Financial Services Bill (Second sitting)

John Glen Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 17th November 2020 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Thank you. We will start with the Minister, John Glen.

[The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (John Glen)]

Q57 Chris, it is good to see you. Thank you very much for addressing the Committee. Obviously, the Bill has a large number of measures, some of which will be of more interest to your members than others. I think it would be useful for the Committee if you could set out the significance to consumers of introducing a more proportionate regime for overseas funds to access the UK based on equivalence, and why it is important for consumers to be able to access funds based outside the UK. Perhaps you could tell us what your members feel about that measure and whether you have any reservations about it.

Chris Cummings: Thank you for the opportunity to speak to one of the most central parts of the Bill. May I take a moment to congratulate you and your team on introducing the Bill? It provides much-needed reassurance to my industry, so thank you for that.

The industry is very pleased to see the overseas funds regime introduced as part of the Bill. Around 9,000 funds are currently available to UK investors as a result of the current regime. The reason we feel it is in the interests of UK savers and investors to have access to such a variety of funds is that it brings to the market not only choice but much-needed competition. It means that individual investors have greater choice and an ability to tailor their portfolio in a way that makes sense to them and reflects their risk profile. It is really the foundation of why the UK is the pre-eminent fund centre, not just in Europe, but globally. As the Minister knows, the UK has long enjoyed a reputation for being an attractive centre for fund management. That is built on the ability of UK investors to access an innovative and ever-adapting fund market.

We support this measure in the Bill wholeheartedly. At the moment, as the Minister knows, we manage around 37% of Europe’s assets, which is enabled through measures such as this. It is important for UK savers and investors; having such a variety of funds goes to the heart of having such a sophisticated savings environment in the UK.

It is important to note that if there was a cliff edge—if UK investors were not able to access these funds—that would constrict consumer choice. In trying to replicate something akin to what we have at the moment, we would bring a heavy burden of extra costs on to the industry and greater bureaucracy. It would reduce significantly the number of funds to which UK investors could have access. That is why we believe that the overseas fund regime is material.

It is worth contrasting that with what we see at the moment. In order to help navigate these turbulent waters through the Brexit period, I was delighted that the Government heard our calls to introduce a temporary permissions regime with the Financial Conduct Authority. I am pleased to note that the Bill extends the period from three to five years for that requirement, which is very good. It also allows us to tackle two particular issues wrapped up in the overseas funds regime.

First, there is a review of section 272, which is the current structure by which a fund sponsor or investment management company would seek to have their fund recognised by the FCA—our regulator here in the UK. Section 272 is okay, but it is rather cumbersome. It does not stand up well compared to international comparators. It is a rather lengthy form, which takes a while to complete and gives the FCA a six-month period to look at approving that particular fund.

The proposals in the Bill take us to a completely different level, where the FCA is able to look at fund structures across the piece rather than at each individual fund. We feel that is a big step forward. While section 272 could be reviewed and reformed, there is a different category of opportunity presented by the Bill and that is why our industry is so keen to see the Bill come forward and have the overseas fund regime baked into it as a measure that goes ahead. I will pause there in case there are comments before I move on to comment on equivalence, as you were kind enough to mention.

[John Glen]

Q It would probably be worth talking about equivalence. I am keen at this point to get an explanation of the measure for the Committee. I am sure others will want to probe some of the weaknesses or disadvantages that they may perceive.

Chris Cummings: Currently, we enjoy unfettered marketing right across the whole of Europe and the EEA. Post Brexit, naturally, that will come to an end. The way that the regulatory authorities assess whether a particular fund is suitable is to judge the equivalence of the regime of the sponsoring organisation or where the organisation is based. Having that judgment of equivalence has been one of our industry’s clear calls throughout the Brexit process.

We were pleased that the Chancellor took a step forward in recognising and granting equivalence to a limited measure in the House of Commons in his statement last week. We think that was absolutely in the right direction. We have been unstinting in our calls for the European Commission and our European regulator, the European Securities and Markets Authority, to respond to those in kind and move forward so that the equivalence determination could have been made by now and be working. We were sorely disappointed that in June ESMA decided not only not to make a decision on equivalence, but to defer it for a period of time until after the IFR comes into effect.

