Financial Services Bill

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 8th March 2021 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

74: After Clause 40, insert the following new Clause—
“Alignment of accounting to prudential standards
Where the prudential capital and profit or losses for a banking company are lower than the accounting numbers for that banking company where International Accounting Standards have been used, then the accounting numbers must have an adjustment to the balance sheet and profit and loss account in order to—(a) align the accounting numbers with the regulatory capital of the banking company which constrains the growth of a banking company and its ability to lend,(b) align the regulatory capital for going concern purposes with the accounting capital for going concern purposes,(c) align the regulatory capital and profits for remuneration purposes with the accounting capital and profits in accordance with the regulations for shareholder approval of director remuneration, and(d) align the regulatory capital and profits for distribution purposes with the accounting capital and profits for distribution purposes.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that when there are prudential filters discounting capital these should be carried through to accounting capital figures.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I declare my financial services interests as in the register. The two amendments in this group concern the use of international financial reporting standards, particularly with regard to banks. Their aim is to permit a very abbreviated explanation of some of the problems with and lack of transparency of IFRS and to probe the return of a role for the Bank of England concerning the endorsement of accounting standards now that the approval of IFRS is repatriated to the UK and their approval under UK legislation involves an economic interest test. I thank my noble friend Lady Kramer and the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, for signing my amendments.

It is undeniable that IFRS played a part in the financial crisis and, even though they have been amended since in recognition of that role, they are still not fit for purpose for calculating prudential capital. As far as banks are concerned, they have two sets of numbers: statutory accounts for Companies Act going concern, on which there is an auditor’s opinion, and numbers for the prudential regulator which—if I may put it this way—really show the going concern situation, because that is what prudential regulators want to know.

It is worth looking at a couple of points to see the sort of thing that regulators discount for prudential purposes. Good will is taken out, because obviously it is not loss-absorbing and is not much good when a company is running out of money. It is also the case that a bank’s debt can be shown merely at the junk bond debt value in a bank’s IFRS accounts rather than the sum actually owed, which again is not the real money situation. For a bank that is going bust, or just not doing so well, the published accounts can show a rosier picture than the prudential numbers. I do not know any serious analysts who use the IFRS accounts rather than regulators’ numbers.

Regrettably, there are many other anomalies affecting other businesses. IFRS 15, for example, can introduce a smoothing effect, changing some sales into an income spread over future years and therefore providing exactly the kind of disguising of downturns that has caused problems in the past.

Given that a bank’s ability to trade is determined by its prudential solvency and banking licence rather than its IFRS accounts disclosed to the market, it is actually a bit absurd to say that a set of accounts can fit the Companies Act going-concern requirements and be signed off for the market when a bank might be a gone concern as far as the regulator is concerned and no longer able to trade. That may be the theoretical end-game problem, but it would seem more sensible for the banks to have to disclose to the markets the accounts that they have to live by for their licence. That is probably a better set of numbers on which to reward executives as well.

Many other countries recognise such anomalies and do not allow IFRS to be used without modification. Australia has its guidance note AGN 220.2, Impairment, Provisioning and the General Reserve for Credit Losses, and fared better in the financial crisis as a result. EU countries do not allow IFRS or IFRS-like calculations at the company level for determining going concern. The US will have nothing to do with it and only very grudgingly allows it to be used by non-US companies. I know that because I helped to negotiate it. The UK is really the outlier here.

Amendment 74 suggests that where the prudential capital and profit or loss for a banking company are less than the accounting numbers, the accounting numbers should be adjusted to the prudential numbers in the balance sheet and the profit-and-loss account because it is the regulatory capital that is the true amount for limiting growth, the real going-concern number, the safe distribution calculation and the fair director remuneration assessment. Yes, I am being provocative because I want some thinking on this, not the usual bland leave-us-alone acceptance.

