looking at the consequences of what we have done and trying to identify what worked, what did not and where the gaps are. It seems that this proposal goes absolutely in the right direction.
There is something interesting in Amendment 37 because one of the big questions that has never been answered is: how does our financial services industry impact on the real economy, in contrast to something much more circular within the financial services economy? I do not think that one is good and the other bad but they are very significant questions, particularly in a country where we have such a dominant investment banking culture, which does not necessarily provide a wide range of relevant services to a great deal of our economic base—particularly our small business base. There is a very interesting question wrapped up in all of that. The approach of saying “We need to look at this in a serious and consistent way, perhaps regularly” strikes me as important when feeding the strategy which then informs the way in which the regulator, the Treasury and the Government behave.
Lord Eatwell (Lab)
My Lords, Amendments 24 and 25 develop the notion of an information system—the information that will be provided by the FCA, PRA and the Government to feed into an assessment of the performance and impact of the financial services sector and the regulators. Amendment 37 goes much wider, as one might have gathered from its presentation, seeking to make, or ask for, a general economic assessment of the role of financial services generally within the UK, particularly the impact of the various regulators and the Treasury.
One of the themes particularly around the discussion of Amendment 37 was that this is not done. There are shelves of academic books that do this, and there are libraries of this material, but what has not happened is that it has not been brought together and assessed in a decision-making environment on a regular basis. The problem with Amendment 37 is that it asks the FCA and the PRA to—to use a phrase that has become popular today—mark their own homework. They are not really the right people to assess themselves; there are plenty of research institutes around this country that do a first-class job of assessing exactly these issues. However, we have not brought them together very well. What is so valuable about Amendments 24 and 25 is that they are targeted on that bringing together—bringing information into what I have called the “New Scrutiny”.
I would be interested to hear the Minister reflect, when he sums up, on the information role that is represented by the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the role that that sort of information system will play in our regulatory future.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, Amendments 24, 25 and 37 return to an issue that I know is of keen interest to many in this House. They seek to introduce requirements to publish reports on the impact of financial services regulation and to undertake assessments of the impact of the financial services sector on the UK more broadly.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, many not feel able to assent to what I am about to say, but, as we consider this topic, we should remind ourselves of the vital role that the financial services sector plays in our economy, employing more than 1 million people nationwide. It is also a critical source of tax revenue, which has proved especially important during these difficult times. We can argue about how we should calculate the precise amount of such revenue, but, by any measure, it is very substantial. We also should not forget the role that the sector plays in enhancing the nation’s standing abroad. The UK exported over £50 billion-worth of financial and insurance activities in 2019, a trade surplus of £41 billion.
Amendment 24 would require the Government to publish a report on the “impact of measures” taken by the FCA, PRA and the Government to regulate this most important financial services sector. In particular, it seeks understanding of the impact of measures on small businesses, innovation and competitiveness. Amendment 25 would add “consumer protection” to the list of things that the Government would be required to report on.
Lest there be any doubt, the Government are wholly committed to ensuring that the financial services sector supports competition, innovation and competitiveness. I hope that this is evidenced by the last set of remit letters issued to the FCA and the PRA by the Chancellor, which requested that the regulators have regard to these three priorities when advancing their objectives and discharging their duties.
In respect of reporting, the FCA and the PRA both have a statutory objective to promote effective competition. What does that involve? It involves promoting a financial services framework that supports new firms to enter the market and grow, promotes innovation and allows successful, innovative firms to grow and thrive. Those, surely, are the key aims for the sector when we talk about effective competition.
I remind my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe that both regulators are obliged to prepare annual reports that analyse the extent to which their objectives, including this competition objective, have been advanced that year. Those reports are in turn laid before Parliament for scrutiny. Moreover, I should say to her that, under the Financial Services and Markets Act, the FCA and the PRA are required to publish cost-benefit analyses when proposing new rules. The regulatory initiatives grid, a relatively recent innovation, sets out the regulatory pipeline that allows the financial services industry and other interested parties to understand and plan for the timings of initiatives that may have a significant operational impact. The grid is published at least twice a year, so Parliament has a forward look at upcoming proposals in a material and transparent way.
Turning to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe’s point about small firms, in my letter to her of 2 March, I set out the Government’s actions to support smaller innovative firms to grow to their full potential, including through the FCA’s regulatory sandbox and our support for the fintech sector. The amendment would therefore duplicate reporting obligations and arrangements that already exist.
I should also note the new accountability frameworks that the Bill puts in place for prudential measures. These require the FCA and PRA to have regard to UK competitiveness, among other things, when making rules to implement Basel or the investment firms prudential regime. Furthermore, the regulators will then be required to report on how having regard to competitiveness has affected their proposed rules.
On consumer protection, which is the subject of the amendment, let me first reassure noble Lords that the protection of consumers is at the heart of our existing regulatory framework. The FCA has an operational objective to secure an appropriate degree of protection for consumers and is required under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to consult a consumer panel on the impact of its work. The panel ensures that consumers play an integral role in the regulator’s rule-making and policy development.
The FCA has repeatedly demonstrated its commitment to consumer protection. One of the key areas of focus in the FCA’s Business Plan 2020/21 is,
“ensuring…that the most vulnerable are protected”.
The FCA has also recently published guidance on how firms can treat vulnerable customers fairly. As consumer protection is one of the FCA’s statutory objectives, as set out in FSMA 2000, the FCA must already report on how consumer protection has been advanced in its annual report, as outlined earlier. Therefore, as with a previous amendment, the amendment would duplicate reporting that already exists. As regards the PRA, it is important to remember that it already has an important role in protecting consumers indirectly by promoting the safety and soundness of PRA-authorised firms. This means that consumers are protected from the significant distress and suffering caused by disorderly bank failures.
I now turn to Amendment 37, which would require regular reports on the impact of the financial services sector on a range of topics, including economic development and regional inequality. I have already set out some examples of the overwhelmingly positive impact that the sector has on jobs, productivity and tax revenues across the whole UK.
Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]
My Lords, I find myself agreeing with both the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and so I have nothing more to say except to beg leave to withdraw Amendment 25.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. I also thank the Minister for reminding us of the contribution of the financial services sector to our economy, and for his summary of the remit letters. I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, for Amendment 25, and am grateful for the support across the House for the idea of ex-post reporting—perhaps bringing things together a little bit better than the existing system of reporting, which has been outlined, currently does.
I emphasize, however, that I am very flexible and would be happy to have a report less often than once a year. As my noble friend Lady Noakes said, that could encourage more depth. We should also look at some of the difficulties; my noble friend Lord Trenchard reminded us of collateral damage, for example in the case of MiFID.
In any annual report that the Treasury might bring forward—if we were able to persuade it—I am also content to see consumer protection considered and assessed, although it might perhaps be better as a separate report. I know from my own experience in banking that, at present, this is not the main problem area. There is, rightly, a focus by the regulator—particularly the FCA—on protecting the consumer. However, especially in the medium to longer term, other things matter as well: the buoyancy and dynamism of smaller firms; innovation—whoever its parent—and innovation in fraud, as we have been reminded; and competitiveness. They all feature in my amendment. If we fail to think about these things properly, the consumer—and consumer protection—is the loser.
Amendment 37 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, is much broader in focus, but I think it has sparked some useful reflections about the benefits as well as the costs, about opportunity costs and indeed about how we cope with the great change in the financial services landscape brought upon us by the ups and downs of the internet.
We will come back to this in a future Bill. In that context, I would encourage the Treasury to listen to some of the things that noble Lords have said today, to be flexible and perhaps come forward with proposals that encourage these very important dynamics for the future. In the meantime, of course, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Financial Services Bill
Monday 19th April 2021
(3 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Financial Services Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 162-R-III Third marshalled list for Report - (14 Apr 2021)
Baroness Neville-Rolfe
“Digital identification in the UK financial system
(1) The Treasury may by regulations establish a scheme for the use of a distributed digital identification for individuals and corporate entities operating in the UK financial system.(2) Regulations under this section are subject to the affirmative procedure.(3) In this section, “the UK financial system” has the same meaning as in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (see section 1I of that Act).”
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 28 and 29 in my name on digital identification, and I thank my noble friends Lady Mcintosh of Pickering and Lord Holmes of Richmond for their support. I take a substantial interest in facilitating the provision of digital ID and have done so for several years. It is the sort of thing where the UK, with its early adoption of digital and skills in matters of security, should be ahead of the curve. Perfectly good systems exist in a number of areas and have been rolled out in other European countries and Asia but, unfortunately, not here.
I tabled amendments in the same sense during the passage of Covid legislation last year. I did not press the matter because I was promised progress and I had good meetings with my noble friend Lady Williams and with the Digital Minister, Matt Warman MP, who published proposals for the UK digital identity and attributes trust framework on 11 February. Last week, my noble friend Lord Holmes and I had another constructive meeting, this time with my noble friend Lady Penn—currently on the Front Bench—and civil servants in DCMS and the Treasury.
I am perhaps a little too impatient for the Civil Service or, indeed, for the Front Bench, which is no doubt why I am better suited to these Benches, but I warn noble Lords that I will continue to press this matter until we introduce a reliable system of online ID—not a consultation and not a plan, but a government-approved system. But I am very reasonable, so let us start in financial services—the subject of today’s Bill. So much progress has been made already that it ought to be possible to capture this in regulation now. As we discussed in Committee, this could be helpful in reducing fraud, which has mushroomed in financial services.
Likewise, we should be able to introduce digital ID for sales of alcohol; the supermarkets already use such methods for preventing the sale of knives to those aged under 18. We should also allow a trial in a pub chain or two, and we could use digital ID in the property sector, where the ID checks for domestic house sales are needlessly bureaucratic and repetitive. We do not need to get into the question of domestic vaccine passports, of which I strongly disapprove, or of ID cards, but evolutionary progress on digital ID—starting in financial services and honed to appropriate use—is overdue.
I have tabled two alternative amendments. Amendment 28 is an enabling power allowing the Treasury to press ahead, subject to a parliamentary debate, as soon as it has sorted out a system of digital ID—whether on a trial basis or when it has a definitive solution for the sector, which should be soon. We do not want to wait for the online harms Bill or another legislative vehicle. Amendment 29 provides for a review by 1 September this year. My own experience as a Minister and a civil servant is that such reviews and a clear date can be effective where there is a political will to get something done, as I believe there is here. I beg to move.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe; in doing so, I declare my financial services interests as set out in the register.
My noble friend and I came into the House in the same autumn and, since 2013, we have both talked very much about distributed digital ID. It was pressing in 2013, so it certainly is in 2021. I will speak to all the amendments in this group briefly. I had pleasure in adding my name to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe’s amendments; they are clear, succinct, short and to the point, and do the job. Does my noble friend the Minister agree?
My Amendment 30 merely seeks to flesh out some of the elements which must be considered if we are to have a successful distributed digital ID—the issues around scalability, flexibility and, crucially, inclusion. Does my noble friend the Minister agree that not only are these three issues vital to any distributed digital ID but that any ID should be predicated on the 12 principles set out in self-sovereign identity? Does she also agree that, because of the nature of this issue—as my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe pointed out—including issues around ID cards and Covid passports, there is a pressing need not only to move forward with this work but to have a public engagement to enable people to understand the issues and really get to grips with a system that can work for all?
My Amendment 31 seeks only to push the opportunity for the UK around open finance. We have seen the advantages open banking has brought; does my noble friend the Minister agree that open finance could be a boon for the UK, and could she set out the Government’s plans to enable this? I brought Amendment 32 forward in Committee so I will not dwell on it, except to seek a specific answer on subsection (2)(a) of the proposed new clause. Does my noble friend the Minister agree that we need to seriously consider the dematerialisation of UK securities at least at the same speed as that proposed in the EU? This is a competitive market; it is a race.
Finally, my Amendment 37E was brought forward simply to push the need for a review of access to digital payments. Digital payments are the future, accelerated by Covid, but, crucially, huge swathes of the population rightly rely—and must be allowed to rely—on cash. Does my noble friend agree that we urgently need a review of access to digital payments?
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Haskel) (Lab)
I call the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton. Lord Davies? I call the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
I am delighted to support my noble friends who have tabled amendments in this group, particularly my noble friends Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lord Holmes of Richmond; they are very timely contributions to this debate. I am delighted to lend my support by co-signing Amendment 28 in the name of my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe and co-signed by my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond. My starting point is with my interest in developing digital ID and proof of age through digital verification. I speak as chairman of the Proof of Age Standards Scheme board.
For the reasons that both my noble friends have so eloquently given to the House this afternoon, time is passing, and we are living in a digital age; it is extremely important that this is recognised by all departments affected. I pay tribute to the work of the working group, of which PASS is a member, which is, I think, set up under the auspices of the Home Office and the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport. I hope that my noble friend the Minister will be able to confirm that the Treasury is also co-ordinating aspects of digital identification with these other departments. It is extremely important that, if it is the wish of my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe that we proceed initially with financial services, we co-ordinate with other aspects. It has been a huge success in terms of sales of alcohol and knives, as my noble friend expressed. In Scotland, where 16 year-olds are able to perform and purchase so many more services than 16 year-olds in the rest of the United Kingdom, the proof-of-age PASS card has been especially important in that jurisdiction.
With these few remarks, I hope that my noble friend will look favourably in particular on Amendment 28. It is important to proceed prudently but with some pace to make sure that we are ahead of the game. This is the time for digital identification—with the proviso that we have the ability to verify age. I absolutely agree with my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe that there is space for digital identification in the terms of the online harms Bill, but there is no reason to delay by not passing this amendment to the Financial Services Bill before us this afternoon.
Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)
My Lords, I draw attention to my interests as set out in the register, particularly as one of the independent directors of the LINK scheme, the UK’s largest cash machine network. I support my noble friends Lady Neville-Rolfe, Lord Holmes of Richmond and Lady McIntosh of Pickering, on Amendment 37E in particular.
It is, of course, far too soon to be drawing definitive conclusions based upon our experiences of the past year or so. However, it is striking how the pandemic has tended to accelerate some existing trends. One has been the declining use of cash. For many people, this decline is something to be embraced. Last summer and again in recent days, pubs and restaurants have begun to reopen, almost universally on the basis of card payments only; the commonly preferred method is to order from the table and pre-pay through a mobile device—no cash, no cards even, and with minimised physical contact. Home delivery of food has expanded dramatically. It is therefore hardly surprising that withdrawal of cash from ATMs almost halved during the worst of the pandemic. I know people who have stopped carrying cash. However, as my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond pointed out, this approach does not work for everyone.
Think, for example, of the disadvantages for isolated, elderly people who have to rely upon neighbours for food shopping. Unless they bank online, how can they repay them? My noble friend’s amendment reminds us that even when a trend is broadly welcome to the vast majority of people, it can isolate a minority from the mainstream, sometimes with cruel and unjust consequences. Financial exclusion, digital exclusion, social exclusion and economic exclusion all too often go hand in hand. I know from my work with LINK that those in charge of the UK financial system are acutely aware of these problems and challenges. Indeed, they are working tirelessly to address them, and LINK in particular is committed to maintaining free access to cash across the country, for as long as consumers want and need it.
As part of this commitment, LINK maintains a financial inclusion programme. This has so far provided 1,800 communities with a new, free-to-use ATM service, by providing financial subsidies to operators who install the machines. Consumer and community groups, local authorities, Members of Parliament—including Members of this House—and indeed any other interested parties, can help to identify further, suitable sites. Some providers of ATMs base their business model on charging for transactions. That is a perfectly valid approach, but no one should underestimate just how precious a resource a free-to-use ATM is.
It may be that this amendment is too prescriptive, and I look forward to hearing from my noble friend the Minister on the wording, but these challenges can be overcome only by partnership, including banks, the Post Office, retailers, regulators and the Government, all founded upon the latest possible information and analysis. This will require leadership and a positive, co-operative spirit.
We would be wise to take care in drawing any lasting conclusions from our experience of the pandemic. Much more analysis needs to be done of how financially marginalised people, particularly those without bank accounts, have fared since the beginning of 2020. I am confident that the trends and suggested responses set out in Natalie Ceeney’s excellent report of March 2019 will broadly stand the test of time. All that has changed is the acuteness of the challenge and the urgency of coming together to fashion a sustainable response.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, the amendments in this group all deal in one way or another with the digital world and its implications for financial services. We all understand that we are in the midst of a revolution which will gather pace, rapidly expand, and reshape how we lead our lives. It is important that the UK is at the front of the curve in delivering those changes, to underpin its financial services industry. I was very pleased to see that the Bank of England and the Treasury have just announced the creation of a joint task force on central bank digital currency, a potential linchpin to those changes.
These amendments are all extremely useful. On digital identity, the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, hit the nail on the head, when he talked about the importance of engagement with the public. There are a lot of issues around identity, including issues of privacy. It is not an easy issue but a complex one. I hope that this engagement is dealt with more broadly. It may well be that the kind of targeted examples that the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, is concerned to see delivered much more quickly are easier to deal with, but of course, they will always lead to further questions, and this is something that we must confront head on.
We will be discussing access to cash in another group, as the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, has a specific amendment related to that, but it also points out how when we go through revolutionary change, there are always people who will be part of the “left behind”, either by choice or by capacity. Those people have every right to be able to pay a full part in our society and in our communities. Finding those mechanisms may be expensive, since it is much more efficient to go with a single strategy, but we must recognise the full complexity of the societies in which we live, the different pace at which people accept change and the degree to which they need support through that change.
I very much hope that we see something strategic coming from the Government, because we are dealing with each issue in a rather piecemeal way. We have reached the point where we need that fundamental underpinning, and I hope that we can begin to develop that strategic view, and quickly.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, we welcome the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, on digital ID and other, broader, fintech issues. They provide the Government with an opportunity to elaborate on the responses given in Committee. I hope that those who tabled the amendments will forgive me for not speaking to each in turn, but to do so would be to repeat many of the points already made.
While we would not necessarily endorse some of the timescales envisaged in the amendments, the questions asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, are sensible. In commissioning a review of fintech, the Government have demonstrated a level of interest in it, but the key question is how that is developed into concrete initiatives that grow the financial services sector while also improving the customer experience. The use of distributed digital identification could bring about a fundamental shift in how individuals and financial service businesses operate and interact on a day-to-day basis.