We feel that that was a missed opportunity to settle the fact that the UK and the EU would be equivalent, which we currently are, having adopted, rather in full vigour, the European rules under which our industry labours. We are hopeful that continuing industry efforts to encourage ESMA and the European Commission to recognise the UK as equivalent will come through, but we are more than pleased with the steps that the Chancellor announced and the comments that are carried forward in the Bill. At the moment, we see that as a first step, but we look forward to greater work being done on this in the months and years ahead.

[John Glen]

Thank you very much, Chris, and thank you, Chair.

[Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)]

Q Chris, good afternoon and thanks for giving evidence today. I want to continue to ask about the same things.

The Bill does lots of different things, but I would like to mention two. First, it onshores or incorporates a significant body of EU law through different directives into UK law and gives the governance of those to the UK regulators. Secondly, it sets up this overseas fund regime, by which it grants equivalence on a country-by-country basis. It says that the Treasury will make these equivalence decisions as well. The Chancellor announced the direction of travel last Monday.

How do you see the relationship between these two different parts of the Bill? In theory, in future, having onshored the body of EU law and the directives, we are now at liberty to depart from them if we so choose. Do you see a relationship between that debate around divergence and the degree of divergence that the UK decides to opt for and the equivalence decision that we now need from the rest of the EU?

Chris Cummings: It is worth reflecting on the good work that has been done so far in trying to bring the different regimes together and match equivalence. Looking to the future, there is a strong argument for the UK to continue to bolster its presence in the international standard-setting fora, whether that is the Financial Stability Board, the International Organisation of Securities Commissions, Basel, and so on. Our authorities can continue to play a very strong role in arguing for what our industry would prefer, which is global and international standards.

We continually push for international standards as a global industry because that allows us to operate with reduced bureaucracy and by taking costs out of the organisation so we can really focus on looking after client needs. The UK has an outstanding track record of having its policymakers and regulators taken seriously in those international fora, because of the scale of the market that we have in the UK and the sophistication of our capital market in particular. At that level, if we can push for international standards in an international environment, that reduces some of the potential friction between the EU and the UK or other jurisdictions about where divergence may or may not be happening. That is the first thing we would like to stress—the international nature.

Secondly, something that has become part of the discussion in terms of the future relationship of the UK and the EU, and which our industry thoroughly supports, is a much clearer focus on outcomes and outcome-based regulation. It is noticeable that across the EEA there are different approaches in different European jurisdictions, all of which have been judged equivalent so far. Recognising that different jurisdictions will walk up to the same issue from different directions, yet seeking to achieve the same thing, that is the material part.

The third area I would just point to, if I may, is the depth of relationship between the UK authorities and those across the EU, not just in ESMA, our European regulator, but in the national domestic regulatory authorities. It is still absolutely the case that the UK policy-making apparatus—the UK regulatory bodies—is seen to have considerable expertise to offer. So just because we start in different places, it does not mean that we should not see the UK taking a little leadership and the EU tacking towards us in terms of lessons learned because of the sophistication of the market that we can offer. That was one of the reasons why we in the IA, among many other organisations, through the Brexit process was keen to press for a regulator to regulate a dialogue, which could be technically oriented, focused on bringing market and regulatory understanding to bear and making sure that there was a no-surprises, keeping-markets-open focus through the process that we have been through.

So I do not see equivalence and divergence as axiomatically pulling in different directions. I think what we will undoubtedly see is a period where the definition of equivalence needs to be—we need to have a thoughtful discussion, actually, about the substance of equivalence, moving away from its ephemeral nature and the fact that it can be granted or dismissed within a 30-day notice period. We need to have a much more joined-up and mature discussion about how two major markets can keep on doing business together, particularly in investment management when, as I mentioned earlier, 37% of Europe’s assets are managed here in the UK and when, for certain member states, whether it is the Dutch pensions industry or something else, the quality of investment management conducted here in the UK is seen as a prized asset and something that they want to learn from and continue to enjoy the benefit of.

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[The Chair]

Thank you. We will start with the Minister, John Glen.

[John Glen]

Q Emma, I will come to you first. Obviously, TheCityUK represents, as you said, a range of institutions and firms. It would be helpful for the Committee if you could set the context by summarising the industry’s reaction to the Bill, and try to give us the widest possible view of the industry’s reaction to the measures in it and what the consequences would be if we did not pass it. Afterwards, I will come to Catherine separately.