I turn to Amendment 77. The PRA is the body closest to dealing with the unrealities still existent in IFRS that affect banks and recognising the effects that they have on the safety and stability of companies. The Bank of England is surely the pre-eminent body for analysing economic effects in the UK. Therefore, my Amendment 77 proposes to give the Bank of England a role in determining whether there is an adverse effect on the economy of the UK—the test set in the relevant statutory instrument for endorsing IFRS—and whether the standard is suitable for use in prudential regulation and, if not, to require that it not be used for the purpose of prudential regulation. Of course, some of this overlaps with what it is already doing.

I am sure that the Minister and other Members of the Committee realise that I am using this opportunity to highlight a matter that should be looked at more carefully, rather than just letting the IFRS juggernaut trundle on, whether that be for another HBOS or another Carillion. There are significant issues that affect the economy as well as many other issues with IFRS that depart from the normal logic of what accounts should mean and that are hard, if not impossible, to reconcile with the various requirements of company law. They have been swept under the carpet for far too long. I beg to move.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I am struggling with Amendment 74 because I think that it is aiming at a target that does not really exist, and it confuses capital and profits and losses.

The amendment would require what are quaintly called the “accounting numbers” to be adjusted to align with regulatory capital. Apart from anything else, that would result in accounts that do not comply with the Companies Act 2006, which requires, under Section 393, that accounts show

“a true and fair view of the assets, liabilities, financial position and profit or loss”.

The amendment seems to suggest that adjustments would be made to the accounts other than for the purposes of compliance with international accounting standards or to show a “true and fair view”, and, in that case, I believe that the resulting accounts would not comply with the Companies Act. We have to emphasise that these are international accounting standards, to which all countries that sign up follow, so this would be a major departure for accounting by banks and other institutions in this country.

I also note that, in proposed new paragraph (d), this is to apply to “profits for distribution purposes”, but that seems to misunderstand the fact that distributable profits are determined at the level of the parent entity solo accounts, whereas the adjustments that I believe are being targeted would be found in the accounts of subsidiary regulated entities or in the consolidated accounts, rather than those of the parent itself.

Regulatory capital already operates as a constraint on lending, so I fail to see what real-world impact any adjustments in the statutory accounts would have. While I understand the concept of regulatory capital, I do not understand the concept of “prudential” or “regulatory” profits or losses. I do not believe that “regulatory profits or losses” is a term that really exists, except to the extent that accumulated profits or losses form part of regulatory capital. It is difficult to see how proposed new paragraph (c) in Amendment 74 would work in relation to remuneration.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, has explained the sorts of adjustments that are made for regulatory purposes and that, under her amendment, would be taken into the statutory accounts—for example, the treatment of intangible assets. It is not clear to me why the prudential treatment of these items should be imported into true and fair accounts. The treatment for regulatory capital is linked to loss absorbency, which is not an underlying principle of financial accounting, and it therefore cannot readily be accommodated within the structure of accounting standards.

Pillar 3 statements, which are required to be produced by all regulatory banks, set out the information required in much detail. If the noble Baroness is correct—I am not sure that she is—that analysts use and rely on Pillar 3 statements, not statutory accounts, they already have that information: all of it is in the public domain.

Amendment 77 is unnecessary. It is already open to the PRA to base regulatory capital on different numbers from those in the annual accounts. I have already mentioned intangible assets. It also ignores gains or losses or known liabilities, a very arcane bit of the accounting standards that makes companies recognise gains when their credit ratings reduce the fair value of their outstanding liabilities. The PRA has not needed any special statutory cover to eliminate that from regulatory capital.

Furthermore, it is unsound for the Bank of England to approach accounting for individual institutions on the basis of the impact that a standard may have on the economy of the UK, as if accounting were a mere plaything of policymakers. I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, will not press these amendments.

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I hope that the noble Baroness will understand why I cannot accept these amendments, even though I understand that they are largely probing in nature, and that she will feel able to withdraw them.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for having taken part in this debate and for enabling me to find some way in a busy parliamentary schedule to enable airing of a few of the problems with IFRS. I regret that IFRS has not been picked for a study by a Select Committee; I have tried but it is a rather dry subject that gets few votes when set against competing topics.