Properly considered implementation of digital ID could empower consumers by giving them greater choice in the services that they can access and better control over their personal data. The latter point is crucial. Any steps to further digitise the sector must come with security and privacy safeguards built in. It may not be possible or desirable to roll out digital ID overnight, but it would be interesting to hear more on the steps being taken by the Treasury and others to assess the opportunities and risks that exist. I hope that the Minister can also speak to potential timescales, even if they are not as ambitious as those spelled out in the amendments.
Amendment 37E in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, appears to be a probing amendment, but I hope the Government will take seriously his suggestion of studying the links between digital and financial exclusion. In an earlier debate I referred to the need to tackle some of the bigger, more complex issues that contribute to financial exclusion. Without concerted effort now, one can envisage a scenario in which certain sections of the population already susceptible to financial exclusion will be unable to avail themselves of the products and services facilitated by new technologies.
We are at an interesting point in the fintech debate following publication of the Kalifa review. Items such as digital ID are mentioned in that document, albeit in the context of the need to establish international codes and standards. The UK has long been a leader in this sector. If we are to continue being so, both government and business must seek to participate fully in relevant cross-border discussions and initiatives.
I note from my latest perusal of the House of Lords business that the ever-tenacious noble Lord, Lord Holmes, has secured an Oral Question on 27 April regarding the Government’s response to the Kalifa review’s recommendations. I hope the Minister can provide sufficient reassurance that the Treasury recognises and wishes to harness the potential of fintech, but I am sure that any gaps in the response today will be revisited in just under two weeks.
Baroness Penn (Con)
My Lords, this group of amendments returns to the use of technology and data in financial services, a topic we have discussed at length at earlier stages. It is an important debate, and I welcome the efforts of noble Lords to bring this to our attention again.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, noted, as part of UK FinTech Week 2021 my right honourable friend the Chancellor, just this morning, delivered a speech setting out the Government’s commitment to fintech as a crucial component of the future of UK financial services. The Chancellor made several announcements, including the launch of a new task force between the Treasury and the Bank of England to co-ordinate exploratory work on a potential central bank digital currency; a new financial market infrastructure sandbox; confirmation that the FCA will take forward the idea of a regulatory scale box; a package of measures to support fintech firm growth; and a commitment to work with the fintech community to realise the idea of a new, industry-led centre for finance, innovation and technology.
The Chancellor also reiterated his thanks to Ron Kalifa for his landmark fintech review and confirmed that the Government will shortly provide a detailed response to Parliament via a Written Statement. I am not sure I can say to the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, whether that will be before the Oral Question on 27 April.
I turn to the amendments before us today. Amendments 28, 29 and 30 all relate to the establishment of a system of digital identification and call on the Government to publish plans for achieving this. Digital identity is a vital building block for the economy of the future. The Government recognise that digital identities have the potential to make it quicker, easier and more secure for people and businesses to get things done, to simplify people’s lives and to boost business. We want to offer people the choice to provide their identity digitally where and when it suits them, securely, easily and with confidence.
I was pleased to be able to meet my noble friends Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lord Holmes last week. In that meeting, we discussed the ambitious programme of work that the Government are taking forward on digital identities that work across the economy, some of which I will summarise here.
The Government published their response to the digital identity call for evidence in September 2020 and committed to creating a framework of standards, governance and legislation to enable digital identities to be used in the greatest number of circumstances. I assure my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering that this work is being co-ordinated by the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport across all departments, including the Treasury, so that the policy on digital ID captures the widest number of applications and uses for it. An important part of this work was the recent publication of the draft UK Digital Identity and Attributes Trust Framework. This framework sets out a vision of the rules governing the future use of trusted digital identity products.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I thank all who have spoken in this short but wide-ranging debate. Time is passing, and we live in a digital age, as my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering said—a revolution indeed, in the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. My noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral reminded us that the withdrawal of cash halved during the pandemic, with some cruel consequences. LINK does great work; I remember that from my time at Tesco. We need a network to endure as normality returns. I thank the Minister for updating us on the Chancellor’s statement on fintech and open finance today.
It may not surprise noble Lords that I remain disappointed at the pace of change on digital ID. The Minister is right to emphasise what has been done in recent months, and I strongly support this. However, years are passing, our leadership in digital is eroding, and we can no longer blame the EU. We must solve this problem for the industries, services and, above all, consumers involved. Of course there must be public engagement, but this must not be used as an excuse for undue delay. I will be back, but for today, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)
We now come to the group consisting of Amendment 53. Anyone wishing to press this amendment to a Division must make that clear in the debate.
Amendment 33
Lord Sikka
“FCA duty to make a statement about ministerial directions on investigations
(1) The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is amended as follows.(2) After section 1T (right to obtain documents and information) insert—“1U Duty to make a statement about ministerial directions on investigationsWhere a Minister directs, comments on, or intervenes with an FCA investigation into wrongdoing or malpractice by a company, the FCA must make a public statement about the nature of any such intervention.””
Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans for supporting this amendment. It was discussed in Committee, but the Government’s response has raised more questions than answers.
The amendment seeks transparency about ministerial interventions or directions on investigations, especially into malpractice by companies. It would require the FCA to make a statement as and when Ministers intervene. Currently, ministerial interventions and directions, especially those that stymie investigations, are made in secret. Parliament and the public are not informed, and there is no opportunity to question Ministers. Such interventions mean that selected corporations receive ministerial favours and others do not. In the absence of investigations into the criminal practices of major corporations, it is impossible to develop effective legislation or financial regulatory practices.
In Committee, I provided some evidence of how the UK Government protected criminal organisations. It related to HSBC, which, by its own admission, had been engaged in criminal conduct in the US. In 2012, it was fined $1.9 billion for money laundering offences, which at that time was the largest fine ever levied upon a corporation. HSBC also faced the prospect of a criminal prosecution.
HSBC was supervised by the Financial Services Authority, an independent regulatory body in the UK. The US fine did not persuade the FSA to investigate. Instead, on 10 September 2012, the then-Chancellor George Osborne, the Bank of England and the FSA secretly wrote to US regulators and urged them not to prosecute HSBC, as the bank was apparently too big to fail.
The ministerial interventions came to light not because of any statement made by the Government but through a July 2016 report by the US House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services. The report was titled Too Big to Jail, and reproduced the Chancellor’s letters and some email and telephone conversation records, though these are not comprehensive. It is clear that the Bank of England, the Treasury and the regulator colluded to protect a bank engaged in criminal conduct. The matter came to light in July 2016, but there was no Statement made to Parliament to explain why a criminal organisation was being protected by the Government. By July 2016, the FSA had morphed into the FCA, but the FCA did not launch an investigation either.
The report by the US House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services shows that the Government were also shielding other UK banks. These included Standard Chartered, which was fined £670 million for money laundering, and a closer reading of the same report shows that the Government also intervened to protect Barclays.
In Committee, I referred to my legal endeavours to secure a copy of the Sandstorm report, which provides some information about frauds and fraudsters at the Bank of Credit and Commerce International. The bank was closed in July 1991, but there has been no forensic investigation into the biggest banking fraud in the 20th century. Most of the Sandstorm report is available in 1,300 US libraries. The UK courts have forced the Treasury to release a copy to me, and it shows that the Government are still protecting individuals linked to al-Qaeda, Saudi intelligence, and the royal families of Abu Dhabi and other countries in the Middle East, as well as arms dealers, smugglers, fraudsters, convicted criminals, BCCI senior personnel, and some politicians.
What kind of Government protect criminal organisations and wrongdoers? What kind of democracy do we have when such interventions are not explained to Parliament and the people? One of our greatest failures is to not develop durable institutional structures, effective laws and enforcement, and a major reason for this is that many frauds and abuses are simply covered up.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, who has just delivered what I can describe only as a bombshell of a speech—one that makes the case for the extraordinary importance of this amendment and for a far broader cleanout of the Augean stables of our financial sector and its so-called regulation and, indeed, of our entire UK system of government.
I remind noble Lords that Amendment 33 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka—also signed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, and to which I am pleased to attach my name—creates for the FCA a
“duty to make a statement about ministerial directions on investigations”.
I also remind noble Lords of a key part of the speech that we have just heard. On 30 May 2017, possibly in response to previous invitations, the Thames Valley police and crime commissioner wrote to Prime Minister saying:
“There is a serious problem with bank governance, which appears to be corrupt at the highest level in a number of our major banks. The governance system itself is being run by those most involved in cover ups and corrupt practices.”
That came from the Thames Valley police and crime commissioner, yet it appears that nothing has been done in response to that letter. I note also, as the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, said, that despite an initial offer of a meeting, the late Sir Jeremy Heywood subsequently declined to meet the police and crime commissioner.
Who should be paying attention to this? I would say everyone in the UK, and indeed the world, for while it might be more than a decade since the threat presented by the financial sector to the security of us all was made so starkly evident, the threat remains and is undoubtedly even greater now than in 2008. Among those who should be paying particular attention, I strongly suggest, are all those who have been assuring us in this House and elsewhere that everything is fine: “Nothing to see here, just a few bad apples being cleared out”. People have been saying that there is no problem with regulation or transparency, or the risks that the financial sector presents. They should pay attention to the noble Lord’s speech.
The House has heard my views before on the deep-rooted, decades-old—indeed, centuries-old—issues with our financial sector. I am not going to repeat those, which I explored at some length in Committee. Instead, I focus in this stage on the financial sector as a huge global crime issue, as a major United Nations initiative has recognised. I refer to the High-Level Panel on International Financial Accountability, Transparency and Integrity for Achieving the 2030 Agenda—the so-called FACTI panel. It is calling on Governments to agree to a global pact for financial integrity for sustainable development. This reminds us that while we often think of white-collar crimes and fraud as victimless, in fact they are crimes that damage the whole world, but particularly the poorest and most vulnerable in the UK and globally.
The FACTI panel, consisting of former world leaders and central bank governors, business and civil society heads and academics, says that as much as 2.7% of global GDP is laundered annually, while corporations shopping around for tax-free jurisdictions cost Governments up to $600 billion a year. We have heard often in debating the Bill, and elsewhere from the Government in particular, about how prominent the UK financial sector is on the global stage and about its world-leading role. There can be no conclusion from the FACTI report except that it is directed clearly at the UK and at your Lordships’ House.
The FACTI panel says that stronger laws and institutions are needed to prevent corruption and money laundering, and that the bankers, lawyers and accountants who enable financial crime must also face punitive sanctions. The report also calls for greater transparency on company ownership and public spending, stronger international co-operation on the prosecution of bribery, to which this amendment is particularly relevant, on minimum corporate tax, which I asked a question about last week, and on the global governance of tax abuse and money laundering. In Committee, I also referred to the Center for American Progress, not necessarily an organisation with which I often ideologically agree. However, it was making similar arguments to those of the FACTI panel. I invite any noble Lords with an FT subscription—which is all of us, through the Library—to look at stories tagged “financial fraud”. They make for a sober set of reading.
Action is needed. We hear often about the need for the UK to be world leading. I want to reflect on a meeting—which I know was before the pandemic because it was in person, conducted upstairs in one of the Committee Rooms of your Lordships’ House—when I had a discussion with a group of University of Michigan master’s students. They were visiting with their professor while in Europe to study fraud; their entire master’s degree was in fraud and corruption, examining the scale of it around the world. Pointing down the road from your Lordships’ House, I said to them that the City of London was one of the global centres of corruption. I was perhaps not surprised but still interested to discover that there was no expression of shock or surprise from those students. They simply nodded in agreement, as if I had made a statement that to them was blindingly obvious.
The City of London has been trading on its global reputation with centuries of propaganda, backed for much of that time by the muscle of colonial power. The world has moved on and is less and less likely to believe the propaganda. Amendment 33 is a simple, modest and far from sufficient step, though an important one, to ensure transparency in the governance of our financial sector—indeed, transparency of our governance. I commend it to your Lordships’ House.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I rise to speak on Amendment 33 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, having studied the comments made in Committee and repeated today. I can understand his frustration with history in this area. In particular, I would highlight the long delay and prevarication by Lloyds and the then regulator in dealing with the HBOS scam, which led to the demise of a number of small businesses banking with HBOS’s corporate division in Reading. Maybe more transparency would have helped there but it was actually a failure by the bank itself and by the regulator, which I very much hope would not happen again today. I am still not entirely sure what eventually happened; I know that there were some high-profile convictions. Perhaps my noble friend the Minister could update us on that sorry tale. I share everyone’s wish to see a system where it could never happen again.
However, I always worry that bad cases make bad law. The cases being quoted are generally old, while the FCA’s powers have been strengthened over the years and the culture has changed so that it is now very pro-consumer. Moreover, as my noble friend the Deputy Leader of the House explained on 10 March, the FCA is an independent body and the power of Ministers to intervene is very circumscribed. I suspect we will come back to these issues in the next financial services Bill, so I would like to make two points today.
First, reports from the United States have to be treated with some care. It is a sad fact that, unlike our own regulatory authorities, the US ones are more than a little protectionist. They come down harder on foreign entities than their domestic ones and like to levy huge fines whenever they can. It is not a level playing field, unlike the UK, which is of course one of the reasons why investors like it here. Secondly, in the sort of cases we are talking about, Ministers—I speak from experience, first as a civil servant and secondly as a Minister at BEIS, DCMS and HM Treasury—act on advice, not as free-talking politicians. If they make a direction in an investigation, it will reflect a public policy need and that could be a confidential matter, such as security or a government interest. Once that is made public it might be difficult for those being investigated to get a fair hearing, which is unfortunate in itself and likely to lead to aborted prosecutions. Whichever party is in power, this would not be in the public interest. For all these reasons, I encourage those involved to withdraw their amendment today.
The Lord Bishop of St Albans [V]
My Lords, I will be brief in my support for this amendment. I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, for speaking at great length. I therefore do not need to add a huge amount more, not least as I intend to go into a bit more detail on my concerns about transparency when speaking in support of Amendment 34, which touches on similar issues of accountability.
I am a little puzzled why the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, thinks that this is a case of bad cases making bad laws. It seems to me that there have been very considerable concerns in the past. Surely those ought to be investigated.
We are facing a real crisis of trust in public bodies at the moment, and I believe that this amendment will be a beneficial addition to this Financial Services Bill. In making provisions for an additional layer of transparency, it will act as an incentive against any possible interference; whether done formally or informally, it will still have that effect. The truth is that we do not know whether ministerial interference in FCA investigations has occurred, and positively stating either way is speculative.
Although I was not privy to the written response from the noble Earl, Lord Howe, which he promised to send to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, confirming whether there were provisions within the Ministerial Code to allow for interventions in FCA investigations, the assumption in Committee was that any attempt to steer an FCA investigation would constitute a breach of the Ministerial Code. That would require breaches of the Ministerial Code or other offences to be taken seriously, and not treated lightly or even dismissed. Last year, an inquiry found evidence that the Home Secretary had breached the Ministerial Code, yet the consequences extended little further than an apology. In February, it was revealed that the Health Secretary had acted unlawfully when his department failed to reveal details of contracts signed during the Covid-19 period. Just before Easter, we all started reading about allegations surrounding conflicts of interest in a former Prime Minister’s dealings with the financial services firm Greensill, and there have been concerns about the current Prime Minister’s dealings during his time at City Hall. It is vital that, if we are to rely on breaches of the Ministerial Code, they are given some teeth and have some effect.
I have no evidence, but it may be that no Minister has ever interfered in any FCA investigation, in any way. I sincerely hope that that is the case, but we cannot rule it out. If interferences have occurred, it would be doubtful to assume that investigations are always steered in the interests of consumers. Although provisions are in place to prevent misconduct, they should not discount the contribution that this important amendment can make in strengthening those rules and further disincentivising any possible ministerial interferences in FCA investigations. If Her Majesty’s Government have concerns about small parts of the wording here, I hope they come back with some improvements to ensure that the levels of transparency are clear to everybody, in every part of the system.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, unfortunately, I did not bring with me a copy of the letter that the noble Earl, Lord Howe, kindly sent me in response to my question about the Ministerial Code. I expect that a copy is in the Library and available to everyone, but I am sure that the Minister will follow through. While reading the content was reassuring, I do not want it to be a distraction—it is one of the reasons that I have not signed this amendment—from the underlying issue of whether there is adequate transparency to act as the cleansing light that we need in an industry sector that will always be subject to misbehaviour. There is just too much money and opportunity, and an awful lot of power, washing through this industry. Insight, clarity and visibility are probably more important than in almost any other sector of our economy.
The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, talked as if all the misbehaviour was in the past, but we are talking about Greensill today and I have questions. I know that there are many task forces and investigations going on, but I still have no understanding of how a company with as many red flags against it as Greensill got through the accreditation process to enable it to participate in the CBILS. Other than writing to the British Business Bank—and I doubt that I will get an adequate answer—I am not sure what mechanism I can possibly use to get to the bottom of that. We do not have transparency in the areas where we need it.
I remember many conversations, in the midst of the 2008 financial crisis and subsequently, with regulators that were anxious not to rock the boat. The economy and industry were fragile enough, and they were disinclined to investigate. It is to that which I have always attributed the FCA’s inaction with regard to HBOS. I support the description of the HBOS crisis given by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka. It was purely by chance that the fraud—it was literally fraud that sent people to jail for 10 years—at HBOS was exposed. Thames Valley Police decided to investigate when all the regulators, the Serious Fraud Office and the most relevant and obvious police forces had refused. Part of that was due to a lack of resources, from the police forces’ perspective.
I do not think I have ever forgiven the Treasury for its actions in this regard. It cost £7 million for Thames Valley Police to investigate that fraud and it was never reimbursed that money. The fine, of about £45 million, went to the Treasury and was deliberately not shared with the police force. Had it been, it would have encouraged and enabled police forces around the country to be more acutely aware and engaged when there was evidence of fraudulent behaviour. Even today, the various companies that were defrauded have not yet been fully compensated. Nearly 14 years on, it has not been resolved. We have two more bodies now involved in trying to clean up that mess.
The other area that leaves me with great concern is that the response I always get when I raise issues around transparency and enforcement in financial services is: “We now have the senior managers regime.” I was on the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, which drove a lot of the thinking that led to that regime, but, as we have often discussed in this House, it has been holed below the waterline by decisions of the FCA not to pursue senior executives. We know mostly about Barclays and Jes Staley—who had hired private investigators to track down a whistleblower—being fined but not declared unfit to hold his position. The fine was of a size that was more than made up by the bonuses he received in the following years, so it was pointless.
