Financial Services Bill

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 10th March 2021 Grand Committee

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, financial regulation has to ensure that consumers are well protected. It is with this principle in mind that I move the amendment in my name. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Sharkey and Lord Holmes of Richmond, for their support. We have also had an aperitif, in the sense that Amendment 127 in the name of the noble Lord has already been debated in an earlier group, although its main focus is aligned with the amendments in this group and I look forward to his comments.

The recent report of the UK Mortgage Prisoners group referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, when he spoke on the earlier group of amendments, is graphic and shocking. It makes the case that the Government need to come forward promptly with a fair deal for the 250,000 or so mortgage prisoners who have been stuck for some 10 years paying higher interest rates than they needed to. The All-Party Parliamentary Group on Mortgage Prisoners has kept this issue alive, having been contacted by hundreds of mortgage prisoners who describe the worry and stress that comes from being trapped as they are. This is a shameful episode.

I am grateful to the Economic Secretary to the Treasury for meeting my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe, myself and others last month. The Economic Secretary told us that he has a keen interest in settling this matter. He explained that there are difficulties including moral hazard, which means that it is not easy to sort. However, while the issue continues, considerable injustice is occurring. The Government may well be right to say that the SVRs currently paid by mortgage prisoners are only a little higher on average than the SVRs of other lenders but, particularly during the pandemic, small differences matter. In any case, the assertion that the Government make that the differences are rather minor does not ring true in the light of the report from the all-party group. Its case studies, which include nurses, teachers, members of the Armed Forces and small business people, suggest that, for all those who are trapped and struggling with the consequences of the Government’s decisions when money is tight and margins matter, these things need to be sorted.

Surely the true comparison is that if mortgage prisoners were with an active lender and of course up to date with their payments, they would have access to a range of products to transfer to, which would give them a lower fixed rate for their mortgages. In the other place when this issue was discussed, the savings available were said to be in the order of £5,000 a year. That is not an inconsiderable sum. Why are these people being singled out for this penalty?

The problem also seems to be the inability to access the best market-matching deals, compounded by the fact that the prison effect is reinforced by the inability to prevent mortgages being sold off to so-called vulture funds, which are often unregulated. This matter has been left unresolved for far too long. The inability to seek out new deals and to limit costs is causing stress, and in some cases has caused families to lose their homes. As the Government have been involved throughout this process, is it too much to ask them to explain what the plan is, and what the timetable for resolving the incarceration of these prisoners will be?

In its recent report, UK Mortgage Prisoners says that it has put the record straight on what it calls a “Government made scandal”. It is for the Government to defend themselves on that charge. UK Mortgage Prisoners complains that the Government have “effectively ignored the issue” and that, where the FCA has intervened, it has done so in a limited and ineffective manner. Its asks seem very simple: an immediate cap on SVRs for closed mortgages; introducing a tailored mortgage product for those affected; giving credit to prisoners who have for a decade or more made overpayments; stopping penalty charges for any excess arrears; and adjusting credit ratings going forward. Those are five simple steps for 250,000 people whose lives have quite simply been blighted.

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I declare an interest as co-chair of the APPG on Mortgage Prisoners. Mortgage prisoners exist almost entirely because the Treasury made a terrible mistake when it sold the first tranche of former Northern Rock and B&B mortgages to an unregulated American vulture fund called Cerberus. Cerberus is the name of the multi-headed dog that in Greek mythology sits at the entrance to the gates of hell. That is not an inappropriate name, in view of what happened next.

Three things are needed to rescue mortgage prisoners. The first is to reduce immediately to comparable market rates the SVRs that they pay. The second is to make sure that transfers to much less expensive fixed-rate deals are properly available to them. The third is to make sure that new classes of mortgage prisoners cannot be created in the future.

Amendment 99, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, to which I have added my name, deals with the first of those things. My Amendments 116 and 117 deal with the second and third. Amendment 99, as he has so clearly and forcefully explained, would protect the thousands of mortgage prisoners stuck paying high standard variable rates. It would introduce a cap on the standard variable rates paid by customers of inactive lenders and unregulated entities. That would provide immediate relief for thousands of mortgage prisoners, and could give space for longer-term solutions to be found. It would help mortgage prisoners who took out loans with a fully FCA-regulated high-street bank which were then sold on to vulture funds.