Emma Reynolds: Thank you, Mr Glen. We support the measures in the Bill, and both the overarching and the stated objectives. It is absolutely right that the UK Government are onshoring the regulations. There are obviously other measures within the Bill that are extraneous to that, which we support. The Bill is a welcome first step, but we look forward to working with the Government to develop an overall strategy for the financial services sector that could pull all the different strands together, building on what the Chancellor said last week, which was very welcome.

[John Glen]

Q Would you like to spell out where you think anything is missing from the Bill? The second part of your answer seems to suggest that there is a lack of an overall strategy. Is that what you are seeking to say? Obviously this has been contextualised as a first step, as we get towards the end of the transition period. I have indicated, as the Minister, that there will be subsequent legislation in future Sessions. Would you like to set out in more detail where you think there are specific gaps at this point?

Emma Reynolds: It is a very welcome first step. All I would say is that we, as an industry, have a broader agenda about our industry’s long-term competitiveness going forward. I would not have expected to see that in this Bill. We had a very good relationship with Government, particularly with the Treasury, but some of the other issues that we are concerned about relate more to other Departments, whether it is access to skills and talent from abroad or green finance or other issues that are not in the Bill. It is a welcome first step.

[John Glen]

Q May I turn to Catherine? Thank you for giving evidence. One of the issues that has come up generally is an apprehensiveness about the capacity of the regulators in terms of their technical expertise to implement detailed rules such as the Basel rules. I have been fortunate enough to have been a Minister for a while and I recognise the complexity of the dynamic between the Treasury and the regulators. There is an intimate relationship, but could you give us a view on how you see the role of the regulators in the context of this Bill? Do you see any risk that they are being asked to do something that stretches them beyond what they should normally be able to do? Could you give the Committee a sense of that responsibility and how well placed they are to do what we have asked them to do?

Catherine McGuinness: Thank you for inviting me to give evidence. I cannot answer on the technical ability of the regulators in detail, other than to say that, in our experience, they are very capable of adapting and innovating. Indeed, we heard last week at Mansion House from both the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority about their plans. Obviously, the regulators will be gaining significant powers under the Bill. It is important that we look at how those powers are scrutinised, including by Parliament.

On that front, the International Regulatory Strategy Group, which both TheCityUK and the City Corporation support, has suggested that parliamentary scrutiny be strengthened and reordered, and that the role of the Treasury Committee be complemented by setting up a joint Select Committee on financial regulation to look in detail at specific pieces of financial services regulation. That would be important to strengthen scrutiny, as we hand more responsibility to the regulators. It would also be useful––and the IRSG has recommended it––to increase the transparency of decision making by both the Treasury and the regulators, and to improve scrutiny. I am not sure if I have fully answered your question.

[John Glen]

Q You are referring to the response of both yourselves and TheCityUK to the consultation on the future regulatory framework, separate and additional to the Bill?

Catherine McGuinness: indicated assent.

[Mr McFadden]

Q Good afternoon, Emma and Catherine. It is very nice to see both of you. Emma, I want to come to you first. You are the fifth panel to appear and there is beginning to be a pattern to the questions that we have asked. I feel that I have asked this of a few people.

The Bill does lots of different things but two big things are that it transposes, or onshores, lots of different parts of EU regulation from many different directives. It gives powers to the UK regulators to govern all that. In doing that, as we come to the end of the transition process, there is greater freedom for either the Treasury or the regulators to diverge from that body of EU law. The Bill does that, but it also has this overseas markets vision, which is granting equivalence on a country-by-country basis, to the 9,000 funds that are domiciled overseas but which operate in the UK. I want to talk a bit about these two different parts of the Bill. Starting with you, Emma, what do you think your members’ attitude is to onshoring this body of EU law? Do they broadly regard it as something that they would like to stick with or are there areas that they would quite quickly want to diverge from and, if so, what would be the most prominent areas?

Emma Reynolds: We were delighted that the Government took the unilateral decision last week to grant the EU equivalence in a number of different areas. We are still hopeful that the EU might follow suit. We have been calling for a technical outcome-based approach to equivalence for some time now. Within that, you could have different rules but the same outcomes. Even if there are pinch points around Solvency II—only some elements of Solvency II—you could have different rules in the UK that achieve the same objective.