We have an underlying problem. It is not that the senior managers regime does not do some good—it establishes some procedures and processes—but it focuses on more junior people and does not hold people accountable at the senior level. With Greensill coming into the picture now and triggering a much wider discussion, I very much hope that the Government will take back the message that they have to sit the regulators and the various enforcement bodies down, and work out a way to make this system more effective. They are up against powerful forces and there is inequality of arms, but this industry has to be kept under oversight and control because, when it goes wrong, it takes a large part of our economy with it, as well as creating many individual victims.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Sikka facilitated perhaps one of the most interesting debates in Grand Committee. The amendments raised several important questions about the independence of the FCA, as well as the nature and success, or otherwise, of its past investigations. My noble friend was not happy with the response provided by the Minister last time; nevertheless, I felt that we had a helpful initial response in Committee, with references to legislation that requires FCA action in certain circumstances and allows a Minister to initiate an investigation in others. The response was perhaps a little light on the limits of ministerial power; recent times have shown that the Ministerial Code is not always considered binding. I hope that we will hear more on this later.
Some of the concerns that my noble friends cited related to events preceding the financial crisis, and I wonder whether this is an area where Ministers can go further today. For example, the noble Earl mentioned Section 73 of the Financial Services Act 2012, which imposes a duty on the FCA to investigate in the event of certain regulatory failures. As the measure was introduced after the global crash, it is clearly of no use in shedding light on events that took place before it. However, is he confident that, if some of the instances cited by my noble friend were to happen today, the current legal provisions would be sufficient to trigger an independent investigation?
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, before I respond to this amendment, I would like to express my sadness on behalf of us all at the news of the death of the noble Lord, Lord Judd. Lord Judd took part in our debates on the Bill only just before Easter. He was a Member of this House for some 30 years, a man of great wisdom and wide experience, but above all a man of great kindness, who had an abiding concern for those less fortunate than himself both in this country and across the world. We shall miss him.
Amendment 33 seeks to require the FCA to make a public statement on the nature of any intervention a Minister may make concerning an FCA investigation into an individual firm. The noble Lord, Lord Sikka, made a number of allegations against Ministers, past and present, and the Treasury. I do not have the facts or the briefing to enable me to respond to him today on so many detailed issues. Indeed, I have to say that, for the most part, I did not recognise the picture that he painted. I hope, therefore, that he will allow me to write to him on what he has said, copying in noble Lords speaking in this debate, and in doing so I shall attempt also to address the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. However, I can respond to the issue of principle raised by this amendment, which is what we are here to focus on for the purposes of the Bill.
The House may recall that, in Committee, I outlined the current legislative framework which establishes the FCA as an independent, non-governmental body. In my remarks today, I hope to build on that discussion and reassure noble Lords that this amendment is not necessary. Ministerial intervention in the activities of the FCA, were it to occur, would be one of two things: either legally permitted under existing statute, or illegal. What actions are legally permitted within the legislative framework? Under the framework established by Parliament, the Treasury and hence Ministers have strictly limited powers in relation to the FCA. Indeed, the Treasury’s ability to direct or influence the regulators is set out in statute. Most crucially, the Treasury has no general power of direction over the FCA.
The Financial Services Act 2012 sets out the legislative mechanisms through which the Treasury can launch investigations, provided under Section 77 of that Act, which provides a mechanism for the Treasury to direct the FCA to conduct an investigation into events related to a person carrying on a regulated activity. Section 77 was made use of recently, as noble Lords will know, in relation to the regulation of London Capital & Finance, or LCF. Under Section 78, the Treasury can provide direction as to the scope of an investigation, the timeline that it should cover and how it is conducted. So the scope of the powers available to the Treasury is tightly circumscribed by statute. That has to be right, because the ultimate independence of the FCA is vital to its role. Its credibility, authority and value to consumers would be undermined if it were possible for the Government to intervene in its decision-making or ongoing supervision of authorised firms.
As the FCA has acknowledged in its mission statement, Parliament has given the FCA a range of tools in order to deliver its objectives. These tools range from guidance, to censure, to its Section 166 FSMA powers, which allow the FCA to seek the view of an independent third party or “skilled person” on aspects of a regulated firm’s activities if it is concerned or wants further analysis. These accompany independent powers for the FCA to make decisions on how to use these tools most effectively. In my remarks in Committee, I did not intend to suggest that the FCA cannot investigate events that occurred before it was created. I merely pointed out that the events being discussed were historical. The FCA can and does look at historical behaviour of the firms that it supervises.
In the context of this amendment, it is necessary to appreciate that the FCA is an independent body and that there are laws which govern and strictly limit the directions that the Treasury can and cannot give it. However, were such directions to be given under Section 77 and 78 of the 2012 Act, I cannot conceive of a situation where Ministers and the Treasury would not make that fact public.
That covers the intervention that is legally permitted; what about nefarious interference? In Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, raised the Ministerial Code, as indeed she has today, and asked whether the provisions of the code were applicable in this instance and strong enough in relation to engagement with regulators. I have since written to the noble Baroness on this topic and a copy has indeed been placed in the Library. However, for the benefit of the House I will expand on that now.
The Ministerial Code requires Government Ministers to
“maintain high standards of behaviour and to behave in a way that upholds the highest standards of propriety.”
In addition, Ministers must act in accordance with the highest standards as set out in the seven principles of public life: selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership. I particularly point to the requirements under the openness principle for Ministers to
“act and take decisions in an open and transparent manner.”
I hope that this assures noble Lords that, even if Ministers were tempted to interfere improperly, the Ministerial Code provides the proper protections against this. In short, if a Minister were to attempt it, he or she would simply not get away with it. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans in a real sense made my point for me. If anyone has evidence of improper behaviour by Ministers, the regulators or firms, they should of course raise that through the proper channels.
It is not a case of my arguing along the lines of “Trust me—I’m a Minister.” I hope that I have demonstrated that the appropriate legislation and the appropriate code and principles of ministerial behaviour are already in place in this space to safeguard against any undue interference as envisaged by this amendment. I hope that this reassures noble Lords that this amendment is simply not necessary, and that the noble Lord is thereby content to withdraw it.
Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I join the noble Earl, Lord Howe, in expressing sadness at the death of Lord Judd, and send my condolences to all his loved ones.
In her response, the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, raised the interesting point that some matters were confidential and that Ministers or the Government cannot therefore talk about them. There is also a broader issue of parliamentary accountability and public interest, and of being open and accountable, which should always triumph over the pursuit of private interests. I do not think that any of the issues I have spoken about touch upon the position of spy satellites or troop movements and are not, therefore, a real threat to national security. They may be a threat to private arrangements which some elites have negotiated with Governments, but that is another matter.
I am grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Howe, for his detailed explanation. He said that if there is any evidence about ministerial interventions it should be brought to the attention of the proper authorities, but the difficulty is that there is no mechanism by which this intervention is placed on public record. We only become aware of it because of revelations in other cases. In the case of BCCI, which I cited, it was after five and a half years of litigation against the Treasury that I managed to secure a copy of the Sandstorm report. The Government did their utmost to prevent the disclosure of that document, so there simply are no formal channels for any evidence. That means that we can only investigate past events, try to put the bits and pieces together and build up a picture about ministerial interventions.
This issue will remain with us, but one thing we cannot deny is that, even under the FCA’s rules and the Ministerial Code, which the Minister cited, the unredacted version of Lord Justice Bingham’s report on the Bank of England’s supervision of BCCI still remains a secret document. That is really bizarre. The Sandstorm report is on the internet, because I put it there, but as far as the state is concerned it is somehow a secret document.
As I said, this issue is not going to go away. In the post-Covid world there may well be more scandals and more issues. There will, therefore, be more questions about government accountability and interventions. For the time being, I withdraw the amendment, but hope to return to it in the future. I thank noble Lords for their indulgence.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Fookes) (Con)
We now come to the group consisting of Amendment 34. Anyone wishing to press this amendment to a Division must make that clear in debate.
Amendment 34
Lord Sikka
“Supervisory Board
(1) There is to be a Supervisory Board to perform the function of monitoring the FCA and PRA.(2) The Supervisory Board must consist entirely of stakeholders.(3) Recruitment for the membership of the Supervisory Board is to be conducted through open competition and the appointments are to be confirmed by the House of Commons Treasury Committee, or another relevant House of Commons Select Committee.(4) The Chancellor of the Exchequer may nominate individuals to the Supervisory Board.(5) The following are ineligible for appointment to the Supervisory Board—(a) current and past employees of the FCA and the PRA, and(b) current employees of organisations supervised by the FCA and the PRA.(6) A member’s membership of the Supervisory Board cannot exceed a period of five years beginning with the day the member’s appointment is confirmed under subsection (3).(7) The Supervisory Board has no responsibility for—(a) the day-to-day operations of the FCA or the PRA, and(b) investigations and enforcement of the rules devised by the FCA and the PRA.(8) The Supervisory Board’s functions are to—(a) provide strategic oversight of the Executive Boards of the FCA and PRA responsible for day-to-day operations;(b) inquire into the adequacy of resources used and available to the FCA and the PRA;(c) seek explanations from the Executive Board for reasons for the delay in launching and completing investigations; and(d) seek explanations from the Executive Board in relation to the efficiency and effectiveness of the FCA and the PRA in discharging their statutory duties.(9) The Supervisory Board shall have powers to—(a) demand explanations from the Executive Board on any matter affecting the protection of consumers from harmful practices;(b) secure information from the Executive Board about their transparency and accountability to the public; and(c) liaise with whistle-blowers and examine FCA and PRA policies for protecting and rewarding whistle-blowers.(10) The Supervisory Board must hold open meetings with the Executive Boards of the FCA and the PRA at least once every three months.(11) The working and background papers of the Supervisory Board must be made publicly available.(12) The Supervisory Board must lay before each House of Parliament an annual report highlighting matters of concern relating to the operation of the FCA and PRA which it has discovered in exercising its powers and functions.(13) The Supervisory Board must be consulted on appointment and reappointment of the Chief Executives of the FCA and the PRA.”Member’s explanatory statement
The new Clause will create a Supervisory Body for each of the FCA and the PRA. Its function would be to internally monitor the Executive Boards of the FCA and the PRA and provide a diversity of views on the conduct and practices of the FCA and the PRA.
Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans for supporting this amendment, which seeks to democratise regulators by giving the people a direct say in their governance structure, and thus act as a bulwark against capture by corporate interests. Almost every regulator claims to serve the people, but normal people—as I like to call them, rather than ordinary people— are kept off the boards. This amendment would put people inside the regulatory bodies. The amendment proposes a two-tier board structure for the FCA and the PRA. One tier, the executive board, would be responsible for the day-to-day operations, just as it is today. The second tier, a supervisory board consisting of stakeholders, would exercise oversight of the executive board and its practices. The amendment sketches out the composition and some of the powers, rights and duties of the supervisory board and its modus operandi, which is complete sunshine.
Throughout the debate on the Bill, many noble Lords have expressed concerns about the failures of the FCA. Capture by corporate interests has been identified as a major factor. The colonisation of the FCA and the PRA boards, working parties and committees by corporate interests means that their interests are prioritised and anything threatening is filtered out of consideration altogether. The FCA and the PRA are more likely to have one-to-one meetings with finance industry elites than with the victims of banking frauds or mis-sold financial products, or individuals concerned about the RBS and HBOS frauds and bank forgeries.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
I start by sharing the powerful words of my noble friend the Deputy Leader on the sudden loss of the noble Lord, Lord Judd, who contributed so very recently to this Bill and whom I remember well as an effective Minister of State at the FCO when I was a young civil servant. His death is a great loss.
As I understand it, Amendment 34 is designed to improve the culture of the financial services sector—a sentiment that I empathise with—although it would do so by adding an extra layer of regulation through a stakeholder supervisory board. I am against this for the FCA, the PRA and other regulators. I have substantial experience of regulation from my Civil Service past, as an executive and a non-executive of non-financial companies, as a Minister and, currently, as a non-executive of a small bank. In my judgment, adding an extra layer of board members without practical experience could have a perverse and negative effect.
For good outcomes, one needs clear, simple and outcome-based regulation, and company directors who take their responsibilities seriously and promote a good culture, with a focus on customers and protection, on risk and the good use of capital, on fraud and cyber, on the people who operate the business—from the top right down to the bottom—and on innovation and cost control. Above all, one needs directors who will challenge, get into the detail and be listened to.
I have been a non-exec for over 20 years and, until recently, there has not been enough attention paid to, or appreciation of, the challenge function and directors who challenge. Cases such as the HBOS scam, which we have been concerned about today, are the result. This needs to change, in terms of the selection of non-executives and with strong internal challenge in the executive structure of companies. This applies to financial services companies and more broadly.
An extra layer in the form of a supervisory board will not solve the problems of culture that have been highlighted. It risks introducing a further confusion of responsibility. To my mind it is, I am afraid, a bad idea.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, will not be surprised to find that I do not support his Amendment 34. In particular, as a former director of a supervised bank, I do not recognise the regulatory capture that he majored on in Committee and again today. In my experience, the relationships are always challenging and, sometimes, worse than that.
I have two main reasons for opposing the amendment. First, a supervisory board sitting over the top of the existing regulators undermines a fundamental characteristic of regulation in the UK—namely, that regulators are independent. That means that they are independent of government, certainly, and of Parliament and anyone else who thinks that they might have an interest in what they do. They are certainly accountable for delivering against their objectives and expect to be scrutinised by Parliament, but they are autonomous bodies. This amendment runs against that.
Secondly, the regulators already have governance structures that oversee the work that the executives undertake. In the FCA, it is the FCA’s own board, which has a chairman and a majority of non-executive directors. I believe that the only executive on the FCA board is, in fact, its chief executive. In the case of the PRA, there is a Prudential Regulation Committee, which has Bank of England executives and outside members, and is chaired by the Governor of the Bank of England. More importantly, in governance terms, as the PRA is part of the Bank of England it is overseen by the Court of the Bank of England, which, again, is a largely non-executive body chaired by a non-executive, although it does have the governor and the deputy governors, including the head of the PRA.
Governance of the regulators is carried out in the way in which governance in the UK is normally done. It covers the very things mentioned in proposed new subsection (8), which is therefore duplicative. If there are concerns, they should be dealt with within the organisations concerned, without writing reports to Parliament. I believe in transparency, but there is a point at which transparency becomes counterproductive, and I am sure that this amendment is way beyond that point.
Accountability to Parliament takes many forms, a key one being the annual reports that are laid before Parliament, setting out the regulators’ performance against their objectives, which is required by existing statute. It really is difficult to see what added value this amendment would create.
The amendment is also deficient in a number of respects. Perhaps the most glaring is the reference to the “Executive Board” of the PRA and of the FCA. As far as I am aware, there is no such thing specified in legislation or the governance arrangements of either body. I believe that each regulator has an executive committee or equivalent, but they do not have an “Executive Board”, with a capital “E” and a capital “B”.
The amendment would require the exclusion from the supervisory board of anyone who might actually understand what the PRA and the FCA actually do. Proposed new subsection (5) would disqualify “current and past employees” not just of the FCA and the PRA but of any organisation that they supervise. I have never thought that ignorance was a good qualification to be a member of a board.
Proposed new subsection (10) talks about “open meetings” but does not explain what that means in practice. Proposed new subsection (11) says that all the supervisory boards papers must “be made publicly available”, but it seems to pay no heed to the need for confidentiality or data protection. I could go on. These are unnecessary and ill-thought-out proposals, and I hope that my noble friend the Minister will not accept them.
The Lord Bishop of St Albans [V]
My Lords, I will speak in support of Amendment 34, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, which is an interesting contribution to the question of governance. I am keen that we find any ways that we can to speak into those organisational cultures that every industry adopts and promotes, and which sometimes lead to groupthink.
There are times when it takes someone from the outside to ask intelligent questions. I am reminded of Her Majesty the Queen asking the Bank of England why there had been a financial crash back in 2008, when many people in the industry, who were paid extraordinary amounts of money because of their supposed expertise, had not spotted that it was coming. I do not think that this is about inviting people who are ignorant to come on to boards; this is a question about whether there is a wider contribution that might be very useful and of help to thinking about issues of governance responsibility.
I will comment briefly on a further development in the FCA’s investigation into car finance, which I have referred to in the House in the past. Since the FCA introduced its new rules banning discretionary commission models in January 2021 and subsequently closed its investigations into Lookers, the car dealership firm, for possible mis-selling, it was revealed that the UK’s accounting watchdog, the Financial Reporting Council, was investigating accounting giant Deloitte for its role in auditing the very same Lookers that the FCA had only just ended its investigation into a few weeks earlier. The FCA never confirmed or dismissed whether there had been any mis-selling, remarking that it had made its concerns clear and did not intend to impose penalties on this FTSE 250 firm. However, the opening of a new investigation relating to Lookers raises questions about the thoroughness of the original FCA investigation: were all aspects investigated?
Viscount Trenchard (Con) [V]
My Lords, I declare my interests in financial services businesses, as stated in the register. I would also like to record my sadness and offer my sincere condolences at the passing of both the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, and the noble Baroness, Lady Williams. Both made an enormous contribution to your Lordships’ House over very many years and will be much missed on all sides of the House.
It is a great pleasure to follow the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans. We agree on so much, but on this question and this amendment I have to take a slightly different view from his. The noble Lord, Lord Sikka, has brought back Amendment 34, substantially in the same form as his Amendment 120 in Committee.
The drafting of the amendment suggests that it is intended that there should be a single supervisory board of both regulators, the FCA and PRA. The Member’s explanatory statement on the other hand states:
“The new Clause will create a Supervisory Body for each of the FCA and the PRA.”
This implies one supervisory board for each of two regulators. That at least makes more sense than a single supervisory board for the two separate regulators, which is an impossible concept, as I pointed out on 10 March.
As the FCA and PRA are not the same organisation—although I sometimes wish they were—each has its own executive board. In the case of the FCA, this is the FCA board. However, the PRA board was replaced four years ago on 1 March 2017 by the Prudential Regulation Committee and the PRA was absorbed into the single legal entity of the Bank of England. I pointed this out to the noble Lord on 10 March, but he has not altered his approach. My noble friend Lady Noakes has also explained these fundamental errors clearly. A supervisory board such as he proposes, charged with exercising oversight over the board of the FCA and the Prudential Regulation Committee of the Bank of England, could not be a single entity. It would have to have two distinct personae, one within the FCA and one within the Bank of England.