I have to admit that Amendment 74 was not only probing but perhaps a little impetuous in trying to provoke some thought about what was actually going on. My main point is that accounting has made it very difficult to get a genuine view of what is true and fair. If anybody wants to look at the RBS preliminary hearings that went to the courts, it was said there that the law was not for experts but for ordinary people. The fact is that we have got to a stage where there is such a departure between accounting standards and what the normal person would understand that I seriously challenge whether they really do give a true and fair view.

Things that can be done with supply chain financing, as the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, expressed, have undermined several significant businesses, yet still it is there and going on. I accept that one needs something like IFRS for international comparisons, but the UK is still the outlier in having copied a lot of the flaws of IFRS into the national accounting, so it appears again at the company level beneath. It is that which can therefore cause some of the crashes, whereas, in other countries, because they do not apply it at their national accounting standard level and to company-level accounts, they manage to escape.

Amendment 77 is not as impetuous, perhaps, as Amendment 74. Once upon a time the Bank of England used to jointly appoint the head of the FRC, so it had some say in it, but that now seems to have disappeared and it is left just to the Minister and BEIS. But I did not invent the bit that I pointed out about the economic analysis; that is what the endorsement board has to do to endorse IFRS and what is present in the International Accounting Standards and European Public Limited-Liability Company (Amendment Etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, one of the 100 or so SIs that I diligently scrutinised with other noble Lords. So I have not invented the test; a test is there and is going to be conducted by a subset of the FRC, a board established under the auspices of the FRC, or the ARGA, when we get round to doing it. Will it really be the right body for that economic interest test? As the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, explained, taking an opinion from the Bank of England would seem appropriate.

The Minister’s argument is that we should not rock the boat on anything. We can let the deceptions and failures keep on coming but, underlying this, if we do nothing and leave it with the accountants to do their fancy footwork on the figures, which might suit them but nobody else, we can record now that the Treasury did not go poking around to find out what was going on and has done nothing to help. For now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 74 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I was not sure where the debate on short selling would go. I am broadly satisfied with the present rules that prohibit naked short selling and require that a short seller has identified where they will obtain the shares when delivery is required. There is a little bit of wriggle room in the identifying, which was very hard fought for by the UK when the EU regulation was being negotiated. Some would like it more relaxed so that there is a looser understanding of how the shares will be found; others would like to ban short selling altogether. I am not convinced that any significant change is needed in that area but, having negotiated the current compromise, I am both biased and happy for someone else to gather the scars on their back.

As the noble Baroness said, there has been additional interest in short selling because of the developments around GameStop and AMC shares, with some retail investors deliberately seeking to put a short squeeze on to hedge funds with large short positions. The shares became heavily promoted on internet sites and social media, and no doubt there are individuals who made poor decisions about investing as a consequence. Eventually, brokers took steps to curtail retail access, and therefore activity, which stopped extreme movements, but that also calls into question rights of retail access and whether there will be discouragement of things such as commission-free retail trading.

In the UK—and, indeed, the EU—we do not have such large net short positions as tend to be found in the US. That may well be due in part to the more restrictive requirements on the identification of where one is going to get the shares from, and stricter disclosure requirements. Retail access is not so well developed here, either.

I do not know whether the Treasury Select Committee has taken any evidence on this—it seems taken up by the Gloster review—but the chair of ESMA appeared before the corresponding committee in the European Parliament on 23 February. In that appearance, there was a suggestion that other things around the subject may need looking at—such as market abuse and best execution, which would be under MiFID II—rather than short selling.

The FCA website has a six-line generic statement, put up on 29 January, about “recent share trading issues”, warning about potential loss of money, that losses are unlikely to be covered by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, and that broking firms are not obliged to offer trading facilities to clients, which covers the point about withdrawal of service. It tweeted a similar warning.