From now until 1 January, we will remain technically equivalent. Inevitably, over time, there will be some changes in regulation, both on our side in the UK and in the EU. The EU is currently reviewing some of its own directives, MiFID being a case in point, but there are others too. We do not want to see divergence for divergence’s sake. We would like to encourage a strong dialogue between regulators in the UK and the EU. There already is that dialogue, but we would like to see a framework for that plan. If you are a member of ours who trades across borders, you want similar or the same rules.

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[John Glen]

Q Welcome to the Committee, and thank you for giving evidence. Adam, may I start with you? We have heard a number of references today to the role that the UK has played in the EU financial services legislation process. Given the wide experience that you have just mentioned, it would be useful if you could explain how you see the UK, in terms of the role that it has played. In the context of the investment firms review, do you think it is right that we should be implementing a more proportionate regime for investment firms?

Adam Farkas: I will try to answer the first part of the question, but then I will leave it to Constance. because this is one area where I was personally involved, and I am not allowed to comment.

On the first part of the question, it is beyond doubt, and everybody in the public and private sector recognises it, that the UK as part of the European Union was playing a leading role in shaping and forming financial services regulations in the Union. That is clearly evidenced by the leading role of London and the UK more broadly as the financial services centre or hub of the Union. That is beyond any doubt. It was respected as such, and had a very strong voice in shaping the different regulatory initiatives. For the future relationship, it is important to have engagement and openness, and that a co-operative attitude, or co-operative setting, is retained, with two autonomous decision-making jurisdictions, in which the two sides can co-ordinate, exchange views and possibly even influence each other’s new initiatives or the evolution of their respective regulatory frameworks, with the potential aim of maintaining as much consistency as possible and practicable. On the investment firms regime, I pass the floor to Constance, because I was part of the development of the standards at the EBA, so I must refrain from comment.

Constance Usherwood: With the investment firms prudential regime, the UK authorities have played a key role in the development of the prudential regime that is specifically targeted to the business models of investment firms and making sure that it is proportionate. In that respect, we fully support the approach that is being taken today. In terms of the application to the different prudential frameworks and of the regimes versus the CRR, the bulk of our membership will probably not be directly impacted by the regime due to their size and activities. That would also tally with the approach that the EU has taken.

[John Glen]

Q If I may probe just a little further, you are saying that this proportionate change for the UK is in line with your members’ expectations and does not offer any serious threat to the integrity and reputation of the UK in this area?

Constance Usherwood: Yes, I would agree with that, absolutely.

[John Glen]

Q May I ask you about the LIBOR benchmark? This is a complex area, as we have already heard today. Do you agree with the approach that we have taken in the Bill? What would be the implications if we did not take this approach, and can you say what other approach we could take if you disagree with it?

Constance Usherwood: I am going to apologise, but I think that Adam is probably best placed to come in on this one.

Adam Farkas: We very strongly support the clear and oft-repeated message of the UK authorities that active transition by transaction parties to the new risk-free rate is the only way to achieve certainty of outcome in the transition. We have promoted this message regularly and we have developed market standard language to support it that can be used by investors to assist them in this process.

A very difficult part of the transition process relates to what happens to legacy contracts already in place that reference the old LIBOR rates that are being phased out. Within legacy contracts, there are the so-called tough legacy contracts, which are very difficult to repaper or change the reference in. They cause the most complex challenges for end users as well as for members of AFME or other financial services providers. We therefore very much welcome the provisions of the Financial Services Bill that give the FCA new powers to mitigate that risk by directing the administrator to change the methodology of LIBOR if doing so would protect the consumer and market integrity. That would enable the FCA to stabilise certain LIBOR rates during the wind-down period so that their limited use in legacy contracts can continue. The answer is yes, we are very supportive. None the less, we welcome the further clarity which, I think, will be forthcoming on 25 November from the FCA and the Treasury on what steps the authorities are planning to further this objective, because there are some outstanding questions that require clarification. I would be happy to go into them, but in the interests of time, I will stop there.

[John Glen]

Q Just to be clear, there is no substantively different path that you anticipate that we could have taken on this matter that would give us a better outcome than the one that we are headed for, notwithstanding the need for the further clarification that is in train?

Adam Farkas: That is a difficult question to answer because we have not speculated on different outcomes, but certainly the path that the Bill is taking is something that we can very strongly support.