My noble friend Lord Howe explained to the noble Lord that both the FCA and PRA must already
“attend … hearings before parliamentary committees, and those committees may also hear evidence from stakeholders about the performance of the regulators.”
He said:
“Parliamentary committees of both Houses are also able to summon the regulators to give evidence whenever they may choose.”
He added,
“the Treasury already has the capacity to order independent reviews into the regulators’ economy, efficiency and effectiveness. Therefore, all told, the amendment would result in a duplication of existing opportunities for scrutiny and oversight of the regulators’ resourcing.”
As I said on 10 March:
“I do not think that such a supervisory board would replace the need for parliamentary scrutiny of the regulators, which will in itself provide appropriate transparency and accountability, rather than the completely crushing, destructive oversight that I believe the noble Lord’s new board would cause.”
The noble Lord said that his new board would
“not duplicate in any way whatever what any parliamentary committee or review board might do. The supervisory board would simply be engaged in day-to-day strategic oversight. Those people would be in the organisation on a permanent basis, observing, requiring reports, making recommendations”.—[Official Report, 10/3/21; cols. GC 723-26.]
Such an advisory board would seriously and negatively impact the operation of the regulators.
The noble Lord has said that he will not press his amendment, which I think is a wise decision because I believe your Lordships would have rejected it as unworkable, impractical and likely to have a negative impact on the attractiveness of our financial markets which provide so many jobs and a large slice of the country’s tax revenues.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
I suspect that the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, was referring to the loss of the noble Lord, Lord Judd, which was just announced, rather than the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. I join with him; I am still feeling slightly in shock, frankly, at the news. We have all lost too many people of significance to this House over this last year. I think we all want to pay tribute to all of them, but we are all struggling a little with some of the very significant people who will not be here for future debates.
On this amendment, I will speak briefly. I understand where some of the thinking of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, is coming from, but I cannot say that I see a supervisory board as the answer to the issue he raises. I am much more taken with the proposal made by my noble friend Lady Bowles in Committee, for an expert body—it takes experts to really understand how the regulator functions—regularly to follow the Australian model and review the regulators. This could be every three years; the number of years is not exactly the key issue. It would not second-guess the decisions the regulators have made but look at operations, resources and effectiveness. With the regulator now so detached in many ways, that is essential.
I would want the Treasury to be a good distance from anything like this because, like it or not, the Treasury will always be seen as an influencer of decision-making. An expert view is needed to help us ensure that our regulators are functioning in the way that they need to, given the enormous challenges and responsibilities that they have. With that, I have to say that I cannot support this amendment.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Sikka for bringing back this amendment. In Grand Committee, it was discussed in the context of our wider debates on parliamentary scrutiny and the financial services regulators. My noble friend was not content with this, and while I believe that there is a degree of overlap, I accept the point that his amendment focuses on detailed day-to-day oversights rather than taking what some might call a “helicopter view”.
In his previous response, the Minister indicated that supervisory bodies are not necessary because of the various panels that must be consulted by the PRA and the FCA as they fulfil their duties. However, while these panels undertake valuable work, the extent to which the regulators take their views on board is unclear; for example, I sense that the FCA’s consumer panel would take a very different view on the duty-of-care amendment passed on day 1 from the positions taken by both the Treasury and the FCA.
The Minister also pointed to the future regulatory framework review as the correct vehicle for taking this issue forward. I have some sympathy with that view: I will be very surprised if the review endorses the status quo. If it does, we have had assurances that there will be further primary legislation and that means further opportunities for my noble friend to pursue this initiative.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, the Government agree that effective oversight of the FCA and PRA is a crucial component of our regulatory framework. The Government also agree that having a diverse range of independent views in such an oversight regime is key to its success. However, as I have touched on previously, a number of mechanisms already exist to ensure effective independent oversight of the regulators by a diverse range of stakeholders. I believe these are sufficient and I do not propose to go into them in detail here, given our other debates on Report. However, I know from our previous debate in Committee, and from what he has said today, that the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, is seeking particularly to address potential issues arising from so-called regulatory capture and groupthink with his amendment.
Regulatory capture becomes a risk in situations where regulators do not have the views of others—particularly stakeholders—to influence their work. I assure the noble Lord that there are already extensive arrangements in place to allow a wide range of stakeholders to contribute their views to influence the regulators’ work. There are also arrangements in place to provide effective scrutiny of the regulators and to require them to explain their actions; for example, both the FCA and PRA are required under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to consult independent panels on the impact of their work, as the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, has just mentioned. For the PRA, this involves consulting an independent practitioner panel of industry representatives, while the FCA must consult four different statutory panels. These four panels are: the consumer panel, the practitioner panel, the smaller business practitioner panel and the markets practitioner panel. The FCA considers the views of each of these panels, as appropriate, when developing policies and making regulatory interventions.
I point to the work of the FCA’s consumer panel in particular. This panel meets twice a month to advise and challenge the FCA from the earliest stage of policy development, and to bring to the FCA’s attention broader issues for consumers. This ensures that different perspectives on how the FCA should take forward its consumer protection objective can be taken into account. The FCA board receives a report on the panel’s work each month, which helps to inform the FCA’s rule-making and policy development. Through the panel’s annual report, press releases and public statements, the consumer panel can publicly hold the FCA to account, enhancing transparency and reducing the risk of regulatory silence or capture. Furthermore, the regulators are already under a statutory obligation to organise and publish the results of their public consultations. These consultations allow interested parties—including financial services firms, but also consumer organisations and members of the public—to make representations on issues such as proposed new rules.
Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I thank everyone for their contributions and deep insights. As I listened to the noble Baronesses, Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lady Noakes, I was briefly reminded of the historical development of the role of the non-executive director, which became popular after the 1973 US crash due to fraud at the Equity Funding Corporation. After that, audit committees staffed by non-executive directors became mandatory for companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange.
However, if you look at the history from about 50 years before that you will find non-executive directors frequently described as inexperienced, lacking in technical knowledge and not knowing enough about business. How could they really invigilate boards of directors in 15 to 20 hours a year? It is strange that so many years after non-executive directors were established we are now hearing the same kinds of points being made against the involvement of stakeholders in the governance of regulatory bodies.
To my mind, democratisation of regulatory bodies is essential. Periodic scrutiny by parliamentary committees is not a substitute for the real-time involvement of stakeholders and their oversight of the executive board. I have listened to all the arguments carefully and will withdraw the amendment; no doubt, I will refine it and return to it at some time in the future.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Fookes) (Con)
We now come to the group consisting of Amendment 36. Anyone wishing to press this amendment to a Division must make that clear in debate. I call the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle.
Amendment 36
“UK Finance Watch
(1) A body corporate called UK Finance Watch is established.(2) The purpose of UK Finance Watch is to provide oversight of—(a) the United Kingdom’s financial services industry,(b) its impacts on the real economy, and(c) all associated regulations.(3) The PRA and FCA must fund the activities of UK Finance Watch.(4) UK Finance Watch must produce reports on the following matters—(a) proposed changes in financial legislation and regulations;(b) deficiencies identified in retained EU law relating to financial regulation;(c) any other issue relating to financial markets and the financial services sector which, in the opinion of UK Finance Watch, threatens the stability and prosperity of the economy of the United Kingdom.(5) The Treasury, PRA and FCA must have regard to any publication produced by UK Finance Watch.(6) The Chancellor of the Exchequer must appoint members to UK Finance Watch.(7) When appointing members to UK Finance Watch, the Chancellor of the Exchequer must have regard to the desirability of appointing members who, between them, have expertise in— (a) academia;(b) accounting;(c) law;(d) climate, biodiversity and the environment;(e) trade unions.(8) UK Finance Watch may appoint officers and staff to assist their functions.”
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, before moving the amendment, I join the noble Earl, Lord Howe, the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, in expressing my sadness at the death of the noble Lord, Lord Judd. I send my condolences to his family. The noble Lord, Lord Judd, was the first person to ask me a question while I was in the middle of delivering a speech in your Lordships’ House and did so in his characteristically kind and generous manner. It was a good lesson—perhaps intentionally so—for a newbie.
In light of our time-truncated debate in Committee, Amendment 36 in my name, also backed, kindly, by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, is a somewhat adapted version of the amendment that I presented there. It would create a UK equivalent of the EU’s Finance Watch. I have chosen at this time to use this name for clarity as well as pronounceability.
I really must thank the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, who made the case for this amendment—intentionally or not, I am not sure—in our previous session on Report. He suggested that there were flaws in my Amendment 37, criticisms with which I would not necessarily disagree. He said the amendment
“asks the FCA and the PRA to—to use a phrase that has become popular today—mark their own homework. They are not really the right people to assess themselves; there are plenty of research institutes around this country that do a first-class job of assessing exactly these issues. However, we have not brought them together very well.”—[Official Report, 14/4/21; cols. 1425-26.]
I highlight the last sentence in particular because bringing together expertise, knowledge and analysis is exactly what “UK Finance Watch” would be designed to achieve—to bring together the undoubtedly wide range of expertise around the country to provide independent technical advice to enable Members of your Lordships’ House and the other place to contribute to public debate.
I set out in Committee and in briefings circulated before the Committee debate a detailed explanation of what the comparable EU body has achieved, and I will not repeat that here; nor will I repeat comments I made then about the thinness of the scrutiny of this Bill by your Lordships’ House, except to repeat that that is not a criticism of those here but rather a call for many more Peers to be engaged. The financial sector impacts on every aspect of modern life. We live in a financialised society, whether it is hedge fund ownership of care homes, water supplies or the PFI contracts and their successors doing such damage to our schools and hospitals. Peers who are experts in these areas have interests in these areas and many other Peers from all aspects of society need to be engaged in debates on financial Bills. But that is clearly not customary and could easily be daunting.
However, there is a need for a co-ordinated independent source of information, expertise and detailed knowledge that can, in some way, match the lobbying firepower and influence. I have in mind here the position of remembrancer, to empower Peers concerned with every aspect of society in overseeing the impact of the financial services laws and regulations that are so crucial. This would help the House obtain the complete picture that I was calling for in the amendment last week.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, for her comments in that debate. She said that
“one of the big questions that has never been answered is: how does our financial services industry impact on the real economy, in contrast to something much more circular within the financial services economy?”—[Official Report, 14/4/21; col. 1425.]
She has entirely identified what I was seeking to do with that amendment. This amendment would not, as drafted, achieve that aim, being focused on ensuring the quality and effectiveness of legislation and regulation. However, when I put the words of noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, together, if UK Finance Watch proved to be a network, a clearing house—as the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, suggested it could be in our debate in Committee on a similar amendment—of the information that the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, referred to, then we would have made real progress in the oversight and public legislative understanding of what is currently a far too opaque and little-understood area. As the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans said earlier, we need far more people asking questions about the financial sector from the outside, but they need help to be able to do that effectively.
I feel that the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, made the arguments for me but I note that Greensill is just the latest brand name for which the UK financial sector will be famous—or infamous. I hope this model being based on one in the EU does not prejudice noble Lords or, indeed, the Government against it. Being world leading surely means looking around the world, seeing best practice and copying it.
It is not my intention to divide the House on this amendment. The oversight and scrutiny of regulation and laws for our financial sector is clearly an ongoing debate of considerable concern to a wide range of Members of your Lordships’ House. I beg to move.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, we simply do not need another body set up to look at the financial services industry. It is already in effect a core function of the Treasury and if the Treasury thought that it needed some help in identifying the issues that the proposer of this amendment identifies, it does not need the cover of primary legislation to set one up. In addition, Parliament itself has always taken a keen interest in the financial services industry. The long-standing Treasury Select Committee of the other place examines regulators as well as key emerging themes in relation to financial services and your Lordships’ House has recently created an Industry and Regulators Committee, which is having its first meeting as we speak. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, my noble friend Lord Blackwell and I are members of the new committee. Therefore, it should not surprise the House if in due course there is a focus on matters relating to the financial services sector.
I suspect that the subtext of this amendment is a belief that the financial services sector is wicked and has a negative impact on the UK economy. I do not believe that belief is widely shared in your Lordships’ House. On the other hand, there are few—if any—Members of your Lordships’ House who think that the financial services sector is perfect, and that includes me. The important point is that we already have the scrutiny mechanisms that I have described to give a proper focus to the activities and the impact of the financial services sector. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, that this amendment should not be pressed to a vote.
Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]
My Lords, it is always a pleasure to speak after the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. The key issue, which has been touched on by a number of speakers, has been how to secure effective, responsible and accountable regulation. This amendment presents another model. We have already heard about a number of models.
Numerous aspects of life have been financialised, and the finance industry affects every household and almost every walk of life—all the more reason to examine its effects on the economy and daily life. The last 50 years have been littered with examples of mis-sold financial products. We have had a banking crisis in every decade since the 1970s, but still the finance lobby is too powerful for Governments to resist. We need structures and policies that can mitigate the negative effects of the finance industry.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I think we may end up coming to something like a UK Finance Watch, but I hope not, because I hope Parliament will step up to the plate. The kind of issues described here ought to be part of parliamentary accountability, but that will take support from significant expertise that I do not think currently exists for many of the committees we operate. This is such an important industry; it is so huge, complex and powerful. That specialist knowledge will be necessary.
I was on the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, and it is fair to say that the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, then in the Commons and chair of that commission, had to beg and borrow to find the staff we needed to support that commission. It was scratched together probably with the minimum number of staff with which it could have operated. We were so lucky; we had brilliant people totally dedicated and working the most ridiculous hours. That commission was a good demonstration of how we often underresource around critical issues. That is going to have to be remedied.
I hope Parliament, as it works out how it is going to manage this process of accountability, will take all that on board, so we will come back and look at this amendment for UK Finance Watch and see that a lot of what it proposes has been ticked off as “satisfactory,” because it has been embedded in the support and expertise that will be provided to Parliament. But anyone who thinks that two meetings a year with the Treasury Select Committee, and ad-hoc meetings on whatever happens to be the issue of the day, is anything close to satisfactory, and anyone who thinks that the annual report—never one of the most informative documents from any organisation—is accountability, completely misunderstands the animal with which we are now dealing.
I hope we will not have to go back and resort to an equivalent to the EU Finance Watch body. We may have to, but I would almost regard that as a mark of failure by this House and the other place. Our committees that look at these issues are going to need to be resourced and provided with the real expertise that they need to deal with both the quantity and the quality of the investigation and challenge that they will have to undertake.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, gave us fair warning that she was likely to bring an amendment back on Report for further debate, which is reasonable given the time constraint we faced in Grand Committee. As with the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, we agree that implementing the right forms of oversight is of utmost importance. In Committee, several speakers mentioned the potentially valuable contributions to policy debates that could come from academics, think tanks and others, if they only had access to the data they needed. We agree that more must be done to facilitate such research, and I hope the Minister will say something on this.
The noble Baroness’s redrafting of her amendment addresses some of the points raised in the previous debate. However, her original pitch was for
“a network, not reinventing the wheel, not creating a whole new institution.”—[Official Report, 10/3/21; col. GC 735.]
Yet Amendment 124 from Committee and today’s Amendment 36 would create a whole new institution. I believe that the comments from the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, bear consideration. Surely the first thing we should do is to make sure that this role is fully taken up by Parliament. We have already established, informally at least, that much more scrutiny of how the FCA and the PRA work will be necessary, and I look forward to how well Parliament reacts to this challenge. It is also important to recognise that resources may be needed to give parliamentary scrutiny the expertise necessary in this complex area.
One area that interests me is the impact of the financial services sector on the real economy. We are all familiar with the arguments advanced by the Minister last time on jobs, tax take and so on, and colleagues will remember that I reflected on the successes of the sector at Second Reading. However, as the UK comes out of the pandemic and as government support schemes begin to disappear, we will need to monitor the extent to which lenders continue to support business expansion and other aspects of the economy. This brings us back to the point about ensuring the availability of data.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, as I set out in our earlier debate, the Government agree that effective oversight of the regulation of our financial services sector and consultation with a diverse range of stakeholders are crucial to the sector’s ongoing success. As we have discussed previously, Parliament has a unique role to play in that oversight function.
In that context, I will set out the existing mechanisms that ensure effective independent oversight of the sector and its regulation by a diverse range of stakeholders. I will not repeat my previous remarks on the regulators’ arrangements for publishing consultations and the manifold ways in which they are already held to account by various panels and Select Committees.
I understand that this amendment is partly inspired by Finance Watch in the EU, an organisation which conducts research, monitors financial services legislation inside the EU and advocates on financial services issues. As the noble Baroness indicates in her amendment, we do not have a body in this country that performs an equivalent role; were we to have one, I imagine it would be made up of industry stakeholders of various kinds. As noble Lords will know, parliamentary committees can and do seek input from a wide variety of experts. In doing so, they can bring together the existing expertise of academics, think tanks and industry stakeholders.
Nothing prevents the creation of such a body in this country without a legislative basis; indeed, the EU organisation was not created by EU law but was simply set up as a non-profit organisation under Belgian law. It is funded by a combination of contributions from its members and philanthropic foundations and grant funding from the EU, for which the group has to bid.
The Government and the regulators regularly consult on their plans and proposals, and interested parties, including those from the backgrounds set out in this amendment, are free to respond. The Government and regulators consider all responses to such consultations carefully and consider how the views expressed should influence final policies and rules. I am concerned that this amendment would therefore duplicate existing practices in a very real sense.
In addition, it would appear to duplicate the work carried out by the Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England. The FPC acts as the UK’s macroprudential authority; it identifies, monitors and acts to remove or reduce systemic risks to the UK financial system. It may make recommendations to the Treasury, the FCA and the PRA, and is required to publish a financial stability report twice a year setting out its view of the outlook for UK financial stability, including its assessment of the resilience of the UK financial system and the main risks to UK financial stability.
Given this, and the existing processes that I have set out in previous debates today that offer ample means for achieving the outcomes sought by this amendment, I hope the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw it.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response and all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate.
The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, suggested that what this amendment covers is actually a core function of the Treasury. That is very much not the case. The Treasury is the definition of the establishment, part of the Government; this is an outside, independent oversight body. She also said that Parliament takes a keen interest in financial regulation. That conclusion can be questioned by looking down the lists of speakers through the progress of this Bill and contrasting them to the lists of speakers for, for example, the Domestic Abuse Bill.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Haskel) (Lab)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 37D. Anyone wishing to press this or anything else in this group to a Division must make that clear in debate.