Here I should probably draw attention to my specific interest as a director of the London Stock Exchange. I know that a close eye has been kept on the situation, looking at additional analysis, possible additional monitoring and scenarios that could arise within our markets, and having discussions with the FCA, but that is all work in progress.

A lot of people seem to consider short selling fundamentally evil, but it is really just like ordering a book from a bookseller, paying for it, and getting it later when the seller has purchased it from the publisher. That is okay if you know there is a book and a publisher and you have not already been told that it is sold out. It is not okay when there is no book, and so on. That is the distinction between naked short selling, when you do not know whether the book is there, and having identified that you can actually get your hands on the book to fulfil the order. Broadly speaking, I am not sure that a huge overhaul of short selling needs to be looked at. If all these things are to be looked at, it probably needs to go beyond what is in the short selling regulation and look at how execution has to happen as well.

[Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con) [V]]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to take part in day five of Committee of the Financial Services Bill. In doing so, I declare my interests as set out in the register.

I was keen to speak to the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering—and have put my name to it—mainly because of the reasons set out by my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. That is, given the position we are now in with financial services, it seems opportune to review this practice. In saying that, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, that it makes sense to see this as part of a wider review of a number of other market practices. Indeed, it reflects an earlier amendment that I put forward on day one on the opportune moment to review all our financial services regulations and regulators’ rules, given that our situation is so fundamentally different from what it was a matter of weeks ago.

On short selling, it is important to understand the difference between different markets, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, eloquently set out. It is important for that to be understood, not least as a number of people’s understanding of short selling will have been informed by the earlier situation with GameStop on the exchange in the United States and the excellent film “The Big Short”—excellent unless you happen to be on the wrong end of that practice. However, it is different in different jurisdictions. Which jurisdictions would the Minister look at in considering potential better practices around the world? Would she also see this as a positive, opportune step to take as part of a wider review of all financial services regulations and the rules of our regulators?

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This may or may not be an appropriate amendment for this Bill, but I would welcome the Minister’s thoughts on the issue that I have raised and what might be done to address such conflicts.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I have some sympathy with the motivation for this amendment concerning co-ordination of regulators and combined regulatory agendas. Of course, there is already an MoU between the PRA and the FCA about modes of co-operation, who leads on which issues, and how to escalate to the two CEOs to resolve. I took the opportunity to remind myself of it; it is only an agreement to consult on deliberations that are equally relevant to both regulators’ objectives or which might have a material effect on the others’ objectives. Senior executives have discussions every quarter and report to their respective boards. It is perhaps disappointing that it does not contain more. It reminded me that it can be hard to force independent regulators to co-operate, especially at the moment that they are created. They fiercely guard their independence, not just wanting to do things their own way but vehement that they are obliged to do so.

In the EU, my committee insisted that there be a joint committee of the three regulators; we got it into legislation, albeit in a very sketchy form, with the intention that they got together to thrash out different positions. However, in that, they stayed as equals and there was no overarching power, rather as it is in the MoU between the PRA and the FCA. I can tell you that the regulators did not like the idea. When they came to committee hearings, we had to keep asking whether they had met yet. The answer was that they were concentrating on their own set-up and procedures first. Eventually, there came to be a few problems and, as happened back then in the EU, the Parliament was seen as part of the solution. So, they came to me, discovered that I knew all about this since industry had alerted me as well, and, after a chat and—perhaps—a bit of pressure, I remember saying that that was why we had invented the joint committee and kept asking about it. Slowly, they started to use it, then decided it was quite a good thing and, finally, wondered how they could ever have done without it; maybe they were also a little afraid of what Parliament might say if they did not make it work.

I have thought about that experience and whether the UK is better off with the MoU—which actually has more definition in it—or worse off because, in the end, it reinforces territories rather than being a less formal get-together. There is a problem with the proposal by the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, in that it is formalised with the Governor of the Bank of England as chair. I am not sure that establishing a pecking order as it does is the right thing, even if it does end up going back to the two CEOs, which, of course, is where the MoU takes it all to anyway. I certainly do not like it as a step towards abandoning the “twin peaks” idea.

