Thursday 19th November 2020
(4 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesFinancial Services Bill 2019-21 View all Financial Services Bill 2019-21 Debates Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 19 November 2020 - (19 Nov 2020)
Mr McFadden
I have no further questions, although my colleagues might have.
The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (John Glen)
Q
There is a Law Commission consultation going on. We have fully transposed the fifth anti-money laundering directive in line with international best practice. You gave us some perspectives on Germany and Holland in terms of future orientations, which is something that I imagine we would look at in the context of that review. How would the provisions of the Bill help?
Dr Hawley: Obviously, we have welcomed the leadership that the Government have taken on beneficial ownership and the implementation of the fifth AMLD. My colleagues from Transparency International, who are giving evidence later to the Committee, have done more work on the beneficial ownership side. They are the people to talk in more detail about how the Bill specifically relates to that.
We hope that there will be other legislative vehicles brought forward soon to introduce the property register of beneficial ownership and the Companies House reforms. It is excellent that that consultation has now come out and the Government have taken strong steps towards looking at how Companies House can be strengthened, because, as FATF noted, it was, as you have mentioned, an area of weakness.
I do not want to bang on about it, but FATF also highlighted the lack of high-end money laundering convictions in the UK and questioned whether that was really reflective of the risk within the UK. We are carrying out some analysis into what is happening with regulatory fines in this space. The number of fines seems to be going down dramatically, and we are not seeing an increase in high-end money laundering convictions. To be honest, we are a bit worried that the Law Commission review, which we really welcome, will take too long.
John Glen
Q
Dr Hawley: I am actually saying something different. That review rightly focuses on the identification doctrine that was the primary focus that the Law Commission was given, and it is absolutely right that the Law Commission does that. We monitor bribery cases as they go through the courts, and we have seen that, even with the Bribery Act, there is still an ongoing unfairness. A small company can be prosecuted for a main offence and a “failure to prevent” offence. We have heard directly from prosecutors that they can say to a small company, “Look, if you co-operate with us, we will only prosecute you for failure to prevent. But if you don’t, we will prosecute you with section 1 or section 2.” We also have the fact that a section 1 or a section 2 offence incurs mandatory debarment from public procurement and a “failure to prevent” offence does not. So small companies face the risk of being excluded from public procurement in a way that large companies do not. We think that that is not compatible with the Government’s stated intention of levelling the playing field for small companies in public procurement.
What we would say—and it is something we have always said—is that we absolutely need the Law Commission to look into the identification principle, but we do not think it would pre-empt the review to introduce the “failure to prevent” offence for these crimes, because we already have that offence for bribery and tax evasion. That would complement the Law Commission’s work. We still need the review of the identification doctrine, and that cannot be done by anyone other than the Law Commission.
Stephen Flynn (Aberdeen South) (SNP)
Q
“However, there is no corporate offence in the FSA and it is therefore not clear that prosecutors would be able to hold companies to account were similar conduct to reoccur.”
I will be open and honest with you: I do not have a legal background, so perhaps you could elaborate on that further. Either there is the ability to do something or there is not. That ties in with the remarks about Barclays in point 21, which quotes remarks that it
“effectively removes companies with widely devolved management and functioning boards”.
The term “effectively” implies that it could or could not. Can I have a little more clarity on that point?
Dr Hawley: Yes, absolutely. We have checked that with lawyers, and it is the case currently under the Financial Services Act that if you wanted to bring a prosecution for misleading statements on benchmarks—let us hope that will not happen again because financial institutions have learned the lessons from last time—the only way that you could hold a company to account would be under the directing mind principle that I mentioned earlier. You would have to show that one of the directors knew and intended for this to occur. There is no comparative offence, as there is under the Bribery Act, of a failure to prevent misleading statements being made, for which there could be a corporate fine. That would be almost impossible to do if a bank were making misleading statements.
The Barclays judgment has made that even more difficult and narrower. Prosecutors and the Serious Fraud Office can no longer say, “We’ve got the evidence on the CEO and CFO, and we think we can prove it, so we will take this to court.” The court then turns round and says, “No, it’s not just that. You have to show that the board actually delegated authority to these people.” It set a whole new hurdle for how you hold corporates to account. What we are hearing from people is that this is going to lead to a massive decrease in corporate prosecutions, because the grounds for bringing a company to account are so narrow now that they are almost impossible. I cannot say that it would not happen, but I can say that it would be an extremely brave prosecutor to risk public money in the courts to try.