Amendment 37D
Lord Holmes of Richmond
“Payment services and the provision of cash
In Part 2 of Schedule 1 to the Payment Services Regulations (S.I. 2017/752) (activities which do not constitute payment services), after paragraph 2 insert—“3_(1) The provision of cash otherwise than through an automatic teller machine does not constitute a payment service where—(a) there is a transfer of a corresponding amount from a payment account held by the recipient of the cash to a relevant person, and(b) the payment account is not provided by a relevant person.(2) In sub-paragraph (1), “relevant person” means—(a) where the cash is provided by a person (“P1”) through one or more persons acting on P1’s behalf, P1 and each person acting (directly or indirectly) on P1’s behalf;(b) where the cash is provided by a person (“P2”) otherwise than on behalf of another person or through one or more persons acting on P2’s behalf, P2.(3) The execution of the transfer referred to in sub-paragraph (1)(a), and other services enabling that transfer, are not excluded from the meaning of payment services by this paragraph.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that, in certain circumstances, the provision of cash does not constitute a “payment service” for the purposes of the Payment Services Regulations 2017. Persons would no longer have to be authorised by, or registered with, the FCA in order to provide that service.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to speak to these amendments, both of which are in my name. In doing so, I declare my financial services interests as set out in the register. I will move also Amendment 40A when we get to that stage.
I thank my noble friend the Minister for the way that he has engaged not just on this amendment but across the whole of the Financial Services Bill. Indeed, I thank the whole ministerial team and all Treasury officials for having numerous meetings with myself and other noble Lords. It has been the model of how to progress legislation through your Lordships’ House.
There is a very simple and, I hope, clear purpose at the heart of the amendments: to enable cashback without a purchase. As with so many other areas of our lives, Covid has had a dramatic impact on cash usage across the United Kingdom, which has been divergent across different nations, regions, socioeconomic groups and people with different protected characteristics. If cash is no longer king, to millions across the UK it is certainly still more than material. It is beholden on all of us to ensure that people have a right to rely on cash and that a network exists across the country where they can reasonably access it. ATM withdrawals have dropped by over 50% since 2019. We have to look to other resources, other things that we have across the country where individuals and small businesses can access cash. That is the purpose of my Amendment 37D.
Currently, it is possible to get cashback with a purchase and, under the Payment Services Regulations, it is not possible to get cashback without a purchase. This amendment would change that, enabling cashback without a purchase and taking it away from what would be considered a payment service under the PSR 2017. The amendment has wider implications, I hope, than just the ability to access cash. It speaks to well-being, social isolation and a real sense of community, and to using the resources that currently exist far more efficiently and effectively for the benefit of all. In 2019 there were 123 million cashback with purchase transactions. Clearly, there is huge potential for cashback without purchase if we pass the amendment this evening.
The amendment is drawn in a deliberately permissive way to enable innovation. For example, if a fintech wanted to offer a service across a number of locations on behalf of those locations, the amendment would enable it to. Similarly, if a rural café wanted to offer cashback without a purchase on its own behalf, the amendment would enable it to.
We have seen such dramatic changes in the use of cash in recent years, heavily accelerated by the Covid crisis, yet cash still matters. If we do not act, the network that supports cash could disappear in a trice, or become inordinately expensive and leave millions of people without access to cash and, through that, to social inclusion, financial inclusion and an ability to play the part that they have a right to in our society.
Amendment 40A merely enables the regulation to come in two months after the passage of the Bill to give a reasonable period post passage.
I hope that Amendment 37D is clear and that it achieves what it seeks to: enabling cashback without a transaction for millions across the country. I believe it is good for individuals, financial inclusion, business and the high street. Cashback without a transaction could enable part of our Covid build back. I beg to move.
Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)
My Lords, I again draw attention to my interests as set out in the register, particularly as an independent non-executive director of LINK.
In speaking to an earlier amendment, I touched on the challenges of financial exclusion. The problem is complex and the answer, in so far as there is one, is never going to be simple. However, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond, particularly on his vision in seeing a way to at least meet the problem that he so clearly set out. I welcome word that the Government propose to act along the lines set out in this amendment and the subsequent one to help create greater flexibility in access to cash. Of course we all accept that financial services require regulation, but that regulation should always be proportionate, not stifling.
In some respects we have been fortunate in the past year. Not only have food supplies been maintained, but our digital infrastructure held up remarkably well, despite the increased demands on it. Imagine if it had not—if the internet had crashed for a few days or our banking system had cracked and digital payments had failed. I believe there would then have been rather less talk of cash being a thing of the past.
The principal theme of recent months has been resilience, which demands diversity and innovation. The amendment, and my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond’s vision and thinking behind it, perfectly captures that.
For the foreseeable future, cash will continue to be a vital medium of exchange for millions of people. The viability of our system for providing access to cash is therefore a necessity, not a luxury. I pay tribute also to the foresight and leadership shown by my noble friend Lord True. These decisions demand innovation and flexibility, and the kind of thinking captured by my noble friend’s amendment will be vital. I know that everyone involved in the payment system will be very supportive.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, on reading Amendment 37D I think I recognised some of the distinct phraseology to denote an expert hand in its drafting, so I am exceedingly hopeful that the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, has been effective in persuading the Government that this is language they can accept and live with.
Of course, I join in all the calls to make sure that access to cash remains. Despite Covid and all the pressures that have encouraged people to change to digital and electronic payments, 5 million people have stuck to cash, and those people deserve to be served as much as anyone else. Indeed, the point made by noble Lord, Lord Hunt, that digital systems can always go down and that you had better have a back-up, did not occur to me but strikes me as fundamentally important.
My concern is this: I hope the Government do not think this is all they need to do and that this is part of a broader programme of ensuring access to cash. I spoke to quite a number of the storekeepers in my local area. It is a mixed area, with a lot of wealthy and middle-class people but also many people living on a former council estate, now housing association. Among that range, quite a number of people, for a whole variety of reasons, still want to use cash—but I could not find a single shop that would be willing to do cashback without a purchase. In fact, they did not want to do cashback with a purchase in most instances, simply because they did not want to have the cash on the premises, especially at night. Frankly, because of all the various bank branch closures, it would be at least a 35 to 40-minute drive to get to a place where you could deposit the cash overnight. Then you would have to collect it in the morning, which of course would make no sense because most of the shops would be open before the bank was available to hand it over.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, we are grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, for bringing forward these amendments, which would enable individuals to obtain cashback from retail settings without first having to make a purchase. We have not spent a huge deal of time discussing access to cash during the Bill’s passage, which is a surprise given the challenges we face in this area. It is beyond doubt that the Covid-19 pandemic has accelerated the transition to cashless payment, but this does not mean that cash is becoming obsolete. Many millions of people continue to feel most comfortable making physical payments. While small businesses have access to low-cost options for taking card payments, many will still prefer to deal with cash.
While we welcome this initiative, I hope the Minister can briefly touch on the Government’s response to the wider challenge we face with access to cash, such as the continued closure of bank branches. It is also worth noting that, while people may soon be able to access cash more easily, these amendments do not deal with the fact that some businesses have chosen no longer to accept it. That is their choice, of course, but acceptance is as important as access. I urge the Government to accept these amendments, which would be beneficial to an important part of society.
The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Lord True) (Con)
My Lords, I join the expressions of sadness at the news of the death of the noble Lord, Lord Judd, such a tireless campaigner for all the causes he held dear. Even though we meet, of necessity, in an almost entirely empty House, it says everything about the noble Lord that one feels that one particular place over there is empty. Our thoughts go out not only to his family, particularly, but to all those in the Labour Party family who were inspired by his example and loved him as a man.
Amendments 37D and 40A seek to facilitate the provision of cashback without a purchase. I say at the outset to the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral and others that the Government will support these amendments. The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, is able to divine the language of draftsmen even better than I am.
These amendments introduce an exemption for cashback without a purchase, such that it will no longer be a regulated payment service. Under the current legislation, which derives from the EU’s second payment services directive, if a business or its agent, such as a corner shop or supermarket, wanted to offer you cashback without requiring you to make a purchase, it would have to be authorised or registered with the FCA to give you cash from your own accounts. That is a significant burden for even the largest of retailers, let alone small, local shops along the various high streets across the UK.
This amendment removes this requirement; it will take effect two months after Royal Assent. From that point, industry will have discretion to make the service available across the United Kingdom. Where the service is offered, customers will be able to walk into a local business that wishes to participate, such as a corner shop, café or pub, and withdraw cash without having to make an accompanying purchase.
As part of the community access-to-cash pilots, LINK—the UK’s main ATM cash machine network—and PayPoint are already testing a cashback without purchase service in a small number of local stores in Cambuslang, Hay-on-Wye, Burslem and Denny. Indications from this trial are positive, and the Government look forward to the outcomes. This amendment will allow for such initiatives to be rolled out across the UK more easily.
The Government recognise that, as my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond said, widespread access to cash remains and will remain extremely important to the daily lives of millions of people across the United Kingdom. Although it was not possible in time for this Bill, I can certainly assure the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, that the Government have committed to legislate to protect access to cash and to ensure the cash infrastructure is sustainable in the longer term.
The Government published a call for evidence on access to cash in October 2020. This highlighted the potential benefit of facilitating cashback without a purchase through legislation. Cashback with a purchase was in 2019 the second most frequently used method of withdrawing cash in the UK, behind ATMs. As my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond told us, there were 123 million cashback transactions, amounting to a total amount withdrawn of £3.8 billion.
The Government’s view is that cashback without a purchase has the potential to be a valuable facility to cash users and to play an important role in the UK’s cash infrastructure. This legislative change, which is possible only now we have left the European Union, would help both to support the availability of cash withdrawal facilities across the United Kingdom, benefiting individuals’ access to cash, and to support local cash recycling. These amendments are therefore a welcome step towards protecting access to cash.
I am particularly grateful to my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond, who raised this important issue in Grand Committee, for the constructive way he has engaged with the Government and officials since then on this important issue. I am very pleased to be able to say that the Government are proud to support these amendments. Meanwhile, as I covered in my earlier remarks, the Government are considering responses to the call for evidence and look forward to setting out next steps on legislation to protect access to cash in due course.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate on such an important issue. Cash still matters, and it matters materially to millions. I thank particularly my noble friend the Minister for the way in which he and all Treasury officials have engaged with this issue. It is a key part, but, as other noble Lords have rightly identified, only one part, of what it means to have a cash-enabled, easily accessed economy across the UK. It adds to financial inclusion. More than that, it adds to complete social inclusion.
We all need to think innovatively about how we can do more to enable, empower and unleash true financial inclusion across the UK. It matters economically, socially and psychologically. If we can enable it, it can address so many of the issues that have dogged our nations for decades.
Again, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed, and I thank particularly the Minister and Treasury officials.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Haskel) (Lab)
We now come to the group consisting of Amendment 37F. Anyone wishing to press this amendment to a Division must make that clear in debate.
Amendment 37F
Baroness Kramer
“Response from the regulators to Parliamentary scrutiny
(1) The PRA and the FCA must have regard to the findings of any Parliamentary scrutiny of their work and operational performance, including but not limited to consultations, rules, supervision and enforcement.(2) The consultations and rules under subsection (1) include but are not limited to—(a) prospective or actual rule changes, and(b) rules and rule changes that have already taken place.(3) The PRA and the FCA must provide a written response to any committee of either House of Parliament in relation to any concerns it has expressed following such scrutiny.(4) The written response in subsection (3) must be received by the committee—(a) in the case of a prospective rule change, before that rule change takes place, or(b) in any other case, within 12 weeks following publication of an expression of concern.”
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, it seems very fitting that the last amendment for debate on Report should return to the issue of parliamentary scrutiny. Of all the issues that we have discussed over the past many days, and of all the sections of this Bill, it seems to me that that is the one that stands out as being extraordinarily important. It refers to the constitution, in a sense, and the constitutional roles in this country. It deals with the largest economic sector, the way in which it is regulated, and Parliament’s role in scrutinising the regulation of that sector.
The amendment itself is quite brief; it is almost a summation of some of the previous amendments that we have looked at. But let me reassure the House that we have made the decision not to press it today. We will be relying on the Government’s many assertions that the future regulatory framework will offer far more than it appeared to offer in the first days when we looked at the initial consultation.
I want to thank the Minister for persuading—the word is probably not “persuade” but let us use it—both the FCA and the PRA to write to him with their views on this issue. He knows that I consider the FCA letter to be one that simply confirms the status quo, which is inadequate. The PRA letter, however, recognised that, with our departure from the European Union, a whole layer of scrutiny over financial regulation had been stripped away. Although the PRA would obviously not dictate to Parliament how it should replace that accountability, it recognised that it was very likely that Parliament would feel the need to enhance the way in which it scrutinised financial regulation. In the end, we also had a letter from John Glen, using some language to say that it was his view that there must be some toughening of parliamentary oversight—I do not think I paraphrase him incorrectly.
Viscount Trenchard (Con) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and I thank her for correcting my earlier incorrect inadvertent reference to the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, to whom I apologise, while expressing my sincere condolences on the death of Lord Judd.
The noble Baroness rightly returns again to the subject of parliamentary oversight, which we have discussed extensively, including on the second day of Report, last Wednesday. My noble friend the Minister has argued that it is difficult to decide definitively how parliamentary scrutiny will work ahead of the conclusions of the future regulatory framework review.
I had put my name to Amendment 37A in the name of my noble friend Lord Blackwell, which provides for timely scrutiny of rules proposed by either regulator, either before taking effect or, at latest, within five days of taking effect. It does not refer to a specific committee of either House or a specific Joint Committee of both Houses, but provides for both Houses to agree and resolve which committees or Joint Committee should be charged with this responsibility.
I prefer Amendment 37A to Amendment 37F, because it does not damage the independence of the regulators. Furthermore, it requires a written response to any prospective rule change before the rule change comes into effect, whereas if the rule change has already come into effect, a written response is required only within 12 weeks of any expression of parliamentary concern.
This does not provide for a consistent approach. In the first case, it shackles the regulators too much, but in the second case seems to provide for a very relaxed response, devoid of a necessary level of influence on the regulators. I regret that the Government have not brought forward their own ideas about parliamentary scrutiny, especially as the House has accepted their proposal to dispense with a separate Third Reading for this Bill. I trust that the Minister will let us know the apparent thinking of the Government on this matter.
I thank the Minister and my other noble friends on the Front Bench for the courteous way in which they have conducted the House’s scrutiny of the Bill. I thank the Bill team for all their work, and will welcome passage of the Bill as it completes its remaining stages.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the reflections of the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, on how oversight of this Bill has been truncated, despite all the hard work put in, and the fact that we still do not have a clear picture of what the Government propose, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, said in introducing Amendment 37F.
As this is the last amendment, and we have already covered this ground extensively, I will be brief. I wanted to speak on this group to offer my support for the amendment in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, both of whom have done extraordinary, sterling work on this Bill.
We have a real problem of oversight, which has been seen and expressed on many sides of your Lordships’ House. Looking at the real-world situation, the circumstances now and the headlines coming out, we have huge problems with our financial sector, and any independent outside observer would see that clearly. Although we know that this amendment will not be put to a vote, it would ensure that there is a chance to properly question and scrutinise the work of the regulators, which has to be at the heart of the system, and of trying to fix our broken system.
It has been a long debate, if often cut up into different stages and occurring at odd intervals, and we have a long way to go. The Government tell us we are to expect many more financial Bills coming down the track. We will have to keep coming back to these issues again and again, until we finally see progress.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)
The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, has withdrawn, so I now call the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, we had a fruitful debate on the issue of parliamentary scrutiny and the regulator’s rule-making powers last Wednesday. Since this amendment was tabled, I have viewed it as an opportunity to tie up any loose ends, rather than being likely to result in a Division.
It is fair to say that nobody is particularly happy with the current arrangements, particularly given the loss of European Parliament scrutiny of new prudential rules, and the glut that will come once the Bill becomes an Act. However, there is little sense in repeating the arguments made in previous debates. I recognise that the Minister was able to make some important additional commitments in his response to last week’s group of amendments. Since this amendment was tabled, we have seen correspondence from the Economic Secretary to the heads of the FCA and PRA, asserting that Parliament, as we have all said in recent months, has and must enjoy a special role in overseeing the regulators’ output. The letter provided what my noble friend Lord Eatwell has long referred to as the final component of a three-legged stool.
Having reached agreement that Parliament should be treated as a significant stakeholder, the key is to now put in place a mechanism for meaningful scrutiny to take place. Our Amendments 45 and 48 envisage the establishment of a dedicated committee of each House, or a Joint Committee of both, and that remains an attractive prospect to us. Therefore, as we move into a new Session, I hope the Minister can assure me that the Treasury and business managers in both Houses will look at making it a reality. We await the outcomes of the future regulatory framework review, which I hope will represent a significant step forward for all strands of oversight. Once we have digested the findings, our task will be to scrutinise a successor to FiSMA, and I repeat our call for legislation to receive the detailed pre-legislative scrutiny it deserves.
Scrutiny has been the central theme of the Bill. The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, said that we must look forward, and she commented that, in many ways, the theme of scrutiny has crossed parties as an apolitical discussion. I hope it will not be a matter of conflict between regulators and Parliament, and that the opposite will be true, as they must work together to make this scrutiny work. I also hope it will mean that we can have real confidence in the work of the regulators, and a real sense that their actions are fully understood by responsible politicians.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, for her helpful and constructive introduction to this amendment. I begin by stating my agreement with her on what I am confident is common ground between us in two respects: Parliament has a unique and special role in scrutinising the regulators and shaping the financial services regulatory landscape, and scrutiny and accountability of regulators has emerged as the foremost issue throughout our debates on the Bill. The noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, will forgive me for not putting the issue alongside that of climate change.
I appreciated the noble Baroness’s remarks on the way in which our cross-party discussions have enabled us to make progress on this issue, which we debated in some detail last week. I will not repeat all my remarks from that occasion, but I will summarise them. I confirmed to the House that the Economic Secretary to the Treasury has written to the chief executives of the PRA and the FCA, to endorse the commitments that they made in their recent letters, and emphasised the importance that the Government place on them. I assured noble Lords that the Government agree that the regulators should provide a comprehensive response to parliamentary committees on any issues they raise in the course of their scrutiny. I also confirmed that the Government remain committed to further considering this issue as part of the ongoing future regulatory framework review, and to engaging with Members of this House and the other place, as we continue that review.