The present Governor also has FCA experience but, in the circumstances, that might complicate matters. One thing the amendment proposes is for the joint committee to check that the MoU is working. That check is important; it will surprise nobody that, in my view, if the MoU is not working, that is just the sort of matter that Parliament should get involved with to see if it can catalyse some action. The rest of the amendment also seems to be on things Parliament should be asking about and could ask to have reports about. Although I do not think that the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, has directed attention towards the right body, he highlights some issues on which the regulators should be quizzed.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Blackwell’s Amendment 86 identifies a very real problem that has existed since the Government decided to abolish the Financial Services Authority and split responsibility for conduct and prudential regulation.

I was never in favour of splitting the FSA. It had certainly failed as a regulator, as the financial crisis laid bare, although it must be said that other regulators around the world, whether combined or separate, fared no better. The FSA had not managed to get the balance right between conduct and prudential regulation; it had an obsession with conduct matters and treating customers fairly, which often dominated its thinking, while banks in particular were allowed to run on wafer-thin capital ratios. It needed reform rather than a wrecking ball.

When they were separated by the Financial Services Act 2012, many concerns were expressed about the possibility of a lack of co-operation. As has been said, a number of mechanisms were put in place, including the statutory duty to co-operate, the memorandum of understanding and cross-membership of the boards of the PRA and the FCA. However, as my noble friend Lord Blackwell explained, it has not always worked well in practice. There are problems of overlap and overload. Some issues, such as cybersecurity, are of interest to both the PRA and the FCA. Such an overlap comes with the split between the two regulatory peaks, but often they focus on the issues in different ways, on different timescales and with different objectives. This is often inefficient from the perspective of regulated firms.

The cumulative impact of the requirements of the PRA and the FCA can lead to significant overload. There is no real prioritisation mechanism. Regulated firms can be bombarded by each regulator and, even if the individual regulator prioritises its own demands, which is not always the case, there is no real mechanism for the competing demands of the FCA and the PRA. For example, I recall in the middle of stress testing, which is led by the PRA and tends to absorb the resources of subject matter experts specialising in credit risk, the FCA produced big data demands in exactly the same area and requiring exactly the same subject matter experts. It would not have occurred to either regulator to see regulatory demands from the other regulator as more important than its own.

I support the aims of this amendment. Whether another committee would have any impact is another matter, especially if it met only once a year. We must remember that the tripartite arrangements that failed during the financial crisis looked good on paper. It was just that they were never taken seriously and were allowed to fall into disuse. The same could happen to a committee.

My noble friend might want to look at how his amendment could be improved by incorporating an element of reporting to Parliament. On the first day of Committee, we debated parliamentary accountability more widely in the context of the new rule-making powers that are being transferred to the FCA and the PRA. The new accountability arrangements, which some of us advocated, could include examining how well the regulators are working together and co-ordinating their activities; that should be strongly considered if my noble friend chooses to bring this issue back on Report.

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Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

90: After Clause 40, insert the following new Clause—
“Equivalence
The Treasury may not make an equivalence decision unless it has determined that a third country has equivalent legal and supervisory standards, and it may not make a determination based only on agreement to make reciprocal determinations.”Member’s explanatory statement
This is a probing amendment in order to discuss equivalence determinations and processes and the role of reciprocity.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

My Lords, in moving this amendment, I shall make comments that reflect in part on EU relations and therefore on the other two amendments in this group.

As the explanatory statement says, this is a probing amendment in order to discuss equivalence determinations and processes and the role of reciprocity. The amendment states:

“The Treasury may not make an equivalence decision unless it has determined that a third country has equivalent legal and supervisory standards, and it may not make a determination based only on agreement to make reciprocal determinations.”


Broadly speaking, the first part of the amendment restates the usual equivalence requirement, and in the second part I am hoping that the Minister can explain how equivalence through trade agreements or reciprocal equivalence agreements will work. Will those mechanisms be allowed to dilute the standard set through the usual requirement?