Money-saving expert and consumer champion Martin Lewis supports this proposal, and on Monday he released a statement saying:

“While the government chose to bail out the banks in the financial crisis, it has never bailed out the banks’ customers who were victims of that collapse. Mortgage prisoners have been left paying obscene interest rates for over a decade through no fault of their own. They have been completely trapped in their mortgages and unable to escape the financial misery it causes … Coupled with the devastating impact of the pandemic on people’s finances, urgent action is needed to prevent the situation from becoming catastrophic. The independent LSE report I funded has a cogent argument as to why an SVR cap isn’t a balanced long-term solution. Yet in lieu of anything else, I believe for those on closed-book mortgages it is a good stopgap while other detailed solutions are worked up, and I’m very happy the All-Party Parliamentary Group on mortgage prisoners is pushing it. This would provide immediate emergency relief for those most at risk of financial ruin. No one should underestimate the threat to wellbeing and even lives if this doesn’t happen, and happen soon.”


The Government will no doubt say that some mortgage prisoners are already paying rates lower than 3.5%, so rates do not need to be capped. But those sold on by the Government to vulture funds like Cerberus are paying high rates. In the package sold by the Government containing more than 66,000 mortgage loans, 52% were paying rates between 4.5% and 5%, and 37% were paying rates of over 5%, when the mortgages were securitised.

The Government could have set strict conditions when selling the mortgages on the interest rates which could be charged. But when they sold £16 billion of mortgages to Tulip and Cerberus, they imposed only a 12-month restriction on increases to the standard variable rate. These have long since expired and the chief executive of Tulip Mortgages told the Treasury Select Committee that the firm now had

“complete discretion to set the interest rate policy.”

On the sale to Heliodor, the Government claimed that the organisation which bought the loans would be required to set their standard variable rates by reference to the SVR charged by a

“basket of 15 active lenders”.

But when you read the details of the securitisation agreements for the mortgage loans sold, you will find that, actually, the Government have required the SVR to be set only at the level of the third highest of the 15 active lenders. This is absolutely critical, as the third highest SVR is actually 4.49%. The lowest SVR among those 15 active lenders is 3.35%, and the average SVR weighted by market share is 3.72%.

The latest and final sale of the Treasury-held mortgages was announced in February. The book was sold to Davidson Kempner Partners and Citibank, with funding by PIMCO. The Government said that the SVR was going to be charged by reference, again, to a basket of 15 active lenders, but there are no details about how this will work in practice. If it reflects the practice in earlier sales, it will not actually provide any protection to customers. The Government will also say that the FCA has changed the affordability test to enable mortgage prisoners to switch to a different lender. But the progress has been very slow, with only a very small number of lenders willing to use these new flexibilities.

The cap on the SVR proposed by this amendment would provide immediate relief to mortgage prisoners who have been overpaying for the past 13 years. It would protect all mortgage prisoners, including those who are unable to switch. It would give time for other solutions to help mortgage prisoners to be developed. The SVR cap would apply only to mortgages owned by inactive lenders and unregulated entities. It would have no impact on active lenders competing to attract customers.

The cap is supported by the campaign group UK Mortgage Prisoners, as the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, said. Members of the group have stated that this amendment is the difference between feeding their children and themselves or continuing to rely on food banks. The Government created the problem of mortgage prisoners and it is their moral responsibility to rescue them from the significant detriment that many still face. I urge the Government to accept the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson.

I now turn to Amendment 116, which would extend access to fixed interest rates to all mortgage prisoners, enabling them to gain control and certainty over their monthly mortgage payments. When the time came for the nationalised Northern Rock and B&B mortgages to be sold by the Government back to the private sector, they could have pursued an approach which ensured that these customers were in fact protected. They could have sold them to active lenders or secured a commitment from purchasers to offer these new customers new deals.

The risk to these customers was identified. In January 2016, the noble Lord, Lord McFall, wrote to the Treasury, UK Asset Resolution and the FCA to say that the customers affected by these sales should be protected, offered a fair deal and given access to fixed rates. UKAR responded that, by returning these mortgages to the private sector,

“the option to be offered new deals, extra lending and fixed rates should become available”.

But this requirement was not written into the contract when mortgages were sold to funds such as Cerberus, with the BBC reporting that UKAR is now claiming to have been “misled” by Cerberus.

A UKAR spokesman told BBC “Panorama” that Cerberus had the ability to lend to the former Northern Rock customers and that UKAR believed that it intended to do so. They said:

“The reply to Lord McFall sent on behalf of the UKAR board of directors was based on information presented to UKAR and the board had no reason to disbelieve this at that time.”


At the very best, this is evidence of catastrophic incompetence. At worst, it is evidence that UKAR heartlessly pursued profit over care for mortgage customers.

Consumer champion Martin Lewis lays responsibility for the treatment of mortgage prisoners squarely with the Government. He said that the Government

“have sold these loans to professional debt buyers who do not offer mortgages and left these people in these types of mortgages, which have been too expensive, crippled their finances and destroyed their wellbeing.”