As I said then, delivering the reforms that the Government have proposed in this area could be done only through further primary legislation. Therefore, Parliament will have the opportunity to return to this issue where it can be considered fully. The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, noted that consultations are not the only relevant issue here, and I agree with her. I am happy to confirm again that the Government view parliamentary scrutiny much more broadly, also to encompass the regulators’ wider work.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I am going to do something quite dangerous and put myself for a moment in the shoes of my noble friend Lady Bowles, picking up a couple of points from the Minister, because they are necessary.
First, one of the underlying points of my noble friend Lady Bowles is that, certainly in the European Union but in other places too, there are mechanisms for confidential information to be shared with Parliament, and shared in such a way that the individual firm is not afraid that this will get out into the wider world and therefore compromise it in any competitive way. Sometimes that is a necessary part of appropriate oversight and scrutiny of the decisions the regulator is making. On behalf of my noble friend, I think I can say that she would be delighted to meet with the Economic Secretary to discuss how this could be addressed.
Secondly, it is always slightly disingenuous to treat Basel as though it were some distant body that, essentially, comes out with a set of regulations and tells us what we have to do. The UK regulators are incredibly influential—or they traditionally have been—on the Basel process; they fundamentally shape it. Therefore, engagement with those regulators before they trot off to a Basel meeting and use their various resources to affect the outcome and decisions at the Basel level is particularly significant and important. I want to make sure that it is understood that this is not just a question of our regulators following instructions from a world body; our regulators have a very big impact on what that world body chooses to say. It is a very important way for us as a Parliament to make sure that our concerns that regulation is appropriate are communicated through that route and help shape—or, at least, are in the minds of regulators when they engage in shaping—that world environment.
Having said that, I think we all recognise that we are at the early stages of a process that will not be completed in this Bill. That process now takes off to a series of consultations and eventually to legislation. I have said to the Minister before that I hope there will not be any more measures that end-run that final regulatory framework, but that may happen, and if it does, we will have to deal with it as it occurs. We are doing this backwards—a lot of legislation is going through, shaping the relationship between Parliament and the regulator, before we have even done the consultation on what that should look like, but I appreciate the time that the Minister has taken to respond to my noble friend’s points. With that, I will sit down and be quiet until the next opportunity to take on this issue. I beg to withdraw the amendment.
Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for the Minister’s second amendment at page 47, line 34.
“(2) In section 34 —(a) subsections (1), (3) and (5) extend to England and Wales only, and(b) subsection (4) extends to England and Wales and Northern Ireland only.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that certain amendments of sections 6 and 7 of the Financial Guidance and Claims Act 2018 in Clause 34 extend only to England and Wales.
“(2A) In Schedule 12, paragraph 14(3A) extends to Northern Ireland only.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment and the Minister’s amendment at page 47, line 33 provide that subsection (5B) of section 303Z1 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, inserted by Schedule 12 to the Bill (see the Minister’s amendment at page 182, line 26), extends to Northern Ireland only.
Lord Holmes of Richmond
“(e) section (Payment services and the provision of cash).” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides for the new Clause about payment services and the provision of cash to come into force two months after the Bill receives Royal Assent.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the Minister’s amendment at page 182, line 26.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the Minister’s amendment at page 48, line 21.
“(ba) the target in section 1 of the Climate Change Act 2008 (carbon target for 2050), and”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the FCA to have regard to the carbon target for 2050 when making Part 9C rules (defined in section 143F of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, inserted by Schedule 2 to the Bill).
“Carbon target
21A_ In relation to the making of Part 9C rules that are made on or before 1 January 2022—(a) paragraph (ba) of section 143G(1) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (duty to have regard to carbon target for 2050) does not apply, and(b) section 143H(1)(b) of that Act does not require an explanation in respect of matters specified in that paragraph.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment disapplies the FCA’s duty to have regard to the carbon target for 2050 (see the Minister’s amendment at page 65, line 27) in relation to Part 9C rules made on or before 1 January 2022.
“(ca) the target in section 1 of the Climate Change Act 2008 (carbon target for 2050), and”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the PRA to have regard to the carbon target for 2050 when making CRR rules (defined in section 144A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, inserted by Part 1 of Schedule 3 to the Bill) and also when making section 192XA rules (see sections 192XA and 192XB, inserted by Part 2 of Schedule 3 to the Bill).
“Carbon target
24A_ In relation to the making of CRR rules or section 192XA rules that are made on or before 1 January 2022—(a) paragraph (ca) of section 144C(1) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (duty to have regard to carbon target for 2050) does not apply, and(b) section 144D(1) of that Act does not require an explanation in respect of matters specified in that paragraph.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment disapplies the PRA’s duty to have regard to the carbon target for 2050 (see the Minister’s amendment at page 82, line 14) in relation to CRR rules and section 192XA rules made on or before 1 January 2022.
“(3) After subsection (5) insert—“(5A) In this Chapter as it extends to England and Wales and Scotland, “relevant financial institution” means—(a) a bank,(b) a building society,(c) an electronic money institution, or(d) a payment institution.”(3A) After subsection (5A) insert—“(5B) In this Chapter as it extends to Northern Ireland, “relevant financial institution” means—(a) a bank, or(b) a building society.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that it is only Chapter 3B of Part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 as it extends to England and Wales and Scotland that is amended to provide for forfeiture of money in accounts maintained with electronic money institutions and payment institutions.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the Minister’s amendment at page 182, line 26.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, it is right that we take a brief time to offer some concluding remarks. I begin by thanking all noble Lords who have taken part in our debates for their thorough consideration of this Bill. The Bill is a very important step towards the Chancellor’s vision for the future of the UK’s financial services sector. As the first major piece of financial services legislation since our leaving the EU, it will enhance the UK’s world-leading prudential standards, promote financial stability, promote openness between the UK and international markets, and maintain an effective financial services regulatory framework and sound capital markets.
It has been a great privilege to guide this legislation through the House alongside my noble friends Lord True and Lady Penn; I thank them both. I am especially grateful to both opposition Front Benches for their constructive engagement on the Bill. All those involved have brought to bear huge experience as well as great enthusiasm and insight. There are too many other noble Lords for me to thank individually, but I do so collectively. I for one have appreciated the very thoughtful and expert contributions from all quarters of the House, not least from my noble friends on these Benches.
As my right honourable friend the Chancellor has set out, the financial services sector will be crucial to our economic recovery from the pandemic, offering job creation and economic growth in all corners of the economy. In these debates, noble Lords across the House have demonstrated their appreciation of the important role that this sector will continue to have, and this legislation is undoubtedly better for their consideration.
We have discussed some extremely technical issues as well as broad issues that reach far beyond the specifics of the Bill. We have looked at the role that the financial services sector will play in our efforts to tackle climate change. We have discussed at length the special role that Parliament must continue to have in relation to the scrutiny of the financial services regulators and their activities. As the Government move forward in delivering their vision for the financial services sector, the debates that we have had during the passage of this Bill will continue to be of vital relevance.
I conclude these brief remarks by acknowledging the hard work undertaken by the Treasury Bill team, the numerous Treasury officials and the clerks in the Public Bill Office, who have worked incredibly hard to support the passage of the Bill. I express my warmest appreciation to them for the unstinting support that they have provided. I beg to move.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, this is a very significant Bill. At the point of discontinuity between the days of EU involvement and control to the new world after leaving the EU, the depth of involvement that we have had with both other parties and the Government has been significant. We have had conversations on the Floor of the House and in other meetings, and we have all at least understood one another. We have gone some way to address the central point of the Bill, which is how to scrutinise the regulators while, at the same time, leaving them independent and effective. We will see whether the compromises that have been agreed work, over the next several months, in both the day-to-day examination of the regulators’ output and the development of subsequent law.
I thank the noble Earl, Lord Howe, the noble Lord, Lord True, the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, and their teams, for all their efforts. The leader of the Labour side in this debate was of course my noble friend Lord Eatwell who, unfortunately, was not able to be with us today, but he asked me to read the following statement. These are his words, not mine.
“Standing at the Dispatch Box for the Opposition, I have always believed that my job is to oppose; to expose the flaws in the Government’s erroneous and sloppy thinking. It has, however, been a very new experience working on this Bill with the noble Earl, Lord Howe. It was evident from the start that his objective was to achieve something useful—a constructive experience that I value and for which I am grateful.”
I was less surprised than my noble friend Lord Eatwell, because I have been on the opposite side of this Chamber from the noble Earl, Lord Howe, for many years, and have always found him very committed to finding a consensus way forward, where possible.
I thank my researcher, assistant and speechwriter, Dan Stevens, for all his work, because I would not have survived without it. Finally, I thank the House for its tributes to Frank Judd. He was a wonderful person and he carried on being a wonderful person right to the end. He was voting last week—the right way, of course. I was also his whip, but it really felt the other way round, because he was always so supportive. I have lost not only a member of my team but a very good friend, who has always supported me and been helpful. I thank the House once again for its tributes.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, once again I thank Lord Judd, because he contributed to this Bill, so it is entirely appropriate to reference him, as we close and the Bill passes. This was originally presented as a “limited, technical Bill”. Whoever thought up that phrase is probably now assigned to writing detailed amendments on obscure financial practice, because it has been anything but.
From my perspective, we had three major areas to tackle in this Bill. We have talked about the constitutional issues of regulator accountability to Parliament, which are overwhelmingly important to this House and the other place. We have also dealt with extensive legislation that impacts ordinary consumers. One can never overstate the importance of dealing with issues such as debt, mortgage prisoners, sharia finance, access to cash or financial exclusion. They are crucial to the people of this country and to everyday lives, so I am very glad that they formed a major part of this Bill. Thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, we have had some particular success—and perhaps will have more success with the amendments that we passed.
We also dealt with the environment and made some real progress in that area. I regret that by one vote only—because it was a tie—we did not get our capital adequacy amendment through but I think the House will, at some point in time, be back discussing that issue. I also suspect that, at some point, the PRA will announce the changes to capital adequacy ratios that reflect the underlying stranded assets associated with fossil fuels in various forms. That, too, I see as a work in progress but it was an important discussion and put down some very significant markers.
I want to thank the Public Bill Office. I cannot remember a piece of legislation where so many amendments appeared in each round, both in Grand Committee and on Report. Its work in turning around those amendments to ensure they were in an appropriate form was very much appreciated.
I join in thanking the noble Earl, Lord Howe, the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, and the noble Lord, Lord True. I say to all three of them that we appreciate that they listened to what we had to say and, whether they agreed or disagreed, always responded to us with respect and looked for common ground. Frankly, I regard the noble Earl, Lord Howe, as the Conservative Government’s secret weapon because he certainly brings us to a common point that finds a way through when relatively few other people could.
I really want to thank others for the co-operative working across the House. We have worked closely with all those on the Labour Benches, but it has been with the Conservative Benches as well. It really shows this House at its best when it deals with issues of fundamental importance.
On my own team, Sarah Pughe in the Whips’ Office kept us co-ordinated; she also kept us informed, which was quite some challenge. My noble friends Lord Bruce, Lady Sheehan and Lady Tyler stepped in to contribute some special knowledge. I thank in particular my noble friends Lady Bowles, Lord Sharkey and Lord Oates, each of whom took on one of those three areas that I categorised as crucial in this Bill and brought to them absolutely exceptional levels of expertise, real dedication and hard work. They supported their positions with extraordinary diligence. Sometimes when people come with not only expertise but passion and concern, they can make an effective difference in the way they communicate with the House. I have to say to those three how much I appreciated them.
My noble friends Lady Bowles and Lord Sharkey are off at the Industry and Regulators Select Committee. I understand that the noble Lords, Lord Eatwell and Lord Blackwell, are there. I am sure they are missing the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, today but I hope she will make that up at the next meeting and ensure that her imprint is on the work of that committee.
This has been a real pleasure. I believe we have achieved something. It is not all I would have wanted but, as I say, this is only the beginning of a long process.
Baroness Coussins (CB)
From these Benches, I too am grateful for the opportunity to express my thanks to all noble Lords who participated at all stages of the Bill. The noble Earl, Lord Howe, the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, and, from the point of view of my own particular interest in the Bill, especially the noble Lord, Lord True, have steered the Bill skilfully through your Lordships’ House. Although he is not in the Chamber at the moment, I place on record my grateful thanks to the noble Lord, Lord True, for his constructive engagement and for meeting me and the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, on two occasions to discuss amendments concerning the statutory debt repayment plans.
Together with the Bill team and the wider group of Treasury officials, the noble Lord, Lord True, has given me and the network of debt advice charities a great deal of confidence that these plans will be brought into effect in 2024. We are all grateful for this positive attitude. I thank all other noble Lords who spoke on this issue and on a variety of other matters of concern to consumers. As well as SDRPs, I welcome the fact that the Bill paves the way towards regulating buy now, pay later products, for example. Indeed, it has been very pleasing to see the level of consensus across the House on the need to improve support for people in financial difficulty and to tackle financial exclusion.
Finally, the passage of the Bill has been an important opportunity to look at what more needs doing on the financial services regulatory framework to ensure that it is as effective as possible at protecting consumers; for example, one area that was raised but ultimately found to be beyond the ambit of the Bill was oversight of bailiffs, but the commitment from the Government to work with stakeholders to develop this is very welcome.
I thank all concerned, including the excellent Lord Judd, whom we will all miss very much indeed.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their remarks in bringing our proceedings to a conclusion. I beg to move.
Financial Services
Monday 26th April 2021
(3 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Financial Services Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Commons Consideration of Lords Amendments as at 26 April 2021 - (26 Apr 2021)
The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (John Glen)
I beg to move,
That the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) (High-Risk Countries) Regulations 2021 (S.I., 2021, No. 392), dated 24 March 2021, a copy of which was laid before this House on 25 March, be approved.
This Government are committed to combating money laundering and terrorist financing and recognise the threat of economic crime to our financial system. Illicit finance risks damaging not only our national security, but our reputation as a global financial centre by undermining the integrity and stability of our markets and institutions.
While it is right that we stamp out the scourge of illicit finance for the benefit of the United Kingdom, it is also right that we do so because of our responsibilities to the wider world. When illicit finance flourishes, so does serious and organised crime, such as people and drug trafficking and terrorism. These are acts that have huge social and economic costs and, of course, cause unimaginable suffering. That is why the Government are focused on making the UK a hostile environment for illicit finance. As part of this work, we have taken significant action to tackle money laundering while strengthening the response of the whole financial system to economic crime.
The bedrock of these efforts is the money laundering regulations. This is the legislative framework that sets out a number of requirements that businesses falling under its scope must take to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism. These requirements include the need for firms to implement measures to identify and verify the people and organisations with whom they have a business relationship or for whom they facilitate transactions.
In addition, the regulations require financial institutions and other regulated sector businesses to carry out greater scrutiny or enhanced due diligence in respect of business relationships and transactions involving so-called high-risk third countries. These are nations that have been identified as having strategic deficiencies in their anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing regimes, and that pose a significant threat to the UK’s financial system. The statutory instrument under discussion this evening amends the definition of a high-risk third country in the money laundering regulations.
Allow me to explain the background to some of these changes. At present, the definition of a “high-risk third country” in the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 is linked to retained EU law and references the list of countries identified by the European Commission as high risk. This list was previously operated via EU law, which no longer has an effect in the UK. If our legislation is not amended, the list will become outdated and could leave the United Kingdom at risk from those operating in nations with poor money laundering and terrorist financing controls.
Furthermore, the United Kingdom will risk falling behind international standards set by the Financial Action Task Force or FATF. This instrument will therefore amend the money laundering regulations to remove references to the EU’s high-risk third countries list and insert a new list of countries identified in schedule 3ZA. This will be the UK’s new autonomous high-risk third countries list. It will mirror exactly the list of countries identified by the Financial Action Task Force as having strategic deficiencies in their anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing regimes, and it will keep the UK in line with international standards.
The change that I have outlined will allow us to continue to protect businesses and the financial system from those who pose a significant threat, while ensuring that the United Kingdom remains at the forefront of global standards in combating money laundering and terrorist financing. I thank Members for their examination of this important piece of legislation, and hope that colleagues will join me in supporting it this evening.
Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)
As we pass the midnight hour, we turn to the subject of money laundering. I am grateful to the Minister for his remarks and note that, alongside this statutory instrument, we had the statement earlier—I was going to say today, but it is now yesterday—by the Foreign Secretary, announcing sanctions against a number of named individuals. In that statement, the Foreign Secretary said that
“Our status as a global financial centre”
had made us both an attraction for investment and also a
“a honey pot—a lightning rod—for corrupt actors who seek to launder their…money through British banks or…businesses.”
It is precisely because we are a global financial centre that there is a special responsibility on the United Kingdom to ensure that each part of that sector always operates to the highest standards. We cannot build a future as a laundromat for dirty money, we cannot turn the other way when wrongdoing takes place and we cannot take part in the denigration of institutions. Of course, we also need the highest possible standards in our own public life if we are going to talk to other countries about corruption. That means allegations being properly investigated; it means a duty of propriety with public money; it means procurement based on open criteria, not on inside connections; and it means that those at the very top of our Government should tell the truth.
We support this instrument, which updates the list of third countries where extra due diligence is required in relation to money laundering and terrorist financing. We understand that these matters lie at the heart of national security and financial security, and we want systems as robust as possible in place to guard against money laundering and terrorist financing. Our defences against money laundering are not just a matter of law and regulation, vital though those things are; they are also a matter of enforcement, so I have a couple of questions for the Minister. Why does he think that in the recent FinCEN reports the UK was considered to be a higher-risk jurisdiction? Why does he think that so many shell companies are based in the UK? What are the authorities doing about that?
Both the Royal United Services Institute and Spotlight on Corruption have identified Companies House reform as an urgent issue in the tackling of corruption and money laundering. What are the Government doing to drive this? Where are we with the draft Register of Overseas Entities Bill? There was nothing about it in the most recent Queen’s Speech. Will there be anything about it in the next Queen’s Speech? A foreign property register was supposed to be established this year. Will the Government meet that deadline? Finally, where are the Government on implementing the findings of the Intelligence and Security Committee’s Russia report, which used the phrase “the London laundromat” in the first place?
Effective action against money laundering, terrorism and fraud is about a lot more than maintaining a list of countries; it requires action on all fronts if we are to fight these problems effectively. That is what we need to see.
Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP) [V]
I endorse a lot of the comments made by the Labour Front-Bench spokesperson, the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden); I found myself agreeing with a great deal of what he was saying.