We have heard a lot about trying to get equivalence with the EU. My position has always been that it was a remote possibility without rule taking, or dynamic alignment as it has become called. It also seems to me that the way in which the UK wants to operate, with the regulator making rules that can be flexible, makes it more difficult, or even impossible, for the EU, and maybe some other jurisdictions, to agree equivalence. That is because it ends up not being about rules—because in the UK they will be able to flex and vary—but about supervisory equivalence, or, as the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, called it, the outcomes. That is more subjective, a matter of opinion and confidence in supervisors rather than an objective analysis of rules.

This reasoning also lies behind what some noble Lords may see as my obsession with getting more information out of supervisors and for regular independent reviews. How else are we, let alone another jurisdiction, going to know what really goes on? Even less demanding jurisdictions than the EU, such as Australia, once they have set up independent scrutiny of their own regulators, may begin to wonder what they know about ours.

Our regulators will say that they have good and friendly relationships with other regulators and that they are respected and so on—all the presentations that they have repeatedly given to committees about why there would be equivalence with the EU in the end. They have been wrong so far, and I am not holding my breath. The statutory instruments currently underpinning legislation will be progressively taken away. I am sure that the EU will read these debates where the Minister has repeatedly stated how FSMA will enable rules to change quickly and be made bespoke and that is why Parliament cannot be let in too much. One hopes that means that rules will change to close gaps and adapt to new types of business, but there is nothing anywhere that says that. It can easily be interpreted as an intention to ease here and there, just like the tailor if we eat a little too much.

I am not trying to be awkward. I have sat in discussions with the European Commission at a time when my committee was concerned that the EU was being too rigid on equivalence. I have had to explain that equivalence was sometimes—in fact, quite often—of mutual benefit. That instinct to have things fixed and controlled between member states ran through every piece of legislation in one never-ending grind, as elaborated correctly by the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, on the previous amendment, although we may come from opposite positions. Such an instinct is stronger in financial services than in any other sector because of the philosophical commitment to the euro, whether or not that is relevant. Yet, somehow, it is still hoped that the EU can work out how to deal with this squidgy balloon that defines UK financial services rules. All I am saying is that we have to recognise that if we want the squidgy balloon way and the outcomes way, there are consequences when it comes to equivalence decisions.

That is looking at it from the outside. The other side of it is the inside. What are our rules and supervisory standards that other countries will have to be equivalent to? How is that judgment to be made? Will it be a rule book by rule book comparison or will it really be mutual recognition of supervisors, and if so, based on what? How will that assessment be done? Will HMT agree reciprocal equivalence with anyone when it sees an opportunity for export of financial services and assumes that not much will be incoming back to the UK, or will UK standards be lowered to match those of incoming equivalent businesses from the third country? Will UK firms be allowed to drop standards when operating overseas? To come back to my amendment, will the Government allow weaker standards, through trade agreements and reciprocal equivalence agreements, and how will consumers and financial stability be protected?

The example of software being allowed for capital is a convenient one, although there are probably bigger things. I kept that out of EU legislation but the UK could not hold the line on that this time round. The US has also allowed it. Where does that put banking equivalence for us in relation to the US and, should it ever be on offer, the EU? What top-up supervision or other requirements will go on?

It will be clear that I am less obsessed by getting reports on the EU situation as required by Amendments 100 and 105—although I will happily read them and wonder what is new. I am more obsessed with what standard is really being required by the UK of other jurisdictions to permit equivalence by any route and, in turn, how that will reflect back into our own supervisory standards. I beg to move.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I have Amendment 105 in this group, which is also a probing amendment, and seeks to insert a new clause in the Bill about regulatory co-operation with the EU. In her Amendment 90 the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, called for actions. Amendment 105, as the explanatory statement makes clear, is a reporting mechanism to report on progress towards or completion of an MoU with the EU on regular co-operation measures, which were envisaged under the trade and co-operation agreement between the UK and EU as regards financial services. The amendment flows from my chairmanship of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee of your Lordships’ House.