[Mr McFadden]

Q Thank you for coming today. I want to start with our current situation on equivalence, where we had an announcement from the Chancellor that the UK will grant equivalence recognition to companies based in current EU member states but we have not got a reciprocal equivalence recognition for UK companies selling into EU markets. What are the practical implications for UK-based financial services companies if that situation continues to exist for some time?

Adam Farkas: Very briefly, equivalence determinations provide the major legal framework for different jurisdictions to provide access to service providers that are licensed and supervised in each other’s markets. To answer your question, if equivalence determinations by the EU are not forthcoming, or not brought forward at pace or with the width that is expected, that will put limitations on the access of service providers—financial services companies and firms—to the EU market. This is really an issue of market access.

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[The Chair]

Thank you very much. We are going to follow the time-honoured tradition of going first to the Government, then to the Opposition, and then to other members of the Committee. We will start with the Minister, John Glen.

[John Glen]

Q Thank you very much, Gurpreet, for coming before us to give evidence. I will start by addressing one of the key headline measures in the Bill that enables the FCA to implement a more proportionate prudential regime for investment firms. I would like you to give us your perspective on that measure, how you think it could be helpful, what you are looking to see come out of it, and whether you expect to see improvements based on the discretion that the FCA will have.

Gurpreet Manku: We welcome the Financial Services Bill as it implements a prudential regime for investment firms that is tailored to the specificities of the UK market while maintaining world-class regulatory standards. To give you some context, the UK has already regulated private equity and venture capital firms. Broadly, there are two categories. First, we regulate the managers of private equity and venture capital funds. Those entities are regulated under the alternative investment fund managers directive. We also regulate advisory entities under MiFID. Those firms will be most impacted by the investment firms prudential regime. These advisory firms advise on and arrange private equity transactions for other regulated fund managers, sometimes within the same group. Those other managers tend to be based overseas, including in the US, Asia and Europe.

That is important because the fact that the UK has a lot of those advisory entities signifies that the UK is a global hub for private equity and venture capital. Many international firms choose to make the UK a base for carrying out UK, European and, in some cases, international investment and fund-raising activity. Since the inception of the investment firms review, the BVCA has been in dialogue with both the FCA and the Treasury about its implementation.

We welcome the introduction of a tailored regime that appropriately covers the activities of these firms, as well as their size, and the relative risk they pose to the financial system when compared with other banks and financial institutions. The new regime will lead to additional requirements for some of those firms, particularly the advisory entities that I mentioned, including higher capital requirements. We submitted feedback to a recent FCA discussion paper on the need to calibrate these new requirements for the risk posed by those firms. Our key ask for the FCA and the Treasury is that an appropriate transition period is available to those advisories.

Interestingly, the FCA’s discussion paper acknowledges that while there are transition provisions in place for other categories of investment firms, there is a gap for the category that includes these private equity advisers. That FCA category in the UK is known as exempt CAD—capital adequacy directive—firms. That is not just an issue for private equity and venture capital firms. There are many other types of firms in this category. My understanding is that they tend to be smaller financial services firms, such as corporate finance advisory boutiques and other consultants. That reflects the UK market, which has a huge number of financial services firms at the smaller end.

We think that the omission of this transitional period in the EU text was not deliberate and was just a mistake. The category of advisers that we are referring to should also have a transition period. The benefit of the Financial Services Bill is that it will enable the FCA to correct this omission and ensure that all types of investment firms benefit from transition rules.

Finally, I welcome the confirmation that the target implementation date is January 2022, because I think that will give sufficient time for the FCA to consult on the detailed rules and we need that lengthy consultation period. It will also give firms the time that they need to implement them.

[John Glen]

Q Thank you. I will follow up with one question. You have helpfully set out the context of the range of firms and the different and proportionate levels of capital requirements that are required. Can I ask about your level of confidence in the FCA’s ability to implement the appropriate regime with the degree of customisation and detail, in terms of competence? Do you have any reservations about their capacity to do that? How comfortable is your working relationship with them?

Gurpreet Manku: Interestingly, we have been speaking to the FCA about this since 2016. The need for a special investment firms prudential regime emanated out of discussions in the UK, because there was a recognition that regulatory requirements that apply to banks do not necessarily work in an investment firms context.

The FCA does understand the breadth and variety of firms that operate in the UK. The confirmation that there will be a bit more time to think through how the detailed rules will operate in practice is really welcome. If I had one ask, it would have been for more time to look at the details of what would follow.