The Scottish National party welcomes the measures in the regulations, but I certainly cannot share the Minister’s glowing endorsement of the Government’s record on money laundering or, indeed, the even more glowing self-praise that we heard from the Foreign Secretary earlier—or yesterday, as it is now. This is a Government who legislate against money laundering, or in favour of transparency in the world of big business only when the eruption of yet another scandal makes it politically too hot for them to continue to pretend that everything is fine. The Government are packed with hard-line Brexiteers—supporters of Brexit, the timing of which we now know was critical to those who had reason to want to keep British-regulated businesses clear of a tightening of European Union regulation.
The Government showed no hint of embarrassment when the first person to be hit with one of their much-trumpeted unexplained wealth orders turned out to be an east European multimillionaire whose immigration and UK citizenship applications had been fast-tracked purely because of the amount of money they owned—money the source of which was as unexplained and dodgy when they were allowed into the country as it was when the National Crime Agency finally caught up with them. Of course, even now the Government are mired in scandal over who really put up the cash for the spiffing up of the Prime Minister’s flat. Over the weekend, there were persistent claims, which went noticeably unanswered, that the money might originally have come from an unauthorised donor and that, in effect, the money might have been laundered.
There is no indication of what, if anything, the Government are doing to address the fact that seven of the 21 countries on the high-risk list are members of the Commonwealth, and another is trying to join. How can anyone have confidence in the super influence that global Britain is supposed to have if it cannot even fix corruption in its own Commonwealth? It gets worse, because another name on that list is that of the Cayman Islands, a British overseas territory. The Government have at their disposal the constitutional tools to put an end to the Cayman Islands’ grim reputation, but they choose not to use them. In fact, recent events have suggested that the Government would rather use their muscle to prevent the Scottish Government from giving children the full protection of a United Nations convention than use it to free one of their few remaining colonies from dodgy business practices that—who knows?—may well have been learned from former colonial masters in the first place.
There may well be legitimate and honourable reasons why a company that never does any business in the Cayman Islands would choose to have its brass nameplate on a door there, rather than in the United Kingdom, North America or wherever the business is genuinely based, but we are talking about 100,000 company registrations in a place the population of which is lower than that of my constituency. As well as answering the questions from the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East, will the Minister tell us what he thinks attracts so many British companies to create wholly artificial structures to link them to Cayman Islands? If it is not tax dodging or money laundering, or to evade legitimate laws on business ethics and transparency, what on earth does he think they do it for? If he cannot think of a reason, perhaps he should ask some of his colleagues why they choose to register companies there. If you have the Companies House register and the Register of Members’ Financial Interests open side by side on a computer screen, it does not take very many clicks of a mouse to find some very senior Tories who do exactly that.
As well as welcoming the regulations, the SNP will continue to keep up the pressure on the UK Government to bring in the further measures needed to clean up the entire financial services sector. The SNP can already claim a number of significant successes in forcing the Government to match their rhetoric with action and, for as long as there are MPs from Scotland in this place, we will continue to keep up that pressure.
John Glen
I thank the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) and the hon. Member for Glenrothes (Peter Grant) for the points they raised. I shall try to address some of them. As I outlined earlier, the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) (High-Risk Countries) Regulations introduce a new autonomous high-risk third countries list, which will ensure that UK legislation to protect the financial system from money laundering and terrorist financing remains up to date.
The right hon. Gentleman raised a number of points. He first mentioned the FinCEN files, which are largely historic, but I will write to him about anything further I can on that. I met Spotlight on Corruption recently to be challenged on a number of aspects. He mentioned Companies House reform, on which work is ongoing, and there will be further announcements in due course.
The regulations represent the UK’s new approach to high-risk third countries. It will allow the UK to take its own view on which countries are high risk without referencing EU legislation and to remain in line with international standards in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. The UK is internationally recognised as having some of the strongest controls worldwide for tackling money laundering and terrorist financing.
Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (The Cotswolds) (Con)
Who will be responsible for maintaining the list? Will it be Her Majesty’s Treasury? What will be the procedure to review it so that countries may come on to it and existing countries may come off it if they no longer meet the criteria?
John Glen
I thank my hon. Friend for his reasonable question about the updating of the list. The Financial Action Task Force meets three times a year to determine the countries identified on its public lists. As such, the UK’s new autonomous high-risk third countries list could be updated up to three times a year to mirror the decisions made by FATF. We will look at that carefully. FATF monitors the UK—indeed, it did a mutual evaluation of the UK in December 2018 and gave us one of the highest ever rankings—and constantly updates countries who are high risk around the world.
I will make a few points in response to the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East. In recent years, the Government have taken a number of actions to combat economic crime, including creating a new National Economic Crime Centre to co-ordinate the law enforcement response to economic crime, and passing the Criminal Finances Act 2017, which introduced new powers, including unexplained wealth orders and account freezing orders, and established the Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision to improve the oversight of anti-money laundering compliance in the legal and accountancy sectors. In 2019, the Government and the private sector jointly published a landmark economic crime plan that outlines a comprehensive national response to economic crime such as fraud and money laundering, as mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman. It provides a collective articulation of 52 actions being taken in both the public and private sectors in the next three years to ensure that UK cannot be abused for economic crime.
The hon. Member for Glenrothes mentioned the Cayman Islands. As of the FATF plenary in February 2021, FATF collectively agreed to include the Cayman Islands in its list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring. As that is one of the FATF public lists that the UK autonomous list mirrors, the Cayman Islands will be included in the UK’s list of high-risk third countries. The outstanding issues that the Cayman Islands must address are outlined in FATF’s publicly available statement.
I hope that the House has found the debate informative and will join me in supporting this important step to ensure that we have an up-to-date framework to protect the financial system from money laundering and terrorist financing.
Question put and agreed to.
Business of the House (Today)
Ordered,
That, at this day’s sitting, the Speaker shall put the Question on the Motion in the name of Keir Starmer relating to the Health Protection (Coronavirus, International Travel) (England) (Amendment) (No.7) Regulations (SI, 2021, No. 150) not later than 90 minutes after the commencement of proceedings on the motion for this Order; the business on that Motion may be proceeded with at any hour, though opposed; and Standing Order No. 41A (Deferred divisions) shall not apply.—(David Duguid.)
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
We will now have a two-minute suspension for cleaning.
Financial Services Bill
Wednesday 28th April 2021
(3 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Financial Services Bill 2019-21 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 193-I Marshalled list for Consideration of Commons disagreement, amendment in lieu and reason - (27 Apr 2021)
“FCA rules about level of care provided to consumers by authorised persons
(1) The Financial Conduct Authority must carry out a public consultation about whether it should make general rules providing that authorised persons owe a duty of care to consumers.
(2) The consultation must include consultation about—
(a) whether the Financial Conduct Authority should make other provision in general rules about the level of care that must be provided to consumers by authorised persons, either instead of or in addition to a duty of care,
(b) whether a duty of care should be owed, or other provision should apply, to all consumers or to particular classes of consumer, and
(c) the extent to which a duty of care, or other provision, would advance the Financial Conduct Authority’s consumer protection objective (see section 1C of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000).
(3) The Financial Conduct Authority—
(a) must carry out the consultation, and publish its analysis of the responses, before 1 January 2022, and
(b) must, before 1 August 2022, make such general rules about the level of care that must be provided to consumers, or particular classes of consumer, by authorised persons as it considers appropriate, having regard to that analysis.
(4) The duties to consult under this section may be satisfied by consultation carried out after 1 January 2021 but before this section comes into force (as well as by consultation carried out after this section comes into force).
(5) In this section—
“authorised person” has the same meaning as in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (see section 31 of that Act);
“consumer” has the meaning given in section 1G of that Act; “general rules” means rules made under section 137A of that Act.”
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, this Financial Services Bill will enhance the UK’s world-leading prudential standards, promote financial stability, promote openness between the UK and international markets, and maintain an effective financial services regulatory framework and sound capital markets. I acknowledge the work of your Lordships in scrutinising this important Bill. The issue of parliamentary scrutiny has been prominent in our debates and noble Lords have more than demonstrated the positive role that they can play in this regard.
During the passage of the Bill, Members of both Houses debated how best to address issues of consumer harm in the financial sector. Amendment 1, which this House approved on Report, proposes that this should be addressed through a requirement for the FCA to bring forward rules on a duty of care. Let me underline that the Government are committed to ensuring that financial services consumers are protected and that steps are taken quickly to address issues, when they are identified. However, as the Economic Secretary set out in the other place, the Government believe that the FCA already has the necessary powers and is acting to ensure that sufficient protections are in place for consumers, so I cannot accept this amendment.
It is important to remember that financial services firms’ treatment of their customers is already governed by the FCA’s Principles for Businesses and specific requirements in its handbook. These fundamental principles set out specific requirements for firms, including that
“A firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly.”
The FCA’s enforcement powers allow it to ensure that these standards are met, but it recognises that the level of harm in markets is still too high. It is committed to taking further actions.
The Government accept, as the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, has rightly suggested, that this harm may stem from asymmetry of information between financial services firms and their customers. The risk is that some firms may seek to exploit this asymmetry. The FCA is well aware of how informational asymmetries and behavioural biases can influence consumer behaviour, and it works every day to address these issues where it considers that they may result in harm. The Government therefore support the FCA’s ongoing programme of work in this area and believe that it will deliver meaningful change for the benefit of consumers.
The FCA has considered its existing framework of principles and whether the way in which firms has responded to them is sufficient to ensure that consumers have the right protections and get the right outcomes. Building on this, in May, the FCA will consult on clear proposals to raise and clarify its expectations of firms’ actions and behaviours and on any necessary changes to its principles to deliver them. These proposals will consider how to raise the level of care that firms must provide to consumers, through a duty of care or other provisions. Ultimately, the proposals in this consultation seek to ensure that consumers benefit from a better level of care from financial services firms.
Amendment 1A puts this work on a statutory footing. It requires the FCA to consult on whether it should make rules providing that authorised persons owe a duty of care to consumers. It ensures that the FCA will publish its analysis of the responses to this consultation by the end of the year. It also ensures that the FCA will make final rules, following that consultation, before 1 August 2022. I hope that this provides reassurance of both the FCA’s and the Government’s commitment to this important agenda. I urge the House to accept this proportionate and, I believe, well-judged amendment.
The FCA will bring its consultation to the attention of the relevant parliamentary committees. This will give them an opportunity to consider the proposals and, if they choose, to express a view or raise any issues. The FCA will respond to any issues raised by parliamentary committees, in line with commitments made during the passage of this Bill.
Let me end there. I hope that noble Lords will accept Motion A and this amendment in lieu.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, we will not challenge this Motion. I cannot say that it goes as far as reassurance, but I think we are in a much better place to have the consultation and its characteristics in statute on the face of the Bill. I particularly thank the Minister and his team. I suspect they have been instrumental in making sure that the concerns, from all sides of the House, were communicated back to the Treasury and the Treasury team.
The Minister today repeated a number of the statements that the Economic Secretary made in the other place when he addressed this issue. I will highlight a few that were of particular importance to me. The FCA recognises that,
“the level of harm in markets is still too high and is committed to—”—[Official Report, 24/4/21; col. 867]
taking further actions. That is an important statement to have on the record. I am slightly concerned, however, that the focus of the FCA should not exclusively be on asymmetry of information. Asymmetry of information is fundamental and important, but it is far from everything. The Economic Secretary said that
“the FCA will consult in May on clear proposals to raise and clarify its expectations of firms’ actions and behaviours, and on any necessary changes to its principles to deliver this.”—[Official Report, Commons, 26/4/21; col. 84]
I hope that will not be confined simply to asymmetry of information, but as the Economic Secretary said, and the Minister today said, Parliament wants to be assured that the FCA’s ongoing work will lead to meaningful change. I think that reflects some of the frustrations expressed in this House of having had eight consultations to date and relatively little action. I hope this will lead to a great change.
In the amendment in lieu—this is perhaps something the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell will address more extensively than I—the fact that all consumers are part of the consideration is an important one. I want to use this opportunity to underscore to the Minister how urgent and significant this issue is.
When the Government’s amendment in lieu was passed, I got an email from one of the leading financial services lawyers in the country, and two things are pertinent. It said that it looks like this one is headed for the long grass again. I think that is partly because we are looking at action in 2022 and not immediately. The reason for that level of concern was, apparently, that audit firms are now saying that any credit risk between the client and the authorised firm should be counted as client money within the meaning of CASS—the protection of client assets and money. This is storing up some big problems when one of these babies—we are talking about firms that collectively have well over £10 trillion in assets under management—goes down and a judge finds that the trust is bust because they comingled client money with money that is not. Lehman Brothers, here we go again. I went immediately to the FCA site, and it is an excellent but sad example of the very limited powers that the FCA has to deal with such situations, because of the regulatory perimeter that limits a great deal of their potential for action to their definition of consumers. The issue has always been that that is a very narrow definition of consumer.
Every day we wait for a duty of care to become embedded in the system, we run significant risk. It is a risk that none of us wants—it has the potential to be limited to a small pool of clients, but also to knock the economy off its paces once again. It is important that there is an element of urgency built into all of this, that the issue is taken seriously and that there is not an attempt to narrow examination by and the focus of the FCA to simply something like asymmetry of information, but to consider the much wider picture before we end up with another crisis none of us wants.
Lord Eatwell (Lab)
My Lords, while we on this side of the House were hoping for action rather than further consultation, and we remain somewhat puzzled as to exactly what further the FCA has to learn that was not learned in the consultation of 2018 when it published a discussion paper entitled with some prescience, A Duty of Care and Potential Alternative Approaches. None the less, despite our desire for action and puzzlement in that respect, we welcome the tenor of the Government’s amendment.
In particular, I congratulate the Government on the clear acknowledgement that real harm is done today to millions of users of financial services by this famous asymmetrical relationship in financial transactions and that harm is done to those excluded from access to financial services. As evidence of this acknowledgement, I refer to the remarks just made by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and also the remarks by the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. For example, Mr Glen said:
“The Government agree with the concerns that … this harm may in part stem from an asymmetry of information between financial services firms and their customers. The risk is that many firms may seek to exploit this asymmetry. The FCA is well aware of how informational asymmetries and behavioural biases can influence consumer behaviour, and is committed to ensuring that these issues are addressed where it considers that they may result in harm”.—[Official Report, Commons, 26/4/21; cols. 83-84.]
All I can say to that is: “Quite right too”.
I am particularly pleased that in new subsection 2(b) in their amendment, the Government refer to the need to extend the duty of care to “all consumers”. I urge the FCA to ignore the suggestion that a duty of care might be limited to “particular classes of consumer”. That way lies unnecessary complexity and the potential for error and injustice. Any inclusive list of “particular classes” is also a list that excludes. Confining the duty of care to particular classes would also eliminate the peculiar advantages of principles-based regulation, namely the flexibility of the principle in an industry of which persistent innovation is a defining characteristic. This is an advantage not to be sacrificed lightly.
In the debates on this issue—including those in the other place—not only Mr Glen, but the noble Earl, Lord Howe, the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and several noble Lords have referred to the prevalence of asymmetric information in retail financial services. As we know, this renders markets inefficient. In retail financial markets, asymmetric information results in excessive risk being loaded on to consumers. A duty of care will rebalance risk by shifting the balance of risk from the consumer back towards the provider, which in an efficient market is where it should be.
However, the FCA must be alert to a potential consequence. This may well result in some financial services providers deciding to withdraw from the provision of services where previously they happily dumped the risk on consumers. This increase in exclusion would be contrary to the intent and spirit of the Government amendment. We should therefore emphasise that having the status of an authorised person in financial services is a privilege, and with that privilege comes responsibility. Indeed, as Mr Glen remarked in the other place,
“authorised persons owe a duty of care to consumers.”—[Official Report, Commons, 26/4/21; col. 84.]
He is quite right. It is the responsibility of financial institutions providing financial services not to withdraw but, on the contrary, to play their full part in tackling financial exclusion. I am sure that the FCA will address this issue as it draws up its new general rules on the level of care.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, I express my thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, for what they have said. I am pleased that they have both taken the trouble to read the words of my right honourable friend the Economic Secretary when responding to the debate in the other place on Monday. I was careful to frame my remarks in a way intended to ensure that there is not a hair’s breadth of difference between his words and mine.
The noble Lord made some very well-observed remarks on the risks arising from asymmetric information. However, I am happy to confirm to the noble Baroness that the FCA’s consultation will not be solely focused on asymmetry of information, important though that is; it will look more broadly at raising the level of care that firms provide to consumers—not particular classes of consumers, but all consumers.
Some hesitation—I think that is the best word—was expressed as to why there is yet another consultation. In response to that, I say that it is important that consumer groups and firms have the opportunity to comment on clear proposals and subsequent draft rule changes before final rules are set in stone. So I argue that it is a necessary step, even though I fully understand the noble Baroness’s wish for action this day. I remind her that we are talking about a consultation to be launched very shortly, and I hope that indicates that the sense of urgency which both noble Lords have indicated is right is shared by the FCA.
The FCA will and must act in accordance with its statutory objectives, which include the consumer protection objective. I come back to that point: this is not an issue that is ever lost on the FCA. With those comments, I am grateful to both noble Lords for their acceptance of the amendment in lieu, and I beg to move.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
My Lords, we have a request to speak after the Minister from the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I join others in congratulating my noble friend the Deputy Leader of the House and other Members of the Front Bench on the way they have dealt with the Bill and got us to this final stage. I just have a question about the consultation on the duty of care, and it stems from my experience in other areas of regulation—that is, health and safety and food safety. I have found that, where a duty of care is introduced, it is sometimes possible to change adjacent rules and regulations in a regulatory area and reduce the bureaucracy that can be a problem for both consumers and operators in the field. I would be interested to know whether that sort of work is likely to be envisaged by the Economic Secretary.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, I do not have an answer for my noble friend, but her point is extremely helpful and I shall ensure that it is fed into the thinking that will be wrapped around the consultation process as it goes forward.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 8 concerns mortgage prisoners, an issue that the Government take extremely seriously. We are committed to finding practical and proportionate solutions to help this group but, as Motion B in my name makes clear, the amendment is not one that the Government can accept. As explained in Reason 8A, the amendment is neither a proportionate nor a practical response to this complex issue, and this is why the Government cannot support Motion B1, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey.