Last autumn, the committee considered a number of statutory instruments, which have granted equivalence to oversight and regulatory arrangements in the EU in the area of financial services. Mostly they were laid by the Treasury but some were laid by another departments. It was not clear to our committee whether the SIs were all part of a potential agreement with the EU or whether they were unilateral individual decisions. We wrote to John Glen, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, as follows:

“Equivalence in relation to the regulation of financial services is an important aspect of our future relationship with the EU. In several of the instruments that we have considered, the UK appears to have granted equivalence indefinitely, while the EU has not yet completed its assessment of the UK’s equivalence (for example in relation to the regulatory regime for auditors) or has granted only time-limited equivalence (for example limited to 18 months in the case of the supervisory arrangements for central counterparties).”


Against this background, we asked for further and better particulars on three points:

“A list of the equivalence decisions made by the UK Government in the different areas of financial services regulation. Whether the EU has reciprocated and granted equivalence to the UK and its regulatory arrangements in these areas. Whether equivalence by the UK and EU has been granted indefinitely or is time limited.”


The reply on 7 January, which I referred to in my speech at Second Reading, was not a model of clarity and precision. Phrases like

“a package of equivalence decisions”

and “the majority of decisions” do not help critical analysis. The correspondence between the noble Lord, Lord Butler, and my noble friend Lord Agnew at Second Reading, which followed this and circulated among all who participated in that debate, seemed to follow the same generalist approach.

However, John Glen’s letter did make one thing clear, that

“there are no decisions made by the EU that have not been reciprocated by the UK.”

As such, to date, it has been a one-way street. That is not necessarily a bad thing, but Parliament and the country are entitled to, and should, know about the development of our relationship with this most significant and geographically proximate market in a sector of particular importance to the United Kingdom—hence my tabling this amendment.

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[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, I hope that my response to this debate has indicated that, of course, we regard mutual determinations of equivalence as desirable. However, I have also made it clear that there is advantage to both the UK and the EU in our adopting an autonomous position to take decisions for ourselves in this area. Of course, I am hopeful that our discussions with the EU will progress in a helpful way, and I assure my noble friend that, as soon as I have news that I can vouchsafe to him and other noble Lords, I shall certainly do so.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for what has turned out to be a very interesting debate. For once, the crafting of my probing amendment produced exactly the responses that I was hoping to obtain. Here is the thing: in many respects, I can agree with everybody, even though noble Lords were obviously coming from different positions.

The noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Noakes and Lady Neville-Rolfe, think that we just have to get on and plough our own furrow. The Minister has said that that is essentially what we are doing, but we are maintaining the hope or ambition that the EU will, one day, come round and finally realise that there is mutual advantage in equivalence decisions or whatever one wants to call them. In my opening speech, I said that I had sometimes failed to persuade it of that, and, ultimately, we already see the pattern: once it realises it needs it, we will get it, but not before. It will not concede a general mutual benefit, which is one of the big differences between the UK and the EU. I fully support the line that the UK is taking, which is to be open and to show that openness works. There lies the power of London—and common law has a hand in it as well.

The Minister has been clear. On the adoption of the squidgy balloon, as I termed it, I did not mean that in a disrespectful way; I was just trying to say that the EU looks for something concrete, and we have a squidgy balloon, although the outcome might end up being around the same. It has difficulty with that, but we are proceeding with the squidgy balloon, and, therefore, we will have to take in our stride whether we get equivalence or not. I think that that is what the Minister has said, quite fairly and clearly.

However, he has confirmed that standards will be maintained. I knew that I was broadly quoting from guidelines in the first part of my amendment; that was not a happy accident. However, there was confirmation that there will always be this looking at the outcomes and what is supporting that, which applies no matter the route we take to equivalence or whatever else it is called—as the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, explained, there are various routes to achieving the mutual recognition, however it comes about.

From my perspective, this has ended up being quite a satisfactory debate—probably nobody is happy, but we are where we are. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 90 withdrawn.