[John Glen]

Thank you.

[The Chair]

I call the shadow Minister, Pat McFadden.

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[The Chair]

We will now move on to our final panel of the afternoon. It is another one-man virtual panel, with Peter Tutton from StepChange joining us remotely. We have until 5 o’clock, when we must adjourn. Peter, could you introduce yourself for the record and for the members of the Committee?

Peter Tutton: Good afternoon, everyone, and thanks for inviting me. My name is Peter Tutton; I am head of policy at StepChange Debt Charity.

[John Glen]

Q Thank you very much for joining us and giving your input this afternoon. I think that there are probably two measures that would be of most interest to your organisation––please correct me if I am wrong––in the statutory debt repayment plans and the measure to transfer the Help-to-Save bonus. May I ask you about the first one? Obviously, your organisation has been a key consultee and driver of the moratorium that we introduced in May. The statutory debt repayment plan is a key option during that eight-week period. How do you think this will work and what do you see as its challenges? How does it sit within the context of what is available at the moment for people who get into difficulty?

Peter Tutton: That is a good question. We are delighted that the two new debt schemes are going forward. We think that they will be a very important help for people who are struggling. What we think they will do is partly driven by our experience of being a deliverer of the debt advice scheme in Scotland. From when we have spoken to our clients, we know that the protections that both the breathing space scheme and the statutory debt repayment plan will offer––a sort of guarantee that if you keep up with your payments you will have protection from your debt spiralling, from collections activity, with people asking you to pay money that you cannot afford, and the threat of enforcement action––deal with the things that frighten people and make them stressed and anxious. They damage people’s health and lead them to do things like borrowing more to cope with unaffordable demands. The lack of a guarantee of forbearance can really impede people’s recovery from debt and financial difficulty.

We are very pleased: those protections have existed in England and Wales for insolvency solutions for some time but not for people who are able to repay their debts. Very often, clients will come to us after an income shock. As we sit here now, people are losing their jobs, having income reductions or falling ill. Their income will drop significantly for a time, but then it takes time for them to recover and get back on track. In those cases, these kind of schemes, first the breathing space scheme to help people to get advice and then the statutory debt repayment plan to help people pay their debts off within that safe space, will be really important in helping people. A lot of the fine detail about how they will work has still to be worked out. It will be important to ensure that they are accessible and that they fit together.

One thing we are interested in is when someone gets to the end of their breathing space scheme. If someone is still recovering, as we call it, from their financial difficulties, will they be able to go into the statutory debt repayment plan, where it may not be apparent that they can pay their debts within their long-stop period at that point, but where we have good reason to believe that their income will recover and that they have a good chance of getting back into work? It would be useful if the two schemes aligned so that people do not, first, get protection, then fall out of protection and only come back into it later. There could be a position where creditors could all pile in to take enforcement action or debts could begin to grow again. That is one of the things where we are keen to see the detail to ensure that the two schemes align and that we can move people from one to the other, with a long-stop on “How long is a reasonable period to repay their debts?” but one that is not worked out very strictly at the beginning while people’s circumstances are still fluid.

There is lots of fine detail to work out. We are going through the process at the moment with the Insolvency Service creditors and debt advice. Agencies are working out the detail of how the scheme will work in practice. What is important for both schemes is that we as debt advisers need to be able to administer them without significant extra cost. We might come to that later. With breathing space, there is no direct funding so the cost situation is very important. If it is very burdensome for us to deliver, it may be hard to do. We then need to do some work still with the creditors to make sure that everyone is getting the information that they need to get protection quickly to people who need it. There is a bit more work to be done there. Likewise, with regard to the way in which the statutory debt repayment will work, there are practical details such as how people will go into the scheme; how the “fair and reasonable” test will work—there is a need to make sure that it is not too cumbersome, and that it is effective and cannot delay protection unduly—and ensuring that creditors do not abuse the right to object, although they must have that right, in a way that can slow the whole scheme down. These are the sorts of things we will need to work out.

[John Glen]

Q Thank you. I appreciate the work that you and your organisation have done, and Phil Andrew as well. On my second question, can I ask you about the Help-to-Save provision, under which people can save up to £50 a month for four years, and after two years, if they have saved up £1,200, they have £600 transferred to them by the Government? As you know, the provision makes sure that that money can be transferred to a NS&I account. Could you set out your understanding of why this would be necessary and how people become disengaged? Why is this measure, which may appear to some unnecessary, needed?