In our previous debates, my noble friend Lord True set out the FCA’s analysis of this complex issue. To recap briefly, according to FCA data, there are 250,000 borrowers with inactive lenders. Of these, analysis suggests that 125,000 borrowers could switch mortgage providers if they chose to, even prior to the introduction of the FCA’s new rules. Of the 125,000 who cannot switch, the FCA estimates that 70,000 are in arrears and so would struggle to access a new deal even in the active market. The FCA therefore estimates that there are 55,000 borrowers who may struggle to switch but are up to date with their payments. Its data show that, on average, the 55,000 borrowers with inactive firms who have characteristics that would make it difficult for them to switch but are up to date with payments are paying around 0.4 percentage points more than similar borrowers with active firms who are now on a reversion rate.
As the Economic Secretary set out on Monday, the reason these borrowers are unable to switch is not that their mortgage is with an inactive firm; it is that they do not meet the risk appetite of lenders. For example, they may have a combination of high loan-to-value, be on interest-only mortgages with no plan for repayment, or have higher levels of unsecured debts, non-standard sources of income or a poor credit history. Similar borrowers in the active market are also very unlikely to be offered deals with new lenders.
My noble friend Lord True has previously set out the significant work undertaken by the Government and the FCA in this area, which has created additional options to make it easier for some of these borrowers to switch into the active market. If we look at Amendment 8, we see that what it proposes would be a very significant intervention in the private mortgage markets and in private contracts. It would bring with it a risk to financial stability as it would restrict the ability of lenders to vary rates in line with market conditions. The ability to vary standard variable rates allows lenders to reprice products to reflect changes to the cost of doing business and could therefore create risks with significant implications for financial stability. On top of that, the amendment is not fair to borrowers with active lenders in similar circumstances as it targets only borrowers with inactive lenders. Indeed, this cap would be deeply unfair to borrowers in the active market who are in arrears or unable to secure a new fixed-rate deal because it would not include them.
So, at the most basic level, I just do not think it is right to introduce such a significant intervention for those with inactive lenders which could cut their mortgage payments far below the level of someone in a similar financial situation who happens to be with an active lender. Nevertheless, while the Government are opposing this amendment today, I want to reiterate our commitment to finding any further practical and proportionate options for affected borrowers, supported by facts and evidence.
On Monday, the Economic Secretary set out what further steps the Government and the FCA are taking and I want to repeat those commitments today: namely, that
“the Treasury will work with the FCA … on a review to its existing data on mortgage prisoners”.
This will ensure that we have the right data
“on the characteristics of those borrowers who have mortgages with inactive firms and are unable to switch despite being up to date with their mortgage payments. The FCA will also review the effect of its recent interventions to remove regulatory barriers to switching for mortgage prisoners and will report on this by the end of November, and … a copy of that review”
will be laid before Parliament.
“The Treasury will use the results of the review … to establish whether further solutions can be found for such borrowers that are practical and proportionate.”—[Official Report, Commons, 26/4/21; col. 87.]
Within the significant constraints that I have noted, I want to reassure the House that the Economic Secretary, as the Minister responsible for this area, will continue to search for any further solutions that may provide support for borrowers with inactive lenders who are unable to switch. But, again, they must be practical and proportionate. The Economic Secretary has also confirmed that he will write to active lenders and encourage them and the wider industry to go even further and look at what more they can do to ensure that as many borrowers as possible benefit from these options.
I hope I have convinced the House that the Government are taking the appropriate next steps and have demonstrated our commitment to continuing to work tirelessly on this. Therefore, I ask the House not to insist on this amendment and I beg to move.
Motion B1 (as an amendment to Motion B)
Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]
My Lords, I was very disappointed that the Government felt unable to accept our amendment, which would provide relief for mortgage prisoners. I was disappointed, but the mortgage prisoners themselves were devastated by what they heard on Monday in the Commons. Many have called me, some in tears and all in obvious distress. None of them could understand why no solution had been offered by the Government and none could credit the arguments used by the Government in rejecting our—or, as they saw it, their—amendment. I entirely understood their point of view, their distress and their fears for the future.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
The original question was that Motion B be agreed to, since when Motion B1 has been moved as an amendment to Motion B. Therefore, the question I now have to put is that Motion B1 be agreed to.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Deputy Leader, the noble Earl, Lord Howe, for introducing the debate today. I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and his all-party parliamentary group for their determined efforts to make sure that this issue is kept alive and at the forefront of our debates on the Bill. We discussed this issue at Committee, on Report and now at ping-pong. We have had the opportunity to meet Ministers and we have been extensively briefed by civil servants, and I am grateful to all of them for the time they have taken to make sure we are fully briefed about the issues.
It is not uncommon to come across issues in Bills containing matters of public policy which seem to pose difficulties to the Government, despite general support for a solution expressed in amendments such as those we have before us today. In my experience, these often turn out to be what are called wicked issues, ones that span departments and need more time, it turns out, to be resolved in Whitehall than is available in the Bill. In this Bill, we had debates on statutory regulation for bailiffs, which probably falls into that category, as it was primarily a matter for the Ministry of Justice. Sadly, we have to wait for a resolution of a problem that all concerned agreed is actually settleable, albeit we have a deadline imposed of some two years. With that, now, the mortgage prisoner issue, but this is not really a wicked issue: the question of how to deal with mortgage prisoners really boils down to how to provide a “get out of jail” card for the small but not inconsiderable number of people—we think it is about 15,000—who are not able to exercise the basic choices about mortgage borrowing that we would regard as fair and appropriate for comparable citizens not caught in this prison. The sad fact is that while this issue continues, injustice is occurring.
Yes, there are problems of who qualifies; yes, there is a moral hazard; and yes, there may be unforeseen consequences. As Her Majesty’s loyal Opposition, we do not normally recommend that any Government should intervene directly in the market—although providing support for those who are trapped in financial difficulties not of their own making has many precedents and, ironically, is presumably where we are likely to end up on this issue, as I very much doubt that the current voluntary solutions will take the trick. As the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, says, only 40 have so far managed to make the transfer that is on offer through the changes the Government have already made.
I have to say that, since the powers to deal with this issue are already invested in the Treasury, it is hard to see why a possible solution based on the efforts to date to modify the normal affordability checks for existing borrowers, perhaps underwritten or guaranteed by the Government, cannot be devised so that it deals with the situation in what the Government say they need, a proportionate and appropriate way—well, we would all applaud that.
All of us involved in this issue in both Houses have been impressed by the commitment and understanding of the issue displayed by the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, John Glen. We are supportive of his efforts to resolve this issue and want him to carry on—but with pace. We would be happy to continue the dialogue with him if that would be helpful. He stressed in the other place that one of his main concerns was that any solutions proposed should
“not provide false hope to borrowers”.—[Official Report, Commons, 26/4/21; col. 85.]
He is right to say that, but I put it to him that our main concern, and the reason we have pursued this issue to this very late stage in proceedings, is that it is surely unconscionable for the Government to leave a group of their citizens with no hope of recovery from circumstances that, as the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, pointed out, they did not create. We need to keep in mind the need for hope.
I trust that the positive words we heard earlier from the Deputy Leader, the noble Earl, Lord Howe, about the Government’s strong commitment to finding proportionate and appropriate solutions to this problem will be turned into action very early in the new Session, with strong leadership from the Treasury, giving hope to those suffering the injustice we have been discussing. If the noble Earl can give that assurance when he comes to respond to this debate, I can confirm that we will not seek to test the opinion of the House on Motion B1.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has indicated a wish to speak.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I spoke at length on this amendment on Report, and I will be brief today. The first part of the amendment proposes to cap SVRs at two percentage points over base rate. As my noble friend the Minister pointed out, this is a potentially dangerous market intervention with financial stability connotations. A recent study by the London School of Economics specifically recommended against this solution to the problem of mortgage prisoners. As my noble friend the Minister explained, it would confer a benefit on mortgage prisoners beyond what they could have obtained as customers of current mainstream mortgage lenders. The loan and borrower characteristics of mortgage prisoners often put them in the high-risk and therefore high-interest rate categories. It is just not fair to confer better terms than are available to borrowers with active lenders but in similar financial positions.
The second half of the amendment proposes that the FCA should make rules that some borrowers would be offered new fixed-rate deals, but this is probably incapable of operation given that the FCA cannot tell mortgage providers it regulates to whom they should lend and on what terms. Alternatively, if the FCA really could dictate to mortgage providers in this way, it would be a stake in the heart of financial regulation as it works in this country.
I have great sympathy for those who find themselves on high SVRs because they took out their mortgages with lenders that for whatever reason are no longer active in the market. However, we should be very wary of solutions that do not take account of the particular characteristics of these borrowers. It is a far from homogenous population with, at one extreme, borrowers who can and probably should remortgage, through to those who simply do not fit the risk appetite criteria of any active lenders. The devil really is in the detail, and across-the-board solutions such as Amendment 8 will throw up more problems than they solve.
My noble friend the Minister has explained how the Government are committed to finding practical solutions to help those trapped on mortgage terms unrepresentative of market rates on offer for equivalent mortgage situations. In the other place, my honourable friend the Economic Secretary said he was “absolutely committed” to working with the FCA to find practical solutions and to being in touch with active lenders to see to what extent they can help with this problem. I believe that he is sincere in his commitment and that we should await the outcome of the further work he now plans to carry out, which should come to fruition later this year. I urge the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, not to press his amendment.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I will be brief. My noble friend Lord Sharkey comprehensively answered the points raised by the Economic Secretary on Monday and by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, today in rejecting this amendment. I should point out that if the Government thought that the amendment was not quite correctly finessed, they could easily have brought in an amendment in lieu that would have achieved relief for mortgage prisoners, and they have chosen not to do so.
The nub of the problem is straightforward. Would the financial experience of a mortgage holder be the same if his or her mortgage had been sold by the Government to an active, rather than an inactive, lender? Even the Government do not deny that the answer to that is no. The difference in experience between those whose mortgages were held by active lenders, compared with those whose mortgages were sold to inactive lenders, has been markedly different. Those whose mortgages were held by active lenders that did not collapse in the 2008-09 crash have been able to take advantage of the fact that rates have fallen very sharply and have been offered a whole variety of new and different deals, as part of the normal practice of banks in dealing with their mortgage opportunities and portfolios. Those who ended up in the hands of inactive lenders have faced between limited options and none, and have been unable to take advantage of interest rates falling exceedingly sharply.
That is the only issue at play here. To compare those mortgage prisoners to people today seeking a mortgage is to look at an entirely false set of circumstances. I am concerned that the Government are choosing not to rectify the situation. It was the Government who chose to sell those mortgage assets to inactive lenders. They did so in good faith and without any expectation that the mortgage holders would end up in a different position from their peers who had taken out mortgages with institutions that did not fail. I understand that that was not an intentional process, but, regardless, the Government remain responsible for their decisions when they sold off those assets.
People are genuinely suffering and I ask the Government that the very small measure that my noble friend Lord Sharkey begged for at the end of his speech—that those individuals could at the very least be protected from foreclosures as we exit from Covid and the rules change on repossessions—could be put in place. The Government would then have an opportunity to justify the arguments made in both Houses that they are genuinely trying to find a solution to the problems and devastation that so many individuals face.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
My Lords, we have not made as much progress on this issue as many people, including thousands across the country, would have hoped. That is not through any lack of effort. The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and my noble friend Lord Stevenson have been tenacious in their pursuit of change. However, for that to be possible, both sides must want to work towards a favourable outcome.
I said on Report that we were not convinced that this amendment provided the answer to the long-running problems experienced by mortgage prisoners. It certainly provides an answer, but I accept the argument that there would be consequences for the mortgage market as a whole. With this in mind, colleagues offered an alternative option in what was then Amendment 37B. Your Lordships’ House has a reputation for being constructive and, in that spirit, the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and my noble friend made further offers to look at any text that the Treasury would be prepared to bring forward. Unfortunately, Ministers chose not to put an amendment on the table.
The Economic Secretary has, to his credit, demonstrated knowledge of the challenges in this area. Every time he has spoken, I have believed his wish to identify workable solutions. The noble Earl, Lord Howe, and the noble Lord, Lord True, have said similar things in our meetings; again, I have viewed their comments as earnest. The problem is that warm words do not pay bills—nor do they generally lead to lenders taking the kind of steps that are required. The initiatives launched to date have helped only a tiny fraction of mortgage prisoners, so one would have thought that the case for further action was overwhelming.
We wanted—and continue to need—the Government to take proper ownership of this issue. We welcome the fact that the FCA will conduct a further review of the options available to mortgage prisoners and that the Treasury will revisit its data on the different cohorts of affected customers. As well as following these processes closely, we will of course continue to press the Economic Secretary to do what is needed.
It is regrettable that we have not been able to achieve a satisfactory outcome on this legislation, which should have been more than another false dawn. However, Conservative MPs have rejected the case for action, and it is hard to imagine meaningful progress being made unless Ministers revise their red lines. Accordingly, we do not believe we should press this matter any further today and look to the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, to withdraw his amendment. However, I can assure the Minister that we will return to this issue at the next legislative opportunity.
Earl Howe (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have spoken in this short debate, both for their constructive comments and for re-emphasising the genuine concerns they clearly have for this unfortunate group of people who find themselves trapped in mortgages that cause them great difficulty. I do not doubt for a second the distress that many such people are experiencing, but my noble friend Lady Noakes brought us back to some very important realities on this vexed subject. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, that it is regrettable that we have not been able to reach full agreement on the way forward. Nevertheless, I hope my earlier remarks indicated that we take this subject extremely seriously. I am confident that noble Lords who have listened to my honourable friend the Economic Secretary speak on the subject will be in no doubt whatever of his intention to keep on top of it in the weeks ahead.
Part of the problem we face relates to the data that underpin the case that the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, have made. The report of the UK Mortgage Prisoners group makes accusations about the data held by the FCA, essentially saying that the data analysis is wrong. However, I put it on record that the FCA data analysis was conducted using information on the 250,000 borrowers with inactive lenders alongside a credit referencing agency dataset which includes data on 23,000 borrowers with inactive lenders. The FCA data has shown that, on average, the 55,000 borrowers with inactive firms who have characteristics that would make it difficult for them to switch but are up to date with payments are paying around 0.4 percentage points more than similar borrowers with active lenders who are now on a reversion rate. Its analysis also shows that the majority of borrowers with inactive firms are on relatively low interest rates of 3.5% or less.
It is important that, as part of the review that the Government have announced, the existing data is analysed to provide further details on the characteristics of the borrowers of most concern. That is definitely a core part of getting to grips with what more can be done in this area.
It was suggested that in the first instance the Government failed these consumers. I repudiate that suggestion very strongly. The customer protections that we set were best practice for transactions of this type—or went beyond best practice: the Government strengthened the consumer protections for the last two sales of new car loans in response to concerns raised by parliamentary colleagues.
I do not accept the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, about the difference between those whose mortgages were refinanced with active lenders and those who found themselves with inactive lenders. The sales of those mortgages did not impact customers’ ability to remortgage elsewhere: customers with inactive lenders can remortgage with another provider as long as they meet the lender’s risk appetite. The customer protections that we insisted on for new car sales also included prohibitions on placing barriers in the way of customers remortgaging with another provider; for example, all early repayment charges are waived. These lenders are charging interest rates in line with SVRs set by active lenders.
The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, asked about Cerberus. The customer protections in these sales were best practice in the market at the time. For the last two sales, restrictions on setting the SVR last for the lifetime of the mortgage. I add that Cerberus indicated that it was offering new products to customers but this was not part of its bid, so UKAR did not seek a binding commitment on this point. Cerberus was selected because it agreed to the consumer protections that were sought and provided the best value for money for taxpayers. I underline, therefore, that inactive lenders can, and often do, allow borrowers in arrears to make use of a variety of tools to get themselves back on track. Such tools include capitalisation of arrears, term extensions and payment holidays.
It is simply not true that the FCA has done nothing for this group of people. For example, to reflect the current Covid-19 situation, the FCA has brought forward guidance to allow borrowers who are up to date with their payments on a recently matured or soon-to-mature interest-only, or part-and-part, mortgage to delay repaying the capital on their mortgage while continuing to make interest payments. This guidance has enabled borrowers to stay in their own homes for a significant period. The FCA also confirmed that it was making intra-group switching easier for borrowers with an inactive firm that is in the same lending group as an active lender. On 14 September, the Money and Pensions Service launched online information and a dedicated phone service as a key source of information and advice for borrowers with inactive firms.
The point was made that the modified affordability assessment has helped only 40 households. The modified affordability assessment, I contend, provides an additional and important option for some borrowers who may not otherwise have been able to switch. We must just give it time to take effect. It will not be a silver bullet for all borrowers with inactive firms, many of whom have other characteristics that affect their ability to remortgage.
I will leave it there. I say again that I regret there has been no meeting of minds on this, but I also say that the Government place a great deal of emphasis on the work that is now in train. We will do our utmost to see what more can be done for mortgage prisoners as a result of the further analysis I have referred to. I hope noble Lords will see fit to agree with the Government’s Motion.
Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this brief debate. I listened carefully to the Minister’s thorough reply. I was struck again that there was no acknowledgement of any moral responsibility for the condition of the mortgage business. I was totally confused by his explanation of dealing with Cerberus. I point again to the fact that UKAR wrote to the Treasury Select Committee explaining that it had been misled by Cerberus about its treatment of people who became mortgage prisoners.
I would like to place on the record that, contrary to what the noble Earl said, I have never said the FCA has done or was doing nothing to help relieve the plight of the mortgage prisoners. I know that is not the case, and I have always been careful not to say that.
I do not think there was any convincing explanation offered for why this problem has been allowed to run for over a decade. There was no comfort for mortgage prisoners in what the Minister had to say—or, at least, none in prospect. Regrettably, it is clear the Government are unwilling to meet us, and they have not proposed their own amendment in lieu of ours. Obviously, we have reached the end of this episode in this long and distressing tale. The Government remain, in my view, directly responsible for the major injustice done to our mortgage prisoners and the suffering they are experiencing.
We will, of course, return to this issue at every opportunity and willingly join and co-operate with any initiatives the Government and the regulator may want to consider. In particular, we would like the Treasury to release the data the LSE says its needs to complete its analysis of possible solutions. I would be grateful for that at some point. Perhaps the Minister could write to me and tell me the Treasury is prepared to do that and is doing that. But for now, I beg leave to withdraw.
Royal Assent
Thursday 29th April 2021
(3 years, 7 months ago)
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