Peter Tutton: I think this is a necessary measure. We should cast our minds back to the child trust fund. In some ways that was similar, as it was a way of encouraging people to build up savings, although in that case the savings were for their children. As you may remember, one aspect of the child trust fund is that people got a voucher and then had to put it somewhere. A huge number of those vouchers ended up in default. We know that, especially among people who are less experienced in using financial services and in lower income households, it can be quite daunting when a choice has to be made between a number of different savings products that they do not really understand, and when they do not really know the difference.

That can create inertia. It makes a great deal of sense to give a safe way of moving people automatically into a successor product so that we do not have that problem of trying to contact them to get them to make a decision. The clause is worded so as still to allow people to make their own decision, which is quite right, and having safeguards seems sensible. We are big supporters of the Help-to-Save scheme, which is a cracking scheme. Our own research shows that having a pot of precautionary savings can significantly reduce people’s chances of falling into debt. If I had one criticism—

[John Glen]

Go for it.

Peter Tutton: It would be that at the moment not enough people—

[John Glen]

I agree with that. We are trying to do what we can to improve awareness and get people to use small amounts; I think they can put by up to £1 or £2 minimum.

Peter Tutton: But it is a good scheme, and it is sensible to allow people who have saved into the scheme to put their savings somewhere else. They can make a choice if they want to, but we know that some of the people whom the scheme is designed to attract may struggle to choose between superficially similar financial service providers and get stuck in the middle. This makes sense.

[John Glen]

Thank you very much indeed, Peter.

[Mr McFadden]

Q Peter, we are talking about things that have broad support: the debt respite scheme, Help-to-Save and so on. The Minister and I debated some regulations about these matters about a month ago. This is really just a short question. You have looked at how these things have been set out in the Bill and you have been very warm about them today. Is there anything you would change, given what you have seen in the Bill? Are there any gaps or any changes you would suggest to the way in which these things have been set out in the Bill?

Peter Tutton: In an ideal world, we would like the breathing space period to be longer. We can understand why it has been set up as it has. It is very good that it includes, for instance, Government debt; it is a new thing that people will have protection from Government and local government debt; things like council tax are a very big problem for our clients. We can see that the Government may be nervous about a longer scheme. Perhaps if there was a way of looking again soon, once we are satisfied that it works okay, we could give that breathing space a bit more time. There are two things that the breathing space can do. There is what it does at the moment, which is largely about allowing people to get advice and get into a debt solution, but there is also time during which people need to recover.

As I said earlier, when people come to us they are often still in quite a degree of difficulty and their circumstances have not resolved themselves. We cannot always instantly put them into a stable long-term solution. One of the things that might help that would be a longer period of breathing space while they are recovering. In lots of cases, there is an obvious solution to put people into; if their circumstances are not going to improve and debt relief is the right solution, we will put them into that. We may be able to deal with that by articulating the statutory debt repayment plan and the breathing space such that there is a gap in the middle. Ideally, a longer period would be good. There may be a way of effecting that just by making sure those two things align, so that people whose circumstances are still recovering—they come to us and have a very small amount of money, but we believe that they will back into work, and for a lot of our clients that is what happens—can keep that protection going through until their circumstances improve and they can get back on the track of repaying their debts. That would be the one thing, instantly, that we would think about changing.

Another thing is that in the Treasury policy statement, including this legislation, there is a provision for funding the statutory debt repayment plan. The Treasury policy statement talks about that funding for debt advice providers being around 9% if you distribute funds as well. That is something that may need to be looked at again—not a lot, but a bit. That 9% is a bit less than the funding that we currently get from what is called fair share funding, which is [Inaudible] funding we get for helping clients with debt management plans. That funding actually allows us to do a lot of things.

One of the things that we are not yet sure about and are not able to model is what the additional costs of the statutory debt repayment plan will be. For instance, there is a provision in there for creditors to have a vote as a safeguard before a plan can be accepted. If we have to administer that vote in some way, for instance, it would mean an extra cost. There are some bits and pieces around that that may need looking at a bit more once the precise details of the debt repayment plan scheme are better understood.